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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8302625#3_12745569
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/91857.htm
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
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Leaders for the cause of independence wanted to make certain that they had sufficient congressional support before they would bring the issue to the vote. On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee introduced a motion in Congress to declare independence. Other members of Congress were amenable but thought some colonies not quite ready. However, Congress did form a committee to draft a declaration of independence and assigned this duty to Thomas Jefferson. Benjamin Franklin and John Adams reviewed Jefferson's draft. They preserved its original form, but struck passages likely to meet with controversy or skepticism, most notably passages blaming King George III for the transatlantic slave trade and those blaming the British people rather than their government. The committee presented the final draft before Congress on June 28, and Congress adopted the final text of the Declaration of Independence on July 4. The British Government did its best to dismiss the Declaration as a trivial document issued by disgruntled colonists. British officials commissioned propagandists to highlight the declaration's flaws and rebut the colonists' complaints. The Declaration divided British domestic opposition, as some American sympathizers thought the Declaration had gone too far, although in British-ruled Ireland it had many supporters.
| 2,844 | 4,174 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8302625#4_12747209
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/91857.htm
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
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They preserved its original form, but struck passages likely to meet with controversy or skepticism, most notably passages blaming King George III for the transatlantic slave trade and those blaming the British people rather than their government. The committee presented the final draft before Congress on June 28, and Congress adopted the final text of the Declaration of Independence on July 4. The British Government did its best to dismiss the Declaration as a trivial document issued by disgruntled colonists. British officials commissioned propagandists to highlight the declaration's flaws and rebut the colonists' complaints. The Declaration divided British domestic opposition, as some American sympathizers thought the Declaration had gone too far, although in British-ruled Ireland it had many supporters. The Declaration's most important diplomatic effect was to allow for official recognition of the United States by friendly foreign governments. The first to do so was the Kingdom of Morocco. Most European governments held back to avoid provoking British displeasure. Congress would have to wait until the 1778 Treaty of Alliance for the French Government to recognize the Declaration. The Netherlands acknowledged U.S. independence in 1782.
| 3,357 | 4,614 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8302625#5_12748776
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/91857.htm
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
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The Declaration's most important diplomatic effect was to allow for official recognition of the United States by friendly foreign governments. The first to do so was the Kingdom of Morocco. Most European governments held back to avoid provoking British displeasure. Congress would have to wait until the 1778 Treaty of Alliance for the French Government to recognize the Declaration. The Netherlands acknowledged U.S. independence in 1782. Although Spain joined the war against Great Britain in 1779, it did not recognize U.S. independence until the 1783 Treaty of Paris. Under the terms of the treaty, which ended the War of the American Revolution, Great Britain officially acknowledged the United States as a sovereign and independent nation.
| 4,174 | 4,920 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8307845#0_12749831
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90614.htm
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French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
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French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
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French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
The French and Indian War was the North American conflict that was part of a larger imperial conflict between Great Britain and France known as the Seven Years' War. The French and Indian War began in 1754 and ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The war provided Great Britain enormous territorial gains in North America, but disputes over subsequent frontier policy and paying the war's expenses led to colonial discontent, and ultimately to the American revolution. The French and Indian War resulted from ongoing frontier tensions in North America as both French and British imperial officials and colonists sought to extend each country's sphere of influence in frontier regions. In North America, the war pitted France, French colonists, and their Native allies against Great Britain, the Anglo-American colonists and the Iroquois Confederacy, which controlled most of upstate New York and parts of northern Pennsylvania. In 1753, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Great Britain controlled the 13 colonies up to the Appalachian Mountains, but beyond lay New France, a very large, sparsely settled colony that stretched from Louisiana through the Mississippi Valley and Great Lakes to Canada. ( See Incidents Leading up to the French and Indian War and Albany Plan)
The border between French and British possessions was not well defined, and one disputed territory was the upper Ohio River valley. The French had constructed a number of forts in this region in an attempt to strengthen their claim on the territory. British colonial forces, led by lieutenant colonel George Washington, attempted to expel the French in 1754, but were outnumbered and defeated by the French. When news of Washington's failure reached British Prime Minister Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle, he called for a quick undeclared retaliatory strike.
| 0 | 1,972 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8307845#1_12752179
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90614.htm
|
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
|
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
|
In 1753, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Great Britain controlled the 13 colonies up to the Appalachian Mountains, but beyond lay New France, a very large, sparsely settled colony that stretched from Louisiana through the Mississippi Valley and Great Lakes to Canada. ( See Incidents Leading up to the French and Indian War and Albany Plan)
The border between French and British possessions was not well defined, and one disputed territory was the upper Ohio River valley. The French had constructed a number of forts in this region in an attempt to strengthen their claim on the territory. British colonial forces, led by lieutenant colonel George Washington, attempted to expel the French in 1754, but were outnumbered and defeated by the French. When news of Washington's failure reached British Prime Minister Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle, he called for a quick undeclared retaliatory strike. However, his adversaries in the Cabinet outmaneuvered him by making the plans public, thus alerting the French Government and escalating a distant frontier skirmish into a full-scale war. The war did not begin well for the British. The British Government sent General Edward Braddock to the colonies as commander in chief of British North American forces, but he alienated potential Indian allies and colonial leaders failed to cooperate with him. On July 13, 1755 Braddock himself died while on a failed expedition to capture Fort Duquesne in present-day Pittsburgh, after being mortally wounded in an ambush. The war in North America settled into a stalemate for the next several years, while in Europe the French scored an important naval victory and captured the British possession of Minorca in the Mediterranean in 1756.
| 1,060 | 2,799 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8307845#2_12754266
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90614.htm
|
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
|
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
|
However, his adversaries in the Cabinet outmaneuvered him by making the plans public, thus alerting the French Government and escalating a distant frontier skirmish into a full-scale war. The war did not begin well for the British. The British Government sent General Edward Braddock to the colonies as commander in chief of British North American forces, but he alienated potential Indian allies and colonial leaders failed to cooperate with him. On July 13, 1755 Braddock himself died while on a failed expedition to capture Fort Duquesne in present-day Pittsburgh, after being mortally wounded in an ambush. The war in North America settled into a stalemate for the next several years, while in Europe the French scored an important naval victory and captured the British possession of Minorca in the Mediterranean in 1756. However, after 1757 the war began to turn in favor of Great Britain. British forces defeated French forces in India, and in 1759 British armies invaded and conquered Canada. Facing defeat in North America and a tenuous position in Europe, the French Government attempted to engage the British in peace negotiations, but British minister William Pitt (the elder), Secretary for Southern Affairs, sought not only the French cession of Canada but also commercial concessions that the French Government found unacceptable. After these negotiations failed, Spanish King Charles III offered to come to the aid of his cousin, French King Louis XV, and their representatives signed an alliance known as the Family Compact on August 15, 1761. The terms of the agreement stated that Spain would declare war on Great Britain if the war did not end before May 1, 1762.
| 1,973 | 3,656 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8307845#3_12756295
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90614.htm
|
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
|
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
|
However, after 1757 the war began to turn in favor of Great Britain. British forces defeated French forces in India, and in 1759 British armies invaded and conquered Canada. Facing defeat in North America and a tenuous position in Europe, the French Government attempted to engage the British in peace negotiations, but British minister William Pitt (the elder), Secretary for Southern Affairs, sought not only the French cession of Canada but also commercial concessions that the French Government found unacceptable. After these negotiations failed, Spanish King Charles III offered to come to the aid of his cousin, French King Louis XV, and their representatives signed an alliance known as the Family Compact on August 15, 1761. The terms of the agreement stated that Spain would declare war on Great Britain if the war did not end before May 1, 1762. Originally intended to pressure the British into a peace agreement, the Family Compact ultimately reinvigorated the French will to continue the war, and caused the British Government to declare war on Spain on January 4, 1762 after bitter infighting between King George III's ministers. Despite facing such a formidable alliance, British naval strength and Spanish ineffectiveness led to British success. British forces seized French Caribbean islands, Spanish Cuba, and the Philippines. Fighting in Europe ended after a failed Spanish invasion of British ally Portugal. By 1763, French and Spanish diplomats began to seek peace.
| 2,800 | 4,286 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8307845#4_12758127
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90614.htm
|
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
|
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
French and Indian War/Seven Years' War, 1754-1763
|
Originally intended to pressure the British into a peace agreement, the Family Compact ultimately reinvigorated the French will to continue the war, and caused the British Government to declare war on Spain on January 4, 1762 after bitter infighting between King George III's ministers. Despite facing such a formidable alliance, British naval strength and Spanish ineffectiveness led to British success. British forces seized French Caribbean islands, Spanish Cuba, and the Philippines. Fighting in Europe ended after a failed Spanish invasion of British ally Portugal. By 1763, French and Spanish diplomats began to seek peace. In the resulting Treaty of Paris (1763), Great Britain secured significant territorial gains, including all French territory east of the Mississippi river, as well as Spanish Florida, although the treaty returned Cuba to Spain. Unfortunately for the British, the fruits of victory brought seeds of future trouble with Great Britain's American colonies. The war had been enormously expensive, and the British government's attempts to impose taxes on colonists to help cover these expenses resulted in increasing colonial resentment of British attempts to expand imperial authority in the colonies. British attempts to limit western expansion by colonists and inadvertent provocation of a major Indian war further angered the British subjects living in the American colonies. These disputes would ultimately spur colonial rebellion that eventually developed into a full-scale war for independence.
| 3,657 | 5,182 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8313358#0_12759998
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90615.htm
|
Treaty of Paris, 1763
|
Treaty of Paris, 1763
Treaty of Paris, 1763
|
Treaty of Paris, 1763
Treaty of Paris, 1763
The Treaty of Paris of 1763 ended the French and Indian War/Seven Years' War between Great Britain and France, as well as their respective allies. In the terms of the treaty, France gave up all its territories in mainland North America, effectively ending any foreign military threat to the British colonies there. During the war, British forces had scored important overseas victories against France: not only had the British conquered French Canada, they also won victories in India, and captured French island colonies in the Caribbean. In March of 1762, French King Louis XV issued a formal call for peace talks. The British Government was also interested in ending the war�the Seven Years' War had been enormously expensive, and the Government had had to finance the war with debt. Creditors were beginning to doubt Great Britain's ability to pay back the loans it had floated on financial markets. In addition, British King George II had died in 1760, and his successor George III was more amenable to ending the war. Initial attempts at negotiating a peace settlement failed, and instead French and Spanish diplomats signed the Family Compact, a treaty that brought Spain into the war against Britain. British Prime Minister Lord Bute continued secret and informal talks with French diplomat Etienne-Fran�ois de Stainville, duc de Choiseul, and they came to an unofficial agreement in June, 1762.
| 0 | 1,476 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8313358#1_12761774
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90615.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
Treaty of Paris, 1763
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The British Government was also interested in ending the war�the Seven Years' War had been enormously expensive, and the Government had had to finance the war with debt. Creditors were beginning to doubt Great Britain's ability to pay back the loans it had floated on financial markets. In addition, British King George II had died in 1760, and his successor George III was more amenable to ending the war. Initial attempts at negotiating a peace settlement failed, and instead French and Spanish diplomats signed the Family Compact, a treaty that brought Spain into the war against Britain. British Prime Minister Lord Bute continued secret and informal talks with French diplomat Etienne-Fran�ois de Stainville, duc de Choiseul, and they came to an unofficial agreement in June, 1762. Bute promised fairly generous terms, and the two countries agreed to an exchange of ambassadors in September. By the time the formal negotiations began, the situation had changed. News had reached Europe of the British capture of Havana, and with it the Spanish colony of Cuba. Spanish King Charles III refused to agree to a treaty that would require Spain to cede Cuba, but the British Parliament would never ratify a treaty that did not reflect British territorial gains made during the war. Facing this dilemma, French negotiator Choiseul proposed a solution that redistributed American territory between France, Spain and Great Britain.
| 689 | 2,117 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8313358#2_12763472
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90615.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
Treaty of Paris, 1763
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Bute promised fairly generous terms, and the two countries agreed to an exchange of ambassadors in September. By the time the formal negotiations began, the situation had changed. News had reached Europe of the British capture of Havana, and with it the Spanish colony of Cuba. Spanish King Charles III refused to agree to a treaty that would require Spain to cede Cuba, but the British Parliament would never ratify a treaty that did not reflect British territorial gains made during the war. Facing this dilemma, French negotiator Choiseul proposed a solution that redistributed American territory between France, Spain and Great Britain. Under Choiseul's plan, Britain would gain all French territory east of the Mississippi, while Spain would retain Cuba in exchange for handing Florida over to Great Britain. French territories west of Mississippi would become Spanish, along with the port of New Orleans. In return for these cessions, along with territory in India, Africa, and the Mediterranean island of Minorca, France would regain the Caribbean islands that British forces had captured during the war. The British Government also promised to allow French Canadians to freely practice Catholicism and provided for French fishing rights off Newfoundland. Choiseul preferred to keep the small Caribbean islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Lucia rather than hold on to the vast territory stretching from Louisiana to Canada.
| 1,477 | 2,914 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8313358#3_12765171
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90615.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
Treaty of Paris, 1763
|
Under Choiseul's plan, Britain would gain all French territory east of the Mississippi, while Spain would retain Cuba in exchange for handing Florida over to Great Britain. French territories west of Mississippi would become Spanish, along with the port of New Orleans. In return for these cessions, along with territory in India, Africa, and the Mediterranean island of Minorca, France would regain the Caribbean islands that British forces had captured during the war. The British Government also promised to allow French Canadians to freely practice Catholicism and provided for French fishing rights off Newfoundland. Choiseul preferred to keep the small Caribbean islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Lucia rather than hold on to the vast territory stretching from Louisiana to Canada. This decision was motivated by the fact that the islands' sugar industry was enormously profitable. In contrast, Canada had been a drain on the French treasury. The loss of Canada, while lamentable to French officials, made sense from a mercantile perspective. The diplomats completed their negotiations and signed the preliminary Treaty of Paris on November 3, 1762. Spanish and French negotiators also signed the Treaty of San Ildefonso at the same time, which confirmed the cession of French Louisiana to Spain.
| 2,118 | 3,429 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8313358#4_12766744
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90615.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
Treaty of Paris, 1763
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This decision was motivated by the fact that the islands' sugar industry was enormously profitable. In contrast, Canada had been a drain on the French treasury. The loss of Canada, while lamentable to French officials, made sense from a mercantile perspective. The diplomats completed their negotiations and signed the preliminary Treaty of Paris on November 3, 1762. Spanish and French negotiators also signed the Treaty of San Ildefonso at the same time, which confirmed the cession of French Louisiana to Spain. Although British King George III and his ministers were in favor of the treaty, it was unpopular with the British public. However, the treaty contained enough concessions to war hawks that the British Parliament ratified the Treaty of Paris by a majority of 319 to 64, and the treaty went into effect on February 10, 1763. For Anglo-American colonists, the treaty was a theoretical success. By confirming the conquest of Canada and extending British possessions to the Mississippi, the colonists no longer had to worry about the threat of a French invasion. For the American Indians in what had been frontier territory, the treaty proved disastrous�they could no longer pursue what had been a largely effective strategy of playing the French and British against each other to extract the most favorable terms of alliance and preserve their lands against encroachment by Anglo-American colonists.
| 2,915 | 4,325 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8313358#5_12768421
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90615.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
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Treaty of Paris, 1763
Treaty of Paris, 1763
|
Although British King George III and his ministers were in favor of the treaty, it was unpopular with the British public. However, the treaty contained enough concessions to war hawks that the British Parliament ratified the Treaty of Paris by a majority of 319 to 64, and the treaty went into effect on February 10, 1763. For Anglo-American colonists, the treaty was a theoretical success. By confirming the conquest of Canada and extending British possessions to the Mississippi, the colonists no longer had to worry about the threat of a French invasion. For the American Indians in what had been frontier territory, the treaty proved disastrous�they could no longer pursue what had been a largely effective strategy of playing the French and British against each other to extract the most favorable terms of alliance and preserve their lands against encroachment by Anglo-American colonists. Despite what seemed like a success, the Treaty of Paris ultimately encouraged dissension between Anglo-American colonists and the British Government because their interests in North America no longer coincided. The British Government no longer wanted to maintain an expensive military presence, and its attempts to manage a post-treaty frontier policy that would balance colonists' and Indians' interests would prove ineffective and even counterproductive. Coupled with differences between the imperial government and colonists on how to levy taxes to pay for debts on wartime expenses, the Treaty of Paris ultimately set the colonists on the path towards seeking independence, even as it seemed to make the British Empire stronger than ever. ( see Parliamentary Taxation of Colonies)
| 3,429 | 5,109 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8318733#0_12770368
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102468.htm
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations to provide collective security against the Soviet Union. NATO was the first peacetime military alliance the United States entered into outside of the Western Hemisphere. After the destruction of the Second World War, the nations of Europe struggled to rebuild their economies and ensure their security. The former required a massive influx of aid to help the war-torn landscapes re-establish industries and produce food, and the latter required assurances against a resurgent Germany or incursions from the Soviet Union. The United States viewed an economically strong, rearmed, and integrated Europe as vital to the prevention of communist expansion across the continent. As a result, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a program of large-scale economic aid to Europe. The resulting European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, not only facilitated European economic integration but promoted the idea of shared interests and cooperation between the United States and Europe. Soviet refusal either to participate in the Marshall Plan or to allow its satellite states in Eastern Europe to accept the economic assistance helped to reinforce the growing division between east and west in Europe. In 1947-1948, a series of events caused the nations of Western Europe to become concerned about their physical and political security and the United States to become more closely involved with European affairs. The ongoing civil war in Greece, along with tensions in Turkey, led President Harry S. Truman to assert that the United States would provide economic and military aid to both countries, as well as to any other nation struggling against an attempt at subjugation.
| 0 | 1,926 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8318733#1_12772664
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102468.htm
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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As a result, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a program of large-scale economic aid to Europe. The resulting European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, not only facilitated European economic integration but promoted the idea of shared interests and cooperation between the United States and Europe. Soviet refusal either to participate in the Marshall Plan or to allow its satellite states in Eastern Europe to accept the economic assistance helped to reinforce the growing division between east and west in Europe. In 1947-1948, a series of events caused the nations of Western Europe to become concerned about their physical and political security and the United States to become more closely involved with European affairs. The ongoing civil war in Greece, along with tensions in Turkey, led President Harry S. Truman to assert that the United States would provide economic and military aid to both countries, as well as to any other nation struggling against an attempt at subjugation. A Soviet-sponsored coup in Czechoslovakia resulted in a communist government coming to power on the borders of Germany. Attention also focused on elections in Italy as the communist party had made significant gains among Italian voters. Furthermore, events in Germany also caused concern. The occupation and governance of Germany after the war had long been disputed, and in mid-1948, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin chose to test Western resolve by implementing a blockade against West Berlin, which was then under joint U.S., British, and French control but surrounded by Soviet-controlled East Germany. This Berlin Crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of conflict, although a massive airlift to resupply the city for the duration of the blockade helped to prevent an outright confrontation.
| 924 | 2,747 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8318733#2_12774828
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102468.htm
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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A Soviet-sponsored coup in Czechoslovakia resulted in a communist government coming to power on the borders of Germany. Attention also focused on elections in Italy as the communist party had made significant gains among Italian voters. Furthermore, events in Germany also caused concern. The occupation and governance of Germany after the war had long been disputed, and in mid-1948, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin chose to test Western resolve by implementing a blockade against West Berlin, which was then under joint U.S., British, and French control but surrounded by Soviet-controlled East Germany. This Berlin Crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of conflict, although a massive airlift to resupply the city for the duration of the blockade helped to prevent an outright confrontation. These events caused U.S. officials to grow increasingly wary of the possibility that the countries of Western Europe might deal with their security concerns by negotiating with the Soviets. To counter this possible turn of events, the Truman Administration considered the possibility of forming a European-American alliance that would commit the United States to bolstering the security of Western Europe. The Western European countries were willing to consider a collective security solution. In response to increasing tensions and security concerns, representatives of several countries of Western Europe gathered together to create a military alliance. Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty in March, 1948.
| 1,927 | 3,509 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8318733#3_12776752
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102468.htm
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
|
These events caused U.S. officials to grow increasingly wary of the possibility that the countries of Western Europe might deal with their security concerns by negotiating with the Soviets. To counter this possible turn of events, the Truman Administration considered the possibility of forming a European-American alliance that would commit the United States to bolstering the security of Western Europe. The Western European countries were willing to consider a collective security solution. In response to increasing tensions and security concerns, representatives of several countries of Western Europe gathered together to create a military alliance. Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty in March, 1948. Their treaty provided collective defense; if any one of these nations was attacked, the others were bound to help defend it. At the same time, the Truman Administration instituted a peacetime draft, increased military spending, and called upon the historically isolationist Republican Congress to consider a military alliance with Europe. In May of 1948, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg proposed a resolution suggesting that the President seek a security treaty with Western Europe that would adhere to the United Nations charter but exist outside of the Security Council where the Soviet Union held veto power. The Vandenburg Resolution passed, and negotiations began for the North Atlantic Treaty.
| 2,748 | 4,217 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8318733#4_12778563
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102468.htm
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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Their treaty provided collective defense; if any one of these nations was attacked, the others were bound to help defend it. At the same time, the Truman Administration instituted a peacetime draft, increased military spending, and called upon the historically isolationist Republican Congress to consider a military alliance with Europe. In May of 1948, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg proposed a resolution suggesting that the President seek a security treaty with Western Europe that would adhere to the United Nations charter but exist outside of the Security Council where the Soviet Union held veto power. The Vandenburg Resolution passed, and negotiations began for the North Atlantic Treaty. In spite of general agreement on the concept behind the treaty, it took several months to work out the exact terms. The U.S. Congress had embraced the pursuit of the international alliance, but it remained concerned about the wording of the treaty. The nations of Western Europe wanted assurances that the United States would intervene automatically in the event of an attack, but under the U.S. Constitution the power to declare war rested with Congress. Negotiations worked toward finding language that would reassure the European states but not obligate the United States to act in a way that violated its own laws. Additionally, European contributions to collective security would require large-scale military assistance from the United States to help rebuild Western Europe's defense capabilities.
| 3,510 | 5,020 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8318733#5_12780415
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102468.htm
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
|
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
|
In spite of general agreement on the concept behind the treaty, it took several months to work out the exact terms. The U.S. Congress had embraced the pursuit of the international alliance, but it remained concerned about the wording of the treaty. The nations of Western Europe wanted assurances that the United States would intervene automatically in the event of an attack, but under the U.S. Constitution the power to declare war rested with Congress. Negotiations worked toward finding language that would reassure the European states but not obligate the United States to act in a way that violated its own laws. Additionally, European contributions to collective security would require large-scale military assistance from the United States to help rebuild Western Europe's defense capabilities. While the European nations argued for individual grants and aid, the United States wanted to make aid conditional on regional coordination. A third issue was the question of scope. The Brussels Treaty signatories preferred that membership in the alliance be restricted to the members of that treaty plus the United States. The U.S. negotiators felt there was more to be gained from enlarging the new treaty to include the countries of the North Atlantic, including Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and Portugal. Together, these countries held territory that formed a bridge between the opposite shores of the Atlantic Ocean, which would facilitate military action if it became necessary.
| 4,217 | 5,718 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8318733#6_12782257
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102468.htm
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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While the European nations argued for individual grants and aid, the United States wanted to make aid conditional on regional coordination. A third issue was the question of scope. The Brussels Treaty signatories preferred that membership in the alliance be restricted to the members of that treaty plus the United States. The U.S. negotiators felt there was more to be gained from enlarging the new treaty to include the countries of the North Atlantic, including Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and Portugal. Together, these countries held territory that formed a bridge between the opposite shores of the Atlantic Ocean, which would facilitate military action if it became necessary. The result of these extensive negotiations was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. In this agreement, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom agreed to consider attack against one an attack against all, along with consultations about threats and defense matters. This collective defense arrangement only formally applied to attacks against the signatories that occurred in Europe or North America; it did not include conflicts in colonial territories. After the treaty was signed, a number of the signatories made requests to the United States for military aid.
| 5,021 | 6,392 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8318733#7_12783970
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102468.htm
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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The result of these extensive negotiations was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. In this agreement, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom agreed to consider attack against one an attack against all, along with consultations about threats and defense matters. This collective defense arrangement only formally applied to attacks against the signatories that occurred in Europe or North America; it did not include conflicts in colonial territories. After the treaty was signed, a number of the signatories made requests to the United States for military aid. Later in 1949, President Truman proposed a military assistance program, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program passed the U.S. Congress in October, appropriating some $1.4 billion dollars for the purpose of building Western European defenses. Soon after the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the outbreak of the Korean War led the members to move quickly to integrate and coordinate their defense forces through a centralized headquarters. The North Korean attack on South Korea was widely viewed at the time to be an example of communist aggression directed by Moscow, so the United States bolstered its troop commitments to Europe to provide assurances against Soviet aggression on the European continent. In 1952, the members agreed to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO and added the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. West German entry led the Soviet Union to retaliate with its own regional alliance, which took the form of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and included the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe as members.
| 5,718 | 7,444 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8318733#8_12786037
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102468.htm
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
|
Later in 1949, President Truman proposed a military assistance program, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program passed the U.S. Congress in October, appropriating some $1.4 billion dollars for the purpose of building Western European defenses. Soon after the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the outbreak of the Korean War led the members to move quickly to integrate and coordinate their defense forces through a centralized headquarters. The North Korean attack on South Korea was widely viewed at the time to be an example of communist aggression directed by Moscow, so the United States bolstered its troop commitments to Europe to provide assurances against Soviet aggression on the European continent. In 1952, the members agreed to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO and added the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. West German entry led the Soviet Union to retaliate with its own regional alliance, which took the form of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and included the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe as members. The collective defense arrangements in NATO served to place the whole of Western Europe under the American "nuclear umbrella." In the 1950s, one of the first military doctrines of NATO emerged in the form of "massive retaliation," or the idea that if any member was attacked, the United States would respond with a large-scale nuclear attack. The threat of this form of response was meant to serve as a deterrent against Soviet aggression on the continent. Although formed in response to the exigencies of the developing Cold War, NATO has lasted beyond the end of that conflict, with membership even expanding to include some former Soviet states. It remains the largest peacetime military alliance in the world.
| 6,393 | 8,158 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8327223#0_12788148
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/107189.htm
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
After Germany's defeat in the Second World War, the four main allies in Europe - the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France - took part in a joint occupation of the German state. With the original understanding that the country would eventually be reunified, the Allied Powers agreed to share the responsibility of administering Germany and its capital, Berlin, and each took responsibility for a certain portion of the defeated nation. This arrangement ultimately evolved into the division of Germany into a Western and an Eastern sector, thereby contributing to the Cold War division of Europe. During the Second World War, one of the major topics under discussion at conferences of the Allied leadership was how to deal with Germany after the war. Having experienced great losses as a result of German invasions in the First and Second World Wars, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin preferred that a defeated Germany be dismembered and divided so that it could not rise to its former strength to threaten European peace and security again. At the Tehran Conference between U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1943, the two countries agreed that after the war Germany would be divided and occupied jointly. At the final wartime conference between these two men at Yalta in 1945, the two powers agreed to shift the eastern border of Germany to the West, enlarging western Poland as compensation for the eastern sections of that country annexed by the Soviet Union. They also determined that the occupation would divide Germany into sections, with each Allied power taking responsibility for one section, although they would be governed as a single economic unit in anticipation of their eventual reunification. Finally, they also concluded that they would demand reparations from Germany, although they did not yet agree on exactly how much they would request. A meeting later in 1945 between Stalin and new U.S. President Harry Truman held at Potsdam confirmed and ratified these arrangements.
| 0 | 2,146 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8327223#1_12790634
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/107189.htm
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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At the Tehran Conference between U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1943, the two countries agreed that after the war Germany would be divided and occupied jointly. At the final wartime conference between these two men at Yalta in 1945, the two powers agreed to shift the eastern border of Germany to the West, enlarging western Poland as compensation for the eastern sections of that country annexed by the Soviet Union. They also determined that the occupation would divide Germany into sections, with each Allied power taking responsibility for one section, although they would be governed as a single economic unit in anticipation of their eventual reunification. Finally, they also concluded that they would demand reparations from Germany, although they did not yet agree on exactly how much they would request. A meeting later in 1945 between Stalin and new U.S. President Harry Truman held at Potsdam confirmed and ratified these arrangements. After the victory over the Axis powers, however, the wartime cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union soon faded. In reality, mutual distrust ruled the relationship between the two countries, and nowhere was this more evident than in the difficulties over the occupation of Germany. The Allies agreed to a joint occupation, with each country taking charge of a larger zone and a sector of the nation's capital, Berlin. Upon British insistence, France joined Great Britain and the United States in the occupation of West Germany and West Berlin, while the Soviet Union managed the affairs of East Germany and East Berlin. The divided Germany was weak and dependent on the allies for goods and the differing approaches of the occupying powers served to establish what would become a stark contrast between the two Germanys.
| 1,161 | 2,986 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8327223#2_12792771
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/107189.htm
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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After the victory over the Axis powers, however, the wartime cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union soon faded. In reality, mutual distrust ruled the relationship between the two countries, and nowhere was this more evident than in the difficulties over the occupation of Germany. The Allies agreed to a joint occupation, with each country taking charge of a larger zone and a sector of the nation's capital, Berlin. Upon British insistence, France joined Great Britain and the United States in the occupation of West Germany and West Berlin, while the Soviet Union managed the affairs of East Germany and East Berlin. The divided Germany was weak and dependent on the allies for goods and the differing approaches of the occupying powers served to establish what would become a stark contrast between the two Germanys. The Soviet Union stripped its sector of manufacturing equipment in an effort to garner partial payment for wartime remittances, further stifling the reemergence of a strong German economy. In the western sector, military leaders from the United States soon grew concerned about the economic costs of a Germany completely dependent on the United States, and the United States began investing in German industries. In 1946, the United States and Great Britain merged their occupation zones, and in 1947 the U.S. Government began a massive aid program under the Marshall Plan, which pumped dollars and goods into Europe to aid in recovery. The Soviet Union prevented the countries along the Soviet border in Eastern Europe, many of which had experienced the rise of communist leadership in the wake of the war, from taking part in the arrangement. Instead it offered the Soviet Union offered its own postwar program for economic aid.
| 2,146 | 3,917 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8327223#3_12794853
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/107189.htm
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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The Soviet Union stripped its sector of manufacturing equipment in an effort to garner partial payment for wartime remittances, further stifling the reemergence of a strong German economy. In the western sector, military leaders from the United States soon grew concerned about the economic costs of a Germany completely dependent on the United States, and the United States began investing in German industries. In 1946, the United States and Great Britain merged their occupation zones, and in 1947 the U.S. Government began a massive aid program under the Marshall Plan, which pumped dollars and goods into Europe to aid in recovery. The Soviet Union prevented the countries along the Soviet border in Eastern Europe, many of which had experienced the rise of communist leadership in the wake of the war, from taking part in the arrangement. Instead it offered the Soviet Union offered its own postwar program for economic aid. By 1948, the Western Allies began the project of pulling their occupation zones together for the sake of rebuilding - a project that the Soviet Union, still worried about a Germany threat to its security, wished to prevent. Although the Western Allies made frequent suggestions for the terms under which the country might be reunified, usually involving the introduction of free and democratic elections and German autonomy for conducting its own foreign policy. These proposals were never made in terms that the Soviet Union would consider accepting, so the continued division of the country was in many ways inevitable. In June 1948, the Soviet Union took action against the West's policies by blocking all road access between West Germany and West Berlin, effectively cutting off the city's occupation zones from the British, French, and American forces responsible for maintaining them. The administrators of the western zones had no agreement with the Soviet Union that required the latter to allow ground access to the city through Eastern Germany, but they did have an agreement on air access.
| 2,987 | 5,018 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8327223#4_12797196
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/107189.htm
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
|
Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
|
By 1948, the Western Allies began the project of pulling their occupation zones together for the sake of rebuilding - a project that the Soviet Union, still worried about a Germany threat to its security, wished to prevent. Although the Western Allies made frequent suggestions for the terms under which the country might be reunified, usually involving the introduction of free and democratic elections and German autonomy for conducting its own foreign policy. These proposals were never made in terms that the Soviet Union would consider accepting, so the continued division of the country was in many ways inevitable. In June 1948, the Soviet Union took action against the West's policies by blocking all road access between West Germany and West Berlin, effectively cutting off the city's occupation zones from the British, French, and American forces responsible for maintaining them. The administrators of the western zones had no agreement with the Soviet Union that required the latter to allow ground access to the city through Eastern Germany, but they did have an agreement on air access. As a result, the United States began an airlift of supplies to the stranded citizens of West Berlin. Over the course of the next eleven months of the blockade, the Americans, assisted by the British and the French, supplied West Berlin entirely by air, landing planes filled with food, clothing, and coal for heat nearly every minute. Because it was a mild winter, they were able to keep ahead of the city's requirements, and the extraordinary accomplishments of the Berlin Airlift became an early propaganda success for the West in the emerging Cold War. After nearly a year, the Soviet Union lifted the blockade, making it once again possible to supply West Berlin overland. The blockade and airlift contributed to cementing the division of Germany and Europe into East and West.
| 3,917 | 5,800 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8327223#5_12799390
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/107189.htm
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
|
As a result, the United States began an airlift of supplies to the stranded citizens of West Berlin. Over the course of the next eleven months of the blockade, the Americans, assisted by the British and the French, supplied West Berlin entirely by air, landing planes filled with food, clothing, and coal for heat nearly every minute. Because it was a mild winter, they were able to keep ahead of the city's requirements, and the extraordinary accomplishments of the Berlin Airlift became an early propaganda success for the West in the emerging Cold War. After nearly a year, the Soviet Union lifted the blockade, making it once again possible to supply West Berlin overland. The blockade and airlift contributed to cementing the division of Germany and Europe into East and West. The Soviet Union was not alone in worrying over the threat to European security that could come of a revitalized Germany. Countries to the west, including France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg, were also wary and preferred a neutral and demilitarized Germany. To address these concerns, the British proposed a collective security arrangement that would include these nations, plus Britain, West Germany and the United States. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formally established in 1949. In 1949, the occupying powers in both East and West Germany replaced their military governors with civilian leaders, and the occupations ended officially in the mid-1950s.
| 5,019 | 6,480 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8327223#6_12801163
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/107189.htm
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
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Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-52
|
The Soviet Union was not alone in worrying over the threat to European security that could come of a revitalized Germany. Countries to the west, including France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg, were also wary and preferred a neutral and demilitarized Germany. To address these concerns, the British proposed a collective security arrangement that would include these nations, plus Britain, West Germany and the United States. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formally established in 1949. In 1949, the occupying powers in both East and West Germany replaced their military governors with civilian leaders, and the occupations ended officially in the mid-1950s. Even so, both sides retained a strong interest in Germany, and the country and its capital remained divided throughout the Cold War. Reunification finally took place in October of 1990.
| 5,800 | 6,666 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8334186#0_12802340
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/88312.htm
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
On October 1, 1949, Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong declared the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The announcement ended the costly full-scale civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), which broke out immediately following World War II and had been preceded by on and off conflict between the two sides since the 1920's. The creation of the PRC also completed the long process of governmental upheaval in China begun by the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The "fall" of mainland China to communism in 1949 led the United States to suspend diplomatic ties with the PRC for decades. The Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921 in Shanghai, originally existed as a study group working within the confines of the First United Front with the Nationalist Party. Chinese Communists joined with the Nationalist Army in the Northern Expedition of 1926-27 to rid the nation of the warlords that prevented the formation of a strong central government. This collaboration lasted until the "White Terror" of 1927, when the Nationalists turned on the Communists, killing them or purging them from the party. After the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931, the Government of the Republic of China (ROC) faced the triple threat of Japanese invasion, Communist uprising, and warlord insurrections. Frustrated by the focus of the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek on internal threats instead of the Japanese assault, a group of generals abducted Chiang in 1937 and forced him to reconsider cooperation with the Communist army. As with the first effort at cooperation between the Nationalist government and the CCP, this Second United Front was short-lived.
| 0 | 1,804 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8334186#1_12804466
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/88312.htm
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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Chinese Communists joined with the Nationalist Army in the Northern Expedition of 1926-27 to rid the nation of the warlords that prevented the formation of a strong central government. This collaboration lasted until the "White Terror" of 1927, when the Nationalists turned on the Communists, killing them or purging them from the party. After the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931, the Government of the Republic of China (ROC) faced the triple threat of Japanese invasion, Communist uprising, and warlord insurrections. Frustrated by the focus of the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek on internal threats instead of the Japanese assault, a group of generals abducted Chiang in 1937 and forced him to reconsider cooperation with the Communist army. As with the first effort at cooperation between the Nationalist government and the CCP, this Second United Front was short-lived. The Nationalists expended needed resources on containing the Communists, rather than focusing entirely on Japan, while the Communists worked to strengthen their influence in rural society. During World War II, popular support for the Communists increased. U.S. officials in China reported a dictatorial suppression of dissent in Nationalist-controlled areas. These undemocratic polices combined with wartime corruption made the Republic of China Government vulnerable to the Communist threat. The CCP, for its part, experienced success in its early efforts at land reform and was lauded by peasants for its unflagging efforts to fight against the Japanese invaders.
| 923 | 2,470 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8334186#2_12806304
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/88312.htm
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
|
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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The Nationalists expended needed resources on containing the Communists, rather than focusing entirely on Japan, while the Communists worked to strengthen their influence in rural society. During World War II, popular support for the Communists increased. U.S. officials in China reported a dictatorial suppression of dissent in Nationalist-controlled areas. These undemocratic polices combined with wartime corruption made the Republic of China Government vulnerable to the Communist threat. The CCP, for its part, experienced success in its early efforts at land reform and was lauded by peasants for its unflagging efforts to fight against the Japanese invaders. Japanese surrender set the stage for the resurgence of civil war in China. Though only nominally democratic, the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive U.S. support both as its former war ally and as the sole option for preventing Communist control of China. U.S. forces flew tens of thousands of Nationalist Chinese troops into Japanese-controlled territory and allowed them to accept the Japanese surrender. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, occupied Manchuria and only pulled out when Chinese Communist forces were in place to claim that territory. In 1945, the leaders of the Nationalist and Communist parties, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, met for a series of talks on the formation of a post-war government.
| 1,805 | 3,205 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8334186#3_12807994
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/88312.htm
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
|
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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Japanese surrender set the stage for the resurgence of civil war in China. Though only nominally democratic, the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive U.S. support both as its former war ally and as the sole option for preventing Communist control of China. U.S. forces flew tens of thousands of Nationalist Chinese troops into Japanese-controlled territory and allowed them to accept the Japanese surrender. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, occupied Manchuria and only pulled out when Chinese Communist forces were in place to claim that territory. In 1945, the leaders of the Nationalist and Communist parties, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, met for a series of talks on the formation of a post-war government. Both agreed on the importance of democracy, a unified military, and equality for all Chinese political parties. The truce was tenuous, however, and, in spite of repeated efforts by U.S. General George Marshall to broker an agreement, by 1946 the two sides were fighting an all-out civil war. Years of mistrust between the two sides thwarted efforts to form a coalition government. As the civil war gained strength from 1947 to 1949, eventual Communist victory seemed more and more likely. Although the Communists did not hold any major cities after World War II, they had strong grassroots support, superior military organization and morale, and large stocks of weapons seized from Japanese supplies in Manchuria.
| 2,470 | 3,919 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8334186#4_12809732
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/88312.htm
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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Both agreed on the importance of democracy, a unified military, and equality for all Chinese political parties. The truce was tenuous, however, and, in spite of repeated efforts by U.S. General George Marshall to broker an agreement, by 1946 the two sides were fighting an all-out civil war. Years of mistrust between the two sides thwarted efforts to form a coalition government. As the civil war gained strength from 1947 to 1949, eventual Communist victory seemed more and more likely. Although the Communists did not hold any major cities after World War II, they had strong grassroots support, superior military organization and morale, and large stocks of weapons seized from Japanese supplies in Manchuria. Years of corruption and mismanagement had eroded popular support for the Nationalist Government. Early in 1947, the ROC Government was already looking to the island province of Taiwan, off the coast of Fujian Province, as a potential point of retreat. Although officials in the Truman Administration were not convinced of the strategic importance to the United States of maintaining relations with Nationalist China, no one in the U.S. Government wanted to be charged with facilitating the "loss" of China to communism. Military and financial aid to the floundering Nationalists continued, though not at the level that Chiang Kai-shek would have liked. In October of 1949, after a string of military victories, Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the PRC;
| 3,206 | 4,682 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8334186#5_12811500
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/88312.htm
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
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Years of corruption and mismanagement had eroded popular support for the Nationalist Government. Early in 1947, the ROC Government was already looking to the island province of Taiwan, off the coast of Fujian Province, as a potential point of retreat. Although officials in the Truman Administration were not convinced of the strategic importance to the United States of maintaining relations with Nationalist China, no one in the U.S. Government wanted to be charged with facilitating the "loss" of China to communism. Military and financial aid to the floundering Nationalists continued, though not at the level that Chiang Kai-shek would have liked. In October of 1949, after a string of military victories, Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the PRC; Chiang and his forces fled to Taiwan to regroup and plan for their efforts to retake the mainland. The ability of the PRC and the United States to find common ground in the wake of the establishment of the new Chinese state was hampered by both domestic politics and global tensions. In August of 1949, the Truman administration published the "China White Paper," which explained past U.S. policy toward China based upon the principle that only Chinese forces could determine the outcome of their civil war. Unfortunately for Truman, this step failed to protect his administration from charges of having "lost" China. The unfinished nature of the revolution, leaving a broken and exiled but still vocal Nationalist Government and army on Taiwan, only heightened the sense among U.S. anti-communists that the outcome of the struggle could be reversed.
| 3,920 | 5,533 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8334186#6_12813409
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/88312.htm
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The Chinese Revolution of 1949
|
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
The Chinese Revolution of 1949
|
Chiang and his forces fled to Taiwan to regroup and plan for their efforts to retake the mainland. The ability of the PRC and the United States to find common ground in the wake of the establishment of the new Chinese state was hampered by both domestic politics and global tensions. In August of 1949, the Truman administration published the "China White Paper," which explained past U.S. policy toward China based upon the principle that only Chinese forces could determine the outcome of their civil war. Unfortunately for Truman, this step failed to protect his administration from charges of having "lost" China. The unfinished nature of the revolution, leaving a broken and exiled but still vocal Nationalist Government and army on Taiwan, only heightened the sense among U.S. anti-communists that the outcome of the struggle could be reversed. The outbreak of the Korean War, which pitted the PRC and the United States on opposite sides of an international conflict, ended any opportunity for accommodation between the PRC and the United States. Truman's desire to prevent the Korean conflict from spreading south led to the U.S. policy of protecting the Chiang Kai-shek government on Taiwan. For more than twenty years after the Chinese revolution of 1949, there were few contacts, limited trade and no diplomatic ties between the two countries. Until the 1970s, the United States continued to recognize the Republic of China, located on Taiwan, as China's true government and supported that government's holding the Chinese seat in the United Nations.
| 4,683 | 6,243 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8340716#0_12815263
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/16336.htm
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
During his tenure, U.S. President James K. Polk oversaw the greatest territorial expansion of the United States to date. Polk accomplished this through the annexation of Texas in 1845, the negotiation of the Oregon Treaty with Great Britain in 1846, and the conclusion of the Mexican-American War in 1848, which ended with the signing and ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848. These events brought within the control of the United States the future states of Texas, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Washington, and Oregon, as well as portions of what would later become Oklahoma, Colorado, Kansas, Wyoming, and Montana. Following Texas’ successful war of independence against Mexico in 1836, President Martin van Buren refrained from annexing Texas after the Mexicans threatened war. Accordingly, while the United States extended diplomatic recognition to Texas, it took no further action concerning annexation until 1844, when President John Tyler restarted negotiations with the Republic of Texas. His efforts culminated on April 12 in a Treaty of Annexation, an event that caused Mexico to sever diplomatic relations with United States. Tyler, however, lacked the votes in the Senate to ratify the treaty, and it was defeated by a wide margin in June. Shortly before he left office, Tyler tried again, this time through a joint resolution of both houses of Congress. With the support of President-elect Polk, Tyler managed to get the joint resolution passed on March 1, 1845, and Texas was admitted into the United States on December 29. While Mexico did not follow through with its threat to declare war if the United States annexed Texas, relations between the two nations remained tense due to Mexico’s disputed border with Texas.
| 0 | 1,994 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8340716#1_12817786
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/16336.htm
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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His efforts culminated on April 12 in a Treaty of Annexation, an event that caused Mexico to sever diplomatic relations with United States. Tyler, however, lacked the votes in the Senate to ratify the treaty, and it was defeated by a wide margin in June. Shortly before he left office, Tyler tried again, this time through a joint resolution of both houses of Congress. With the support of President-elect Polk, Tyler managed to get the joint resolution passed on March 1, 1845, and Texas was admitted into the United States on December 29. While Mexico did not follow through with its threat to declare war if the United States annexed Texas, relations between the two nations remained tense due to Mexico’s disputed border with Texas. According to the Texans, their state included significant portions of what is today New Mexico and Colorado, and the western and southern portions of Texas itself, which they claimed extended to the Rio Grande River. The Mexicans, however, argued that the border only extended to the Nueces River, several miles to the north of the Rio Grande. In July, 1845, Polk, who had been elected on a platform of expansionism, ordered the commander of the U.S. Army in Texas, Zachary Taylor, to move his forces into the disputed lands that lay between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers. In November, Polk dispatched Congressman John Slidell to Mexico with instructions to negotiate the purchase of the disputed areas along the Texas-Mexican border, and the territory comprising the present-day states of New Mexico and California. Following the failure of Slidell’s mission in May 1846, Polk used news of skirmishes between Mexican troops and Taylor’s army to gain Congressional support for a declaration of war against Mexico.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/16336.htm
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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According to the Texans, their state included significant portions of what is today New Mexico and Colorado, and the western and southern portions of Texas itself, which they claimed extended to the Rio Grande River. The Mexicans, however, argued that the border only extended to the Nueces River, several miles to the north of the Rio Grande. In July, 1845, Polk, who had been elected on a platform of expansionism, ordered the commander of the U.S. Army in Texas, Zachary Taylor, to move his forces into the disputed lands that lay between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers. In November, Polk dispatched Congressman John Slidell to Mexico with instructions to negotiate the purchase of the disputed areas along the Texas-Mexican border, and the territory comprising the present-day states of New Mexico and California. Following the failure of Slidell’s mission in May 1846, Polk used news of skirmishes between Mexican troops and Taylor’s army to gain Congressional support for a declaration of war against Mexico. The President neglected to inform Congress, however, that the Mexicans had used force only after Taylor’s troops had positioned themselves on the banks of the Rio Grande River, which was effectively Mexican territory. On May 13, 1846, the United States declared war on Mexico. Following the capture of Mexico City in September 1847, Nicholas Trist, chief clerk of the Department of State and Polk's peace emissary, began negotiations for a peace treaty with the Mexican Government under terms similar to those pursued by Slidell the previous year. Polk soon grew concerned by Trist’s conduct, however, believing that he would not press for strong enough terms from the Mexicans, and because Trist became a close friend of General Winfield Scott, a Whig who was thought to be a strong contender for his party’s presidential nomination for the 1848 election. Furthermore, the war had encouraged expansionist Democrats to call for a complete annexation of Mexico.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8340716#3_12822538
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/16336.htm
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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The President neglected to inform Congress, however, that the Mexicans had used force only after Taylor’s troops had positioned themselves on the banks of the Rio Grande River, which was effectively Mexican territory. On May 13, 1846, the United States declared war on Mexico. Following the capture of Mexico City in September 1847, Nicholas Trist, chief clerk of the Department of State and Polk's peace emissary, began negotiations for a peace treaty with the Mexican Government under terms similar to those pursued by Slidell the previous year. Polk soon grew concerned by Trist’s conduct, however, believing that he would not press for strong enough terms from the Mexicans, and because Trist became a close friend of General Winfield Scott, a Whig who was thought to be a strong contender for his party’s presidential nomination for the 1848 election. Furthermore, the war had encouraged expansionist Democrats to call for a complete annexation of Mexico. Polk recalled Trist in October. Believing that he was on the cusp of an agreement with the Mexicans, Trist ignored the recall order and presented Polk with the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which was signed in Mexico City on February 2, 1848. Under the terms of the treaty, Mexico ceded to the United States approximately 525,000 square miles (55% of its prewar territory) in exchange for a $15 million lump sum payment, and the assumption by the U.S. Government of up to $3.25 million worth of debts owed by Mexico to U.S. citizens. While Polk would have preferred a more extensive annexation of Mexican territory, he realized that prolonging the war would have disastrous political consequences and decided to submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification. Although there was substantial opposition to the treaty within the Senate, on March 10, 1848, it passed by a razor-thin margin of 38 to 14.
| 3,012 | 4,873 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8340716#4_12824905
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/16336.htm
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848
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Polk recalled Trist in October. Believing that he was on the cusp of an agreement with the Mexicans, Trist ignored the recall order and presented Polk with the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which was signed in Mexico City on February 2, 1848. Under the terms of the treaty, Mexico ceded to the United States approximately 525,000 square miles (55% of its prewar territory) in exchange for a $15 million lump sum payment, and the assumption by the U.S. Government of up to $3.25 million worth of debts owed by Mexico to U.S. citizens. While Polk would have preferred a more extensive annexation of Mexican territory, he realized that prolonging the war would have disastrous political consequences and decided to submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification. Although there was substantial opposition to the treaty within the Senate, on March 10, 1848, it passed by a razor-thin margin of 38 to 14. The war had another significant outcome. On August 8, 1846, Congressman David Wilmot introduced a rider to an appropriations bill that stipulated that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist” in any territory acquired by the United States in the war against Mexico. While Southern senators managed block adoption of the so-called “Wilmot Proviso,” in nonetheless provoked a poltiical firestorm. The question of whether slavery could expand throughout the United States continue to fester until the defeat of the Confederacy in 1865.
| 3,973 | 5,426 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8346675#0_12826869
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/82011.htm
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
The Treaty of Wangxia (Wang-hsia) was the first formal treaty signed between the United States and China in 1844. It served as an American counterpart to the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Nanjing that ended the First Opium War in 1842. The Opium War and these treaties were emblematic of an era in which Western powers tried to gain unfettered access to Chinese products and markets for European and U.S. trade. Western traders, including those from the United States, had long sought a variety of Chinese products (including furniture, silk and tea), but found there were few products that China wanted from the West. American trade with China began as early as 1784, relying on North American exports such as furs, sandalwood, and ginseng, but American interest in Chinese products soon outstripped the Chinese appetite for these American exports. The British had already discovered a great market in southern China for smuggled opium, and American traders soon also turned to opium to supplement their exports to China. Beyond the health problems related to opium addiction, the increasing opium trade with the Western powers meant that for the first time, China imported more goods than it exported. Settling this financial problem eventually led to the First Opium War between Great Britain and China, from 1839 to 1942.
| 0 | 1,560 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8346675#1_12828972
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/82011.htm
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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Western traders, including those from the United States, had long sought a variety of Chinese products (including furniture, silk and tea), but found there were few products that China wanted from the West. American trade with China began as early as 1784, relying on North American exports such as furs, sandalwood, and ginseng, but American interest in Chinese products soon outstripped the Chinese appetite for these American exports. The British had already discovered a great market in southern China for smuggled opium, and American traders soon also turned to opium to supplement their exports to China. Beyond the health problems related to opium addiction, the increasing opium trade with the Western powers meant that for the first time, China imported more goods than it exported. Settling this financial problem eventually led to the First Opium War between Great Britain and China, from 1839 to 1942. After defeating the Chinese in a series of naval conflicts, the British were in a position to make a large number of demands from the weaker Qing Government of China, in the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Nanjing. Not to be outdone, U.S. negotiators sought to conclude a similar treaty with the Chinese, to guarantee the United States many of the favorable terms awarded the British. The Chinese readily agreed in an effort to keep all foreigners on the same footing. U.S. President John Tyler chose Massachusetts Congressman Caleb Cushing as his representative in treaty negotiations with the Chinese. Cushing and his counterparts reached the terms of the treaty quickly and signed it at Wangxia, a suburb of the Portuguese port city of Macau, in 1844.
| 646 | 2,307 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8346675#2_12831146
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/82011.htm
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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After defeating the Chinese in a series of naval conflicts, the British were in a position to make a large number of demands from the weaker Qing Government of China, in the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Nanjing. Not to be outdone, U.S. negotiators sought to conclude a similar treaty with the Chinese, to guarantee the United States many of the favorable terms awarded the British. The Chinese readily agreed in an effort to keep all foreigners on the same footing. U.S. President John Tyler chose Massachusetts Congressman Caleb Cushing as his representative in treaty negotiations with the Chinese. Cushing and his counterparts reached the terms of the treaty quickly and signed it at Wangxia, a suburb of the Portuguese port city of Macau, in 1844. The Treaty of Wangxia replicated many of the key terms of the Treaty of Nanjing. Most importantly, it established five treaty ports as open for Chinese-Western trade (Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai). These treaty ports became key crossroads for Western and Chinese culture, as they were the first locations where foreigners and foreign trading operations could own land in China. The U.S. treaty was somewhat longer than the British version, as it included major points from the Treaty of Nanjing, but also added some issues of particular interest to the United States. Article 17 protected the interests of American missionaries in China (several had acted as translators during the negotiation process).
| 1,561 | 3,030 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8346675#3_12833130
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/82011.htm
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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The Treaty of Wangxia replicated many of the key terms of the Treaty of Nanjing. Most importantly, it established five treaty ports as open for Chinese-Western trade (Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai). These treaty ports became key crossroads for Western and Chinese culture, as they were the first locations where foreigners and foreign trading operations could own land in China. The U.S. treaty was somewhat longer than the British version, as it included major points from the Treaty of Nanjing, but also added some issues of particular interest to the United States. Article 17 protected the interests of American missionaries in China (several had acted as translators during the negotiation process). Article 18 allowed Americans living or working in China to employ tutors to help them learn Chinese, a practice formerly forbidden by the Chinese Government. Unlike Great Britain, the United States agreed that anyone involved in the opium trade or the smuggling of contraband would be prosecuted under Chinese law, but, with that exception, the treaty allowed for other Americans in China to be afforded the benefits of extraterritoriality. This meant that any American accused of committing a crime in China would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the local law, but would instead be tried and, if necessary, punished by American officials in China. Due to the most-favored-nation clause in all of the western powers' treaties with the Chinese Government, any special consideration given one power could ultimately be claimed by them all. In the 1850s, the United States and the European powers grew increasingly dissatisfied with both the terms of their treaties with China, and the Qing Government's failure to adhere to them.
| 2,308 | 4,064 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8346675#4_12835401
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/82011.htm
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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Article 18 allowed Americans living or working in China to employ tutors to help them learn Chinese, a practice formerly forbidden by the Chinese Government. Unlike Great Britain, the United States agreed that anyone involved in the opium trade or the smuggling of contraband would be prosecuted under Chinese law, but, with that exception, the treaty allowed for other Americans in China to be afforded the benefits of extraterritoriality. This meant that any American accused of committing a crime in China would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the local law, but would instead be tried and, if necessary, punished by American officials in China. Due to the most-favored-nation clause in all of the western powers' treaties with the Chinese Government, any special consideration given one power could ultimately be claimed by them all. In the 1850s, the United States and the European powers grew increasingly dissatisfied with both the terms of their treaties with China, and the Qing Government's failure to adhere to them. The British forced the issue by attacking the Chinese port cities of Guangzhou and Tianjin in the Second Opium War (1857-1858). Under the most-favored-nation clause, all of the foreign powers operating in China were permitted to seek the same concessions of China that Great Britain achieved by force. As a result, France, Russia, and the United States all signed treaties with China at Tianjin in quick succession in 1858. The agreements reached between the Western powers and China following the Opium Wars came to be known as the "unequal treaties" because in practice they gave foreigners privileged status and extracted concessions from the Chinese. Ironically, the Qing Government had fully supported the clauses on extraterritoriality and most-favored nation status in the first treaties in order to keep the foreigners in line.
| 3,031 | 4,900 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8346675#5_12837787
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/82011.htm
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-1844
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The British forced the issue by attacking the Chinese port cities of Guangzhou and Tianjin in the Second Opium War (1857-1858). Under the most-favored-nation clause, all of the foreign powers operating in China were permitted to seek the same concessions of China that Great Britain achieved by force. As a result, France, Russia, and the United States all signed treaties with China at Tianjin in quick succession in 1858. The agreements reached between the Western powers and China following the Opium Wars came to be known as the "unequal treaties" because in practice they gave foreigners privileged status and extracted concessions from the Chinese. Ironically, the Qing Government had fully supported the clauses on extraterritoriality and most-favored nation status in the first treaties in order to keep the foreigners in line. This treaty system also marked a new direction for Chinese contact with the outside world. For years, the Chinese had conducted their foreign policy through the tribute system, in which foreign powers wishing to trade with China were required first to bring a tribute to the emperor, acknowledging the superiority of Chinese culture and the ultimate authority of the Chinese ruler. Unlike China's neighbors, the European powers ultimately refused to make these acknowledgements in order to trade, and they demanded instead that China adhere to Western diplomatic practices, such as the creation of treaties. Although the unequal treaties and the use of the most-favored-nation clause were effective in creating and maintaining open trade with China, both were also important factors in building animosity and resentment toward Western imperialism.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8352924#0_12839987
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/87721.htm
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
The Gadsden Purchase, or Treaty, was an agreement between the United States and Mexico, finalized in 1854, in which the United States agreed to pay Mexico $10 million for a 29,670 square mile portion of Mexico that later became part of Arizona and New Mexico. Gadsden's Purchase provided the land necessary for a southern transcontinental railroad and attempted to resolve conflicts that lingered after the Mexican-American War. While the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo formally ended the Mexican-American War in February 1848, tensions between the Governments of Mexico and the United States continued to simmer over the next six years. The two countries each claimed the Mesilla Valley as part of their own country. The Mexican Government demanded monetary compensation for Native American attacks in the region because, under the Treaty, the United States had agreed to protect Mexico from such attacks; however, the United States refused to comply, insisting that while they had agreed to protect Mexico from Native American attacks, they had not agreed to financially compensate for attacks that did occur. The persistent efforts of private American citizens to enter Mexico illegally and incite rebellions in an effort to gain territory exacerbated tensions between the governments. These continuing tensions between Mexico and the United States complicated U.S. efforts to find a southern route for a transcontinental railroad as the only viable routes passed through Mexican territory. In 1847, the United States attempted to buy the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, an isthmus on the southern edge of North America, as an alternative means of providing a southern connection between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Mexico, however, had already granted Mexican Don Jos� de Garay the right to build colonies for Americans on the isthmus with capital from the New Orleans Company.
| 0 | 1,960 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8352924#1_12842261
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/87721.htm
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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however, the United States refused to comply, insisting that while they had agreed to protect Mexico from Native American attacks, they had not agreed to financially compensate for attacks that did occur. The persistent efforts of private American citizens to enter Mexico illegally and incite rebellions in an effort to gain territory exacerbated tensions between the governments. These continuing tensions between Mexico and the United States complicated U.S. efforts to find a southern route for a transcontinental railroad as the only viable routes passed through Mexican territory. In 1847, the United States attempted to buy the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, an isthmus on the southern edge of North America, as an alternative means of providing a southern connection between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Mexico, however, had already granted Mexican Don Jos� de Garay the right to build colonies for Americans on the isthmus with capital from the New Orleans Company. Fearing the colonists would rebel as those in Texas had, Mexican President Juan Ceballos revoked the grant, angering U.S. investors. In 1853, Mexican officials evicted Americans from their property in the disputed Mesilla Valley. When the U.S. Government did not act, Governor William Lane of New Mexico declared the Mesilla Valley part of the U.S. territory of New Mexico. Mexican President Antonio de Santa Anna responded by sending troops into the valley. Attempting to diffuse the situation, U.S. President Franklin Pierce sent James Gadsden, the new U.S. Minister to Mexico, to negotiate with Santa Anna.
| 989 | 2,570 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8352924#2_12844127
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/87721.htm
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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Fearing the colonists would rebel as those in Texas had, Mexican President Juan Ceballos revoked the grant, angering U.S. investors. In 1853, Mexican officials evicted Americans from their property in the disputed Mesilla Valley. When the U.S. Government did not act, Governor William Lane of New Mexico declared the Mesilla Valley part of the U.S. territory of New Mexico. Mexican President Antonio de Santa Anna responded by sending troops into the valley. Attempting to diffuse the situation, U.S. President Franklin Pierce sent James Gadsden, the new U.S. Minister to Mexico, to negotiate with Santa Anna. Secretary of State William Marcy instructed Gadsden to renegotiate a border that provided a route for a southern railroad, arrange for a release of U.S. financial obligations for Native American attacks, and settle the monetary claims between the countries related to the Garay project. Gadsden met with Santa Anna on September 25, 1853. President Pierce sent verbal instructions for Gadsden through Christopher Ward, an agent for U.S. investors in the Garay project, giving Gadsden negotiating options ranging from $50 million for lower California and a large portion of northern Mexico to $15 million for a smaller land deal that would still provide for a southern railroad. Ward also lied to Gadsden, stating the President wanted the claims of the Garay party addressed in any treaty concluded with the Mexican Government; however, President Pierce never gave Ward these instructions because he did not believe in government involvement in affairs between private companies and foreign governments.
| 1,961 | 3,572 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8352924#3_12846019
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/87721.htm
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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Secretary of State William Marcy instructed Gadsden to renegotiate a border that provided a route for a southern railroad, arrange for a release of U.S. financial obligations for Native American attacks, and settle the monetary claims between the countries related to the Garay project. Gadsden met with Santa Anna on September 25, 1853. President Pierce sent verbal instructions for Gadsden through Christopher Ward, an agent for U.S. investors in the Garay project, giving Gadsden negotiating options ranging from $50 million for lower California and a large portion of northern Mexico to $15 million for a smaller land deal that would still provide for a southern railroad. Ward also lied to Gadsden, stating the President wanted the claims of the Garay party addressed in any treaty concluded with the Mexican Government; however, President Pierce never gave Ward these instructions because he did not believe in government involvement in affairs between private companies and foreign governments. Santa Anna refused to sell a large portion of Mexico, but he needed money to fund an army to put down ongoing rebellions, so on December 30, 1953 he and Gadsden signed a treaty stipulating that the United States would pay $15 million for 45,000 square miles south of the New Mexico territory and assume private American claims, including those related to the Garay deal. The United States Government agreed to work toward preventing American raids along Mexico's border and Mexico voided U.S. responsibility for Native American attacks. With a great deal of difficulty resulting from the increasing strife between the northern and southern states, the U.S. Senate ratified a revised treaty on April 25, 1854. The new treaty reduced the amount paid to Mexico to $10 million and the land purchased to 29,670 square miles, and removed any mention of Native American attacks and private claims. President Pierce signed the treaty and Gadsden presented the new treaty to Santa Anna, who signed it on June 8, 1854.
| 2,571 | 4,581 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8352924#4_12848310
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/87721.htm
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
Gadsden Purchase, 1853-1854
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Santa Anna refused to sell a large portion of Mexico, but he needed money to fund an army to put down ongoing rebellions, so on December 30, 1953 he and Gadsden signed a treaty stipulating that the United States would pay $15 million for 45,000 square miles south of the New Mexico territory and assume private American claims, including those related to the Garay deal. The United States Government agreed to work toward preventing American raids along Mexico's border and Mexico voided U.S. responsibility for Native American attacks. With a great deal of difficulty resulting from the increasing strife between the northern and southern states, the U.S. Senate ratified a revised treaty on April 25, 1854. The new treaty reduced the amount paid to Mexico to $10 million and the land purchased to 29,670 square miles, and removed any mention of Native American attacks and private claims. President Pierce signed the treaty and Gadsden presented the new treaty to Santa Anna, who signed it on June 8, 1854. After Gadsden's Purchase a new border dispute caused tension over the United States' payment, and the treaty failed to resolve the issues surrounding financial claims and border attacks. However, it did create the southern border of the present-day United States, despite the beliefs of the vast majority of policymakers at the time who thought the United States would eventually expand further into Mexico.
| 3,573 | 4,989 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8358184#0_12850007
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/104271.htm
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
In the early 1960s, U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev each expressed deep concern about the strength of their respective nations' nuclear arms forces. This concern led them to complete the first arms control agreement of the Cold War, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. This treaty did not have much practical effect on the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it established an important precedent for future arms control. Both superpowers entered the 1960s determined to build or maintain nuclear superiority. The Soviet Union had led the way in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles after its launch of the first man-made satellite, Sputnik, in 1957. In just a few years, it had developed an arsenal of long and medium range missiles that had raised alarm in Washington. President Kennedy had even campaigned for office on a claim that President Dwight Eisenhower had allowed the Soviet Union to far out-produce the United States in nuclear technology, creating a "missile gap." However, soon after he took office, the Kennedy Administration determined that the balance of nuclear power remained in favor of the United States. With both sides working to develop new and better nuclear technology over the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s, each engaged in a series of test explosions. These nuclear tests received worldwide scrutiny, not only for what they meant for the arms race but also for what they meant for human life.
| 0 | 1,602 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8358184#1_12851938
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/104271.htm
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
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In just a few years, it had developed an arsenal of long and medium range missiles that had raised alarm in Washington. President Kennedy had even campaigned for office on a claim that President Dwight Eisenhower had allowed the Soviet Union to far out-produce the United States in nuclear technology, creating a "missile gap." However, soon after he took office, the Kennedy Administration determined that the balance of nuclear power remained in favor of the United States. With both sides working to develop new and better nuclear technology over the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s, each engaged in a series of test explosions. These nuclear tests received worldwide scrutiny, not only for what they meant for the arms race but also for what they meant for human life. As the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom tested new nuclear technologies in the earth's atmosphere, concerns emerged worldwide about the potential effects of radioactive fallout on the people exposed to it. This led to the formation of activist groups and public discussion of the issue. The three countries entered into negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty in 1958. Having recently completed rounds of tests, at that time all three entered into a voluntary moratorium on all forms of testing, initiated first by the Soviet Union but later adhered to by the United States and Great Britain. In spite of this willingness to self-restrict testing, one of the most difficult issues preventing the conclusion of a formal treaty was the question of verification.
| 821 | 2,385 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8358184#2_12853802
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/104271.htm
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
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As the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom tested new nuclear technologies in the earth's atmosphere, concerns emerged worldwide about the potential effects of radioactive fallout on the people exposed to it. This led to the formation of activist groups and public discussion of the issue. The three countries entered into negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty in 1958. Having recently completed rounds of tests, at that time all three entered into a voluntary moratorium on all forms of testing, initiated first by the Soviet Union but later adhered to by the United States and Great Britain. In spite of this willingness to self-restrict testing, one of the most difficult issues preventing the conclusion of a formal treaty was the question of verification. The United States and Great Britain, in particular, pushed for on-site inspections of Soviet facilities as without them, it was impossible to determine whether the Soviets were continuing underground nuclear tests or just experiencing the frequent seismic activity to which its geographic area was prone. However, the Soviets were hesitant to permit such onsite inspections of its nuclear facilities, interpreting U.S. insistence on these inspections as a ruse to facilitate U.S. efforts to spy on Soviet advancements. After the Soviet military shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Russia in 1960, the prospects for reaching an agreement on the inspections issue all but disappeared. Khrushchev also rejected the idea of having the United Nations conduct inspections after observing what he believed was the organization's mishandling of the Congo crisis. Instead, in the wake of these incidents both the United States and the Soviet Union resumed testing.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8358184#3_12855844
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/104271.htm
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
|
The United States and Great Britain, in particular, pushed for on-site inspections of Soviet facilities as without them, it was impossible to determine whether the Soviets were continuing underground nuclear tests or just experiencing the frequent seismic activity to which its geographic area was prone. However, the Soviets were hesitant to permit such onsite inspections of its nuclear facilities, interpreting U.S. insistence on these inspections as a ruse to facilitate U.S. efforts to spy on Soviet advancements. After the Soviet military shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Russia in 1960, the prospects for reaching an agreement on the inspections issue all but disappeared. Khrushchev also rejected the idea of having the United Nations conduct inspections after observing what he believed was the organization's mishandling of the Congo crisis. Instead, in the wake of these incidents both the United States and the Soviet Union resumed testing. In 1961, Kennedy established an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency within the U.S. Department of State, and the new organization reopened talks with the Soviet Union. That year, however, neither side was ready to make major concessions. As long as it remained difficult to verify that the other side was not engaging in clandestine testing, there was little incentive to form an agreement. Over the course of the next year, however, the situation changed dramatically for a number of reasons. Concerns about nuclear proliferation increased interest in the testing ban, as France exploded its first weapon in 1960 and the People's Republic of China appeared close to successfully building its own atom bomb.
| 2,386 | 4,054 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8358184#4_12857811
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/104271.htm
|
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
|
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
|
In 1961, Kennedy established an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency within the U.S. Department of State, and the new organization reopened talks with the Soviet Union. That year, however, neither side was ready to make major concessions. As long as it remained difficult to verify that the other side was not engaging in clandestine testing, there was little incentive to form an agreement. Over the course of the next year, however, the situation changed dramatically for a number of reasons. Concerns about nuclear proliferation increased interest in the testing ban, as France exploded its first weapon in 1960 and the People's Republic of China appeared close to successfully building its own atom bomb. However, it was the rapid escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962 that compelled leaders in both the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue more aggressively an agreement that could help them avoid the devastating destruction that nuclear warfare would bring. Although the crisis provided the impetus for an agreement, its final negotiation was made possible by the decision to step back from the original idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty and work instead on a more limited arrangement. Atmospheric and underground tests proved equally effective for scientific purposes, so there was no reason to insist that access to both types of testing remain available. In past negotiations, the inability to detect underground explosions and agree on provisions for inspections to ensure such explosions were not taking place became a problem that prevented an agreement. Once the Soviet Union and the United States decided that underground testing would not be included in this first treaty, the two sides very quickly reached terms they could agree upon.
| 3,346 | 5,132 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8358184#5_12859895
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/104271.htm
|
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
|
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963
|
However, it was the rapid escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962 that compelled leaders in both the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue more aggressively an agreement that could help them avoid the devastating destruction that nuclear warfare would bring. Although the crisis provided the impetus for an agreement, its final negotiation was made possible by the decision to step back from the original idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty and work instead on a more limited arrangement. Atmospheric and underground tests proved equally effective for scientific purposes, so there was no reason to insist that access to both types of testing remain available. In past negotiations, the inability to detect underground explosions and agree on provisions for inspections to ensure such explosions were not taking place became a problem that prevented an agreement. Once the Soviet Union and the United States decided that underground testing would not be included in this first treaty, the two sides very quickly reached terms they could agree upon. The Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in 1963, and it banned all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, or underwater. Because it stopped the spread of radioactive nuclear material through atmospheric testing and set the precedent for a new wave of arms control agreements, the Treaty was hailed as a success. The Treaty was the first of several Cold War agreements on nuclear arms, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty that was signed in 1968 and the SALT I agreements of 1972. In 1974, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty returned to the question of nuclear testing by limiting underground testing of bombs with a yield greater than 150 kilotons.
| 4,055 | 5,840 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8364310#0_12861979
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/17739.htm
|
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
|
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
|
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
In early 1961 President John F. Kennedy concluded that Fidel Castro was a Soviet client working to subvert Latin America. After much debate in his administration Kennedy authorized a clandestine invasion of Cuba by a brigade of Cuban exiles. The brigade hit the beach at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961, but the operation collapsed in spectacular failure within 2 days. Kennedy took public responsibility for the mistakes made, but remained determined to rid Cuba of Castro. In November 1961 Kennedy approved Operation Mongoose, a secret plan aimed at stimulating a rebellion in Cuba that the United States could support. While the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev secretly introduced medium-range nuclear missiles into Cuba. U.S intelligence picked up evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up during routine surveillance flights and on September 4, 1962, Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. A U-2 flight on October 14 provided the first proof of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Kennedy called together 18 of his closest advisers to try to resolve the most dangerous U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the cold war. Some advisers argued for an air strike to take out the missiles and destroy the Cuban air force followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba;
| 0 | 1,507 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8364310#1_12863878
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/17739.htm
|
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
|
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
|
While the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev secretly introduced medium-range nuclear missiles into Cuba. U.S intelligence picked up evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up during routine surveillance flights and on September 4, 1962, Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. A U-2 flight on October 14 provided the first proof of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Kennedy called together 18 of his closest advisers to try to resolve the most dangerous U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the cold war. Some advisers argued for an air strike to take out the missiles and destroy the Cuban air force followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba; others favored warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On October 22 Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of Cuba. He sent a letter to Khrushchev calling upon him to remove the missiles, thus initiating an exchange of correspondence between the two leaders that continued throughout the crisis. On October 24 Soviet vessels approached the quarantine line but turned back;
| 765 | 1,920 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8364310#2_12865396
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/17739.htm
|
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
|
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
|
others favored warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On October 22 Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of Cuba. He sent a letter to Khrushchev calling upon him to remove the missiles, thus initiating an exchange of correspondence between the two leaders that continued throughout the crisis. On October 24 Soviet vessels approached the quarantine line but turned back; 3 days later, the Cubans shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane. After these near flash points, Kennedy responded on October 27 to the first of two letters sent by Khrushchev on October 26 and 27 proposing various settlements of the crisis. Kennedy accepted the Soviet offer to withdraw the missiles from Cuba in return for an end to the quarantine and a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. The same day Attorney General Robert Kennedy told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that if the Soviet Union did not remove the missiles the United States would do so. Robert Kennedy also offered an assurance that Khrushchev needed:
| 1,508 | 2,532 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8364310#3_12866784
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/17739.htm
|
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
|
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
|
3 days later, the Cubans shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane. After these near flash points, Kennedy responded on October 27 to the first of two letters sent by Khrushchev on October 26 and 27 proposing various settlements of the crisis. Kennedy accepted the Soviet offer to withdraw the missiles from Cuba in return for an end to the quarantine and a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. The same day Attorney General Robert Kennedy told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that if the Soviet Union did not remove the missiles the United States would do so. Robert Kennedy also offered an assurance that Khrushchev needed: several months after the missiles were removed from Cuba, the United States would similarly remove its missiles from Turkey. On the basis of those understandings, the Soviet Union agreed on October 28 to remove its missiles from Cuba. The quarantine and the crisis lingered until the removal of the Soviet missiles was verified at sea on November 20, and the Soviet Union agreed to remove the medium-range Il-28 bombers it had also introduced into Cuba. Exactly how close the United States and the Soviet Union came to nuclear war over Cuba remains one of the most keenly discussed issues of the cold war.
| 1,921 | 3,138 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8367793#0_12868365
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/gp/17661.htm
|
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
|
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
|
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
America's annexation of Hawaii in 1898 extended U.S. territory into the Pacific and highlighted resulted from economic integration and the rise of the United States as a Pacific power. For most of the 1800s, leaders in Washington were concerned that Hawaii might become part of a European nation's empire. During the 1830s, Britain and France forced Hawaii to accept treaties giving them economic privileges. In 1842, Secretary of State Daniel Webster sent a letter to Hawaiian agents in Washington affirming U.S. interests in Hawaii and opposing annexation by any other nation. He also proposed to Great Britain and France that no nation should seek special privileges or engage in further colonization of the islands. In 1849, the United States and Hawaii concluded a treaty of friendship that served as the basis of official relations between the parties. A key provisioning spot for American whaling ships, fertile ground for American protestant missionaries, and a new source of sugar cane production, Hawaii's economy became increasingly integrated with the United States. An 1875 trade reciprocity treaty further linked the two countries and U.S. sugar plantation owners from the United States came to dominate the economy and politics of the islands. When Queen Liliuokalani moved to establish a stronger monarchy, Americans under the leadership of Samuel Dole deposed her in 1893. The planters' belief that a coup and annexation by the United States would remove the threat of a devastating tariff on their sugar also spurred them to action.
| 0 | 1,633 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8367793#1_12870303
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/gp/17661.htm
|
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
|
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
|
In 1849, the United States and Hawaii concluded a treaty of friendship that served as the basis of official relations between the parties. A key provisioning spot for American whaling ships, fertile ground for American protestant missionaries, and a new source of sugar cane production, Hawaii's economy became increasingly integrated with the United States. An 1875 trade reciprocity treaty further linked the two countries and U.S. sugar plantation owners from the United States came to dominate the economy and politics of the islands. When Queen Liliuokalani moved to establish a stronger monarchy, Americans under the leadership of Samuel Dole deposed her in 1893. The planters' belief that a coup and annexation by the United States would remove the threat of a devastating tariff on their sugar also spurred them to action. The administration of President Benjamin Harrison encouraged the takeover, and dispatched sailors from the USS Boston to the islands to surround the royal palace. The U.S. minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens, worked closely with the new government. Dole sent a delegation to Washington in 1894 seeking annexation, but the new President, Grover Cleveland, opposed annexation and tried to restore the Queen. Dole declared Hawaii an independent republic. Spurred by the nationalism aroused by the Spanish-American War, the United States annexed Hawaii in 1898 at the urging of President William McKinley.
| 803 | 2,235 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8367793#2_12872011
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/gp/17661.htm
|
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
|
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
Annexation of Hawaii, 1898
|
The administration of President Benjamin Harrison encouraged the takeover, and dispatched sailors from the USS Boston to the islands to surround the royal palace. The U.S. minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens, worked closely with the new government. Dole sent a delegation to Washington in 1894 seeking annexation, but the new President, Grover Cleveland, opposed annexation and tried to restore the Queen. Dole declared Hawaii an independent republic. Spurred by the nationalism aroused by the Spanish-American War, the United States annexed Hawaii in 1898 at the urging of President William McKinley. Hawaii was made a territory in 1900, and Dole became its first governor. Racial attitudes and party politics in the United States deferred statehood until a bipartisan compromise linked Hawaii's status to Alaska, and both became states in 1959.
| 1,634 | 2,480 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8370531#0_12873134
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/87718.htm
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
The Immigration Act of 1924 limited the number of immigrants allowed entry into the United States through a national origins quota. The quota provided immigration visas to two percent of the total number of people of each nationality in the United States as of the 1890 national census. It completely excluded immigrants from Asia. In 1917, the U.S. Congress enacted the first widely restrictive immigration law. The uncertainty generated over national security during World War I made it possible for Congress to pass this Act, and it included several important provisions that paved the way for the 1924 Act. The 1917 Act implemented a literacy test that required immigrants over 16 years old to demonstrate basic reading comprehension in any language. It also increased the tax paid by new immigrants upon arrival and allowed immigration officials to exercise more discretion in making decisions over whom to exclude. Finally, the Act excluded from entry anyone born in a geographically defined "Asiatic Barred Zone" except for Japanese and Filipinos. In 1907, the Japanese Government had voluntarily limited Japanese immigration to the U.S. in the Gentlemen's Agreement. The Philippines was an American colony, so its citizens were American nationals and could travel freely to the United States.
| 0 | 1,431 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8370531#1_12874944
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/87718.htm
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The 1917 Act implemented a literacy test that required immigrants over 16 years old to demonstrate basic reading comprehension in any language. It also increased the tax paid by new immigrants upon arrival and allowed immigration officials to exercise more discretion in making decisions over whom to exclude. Finally, the Act excluded from entry anyone born in a geographically defined "Asiatic Barred Zone" except for Japanese and Filipinos. In 1907, the Japanese Government had voluntarily limited Japanese immigration to the U.S. in the Gentlemen's Agreement. The Philippines was an American colony, so its citizens were American nationals and could travel freely to the United States. China was not included in the Barred Zone, but the Chinese were already denied immigration visas under the Chinese Exclusion Act. The literacy test alone was not enough to prevent most potential immigrants from entering, so members of Congress sought a new way to restrict immigration in the 1920s. Immigration expert and Republican Senator from Vermont William P. Dillingham introduced a measure to create immigration quotas, which he set at three percent of the total population of the foreign-born of each nationality in the United States as recorded in the 1910 census. This put the total number of visas available each year to new immigrants at 350,000. It did not, however, establish quotas of any kind for residents of the Western Hemisphere.
| 742 | 2,181 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8370531#2_12876733
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/87718.htm
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
China was not included in the Barred Zone, but the Chinese were already denied immigration visas under the Chinese Exclusion Act. The literacy test alone was not enough to prevent most potential immigrants from entering, so members of Congress sought a new way to restrict immigration in the 1920s. Immigration expert and Republican Senator from Vermont William P. Dillingham introduced a measure to create immigration quotas, which he set at three percent of the total population of the foreign-born of each nationality in the United States as recorded in the 1910 census. This put the total number of visas available each year to new immigrants at 350,000. It did not, however, establish quotas of any kind for residents of the Western Hemisphere. President Wilson opposed the restrictive act, preferring a more liberal immigration policy, so he used the pocket veto to prevent its passage. In early 1921, the newly inaugurated President Warren Harding called Congress back to a special session to pass the law. In 1922, the act was renewed for another two years. When the Congressional debate over immigration began in 1924, the quota system was so well-established that no one questioned whether to maintain it, but rather discussed how to adjust it. Though there were advocates for raising quotas and allowing more people to enter, the champions of restriction triumphed.
| 1,432 | 2,808 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8370531#3_12878458
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/87718.htm
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
President Wilson opposed the restrictive act, preferring a more liberal immigration policy, so he used the pocket veto to prevent its passage. In early 1921, the newly inaugurated President Warren Harding called Congress back to a special session to pass the law. In 1922, the act was renewed for another two years. When the Congressional debate over immigration began in 1924, the quota system was so well-established that no one questioned whether to maintain it, but rather discussed how to adjust it. Though there were advocates for raising quotas and allowing more people to enter, the champions of restriction triumphed. They created a plan that lowered the existing quota from three to two percent of the foreign born population. They also pushed back the year on which quota calculations were based from 1910 to 1890. Another change to the quota altered the basis of the quota calculations. The quota had been based on the number of people born outside of the United States, or the number of immigrants in the United States. The new law traced the origins of the whole of the American population, including natural-born citizens.
| 2,182 | 3,319 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8370531#4_12879944
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/87718.htm
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
They created a plan that lowered the existing quota from three to two percent of the foreign born population. They also pushed back the year on which quota calculations were based from 1910 to 1890. Another change to the quota altered the basis of the quota calculations. The quota had been based on the number of people born outside of the United States, or the number of immigrants in the United States. The new law traced the origins of the whole of the American population, including natural-born citizens. The new quota calculations included large numbers of people of British descent whose families were long resident in the United States. As a result, the percentage of visas available to individuals from the British Isles and Western Europe increased, but newer immigration from other areas like Southern and Eastern Europe was limited. The 1924 Immigration Act also included a provision excluding from entry any alien who by virtue of race or nationality was ineligible for citizenship. Existing nationality laws dating from 1790 and 1870 excluded people of Asian lineage from naturalizing. As a result, the 1924 Act meant that even Asians not previously prevented from immigrating - the Japanese in particular - would no longer be admitted to the United States.
| 2,809 | 4,081 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8370531#5_12881565
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/87718.htm
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The new quota calculations included large numbers of people of British descent whose families were long resident in the United States. As a result, the percentage of visas available to individuals from the British Isles and Western Europe increased, but newer immigration from other areas like Southern and Eastern Europe was limited. The 1924 Immigration Act also included a provision excluding from entry any alien who by virtue of race or nationality was ineligible for citizenship. Existing nationality laws dating from 1790 and 1870 excluded people of Asian lineage from naturalizing. As a result, the 1924 Act meant that even Asians not previously prevented from immigrating - the Japanese in particular - would no longer be admitted to the United States. Many in Japan were very offended by the new law, which was a violation of the Gentlemen's Agreement. The Japanese government protested, but the law remained, resulting in an increase in existing tensions between the two nations. But it appeared that the U.S. Congress had decided that preserving the racial composition of the country was more important than promoting good ties with the Japanese empire. The restrictionist principles of the Act could have resulted in strained relations with some European countries as well, but these potential problems did not appear for several reasons. The global depression of the 1930s and World War II both served to curtail European emigration.
| 3,320 | 4,767 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8370531#6_12883361
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/87718.htm
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
|
Many in Japan were very offended by the new law, which was a violation of the Gentlemen's Agreement. The Japanese government protested, but the law remained, resulting in an increase in existing tensions between the two nations. But it appeared that the U.S. Congress had decided that preserving the racial composition of the country was more important than promoting good ties with the Japanese empire. The restrictionist principles of the Act could have resulted in strained relations with some European countries as well, but these potential problems did not appear for several reasons. The global depression of the 1930s and World War II both served to curtail European emigration. When these crises had passed, emergency provisions for the resettlement of displaced persons in 1948 and 1950 helped the United States avoid conflict over its new immigration laws. In all of its parts, the most basic purpose of the 1924 Immigration Act was to preserve the ideal of American homogeneity. Congress revised the Act in 1952.
| 4,082 | 5,105 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8375973#0_12884733
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/99849.htm
|
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
|
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
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The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
In the 1930s, the United States Government enacted a series of laws designed to prevent the United States from being embroiled in a foreign war by clearly stating the terms of U.S. neutrality. Although many Americans had rallied to join President Woodrow Wilson's crusade to make the world "safe for democracy" in 1917, by the 1930s critics argued that U.S. involvement in the First World War had been driven by bankers and munitions traders with business interests in Europe. These findings fueled a growing "isolationist" movement that argued the United States should steer clear of future wars and remain neutral by avoiding financial deals with countries at war. By the mid-1930s, events in Europe and Asia indicated that a new world war might soon erupt and the U.S. Congress took action to enforce U.S. neutrality. On August 31, 1935, Congress passed the first Neutrality Act prohibiting the export of "arms, ammunition, and implements of war" from the United States to foreign nations at war and requiring arms manufacturers in the United States to apply for an export license. American citizens traveling in war zones were also advised that they did so at their own risk. President Franklin D. Roosevelt originally opposed the legislation, but relented in the face of strong Congressional and public opinion. On February 29, 1936, Congress renewed the Act until May of 1937 and prohibited Americans from extending any loans to belligerent nations. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and the rising tide of fascism in Europe increased support for extending and expanding the Neutrality Act of 1937. Under this law, U.S.citizens were forbidden from traveling on belligerent ships, and American merchant ships were prevented from transporting arms to belligerents even if those arms were produced outside of the United States.
| 0 | 1,925 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8375973#1_12886969
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/99849.htm
|
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
|
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
|
American citizens traveling in war zones were also advised that they did so at their own risk. President Franklin D. Roosevelt originally opposed the legislation, but relented in the face of strong Congressional and public opinion. On February 29, 1936, Congress renewed the Act until May of 1937 and prohibited Americans from extending any loans to belligerent nations. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and the rising tide of fascism in Europe increased support for extending and expanding the Neutrality Act of 1937. Under this law, U.S.citizens were forbidden from traveling on belligerent ships, and American merchant ships were prevented from transporting arms to belligerents even if those arms were produced outside of the United States. The Act gave the President the authority to bar all belligerent ships from U.S. waters, and to extend the export embargo to any additional "articles or materials." Finally, civil wars would also fall under the terms of the Act. The Neutrality Act of 1937 did contain one important concession to Roosevelt: belligerent nations were allowed, at the discretion of the President, to acquire any items except arms from the United States, so long as they immediately paid for such items and carried them on non-American ships�the so-called "cash-and-carry" provision. Since vital raw materials such as oil were not considered "implements of war," the "cash-and-carry" clause would be quite valuable to whatever nation could make use of it.
| 1,168 | 2,659 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8375973#2_12888750
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/99849.htm
|
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
|
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
|
The Act gave the President the authority to bar all belligerent ships from U.S. waters, and to extend the export embargo to any additional "articles or materials." Finally, civil wars would also fall under the terms of the Act. The Neutrality Act of 1937 did contain one important concession to Roosevelt: belligerent nations were allowed, at the discretion of the President, to acquire any items except arms from the United States, so long as they immediately paid for such items and carried them on non-American ships�the so-called "cash-and-carry" provision. Since vital raw materials such as oil were not considered "implements of war," the "cash-and-carry" clause would be quite valuable to whatever nation could make use of it. Roosevelt had engineered its inclusion as a deliberate way to assist Great Britain and France in any war against the Axis Powers, since he realized that they were the only countries that had both the hard currency and ships to make use of "cash-and-carry." Unlike the rest of the Act, which was permanent, this provision was set to expire after two years. Following Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, Roosevelt suffered a humiliating defeat when Congress rebuffed his attempt to renew "cash-and-carry" and expand it to include arms sales. President Roosevelt persisted and as war spread in Europe, his chances of expanding "cash-and-carry" increased. After a fierce debate in Congress, in November of 1939, a final Neutrality Act passed.
| 1,926 | 3,419 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8375973#3_12890539
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/99849.htm
|
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
|
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
|
Roosevelt had engineered its inclusion as a deliberate way to assist Great Britain and France in any war against the Axis Powers, since he realized that they were the only countries that had both the hard currency and ships to make use of "cash-and-carry." Unlike the rest of the Act, which was permanent, this provision was set to expire after two years. Following Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, Roosevelt suffered a humiliating defeat when Congress rebuffed his attempt to renew "cash-and-carry" and expand it to include arms sales. President Roosevelt persisted and as war spread in Europe, his chances of expanding "cash-and-carry" increased. After a fierce debate in Congress, in November of 1939, a final Neutrality Act passed. This Act lifted the arms embargo and put all trade with belligerent nations under the terms of "cash-and-carry." The ban on loans remained in effect, and American ships were barred from transporting goods to belligerent ports. In October of 1941, after the United States had committed itself to aiding the Allies through Lend-Lease, Roosevelt gradually sought to repeal certain portions of the Act. On October 17, 1941, the House of Representatives revoked section VI, which forbade the arming of U.S. merchant ships, by a wide margin. Following a series of deadly U-boat attacks against U.S. Navy and merchant ships, the Senate passed another bill in November that also repealed legislation banning American ships from entering belligerent ports or "combat zones."
| 2,660 | 4,185 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8375973#4_12892351
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/99849.htm
|
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
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The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
The Neutrality Acts, 1930s
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This Act lifted the arms embargo and put all trade with belligerent nations under the terms of "cash-and-carry." The ban on loans remained in effect, and American ships were barred from transporting goods to belligerent ports. In October of 1941, after the United States had committed itself to aiding the Allies through Lend-Lease, Roosevelt gradually sought to repeal certain portions of the Act. On October 17, 1941, the House of Representatives revoked section VI, which forbade the arming of U.S. merchant ships, by a wide margin. Following a series of deadly U-boat attacks against U.S. Navy and merchant ships, the Senate passed another bill in November that also repealed legislation banning American ships from entering belligerent ports or "combat zones." Overall, the Neutrality Acts represented a compromise whereby the United States Government accommodated the isolationist sentiment of the American public, but still retained some ability to interact with the world. In the end, the terms of the Neutrality Acts became irrelevant once the United States joined the Allies in the fight against Nazi Germany and Japan in December 1941.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108646.htm
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
The Progressive movement was a turn-of-the-century political movement interested in furthering social and political reform, curbing political corruption caused by political machines, and limiting the political influence of large corporations. Although many Progressives saw U.S. power in a foreign arena as an opportunity to enact the Progressive domestic agenda overseas, and to improve foreign societies, others were concerned about the adverse effects of U.S. interventions and colonialism. The Progressive movement began with a domestic agenda. Progressives were interested in establishing a more transparent and accountable government which would work to improve U.S. society. These reformers favored such policies as civil service reform, food safety laws, and increased political rights for women and U.S. workers. In the 1890s, the Progressive movement also began to question the power of large businesses and monopolies after a series of journalistic expos�s that revealed questionable business practices. Throughout the 1890s, the U.S. Government became increasingly likely to rely on its military and economic power to pursue foreign policy goals. The most prominent action during this period, the Spanish-American War, resulted in U.S. rule of the former Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, as well as increased influence over Cuba. These territories captured in the Spanish-American war had a varied response toward U.S. occupation. In the Philippines, American forces faced armed insurgency, while in Puerto Rico, working-class and Progressive Puerto Ricans saw the United States as a successful counterweight to local sugar industry elites.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108646.htm
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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In the 1890s, the Progressive movement also began to question the power of large businesses and monopolies after a series of journalistic expos�s that revealed questionable business practices. Throughout the 1890s, the U.S. Government became increasingly likely to rely on its military and economic power to pursue foreign policy goals. The most prominent action during this period, the Spanish-American War, resulted in U.S. rule of the former Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, as well as increased influence over Cuba. These territories captured in the Spanish-American war had a varied response toward U.S. occupation. In the Philippines, American forces faced armed insurgency, while in Puerto Rico, working-class and Progressive Puerto Ricans saw the United States as a successful counterweight to local sugar industry elites. Many Progressives, including U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, saw no conflict between imperialism and reform at home -to them, both were forms of uplift, reform and improvement, and so they saw in these new colonies an opportunity to further the Progressive agenda around the world. However, especially after the violence of the Philippine-American War, other Progressives became increasingly vocal about their opposition to U.S. foreign intervention and imperialism. Still others argued that foreign ventures would detract from much-needed domestic political and social reforms. Under the leadership of U.S. Senator Robert La Follette, Progressive opposition to foreign intervention further increased under the Dollar Diplomacy policies of Republican President William Howard Taft and Secretary of State Philander Knox. However, Progressives remained mostly interested in domestic issues, and Republican Progressives sometimes hesitated to break party lines on foreign policy, hoping to ensure greater influence on domestic matters within the Republican Party.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108646.htm
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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Many Progressives, including U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, saw no conflict between imperialism and reform at home -to them, both were forms of uplift, reform and improvement, and so they saw in these new colonies an opportunity to further the Progressive agenda around the world. However, especially after the violence of the Philippine-American War, other Progressives became increasingly vocal about their opposition to U.S. foreign intervention and imperialism. Still others argued that foreign ventures would detract from much-needed domestic political and social reforms. Under the leadership of U.S. Senator Robert La Follette, Progressive opposition to foreign intervention further increased under the Dollar Diplomacy policies of Republican President William Howard Taft and Secretary of State Philander Knox. However, Progressives remained mostly interested in domestic issues, and Republican Progressives sometimes hesitated to break party lines on foreign policy, hoping to ensure greater influence on domestic matters within the Republican Party. Similarly, after the election of Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, Democratic Progressives also tended to follow Wilson's lead on foreign policy issues, while the partisan reaction against them was led by Republican Progressives. Wilson also faced opposition from John Barrett, Director-General of the Pan-American Union, whom Wilson eventually forced out of office in 1919. President Wilson may have had greater reservations about U.S. foreign intervention in the Americas than President Theodore Roosevelt, but he was willing to intervene in the Mexican Revolution. Concerns about possible German submarine warfare also caused him to order U.S. military interventions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and also led to the purchase of the U.S. Virgin Islands from Denmark. The military occupations incorporated elements of the Progressive program, attempting to establish effective local police forces, reform land laws, build public infrastructure, and increase public access to education.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108646.htm
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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Similarly, after the election of Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, Democratic Progressives also tended to follow Wilson's lead on foreign policy issues, while the partisan reaction against them was led by Republican Progressives. Wilson also faced opposition from John Barrett, Director-General of the Pan-American Union, whom Wilson eventually forced out of office in 1919. President Wilson may have had greater reservations about U.S. foreign intervention in the Americas than President Theodore Roosevelt, but he was willing to intervene in the Mexican Revolution. Concerns about possible German submarine warfare also caused him to order U.S. military interventions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and also led to the purchase of the U.S. Virgin Islands from Denmark. The military occupations incorporated elements of the Progressive program, attempting to establish effective local police forces, reform land laws, build public infrastructure, and increase public access to education. However, these programs were hampered by local opposition to U.S. occupation and U.S. policies that inadvertently proved counterproductive. Where Progressive policies threatened to destabilize U.S. authority, U.S. officials in charge of occupying forces opted for stability rather than authentic Progressive changes. In foreign policy, the Progressive movement also split over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. Progressive U.S. Senator William Borah led the campaign against ratification, and he would increasingly become the champion of the isolationist movement until his death in 1940. Other Progressives viewed the treaty more favorably.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108646.htm
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
The Progressive Movement and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1890-1920s
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However, these programs were hampered by local opposition to U.S. occupation and U.S. policies that inadvertently proved counterproductive. Where Progressive policies threatened to destabilize U.S. authority, U.S. officials in charge of occupying forces opted for stability rather than authentic Progressive changes. In foreign policy, the Progressive movement also split over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. Progressive U.S. Senator William Borah led the campaign against ratification, and he would increasingly become the champion of the isolationist movement until his death in 1940. Other Progressives viewed the treaty more favorably. In the 1920s, the Progressive movement began to be supplanted by several different movements. In some cases, such as women's suffrage, Progressive victory caused activists to lose momentum to push for further change. The Progressive wing of the Republican Party was weakened by the party splits of 1912 and 1924, which were attempts to form a third, Progressive party. The Progressive wing of the Democratic Party would eventually be subsumed under the broader New Deal coalition of Franklin Roosevelt. Foreign policy matters would increasingly be focused on the buildup to the Second World War, and Progressive issues took a back seat to the interventionist/isolationist split.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8386418#0_12904496
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/87722.htm
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
After its defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, Spain ceded its longstanding colony of the Philippines to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. On February 4, 1899, just two days before the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, fighting broke out between American forces and Filipino nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo who sought independence rather than a change in colonial rulers. The ensuing Philippine-American War lasted three years and resulted in the death of over 4,200 American and over 20,000 Filipino combatants. As many as 200,000 Filipino civilians died from violence, famine, and disease. The decision by U.S. policymakers to annex the Philippines was not without domestic controversy. Americans who advocated annexation evinced a variety of motivations: desire for commercial opportunities in Asia, concern that the Filipinos were incapable of self-rule, and fear that if the United States did not take control of the islands, another power (such as Germany or Japan) might do so. Meanwhile, American opposition to U.S. colonial rule of the Philippines came in many forms, ranging from those who thought it morally wrong for the United States to be engaged in colonialism, to those who feared that annexation might eventually permit the non-white Filipinos to have a role in American national government. Others were wholly unconcerned about the moral or racial implications of imperialism and sought only to oppose the policies of President William McKinley's administration. After the Spanish-American War, while the American public and politicians debated the annexation question, Filipino revolutionaries under Aguinaldo seized control of most of the Philippines' main island of Luzon and proclaimed the establishment of the independent Philippine Republic.
| 0 | 1,891 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8386418#1_12906728
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/87722.htm
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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Americans who advocated annexation evinced a variety of motivations: desire for commercial opportunities in Asia, concern that the Filipinos were incapable of self-rule, and fear that if the United States did not take control of the islands, another power (such as Germany or Japan) might do so. Meanwhile, American opposition to U.S. colonial rule of the Philippines came in many forms, ranging from those who thought it morally wrong for the United States to be engaged in colonialism, to those who feared that annexation might eventually permit the non-white Filipinos to have a role in American national government. Others were wholly unconcerned about the moral or racial implications of imperialism and sought only to oppose the policies of President William McKinley's administration. After the Spanish-American War, while the American public and politicians debated the annexation question, Filipino revolutionaries under Aguinaldo seized control of most of the Philippines' main island of Luzon and proclaimed the establishment of the independent Philippine Republic. When it became clear that U.S. forces were intent on imposing American colonial control over the islands, the early clashes between the two sides in 1899 swelled into an all-out war. Americans tended to refer to the ensuing conflict as an "insurrection" rather than acknowledge the Filipinos' contention that they were fighting to ward off a foreign invader. There were two phases to the Philippine-American War. The first phase, from February to November of 1899, was dominated by Aguinaldo's ill-fated attempts to fight a conventional war against the better-trained and equipped American troops. The second phase was marked by the Filipinos' shift to guerrilla-style warfare.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/87722.htm
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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When it became clear that U.S. forces were intent on imposing American colonial control over the islands, the early clashes between the two sides in 1899 swelled into an all-out war. Americans tended to refer to the ensuing conflict as an "insurrection" rather than acknowledge the Filipinos' contention that they were fighting to ward off a foreign invader. There were two phases to the Philippine-American War. The first phase, from February to November of 1899, was dominated by Aguinaldo's ill-fated attempts to fight a conventional war against the better-trained and equipped American troops. The second phase was marked by the Filipinos' shift to guerrilla-style warfare. It began in November of 1899, lasted through the capture of Aguinaldo in 1901 and into the spring of 1902, by which time most organized Filipino resistance had dissipated. President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed a general amnesty and declared the conflict over on July 4, 1902, although minor uprisings and insurrections against American rule periodically occurred in the years that followed. The United States entered the conflict with undeniable military advantages that included a trained fighting force, a steady supply of military equipment, and control of the archipelago's waterways. Meanwhile, the Filipino forces were hampered by their inability to gain any kind of outside support for their cause, chronic shortages of weapons and ammunition, and complications produced by the Philippines' geographic complexity. Under these conditions, Aguinaldo's attempt to fight a conventional war in the first few months of the conflict proved to be a fatal mistake;
| 1,892 | 3,534 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/87722.htm
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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It began in November of 1899, lasted through the capture of Aguinaldo in 1901 and into the spring of 1902, by which time most organized Filipino resistance had dissipated. President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed a general amnesty and declared the conflict over on July 4, 1902, although minor uprisings and insurrections against American rule periodically occurred in the years that followed. The United States entered the conflict with undeniable military advantages that included a trained fighting force, a steady supply of military equipment, and control of the archipelago's waterways. Meanwhile, the Filipino forces were hampered by their inability to gain any kind of outside support for their cause, chronic shortages of weapons and ammunition, and complications produced by the Philippines' geographic complexity. Under these conditions, Aguinaldo's attempt to fight a conventional war in the first few months of the conflict proved to be a fatal mistake; the Filipino army suffered severe losses in men and material before switching to the guerrilla tactics that might have been more effective if employed from the beginning of the conflict. The war was brutal on both sides. U.S. forces at times burned villages, implemented civilian reconcentration policies, and employed torture on suspected guerrillas, while Filipino fighters also tortured captured soldiers and terrorized civilians who cooperated with American forces. Many civilians died during the conflict as a result of the fighting, cholera and malaria epidemics, and food shortages caused by several agricultural catastrophes. Even as the fighting went on, the colonial government that the United States established in the Philippines in 1900 under future President William Howard Taft launched a pacification campaign that became known as the "policy of attraction."
| 2,570 | 4,409 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8386418#4_12912907
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/87722.htm
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902
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the Filipino army suffered severe losses in men and material before switching to the guerrilla tactics that might have been more effective if employed from the beginning of the conflict. The war was brutal on both sides. U.S. forces at times burned villages, implemented civilian reconcentration policies, and employed torture on suspected guerrillas, while Filipino fighters also tortured captured soldiers and terrorized civilians who cooperated with American forces. Many civilians died during the conflict as a result of the fighting, cholera and malaria epidemics, and food shortages caused by several agricultural catastrophes. Even as the fighting went on, the colonial government that the United States established in the Philippines in 1900 under future President William Howard Taft launched a pacification campaign that became known as the "policy of attraction." Designed to win over key elites and other Filipinos who did not embrace Aguinaldo's plans for the Philippines, this policy permitted a significant degree of self-government, introduced social reforms, and implemented plans for economic development. Over time, this program gained important Filipino adherents and undermined the revolutionaries' popular appeal, which significantly aided the United States' military effort to win the war. In 1907, the Philippines convened its first elected assembly, and in 1916, the Jones Act promised the nation eventual independence. The archipelago became an autonomous commonwealth in 1935, and the U.S. granted independence in 1946.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8391802#0_12914768
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/103729.htm
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The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
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The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
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The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the earth's first artificial satellite, Sputnik I. The successful launch came as a shock to experts and citizens in the United States, who had hoped that the United States would accomplish this scientific advancement first. The fact that the Soviets were successful fed fears that the U.S. military had generally fallen behind in developing new technology. As a result, the launch of Sputnik served to intensify the arms race and raise Cold War tensions. During the 1950s, both the United States and the Soviet Union were working to develop new technology. Nazi Germany had been close to developing the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) near the end of the Second World War, and German scientists aided research in both countries in the wake of that conflict. Both countries were also engaged in developing satellites as a part of a goal set by the International Council of Scientific Unions, which had called for the launch of satellite technology during late 1957 or 1958. Over the course of the decade, the United States tested several varieties of rockets and missiles, but all of these tests ended in failure. The Soviet launch of the first Sputnik satellite was one accomplishment in a string of technological successes. Few in the United States had anticipated it, and even those who did were not aware of just how impressive it would be. At 184 pounds, the Russian satellite was much heavier than anything the United States was developing at the time, and its successful launch was quickly followed by the launch of two additional satellites, including one that carried a dog into space.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/103729.htm
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The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
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The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
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Both countries were also engaged in developing satellites as a part of a goal set by the International Council of Scientific Unions, which had called for the launch of satellite technology during late 1957 or 1958. Over the course of the decade, the United States tested several varieties of rockets and missiles, but all of these tests ended in failure. The Soviet launch of the first Sputnik satellite was one accomplishment in a string of technological successes. Few in the United States had anticipated it, and even those who did were not aware of just how impressive it would be. At 184 pounds, the Russian satellite was much heavier than anything the United States was developing at the time, and its successful launch was quickly followed by the launch of two additional satellites, including one that carried a dog into space. Together, these orbited the earth every 90-minutes and created fear that the United States lagged far behind in technological capability. These concerns were compounded when the United States learned that the Soviet Union also tested the first intercontinental ballistic missile that year. Although President Dwight Eisenhower had tried to downplay the importance of the Sputnik launch to the American people, he poured additional funds and resources into the space program in an effort to catch up. The U.S. Government suffered a severe setback in December of 1957 when its first artificial satellite, named Vanguard, exploded on the launch pad, serving as a very visible reminder of how much the country had yet to accomplish to be able to compete militarily with the Soviets. At last, on January 31, 1958, the United States succeeded in launching its first satellite, the Explorer.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/103729.htm
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The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
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The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
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Together, these orbited the earth every 90-minutes and created fear that the United States lagged far behind in technological capability. These concerns were compounded when the United States learned that the Soviet Union also tested the first intercontinental ballistic missile that year. Although President Dwight Eisenhower had tried to downplay the importance of the Sputnik launch to the American people, he poured additional funds and resources into the space program in an effort to catch up. The U.S. Government suffered a severe setback in December of 1957 when its first artificial satellite, named Vanguard, exploded on the launch pad, serving as a very visible reminder of how much the country had yet to accomplish to be able to compete militarily with the Soviets. At last, on January 31, 1958, the United States succeeded in launching its first satellite, the Explorer. The Explorer was still slighter than Sputnik, but its launch sent it deeper into space. The Soviets responded with yet another launch, and the space race continued. The success of Sputnik had a major impact on the Cold War and the United States. Fear that they had fallen behind led U.S. policymakers to accelerate space and weapons programs. In the late 1950s, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev boasted about Soviet technological superiority and growing stockpiles of ICBMs, so the United States worked simultaneously to develop its own ICBMs to counter what it assumed was a growing stockpile of Soviet missiles directed against the United States.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/103729.htm
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The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
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The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
The Launch of Sputnik, 1957
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The Explorer was still slighter than Sputnik, but its launch sent it deeper into space. The Soviets responded with yet another launch, and the space race continued. The success of Sputnik had a major impact on the Cold War and the United States. Fear that they had fallen behind led U.S. policymakers to accelerate space and weapons programs. In the late 1950s, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev boasted about Soviet technological superiority and growing stockpiles of ICBMs, so the United States worked simultaneously to develop its own ICBMs to counter what it assumed was a growing stockpile of Soviet missiles directed against the United States. With both countries researching new technology, talk of creating a treaty banning nuclear testing faded away for several years. In this way, the launch of Sputnik fueled both the space race and the arms race, in addition to increasing Cold War tensions, as each country worked to prepare new methods of attacking the other. Eventually, lawmakers and political campaigners in the United States successfully exploited the fear of a "missile gap" developing between U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals in the 1960 presidential election, which brought John F. Kennedy to power over Eisenhower's vice president, Richard Nixon. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 served to remind both sides of the dangers of the weapons they were developing.
| 2,634 | 4,014 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8396082#0_12922302
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/82548.htm
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The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
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The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
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The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, and Congress approved it in March of the same year. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. Eisenhower singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. forces "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." The Eisenhower Administration's decision to issue this doctrine was motivated in part by an increase in Arab hostility toward the West, and growing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria following the Suez Crisis of 1956. The Suez Crisis, which had resulted in military mobilization by Great Britain, France, and Israel--as well as United Nations action--against Egypt, had encouraged pan-Arab sentiment in the Middle East, and elevated the popularity and influence of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. President Eisenhower believed that, as a result of the Suez conflict, a power vacuum had formed in the Middle East due to the loss of prestige of Great Britain and France. Eisenhower feared that this had allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form dangerous alliances with Jordan and Syria, and had opened the Middle East to Soviet influence. Eisenhower wanted this vacuum filled by the United States before the Soviets could step in to fill the void. Because Eisenhower feared that radical nationalism would combine with international communism in the region and threaten Western interests, he was willing to commit to sending U.S. troops to the Middle East under certain circumstances. The first real test of the Eisenhower Doctrine came in 1958 in Lebanon, where the threat was not armed aggression or a direct Soviet incursion.
| 0 | 2,061 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8396082#1_12924679
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/82548.htm
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The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
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The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
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President Eisenhower believed that, as a result of the Suez conflict, a power vacuum had formed in the Middle East due to the loss of prestige of Great Britain and France. Eisenhower feared that this had allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form dangerous alliances with Jordan and Syria, and had opened the Middle East to Soviet influence. Eisenhower wanted this vacuum filled by the United States before the Soviets could step in to fill the void. Because Eisenhower feared that radical nationalism would combine with international communism in the region and threaten Western interests, he was willing to commit to sending U.S. troops to the Middle East under certain circumstances. The first real test of the Eisenhower Doctrine came in 1958 in Lebanon, where the threat was not armed aggression or a direct Soviet incursion. Lebanon's President, Camille Chamoun, requested assistance from the United States in order to prevent attacks from Chamoun's political rivals, some of whom had communist leanings and ties to Syria and Egypt. Eisenhower responded to Chamoun's request by sending U.S. troops into Lebanon to help maintain order. Although Eisenhower never directly invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, the American action in Lebanon was meant not only to help Chamoun's Government against its political opponents, but also to send a signal to the Soviet Union that it would act to protect its interests in the Middle East.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/97179.htm
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Suez Crisis, 1956
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Suez Crisis, 1956
Suez Crisis, 1956
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Suez Crisis, 1956
Suez Crisis, 1956
The Suez Crisis of 1956, in which the Egyptian Government seized control of the Suez Canal from the British and French owned company that managed it, had important consequences for U.S. relations with both Middle Eastern countries and European allies. On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the British and French owned Suez Canal Company that operated the Suez Canal. Nasser's decision threatened British and French stock holdings in the Company and, as the Canal afforded Western countries access to Middle Eastern oil, also threatened to cut off Europe's oil supply. The ensuing Suez Crisis threatened regional stability and challenged the U.S. relationship with two primary Cold War allies, Britain and France. Nasser nationalized the canal after the United States and Britain reneged on a previous agreement to finance the Aswan Dam project. The Aswan Dam was designed to control the Nile's flood waters and provide electricity and water to the Egyptian populace and, as such, was a symbol of Egypt's modernization. The United States and Britain withdrew their financing for the Aswan Dam after Nasser made several moves that appeared friendly to the communist block, including an arms deal with Czechoslovkaia and recognition of the Chinese Government in Beijing. Without support from the United States and Britain, Nasser needed the revenue generated from tolls collected from ships using the Suez Canal to subsidize the cost of building the dam. Although the United State was concerned about Nasser's nationalization of the canal, it sought a diplomatic solution to the problem. Britain and France, however, viewed the situation as a threat to their national interests.
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Suez Crisis, 1956
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Suez Crisis, 1956
Suez Crisis, 1956
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The Aswan Dam was designed to control the Nile's flood waters and provide electricity and water to the Egyptian populace and, as such, was a symbol of Egypt's modernization. The United States and Britain withdrew their financing for the Aswan Dam after Nasser made several moves that appeared friendly to the communist block, including an arms deal with Czechoslovkaia and recognition of the Chinese Government in Beijing. Without support from the United States and Britain, Nasser needed the revenue generated from tolls collected from ships using the Suez Canal to subsidize the cost of building the dam. Although the United State was concerned about Nasser's nationalization of the canal, it sought a diplomatic solution to the problem. Britain and France, however, viewed the situation as a threat to their national interests. Accordingly, they sought a military solution that involved Israel. They secretly contacted the Israeli Government and proposed a joint military operation in which Israel would invade the Sinai and march toward the Suez Canal zone after which Britain and France would issue a warning to both Egypt and Israel to stay away from the Canal. Britain and France would then land paratroopers in the Canal Zone on the pretense of protecting it. Israel willingly agreed to this scenario since it gave Israel the opportunity to gain control of the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula, end the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and retaliate against Egypt over its support for Palestinian commando raids on Israel's western border during the previous two years. On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces moved across the border, defeated the Egyptian army in the Sinai, captured Sharm al-Sheikh and thereby guaranteed Israeli strategic control over the Straits of Tiran.
| 942 | 2,730 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8399011#2_12930494
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/97179.htm
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Suez Crisis, 1956
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Suez Crisis, 1956
Suez Crisis, 1956
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Accordingly, they sought a military solution that involved Israel. They secretly contacted the Israeli Government and proposed a joint military operation in which Israel would invade the Sinai and march toward the Suez Canal zone after which Britain and France would issue a warning to both Egypt and Israel to stay away from the Canal. Britain and France would then land paratroopers in the Canal Zone on the pretense of protecting it. Israel willingly agreed to this scenario since it gave Israel the opportunity to gain control of the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula, end the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and retaliate against Egypt over its support for Palestinian commando raids on Israel's western border during the previous two years. On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces moved across the border, defeated the Egyptian army in the Sinai, captured Sharm al-Sheikh and thereby guaranteed Israeli strategic control over the Straits of Tiran. Britain and France issued their ultimatum and landed troops, effectively carrying out the agreed upon operation. However, the United States and the Soviet Union responded to events by demanding a cease-fire. In a resolution before the United Nations, the United States also called for the evacuation of Israeli, French, and British forces from Egypt under the supervision of a special United Nations force. This force arrived in Egypt in mid-November. By December 22, the last British and French troops had withdrawn from Egyptian territory, but Israel kept its troops in Gaza until March 19, 1957, when the United States finally compelled the Israeli Government to withdraw its troops.
| 1,773 | 3,417 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8399011#3_12932388
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/97179.htm
|
Suez Crisis, 1956
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Suez Crisis, 1956
Suez Crisis, 1956
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Britain and France issued their ultimatum and landed troops, effectively carrying out the agreed upon operation. However, the United States and the Soviet Union responded to events by demanding a cease-fire. In a resolution before the United Nations, the United States also called for the evacuation of Israeli, French, and British forces from Egypt under the supervision of a special United Nations force. This force arrived in Egypt in mid-November. By December 22, the last British and French troops had withdrawn from Egyptian territory, but Israel kept its troops in Gaza until March 19, 1957, when the United States finally compelled the Israeli Government to withdraw its troops. The Suez conflict fundamentally altered the regional balance of power. It was a military defeat for Egypt, but Nasser's status grew in the Arab world as the defender of Arab nationalism. Israel withdrew from Egyptian territory gained in the fighting but regained access to the Straits of Tiran, while the United Nations adopted a larger role maintaining a peacekeeping force in the Sinai. Britain and France lost influence in the region and suffered humiliation after the withdrawal of their troops from the Canal Zone. Moreover, relations between the United States and its British and French allies temporarily deteriorated in the months following the war.
| 2,731 | 4,075 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8399011#4_12933982
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/97179.htm
|
Suez Crisis, 1956
|
Suez Crisis, 1956
Suez Crisis, 1956
|
The Suez conflict fundamentally altered the regional balance of power. It was a military defeat for Egypt, but Nasser's status grew in the Arab world as the defender of Arab nationalism. Israel withdrew from Egyptian territory gained in the fighting but regained access to the Straits of Tiran, while the United Nations adopted a larger role maintaining a peacekeeping force in the Sinai. Britain and France lost influence in the region and suffered humiliation after the withdrawal of their troops from the Canal Zone. Moreover, relations between the United States and its British and French allies temporarily deteriorated in the months following the war. In contrast, Soviet influence in the Middle East grew, especially in Syria where the Soviets began to supply arms and advisers to the Syrian military. The United States had played a moderating role, and in so doing had improved its relations with Egypt, but the fundamental disputes between Israel and its neighbors remained unresolved. When these disagreements resurfaced, the United States would again be drawn into the conflicts.
| 3,417 | 4,508 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8403753#0_12935322
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/88110.htm
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
Edmond Charles Gen�t served as French minister to the United States from 1793 to 1794. His activities in that capacity embroiled the United States and France in a diplomatic crisis, as the United States Government attempted to remain neutral in the conflict between Great Britain and Revolutionary France. The controversy was ultimately resolved by Gen�t's recall from his position. As a result of the Citizen Gen�t affair, the United States established a set of procedures governing neutrality. American foreign policy in the 1790s was dominated by the events surrounding the French Revolution. Following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1792, the revolutionary French Government clashed with the monarchies of Spain and Great Britain. French policymakers needed the United States to help defend France's colonies in the Caribbean - either as a neutral supplier or as a military ally, and so they dispatched Edmond Charles Gen�t, an experienced diplomat, as minister to the United States. The French assigned Gen�t several additional duties: to obtain advance payments on debts that the U.S. owed to France, to negotiate a commercial treaty between the United States and France, and to implement portions of the 1778 Franco-American treaty which allowed attacks on British merchant shipping using ships based in American ports. Gen�t's attempt to carry out his instructions would bring him into direct conflict with the U.S. Government.
| 0 | 1,538 |
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