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<title> - NO COMPUTER SYSTEM LEFT BEHIND: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S D+ INFORMATION SECURITY GRADE</title>
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[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

NO COMPUTER SYSTEM LEFT BEHIND: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S D+
INFORMATION SECURITY GRADE

=======================================================================

HEARING

before the

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

APRIL 7, 2005

__________

Serial No. 109-13

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform

______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
20-562 WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent)
------ ------

Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

C O N T E N T S

----------
Page
Hearing held on April 7, 2005.................................... 1
Statement of:
Crandlemire, Bruce N., Assistant Inspector General for Audit,
U.S. Agency for International Development; John Streufert,
Acting Chief Information Officer, U.S. Agency for
International Development, accompanied by Mark Norman,
USAID OIG; Melinda Dempsey, USAID OIG; Philip M. Heneghan,
USAID; Frank Deffer, Assistant Inspector General for
Information Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Steve Cooper, Chief Information Officer, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, accompanied by Edward G.
Coleman, DHS OIG; Ted Alves, Assistant Inspector General
for IT and Financial Management, U.S. Department of
Transportation; Daniel Matthews, Chief Information Officer,
U.S. Department of Transportation, accompanied by Rebecca
Leng, DOT OIG; Ed Densmore, DOT OIG; Nate Custer, DOT OIG;
Vicki Lord, DOT OCIO; and Dr. Dan Mehan, CIO, FAA.......... 71
Alves, Ted............................................... 105
Cooper, Steve............................................ 99
Crandlemire, Bruce N..................................... 71
Deffer, Frank............................................ 89
Matthews, Daniel......................................... 124
Streufert, John.......................................... 79
Wilshusen, Greg, Director, Information Security Issues, U.S.
Government Accountability Office; and Karen S. Evans,
Administrator, Office of E-Government and Information
Technology, U.S. Office of Management and Budget........... 22
Evans, Karen S........................................... 52
Wilshusen, Greg.......................................... 22
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Alves, Ted, Assistant Inspector General for IT and Financial
Management, U.S. Department of Transportation, prepared
statement of............................................... 107
Cooper, Steve, Chief Information Officer, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, prepared statement of................... 102
Crandlemire, Bruce N., Assistant Inspector General for Audit,
U.S. Agency for International Development, prepared
statement of............................................... 74
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 17
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia, prepared statement of................... 4
Deffer, Frank, Assistant Inspector General for Information
Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, prepared
statement of............................................... 91
Evans, Karen S., Administrator, Office of E-Government and
Information Technology, U.S. Office of Management and
Budget, prepared statement of.............................. 54
Matthews, Daniel, Chief Information Officer, U.S. Department
of Transportation, prepared statement of................... 126
Ruppersberger, Hon. C.A. Dutch, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Maryland, prepared statement of.......... 12
Streufert, John, Acting Chief Information Officer, U.S.
Agency for International Development, prepared statement of 81
Wilshusen, Greg, Director, Information Security Issues, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of.... 24

NO COMPUTER SYSTEM LEFT BEHIND: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S D+
INFORMATION SECURITY GRADE

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 2005

House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Davis, Duncan, Cummings,
Ruppersberger, and Norton.
Staff present: Ellen Brown, legislative director and senior
policy counsel; Robert Borden, counsel/parliamentarian; Rob
White, press secretary; Victoria Proctor, senior professional
staff member; Jamie Hjort, professional staff member; Chaz
Phillips, policy counsel; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah
D'Orsie, deputy clerk; Kristin Amerling, minority deputy chief
counsel; Karen Lightfoot, minority communications director/
senior policy advisor; Nancy Scola, minority professional staff
member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa,
minority assistant clerk.
Chairman Tom Davis. Good morning. The committee will come
to order.
I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on
implementation of FISMA, the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002.
We rely heavily on information technology and the Internet
to support our economy, our national security and government
operations. For instance, e-commerce is more popular than ever;
Christmas 2004 saw record high consumer demapped on retail Web
sites. IT systems are used to operate and protect our critical
infrastructures. And in the Federal Government, electronic
government initiatives create efficiencies, save taxpayers time
and money, and help eliminate redundant processes.
Given the interconnectivity of systems, all it takes is one
weak link to break the chain. All users, whether they are at
home or at school or at work, need to understand the impact of
weak security and the measures that should be taken to prevent
cyber attacks.
Everyone must protect his or her cyberspace, and of course,
that includes the government. Therefore, it is critical that
the Federal Government adequately protect its systems to ensure
the continuity of operations, and to maintain public trust.
This is particularly true of agencies such as the Internal
Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration and the
Department of Veterans Affairs that maintain citizens' personal
information in their systems. Recent failures by the Bank of
America and Choice Point have focused the spotlight on identity
theft. Successful FISMA implementation is important because a
similar event could occur in the government.
Like the private sector, agencies are not immune to the
loss of personal information. Threats to government systems
could result in identity theft and subsequent financial damage
and frustration, as well as diminished trust in government IT
capabilities and electronic government programs.
Every day Federal information systems are subjected to
probes or attacks from outside sources. Cyber attacks are
evolving and becoming more sophisticated. Therefore, a
government information security management program must be
comprehensive, yet flexible enough to adapt to the changing
cyber threat environment. It is a matter of good management and
good business practice, but it is also a matter of national
security. FISMA provides that structure by requiring that each
agency create a comprehensive risk-based approach to agency-
wide information security management.
OMB performs an important role in the information security
management process by encouraging agencies to adopt a new
approach to security. In the past, information security was
often seen as an afterthought, more of a crisis response than a
management tool. OMB is helping to alter that perspective. It
holds the agencies responsible for protecting Federal systems
through business case evaluations so that agencies can better
fulfill their missions. OMB requires agencies to address their
security deficiencies before they are permitted to spend money
on IT upgrades or new IT projects.
I support this action because it forces agencies to
concentrate on security before adding new layers of systems to
their architecture and potentially complicating their security
concerns.
I'm also pleased that OMB has identified a sixth line of
business, cyber security. Laws like FISMA and the Clinger-Cohen
amendment require every agency to think about and invest in
information security. However, each agency does it differently.
The reason FISMA grades show the Federal Government still has a
long way to go when it comes to information security. As with
the other five lines of business, the goal of the cyber
security line of businesses is to use business principles and
best practices to identify common solutions for business
processes and/or technology-based shared services for
government agencies. The intended result is better, more
efficient and consistent security across the Federal Government
for the same amount of dollars, if not less. And at the end of
the day, it's not how much money you spend, though, it's how
well you spend it.
To help us gauge the agencies information security
progress, FISMA requires the CIOs and IGs to submit reports to
Congress and OMB. The committee enlists GAO's technical
assistance to prepare the annual scorecard. This year the
government made a slight improvement, receiving a D+. The
overall government score is two points above last year, but
needless to say, this isn't impressive. Progress is slow. Our
objective today is to find out how the government can improve,
and why some agencies can show remarkable improvement while
others appear to flounder.
We will hear from the IGs and CIOs of two agencies that
improved their scores this year, Department of Transportation
and the U.S. Agency for International Development. We will also
hear from the IG and the CIO of the Department of Homeland
Security, a poor performer again this year. I think it is worth
noting that DHS has cyber security responsibilities for the
Nation, and must work with the private sector regularly on
these issues. Given this role, DHS needs to have its house in
order and should become a security leader among agencies. What
is holding them up? Well, the DHS witnesses will discuss the
unique challenges that they face in a large and relatively new
agency, and what actions they are taking to improve their
information security, giving us a better understanding of their
difficulties.
In addition, we're concerned about how well the CIO and IG
offices communicate about issues such as their interpretations
of the OMB reporting requirements. Disagreements on
interpretation may impact their respective reports and make it
difficult for us to get an accurate picture of the agency's
information security progress. This also raises questions about
the clarity of the guidance, and whether agencies respond to
OMB about the guidance during the comment period so their
comments and concerns are adequately addressed in the final
version.
We will examine whether the IGs need a standardized
information security audit framework similar to that used for
financial management systems. Also, we need to address whether
agencies need additional guidance, procedures or resources to
improve their information security and fully comply with FISMA.
Panel one witnesses from GAO and OMB will focus on
information security from the government-wide perspective.
Panel two is comprised of agency representatives and will focus
on the agency-level perspective on implementation of FISMA.
We'll hear from the IGs and CIOs at USAID, DHS, and the
Department of Transportation. GAO will join panel two for the
question-and-answer period.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. I now recognize our distinguished
ranking member, Mr. Waxman, for his opening statement.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I'm not Mr. Waxman, I'm a little bit
larger than Mr. Waxman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, when he comes, we will recognize
him. In the meantime, we're very pleased to recognize from
Baltimore City, Mr. Ruppersberger, who I will be happy to
recognize.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, first, thank you for calling this
hearing today on OMB's report to Congress on the Federal
Information Security Management Act.
According to the report, the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the Department of Transportation received the
highest grades of all 24 agencies reviewed. I hope that during
today's hearing, we will be able to pull out some best
practicing and tangible suggestions from those agencies as to
how the other 22 can improve their grades. It is disappointing
and unacceptable that our government agencies' overall grade is
a D+, however, I'm encouraged by the few successes that will be
discussed here today.
The F grade for the Department of Homeland Security is
totally unacceptable because of the high stakes involved and
their mission to protect our national security. Last week, the
President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States issued their report regarding WMDs. In the
report's postscript the Commission identified security,
counterintelligence, and information assurance as crucial
issues in the intelligence community and the Director of
National Intelligence in the next few years to come.
The Commission acknowledges that they only scratched the
surface of the problem, and the Commission recommends early
action to define new strategies for managing security in the
21st century, security that includes information assurance,
which is why we're all here today.
This recommendation from the Commission will be a
beneficial step in the process for the Department of Homeland
Security and other security offices to improve their
infrastructure security and their information and cyber
security efforts.
The good news is that the Justice Department improved the
most, going from an F last year to a B- this year. Currently,
as graded, the FBI is evaluated within the overall grade given
to Justice. Based on the FBI's mission regarding national
security interests, I believe they should be graded separately
from the Department of Justice.
Again, according to the President's Commission, further
reforms are also necessary in the FBI's information technology
infrastructure which remains a persistent obstacle for
successful execution of the FBI's national security mission.
If we look at the problem as a national security issue in
addition to a general information security issue, I think we
will be able to come together to find solutions that will work
across all agencies. I know there is always a tradeoff between
the cost of implementing a security measure and the potential
risks if we do not. I feel that projecting our citizens and the
government from information security breaches is worth the cost
that will be incurred to set up appropriate security measures.
I am concerned about all of these issues, but I think if we get
past the grades and use this hearing and OMB's report as a
guide, I think we will be able to quickly improve information
security government-wide.
We're here today to point out a problem and to see what we
can do to fix it. These failing grades are unacceptable. We
need to learn from those agencies who are doing well so that we
can improve individual agency's scores and the government-wide
score.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger
follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. I do not see Mr.
Waxman, even though he is in my script.
The gentleman from Maryland, any opening statement?
Mr. Cummings. Yes, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I, too, thank you for calling this important
hearing on the effectiveness of the Federal Government's
ongoing attempt to strengthen the security and reliability of
its information and information systems.
Decades ago, the necessity of such a hearing would have
been questionable as information technology and the Internet
were not as prevalent nor as indispensable in the Federal
Government as they are today. In the 21st century, one need not
look very far to see how ambiguous information technology and
the Internet have become in the day-to-day operations of the
Federal Government. Communications now travel as fast and as
far as the Internet allows. The electronic processing of
information allows delivery of services to function with
unprecedented ease and accuracy. The sharing of information
intergovernmentally and across sectors can permit the Federal
Government to operate with renewed effectiveness.
However, with all the advantages that accompany the Federal
Government's information technology capabilities, there still
exist critical areas of concern. The terms ``computer virus,''
``worm'' and ``hacker'' are now part of the modern day lexicon
for good reason. Given the sensitivity of personal and
confidential data found in Federal information systems in
agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service and the
Department of Defense, the potential exists for cyber criminal,
terrorist or foreign nation to wreak havoc.
The American people are acutely aware that such
vulnerabilities could not only result in identity theft and a
loss of privacy, but also endanger our economy and undermine
our national security.
Due to these concerns, information security has become a
top governmental priority. To that end, Congress passed the
Federal Information Security Management Act [FISMA], in 2002.
This legislation established a comprehensive framework to
safeguard the Federal Government's information and information
systems.
Agencies are mandated to implement an information security
program, which includes performing risk assessments, accounting
for utilized information systems, and developing procedures to
ensure the accessibility and continuity of information.
Agencies must also furnish the Office of Management and Budget
with an annual report on the effectiveness of their program.
These agency reports form the basis of the Government Reform
Committee's Federal computer security report card.
Specifically, the FISMA report for 2004 acknowledges some
improvements and perennial challenges in this area.
It states that agencies have made substantial progress in
the certification and accreditation of systems, the
incorporation of built-in security costs, the annual testing of
system controls, the development of contingency plans to ensure
operational continuity, and the implementation of security
configuration requirements. This progress is commendable,
however, given that the 2004 government-wide grade for
information security is a D+, information technology is too
early to celebrate. Critically important agencies such as the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Department of Veteran Affairs all
received Fs.
I would argue no one here would be satisfied if their child
brought home these grades from school. How can we afford to
have a lower standard for the Federal Government? The American
people demand excellence, and Cs, Ds and Fs in securing the
Federal Government's information just won't do.
Today's hearing will serve as an avenue to identify what
needs to occur to assist Federal agencies in realizing the
goals of FISMA. I hope the witnesses will provide insight to
help Congress determine whether agencies require additional
guidance in order to meet FISMA requirements, the
responsibilities of agency Inspectors General in this process,
and the need to possibly provide increased flexibility in
assessing agency compliance with FISMA mandates.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for calling the
hearing, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank you very much.
For our first panel we have Greg Wilshusen, who is the
Director of Information Security Issues, at the Government
Accountability Office, who is no stranger to this committee.
And we have Karen Evans, who is the Administrator of the Office
of E-Government and Information Technology at the Office of
Management and Budget. I'm not sure if this is your first time
in a full committee, you have done a lot in the subcommittee,
but we welcome you, we're happy to hear from you, and we
appreciate the job that you are doing.
You know it is our policy to swear witnesses in, so would
you rise and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

STATEMENTS OF GREG WILSHUSEN, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY
ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND KAREN S.
EVANS, ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF E-GOVERNMENT AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

STATEMENT OF GREG WILSHUSEN

Mr. Wilshusen. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee,
I am pleased to be here today to discuss Federal efforts to
implement requirements of the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 [FISMA]. This act requires each agency
to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information
security program that provides security for the information and
information systems that support the operations and assets of
the agency, including those provided and/or managed by another
agency or contractor. Agency programs are to include eight
components, such as periodic assessment of risks and periodic
testing and evaluation of controls. FISMA also requires OMB,
Federal agencies and Inspectors General [IGs], to report each
year on efforts to implement these programs.
Mr. Chairman, my bottom-line message today is that
continued efforts are needed to sustain progress made by the
agencies in implementing the requirements of FISMA.
In my testimony today, I will note areas where agencies
have made significant progress and those areas where challenges
remain. In addition, I will discuss opportunities for improving
the annual FISMA reporting process.
Our reviews of information security controls at Federal
agencies have found that significant information security
weaknesses continue to place a broad array of Federal
operations and assets at risk of misuse and disruption. As a
result, we continue to designate Federal information security
as a government-wide high risk area in our recent update to
GAO's high-risk series.
In its fiscal year 2004 report to the Congress, OMB noted
that the 24 major Federal agencies continued to make
significant progress in implementing key information security
requirements. For example, OMB reported that the percentage of
Federal information systems that have been certified and
accredited rose 15 points to 77 percent. Systems certification
and accreditation is a process by which agency officials
authorize systems to operate. It is to include a security of
the management, operational and technical security controls in
the system.
However, OMB, the agencies, and IGs also reported several
areas where implementing effective information security
practices remains a challenge. For example, seven IGs assessed
the quality of their agency's certification and accreditation
processes as poor. As a result, agency reported performance
data may not accurately reflect the status of the agency's
efforts to implement this requirement.
As another example, 43 percent of Federal systems did not
have a tested contingency plan. These plans provide specific
instructions for restoring critical systems, business
processes, and information in the event of a disruption of
service. The testing of contingency plans is essential to
determine whether the plans will function as intended. Without
testing, agencies can have only minimal assurance that they
will be able to recover mission-critical systems and processes
in the event of an interruption.
Opportunities exist to improve the annual FISMA reporting
process. For example, in the absence of an independent
verification of agency-reported data, having a senior agency
official attest to the accuracy of data could provide
additional assurance.
In addition, performance measurement data do not indicate
the relevant importance or risk of the systems for which FISMA
requirements have been met. Reporting performance data by
system risk would provide better information about whether
agencies are prioritizing their information security efforts
according to risk.
Finally, developing and adopting a commonly accepted
framework for conducting the annual IG reviews mandated by
FISMA could help to ensure consistency and usefulness of these
reviews.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I will
be happy to answer any questions you or the members of the
committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilshusen follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. We do have a number of
questions.
Ms. Evans, thanks for being with us.

STATEMENT OF KAREN S. EVANS

Ms. Evans. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak about the status
of the Federal Government's efforts to safeguard our
information and systems.
In March 2005 OMB issued our second annual report on
implementing the Federal Information Security Management Act
[FISMA]. We continue to believe FISMA provides a sound
foundation for improving and maintaining a strong Federal
information technology security program. In short, FISMA is
working. Results are apparent. Agencies and Inspectors General
are becoming more acclimated to its requirements, and new
technical guidelines from the National Institute of Standards
and Technology are coming online to promote further progress.
We see no need at this time to revise it in any significant
way, in fact, substantial revision could delay additional
progress.
Across the Federal Government, most agencies have shown
substantial progress in improving their information security
programs. In addition, for the first time agencies reported the
degree to which they've implemented security configurations for
operating systems and software applications. We found that all
agencies have begun developing and implementing security
configuration policies for at least some of their operating
systems.
While progress has been made, deficiencies in agency
security procedures and practices remain. Two common
deficiencies noted by the agency's Inspector Generals include
weaknesses in agency-wide plans of actions and milestones, and
the lack of quality in some of the agencies' certification and
accreditation processes.
In addition, we have identified other areas of concern;
they include overall inconsistency in agency and government-
wide FISMA implementation, self and IG evaluations. Potentially
unnecessary duplication of effort and resources across the
government, ensuring adequate security of contractor-provided
services, and a transition to Internet protocol version 6.
While we believe FISMA itself, along with the implementing
guidance from OMB, NIST, and the national security authorities
are sufficiently comprehensive and detailed to address these
concerns at a policy level. Consistent implementation is
difficult and requires considerable expertise and resources at
the agency.
I would like to answer directly one of the questions asked
in your invitation letter, whether there is a need for the
Inspector General auditing framework similar to that used in
financial audits. We have found the IG's analysis extremely
valuable in gaining additional insight into the agency's IT
security programs and operations. Much of the analysis in our
annual report comes from the IG's findings, but at the same
time, like agency CIOs and operational program officials, IGs
have varying capacities in the areas of resource available and
security expertise.
And across the IG community, there are differing
methodologies and perspectives on what comprises a sound
security program, including the proper way to implement FISMA.
Therefore, to the extent that an IG framework would promote
greater consistency, we would support it; but we do note a few
concerns; first and foremost, we strongly believe that the work
of the IG should, to the maximum extent practical, be
integrated with and not separate from agency IT security
programs; and second, we're concerned with the adoption of a
strict and specific review requirement for FISMA purposes if
they would, in any way, limit the essential interaction needed
between IGs and CIOs.
In addition to ongoing discussions to promote consistency
in oversight and reporting, we have asked the IGs to
participate in the newly formed IT security line of business.
We expect this line of business will not only lead to a de
facto IG and CIO reporting framework, but more importantly, a
stronger Federal Government-wide IT security program.
While the task force performs its work, OMB will continue
to use our existing oversight mechanisms to improve agency and
government-wide IT security performance. Information technology
security is one of the No. 1 critical components that agencies
must implement in order to achieve green for the e-government
initiative of the President's management agenda. If the
security criteria are not successfully met, agencies cannot
move forward regardless of their performance against the other
criteria.
In conclusion, over the past year agencies have made
significant progress in closing the Federal Government
information technology security performance gaps.
I would like to acknowledge the significant work of the
agencies and the IGs in conducting the annual reviews and
evaluations. While notable progress in resolving IT security,
weaknesses have been made, problems continue, and new threats
and vulnerabilites continue to materialize. To address these
challenges OMB will continue to work with the agencies, GAO and
Congress to promote appropriate risk-based and cost-effective
IT security programs, policies and procedures to adequately
secure our operations and assets. But again, we believe FISMA
is more than adequate in its current form to support all the
needed improvement efforts. I would be glad to take any
questions at this time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Evans follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank you both.
Ms. Evans, what changes or improvements is your office
proposing for the 2005 FISMA guidance? And do you plan to issue
new updated guidance regarding your circular A-130?
Ms. Evans. We are working right now with the IG community
and NIST, CNSS and GAO to revise the reporting requirements.
It's going to be similar to last year. We are going to focus
this year more on performance metrics, and we are we going to
include a new reporting requirement this year dealing with
privacy of the information that the agencies are collecting.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, some agencies have expressed
concern that the term ``system'' is not well defined; for
instance, how should an agency classify a state system that
contains Federal data? Does OMB plan to address this in the new
guidance?
Ms. Evans. The definition of a system--and I want to answer
this question both from my past experience as an agency CIO,
and now as the policy official.
The reason why I believe that we have allowed the
definition to be the way that it is is that it provides maximum
flexibility. So as agencies would potentially view this as
ambiguous, we view it from a policy perspective as giving the
agencies flexibility that they need to be able to determine and
analyze what risk is appropriate for assets within their
control that they have that they are responsible for.
So there is an ambiguous nature to the definition of
system, but we look at it as it allows the flexibility for the
agency to define that so that they can then go forward and
implement the management policies and procedures they need in
order to deal with that.
You could do something very small and say one piece--there
could be an application on one piece that has enormous risk
that it would impose if it was connected to a network; you may
determine that should be called a system, and go through the
full certification and accreditation for that. And a system
could be as huge as a network, where the whole department's
network, that can constitute a system because there are certain
rules of engagement that you would want to have, rules of
behavior on that system before you would go forward and allow
other resources to be connected to it. So we don't necessarily
want to go down and be so proscriptive in our definitions as to
restrict the ability of the agency to be able to go forward and
determine what is the best posture for them.
Chairman Tom Davis. But you could have agencies defining it
differently, basically.
Ms. Evans. They may, and that is why the evaluation that is
being done by the IG, the independent evaluation coming in,
looks at how they apply that definition, how they have a
methodology within their department to see if the thought
process that they put behind it to determine it is sound to
address the risk.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. Wilshusen, what do agencies
have to do to get information security removed from the GAO
high-risk list? This is, as you know, the list was expanded to
include cyber security--well, cyber critical infrastructure
protection. Information security has been on the list since
1997. Can you briefly discuss what you think needs to be done
to get this off the high-risk list?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, first of all, what they need to do--
and where we have consistently found on our review--is to
implement at each agency an effective agency-wide information
security program, such as those principles and requirements
embodied in FISMA. And we have found that many of the agencies
have not done that. This in turn has allowed and has resulted
in many of their systems being insecure.
Chairman Tom Davis. Now why don't they do that? Is it lack
of money, they've got so many priorities at this point this is
just one, without additional resources, that they're reluctant
to do?
Mr. Wilshusen. It is probably a couple of issues. Certainly
the emphasis and level of attention since the passage of FISMA
has helped and has improved both awareness and accountability
of the highest levels of each of the agencies, and that has
been a positive thing. But in many cases it's primarily
management issues, even though security has technical aspects
to it. Many of the findings and issues that we identify are the
result of management issues where certain requirements are just
not being implemented.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you very much. I'm going to
have some more questions, but Mr. Ruppersberger is going to get
a turn here.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, after looking at the reports and
the grades, I see that some agencies have improved. Is there
any effort to have a departmental roundtable to share best
practices? I mean, what we are really here for today is to try
to get us to a level where we are going to be a lot more
efficient, and we have to find a way to do this. And it seems
to me, when you have agencies that are doing well and agencies
that aren't doing well, let's look at it and share information.
Could either one of you address that issue?
Ms. Evans. Yes, sir, I would be glad to.
There is actually two efforts underway. One the chairman
already noted, which is the cyber security line of business.
This is an interagency government-wide task force that OMB has
brought together under the leadership of the Department of
Homeland Security as well as it is being co-chaired by NSA. And
what we are doing there is looking at all of the issues. There
are four particular areas that we are looking at, like
training, like management practices of framework, those types
of activities which get to the heart of your question, what is
working, and what can we take that is working within the
agencies and move it out government-wide?
The one thing that when we set up this task force is,
because of the way FISMA is set up and the way that a cyber
security program should work, a good IT program should work
within a department is you still have to look at the risk. Each
department may have a different level of risk, so you can't
necessarily think that one size would fit all. But that is what
the security line of business is looking at.
Also, on the CIO council, the Department of Justice Vance
Hitch, is our cyber security liaison; he works very closely
with our Best Practices Committee on topics, and topics such as
security have always been on the forefront to bring together
the appropriate groups so that we can share best practices. And
then also, there is a newly named forum that we are--the CIO
council is co-chairing with Congressman Davis' staff, which is
the Chief Information Security Officers Forum.
So we are trying to bring it together at multiple levels
within an organization, and across the government as a whole,
so that practices can be identified----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask you this question: So much of
whatever we do in management, managing large organizations,
whatever, is accountability, and also giving the resources to
the people that we want to perform the mission. How about the
issue of maybe a government-wide audit standard? Do you think
that would help in this situation? It seems that we need a
standard for all of our agencies. Now we have different
missions and different areas that we move into. What do you
think of that issue?
Ms. Evans. Well, I believe, through the President's
management agenda, that we have added specific criteria into
the score card under e-government, so we are holding the
agencies accountable for their performance.
Mr. Ruppersberger. But these failing grades are just not
acceptable.
Ms. Evans. I believe that the progress and the way that we
are measuring progress--we have the same goals in mind, both
the committee as well as the administration. How we are
measuring progress may be a little bit different based on what
the rating factors are based on what the committee has. You are
specifically asking me about an auditing standard, and FISMA
specifically makes a difference between audit and evaluation.
And we really think that it's more of an evaluation because
this really needs to be a collaborative effort within the
entire department, because as you are talking about it, it is a
management issue as well. If it turns into an audit situation,
our concern is is that there won't be as much exchange, that it
is more an evaluation----
Mr. Ruppersberger. That's a good point. I'm near the end of
my 5 minutes, I want to keep moving down another area.
I am very concerned about the issue of the failing grade
with Homeland Security, and I guess it is your turn, Mr.
Wilshusen. Why do you feel at this point that Department of
Homeland Security has a failing grade? What can we do to move
that to another level to get them a lot more proficient in this
subject matter today?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, first of all, Homeland Security does--
and I guess you will talk to the CIO and IG on the next panel
as well, but they have had a number of challenges that they
need to overcome just in the creation of the department to----
Mr. Ruppersberger. No question.
Mr. Wilshusen. And that has been pretty much a key factor
in some of the challenges that they face. However, at the same
time, only just recently have they established key positions
within that department in terms of having a chief information
security officer, and they have identified key individuals to
be responsible for information security. But it will take quite
a bit of an effort for them to kind of meld different systems
to make sure there is appropriate accountability, and the
alignment of the information security program at the department
level with different operating entities. Right now there is
apparently quite a bit of autonomy between the two.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And we can develop that in the next
panel also, I see my time is up.
Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm sorry I was detained and I did not hear the entire
testimony, but what concerns me is the unevenness among the
agencies. Mr. Ruppersberger asked about homeland security and
there may be some reason why they haven't gotten most of their
act together, but some of these agencies you would expect to do
better, you would expect the Department of State to do better,
you would expect the Nuclear Regulatory Agency not to go down.
And I note that the agencies look like they are in charge
of this entire process. They are required to take the steps to
do the inventory of their systems. And apparently in the
survey, 70 percent of them said they wanted greater guidance in
meeting the requirements. The report cards signify nothing, if
not the need for greater guidance. I'm wondering if too much of
this is left to agencies who have no expertise here either in
choosing consultants in security aspects of computer systems;
in fact, no agency really does have that expertise. I'm
wondering if simply saying to the agencies, do this, has been
sufficient, particularly when they themselves say they want
greater guidance in meeting the requirements. And I suppose the
obvious question is, do you agree, and where would such
guidance come from? Are any steps being taken to offer greater
guidance, given the rather pathetic reports that are indicated
in the Federal computer security report card?
Ms. Evans. First off, what we are trying to do from an
administration perspective is avoid being very, very
proscriptive in the policy because what we want to avoid is
people just going down and cranking through--mechanically
cranking through and getting checkmarks because you really want
the practice to be engrained, and we were talking about
management practices.
So in order to meet what we are hearing from the agencies
about additional guidance, we did take that to heart, and that
is why the cyber security line of business was announced. They
are looking at very specific areas, and we are bringing in the
expertise in order to complement the team that has been put
together government-wide. There will be recommendations that
come out of that task force, specifically about how to identify
problems, how to move forward, how to make sure that we have
consistent and measurable types of statistics, how to do good
certification and accreditation, and how to achieve the things
that they are being measured upon, because I do agree with you,
you just can't say, here are the requirements, go out and do
it, and not provide the help and assistance that they need,
especially when they are asking for it.
So the products that will come out of the cyber security
line of business we are very hopeful will address the issue of
giving further guidance, without issuing new policies.
Ms. Norton. I don't understand what you mean about policy--
being proscriptive as to policy. As I understand it, they want
greater guidance in meeting the requirements and a
clarification of FISMA's assessment guidelines. I don't see
where there is policy proscription involved in that.
Mr. Wilshusen. One of the sources that the agencies can
look to is NIST. Since FISMA was enacted, it placed
specifically a responsibility to NIST in preparing and
providing guidance and requirements to agencies and
implementing the various aspects of FISMA. Over the last
several--2 years, NIST has come out with guidance, and indeed
they are going to be coming out with some additional guidance
in different areas going forward.
Ms. Norton. Well, they can look to that, and they could
have looked to that all along, I take it.
Mr. Wilshusen. Over the last couple of years they have
issued new guidance.
Ms. Norton. Well, all I can say is if the agency--if this
large percentage of the agencies that is, a super majority say
we need greater guidance, it does seem to me that whatever is
in place is insufficient, and that the responsibility of the
administration centrally is to assure that they get that
guidance so that these pathetic grades do not come before the
committee again.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Tennessee.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I remember when we passed the one agriculture bill, farm
bill a few years ago, 2 or 3 years ago, the Wall Street Journal
had an editorial--and the bill was called the Farm Security
Act--and it said any time we have the word ``security'' in a
bill, we ought to give it 4 times the scrutiny because they
were putting the word ``security'' in every bill, and we were
going to great, great expense, and not getting a lot of bang
for the buck, so to speak.
And then I have also read and heard that every computer
system is obsolete the day it's taken out of the box now
because the technology is moving so fast. So the concerns I
have--and I know Governor Gilmore from Virginia, who chaired
the President's Commission on Security and Terrorism, he said--
in his cover letter to the President, he said we must resist
the urge to try to achieve total and complete computer because
he said it's not attainable, and if we aren't careful, we will
drain our resources from other things that are achievable.
So I guess the two concerns I have is, No. 1, the cost of
some of these things, because what I read repeatedly, I
remember the FBI came up with a computer system that we spent
hundreds of millions on, and then they said it was a disaster
after we had paid for it. So what do we do on the cost of some
of these things? Are we looking at those costs and what we are
getting for our money so we don't just go ridiculously
overboard? And second, are we settling for a Mercedes instead
of constantly seeking to get Rolls Royces in regard to these
systems?
You've always got these companies that want to sell you
more and better and newer, and I'm just wondering are we using
a little common sense in regard to some of these things?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, certainly you are absolutely right,
there is no way to provide absolute assurance that you are
going to prevent any particular security infractions or
violations and the like. You can never give 100 percent
assurance that you are going to be able to thwart all security
threats.
What you have to do, and what FISMA requires, is that you
have a risk-based program and process in which you assess the
risk to your systems, and then come up with cost-effective
measures to protect against those particular risks. And
certainly, that is one of the key underpinnings of any
information security program is having it based on risk.
Mr. Duncan. All right.
Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Evans. As far as your question about evaluating the
cost based on the cyber security program, every agency is
required, as they bring forth their IT investments, to ensure
that the cyber security aspect, the risk associated with
implementing that system, is addressed, and the costs are
included in the cost of that business case coming forward.
So they have to look at how to secure the system against
the benefits that they are going to achieve for implementing
that system to ensure that there is an adequate return on
investment as they go forward.
So the business case process does get to your other concern
about ensuring that cost is being adequately addressed as they
go forward.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I just don't want to see us go
ridiculously overboard on the costs, or in any other direction,
and have to buy new computer systems at hundreds of millions or
even billions of dollars worth of cost just because somebody
comes up with a little better system the next year than we had
the year before. I mean, we just can't afford to keep doing
that. And then have us read and hear at hearings and read in
the paper that systems that some department or agency bought 1
year, as soon as it's taken--as soon as it's put on line, it's
not what it was promised to be. So I just hope you will take
those considerations--those concerns into consideration.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Let me do a couple
of followups.
The annual scorecard reflects that many of the larger
agencies have--consistently are poor performers, it may be
because of the complexity of their system. Has OMB identified a
trend here?
Ms. Evans. We have gone through and looked at the issues
associated with the larger agencies. I think it does get back
to some of the other high level issues that have been raised by
the committee themselves, which is proper attention from
management and ensuring that the priorities are established
within the Department to be able to move forward. And a lot of
it has to do with the leadership aspect of giving the proper
attention to the program.
So the way that we are trying to address that, again, is
back to the accountability issue, putting the proper tools in
place, working with the agencies, but using the President's
management agenda to hold the cabinet secretaries accountable
for their performance in this area.
Chairman Tom Davis. And CIOs could be great, but if the
cabinet secretaries aren't paying attention, or the managers,
it makes it a lot tougher, doesn't it?
Ms. Evans. Right. So we are trying to make sure--the
administration is trying to make sure--and is making sure
through the President's management agenda--that the cyber
security aspect of anything that they do is brought to the
level of the attention of the Deputy Secretary and the
Secretary, who are responsible for the overall programs of
their department.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me just talk about the
certification and accreditation, this C and A process, so to
speak. I know that one of OMB's objectives in its plan of
action is having all the systems C and A'd. But many IGs are
reported on a very inconsistent quality of agencies C and A
process. If the number of certified and accredited systems is
increased, but there is a question about the quality of the
processes, should we question the value of that information?
And I will ask Mr. Wilshusen to also respond.
Ms. Evans. Well, I was going to say the shorter answer is
yes, you should question the quality of that based on the IG's
finding; and that gets back to making sure that we provide
better guidance where the agencies are asking for that, and
working with the IG community and working with the CIOs as to
having a good credible certification and accreditation program
so that it does insert the discipline of always constantly
looking at the risk.
Mr. Wilshusen. And I would agree, you certainly do need to
question those statistics.
You know, just looking at what the agencies have reported
in terms of 77 percent of all the systems have been certified
and accredited, but one of the key aspects of that is to have a
testing contingency plan that you need in order to be certified
and accredited, and yet the agencies are also reporting that
only 57 percent of their systems have testing contingency
plans. So just that, in and of itself, shows that there is some
question about the reliability of that data.
Chairman Tom Davis. We are going to hear Daniel Matthews,
who is the DOT's CIO, suggest in his testimony eliminating
timing differences between the IG and the agency reports in
order to create a common point in time for measuring the status
of an agency's IT security program. I can see the merit of that
change; I would appreciate any comments either of you might
have on that.
Mr. Wilshusen. OK. In terms of having an as-of date, what
that would typically allow would allow the IGs to be able to
perhaps verify the information that the agencies are reporting
on their report cards in their performance measures, if that is
the goal of having such an as-of date. Similar to like on the
financial statement report where we have the end of the fiscal
year, and then the IGs have another 45 days to make the report
on it. But other than that, you know, I'm not sure what the
benefit would be.
Chairman Tom Davis. All right.
Ms. Evans. I was going to say, I concur with that. And we
are just--we would proceed with caution on an as-of date
because we want to make sure that interaction between the IGs
and the CIOs for their programs are ongoing, even while they
are still doing this annual reporting as well. So there is
nothing wrong with getting an as-of date in order to have
consistency for reporting, as long as the other goals are met.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I just have one question of you, Ms.
Evans.
The Federal Information Security Management Act extends a
requirement from the Paperwork Reduction Act that agencies
develop detailed inventories of their systems, and this seems
to be a requirement that agencies have a struggle with. One
official from the Department of Energy recently remarked that
unless that agency overhaul gets decentralized structure, poor
assessment under FISMA were guaranteed for years to come.
Do you think that there are ways that FISMA's inventory
requirement could be changed to address such concerns, without
compromising security?
Ms. Evans. That is an issue that we are attempting to
address with the change in the scorecard criteria as well.
Chairman Davis brought up the fact that we are saying all
systems need be to certified and accredited. At the heart of
that requirement is getting to how agencies are identifying
their inventory.
What we intend, and the issue that we brought forward to
the Interagency Task Force is to get a best practice or lessons
learned from the agencies that are scoring really well on how
they got a handle on their inventory process, and be able to
apply that out to the agency.
If at the end of that task force effort that is not
possible, then we will look at other alternatives and make
recommendations or changes to address the inventory issue.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. And for 2004, three agencies did not
submit independent IG reports to OMB for their annual report.
Can you explain why agencies are not complying with the IG
independent evaluation, and if they're not, what
recommendations will you have so that we make sure they do?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, one I think was in the case where
they--I think that was from the previous year, when DOD and VA
did not submit their report.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And that is not an issue now?
Mr. Wilshusen. Not as much this year, I don't think.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, you say not as much though; if
it's not, let's talk about----
Mr. Wilshusen. OK. I'm sorry, right. No, I don't think that
was a major issue.
Mr. Ruppersberger. For any of the agencies.
Mr. Wilshusen. That's correct.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. That's good news then.
Chairman Tom Davis. Anyone else with questions? Anything
you would like to add to clarify anything?
Ms. Evans. Well, the only thing, sir, I would like to add
is that we appreciate the focus of the committee on this issue
because, as you know, it is a continuing priority for the
administration in that we want to continue to make sure that
cyber security is at the forefront of everything that we do.
You have to have this going forward and manage the risk as we
continue to take more and more information and move more and
more--and deploy more and more in technology. So thank you for
your oversight.
Chairman Tom Davis. And thanks for what you're doing. I'll
just say, all you need is a bad adverse cyber event and
everybody is going to be all over this thing and asking the
questions that we're asking now, why wasn't this done. And I'm
not sure who the fall guy will be, but it ain't gonna be me.
And the difficulty in the private sector in many ways are
ahead of us because they always are looking at the downside,
they have to look at that. In government, many times the
managers will take the risk that it won't happen on my watch,
and they will go ahead with some of their other priorities; and
yet we know we're talking so people out there--for their
reasons are trying get in. So we appreciate your efforts on
this, and the CIO's efforts. I think a lot of this depends on
how close our CIOs are working with the agency heads at the end
of the day.
The other thing is, I think ultimately these FISMA report
cards are going to have to be tied to funding because sometimes
that's the only thing people understand, you can preach, you
can give them boxes to check, but if you tie it to funding,
that really gets their attention, and that may have to be the
next step if we continue to see the occurrences we do with some
of these report cards.
We're going to hear from some very good CIOs in the next
panel that have just very difficult jobs. These are difficult
jobs in some of these agencies where you are putting a lot of
their elements together, some of them that have been not
working well for a long time, but we'll get to that.
Anything you want to add?
Mr. Wilshusen. Right. And I would just like to also express
my appreciation for these oversight hearings because this
certainly does help to hold the agencies accountable for
implementing information security, and also with light comes
heat, and heat usually brings action. And hopefully the
increase of attention that this committee brings will help to
improve that as well----
Chairman Tom Davis. And a lot of times we're just
oversight; in this case we have jurisdiction as well. The FISMA
came out of this committee. We do share oversight
responsibilities with the Commerce Committee and with the
Homeland Security Committee on which I serve. And that's good,
I think we want everybody looking at this. I want to see more
focus on this from more committees and more questions answered,
that's what gets agency heads' attention.
But Ms. Evans, we appreciate your efforts on this.
Sometimes you're the voice out there in the wilderness crying,
but I know you have--your bosses are behind what you're doing
and everything as well, and we want to make sure you have the
tools to get the job done.
Thank you very much. We will take about a 2-minute recess
and set up for the next panel.
[Recess.]
Chairman Tom Davis. We are now going to move to our second
panel, and it is a distinguished panel indeed. We appreciate
having everybody back. Mr. Wilshusen, who is here to stay on to
answer questions but doesn't need to be sworn in again. We have
Bruce Crandlemire, who is the Assistant Inspector General for
Audit, U.S. Agency for International Development. John
Streufert, the Acting Chief Information Officer of the U.S.
Agency for International Development. Mr. Frank Deffer, who is
the Assistant Inspector General for Information Technology,
Department of Homeland Security. Steve Cooper, no stranger to
this committee, the Chief Information Officer, Department of
Homeland Security. Ted Alves, the Assistant Inspector General
for IT and Financial Management, Department of Transportation.
Daniel Matthews, the Chief Information Officer, Department of
Transportation.
It is our policy that we swear all the witnesses in, so if
you could just rise and raise your right hands. Can we identify
the folks in the back who will be answering questions, too?
Mr. Wilshusen. Ms. Melinda Dempsey, USAID. Mark Norman, who
is the Audit Manager who has all the detail knowledge.
Chairman Tom Davis. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Crandlemire. Phil Heneghan, the Information Systems
Security Officer, USAID.
Mr. Deffer. Edward Coleman, my Security Director.
Chairman Tom Davis. Excellent.
Mr. Alves. Rebecca Leng, Deputy Assistant Director.
Mr. Matthews. This is Ed Densmore, Director of IT Security,
Department of Transportation, and Dr. Dan Mehan who is the CIO
of the Federal Aviation.
Chairman Tom Davis. You have enough help there, don't you?
And how about in the back? I just need to make sure the
clerk gets everybody down for the record.
OK. Thank you.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you all very much for being here.
We've got a 5-minute rule we try to follow. The goal is to get
out of here about noon, so it will be 5 minutes apiece. So that
leaves us time for questions and we'll be fine.
Your entire statement is in the record, so it will be based
on that.
Mr. Crandlemire, we will start with you, and thank you for
being with us today.

STATEMENTS OF BRUCE N. CRANDLEMIRE, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR AUDIT, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; JOHN
STREUFERT, ACTING CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY MARK NORMAN, USAID
OIG; MELINDA DEMPSEY, USAID OIG; PHILIP M. HENEGHAN, USAID;
FRANK DEFFER, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; STEVE COOPER,
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ACCOMPANIED BY EDWARD G. COLEMAN, DHS OIG; TED ALVES,
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IT AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; DANIEL MATTHEWS, CHIEF
INFORMATION OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
ACCOMPANIED BY REBECCA LENG, DOT OIG; ED DENSMORE, DOT OIG;
NATE CUSTER, DOT OIG; VICKI LORD, DOT OCIO; AND DR. DAN MEHAN,
CIO, FAA

STATEMENT OF BRUCE N. CRANDLEMIRE

Mr. Crandlemire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other
committee members, for the opportunity to provide testimony for
the U.S. Agency for International Development's compliance with
FISMA. As you requested, my testimony will focus on the state
of information security at USAID and the methodology with which
we used to perform our audit in 2004. In addition, I will
discuss the need for standardized FISMA auditing framework and
possibly what guidance would be needed for agencies to fully
comply with FISMA.
USAID has made many positive strides over the last several
years in addressing information security weaknesses. In
particular, USAID has made several improvements in response to
audits performed by my office and in turn substantially
improved its computer security program.
In 1997, the Office of Inspector General identified
information security as a material weakness at USAID; USAID
information technology officials agreed with our conclusion and
included it in USAID's annual report as required by FMFIA. At
that time, USAID did not have an organizational structure that
clearly delegated information security responsibilities,
policies that provided for an effective information security
program, or key management processes to ensure that security
requirements were met. These material weaknesses remained
outstanding for several years until fiscal year 2004, when
USAID concluded, and we agreed, that information security was
no longer a material weakness at the agency.
In the recent 2 years, the most significant changes are an
appointment of an information security officer and the
implementation of a centralized information security framework.
Under this framework, USAID centrally manages its Windows 2000
domain servers, firewalls, and virus scan software for most of
USAID's networks; instituted a process to assess information
system security for the purchase of capital assets; and is
continually updating its information security policies and
procedures.
The agency has also identified several technological
changes to improve its computer security. For example, they
deployed Windows 2000, which has allowed the agency to lock
down and configure security settings and incorporate many
security improvements in comparisons with Windows 98. They have
installed operating network sensors to detect unauthorized
attempts to access our network. They run daily scans of its
worldwide network to proactively identify potential
vulnerabilities. They have also implemented a tips of the day
program, which is an automated security awareness program that
provides reminders to all system network users each day as a
prerequisite to sign into the network.
Through these systemwide information technology and network
changes, information security and information security
awareness at USAID locations around the world have been
significantly increased.
Although USAID has made substantial progress in improving
security, information security weaknesses still remain. As
reported in our 2004 FISMA audit report, the agency had not
developed a disaster recovery program for its three major
systems and had not tested the disaster recovery programs in
two other systems.
The OIG methodology for assessing USAID information
security into FISMA was to conduct an audit as opposed to an
evaluation. For fiscal year 2004, our audit field work was
conducted from August 19th to October 6th and involved over 600
hours. In addition, as part of our financial statement audit,
we incorporated about 2,800 staff hours as part of our general
control work. This work complemented our FISMA work.
To perform the audit, we interviewed USAID officials to
discuss their answers to the OMB questionnaire, and then we
tested the support for the answers. For each of USAID's 49
answers to the questionnaire, we determined whether the
agency's answer was supported by source documentation.
I am going to move now to the need for an Inspector General
auditing framework for information security. In our opinion,
since the OIG input to the FISMA process is used to upgrade
security among civilian agencies, there is an implicit
assumption that there must be a defined common set of
attributes to facilitate meaningful comparisons of independent
evaluation or audits performed by each IG.
Further, the establishment of these attributes or common
security auditing framework should be developed on a
collaborative basis among the IG community, OMB, and the
Government Accountability Office. This framework also should
address the resources needed to carry out the development and
implementation of the framework along with congressional
support for such an initiative.
I have just a couple comments on the existing process. I
think the agencies and the IGs need more time to prepare or
more time to respond to the annual FISMA questionnaire. Since
2002, the time between the issuance of the guidance until the
time we actually start--we actually have to report in has
gotten less. In 2002, it was 76 days, and this last year it was
only 44 days. We need more time so we can more efficiently use
our audit resources.
That concludes my statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Crandlemire follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Streufert, thanks for being with us.

STATEMENT OF JOHN STREUFERT

Mr. Streufert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify
on the status of our FISMA implementation and our security
program. We submitted detailed information in response to your
questions. What I would like to do in my oral remarks is
address the 10 reasons that helped us improve our IT scores
during the past period.
No. 10, our industry partnerships. USAID has teamed with
industry both in services and in our tools to increase
performance. There has been a commitment to continuous
improvement that has now spread over a 2-year period.
No. 9, managing risk. Our agency information system
security officer defined risk as critical. We want to be
compliant with the rules but make sure that compliance does not
overshadow our responsibility to attend to threats and impact
on our business results.
No. 8, central administration. USAID IT security sensitive
settings have been drawn from 80 countries and 20 time zones to
be administered centrally at AID headquarters. This would not
have happened without executive support at all levels. We have
one organization and one approach when it comes to security.
Continuous awareness. As Bruce mentioned, we have a product
called tips of the day implemented worldwide where 135,000
instances of training and awareness came into effect. Our
awareness also includes the followup on every action item we
have of a finding of a security improvement.
Item 6, rules of behavior. The agency has defined that the
use of the network and our systems is a privilege and not a
right. Though our employees have overwhelmingly supported IT
security for the imperative it is, a handful of employees who
have violated IT rules of behavior have been submitted for
disciplinary action and, where warranted, recommended for
removal for the reasons of that improper conduct.
Continuous measurement. USAID has 15,000 devices connected
to it worldwide, 5,000 software tools and packages, 8 major
applications and 3 what we call general support systems against
which our disciplines are applied. These devices are centrally
checked worldwide 10 times a month for among 33,000 possible IT
security weaknesses using the same tool that protects worldwide
international credit card transactions. We felt that the most
sophisticated tool was in fact important for our purposes.
Management accountability, to refer to an item one of the
members drew attention to. We give the boss of our 90 technical
managers worldwide a grade of A to F once a month, because it
is their business at risk in addition to ours collectively.
Regions and bureaus who represent these 90 technical managers
and their bosses receive grades A through F for all their
reporting units, which has created a competition for
excellence. Our managers have performed this work in harm's
way, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other hardship posts, and among
operating environments where power and other circumstances such
as interrupted telecommunication lines have made it difficult.
Notwithstanding these difficulties and including setting up for
tsunami relief, we have been able to implement a security
program and found significant benefits for it.
Item No. 3, correlation of threats. We have found it
essential to install sensors throughout our networks to capture
those critical events and submit them to a statistical
correlation so that we may find whether systematic attacks in
fact are occurring which otherwise would be hidden from visual
inspection.
Item No. 2, continuous audit review. We have forged over
the past 7 years a partnership with our Inspector General who
has in fact audited every significant IT initiative of our
organization for the past 7 years. We have come to learn that
the harshest criticism from our auditors and others, GAO and
externally, is a source for building on strength, and we have
chosen to respond to those items of improvement in just that
way.
Last and perhaps most importantly, our Administrator Andrew
Natsios defined IT security as critical to success of the
agency. He has defined the need to improve management systems
across the board, and information technology was one of those
areas of improvement. In each of the cases where a critical
issue was facing the agency in the area of IT security, when we
carried it forward to him we received his full support. We
believe the correct decisions were made, which in fact has been
critical to the success of our organization and our security
effort.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Streufert follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deffer.

STATEMENT OF FRANK DEFFER

Mr. Deffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee, for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the
status of FISMA implementation in the Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Chairman, I would note at the outset that we in the
Inspector General's office have developed an effective working
relationship with the DHS CIO and his staff in order to
facilitate FISMA compliance at DHS.
As we reported last year, DHS has made significant progress
in developing and implementing its information security program
at the headquarters level. For example, DHS developed the
necessary plans such as the information security program
management plan to provide the foundation for an agencywide
program. Based on our review of those plans, DHS has
established an adequate structure, blueprint, and process to
implement and manage its program. Also, the Department has
developed an adequate process to report security weaknesses in
its plan of action and milestones, or POA&M, and has adopted an
enterprise management tool, trusted agent FISMA, to collect and
track data related to all POA&M activities.
Even with these efforts, however, there are a number of
factors that are hindering further progress. Specifically, one
of the impediments to implementing DHS's program is that the
CIO is not a member of the department's senior management team.
Therefore, the CIO does not have the authority to strategically
manage agencywide IT programs, systems, or investments.
Furthermore, there is no formal reporting relationship between
the DHS CIO and the component CIOs or between the DHS CISO and
the department security managers.
Also, DHS does not have an accurate and complete system
inventory. An initial attempt at developing an inventory in
2003 did not provide an accurate picture of DHS's information
systems. In September 2004, DHS began a second effort using an
outside contractor to establish a system inventory.
Finally, while DHS has developed an adequate process to
report security weaknesses in its POA&M, DHS components have
not established verification processes to ensure that all IT
security weaknesses are included. Overall, DHS is on the right
track to create and maintain an effective program. However, the
Department and its components still have much work to do to
become fully FISMA compliant.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, annual information security
evaluations began 4 years ago with the Government Information
Security Reform Act [GISRA]. And I would say that, after being
involved in four of these efforts, two at the State Department
OIG, and using a different approach each time, it is becoming
clear that a more standard approach is needed, perhaps similar
to that used in financial audits. This standard framework would
ensure--help ensure that all IGs review and report on the same
information across all agencies. Currently, each IG performs
its FISMA evaluation based on its interpretation of FISMA and
OMB guidance. A standard audit framework should allow OMB and
Congress to more effectively and objectively determine the
status of information security across the entire Federal
Government.
Finally, let me say a few words about what additional
guidance or procedures are needed to help improve FISMA
compliance. OMB issues annual guidance to agencies and IGs to
promote consistent reporting across government and to ensure
that agencies comply with FISMA. But this guidance needs to be
clearer. For example, organizational components in DHS have
struggled with the definition of a system for FISMA reporting.
This has hindered DHS's ability to develop a reliable
inventory.
Another area of concern is how security of systems is
measured by the FISMA metrics. OMB asks the agencies and IGs
for the number of systems that have been reviewed, certified,
and accredited, but treats all systems the same. That is,
systems are not differentiated between routine or mission
critical. For example, an agency may have certified and
accredited 80 percent of its systems, but it could still be
seriously at risk if its mission critical systems are those
that have not been certified and accredited.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I
appreciate your time and attention, and welcome any questions
from you or members of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Deffer follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cooper, I understand that you announced today, at least
from reading the trade press, that you are leaving your post.
Mr. Cooper. I did.
Chairman Tom Davis. I just want to say--well, I hope this
isn't your last time before the committee; we may bring you
back as a consultant, but we appreciate the job that you have
done.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. You have been steadfast in coming
before us and offering your ideas, and we consider you a
valuable asset to the committee. Thanks for being with us.

STATEMENT OF STEVE COOPER

Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. It is my pleasure to appear before the committee
again, and I wish to thank the chairman and the members for
providing me the opportunity to update you on our efforts and
progress in integrating and securing information systems within
the Department of Homeland Security.
I would like to begin by acknowledging the important role
that our Inspector General plays in the Department. We have
established an extremely effective and collaborative
partnership with our Inspector General, and especially with
respect to the development and operations of information
technologies and support of the critical missions of the
Department. The IG has been an important and independent voice
as the Department formulates a strategy for building a robust
and effective information security program.
Mr. Deffer has provided what I believe to be an accurate
and detailed assessment of our progress to date and rather than
repeat what has been already said I would like to focus my
remarks on the future.
The DHS Information Security Program is structured around
compliance with FISMA as well as OMB and NIST guidance. I want
to stress that we are not proud of our failing grade. We have
done much, and much needs to be done. Specifically, we have
implemented and continue to implement a number of security
performance metrics to address the issues represented by the
FISMA grade.
I fully understand that the success of the Department is
dependent upon our ability to protect sensitive information
used to secure the homeland, and to this end, the Department's
Information Security Program has been designed to provide a
secure and trusted computing environment based upon sound risk
management principles and program planning. The development of
a formal trust model within this program will eliminate
institutional barriers that regularly divide organizations and
will enable disparate agencies to more effectively share
information within this common trusted framework. We have
implemented a digital dashboard that provides us for the first
time with the status of security performance based upon
computed FISMA metrics, and we have implemented a security
performance scorecard.
Three key Information Security Program initiatives under
way for over a year now are beginning to provide tangible
results. As these three efforts converge, together they will
pave the way for real and measurable security improvements in
the near future. These include, first, completing a
comprehensive baseline inventory for defining accreditation
boundaries and assigning responsibilities for security controls
for appropriate program officials throughout the Department;
second, fielding a robust set of automated enterprise security
management tools to optimize our security processes; and,
third, implementing a comprehensive and repeatable set of
metrics for holding program officials accountable.
The baseline systems inventory project now under way has
already identified a significant number of legacy systems that
were not previously identified in our initial systems inventory
that we did during the standup of the Department. At one of the
organizational elements, this most recent system inventory
project has now identified 106 information systems programs
compared to the 5 that were previously identified at standup.
In response to this legacy issue, the Department is
developing a comprehensive remediation plan for completing all
the required certification and accreditations by the end of
fiscal year 2006. Related to these actions, we have implemented
a department plan of action and milestones process and an
enterprised system to manage that plan of action. Evidence that
DHS is successfully institutionalizing this process is
demonstrated by the fact that our initial fiscal year 2003
program and milestones contained less than 100 line items,
meaning task activities that we identified that we needed to
do, while our current plan now contains several thousand line
items and activities.
Furthermore, we have implemented a certification and
accreditation tool that will ensure C&A equality and map that
certification and accreditation testing to our established
policies. The C&A and remediation plan will include a
prioritized list of systems to be certified based upon the
system's security impact level, which means the systems with
higher security impact levels will be the first systems that we
will accredit if not already accredited. This remediation plan
will identify a variety of funding alternatives for completing
all certifications and accreditations, and our new automated
security management tools are already designed to streamline
this process. Use of this tool has now been mandated for all
activity initiated after April 10th.
This aggressive remediation effort will provide a sound
baseline of secure systems with appropriate controls in place.
However, we must continue to improve our security posture
throughout the life cycle of each and every system or
application in use in the Department. For this reason, we are
continuing to refine the program so that we will remain
relevant for the future. Program enhancements currently under
way include developing a communications plan for our
information security program, to include a Web-based
information security portal that will improve the availability
of information security data to all DHS employees, including
those who do not have access to DHS Online; and, publishing an
updated Information Security Program strategic plan outlining a
revised vision for the future of the program based on lessons
learned over the past 2 years.
Finally, to sustain a viable and healthy information
systems program and security program, I know that we must have
strong support throughout the Department. Through the DHS Chief
Information Officers' Council, I will work with each member to
ensure that we not only continue to improve our security
posture through periodic program reviews, but that we also
implement new and improved measures wherever appropriate.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Alves.

STATEMENT OF TED ALVES

Mr. Alves. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members
of the committee for the opportunity to testify on the progress
the Department of Transportation has made and the challenges it
faces implementing FISMA.
This committee has been a driving force behind improvements
made over the last several years in protecting Federal
information and information systems. I also want to take this
opportunity to compliment OMB, NIST, and GAO for the leadership
roles they have played in this effort.
With an annual IT budget of about $2.7 billion, the
Transportation Department maintains over 480 systems to carry
out the Department's mission. For example, the Department
operates financial systems that process over $35 billion in
grants to States and local governments, and the Federal
Aviation Administration relies on about 100 systems to provide
safe and efficient air traffic control 24 hours a day.
As you requested, I will discuss the progress
Transportation has made and the challenges it faces to
strengthen information security practices, the need for a
framework to guide Inspector General FISMA audits, and the
approach we take to audit computer security issues.
The commitment to improve information security begins at
the top, and we attribute much of the Department's progress
over the last 2 years to the support provided by Secretary
Mineta. In early 2003, the Secretary appointed a Chief
Information Officer and significantly strengthened his roles
and responsibilities. Since then, the CIO has played a much
more prominent role in managing IT issues in all DOT component
agencies.
Key improvements the Department has made include the
following four areas. First, the CIO invigorated the Investment
Review Board, which now considers security issues when
reviewing the major systems.
Second, the Department enhanced its ability to protect
systems from internal and external attacks by, among other
things, establishing an incident response center to prevent,
detect, and analyze intrusions from the Internet.
Third, the Department increased the number of certified and
accredited systems from 33 percent to over 90 percent by
dedicating resources to do the reviews and by closely
monitoring progress.
And fourth, the Department significantly strengthened
background checks on contractor personnel.
Notwithstanding this progress, DOT still faces challenges
to secure its systems. These include: The Department needs to
enhance security over air traffic control systems. We have
reported that security deficiencies affect en route computer
systems which control high altitude traffic. Because the issues
are sensitive, we can only cover two issues today.
First, FAA certified that en route systems were secure, but
the review was limited to a developmental system. FAA has
agreed to review operational systems deployed at the 20 en
route centers.
Second, FAA agreed to identify a contingency plan to
restore air service in the event of a prolonged en route center
disruption.
We recently expressed concern about FAA's progress
correcting these deficiencies to the FAA Administrator, the
Office of the Secretary, and the CIO, and we are working
closely with those officials to ensure continued progress.
The Department needs to improve the security certification
process. We also found some deficiencies in the quality of
certification reviews, including inadequate risk assessments,
lack of evidence that tests had been performed, and in one case
a test item failed when we retested it. The Department also
needs to continue its focus on emerging threats.
The fact that you raised the question of whether a
framework is needed to help standardize IG FISMA reports
suggests that the current framework does not fully meet
oversight requirements. This issue is being addressed by the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, a group of
Presidentially appointed IGs, but they have not yet reached a
consensus. We think a broader discussion involving the key
players, congressional staff, OMB, GAO, and the IG community
could help forge a consensus among all interested parties. The
IG community would benefit from better understanding how our
FISMA reports are used by oversight organizations; oversight
organizations would benefit from understanding the challenges
the IG community faces addressing computer security issues at
agencies with very different system risks and missions.
Regarding our approach to meet FISMA requirements, each
year we do detailed tests on a subset of systems to answer
OMB's specific questions such as the number of systems with
contingency plans. We also perform computer security audits
focused on specific systems of security issues. We use all of
this work to reach conclusions about the status of DOT's
Information Security Program when preparing our annual FISMA
report.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my oral testimony. I would be
happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Alves follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Matthews, last but not least here.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL MATTHEWS

Mr. Matthews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today
to discuss the Department of Transportation's implementation of
the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
[FISMA].
I serve as the Department's CIO, and I also currently serve
as the vice chair of the CIO Council. The DOT Office of the
Chief Information Officer has operational responsibility for
the departmental network and communications infrastructure as
well as providing shared services for the Office of the
Secretary and the operating administrations currently engaged
in the Department's information technology services
consolidation.
FISMA compliance at DOT is moving from the intensity of the
past year's implementation activities to a more operational
mode. Our system inventory is mature, our certification and
accreditation methodology is defined, and we have begun
oversight of the remediation of weaknesses identified over the
course of the last 2 years. Additionally, we have been in the
process of making assessments of the Department's ongoing
security posture. Securing the IT assets of the Department of
Transportation is a critical responsibility that falls to the
CIO's office.
In striving to secure those assets, many people from
various areas must pull together. The strides the Department
has made over the past year occurred in large measure because
of the support of Secretary Norman Y. Mineta. His leadership
and guidance combined with each and every modal administrator's
commitment are critical to the Department's success.
We are pleased to have achieved an A-minus rating on the
FISMA scorecard, and we note that DOT relied on teamwork across
the agency, the establishment, refinement, and validation of
our system inventory, good communications, comprehensive
training, and the support of the Inspector General throughout
the year. This last point is critical. With our Inspector
General, who is engaged, involved, and informed throughout the
process, DOT makes sure that it approaches FISMA requirements
appropriately and the end products and results are supportable.
The teamwork for FISMA compliance was established through
the acceptance of a single departmentwide methodology in lieu
of individual approaches established by each operating
administration. That methodology allowed us to focus and work
collectively on a single plan in which all participants had
confidence. This gave us the benefit of synergy, an end greater
than the sum of its individual parts.
If we endeavor to proceed using agency unique approaches,
some agencies may have been successful and some may have
faltered. With the support of an industry-recognized security
subject matter expert from Titan Corp., along with agencywide
buy-in and acceptance, DOT was able to reduce overall
certification and accreditation schedules, manpower
requirements and costs. More importantly, DOT was able to
ensure accuracy, consistency, and completeness of each
accreditation package.
The strides made over the last year to comply with FISMA
requirements were impressive. DOT has accredited over 90
percent of all operational IT systems, established a program to
ensure security as part of every system's development life
cycle, significantly reduced vulnerabilities of public facing
systems, and improved training and communications at all levels
of the organization.
Moving forward, DOT is using metrics to gauge FISMA's
implementation and compliance throughout the Department. This
point is important. DOT recognizes that plans of actions and
milestones, POA&Ms, are established from the certification and
accreditation process required by FISMA and are reviewed by the
Inspector General. DOT uses these POA&Ms as a mechanism to
ensure we mitigate the risks and remediate vulnerabilities
identified during the CNA process knowing full well that the
actions taken prescribed in the POA&M will specifically improve
DOT's overall security posture.
To address the steps DOT is taking to further strengthen IT
security, we are coordinating and cooperating with DHS on cyber
exercises, we are addressing the critical need for enterprise-
wide vulnerability management, we are implementing baseline
security configuration standards for critical software, and we
are consolidating IT services.
More needs to be done. The FAA's National Air Space System
is part of the national critical infrastructure program. I am
working directly with the FAA senior leadership and the
Inspector General to ensure FAA secures and protects the
important NAS systems and telecommunications infrastructure.
Ensuring the FAA constructs are measurable plans of actions in
conjunction with its POA&Ms, audit reports, and IG findings,
with follow through to complete its commitments is fundamental
to DOT's ability to maintain current FISMA scorecard ratings.
I have included in my statement some specific observations
and suggestions for creation of an ``as of date'' and believe
that existing FISMA guidance is adequate but have some
additional comments. I look forward to answering your
questions. And, again, I thank you for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Matthews follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
I think a recurrent theme both with DOT and USAID is that
you are getting support at the top, that this comes--it is not
just generated from the CO, it is top down, it is holding
people accountable. Great stories. I hope we can learn from
that.
Mr. Cooper, let me start with you because your department
is great but it is down. I don't hold you accountable. You are
one of the best CIOs in the business, and we are sorry to see
you going. But I wonder if we could talk about, you also, as
you could see from some of the early comments from our members,
the area everybody wants to focus on. Homeland security is a
hot topic. It is an area where the systems need to be up. It is
a very difficult job given the type of systems you inherited
when we merged the departments. I think we can--that is a
given; this was a very, very, very tough job. But we are a long
way from where we need to be. We are seeing improvement, and I
appreciate your opening statement.
What are the major obstacles you would put together that
Homeland Security faces uniquely versus some of the other
agencies that make it so difficult?
Mr. Cooper. OK. Let me try to answer that question
directly, very specifically and very candidly.
Chairman Tom Davis. This is the last bite I get at you.
Mr. Cooper. No, that is all right. I am happy to come back.
And let me also try to put it within the context of the FISMA
scorecard, because I think this will be extremely helpful, I
hope, to the committee as well as to members of the audience
and interested parties and my colleagues.
The first thing that we face as the Department of Homeland
Security is the fact that we have inherited a huge amount from
our legacy environments. Now, that translates to the inventory
in the FISMA scorecard. This is not a defense. We are not where
we need to be. But the scoring in the scorecard, we get minus
10 points against our total score until we can actually certify
that we have inventoried 95 percent of the systems and
applications that are in the Department. And here's what we're
learning and here's what we found. Meaning no disrespect to my
colleagues on the panel, DOT has identified 480, I think Dan
said 480 significant applications or the ones that they have
identified and accredited. And, again, no offense to AID, but I
think you guys have nine. We have over 3,600.
So there's a simple fact, it's a numbers game. All right?
We move from 34 percent of that initial 3,600 to 68 percent.
Now, the scorecard doesn't reflect the progress. 68 percent I
admit is still a failing grade. But we know what we need to do,
we are working with our IG, we have demonstrated that our
certification and accreditation process is sound. We need to
stay the course and apply it. We have committed to completing
100 percent certification and accreditation by fiscal year
2006.
Another major area. Configuration management addresses the
different parts and pieces in the FISMA scorecard. Now, what
that translates to is how many different operating systems or
platforms or environments does the Department have? We have
everything that's listed in the scorecard. But I--and I am the
one that can be held accountable. I made a tactical and
conscious decision that we were not going to put significant
effort into the configuration management aspect of all of the
listed platforms for the following reason: We are also
undergoing a major IT infrastructure transformation program. We
are consolidating those operating platforms and the operating
systems and the associated applications, and we are eliminating
some of those. Therefore, I made a decision that said don't put
any energy into publishing guidelines within the Department in
our Information Security Program around configuration
management for those platforms and operating systems that we
are going to retire. I am the person, I am accountable. But it
reflects in our score because we then don't--we legitimately
don't have anything in that area.
Another thing, final thing we did very quickly. The
training of all DHS employees in information assurance and
information security management is an extremely high value
activity. It scores very few points on the scorecard. But we
consciously made a decision, again. We have trained almost 100
percent of all of our employees across the Department. That's
180,000 people, and we accomplished that in the past 2 fiscal
years.
So those are very specific examples in the framework of the
scorecard that I think help reveal some of the complexities
that we're facing but also significant progress.
Chairman Tom Davis. What are the most difficult parts of
all the disparate systems that you have? You know, what are the
most dysfunctional or most vulnerable areas that you have at
DHS?
Mr. Cooper. That's a tough question in that I'm not sure I
want to put any parts of the Department on the spot.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, but you inherited legacy systems
and some of these. Like we know, the old INS system just wasn't
working. Now, we've got new--I mean, this is something that
this committee has talked about and everything else. I am not
trying to go out to tell terrorists where we are vulnerable or
something. But within those confines you have some old legacy
systems that you haven't been able to move forward on as
quickly as others and stuff like that. Give me a priority list,
in other words.
Mr. Cooper. OK. I'm going to share at least the part that
we've identified.
Chairman Tom Davis. You're leaving now. I can't do
anything.
Mr. Cooper. That's true.
Chairman Tom Davis. You are under oath, too.
Mr. Cooper. They can fire me early, I guess.
Chairman Tom Davis. But we will hire you. We will pick you
up if you need it.
Mr. Cooper. Here's what we found. And, again, please
understand, I offer this in a very constructive way. It's not
meant to be critical.
Chairman Tom Davis. Absolutely.
Mr. Cooper. One of the areas that we have found a little
bit more challenged is in some of the legacy INS, Immigration
and Naturalization Services, and Citizenship and Immigration
Services, as those two entities exist now. But in fact those
were more or less, I won't say truly combined, but they were
all under the auspices of an organizational structure inside
the Department of Justice that pretty much operated from the
same or similar platforms. Now, we have broken them apart, so
to speak. But in breaking them apart, we actually don't have
all of the IT infrastructure and skills and personnel and
everything fully in place yet.
Now, again, plans are in place, we are making good
progress, but it remains a challenge because we just don't have
quite enough of the resources in the timeframe we would like to
have to finish a lot of the certification and accreditation,
some of the securing activities that we need to do.
Our Customs and Border Protection environment has actually
made very, very good progress in a lot of areas, and what we
are doing is drawing upon the positive skills and the positive
performance in CBP to now reach over and assist ICE and CIS. So
we figured out ways that we can actually leverage where we have
good stuff going on and address some of the challenge areas.
Chairman Tom Davis. How many incidents--well, we don't
really get the level of incident reporting. Am I right? We
don't get the incident reporting that we'd like to get that we
feel is accurate. Is that fair?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, OMB reported that in their 2004 report
on FISMA that they felt that the reporting was sporadic from
the different agencies, and they had questions and concerns
about that.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, let me just go with each agency
and ask the CIO or IG or which office; but start with AID. Are
you getting a lot of incidents of penetrations every year, and
do you test yourself? Do you hire people who come in and try to
penetrate? That was inarticulate, but I think you understand.
Mr. Streufert. We're initiating some internal testing, and
we're constantly monitoring for intrusions, and I think that
the most constructive part of that is that we are tracking
precisely those patterns and trying to assess who's at us. So,
from an internal purpose, we are doing well.
Chairman Tom Davis. Is that reported up the food chain in
terms of who we think is going after you?
Mr. Streufert. We make every effort that we possibly can,
and the comments that we collect internally on this topic are
some of the descriptions that come out from elsewhere at
varying degrees of descriptions, some general, some specific.
And so we think an area of potential improvement is having a
matching of a good taxonomy externally against what we are
actually seeing, and we think that this will improve over time.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask Homeland Security. What are
you seeing in that area? I don't want you to give away the
store, but----
Mr. Cooper. No. First of all, we see hundreds of thousands
of attempts on an annual basis. We actually identified 214
incidents. We reported 100 percent of the 214 both to the IG
and up through US-CERT that passes over to OMB.
Chairman Tom Davis. Do you have a good idea of who the
people are that are trying to get in?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, we do, partly because of the link into the
intel environment and everything. So, yes, we do. We believe
this is an area and it actually is represented in our scorecard
where we are in very good shape.
Chairman Tom Davis. And it helps you also target your
resources when you know who is coming after you. Doesn't it?
Mr. Cooper. Absolutely.
Chairman Tom Davis. And how about Transportation?
Mr. Matthews. Mr. Chairman, last year we had over 3,000
incidents and reported them. We do track individuals, Web
sites, IP addresses that are coming toward the Department as
well as other information. We routinely----
Chairman Tom Davis. One of them gets through and really
gets into the system, they could run you amuck. Couldn't they?
They could really destroy you?
Mr. Matthews. Absolutely, no doubt, if somebody penetrates
the shield, indeed they can run amuck. You know, TOPOFF III is
currently going on, and when I'm sitting watching what we're
doing in TOPOFF III I'm constantly reminded that if someone did
a concerted effort and went after the communications of the
Federal Government, its ability to respond could be impacted.
Chairman Tom Davis. And it helps. I mean, I think it's
reassuring to us to know that at least you have a pretty good
idea of who is after you.
Mr. Matthews. Yes.
Chairman Tom Davis. And that helps you, doesn't it, in
terms of where you spend your resources? It may or may not help
your report card, but it helps you in terms of where you spend
your resources?
Mr. Matthews. Absolutely 100 percent. We work hand in glove
with the IG to do the forensics and pursue and prosecute those
individuals as well.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Alves, do you agree with that?
Mr. Alves. Yes, I do. The Department of Transportation has
made really significant progress in this area over the last
couple of years, and whenever there is an intrusion they let us
know immediately. We do some of the penetration testing
ourselves.
Chairman Tom Davis. Some of them are yours.
Mr. Alves. To test the system and make sure that it's
secure.
Chairman Tom Davis. And Mr. Cooper, let me just ask you.
The fact that you have an idea in most of these cases, I
gather, who is coming, allows you to expend resources in those
areas, maybe to the detriment of other areas but at least it
allows you to give appropriate prioritization, and that ought
to give the committee some assurance that you're on top of it.
Mr. Cooper. Yes, sir. In this case, we do. And in this
case, because of the capability within the Department, we work
very closely with our Homeland Security Operations Centers, we
work very closely with our Intelligence Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and actually share. All
of the key members of my team are cleared to the highest
levels, and so we actually use a lot of the classified
information to help us address risks, threats, and
vulnerabilities.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. You feel--well, we'll have another
conversation later. But thank you again. My 10 minutes is up.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. Mr. Deffer, in your testimony you
mentioned that FISMA does not differentiate between routine or
mission critical systems.
Mr. Deffer. Correct.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And you continue to say that the agency
might still be at risk if its security, a vast majority of its
systems yet is left vulnerable, the most mission critical ones.
Can you explain how your department has balanced meeting its
FISMA obligations with protecting its most critical systems?
Mr. Deffer. Well, I think the Department has sort of--
they've made an effort to get their systems certified and
accredited. I don't know if they've--Mr. Cooper talked about
this, trying to get them on a risk based methodology to certify
and accredit those systems that are high priority. But the
numbers don't tell us which systems that have been certified
and accredited are really that important. We don't know
whether--has their network been certified and accredited? I
don't know. But, you know, their training management system
FLETC may have been certified and accredited, and that's a good
thing, but it's probably not as important as the network or
other critical applications.
Mr. Cooper. If I may kind of clarify. We have made a very
conscious and deliberate decision to go after our mission
critical systems first. So we are taking a risk-based
prioritization approach to what we accredit.
The good news that I can share with the committee is that
the 68 percent that are now accredited include almost every one
of our major mission critical systems, and we are getting to
some that doesn't mean they're not important but lesser impact
or risk by not accrediting them right away. That is the
approach we're taking.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I would like more, a little bit more
about the questions that the chairman asked you, and I was
going to ask you more questions but you answered some of them.
One of the questions was, when do you expect that the
Department of Homeland Security will come up to where they need
to be? And you mentioned that your goal was 2006. Do you feel
that you are on time for that goal at this point?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, we do.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And what is it, the end of the year,
beginning of the year? Where are we?
Mr. Cooper. By the end of fiscal year 2006 we expect to
complete almost 100 percent of those items represented by the
scorecard. Now, here's what is going to happen though, and we
will see whether or not I'm a good prognosticator.
Unfortunately, the way that we are going at this and the way
that the scoring works in the scorecard, I think what we are
going to do is we are going to jump. We may indeed be--I'm
hoping we will get to a D in fiscal year 2005. I am being very
candid here. Because we lose 10 points off of our total score
because of this 95 percent requirement for inventory. And we
will not complete 95 percent of our full inventory by the end
of fiscal year 2005. We are going to be very, very close, but I
am not sure we'll trip it. We are going to basically lose 20
points of our score because of the configuration management
approach that I explained to you. If you deduct those 30 points
from the score and we do everything else, that's 70, which puts
us at 70 percent, which may creep us into a D.
What I think is going to happen is we are probably going to
be, I hope, at a D; and then in 2006, as we complete all this
stuff, we are going to jump significantly up. So you are going
to kind of see, unfortunately, not much in the score, and then
we will be there.
Mr. Ruppersberger. There is no question the Department of
Homeland Security has a lot of administrative issues that they
have to deal with, you know, inheriting all these different
agencies, you know, pulling them together, the funding issues.
I mean, it's a very difficult job, as you know, and I
understand that. Do you feel that the system that's being used
now and the standards for grading are just more of a
bureaucratic type of system of holding people accountable based
on Homeland Security and all the issues you have, do you think
it's fair? And what would you do to change that system based on
where you are now and to get to the end game? Because it's
not--the grade is a standard, but bottom line, we want to get
to where you can provide the best national security for our
country.
Mr. Cooper. Exactly. Bob West, who is our Chief Information
Security Officer, and I believe very strongly that the criteria
are very sound. We have no issue with the criteria. Now, Bob
and I both will grumble to you and complain about the negative
points that kind of in this last go-round were assessed, but we
understand them and we'll live with them. What becomes most
important I think is how a department like the Department of
Homeland Security kind of prioritizes and applies these
criteria. And you've heard, I've explained the approach that we
took, I've explained a little bit of why. I believe very
strongly that if the committee will allow us to stay the
course, and with support of our new Secretary and Deputy
Secretary, the Department of Homeland Security will indeed
arrive rather quickly, although it may be fiscal year 2006, at
precisely where the intent of the committee and the scorecard
and FISMA represent.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you feel that you have the money or
the resources to deal with the problem.
Mr. Deffer. I think applied in a prioritized approach, yes.
Now any time--again, you know, I may get beaten up, it's OK,
the worst they can do is fire me. Any time we have additional
funding and resource we can move faster. But we believe that
within the funding and resource that we have, we absolutely are
on track to succeed.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I don't know if you can answer the
question--I may go back to Mr. Wilshusen, who is still at the
panel. I am concerned a little bit about what is happening with
respect to Justice, and especially FBI within Justice. We know
some of the issues, that FBI is having a hard time in their
technology area. And it seems to me we have other groups--we
talked about this in the first panel, I know CIA and NSA are
doing very well. And we cannot afford to have our FBI that is
so important to our national security, especially domestic
security, not be where they need to be.
Can you discuss some of these issues--well, I'm going to
ask you the question basically. You said that Immigration was
under Justice, and now they also have some issues that you are
dealing with because they are now under Homeland Security. I'm
concerned that we need to really refocus and prioritize in
those arenas, especially FBI. You are doing Immigration. But
how can, with the problems that the FBI is having, how can we
now have a grading system where the Justice Department went
from I think a D or an F to a B+ or B-? Could you explain that?
Mr. Deffer. Well, I can offer a couple of thoughts. I'm not
sure I can actually explain it. But one of the things that
works to----
Mr. Ruppersberger. And I'm going to ask you to answer this,
too, Mr. Wilshusen.
Mr. Deffer. One of the things that works to any
department's advantage is if you have less things to do and
less things to accredit and certify, then within the same
resource base you can accomplish a lot more.
Justice lost, if you will, a significant portion of what
represented the legacy systems that weren't accredited at one
point in time. We inherited them all. So I think that they----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Good news for them, bad news for you,
right?
Mr. Deffer. Exactly. And that's one sense.
Now the other thing that I would offer--and again, the
right person to really talk to is Zal Azmi, who is the CIO at
the FBI, an extremely competent professional. Zal and I have
talked a couple different times about information assurance,
some of the challenges that we are sharing in exchanging
information and working together, our respective agencies.
I believe that under Zal they do have the proper talent and
approach, I can't really speak to the timing.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you know if they are getting the
resources to do the job, based on your conversations about it?
Mr. Deffer. Zal and I have talked about a number of
vacancies, key vacancies that Zal is working on to fill. I
think that as he fills those he will be able to pick up speed.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I think that is a very high priority, I
would think.
Do you want to address that issue, also, Mr. Wilshusen?
Mr. Wilshusen. Sure. The key thing in terms of FBI and DOJ
having an increased score this year was basically because of
what they had reported on their FISMA report to OMB and to
Congress. That score was based upon an analysis of what they
had reported.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Are you aware of the problems with
respect to the FBI?
Mr. Wilshusen. I am aware with regard to issues related to
DCF a Trilogy----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Their technology issue.
Mr. Wilshusen [continuing]. That they had developed that or
were in the process of developing it, and it has since been
terminated. At least the operational pilots have been
terminated.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you feel they have a plan to move
forward in what needs to be done to be brought up to speed?
Mr. Wilshusen. I don't know that because we haven't looked
at that, but we have received a request to take a look at that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. We sure don't want to criticize the FBI.
What we want to do is give the FBI all the resources they need
to fix this problem. And again it seems to me--and we alluded
to this in the first panel--when you have systems that work--
and again, I can say this, I'm on the House Select Intelligence
Committee, I know NSA's systems are doing well. We need to make
sure we pull together, find out what is working and not
working, and move forward. If it's a resource problem, we have
to fix it. If it's a money problem, we have to fix it.
My time is up. Thank you for being here today.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, we've kept you a long time. We
appreciate everything. Anybody want to add anything, add in
anything they said along the way?
I think it has been very helpful to the committee as we
move forward. I want to just thank every one of you for being
here. I want to congratulate both AID and Transportation on
your improvements this year. I think you've talked about this
is really a team effort, it is not the CIO.
Mr. Cooper, thank you. It has been a good explanation for
us. We wish you the best of luck as you move forward and
appreciate the job you have done.
Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
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