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	<title> - UNPACKING THE WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY</title>
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	[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


	UNPACKING THE WHITE HOUSE
	NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY

	=======================================================================

	HEARING

	BEFORE THE

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFORMATION
	TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT INNOVATION

	OF THE

	COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
	AND ACCOUNTABILITY

	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

	FIRST SESSION

	__________

	MARCH 23, 2023

	__________

	Serial No. 118-12

	__________

	Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability

	[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


	Available on: govinfo.gov
	oversight.house.gov or
	docs.house.gov

	__________


	U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
	51-668 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023

	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

	COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

	JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman

	Jim Jordan, Ohio Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking
	Mike Turner, Ohio Minority Member
	Paul Gosar, Arizona Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
	Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Columbia
	Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
	Gary Palmer, Alabama Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
	Clay Higgins, Louisiana Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
	Pete Sessions, Texas Ro Khanna, California
	Andy Biggs, Arizona Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
	Nancy Mace, South Carolina Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
	Jake LaTurner, Kansas Katie Porter, California
	Pat Fallon, Texas Cori Bush, Missouri
	Byron Donalds, Florida Shontel Brown, Ohio
	Kelly Armstrong, North Dakota Jimmy Gomez, California
	Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
	William Timmons, South Carolina Robert Garcia, California
	Tim Burchett, Tennessee Maxwell Frost, Florida
	Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Becca Balint, Vermont
	Lisa McClain, Michigan Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
	Lauren Boebert, Colorado Greg Casar, Texas
	Russell Fry, South Carolina Jasmine Crockett, Texas
	Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Dan Goldman, New York
	Chuck Edwards, North Carolina Jared Moskowitz, Florida
	Nick Langworthy, New York
	Eric Burlison, Missouri

	Mark Marin, Staff Director
	Jessica Donlon, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
	Raj Bharwani, Senior Professional Staff Member
	Lauren Lombardo, Senior Policy Analyst
	Peter Warren, Senior Advisor
	Mallory Cogar, Deputy Director of Operations and Chief Clerk

	Contact Number: 202-225-5074

	Julie Tagen, Minority Staff Director
	Contact Number: 202-225-5051
	------

	Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Government
	Innovation

	Nancy Mace, South Carolina, Chairwoman
	William Timmons, South Carolina Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
	Tim Burchett, Tennessee Ranking Minority Member
	Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Ro Khanna, California
	Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
	Chuck Edwards, North Carolina Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
	Nick Langworthy, New York Jimmy Gomez, California
	Eric Burlison, Missouri Jared Moskowitz, Florida


	C O N T E N T S

	----------
	Page
	Hearing held on March 23, 2023................................... 1

	Witnesses

	Ms. Kemba Walden, Acting National Cyber Director, Office of the
	National Cyber Director
	Oral Statement................................................... 5

	Opening statements and the prepared statement for the witness
	are available in the U.S. House of Representatives Repository
	at: docs.house.gov.

	Index of Documents

	----------

	* Article, Wall Street Journal, ``Wave of Stealthy China
	Cyberattacks Hits U.S., Private Networks, Google Says'';
	submitted by Rep. Lynch.

	* Questions for the Record: to Ms. Walden; submitted by Rep.
	Mace.

	* Questions for the Record: to Ms. Walden; submitted by Rep.
	Langworthy.

	* Questions for the Record: to Ms. Walden; submitted by Rep.
	Connolly.

	Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.


	UNPACKING THE WHITE HOUSE
	NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY

	----------


	Thursday, March 23, 2023

	House of Representatives

	Committee on Oversight and Accountability

	and Government Innovation

	Washington, D.C.

	The Subcomittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:09 p.m., in
	room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nancy Mace
	[Chairwoman of the Subcomittee] presiding.
	Present: Representatives Mace, Timmons, Burchett, Edwards,
	Langworthy, Connolly, and Lynch.
	Ms. Mace. The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Information
	Technology, and Government Innovation will now come to order.
	Welcome everyone, and good afternoon.
	Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any
	time.
	I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
	statement.
	Good afternoon, and welcome to this hearing, the
	Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technology, and Government
	Innovation. Today, we are going to discuss the White House
	National Cybersecurity Strategy, which was issued three weeks
	ago today. The strategy in this Administration's proposal for
	fighting a battle that, as a Nation, we must win. Key aspects
	of our everyday life now rely on the safe flow of data,
	computerized systems, and even AI. That includes the delivery
	of medical care, the conduct of law enforcement activity, the
	operation of utilities, and the smooth flow of ground and air
	transportation, and even critical infrastructure.
	We must be able to trust the integrity of these systems,
	their ability to keep functioning, and to preserve and protect
	the data they use. When these systems fall victim to malicious
	hackers, the costs are enormous. And I don't have to remind our
	witness today, but in December 2020, with SolarWinds, we had 11
	Federal agencies hacked by adversaries aligned with China and
	Russia. In my home state of South Carolina, a few summers ago,
	we saw the Colonial Pipeline hacked, and that is when we saw
	gas prices started to go up, and they really have never come
	back down since then. And so, this is an issue that is--affects
	everybody, whether in the public or the private sector.
	Aside for the enormous costs, these breaches also erode
	trust in key institutions. So, for instance, the Federal
	Government computer systems, holding confidential data of
	millions of Americans, has been compromised by malicious actors
	too many times. As I cited before, and most recently, D.C.
	Health Link, where we have been advised that over 50,000 people
	who use D.C. Health Link in the Federal Government work force,
	had been affected by that particular hack.
	So, this is truly a national security issue. Many of the
	most sophisticated attacks come from abroad and target our
	critical infrastructure. In recent years, foreign hackers from
	China, Russia, and Iran have sought to disrupt our economy and
	society by infiltrating U.S. critical infrastructure systems,
	including airports, telecommunications networks, along with
	Federal and state government systems. I don't think I can open
	up my computer today and look at a news story and not hear
	about another cyberattack on one of our systems or one of our
	government, Federal, or state, or local agencies, that is
	everywhere. It is pervasive, and it is every day. We must have
	reliable safeguards against criminal and unauthorized use of
	data to ensure economic security, our homeland security, and
	our national security. This is going to require intelligent,
	coordinated action at the Federal level.
	To help the executive branch rise to that challenge, two
	years ago, Congress created a new White House office to provide
	coherent direction and coordination to agency-level
	cybersecurity efforts across the Federal Government. That is a
	lot. You have a big shoes to fill, including by spearheading a
	National Cybersecurity Strategy. Prior administrations have
	released similar cybersecurity strategies, but this is really
	the first time it is to be issued since the Office of National
	Cyber Director was created into law.
	We are pleased to have here today the acting head of the
	Office of National Cyber, Director, as our witness today. There
	are many burning questions that I have about implementation of
	the national cybersecurity strategy, so we all look forward to
	hearing from you this afternoon about the strategy document
	itself. I have it right here and discussing, you know, how and
	when the rubber meets the road, on how rhetoric can be
	translated into action either now or hopefully soon and in the
	future. But before I formally introduce our witness, I will
	yield to the Ranking Member Connolly to provide his opening
	remarks, and I yield back.
	Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you for
	having the hearing, and welcome, Ms. Walden, this afternoon.
	Cybersecurity is a defining political, economic, and
	national security challenge for our time. From malicious
	foreign actors' online destabilization and espionage campaigns
	to ransomware incidents that compromise government and private
	sector information technology networks, these attacks have cost
	the United States billions of dollars and countless critical
	strategic disadvantages. In Fiscal Year 2021 alone, U.S.
	Federal agencies, which depend on IT systems to carry out
	operations and protect the essential information, were the
	target of more than 32,500 cybersecurity incidents. In the last
	half of 2022, cyberattacks targeting governments jumped 95
	percent worldwide and cost an average of $2.07 million per
	incident, a 7.25 percent increase from the previous year alone.
	Data breaches also affect the private sector, including
	educational institutions and healthcare centers. In 2022, the
	FBI received almost 801,000 phishing, personal data breach, and
	other complaints representing estimated losses of more than
	$10.2 billion dollars. According to a 2021 survey by research
	firm, AdvisorSmith, 42 percent of small-and medium-sized U.S.
	businesses had experienced a recent data breach--42 percent.
	The estimated average cost totals almost $9.5 million per
	breach, higher than any other country in the world, and 60
	percent of organizations have raised prices on consumers to
	cover those costs. Experts now predict that the annual cost of
	cybercrime will climb to over $10 trillion in the next number
	of years.
	Cyberattacks will eventually hit close to home for
	everybody. For Congress, it was most recently the hack of the
	D.C. Health Link, which operates the healthcare system used by
	most Members of Congress and our staff. Before that, it was the
	2015 OPM data breach that exposed the private information of
	nearly 22 million individuals, including my own personal
	information. Cyber threats are not new, as information security
	has been on the Government Accountability Office's high-risk
	list since 1997.
	For those who are concerned, you are right to be concerned,
	but we cannot just throw up our hands. We must act quickly and
	decisively to secure digital infrastructure, protect the
	integrity and confidentiality of data, and preserve public
	trust in government institutions. I am proud that Democrats in
	this Committee did just that and helped to lead the bipartisan
	fight to establish the Office of the National Cyber Director,
	the ONCD, in FY 2021. The ONCD is required to coordinate the
	whole of government effort to elevate American safety in the
	digital world, including through the development and
	implementation of the National Cybersecurity Strategy. I
	applaud this and look forward to hearing more from our witness
	today.
	Drawing on bipartisan ideas, including those vested in the
	recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, the
	Biden-Harris strategy, as presented, is a bold, comprehensive
	plan for government and industry to create a safer digital
	ecosystem for all Americans. Recognizing that cyber threats cut
	through all industries and ignore geographic borders, the plan
	will examine the regulatory landscape to harmonize
	cybersecurity standards across different sectors and around the
	globe. With so much at stake, it is critical that our
	regulatory landscape allow industry to focus on security
	outcomes, not duplicative or nonsensical compliance burdens. We
	also know that if hackers fail to break into one agency system,
	they will seek out vulnerable entry points elsewhere, and they
	do.
	We must address the current patchwork of cyber regulations
	to ensure that cybersecurity protections flow seamlessly and
	efficiently across industries and government. The strategy
	realigns incentives to ensure that Federal Government's
	investments enhance the long-term strength of a cybersecurity
	posture. For example, it harnesses the Federal Government's
	purchasing power to shape market demand for safe and secure
	technologies. Through programs such as the Federal Risk and
	Authorization Management Program, FedRAMP, which this committee
	passed legislation forward that became law, we can bake into a
	product rather than an additional expensive feature.
	Additionally, the strategy redistributes the responsibility
	so that those best positioned to protect the cybersecurity of
	our citizens, schools, hospitals, and small businesses are
	required to take reasonable steps to do so. For example, it
	embraces liability for software companies that fail to use best
	practices or take reasonable precautions to secure their own
	products. If we do not hold bad actors or actors more focused
	on sales than security accountable, we disadvantage responsible
	companies that take time to follow these best practices, and we
	increase systematic risk for our constituents.
	As the Administration works to implement this strategy,
	Congress must provide the funding and clarify the authorities
	needed to ensure its success. As former chair of Government
	Operations Subcommittee and a current Member of this
	Subcomittee, I know it is essential that we invest in
	modernizing our legacy ID systems and recruit and maintain a
	Federal cyber work force for the future.
	The Federal Government must improve its internal practices.
	It must reap the benefits of the latest cybersecurity
	technologies and increase cooperation with the private sector.
	I look forward to understanding how the ONCD will leverage this
	plan and collaborate with other congressionally empowered IT
	and cyber related leaders to promote the kind of accountability
	our critical Federal systems need. With that, I yield back.
	Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. I am pleased today to
	introduce our witness for the hearing. Ms. Kemba Walden is the
	acting director of the White House Office of National Cyber
	Director. Ms. Walden came to the ONCD from Microsoft, where she
	was the assistant general counsel in the company's Digital
	Crimes Unit. Prior to that experience, Ms. Walden spent a
	decade at the Department of Homeland Security, holding several
	counsel positions, including the Cyber and Infrastructure
	Security Agency. Welcome, Ms. Walden. We are pleased to have
	you this afternoon.
	Pursuant to Committee Rule 9(g), the witness, if you will
	please stand and raise your right hand.
	Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you
	are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
	but the truth, so help you God?
	Ms. Walden. Aye.
	Ms. Mace. Let the record show the witness answered in the
	affirmative.
	We appreciate you being here today and look forward to your
	testimony and answering some of our questions. Let me remind
	the witness that we have read your written statement, and it
	will be here in full in the hearing record. Please limit your
	oral statement to five minutes today. As a reminder, press the
	button on the microphone in front of you so that it is on, and
	all Members up here can hear you. When you begin to speak, the
	light in front of you will turn green. After four minutes, the
	light will turn yellow. When the red light comes on, your five
	minutes has expired, and we would ask that you try to wrap it
	up at that juncture.
	I recognize Ms. Walden to please begin her opening
	statement.

	STATEMENT OF KEMBA E. WALDEN, ACTING NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR,
	THE WHITE HOUSE

	Ms. Walden. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Mace, Ranking
	Member Connolly, distinguished Members of the Subcomittee.
	Thank you for the privilege to appear before you today to
	discuss the Biden-Harris Administration's National
	Cybersecurity Strategy. I am eager to share with you how the
	President's strategy will make our digital ecosystem more
	secure and resilient. It builds on two years of the President's
	unprecedented attention on cyber issues as well as the
	resources and valuable leadership provided by Congress and this
	Committee. While my written testimony goes into more detail
	discussing each of the five pillars that make up the document,
	I would like to highlight the framing of the strategy and the
	two fundamental shifts in policy that are woven throughout it.
	As you know well, the magnitude of the threat we face in
	cyberspace is real, but it is important to remember that we
	defend cyberspace not because it is some distant terrain where
	we battle our adversaries. We defend cyberspace because it is
	intertwined into nearly every aspect of our lives. We live in a
	world that is increasingly digitally dependent. Too often we
	are layering new technology onto old systems at the expense of
	security and resilience, and, unfortunately, today, an attack
	on one organization, industry, or state can rapidly spill over
	to other sectors and regions.
	We all remember how the Colonial Pipeline ransomware
	attack, an incident affecting one company, resulted in a gas
	shortage impacting the entire East Coast. It is within these
	circumstances in mind that we crafted the President's National
	Cybersecurity Strategy--strategies or tools. At their most
	basic level, they match our goals where we are trying to go
	with the vision we need to get there.
	In this strategy, our ultimate goal is a digital ecosystem
	that is more defensible, resilient, and aligned with our
	values. ``Defensible'' means we have tipped the advantage from
	attackers to defenders by designing systems where security is
	baked in, not bolted on. ``Resilient'' means that when defenses
	fail, which they sometimes will, the consequences are not
	catastrophic, and recovery is seamless and swift. Cyber
	incidents shouldn't have systemic real-world impacts, and in
	creating these conditions, we can and must seize the
	opportunity to instill America's values.
	The strategy calls for two fundamental shifts in how the
	United States allocates roles, responsibilities, and resources.
	First, we need to rebalance the responsibility for managing
	cyber risk. Today, we tend to devolve responsibility for cyber
	risk downwards. We ask individuals, small businesses, and local
	governments to shoulder a significant burden for defending us
	all. We ask our parents and our kids to be vigilant against
	clicking suspicious links, and we expect school districts to go
	toe-to-toe with transnational criminal organizations, largely
	by themselves. This isn't just unfair, it is ineffective.
	Instead, the biggest, most capable, and best positioned
	actors in our digital ecosystem can and should shoulder a
	greater share of the burden for managing cyber risk and keeping
	us all safe, and that includes the Federal Government. We must
	do a better job of leading by example and defending our own
	systems, something I know is a key priority for this
	Subcommittee, but we expect similar leadership from industry,
	too. Our mantra is every American should be able to benefit
	from cyberspace, but every American should not have the same
	responsibility to keep it secure. Second, our economy and
	society must incentivize investments that make cyberspace more
	resilient and defensible over the long term. Doing that
	requires creating conditions so an entity is faced with
	tradeoffs between easy, but temporary fixes and harder, but
	lasting solutions. They are motivated to choose the latter.
	We need the free market and public programs, alike,
	rewarding security and resilience. That means building a robust
	cyber work force that draws from all parts of society and
	embracing security and resilience by design. A cybersecurity
	job should be in reach for anyone who wants one. These efforts
	also require thoughtful research and development, investments
	in cybersecurity to prepare for revolutionary changes in our
	technology landscape brought by artificial intelligence and
	quantum computing, and working with our allies and partners to
	promote the collaborative stewardship of our digital ecosystem.
	A strategy is only as good as its implementation, and in
	implementing this strategy, the Federal Government will take a
	data-driven approach and will measure investments made,
	progress, and the outcomes and effectiveness of these efforts.
	Closely working with Congress, interagency partners, civil
	society, and the broader cybersecurity community will be key to
	getting this right and ensuring accountability. Work is already
	under way putting this strategy into action.
	In conclusion, the President's strategy lays out how the
	United States will meet these challenges in cyberspace from a
	position of strength, leading in lockstep with our allies, and
	working with partners everywhere who share our vision for a
	brighter digital future. Thank you for the opportunity to
	testify, and I look forward to your questions.
	Ms. Mace. Thank you, Ms. Walden, and we are asking about
	your mics, and I know you have been moving around. We apologize
	for that. I will now recognize myself for five minutes.
	The National Cybersecurity Strategy, it really reads like a
	vision for the Federal Government, but real results, as you
	know, in your work in the private and public sector really
	depend on implementation of a vision or of a strategy. So, will
	you and your office be leading the implementation of the
	strategy, and if not, then who would be doing that? Where do we
	start with the strategy to do the implementation side of it?
	Ms. Walden. Well, thank you, Chairwoman, for that question.
	One of the most exciting parts of the strategy for me is the
	last page where we articulate precisely that ONCD, in
	collaboration with OMB, are going to lead the development of
	this implementation plan. In fact, we have already started that
	work. ONCD was built to do that work. This is a plan that, as
	we articulate in the strategy, will be public, it will be
	developed, it is being developed, in full collaboration with
	all the departments and agencies who are going to be charged
	with certain action items, and with the private sector, and
	with civil society, and with Congress to make sure that the
	strategy realizes the vision that we have laid out. This
	strategy is new and novel in my mind, because we have attempted
	to, where appropriate, place departments and agencies
	responsible for certain action items, and we will build that
	out in the implementation plan.
	Ms. Mace. What do you think, the timeline? I mean, this is
	a big plan, a big strategy, but how long will it take to
	finally get there from point A to point B?
	Ms. Walden. So, we have already started the work. We have
	created an implementation plan working group that we have
	convened other departments and agencies. We have started the
	actual implementation. So, for example, we have started
	crafting our work force awareness and education strategy. That
	is one of the implementation pieces. We have been implementing
	Executive Order 14028, which is that cybersecurity executive
	order putting actual action into place alongside of that or as
	part of that. We have been implementing our Zero Trust
	Architecture Strategy for the Federal enterprise to be more
	secure, layer by layer, piece-application by application. So,
	we have already started the work. We are moving full speed
	ahead. This will be an ever-evolving dynamic process because
	cybersecurity and cyberspace is ever evolving and dynamic, but
	we have already started the work.
	Ms. Mace. And then, on the topic of work force, obviously
	we all agree here we want to build a robust cyber work force
	drawing from all parts of our society. I think everybody up
	here would agree with that. I am working on legislation to try
	to accelerate the hiring of Federal employees in the
	cybersecurity space, and I would look forward to working with
	you and your office on some of the ideas that we have from, you
	know, education to--in the way that we hire as well. But even
	under existing law, the executive branch has tools at its
	disposal it is not necessarily fully utilizing.
	A report based on the findings of Solarium Commission cited
	specific actions the Administration could take now, should take
	now, and it calls for the office to help coordinate some of
	those actions. Your thoughts on that, and is that possible?
	Your thoughts on getting more employees. You know, as we have
	discussed before, we have an ageing work force. We have got
	four times as many people over the age of 60 in a lot of these
	jobs versus under the age of 30, and so at some point those
	individuals will retire. So, just sort of your thoughts. Will
	your office take the wheel and steer the effort to this more
	robust cyber work force?
	Ms. Walden. So, yes, and in partnership with OPM. So, yes,
	we have similar concerns about access to good-paying cyber jobs
	for anybody that wants one, right? We need to be able to
	rethink the barriers that we might have imposed for those entry
	level jobs. We need to broaden the scope for how we bring in
	new employees, and perhaps we don't need people with four-year
	college degrees for----
	Ms. Mace. Hundred percent, yes.
	Ms. Walden. Maybe we look at community colleges. Maybe you
	just look at the digital skills. I have friends who are
	executives in the outside world there who are great at
	researching when they were younger. They have the right digital
	skills in order to be able to enter this work force.
	In terms of the Federal cyber work force, I share a similar
	concern. And so, we are working with OPM to shore up and
	harmonize the differing Federal authorities across departments
	and agencies for hiring and retaining talent in this space. We
	are working with OPM to develop a legislative proposal, so, I
	would love the opportunity to work with you on those
	initiatives. But the idea is to make sure that we are not
	putting up or imposing barriers to recruitment and that we are
	also putting in incentives for retention.
	Ms. Mace. Thank you, and I wish you the best of luck with
	the Director of OPM. We had her here two weeks ago. She was the
	worst witness our Committee has ever had in the two-plus years
	that I have been here. And so, I have much greater confidence
	in you and your leadership and hope like hell that you can pull
	that off with--because she really couldn't answer any of our
	questions about even workforce issues. So, I really hope and
	pray that you will be able to work with her, and she will be
	able to work with you, and us, too, to expedite getting Federal
	employees into our cyber workforce. So, thank you, and I yield
	back.
	I will now recognize the Ranking Member Connolly for five
	minutes.
	Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Ms. Walden, if I
	could pick up a little bit on where Ms. Mace was, OK? We are
	looking at tens of thousands of positions in IT in the Federal
	Government and cyber as a subset of that, for sure. Given the
	age cohort of the Federal Government, right, we are looking at
	serious numbers of retirements over the next five years. So,
	how proactively--I mean you talked about removing barriers and
	working with OPM, but how do we proactively persuade, you know,
	the millennial generation `you want to come work for the
	Federal Government, and we see a 30-year career in your
	future.' How do you do that? Do you go to college campuses, and
	how do we make Federal services attractive in the sphere when
	the private sector alternative is glaringly seductive in terms
	of compensation and benefits and everything else?
	Ms. Walden. Well, thank you for that question,
	Representative Connolly. I personally do go to college
	campuses. I go to high schools. I even teach cybersecurity
	badge in my daughter's Girl Scout's troop. The pipeline is a
	serious part of our focus in the work force strategy. That is
	why we call it the work force and education strategy. We really
	need to not only focus on the core cyber and IT jobs and how we
	fill that, but the pipeline. So, in my experience, you cannot
	imagine yourself in a particular career unless you see yourself
	in that career. So, it is important to me, for example, to make
	sure that I am out there in front, motivating people to
	consider this.
	So, a couple of thoughts about this. One, the thing that
	draws me in and out of the private sector and into the
	government is mission. Private sector cannot compete with the
	government on mission, and, quite frankly, the government
	cannot compete with the private sector on pay. We can do
	better, and that is one of the opportunities we are looking at
	in this new legislative proposal, being flexible and how we do
	pay. But what we really offer is mission as a sense of moral
	enlightenment, in many ways. So, yes, reaching out, reaching to
	rural areas of the United States, reaching into parents to have
	parents understand the benefits of a career in cyber, and
	parents are and should be one of the primary influencers of
	their children. That is a constituency that I like to reach.
	But it is really the mission that is the secret sauce here.
	Mr. Connolly. Well, thank you. I will commend you. We have
	seen, for example, the excitement generated in high schools
	with robotics competition teams. The excitement is incredible,
	and I remember that some of our intelligence agencies actually
	sponsored cyber competitions. And so, we may want to think more
	about expanding that kind of program to get into high schools
	and get in people's heads this might be something you might
	want to pursue, including in Federal service.
	Let me talk about the National Strategy. I mean, candidly,
	the National Strategy took a little while to get together. Now,
	granted, we were in a pandemic, and we have lots of other
	competing things, but cyber is not a new topic. The OPM breach
	occurred two administrations ago, affecting 22 million current
	and retired Federal employees, and so, it comes to us a little
	bit late. And I guess I am worried about implementation because
	we talk about a whole-of-government approach. Knowing the
	Federal Government, this Subcomittee and its predecessor have
	spent a lot of time looking at Federal agencies, the diversity
	of capability, the diversity of expertise, the diversity of
	proactive strategies to protect, you know, the jewels in a
	given agency is very variable. So, how are you going to have a
	whole-of-government approach that guarantees all Federal
	agencies, whether you are in intelligence or you are in
	education, are protected and that are proactively fending off
	and maybe even proactively attacking the bad guys?
	Ms. Walden. What I can guarantee is that we are, as a whole
	of government, proactive in making sure that our systems are
	resilient. I feel the same urgency. I feel that we are moving
	like a bullet train in this space. There is a sense of urgency
	here. We want to get it right, though, so we have all of the
	departments and agencies working with us. We work by, with, and
	through them. We need mostly consensus to make sure that this
	moves forward in a deliberate, thoughtful, but expedient way,
	so I share that. That is why we were designed the way that we
	are as ONCD. So, we have been implementing, we have been
	working for the last two years on shoring up our cybersecurity
	resilience. I see my time is up.
	Mr. Connolly. Let me just say, because I know the
	Chairwoman shares my concern in this regard, I think you have
	got your work cut out for you.
	Ms. Walden. I do.
	Mr. Connolly. And it is an across-the-board kind of thing.
	It is the IT we possess, the legacy systems that need to be
	retired. It is the encryption that hasn't happened or hasn't
	been updated. It is the personnel as the Chair pointed out, I
	mean, that the age gap between us and the private sector is
	phenomenal. And so, you know, I just think you have got limited
	resources, and your ability to try to have a cohesive strategy
	that affects everybody and protects everybody is going to be,
	well, I hope not a Sisyphean task. I am sorry, Madam
	Chairwoman. Thank you.
	Ms. Mace. You are good. And it will be some of the Federal
	employees that won't want to go along with the national
	strategy that is, as you said, it is preeminent. It is deeply
	important. I would now like to recognize Representative Timmons
	for five minutes.
	Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Madam Chair. The National Cyber
	Strategy was expected to be released last fall. Was that delay
	a reflection of how difficult it is to get the various
	interested parties on the same page, or were there other
	challenges?
	Ms. Walden. You know, it was a bureaucratic process
	intentionally so that we can make sure that everybody, every
	department and agency, saw themselves in the strategy and are
	ready to implement. So, that was just a necessary step that had
	to take place in order to make sure that it is successful.
	Mr. Timmons. Sure. So, next question. U.S. businesses, no
	matter how hard they try to have the best cybersecurity
	possible, can still fall victim to nation-state attacks, and
	those attacks can often cost billions of dollars to publicly
	traded companies.
	Mr. Timmons. Do you think that the Federal Government has a
	role in backstopping those businesses? Since, assuming they are
	doing everything possible to avoid an attack, it is just not
	possible to stand up to nation-state actors. What are your
	thoughts on that?
	Ms. Walden. So, I will start by saying that the cyberspace
	is a global commons. It is a public good. So, the U.S.
	Government has a responsibility and a duty to make sure that it
	is safe, while the private sector pretty much owns and controls
	most of the infrastructure that underlines cyberspace. So, we
	have to work together.
	So, my response to your specific question about small and
	medium businesses, one of the core tenants of the cybersecurity
	strategy is to make sure that those small and medium businesses
	don't bear the significant brunt of cybersecurity risk all on
	their own. So, all of the tools in the strategy are there to
	lift and shift that risk, while also making the infrastructure
	cyberspace more resilient. You talked about backstopping. That
	is indeed one of the tools that we are considering, so cyber
	insurance backstop. Think of flood insurance, for example, in
	order to make sure that cybersecurity, small and medium
	businesses, don't bear the full cost of a cybersecurity breach
	while we are also working on making sure that the systems are
	resilient.
	Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you for that. So, let us talk
	about ICANN. The original intent was to promote the stability
	and security of the internet by creating a transparent multi-
	stakeholder governance model for the management of domain name
	system. So, in 2016, Department of Commerce, their role in
	ICANN expired. Do you have concerns over that, in the U.S.'
	leadership in maintaining a secure internet globally?
	Ms. Walden. So, I think we need to consider how do we
	harmonize standards. Digital ecosystem is--doesn't have
	specific borders, so we need to make sure that we harmonize
	standards in general, but let me just even take it a step
	further back. Cyberspace is composed of three pieces. We have
	touched a lot on personnel, people, which is arguably the most
	important part of cyberspace, but it is also technology, the
	gizmos, the microphone that has an echo, all of that, right?
	But it is also governance, it is authorities and
	responsibilities. If no one is guarding the gate, then the bad
	guy can just walk through. It is that governance layer that you
	are getting at.
	So, yes, the cybersecurity strategy, generally, is intended
	to articulate and find vulnerabilities in that governance
	layer, in the roles and responsibilities, figure out who is
	guarding the gates, figure out what the vulnerabilities are,
	and then close those vulnerabilities. So, that is a symptom of
	the challenge that we face.
	Mr. Timmons. To that point, what tools does the
	Administration plan to use to bolster the security of the
	foundation itself?
	Ms. Walden. So, there are a couple of tools as articulated
	in the strategy. I think it is Pillar 4 we talk about the
	technical opportunities in the foundations of the internet,
	right, like a faster migration to IPv6 from IPv4. That is one
	opportunity in terms of modernizing the backbone of the
	internet. But then there are also opportunities for filling
	those vulnerabilities, like I described, in the roles and
	responsibilities. The implementation plan is going to help us
	with that, at least in the departments and agencies. We are
	also looking at the idea of harmonizing standards, harmonizing
	regulations so that we know exactly what we are certifying to
	when we have like IoT device labeling, for example, how that
	works across borders, we collaborate with our allies. Pillar 5
	talks about that. So, that is that roles and responsibilities
	piece that relates to the backbone of the internet.
	Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you for being here today. Madam
	Chair, I yield back.
	Mr. Connolly. Madam Chairwoman, I just want to welcome to
	the Subcommittee the former Chairman of our full Committee and
	my predecessor in this seat in the 11th District, Virginia, the
	Honorable Thomas Davis. Welcome, Tom.
	Ms. Mace. Thank you for joining us, sir. I would now like
	to recognize Representative--I turned my mic off for you--
	Burchett for five minutes.
	Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Chairlady. You mentioned when we
	first started this that she doubted that I could spell AI, but
	I can assure you I can now. I have researched it. I Googled it.
	Ma'am, Chinese-owned media application, TikTok, has over 150
	million active users in the U.S. Do you feel like this is a
	national security concern?
	Ms. Walden. Yes.
	Mr. Burchett. Another question. What countries do you think
	are the biggest threats to national cybersecurity?
	Ms. Walden. Well, as articulated in the worldwide threats
	report that ODNI published, it is China, North Korea, Iran, and
	Russia.
	Mr. Burchett. All right. 1,600 offshore oil and gas
	facilities faces significant risk of cyberattacks. What do you
	think the potential impact of a successful cyberattack on these
	facilities is, and what steps is your office taking to secure
	this infrastructure?
	Ms. Walden. Please excuse me, I did not hear the very
	beginning of that question.
	Mr. Burchett. I said six. OK. Yes, ma'am. I am sorry. I am
	from East Tennessee. It is the only place in the country where
	people do not speak with an accent.
	Mr. Connolly.
	[Laugh]
	Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Connolly. I appreciate it. 1,600
	offshore oil and gas facilities faces significant risk of
	cyberattacks. What is the potential impact of a successful
	cyberattack on these facilities, and what is your office doing
	to secure this valuable infrastructure?
	Ms. Walden. Well, let me start with Pillar 1 of our
	National Cybersecurity Strategy, which is focused clearly on
	critical infrastructure security. There are several tools that
	we have identified in that pillar for making sure that we make
	our critical infrastructure more defensible, while also making
	investments in making sure that it is resilient regardless of
	the attacker or the type of attack. One of those opportunities
	is raising baseline cybersecurity requirements across all
	critical infrastructure sectors. There are many ways to do it,
	but as we do that, we need to make sure that no one, particular
	sector is overregulated so that we encourage investment in
	raising baseline cybersecurity requirements rather than
	investing in compliance. Now, with respect to the offshore oil
	rig, I would love to give you a reaction to that question, but
	I would need to research what the exposure is and----
	Mr. Burchett. Please do. It has been recently reported, and
	I have been informed that that is a major issue, and I can
	assure you that if our enemies can turn that spigot off, they
	will.
	Ms. Walden. Yes.
	Mr. Burchett. And they will not do it in an environmentally
	sound manner either. If somebody could get with me from your
	office, that would be great.
	Ms. Walden. Absolutely.
	Mr. Burchett. From the cybersecurity perspective, ma'am,
	how can we better secure our global financial institutions from
	bad actors? I am always afraid they are going to turn the
	switch. In early days of eBay, they always said make sure you
	use PayPal. Everybody thought it was a racket, and it is a
	racket, but it is their racket, so it is just the deal. But
	then they would say, you know, you get wired money, and it was
	always some kind of lame deal, and people were always getting
	ripped off.
	Ms. Walden. So, there are several opportunities. First, I
	would like to say about the financial services sector that they
	are quite mature in their cybersecurity practices. Of course,
	more work can always be done. As cybersecurity threat actors
	are always evolving and improving, so can our defenses, and so
	can our resilience, so it is an evolution. We work closely with
	the financial sector. We work closely with the Department of
	Treasury. So, for example, we have recently done exercises with
	the Department of Treasury for how do we make sure that our
	financial services sector becomes more resilient?
	Mr. Burchett. Let me get to one more because I am running
	out of time.
	Ms. Walden. OK.
	Mr. Burchett. This is really important to me. Our senior
	citizens, they seem like they are on the radar for a lot of
	these dirtbags that prey upon them. And what steps can your
	office do to work with us to ensure that these folks are
	protected from these hostile foreign actors and groups?
	Ms. Walden. My mom might hate me saying this on live C-
	SPAN, but I have got a mom who might be classified as a senior
	citizen, and it concerns me every time she does online banking.
	Mr. Burchett. Mama had a Sunday school class and they
	called them ``seasoned.''
	Ms. Walden. I like it.
	Mr. Burchett. Well, she said, I did not like that, honey.
	It makes it sound like a bunch of cannibals, so my mama was a
	pretty cool lady. But go ahead, I am sorry.
	Ms. Walden. No, but we need to make sure that all of the
	technology, all of the devices that we have, need security
	built in, right? We need to make that commercial where there is
	an easy button. That is what I envision when I am envisioning
	security built in for senior citizens. They should be able to
	turn on their computer, login is already enabled by default,
	multi-factor authentication is already enabled by default. All
	the different security options that you can take should be
	enabled by default. Security has to be built in.
	Mr. Burchett. And I know we are out of time, but a recent
	former Director of the FBI got ripped off on one of these
	deals. And they went after them and got his money back, and I
	was glad they did that. But I was ticked off because I have had
	people that the FBI just gives me lip service, and if they
	could do it for one, they can do it for all of them, and
	dadgummit, they need to start doing it. So, thank you, ma'am.
	Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Burchett.
	Mr. Burchett. I am sorry. I went out of time.
	Ms. Mace. Are you yielding back?
	Mr. Burchett. Do what?
	Ms. Mace. Are you yielding back?
	Mr. Burchett. Yes, ma'am, I yield----
	Ms. Mace. Yes, you are. Yes, you are.
	Mr. Burchett [continuing]. None of my time back.
	Ms. Mace. All right. I would now like to recognize
	Representative Langworthy for five minutes.
	Mr. Langworthy. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Ms. Walden, I
	just want to thank you for being here today and providing this
	Subcommittee with the invaluable insight on the path forward in
	the cybersecurity sector.
	So, I would like to start off by looking at cloud service
	providers. And the strategy correctly notes that cloud-based
	services enable better and more economical cybersecurity
	practices at scale, and their security is crucial for critical
	infrastructure in government systems. However, the strategy
	also is looking to close gaps in regulatory authorities for
	cloud services. Now, I am concerned that this categorical
	effort to sweep in an all cloud-based services is inconsistent
	with a risk-based approach. Can you explain the rationale for
	the blanket approach that you plan to pursue?
	Ms. Walden. So, cloud service providers provide some
	cybersecurity risk protections, particularly for small and
	medium businesses, and even for large enterprises, so let us
	start there. The cloud service providers operate in a highly
	regulated environment as it is. They are a participant in all
	of the regulations that their customers bear. Wouldn't it be
	fantastic if we had harmonized system regulations so that those
	that are highly regulated and that cloud service providers
	provide the compliance for, equal--and we reward that
	investment and cause others to invest in cybersecurity best
	practices by looking at how they are regulated. But cloud
	services providers have publicly acknowledged--we have worked
	with them directly in developing the strategy, but they have
	publicly acknowledged the need for regulatory minimum
	cybersecurity requirements baselines to be brought up and for
	harmonization to take place.
	So, cloud service providers, cloud environments are more
	secure than on-prem, but there is some work still to be done.
	And we are ready, willing, and able to work directly with cloud
	service providers, not necessarily to kowtow to their demands,
	but to make sure that we have effective harmonization across
	all sectors for these purposes of making cloud services more
	secure.
	Mr. Langworthy. You spoke in an interview recently saying
	that of cloud services, that if they were disrupted, they could
	create large and potentially catastrophic disruptions to our
	economy and to our government. Can you talk a little bit about
	this? You had mentioned how cyber criminals in malign foreign
	countries disrupt cloud services.
	Ms. Walden. So, cyber criminals will typically spin up
	infrastructure using cloud services to do so. I was part of a
	team that would find that infrastructure and use all means
	appropriate to tear it down. I think that we can do that at
	scale. We need to be able to work with cloud service providers
	to remove infrastructure, or at least to harden infrastructure,
	so that cyber criminals cannot leverage it. Of course, there
	are other opportunities for making sure that we reduce or we
	increase the cost of cybercrime. We can arrest people. We can
	lean into our authorities more. But we also need to work with
	private sector, owners and operators of managed service
	providers, and cloud service providers to tear down
	infrastructure where infrastructure is being used by
	cybercriminals.
	Mr. Langworthy. OK. Now, the Stafford Act, generally
	speaking, is an all-encompassing document for disasters in the
	United States. A largescale cyberattack could plausibly be
	considered a disaster. However, cyber-related disasters are not
	mentioned in the Stafford Act. What would our strategy be in
	case of a large-scale attack?
	Ms. Walden. This is the reason why we have designed the
	strategy the way that we have. We need to make sure that we
	have our ducks in a row so that we make it more defensible. But
	the focus really needs to be on what investments do we need to
	make in order to make sure that cyberattacks are not
	catastrophic and do not cause systemic failure or long-term
	failure, that we have shorter downtimes. We have a seamless
	response. So, that is the reason why we have the Cybersecurity
	Strategy. On your specific questions about the Stafford Act, I
	would be happy to come back to you with some thoughts about
	that, but that is the reason why we have the strategy the way
	it is.
	Mr. Langworthy. Thank you very much.
	Mr. Langworthy. And I yield back, Madam Chair.
	Ms. Mace. Thank you. I would now like to recognize
	Representative Edwards for your five minutes.
	Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Walden, thanks for
	being with us. As I sit here and read your testimony and listen
	to your responses, I cannot think of a less enviable position
	than yours. We are certainly appreciative of you taking this
	on. I served on a bank board for a number of years, and I knew
	the thing that kept us awake most at night was the chance of a
	cyber threat, and you have got a whole country to look out for.
	Can you see any, at this time, I do not want to talk about the
	plan so much, I want to talk about right now. Can you see any
	coordinated efforts from foreign governments right now to hack
	into systems in the United States, or are the threats out there
	from universities or just ne'er-do-wells or that sort of thing?
	Ms. Walden. Thank you for that question. What I can say is
	that the Worldwide Threats Report that was published by ODNI is
	the preeminent description of cyber threats and nation-state
	actors. That is not classified. I would refer you to that, and
	I agree with everything that is in that report. If you are
	asking me about specifics, that might get into classified
	nature of a conversation, and I am not prepared to do that
	today.
	Mr. Edwards. I respect that. Thanks. How do you coordinate
	with the private sector? We have all seen examples of how they,
	too, are under attack, and your responsibility is vast. How do
	you include the private sector?
	Ms. Walden. You know, you can always just pick up the phone
	and call. So, there are opportunities, right? ONCD, my office,
	collaborated with the private sector in a robust way in a
	development of the strategy. We are not an operational office.
	We are, by design, a strategic policymaking office, but
	operationally, there are several different models. We need to
	meet the private sector where they are. We have recognized that
	we need proactive operational collaboration, and this is
	different than information sharing when I left government the
	last time. So, it is exciting for me to see how we are doing it
	now.
	So, for example, CISA runs the Joint Cyber Defense
	Collaborative, known as the JCDC. It is a model where different
	private sector entities are able to come together, exchange
	ideas, exchange information with CISA, with each other. And
	there are other models like the National Security Agency's
	Cyber Collaboration Center, the CCC, which does cyber
	information sharing with their defense industrial base, maybe
	one-on-one, in a classified nature, however it is. But we need
	to meet the private sector where they are. We need to find
	opportunities to identify problems together, come up with
	solutions and operational plans for mitigating that problem
	together, and then executing and deploying that solution
	together.
	Good example, one that makes me really excited and I think
	is a pivotal moment that really did inform the strategy, was
	that on the eve of, or the weeks leading up to the Russian
	invasion of Ukraine, we collectively, we the government,
	collectively figured out that we had intelligence that the
	private sector may not have. Understanding, particularly in the
	financial sector, that if we sanction Russia, that there might
	be some retaliatory effects on the financial sector here at
	home, that there is more that could be done with the
	intelligence that we had by those that actually operate and
	control the infrastructure in the financial services sector. We
	delivered that intelligence so that they can take action. We
	worked the intelligence. We worked the action together. And I
	would like to think that that is a success story. We did not
	see any retaliatory effect on the financial services sector.
	Mr. Edwards. I am running out of time, but a question that
	has been burning on my mind for years, we have heard of this
	threat that maybe computers, PCs that we buy through foreign
	entities that may come from China, Korea, the chips may contain
	in their bias, some sort of code that is sniffing out activity
	here in the U.S. and just ready to be called whenever the
	foreign entity decides. Are you aware of that? Is that actually
	happening? Has it happened?
	Ms. Walden. Well, I would like to point you to the
	strategy, and perhaps you might understand why the strategy
	talks about understanding the supply chain implications of
	chips manufacturing. That is partly what the CHIPS and Science
	Act is intended to mitigate, any opportunity like that,
	hypothetically, could happen like that. Wouldn't it be nice if
	we understood what was in our software, right, what code
	libraries were in our software and how they were assembled?
	Wouldn't it be nice if we could make sure that the final
	assemblers, for example, of software, were held liable for what
	is in it so that it is not buggy, or, and it does not have some
	nefarious code written into it.
	That is one of the most intriguing parts of the National
	Cybersecurity Strategy, from my perspective, is how do we make
	sure that software is built with security in mind. How do we
	make sure that market focuses on securing the market rather
	than first to market? What are the incentives that we need to
	shift in order to make sure that that hypothetical situation
	does not happen?
	Mr. Edwards. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield.
	Ms. Mace. Thank you. I am going to do one more quick round
	of questions. I may be the only one with questions, and then we
	are going to close it out, if that would be OK to the Ranking
	Member. I am going to recognize myself for five minutes and
	hopefully less than that.
	One of my burning questions is on legacy systems. So, Y2K,
	I was learning COBOL, C++, we called it. COBOL was legacy back
	then in the late 1990's and early 2000's, and it is sort of
	shocking to me to see how many systems that we have that are
	still legacy today. So, for example, there is a 46-year-old
	Department of Education System handling 20 million student
	financial aid applications annually, running on COBOL. There is
	a 50-year-old HHS system supporting clinical and patient admin
	activities coded in C++. I mean, so the list goes on and on of
	all of these examples of these legacy systems. So you know,
	your thoughts on--the Government Accountability Office has
	pointed this out repeatedly--we need these upgrades. We have
	needed it for decades. How does the strategy play into getting
	this done across the board?
	Ms. Walden. You know, IT modernization is part of the story
	here. It has to happen. We cannot have 50-year-old systems.
	Ms. Mace. It has to happen.
	Ms. Walden. It has to happen.
	Ms. Mace. I mean, there is--yes.
	Ms. Walden. But it has to happen in a way that is smart and
	thoughtful, but it has to happen. There is some urgency behind
	it. We have already started working on that process.
	Ms. Mace. What about the agencies and Federal employees
	that are dragging their feet on some of this? I mean, we have
	seen, like, at the VA right now, EHR, I mean, just taking over
	a decade to do something that really should not take as long as
	it is. How do we get them to come along with this?
	Ms. Walden. Well, I would love to take that particular
	question back about the VA and give you a detailed answer.
	Ms. Mace. Yes.
	Ms. Walden. But I share your urgency. I am 51.
	Ms. Mace. And a lot of examples.
	Ms. Walden. Yes.
	Ms. Mace. I will not go into all of it. But the other quick
	thing I wanted to ask about, and you have talked about this,
	too. Our first hearing was on AI in this committee, and there
	are things that we cannot even imagine how AI will be used. I
	read a story the other day about ChatGPT getting through
	CAPTCHA, like, with a TaskRabbit employee, and told them that
	they were visually impaired, to break into that. We cannot even
	imagine how it might be used for good and then also for bad,
	which is one of my concerns. How are we going to use some of
	these tools to ensure that we defend ourselves against breaches
	that we cannot even be aware of right now? Where is AI? I know
	it is mentioned in the plan, but where do you see AI in the
	overall strategy?
	Ms. Walden. So, it is mentioned in the strategy, but I
	think our first conversation was around AI at some point, and
	so, I have been giving this some thought. I think of AI and the
	cybersecurity pieces of it in three buckets, right? Data that
	fuels AI, the compute power for AI, and the algorithms. There
	are cybersecurity components of each piece of that, that we can
	use to not only shore it up so that it is not used for
	nefarious purposes, or at least we reduce the chances of it
	being used for nefarious purposes, but we can also use it for
	the benefit of security, right?
	So, I am thinking in terms of data. I am thinking through
	data security measures, thinking through cryptography. How do
	we do data analytics without decrypting? Thinking about compute
	power and the work we are doing right now, as articulated in
	the strategy, on quantum is all about compute power. The work
	that we are doing on chip supply chain the gentleman here
	raised, it is all about compute power. And then the algorithms,
	how do we think about that? So, we are purposefully thinking
	through how to make sure that AI, the cybersecurity elements of
	AI, are used for good purposes, and that we are reducing the
	likelihood of----
	Ms. Mace. We do not want China to eat our lunch or Russia,
	or Iran, or any of that.
	Ms. Walden. Absolutely.
	Ms. Mace. My last question is part of the strategy
	contemplates more regulation, but from your lips, God's lips to
	my ears, you said you did not want to overregulate. So, thank
	you for making that statement, much appreciated because I think
	that we could stifle innovation by overregulating. But in terms
	of regulation, that framework, who is going to coordinate the
	cybersecurity regulatory regime and then also de-conflict when
	that is necessary?
	Ms. Walden. Well, we do have language, and not in this
	strategy, offering that ONCD in collaboration with OMB will
	lead a regulatory harmonization taskforce, for example, where
	we will think through precisely what are the gaps, what are the
	regulations, what are the authorities that exists now that we
	are underutilizing for regulatory purposes of cybersecurity.
	How do we fill any gaps that might exist? But most importantly,
	you and I agree, that we need to harmonize so that we make sure
	that we incentivize investment in cybersecurity requirements
	and not compliance, which some sectors are doing right now.
	And so, that is an all-of-department and--agency effort. We
	would love to have a task force that does that work. We are
	already working on that. We work on that through the CIRC, the
	Cyber Incident Response Council, and CIRCIA. We are working on
	that with independent agencies in terms of thinking through how
	do we harmonize the regulations that independent agencies are
	imposing, but there is more work to be done.
	Ms. Mace. Thank you. And I would now like to recognize
	Representative Lynch for five minutes.
	Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the Ranking
	Member for holding this hearing, and I want to welcome Ms.
	Walden for giving her testimony and helping the committee with
	this work.
	Ms. Walden, the Administration's National Cybersecurity
	Strategy represents, I think, an important step in our response
	as a Nation in dealing with the cyber threat landscape. We know
	that autocratic and oppressive governments like Russia and
	China are not only operating full spectrum surveillance of
	their own citizens, but we also know that they are taking
	advantage of the freedoms that we have in our country by
	surveilling our personnel, our citizens as well. And they are
	leveraging espionage, influence campaigns, ransomware, critical
	infrastructure attacks, and emerging technologies to pursue all
	those goals.
	Your strategy, as I read it, mentions ``the dark vision for
	the future of the internet that the People's Republic of China
	and other autocratic governments,'' I presume, Russia, what
	``those regimes promote.'' Can you sort of flesh that out a
	little bit and talk about what does that look like, the dark
	vision that Russia and China present in terms of our future on
	the internet?
	Ms. Walden. So, the way I think about the internet, is that
	it carries our values. It carries the values of those that
	design and build it. We have democratic values here. We need to
	lead and lean into that as we think about the future resilience
	of internet. We cannot allow autocratic societies like China,
	like Russia, to set our agenda to have internet, to have a
	cyberspace that we envision in the document that we presented
	here today. That is the idea. That is the big idea in this
	strategy is that we need to set what we think the future of
	cyberspace is. We need to invest in that future of cyberspace,
	and that is the resilience piece of it, rebalancing the risk
	piece of it. But we cannot let China, Russia, et cetera, et
	cetera, set our agenda. We are getting really great at
	defending against, but wouldn't it be great if we got in front
	of? That is a better opportunity from my perspective.
	Mr. Lynch. Absolutely.
	Ms. Walden. That is what we mean.
	Mr. Lynch. OK. In some ways, and in frightening ways, this
	dark future that you identify in your National Cybersecurity
	Strategy, that dark future seems more immediate, to be honest
	with you. For example, The Wall Street Journal reported last
	week, and I have an article here that I will ask for unanimous
	consent. It talks about China's use of state-sponsored hackers,
	teams of hackers, to employ novel hacking techniques.
	Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent to submit this Wall
	Street Journal article entitled, ``Wave of Stealthy China
	Cyberattacks Hits U.S. and Private Networks, Google Says.''
	Ms. Mace. Without objection.
	Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair. These techniques have
	allowed China to spy on governments and businesses for years
	without detection. These activities are so stealthy that, ``The
	scope of Chinese intrusion into U.S. and Western targets is
	likely far broader than currently known.'' Ms. Walden, what
	solutions do we have in terms of--does the strategy include
	solutions to root out and combat these type of aggressive
	attacks by autocratic state actors, and how successful have we
	been thus far?
	Ms. Walden. So, Pillar 2 of the strategy, in my mind, is
	quite aggressive and forward leaning. It really projects the
	concept that defense is the new offense in this space. But we
	need to lean further into the authorities that we do have to
	dismantle and disrupt while shoring up opportunities with the
	private sector to remove infrastructure that we know that these
	hackers are leveraging. So, there are opportunities for that,
	but really, what is going to happen here is we are going to
	have a cyberspace that is more resilient. There are going to
	always be some sort of holding our infrastructure at risk. We
	need to get in front of that. We cannot just keep playing
	whack-a-mole, essentially. That is the general idea. But I
	would direct your attention to Pillar 2 about our opportunities
	to disrupt and dismantle.
	Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair. My time has expired, and
	I yield back. Thank you.
	Ms. Mace. And I will recognize the Ranking Member Connolly
	for five minutes.
	Mr. Connolly. I thank the Chair, and I will not take five
	minutes. I do want to thank the Chair for holding this hearing,
	which is one of a series of hearings planned on cybersecurity,
	AI, IT management in general. And I just want to say thank you
	to Ms. Walden, but I also want to urge, and I know you share
	this view, Madam Chairwoman, we will have you back, and we are
	going to talk about implementation of the strategy because we
	are eager to see that happen.
	And I do believe the task in front of you is herculean. A
	whole-of-government approach to this subject, noble, worthy,
	but very challenging, and we have been working a lot on those
	issues for a long time on this Subcommittee as predecessors.
	So, we certainly want to help, and we want to give you the
	opportunity to share successes and frustrations as we move
	forward.
	I, also, Madam Chair, and then I will yield back. We talked
	earlier about hiring, and I just wanted to commend the three
	bills we are working on. One I have introduced, called the OPM
	Reform Bill to improve our hiring practices. The second I am
	working with Virginia Foxx, Congresswoman Foxx of North
	Carolina, called the Chance to Compete Act, which addresses
	what you were talking about earlier to Madam Chairwoman, to
	increase hiring of people with non-traditional credentials. And
	the third is the NextGen Fed Employee Act, a bill I have
	introduced, which is to try to systematize and professionalize
	the use of internships in the Federal Government. We are so far
	behind the private sector in the use of internships to recruit
	the talent we need for the future, and I am working with
	Chairman Comer on that bill as well.
	So anyway, we are working on trying to bolster how we hire,
	who we hire, and not only recruit but retain that work force of
	the future, and it is particularly acute and important in U.S.
	sphere. With that I yield back, and I thank the Chair.
	Ms. Mace. Thank you, and in closing, and I agree with the
	Ranker, that this is a herculean effort, the tasks before you,
	but know that we are here to assist and help you. We will have
	you back. We are going to want to hear about implementation and
	how that is progressing along as well. The importance, as
	Representative Lynch said earlier, it seems like it is needed
	faster and faster. In particular, I am going back to AI,
	everything that I come back to, because it is advancing so
	quickly.
	We just do not know what we do not know, and we do not know
	how it will impact us, the vulnerabilities that we have. And I
	have great concern, but not just the public sector, but the
	private sector, as well, on this issue, and so we want to offer
	as much support as we can. We will be putting out a portfolio
	of legislation to be helpful, and so in any way that any of us,
	you need us, you call us, and we will be there to assist here.
	So, in closing, I want to thank Ms. Walden for her
	presence. Your testimony today was clearly knowledgeable. It
	was fantastic, and we really appreciate it. We are very
	interested to learn about how the Administration, as
	Congressman Connolly said, will implement this strategy, and we
	are going to want more details on that in our next
	conversation, and we will invite you back.
	So, with that and without objection, all Members will have
	five legislative days within which to submit materials and to
	submit additional written questions for the witness, which will
	be forwarded to the witness for her response.
	Ms. Mace. If there is no further business, and without
	objection, the Subcomittee stands adjourned.
	[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Subcomittee was adjourned.]

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