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<title> - DIGITAL MUSIC INTEROPERABILITY AND AVAILABILITY</title> |
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[House Hearing, 109 Congress] |
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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] |
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DIGITAL MUSIC INTEROPERABILITY |
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AND AVAILABILITY |
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HEARING |
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BEFORE THE |
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, THE INTERNET, |
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AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY |
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OF THE |
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY |
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES |
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ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS |
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FIRST SESSION |
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APRIL 6, 2005 |
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Serial No. 109-9 |
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Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary |
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary |
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE |
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20-389 WASHINGTON : 2005 |
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_____________________________________________________________________________ |
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For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office |
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Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800 |
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Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001 |
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY |
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F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman |
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HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan |
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HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California |
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LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia |
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ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York |
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BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia |
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STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina |
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DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ZOE LOFGREN, California |
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WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas |
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CHRIS CANNON, Utah MAXINE WATERS, California |
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SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts |
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BOB INGLIS, South Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts |
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JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana ROBERT WEXLER, Florida |
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MARK GREEN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York |
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RIC KELLER, Florida ADAM B. SCHIFF, California |
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DARRELL ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California |
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JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ADAM SMITH, Washington |
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MIKE PENCE, Indiana CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland |
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J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia |
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STEVE KING, Iowa |
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TOM FEENEY, Florida |
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TRENT FRANKS, Arizona |
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LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas |
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Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel |
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Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel |
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------ |
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Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property |
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LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman |
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HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California |
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ELTON GALLEGLY, California JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan |
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BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia RICK BOUCHER, Virginia |
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WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee ZOE LOFGREN, California |
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SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MAXINE WATERS, California |
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BOB INGLIS, South Carolina MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts |
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RIC KELLER, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida |
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DARRELL ISSA, California ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York |
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CHRIS CANNON, Utah ADAM B. SCHIFF, California |
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MIKE PENCE, Indiana LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California |
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J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia |
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Blaine Merritt, Chief Counsel |
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David Whitney, Counsel |
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Joe Keeley, Counsel |
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Alec French, Minority Counsel |
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C O N T E N T S |
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APRIL 6, 2005 |
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OPENING STATEMENT |
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Page |
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The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the |
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State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, the |
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Internet, and Intellectual Property............................ 1 |
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The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on |
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Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property................ 2 |
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The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress |
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from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on |
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the Judiciary.................................................. 4 |
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WITNESSES |
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Mr. Mark Cooper, PH.D., Director of Research, Consumer Federation |
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of America, on behalf of the Consumer Federation of America and |
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Consumer Union |
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Oral Testimony................................................. 5 |
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Prepared Statement............................................. 7 |
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Mr. Raymond L. Gifford, President, The Progress & Freedom |
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Foundation |
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Oral Testimony................................................. 9 |
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Prepared Statement............................................. 11 |
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Mr. William E. Pence, Ph.D., Chief Technology Officer, Napster |
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Oral Testimony................................................. 14 |
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Prepared Statement............................................. 16 |
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Mr. Michael Bracy, Policy Director, Future of Music Coalition |
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Oral Testimony................................................. 18 |
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Prepared Statement............................................. 20 |
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APPENDIX |
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record |
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Prepared Statement of the Honorable Howard L. Berman, a |
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Representative in Congress from the State of California, and |
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Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and |
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Intellectual Property.......................................... 27 |
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Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a |
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Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and |
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Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary..................... 28 |
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DIGITAL MUSIC INTEROPERABILITY |
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AND AVAILABILITY |
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2005 |
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House of Representatives, |
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Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, |
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and Intellectual Property, |
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Committee on the Judiciary, |
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Washington, DC. |
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The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m., in |
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Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Lamar |
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Smith, (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. |
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Mr. Smith. The Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and |
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Intellectual Property will come to order. I am going to |
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recognize myself for an opening statement, and then recognize |
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other Members, and then we will proceed to introduce the |
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witnesses, and we will look forward to hearing from them. |
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Today, this Subcommittee continues its work to update music |
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licensing for the digital era. New technologies are providing |
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numerous and competing methods for delivering music content to |
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consumers. Consumers can buy music on-line for immediate |
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download, subscribe to unlimited amounts of music that can be |
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downloaded to a portable device, listen to webcasts of their |
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favorite radio stations on the Internet, and subscribe to music |
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broadcasts from satellites in space. |
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Each of these different types of music services is a new |
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and unique business model that brings different values and |
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opportunities for consumers. Consumers have multiple choices |
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for how they can purchase and listen to legal music. |
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Unfortunately, just as the number of legal options has |
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increased, so has the number of illegal ones. |
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Legitimate questions have been raised regarding the impact |
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of digital interoperability on consumers. In the physical |
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world, consumers didn't expect that music audio cassettes were |
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interoperable with CD players. Consumers switching from music |
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cassettes to CDs bought the same music for $10 to $20 per CD |
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that they already owned. Consumers accepted this, since they |
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felt they were getting something new with more value, a digital |
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format that made every reproduction sound as good as the first |
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playback. |
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Music is quickly becoming an on-line business with no |
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connection to the physical world, except for the Internet |
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connection. Even that connection is increasingly becoming |
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wireless. Some of the same interoperability issues that occur |
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in the physical world are now appearing here. Consumers who |
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want to switch from one digital music service to another must |
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often purchase new music files and sometimes new music players. |
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For example, music purchased from the iTunes Music Store will |
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only work on Apple's iPod music player. Music purchased from |
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RealNetworks cannot be accessed on the iPod. |
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Last year, both companies became involved in a dispute over |
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Real's attempt to offer software called ``Harmony,'' that would |
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have allowed legal copies of music purchased from Real's on- |
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line music store to be playable on Apple's iPod music player. |
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Apple objected to this effort, calling it ``hacker-like,'' and |
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invoking the DMCA. Apple blocked Real software from working a |
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short time afterwards. |
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This interoperability issue is of concern, since consumers |
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who bought legal copies of music from Real could not play them |
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on the iPod. I suppose this is a good thing for Apple, but |
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perhaps not for consumers. Apple was invited to testify today, |
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but they chose not to appear. Generally speaking, companies |
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with 75-percent market share of any business, in this case, the |
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digital download market, need to step up to the plate when it |
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comes to testifying on policy issues that impact their |
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industry. Failure to do so is a mistake. |
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As a result of disputes like the one between Apple and |
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Real, some have suggested that efforts to boost digital music |
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interoperability should be encouraged by regulation or |
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legislation. Others have urged Congress to leave the issue to |
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the marketplace and let consumers decide what is best for them. |
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Just last week, the Supreme Court heard a copyright case |
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dealing with the 1984 decision in the Sony-Betamax case. |
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Consumers ultimately chose the VHS format over their Betamax as |
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their preferred technology in their homes without any |
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intervention by Congress. At the same time, broadcasters chose |
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the Betamax standard for their internal broadcast operations. |
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If anything, this example demonstrates not only how consumers |
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will decide for themselves what standard best meets their |
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needs, but also that multiple standards can survive in the |
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marketplace. |
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The digital music interoperability issue is of interest to |
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more than consumers. Performers and songwriters are affected by |
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the decisions made about how their music is made available. |
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Music that is made available on only one digital music service |
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will limit the options for artists to earn royalties. Many of |
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the licenses and rights in the music industry stem from |
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compulsory licenses and exclusive contracts. Since one of these |
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licenses, the compulsory section 115 mechanical license, is now |
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being updated for the digital era, the time is appropriate for |
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the Subcommittee to learn more about the impact of digital |
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interoperability on consumers and artists. |
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That concludes my opening statement, and the gentleman from |
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California, the Ranking Member, Mr. Berman, is recognized for |
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his. |
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Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for |
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scheduling this hearing on digital music interoperability. The |
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explosion of technologies that enable consumers to digitally |
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download music has provided many new opportunities to the music |
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lover. The ultimate goal is to provide consumers with their |
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choice of music any time, anywhere, in any format. However, |
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this new environment has come at a great cost; that of rampant |
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piracy on peer-to-peer networks. What is considered free music |
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available on the Internet comes at the expense of numerous |
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people involved in the development of the sound recording, the |
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artists, songwriters, musicians, sound engineers and others. |
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The consequences of piracy are felt throughout our economy, |
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but they are especially harmful in my district, as well as |
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several other Members on this Committee, where many jobs depend |
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on the lawful sale of music. The proliferation of legitimate |
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music distributors in the marketplace has helped stem the tide |
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of piracy. The number of available digital music delivery |
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alternatives has increased, enabling technology companies to |
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help copyright owners make inroads against unauthorized |
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downloading and sharing of music files. However, music |
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companies will always have to compete with free music, and |
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analysts claim that it will take a number of years before |
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download services can provide a significant sales boost for the |
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content creators. |
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One of the major impediments to achieving a more level |
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playing field according to analysis is the bewildering array of |
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competing technologies. As with any nascent industry, the |
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development of new business models have unintended results. In |
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the case of digital music, there are concerns that |
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interoperability barriers between the various suppliers could |
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actually hinder growth in the market. |
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Brandenburg, the father of the MP3, has warned that rival |
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technologies will baffle consumer and risk alienating fans, |
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driving them to unsanctioned file-sharing networks, where the |
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songs are free and encoded in the unprotected MP3 format. |
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The International Federation of Phonographic Industry has |
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noted that ``one important problem that hinders growth of the |
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on-line music business is the lack of interoperability between |
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services and devices. The danger is of wide-scale consumer |
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confusion and wasted opportunities in a market which has an |
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extraordinary growth potential.'' They observe that there is no |
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easy solution, that all players in the on-line market need to |
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work harder to solve the interoperability difficulties in 2005. |
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Yet the market continues to develop. The portable player market |
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already presents consumers with an array of choices. |
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Now, we see the convergence of music devices and mobile |
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handsets. The goal of making music easier to buy than to steal |
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is becoming a reality, and therefore these innovative services |
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deserve our thanks. However, anti-piracy efforts must remain a |
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focus for technology company industries as they develop their |
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products. A legitimate distribution business model must be one |
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that is based on payment and permission of the rights holder. |
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With digital music moving into the mainstream of consumer |
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life, I believe it will be helpful to further this conversation |
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by just guessing what, if any, impediments are facing companies |
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that are now distributing digital music and how they are |
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addressing consumers' needs for legitimate music. In an ideal |
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world, we would all have the major players in the digital music |
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market at the table to hear their opinions about this issue. |
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The Chairman made reference to at least one party not at the |
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table, but I do look forward from hearing these witnesses to |
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help define some of the issues. |
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. |
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Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Berman. |
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I understand that the Ranking Member of the Judiciary |
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Committee, Mr. Conyers, you have a statement? |
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Mr. Conyers. Only a comment or two, sir. |
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Mr. Smith. The gentleman is recognized. |
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Mr. Conyers. I will ask unanimous consent that my statement |
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be put in the record. |
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Mr. Smith. Without objection. |
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Mr. Conyers. First of all, I welcome this panel, and I |
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think this is an important discussion. I want to say that I |
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commend the Ranking Member, Mr. Berman, on his very thoughtful |
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presentation, which leads me to put mine in the record and let |
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it go at that. |
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A couple of things have been said by witnesses that I just |
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want to repeat; that market forces will continue to drive |
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innovation and new ways to enjoy music and pricing and will |
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eventually resolve the interoperability problem and that |
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Government intervention can probably inhibit innovation. |
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Finally, I join with those who believe that consumers will |
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ultimately choose the interoperable systems over closed |
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platforms. |
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With that, I would return my time and thank the Chairman |
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for his courtesy. |
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Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. |
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I would, also, like to thank the gentlewoman from |
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California, Ms. Lofgren, and the gentleman from California, Mr. |
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Schiff, for their attendance here today as well. |
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Before I introduce the witnesses, I would like you all to |
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stand so I can swear you in. |
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[Witnesses sworn en masse.] |
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Mr. Smith. Thank you. Please be seated. |
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Our first witness is Mark Cooper--oh, excuse me, in |
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recognizing other Members who are present, I didn't look far |
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enough or long enough to my right to see Bob English, the |
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gentleman from South Carolina. We appreciate his presence as |
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well. |
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Our first witness is Mark Cooper, the director of Research |
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at the Consumer Federation of America, where he has |
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responsibility for energy, telecommunications and economic |
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policy analysis. Dr. Cooper is a fellow of both the Stanford |
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Law School Center for Internet and Society and the Donald |
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McGannon Communications Center at Fordham University. He is the |
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author of five books and has published numerous chapters and |
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edited works and journal articles focusing on digital society |
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issues. Dr. Cooper holds a Ph.D. from Yale University and is a |
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former Yale University and Fulbright Fellow. |
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Our next witness is Ray Gifford, president of the Progress |
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& Freedom Foundation and a member of its board. Before joining |
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the foundation in 2003, Mr. Gifford served as chairman of the |
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Colorado Public Utilities Commission for 4 years. Mr. Gifford |
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earned his law degree from the University of Chicago, where he |
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served as president of the Federalist Society and chairman of |
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the Edmund Burke Society. He earned a bachelor's degree in |
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philosophy from St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland. |
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Later on, you can tell us the difference between the |
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Federalist Society and the Edmund Burke Society, if you will. |
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Our next witness is Dr. William Pence, chief technology |
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officer of Napster. In 2000, Dr. Pence joined Universal Music |
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Group as lead technologist for its on-line music initiative. In |
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2001, he became chief technology officer of Pressplay, a joint |
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venture between Sony and Vivendi Universal, designed to offer |
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an on-line music subscription service. In 2002, Roxio acquired |
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Pressplay and rebranded that service with the Napster name. Dr. |
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Pence led the effort to build a legitimate service on the |
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Pressplay technology infrastructure, culminating in the |
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relaunch of Napster in October 2003. Most recently, he led the |
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effort which resulted in the world's first portable music |
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subscription service--Napster To Go. |
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Dr. Pence holds several U.S. patents, he received a B.S. |
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degree in physics from the University of Virginia in 1984 and a |
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Ph.D. degree in electrical engineering from Cornell University. |
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Our final witness is Michael Bracy, co-founder of the |
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Future of Music Coalition, where he currently serves as a board |
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member and its policy director. He, also, co-owns Misra, an |
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independent record label based in Austin, Texas, which, as one |
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would expect, is a city I have a particular interest in. |
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The Future of Music Coalition is a not-for-profit |
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collaboration between members of the music, technology, public |
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policy and intellectual property law communities. The Coalition |
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seeks to educate about music technology issues and to bring |
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together diverse voices in an effort to come up with creative |
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solutions. The Coalition, also, aims to identify and promote |
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innovative business models that will help musicians and |
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citizens to benefit from new technologies. Mr. Bracy graduated |
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from Georgetown University. |
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By unanimous consent, as I think you all know, your |
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complete testimonies will be made a part of the record, and we |
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look forward to hearing your testimony now. |
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Dr. Cooper, we will begin with you. |
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TESTIMONY OF MARK COOPER, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, CONSUMER |
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FEDERATION OF AMERICA, ON BEHALF OF THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF |
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AMERICA AND CONSUMER UNION |
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Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
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Interoperability is an extremely valuable and important |
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trait in the digital economy. Digital products are inherently |
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networked, which means that they are made up of complimentary |
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components or the current terminology is they are layers of a |
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platform. These layers must interoperate if the product is to |
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function properly. |
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Over the past three decades, we have learned what I call |
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the Internet lesson. The more open the interfaces within the |
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platform, the more dynamic the development. Open platforms |
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create large network effects and an innovation-friendly |
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environment. Economists call them positive externalities |
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created by these open platforms. |
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However, it is extremely important to recognize that |
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interoperability plays different roles and needs different |
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policies at different points in this platform. The |
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communications network at the core of the digital economy must |
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be open and interoperable as a matter of obligation. Closed |
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proprietary platforms in the core destroy the vast array of |
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positive externalities that can develop above. Refusals to |
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deal, discrimination in functionalities, foreclosure, |
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anticompetitive bundling simply cannot be tolerated at the core |
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of the communications network, and that is why the |
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Communications Act requires just, reasonable, and |
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nondiscriminatory terms for interconnection and carriage. |
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But as we move above from that core or from the lower |
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layers to the upper layers, the basis for interoperability |
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changes. At the periphery of the digital platform, at the |
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applications layer it is called, interoperability is very |
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consumer friendly, but it needs to be enforced or created by |
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market forces. Applications are the widgets of the digital age, |
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the things that people make and sell directly to the public. In |
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the digital content and distribution of applications, like |
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music formats, the failure to interoperate affects the direct |
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consumer. It hurts the music consumer if you don't |
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interoperate, but only the music consumer. It doesn't damage |
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the rest of the economy. |
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If an applications developer fails to interoperate, we |
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believe that developer will ultimately pay the price because |
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consumers will migrate to interoperable offerings. We believe |
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consumers demand interoperability, will pick interoperability |
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if they have information, and they have a fair choice. |
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Disclosure and expectations play a key role. Consumers must |
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be aware that if they buy a certain product that will not |
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interoperate, they will be locked in and cut off. Once they |
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know that, they will exercise, they will vote with their feet. |
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Similarly, a refusal to interoperate should not be a lever |
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for anticompetitive strategies. If we see lots of exclusive |
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deals and only a very few widget manufacturers, antitrust |
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authorities should become concerned because we expect the |
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applications layer, the widget manufacturers, to be plentiful |
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and competitive. If they don't behave in that fashion, if there |
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aren't a lot of choices, then there is a legitimate antitrust |
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concern. |
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As several Members have noted, last year, the recording |
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industry finally accepted the inevitability of digital |
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distribution of music. They sold more singles last year than |
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any time in the previous 20 years, and consumers saved a great |
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deal of money. The transition to digital distribution is |
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inevitable because it reduces the cost of production marketing |
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and distribution and may transform promotion as well. The cost |
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of delivering music to the public will decline, and the nature |
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of sales will shift from CDs and bundles to singles, and that |
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is a good thing for consumers and artists who can make more |
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money by selling lots of singles. |
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Now, those who had the foresight to see this digital |
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transformation coming and to put digital distribution in the |
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world, they have got a lead. They have, one, a first-mover |
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advantage. But as the entirety of the industry moves toward |
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digital distribution, there are no guarantees that that |
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advantage will persist, especially if they make a mistake on |
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interoperability. |
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It is not surprising to find that the very company that has |
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a lead today also had a lead 25 years ago in the PC market. |
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They were the dominant PC provider about a quarter of a century |
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ago. They refused to interoperate. They refused to open their |
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platform, and they were blown away. They are a niche market |
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player today, with a market share around 5 or 6 percent of the |
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market. Interoperability is consumer friendly, and it will |
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prevail in the marketplace. |
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I thank the Committee for giving me this opportunity, for |
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recognizing how important interoperability is in the digital |
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industries, and I look forward to working with the Committee to |
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find the right mix of public obligations at the core of the |
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digital economy and private incentives at the periphery and in |
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the widget manufacturers so that we can create competitive, |
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dynamic platforms that serve consumers, the economy and |
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artists. |
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Thank you. |
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:] |
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Prepared Statement of Dr. Mark Cooper |
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, |
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My name is Dr. Mark Cooper. I am Director of Research at the |
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Consumer Federation of America. I appreciate the opportunity to testify |
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on the subject of interoperability and commend the Committee for having |
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the foresight to hold hearings to explore the implications of this |
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important topic. |
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Interoperability is a critically important issue, not only for |
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consumers, but also for producers and the economy. However, it is |
|
important for the Committee to appreciate that the role of |
|
interoperability and public policies to promote it vary greatly |
|
depending on the nature of the economic activity that is being |
|
analyzed. |
|
|
|
INTEROPERABILITY SHOULD BE REQUIRED AS A MATTER OF |
|
PUBLIC POLICY IN CORE NETWORKS |
|
|
|
Ensuring interoperability is a critical and pressing public policy |
|
concern when it affects the critical functions of a vital network in |
|
our economy. For example, we demand interoperability in the |
|
communications network, as a public obligation, because it is a vital |
|
infrastructure at the core of our economy.\1\ Telephone networks have |
|
interoperated for almost 100 years. The advent of the Internet has |
|
brought with it amazing new opportunities for communication-WiFi- |
|
enabled telephones can connect with computers. E-mail users can connect |
|
to Blackberries. Macintosh users can send and receive files to and from |
|
Windows users. Interoperability supports a vast array of other |
|
activities and the failure to interoperate would chill innovation and |
|
distort economic activity. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
\1\ Mark Cooper, Open Architecture as Communications Policy |
|
(Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, 2004), available |
|
for download under a Creative Commons License at http:// |
|
Cyberlaw.Stanford,edu/blogs.cooper/openarchitecture.pdf. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
Over the past quarter of a century, as the digital economy has |
|
grown and influenced the broader economy, the importance of |
|
interoperability has grown because ``platforms'' play an increasingly |
|
important role. ``A platform is a common arrangement of components and |
|
activities, usually unified by a set of technical standards and |
|
procedural norms round which users organize their activities. Platforms |
|
have a known interface with respect to particular technologies and are |
|
usually 'open' in some sense.'' \2\ |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
\2\ Shane Greenstein, ``The Evolving Structure of the Internet |
|
Market'' in Understanding the Digital Economy (Erik Brynjolfson and |
|
Brian Kahin (Eds) (2000), p. 155. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
Interoperability to maximize the availability of functionality has |
|
been the hallmark of digital platforms for a simple reason. By keeping |
|
interfaces open and making the functionality available, the entire |
|
platform is driven forward, expanding the opportunities for all who |
|
build to and take from (use) the platform. ``Interfaces exist to entice |
|
other firms to use them to build product that conform to the defined |
|
standards and therefore work efficiently with the platform.'' \3\ |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
\3\ Anabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano, Platform Leadership |
|
(2002), p. 56. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
The superior value of interoperability of critical networks through |
|
open interfaces was recognized by the National Research Council of the |
|
National Academy of Sciences in a 1994 analysis of the Internet, just |
|
before it exploded into wide popular use in America. ``The telephone |
|
system is an example of an open network, and it is clear to most people |
|
that this kind of system is vastly more useful than a system in which |
|
the users are portioned into closed groups based, for example, on |
|
service provider or the user's employer.'' \4\ |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
\4\ National Research Council, Realizing the Information Age |
|
(1994), p. 43. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
In contrast, interoperability in the digital content and consumer |
|
goods industries, like video games or music formats, is a consumer- |
|
friendly way to do business. The failure of interoperability in the |
|
music industry affects the music industry and the consumers who |
|
purchase digital music. The failure of interoperability in the |
|
communications industry affects the entire economy. |
|
|
|
INTEROPERABILITY SHOULD BE PROMOTED IN CONSUMER APPLICATIONS |
|
|
|
We believe that interoperability best serves the interest of |
|
consumers and producers throughout the digital platform, but as the |
|
question moves from the interoperability of the network, to how that |
|
network is used for music it becomes important for the marketplace to |
|
provide better clarity. If an application developer refuses to |
|
interoperate, we believe that developer will ultimately pay the price, |
|
because consumers will migrate to interoperable offerings. Applications |
|
developers should be allowed to discover the consequences of their bad |
|
decisions in the marketplace. |
|
We believe consumers demand interoperability, and will pick it when |
|
given the choice. However, the development of converged or open |
|
platforms takes time, and it requires that consumers understand their |
|
options. Disclosure and consumer expectations should be taken into |
|
consideration. Sellers of closed platforms need to better inform |
|
consumers that their platforms are closed, and that consumers might be |
|
locking themselves into future hardware and software purchases in that |
|
platform. |
|
Consumers have certain expectations that they could pop a record |
|
onto a turntable or a compact disc into a CD player and music would |
|
come out. If digital formats are not going to replicate that |
|
interoperability, retailers of digital music and digital music players |
|
have a special obligation to inform consumers who have built up |
|
expectations of interoperability over years, even decades of |
|
experience. Given good information-such as where and how things will |
|
work, and where it won't--we are confident consumers will choose the |
|
interoperable systems over closed platforms, |
|
|
|
WHEN THE FAILURE TO INTEROPERATE RAISES CONCERNS |
|
|
|
An industry's refusal to interoperate should also not become a |
|
lever for anticompetitive strategies. This is a special concern in |
|
platform industries where a company may come to dominate one critically |
|
important component (layer) of a platform and seeks to use that |
|
dominance to frustrate competition in other components.\5\ This is a |
|
problem of vertical leverage in antitrust analysis and it grows in |
|
significance in platform industries precisely because of the heightened |
|
importance of interfaces between components (layers) in these |
|
platforms. Closing interfaces takes on special importance. |
|
Unfortunately, antitrust practice has drifted away from concerns about |
|
vertical leverage, at precisely the moment it demands greater scrutiny |
|
and attention. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
\5\ Mark Cooper, ``Antitrust as Consumer Protection in the New |
|
Economy: Lessons from the Microsoft Case,'' Hastings Law Journal, 52:4, |
|
2001. Available at http://www.consumerfed.org/cooper--hastings--law-- |
|
review--200106.pdf |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
We believe that music, movies and other digital content could |
|
quickly grow to become that anti-competitive lever, if it is not |
|
already. For the consumer who purchased any digital music player other |
|
than an iPod, there's no simple recourse when R.E.M. releases a series |
|
of songs exclusively on iTunes Music Store.\6\ Nor is there any |
|
recourse at all for a Mariah Carey fan with an iPod on a Macintosh when |
|
she releases an exclusive song on MSN Music--a platform that simply |
|
won't work with Macintosh or iPods.\7\ |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
\6\ While iTunes allows consumers to burn purchased protected |
|
digital music to a CD--n open platform--it must be pointed out that a |
|
consumer would need to install a new program, purchase the song, burn |
|
the song to CD, rip the burned CD into a format their current player |
|
will understand and then enter all the song information manually--a |
|
cumbersome process digital music stores were supposed to make |
|
automatic. |
|
\7\ A consumer with an iPod and Windows might have more luck if |
|
they followed the steps in Footnote 6, but users with a Mac are out of |
|
luck--and won't be able to download that song legally. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
Consumers who run up against these problems with music, movies or |
|
other digital content will increasingly turn to methods that |
|
potentially infringe copyright to get the song they want, including |
|
searching the Internet for a copy of the song converted to an open |
|
format. This is a less-than-adequate solution, and one that all parties |
|
should be wary of inadvertently promoting. Both the content and device |
|
industries surely recognize that every time they drive a consumer to |
|
infringe copyright because of their support for a closed platform, they |
|
create new incentive to create and deliver an open platform. |
|
|
|
DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION OF MUSIC HAS JUST BEGUN: |
|
INTEROPERABILITY WILL LIKELY PREVAIL |
|
|
|
Last year, when the recording industry finally accepted the |
|
inevitability of digital distribution of music, the industry sold more |
|
singles than at any time in the past two decades. The transition to |
|
digital distribution has begun in earnest. This transition is |
|
inevitable. Digital distribution reduces the costs of production, |
|
marketing, and distribution. It may also radically alter the approach |
|
to promotion. The cost of delivering music to the public will decline |
|
by 50 percent or more and the selling of music will shift from bundles |
|
of songs to singles. |
|
Major record labels--whose artists account for over 80% of the |
|
music purchased in America--are belatedly considering alternative |
|
business models for digital distribution. This lead to subscription |
|
services like Real Rhapsody and Napster 2.0 or a la carte services like |
|
those two companies offer, iTunes Music Store, and others. |
|
The music industry is not facing a format war, like the battle they |
|
are currently fighting over high-definition music--where some labels |
|
exclusively sell content on SuperAudio CD while others only release |
|
premium music on the DVD-Audio format. A format war clearly would have |
|
impeded the adoption of digital music. But as the amount music |
|
exclusively available on one format increases, and as consumers |
|
discover they've purchased thousands of dollars of music to fill up |
|
their digital music devices, locking themselves to one type of player |
|
forever, they are more likely to get confused and frustrated. To |
|
alleviate both, record labels and device manufacturers should |
|
proactively inform consumers about the limitations of their closed |
|
systems, and work to develop open standards. |
|
Those who had foresight and created a digital music platform with |
|
portable digital music players and digital music download stores now |
|
have a lead, winning a first-mover advantage. But as the entirety of |
|
the music industry makes the inevitable transition to digital |
|
distribution, there are no guarantees that the initial advantage will |
|
persist, especially if mistakes are made with regard to |
|
interoperability. A quarter of a century ago a closed platform |
|
dominated the computer desktop market. A more open platform quickly |
|
replaced it, forcing all platforms to improve compatibility. Given a |
|
choice that is not distorted by anticompetitive practices and good |
|
information consumers will prefer and migrate to the interoperable |
|
platforms. |
|
|
|
CONCLUSION |
|
|
|
Last week oral argument in two critical cases (National Cable and |
|
Telecommunications Association et al. v. Brand X Internet Services et. |
|
al and Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios Inc. et al v. Grokster) that will |
|
determine the future of the Internet made it clear that technology |
|
policy requires a careful balance between the public and private |
|
interests. Interoperability in core infrastructure industries has been |
|
a key ingredient in this nation's economic success since the railroad |
|
track was standardized and the telecommunications network was obligated |
|
to provide interconnection and carriage on just, reasonable and |
|
nondiscriminatory rates, terms and conditions. |
|
I thank the Committee for recognizing that in the digital economy |
|
interoperability has even broader implications and I look forward to |
|
working with the committee to find the right mix of public obligations |
|
and private incentives to achieve open, competitive platforms that |
|
provide a dynamic, consumer-friendly economy. |
|
|
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Dr. Cooper. |
|
Mr. Gifford? |
|
|
|
TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND L. GIFFORD, PRESIDENT, |
|
THE PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUNDATION |
|
|
|
Mr. Gifford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
When I begin to agree with my friend, and sometimes |
|
nemesis, Mark Cooper I start to doubt myself, but I appreciate |
|
the opportunity to speak with you today and the Members of the |
|
Subcommittee. |
|
In seizing on this topic, the Committee has hit upon one of |
|
the key conundrums of the digital age, namely, the role of |
|
standard-setting and the subsidiary goal of interoperability. |
|
Interoperability is a key challenge to firms and network |
|
industries. The success of a given platform depends on its |
|
attractiveness to consumers, and a key value for consumers is |
|
the platform's ability to interoperate with a variety of |
|
applications. Interoperability, to be sure, is a value to |
|
consumers and firms, but it is not an absolute value. |
|
The Progress and Freedom Foundation recently hosted a |
|
series of events in Europe on standard-setting and |
|
interoperability. My conclusions from those events will serve |
|
as my introduction here. |
|
First, standard-setting is hard. We do not know, before the |
|
fact, the optimal method or amount of standards or |
|
interoperability. For public policy, this should inspire a |
|
great deal of caution from mandating any given outcome or |
|
particular standard. Because there are undeniable tradeoffs |
|
from any standard-setting or interoperability decision |
|
Governments should be wary of thinking they have sufficient |
|
foresight to make proper interoperability decisions and |
|
deferential to private attempts to achieve interoperability. |
|
Finally, for public policymakers, we can never forget the |
|
lessons of public choice theory, which predict that firms and |
|
interest groups will seek Government favor in promoting their |
|
interoperability solution and in handicapping their rivals. |
|
I have three specific theses: |
|
First, protect the Schumpeterian incentives to innovate and |
|
compete for not just in the market; |
|
Second, allow open and closed platform business models to |
|
compete; |
|
And, third, permit the freedom to use digital rights |
|
management. |
|
First, much of the brow-furrowing over interoperability and |
|
digital music stems from the success of the Apple iPod |
|
platform. I urge this Subcommittee not to give into the |
|
politics of platform envy. Joseph Schumpeter, you may recall, |
|
was the economist who described capitalism as a process of |
|
creative destruction, with new firms and new products spurring |
|
innovation and creating new markets. Digital music is a new |
|
market, and the iPod platform and its remarkable success is the |
|
harbinger of those types of markets and what they can be. The |
|
law, intellectual property and antitrust law, specifically, |
|
should encourage this dynamism. |
|
Second, a related question to the types of competition that |
|
is occurring in this market is the platform models that firms |
|
choose to compete in the market. This gets to the heart of |
|
interoperability as different firms opt for platforms of |
|
varying degrees of openness on the one hand or closed |
|
integration on the other. |
|
From a business standpoint, you can see the tradeoffs and |
|
strategic decisions the companies are making. By opting for a |
|
more open platform, the firm hopes to attract more users to its |
|
platform and increase the number of applications compatible |
|
with its platform. The tradeoff involves sharing more of the |
|
profits from that platform and, also, perhaps some of the |
|
quality control over the whole consumer experience. In |
|
contrast, a more closed platform rather audaciously attempts to |
|
gather all of the rents from production, but perhaps at a cost |
|
of interoperability. |
|
Should public policy be concerned with these business |
|
decisions? Probably not. If you start looking for standards to |
|
scrutinize, you will see them everywhere, from razors and |
|
blades, to PSPs and disk drives, to MP3 Players and iPods. |
|
Because we cannot know in advance what consumers will prefer or |
|
what is truly superior, we should forbear from interfering. |
|
A final value of public policy should be to ratify the |
|
acceptability and use of digital rights management or DRM |
|
technologies. DRM allows content providers a reasonable degree |
|
of confidence in bringing digital music to market and consumers |
|
the ability to purchase digital music. DRM will be integral to |
|
consumers' access to digital content and, hence, must be |
|
allowed its place as a valid market mechanism. |
|
Standards are hard. Interoperability is a good thing, but |
|
not an absolutely good thing. Consumers' tastes for the most |
|
part will drive toward interoperable platforms, but not |
|
necessarily. Intellectual property law, antitrust and |
|
administrative regulation point in slightly different |
|
directions on these issues, but are up to the task of |
|
confronting the policy challenges presented by digital |
|
technologies. From Congress's point of view, the best course |
|
would be to resist calls for mandates or technology limitations |
|
in this dynamic space. |
|
I thank the Committee for the opportunity to testify today |
|
and look forward to your questions. |
|
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gifford follows:] |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of Raymond Gifford |
|
|
|
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Berman and members of the |
|
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on |
|
digital music interoperability and availability. In seizing on this |
|
topic, the Committee has hit upon one of the key conundrums of the |
|
digital age; namely, the role of standard setting and the subsidiary |
|
goal of interoperability. As you know, markets for digital music are |
|
nascent and emerging. Different platforms, different file formats and |
|
different digital rights management systems are competing for |
|
dominance. Indeed, even different business models are duking it out, |
|
with Napster To Go's subscription model taking on iTunes and Wal Mart's |
|
(among others) pay-per-song model. All of this indicates a competitive, |
|
functioning market working within the bounds of copyright and patent |
|
law, with a backstop of antitrust should unlawful monopoly concerns |
|
arise. |
|
Interoperability is a key challenge to firms in network industries. |
|
The success of a given platform depends on its attractiveness to |
|
consumers, and a key value for consumers is the platform's ability to |
|
interoperate with a variety of applications. Interoperability, to be |
|
sure, is a value to consumers and firms, but it is not an absolute |
|
value. Standards and interoperability can be achieved through a variety |
|
of institutions: within single firms, within private consortia, with |
|
government blessing and with government mandate. Standards can be open |
|
and non-propriety, or closed and proprietary, and gradations in between |
|
these extremes. In digital music markets we see all of these models, to |
|
varying degrees. There is the relatively more closed and integrated |
|
iPod platform; there are the relatively more open MP3 platforms. There |
|
are different file formats; there are different DRM solutions. |
|
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you on this topic because |
|
I have been thinking about it so much myself. The Progress & Freedom |
|
Foundation recently hosted a series of events in Europe. My conclusions |
|
from those events serve as my introduction here: |
|
|
|
First, standard setting is hard. We do not know ex ante the |
|
optimal method for standard setting, or the optimal model. Are |
|
open standards preferable? In some cases, yes; in others, no-- |
|
you are making a trade-off. Are proprietary or non-proprietary |
|
standards going to give the greatest amount of innovation? We |
|
cannot be sure. Do we prefer competition for a standard or |
|
competition within a standard? Depends on the quality of the |
|
standard you start with, and also requires recognition of the |
|
(unknown and unknowable) costs of the standard foregone. |
|
|
|
For public policy, all this should inspire a great deal of |
|
caution for mandating any given outcome or specific standard. |
|
Because there are undeniable trade-offs from any standard- |
|
setting decision, governments should be: a) wary of thinking |
|
they have sufficient foresight to make proper standard-setting |
|
decisions; and b) deferential to private attempts at standard |
|
setting. Different business models will emerge, different |
|
appetites for risk will be revealed--some firms will hedge risk |
|
and cooperate with others in standard setting; others will |
|
audaciously seek to ``win'' the standard with a fully closed, |
|
vertically integrated model (large parts of the iPod business |
|
model come to mind here). Only where the collective action |
|
problem seems overwhelming should government deign to enter the |
|
standard setting sphere. |
|
|
|
Finally, for public policy makers, we can never forget the |
|
lessons of public choice theory, which predicts that firms and |
|
interest groups will seek government favor in promoting their |
|
standards solution and handicapping their rivals. Any call for |
|
government to prefer one standard or model over another must be |
|
subject to the most exacting skepticism given what we know |
|
about the propensity for the public policy process to be |
|
perverted toward private ends. |
|
|
|
With that, let me address three issues relating to digital music |
|
interoperability that occasioned this hearing today. I have three |
|
specific theses: first, protect the Schumpeterian incentives to |
|
innovate and compete for, not just in, the market; second, allow open |
|
and closed platform business models to compete; and, third, permit the |
|
freedom to use digital rights management technology so digital music |
|
will be brought to market. |
|
|
|
PROTECT THE SCHUMPETERIAN INCENTIVE TO INNOVATE AND CREATE NEW |
|
PLATFORMS |
|
|
|
Much of the brow-furrowing over interoperability in digital music |
|
stems from the success of Apple's iPod platform. I urge this |
|
Subcommittee not to give in to the politics of platform envy, however. |
|
Instead of being concerned with the business decisions of a firm, and |
|
the preferences of consumers, the Committee should celebrate the |
|
triumph of the iPod platform as Schumpeterian competition at its best. |
|
Joseph Schumpeter, you may recall, was the economist who described |
|
capitalism as a process of ``creative destruction,'' with new firms and |
|
new products spurring innovation and creating new markets. Digital |
|
music is a new market, and the iPod platform and its remarkable success |
|
is the harbinger of that market and what it can be. In turn, this |
|
competition for the market has spurred other innovation, other |
|
platforms and other business models to emerge to challenge the iPod |
|
platform. This is a type of competition that benefits consumers |
|
immeasurably. It is the type of dynamic competition that is making |
|
digital music a reality to millions of American consumers. The law-- |
|
intellectual property and antitrust law, specifically--should encourage |
|
this dynamism. |
|
There are at least three benefits to this Schumpeterian |
|
competition: firms compete to build a valuable customer base, firms |
|
bring new products to market more quickly for fear of being displaced, |
|
and companies are driven to develop superior technologies. All of these |
|
are benefits we are now seeing from inter-platform competition for |
|
digital music markets. To be sure, this competition may create some |
|
hiccups and difficulties for interoperability as it goes on, but the |
|
innovation benefits are worth it. Furthermore, these markets usually |
|
trend toward interoperability, as that is usually where consumer |
|
preference directs them. |
|
By contrast, government-mandated interoperability sacrifices the |
|
dynamic competition for the standard for competition within the |
|
standard. This mandate would appropriate the value that the platform |
|
innovator has created, and allow others to interoperate on the |
|
platform. Long-term, such mandated unbundling of digital music |
|
platforms in the name of interoperability will quell innovation and |
|
investment in the platform. Furthermore, this call for mandated |
|
interoperability is, by definition, going to be opportunistic. No one |
|
calls for access to failed platforms, say the Betamax, the Commodore |
|
64, or the Digital Audio Tape. |
|
One of the questions here is how law will treat cases of reverse |
|
engineering, such as Real Networks has attempted to do with the iPod, |
|
and various hackers have done with the Fairplay DRM system and the |
|
Napster To Go DRM. Interestingly, copyright law tends to be more |
|
solicitous of reverse engineering, while patent law tends to be hostile |
|
toward reverse engineering attempts. On balance, it seems to me that IP |
|
law should encourage this inter-platform competition such as we see |
|
happening in digital music, and thus be suspicious of attempts to |
|
reverse engineer and de facto ``unbundle'' the successful platform. |
|
So, my first advice is: don't give into platform envy and mandate |
|
some sort of interoperability. Antitrust law and the common law-like |
|
doctrines of intellectual property law are adequately suited to address |
|
the challenges from new digital music platforms. |
|
|
|
(RELATIVELY) MORE OPEN AND MORE CLOSED PLATFORM MODELS |
|
WILL COMPETE FOR DOMINANCE |
|
|
|
A related question to the type of competition that is occurring in |
|
this market is the platform models that firms choose to compete in the |
|
market. This gets to the heart of interoperability, as different firms |
|
opt for platforms of varying degrees of ``openness,'' on the one hand, |
|
or closed integration, on the other. For Congress, I do not think this |
|
should be of particular concern because the market will sort out what |
|
is superior, or at the very least make a better judgment about the |
|
inevitable trade-offs involved. |
|
From a business standpoint, you can see the trade-offs and |
|
strategic decisions that companies are making. By opting for a more |
|
``open'' platform, the firm hopes to attract more users to its platform |
|
and increase the number of applications compatible with its platform. |
|
The trade-off involves sharing more of the profits from that platform, |
|
and also perhaps some of the quality control over the whole consumer |
|
experience. In contrast, a more closed platform rather audaciously |
|
attempts to garner all of the ``rents'' from production, but at a cost |
|
(perhaps) of interoperability. We saw this very dynamic in the |
|
competition for the personal computer standard with the lower-cost, |
|
modular Wintel platform competing with the higher-cost, more tightly |
|
integrated Apple MacIntosh platform. We see reflections of that same |
|
business strategy difference now with digital music players. |
|
Recently, The Wall Street Journal had a story about a new trend |
|
toward ``closed'' non-interoperable platforms--in coffee makers. Yes, |
|
coffee makers, which have traditionally been ``open-architectured'' |
|
devices with standard filter basket design and open to any brand or |
|
grind of coffee. Now, companies such as Nestle with a Nespresso, Sara |
|
Lee with Senseo and Kraft with a Tassimo, are making closed-platformed |
|
coffee makers that use special fiters and coffees that work just with |
|
the specific maker. And just last week a new, relatively closed |
|
standard emerged on the consumer electronics scene, the Sony PSP. I |
|
know this because my 10 year old son is bugging me for one. The PSP |
|
uses a disk size that is proprietary to Sony. As a consumer, I may fear |
|
``lock in'' on these closed platforms, but I can make the decisions |
|
whether to buy or not. |
|
Should public policy be concerned with this turn in the annals of |
|
coffee maker platform design or video game devices? Probably not. If |
|
you start looking for standards to scrutinize, you will see them |
|
everywhere--from razors and blades, to PSPs and disk drives, to MP3 |
|
Players and iPods. Because we cannot know in advance what consumers |
|
will prefer or what is truly superior, we should forbear from |
|
interfering. |
|
|
|
FREEDOM TO USE DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT |
|
|
|
A final value for public policy should be to ratify the |
|
acceptability and use of digital rights management or DRM technologies. |
|
DRM allows content providers a reasonable degree of confidence in |
|
bringing digital music to market, and consumers the ability to purchase |
|
digital music. DRM will be integral to consumers' access to digital |
|
content and hence must be allowed its place as a valid market mechanism |
|
to bring digital music to market. |
|
Some argue that DRM is a limitation on consumers' freedom and its |
|
used should be circumscribed. This is wrong on two fronts. First, the |
|
price system in a functioning market takes this into account and |
|
reduces consumers' costs correspondingly. If I purchase a song with DRM |
|
attached that limits its platform compatibility, those limits are in |
|
the price I pay. Because the nature of digital technologies allows |
|
perfect, costless copying, my consent as a consumer to purchase a DRM- |
|
restricted song may be the only way I can enjoy digital music. If the |
|
choice is between digital music with DRM and no digital music, I will |
|
take the former. |
|
The argument that DRM--and its associated technological arms races |
|
to break it--is socially wasteful proves too much. By this logic, my |
|
investment of locks on my home is socially wasteful because a |
|
determined burglar will be able to break in anyway. DRM does, as we |
|
see, inspire a hack and counter-hack arms race, and this is indeed not |
|
salutary for the mass of consumers who want to properly use licensed |
|
digital music. And indeed, DRM can be overrestrictive to consumers' |
|
desires for interoperability. But right now, I do not have a better |
|
idea. More important, the market opportunity for more-tailored DRM |
|
should provide the opportunity for it to become better and more |
|
accommodating of consumers' wishes. |
|
Indeed, HR 1201, pending in another committee, would in effect |
|
remove DRM as a marketplace option. By permitting consumers to |
|
circumvent copy-protection mechanisms, currently a violation of the |
|
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, any contract between a consumer and a |
|
content provider involving a fixed payment for a fixed set of rights |
|
could be unilaterally voided by the consumer. |
|
We are constantly hearing calls for more flexible business models |
|
in digital content. If HR 1201 were to pass, I could approach the |
|
existing smorgasbord of digital music offerings, for example, and |
|
purchase the most affordable option, which likely involves limitations |
|
on platforms and devices, enforced through DRM technology. I could then |
|
legally hack through those protections and use the content however I |
|
may see fit, gaining the same flexibility of use as a consumer who paid |
|
full price for that use. It's not hard to imagine that in a world where |
|
DRM hacking is legal, there would be little incentive for content |
|
providers to compete with various rights models, as we see now with |
|
Napster To Go. That would mean less content with fewer price options, |
|
and thus a loss for consumers. |
|
|
|
CONCLUSION |
|
|
|
Standards are hard. Interoperability is a good thing, but not an |
|
absolutely good thing. Consumers' tastes, for the most part, will drive |
|
toward interoperable platforms, but not necessarily. |
|
Intellectual property law, antitrust and administrative regulation |
|
point in slightly different directions on these issues, but are up to |
|
the task of confronting the policy challenges presented by digital |
|
technologies. From Congress' point of view, the best course would be to |
|
resist calls for mandates or technology limitations in this dynamic |
|
space. |
|
I thank the Committee for this opportunity and ask that my written |
|
remarks be made part of the record. I am happy to answer any questions |
|
you may have. |
|
|
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Gifford. |
|
Dr. Pence. |
|
|
|
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. PENCE, PH.D., |
|
CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, NAPSTER |
|
|
|
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Berman, Members of |
|
the Subcommittee for inviting me here today. Thank you, also, |
|
for the leadership that you have exercised in the fight against |
|
piracy and for recognizing the importance of the legitimate on- |
|
line music marketplace. |
|
Like our colleagues in the on-line music industry, Napster |
|
has a vision for what consumers want in a service: great music, |
|
deep catalog, easy-to-use technology, high-quality files |
|
without spyware, pornography or viruses, and flexibility and |
|
portability all at a fair price. |
|
Recently, as you may be aware, Napster introduced the first |
|
portable music subscription service, Napster To Go, that allows |
|
consumers to enjoy our large catalog of music on a variety of |
|
portable devices for a plat price of only $15 a month. Combined |
|
with unlimited downloading and streaming, we believe this |
|
service provides consumers with all of the key elements they |
|
want in a digital music service: freedom to discover music on |
|
an unlimited basis and the ability to take that music with them |
|
wherever they go. |
|
For many users, this is a more attractive option than |
|
buying individual tracks for 99 cents. We support an ala |
|
carte download store as well, and we strive to offer as |
|
many choices to consumers as possible. All of these choices, |
|
and more to come, are enabled through our underlying digital |
|
rights management platform which is based on Microsoft software |
|
components. |
|
I have been asked to testify today specifically about |
|
digital music interoperability, about the value of |
|
interoperability to consumers, creators, and legitimate on-line |
|
music marketplace and about when full digital music |
|
interoperability may be available. In particular, some have |
|
asked whether Congress should help jump-start the legitimate |
|
marketplace by mandating digital music interoperability so that |
|
consumers will no longer be confused, so that they will know |
|
for sure that every digital song they acquire lawfully will |
|
play on any portable music player and on any PC. |
|
We have been asked whether digital interoperability might |
|
be the magic bullet that enables legitimate on-line music to |
|
win the battle against piracy and black-market networks. |
|
As a technologist, it seems important to appreciate that |
|
each digital song file has two essential components, the audio |
|
compression software and the digital rights management software |
|
and that each can be a source of interoperability confusion. |
|
You may be familiar with audio compression software or codecs |
|
that have been developed by Real Networks and Microsoft, as |
|
well as the MP3 format developed by Fraunhofer and the AAC |
|
format utilized by Apple. But there were literally dozens of |
|
audio codecs offered in the late 1990's. |
|
Historically, codecs were incompatible, and if one |
|
downloaded a song in the MP3 format, it would not play if your |
|
PC utilized a different format. Today, however, this is less of |
|
an issue, generally, because audio codecs have been in the |
|
marketplace for several years, and traditional marketplace |
|
forces have evaluated the qualities and sustainability of each. |
|
As a result, only two or three codecs are relevant in the on- |
|
line marketplace today, and interoperability is considered |
|
essential and made possible by licenses that are easily |
|
available and economically reasonable. |
|
For consumers, the generally successful outcome is that PCs |
|
and portable music devices today support more than one of the |
|
surviving codecs, minimizing, although not eliminating, |
|
dysfunction for end users. Today, for example, users can copy |
|
their CD collection onto their PC in the MP3 format and combine |
|
those music files with songs purchased from Napster in the |
|
Microsoft WMA format and seamlessly transfer all to portable |
|
devices without ever knowing that two separate formats were |
|
involved. |
|
In contrast, DRM interoperability has remained at the |
|
center of debate in the on-line music industry. In the last |
|
several years, high-quality DRM technologies have been |
|
developed and offered by dozens of companies. While the market |
|
has narrowed the field from dozens of DRM technologies to less |
|
than a handful today that are commercially meaningful, the DRM |
|
market is still significantly less mature than the codec |
|
market, and the competing offerings are not fully rationalized |
|
or stabilized. |
|
More importantly, DRM technology is still in a stage of |
|
rapid innovation. This is best demonstrated by the pace of new |
|
business models being introduced in the market, including our |
|
own Napster To Go service. As consumers' on-line services and |
|
copyright owners have become more sophisticated, technology |
|
innovators have responded rapidly and brought improved products |
|
to market, but DRMs are still being developed, tested, |
|
challenged and upgraded, and I encourage Congress to welcome |
|
and promote this innovation and the improved music offerings |
|
that result. |
|
It is my belief, and the essential point of my |
|
participation today, that marketplace forces will continue to |
|
drive innovation in the DRM arena with the tenant consumer |
|
benefits, new ways to enjoy digital music at a variety of |
|
different price points, while also gradually solving the |
|
interoperability problem. |
|
The solutions will be evident through a combination of |
|
consumer devices that support multiple DRM formats and services |
|
that will translate from one DRM format to another, as content |
|
flows legitimately between devices, always maintaining the user |
|
rules as defined by the service that originally makes the |
|
content available. Already we see evidence of DRM market forces |
|
in action, as companies coalesce around platforms. |
|
Historically, the Government has not been a participant in |
|
competition between early-stage consumer technologies. |
|
Government intervention in the innovation business can lead to |
|
politicizing and inhibiting such innovations rather than |
|
allowing the marketplace, based on actual demand, to select |
|
winners that must continue to provide viable solutions. |
|
In contrast, Napster wholeheartedly endorses the |
|
conclusions of Chairman Smith and Representative Berman that |
|
were offered in a recent Subcommittee hearing about our music |
|
licensing laws. Congress has a critical role to play in |
|
facilitating the legitimate on-line music marketplace by |
|
modernizing the Copyright Act. |
|
Thank you, again, for providing the opportunity for Napster |
|
to address the issues that continue to hamper industry and for |
|
your continuing support in helping royalty-paying, on-line |
|
music services defeat piracy. |
|
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pence follows:] |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of William E. Pence |
|
|
|
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Berman, and Members of the Subcommittee: |
|
Thank you for inviting me, on behalf of Napster, to testify at |
|
today's hearing at which the Subcommittee is considering the importance |
|
of digital music interoperability. Thank you also for the leadership |
|
that you and the Members of the Subcommittee have exercised in the |
|
fight against piracy, and for recognizing the importance of the |
|
legitimate online music marketplace, both for its independent value as |
|
an opportunity for creators and consumers to distribute and enjoy more |
|
and different types of music, and for the value of royalty-paying |
|
online music as the marketplace solution to piracy. |
|
Napster is also particularly appreciative of the Subcommittee's |
|
leadership with regard to the education and youth market. Napster, as |
|
you know, is working closely with the recording industry and a number |
|
of universities to bring legal music to the campuses of America in a |
|
manner that encourages this important consumer group to respect the |
|
legitimate marketplace while recognizing its hunger for a full-featured |
|
digital music service at a reasonable price. |
|
Like our colleagues in the online music industry Napster has a |
|
vision of what consumers want in an online music service: great music, |
|
deep catalog, easy-to-use technology, high-quality files without |
|
spyware, pornography, or viruses, and flexibility and portability, all |
|
at a fair price. Moreover, our company story demonstrates that |
|
consumers are willing to pay for this: from a standing start four years |
|
ago as PressPlay to today's Napster, we now have more than 400,000 |
|
paying subscribers worldwide, including more than 50,000 subscribers on |
|
college campuses. |
|
Recently, as you may be aware, Napster introduced the first |
|
portable music subscription service, Napster-to-Go, that allows |
|
consumers to enjoy our large catalog of music on a variety of portable |
|
devices for a flat price of only $15 a month. Combined with unlimited |
|
downloading and streaming, we believe this service provides consumers |
|
with all the key elements they want in a digital music service--freedom |
|
to discover music on an unlimited basis, and the ability to take that |
|
music with them wherever they go. For many users, this is a more |
|
attractive value than buying individual tracks for $0.99, though we |
|
support an a la carte download store as well, and we strive to offer as |
|
many choices to consumers as possible. All of these choices, and more |
|
to come, are enabled through our underlying digital rights management |
|
platform, which is based on Microsoft software components. |
|
I have been asked to testify today specifically about digital music |
|
interoperability--about the value of interoperability to consumers, |
|
creators, and the legitimate online music marketplace--and about when |
|
full digital music interoperability may be available. In particular, |
|
some have asked whether Congress should help jump-start the legitimate |
|
marketplace by mandating digital music interoperability so that |
|
consumers will no longer be confused, and rather they will know for |
|
sure that every digital song they acquire lawfully will play on any |
|
portable music player, on any PC, and if burned to a compact disc that |
|
it will play on every CD player. We have been asked whether digital |
|
interoperability might be the magic bullet that enables legitimate |
|
online music to win the battle against black market networks that |
|
enable music theft and generate no royalties to artists. |
|
As a technologist, it seems important to appreciate that each |
|
digital song file has two essential components--the audio format |
|
software and the digital rights management software--that can each be a |
|
source of incompatibility. You may be familiar with audio format |
|
softwares, or codecs, that have been developed by RealNetworks and |
|
Microsoft, as well as the MP3 format developed by Fraunhofer and the |
|
AAC format utilized by Apple. But there were literally dozens of audio |
|
codecs offered in the late 1990s, including software developed by AT&T |
|
Labs and Universal Music. |
|
Historically codecs were incompatible, and if one downloaded a song |
|
in the MP3 format it would not play if your PC utilized Liquid Audio |
|
software, and vice-versa. Today, however, this is less of an issue, |
|
generally because audio codecs have been in the marketplace for several |
|
years and traditional marketplace forces have evaluated the qualities |
|
and sustainability of each. As a result only two or three codecs are |
|
relevant in the online music industry today, and interoperability is |
|
considered essential and is made possible by licenses that are easily |
|
available and economically reasonable. And for consumers, the generally |
|
successful outcome is that PCs and portable music devices today support |
|
more than one of the surviving codecs, minimizing (although not |
|
eliminating) dysfunction for end users. Today, for example, users can |
|
copy their CD collection onto their PC in the MP3 format and combine |
|
those music files with songs purchased from Napster in the Microsoft |
|
WMA format, and seamlessly transfer all to portable devices without |
|
ever knowing that two separate formats were being integrated. |
|
In contrast, DRM interoperability has emerged recently as the |
|
center of debate in the online music industry. In the last several |
|
years high-quality DRM technologies have been developed and offered by |
|
dozens of companies, including Liquid Audio, AT&T Labs, Universal |
|
Music, RealNetworks, IBM, Microsoft, Contentguard, Intertrust, Verance |
|
and Macrovision. While the market has narrowed the field from dozens of |
|
DRM softwares to less than a handful today that are commercially |
|
meaningful, the DRM market is significantly less mature than the codec |
|
market, so the competing offerings are not fully rationalized or |
|
stabilized. |
|
Importantly, the market's immaturity is driven by the technology's |
|
immaturity, as DRM technology is still in a stage of rapid innovation. |
|
This is best demonstrated by the pace of new business models being |
|
introduced in the market, including our own Napster to Go service, |
|
based on the just released DRM10 technology from Microsoft. As |
|
consumers, online services and copyright owners have become more |
|
sophisticated, technology innovators have responded rapidly and brought |
|
improved products to market, but DRMs are still being developed, |
|
tested, challenged, and upgraded--and I encourage Congress to welcome |
|
and promote this innovation and the improved music offerings that |
|
result. |
|
It is my belief, and the essential point of my participation today, |
|
that marketplace forces will continue to drive innovation in the DRM |
|
arena with attendant consumer benefits--new ways to enjoy digital music |
|
at a variety of different price points--while also gradually |
|
``solving'' the interoperability problem. The solutions will be evident |
|
through a combination of consumer devices that support multiple DRM |
|
formats, and services that will translate from one DRM format to |
|
another as content flows legitimately between devices, always |
|
maintaining the user rules as defined by the service that originally |
|
makes the content available. |
|
Already we see evidence of DRM market forces in action as companies |
|
coalesce around platforms. A good example of this is the many online |
|
services and device manufacturers that have licensed and deployed the |
|
Microsoft DRM. Others, such as Apple, have chosen not to license their |
|
technology platform under any terms to services and manufacturers eager |
|
to offer innovative business models to consumers. Perhaps Apple is |
|
confident that its market-leading position is best maintained by |
|
promoting a closed environment, and that is a legitimate business |
|
decision that some endorse and others may question. Napster believes |
|
that allowing the iPod to work with multiple service offerings would |
|
benefit consumers. Nevertheless, I do not see Government intervention |
|
as the solution, as it would stifle competition and innovation that |
|
will benefit consumers and copyright owners at a very early stage of |
|
the market's development. |
|
Historically the Government has not been a participant in |
|
competition between early-stage consumer technologies, such as between |
|
the VHS and the Betamax, the cassette and the 8-track tape, USB and |
|
Firewire, or the current competition between DVD Audio and Super Audio |
|
CD. Similarly, it does not seem prudent for Government to pick a winner |
|
in the continuing (but still quite early-stage) marketplace battle |
|
between Apple's Fairplay DRM and its competitors. Government |
|
intervention in the innovation business can lead to politicizing and |
|
inhibiting such innovation, rather than allowing the marketplace, based |
|
on actual demand, to select ``winners'' that must continue to provide |
|
viable solutions or lose their market--deservedly--to the next great |
|
offering that someone develops in his or her garage or corporate lab. |
|
In contrast, Napster wholeheartedly endorses the conclusions of |
|
Chairman Smith and Representative Berman that were offered in the |
|
recent Subcommittee hearing about our music licensing laws. Congress |
|
has a critical role to play in facilitating the legitimate online music |
|
marketplace, by modernizing the Copyright Act--in particular, Sections |
|
115 and 112 as they relate to music publishing rights and royalties. |
|
Napster and our legitimate online music competitors compete with pirate |
|
services, and it is critical to creators and all who support them that |
|
royalty-paying services win the day. |
|
If this Subcommittee helps legal services to secure blanket |
|
licenses for music publishing rights, we will offer the full catalog of |
|
music that, ironically, only the black market networks players can |
|
currently provide to consumers. Once we are actually functioning on an |
|
equal music playing field, Napster believes that our then-significantly |
|
larger number of consumers who realize that our features and |
|
functionality are so much more robust and appealing than the virus- |
|
ridden free option, will speak out on the subject of interoperability |
|
and encourage the market to adapt. |
|
Thank you again for providing the opportunity for Napster to |
|
address the issues that continue to hamper our industry, and for your |
|
continuing support in helping royalty-paying online services defeat |
|
piracy. |
|
|
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Dr. Pence. |
|
Mr. Bracy? |
|
|
|
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL BRACY, POLICY DIRECTOR, |
|
FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION |
|
|
|
Mr. Bracy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Berman, Mr. |
|
Conyers, for being here today, and the rest of the |
|
Subcommittee. We appreciate the opportunity to present some |
|
testimony, some thoughts. |
|
You have our written statement, so I am just going to kind |
|
of give some reflections off that if that is okay with the |
|
Committee. |
|
As we are preparing for this hearing, it occurred to us |
|
that this is actually the 5-year anniversary of the formation |
|
of Future Music Coalition, and it gave us an opportunity to |
|
reflect on sort of what we have seen over the last 5 years and |
|
some kind of larger themes. |
|
I think one of the things that is important to recognize is |
|
that a lot of what we are dealing with in the music community |
|
is the idea that new technologies have dropped the cost of |
|
actually getting involved in the music community, that |
|
technology creates more musicians because more people have |
|
access to capital to create music and to distribute music, to |
|
promote themselves, and to build that one-on-one relationship |
|
with friends. |
|
The challenge that you see, as more and more people come |
|
into the community, is that the existing music structures, the |
|
historic music structures don't really support the amount of |
|
content that comes into the marketplace, and, frankly, didn't |
|
support in the traditional models the way and the ability for |
|
consumers to then to access that content. |
|
And while there is a lot of disagreement and a lot of |
|
different sort of visions as far as how you get to the end |
|
game, as far as the legitimate digital marketplace for music, |
|
there are some themes that we think cut across all aspects of |
|
the music community of musicians an songwriters; the first |
|
being that whenever possible artists need to maintain control |
|
over their copyright and their career decisions. |
|
Second is that artists, as independent entrepreneurs, need |
|
the ability to compete in the marketplace, meaning they need |
|
access to the basic networks, they need the ability to be |
|
compensated for their work, and they need the ability to access |
|
consumers. |
|
The third is something that you have done a great job |
|
throughout this process with the Committee is that artists need |
|
to be seen by policymakers as valued participants in this |
|
process, that is, the new systems are designed, new structures |
|
are designed that artists need to be at the table, and we |
|
certainly appreciate your leadership. |
|
Now, this transition, as we said, is necessary and it is |
|
welcome, and it is important, and that as more people get into |
|
this marketplace, you are starting to see the type of |
|
experimentation that really leads to this development of a |
|
legitimate marketplace. Five years ago, we said the only way to |
|
compete with Napster, an unlicensed Napster, was with a legal |
|
Napster, that you have to really try to create incentives in |
|
the marketplace to grow the market, to create legitimate |
|
models. |
|
And in the music community and among musicians, you really |
|
see an embracing of those technologies. We recently published a |
|
study with the Pew Internet and American Life project that |
|
really had two major conclusions: |
|
The first is that, on a universal basis, artists are |
|
embracing the Internet. They are embracing technology. They are |
|
trying to integrate that into their careers as a way to reach |
|
their fans directly and to promote their work. |
|
Of course, at the same time, there is this wide diversity |
|
of opinions as far as where we are today. There are a lot of |
|
different opinions in terms of peer-to-peer. You see that |
|
emerging artists embrace peer-to-peer, to a certain degree, |
|
because it gives them exposure. It is a way to get their name |
|
out there. Existing artists, established artists, they are |
|
concerned about what is happening to their revenue streams. |
|
They are skeptical about what is happening with the new models, |
|
and they are eager to see revenue flow into them directly. They |
|
see what is going on with their checks. |
|
Now, as the other witnesses have talked about, you are |
|
starting to really see this digital marketplace emerging. It is |
|
remarkable, 5 years on, to think about the growth of satellite |
|
radio, digital subscription services, music blogs, e-zines, |
|
Internet radio, webcasting, podcasting, iTunes. |
|
Consumers are demonstrating their willingness to adopt |
|
legitimate digital services. The marketplace is beginning to |
|
take hold. The question is can we continue to see a legitimate |
|
marketplace that really will benefit musicians and music fans. |
|
In fact, the point is not that this industry is perfect or that |
|
there even is a ``solution'' in place. It is a complicated |
|
process. It includes multiple competing markets which are |
|
dependent on evolving, technological innovation and regulatory |
|
policy decisions. The future music marketplace will be driven, |
|
to a large degree, by consumer adoption of broadband and high- |
|
speed services to the home, which has its own regulatory and |
|
technological uncertainty. Spectrum policy and the transition |
|
to digital radio are going to play a big part of this as well. |
|
So vigilant congressional oversight to date has been |
|
critical to this process. We are making a lot of inroads. We |
|
are seeing the growth of the market. Now, there are a lot of |
|
other sort of issues that are involved here that some don't |
|
have the jurisdiction of this Committee, some do, but that help |
|
sort of inform the growth of this digital marketplace. |
|
They include looking at issues of consolidation of the |
|
existing commercial radio industry, accusations of structural |
|
payola that limit the amount of songs or the type of songs they |
|
can get on the public airwaves, expanding community-based low- |
|
power radio networks into urban markets, looking at the digital |
|
audio broadcasting question to make sure that DAB is |
|
implemented in a way that addresses the fundamental concerns |
|
about localism, competition and diversity that we have raised |
|
as far as what is happening in the commercial radio |
|
marketplace, and bringing digital radio in line with other |
|
noninteractive digital transmission services that are required |
|
to pay an additional performance royalty to performers for the |
|
use of the music. |
|
Finally, I want to echo Mark Cooper's point, which is that, |
|
as independent entrepreneurs, it is absolutely critical that |
|
musicians and artists have access to the underlying networks, |
|
that they can't be blocked off of the main channels. |
|
So, again, we appreciate the opportunity to testify. We |
|
look forward to answering any questions and thank the Committee |
|
for their leadership. |
|
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bracy follows:] |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of Michael Bracy |
|
|
|
My name is Michael Bracy. As a founder and the Policy Director of |
|
the Future of Music Coalition, I appreciate the opportunity to speak |
|
with you today. |
|
FMC was founded on the belief that the terrestrial music industry |
|
is fundamentally broken. By that we mean that the structures that |
|
dominate the marketplace underserve the majority of creators and music |
|
fans. We did not form FMC simply to complain, but to effect substantive |
|
change in the music community by injecting the critical voices of |
|
artists and creators in the midst of this transition from analog to |
|
digital. By including these often absent voices at this critical |
|
juncture, we work to build more equitable and responsive models. By |
|
that we mean: |
|
|
|
1. Whenever possible, artists must maintain control over |
|
copyright and career decisions. |
|
|
|
2. Artists must be able to compete fairly in the marketplace, |
|
meaning they must be able to receive compensation for their |
|
work and have access to consumers. |
|
|
|
3. Artists must be seen by the policymaking community as |
|
valued stakeholders in policy debates |
|
|
|
The music community is in the midst of a necessary and welcome |
|
transition to a digital business model. Major labels and commercial |
|
radio stations have became integrated into huge corporations focused |
|
less on music and culture but on maximizing revenues. The fundamental |
|
basics of the major label structure--the need for huge capital |
|
investment and scarcity of promotion and retail outlets--have been |
|
overrun by technological innovation. |
|
This innovation has reshaped the way that music is recorded, |
|
manufactured, promoted and distributed. Digital studios and software |
|
programs dramatically reduce production costs. The Internet vastly |
|
increases promotional and sales opportunities. The marketplace for |
|
independent music has exploded, as indie labels proliferate to serve |
|
the expanding artist community. While much of this music is simply not |
|
aimed at the kinds of mass audiences of interest to major labels or |
|
commercial radio, there clearly is a market for this music, and |
|
alternate and Internet-based economies have begun to take shape. |
|
As these digital models take flight, many musicians are embracing |
|
new business models that allow greater independence, direct contact |
|
with their fans and more control over their careers. Others point out |
|
the uncertainty of these times, and express skepticism that legitimate |
|
digital distribution structures can be monetized at a level that would |
|
replicate their revenue streams they are used to receiving from |
|
previous models. |
|
In this context, the results of a recent study conducted by FMC and |
|
the Pew Internet and American Life Project should not be surprising, or |
|
controversial. This study found that musicians fully embrace the |
|
Internet to promote and sell their work but remain divided over the |
|
question of file-sharing. |
|
To a large degree, we found that these results could be tracked |
|
according to demographic factors--emerging artists were more likely to |
|
embrace file sharing services as a way to promote and distribute their |
|
work, while established artists who made a majority of their income |
|
from being a musician or songwriter raised more concerns. |
|
From our standpoint, it is important to recognize that we are still |
|
in the early days of a significant marketplace transition. While peer- |
|
to-peer remains extraordinarily popular, a legitimate digital |
|
marketplace is emerging. Consumers are exploring new, licensed ways of |
|
accessing and enjoying music, including satellite radio, digital |
|
subscription services like Rhapsody, Emusic and Napster, music blogs |
|
and ezines, the growth of Internet radio, webcasting, podcasting and |
|
digital download stores like iTunes. This trend demonstrates consumers' |
|
willingness to adopt legitimate digital services, and reinforces the |
|
critical notion that the combination of technical innovation, access to |
|
the underlying delivery mechanisms and reasonable licensing terms can |
|
create a revitalized industry that serves both musicians and music |
|
fans. |
|
The point is not that this industry is now perfect, or that we even |
|
can see the ``solution''. Rather, we all should acknowledge that the |
|
digital transition is complicated. It includes multiple competing |
|
markets, dependent on evolving technological innovation and regulatory |
|
policy decisions. The future music marketplace will be driven by |
|
consumer adoption of broadband to the home, an area full of regulatory |
|
and technological uncertainty of its own. Spectrum policy and the |
|
transition to digital terrestrial radio will play a significant role in |
|
determining how consumers are able to access digital content, and how |
|
performers will be compensated in the future. |
|
Vigilant Congressional oversight of the transition of the music |
|
marketplace has played a critical role in its success to date. At the |
|
same time FMC sees a number of potential opportunities for action |
|
today. Will Congress listen to the concerns of the music community by |
|
addressing consolidation of the commercial radio industry and |
|
accusations of structural payola that limit the songs that appear on |
|
the public airwaves? Will the FCC be permitted by Congress to expand |
|
the wildly popular non-commercial Low Power Radio licenses to urban |
|
markets? Will Digital Audio Broadcasting be implemented in a way that |
|
addresses the fundamental concerns about localism, competition and |
|
diversity in the radio marketplace? And will digital radio be brought |
|
in line with other non-interactive digital transmission platforms that |
|
are required to pay an additional performance royalty to performers? |
|
Most importantly, will Congress be able to defend the ability of |
|
musicians and songwriters to compete in the marketplace by ensuring |
|
access to high speed networks? As independent entrepreneurs, musicians |
|
and songwriters require that the fundamental open structures of the |
|
Internet remain in place and that innovation is allowed to continue. |
|
Over the past five years, the Future of Music Coalition has been |
|
fortunate to collaborate with dozens of organizations, representing |
|
hundreds of thousands of musicians, songwriters, retailers, promoters, |
|
community broadcasters and fans. The transition to a digital economy |
|
represents real threats and real opportunities to these communities. |
|
That being said, there are core themes that cut across all aspects of |
|
the music community. These shared values of artists' control over their |
|
copyright and career decision, ability to compete in the marketplace by |
|
receiving compensation for their work and accessing consumers, and |
|
being active participants in the policy process can serve us going |
|
forward. |
|
Thank you again for the opportunity to participate in this hearing, |
|
and I look forward to answering your questions. |
|
|
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Bracy. |
|
Dr. Cooper, in your testimony you said sellers of closed |
|
platforms need to better inform consumers that their platforms |
|
are closed. How would you suggest that they do that? Are you |
|
just talking about a warning label or something else? And if |
|
there's anyone who disagrees with that, I'd like to know that |
|
as well. |
|
Mr. Cooper. You know, we could hypothesize a labeling |
|
program which would be an obligation, but I don't necessarily |
|
want to get there because that creates a process of gaming that |
|
Mr. Gifford talked about. |
|
But the simple fact of the matter is, imagine if we had--if |
|
iPods had to be labeled that said, ``This music won't play on |
|
anything else,'' or vice versa. That would actually, people |
|
would then start to think. And as people build up libraries and |
|
they discover that they can't move their music from one device |
|
to another, although if that continues what you'll get is |
|
hackers who will start making it possible because innovation is |
|
hard to quell in this marketplace. |
|
So the point is that policymakers need to engage in a |
|
little bit of jawboning here, as maybe instead of a regulatory |
|
position. |
|
Mr. Smith. So maybe not a Government mandate, but still |
|
full disclosure. |
|
Mr. Cooper. Sure. Full disclosure, and attorneys general |
|
ought to be asking these questions, this Committee, et cetera. |
|
Jawboning can frequently get you a lot of help in the |
|
marketplace rather than having a formal process about is this |
|
labeled. |
|
Mr. Smith. Is there anyone who disagrees with the idea of |
|
full disclosure and labeling for the consumers? |
|
[No response.] |
|
Mr. Smith. Okay. Mr. Gifford, I'm tempted to ask you if you |
|
think Schumpeter should be the patron saint of Congress, but |
|
let me ask you a more colloquial question, which is, do you see |
|
any role for Government at all in the process? |
|
And that's a question I'd like the other members to address |
|
as well. |
|
Mr. Gifford. Not at this time, Congressman. You have an |
|
emerging nascent market. I think Dr. Pence spoke well, that you |
|
have DRM technologies that are less mature than file format |
|
technologies, and there's a lot of foment going on right now in |
|
this marketplace, a lot of business models that are being |
|
tried, a lot of reliance interests that are just taking root, |
|
and I don't know how Government can do anything but upset that |
|
very tentative equilibrium we're seeing. |
|
Mr. Smith. Dr. Pence and Mr. Bracy, what do you think about |
|
any role for Government? |
|
Mr. Pence. Well, I mentioned the 115 issue in my opening |
|
remarks. Short of that I don't think there is much of a role to |
|
play at this time. We think the market is very dynamic. We've |
|
been introducing new business models as some of our competitors |
|
have been, and we think the market is in the early stages where |
|
it should be allowed to evolve and offer more choices to |
|
consumers. So we don't--I don't see any additional role at this |
|
time. |
|
Mr. Smith. Okay. Mr. Bracy? |
|
Mr. Bracy. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the challenges is |
|
that to a certain extent it's important that Congress look at |
|
ways of demonstrating that there is this broader marketplace |
|
for local and independent music. I mean one of the realities of |
|
the music community is that it is local, it's independent. The |
|
music community has very little to do as far as the mass |
|
marketing of music that you see in terms of major, you know, |
|
huge platinum selling artists. And there are little things that |
|
I mentioned in our testimony that can be done tangentially, |
|
less on technology mandates or DRM discussions or things like |
|
that, but more on looking at the existing ways that most |
|
consumers access music and making sure they have access to |
|
independent voices. |
|
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Bracy. |
|
Mr. Bracy, let me ask you and Dr. Pence to go beyond your |
|
testimony. And you don't have to answer this question if you |
|
don't want to, but I want to ask you about the Apple business |
|
model, whether you think limiting the interoperability to |
|
iTunes and the iPod is going to be a successful business model |
|
or not, just your opinion? |
|
Mr. Bracy. You know, with the understanding that this is |
|
really we have very limited expertise, but as a personal on the |
|
specific concept, you know, business people do business and we |
|
do different things, but, you know, that we are glad to see the |
|
market evolving and obviously they have first mover advantage, |
|
but you know, the challenge is will the market speak? And the |
|
question is will the market speak or not? And I don't really |
|
have an opinion on that. |
|
Mr. Smith. Dr. Pence, do you have a---- |
|
Mr. Pence. I do have an opinion. I think it is a business |
|
model that has clearly had some success. It's actually--the ala |
|
carte model is one that we offer as well. However, we have |
|
offered other business models and we expect to offer additional |
|
models in the future, so we think choice is very, very |
|
critical, and that's the path we've embraced, choice not only |
|
in business models but an open approach to devices and support |
|
on different platforms. The choice Apple has made about |
|
retaining a closed environment is a legitimate business choice |
|
they have made and time will tell whether the marketplace will |
|
reward that or not. |
|
Mr. Smith. And I think as the market evolves you're |
|
probably going to have consumers want more choice, but that's |
|
also just my opinion as well. |
|
Mr. Gifford, anything to add to that? |
|
Mr. Gifford. Well, actually, I think, and I mentioned---- |
|
Mr. Smith. Well, actually, Dr. Cooper. I called on Mr. |
|
Gifford, but then I'll ask you for your response in a minute |
|
too. |
|
Mr. Cooper. I think this history of the last 25 years |
|
really, I started from that one example of--I'm sure Mac thinks |
|
they had a very successful business model, and they have 5 |
|
percent of the market now, and that may make them happy. But we |
|
can go back and find other examples. |
|
One really interesting example has to do with the World |
|
Wide Web, and the predecessor to World Wide Web was a service |
|
known as Gopher. It was an application, and some people in this |
|
room may remember that. And there was a key moment where the |
|
owners of Gopher, the creators of Gopher had said, hey, we're |
|
going to start charging people royalties and reorganizing this, |
|
and folks dropped it like a rock. And the World Wide Web came |
|
along, which is a magnificently open system. And I could give |
|
you other examples. |
|
So what happens here is that business people can make |
|
decisions about what serves their interest, and they'll be |
|
happy with a nice little niche market, but our society is much |
|
better served by the drive toward open platform. |
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Dr. Cooper. |
|
Anything to add, Mr. Gifford? |
|
Mr. Gifford. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I've been on |
|
enough panels with Dr. Cooper to know that he can't help |
|
himself. [Laughter.] |
|
I don't think I have anything to add. I think you could, |
|
you can recognize a general trend, that digital markets tend |
|
toward interoperability, but not necessarily. |
|
Mr. Smith. Agreed. And despite the sort of divergent |
|
backgrounds of the four panelists today, it's interesting that |
|
almost everybody seems to agree on the issue at hand. |
|
So I thank you all for your testimony, and the gentleman |
|
from California, Mr. Berman, is recognized. |
|
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. |
|
So, Dr. Pence, even though my daughter complains about not |
|
being able to get the Napster service on her iPod, you don't |
|
think Congress should make iPod get the Napster service? |
|
Mr. Pence. Well, Congressman, we have a very active |
|
community in the Napster service, as I'm sure your daughter |
|
knows, and we have very active message boards, and so the issue |
|
of iPod compatibility is raised all the time to our customer |
|
care group, to us directly. And there's no question that we |
|
would benefit with interoperability with iPod. |
|
However, having said that, I think to take that into a |
|
Government mandate for some sort of interoperability solution |
|
is not the right answer. The Apple service has been very |
|
successful. We announced 2 days ago very, very strong growth in |
|
our own business, as you may have heard. So we feel very |
|
confident that over time by offering choice and using every |
|
legitimate means to license the various platforms to take the |
|
Napster service to all devices and all platforms, we think that |
|
is the best way for us to proceed, and we think it's in the |
|
best interest of consumers in the market. |
|
Mr. Berman. All right. I'm going to tell her to quit |
|
bothering me and go to your message board. [Laughter.] |
|
Dr. Cooper, you make a differentiation in your testimony |
|
about when it's okay to demand interoperability, and you cite |
|
as an example the music industry is limited in that it affects |
|
only the music business, while the railroad industry affects |
|
the entire economy. Ignoring the fact that you brush over the |
|
role of music and the productivity of the workforce, I want to |
|
carry out your assertion, take the logic of your assertion and |
|
apply it to something else here. When you say the marketplace |
|
and not Government intervention or legislation should and will |
|
resolve the interoperability question for technology, why |
|
doesn't this analysis work for the copyright owners who use too |
|
restrictive DRM? Won't they also pay the price, consumers will |
|
choose formats more convenient for them? Isn't that the most |
|
efficient way for consumers to let it be known to the copyright |
|
owner instead of through legislation? What is the difference |
|
between the developer and the content owner in this particular |
|
area? |
|
Mr. Cooper. No. I agree. I think that DRM, once we have |
|
choices out there, different people will choose the level of |
|
use that they're allowing to their customers. And you've heard |
|
examples of different kinds of models. And the marketplace will |
|
decide that. I do also think that a too restrictive DRM is |
|
going to be a form of failure of interoperability and consumers |
|
will--we will get competition for DRM as well. And so I do |
|
think because--but that's still the widgets part, and we think |
|
that that marketplace will actually also address that problem. |
|
So I accept your challenge. And we consistently will argue and |
|
have argued that give consumers choices about the level of |
|
functionality and they will make their choice and it will drive |
|
the marketplace. |
|
Mr. Berman. Good answer. Not consistent with the Consumer |
|
Federation's position on some legislation that's come to |
|
Congress, but a good answer. |
|
Mr. Cooper. Well, I think it went too far but---- |
|
Mr. Berman. The legislation the Consumer Federation |
|
endorsed or the ones it opposed? |
|
Mr. Cooper. No, no. We endorse a reasonable definition of |
|
``fair use'' for consumer and oppose the legislation that we |
|
think---- |
|
Mr. Berman. And a mandate on labeling requirements, okay. |
|
You state that the retailers of digital music--well, actually |
|
what I'd like to--the French Consumer Federation, in effect, |
|
which is a better way for you to hear about this than me trying |
|
to pronounce the French name, has launched a legal action over |
|
the two companies' proprietary music formats, claiming that the |
|
respective digital rights management used by both Sony and |
|
Apple which prevents songs brought from their online music |
|
shops from being played on other manufacturers' media players |
|
is limiting consumers' choice. The total absence of |
|
interoperability between DRM removes not only consumers' power |
|
to independently choose their purchase and where they buy it, |
|
but also constitutes a significant restraint on the free |
|
circulation of creative works, that group said. |
|
It's interesting how the French perspective on this is |
|
different than the Consumer Federation's. Could you develop |
|
that? |
|
Mr. Cooper. Well, look, our testimony is clear. When we get |
|
to widgets, and in my opinion applications of widgets in the |
|
digital age, we believe market forces will solve these |
|
problems. I've identified the situation in which as the market |
|
matures if we have lots of exclusive deals and not lots of |
|
competition widgets, then we would get some antitrust concerns. |
|
But at this stage of this game, especially with the recording |
|
industry, the established recording industry just getting into |
|
this business--last year was our watershed year--we think that |
|
this is not the time or the place to impose mandates. We think |
|
we still have platform competition going on at the level of |
|
widgets, and we think that we are going to be much better |
|
served with the industry now adopting a digital distribution |
|
and allowing innovators to continue to innovate, including all |
|
forms of distribution. |
|
Mr. Berman. The only thing I'll say in closing because my |
|
time has expired is I understand this position and it makes a |
|
lot of sense to me. What I don't understand is supporting my |
|
friend's bill in the context of why won't the same market |
|
forces end up creating music that individuals be able to pass |
|
to their friends and take in other formats in their home and do |
|
all those things because it will serve a need that consumers |
|
want? Why are we getting into trying to draft the exact |
|
contours of that? |
|
Mr. Cooper. Well, the--one of the central concerns about |
|
DRM is that it is taking away some of my rights that I thought |
|
I had in terms of my fair use rights, and that's a source of |
|
concern to us. So that we used to be able to listen to music in |
|
a variety of ways, to make copies to share, and those were fair |
|
uses, and maybe unregulated uses that were not bones of |
|
contention. And our concern is that we don't want to lose a lot |
|
of functionality and flexibility in this transition, which is |
|
supposed to be increasing my functionality and flexibility. And |
|
so we'll be glad to come back and testify on that legislation |
|
too, if I can wangle an invite. |
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Berman. |
|
The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren, is recognized |
|
for questions. |
|
Ms. Lofgren. I'll be brief because our joint session of |
|
Congress is about to begin. But I'll just say that this has |
|
been interesting to hear such unanimity actually from all of |
|
the witnesses, that this is a situation where Congress doesn't |
|
have to get involved. I mean there are some interoperability |
|
issues that demand congressional attention in fire services and |
|
the like, but this is not one of them. So I appreciate the |
|
intelligent commentary and the pitch to get a hearing on my |
|
bill, which would be great. |
|
I yield back. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ms. Lofgren. |
|
There are no other Members here, no other questions, so we |
|
thank you for your expert testimony today. It's been very, very |
|
helpful and very, very conducive to our being able to move |
|
forward with the process. So thank you all very much. |
|
And we stand adjourned. |
|
[Whereupon, at 10:52 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] |
|
|
|
|
|
A P P E N D I X |
|
|
|
---------- |
|
|
|
|
|
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative |
|
in Congress from the State of California, and Ranking Member, |
|
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property |
|
|
|
Mr. Chairman, |
|
Thank you for scheduling this hearing on digital music |
|
interoperability. I hope the testimony will be helpful in our |
|
continuing discussion of issues concerning the availability of |
|
legitimate distribution mechanisms for digital music. |
|
The explosion of technologies that enable consumers to digitally |
|
download music has provided many new opportunities to the music lover. |
|
The ultimate goal is to provide consumers with their choice of music |
|
anytime, anywhere, in any format. However, this new environment has |
|
come at a great cost, that of rampant piracy on Peer to Peer Networks. |
|
What is considered ``free'' music available on the internet comes at |
|
the expense of the numerous people involved in the development of the |
|
sound recording: the artists, songwriters, musicians, sound engineers, |
|
and others. The consequences of piracy are felt throughout our economy, |
|
but they are especially harmful in my district where many jobs depend |
|
on the lawful sale of music. |
|
The proliferation of legitimate music distributors in the |
|
marketplace has helped stem the tide of piracy. The number of available |
|
digital music delivery alternatives has increased enabling technology |
|
companies to help copyright owners make inroads against unauthorized |
|
downloading and sharing of music files. However, music companies will |
|
always have to compete with free music and analysts claim it will take |
|
a number of years before download services can provide a significant |
|
sales boost for the content creators. One of the major impediments to |
|
achieving a more level playing field, according to analysts, is the |
|
bewildering array of competing technologies. |
|
As with any nascent industry, the development of new business |
|
models can lead to unintended results. In the case of digital music, |
|
there are concerns that interoperability barriers between the various |
|
suppliers could actually hinder growth in the market. Brandenburg, the |
|
father of the MP3, has warned that rival technologies will baffle |
|
consumers and risk alienating fans, driving them to unsanctioned file |
|
sharing networks where the songs are ``free'' and encoded in the |
|
unprotected MP3 format. |
|
The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IPFI) |
|
has noted that ``one important problem that hinders growth of the |
|
online music business is the lack of interoperability between services |
|
and devices. The danger is of wide-scale consumer confusion and wasted |
|
opportunities in a market which has extraordinary growth potential.'' |
|
They observe that there is no easy solution, but that all the players |
|
in the online market need to work harder to solve the interoperability |
|
difficulties in 2005. |
|
Yet the market continues to develop. The portable player market |
|
already presents consumers with an array of choices. Now we see the |
|
convergence of music devices and mobile handsets. The goal of making |
|
music easier to buy then to steal is becoming a reality, and therefore |
|
these innovative services deserve our thanks. |
|
However, anti-piracy efforts must remain a focus for technology |
|
companies industries as they develop their products. A legitimate |
|
distribution business model must be one that is based on payment and |
|
permission of the rights holder. |
|
With digital music moving into the mainstream of consumer life, I |
|
believe it will be helpful to further this conversation by discussing |
|
what, if any, impediments are facing companies that are now |
|
distributing digital music and how they are addressing consumers' needs |
|
for legitimate music. |
|
In an ideal world, we would have all the major players in the |
|
digital music market at the table to hear their opinions about the |
|
issue--but I look forward to hearing from these witnesses to help |
|
define some of the issues. |
|
|
|
---------- |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative |
|
in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee |
|
on the Judiciary |
|
|
|
Content owners and the high-tech industry should be commended for |
|
responding to consumer demand for digital music. For years, consumers |
|
have been clamoring for access to digital content. Because content |
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protection technology and content owners had not caught up with the |
|
Internet, music lovers turned to illegal download sites like Napster |
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and Kazaa for digital content. |
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We had heard that, if the content industry would just create a |
|
legal avenue for obtaining digital music, consumers would embrace it. |
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The premonition was largely true. The record industry and high-tech |
|
worked together to develop digital content protection, to clear the |
|
rights needed to get music online, and to get music on the Internet. |
|
According to the Pew Internet and American Life Project, the response |
|
to legitimate digital content has been overwhelming: in 2004, only |
|
twenty-four percent of music downloaders had tried legitimate download |
|
sites; in 2005 to date, the number jumped to forty-three percent. |
|
It is probably safe to say that the reason for this overwhelming |
|
response is the late 2003 launch of Apple iTunes. In business for a |
|
little over a year, iTunes has sold a record-breaking 300 million songs |
|
through its online store. Other download sites, like Napster and |
|
Rhapsody, are gaining speed by offering alternatives such as monthly |
|
subscription services instead of just downloads and allowing transfers |
|
to numerous digital music players. No matter how you view it, the |
|
marketplace is working. |
|
Digital piracy existed long before legitimate services like iTunes |
|
came onto the market and, unfortunately, it likely will continue no |
|
matter how much easier the songwriters, recording artists, and record |
|
labels make it to obtain music digitally. |
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