Datasets:

gtfintechlab
/

CoCoHD_transcripts

	<html>
	<title> - BUILDING THE INFORMATION ANALYSIS CAPABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY</title>
	<body><pre>
	[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



	BUILDING THE INFORMATION ANALYSIS
	CAPABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
	HOMELAND SECURITY

	=======================================================================

	HEARING

	before the

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION
	SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

	of the

	COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

	FIRST SESSION

	__________

	FEBRUARY 16, 2005

	__________

	Serial No. 109-2

	__________

	Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

	[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13


	Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
	house


	__________

	U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
	20-542 WASHINGTON : 2005
	_____________________________________________________________________________
	For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
	Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
	Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012005


	COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

	Christopher Cox, California, Chairman

	Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
	Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
	Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania, Vice Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
	Chairman Norman D. Dicks, Washington
	Christopher Shays, Connecticut Jane Harman, California
	Peter T. King, New York Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
	John Linder, Georgia Nita M. Lowey, New York
	Mark E. Souder, Indiana Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
	Tom Davis, Virginia Columbia
	Daniel E. Lungren, California Zoe Lofgren, California
	Jim Gibbons, Nevada Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
	Rob Simmons, Connecticut Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
	Mike Rogers, Alabama Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
	Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Islands
	Katherine Harris, Florida Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
	Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
	Dave G. Reichert, Washington Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
	Michael McCaul, Texas
	Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania

	______

	Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
	Assessment

	ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut, Chairman

	CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania ZOE LOFGREN, California
	PETER T. KING, New York LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
	MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana JANE HARMAN, California
	DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California NITA M. LOWEY, New York
	JIM GIBBONS, Nevada SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
	STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
	BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
	DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
	CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
	CHRISTOPHER COX, California (Ex (Ex Officio)
	Officio)

	(II)


	C O N T E N T S

	----------
	Page

	STATEMENTS

	The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
	State of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
	Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
	Assessment..................................................... 1
	The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
	State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
	Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
	Assessment..................................................... 2
	The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
	Security....................................................... 4
	The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
	Homeland Committee............................................. 5
	The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
	State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 19
	The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of North Carolina.................................... 17
	The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of New York.......................................... 16
	The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of Rhode Island................................. 20
	The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of Texas........................................ 25
	The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of California................................... 22

	WITNESS

	Lieutenant General Pat Hughes, (Retired), Acting Under Secretary,
	Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Department
	of Homeland Security
	Oral Statement................................................. 6
	Prepared Statement............................................. 7

	APPENDIX
	Material Submitted for the Record

	Questions and Responses submitted by the Honorable Bennie
	Thompson....................................................... 31


	BUILDING THE INFORMATION ANALYSIS
	CAPABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

	----------


	WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2005

	U.S. House of Representatives,
	Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
	Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment,
	Committee on Homeland Security,
	Washington, DC
	The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in
	Room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons
	[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
	Present: Representatives Simmons, King, Lungren, Pearce,
	Dent, Cox, Lofgren, Etheridge, Langevin, Thompson, and Jackson-
	Lee.
	Mr. Simmons. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Intelligence,
	Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come to
	order.
	The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on how
	the fiscal year 2006 Department of Homeland Security budget
	request helps further the information sharing and analysis
	capabilities of the Department of Homeland Security. I am told
	that we only have this room until 4:00 p.m., 1600 hours, today,
	so I will be short in my comments, and then we will try to
	extend to all members the opportunity to ask questions, but
	also remind them that the room will be made available to
	another group at 4 p.m.
	I would like to recognize myself for an opening statement.
	As we begin this first hearing of the Committee on Homeland
	Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and
	Terrorism Risk Assessment, I would like to start by thanking
	the Chairman, Chairman Cox, for his leadership in helping to
	establish the full committee as a standing committee of
	Congress. I look forward very much to working with my
	colleague, Representative Lofgren from California, as the
	Ranking Member of the subcommittee, and also the Ranking Member
	of the full committee, Representative Thompson, who is with us
	here today.
	I represent the Second District of Connecticut. On
	September 11, we lost 12 friends and neighbors. On September
	11, we all failed in our constitutional responsibility to
	provide for the common defense. This subcommittee has a vital
	role to build our capabilities in intelligence, information
	sharing and risk assessment to help prevent another terrorist
	attack.
	I would also like to make a second point. I believe in
	bipartisanship when it comes to national security and homeland
	security. When I joined the U.S. Army almost 40 years ago, I
	put these dog tags around my neck. I wore them until I retired
	from the U.S. Army Reserve in the year 2003. These dog tags
	have my name on them, my serial number, my blood type and my
	religion, but there is no mention of party affiliation. During
	my years of public service, I have tried to be bipartisan. I
	look forward to conducting the work of this subcommittee in a
	bipartisan fashion.
	Information analysis and warning is perhaps the most
	important capability of the Department of Homeland Security.
	Intelligence must drive our protection decisions, resource
	allocations, and homeland security priorities. Since its
	inception in March 2003, the Department of Homeland Security
	has worked to construct a robust analytical capability and has
	dedicated itself to fulfilling the broad statutory functions
	outlined in the Homeland Security Act. The committee is
	encouraged by the progress to date, but there is a lot more
	work to do, and the responsibility for that work falls on us.
	General Hughes, you have some challenges and opportunities
	ahead of you. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention
	Act of 2004 created a Director of National Intelligence and a
	National Counterterrorism Center. This new reality will require
	the office of Information Analysis of DHS to adjust to a new
	operating environment. IA must take this opportunity to
	continue to build on its initial progress and construct a fully
	functioning and operational Intelligence Community component,
	while ensuring that DHS maintains the vital link to its state
	and local partners, and also ensuring that as we work to
	protect the freedom and security of our homeland, we also
	continue to protect and preserve our civil liberties.
	The partnerships that you have engaged in have led to
	central communications links between the federal government and
	state, local, tribal and private sector officials. These links
	help to ensure that the men and women on the frontlines in the
	fight to protect our homeland have the essential information
	they need to help prevent another terrorist attack. I hope your
	testimony today will address how these links and partnerships
	are being strengthened and refined to help keep America safe.
	I welcome you, General Hughes, to the subcommittee today. I
	also want to thank you, as somebody who has also worn the
	uniform for, in my case, 37 years, 7 months, and 24 days, but
	who is counting. When you are having a good time, you do not
	count it all up. But I want to thank you for your very
	distinguished service to our country. I look forward to hearing
	your testimony.
	I would like now to recognizing the Ranking Minority Member
	of the subcommittee for any statement that she may wish to
	make.
	Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
	this hearing to discuss the proposed fiscal year 2006 budget,
	building the information analysis capability of the Department
	of Homeland Security.
	Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you. I hope to
	be able to have a good, productive and professional
	relationship on this subcommittee, as I enjoyed in the last
	Congress with Chairman Thornberry. That was a very rewarding
	experience for me, and I think for Chairman Thornberry.
	We worked together as a team. We developed our hearings
	together. We decided our witnesses together. We wrote bills
	together. In the end of the Congress, we issued not a majority
	report and a minority report, but we issued one report from our
	committee. I hope that we will have that same level of success
	in standing up for our country and making sure that we are
	facing.
	General Hughes, I welcome you and I look forward to hearing
	your testimony, as we work with you as we seek to empower the
	critical exchange of information within the Department of
	Homeland Security. You have a difficult task, and I hope that
	the subcommittee will be able to help you as you work to
	enhance the department's capability to collect, aggregate,
	analyze and share information.
	I understand your office is responsible for four specific
	tasks: analyzing and mapping terrorism threat intelligence to
	vulnerabilities in the nation's critical infrastructure;
	sharing information with state and local governments and at
	times with the private sector on the public information
	concerning terrorist threats; meeting operational efforts
	regarding the homeland security advisory system; and providing
	intelligence analysis to senior DHS officials.
	As you may know, I served for 14 years on the Board of
	Supervisors for in Santa Clara County, so I have a very keen
	interest in how information is shared with local governments so
	that they can take appropriate action. I am also very
	interested in how we have assessed what is vulnerable so that
	we can effectively map the threats that we discover.
	Finally, I do not want to be a nag, but I am going to raise
	it anyhow. This is your first meeting before us and so I am
	going to cut a little slack to the department, but there is a
	Committee Rule, rule 11(j), that requires witnesses to have
	their statements to the committee in advance of the actual
	hearing. It is 48 hours that testimony is to be submitted, and
	we received your testimony just 4 hours ago.
	So this is not a senseless rule. I like to read the
	testimony before I come to a hearing and have the staff analyze
	it, and receiving it 4 hours in advance of a hearing just does
	not permit that. If we are going to do our job well, you need
	to help us by complying with that rule. So I hope I will never
	have to refer to that rule again, and I look forward to your
	testimony.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Simmons. Thank you. That is a good and a useful comment
	to make.
	I would now like to recognize the Chairman of the full
	committee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Cox, who I just
	mentioned a few minutes ago has played an historic role, a
	truly historic role, in bringing about a full Committee on
	Homeland Security.
	I believe the reorganization of our government over the
	last several years is the largest reorganization we have
	encountered since World War II, with the National Security Act
	of 1947 and the creation of the Department of Defense. With
	that massive reorganization goes a requirement to oversee the
	Department of Homeland Security.
	Chairman Cox has been a critical component in making sure
	that the Congress lives up to its obligations in these
	difficult, historic times.
	Mr. Chairman?
	Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I want to begin by welcoming Chairman Simmons to this
	subcommittee. We are picking up the work that was carried on in
	the Select Committee on Homeland Security during the last
	Congress. I do not think there is any question that by
	background, Congressman Simmons is well suited to chair this
	subcommittee. I do not think there is any question either that
	Zoe Lofgren of California is very able and equipped to serve as
	our Ranking Member on this subcommittee.
	General Hughes, as you know, we have been on this
	committee, at least as it was constituted in the last Congress,
	aggressive supporters of your responsibilities in the
	Department of Homeland Security. Since the last Congress, we
	have enacted legislation creating a national Intelligence
	Director and creating the NCTC that will have profound impacts
	on the Information Analysis responsibility within the
	Department of Homeland Security.
	I note that this is not a packed hearing room and it is in
	some senses ironic because I do not believe we will ever focus
	on anything that is more central to the government's
	responsibility in protecting Americans from terrorism than what
	we are going to be talking about today. So to those of you are
	here, you are involved in a very important undertaking on
	behalf of our country.
	The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the department a new
	overriding counterterrorist mission that had not previously
	been the job of any part of the federal government. It sought
	to enable to department's success in this new mission through a
	Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure
	Protection. The information analysis portion of that
	directorate is the intelligence piece overview with prevention,
	particularly when it comes to the eventual threat of terrorists
	armed with nuclear weapons, not dirty bombs, but real nuclear
	weapons, or terrorists armed with bio-weapons, particularly
	bio-engineered weapons that are designed to be resistant to
	antidotes and vaccines that we might have stockpiled. There can
	be no overstating the importance of prevention. That is what
	this is all about.
	During the Cold War, I think we understood that dealing
	with the response and recovery from a nuclear exchange was not
	plan A, plan B, or plan C. We were very much focused on
	avoiding that nuclear exchange. Likewise, the prospect that
	terrorists might apply weapons of mass destruction now or in
	the future has to cause us to focus enormous attention on
	prevention. That is what we hope, notwithstanding the passage
	of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Implementation Act, we
	can continue to do under the legal mandate of the Homeland
	Security Act.
	The memorandum of understanding on information sharing of
	March 2003 was a truly unprecedented undertaking between the
	Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the
	Secretary of Homeland Security. Its purpose is to move
	information along and through these three communities free of
	the longstanding constraints that existed prior. There are some
	signs that are less encouraging or convey a mixed message about
	our potential to achieve what we envisioned when we wrote the
	Homeland Security Act and in passing the law in 2002, and when
	this memorandum was agreed to in 2003.
	I hope today, General Hughes, that we have the opportunity
	to understand from you exactly where we are headed and whether
	we have the resources to get there.
	I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Simmons. I thank you for your comments.
	Now, the Chair would like to recognize the Ranking Member
	of the full committee, Mr. Thompson from Mississippi.
	Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am appreciative of
	you calling this hearing at this time. Even though we cannot
	discuss the numbers for this department in open session, I
	think there are some issues that we need to get on the table
	real quick for the sake of the public.
	I guess about 2 months ago, Ms. Lofgren and I had an
	opportunity to look at the vulnerabilities of our
	infrastructure by state. We were somewhat dismayed, Mr.
	Chairman, at how inconsistent that list was by state, and we
	are really concerned that somehow we have to have some
	standardization associated with that infrastructure list. As I
	understand it, there are some 85,000 vulnerabilities identified
	from miniature golf courses to shopping centers and what have
	you. But I am concerned about it, and I want to make sure that
	we address it this year so that we all, as members of this
	committee, can feel comfortable that those critical
	infrastructures in our districts clearly are being identified
	so that they can be protected.
	In addition to that, I am concerned about this information
	sharing across the board, whether or not we have satisfactorily
	changed the culture of the department so that they are actually
	talking to each other. We hear comments all along about
	departments being territorial with their information, and if we
	are indeed protecting the homeland. We ought to make sure that
	all those agencies involved in protecting us are communicating
	with each other. So I look forward to this hearing and many
	more around this subject. Obviously, I look forward to your
	testimony, General Hughes.
	Thank you very much.
	Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman for his comments. As
	somebody who worked for the CIA for 10 years, and then finally
	in military intelligence for over 30 years, sharing information
	is a hugely important issue. Security is important, but a
	perfectly secure piece of information which is not disseminated
	is of no use. So what we have to do is come up with a balancing
	act. We have to balance the needs for security with the needs
	for sharing so that we can better protect the American
	homeland. So that is a very good point.
	General Hughes, thank you again for coming before the
	subcommittee today. I will apologize to you in advance. I will
	have to vacate myself from the chair in a few moments to meet
	with the Secretary of the Navy in a prior commitment. I trust
	that our distinguished full committee Chairman will be able to
	carry on in my absence. I will be back as soon as possible.
	Thank you for being here today, and we look forward to hearing
	your testimony.

	STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK HUGHES (RETIRED),
	ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, AND
	INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
	INFORMATION ANALYSIS

	Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you very much. I am glad
	to be here today, too. I may have been the victim of a
	biological attack before coming here. I am a little ill.
	Mr. Simmons. Spread it around.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I am trying not to. I hope you
	will forgive me if I have to cough or blow my nose or
	something. My apologies.
	I liked your opening comments very much. I, too, have worn
	a set of dog tags around for a long time, and have the same
	frame of reference. I note that this is quite different,
	however. I did not realize, I don't think, before I came to the
	Department of Homeland Security how different it is to come
	into my office in the morning and find myself examining a map
	of the United States and operating in the construct of our
	national values and civil liberties and rights of American
	citizens, as compared to the military application of force in
	an overseas environment. It is quite interesting to me, and has
	caused me to have to shift to some degree my mind set.
	I think I would like to apologize to the Congresswoman for
	the delay in our testimony getting here. I would merely say we
	did submit it on time, but the clearance process did not
	respond. We will do our best, though, and your point is not
	only well taken, but understood. So thank you very much.
	I believe from your comments and Ms. Lofgren's comments and
	others that I have to clear the air here. Otherwise, I will
	proceed in this hearing under false pretenses. My last day on
	this job will be March 15. You are speaking to someone who will
	not be carrying out for the most part many of the hopes and
	dreams that you have as a federal official, but in my future I
	will continue to support the Department of Homeland Security,
	and I will do everything I can to support the government in the
	future. I would just like you to know that, because it sounded
	like in your comments you did not know that, and you expected
	me to be continuing in this job. I hope that is not too much of
	a surprise to you.
	Mr. Simmons. Well, you are on the hot seat right now, so
	let's just keep you there until you disappear.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. That is fine. I am not trying to
	avoid anything. I merely want you to know my tenure here is
	relatively short. I would be glad to answer questions about
	that, if you would like me to include any ideas I might have
	about my replacement.
	The last comment I would like to make to you all is that I
	have lived through the last year and a few months with you. I
	have come before you on a few previous occasions formally and
	several times informally. I have appreciated every opportunity
	I have had to talk with you and interact with you. I can look
	you directly in the eye and tell you that we have made
	progress. We have made a lot of progress. In some cases, it is
	not smooth or very attractive, but it is real. We are
	continuing that progress. The dedication and devotion of the
	people who are carrying out the work of the Department of
	Homeland Security, if you have that in your mind, you can never
	be in doubt.
	We do require guidance and direction and we do require
	measuring and rating at times, and we do require a steward and
	admonition and wisdom from others. But the heart, the spirit,
	the devotion and the dedication to duty is present in all of
	those who serve in this department.
	Thank you very much. I will be happy to answer questions
	you ask.
	[The statement of Lieutenant General Hughes follows:]

	PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICK M. HUGHES

	Good morning Chairman Simmons, Congresswoman Lofgren and
	distinguished Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to appear
	before you today to discuss the Information Analysis (IA) capability of
	the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This time of year marks the
	two-year anniversary of the actual ``stand up'' of the Department. We
	have really been able to support the intelligence and information needs
	of the Department for about 13 months. As we transition much of the
	senior leadership of the Department and as we anticipate the arrival of
	our new Secretary, we clearly intend to work to improve our
	capabilities, but it is important to acknowledge the tremendous efforts
	of the many individuals who have worked tirelessly to bring together a
	functional and effective intelligence support organization. I want to
	specifically mention the extraordinary men and women of the Information
	Analysis and Information Protection Directorate (IAIP) with whom I am
	so proud to have served. These superb professionals, laboring often in
	the background, are focused on the business of the Department and the
	Nation because they are 100 percent committed to our mission and our
	Nation's security. Judging from the feedback I have personally
	received, and according to my professional judgment, we--they--are
	making a difference with our effort to provide accurate, timely,
	actionable, and cogent information to the customers we serve.
	It is also important to recognize the impressive strides made in
	the area of information sharing, collaboration and cooperation at the
	Federal level. We have worked hard to develop more robust and
	deliberate interaction with our Federal partners, particularly with the
	Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our joint efforts with the National
	Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), our relationships with DOD and the
	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other key departments, such as
	Justice, State, and Energy, have greatly advanced our collective
	capabilities and relationships. Our current information sharing and
	collaboration environment within the government is far superior to that
	which existed before the establishment of DHS and has notably improved
	during the past year. We look forward to the advent of the Director of
	National Intelligence and continuing progress throughout the
	intelligence community.
	Our efforts to build a DHS intelligence capability are oriented
	around three overarching imperatives. These are: building and expanding
	capacity within the Department; furthering our coordination and liaison
	efforts with all of our stakeholders, domestic and foreign, government
	and non-government; and, creating and distributing the work products
	that will ensure we all have the right information, at the right time,
	in the right way. . . to protect and preserve. In short, we are doing
	our job supporting the Department of Homeland Security and in my view
	doing it well.
	As we evaluate and assess the roles and mission of the Office of
	Information Analysis (IA), I believe we must acknowledge IA's role
	within the broader construct of DHS. IA should be considered the Office
	of Intelligence for the Department. This essential function will
	include building out the intelligence infrastructure for DHS
	Headquarters and ensuring the establishment of common Intelligence
	Community (IC) standards that apply to the ``intelligence elements'' of
	the ``components'' of DHS. The 9/11 Commission Report specifically
	cited the continuing need to assimilate and analyze information from
	DHS' own components. IA needs to better integrate, coordinate,
	correlate and fuse these activities and the intelligence information
	they produce, in partnership with all component intelligence elements.
	IA, acting as the Departmental intelligence office, is developing a
	plan for the integration and collective application of all DHS
	component intelligence organizations in a way that will achieve greater
	synergy in this mission area. IA is and will continue to develop as the
	Departmental intelligence support element, while continuing to pursue
	its statutory obligations under the Homeland Security Act. As you know,
	IA is a part of the Intelligence Community and its funding is provided
	by the Intelligence Authorization Act, the specifics of which are
	classified. While I cannot go into classified specifics in this open
	forum, I am more than ready to discuss IA's budget with you in an
	appropriately classified session at your convenience.
	We have a dynamic vision of how intelligence and information will
	be analyzed, how the analytic elements of the Department will be
	managed to achieve optimum benefit, and how to develop a budgetary
	strategy that will unify the programs related to intelligence
	activities and information analysis across DHS. A major collaborative
	study is currently under way within the DHS to establish the baseline
	for this effort. In addition, we seek to reshape the Department's
	efforts consistent with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
	Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and the new authorities of the Director
	of National Intelligence (DNI).
	No less important is the need for adequate facilities, analysts,
	and program resources to assure that the complex and difficult process
	for obtaining and analyzing intelligence is managed, operated and
	sustained. It is not sufficient to simply create authorization for
	fully funded U.S. Government employees without also providing the
	resources to properly house these intelligence professionals in
	facilities that are designed and constructed to facilitate the receipt,
	handling, analysis, and storage of highly classified material in order
	to protect and preserve our security. To that end, the 2006 budget
	request includes $38 million to allow IAIP to fit out facilities that
	meet security and information technology requirements and allow IAIP to
	access and analyze intelligence, collaborate with our partners and
	execute the mission we have been given. IAIP came into the Department
	with no legacy facilities and no predetermined permanent housing. We
	now have a plan to occupy both swing and permanent facilities that fit
	our needs, and this funding request will enable us to complete that
	plan.
	As we work toward building IA's capability, we have framed our
	thinking around a new paradigm that seeks to encompass ``all
	information necessary to protect and preserve the homeland.'' Within
	that environment are subsets of information such as defense or military
	information, intelligence information, law enforcement information,
	homeland security information, and critical infrastructure information
	as well as public and private sector information. All of these types of
	information make up the vast array of intelligence that DHS needs to do
	its job.
	DHS is a fully vested member of the IC and the Office of the
	Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis represents the Department
	in all IC venues, ensuring that DHS interests and requirements are
	fully represented and considered among the community. IA analysts have
	access to the most sensitive national intelligence regarding
	international and domestic terrorist threats, and the interaction with
	their peers throughout the IC continues to develop and improve. Much of
	the information we receive comes to us from IA analysts' connections to
	the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems (JWICS), NCTC
	Online, the IA Automated Message Handling System (AMHS), the Homeland
	Security Information Network (HSIN), the Open Source Information System
	(OSIS), and a variety of other formal and informal (i.e., analyst-to-
	analyst) mechanisms. These information streams from external sources
	are augmented by our own internal reporting from DHS components. We are
	increasingly well informed, but not yet satisfied with this endeavor.
	The range of intelligence and information coordinated by IA from
	the IC, and our state, local, tribal, municipal and private sector
	partners; as well as from all DHS entities with intelligence and
	operational capabilities, is both impressive and daunting. These
	entities--and their products--continue to be an important part of how
	IA does its work.
	IA's relationship with our colleagues in the Infrastructure
	Protection (IP) Directorate is critical to our success. Jointly we are
	able to deliver threat-informed vulnerability analysis and data-
	supported risk assessments regarding our critical infrastructure to our
	constituents and customers--notably the private sector, which owns the
	vast majority of our nation's critical infrastructure.
	IA is an integral part of the Homeland Security Operations Center
	(HSOC) effort to monitor and communicate on all matters of homeland
	security interest 24x7. Intelligence from DHS components that IA
	correlates and analyzes provides invaluable perspectives and insight
	for the entire Federal government. From a citizen providing a Patriot
	Report on suspicious activity, to Border and Transportation Security
	(BTS) reports regarding individuals of interest trying to enter the
	United States illegally, or US Coast Guard reports regarding suspicious
	activity near critical infrastructure. Such information is provided to
	IA through the same methods the larger IC uses: the physical presence
	of DHS component and IC element liaison officers within both IA and the
	Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), strong linkage between the
	HSOC and our constituents, and communication between analysts and
	leadership. In fact, the presence of representatives of 30 separate
	Federal and local representatives within the HSOC provides a
	perspective and collaboration capability that is virtually unique.
	Additionally, coordination within DHS is aided by regular meetings of
	the intelligence chiefs of each entity, led by the Assistant Secretary
	for Information Analysis.
	It is not sufficient to just produce information. In order to be
	effective, information must be shared. DHS has developed this
	capability and in cooperation with our Federal partners and is
	coordinating information sharing among previously unconnected systems.
	For example, DHS has collaborated with the Justice Department on the
	DOJ Law Enforcement Sharing Plan. Further, the Homeland Security
	Information Network (HSIN) is a ``system of systems'' that provides
	discrete communities of interest for Law Enforcement, Counter
	Terrorism, Analysts, Emergency Management, and Critical Infrastructure
	groups to collaborate and share critical information in real time. In
	addition, the DHS network provides the ability to pull together
	participants from all of these communities, into a shared space to
	collaborate, during any period when the threat creates the need.
	Further, as a direct result of the Department's Information Sharing and
	Collaboration (ISC) initiative to cooperate and work jointly with other
	Federal partners, DHS and DOJ/FBI have established the first ever
	capability to share information between our respective communications
	and automation networks. Specifically, we were able to connect the
	Homeland Security Information Network with the Regional Information
	Sharing Systems (RISS) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO). More needs to
	be achieved but we are on the right track
	Already, the DHS ISC Program has engaged other Federal, State,
	local, and Tribal, information sharing programs in an effort to create
	synergy by fostering mutual awareness of their key programs and
	capabilities, and creating a forum to garner feedback on policies and
	procedures under development at the Federal level. Additionally, this
	effort has resulted in the first ever capability to share information
	among the State, local, and tribal information sharing systems.
	IAIP's fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $7,482,000 for ISC.
	The Department is budgeting an additional $5,000,000 from the Chief
	Information Officer and $4,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to
	bring the total funding for ISC in fiscal year 2006 to $16,482,000.
	In addition to receiving information from these entities, IA is
	routinely sharing information and collaborating at all levels--from the
	Federal Government and the IC to State and local officials. DHS
	component organizations also serve as a conduit through which
	information and warnings can pass to government at all levels. Thus,
	IA's continuous information sharing and collaboration with the HSOC,
	BTS, USCG, and other DHS entities, provides valuable information to all
	of the men and women responsible for protecting the homeland.
	It is IA's specific focus on the protection of the American
	homeland against terrorist attack that is unique among its IC partners.
	This focus provides invaluable information and assistance not only to
	State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector officials that
	receive accumulated threat information, but also to DHS components that
	use the information, trends, and indicators to inform and prepare
	operators and decision makers on the front line. The relationship IA
	has with the HSOC, BTS, and other DHS entities translates into
	continuous information sharing and collaboration that provides a unique
	threat picture and actionable information to those who are vital to
	protecting the homeland.
	The Department of Homeland Security is a prime example of how
	changes have been made within the Intelligence Community, the
	counterterrorism community, the law enforcement community and the
	response community to work more cohesively as well as more
	collaboratively, and to assure information is shared as fully and
	completely as possible. This represents a dramatic change from
	conditions as they existed before September 11th, 2001 and an very
	impressive change from even one year ago. DHS plays a central role in
	the counter-terrorism and homeland security effort as we continue the
	work of communicating intelligence and information to our partners in
	the federal government as well as with the State, territorial, tribal,
	local, major city and private sector officials charged with protecting
	the people and infrastructure of the United States.
	We are proud of our work and our place in the larger national
	defensive network and we look forward to a safe and secure future for
	our nation. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes
	my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
	have at this time.

	Mr. Simmons. I thank you for your testimony. What we will
	do is I will ask a question and then I will go to my left and
	right by order of appearance at the time of the gavel and
	thereafter, after of course our Chairman and Ranking Member
	have had their opportunities.
	I commanded a military intelligence unit in the mid-1990s
	that created a handbook for open source intelligence that was
	eventually adopted by the U.S. Army as doctrine. I have had a
	personal interest in open source intelligence ever since. I
	have traveled to Special Operations Command in my capacity as a
	member of the Armed Services Committee. I have gone to open
	source conferences. I have met with officials from around the
	world who have an interest in this capability.
	It seems to me that open source acquisition or open source
	intelligence, that is intelligence that is created from the
	collection and analysis of open sources of information, lends
	itself particularly to the intelligence challenges of the
	Department of Homeland Security for two reasons. One, in some
	respects the information that we are relying on or looking for
	may come from that small municipal county sheriff's department,
	for all we know. It needs to be transmitted quickly, and it
	does not need to be classified in and of itself. Two, products
	that are derived from open source acquisition and analysis
	often do not have to have the same level of classification as
	those that are collected through other venues, so it is more
	readily available to share with the American people.
	Cost is also a factor. Where are we in the development of
	this capability in support of the mission of the Department of
	Homeland Security, and where would you like to see us go?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. We have explored a number of
	avenues with regard to open source information. I have been a
	proponent of it for a long period of time. I have to tell you
	that I have discovered along the pathway that I have taken,
	anyway, that there are some problems with it. A lot of
	information from open sources, much of it is erroneous, wrong.
	When we use it exclusively without cross-checking it with
	something else, we have found, I have found, it has been my
	experience, that it usually gets us in trouble.
	So I think while I think there is great power in this
	source of information, I also think we need to tread carefully
	in using it, and understand the context in which it can be
	used. We have on our computers now in the IA element the OSIS.
	It stands for the Open Source Intelligence System that the
	intelligence community is the proponent for and now provides
	numerous search engines, databases, media files, download
	capabilities of all kinds, including photographs, pictures of
	the ambient culture and environment around the world. We have
	all that at our fingertips right now. We have had guest
	speakers on this topic we have tried to inculcate in the
	homeland security intelligence analysis the power of, the idea
	of open source intelligence.
	I do not know whether you are familiar with a gentleman
	named Robert Steele.
	Mr. Simmons. I am intimately familiar.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Okay.
	Mr. Simmons. I think you know what that means.
	[Laughter.]
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes, I do. I do. Robert Steele,
	for all of his many interesting characteristics, has been
	something of a pioneer in this field. We have had him come and
	talk to us. It was a very interesting talk and very
	deliberative and engendered a lot of discussion. I think that
	with Robert Steele's views as something on the far end of the
	utility spectrum, you may think of never using open source
	information as the other end of that spectrum. We are trying to
	find utility and balance along that spectrum.
	Once again, I think it has great potential and we are very
	knowledgeable about it and using it.
	Mr. Simmons. Thank you for that response.
	I would like to recognize the gentlewoman from California,
	Ms. Lofgren.
	Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
	I am concerned about the number of contractors that are in
	the department, instead of full-time employees, not just in IA,
	but throughout the department. One question I have, without
	getting into the numbers, which we cannot, is whether you are
	confident that we have sufficient budget authority to actually
	have staff, as opposed to contractors, in the upcoming fiscal
	year.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes, ma'am. I believe that the
	budget authority is not in question here. Finding the expertise
	is a problem. And accompanying this, to the best of my ability
	to characterize the truth here, it is true that the contractors
	have offered us and we have taken advantage of their offer,
	some very fine people with some tremendous technical expertise
	that we were not able to acquire in any other way.
	Back to the fiscal realities of this, those people are
	costing us more money than a federal employee would. However,
	you cannot get them. We have not been able to get them by
	hiring them off the street. They are a limited supply and high
	demand.
	Ms. Lofgren. I know we cannot go into the numbers in this
	open session, but I would be interested in a secure setting to
	take a look at where that balance is so we can get a handle. I
	know in some of the other aspects of DHS, I have a better
	handle on the contractor-to-employee ratio and how it is
	working. I would like to do that if I could arrange that with
	you.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I would be happy to do it. In
	lieu of reading, which might take a longer time, I can get an
	information paper back to you that has the details at either
	the unclassified level or at the level of classification that
	we have.
	Ms. Lofgren. Why don't you do that, and then if I have
	further questions, we can follow up further.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I am happy to do so.
	Ms. Lofgren. I appreciate that.
	In thinking about the task that you face, is it fair to say
	that the largest part of the IA job is to map the intelligence
	collected by other agencies to the critical infrastructure
	information maintained by IP? If that is the case, I am
	wondering what influence you have, if any, on the state of the
	critical infrastructure listing and analysis, and how much that
	is impairing your task?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. First, the answer to the first
	part of your question, is that our primary or most critical
	function, my answer to that, I am sorry to say, is no. Our
	primary task and our most critical function has become, and I
	think it is logical for this to happen, departmental support
	across the board, working as an all-source intelligence
	producer for the department. That is really our work in its
	primary form.
	The most important part of that work is to continue that
	interface between IA, the intelligence part, and IT that does
	the risk analysis and vulnerability assessment, but I will have
	to tell you that it is a little bit hard for all of us to
	understand, the risk analysis and vulnerability assessments are
	not done strictly on the basis of threat. They are done with
	civil characteristics in mind. One of them is apparent
	vulnerability to possible attack using means of attack. Another
	idea that is applied here is whether or not a particular kind
	of infrastructure has proven to be attackable if gaps are not
	closed and if vulnerabilities are not reduced.
	Another idea behind it is the value of the infrastructure,
	whether it has ever been attacked or not. That is kind of a
	strategic assessment. As an example, I think Mr. Thompson
	mentioned miniature golf courses or something like that.
	Obviously, when you are using good common sense, not high-
	faluting intelligence, and you are weighting the importance of
	a miniature golf course against a nuclear storage site,
	hopefully most people would choose the nuclear storage site.
	That does not mean, however, that something in between those
	two extremes does not need some kind of protection.
	Ms. Lofgren. I know my time is up, but the concern I had
	with the latter question is that in fact the miniature golf
	site is on the list and the nuclear power plant is not. So if
	part of your job is to map the threats to the listing of the
	critical infrastructure, and the critical infrastructure is
	just random, how do you do that job?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. That should not be the case. I
	am not familiar with the specific part of the list that you are
	telling me the nuclear power plan is not on there, but let's
	suppose that that is accurate. That is a mistake and we need to
	fix that.
	Ms. Lofgren. Okay. Thank you.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. You are welcome.
	Mr. Cox. [Presiding.] General, I would like to go into some
	of the numbers in this open session, and I do not see any
	reason that we cannot discuss the programmatic figures here. My
	understanding with staff is that these are all open. I would
	like to talk about threat determination and assessment,
	evaluation and studies, the homeland security operations
	center, and the new account for information sharing and
	collaboration.
	I wonder if, just to set the stage for discussion of this,
	if you could describe for the subcommittee what each of these
	programs is in chief focused upon, starting with TDA.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I hope I can do this right, but
	it is not a classification issue. It is a knowledge issue, so I
	am going to have to refer to a book. The first one you wanted
	to talk about, sir, was?
	Mr. Cox. Threat determination and assessment. Do you know
	what I can do also, I mean, we are sort of constrained to go
	through this program by program in order to talk about it in
	this open session, but I would like to get into what is the nub
	of your work. The figures that I have before me include the
	programs for threat determination and assessment, evaluation
	and studies, homeland security operations center, and
	information sharing and collaboration. I wonder if you could
	begin with whichever of these is closest to the core function
	of IA to do all source intelligence fusions?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Obviously, threat determination
	and analysis is a primary factor. I am not sure exactly what
	you want to know, but if you want to know if our budget is
	adequate, the answer I believe is yes.
	Mr. Cox. To the extent that threat determination and
	assessment is central to your mission, it would disturb me,
	then, that we are cutting its budget.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I do not know if you should be
	disturbed about that, sir. We are not cutting it too much. The
	issue here is the threat determination, after you initially
	make it on a piece of fixed infrastructure, does not really
	need too much work after that if nothing changes. So once you
	lay down a baseline, you may not need quite the same level of
	effort that you did in the past. You do not have to re-do that
	baseline.
	Mr. Cox. Over time, we have been working with the
	department and with you directly to make sure that you acquire
	the number and quality of analysts necessary to perform IA's
	function. To what extent do these programmatic figures for TDA,
	for evaluation and studies, for the operations center and for
	information sharing and collaboration reflect the number of
	analysts that you have at your disposal?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. In the case of the operations
	center, there is no parallel at all. The operations center
	generally has people in it who are doing what I would refer to
	as information transfer. They are getting information in from
	any source at all. They do not analyze the information. They
	put it in the right bins. They alert people to the fact of the
	information. They pass it to others. They do any analytic
	endeavor.
	Mr. Cox. I note that the operations center is getting a big
	plus-up of, it looks to eyeball it, of about 40 percent.
	Likewise, evaluation and studies is getting a healthy increase.
	The threat determination and assessment account, on the other
	hand, is being reduced, and the explanation that has been
	provided to committee staff is that it is due in large part to
	a decrease in purchasing from government accounts and a
	decrease in advisory services needed for this account.
	To be perfectly honest with you, I do not have any idea
	what that means. So I do not know whether or not I need to be
	concerned. I know what our chief programmatic concerns are, and
	that is that we continue to help you build a core of talented
	analysts who can carry the full statutory mission forward of
	all source intelligence analysis, and make sure that even post-
	9/11 Act, that the Homeland Security Department is a major
	participant in the intelligence community at the NCTC.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I think your concern is well
	founded. If I could try it from a macro level, our overall
	budget I think is about 2 percent reduced, but money has been
	shifted around inside the structure of the IAIP to meet needs
	that we believe are present. Part of the plus-up in the HSOC is
	to handle COOP requirements and to meet the needs of the
	information flow that we anticipate is going to come into the
	department from greater feeding of information. This is raw
	information from the state and local sectors. In other words,
	we think after fielding homeland security information network,
	and that is JRIES with a new name on it, and after upgrading it
	to the secret level, we will be getting a lot more raw
	information.
	Handling that, processing it, is part of the plus-up that
	you see there. The idea of whether or not I can characterize
	what this set of words or phrases means exactly is kind of a
	mystery to me, too. In fact, I do not know if I could explain
	it. But I think the idea here is to get the information into
	not only the operational channel, but the intelligence channel
	for analysis concurrently. Lots of information that comes,
	especially the state and local and private sector, does not
	require much analysis in its initial form. It is a spot report,
	a patriot report, a person's call-in of suspicious activity.
	That may indeed be a piece of information that has to be
	put into the analytic environment, but standing alone it can
	also be passed to operators and actors for their initial
	appraisal of the information. To use the phrase, the phrase has
	become so unpopular, to connect the dots, the connection of the
	dots still goes on, but it kind of rests in the background for
	some of this information. The foreground is the initial use of
	the information in an operational setting, but we have shifted
	money around to do that.
	Mr. Cox. My time has expired.
	The gentleman from Mississippi, the Ranking Member of the
	full committee, Mr. Thompson.
	Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Cox.
	General Hughes, can you provide this committee with a
	breakdown of those contractor services that we are paying for
	over and above normal personnel costs, as information that you
	get back to us? You do not have to comment on it. Just provide
	to us.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes, sir.
	Mr. Thompson. To your knowledge, are you aware of any
	problems with any of those contracting services as of this
	date?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I am aware of some problems.
	Mr. Thompson. You are?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes.
	Mr. Thompson. Can you also provide this committee with a
	listing of those problems?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I will.
	Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
	With respect to the mapping the threat to vulnerabilities,
	what is your opinion of those vulnerabilities that have been
	identified, just in general? Do you think in your opinion those
	vulnerabilities meet the test of mapping? Do you think it is 50
	percent complete? Just give me your honest opinion of it.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. My honest opinion is that we are
	far from finished. Indeed, we are now using a term called
	``complex urban environment.'' We are treating the major cities
	especially, but also the industrial outliers and some other
	parts of the United States that have a concentration of
	activity that is of interest to us, and we believe it might be
	of interest to the terrorists, as an organism, so that if you
	kick the shin of a large complex city, the city may also get a
	headache at the same time as the shin hurt, because the thing
	is so interconnected. It is very much like an animal or a
	human. The nervous system of the city may indeed be affected by
	a kinetic blow. That is an important concept. I know it sounds
	a little ethereal, perhaps, but it is not. It is a fact.
	So probably the most common example of this is the
	electricity. You turn off the electricity, you turn off a lot
	of capability. If you turn the electricity off for a short
	period of time, you can live with it, not a problem. If you
	turn it off hard for a long period of time, we would have
	difficulty performing some of the functions we now take for
	granted.
	So that is an example. The electricity itself is what you
	have to attack in order to do that, or the control mechanisms
	associated with it. That fact, that idea that a hospital, as an
	example, when it runs out of fuel and its alternate power
	source does not operate anymore, and the electricity is still
	off, means that that is a vulnerability you have to assess
	carefully.
	If you did not assess it properly and have enough vision to
	see that after 3 days you were going to run out of fuel, there
	may not be a way to get more fuel because the pumps at the fuel
	station do not work because the electricity is off.
	Mr. Thompson. Okay.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. More than you wanted to know
	about it.
	Mr. Thompson. Well, I just want to know if we identified
	the hospital as a potential target.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Absolutely.
	Mr. Thompson. Yes, okay. With respect to your present
	position, have you any access to all intelligence available?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Yes, I have, but I have to tell
	you that not everyone who works for me has.
	Mr. Thompson. What was the problem with others not having
	access to that information?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. There is in the intelligence
	committee, it remains to this day, a culture in which a known
	person with a certain track record, having been polygraphed and
	background investigations done repeatedly over time, and a
	certain amount of dependability built into that background, and
	perhaps maybe you could even call it familiarization, the old-
	boy network, that culture has something to do with what level
	of trust and confidence others are willing to place in you.
	Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, if I could. So if Congress
	passes an Act mandating agencies to share information, do I
	understand you to say that that is still subject to whether or
	not certain individuals want to share that information with
	other agencies?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I probably would not put it
	quite like that. It is subject to the rules governing the
	information itself and who has access to it for what reasons.
	Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I guess my point is, if we pass
	an Act saying that these agencies have to share this
	information between them, I am now hearing that there is some
	other standard out there somewhere that prevents that
	information being shared.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Let me just tell you, if I may
	respond to this, this always has been in the intelligence
	business in the government, something called the ``need to
	know.'' The ``need to know'' rule still applies, and for the
	most sensitive kinds of intelligence, about very specific
	activities, the ``need to know'' rule still is at work.
	My personal view, by the way, is it should be. You should
	not tell everyone every single thing every single day. You
	should make sure that the key persons who are involved in this
	work know the essential issues each and every day, and I
	believe that has been done in my case.
	Mr. Thompson. Well, I think we will probably have some more
	opportunities for discussion. Thank you.
	Mr. King. [Presiding.] All right, Mr. Thompson.
	General Hughes, let me thank you for your service, and I
	certainly wish you well after March 15.
	In a way, I will be following up on Congressman Thompson's
	question, or maybe expanding it a bit. Obviously, information
	analysis is a work in progress. You have described it that way
	yourself.
	How has the passage of the Intelligence Reform Act impacted
	on that, either positively or adversely? Do you feel that the
	sharing is working the way it should? Is it better than it was
	before? Do you feel constricted? Again, how does it impact on
	the Department of Homeland Security?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. The first part of the answer is
	it is a lot better than it was.
	Mr. King. Because of the legislation being passed, or just
	because of the evolving of time?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. To be very frank, sir, I have
	not personally seen or observed any change since the act was
	passed that could be attributed directly to the act. Any of the
	changes that have occurred were ongoing prior to the act being
	passed. The act is going to take some time to reach fruition,
	to have impact.
	I think it is a very good act. I fully support it. I think
	the advent of a Director of national Intelligence is an
	important piece of that act and will cause the sharing
	function, the interoperability and commonality among the
	information systems to occur so that sharing can be better
	facilitated, and numerous other functions that we all think are
	laudatory. That will happen. It is ongoing, and much of it was
	ongoing before the act was passed. That is just a fact.
	Over time, since September 11, I have seen a marked
	improvement. Indeed, in the past year, as I stated in my
	written testimony, there has been a distinct qualitative and
	quantitative improvement in the information that is being
	shared in the intelligence community. By the way,
	parenthetically, in what can be distinguished from the
	intelligence community, is the law enforcement community, which
	as we all know is the nexus that makes Americans nervous, but
	it is a nexus that has to occur in the battle against terrorism
	and the battle against destabilizing forces inside our culture.
	So that is working. We have a much better information
	relationship than we ever did with the FBI. Actually, it is
	improving right along. Every few days, we make some kind of
	improvement.
	Is it perfect? Is it everything we could wish for? No. But
	the improvement is so dramatic that I am loath to criticize it
	in any way. I am happy to characterize it as something that we
	ought to keep going.
	Mr. King. I have to ask you, is there anyone that you are
	willing to criticize? Are there any elements within the
	intelligence community, the law enforcement agencies, who you
	feel are not cooperating with the spirit of the post-9/11 world
	that we live in?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I am not willing to criticize
	them.
	Mr. King. Could you question them? Could you enlighten us
	as to perhaps areas we should be looking at, where there is not
	full cooperation being given?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I think you ought to do what you
	are doing now, which is continuing to press the entire
	intelligence community and the culture to the degree they
	possibly can to have broad and full information sharing. Just
	continue the pressure. It is working. I, for one, ascribe that
	success not to the practitioners of intelligence, but to you,
	the Congress. You have brought pressure to bear, and I thank
	you for it.
	Mr. King. If we were in closed session, could you direct us
	as to where we should apply more pressure, you know, in one
	place rather than another?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. No. I do not think so. I think I
	have given you an honest answer today.
	Mr. King. Okay. Also in your opening statement when you
	mentioned the fact that you would be leaving on March 15, you
	sort of enticed us with a statement that if we have any
	questions to ask you about suggestions that you might want to
	make, we should ask them.
	Let me ask you: Do you have any suggestions as to the
	future, regarding the department or regarding your specific
	position?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I hope we can continue this
	work, strengthen it. We need the support of Congress and
	obviously we need the support of this committee and the
	subcommittees of the committee that are named after the work of
	securing the homeland. You need to be first for effectiveness,
	change, progress in the future here on the Hill. You also need
	to be our advocate to some degree.
	I certainly make a plea for that to continue. My view is
	that we did not have the same kind of supporting mechanism in
	Congress when we first started out at the so-called ``legacy''
	or older agencies and departments did have. We are slowly
	building that. I see the permanence of this committee finally
	recognized, I think a year late at least, as a manifestation of
	that. I cannot see how you could view it any differently.
	Mr. King. Thank you, General.
	The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Etheridge.
	Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join my
	colleagues and thank you for holding this hearing.
	General Hughes, thank you for being here. We are going to
	miss you.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you, sir.
	Mr. Etheridge. I wish you all the best.
	My State of North Carolina is a participant in the regional
	information sharing system or the RISS program. My question is,
	what is the status of linking the homeland security information
	network to RISS? How do you propose that we avoid duplication
	and confusion when we try to make these linkages so they will
	work best for the American people?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. RISS and LEO, the law
	enforcement side of that, can link now to JRIES. The names kind
	of run together here, but the homeland security information
	network is being empowered right now by the JRIES system which
	was an old Department of Defense system. That system was
	brought over to the Department of Homeland Security and put in
	place. Most people who have looked at it think it is an
	effective and efficient system. RISS and LEO both were able to
	link to it. It is not really hard to do.
	However, I believe that what we should have is a narrowing
	down of these systems and maybe even one system with one name,
	which can then be managed technically by one organizational
	entity. That is what I would like to see. That has proven to be
	an unpopular idea because of the investment that has been made
	in each of these separate systems. There are others besides
	RISS and LEO and JRIES out there.
	So I think another year or so of maturity and perhaps field
	evaluation may show, I am hoping it will show, that the power
	of combining these systems should be facilitated as rapidly as
	possible.
	Mr. Etheridge. General, let me follow that up, because it
	seems to me if we can get to that, and the sooner the better,
	because we save not only time, but we will save money. My
	personal view it would be a lot more effective for the American
	people and for those who use it. Would you agree or disagree
	with that statement?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I completely agree.
	Mr. Etheridge. Is there some way, then, that this committee
	can help facilitate that movement and the maturity of that
	system?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I think you can. I would like to
	invite you to have the proponents of the homeland security
	information network come here before this committee and give
	you their views and RISS and LEO also and others. I think that
	would be an excellent thing for you to do.
	Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, sir. I will encourage the
	leadership to take a look at that at some point. I think that
	is real cost savings, and would be very effective for the
	American people.
	I understand that DHS is attempting to provide useful
	intelligence to state and local first responders. How does IA
	handle the raw data and reports that you get from state and
	local officials coming in from the local?
	For example, what is the procedure for a police officer to
	report a suspicious activity that they may find, or any law
	enforcement officer, that ultimately could be used that may
	very well forestall a major problem that Homeland Security is
	responsible for?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Right now, a police officer or a
	police organization will make a report through law enforcement
	channels to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and either
	concurrently or separately to the Department of Homeland
	Security. These reports can be made verbally by telephone, or
	in some cases by the RISS network or the LEO network or some
	other way, a lot of which are terminated at the Homeland
	Security operations center.
	So the FBI gets them and we get them, generally speaking.
	There are cases where we have heard about, where reports do not
	come concurrently to one or the other. Usually, the report
	usually goes to the FBI first, and does not come to the
	Department of Homeland Security as a matter of routine. We are
	pressing to fix that by, first, advertising our role in the law
	enforcement community and asking them to follow this procedure.
	I might add that we have begun in the past year, and we now
	have something over 300 reports that are jointly filed with the
	Federal Bureau of Investigation. Those reports carry a message
	with them in the body of the report that says if you have any
	further information, or if you have any indication of activity
	associated with this report or in any other way, please report
	it to your local joint terrorism task force and the homeland
	security operations center.
	Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, General. I see my time has
	expired.
	It seems like this is another area that we could press a
	little more on, because if the FBI is not sending that
	information over, and it is not being shared, that is not what
	we had in mind when we set up Homeland Security.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. The FBI, I need to add this, I
	hope I did not characterize this wrongly, the FBI is not a
	problem in this regard. The FBI, at least as far as I know, is
	not preventing information from coming to the Department of
	Homeland Security. The local police, the law enforcement
	authorities out in the states and localities, sometimes do not
	report that information concurrently. But when the FBI gets it,
	in most cases they pass it to us, and we do the same.
	Mr. Etheridge. Thank you for that clarification.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. King. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
	Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	General thank you for your service.
	My question deals with the credibility of threats.
	Obviously, the 9/11 report talked a lot about the need to know
	versus need to share, and how do you strike that proper
	balance. When information, before it is going to be shared,
	obviously you have to determine whether it is credible. What is
	the process for determining the credibility of these types of
	threats before you can disseminate that information out in a
	timely manner to the people who need to know?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. That is a wonderful question
	because we live each and every day, and it is what I would
	refer to as Hobson choice.
	Mr. Dent. A what?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. A Hobson choice--a ``damned if
	you do, damned if you don't'' kind of choice. If we send
	information that we get out rapidly without taking some time
	with it, it is apt to be wrong. But if we take some time to
	clarify it, too much time, it loses its importance and its
	value over time. We never know. We cannot know whether it is
	accurate or not immediately.
	So our choice has been to report it as rapidly as we can,
	knowing that that is going to lead to much information going
	out in the field which is wrong. We know that, but we are
	hoping that all the professionals that receive this information
	will somehow understand that and be able to live with it.
	Mr. Dent. Just to follow up, we spend a lot of time around
	here trying to determine answers to questions, and thank you
	for your service.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you very much.
	Mr. King. The gentleman from Rhode Island is recognized,
	Mr. Langevin.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	General I want to thank you for being here and for your
	testimony. Thank you for your service to the country,
	particularly in your latest role at the Department of Homeland
	Security. You have made a great contribution.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you.
	Mr. Langevin. If I could just begin with IA's role in the
	intelligence community. The Senate report on the intelligence
	leading up to Iraq brought to light a tendency toward group-
	think. The information basically stressed the worst-case
	scenario, and a failure to question assumptions, if you will.
	The question I have is, has IA institutionalized measures
	to ensure that a similar type of intelligence failure does not
	occur here, and if so, what measures are in place and are they
	effective?
	Second, there is a truism in the intelligence business that
	to get included in the right meetings, that you have to be able
	to bring something to the table. So what products or expertise
	does IA currently bring to the rest of the intelligence
	community such that it is seen as a valuable contributor to the
	intelligence process?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you very much.
	In the first case, we think there is a problem consistently
	over time in the intelligence building, and you have to guard
	against it at all times. One of the things that it is up to
	leaders to do is to develop an environment in which any
	question could be asked, any premise can be challenged, any
	idea can be called to account. We just have to do that. We have
	to tell people the truth as directly and as clearly as
	possible.
	I would place the burden for avoiding group-think not on a
	process or procedure, but on leaders, specifically the leaders
	in the intelligence community, not merely at the highest level,
	and I would certainly hold them accountable, but also down to
	the mid-grade, middle-management level. They have to let
	analysts reign in their intellectual space and be able to think
	beyond some kind of artificial limit, to be able to deal in
	concepts in their own context without some kind of constraint
	or restriction.
	If we do not have that kind of environment in the
	intelligence community, then group-think will absolutely occur,
	you can depend upon it. I had a friend when I was in the
	military, an Israeli intelligence general. He happened to be a
	lieutenant colonel at the time of the 1973 invasion by the
	Egyptians across the Suez Canal. A captain came to him and
	said, those Egyptians are testing us each and every time we
	carry out war games, and we are not doing anything about it.
	The lieutenant colonel said, they are just war games. The
	captain said, they are not just war games; they are practicing.
	One of these days, they are going to continue. You know the
	rest of the story.
	The lieutenant colonel later regretted his failure in this
	function, and the picture of the dead from the front there was
	an intelligence analyst with chains and a big heavy locks
	around his head. That is the issue. We just have to somehow
	generate an environment that never allows that to happen in the
	United States.
	Mr. Langevin. General, if I could be clear in the
	understanding that you in particular in your department have
	things in place to make sure that consciously you have made
	sure that group-think is not going to be a problem?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I have done the best I could to
	generate an environment in which any idea is welcome, any
	thought is fine. At some point, however, decision-makers have
	to make decisions. If your decisions over time prove to be
	flawed or faulty, then you obviously have a problem.
	The second part of your question, would you repeat it?
	Mr. Langevin. I want to know if it is true that in the
	intelligence business, to get included at the right meetings,
	you have to bring something to the table. So I wanted to ask
	what IA currently brings to the rest of the intelligence
	community such that you are seen as a valuable contributor to
	the intelligence process.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I think that is right, that you
	do have to contribute. I think we are beginning to contribute
	something that is somewhat unique. I refer to it as domestic
	information. In the situation here in the United States, we are
	in partnership with the FBI that involves the concept of law
	enforcement information and intelligence all together to inform
	decision-makers and responsible parties about the context in
	which things are happening, and about potential events. This is
	not spying on the American people in any way, but it is
	understanding that there are persons inside our society and
	coming towards us who would do us great harm. We have to know
	where those people are, who they are, what their capabilities
	are, and what the potentialities are.
	The Department of Homeland Security represents unique
	capabilities in that regard. We are the people who inhabit and
	control the borders. We are the people who inhabit and control
	the borders. We are the people who take care of the brown water
	on the shores of our nation. We are the people who sense the
	environment to protect important persons from harm. We are the
	people who administer the safety of our transportation system.
	No one else does these things. I believe we are being
	recognized as bringing unique and very valuable, not only
	information, but skills and capabilities to the table. I will
	have to tell you that I still detect some resistance, among
	others, to mention of those ideas in the context of the
	Department of Homeland Security.
	There is still sort of a default mechanism out there that
	when you talk about transportation security, and you might say
	TSA. If you talk about the Coast Guard, you talk about the
	Coast Guard. But over time, some development of the concept of
	an umbrella organization is gaining strength and will come to
	fruition. That would be the development of a very valuable
	concept for the Department of Homeland Security, which can
	achieve intra-component synergy among all of these
	capabilities.
	The simple answer is, yes, we bring something to the table,
	now and more in the future.
	Mr. Langevin. I see my time has expired. Thank you for your
	answer to the questions, and again thank you for your service.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Thank you.
	Mr. Simmons. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman for his
	questions. If he refers to the bipartisan Senate Intelligence
	Committee report of last year, the first eight conclusions deal
	with issues of group-think, and a contributing factor to group-
	think is a lack of information.
	The gentleman from California is recognized, Mr. Lungren.
	Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
	Thank you for your testimony, General, and thank you, more
	importantly, for your lifetime of service. We all appreciate
	that.
	Could you give us an idea of where you think your
	department's information analysis capability is right now? That
	is, if you have to say that complete success would be a 10, and
	we know we could never get to a 10; maybe 9 is what we can
	achieve because we are always changing for that last one. As
	you leave, where do you think it is?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Five to six.
	Mr. Lungren. If it were five to six, for us to get up to
	nine, what are the very specific two or three priorities that
	you would have the department emphasize with your successor?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. The kind of experienced,
	analytic workforce, public employees that we can depend upon
	over time, that will stay in this occupational field and
	continue to do this work for a long period of time. This is not
	conventional or routine intelligence work. It is different.
	Second, improvement on facilities. The facilities are
	inadequate to the task. We need support in that area.
	Three, you need a full understanding of the remainder of
	the intelligence community about what it is that we are doing,
	why we are doing it, and how we are doing it. I think that is
	the third item on the list for a reason. That is the lowest
	priority. The first two are vital.
	I would mention that we need more time. Everyone keeps
	saying, and I heard the Chairman mention a ``two-year period.''
	It is true that we have been in existence for over two years,
	but I can tell you that we were not functional when I arrived
	on 17 November, 2003, in the intelligence business. We had 27
	people; we could not do the job. Time period has to be measured
	in capability and effectiveness. We were not effective. We are
	not completely efficient and we are not as good as we should
	be. The progress is real. We just need some more time.
	We also need more people of the right kind, government
	employees, better facilities and structures, and we need
	understanding and support.
	Mr. Lungren. General, when I was Attorney General of
	California, one of my responsibilities was the head of WSIN,
	the Western States Information Network, one of the RISSes
	around the country. Are we utilizing the RISSes around the
	country effectively in information gathering and sharing?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Probably not as effectively as
	we should. That is a process that we began this past summer by
	having people from all of the states come here to Washington.
	We began to inform them about the methods of information
	sharing at that time. We have a plan in place to have that same
	kind of gathering again this summer, and we are sending out
	mobile training teams who help people understand how things can
	be improved in that regard.
	Mr. Lungren. Let me ask the question this way: Are we
	utilizing the RISSes as a platform to provide information to
	you? Or are you duplicating or replicating that?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. We are using the RISS, the law
	enforcement network, and others to the degree that we can. It
	is a cooperative effort.
	Mr. Lungren. Okay. Sure. I know you are loath to criticize
	anybody, and I will not ask you to do that here, but I will
	just give you some insights I have received from some law
	enforcement people on the ground or in middle-management
	positions. They still find a reluctance to share information
	from the feds on down, specifically with the FBI. I would
	normally say, ``Well, you are always having grousing like
	that,'' but when I was Attorney General, frankly, I can tell
	you it was very serendipitous as to whether or not we got a
	spirit of cooperation from the feds, whose need to know seemed
	to be the feds need to know, but you do not need to know.
	Much information in the domestic arena, frankly, can be
	gathered as well and sometimes even better by the many more law
	enforcement officers we have at the local and state level than
	we do not the federal level. They are much closer to the
	street. They have more contacts. They may not have all the
	contacts in the specific terrorist organizations, but they have
	contacts with a lot of people that may come into contact with
	them. It is debilitating for them to be viewed as second-class
	citizens, and to have the feds say, we have the view, we have
	the mileage, we have the right to know, and you do not.
	I see it expressed in this way. That is, with the color
	code system we have and the alerts that they receive, they told
	me that oftentimes they would receive these alerts without
	really underlying information. So they were told generally
	speaking the threat assessment was higher, but they did not
	have real information therefore to respond to that. That, to
	me, suggests an underlying lack of trust of local and state
	government that still pervades the federal establishment. Can
	you tell me whether you have seen that, number one; and number
	two, if you have, what steps in particular has your department
	taken to try and break that down?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. First, everything you said I
	have heard. We may know the same people.
	[Laughter.]
	Mr. Lungren. We will not put that on the record.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I have to tell you that I think
	it is absolutely accurate. The phenomenon of the arrogance of
	the federal establishment in relationship to the state and
	localities with regard to information is well known.
	Mr. Lungren. Well, members of Congress excepted, of course.
	[Laughter.]
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Sir, you can believe whatever
	you want. I have heard a lot about this.
	[Laughter.]
	Mr. Lungren. Better watch it, General. Be careful there.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. I have to tell you that I think
	it is an accurate portrayal. The local effort feels like they
	are second-class citizens because of the attitude that is
	conveyed to them by some federal officials.
	I do not think that is across the board. I think it is
	somewhat circumstantial, but nevertheless, it is a fact.
	What we have done is, first, we are sending out a lot more
	information; that is simply a fact. We can prove that by simply
	showing you the documents we now send routinely to the states
	and localities. We did assemble them here, and we are going to
	assemble then here again this year. It is a participative
	effort. Admittedly, it was not much of a dialogue. That is too
	bad, but in the first instance we had a lot of things to put
	out to them. And they actually thought it was very worthwhile.
	This summer, we have meetings here in Washington again over
	a three-to four-day period. We hope to make it more of a
	dialogue and we will hear from that more.
	By the way, we have this in August, so if there is any
	possible way we could get a Congressman or a Senator to come
	and meet before that group and give your views, we would really
	appreciate it, because this kind of interaction is vital.
	We have also established, and we are establishing over
	time, relationships with people. Some of these relationships
	are very circumstantial and short-lived. I did not meet the
	sheriff of Las Vegas, even though I had telephone conversations
	with him and talked to him on a couple of occasions. I never
	met with this gentleman personally face to face until a few
	days ago. Indeed, when I met with him, he had his share of
	complaints.
	But he is the guy in charge of Las Vegas. What do I know
	about Las Vegas? Nothing. I am completely dependent on him to
	know primarily what is going on in Las Vegas.
	However, he recognizes, I think as most localities do, that
	occasionally, especially in the world of terrorism, big
	problems can come toward specific towns and cities that the
	town and city do not know about. That is a fact. It is the
	nature of the larger world of intelligence and
	counterterrorism. They do not come and rest and stay in exactly
	the target place, so that everybody and their brother gets to
	know them. They project themselves into these environments and,
	usually relatively rapidly in the target area, take action.
	So we are trying to get a mutual understanding of the
	phenomenon. We do at the national level, at the federal level,
	have something to contribute, and we should contribute that by
	passing it to the states and local authorities, and we are
	trying hard to do that. We have made improvements, and if they
	were sitting here in this room, I think they would say that. I
	think they would say, yes, things are better than they used to
	be.
	Mr. Lungren. Thank you, General. Mr. Chairman, could we ask
	the staff to work with the General's staff for us to be able to
	see when threat assessments are made, the level of information
	that is given to local jurisdictions, so that we might be able
	to see what we are really talking about, because I have had
	these complaints from law enforcement saying they have
	inadequate information once a threat level is given to them.
	Maybe we just need to look at it ourselves.
	Mr. Simmons. I would be happy to do that. I began my
	political career as a police commissioner, and in the post-9/11
	environment, the new model is not local, state, federal each
	doing its own thing. The new model is communication between all
	levels. I know the Ranking Member has expressed to me her
	frustration over the same type of issue. My guess is that this
	is an important consideration for this subcommittee, and we
	will certainly look into it.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. If you do not mind, I must give
	you just another piece of information.
	Mr. Simmons. I do not want to deny you, but the
	distinguished lady from Texas, her questions, I know she has
	been here for a while, so make it brief, General.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. Okay, I will make it brief. The
	question you posed to me was in the context of the homeland
	security alert system, the changing of the colors. It is true
	that in the initial application of the changing of the colors,
	not much information was given. It is increasingly true, has
	been over time, since the Christmas 2003 and January, February,
	and March 2004 period, we have given more information. I will
	make sure you have the context of the question, there. But I
	think it is a very good thing to ask, to have us give you a
	better characterization of how much information we are giving
	out.
	Mr. Simmons. The distinguished lady from Texas, Ms.
	Jackson-Lee.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the Chairman and the Ranking
	Member.
	General let me thank you for your service, and try to go
	quickly through my questions because of the time.
	I believe that one of the aspects of the IAIP's most
	important issues is the analyzing and integrating terrorist
	threat information and making sure that amongst any other
	agency that we relate to the homeland, I think of the FBI and
	the CIA as having their own constituency bases, even though we
	are trying to work very hard at the integration of those
	agencies, really in terms of fighting terrorism, the Department
	of Homeland Security signified to America that we are focused
	on their needs and providing them with the intelligence they
	need to understand the terrorist threat and to fight terrorism.
	As I look at the budget, and I know that this is
	particularly related to the intelligence needs, I think a point
	worth noting is that the President's budget indicates that
	government-wide spending for homeland security increases really
	overall by $1 billion. To put this in perspective, we all know
	that we are spending about $1 billion a week in Iraq and
	probably other added dollars in Afghanistan. In particular, I
	believe that there is an intent to hire an additional 73 more
	employees, and also to seek ways of improving our ability to
	analyze and integrate terrorist threat information, map threats
	against our vulnerabilities and implement actions to protect
	American lives.
	I know that we are going to lose your talent in March, and
	again let me thank you for your service, but how are we going
	to do that when we are looking at a potential cut of $20
	million? Might I add to that question a statement that you made
	in your speech when you were able to say that we were able to
	connect the homeland security information network with the
	regional information sharing system, and I think the previous
	question raised that question. You yourself said that one needs
	to be achieved, but we are on the right track. If you could
	expand on what you gave to Congressman Lungren, and talk
	specifically about the ability to hire employees and try to
	improve what we are trying to with this budget cuts.
	Lieutenant General Hughes. If I understand the question
	right, ma'am, the budget cut is not an assured thing. The
	Department of Homeland Security expects plus-up in our overall
	budget as you described, and we do not expect for the budget to
	be cut back. That is our hope.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. But if it is cut back, then you will have
	difficulty fulfilling your mission. Is that correct?
	Lieutenant General Hughes. That is true. That is correct. I
	would certainly hope that that does not happen.
	With regard to the idea of whether or not we can do the job
	and how well we can do it, the connectivity that we have out
	there with the RISS system and the LEO system and others, this
	is an evolutionary thing. We just discovered not long ago a
	system that is run by the Federal Protective Service, which is
	part of the Department of Homeland Security, which is a portal
	into law enforcement information the Federal Protective Service
	holds. That is within our own department and we did not know it
	existed until not long ago.
	So we are learning. We are developing over time. A lot of
	these things, even though they may seem self-evident, they are
	not. We have had to ferret them out. I think we are continuing
	to make good progress.
	The answer I would give to you and to the person who asked
	the earlier question is, connectivity is almost everything. If
	we do not have that, and I think the Chairman is familiar,
	information not shared is worthless. That is it. That gets to
	the central idea here. We can get the information. The next
	imperative is to share it. That is what we are all about. So we
	have been trying to build and make this interconnected network
	a system of systems, whatever names you want to apply to it. We
	want to make sure it is interoperable, that it has enough
	elements of commonality so that we can pass information
	horizontally and vertically throughout the system. That is what
	we would like to do.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the General's
	views, and Ranking Member, sort of focusing on our questions,
	but let me just say that this exercise poses a very difficult
	challenge, because it is very difficult when you have
	overlapping committees of jurisdiction such as the Budget
	Committee. Your expertise and the Ranking Member's expertise on
	some of the aspects of this, still the time is not long enough
	to sort of probe General Hughes and the knowledge that he has.
	Two points I think are key to this, and I would start out
	by saying that homeland security connotes security of the
	homeland. People think of the FBI and CIA, so you have a great
	responsibility. I think that this one sentence that he has, the
	pages are not numbered, but when he talks of RISS and the law
	enforcement online, one needs to be achieved, I think in our
	work we need to focus in on whether we have appropriate
	resources to make sure that the communication is going on in
	the homeland with law enforcement.
	Another point is, and I think it is very important, is this
	right-to-know rule. We look forward to your expertise, but I
	wonder whether or not this committee will have oversight to be
	able to refine that in this new post-9/11 era. For example, and
	I will close on this note, General Hughes, there is something
	called OTMs at the border, the southern border, other than
	Mexican nationals coming across. That has taken a new life,
	that there are potential individuals coming across that border
	that may do us harm. The border patrol agents then become a
	greater force with respect to their need to know, and they need
	to know classified information or information at a very high
	level. I am not comfortable that even in this budget oversight
	we have focused on it.
	General Hughes, I thank you for the one very great point
	that you said, if we cut the budget and do not provide you with
	the resources, you are not going to be able to do the job. I
	think that is our responsibility.
	I yield back, and I thank the Chairman for the additional
	time on the clock. Thank you.
	Mr. Simmons. I thank you for your comments. I think we are
	all aware that this is the first hearing of the permanent
	subcommittee. It is historic in that regard. The opportunities
	for us are pretty dramatic, but the challenges are also great.
	It is an area where we have to work together and share together
	to be successful. I thank you for your comments. I think they
	are right on the dime.
	We will keep the record open for 10 days for any additional
	written comments that anyone may wish to submit. I have a few
	remarks to make as closing remarks, but I would like to
	recognize my Ranking Member, if she has remarks she would like
	to make.
	Ms. Lofgren. This is just the beginning, obviously, and
	General, we do appreciate your being here today, even though we
	will not be seeing much of you for long. I think certain
	questions have become more ripe in our minds as we listened to
	you. The connectivity of the system obviously is important,
	whether it is the Internet or whether it is intelligence.
	Therefore, we are dependent on agencies both within DHS, but
	also without. So we certainly cannot do it today, I am thinking
	about the FBI system that we had great promise for, but did not
	produce, and how that is going to impact DHS.
	I have spent 10 years on the Judiciary Committee paying
	attention to immigration, and I am very well aware of the
	deficiencies in the technology and that aspect, and the impact
	it has on the ability to gather information that then could be
	shared. So I am hopeful that as we move forward in this year
	that we will be able to look at those as they connect and maybe
	get some improvements that will make us all safer.
	I did want to just follow up very briefly in writing, but
	comment that I am concerned about the ``need to know''
	information issue. Certainly, the Congress cannot micromanage
	an intelligence agency. It would not be proper, but I am
	concerned that if that is an ad hoc decision being made in the
	agency, then we have maybe failed to actually have the policy,
	the ``who voted for'' implemented. I think we have to explore
	that further, Mr. Chairman.
	Finally, my colleague from California mentioned the
	frustration that local agencies have. I think that has improved
	somewhat with Director Mueller and the FBI task force. At least
	the feedback I am getting from law enforcement is much
	different than I used to. But what I am hearing form local law
	enforcement is that they never hear from DHS. It is invisible
	to them. So I think we need to sort through and be parochial.
	There are more people living in Los Angeles County than there
	are in over 20 states, and how we are dealing with the gigantic
	nation-state of California and whether that system is going to
	work for that state or not, and how we might format it so we
	really do have a system that is slick and works and protects
	us.
	I thank the Chairman for recognizing me.
	Mr. Simmons. Thank you.
	Just very briefly, back in 1981, I became the staff
	director of the Senate Intelligence Committee, working for
	Senator Barry Goldwater as the Chairman and Senator Daniel
	Patrick Moynihan as the Vice Chairman. Try that one on for
	size, staff. The Chairman is Senator Goldwater. Well, you are
	too young to even remember who he is; and the Vice Chairman was
	Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a good Republican and a good Democrat.
	One from the west and one from the east; one conservative and
	one liberal. I sat and worked with them for 4 years as they
	initiated what I consider to be professional congressional
	oversight of the intelligence community.
	I learned about the value of bipartisanship, and I learned
	about the value of listening to others when it comes to the
	intelligence business. I learned that you can put those
	differences aside if you are focusing on a common goal, which
	in that case was to build the intelligence community to
	preserve and protect our values and our people and our country.
	Regrettably, on 9/11 we failed in that regard. So the
	mantle has been passed to another generation of members of
	Congress and another generation of members of the staff, to do
	what we can do to preserve and protect our homeland, while at
	the same time preserving and protecting our civil liberties.
	That is an awesome challenge. In those days 25 years ago, we
	did not have a hearing room or spaces that were ours. We
	occupied the auditorium in the Dirksen Building. Today, we do
	not have a hearing room, I do not believe. We are looking for
	one, although this is much better than the auditorium of the
	Dirksen Building, I can assure you.
	But we should not let these little logistical challenges
	get in the way of the important work of this subcommittee and
	of course the important work of the full committee.
	I will leave you with a final thought. For the 4 years that
	I have been a member of Congress, I have never changed the
	license plate on my car. I know some immediately go out with a
	screw driver and put on that lovely congressional plate. But
	the plate that I have on my car has the simple phrase ``kung
	ho,'' which conveys enthusiasm and excitement, but as we all
	know comes from the Chinese word ``kung ho,'' which means
	``work together.''
	I look forward to working together with the staff, with the
	members of this subcommittee, with the Administration and
	others, to pursue the important agenda that we have before us.
	Thank you all for being here today.
	And thank you, General, for your participation.
	[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



	A P P E N D I X

	----------
	--________

	Material Submitted for the Record

	Questions and Responses Submitted for the Record by the Hon. Bennie
	Thompson for Acting Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis Karen
	Morr on behalf of DHS

	Question: 1. General Hughes, one theme the Department has repeated
	in describing the President's Fiscal Year 2006 budget is consolidation.
	I think we all recognize that the current organizational structure at
	DHS isn't necessarily the best one, and that moving offices or
	functions can improve performance or reduce cost.
	Some agencies, including the office that distributes billions of
	dollars to first responders, rely on IA for threat information.
	However, some parts of DHS have their own intelligence departments--
	including the Coast Guard and Secret Service as part of the
	Intelligence Community, but also TSA, the Federal Air Marshals, CBP,
	and ICE. Thankfully, many of these programs are unclassified, so we can
	talk about their budgets in public. TSA, for example, is requesting $21
	million and 99 FTEs for Fiscal Year 2006.

	Question: 1. Given the trend within DHS for consolidation, for
	example the transfer of research and development activities to the
	Science and Technology Directorate, should IA have more control over
	all the intelligence operations in DHS?
	Intelligence is integral to the successful operations of the
	Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In our efforts to build a strong
	Department from its original 22 agencies, it is critical to coordinate
	DHS intelligence functions. The ability of the Department to conduct
	its mission is enhanced when components have synchronized intelligence
	activities. The Office of Information Analysis, in concert with the DHS
	components that have intelligence activities, is conducting a study
	with the intent of developing a plan to integrate key aspects of these
	activities. That study is reviewing several elements of the
	intelligence program, including mission areas and supporting functions.
	The results of this study will be presented to the senior leadership
	this spring. IAIP will continue to work to ensure the Department's
	intelligence activities are coordinated.

	Question: 2. With the first deadline on the ``Information Sharing
	Environment,'' as mandated by the recently enacted Intelligence Reform
	and Terrorism Prevention Act, occurring in less than two months, do you
	know what will be the role of DHS in operating or setting the rules for
	the ``environment''
	The first deadline related to the terrorism information sharing
	environment (ISE) was met. The President designated John Russack as the
	Program Manager responsible for planning for, overseeing the
	implementation of, and managing the ISE pursuant to section 1016 of
	P.L. 108-458. Per our statutory authorities and responsibilities, DHS
	has a critical role in the development of all aspects of the ISE,
	including the establishment of the business rules for the ISE. DHS has
	been actively engaged in the work to date toward developing the ISE and
	will continue to have an active role in relation to this Department,
	our stakeholders, and the community at large.
	In particular, DHS has a unique role, as defined under the Homeland
	Security Act, for sharing homeland security information with state,
	local, and tribal governments as well as the private sector in relation
	to critical infrastructure. Specifically, Executive Order 13311
	delegates to the DHS Secretary the responsibilities for procedures for
	prescribing and implementing information sharing as defined in Section
	892 of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296). Improving information
	sharing has been and continues to be a top strategic priority for DHS.
	The Information Sharing and Collaboration Office (ISCO) was established
	in DHS to provide focus and coordination for these statutory and
	Presidential mandates.
	DHS is currently a key link among State, tribal, and local
	government, as well as the private sector critical infrastructure
	entities. The Department is already operating in critical information
	spheres (defense, intelligence, homeland security, law enforcement,
	private sector) and is providing strategic guidance to oversee the
	development of their intersection and collaboration to produce all
	information necessary to govern and protect and will coordinate these
	activities with the Program Manager.

	Question: 3. After the 2004 elections, then-Secretary Ridge said
	that there had been a decrease in chatter and that the threat of
	terrorist attack was lower than it had been in some time. Is that still
	the case, and if so, how do you account for that?
	Beginning in Summer 2004, we began to see a decrease in incoming
	credible and/or specific information mentioning direct threats to the
	United States. The reasons for the quantitative and qualitative
	decrease--which lasted through late February 2005--remain unclear.
	Since then, we have tracked a number of threat streams deemed credible
	and/or specific to Homeland-related interests, however we do not know
	if this is related to the natural cycle of the intelligence collection
	process or other factors more related to actual terrorist operational
	planning.
	Despite this relative increase in credible and/or specific
	reporting since late February, we continue to lack information
	indicating an imminent threat to the United States, as well as the
	timing, targets, or methodology of any potential operation. While the
	Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the rest of the Intelligence
	Community are still analyzing each particular threat stream, as well as
	those streams collectively, they do reinforce our perception regarding
	al-Qaida's ongoing strategic intent to conduct another dramatic attack
	in the United States. This intent and possible planning is reflected in
	all-source intelligence reporting, vice a single collection discipline.
	We note that the reporting level from vague, low-credibility, or
	undetermined sources (call-ins, write-ins, walk-ins, media
	pronouncements, etc.) regarding possible attacks on the Homeland
	remains relatively constant and numerically more significant than
	reports from ``credible'' sources.

	Question: 4. What changes are being considered for the Homeland
	Security Advisory System, and will the system continue to be used in
	its current structure?
	The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) has evolved throughout
	the history of DHS and currently includes the flexibility to assign
	threat levels for the entire nation, or a particular geographic area or
	infrastructure sector, depending on the credibility and specificity of
	available threat information. The HSAS is a collaborative process which
	takes into account current threat information and incorporates the
	perspectives of other federal entities (both within and outside of
	DHS); state, local, and tribal partners; and private sector
	stakeholders. DHS learns new lessons and continues to improve the
	system each time HSAS level changes are considered.

	<all>

	</pre></body></html>