jbp123/hello · Datasets at Hugging Face

instruction stringlengths 1 84	input stringlengths 1 85	output stringlengths 1 83
(f) The role, responsibility and jurisdiction of the Centre in	adopting approaches and policies based on positive	discrimination in favour of backward States.
(g) The impact of the recommendations made by the 8th to 12th	Finance Commissions on the fiscal relations between the	Centre and the States, especially the greater dependence of
the States on devolution of funds from the Centre.	(h) The need and relevance of separate taxes on the production	and on the sales of goods and services subsequent to the
introduction of Value Added Tax regime.	(i) The need for freeing inter-State trade in order to establish a	unified and integrated domestic market as also in the context
of the reluctance of State Governments to adopt the relevant	Sarkaria Commission’s recommendation in chapter XVIII of its	report.
(j) The need for setting up a Central Law Enforcement Agency	empowered to take up suo moto investigation of crimes	having inter-State and/ or international ramifications with
serious implications on national security.	(k) The feasibility of a supporting legislation under Article 355 for	the purpose of suo moto deployment of Central forces in the
States if and when the situation so demands.	The Commission submitted its report to the government in April	2010. In finalising the 1,456 page report, in seven volumes, the
Commission took extensive help from the Sarkaria Commission	report, the National Commission to Review the Working of the	Constitution (NCRWC) report and the Second Administrative Reforms
Commission report. However, in a number of areas, the Commission	report differed from the Sarkaria Commission recommendations.	After examining at length the issues raised in its Terms of
Reference and the related aspects in all their hues and shades, the	Commission came to the conclusion that ‘cooperative federalism’ will	be the key for sustaining India’s unity, integrity and social and
economic development in future. The principles of cooperative	federalism thus may have to act as a practical guide for Indian polity	and governance.
In all, the Commission made over 310 recommendations, touching	upon several significant areas in the working of Centre-state relations.	The important recommendations are mentioned below:
1. To facilitate effective implementation of the laws on List III	subjects, it is necessary that some broad agreement is reached	between the Union and states before introducing legislation in
Parliament on matters in the Concurrent List.	2. The Union should be extremely restrained in asserting	Parliamentary supremacy in matters assigned to the states.
Greater flexibility to states in relation to subjects in the State List	and “transferred items” in the Concurrent List is the key for better	Centre-state relations.
3. The Union should occupy only that many of subjects in	concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction which are absolutely	necessary to achieve uniformity of policy in demonstrable
national interest.	4. There should be a continuing auditing role for the Inter-state	Council in the management of matters in concurrent or
overlapping jurisdiction.	5. The period of six months prescribed in Article 201 for State	Legislature to act when the bill is returned by the President can
be made applicable for the President also to decide on assenting	or withholding assent to a state bill reserved for consideration of	the President.
6. Parliament should make a law on the subject of Entry 14 of List I	(treaty making and implementing it through Parliamentary	legislation) to streamline the procedures involved. The exercise
of the power obviously cannot be absolute or unchartered in	view of the federal structure of legislative and executive powers.	7. Financial obligations and its implications on state finances
arising out of treaties and agreements should be a permanent	term of reference to the Finance Commissions constituted from	time to time.
8. While selecting Governors, the Central Government should	adopt the following strict guidelines as recommended in the	Sarkaria Commission report and follow its mandate in letter and
spirit :	(i) He should be eminent in some walk of life	(ii) He should be a person from outside the state
(iv) He should be a person who has not taken too great a par	politics generally and particularly in the recent past	9. Governors should be given a fixed tenure of five years and their
removal should not be at the sweet will of the Government at the	Centre.	10. The procedure laid down for impeachment of President, mutatis
mutandis can be made applicable for impeachment of Governors	as well.	11. Article 163 does not give the Governor a general discretionary
power to act against or without the advice of his Council of	Ministers. In fact, the area for the exercise of discretion is limited	and even in this limited area, his choice of action should not be
arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice dictated by reason,	activated by good faith and tempered by caution.	12. In respect of bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of a state,
the Governor should take the decision within six months whether	to grant assent or to reserve it for consideration of the President.	13. On the question of Governor’s role in appointment of Chief
Minister in the case of an hung assembly, it is necessary to lay	down certain clear guidelines to be followed as Constitutional	conventions. These guidelines may be as follows:
(i) The party or combination of parties which commands the wid	support in the Legislative Assembly should be called upon to f	the Government.
(ii) If there is a pre-poll alliance or coalition, it should be treated	one political party and if such coalition obtains a majority,	leader of such coalition shall be called by the Governor to f
the Government.	(iii) In case no party or pre-poll coalition has a clear majority,	Governor should select the Chief Minister in the order
preference indicated here.	(a) The group of parties which had pre-poll alliance	commanding the largest number
(b) The largest single party staking a claim to form the	government with the support of others	(c) A post-electoral coalition with all partners joining the
government	(d) A post-electoral alliance with some parties joining the	government and the remaining including independents
14. On the question of dismissal of a Chief Minister, the Governor	should invariably insist on the Chief Minister proving his majority	on the floor of the House for which he should prescribe a time
limit.	15. The Governor should have the right to sanction for prosecution	of a state minister against the advice of the Council of Ministers,
if the Cabinet decision appears to the Governor to be motivated	by bias in the face of overwhelming material.	16. The convention of Governors acting as Chancellors of
Universities and holding other statutory positions should be done	away with. His role should be confined to the Constitutional	provisions only.
17. When an external aggression or internal disturbance paralyses	the state administration creating a situation of a potential break	down of the Constitutional machinery of the state, all alternative
courses available to the Union for discharging its paramount	responsibility under Article 355 should be exhausted to contain	the situation and the exercise of the power under Article 356
should be limited strictly to rectifying a “failure of the	Constitutional machinery in the state”.	18. On the question of invoking Article 356 in case of failure of
Constitutional machinery in states, suitable amendments are	required to incorporate the guidelines set forth in the landmark	judgement of the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai V. Union of
India (1994). This would remove possible misgivings in this	regard on the part of states and help in smoothening Centre-	state relations.
19. Given the strict parameters now set for invoking the emergency	provisions under Articles 352 and 356 to be used only as a	measure of “last resort”, and the duty of the Union to protect
states under Article 355, it is necessary to provide a	Constitutional or legal framework to deal with situations which	require Central intervention but do not warrant invoking the
extreme steps under Articles 352 and 356. Providing the	framework for “localised emergency” would ensure that the state	government can continue to function and the Assembly would
not have to be dissolved while providing a mechanism to let the	Central Government respond to the issue specifically and locally.	The imposition of local emergency is fully justified under the
20. Suitable amendments to Article 263 are required to make the	Inter-State Council a credible, powerful and fair mechanism for	management of interstate and Centre-state differences.
21. The Zonal Councils should meet at least twice a year with an	agenda proposed by states concerned to maximise co-ordination	and promote harmonisation of policies and action having inter-
state ramification. The Secretariat of a strengthened Inter-State	Council can function as the Secretariat of the Zonal Councils as	well.
22. The Empowered Committee of Finance Ministers of States	proved to be a successful experiment in inter-state coordination	on fiscal matters. There is need to institutionalise similar models
in other sectors as well. A forum of Chief Ministers, Chaired by	one of the Chief Minister by rotation can be similarly thought	about particularly to co-ordinate policies of sectors like energy,
food, education, environment and health.	23. New all-India services in sectors like health, education,	engineering and judiciary should be created.
24. Factors inhibiting the composition and functioning of the Second	Chamber as a representative forum of states should be removed	or modified even if it requires amendment of the Constitutional
provisions. In fact, Rajya Sabha offers immense potential to	negotiate acceptable solutions to the friction points which	emerge between Centre and states in fiscal, legislative and
administrative relations.	25. A balance of power between states inter se is desirable and this	is possible by equality of representation in the Rajya Sabha. This
requires amendment of the relevant provisions to give equality of	seats to states in the Rajya Sabha, irrespective of their	population size.
26. The scope of devolution of powers to local bodies to act as	institutions of self-government should be constitutionally defined	through appropriate amendments.
27. All future Central legislations involving states’ involvement	should provide for cost sharing as in the case of the RTE Act.	Existing Central legislations where the states are entrusted with
the responsibility of implementation should be suitably amended	providing for sharing of costs by the Central Government.	28. The royalty rates on major minerals should be revised at least
compensated for any delay in the revision of royalty beyond	three years.	29. The current ceiling on profession tax should be completely done
away with by a Constitutional amendment.	30. The scope for raising more revenue from the taxes mentioned in	article 268 should be examined afresh. This issue may be either
referred to the next Finance Commission or an expert committee	be appointed to look into the matter.	31. To bring greater accountability, all fiscal legislations should
provide for an annual assessment by an independent body and	the reports of these bodies should be laid in both Houses of	Parliament/state legislature.
32. Considerations specified in the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the	Finance Commission should be even handed as between the	Centre and the states. There should be an effective mechanism
to involve the states in the finalisation of the ToR of the Finance	Commissions.	33. The Central Government should review all the existing cesses
and surcharges with a view to bringing down their share in the	gross tax revenue.	34. Because of the close linkages between the plan and non-plan
expenditure, an expert committee may be appointed to look into	the issue of distinction between the plan and non-plan	expenditure.
35. There should be much better coordination between the Finance	Commission and the Planning Commission. The synchronisation	of the periods covered by the Finance Commission and the Five-
Year Plan will considerably improve such coordination.	36. The Finance Commission division in the Ministry of Finance	should be converted into a full-fledged department, serving as
the permanent secretariat for the Finance Commissions.	37. The Planning Commission has a crucial role in the current	situation. But its role should be that of coordination rather that of
micro managing sectoral plans of the Central ministries and the	states.	38. Steps should be taken for the setting up of an Inter-State Trade
and Commerce Commission under Article 307 read with Entry	42 of List-I. This Commission should be vested with both	advisory and executive roles with decision making powers. As a
party aggrieved with the decision of the Commission may prefer	an appeal to the Supreme Court.	The Report of the Commission was circulated to all stakeholders
including State Governments / UT Administrations and Union	Ministries / Departments concerned for their considered views on the	recommendations of the Commission. The comments received from
the Union Ministries / Departments and the State Governments / UT	Administrations are under the consideration of the Inter-State	Council.28
NOTES AND REFERENCES	1. Even now, the last entry is numbered as 97 but the total	number of entries is 98. The entries numbered as 2A, 92A
and 92B have been added and entries 33, 92 and 92C have	been omitted. See Appendix II.	2. Even now, the last entry is numbered as 66 but the total
number of entries is 59. The entries numbered as 11, 19,	20, 29, 36, 52 and 55 have been omitted. See Appendix II.	3. Even now, the last entry is numbered as 47 but the total
number of entries is 52. The entries numbered as 11A, 17A,	17B, 20A and 33A have been added. See Appendix II.	3a. The provision for goods and services tax was added by the
101st Amendment Act of 2016.	3b. Ibid.	4. Report of the Commission on centre-state Relations, Part I
(Government of India, 1988) PP. 28–29.	5. For example, under the Essential Commodities Act, made	by the Parliament on a concurrent subject, the executive
power is vested in the Centre.	6. This provision (the power of the states to entrust functions	to the Centre) was added by the 7th Constitutional
Amendment Act of 1956. Before that, only the Centre had	the power.	7. For details in this regard, see Chapter 15.
8. Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume VII, PP. 41–42.	9. For details, see Chapter 54.	10. For details, see Chapter 78.
12. Entries–82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92A, 92B and	96. See Appendix II.	13. Entries–45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59,
60, 61, 62, 63, and 66. See Appendix II.	14. In this regard, the 101st Amendment Act of 2016 inserted	Article 246-A in the Constitution.
15. Originally, this limit was only ₹250 per annum. The 60th	Amendment Act of 1988 raised it to ₹2,500 per annum.	16. These provisions are contained in Article 286, as amended
by the 101st Amendment Act of 2016.	17. This amendment deleted Article 272 (Taxes which are	levied and collected by the Centre and may be distributed
between the Centre and the states).	18. Entry 52 (taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for	consumption, use or sale therein) and entry 55 (taxes on
advertisements other than advertisements published in the	newspapers and advertisements broadcast by radio or	television) were omitted by the 101st Amendment Act of
2016.	19. See ‘Property of the Union’ in Chapter 67.	20. See ‘Property of the States’ in Chapter 67.
21. M.P. Jain: Indian Constitutional Law, Wadhwa, Fourth	Edition, PP. 342–43.	22. Article 279-A(1) says that the President shall, within sixty
days from the commencement of the Constitution (One	Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, by order,	constitute a Council to be called the Goods and Services
Tax Council.	23. This function was added by the 73rd and 74th Amendment	Acts of 1992 which have granted constitutional status on the
panchayats and the municipalities respectively.	24. In Re. Sea Customs Act (1963).	25. The other two members of the committee were Dr.

(f) The role, responsibility and jurisdiction of the Centre in

adopting approaches and policies based on positive

discrimination in favour of backward States.

(g) The impact of the recommendations made by the 8th to 12th

Finance Commissions on the fiscal relations between the

Centre and the States, especially the greater dependence of

the States on devolution of funds from the Centre.

(h) The need and relevance of separate taxes on the production

and on the sales of goods and services subsequent to the

introduction of Value Added Tax regime.

(i) The need for freeing inter-State trade in order to establish a

unified and integrated domestic market as also in the context

of the reluctance of State Governments to adopt the relevant

Sarkaria Commission’s recommendation in chapter XVIII of its

report.

(j) The need for setting up a Central Law Enforcement Agency

empowered to take up suo moto investigation of crimes

having inter-State and/ or international ramifications with

serious implications on national security.

(k) The feasibility of a supporting legislation under Article 355 for

the purpose of suo moto deployment of Central forces in the

States if and when the situation so demands.

The Commission submitted its report to the government in April

2010. In finalising the 1,456 page report, in seven volumes, the

Commission took extensive help from the Sarkaria Commission

report, the National Commission to Review the Working of the

Constitution (NCRWC) report and the Second Administrative Reforms

Commission report. However, in a number of areas, the Commission

report differed from the Sarkaria Commission recommendations.

After examining at length the issues raised in its Terms of

Reference and the related aspects in all their hues and shades, the

Commission came to the conclusion that ‘cooperative federalism’ will

be the key for sustaining India’s unity, integrity and social and

economic development in future. The principles of cooperative

federalism thus may have to act as a practical guide for Indian polity

and governance.

In all, the Commission made over 310 recommendations, touching

upon several significant areas in the working of Centre-state relations.

The important recommendations are mentioned below:

1. To facilitate effective implementation of the laws on List III

subjects, it is necessary that some broad agreement is reached

between the Union and states before introducing legislation in

Parliament on matters in the Concurrent List.

2. The Union should be extremely restrained in asserting

Parliamentary supremacy in matters assigned to the states.

Greater flexibility to states in relation to subjects in the State List

and “transferred items” in the Concurrent List is the key for better

Centre-state relations.

3. The Union should occupy only that many of subjects in

concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction which are absolutely

necessary to achieve uniformity of policy in demonstrable

national interest.

4. There should be a continuing auditing role for the Inter-state

Council in the management of matters in concurrent or

overlapping jurisdiction.

5. The period of six months prescribed in Article 201 for State

Legislature to act when the bill is returned by the President can

be made applicable for the President also to decide on assenting

or withholding assent to a state bill reserved for consideration of

the President.

6. Parliament should make a law on the subject of Entry 14 of List I

(treaty making and implementing it through Parliamentary

legislation) to streamline the procedures involved. The exercise

of the power obviously cannot be absolute or unchartered in

view of the federal structure of legislative and executive powers.

7. Financial obligations and its implications on state finances

arising out of treaties and agreements should be a permanent

term of reference to the Finance Commissions constituted from

time to time.

8. While selecting Governors, the Central Government should

adopt the following strict guidelines as recommended in the

Sarkaria Commission report and follow its mandate in letter and

spirit :

(i) He should be eminent in some walk of life

(ii) He should be a person from outside the state

(iv) He should be a person who has not taken too great a par

politics generally and particularly in the recent past

9. Governors should be given a fixed tenure of five years and their

removal should not be at the sweet will of the Government at the

Centre.

10. The procedure laid down for impeachment of President, mutatis

mutandis can be made applicable for impeachment of Governors

as well.

11. Article 163 does not give the Governor a general discretionary

power to act against or without the advice of his Council of

Ministers. In fact, the area for the exercise of discretion is limited

and even in this limited area, his choice of action should not be

arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice dictated by reason,

activated by good faith and tempered by caution.

12. In respect of bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of a state,

the Governor should take the decision within six months whether

to grant assent or to reserve it for consideration of the President.

13. On the question of Governor’s role in appointment of Chief

Minister in the case of an hung assembly, it is necessary to lay

down certain clear guidelines to be followed as Constitutional

conventions. These guidelines may be as follows:

(i) The party or combination of parties which commands the wid

support in the Legislative Assembly should be called upon to f

the Government.

(ii) If there is a pre-poll alliance or coalition, it should be treated

one political party and if such coalition obtains a majority,

leader of such coalition shall be called by the Governor to f

the Government.

(iii) In case no party or pre-poll coalition has a clear majority,

Governor should select the Chief Minister in the order

preference indicated here.

(a) The group of parties which had pre-poll alliance

commanding the largest number

(b) The largest single party staking a claim to form the

government with the support of others

(c) A post-electoral coalition with all partners joining the

government

(d) A post-electoral alliance with some parties joining the

government and the remaining including independents

14. On the question of dismissal of a Chief Minister, the Governor

should invariably insist on the Chief Minister proving his majority

on the floor of the House for which he should prescribe a time

limit.

15. The Governor should have the right to sanction for prosecution

of a state minister against the advice of the Council of Ministers,

if the Cabinet decision appears to the Governor to be motivated

by bias in the face of overwhelming material.

16. The convention of Governors acting as Chancellors of

Universities and holding other statutory positions should be done

away with. His role should be confined to the Constitutional

provisions only.

17. When an external aggression or internal disturbance paralyses

the state administration creating a situation of a potential break

down of the Constitutional machinery of the state, all alternative

courses available to the Union for discharging its paramount

responsibility under Article 355 should be exhausted to contain

the situation and the exercise of the power under Article 356

should be limited strictly to rectifying a “failure of the

Constitutional machinery in the state”.

18. On the question of invoking Article 356 in case of failure of

Constitutional machinery in states, suitable amendments are

required to incorporate the guidelines set forth in the landmark

judgement of the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai V. Union of

India (1994). This would remove possible misgivings in this

regard on the part of states and help in smoothening Centre-

state relations.

19. Given the strict parameters now set for invoking the emergency

provisions under Articles 352 and 356 to be used only as a

measure of “last resort”, and the duty of the Union to protect

states under Article 355, it is necessary to provide a

Constitutional or legal framework to deal with situations which

require Central intervention but do not warrant invoking the

extreme steps under Articles 352 and 356. Providing the

framework for “localised emergency” would ensure that the state

government can continue to function and the Assembly would

not have to be dissolved while providing a mechanism to let the

Central Government respond to the issue specifically and locally.

The imposition of local emergency is fully justified under the

20. Suitable amendments to Article 263 are required to make the

Inter-State Council a credible, powerful and fair mechanism for

management of interstate and Centre-state differences.

21. The Zonal Councils should meet at least twice a year with an

agenda proposed by states concerned to maximise co-ordination

and promote harmonisation of policies and action having inter-

state ramification. The Secretariat of a strengthened Inter-State

Council can function as the Secretariat of the Zonal Councils as

well.

22. The Empowered Committee of Finance Ministers of States

proved to be a successful experiment in inter-state coordination

on fiscal matters. There is need to institutionalise similar models

in other sectors as well. A forum of Chief Ministers, Chaired by

one of the Chief Minister by rotation can be similarly thought

about particularly to co-ordinate policies of sectors like energy,

food, education, environment and health.

23. New all-India services in sectors like health, education,

engineering and judiciary should be created.

24. Factors inhibiting the composition and functioning of the Second

Chamber as a representative forum of states should be removed

or modified even if it requires amendment of the Constitutional

provisions. In fact, Rajya Sabha offers immense potential to

negotiate acceptable solutions to the friction points which

emerge between Centre and states in fiscal, legislative and

administrative relations.

25. A balance of power between states inter se is desirable and this

is possible by equality of representation in the Rajya Sabha. This

requires amendment of the relevant provisions to give equality of

seats to states in the Rajya Sabha, irrespective of their

population size.

26. The scope of devolution of powers to local bodies to act as

institutions of self-government should be constitutionally defined

through appropriate amendments.

27. All future Central legislations involving states’ involvement

should provide for cost sharing as in the case of the RTE Act.

Existing Central legislations where the states are entrusted with

the responsibility of implementation should be suitably amended

providing for sharing of costs by the Central Government.

28. The royalty rates on major minerals should be revised at least

compensated for any delay in the revision of royalty beyond

three years.

29. The current ceiling on profession tax should be completely done

away with by a Constitutional amendment.

30. The scope for raising more revenue from the taxes mentioned in

article 268 should be examined afresh. This issue may be either

referred to the next Finance Commission or an expert committee

be appointed to look into the matter.

31. To bring greater accountability, all fiscal legislations should

provide for an annual assessment by an independent body and

the reports of these bodies should be laid in both Houses of

Parliament/state legislature.

32. Considerations specified in the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the

Finance Commission should be even handed as between the

Centre and the states. There should be an effective mechanism

to involve the states in the finalisation of the ToR of the Finance

Commissions.

33. The Central Government should review all the existing cesses

and surcharges with a view to bringing down their share in the

gross tax revenue.

34. Because of the close linkages between the plan and non-plan

expenditure, an expert committee may be appointed to look into

the issue of distinction between the plan and non-plan

expenditure.

35. There should be much better coordination between the Finance

Commission and the Planning Commission. The synchronisation

of the periods covered by the Finance Commission and the Five-

Year Plan will considerably improve such coordination.

36. The Finance Commission division in the Ministry of Finance

should be converted into a full-fledged department, serving as

the permanent secretariat for the Finance Commissions.

37. The Planning Commission has a crucial role in the current

situation. But its role should be that of coordination rather that of

micro managing sectoral plans of the Central ministries and the

states.

38. Steps should be taken for the setting up of an Inter-State Trade

and Commerce Commission under Article 307 read with Entry

42 of List-I. This Commission should be vested with both

advisory and executive roles with decision making powers. As a

party aggrieved with the decision of the Commission may prefer

an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Report of the Commission was circulated to all stakeholders

including State Governments / UT Administrations and Union

Ministries / Departments concerned for their considered views on the

recommendations of the Commission. The comments received from

the Union Ministries / Departments and the State Governments / UT

Administrations are under the consideration of the Inter-State

Council.28

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Even now, the last entry is numbered as 97 but the total

number of entries is 98. The entries numbered as 2A, 92A

and 92B have been added and entries 33, 92 and 92C have

been omitted. See Appendix II.

2. Even now, the last entry is numbered as 66 but the total

number of entries is 59. The entries numbered as 11, 19,

20, 29, 36, 52 and 55 have been omitted. See Appendix II.

3. Even now, the last entry is numbered as 47 but the total

number of entries is 52. The entries numbered as 11A, 17A,

17B, 20A and 33A have been added. See Appendix II.

3a. The provision for goods and services tax was added by the

101st Amendment Act of 2016.

3b. Ibid.

4. Report of the Commission on centre-state Relations, Part I

(Government of India, 1988) PP. 28–29.

5. For example, under the Essential Commodities Act, made

by the Parliament on a concurrent subject, the executive

power is vested in the Centre.

6. This provision (the power of the states to entrust functions

to the Centre) was added by the 7th Constitutional

Amendment Act of 1956. Before that, only the Centre had

the power.

7. For details in this regard, see Chapter 15.

8. Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume VII, PP. 41–42.

9. For details, see Chapter 54.

10. For details, see Chapter 78.

12. Entries–82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92A, 92B and

96. See Appendix II.

13. Entries–45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59,

60, 61, 62, 63, and 66. See Appendix II.

14. In this regard, the 101st Amendment Act of 2016 inserted

Article 246-A in the Constitution.

15. Originally, this limit was only ₹250 per annum. The 60th

Amendment Act of 1988 raised it to ₹2,500 per annum.

16. These provisions are contained in Article 286, as amended

by the 101st Amendment Act of 2016.

17. This amendment deleted Article 272 (Taxes which are

levied and collected by the Centre and may be distributed

between the Centre and the states).

18. Entry 52 (taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for

consumption, use or sale therein) and entry 55 (taxes on

advertisements other than advertisements published in the

newspapers and advertisements broadcast by radio or

television) were omitted by the 101st Amendment Act of

2016.

19. See ‘Property of the Union’ in Chapter 67.

20. See ‘Property of the States’ in Chapter 67.

21. M.P. Jain: Indian Constitutional Law, Wadhwa, Fourth

Edition, PP. 342–43.

22. Article 279-A(1) says that the President shall, within sixty

days from the commencement of the Constitution (One

Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, by order,

constitute a Council to be called the Goods and Services

Tax Council.

23. This function was added by the 73rd and 74th Amendment

Acts of 1992 which have granted constitutional status on the

panchayats and the municipalities respectively.

24. In Re. Sea Customs Act (1963).

25. The other two members of the committee were Dr.