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The dataset generation failed because of a cast error
Error code: DatasetGenerationCastError
Exception: DatasetGenerationCastError
Message: An error occurred while generating the dataset
All the data files must have the same columns, but at some point there are 1 missing columns ({'Unnamed: 0'})
This happened while the csv dataset builder was generating data using
hf://datasets/josedanielaromi/Arg1999/data1.csv (at revision 6d13a487155d61733a57a4bc61eeaa9eb56bd93f)
Please either edit the data files to have matching columns, or separate them into different configurations (see docs at https://hf.co/docs/hub/datasets-manual-configuration#multiple-configurations)
Traceback: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 2011, in _prepare_split_single
writer.write_table(table)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/arrow_writer.py", line 585, in write_table
pa_table = table_cast(pa_table, self._schema)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2302, in table_cast
return cast_table_to_schema(table, schema)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2256, in cast_table_to_schema
raise CastError(
datasets.table.CastError: Couldn't cast
text: string
-- schema metadata --
pandas: '{"index_columns": [{"kind": "range", "name": null, "start": 0, "' + 369
to
{'Unnamed: 0': Value(dtype='int64', id=None), 'text': Value(dtype='string', id=None)}
because column names don't match
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1321, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response
parquet_operations = convert_to_parquet(builder)
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 935, in convert_to_parquet
builder.download_and_prepare(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1027, in download_and_prepare
self._download_and_prepare(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1122, in _download_and_prepare
self._prepare_split(split_generator, **prepare_split_kwargs)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1882, in _prepare_split
for job_id, done, content in self._prepare_split_single(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 2013, in _prepare_split_single
raise DatasetGenerationCastError.from_cast_error(
datasets.exceptions.DatasetGenerationCastError: An error occurred while generating the dataset
All the data files must have the same columns, but at some point there are 1 missing columns ({'Unnamed: 0'})
This happened while the csv dataset builder was generating data using
hf://datasets/josedanielaromi/Arg1999/data1.csv (at revision 6d13a487155d61733a57a4bc61eeaa9eb56bd93f)
Please either edit the data files to have matching columns, or separate them into different configurations (see docs at https://hf.co/docs/hub/datasets-manual-configuration#multiple-configurations)Need help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
Unnamed: 0
int64 | text
string |
|---|---|
0 | <s>[INST] ___ Document 22 of 500 Let the Dollar Reign From Seattle to Santiago Author: By Robert J. [/INST] Barro Publication info: Wall Street Journal , Eastern edition [New York, N.Y] 08 Mar 1999: A18. http://search. proquest.com/docview/398654095? </s> |
1 | <s>[INST] accountid=28034 Abstract: President Carlos Menem of Argentina recently proposed that his country give serious consideration to full dollarization -- [/INST] the abandonment of its own currency, the peso, whose value is already fixed to the U.S. dollar. It's a good idea, not just for Argentina but for other countries in the Western Hemisphere. But the dollarization of the Americas won't happen without U.S. leadership. </s> |
2 | <s>[INST] It's a good idea, not just for Argentina but [/INST] for other countries in the Western Hemisphere. But the dollarization of the Americas won't happen without U.S. leadership. Argentina's disciplined monetary policy stands in stark contrast with that of some of its neighbors. </s> |
3 | <s>[INST] But the dollarization of the Americas [/INST] won't happen without U.S. leadership. Argentina's disciplined monetary policy stands in stark contrast with that of some of its neighbors. At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina enacted an array of economic reforms, including a currency-board type of monetary system. </s> |
4 | <s>[INST] Argentina's disciplined monetary policy stands in stark contrast [/INST] with that of some of its neighbors. At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina enacted an array of economic reforms, including a currency-board type of monetary system. This regime ensured a fixed exchange rate -- one peso to the dollar -- and thereby promoted stability in prices and interest rates. </s> |
5 | <s>[INST] At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina enacted an array of [/INST] economic reforms, including a currency-board type of monetary system. This regime ensured a fixed exchange rate -- one peso to the dollar -- and thereby promoted stability in prices and interest rates. Other Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, instituted some economic reforms but failed to make basic changes in monetary institutions. </s> |
6 | <s>[INST] This regime ensured a fixed exchange rate -- one peso to the [/INST] dollar -- and thereby promoted stability in prices and interest rates. Other Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, instituted some economic reforms but failed to make basic changes in monetary institutions. These countries adopted the worst-of-all-worlds system in which exchange rates neither float nor are genuinely fixed. </s> |
7 | <s>[INST] Other Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, instituted some economic [/INST] reforms but failed to make basic changes in monetary institutions. These countries adopted the worst-of-all-worlds system in which exchange rates neither float nor are genuinely fixed. Hence, they have suffered from volatility in exchange rates, inflation rates and interest rates. </s> |
8 | <s>[INST] These countries adopted the worst-of-all-worlds system in which exchange [/INST] rates neither float nor are genuinely fixed. Hence, they have suffered from volatility in exchange rates, inflation rates and interest rates. On some occasions, such as the Mexican debt crisis and devaluation of 1994-95 and the ongoing Brazilian fiscal crisis and devaluation, the financial markets have speculated that Argentina would deviate from its peg to the dollar. </s> |
9 | <s>[INST] Hence, they have suffered from volatility in exchange [/INST] rates, inflation rates and interest rates. On some occasions, such as the Mexican debt crisis and devaluation of 1994-95 and the ongoing Brazilian fiscal crisis and devaluation, the financial markets have speculated that Argentina would deviate from its peg to the dollar. Argentina has withstood these pressures in the past, notably in 1995. </s> |
10 | <s>[INST] On some occasions, such as the Mexican debt crisis and devaluation of 1994-95 and the ongoing Brazilian fiscal crisis [/INST] and devaluation, the financial markets have speculated that Argentina would deviate from its peg to the dollar. Argentina has withstood these pressures in the past, notably in 1995. But today's Brazilian situation is especially serious because Brazil is Argentina's largest trading partner. </s> |
11 | <s>[INST] Argentina has withstood these pressures in [/INST] the past, notably in 1995. But today's Brazilian situation is especially serious because Brazil is Argentina's largest trading partner. Argentina feels pressure to respond to Brazil's devaluation with a devaluation of its own. </s> |
12 | <s>[INST] But today's Brazilian situation is especially serious because [/INST] Brazil is Argentina's largest trading partner. Argentina feels pressure to respond to Brazil's devaluation with a devaluation of its own. Anticipation of a devaluation raises interest rates, because of increases in currency risk and in related default risk. </s> |
13 | <s>[INST] Argentina feels pressure to respond to Brazil's devaluation [/INST] with a devaluation of its own. Anticipation of a devaluation raises interest rates, because of increases in currency risk and in related default risk. Consequently, the economy tends to contract. </s> |
14 | <s>[INST] Anticipation of a devaluation raises interest rates, because of increases [/INST] in currency risk and in related default risk. Consequently, the economy tends to contract. Full text: President Carlos Menem of Argentina recently proposed that his country give serious consideration to full dollarization -- the abandonment of its own currency, the peso, whose value is already fixed to the U.S. dollar. </s> |
15 | <s>[INST] Full text: President Carlos Menem of Argentina recently proposed that his country give serious consideration to full dollarization -- [/INST] the abandonment of its own currency, the peso, whose value is already fixed to the U.S. dollar. It's a good idea, not just for Argentina but for other countries in the Western Hemisphere. But the dollarization of the Americas won't happen without U.S. leadership. </s> |
16 | <s>[INST] It's a good idea, not just for Argentina but [/INST] for other countries in the Western Hemisphere. But the dollarization of the Americas won't happen without U.S. leadership. Argentina's disciplined monetary policy stands in stark contrast with that of some of its neighbors. </s> |
17 | <s>[INST] But the dollarization of the Americas [/INST] won't happen without U.S. leadership. Argentina's disciplined monetary policy stands in stark contrast with that of some of its neighbors. At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina enacted an array of economic reforms, including a currency-board type of monetary system. </s> |
18 | <s>[INST] Argentina's disciplined monetary policy stands in stark contrast [/INST] with that of some of its neighbors. At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina enacted an array of economic reforms, including a currency-board type of monetary system. This regime ensured a fixed exchange rate -- one peso to the dollar -- and thereby promoted stability in prices and interest rates. </s> |
19 | <s>[INST] At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina enacted an array of [/INST] economic reforms, including a currency-board type of monetary system. This regime ensured a fixed exchange rate -- one peso to the dollar -- and thereby promoted stability in prices and interest rates. Other Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, instituted some economic reforms but failed to make basic changes in monetary institutions. </s> |
20 | <s>[INST] This regime ensured a fixed exchange rate -- one peso to the [/INST] dollar -- and thereby promoted stability in prices and interest rates. Other Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, instituted some economic reforms but failed to make basic changes in monetary institutions. These countries adopted the worst-of-all-worlds system in which exchange rates neither float nor are genuinely fixed. </s> |
21 | <s>[INST] Other Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, instituted some economic [/INST] reforms but failed to make basic changes in monetary institutions. These countries adopted the worst-of-all-worlds system in which exchange rates neither float nor are genuinely fixed. Hence, they have suffered from volatility in exchange rates, inflation rates and interest rates. </s> |
22 | <s>[INST] These countries adopted the worst-of-all-worlds system in which exchange [/INST] rates neither float nor are genuinely fixed. Hence, they have suffered from volatility in exchange rates, inflation rates and interest rates. On some occasions, such as the Mexican debt crisis and devaluation of 1994-95 and the ongoing Brazilian fiscal crisis and devaluation, the financial markets have speculated that Argentina would deviate from its peg to the dollar. </s> |
23 | <s>[INST] Hence, they have suffered from volatility in exchange [/INST] rates, inflation rates and interest rates. On some occasions, such as the Mexican debt crisis and devaluation of 1994-95 and the ongoing Brazilian fiscal crisis and devaluation, the financial markets have speculated that Argentina would deviate from its peg to the dollar. Argentina has withstood these pressures in the past, notably in 1995. </s> |
24 | <s>[INST] On some occasions, such as the Mexican debt crisis and devaluation of 1994-95 and the ongoing Brazilian fiscal crisis [/INST] and devaluation, the financial markets have speculated that Argentina would deviate from its peg to the dollar. Argentina has withstood these pressures in the past, notably in 1995. But today's Brazilian situation is especially serious because Brazil is Argentina's largest trading partner. </s> |
25 | <s>[INST] Argentina has withstood these pressures in [/INST] the past, notably in 1995. But today's Brazilian situation is especially serious because Brazil is Argentina's largest trading partner. Argentina feels pressure to respond to Brazil's devaluation with a devaluation of its own. </s> |
26 | <s>[INST] But today's Brazilian situation is especially serious because [/INST] Brazil is Argentina's largest trading partner. Argentina feels pressure to respond to Brazil's devaluation with a devaluation of its own. Anticipation of a devaluation raises interest rates, because of increases in currency risk and in related default risk. </s> |
27 | <s>[INST] Argentina feels pressure to respond to Brazil's devaluation [/INST] with a devaluation of its own. Anticipation of a devaluation raises interest rates, because of increases in currency risk and in related default risk. Consequently, the economy tends to contract. </s> |
28 | <s>[INST] Anticipation of a devaluation raises interest rates, because of increases [/INST] in currency risk and in related default risk. Consequently, the economy tends to contract. It was to counter this speculation and to reaffirm the commitment to a fixed exchange rate that Mr. Menem floated the idea of full dollarization. </s> |
29 | <s>[INST] It was to counter this speculation and to reaffirm the commitment to a [/INST] fixed exchange rate that Mr. Menem floated the idea of full dollarization. Since much of Argentina's financial system already operates in terms of the dollar, the main change would be a switch of the hand-to-hand currency from pesos to dollars. Then, as in Panama, it would be virtually impossible for the government to devalue -- in effect, there would be no peso assets whose value could be reset in terms of the dollar. </s> |
30 | <s>[INST] Since much of Argentina's financial system already operates in terms of the dollar, the main [/INST] change would be a switch of the hand-to-hand currency from pesos to dollars. Then, as in Panama, it would be virtually impossible for the government to devalue -- in effect, there would be no peso assets whose value could be reset in terms of the dollar. Thus the financial markets would have no currency risk on which to speculate. </s> |
31 | <s>[INST] Then, as in Panama, it would be virtually impossible for the government to devalue -- in effect, [/INST] there would be no peso assets whose value could be reset in terms of the dollar. Thus the financial markets would have no currency risk on which to speculate. In Argentina, the currency board has become highly popular, and a further move toward dollarization might also be popular. </s> |
32 | <s>[INST] Thus the financial markets would have no [/INST] currency risk on which to speculate. In Argentina, the currency board has become highly popular, and a further move toward dollarization might also be popular. Nevertheless, a proposal to dollarize involves political peril. </s> |
33 | <s>[INST] In Argentina, the currency board has become highly popular, and [/INST] a further move toward dollarization might also be popular. Nevertheless, a proposal to dollarize involves political peril. For one thing, Argentina's presidential election this fall makes it difficult for the opposing political parties to agree on a major change in the monetary regime. </s> |
34 | <s>[INST] For one thing, Argentina's presidential election this fall makes it difficult for the opposing [/INST] political parties to agree on a major change in the monetary regime. Domingo Cavallo, the principal architect of the Argentine economic miracle, opposes a move soon toward dollarization. One concern is that a proposal for a modified monetary regime might foster the idea that the existing fixed-exchange-rate system is fragile. </s> |
35 | <s>[INST] Domingo Cavallo, the principal architect of the Argentine economic [/INST] miracle, opposes a move soon toward dollarization. One concern is that a proposal for a modified monetary regime might foster the idea that the existing fixed-exchange-rate system is fragile. This uncertainty would be especially costly when the economic crisis in Brazil threatens to diminish Argentina's exports. </s> |
36 | <s>[INST] One concern is that a proposal for a modified monetary regime might [/INST] foster the idea that the existing fixed-exchange-rate system is fragile. This uncertainty would be especially costly when the economic crisis in Brazil threatens to diminish Argentina's exports. Another issue is the income (known as seigniorage) that the Argentine central bank receives from earnings on its interest-bearing reserves, principally in the form of U.S. government securities. </s> |
37 | <s>[INST] This uncertainty would be especially costly when the economic [/INST] crisis in Brazil threatens to diminish Argentina's exports. Another issue is the income (known as seigniorage) that the Argentine central bank receives from earnings on its interest-bearing reserves, principally in the form of U.S. government securities. The bank would have to use about $16 billion of its reserves to provide for a circulating stock of U.S. dollar bills. </s> |
38 | <s>[INST] Another issue is the income (known as seigniorage) that the Argentine central bank receives from [/INST] earnings on its interest-bearing reserves, principally in the form of U.S. government securities. The bank would have to use about $16 billion of its reserves to provide for a circulating stock of U.S. dollar bills. This reduction in reserves means that the bank would lose roughly $750 million in annual interest income. </s> |
39 | <s>[INST] The bank would have to use about $16 billion of its reserves [/INST] to provide for a circulating stock of U.S. dollar bills. This reduction in reserves means that the bank would lose roughly $750 million in annual interest income. Because of these concerns, dollarization will likely not happen in Argentina unless the initiative comes from the U.S. </s> |
40 | <s>[INST] This reduction in reserves means that the bank would [/INST] lose roughly $750 million in annual interest income. Because of these concerns, dollarization will likely not happen in Argentina unless the initiative comes from the U.S. But the situation is actually an opportunity for the U.S. to promote a dollar zone throughout the Americas by using Argentina as its first client. </s> |
41 | <s>[INST] Because of these concerns, dollarization will likely not happen in [/INST] Argentina unless the initiative comes from the U.S. But the situation is actually an opportunity for the U.S. to promote a dollar zone throughout the Americas by using Argentina as its first client. Such a move would not eliminate all potential economic problems in the region. </s> |
42 | <s>[INST] But the situation is actually an opportunity for the U.S. to promote a [/INST] dollar zone throughout the Americas by using Argentina as its first client. Such a move would not eliminate all potential economic problems in the region. But a stable monetary system removes some sources of difficulty, notably those that involve currency speculation, which tends to generate volatility in interest rates and inflation. </s> |
43 | <s>[INST] Such a move would not eliminate all [/INST] potential economic problems in the region. But a stable monetary system removes some sources of difficulty, notably those that involve currency speculation, which tends to generate volatility in interest rates and inflation. The benefits would be even greater if the system were extended from Argentina to less reliable countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. </s> |
44 | <s>[INST] But a stable monetary system removes some sources of difficulty, notably those that involve [/INST] currency speculation, which tends to generate volatility in interest rates and inflation. The benefits would be even greater if the system were extended from Argentina to less reliable countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Eventually, the monetary union could even encourage extensions of the North American Free Trade Agreement throughout the Americas. </s> |
45 | <s>[INST] The benefits would be even greater if the system were extended from [/INST] Argentina to less reliable countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Eventually, the monetary union could even encourage extensions of the North American Free Trade Agreement throughout the Americas. Nafta could become AFTA. </s> |
46 | <s>[INST] Eventually, the monetary union could even encourage extensions of the [/INST] North American Free Trade Agreement throughout the Americas. Nafta could become AFTA. There are several ways in which the U.S. could compensate joiners of the dollar zone for the lost seigniorage. </s> |
47 | <s>[INST] There are several ways in which the U.S. could compensate [/INST] joiners of the dollar zone for the lost seigniorage. It could provide transfer payments each year to make up for the central bank's lost interest revenue. A simpler method, which does not require payments each year, would be to provide a one-time allotment of U.S. dollar bills. </s> |
48 | <s>[INST] It could provide transfer payments each year to make [/INST] up for the central bank's lost interest revenue. A simpler method, which does not require payments each year, would be to provide a one-time allotment of U.S. dollar bills. For Argentina, this could be accomplished by giving the Argentine central bank $16 billion in newly issued U.S. currency. </s> |
49 | <s>[INST] A simpler method, which does not require payments each year, would [/INST] be to provide a one-time allotment of U.S. dollar bills. For Argentina, this could be accomplished by giving the Argentine central bank $16 billion in newly issued U.S. currency. The Federal Reserve could, for example, exchange this currency for 16 billion non-interest-bearing Argentine pesos, which the Fed would then hold as a form of collateral. </s> |
50 | <s>[INST] For Argentina, this could be accomplished by giving the Argentine [/INST] central bank $16 billion in newly issued U.S. currency. The Federal Reserve could, for example, exchange this currency for 16 billion non-interest-bearing Argentine pesos, which the Fed would then hold as a form of collateral. The deal is that Argentina would remain on the dollar standard, or else the peso notes would become redeemable one-to-one for U.S. dollars. </s> |
51 | <s>[INST] The Federal Reserve could, for example, exchange this currency for 16 billion non-interest-bearing Argentine [/INST] pesos, which the Fed would then hold as a form of collateral. The deal is that Argentina would remain on the dollar standard, or else the peso notes would become redeemable one-to-one for U.S. dollars. This arrangement would cost the U.S. nothing, aside from paper and printing. </s> |
52 | <s>[INST] The deal is that Argentina would remain on the dollar standard, or [/INST] else the peso notes would become redeemable one-to-one for U.S. dollars. This arrangement would cost the U.S. nothing, aside from paper and printing. Moreover, the Fed would enjoy substantial seigniorage income because economic growth in client countries would lead to expansions of desired holdings of U.S. currency. </s> |
53 | <s>[INST] This arrangement would cost the U.S. nothing, [/INST] aside from paper and printing. Moreover, the Fed would enjoy substantial seigniorage income because economic growth in client countries would lead to expansions of desired holdings of U.S. currency. A rough estimate is that the overall value of this flow equals the initial stock of currency -- $16 billion in the case of Argentina and much more if the dollar zone were spread throughout the Americas. </s> |
54 | <s>[INST] Moreover, the Fed would enjoy substantial seigniorage income because economic growth in client [/INST] countries would lead to expansions of desired holdings of U.S. currency. A rough estimate is that the overall value of this flow equals the initial stock of currency -- $16 billion in the case of Argentina and much more if the dollar zone were spread throughout the Americas. More important than the seigniorage revenue would be the U.S. role in promoting economic stability in North and South America. </s> |
55 | <s>[INST] A rough estimate is that the overall value of this flow equals the initial stock of currency -- $16 [/INST] billion in the case of Argentina and much more if the dollar zone were spread throughout the Americas. More important than the seigniorage revenue would be the U.S. role in promoting economic stability in North and South America. To some extent, the dollar zone would parallel and compete with the recently established euro area. </s> |
56 | <s>[INST] More important than the seigniorage revenue would be the U.S. role [/INST] in promoting economic stability in North and South America. To some extent, the dollar zone would parallel and compete with the recently established euro area. In fact, if the U.S. does not create a dollar zone, some Latin American countries might defect to the euro. </s> |
57 | <s>[INST] To some extent, the dollar zone would parallel and [/INST] compete with the recently established euro area. In fact, if the U.S. does not create a dollar zone, some Latin American countries might defect to the euro. One difference from the euro arrangement, which was roughly a merger of equals, is that the U.S. would be the clear leader of the new zone. </s> |
58 | <s>[INST] In fact, if the U.S. does not create a dollar zone, [/INST] some Latin American countries might defect to the euro. One difference from the euro arrangement, which was roughly a merger of equals, is that the U.S. would be the clear leader of the new zone. The currency ought still to be called the dollar, rather than, say, the america. </s> |
59 | <s>[INST] One difference from the euro arrangement, which was roughly a merger of equals, is [/INST] that the U.S. would be the clear leader of the new zone. The currency ought still to be called the dollar, rather than, say, the america. Also, one concern about the European common currency was that it would encourage the spread of antimarket economic and social policies, especially to Britain. </s> |
60 | <s>[INST] The currency ought still to be called the [/INST] dollar, rather than, say, the america. Also, one concern about the European common currency was that it would encourage the spread of antimarket economic and social policies, especially to Britain. The spread of U.S. policies to the rest of the Americas would likely be a plus. </s> |
61 | <s>[INST] Also, one concern about the European common currency was that it would encourage [/INST] the spread of antimarket economic and social policies, especially to Britain. The spread of U.S. policies to the rest of the Americas would likely be a plus. Another issue is whether the U.S. would become the lender of last resort for its dollar-zone clients. </s> |
62 | <s>[INST] The spread of U.S. policies to the rest of [/INST] the Americas would likely be a plus. Another issue is whether the U.S. would become the lender of last resort for its dollar-zone clients. A country's use of the dollar would eliminate part of this problem by removing some sources of economic crisis, namely those that relate to actual and potential devaluations of the currency. </s> |
63 | <s>[INST] Another issue is whether the U.S. would become the [/INST] lender of last resort for its dollar-zone clients. A country's use of the dollar would eliminate part of this problem by removing some sources of economic crisis, namely those that relate to actual and potential devaluations of the currency. But possibilities would remain for defaults by banks or governments. </s> |
64 | <s>[INST] A country's use of the dollar would eliminate part of this problem by removing some sources [/INST] of economic crisis, namely those that relate to actual and potential devaluations of the currency. But possibilities would remain for defaults by banks or governments. The main consequence of a dollarization here is that it would eliminate the potential for a country to deal with problems by devaluing, that is, by engineering a partial and perhaps concealed default on domestically denominated debts of government or banks. </s> |
65 | <s>[INST] The main consequence of a dollarization here is that it would eliminate the potential for a country to deal with problems [/INST] by devaluing, that is, by engineering a partial and perhaps concealed default on domestically denominated debts of government or banks. Defaults would have to be explicit, but there is no reason to think that open default is worse than hidden default. It may be desirable for the U.S. to provide a specified line of credit to countries that are members of the dollar zone. </s> |
66 | <s>[INST] Defaults would have to be explicit, but there is no reason [/INST] to think that open default is worse than hidden default. It may be desirable for the U.S. to provide a specified line of credit to countries that are members of the dollar zone. This borrowing potential is not so different from the one that applies less systematically at present. </s> |
67 | <s>[INST] It may be desirable for the U.S. to provide a specified line [/INST] of credit to countries that are members of the dollar zone. This borrowing potential is not so different from the one that applies less systematically at present. For example, the U.S. and international organizations provided substantial funds to Mexico in 1995, smaller sums to Argentina in 1995, and large amounts to Brazil recently. </s> |
68 | <s>[INST] This borrowing potential is not so different from the [/INST] one that applies less systematically at present. For example, the U.S. and international organizations provided substantial funds to Mexico in 1995, smaller sums to Argentina in 1995, and large amounts to Brazil recently. In recent years, the U.S. has dealt with international financial crises in a reactive and ad hoc manner, its Treasury responding to crises with bailouts. </s> |
69 | <s>[INST] For example, the U.S. and international organizations provided substantial funds to Mexico in 1995, [/INST] smaller sums to Argentina in 1995, and large amounts to Brazil recently. In recent years, the U.S. has dealt with international financial crises in a reactive and ad hoc manner, its Treasury responding to crises with bailouts. More constructive, perhaps, have been the policy recommendations and conditionality that accompanied these bailouts. </s> |
70 | <s>[INST] In recent years, the U.S. has dealt with international financial crises in a [/INST] reactive and ad hoc manner, its Treasury responding to crises with bailouts. More constructive, perhaps, have been the policy recommendations and conditionality that accompanied these bailouts. But it would be better if these countries made basic changes in monetary institutions to avert crises in the first place. </s> |
71 | <s>[INST] More constructive, perhaps, have been the policy recommendations [/INST] and conditionality that accompanied these bailouts. But it would be better if these countries made basic changes in monetary institutions to avert crises in the first place. Dollarization in the Americas is one such change. </s> |
72 | <s>[INST] But it would be better if these countries made basic changes [/INST] in monetary institutions to avert crises in the first place. Dollarization in the Americas is one such change. Washington ought to take the lead in promoting this monetary integration. </s> |
73 | <s>[INST] Washington ought to take the lead [/INST] in promoting this monetary integration. For the Clinton administration, the improvement in international economic policies would build on the impressive economic record at home. Hence, it is an opportunity for the president to leave a great overall economic legacy. </s> |
74 | <s>[INST] For the Clinton administration, the improvement in international economic policies [/INST] would build on the impressive economic record at home. Hence, it is an opportunity for the president to leave a great overall economic legacy. --- Mr. Barro is a professor of economics at Harvard University and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution. </s> |
75 | <s>[INST] ___ Document 52 of 500 The Americas: How to Make the Dollar Argentina's Currency Author: By Steve H. [/INST] Hanke Publication info: Wall Street Journal , Eastern edition [New York, N.Y] 19 Feb 1999: A19. http://search. proquest.com/docview/398702848? </s> |
76 | <s>[INST] accountid=28034 Abstract: The linchpin for Argentina's economic reforms has been its [/INST] currency board-like system, which was instituted on April 1, 1991. But even though the peso-dollar exchange rate has remained fixed at 1-to-1, there has often been speculation that the peso will be devalued. Consequently, there is still an interest rate spread between Argentine loans in pesos and dollars. </s> |
77 | <s>[INST] But even though the peso-dollar exchange rate has remained fixed at 1-to-1, [/INST] there has often been speculation that the peso will be devalued. Consequently, there is still an interest rate spread between Argentine loans in pesos and dollars. During the past year the spread on 30-day loans varied between 50 and 440 basis points. </s> |
78 | <s>[INST] Consequently, there is still an interest rate spread [/INST] between Argentine loans in pesos and dollars. During the past year the spread on 30-day loans varied between 50 and 440 basis points. To make Argentina's currency unification with the dollar perfect, Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem has suggested replacing the peso with the dollar. </s> |
79 | <s>[INST] During the past year the spread on 30-day loans [/INST] varied between 50 and 440 basis points. To make Argentina's currency unification with the dollar perfect, Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem has suggested replacing the peso with the dollar. This official dollarization would eliminate the peso-dollar interest rate spreads. </s> |
80 | <s>[INST] To make Argentina's currency unification with the dollar perfect, Argentine President Carlos [/INST] Saul Menem has suggested replacing the peso with the dollar. This official dollarization would eliminate the peso-dollar interest rate spreads. Lower interest rates could add as much as two percentage points to Argentina's rate of growth and make it much less variable. </s> |
81 | <s>[INST] Lower interest rates could add as much as two percentage points to [/INST] Argentina's rate of growth and make it much less variable. Even if sharing seigniorage -- what a central bank earns by issuing its own currency -- with the U.S. could not be negotiated, the cost of forfeiting peso seigniorage (. 2% to . </s> |
82 | <s>[INST] Even if sharing seigniorage -- what a central bank earns by issuing its own currency -- [/INST] with the U.S. could not be negotiated, the cost of forfeiting peso seigniorage (. 2% to . 25% of gross domestic product) would be much smaller than the gains from eliminating currency risk, reducing interest rates, and stimulating higher economic growth. </s> |
83 | <s>[INST] 25% of gross domestic product) would be much smaller than the gains from [/INST] eliminating currency risk, reducing interest rates, and stimulating higher economic growth. Dollarization is desirable. But what form should it take? </s> |
84 | <s>[INST] The government of Argentina is considering at least two possibilities: unilateral dollarization, which can occur without a treaty with the U.S., and a limited treaty under which Argentina might regain [/INST] some of the seigniorage it would lose from dollarization and gain access for Argentine banks to the discount window of the Federal Reserve System as a source of liquidity. Full text: The linchpin for Argentina's economic reforms has been its currency board-like system, which was instituted on April 1, 1991. But even though the peso-dollar exchange rate has remained fixed at 1-to-1, there has often been speculation that the peso will be devalued. </s> |
85 | <s>[INST] Full text: The linchpin for Argentina's economic reforms has been its [/INST] currency board-like system, which was instituted on April 1, 1991. But even though the peso-dollar exchange rate has remained fixed at 1-to-1, there has often been speculation that the peso will be devalued. Consequently, there is still an interest rate spread between Argentine loans in pesos and dollars. </s> |
86 | <s>[INST] But even though the peso-dollar exchange rate has remained fixed at 1-to-1, [/INST] there has often been speculation that the peso will be devalued. Consequently, there is still an interest rate spread between Argentine loans in pesos and dollars. During the past year the spread on 30-day loans varied between 50 and 440 basis points. </s> |
87 | <s>[INST] Consequently, there is still an interest rate spread [/INST] between Argentine loans in pesos and dollars. During the past year the spread on 30-day loans varied between 50 and 440 basis points. To make Argentina's currency unification with the dollar perfect, Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem has suggested replacing the peso with the dollar. </s> |
88 | <s>[INST] During the past year the spread on 30-day loans [/INST] varied between 50 and 440 basis points. To make Argentina's currency unification with the dollar perfect, Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem has suggested replacing the peso with the dollar. This official dollarization would eliminate the peso-dollar interest rate spreads. </s> |
89 | <s>[INST] To make Argentina's currency unification with the dollar perfect, Argentine President Carlos [/INST] Saul Menem has suggested replacing the peso with the dollar. This official dollarization would eliminate the peso-dollar interest rate spreads. Lower interest rates could add as much as two percentage points to Argentina's rate of growth and make it much less variable. </s> |
90 | <s>[INST] Lower interest rates could add as much as two percentage points to [/INST] Argentina's rate of growth and make it much less variable. Even if sharing seigniorage -- what a central bank earns by issuing its own currency -- with the U.S. could not be negotiated, the cost of forfeiting peso seigniorage (. 2% to . </s> |
91 | <s>[INST] Even if sharing seigniorage -- what a central bank earns by issuing its own currency -- [/INST] with the U.S. could not be negotiated, the cost of forfeiting peso seigniorage (. 2% to . 25% of gross domestic product) would be much smaller than the gains from eliminating currency risk, reducing interest rates, and stimulating higher economic growth. </s> |
92 | <s>[INST] 25% of gross domestic product) would be much smaller than the gains from [/INST] eliminating currency risk, reducing interest rates, and stimulating higher economic growth. Dollarization is desirable. But what form should it take? </s> |
93 | <s>[INST] The government of Argentina is considering at least two possibilities: unilateral dollarization, which can occur without a treaty with the U.S., and a limited treaty under which Argentina might regain [/INST] some of the seigniorage it would lose from dollarization and gain access for Argentine banks to the discount window of the Federal Reserve System as a source of liquidity. My own preference is for unilateral dollarization, now rather than later. It would bring down interest rates quickly and does not require the approval of the U.S. government or the involvement of the Fed. </s> |
94 | <s>[INST] My own preference is for unilateral [/INST] dollarization, now rather than later. It would bring down interest rates quickly and does not require the approval of the U.S. government or the involvement of the Fed. Argentina would need about $15 billion to replace the peso monetary base with dollars -- that is, to trade every one of Argentina's pesos for dollars. </s> |
95 | <s>[INST] It would bring down interest rates quickly and does not require the [/INST] approval of the U.S. government or the involvement of the Fed. Argentina would need about $15 billion to replace the peso monetary base with dollars -- that is, to trade every one of Argentina's pesos for dollars. This swap of currencies would be feasible because, in consequence of the Convertibility Law, the central bank's liquid reserves are about $24 billion. </s> |
96 | <s>[INST] Argentina would need about $15 billion to replace the peso monetary base with dollars [/INST] -- that is, to trade every one of Argentina's pesos for dollars. This swap of currencies would be feasible because, in consequence of the Convertibility Law, the central bank's liquid reserves are about $24 billion. The second possibility, a limited treaty with the U.S. that would allow Argentine banks to have access to the Federal Reserve's discount window would be far from optimal. </s> |
97 | <s>[INST] This swap of currencies would be feasible because, in consequence of the [/INST] Convertibility Law, the central bank's liquid reserves are about $24 billion. The second possibility, a limited treaty with the U.S. that would allow Argentine banks to have access to the Federal Reserve's discount window would be far from optimal. One reason is that, contrary to what most economists think, it is undesirable to have a central bank as a lender of last resort. </s> |
98 | <s>[INST] The second possibility, a limited treaty with the U.S. that would allow Argentine banks to [/INST] have access to the Federal Reserve's discount window would be far from optimal. One reason is that, contrary to what most economists think, it is undesirable to have a central bank as a lender of last resort. All the most expensive rescues of banking systems have occurred under central banking. </s> |
99 | <s>[INST] One reason is that, contrary to what most economists think, it is undesirable [/INST] to have a central bank as a lender of last resort. All the most expensive rescues of banking systems have occurred under central banking. Argentina, in fact, holds the record for the most expensive bank rescue in proportion to the size of its economy: the banking crisis of 1980-82 cost 55% of GDP. </s> |
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