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crs_R43510 | crs_R43510_0 | Introduction
This report briefly summarizes and discusses the economic impact of selected business-related tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2014 and were extended or made permanent by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), signed into law on December 18, 2015. Provisions not made permanent would expire at the end of 2016 or the end of 2019. In the past, these provisions have been extended one, or in some cases two, years in each piece of legislation. The Senate Finance Committee had earlier reported legislation, the Tax Relief Extension Act of 2015 ( S. 1946 ), that would have retroactively extended expired tax provisions, for two years, through 2016. This report discusses provisions that include several employer-related benefits, international provisions that provide exceptions to the Subpart F rules, special cost recovery provisions, provisions related to regulated investment companies (RICs), and several other business-related provisions. Note that bonus depreciation, which allows a deduction of 50% of equipment investment, would be reduced to 40% in 2018 and 30% in 2019, before expiring. Specifically, H.R. 961 would have permanently extended the Subpart F exemption for active financing income and H.R. H.R. Specifically, the provisions addressed in the President's FY2016 budget include (1) the increased expensing for certain businesses under Section 179; (2) the 100% exclusion for qualified small business stock; (3) the research and experimentation (R&E) tax credit; and (4) certain employment-related credits (the Work Opportunity Tax Credit [WOTC] and the Indian employment credit). This report does not include provisions that in the past have been classified as charitable, community development, individual, or housing-related provisions. These provisions are included in the following CRS reports:
CRS Report R43517, Recently Expired Charitable Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43541, Recently Expired Community Assistance-Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43688, Selected Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R43449, Recently Expired Housing Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]. Look-Through Treatment of Payments between Related Controlled Foreign Corporations under the Foreign Personal Holding Company Rules15
Unless an exception applies, Subpart F income includes dividends, interest, rent, and royalty payments between related firms. Increase in Expensing to $500,000/$2,000,000 and Expansion of Definition of Section 179 Property23
This provision allows firms to expense (deduct immediately), with dollar limits, the cost of investment in equipment. 108-357 ) included special rules to allow expensing for certain film and television production costs. Three-Year Depreciation for Race Horses Two Years or Younger28
The cost recovery period for horses is seven years, although race horses that begin training after age two have a three-year recovery period. Accelerated Depreciation for Business Property on an Indian Reservation 31
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ( P.L. Credit for Certain Expenditures for Maintaining Railroad Tracks36
Qualified railroad track maintenance expenditures paid or incurred in a taxable year by eligible taxpayers qualify for a 50% business tax credit. Temporary Increase in Limit on Cover Over of Rum Excise Tax Revenues to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands41
Most federal excise taxes do not apply in the United States Virgin Islands (USVI) and Puerto Rico (PR) or the other possessions. Deduction Allowable with Respect to Income Attributable to Domestic Production Activities in Puerto Rico43
The Section 199 domestic production activities deduction reduces tax rates on certain types of economic activity, primarily domestic manufacturing activities. | The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-113), signed into law on December 18, 2015, made permanent, extended through 2019, or extended through 2016 some tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2014. Previous legislation had extended these provisions for a year (or in some cases two years) at a time. Several bills had been considered in the 114th Congress to make some provisions permanent, including the R&E tax credit (H.R. 880), expensing of investments (H.R. 636, S. 1399), and treatment of built-in gains for Subchapter S corporations (H.R. 636). The Senate Finance Committee had earlier reported legislation, the Tax Relief Extension Act of 2015 (S. 1946), that would retroactively extend expired tax provisions, for two years, through 2016.
This report briefly summarizes and discusses the economic impact of selected business-related tax provisions that expired at the end of 2014. The list below indicates whether a provision was made permanent or extended through either 2016 or 2019. This report discusses
Provisions that include three employer-related benefits:
Work Opportunity Tax Credit (2019) Indian Employment Tax Credit (2016) Employer Wage Credit for Activated Military Reservists (permanent)
Two international provisions that provide exceptions from the Subpart F rules:
Look-Through Treatment of Payments between Related Controlled Foreign Corporations under the Foreign Personal Holding Company Rules (2019) Exceptions under Subpart F for Active Financing Income (permanent)
Seven special business cost recovery provisions:
Bonus Depreciation (2019, phased down from the current 50% share through 2017 to 40% in 2018 and 30% in 2019) Increase in Expensing to $500,000/$2,000,000 and Expansion of Definition of Section 179 Property (permanent) Special Expensing Rules for Certain Film and Television Productions (2016) 15-Year Straight-Line Depreciation Provisions (permanent) 7-Year Recovery Period for Motorsports Entertainment Complexes (2016) 3-Year Depreciation for Race Horses Two Years Old or Younger (2016) Accelerated Depreciation for Business Property on an Indian Reservation (2016)
Two provisions related to regulated investment companies (RICs):
Treatment of Certain Dividends of RICs (permanent) RIC Qualified Investment Entity Treatment under the Foreign Investment in Real Property Act (FIRPTA) (permanent, a separate provision expands this exemption for Real Estate Investment Trusts)
Eight other business-related provisions:
Tax Credit for Research and Experimentation Expenses (permanent) Credit for Certain Expenditures for Maintaining Railroad Tracks (2016) Reduction in S-Corporation Recognition Period for Built-In Gains (permanent) Election to Accelerate AMT Credits in Lieu of Additional First-Year Depreciation (2019) Temporary Increase in Limit on Cover Over of Rum Excise Tax Revenues to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands (2016) 100% Exclusion for Qualified Small Business Stock (permanent) Deduction Allowable with Respect to Income Attributable to Domestic Production Activities in Puerto Rico (2016) Modification of Tax Treatment of Certain Payments to Controlling Exempt Organizations (permanent)
This report does not include provisions that in the past have been classified as charitable, community development, individual, or housing-related provisions. These provisions are included in the following CRS reports:
CRS Report R43517, Recently Expired Charitable Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43541, Recently Expired Community Assistance-Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43688, Selected Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43449, Recently Expired Housing Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed] |
crs_RS22959 | crs_RS22959_0 | The Enactment of FIRREA and the Beginnings of the RTC
To help remedy the thrift industry's problems and restore the public's flagging confidence, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA, P.L. 101-73 ). The vehicle created by FIRREA to conduct the cleanup was the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Principal funding for the RTC came from an off-budget entity, the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP), a FIRREA-created public-private partnership, which was apart from but was operated by the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System, a federal entity that supplies credit reserves to thrift institutions (similar to what the Federal Reserve does for commercial banks). Subsequent legislation increased RTC's funding, which would eventually total about $105.1 billion. While the strategy employed a number of different structures, all of the equity partnerships involved a private sector partner acquiring a partial interest in a pool of assets, controlling the management and sale of the assets in the pool, and making distributions to the RTC based on the RTC's retained equity interest. Initially, the CMBS were reportedly difficult to sell due in part to the fact that the huge losses that had occurred in the value of commercial mortgages was a major factor in the thrifts' troubles. It was also responsible for selling more than $450 billion of their real estate and disposing of 95% of their overall assets with a recovery rate of more than 85%. | In a 1989 legislative response to financial troubles in the thrift industry, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA, P.L. 101-73) was enacted: FIRREA's principal mission was to conduct a partially tax-payer funded program to address the troubles of the nation's many insolvent thrifts. To do so, it established a new entity, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), whose mission was to address troubled thrifts by arranging their sale to other institutions or shuttering them and disposing of their assets. The RTC would eventually obtain $105 billion in funding but a major part of its principal funding came from an off-budget entity, the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP). REFCORP was created by FIRREA as a public-private partnership, which acquired the funds that it would provide to the RTC through proceeds from its sale of U.S. Treasury bonds. During its years of operation, 1989 to 1995, the RTC was alternately criticized for dumping thrift assets and for taking too much time to dispose of them. It subsequently began selling block assets, it partnered with private entities in the joint ownership of some assets, and it issued securities backed by commercial mortgages. When shut down in 1995, the RTC had closed 747 insolvent thrifts and recovered about 85% of the value of the assets it had seized. Estimates vary but several observers cite direct and indirect governmental costs totaling about $150 billion for the undertaking. |
crs_R43266 | crs_R43266_0 | The term "compulsory license" refers to the grant of permission for an enterprise seeking to use another's intellectual property to do so without the consent of its proprietor. The grant of a compulsory patent license typically requires the sanction of a governmental entity and provides for compensation to the patent owner. In the patent system, compulsory licenses most often relate to pharmaceuticals and other inventions pertaining to public health, but they potentially apply to information technologies, manufacturing methods, and any other sort of patented invention. Two notable multilateral international agreements address compulsory patent licenses. The first, the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, has been joined by 175 countries including the United States. The conditions for compulsory licensing within the TRIPS Agreement involve a number of ambiguities. In addition to the TRIPS Agreement and Paris Convention, the United States has entered into a number of free trade agreements that also address compulsory patent licenses. For example, the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Australia provides:
A Party shall not permit the use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorisation of the right holder except in the following circumstances:
(a) to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anticompetitive under the Party's laws relating to prevention of anti-competitive practices; or
(b) in cases of public non-commercial use, or of national emergency, or other circumstances of extreme urgency, provided that:
(i) the Party shall limit such use to use by the government or third persons authorised by the government;
(ii) the Party shall ensure that the patent owner is provided with reasonable compensation for such use; and
(iii) the Party may not require the patent owner to provide undisclosed information or technical know-how related to a patented invention that has been authorised for use in accordance with this paragraph. Compulsory Licenses Under U.S. Law
In contrast to the patent statutes of many nations, the U.S. patent code does not include a general compulsory licensing provision. In addition, circumstances that are arguably akin to a compulsory license may occur through antitrust enforcement, judicial determinations in patent infringement litigation, and activities of the federal government. Plainly, none of these provisions have been frequently employed in the past. This step is arguably akin to the grant of a compulsory license. Following the eBay decision, courts most often award an injunction to the prevailing patentee. Compulsory Licenses Abroad
The patent statutes of many U.S. trading partners include general provisions that allow for the award of compulsory licenses under specified conditions. This paper reviews a number of notable incidents with respect to compulsory licenses on patented inventions, focusing on Brazil, India, South Africa, and Thailand. On the other hand, some commentators believe that the grant of compulsory licenses diminishes incentives for enterprises to undertake research and development. In determining the reasonableness of remuneration for use of a patent, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may consider—
(1) evidence of the risks and costs associated with the invention claimed in the patent and the commercial development of products that use the invention;
(2) evidence of the efficacy and innovative nature and importance to the public health of the invention or products using that invention;
(3) the degree to which the invention benefitted from publicly funded research;
(4) the need for adequate incentives for the creation and commercialization of new inventions;
(5) the interests of the public as patients and payers for health care services;
(6) the public health benefits of expanded access to the invention;
(7) the benefits of making the invention available to working families and retired persons;
(8) the need to correct anti-competitive practices; and
(9) other public interest considerations. This legislation was not enacted. Congress may also wish to continue to monitor the activity of U.S. trade partners with respect to compulsory patent licenses. | The term "compulsory license" refers to the grant of permission for an enterprise seeking to use another's intellectual property without the consent of its proprietor. The grant of a compulsory patent license typically requires the sanction of a governmental entity and provides for compensation to the patent owner. Compulsory licenses in the patent system most often relate to pharmaceuticals and other inventions pertaining to public health, but they potentially apply to any patented invention.
U.S. law allows for the issuance of compulsory licenses in a number of circumstances, and also allows for circumstances that are arguably akin to a compulsory license. The Atomic Energy Act, Clean Air Act, and Plant Variety Protection Act provide for compulsory licensing, although these provisions have been used infrequently at best. The Bayh-Dole Act offers the federal government "march-in rights," although these have not been invoked in the three decades since that legislation has been enacted. 28 U.S.C. Section 1498 provides the U.S. government with broad ability to use inventions patented by others. Compulsory licenses have also been awarded as a remedy for antitrust violations. Finally, a court may decline to award an injunction in favor of a prevailing patent owner during infringement litigation, an outcome that some observers believe is akin to the grant of a compulsory license.
A number of international agreements to which the United States and its trading partners are signatories, including the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, World Trade Organization agreements, and certain free trade agreements, address compulsory licensing. In contrast to the United States, the patent statutes of many other nations include general provisions that allow for the award of compulsory licenses under specified conditions. A number of U.S. trading partners, including Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand, have invoked these provisions. The March 9, 2012, decision of the Indian government to grant a compulsory license on the chemotherapy drug sorafenib has attracted controversy.
Some commentators have expressed concern that compulsory licenses substantially diminish incentives for firms to conduct research and development. Others support the grant of such licenses under certain conditions, noting that many patent-granting states suffer from poverty, dire health needs, and a lack of access to patented technologies.
Congress has previously monitored the issuance of compulsory patent licenses by U.S. trading partners and may wish to continue to do so. Legislation dating from the 109th Congress would have allowed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to declare a compulsory license on a patented invention that was needed to address a public health emergency. This legislation was not enacted and has not been reintroduced. |
crs_R45343 | crs_R45343_0 | The House of Representatives passed the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA; H.R. Some issues discussed in this report were previously addressed in the FY18 NDAA ( P.L. Congress halted further reductions in Army and Marine Corps end-strength in FY2017, providing slight end-strength increases that year and more substantial increases in FY2018. Discussion: Relative to FY2018 authorized end-strengths, the Administration's FY2019 budget proposed increases for the Navy Reserve (+100), Air Force Reserve (+200), and Air National Guard (+500); and no change for the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. Section 411 of the enacted bill specified end-strengths identical to the Administration request. §1073c. In the FY2018 NDAA, Congress authorized $1.4 billion for commissary operations and an additional $40 million for the construction of a new commissary in Stuttgart, Germany. Section 621 of the enacted bill adopts House Section 629, which extends eligibility of certain MWR and commissary privileges to certain veterans and their caregivers. It shall contain the following: (1) details of the internal and external organizational structures of a consolidated defense resale system; (2) recommendations of the Secretaries of each of the military departments regarding the plan to consolidate the military resale entities; (3) the costs and associated plan for the merger of technologies or implementation of new technology from a third-party provider to standardize financial management and accounting processes of a consolidated defense resale system; (4) best practices to maximize reductions in costs associated with back-office retail payment processing for a consolidated defense resale system; (5) a timeline for converting DeCA into a NAF under Section 2484(j) of Title 10, United States Code; (6) a determination whether the business case analysis supports consolidation of the military resale entities; (7) recommendations of the SECDEF for legislation related to consolidation of the military resale entities; and (8) any other elements the SECDEF determines are necessary for a successful evaluation of a consolidation of the military resale entities. Domestic Violence and Child Abuse
Background : The Family Advocacy Program (FAP) is the congressionally-mandated program within DOD devoted to "clinical assessment, supportive services, and treatment in response to domestic abuse and child abuse and neglect in military families." 545), and expedited transfer eligibility for servicemember victims (Sec. This provision was not adopted in the enacted bill; however, the conferees noted concern "about the lack of State or local criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed on those portions of military installations with exclusive Federal jurisdiction by individuals not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice," and directed the service secretaries to seek to relinquish jurisdiction (pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI)
Background: In accordance with 10 U.S.C. DOD established new security screening requirements for MAVNI personnel in a memorandum published on September 30, 2016. Between 2012 and 2018, DOD took a number of steps to implement its own strategic initiatives as well as dozens of congressionally mandated actions related to sexual assault prevention and response, victim services, reporting and accountability, and military justice. Section 1009 of Title 37 of the U.S. Code provides a permanent formula for an automatic annual increase in basic pay that is indexed to the annual increase in the Employment Cost Index (ECI). Increases in basic pay are typically effective at the start of the calendar year, rather than the fiscal year. The enacted bill includes provisions that seek to improve training, as well as qualification standards and processes for Navy watchstanders. Some DOD programs are the Transition Assistance Program (TAP); Credentialing Opportunities Online (COOL); and the DOD Skillbridge program, which is also known as the Job Training, Employment Skills Training, Apprenticeships, and Internships (JTEST-AI) program. This benefit is called the Special Survivor Indemnity Allowance (SSIA). References: CRS In Focus IF10530, Defense Primer: Military Health System , by Bryce H. P. Mendez; CRS Insight IN10922, TRICARE Modernization: Eligibility for the Federal Employee Dental and Vision Insurance Program , by Bryce H. P. Mendez. | Each year, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides authorization of appropriations for a range of Department of Defense (DOD) and national security programs and related activities. New or clarified defense policies, organizational reform, and directed reports to Congress are often included. For FY2019, the John S. McCain NDAA (H.R. 5515) contains several high-profile military personnel issues. Some are required annual authorizations, such as end-strengths; some are updates or modifications to existing programs; and some changes in response to problems identified in certain military personnel programs.
In this year's NDAA, Congress authorized end-strengths identical to the Administration's FY2019 budget proposal, which are slightly higher than in FY2018. The authorized active duty end-strength increased by 1% to 1,338,100. The authorized Selected Reserves end-strength increased by <1% to 824,700. With regards to military pay, a 2.6% increase will take effect in calendar year 2019. Congress considered the increase as requested by the Administration; however, an authorization was not required since 37 U.S.C. §1009 provides for automatic annual increases in basic pay that is indexed to increases in the Employment Cost Index.
Congress also directed modifications to several existing programs, including
development of criteria for internment at Arlington National Cemetery, as well as a $30 million authorization to expand the cemetery; clarified military health system reform requirements outlined in 10 U.S.C. §1073c and revised the implementation date from October 1, 2018 to September 30, 2021; expanded eligibility for TRICARE beneficiaries to access the Federal Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP); extended eligibility for commissary and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) privileges to certain veterans and veterans' caregivers, as well as a $1.26 billion authorization for commissary operations; expanded availability of Military OneSource services, enhanced Transition Assistance Program (TAP) counseling requirements, and broadened educational opportunities for servicemembers desiring professional credentials; and corrected technical calculations for automatic annual adjustments to the Special Survivor Indemnity Allowance.
As part of the oversight process, additional provisions were incorporated to address selected congressional items of interest, such as
added punitive articles on domestic violence in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and directed clarifying policy, support programs, and further study on services for victims of domestic violence and child abuse; stricter eligibility requirements for enlistees of the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program; standardized processes for reporting and accountability, military justice and investigations, and victim services relating to military sexual assault and sexual harassment; increased transparency in Navy watchstander training programs and standards; and enhanced data-sharing between DOD and states to prevent opioid abuse or misuse. |
crs_R43920 | crs_R43920_0 | Introduction
The National Health Service Corps (NHSC) is a clinician recruitment and retention program that Congress created to reduce health workforce shortages in locations where providers historically have not served or have not served in numbers sufficient to address the needs of the local population. All NHSC scholars and loan repayers (federal and state) must agree to serve for a minimum of two years at an NHSC-approved facility that is located in a HPSA. The state portion of the NHSC's loan repayment program may support all providers who are eligible to participate in the federal scholarship and loan repayment programs, and each state may choose to expand the list of eligible providers to include those who are trained in other disciplines (such as pharmacy or optometry). The NHSC's programs are managed within the Bureau of Health Workforce (BHW) in the Health Resources and Service Administration (HRSA), an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The NHSC was created in the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970 to provide an adequate supply of trained health providers in federally designated HPSAs. Throughout its four decades of existence, legislators have authorized and revised the program several times, with the most recent authorization in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). In 2010, Congress permanently authorized the NHSC in the ACA. In addition, the ACA
established the Community Health Center Fund (CHCF), which authorized mandatory appropriations for the NHSC (and the Federal Health Centers Program) from FY2011 through FY2017; required the Secretary of HHS to redefine how HPSAs and Medically Underserved Areas/Populations are designated; implemented a part-time option from which NHSC clinicians (or providers) may choose to fulfill their service commitments; authorized a policy that excludes from taxed income the money that an individual receives from NHSC and similar loan repayment and scholarship programs that are designed to increase health care access in HPSAs or other designated underserved areas; and authorized a policy that permits NHSC clinicians to count time spent teaching at teaching health centers toward the fulfillment of their NHSC service commitment. For FY2016 and FY2017, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA, P.L. The FY2017 NHSC funding level is $288.6 million for this program, following a mandatory spending sequester for FY2017 of 6.9% (pursuant to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended). MACRA extended the mandatory funding for the CHCF and authorized a transfer of funds to the NHSC in the amount of $310 million for each of FY2016 and FY2017. Trends in Recruitment
From FY2011 through FY2016, the most recent data, the NHSC offered an estimated 27,000 loan repayment agreements and scholarship awards to individuals who have agreed to serve for a minimum of two years in a HPSA. A significant increase in new federal loan repayments was awarded in FY2011, when the NHSC awarded 4,113 new federal loan repayments, the largest number of new loan repayments issued in a single year during FY2011-FY2015. Field strength is the number of NHSC providers who are fulfilling a service obligation in a HPSA in exchange for a scholarship or loan repayment agreement. The NHSC's workforce composition consists of an increasingly diverse set of health professionals representing mental and behavioral health, medical, nursing, dental and other disciplines. Since FY2010, behavioral/mental health providers are the largest group of providers making up the NHSC's field strength. | The National Health Service Corps (NHSC) is a pipeline for clinician recruitment and training. Its program objective is to increase the availability of primary care services to populations in Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs). It aims to increase clinician availability by making loan repayments and awarding scholarships to individuals in exchange for their agreement to serve as NHSC clinicians (or providers) at approved sites. NHSC providers are mainly physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and behavioral/mental health professionals who must serve for a minimum of two years at an approved facility. An approved facility, for example, may be a Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC) and FQHC Look-Alike, American Indian and Native Alaska Health Clinic, Rural Health Clinic, Critical Access Hospital, School-Based Clinic, Mobile Unit, Free Clinic, or Community Mental Health Center, and must be located in a federally designated HPSA. All NHSC providers must fulfill a minimum of two-year service commitment at an NHSC-approved site. The NHSC is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Congress created the NHSC in the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-623), and since then has reauthorized and amended its programs several times. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA; P.L. 111-148) permanently reauthorized the NHSC.
Legislation to potentially repeal or replace all or parts of the ACA, depending on its scope, may impact NHSC authorization and funding. In 2010, Congress implemented major revisions in the NHSC through the ACA. Most notably, the ACA permanently authorized the NHSC and created the Community Health Center Fund (CHCF), a source of mandatory funding for the NHSC from FY2011 through FY2015. This funding was subsequently extended in the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA, P.L. 114-10). MACRA provided $310 million to support the NHSC in FY2016 and FY2017 through the CHCF. MACRA is the sole source of NHSC funds in FY2017. (Because this fund is subject to the mandatory spending sequester, the FY2017 funding level is $289 million.) In addition, the ACA amended statutory authorities pertaining to the NHSC's requirements for part-time service, teaching credits toward service obligations, and exclusions from an individual's gross income for those payments from state loan repayment or loan forgiveness programs that seek to increase health care access in federally designated HPSAs.
In FY2015, the most recent annual data available, the NHSC awarded 2,934 new loan repayment agreements; 1,841 continuing loan repayment agreements; 96 student-to-service loan repayments; 620 state loan repayments; 196 new scholarships; and 11 continuing scholarships. In FY2014, the NHSC issued the largest number of awards, 5,620, in a single year. Mental health providers, physicians, and nurse practitioners represented the largest number of NHSC clinicians in recent years. Also, in recent years, congressional appropriators have expressed concerns about updating the methodology for designating areas where NHSC providers are placed, and interest in the possibility of authorizing pharmacists as NHSC clinicians. The 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255) expanded the list of NHSC providers to include child and adolescent psychiatrists. This report summarizes the NHSC's recruitment and retention programs, and the NHSC's funding trends from FY2010 through FY2017. |
crs_R43071 | crs_R43071_0 | Introduction
The U.S. auto industry is of interest to many in Congress because of its large employment, economic impact, and geographic reach. Around the world, there are many automakers and thousands of parts suppliers, leading to intense international competition. For example, the emergence of Japan's auto industry as a major global competitor in the 1980s and 1990s led to frequent conflict with the United States, as many U.S. policymakers argued that Japan's trade policies harmed U.S. domestic auto and auto parts producers at home and abroad. The rapid rise of China's auto and auto parts industries in recent years has raised similar concerns and led to questions about some of the trade practices employed by the Chinese government. Some in Congress have called on the Obama Administration to take a tougher stand against China's industrial policies and other measures that may be distorting trade, including by making greater use of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process to challenge Chinese policies that may violate WTO rules. This report examines the rise of China's auto and auto parts industries, Chinese government policies to promote these industries, trends in U.S.-China trade in autos and parts, auto-related trade disputes, and implications for U.S.-China commercial relations. It has been forecast that as many as 30 million vehicles will be sold annually in China by 2020, with most of them being produced there. Foreign automakers were allowed to produce vehicles in China, but only through joint ventures in which local partners have at least 50% control. GM now sells more cars in China than in the United States. Ford Motor Co. is a more recent entrant, and has about 3% of the market. In 2012, China was the third largest export market (after Canada and Germany) for U.S. automotive vehicles at $5.7 billion (180,265 units). In the first six months of 2013, China was second-largest export market for U.S. vehicles, behind Canada. According to U.S. government data, about 25% of China's auto parts production is exported, including to the United States, where more than $14 billion in parts from China were imported in 2012, a 60% increase since 2008. China is also a major importer of auto parts. In its 12 th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), China laid out three major steps to further build up the auto assembly and parts industry:
consolidation of the currently fragmented industry , which would reduce the number of auto making and auto parts firms and, in so doing, could create economies of scale, reduce manufacturing costs, and raise the industry's international competitiveness; emphasis on bolstering research and development for key auto parts , which could enhance Chinese-owned firms' innovation and productivity and help raise the quality of Chinese-made vehicles and parts; and incentives fo r production and sale of energy- saving vehicles , which could help reduce dependence on imported oil, cut emissions, and usher in a significant rise in technological knowledge that would benefit the indigenous vehicle sector. U.S.-China Trade Disputes over Vehicles and Parts
Autos and auto parts have been the subject of a number of trade disputes between the United States and China. The United States further contended that the policy not only discouraged auto firms in China from importing auto parts, but also put significant pressure on foreign auto parts producers to relocate manufacturing facilities to China. The United States has charged that China maintains an auto and auto parts "export base" subsidy program estimated to have totaled at least $1 billion from 2009-2011. At the 2011 U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (November 20-21, 2011), China
confirmed that "it does not and will not maintain measures that mandate the transfer of technology"; clarified that "mastery of core technology" does not require technology transfer for NEVs; confirmed that the establishment of brands is a corporate decision and that the Chinese government does not and will not impose any requirements for foreign-invested companies to establish domestic brands in China; confirmed that foreign-invested enterprises are eligible on an equal basis for subsidies or other preferential policies for NEVs with Chinese enterprises, and that these subsidies and preference programs will be implemented in a manner consistent with WTO rules; and that China affirmed that as it develops possible future NEV support programs, the views of all stakeholders will be considered, including the comments and opinions of the United States. Parts makers, on the other hand, are permitted to own a majority share of operations in China. | The U.S. auto industry employs nearly 800,000 workers and is a major employer in certain parts of the country. International competition is fierce, with many automakers and thousands of parts makers vying for market share. Because of the industry's importance to the U.S. economy, the rapid rise of China's auto assembly and auto parts industries in recent years has raised concerns among some Members of Congress.
In 2009, China overtook the United States to become both the world's largest producer of and market for motor vehicles. In 2012, assemblers in China sold 19 million vehicles, and forecasts project more than 30 million vehicles will be sold there in 2020. China's increasing importance in this industry presents a unique set of opportunities and challenges for the United States. On the one hand, China is in some respects a relatively open market; it was the third -largest export market for U.S. autos and auto parts in the first six months of 2013 at $5.1 billion ($4.2 billion for autos and $ 0.9billion for auto parts), and has welcomed foreign direct investment by U.S.-based auto and auto parts manufacturers. Every year since 2010, General Motors has sold more cars in China (through exports and its joint ventures there) than in the United States.
On the other hand, China maintains a number of trade and investment barriers that affect trade flows in autos and auto parts. Foreign automakers can produce autos in China only through 50/50 joint ventures with Chinese partners. In addition, U.S. and other foreign auto firms have reportedly faced pressures relating to transfer of technology, export performance, and domestic content requirements, even though China's commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibit the Chinese government from enforcing such policies on foreign firms. Although the United States imports few vehicles from China, China has become the fourth-largest source of U.S. auto parts imports, with shipments totaling $14.5 billion in 2012.
The Chinese government has made the development of its auto and auto parts industries, including "new energy vehicles," a major economic priority, and has implemented a number of industrial policies to promote and protect Chinese auto firms with the long-term goal of making them globally competitive. As a result, auto and auto parts trade has become a source of conflict between the United States and China, most recently in 2012, when the Obama Administration asked the World Trade Organization (WTO) to consider whether alleged Chinese subsidies of auto and auto parts manufacturers violate international rules.
China's demand for motor vehicles is likely to continue growing rapidly because its population of 1.3 billion is just beginning to have the financial resources to purchase automobiles. For the United States, this will mean many new opportunities and challenges. Unlike some other markets, such as Korea, China's large internal demand may well shape the industry for many years, with exporting a secondary interest. China's rising investments in U.S. parts makers such as Nexteer and B456 Systems may help develop a U.S. technology lead in fuel-efficient, low-emission vehicles. But the prevalence of state and municipal ownership of many Chinese auto and auto parts companies may also cause friction. Many in Congress have called on the Obama Administration to take a tougher stand against China's industrial policies that may favor Chinese automakers over foreign automakers. |
crs_RL31308 | crs_RL31308_0 | It provides $64.6 billion for DOT and related agencies, butby agreement with the White House it also includes a 0.65% across-the-board rescission to holddown overall spending. 108-10, P.L. Prior to that, DOT funding hadcome from a series of 8 continuing appropriations acts, known as continuingresolutions (CRs), which provided agencies the same level of funding they receivedin FY2002 (minus extraordinary one-time appropriations) prorated on a daily basisfor the life of the CR. The events of September 11, 2001, have had a significant impact on the DOT's budget. The DOT received an additional $1.8 billion for FY2002 through anemergency supplemental bill passed on September 14, (2) and another $5.5 billionthrough another emergency supplemental bill passed on July 24, 2002, for a total of$7.3 billion in supplemental funding in FY2002. In FY2003,both the Coast Guard and TSA are scheduled to be transferred out of the DOT to thenewly-created Department of Homeland Security. 2 wasagreed to on February 13, 2003 ( H.Rept. President Bush signed the bill on February 20, 2003 (P. L. 108-7). Theimpact of this cut was magnified by the RABA boost to FY2002 highway funding of$4.5 billion over the guaranteed level. 107-206 ), which included a provision setting theRABA adjustment for FY2003 to zero (Section 1402). This had the effect ofrestoring FY2003 highway funding to the level guaranteed in TEA-21, $27.7 billion. It provided $31.8 billion for FY2003, the same amountprovided in FY2002. (4)
TSA was appropriated $1.3 billion in FY2002; it also received an additional $3.9 billion in the second FY2002 emergency supplemental bill (5) . In a change of policy, Congress did not provide the money directly to Amtrak, but tothe Secretary of Transportation, who will allocate the money to Amtrak quarterlythrough the grant-making process. Also, each of Amtrak's long-distance routes willhave to make individual grant applications to receive funding. The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution for FY2003, H.J.Res. P.L. 108-7 ), which included the DOTappropriations legislation and was signed by President Bush on February 20, 2003,provided $3.4 billion less a 0.65% across-the -board rescission (roughly $20 million)for AIP. The FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution ( H.J.Res. 108-7 provides $31.8 billion. Grants to States and Other Activities. 108-7 ), provides $1.05 billion for Amtrak, which is lower than the $1.2billion originally approved by the Senate but more than the $763 million originallyrecommended by the House Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee. 108-7 provides $1.05 billion, and defersrepayment of a $100 million loan; Amtrak said that should be sufficient to keep itoperating through FY2003. c These figures do not reflect the 0.65% across-the-board rescission included in P.L. 106-181 ), the current aviation authorizing legislation
FHWA: Federal Highway Administration
FRA: Federal Railroad Administration
FTA: Federal Transit Administration
Hazmat: Hazardous materials (safety program in RSPA)
HPP: High Priority Projects (FHWA)
HTF: Highway Trust Fund
IM: Interstate Maintenance program (FHWA)
ITS: Intelligent Transportation Systems (FHWA)
MCSAP: Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (FMCSA)
New Starts: part of the FTA's Capital Grants and Loans Program which funds new fixed-guideway systems or extensions to existing systems
NHS: National Highway System; also a program within FHWA
NHTSA: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
NMCSA: National Motor Carrier Safety Administration
O&M: Operations and Maintenance program (FAA)
OIG: Office of the Inspector General of the DOT
OST: Office of the Secretary of Transportation
RABA: Revenue-Aligned Budget Authority
RD&T: Research, Development and Technology program (FHWA)
RE&D: Research, Engineering and Development program (FAA)
RSPA: Research and Special Projects Administration
SCASD: Small Community Air Service Development program (FAA)
STB: Surface Transportation Board
STP: Surface Transportation Program (FHWA)
TCSP: Transportation and Community and System Preservation Program (FHWA)
TEA-21: Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century ( P.L. This is verysignificant from a budgeting standpoint. Additional highway funds can be provided annuallyby a mechanism called "Revenue Aligned Budget Authority" (RABA); RABA fundsaccrue to the trust fund as a result of increased trust fund revenues. | On February 20, 2003, President Bush signed the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution ( H.J.Res. 2 : H.Rept. 108-10 , P.L. 108-7 ), providing appropriations for theDepartment of Transportation (DOT) and other departments. Congress agreed to the conferencecommittee report on February 13, 2003. It provides $64.6 billion to the DOT and related agenciesfor FY2003, minus a 0.65% across-the-board rescission which reduces the total by around $420million (figures in this report do not reflect the 0.65% rescission, as it is unclear how that cut wouldbe calculated for DOT and related agencies overall and for particular departments, agencies, andprograms in the bill). This is $9 billion more than the President requested for FY2003, the primarydifference being increased highway spending. It is $1.8 billion less than enacted in FY2002, a yearin which transportation appropriations were boosted by supplemental spending for security and forrepair of damage to transportation infrastructure in New York City. Prior to the passage of P.L.108-7 , DOT was funded through a series of 8 Continuing Resolutions (CRs) that provided fundingat FY2002 levels, prorated.
The events of September 11, 2001, have had a significant impact on DOT's budget. The DOT received an extra $7.3 billion in FY2002 in emergency supplemental appropriations, much of it forsecurity-related activities, including the creation of an entirely new agency, the TransportationSecurity Administration (TSA). During FY2003 the Coast Guard and TSA are scheduled to betransferred to the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.
The abrupt decrease from FY2002 to FY2003 in requested federal-aid highway funding-from $32 billion to $24 billion-caused a stir. It was mandated by the Revenue-Aligned Budget Authority(RABA) provision in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) that ties annualhighway funding levels to trust fund revenues; trust fund revenues dropped below predicted levelsin 2001. The second FY2002 emergency supplemental act ( P.L. 107-206 ) included a provisionsetting the RABA adjustment for FY2003 to zero, effectively restoring the federal-aid highwayprogram to $27.7 billion, the level authorized in TEA-21. The House Appropriations Committeerecommended this level; the Senate-passed version of H.J.Res. 2 maintained theFY2002 level (which was $4.5 billion over the authorized level as a result of a RABA increase thatyear) for FY2003, $31.8 billion. P.L. 108-7 provided $31.8 billion.
P.L. 108-7 provides Amtrak $1.05 billion, plus deferral of repayment of a $100 million loan, which it said would be enough to keep it solvent through FY2003. The bill introduced a new policyon Amtrak oversight, providing the money not to Amtrak directly but to the Secretary ofTransportation, who will provide the money to Amtrak in quarterly installments through thegrant-making process. Each of Amtrak's long-distance routes will have to have a separate grantapplication for funding.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division. |
crs_RL30972 | crs_RL30972_0 | The Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) defines brownfields as abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilitieswhere expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmentalcontamination. The brownfields program is not specifically mentioned in the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or the Superfund law) -- it was createdadministratively by EPA. In 2001, the Senate passed S. 350 ( S.Rept.107-2 ), which would provide the statutory authority for the program, $250 million per year forvarious brownfield initiatives, and relief from Superfund liability for some property owners, amongother things. It has changed the way it keeps track of potentially contaminated sites, and hasissued guidances to clarify the situations where it will use its enforcement discretion and not bringlegal action to force cleanups, such as against prospective purchasers of brownfields. The agency awards grants for the brownfields assessment pilots on a competitive basis. To assure that residents ofbrownfields communities benefit from the industrial and commercial activities associated with sitecleanup, job training grants of up to $200,000 over 2 years may be awarded to colleges, universities,non-profit training centers, and community job training programs as well as to governmental entities. State voluntary cleanup program grants. Non-grant Activities: Clarification of Liability and Cleanup Issues, and Outreach
EPA has also made an effort to address liability and cleanup issues that lenders, developers,and property owners see as barriers to brownfields development. In FY1997, proposing majorexpansion of the program, the agency requested and received $37.7 million in a line item,specifically for brownfields. In addition to continuing the grants for site assessment and other pre-remedial activities, EPA usedFY1997 appropriations to support revolving loan funds (RLFs) to help finance actual cleanups. ForFY2000 Congress appropriated $91.7 million, for FY2001, $91.6 million, and for FY2002 $97.7million, matching EPA's request in all 3 years. A tax incentiveallowing the costs of redeveloping brownfields to be deducted in the current year was enacted in the105th Congress as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P.L. Initially good for 3 years,until December 31, 2000, the tax break was extended to the end of 2003 by the 106th Congress, andexpanded to include all brownfields certified by the appropriate state agency. 106-554 ) extended the brownfields tax incentive foran additional 2 years, to December 31, 2003. The first was the"state finality" question, that is, the circumstances under which EPA should beallowed to intervene at a site that has been or is being cleaned up under a stateprogram. Ten other bills have beenintroduced in the 107th Congress and two of them, S. 23 and H.R. | The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines brownfields as abandoned, idled, orunder-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicatedby real or perceived environmental contamination. The brownfields program was establishedadministratively by EPA under the aegis of the Superfund program; without explicit authority forit in the law, it has been financed by the Superfund appropriation. The program provides financialand technical assistance to help communities restore less seriously contaminated sites that have thepotential for economic development. A combination of potential environmental, economic andsocial benefits gives this program broad support among governments, environmentalists, developers,and communities.
The program began in 1993 and has grown to include 398 brownfields assessment grants(most for $200,000 over 2 years); 151 grants of up to $350,000 (up to $1 million beginning inFY2001) to establish revolving loan funds to help finance the actual cleanups; 47 job training grants;and 28 Brownfields Showcase Communities where technical and financial assistance from 20participating federal agencies is being coordinated with state, local and non-governmental efforts.
EPA also addressed some liability and cleanup issues affecting brownfields by changing itshazardous waste site tracking system, and issuing guidance clarifying the situations where it will notbring enforcement actions against brownfield property owners.
FY1997 was the first year brownfields became a separate budgetary line item, at $37.7million. For FY2000 the appropriation was $91.7 million, in FY2001 the appropriation was $91.6million, and in FY2002 it is $97.7 million
The 106th Congress extended the brownfields cleanup tax incentive to December 31, 2003,and expanded it to make all brownfields certified by a state environmental agency eligible for thetax break. The provision allows the costs of redeveloping brownfields to be deducted in the currentyear rather than being capitalized over a period of years. The administration favors making theprovision permanent.
Congress passed H.R. 2869 on December 20, 2001, and the President signed iton January 11 ( P.L. 107-118 ). The act provides statutory authority to the brownfields program,authorizes funding at $250 million per year, and protects certain property owners from Superfundliability. Ten other bills have also been introduced.
This report provides background on the issue (including state voluntary cleanup programs),surveys the Environmental Protection Agency's current program, and reviews congressional action,including a description of the new law. The report will be updated as events dictate. For additionalinformation on legislative activity, see CRS Issue Brief IB10078, Superfund and Brownfields in the107th Congress. |
crs_R42626 | crs_R42626_0 | Background
The issue of religious discrimination in public schools has been a subject of congressional attention in a variety of contexts over the past several years. That legislation would have amended Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) to prohibit discrimination based on religion in programs receiving federal funds, in addition to the other classes already protected under the CRA. As Congress continues to consider potential reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), issues related to religious discrimination in schools are particularly relevant. This report analyzes the constitutional and statutory protections that may prevent religious discrimination against students. It examines the current interpretations of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, as well as the protections available to religious student groups under the Equal Access Act and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The report also discusses the effect of Titles IV and VI of the CRA, which prohibit discrimination in education and federally funded programs, respectively. It addresses the Supreme Court's rulings on student religious groups in the context of access to school facilities and funds. Finally, the report analyzes the extent to which religious student groups may be selective in their membership requirements without violating nondiscrimination requirements. To illustrate the complexity of the legal issues involved in these scenarios, a group may challenge a school's policy requiring acceptance of any interested student as a condition to use school resources on a number of counts: (1) the Establishment Clause, alleging disfavorable treatment based on the group's religious identity; (2) the Free Exercise Clause, alleging infringement on the group's ability to maintain its religious identity and beliefs; (3) the Free Speech Clause, alleging that the policy limits the group's ability to express its beliefs as other groups might be permitted to do; (4) the Equal Access Act, alleging that the school has limited access to its facilities based on the religious content of the proposed speech; (5) the constitutional freedom of association, alleging that the school's policy requires groups to accept members who may not otherwise be identified with the group. Legal Rules Governing Religion in Schools
The primary legal protections that may be used to prevent discrimination based on religion in schools are the First Amendment, the Equal Access Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title IV specifically addresses the desegregation of public schools. Title VI provides significant nondiscrimination protection in schools, but it does not extend to discrimination based on religion. The Proposed Student Non-Discrimination Act (H.R. 998; S. 555)
Intended to ensure that students are free from discriminatory conduct such as harassment, bullying, intimidation, and violence, the proposed Student Non-Discrimination Act (SNDA) would prohibit discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation in public elementary and secondary schools. | Reports of harassment in schools, including examples based on religious identity and practices, have raised public attention and congressional interest in the issue of religious discrimination in schools. Congressional attention to the issue has focused on efforts to prevent discrimination in programs receiving federal funding, namely, public schools. The 112th Congress has introduced proposals (e.g., the Student Non-Discrimination Act) to curtail harassment in public schools and may consider related issues in the potential reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Some proposals have specifically addressed religious discrimination, while other proposed nondiscrimination measures have raised tangential concerns regarding religious freedom, namely, the ability of students to maintain religious identity or beliefs that would conflict with the protections offered in legislation.
Both constitutional and statutory protections prevent discrimination based on religion in school contexts. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution generally prohibits public schools from limiting access of religious groups to school facilities and resources for the purpose of religious expression. The Equal Access Act provides similar protection to ensure that student religious groups have access to secondary school facilities on an equal basis as other groups. Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes several protections to prevent religious discrimination, including Title IV and Title VI. Title IV prohibits discrimination based on religion in education, and Title VI prohibits discrimination based on religion in federally funded programs generally, which includes public schools.
This report analyzes the legal protections available to students and student groups that may be subject to religious discrimination in public schools. It examines the current interpretations of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, as well as protections available to religious student groups under the Equal Access Act and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The report also discusses the effect of Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act as they relate to school programs. The report specifically analyzes two significant issues related to religious discrimination in schools: access of religious student groups to school facilities and resources and the rights of such groups to be selective in their membership. Finally, the report examines the status of these legal protections under the proposed Student Non-Discrimination Act (H.R. 998; S. 555). |
crs_R42958 | crs_R42958_0 | Addressing this population, estimated to number more than 11 million today, may take on added urgency in 2013 if the 113 th Congress tackles comprehensive immigration reform. For example, some unauthorized aliens in the United States have U.S. citizen or LPR family members or employers who are petitioning for them to become legal permanent residents (LPRs) of the United States under current law; others have no such sponsors. While there continue to be proposals seeking to establish statutory legalization programs to enable large numbers of unauthorized aliens to become LPRs or, conversely, proposals aimed at promoting the departure of large numbers of unauthorized aliens from the country over time, there also has been discussion of developing policies to provide targeted immigration relief to the unauthorized alien population. Immigration relief is a broad term that encompasses relief from removal from the United States without the granting of a legal immigration status as well as relief in the form of a legal immigration status, which could be a temporary immigration status or a permanent immigration status. A main focus of these various discussions about targeted relief has been limiting eligibility for legal status to certain segments of the unauthorized population. It does not generally allow for unauthorized aliens to obtain legal nonimmigrant status. Under the INA, the Secretary of Homeland Security has broad discretionary authority to waive grounds of inadmissibility, including those related to illegal entry and unlawful presence, in the case of certain nonimmigrant categories. Immigration Status-Related Factors
While a stereotypical view of an unauthorized alien may be of a young man with no connections to the United States who crosses the Southwest border illegally in search of work, in reality the unauthorized alien population includes individuals who entered the country in different ways, for different reasons, and who have different types of connections to the United States. The circumstances of individuals who compose the unauthorized alien population affect their treatment under current immigration law as well as their future status-related prospects. In 2012, in the absence of congressional action on DREAM Act legislation, DHS established an administrative process, known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), to provide temporary relief to certain unauthorized alien residents who entered the country before age 16 and satisfy other requirements (see " Unauthorized Aliens Who Arrived as Children ," below). They could be legislative or administrative, and could provide different types of relief to different subgroups of the unauthorized population. A main focus of these policy discussions has been unauthorized aliens with approved immigrant visa petitions, especially those with U.S. citizen or LPR family members. Selected segments of the unauthorized alien population without an affirmative pathway to legal status, such as students who entered the United States as children and aliens with long-term TPS, also have been the subject of policy proposals. While the granting of legal immigration status to this subgroup of unauthorized aliens would require enactment of the DREAM Act or other legislation, more limited relief from removal could be provided administratively, and DHS has established a program to do so. | The 113th Congress is expected to consider comprehensive immigration reform legislation. If and when it does, a key challenge will be how to address the unauthorized alien population, estimated to number some 11 million. The unauthorized alien population is often treated as if it were monolithic, but it is, in fact, quite diverse. It includes individuals who entered the United States in different ways, for different reasons, and who have different types of connections to the United States. The circumstances of individuals who compose the unauthorized alien population affect their treatment under immigration law, especially with respect to prospects for obtaining legal status in the United States. Relevant immigration status-related factors include mode of entry into the United States, length of unlawful presence in the country, and the existence of family or employment connections.
The differences in circumstances among unauthorized aliens are particularly relevant in the context of current discussions about how to address this population. In past years, immigration proposals on unauthorized aliens often called for the establishment of broad legalization programs to enable large numbers of unauthorized aliens to become U.S. legal permanent residents (LPRs) or, conversely, included provisions aimed at promoting the departure of large numbers of unauthorized aliens from the country over time. More recently, there has been discussion of developing policies to provide targeted immigration relief to unauthorized aliens. Immigration relief is a broad term that encompasses relief from removal from the United States without the granting of a legal immigration status as well as relief in the form of a legal immigration status.
A main focus of recent discussions has been making eligibility for legal status available to certain segments of the unauthorized population. Aliens with approved immigrant visa petitions, especially those with U.S. citizen or LPR family members, seem to be of particular interest. Selected segments of the unauthorized alien population without an affirmative pathway to legal status, such as students who entered the United States as children and beneficiaries of long-term humanitarian relief, have also been the subject of policy proposals.
Policies to provide targeted relief to unauthorized aliens could be legislative or administrative. Legislative options could include amending existing statutory provisions to make it easier for certain unauthorized aliens to obtain LPR status. They also could include establishing statutory mechanisms to enable certain subgroups of unauthorized aliens to become LPRs who may not have pathways to do so under current law, as in the case of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act.
Unauthorized aliens also could receive temporary relief from removal through administrative action. The Department of Homeland Security's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which was established in the absence of congressional action on DREAM Act legislation and includes similar eligibility criteria, provides a recent example. Such administrative actions can provide temporary relief, but, unlike legislative enactments, cannot provide beneficiaries with a legal immigration status. |
crs_R44704 | crs_R44704_0 | In October 2015, the U.S. Treasury argued that allowing the debt limit to constrain the government's ability to meet its obligations "would represent an irresponsible retreat from a core American value: we are a nation that honors all of its commitments"; and that "(f)ailing to increase the debt limit would have catastrophic economic consequences. It would cause the government to default on its legal obligations." 692 , some Members stated that a binding debt limit that would limit the Treasury Secretary's ability to meet federal obligations on a timely basis would be tantamount to default, while other Members stated that default would only encompass a failure to make principal and interest payments linked to U.S. Treasury securities. This report discusses the concept of default in the context of the federal government's financial obligations. During the 2011 debt limit episode, some noted that the U.S. Treasury had failed to make timely payments to some small investors in the spring of 1979, which in the eyes of some, constituted a "technical default." Moreover, third parties may have difficulty evaluating compliance because some contracts are private. Consequences of Default Depend on Expectations
The consequences of a failure to pay or a late payment by the federal government or any other organization depend on the expectations of counterparties and others. The expectation that some other federal payments will be made on time may be weaker. For example, if a sovereign government's fiscal agent is barred from making payments to creditors, the willingness of that government to pay does not excuse the government from its obligations or relieve it from the consequences of nonpayment. For instance, Secretary Lew on October 15, 2015, asked Congress to take action on the debt li mit so that the Treasury would not be "unable to satisfy all of these obligations for the first time in the history of the United States." First, Congress declined in 1811 to renew the charter of the first Bank of the United States, which acted as the government's fiscal agent. At that time, the Treasury had not exhausted its authority to borrow or issue notes. Government finances improved with the end of the war and the rebound in customs revenues stemming from the resumption of international commerce. The Great Depression and the Gold Clause Cases
The decision by President Franklin Roosevelt and Congress to move the U.S. government off the gold standard in 1933 and 1934, in the eyes of some, amounted to a repudiation of the contract terms, and in particular, to the terms of the Second Liberty Bonds issued in 1917. Economic Consequences of the Cancellation of the Gold Clauses
The cancellation of the gold clauses appeared to have little effect on Treasury's ability to borrow on financial markets. Several economists found that countries that left the gold standard earlier in the 1930s recovered more quickly than those that remained longer on the gold standard. While the 1979 payment delays certainly inconvenienced many small investors, the stability of the wider market in Treasury securities was not put at risk. Causes of payment delays were diverse. Under any reasonable definition of default, the federal government defaulted in 1814. In 1979, as noted above, a major shift in monetary policy and conditions can explain changes in market yields on Treasury securities. Market participants have stated that systematic payment delays by the U.S. Treasury could have serious economic consequences. The lack of a fiscal agent or the administrative capacity to administer internal revenues undermined the U.S. Treasury's ability to meet federal obligations during the War of 1812. Even if the payment history of the U.S. government is not completely unblemished, it does compare favorably to nearly all other advanced countries. | During recent debt limit episodes, federal officials have contended that if the debt limit were to constrain the government's ability to meet its obligations, that would be an unprecedented blemish on the nation's credit. For example, the U.S. Treasury has asserted that "(f)ailing to increase the debt limit would have catastrophic economic consequences. It would cause the government to default on its legal obligations" or that it "would represent an irresponsible retreat from a core American value: we are a nation that honors all of its commitments. It would cause the government to default on its legal obligations."
Failure to pay obligations on time is regarded as a central indicator of default, although default may be triggered by a wide range of contractual provisions. More generally, the concept of default stems from contract law, and thus may be ambiguous because contract terms may be private or contracts may be incomplete, in that the consequences of some contingencies are left unspecified. For instance, the terms under which Treasury securities are offered lack any mention of payment delays or nonpayment. The ambiguity of the term "default" leads many third parties to develop their own definitions to monitor compliance with promises to pay.
The U.S. Treasury in some historical instances was unable to pay all its obligations on time or made payments on terms that disappointed creditors. Those instances resulted from extraordinary stresses on public finances. Over time, the United States has managed its finances so that its credit history compares favorably to nearly all other advanced countries.
This report examines three episodes in the federal government's fiscal history when some have questioned the public credit of the U.S. government. During the War of 1812, the federal government eventually became unable to meet its obligations. Shortly before that war, Congress had declined to renew the charter of the first Bank of the United States, leaving the government without a fiscal agent. In addition, President Jefferson and Treasury Secretary Gallatin had dismantled the administrative machinery needed to collect internal revenues, leaving Treasury revenues heavily dependent on customs income. In 1814, military expenses and lagging revenue left the U.S. Treasury unable to meet all of its obligations, including some interest payments on federal debt. The end of that war, the establishment of the second Bank of the United States, and the rebound of tariff revenues put federal finances on a sounder foundation.
In March 1933, newly inaugurated President Franklin Roosevelt soon took steps to suspend the gold standard, as one measure to address severe disinflation, a collapse of the banking system, and other consequences of the Great Depression. While the Supreme Court upheld actions that suspended the gold standard, others contended that the cancellation of gold clauses in federal bond contracts amounted to a restructuring of debt. Although the cancellation of gold clauses in 1933-1934 had no discernable effect on the U.S. Treasury's ability to borrow, holders of Treasury securities lost money relative to what they had expected to receive.
More recently, when the U.S. Treasury failed to make timely payments to some small investors in the spring of 1979, some dubbed the incident a "mini-default." While the payment delays inconvenienced many investors, the stability of the wider market in Treasury securities was never at risk. Shifts in monetary policy, as constraining inflation became a policy priority, provide a stronger explanation for changes in yields in federal securities. Moreover, payment delays were not uncommon at that time, when automatic data processing was at a relatively primitive stage.
Other countries that defaulted in the 1930s or in the 19th century apparently suffered no lasting damage to their ability to borrow. Nonetheless, the prominent role of U.S. Treasury securities in global and domestic financial arrangements implies that systematic delays in Treasury payments now could have serious consequences. |
crs_R45206 | crs_R45206_0 | Introduction
The United States is the largest single financial contributor to the United Nations (U.N.) system. Over the decades, congressional debates on U.N. funding have generally focused on three key issues: the appropriate level of U.S. contributions to the U.N. system; whether U.S. funds are being used effectively; and how changes in U.S. funding might further U.S. policy priorities in the U.N. system. It discusses how the United States funds the United Nations and outlines selected U.S. contributions to U.N. bodies. In FY2017, the last year in which comprehensive information is available, U.S. funding included
$1 billion in assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget and specialized agencies; $1.9 billion in assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations; $295 million in voluntary contributions to U.N. funds and programs; and $5.6 billion in voluntary contributions to U.N. humanitarian-related entities ( Figure 1 ). How the U.N. System Is Funded
The U.N. system is made up of interconnected components that include specialized agencies, voluntary funds and programs, peacekeeping operations, and the U.N. organization itself. Article 17 of the U.N. Charter requires each U.N. member to contribute to the expenses of the organization. Many U.N. entities such as the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), and U.N. Congressional Authorization and Appropriations
Congress has generally authorized the majority of assessed and voluntary contributions to the U.N. system as part of Foreign Relations Authorization Acts, with appropriations provided to the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to meet obligations. When authorization bills are not enacted, Congress has waived the authorization requirements and appropriated funds through U.N. and U.N.-related accounts in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations acts. Over the decades, Congress has enacted several U.N. funding-related reporting requirements to help address this issue. While some have provided useful snapshots of U.S. funding during particular time periods or to select U.N. bodies, for a variety of reasons few have consistently or comprehensively captured the full scope of U.S. contributions to the entire U.N. system. Specifically, it proposes
a 25% reduction from enacted FY2018 funding for assessed contributions to the entire CIO account based on the expectation that U.N. organizations will "rein in costs, enhance their accountability and transparency, improve efficiency and effectiveness, and that the funding burden be shared more equitably"; a 13% reduction from enacted FY2018 funding for U.N. peacekeeping operations, based on the Administration's commitment to seeking reduced costs by "reevaluating the mandates, design, and implementation" of missions, and sharing the financial burden "more fairly" with other U.N. members; zeroing out voluntary contributions to U.N. funds and programs typically funded through the IO&P account, such as UNICEF and UNDP; and a 32% decrease in humanitarian assistance from FY2018 funding levels and the elimination of the Food for Peace (P.L. A detailed breakdown of global humanitarian-related funding by U.N. entity is provided in Appendix F .
Selected Policy Issues
Members of Congress have debated the level and extent of U.S. funding to the United Nations since the United States first joined the organization in 1945. U.S. Assessment Levels
For several decades, many U.S. policymakers, including some Members of Congress, have maintained that the U.S. assessments for the U.N. regular budget and U.N. peacekeeping operations are too high. In particular, some contend that current assessment levels for the regular budget result in a limited number of countries, particularly the United States, providing the bulk of funding while having what they view as minimal influence in the U.N. budget process. Some policymakers have expressed similar concerns about the U.S. peacekeeping assessment, which Congress has capped at 25%. U.S. Arrears to the United Nations
Some Members of Congress have demonstrated an ongoing interest in the accumulation of U.S. arrears to U.N. entities. Some Members of Congress have demonstrated a continued interest in U.N. reform and over the years have sought to link U.S. funding to specific reform benchmarks. Supporters of linking U.S. funding to U.N. reform contend that the United States should use its position as the largest U.N. financial contributor to push for the implementation of policies that lead to comprehensive reform. The possible impacts of current and potential U.S. financial withholding on (1) U.S. influence in U.N. bodies, and (2) the operations and effectiveness of U.N. activities—particularly in light of continued accumulation of U.S. peacekeeping arrears and the Administration's proposed funding reductions for certain U.N. bodies. | Members of Congress are responsible for authorizing and appropriating U.S. funding to the United Nations (U.N.) system. Over the years, congressional interest in U.N. funding has largely focused on three key questions:
What are appropriate levels of U.S. funding to U.N. entities? Are U.S. contributions used as efficiently and effectively as possible? How, if at all, should the United States leverage U.S. contributions to achieve its policy priorities in U.N. bodies?
U.N. System Funding
The U.N. system is made up of interconnected entities including specialized agencies, funds and programs, peacekeeping operations, and the U.N. organization itself. The U.N. Charter requires each U.N. member to contribute to the expenses of the organization. U.N. bodies are funded by a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions. Assessed contributions are required dues shared among U.N. member states to pay for the expenses of the organization. The U.N. regular budget, peacekeeping operations, and specialized agencies are funded mainly by assessed contributions. Voluntary contributions fund U.N. funds, programs, and offices. The budgets for many of these bodies may fluctuate annually depending on contribution levels. Organizations such as the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) and U.N. Development Program (UNDP) are financed mainly by voluntary contributions.
U.S. Contributions
The United States is the largest financial contributor to the U.N. system, providing 22% of the U.N. regular budget and 28.43% of U.N. peacekeeping budgets. In FY2017, it contributed more than $8.5 billion to U.N. entities through the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations act. Congress usually authorizes the majority of U.S. contributions to the U.N. system as part of Foreign Relations Authorization Acts, with appropriations provided to the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to meet obligations. When authorization bills are not enacted, Congress has waived the authorization requirements and appropriated funds through annual SFOPS appropriations acts. The Trump Administration's FY2018 and FY2019 budgets proposed significant reductions in U.N. funding.
Selected Policy Issues
Since the United Nations was established in 1945, Members of Congress have considered a number of ongoing issues related to U.N. funding:
U.S. assessment levels. Some policymakers are concerned that current assessment levels result in the United States providing the bulk of funding to U.N. entities, particularly the U.N. regular budget, while having minimal influence on the organization's budget processes. Some are concerned that the U.S. peacekeeping assessment of 28.43%, which Congress capped at 25%, is too high. Others argue that the U.S. assessment reflects its commitment to the United Nations, affirms U.S. global leadership, and encourages other countries to fund the organization. U.S. withholdings. Over the years, Congress has withheld full or partial funding from selected U.N. bodies and activities. Some Members of Congress have debated the effectiveness of such withholdings in furthering U.S. interests in U.N. bodies, as well as the potential impact on U.N. operations. U.S. arrears. For the past several decades, the United States has accumulated arrears for some U.N. entities and activities, including U.N. peacekeeping. Some Members continue to discuss the impact of these arrears and whether they should be paid. U.S. funding and U.N. reform. Congress has enacted legislation linking U.S. funding to specific U.N. reform benchmarks. Some policymakers oppose such actions due to concerns that they may interfere with U.S. influence and ability to conduct diplomacy in U.N. bodies. Others suggest that the United States should use its position as the largest financial contributor to push for certain U.N. reforms. Tracking U.S. contributions. The manner in which the United States provides funding to the U.N. system is complex and often difficult to track in a timely and accurate manner. Congress has enacted several U.N. funding reporting requirements over the years. While some of these efforts have provided useful snapshots of U.S. funding during particular time periods or to select U.N. bodies, for a number of reasons few have comprehensively captured the full scope of U.S. funding to the U.N. system.
This report will be updated as events warrant. For a brief overview of U.N. funding, see CRS In Focus IF10354, United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding to the U.N. System. |
crs_R41775 | crs_R41775_0 | Background
Signed into law on February 17, 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) provided $7.2 billion for broadband grant and loan programs at the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). For both BTOP and BIP, all projects will be closed out and unobligated funds returned to the U.S. Treasury on September 30, 2015. With regard to project completion, the primary area of concern is the public safety broadband projects. Recipients and subrecipients are monitored by agency staff to ensure that project goals, performance, timelines, milestones, budgets, and other requirements are being met. In cases where NTIA or RUS detects waste, fraud, or abuse, or where it is determined that the awardee is not fulfilling the terms of the award conditions, the agencies have the authority to take back the funding (deobligate) and return the money to the U.S. Treasury. Program Evaluation
There is another question separate from how effectively the broadband awards are being managed by the agencies and implemented by the recipients: how effective overall are the ARRA broadband programs in meeting the goals of providing broadband service to unserved and underserved areas, increasing broadband adoption levels, and generally contributing to the nation's economic development? Issues for Congress
In the 114 th Congress, a number of committees—including the House Committee on Energy and Commerce; the House Committee on Agriculture; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees—have continued to monitor the ARRA broadband programs in NTIA and RUS. Program Deadline
With the September 30, 2015, deadline approaching, Congress has expressed concern that some BIP and BTOP projects may not be fully completed before all unspent funding permanently returns to the U.S. Treasury for deficit reduction. Funding for Oversight and Program Administration
In addition to issuing BTOP and BIP awards, both NTIA and RUS must oversee and administer those awarded projects as they progress toward completion. According to the National Broadband Plan:
BTOP and BIP alone will not be sufficient to close the broadband availability gap. Other government support is required to complete the task of connecting the nation to ensure that broadband reaches the highest-cost areas of the country. | The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provided an unprecedented level of federal funding for broadband projects across the nation. These projects are intended to expand broadband availability and adoption in unserved and underserved areas, which in turn is believed to contribute to increased future economic development in those areas.
The ARRA provided nearly $7 billion for broadband grant and loan programs to be administered by two separate agencies: the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). With the ARRA broadband projects awarded and with many complete and others nearing completion, NTIA and RUS are monitoring the awards to protect against waste, fraud, and abuse, and to ensure that each project reaches its promised milestones, goals, and outcomes. A key oversight role is played by the Offices of Inspector General in the DOC and the USDA, which are monitoring the projects for waste, fraud, and abuse, and are investigating specific complaints. Both NTIA and RUS have the authority to reclaim and recover awards (either for cause or in cases where awardees decide not to pursue the project) and return the deobligated funds to the U.S. Treasury. Meanwhile, all undisbursed federal funds for the ARRA broadband program will be returned to the Treasury on September 30, 2015.
Congress plays an important oversight role. A number of committees, including the House Committee on Energy and Commerce; the House Committee on Agriculture; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have jurisdiction over the ARRA broadband programs in NTIA and RUS.
As the ARRA broadband projects move toward completion, the primary issue for Congress is how to ensure that the money is being spent wisely and will most effectively provide broadband service to areas of the nation that need it most, while at the same time minimizing any unwarranted disruption to private sector broadband deployment. A rising concern is whether all projects will be completed by the September 30, 2015, deadline. If not, all unspent monies will be returned to the U.S. Treasury for deficit reduction. Congress will also be assessing how the broadband stimulus projects fit into the overall goals of the National Broadband Plan. |
crs_RS22863 | crs_RS22863_0 | In light of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, however, some Members have questioned this open-door policy and have argued for greater consideration of the long-term impact of foreign direct investment on the structure and the industrial capacity of the economy, and on the ability of the economy to meet the needs of U.S. defense and security interests. The Committee is an interagency organization that serves the President in overseeing the national security implications of foreign investment in the economy. After considering the two conditions listed above (other laws are inadequate or inappropriate, and he has credible evidence that a foreign transaction will impair national security), the President is granted almost unlimited authority to take " such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the national security of the United States ." Through the Exon-Florio provision, Congress attempted to strengthen the President's hand in conducting foreign investment policy, while limiting its own role as a means of emphasizing that, as much as possible, the commercial nature of investment transactions should be free from political considerations. 110-49 , the Foreign Investment and National security Act of 2007. P.L. Conclusions
The broad sweep of industrial sectors in the economy that fall within the terms "critical infrastructure," "homeland security," and "key resources" reflects a fundamental change in the way some in Congress view national economic security. As a result, Congress and the Bush Administration sparred at times over transactions that CFIUS had approved over the objections of various Members of Congress. The Dubai Ports World case, in particular, demonstrated that there was a difference between the post-September 11, 2001, expectations held by many in Congress about the role of foreign investment in the economy and of economic infrastructure issues as a component of national security. These and other concerns about foreign investment underscore the significant differences that remained between Congress and the Bush Administration over the operations of CFIUS and over the economic and security objectives the Committee should be pursuing. Instead, Huawei discontinued its efforts to acquire the U.S. firm. | The President is generally seen as exercising broad discretionary authority over developing and implementing U.S. direct investment policy, including the authority to suspend or block investments that "threaten to impair the national security." Congress is also directly involved in formulating the scope and direction of U.S. foreign investment policy. At times, some Members have urged the President to be more aggressive in blocking certain types of foreign investments. Such confrontations reflect vastly different philosophical and political views between Members of Congress and between Congress and the Administration over the role foreign investment plays in the economy and the role that economic activities should play in the context of U.S. national security policy. In July 2007, Congress asserted its own role in making and conducting foreign investment policy when it adopted and the President signed P.L. 110-49, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007. This law broadens Congress's oversight role, and it explicitly includes the areas of homeland security and critical infrastructure as separately identifiable components of national security that the President must consider when evaluating the national security implications of a foreign investment transaction. At times, the act has drawn Congress into a greater dialogue over the role of foreign investment in the economy, and conflicts with the Administration over efforts to define the limits of the broad rubric of national economic security. |
crs_R40744 | crs_R40744_0 | C ommonly known as the "8(a) Program," the Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program is one of several federal contracting programs for small businesses. The 8(a) Program provides participating small businesses with training, technical assistance, and contracting opportunities in the form of set-asides and sole-source awards. A "set-aside" is an acquisition in which only certain contractors may compete, while a sole-source award is a contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition. However, small businesses owned by Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs), Community Development Corporations (CDCs), Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs) are eligible for the 8(a) Program under somewhat different terms. In FY2014, the federal government spent over $16 billion on contracts and subcontracts with 8(a) firms. Other programs provide similar assistance to other types of small businesses (e.g., women-owned, HUBZone). Later, the SBA established by regulation that personal net worth of less than $250,000 at the time of entry into the 8(a) Program ($750,000 for continuing eligibility) constitutes economic disadvantage. Requirements In General
Eligibility for the 8(a) Program
Eligibility for the 8(a) Program is limited to "small business[es] which [are] unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States, and which demonstrate[] potential for success." Each of these terms is further defined by the Small Business Act; regulations that the SBA has promulgated to implement Section 8(a); and judicial and administrative decisions. "Business"
Except for small agricultural cooperatives, a "business" is a for-profit entity that has a place of business located in the United States and operates primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy by paying taxes or using American products, materials, or labor. "Small"
A business is "small" if it is independently owned and operated; is not dominant in its field of operations; and meets any definitions or standards established by the Administrator of the SBA. Ownership is "unconditional" when it is not subject to any conditions precedent or subsequent, executory agreements, voting trusts, restrictions on or assignments of voting rights, or other arrangements that could cause the benefits of ownership to go to another entity. "Control is not the same as ownership" and includes both strategic policy setting and day-to-day management and administration of business operations. "Demonstrated potential for success"
For a firm to have demonstrated potential for success, it generally must have been in business in the field of its primary industry classification for at least two full years immediately prior to the date of its application to the 8(a) Program. Constitutionality of the 8(a) Program
The 8(a) Program has periodically been challenged on the grounds that the presumption that members of certain racial and ethnic groups are disadvantaged violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The outcomes in early challenges to the program varied, with some courts finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring such challenges because they were not economically disadvantaged, or were otherwise ineligible for the program; and other courts finding that the program was unconstitutional as applied in specific cases. More recently, in its 2012 decision in DynaLantic Corporation v. U.S. Department of Defense , the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that the 8(a) Program was not unconstitutional on its face because (1) "breaking down barriers to minority business development created by discrimination and its lingering effects" constitutes a compelling government interest; (2) the government had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that race-based action was necessary to further this interest; and (3) the 8(a) Program is narrowly tailored to "minimize the burden on non-minority firms." In particular, in its brief discussion, the court noted the following six factors:
1. alternative, race-neutral remedies had proved unsuccessful in addressing the discrimination targeted here; 2. the 8(a) Program is "appropriately flexible" because it imposes no quotas and prescribes no consequences for failure to meet the aspirational goals as to the percentage of federal contract dollars awarded to small disadvantaged businesses; 3. the program is neither under- nor over-inclusive, since it "does not provide that every member of a minority group is disadvantaged"; 4. the program imposes temporal limits on individuals' participation in the program, and SBA continuously monitors participants' eligibility; 5. the aspirational goals for contracting with small disadvantaged businesses are "numerically proportionate" to the evidence regarding the availability of minority firms that are ready, able, and willing to perform government contracts; and 6. various aspects of the 8(a) Program minimize the program's burden on non-minority firms (e.g., SBA cannot accept a contract for award through the 8(a) Program if it determines that doing so would have an "adverse impact" on other small businesses). | Commonly known as the "8(a) Program," the Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program is one of several federal contracting programs for small businesses. The 8(a) Program provides participating small businesses with training, technical assistance, and contracting opportunities in the form of set-asides and sole-source awards. A "set-aside" is an acquisition in which only certain contractors may compete, while a sole-source award is a contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition. In FY2014, the federal government spent over $16 billion on contracts and subcontracts with 8(a) firms. Other programs provide similar assistance to other types of small businesses (e.g., women-owned, HUBZone).
Eligibility for the 8(a) Program is generally limited to small businesses "unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States" that demonstrate "potential for success." Each of these terms is further defined by the Small Business Act, regulations promulgated by the Small Business Administration (SBA), and judicial and administrative decisions.
A "business" is generally a for-profit entity that has a place of business located in the United States and operates primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy by paying taxes or using American products, materials, or labor. A business is "small" if it is independently owned and operated; is not dominant in its field of operations; and meets any definitions or standards established by the Administrator of Small Business. Ownership is "unconditional" when it is not subject to any conditions precedent or subsequent, executory agreements, or similar limitations. "Control" is not the same as ownership and includes both strategic policy setting and day-to-day administration of business operations.
Members of certain racial and ethnic groups are presumed to be socially disadvantaged, although individuals who do not belong to these groups may prove they are also socially disadvantaged. To be economically disadvantaged, an individual must have a net worth of less than $250,000 (excluding ownership in the 8(a) firm and equity in one's primary residence) at the time of entry into the program. This amount increases to $750,000 for continuing eligibility. In determining whether an applicant has good character, SBA looks for criminal conduct, violations of SBA regulations, or debarment or suspension from federal contracting. For a firm to have "potential for success," it generally must have been in business in the field of its primary industry classification for two years immediately prior to applying to the program. However, small businesses owned by Alaska Native Corporations, Community Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations are eligible for the 8(a) Program under somewhat different terms.
The 8(a) Program has periodically been challenged on the grounds that the presumption that members of certain racial and ethnic groups are disadvantaged violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The outcomes in early challenges to the program varied, with some courts finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not economically disadvantaged. Most recently, two federal district court decisions found that the program is not unconstitutional on its face because (1) "breaking down barriers to minority business development created by discrimination and its lingering effects" constitutes a compelling government interest; (2) the government had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that race-based action was necessary to further this interest; and (3) the 8(a) Program is narrowly tailored to "minimize the burden on non-minority firms." However, in one of these cases, the court did find that the program was unconstitutional as applied in the military simulation and training industry because the government conceded it had no evidence of discrimination in this industry. The decision in one case was appealed. The litigation in the other has reportedly been settled. |
crs_R44718 | crs_R44718_0 | Introduction
The 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. This report provides information on Division B of the law. Summary of Provisions
Division B begins before Title VI with the short title (Section 6000), "Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Reform Act of 2016." Title VI—Strengthening Leadership and Accountability
Subtitle A—Leadership
Subtitle A makes changes to the leadership, organization, and responsibilities of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that has primary responsibility for increasing access to community-based services to prevent and treat mental disorders and substance use disorders. Subtitle B—Oversight and Accountability
Subtitle B creates new planning and evaluation requirements, changes reporting and accounting requirements for state-designated protection and advocacy systems, and requires a report by the Comptroller General on programs funded by SAMHSA's Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness (PAIMI) grants. Title VII—Ensuring Mental and Substance Use Disorders Prevention, Treatment, and Recovery Programs Keep Pace with Science and Technology
Title VII establishes within SAMHSA a "National Mental Health Policy Laboratory," codifies SAMHSA's National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (which was not previously explicitly authorized in statute), and authorizes appropriations for SAMHSA's Programs of Regional and National Significance (for which authorizations of appropriations had expired). 114-255 . Title VIII—Supporting State Prevention Activities and Responses to Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Needs
Title VIII focuses on SAMHSA's two biggest programs: the Community Mental Health Services Block Grant (MHBG, $533 million in FY2016) and the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant (SABG, $1.9 billion in FY2016). Title IX—Promoting Access to Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Care
Subtitle A—Helping Individuals and Families
Changes to Existing Programs and Activities
Treatment Systems for Homeless
PHSA Section 506 authorizes a SAMHSA-administered program commonly known as Treatment Systems for Homeless. It included various other requirements (e.g., application, allowable uses of funds, and reporting). It authorized appropriations through FY2003. Subtitle B—Strengthening the Health Care Workforce
Changes to Existing Programs and Activities
Mental and Behavioral Health Training Grants
PHSA Section 756 authorizes a program commonly known as Mental and Behavioral Health Training Grants, which is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). The section also requires the Secretary to sponsor an annual conference on mental and behavioral health on college campuses. Title X—Strengthening Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Care for Children and Adolescents
Changes to Existing Grant Programs
Children's Mental Health Services
PHSA Title V, Part E (Sections 561–565), authorizes a SAMHSA-administered program commonly known as Children's Mental Health Services. It also makes technical edits. Clarification of Permitted Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information
Title XI (Section 11003) requires OCR, not later than one year after enactment, to issue guidance clarifying the circumstances—consistent with the HIPAA privacy standards—under which health care providers (and other HIPAA-covered entities) may communicate with family members, caregivers, and law enforcement about individuals seeking or receiving treatment for mental health or substance use disorders. Development and Dissemination of Model Training Programs
Title XI (Section 11004) requires the Secretary, not later than one year after enactment, to develop, disseminate, and periodically update model programs for training health care providers, lawyers, and patients and their families on the permitted uses and disclosures of PHI of individuals seeking or receiving treatment for mental health or substance use disorders, consistent with the HIPAA privacy and security standards. Title XII (Section 12001) addresses Medicaid's same-day services prohibition. The letter should include opportunities for demonstration projects under the SSA Section 1115 waiver authority to improve care for such individuals. Study and Report on Medicaid Emergency Psychiatric Demonstration Project
Medicaid's IMD exclusion limits the circumstances under which federal Medicaid matching funds are available for inpatient mental health care. Electronic Visit Verification System for Personal Care Services and Home Health Care Services
Federal Medicaid law requires states to cover certain populations and benefits, but states have discretion to cover other optional populations and services. Title XIII—Mental Health Parity
Title XIII includes provisions related to mental health parity and provisions related to eating disorders, as well as one provision applying mental health parity to eating disorder benefits. Changes to Existing Grant Programs
Subtitle A amends the authorizing legislation for several Department of Justice (DOJ) programs and one Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant program. Broadly, the amendments made by Subtitle A expand the scope of these programs to allow funds to be used to assist people with mental illness, substance use problems, or co-occurring substance abuse and mental health issues. Subtitle B—Comprehensive Justice and Mental Health
Subtitle B makes several changes to the Justice and Mental Health Collaboration program. The amendments largely expand the scope of the program so grants may be used for additional purposes to help respond to people involved in the criminal justice system who have substance abuse, mental health, or co-occurring disorders. | This report summarizes the Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Reform Act of 2016, enacted on December 13, 2016, as Division B of the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255). Division B comprises Title VI through Title XIV. The first five titles in Division B (Title VI – Title X) deal primarily with the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). SAMHSA is the federal agency with primary responsibility for increasing access to community-based services to prevent and treat mental disorders and substance use disorders. The next four titles in Division B (Title XI – Title XIV) deal with confidentiality of patient records, Medicaid, mental health parity, and criminal justice programs.
Title VI "Strengthening Leadership and Accountability"
Within Title VI, Subtitle A makes changes to HHS and SAMHSA's leadership, structure, and responsibilities. Subtitle B creates new planning and evaluation requirements, changes reporting and accounting requirements for state-designated protection and advocacy systems, and requires a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on programs funded by SAMHSA's Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness grants. Subtitle C requires the HHS Secretary to establish an Interdepartmental Serious Mental Illness Coordinating Committee.
Title VII "Ensuring Mental and Substance Use Disorders Prevention, Treatment, and Recovery Programs Keep Pace with Science and Technology"
Title VII establishes within SAMHSA a "National Mental Health Policy Laboratory," codifies SAMHSA's existing National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (which was not previously explicitly authorized in statute), and authorizes appropriations for SAMHSA's Programs of Regional and National Significance (for which authorizations of appropriations had expired).
Title VIII "Supporting State Prevention Activities and Responses to Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Needs"
Title VIII focuses on SAMHSA's two biggest programs: the Community Mental Health Services Block Grant (MHBG, $533 million in FY2016) and the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant (SABG, $1.9 billion in FY2016). It makes various changes—some increasing flexibility, some imposing additional requirements, and some codifying current practice. It also requires a study on the formulas for distributing MHBG and SABG funds.
Title IX "Promoting Access to Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Care"
Within Title IX, Subtitle A reauthorizes and modifies various programs and activities (most of which are administered by SAMHSA), codifies existing SAMHSA-administered programs and activities, authorizes new SAMHSA-administered programs and activities, and repeals statutory authorities for programs that have never been funded. Subtitle B focuses on the mental health and substance use disorder workforce—authorizing, reauthorizing, or amending several programs and activities, most of which are administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within HHS. Subtitle C authorizes or reauthorizes SAMHSA-administered programs and activities focused on mental health on college campuses.
Title X "Strengthening Mental and Substance Use Disorder Care for Children and Adolescents"
Title X focuses on expanding access to community mental and behavioral health services for youth. It reauthorizes and modifies several SAMHSA-administered programs and activities. It also establishes several new grant programs.
Title XI "Compassionate Communication on HIPAA"
Title XI focuses on confidentiality of patient records and the circumstances under which health care providers (and other entities) may communicate with family members, caregivers, and law enforcement about individuals seeking or receiving treatment for mental disorders or substance use disorders. It requires dissemination of model programs for training health care providers, lawyers, and patients and their families on permitted disclosures.
Title XII "Medicaid Mental Health Coverage"
Title XII focuses on Medicaid. It includes a rule of construction related to same-day services. It requires studies and reports related to Medicaid managed care regulation and (separately) Medicaid's Emergency Psychiatric Demonstration Project. It requires a letter from the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services to State Medicaid Directors regarding opportunities for innovation under the Social Security Act (SSA) Section 1115 waiver authority. It requires the use of an electronic visit verification system for personal care services and home health care services under Medicaid.
Title XIII "Mental Health Parity"
Title XIII focuses on mental health parity and (separately) eating disorders, as well as the application of parity to eating disorder benefits. It amends federal parity law to include provisions aimed at improving compliance and requires a GAO report on compliance. It authorizes activities to educate the public and health professionals about eating disorders.
Title XIV "Mental Health and Safe Communities"
Title XIV amends the authorizing legislation for several Department of Justice (DOJ) programs and one Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant program. Broadly, the amendments made by Subtitle A expand the scope of these programs to allow funds to be used to assist people with mental illness, substance use problems, or co-occurring substance abuse and mental health issues. Subtitle B makes several changes to the Justice and Mental Health Collaboration program. The amendments largely expand the scope of the program, so grants may be used for additional purposes to help respond to people involved in the criminal justice system who have substance abuse, mental health, or co-occurring disorders. |
crs_RL32980 | crs_RL32980_0 | Introduction
Enforcement of child support often results in custodial parents and noncustodial parentsbeing in an adversarial relationship. Thus, the custodial parent has access to a network offederal and state resources that are not available to the noncustodial parent. 240 and S. 667 , 109th Congress) that would provide funding formarriage promotion and responsible fatherhood programs. The pending welfare reauthorization legislation (mentioned above) contains incentives forstates to send more of the child support collected on behalf of custodial parents to the family itself,additional CSE enforcement tools, funding for programs designed to promote marriage amonglow-income persons as a way to improve the economic well-being and development of children, andfunding for programs designed to help noncustodial fathers meet both their financial and emotionalresponsibilities to their children. Supporters of the welfare reauthorization legislation claim that itspassage will result in more noncustodial parents paying child support. They contend thatnoncustodial parents who can afford to pay child support but who do not want to pay will not be ableto escape their duty because of the strong enforcement apparatus, and that noncustodial parents whocannot afford to pay will be offered services that may improve their financial ability to pay as wellas their willingness to pay. Although noncustodial parents often find themselves at loggerheads with custodial parentsand the CSE system with respect to paternity and child support, the situation is usually morecomplicated than deadbeat dad vs. dependent mom. Supportersof this approach maintain that providing legal services to noncustodial parents may result in childsupport payments becoming a more reliable source of income for custodial parents becausenoncustodial parents would have had greater access to the legal system and be more satisfied that"they had their day in court" and thereby be more amenable to fulfilling their child supportobligations. Child Support Issues Faced by Noncustodial Parents
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act) wasenacted in January 1975 ( P.L. As mentioned earlier, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) is a private, non-profit, federallyfunded corporation established in 1974 by Congress. In FY2004, the LSC distributed $316.6million of its $335.3 million appropriation in the form of grants to 143 local legal services programs. Rather, it funds local legalservices providers, which are referred to by the LSC as "grantees." These local programs providelegal assistance to individuals based on locally determined priorities that meet local communityconditions and needs. Thus, to a certain extent, it is up to noncustodial parents to advocate on their own behalf andto make the communities in which they live aware of the problems that they face with regard tocountering unjustified allegations of paternity, obtaining fair child support orders, meeting their childsupport obligations, getting child supports orders modified when they have a change in financialcircumstances, seeking custody or visitation rights, and re-establishing family and community ties. With only an estimated 20% of eligible recipients receiving legal services (when they need suchservices), low-income noncustodial parents must compete to be included as customers in a programthat does not have the resources to serve all who are eligible for its services. | Enforcement of child support often results in custodial parents and noncustodial parentsbeing in an adversarial relationship. Noncustodial parents often view it as an unbalancedrelationship, because custodial parents have access to a network of federal and state resources (e.g.,the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) agency and the welfare agency) that are not available to thenoncustodial parent.
Pending welfare reauthorization legislation ( H.R. 240 and S. 667 )includes incentives for states to send more of the child support collected on behalf of custodialparents to the family itself, additional CSE enforcement tools, funding for marriage promotionprograms for low-income persons, and funding for programs designed to help noncustodial fathersmeet both their financial and emotional responsibilities to their children. Supporters of the welfarereauthorization legislation claim that its passage will result in more noncustodial parents paying childsupport. They contend that noncustodial parents who can afford to, but do not, pay child support willnot be able to escape their duty because of the strong enforcement apparatus, and that noncustodialparents who cannot afford to pay will be offered services that may improve their financial ability topay, as well as their willingness to pay.
In situations in which noncustodial parents find themselves at loggerheads with custodialparents and the CSE system with respect to paternity and child support, some have encouraged legalservices providers to play a more "balanced" role. They maintain that providing legal services tononcustodial parents could result in child support payments becoming a more reliable source ofincome for custodial parents if noncustodial parents were provided better access to the legal systemand were satisfied that "they had their day in court" and thereby more amenable to paying childsupport. This report describes some of the child support issues faced by noncustodial parents anddiscusses areas in which legal services providers funded by the Legal Services Corporation (LSC)are authorized to support poor noncustodial parents.
The LSC is a private, non-profit, federally funded corporation established by Congress toprovide financial support for civil legal assistance for persons unable to afford legal help. InFY2004, the LSC distributed $316.6 million of its $335.3 million appropriation in the form of grantsto 143 local legal services programs. Local programs provide legal assistance to individuals basedon locally determined priorities that meet local community conditions and needs. Thus, to a certainextent, it is necessary for noncustodial parents to advocate on their own behalf, that is, to make thecommunities in which they live aware of the problems that they face with regard to counteringunjustified allegations of paternity, obtaining fair child support orders, meeting their child supportobligations, getting child support orders modified when they have a change in financialcircumstances, seeking custody or visitation rights, and re-establishing family and community tiesafter incarceration. With only an estimated 20% of eligible clients receiving legal services (whenthey need such services), low-income noncustodial parents must now compete to be included asclients in a program that does not have the resources to serve all who are eligible for its services. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41196 | crs_R41196_0 | Introduction
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law comprehensive health care reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148), as passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009, and by the House of Representatives on March 21, 2010. On March 30, 2010, the President signed into law H.R. The Reconciliation Act makes changes to a number of Medicare-related provisions in PPACA and adds several new provisions. 111-309), signed into law on December 15, 2010, also modified certain PPACA provisions affecting Medicare. CBO estimates on the Medicare-related provisions in PPACA and the Reconciliation Act indicate that absent interaction effects, net reductions in Medicare direct spending will reach close to $400 billion over the FY2010-FY2019 period. Reducing Medicare payments to hospitals that serve a large number of low-income patients, known as disproportionate share (DSH) hospitals, is expected to decrease expenditures by about $22 billion. Creating an Independent Payment Advisory Board to make changes in Medicare payment rates is expected to save approximately $16 billion over 10 years. Additionally, a new Hospital Insurance tax on taxable wages over $200,000 per year for single filers ($250,000 for joint filers) is expected to raise $87 billion from FY2013 through FY2019, and a new tax on investment income is projected to raise an additional $123 billion over 10 years. Payment Rate Changes Affecting Medicare Fee-for-Service Providers
Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years of age and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. For instance, the program provides for annual updates of Medicare payments to reflect inflation and other factors. In addition, the Reconciliation Act provided a rebate of $250 to enrollees who entered the coverage gap in 2010 and phases out the Part D doughnut hole by gradually reducing the cost-sharing during the coverage gap for both brand-name and generic drugs until it equals 25% of the negotiated price of the drug in 2020 (similar to cost-sharing under the initial coverage limit). For example, a provision in PPACA requires the establishment of a national, voluntary pilot program that will bundle payments for physician and hospital as well as post-acute care services with the goal of improving patient care and reducing spending. PPACA and the Reconciliation Act contain provisions designed to reduce direct Medicare program spending by approximately $400 billion over the next 10 years through adjustments in payments to certain types of providers, by equalizing payment rates between Medicare Advantage and fee-for-service Medicare, and by increasing efficiencies in the way that health services are paid for and delivered. Selected Medicare Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010
This appendix provides an overview of the majority of Medicare-related provisions in PPACA and the Reconciliation Act, including a brief description of the law prior to enactment, a description of the provision and, where possible, the associated CBO score for each provision. Additionally, changes made by the Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act of 2010 (P.L. PPACA repeals this program. According to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L. Funding Outreach and Assistance for Low-Income Programs. Reducing Part D Premium Subsidy for High-Income Beneficiaries. The income thresholds will be set in a similar manner to those under Part B. These advisory reports will not be subject to the rules for congressional consideration. CMS has implemented regulations requiring providers and suppliers to complete an application to enroll in the Medicare program and receive billing privileges. Enhanced Medicare and Medicaid Program Integrity Provisions. | Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years old and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. The rising cost of health care, the impact of the aging baby boomer generation, and declining revenues in a weakened economy continue to challenge the program's ability to provide quality and effective health services to its 47 million beneficiaries in a financially sustainable manner.
On March 23, 2010, the President signed into law H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148), as passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009, and the House on March 21, 2010. The new law will, among other things, make numerous statutory changes to the Medicare program. On March 30, 2010, the President signed into law H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (the "Reconciliation Act," or HCERA; P.L. 111-152), which modifies a number of Medicare provisions in PPACA and adds several new provisions. Several PPACA provisions were also modified by the Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-309), which was signed into law on December 15, 2010.
This report, one of a series of CRS products on PPACA and the Reconciliation Act, examines the Medicare related provisions in these Acts. Estimates from CBO on PPACA and the Reconciliation Act indicate that net reductions in Medicare direct spending (absent interaction effects) will reach close to $400 billion from FY2010 to FY2019. Major savings are expected from constraining Medicare's annual payment increases for certain providers, tying maximum Medicare Advantage payments near or below spending in fee-for-service Medicare, reducing payments to hospitals that serve a large number of low-income patients, creating an Independent Payment Advisory Board to make changes in Medicare payment rates, and modifying the high-income threshold adjustment for Part B premiums. A new Hospital Insurance tax for high-wage earners will also raise approximately $87 billion over 10 years, and a new Medicare tax on net investment income, added by the Reconciliation Act, is expected to raise an additional $123 billion over 10 years.
Other provisions in PPACA address more systemic issues, such as increasing the efficiency and quality of Medicare services and strengthening program integrity. For example, PPACA requires the establishment of a national, voluntary pilot program that will bundle payments for physician, hospital, and post-acute care services with the goal of improving patient care and reducing spending. Another provision adjusts payments to hospitals for readmissions related to certain potentially preventable conditions. In addition, PPACA subjects providers and suppliers to enhanced screening before allowing them to participate in the Medicare program, and both PPACA and the Reconciliation Act increase funding for anti-fraud activities.
PPACA also improves some benefits provided to Medicare beneficiaries. For instance, Medicare prescription drug program enrollees will receive a 50% discount off the price of brand-name drugs during the coverage gap (the "doughnut hole") starting in 2011, and the coverage gap will be phased out by 2020. Other provisions expand assistance for some low-income beneficiaries enrolled in the Medicare drug program, and eliminate beneficiary copayments for certain preventive care services.
This report reflects the Medicare provisions at the time of the enactment of PPACA and HCERA. It is meant to serve as a historical reference to the complete set of Medicare provisions included in the laws, as of March 30, 2010. It will not be updated to capture subsequent legislative changes, program guidance, public notices, or rulemaking. |
crs_RL31355 | crs_RL31355_0 | The Situation Before September 11, 2001
Even before the current crisis, Afghanistan had suffered twenty-two years of war, which included a long Sovietoccupation,followed by civil war, and, beginning in 1996, harsh Taliban rule in most of the country. These factors, in combination with aseveredrought over the last three years, produced enormous human suffering in Afghanistan. (3)
The United States has been the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan through itscontributions to the UNHCR, other agencies, and NGOs. Plans for Security
The International Security Assistance Force. It is anticipated that a total of 2,500 Afghans will be trained by the endof 2002. Current Operating Environment
The humanitarian needs and support required for a recovery in Afghanistan must be understood in the contextof thecontinuing vast numbers of refugees and IDPs, the variations among the regions in which they are located, and thepoliticaland security situation throughout the country. Population Movements
Population movements continue in and out of and within Afghanistan. Food Security
Afghanistan has had three years of drought, although there have been periods of precipitation in different parts of thecountry. UNDP and World Bankofficials estimate that the reconstruction of Afghanistan will require $1.7 billion in the first year, $10 billion over5 years,and $15 billion in the next decade. The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held in Tokyo on January 21 and 22, 2002 (15) gave the then AIA a chance to demonstrate its commitment to the next phase of Afghanistan's recovery and theinternational donor community an opportunity to come together and formally demonstrate support for this initiative. Thesixty-one countries and twenty-one international organizations represented pledged $1.8 billion for 2002. (16) The United States hopes that other nations will carry a greaterportion of the costs for reconstruction andpeacekeeping since it has paid for most of the military campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. U.S. Reconstruction Assistance. As U.S. troops make headway on finishing the Afghan phase of the war,thereare many questions about ensuring a secure environment for reconstruction. What role should the United States play in drug enforcement and the war on terrorism inside Afghanistan? Oversight and Coordination of Aid Projects
In order to keep the support of the international community, reconstruction efforts need to demonstrate the effective use offunds and their distribution. It is also partof abroader effort to include Afghan organizations in the recovery and reconstruction effort which will be important forthetransfer of responsibilities and capabilities in the future. So far, there is little development-type aid in the U.S. pledge, although some is focused on quick impact programs,long-term agriculture, women and children, and education. While the hunt for the Taliban and Al Qaeda continues, the potential formistakentargets remains a risk. | For the past 22 years, Afghanistan has been embroiled in conflict. Humanitarian assistance programs have been a key partof the overall multilateral effort to relieve human suffering and assist refugees and internally displaced persons(IDPs). Since September 11, 2001, while actions are still being taken to eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda forces and otherssupporting terrorism, the needs have only become more urgent.
The case of Afghanistan may present a special category of crisis, in which the United States and others play a significantrole in the war on terrorism while simultaneously providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to theinnocentcivilians caught in the crossfire. Moreover, the conditions in Afghanistan represent a challenging mix ofinfrastructuredestruction, ongoing security concerns, and humanitarian needs requiring an immediate response. So far, theinternationalcommunity has recognized that large amounts of aid and resources will be required in the reconstruction effort. Inaddition,a long-term commitment will be necessary to ensure a stable, democratic Afghanistan emerges and will not fall preyto thetwin evils of drugs and terrorism.
While continuing to hunt down Al Qaeda forces within Afghanistan, transitional and reconstruction assistance has alsomoved ahead. An examination of the progress of reconstruction efforts and aid priorities in the last year reveals thecomplexity of the tasks ahead and raises questions about the the long-term role to be played by the United States. Congress may continue to look at the contributions by and responsibilities of key allies partnering in the effortswithinAfghanistan. The current operating environment demonstrates ongoing challenges for the government and peopleofAfghanistan and for the international community, such as security issues, population movements, food security,environment and infrastructure, health, and education. While the international donors conference in January 2001indicateda strong willingness on the part of the international community to assist in the restoration of Afghanistan, it alsorevealedthe cost could amount to more than $15 billion over the next decade. A total of $1.8 billion was pledged for 2002,althoughsome pledges have not yet been fulfilled.
The many moving parts of the war on terrorism coupled with the uncertainty of developments within Afghanistan makelong-term planning and exit strategies impossible at this stage. Still, of potential, immediate interest to Congressaresecurity concerns, support of the transitional administration, oversight and coordination of aid projects, and theplight ofwomen and children. |
crs_R43114 | crs_R43114_0 | Advances in science and technology can help drive economic growth, improve human health, increase agricultural productivity, and help meet national priorities. The federal government establishes and maintains the legal and regulatory framework that affects science and technology activities in the private sector. Many science and technology policy issues may come before the 113 th Congress. Each issue section provides some background information and outlines the policy issues that may be considered. Overarching S&T Policy Issues
Several issues of potential congressional interest apply to federal science and technology policy in general. In addition, there are dozens of informal congressional caucuses in areas of S&T policy such as research and development, specific S&T disciplines, and STEM education. For Further Information
[author name scrubbed], Specialist in Science and Technology Policy ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
CRS Report RL34736, The President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
Federal Funding for Research and Development
The federal government has long supported the advancement of scientific knowledge and technological development through investments in research and development (R&D). This report included 212 recommendations for a coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy spanning a broad range of topics including ocean science and technology. For Further Information
[author name scrubbed], Analyst in Natural Resources Policy ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
Energy
The science and technology related-energy issues that may come before the 113 th Congress include the funding and role of the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy and the Department of Energy Office of Science, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the development of biofuels and of ocean energy technology. | Science and technology (S&T) have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Public and private research and development spurs scientific and technological advancement. Such advances can drive economic growth, help address national priorities, and improve health and quality of life. The constantly changing nature and ubiquity of science and technology frequently create public policy issues of congressional interest.
The federal government supports scientific and technological advancement by directly funding research and development and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government establishes and enforces regulatory frameworks governing many aspects of S&T activities.
This report briefly outlines an array of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 113th Congress. Given the ubiquity of science and technology and its constantly evolving nature, some science and technology related-issues not discussed in this report may come before the 113th Congress. The selected issues are grouped into 11 categories:
Overarching S&T issues, Workforce and Education, Agriculture, Biomedical Research and Development, Physical Science and Material Sciences Defense, Space, Environment, Energy, Homeland Security, and Information Technology.
Each of these categories includes concise analysis of multiple policy issues. The information and analysis presented in this report should be viewed as introductory rather than comprehensive. Each section identifies available CRS reports and the appropriate CRS experts for further information and analysis. |
crs_R41085 | crs_R41085_0 | Introduction
Some lawmakers have expressed concern over the impact on small business of several proposed increases in the income tax rates for high-income individuals being considered in the current Congress. Upper-income individuals would also face higher marginal tax rates under the versions of health care reform legislation passed by the House ( H.R. 2786 to H.R. The House measure would impose a surtax equal to 5.4% of modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) in excess of $500,000 for single filers and in excess of $1 million for joint filers. Proponents of the proposed rate hikes say they are needed to raise revenue for a variety of crucial budgetary purposes (including reducing projected federal budget deficits). In their view, the hikes would also reverse the decline in the progressivity of the individual income tax ushered in by the sweeping tax cuts enacted during the Bush Administration. Using a micro-simulation model, economists at the Tax Policy Center (TPC) jointly managed by the Urban Institute and the Brookings Institution have generated a distribution of small business income and filers with such income by tax bracket for 2007 and 2009. Still, a line must be drawn between small business income and all other sources of income in order to determine the share of small business owners and small business income that could be affected by an increase in the marginal tax rates affecting upper-income individuals. In both cases, such an owner is anyone who reports any income or loss on Schedule C (self-employment income), Schedule E (income from rents, royalties, partnerships, limited liability companies, and S corporations), and Schedule F (farm income). On the other hand, the definition has several limitations that call into question its usefulness for policy analysis. So given the limitations of any distribution of small business owners and income by tax bracket that relies on the TPC/Treasury definition, its results should be viewed as illustrative or suggestive rather than definitive or conclusive. Less than 2% of tax filers in those brackets in both 2007 and 2009 reported any small business income. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that even after allowing for the limitations to the measurement of small business income in the TPC analysis, a tiny share of individual taxpayers who own and are actively involved in the management of firms that many would regard as small on the basis of their employment, revenue, or asset size would be affected by an increase in the top two individual tax rates. Finally, the results suggest that the proposed tax hikes for upper-income individuals would affect a greater share of small business income than small business owners. In 2007 and 2009, small business income represented an average of 30% of AGI for filers in the 33% tax bracket, and an average of 35% of AGI for filers in the 35% bracket; by contrast, the average for all taxpayers (including non-filers) was 14%. For the third scenario, the individual rate stays at 39.6% and the corporate rate at 35%, but the capital gains rate rises to 20% (as proposed by the Obama Administration for 2011 and beyond). The distribution of taxable income among the main forms of business organization can affect the amount of revenue flowing into the U.S. Treasury. Small Business Formation and Investment
Federal tax policy has the potential to affect the performance of small firms through its impact on the incentives for savings, investment, and entry into self-employment. Critics of the proposed increases in the marginal tax rates for high-income taxpayers claim they would harm the domestic climate for small business formation and investment. The availability of investment tax incentives and other business tax benefits may lessen or offset the dampening effect of such a rise. | Some lawmakers have expressed concern over several proposals being considered in the current Congress to raise the tax burden on high-income individuals. Of particular concern are a proposal by the Obama Administration to allow the top two individual marginal tax rates (currently 33% and 35%) to return to their pre-2001 levels of 36% and 39.6%, starting in 2011, and a provision in the health care reform bill passed by the House (H.R. 3962) to impose a 5.4% surtax on the modified adjusted gross incomes (MAGIs) of single filers above $500,000 and the MAGIs of joint filers above $1 million, also starting in 2011. Critics claim the proposed tax hikes would undermine the economic incentives for small business formation and investment.
By contrast, backers of the Administration's proposal say it is needed to raise revenue during a time of large budget deficits, inject greater progressivity into the federal income tax in the wake of the sweeping tax cuts enacted during the Bush Administration, and promote a fairer distribution by income level of the cost of government services. A similar argument underlies support for the surtax in H.R. 3962.
One approach to evaluating the contention that the proposed tax hikes would harm small business investment, formation, and growth is to examine the distribution of small business income and the tax returns of small business owners by tax bracket. Two critical considerations in undertaking such an evaluation are the definition of small business income and ownership and its compatibility with available federal income tax data.
An analysis by the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center (TPC) of the distribution of small business income and tax filers reporting such income by tax bracket in 2007 and 2009 defines a small business owner as anyone who reports income or loss on Schedule C (self-employment income), Schedule E (income from rents, royalties, partnerships, limited liability companies, and S corporations), and Schedule F (income from farming). Such a broad definition arguably has more disadvantages than advantages, calling into question its usefulness for policy analysis. So any results based on such a definition should be seen as illustrative or suggestive rather than definitive or conclusive.
The TPC analysis found that a small share of small business owners would likely be affected by the proposed tax hikes: an average of less than 2% of such individuals were subject to the 33% or 35% marginal tax rates in 2007 and 2009. At the same time, the results suggested that a significant share of small business income could be subject to the higher rates. In 2007 and 2009, small business income represented an average of 30% of adjusted gross income (AGI) for filers in the 33% tax bracket, and an average of 35% of AGI for filers in the 35% bracket; the average for all filers was 14%.
Raising the marginal tax rates facing high-income individuals without changing the top corporate or capital gains tax rates in theory could increase the share of firms organized as C corporations rather than passthrough entities. A shift in the distribution of taxable income among the main forms of business organization might have a significant impact on business tax revenue.
A rate hike also has the potential to harm the domestic climate for small business formation and investment. But current business tax benefits, if retained beyond 2010, would lessen a rate hike's dampening effect on investment, and its impact on the creation of new firms may be difficult to determine. |
crs_RL33666 | crs_RL33666_0 | Introduction
After several years of steady growth, equity (stock) market prices began to rise rapidly in 1995. In 2000, the trend abruptly reversed, and stock prices began a prolonged decline. Shortly thereafter, in March 2001, the longest expansion in history ended, and the economy entered a recession. By September 2002, prices on the S&P 500 had fallen by nearly half from their previous peak, and prices on the NASDAQ were one-quarter of their former peak. In hindsight, it seems clear that some portion (though not all) of the 1990s stock market rise and subsequent decline was indeed caused by a bubble, or an increase in price that is caused by psychological factors, speculation, or error rather than economic fundamentals. According to the house price index (HPI), prices have doubled since 1997 and increased more than 50% since 2003. Mortgage deliquency rates have risen, and as a result, there was widespread financial turmoil in August 2007 that originated with subprime mortgage-backed securities. Some economists have argued that the housing market is also suffering from a bubble, whereas some commentators argue that owner-occupied housing will always be a bargain investment. Should the Federal Reserve have responded to the stock market bubble (and now the housing boom) when it first emerged by raising interest rates to promptly extinguish it before it took off? And given theoretical predictions, how would the Fed be able to accurately identify a bubble? This means that a rise and (even subsequent decline) in price in the housing market is more ambiguous than in the stock market—it could be fundamentals at work (greater demand causes prices to rise, which increases supply with a lag). And it cannot be ruled out that other factors were equally or more to blame for causing the recession than the bursting of the bubble, including the preceding tightening of monetary policy, the disruption caused by the attacks of September 11 (although those occurred near the end of the recession), the increase in oil prices, and the unusually lengthy duration of the expansion, which presumably could not last forever. Of course, lower mortgage rates in recent years have reduced borrowing costs at the same time that higher house prices have raised borrowing costs. Any alternative measure of owner-occupied shelter inflation would need to take both into account. The current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's philosophy on bubbles has closely followed Greenspan's. Rather, they argue, interest rates should respond to the bubble only insofar as the bubble affects inflationary pressures . Policy Response After a Bubble Has Burst
As discussed above, the Fed's belief that monetary policy can be effectively used to counteract the damage done by a deflating bubble is central to its position that it need not interfere with a growing bubble. Conclusion
Bubbles are difficult to identify with confidence until after the fact. Bubbles lead to volatility in investment spending, consumption, and, in the worst case scenario, financial instability. The greatest drawback of the critics' argument is that aggressively raising interest rates to counteract a bubble risks instigating the very recession that they ostensibly wish to avoid. The Fed claims that it will respond to bubbles insofar as they affect economic growth or inflation, but a case can be made that the Fed has underestimated the effect of bubbles on the overall economy, and inflation and growth have been less stable than desired as a result. The Fed did not raise interest rates in the face of unusually rapid increases in stock prices until 1999. The sharp fall in stock prices in 2000 would seem to vindicate the Fed's critics at first glance, but the Fed could also argue the experience proved its policy to be correct. | After several years of steady growth, stock market prices began to rise rapidly in 1995, more than tripling over the next five years. In 2000, stock prices began a prolonged decline. Shortly thereafter, in March 2001, the longest expansion in history ended, and the economy entered a recession. By September 2002, the Standard and Poor's 500 Index had fallen by nearly half from its peak. In hindsight, it is clear that some of the appreciation in stock prices in the 1990s was caused by a "bubble," a rise in price that cannot be attributed to underlying economic fundamentals, but is instead caused by "irrational exuberance."
Around the same time that the stock market boom was coming to an end, the housing boom began. House prices have doubled since 1997 and increased more than 50% from 2003 to 2006. Since 2006, prices have stagnated, while sales and housing construction have declined precipitously. In August 2007, problems with subprime mortgages led to widespread financial turmoil. This has led some analysts to conclude that a similar asset bubble has infected the housing market.
These experiences have led some critics to question the Federal Reserve's (Fed's) policy of non-intervention toward bubbles. If bubbles reflect harmful economic imbalances, they argue, then the proper policy response is to raise interest rates to neutralize them. This proposal faces two main drawbacks. First, bubbles cannot be accurately identified and their magnitude cannot be estimated until after the fact. Theory suggests that the Fed would be able to accurately identify bubbles only if it knew more than the thousands of professionals participating in those markets who believed high prices to be justified. Second, aggressively raising interest rates to counteract a bubble risks instigating the very recession that critics ostensibly wish to avoid. The relative shallowness and brevity of the 2001 recession is seen as evidence in favor of a hands-off policy response to a bubble.
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has argued that the Fed should respond to a bubble only insofar as it causes inflation or growth to rise above sustainable levels, but need not be concerned about eliminating a bubble for its own sake. Bubbles lead to higher investment in the affected industry and consumption spending (by making households feel wealthier). According to Bernanke's philosophy, the Fed could raise interest rates in response to a bubble if this spending increase were inflationary.
Assuming Bernanke's philosophy were correct, the issue of whether the Fed has responded to bubbles aggressively enough in practice to prevent them from igniting inflationary pressures remains. The Fed waited until 1999 to raise interest rates during the stock market boom, and cut rates in 2007 in response to financial turmoil. Both of these episodes have been marked by rising inflation, and if increases in house prices were recorded in the owner-occupied shelter portion of the consumer price index, recorded inflation would be even higher today. Critics also argue that the Fed's passive approach to a growing bubble is inconsistent with its aggressive rate reductions following a bubble's deflation, and this inconsistency sends a message to investors to take on excessive risk. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL30790 | crs_RL30790_0 | Ecuador accounted for 15%of ATPA imports in 1999, followed by Bolivia with only 4%. (9)
Overall, the ATPA trade effects appear to be relatively small. ATPA's Economic Effects on the Andean Countries
Although the trade effects of ATPA were relatively small, there was some indication that the composition of trade changed and that, with a few products, a case can be made that ATPAcontributed to this change. It is possible that the altered composition of U.S. imports from ATPAcountries reflects broader change in what Andean countries were producing and that this in turnpoints to some indirect evidence that ATPA-eligible products were substituted for illicit coca. (11)
Bolivia and Peru. First, reauthorize ATPA for an extended period of time to reinforce the U.S. commitment to the alternative developmentcounternarcotics strategy. Second, extend duty-free treatment to other Andean exports, such astextile and apparel products, to broaden the program effects, particularly in Colombia, which remainsthe most problematic country. Postscript: Legislation in the 107th Congress
On December 4, 2001, ATPA expired and U.S. tariffs were reimposed on affected Andeanexports. On February 15, 2002, the Bush Administration deferred collection of these tariffs for 90days in expectation that the 107th Congress would either reauthorize ATPA or provide a short-termextension of its trade preferences. In part because the ATPA legislation was eventually linked to thelarger debate on trade promotion authority (TPA), Congress was unable to complete work on the billbefore the deferral expired. The ATPA program was reauthorized in the Andean Trade Promotionand Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002 ( H.R. 3009 ), which was signed into law by President Bush on August 6, 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ). All dutyreductions that were in place prior to ATPA's expiration were made retroactive to December 4, 2001and presumably all those duties collected are reimbursable. Changes to ATPA Provisions
As passed into law, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) expresses the findings of Congress that extending and expanding trade preferences to beneficiarycountries continues to be an effective part of a broader U.S. foreign policy to counter illicit drugtrafficking from the Andean region. To enhance the effects of the expired ATPA, it extendspreferential treatment through December 31, 2006 and expands it to cover many exports previouslyexcluded. (27) For this reason alone,although reauthorized ATPA program may still beonly a small part of a large and long-term U.S. counternarcotics effort, expanding duty-freeprovisions to a larger portion of the region's exports, including its growth industries, may have apositive effect on the program's effectiveness. | Following passage by the 102nd Congress, President George Bush signed into law the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) on December 4, 1991( P.L. 102-182 , title II), making it part of amultifaceted strategy to counter illicit drug production and trade in Latin America. For ten years,it provided preferential, mostly duty-free, treatment to selected U.S. imports from Bolivia, Colombia,Ecuador, and Peru. ATPA's goal was to encourage growth of a more diversified Andean exportbase, thereby promoting development and providing an incentive for Andean farmers and otherworkers to pursue economic alternatives to the drug trade.
On December 4, 2001, ATPA expired and U.S. tariffs were reimposed on affected Andean exports. On February 15, 2002, the Bush Administration deferred collection of these tariffs for 90days in expectation that the 107th Congress would either reauthorize ATPA or provide a short-termextension of its trade preferences. In part because the ATPA legislation was eventually linked to thelarger debate on trade promotion authority (TPA), Congress was unable to complete work on the billbefore the deferral expired. The ATPA was eventually reauthorized as the Andean Trade Promotionand Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002 ( H.R. 3009 ), which was signed into law by President Bush on August 6, 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ). All dutyreductions that were in place prior to ATPA's expiration were made retroactive to December 4, 2001and presumably all those duties collected are reimbursable.
In evaluating the ATPA program, its trade effects were shown to have been relatively small, although there was some indication that the composition of trade changed and that, with a fewproducts, a case could be made that ATPA supported this change. It is possible that the slightlyaltered composition of U.S. imports from ATPA countries reflected broader change in what Andeancountries were producing and that this in turn pointed to some indirect evidence that resources onceused for drug-related activity were being redirected toward ATPA-eligible products. IsolatingATPA's role from other counternarcotics and economic diversification programs, however, has beena difficult challenge, producing imprecise estimates.
Supporters of ATPA argued that its effects were evident and proposed that it be reauthorized to reinforce the U.S. commitment to the "alternative development" counternarcotics strategy and thatpreferential treatment be extended to other Andean exports to broaden the program's effects. Ingeneral, the 107th Congress appeared to accept this position. To enhance the effects of ATPA, thereauthorization legislation provides for an extension of trade preferences through December 31,2006, extending them to cover exports previously excluded, including certain textile and apparelarticles, canned tuna, watches and parts, petroleum, footwear, and selected leather bags and goods. Congress was also careful to consider, and in many cases preserve, the interests of domesticproducers. ATPA may be only a small part of a large and long-term counternarcotics effort, butCongress reasoned that expanding duty-free provisions of ATPA to include more exports in growthindustries may have a positive effect on the region. |
crs_R44555 | crs_R44555_0 | Introduction
On July 12, 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is expected to issue a ruling, known as a final "award," in a case between the Philippines and the People's Republic of China (PRC or China). In the case, the Philippines, a U.S. ally, seeks primarily to clarify some of the two countries' potential maritime rights in the South China Sea under UNCLOS, the 1982 Convention that establishes multilateral rules governing the rights of nations over the seas. The United States is not party to the Convention. The Philippines and China are both parties to UNCLOS and accepted its compulsory dispute settlement provisions when they ratified the convention. China, however, has declined to participate in the arbitral tribunal's proceedings. The case has been closely watched for the implications it may have for the tensions between the Philippines and China over their maritime disputes in the South China Sea, for the overlapping claims of China and other governments to maritime rights, for U.S.-China relations, and for international law more broadly. The tribunal's ruling will be legally binding only for the two parties to the dispute—the Philippines and China. U.S. officials have argued, however, that it could help clarify issues relevant to the claims of all the governments contesting territory in the sea—Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Such clarification could help claimants restart conversations about how to manage the sea in ways that lessen the chances for maritime incidents, protect the sea's role as a conduit for as much as $5 trillion in annual commercial shipping, and allow for joint exploitation of fishing stocks and hydrocarbons. Some observers argue that if China refuses to comply with the award, it could risk deepening regional tensions and harming the authority of UNCLOS as an institution and of international law more broadly. Statements Relating to the Arbitration
Obama Administration officials have made several statements supporting the Philippines' right to bring the case and emphasizing that the tribunal's award will be binding on both parties. In the 114 th Congress, S.Res. 183 (Schatz) and S. 2865 (Cardin) call on parties to implement the tribunal's ruling. S.Res. 370 (Cardin) urges the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to develop a common approach to reaffirm the ruling. All three bills are pending in the Senate. The 15 submissions cover four broad areas: the legality under UNCLOS of China's ambiguous so-called nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea; the maritime entitlements generated under UNCLOS by specific geographic features, most of them controlled by China; the legality of China's alleged harassment of Philippines vessels; and China's alleged violations of an UNCLOS provision requiring parties to protect the marine environment. Many analysts see a potential ruling on the "legal effect" of China's so-called nine-dash line claim to be the most significant aspect of the case, although a ruling on the issue is not assured. The two Philippine submissions related to it are among those on which the tribunal decided to defer consideration of its jurisdiction. Possible Responses by the United States
Like the government of China, the Obama Administration has worked hard to line up international support for its position on the arbitration proceedings. They might include, but are not necessarily limited to:
reiterating calls for the governments of the member states of ASEAN and the government of China to reach early conclusion of a meaningful Code of Conduct (CoC), providing agreed rules of the road for actions in the sea; taking actions that demonstrate the U.S. position on international maritime rights, including conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) near features covered in the tribunal's award; supporting pressure on China in UNCLOS bodies by, for example, arguing to the International Seabed Authority that China's refusal to honor the tribunal's ruling should disqualify China from being able to proceed with its deep seabed mining applications for sites in the Indian Ocean; or scheduling Senate advice and consent on ratification of UNCLOS. | On July 12, 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is expected to issue a ruling in a case between the Philippines and the People's Republic of China (PRC or China). The Philippines, a U.S. ally, initiated the case in January 2013 under the convention's compulsory dispute settlement provisions, seeking primarily to clarify the two countries' potential maritime rights in the South China Sea. The Philippines and China are both parties to UNCLOS. The United States has a policy of operating consistent with the convention, but has not ratified it and is not a party to it. China argues that the tribunal lacks legal jurisdiction to rule in the case. It has declined to participate in the proceedings and has said that it will not accept the tribunal's final award in the case.
The arbitration case has been closely watched for the implications it may have for the tensions between the Philippines and China over their maritime disputes in the South China Sea, for the overlapping claims of China and other governments to maritime rights, for U.S.-China relations, and for international law more broadly. The award will be legally binding only for the two parties to the dispute—the Philippines and China. Some observers argue, however, that it could help clarify issues relevant to the claims of all the governments contesting territory in the sea—Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The U.S. government has suggested that such clarification could help claimants restart conversations about how to manage the sea in ways that lessen the chances for maritime incidents, protect the sea's role as a conduit for as much as $5 trillion in annual commercial shipping, and allow for joint exploitation of fishing stocks and hydrocarbons. If China follows through on its pledge not to accept the ruling, however, some observers warn that its stance could deepen regional tensions and undermine the authority of UNCLOS as an institution and of international law more broadly.
Obama Administration officials have made several statements supporting the Philippines' right to bring the case and emphasizing the binding nature of the tribunal's award. In the 114th Congress, S.Res. 183 (Schatz) and S. 2865 (Cardin) call on the parties to implement the tribunal's ruling, and S.Res. 370 (Cardin) urges the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to develop a common approach to reaffirm the ruling. All three bills are pending in the Senate.
The Philippines' case consists of 15 submissions covering four broad areas. Those four areas are the legality under UNCLOS of China's ambiguous so-called nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea; the maritime entitlements generated under UNCLOS by specific geographic features, most of them controlled by China; the legality of China's alleged harassment of Philippines vessels; and China's alleged violations of an UNCLOS provision requiring parties to protect the marine environment. Many analysts see a potential ruling on the legal status of China's nine-dash line claim to be the most significant aspect of the case, although a ruling on the issue is not assured. The two Philippine submissions related to it are among eight on which the tribunal decided in 2015 to defer consideration of whether it has jurisdiction to rule.
China has worked to line up international support for its position on the arbitration case. It could choose to escalate its actions in the South China Sea after the ruling. Beijing has also held out the possibility that "there will be no incident at all" if new Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte would agree to set aside the ruling. Analysts expect the United States to continue to encourage its allies and partners to support the ruling. Other potential options for U.S. responses following the ruling include reiterating calls for the governments of China and the Association of Southeast Nations to reach early agreement on a meaningful Code of Conduct, conducting additional Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) near features covered in the tribunal's award, supporting pressure on China in UNCLOS bodies, and scheduling Senate advice and consent to the Administration on ratification of UNCLOS. |
crs_R43085 | crs_R43085_0 | Background and Overview1
On April 24, 2013, Rana Plaza, an eight-story building, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, collapsed, killing more than 1,100 garment workers. It brought international focus on portions of the global supply chain. It also raised the issue of what might be done to improve working conditions, especially for lower-wage workers in developing countries around the world. Reportedly, management assured them that the building was safe, and told workers that they would not be paid if they did not work. It has been labeled the deadliest disaster in the history of the garment industry. A number of factors may have led to the recent building collapse. In many countries, apparel production is generally carried out in one- or two-story buildings because of the inherent fire hazards associated with this production. These principles are very similar to the U.S. list of internationally recognized worker rights. U.S. Trade Preference Programs12
One area of congressional focus in supporting internationally recognized worker rights has been through provisions in U.S. trade preference programs. Corporate codes of conduct are voluntary on the part of corporations. U.S. and International Responses to the Bangladesh Tragedy
Response to the Bangladesh tragedy has come from Congress, the Administration, the Bangladesh government, the ILO, and the private sector, and continues to evolve. On May 1, 2013, for example, Representatives Sander Levin, ranking Member of the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee, and George Miller, ranking Member of the House Education and the Workforce Committee, sent a letter to President Obama, urging the Administration to convene representatives of European and American retailers, the Bangladesh garment industry (including their workers and unions), the Bangladeshi government, the ILO, and nongovernmental organizations, to facilitate development of a "concrete action plan" to address the range of issues relating to working conditions and worker rights in the garment sector. Executive Branch
U.S. government interests in the Bangladesh tragedy relate to its oversight of trade and investment, its administration of trade agreements and trade preference programs, and a number of efforts to strengthen the capacity of Bangladesh to promote worker protections. On June 13, 2013, the Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) announced that a competitive grant of $2.5 million would be awarded to recipient(s) who would work to (1) strengthen the Bangladesh government's ability to improve and enforce fire and building safety standards; and (2) build the capacity of worker organizations to effectively monitor violations of such standards and abate hazards in the ready-made garment sector. A broader response from many corporations, particularly in Europe, has been to join forces to support change in Bangladesh. What are its current efforts in Bangladesh? | The April 24, 2013, collapse of an eight-story garment factory, called Rana Plaza, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, resulted in the deaths of more than 1,100 workers. It is reportedly now considered the deadliest accident in the history of the apparel industry. Congress has had a long-standing interest in supporting internationally recognized worker rights in developing countries, and the building collapse has raised concerns about worker conditions in Bangladesh.
Rana Plaza was allegedly structurally unsound and poorly maintained for apparel production. Apparel production is generally known as an industry under threat of fire, and one where workers need easy access to rapid escape routes. Issues relating to workers' inability to effectively exercise their rights to organize, bargain collectively, and work in a safe workplace may have contributed to the tragedy. For example, workers reportedly noticed cracks in the building and resisted entering, and were told that if they did not report to their jobs, they would not be paid. The factory collapse brought international focus to those parts of global supply chains that may not meet basic safety and health standards.
The U.S. government supports internationally recognized worker rights through various policies and programs. These include U.S. trade preference programs, free trade agreements, foreign assistance, and Department of Labor initiatives.
Congressional and U.S. efforts in this regard are part of an international worker rights support structure in place to offer technical assistance and support to countries—especially developing countries. Other major parts of this structure include international organizations, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), founded in 1919; and corporate codes of conduct, which have arisen from a broader movement of corporate social responsibility that gained strength in the 1980s and 1990s.
Early analysis of the causes of the Bangladesh tragedy raises questions about what went wrong and about what can be done to help Bangladesh to improve working conditions at factories. Efforts to make changes in Bangladesh are already underway, and developments on this issue are evolving.
This report provides an overview of the recent tragedy in Bangladesh and the Bangladesh economic environment and culture. It also notes the responses to the tragedy, to date, from Congress, the Administration, the ILO, the Bangladesh government, and the private sector. Finally, it raises some possible issues for Congress. |
crs_RL33994 | crs_RL33994_0 | Timor-Leste has many challenges to overcome to consolidate its democracy and develop its economy. Although the security situation in Timor-Leste is "strikingly improved" at present, observers remain concerned that plans to implement security reforms have yet to be accomplished. This concern stems from the mutiny by security forces in 2006. In June 2009, the last of the IDP camps was being closed. The parliament faces many challenges. Unemployment and underemployment is estimated to be as high as 70% in East Timor. The international community works closely with the East Timor Red Cross and other national and local organizations. United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)
The Mandate
On August 25, 2006, the U.N. Security Council established a new, expanded mission in East Timor for an initial period of six months under Resolution 1704 (2006) called the U.N. On February 26, 2009, the U.N. Security Council extended the mandate for another year until February 26, 2010, with Resolution 1867 (2009). In early January 2009 (covering the period from July 9, 2008, to January 20, 2009), the Secretary General's report focused on (1) political and security developments since 2008 and the need for increasing dialogue and reconciliation, improving democratic governance, maintaining public security, strengthening security institutions, and conducting a comprehensive review of the security sector; (2) promotion of human rights and administration of justice through the monitoring, promotion and protection of human rights, and increasing support for capacity building in the justice system; (3) increased socio-economic development and humanitarian assistance through support for the international compact for Timor-Leste, developing infrastructure and human resource capacity (such as poverty alleviation and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, improving health indicators and implementation of the U.N. Development Assistance Framework 2009-2013) and ongoing humanitarian activities and implementation of the Government's National Recovery Strategy program to ensure durable solutions for IDPs; and (4) preparation of a medium-term strategy for East Timor through specific benchmarks. United States' relations with East Timor have been closely associated with U.S. relations with Indonesia and Jakarta's former control over East Timor. Indonesia has a population of some 230 million as compared to East Timor's one million. The treaty, which covered the joint development of hydrocarbon resources in the maritime area between Australia and the then Indonesian controlled area of East Timor, came into force in 1991 and was replaced by the Timor Sea Treaty between Australia and the newly independent state of Timor-Leste in 2003. (See " Energy Resources " section below for more information.) Portugal has provided Portuguese language teachers and established a cultural center in Dili. Indonesian military backed militias destroyed Timor's infrastructure and killed an estimated 1,300 additional Timorese in the wake of the 1999 referendum where Timorese voted for independence. On the other hand, at the time, the United States thought East Timor should reduce its reliance on direct assistance from the United Nations, though with continuing support from the international community in a number of important political and economic sectors, particularly in strengthening democratic institutions, infrastructure, economic development, and the training of security services. | The situation in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, which is also known as simply Timor-Leste or East Timor, is relatively calm compared with recent periods of political strife and insurrection. That said, some underlying tensions, such as with the security sector, remain to be resolved. Timor-Leste faces many serious challenges as it seeks to establish a stable democracy and develop its economy. Prior to 2006 the international community's main concern focused on possible tensions in East Timor's relations with Indonesia. Since 2006 the main threat to East Timor has been internal strife resulting from weak, or collapsed, state institutions, rivalries among elites and between security forces, a poor economy, unemployment, east-west tensions within the country and population displacement. The reintroduction of peacekeeping troops and a United Nations mission, the flow of revenue from hydrocarbon resources in the Timor Sea, and improved political stability are helping East Timor move towards more effective and democratic government. East Timor has significant energy resources beneath the Timor Sea. A key issue is how this wealth will be conserved and spent in the years ahead.
With the assistance of a transitional United Nations administration, East Timor emerged in 2002 as an independent state after a long history of Portuguese colonialism and, more recently, Indonesian rule. This followed a U.N.-organized 1999 referendum in which the East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence and after which Indonesian-backed pro-integrationist militias went on a rampage, destroying much of East Timor's infrastructure and killing an estimated 1,300. Under several different mandates, the United Nations has provided peacekeeping, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and capacity building to establish a functioning government. On February 26, 2009, the U.N. Security council extended the mandate of U.N. Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) for another year.
Many challenges remain, including the need for economic development and sustained support by the international community. Although the last of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps is being closed, IDPs face a number of issues, the resolution of which will be important to sustaining their return, including the need for basic assistance and services, the settlement of land disputes, and the reintegration in their original communities. Congressional concerns have focused on security and the role of the United Nations, human rights, and East Timor's boundary disputes with Australia and Indonesia.
A key challenge for East Timor will be to create enough political stability to focus on building state capacity and infrastructure with resources from the Timor Sea and prevent them from being squandered by corrupt practices. |
crs_RL34559 | crs_RL34559_0 | In the 111 th Congress, legislation was introduced that would have established a "repair" exemption within the Patent Act. Although potentially of broad application, this legislation appears to have been motivated by intellectual property rights in the designs of automobile parts. The Senate has also recently provided its consent to ratify the Geneva Act to the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs, an international agreement that would allow U.S. designers to obtain intellectual property protection overseas more readily. Industrial Designs and Intellectual Property
Industrial designs that are well-received in the marketplace may attract competition. Under current intellectual property laws, industrial designs may potentially be protected through copyright, trade dress, and design patents. Congress has also established a specialized, or sui generis , intellectual property right for the protection of boat hull designs. Some observers believe that this "ragged quilt of protection" does not adequately protect designers, however. 2196 , titled the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, would have expanded the scope of coverage under the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act to also include "an article of apparel." H.R. Like H.R. 2196 , S. 3728 would have amended the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act in order to provide a three-year term of protection. S. 3728 was reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (without written report) but did not result in enacted legislation. The USPTO has testified before Congress that a number of changes would need to be made to render U.S. design patent law compatible with the Geneva Act to the Hague Convention, including increasing the term of protection from 14 to 15 years and providing limited rights to patent applicants between the date their international applications are published and the date the patent is issued. Although the establishment of sui generis regimes may reduce harmful free riding that results in reduced investment in innovation, experts have also expressed concerns about the expansion of intellectual property rights. | Under current intellectual property laws, industrial designs may potentially be protected through design patents, trade dress, and copyright. In addition, the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act established a specialized, or sui generis, intellectual property right for the protection of boat hull designs. Some experts argue that the present intellectual property regime does not adequately protect industrial designers.
In the 111th Congress, legislation was introduced that would have established proprietary rights in fashion designs. The Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, and H.R. 2196, the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, would have provided a three-year term of protection for fashion designs. Although S. 3728 was reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (without written report), neither bill was enacted.
Also in the 111th Congress, two bills would have established a "repair" exemption within the Patent Act. Although potentially of broad application, H.R. 3059 and S. 1368, each titled the "Access to Repair Parts Act," appear to have been motivated by the enforcement of design patents that are said to restrict competition in the secondary market for automobile replacement parts.
The Senate has also recently provided its consent to ratify the Geneva Act to the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs, an international agreement that would allow U.S. designers more readily to obtain intellectual property protection overseas. Accession to this international agreement would require changes to the design patent statute, including expansion of the term of design patents from 14 to 15 years.
Recent, significant judicial developments concerning the scope of protection accorded to design patents have also occurred.
Supporters of sui generis regimes assert that they allow for protection of subject matter, like industrial designs, that at times fall outside traditional intellectual property paradigms. Proponents believe that these systems can prevent levels of free riding that ultimately discourage innovation. However, some observers are concerned that the proliferation of such systems may limit the ability of others to compete, ultimately diminishing consumer choice. |
crs_RL30914 | crs_RL30914_0 | Background
Debate over the creation of a federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) position has ebbed and flowed over thepast five years as Congress has sought to addressgovernment information technology (IT) organizational and management issues. In private sector organizations witha CIO, this person serves as the seniordecisionmaker providing leadership and direction for information resource development, procurement, andmanagement, with a focus on improving efficiency andthe quality of services delivered. The possibility of creating a federal CIO, to be located in the Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB), was originallyconsidered in an early draft of what became the Clinger-Cohen Act in 1995 ( P.L. 104-106 ). The mixed results ofagency-level CIOs, combined with a growing interest inbetter managing government technology resources, brought renewed attention to creating a national CIO positionduring the 106th Congress. However, the idea of a federal CIO was dropped in favor of agency-level CIOs following testimony at a July, 1995 Senate Governmental Affairs Committeehearing. H.R. H.R. (12) The new position will report tothe Deputy Director of Management at OMB, who in turn will be the federal CIO. (16) On March 21, 2002, the Governmental AffairsCommittee reported S. 803 (now renamed the E-Government Act of 2002) with an amendment. On June 27,2002, the Senate passed S. 803 unanimously and the bill was sent to the House of Representatives for consideration. Establishes an Office of Electronic Government in OMB to be headed by an Administrator. However, there are somedissenting voices raising a number of issues that remain unresolved. Specifically, there is disagreement over whether the federal CIO should be placed inthe Office of Management and Budget (OMB), or if a new office should be established within the White House tofocus solely on information technology issues. It has been reported that Senator Lieberman favors the creation of a new, separate CIOposition with deputy director status within theOMB. (23)
Potential Responsibilities of a Federal CIO
The responsibilities of the federal CIO are closely related to the organizational location of the position. (25)
Information Security. Another issue is budgetary authority. Many observers consider some control overfunding of IT projects critical to the success of a federal CIO. Some observers have suggested either having the federal CIO control a portion of the various agencies' budgets forinformation technology projects or providingthe federal CIO with a single fund to support interagency projects. 2458 (Turner), E-Government Act of 2001 (36)
On July 11, 2001, Representative Turner introduced H.R. Some of these responsibilities would include; reviewingagency budget requests for information technologycapital planning and investment, reviewing information technology investment legislative proposals, evaluating theperformance and results of agency informationtechnology investments, advising the Director of OMB on IRM resources and strategies, providing "overallleadership and direction to the executive branch oninformation policy," promoting the effective and innovative use of information technology by agencies especiallythrough multiagency collaborative projects,administering and distributing funds from the E-Government Fund (discussed in greater detail below), consultingwith GSA on the use of the InformationTechnology Fund to promote e-government projects, serving as the Chair of the CIO Council, establishing andpromulgating information technology standards forthe federal government, establishing fora for federal, state, local, and tribal collaboration and consultation oninformation technology best practices andinnovation, promoting electronic procurement initiatives, and implementing accessibility standards. | Debate over the creation of a federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) position has ebbed and flowed over the past five years as Congress has sought to addressgovernment information technology (IT) management issues. In private sector organizations, a CIO is often a seniordecisionmaker providing leadership anddirection for information resource development, procurement, and management, with a focus on improvingefficiency and the quality of services delivered. Originally considered in an early draft of the Clinger-Cohen Act in 1995 ( P.L. 104-106 ), the idea of a single federalCIO was dropped in favor of creating CIOpositions within the executive agencies. The mixed results of agency-level CIOs, combined with a growing interestin better managing government IT resources,has renewed attention in this issue. Efforts to coordinate electronic government (e-government) initiatives has alsoled some observers to call for an"e-government czar" or a federal CIO.
During the 106th Congress a number of lawmakers made proposals to establish a federal CIO. In the House of Representatives one bill ( H.R. 4670 ,Turner) would have established a federal CIO in an office outside of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). A second bill ( H.R. 5024 ,Davis) had similar provisions but also provided a federal CIO with a broad mandate and budget authority tocarry out federal IT projects, and thepower to coordinate and execute government-wide information security efforts. Neither bill was passed in the lastCongress. In May 2001 a Senate bill wasintroduced ( S. 803 , Lieberman), which included many of the House bills' provisions as well as new ones suchthe creation of a Federal IT TrainingCenter. A companion House bill ( H.R. 2458 , Turner) was introduced in July 2001. On March 21, 2002, theGovernmental Affairs Committeereported S. 803 (now renamed the E-Government Act of 2002) with an amendment. The Senate passed thebill unanimously on June 27, 2002.
Although the Bush Administration has opposed creating a separate federal CIO, in June 2001 OMB announced the creation of a new position, the AssociateDirector of Information Technology and E-Government, who will report to the Deputy Director of Management(DDM) at OMB. The DDM, will be the federalCIO.
Despite the OMB announcement, some policymakers suggest that many issues remain unresolved. One issue is the organizational placement of the position.There is disagreement over whether the federal CIO should be placed in OMB or if a new office should beestablished within the White House.
A second issue is the scope of responsibility of the position. Some proponents suggest that the federal CIO should coordinate information security issues. Criticsargue that individual agencies may believe they have a reduced obligation or will devote fewer resources toinformation security at a time when threats toinformation resources are climbing. Another area of concern is budgetary authority. Many observers consider somecontrol over funding of IT projects critical tothe success of a federal CIO, either by controlling a portion of the various agencies' budgets for IT projects orproviding the federal CIO with a fund to supportinteragency projects. |
crs_RL32809 | crs_RL32809_0 | Since genetically engineered (GE, sometimes called genetically modified organism or GMO) crop varieties first became commercially available in the mid-1990s, U.S. soybean, cotton, and corn farmers have rapidly adopted them in order to lower production costs and increase crop yields. Incidents of regulatory noncompliance have continued to spike concern about the adequacy of regulatory structures. Current Applications
Crops
In 2013, GE crops were planted on an estimated 433 million acres worldwide ( Table 1 ), an increase of nearly 144 million acres over 2008. (See further discussion on FDA's review of GE salmon below.) Future GE Applications15
"Input" Traits
For farmers, new insect-resistant and herbicide-tolerant GE varieties are under development or have been developed for other crops besides corn, cotton, and soybeans. The three lead agencies are USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) at the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). All GE-derived products now on the U.S. market have undergone this process. Moreover, with the Coordinated Framework now nearly 30 years old, the fragmentation of the existing regulatory structure governing federal biotechnology policy today, the perceived lack of public transparency, and the overall confusion that biotechnology regulation seems to engender, the Obama Administration issued a memorandum on July 2, 2015, to update the Coordinated Framework to ensure that the regulatory structure is capable of meeting any biotechnology risks in the future. (21 U.S.C. Questions have been raised about the adequacy of using this regulatory protocol to address the myriad issues that approving the salmon might create. A significant step in the deregulation process involves an assessment of the plant's environmental impact. Several cases over the past several years have raised issues about the adequacy of APHIS's regulatory structure in moving to deregulate a GE plant. The GE salmon would be the first genetically engineered animal approved for human consumption and commercial-level farming. FDA is evaluating the GE salmon under its New Animal Drug Application Process (NADA), because the recombinant DNA construct that is intended to change the fish meets the definition of a drug as defined under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Difference between the United States and the EU regarding genetically engineered products and labeling of foods containing GE material are areas of significant conflict in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) discussions. 1599)
On July 23, 2015, the full House passed a voluntary labeling bill, H.R. 1599 , to preempt current and future state laws that have been recently passed in Maine, Vermont, and Connecticut to require mandatory labeling of GE foods. H.R. 1599 would preempt any state authority over GE labeling in favor of a voluntary National Genetically Engineered Food Certification Program under amendments to the federal Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946. While preserving current jurisdiction, policies, definitions, and regulatory authority of FDA and APHIS, the Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015 would also amend the Plant Protection Act by adding a new subtitle, the Coordination of Food Safety and Agriculture Programs. The voluntary consultative process under FDA's 1992 policy guidelines for the introduction of GE foods would continue. Under the bill, the voluntary National Genetically Engineered Food Certification Program within USDA would establish national standards for labeling both GE and non-GE foods. H.R. For poor countries without a well-articulated regulatory regime or scientific infrastructure for the introduction of GE products into their countries, the "science-based regulation" framing of the issue in the United States that underlies their promotion of GE crops conflicts with the EU precautionary principle. U.S. agricultural interests consider the EU regulation in particular to be unworkable and discriminatory. While not exhaustive, some of these issues may include:
evolving technologies, including the introduction of new "stacked trait" varieties—plant varieties with multiple genetically engineered traits—which is likely to increase; continuing development and the eventual commercialization of GE plant-based industrial and pharmaceutical output traits; oversight of second-generation biotechnology traits such as improved nutritional qualities and resistance to environmental stress (e.g., drought); transgenic animals and the food and industrial/pharmaceutical products derived from them; animal welfare concerns; importation of GE products; developing a low-level presence standard for unapproved GE materials in food and feed products; legal challenges to environmental assessments of transgenic plants and animals; issues related to transparency and the participation in policy and regulatory issues by various stakeholders (e.g., consumers, religious groups, animal welfare activists); compliance with existing and emerging regulatory structures in the United States and our trading partners, particularly the European Union; testing and measurement issues; traceability and labeling of GE products. | Biotechnology refers primarily to the use of recombinant DNA techniques to genetically modify or bioengineer plants and animals. Most crops developed through recombinant DNA technology have been engineered to be tolerant of various herbicides or to be pest resistant through having a pesticide genetically engineered into the plant organism. U.S. soybean, cotton, and corn farmers have rapidly adopted genetically engineered (GE) varieties of these crops since their commercialization in the mid-1990s. Over the past 15 years, GE varieties in the United States have increased from 3.6 million planted acres to 173 million acres in 2013. Worldwide, 27 countries planted GE crops on approximately 433 million acres in 2013. GE varieties now dominate soybean, cotton, and corn production in the United States, and they continue to expand rapidly in other countries, particularly in Latin America.
Ongoing policy issues include the impacts of GE crops on the environment (e.g., pest and weed resistance), whether GE foods should be labeled, their potential contamination of conventionally raised and organic plants, and issues of liability. Underlying these issues are concerns about the adequacy of federal regulation and oversight of GE organisms, particularly as newer applications (e.g., biopharmaceuticals, multiple GE traits in single organisms, GE trees, GE insects) emerge that did not exist when the current regulatory regime was established in 1986. The FDA is currently considering approval of the first GE animal for human consumption, a salmon engineered to grow to market size in half the normal time. Global trade issues involving GE organisms are a long-standing issue and are particularly salient in current U.S.-EU trade discussions on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP).
In the United States, agricultural biotechnology is regulated under the 1986 Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology. Three federal agencies—the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—share regulatory responsibilities. Regulatory non-compliance incidents and issues associated with environmental effects of GE plants have repeatedly raised concerns about the adequacy of existing U.S. regulatory structures. Questions have also arisen about the adequacy of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service's (APHIS's) environmental assessments for deregulating GE plants.
In July 2015, the Administration announced in a memorandum to agency heads a review and update of the Coordinated Framework to ensure the capacity of the regulatory structure to address any future biotechnology risks. This is the first comprehensive review of the Coordinated Framework in nearly 30 years.
The 114th Congress passed a bill, H.R. 1599, to preempt various state laws that have been recently passed in Maine, Vermont, and Connecticut to require mandatory labeling of GE foods. While preserving current jurisdiction and regulatory authority of FDA and APHIS, the Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015, as passed by the full House on July 23, 2015, would preempt any state authority over GE labeling in favor of a voluntary National Genetically Engineered Food Certification Program under the federal Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946. The certification program would establish national standards for labeling both GE and non-GE foods. A consultative process under FDA for the introduction of GE foods would continue, and a new notification system for GE plants used in food would be established.
Three bills have been introduced that would require labeling of GE products. One would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require labeling of GE fish (H.R. 393), and a separate bill would require labeling of all GE foods (H.R. 913/S. 511). A third bill, the Genetically Engineered Salmon Risk Reduction Act (S. 738), would require labeling of GE salmon and further require an environmental impact statement and risk analysis by the Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere of the Department of Commerce. |
crs_R40222 | crs_R40222_0 | Introduction
In a criminal law context, bail is most often thought of as the posting of security to ensure the presence of an accused at subsequent judicial proceedings—that is, "to obtain the release of (oneself or another) by providing security for future appearance." This is an overview of federal law in each of these areas, as well as in the area of extradition from the United States to another country. Any federal or state judge or federal or state magistrate may qualify. The decision requires consideration of four factors: (1) "the nature and circumstances of the offense … ; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person … ; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release…"
Conditional Release
If the judge or magistrate concludes that personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond is insufficient to overcome the risk of flight or to community or individual safety, he may condition the individual's release on a refrain from criminal activity, collection of a DNA sample, and the least restrictive combination of 14 conditions. The first consists of instances in which the accused is charged with one or more designated serious federal offenses, that themselves create a rebuttable presumption that no set of conditions will guarantee public safety or prevent the flight of the accused. In such cases, bail is available only under exceptional circumstances. An individual who fails to appear for his supervised release revocation hearing is liable only if he was released on bail in anticipation of the hearing. An individual who violates a condition of his release on bail may also be prosecuted for contempt of court. The judge or magistrate may also order revocation of the release order and detention of the individual after a hearing, if he finds either probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a new offense or by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has breached some other condition of his release. Material Witnesses
Federal law authorizes the arrest and detention or bail of individuals with evidence material to the prosecution of a federal offense. With limited variations, federal bail laws apply to material witnesses arrested under Section 3144. Extradition
Federal bail laws make no mention of bail in extradition cases. The federal courts instead adhere to the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court over a century ago that "bail should not ordinarily be granted in cases of foreign extradition" except under "special circumstances." | This is an overview of the federal law of bail. Bail is the release of an individual following his arrest upon his promise—secured or unsecured; conditioned or unconditioned—to appear at subsequent judicial criminal proceedings. An accused may be denied bail if he is unable to satisfy the conditions set for his release. He may also be denied bail if the committing judge or magistrate concludes that no amount of security or any set of conditions will suffice to ensure public safety or the individual's later appearance in court.
The federal bail statute layers the committing judge's or magistrate's bail options after arrest and before trial. He may release the individual upon his promise to return—that is, on personal recognizance or under an unsecured appearance bond. Alternatively, the judge or magistrate may condition the individual's release on the least restrictive possible combination of individual or statutory conditions. The statute, however, creates a presumption against release when the individual has been charged with a serious drug, firearms, or terrorist offense. In the case of these and other serious offenses, the judge or magistrate may deny release on bail if he decides, after a hearing, that no set of conditions will guarantee public safety or the individual's return to court. The judge or magistrate may also deny the individual bail in order to transfer him for bail, parole, or supervised release revocation proceedings. Bail is available to a more limited extent after the individual has been convicted and is awaiting a pending appeal.
Federal law also authorizes the arrest, bail, or detention of individuals with evidence material to the prosecution of a federal offense. With limited variations, federal bail laws apply to arrested material witnesses.
Although not specifically mentioned in the federal bail statute, bail is available in extradition cases under a long-standing Supreme Court precedent which holds that "bail should not ordinarily be granted in cases of foreign extradition" except under "special circumstances."
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R40221, Bail: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by [author name scrubbed]—without footnotes, appendixes, most of the citations to authority, and some of the discussion found in the longer report. |
crs_97-619 | crs_97-619_0 | In very general terms, it is a federal crime
to use wire communications to place or receive bets on, or to transmit gambling information relating to, sporting contests or events; to conduct a large-scale gambling business in violation of state law; to travel interstate or overseas, or to use any other facility of interstate or foreign commerce, to facilitate the operation of an illegal gambling business; to conduct a gambling business and accept payment for illegal Internet gambling participation; to systematically commit these crimes in order to acquire or operate a commercial enterprise; to launder the proceeds of an illegal gambling business or to plow them back into the business; to spend or deposit more than $10,000 of the proceeds of illegal gambling in any manner; or to conspire with others, or to aid and abet them, in their violation of any of these federal laws. They may have their telephone service canceled at law enforcement request, and conduct that violates the Wire Act may provide the basis for a prosecution under the money laundering statutes, the Travel Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, RICO, or the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act. Illegal Gambling Businesses
Section 1955, which outlaws conducting an illegal gambling business, appears on its face to reach any illegal gambling business conducted using the Internet. Illegal gambling is at the threshold of any prosecution under the section, and cannot to be pursued if the underlying state law is unenforceable under either the United States Constitution, or the operative state constitution. Whether a federal criminal statute applies overseas is a matter of Congressional intent. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) does so explicitly. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Illegal gambling may trigger the application of federal racketeering (RICO) provisions. A. through the collection of an unlawful debt, or
B. through a pattern of racketeering activity, defined to include:
1. any act of gambling which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment or more than 1 year;
2. any act which is indictable under 18 U.S.C. 1955 (relating to conducting an illegal gambling business, 18 U.S.C. UIGEA outlaws certain Internet gambling related transactions, not Internet gambling itself. 1956 and 1957, both of which involve financial disposition of the proceeds of various state and federal crimes, including violation of 18 U.S.C. The elements of the two are roughly comparable. The provision has promotional, concealment, and report evasion components. Principal among these have been questions as to Congress's legislative power under the Commerce Clause, restrictions imposed by the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, and due process concerns about the regulation of activities occurring at least in part overseas. First Amendment
Gambling implicates First Amendment free speech concerns on two levels. Due Process
Early commentators suggested application of federal criminal law to offshore Internet gambling entrepreneurs implicated due process, personal jurisdiction concerns, as understood in civil cases. Selected Federal Anti-Gambling Laws (Text)
Wire Act (18 U.S.C. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (31 U.S.C. 5367. 18 U.S. C. 1962 . Money Laundering (18 U.S.C. | This is a summary of the federal criminal statutes implicated by conducting illegal gambling using the Internet. Gambling is primarily a matter of state law, reinforced by federal law in instances where the presence of an interstate or foreign element might otherwise frustrate the enforcement policies of state law. State officials and others have expressed concern that the Internet may be used to bring illegal gambling into their jurisdictions.
Illicit Internet gambling implicates at least seven federal criminal statutes. It is a federal crime (1) to conduct an illegal gambling business under the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. 1955; (2) to use the telephone or telecommunications to conduct an illegal gambling business involving sporting events or contests under the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1084; (3) to use the facilities of interstate commerce to conduct an illegal gambling business under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952; (4) to conduct the activities of an illegal gambling business involving either the collection of an unlawful debt or a pattern of gambling offenses, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions, 18 U.S.C. 1962; (5) to launder the proceeds from an illegal gambling business or to plow them back into such a business under money laundering provisions of 18 U.S.C. 1956; (6) to spend more than $10,000 of the proceeds from an illegal gambling operation at any one time and place under the money laundering provisions, 18 U.S.C. 1957; or (7) for a gambling business to accept payment for illegal Internet gambling under the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), 31 U.S.C. 5361-5367.
Enforcement of these provisions has been challenged on constitutional grounds. Attacks based on the Commerce Clause, the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, and the Due Process Clause have enjoyed little success. The commercial nature of a gambling business seems to satisfy doubts under the Commerce Clause. The limited First Amendment protection afforded crime facilitating speech encumbers free speech objections. The due process arguments raised in contemplation of federal prosecution of offshore Internet gambling operations suffer when financial transactions with individuals in the United States are involved.
Citations to state and federal gambling laws, and the text of the statutes cited above, are included. This report appears in abridged form, without footnotes, full citations, or supplementary material, as CRS Report RS21984, Internet Gambling: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Law. Related CRS reports include CRS Report RS22749, Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) and Its Implementing Regulations, and CRS Report R41614, Remote Gaming and the Gambling Industry. |
crs_RL34395 | crs_RL34395_0 | Increased recognition of the potential consequences of wildlife trafficking has caused many to question the efficacy of existing U.S. and international responses and consider new options for addressing the problem. In November 2012, for example, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the beginning of a revitalized effort to combat international wildlife trafficking. In July 2013, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13648 on Combating Wildlife Trafficking. The Executive Order identified poaching of protected species and the illegal trade in wildlife and their derivative parts and products as an escalating international crisis that it is in the national interest of the United States to combat. Some point to the involvement of transnational criminal groups in illegal wildlife trade as a cause for concern. Examples of Wildlife Crime
The following sections describe several illustrative forms of international illegal trade in wildlife, including trafficking in elephant ivory, rhino horn, caviar, and so-called bushmeat. Commonly cited challenges in responding to this persistent illicit activity include ongoing legal gaps, capacity and political will gaps, and continuing structural drivers. International Responses
To address illicit trade in endangered wildlife, the international community has established a global policy framework to regulate and sometimes ban exports of selected species. Domestic, bilateral, regional, and global efforts are intended to support international goals of sustainable conservation, effective resource management, and enforcement of relevant laws and regulations. Recently, increased awareness of wildlife trafficking as a potential problem has caused some observers and policymakers to question the efficacy of existing U.S. and international responses and consider new options for responding to such illicit activity. Issues for Congress
The U.S. Congress has played a role in evaluating and shaping U.S. policy to combat international wildlife trafficking. Over time, Congress has enacted a wide range of laws to authorize conservation programs, appropriate domestic and international funding for wildlife protection and natural resource capacity building, and target and dismantle wildlife trafficking operations. In recent years, Congress has also held hearings and events that have addressed the growing problem of wildlife crimes and raised key questions for next steps. It has also discussed a broad range of international and U.S. policy responses, including long-standing commitments through the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), as well as newer announcements, such as the Obama Administration's July 2013 Executive Order on Combating Wildlife Trafficking. Reports of escalating exploitation of protected wildlife, coupled with the emerging prominence of highly organized and well-equipped illicit actors in wildlife trafficking, suggest that policy challenges persist. | Global trade in illegal wildlife is a potentially vast illicit economy, estimated to be worth billions of dollars each year. Some of the most lucrative illicit wildlife commodities include elephant ivory, rhino horn, sturgeon caviar, and so-called "bushmeat." Wildlife smuggling may pose a transnational security threat as well as an environmental one. Numerous sources indicate that some organized criminal syndicates, insurgent groups, and foreign military units may be involved in various aspects of international wildlife trafficking. Limited anecdotal evidence also indicates that some terrorist groups may be engaged in wildlife crimes, particularly poaching, for monetary gain. Some observers claim that the participation of such actors in wildlife trafficking can therefore threaten the stability of countries, foster corruption, and encourage violence to protect the trade.
Reports of escalating exploitation of protected wildlife, coupled with the emerging prominence of highly organized and well-equipped illicit actors in wildlife trafficking, suggests that policy challenges persist. Commonly cited challenges include legal loopholes that allow poachers and traffickers to operate with impunity, gaps in foreign government capabilities to address smuggling problems, and persistent structural drivers such as lack of alternative livelihoods in source countries and consumer demand.
To address the illicit trade in endangered wildlife, the international community has established, through the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), a global policy framework to regulate and sometimes ban exports of selected species. Domestic, bilateral, regional, and global efforts are intended to support international goals of sustainable conservation, effective resource management, and enforcement of relevant laws and regulations.
Increased recognition of the potential consequences of wildlife trafficking has caused some observers and policymakers to question the efficacy of existing U.S. and international responses and consider new options for addressing the problem. In November 2012, for example, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the beginning of a revitalized effort to combat international wildlife trafficking. In July 2013, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13648 on Combating Wildlife Trafficking. The Executive Order identified poaching of protected species and the illegal trade in wildlife and their derivative parts and products as an escalating international crisis that is in the national interest of the United States to combat.
The U.S. Congress has played a role in responding to these ongoing challenges and evaluating U.S. policy to combat international wildlife trafficking. Over time, Congress has enacted a wide range of laws to authorize conservation programs, appropriate domestic and international funding for wildlife protection and natural resource capacity building, and target and dismantle wildlife trafficking operations. In recent years, Congress has also held hearings and events that have addressed the growing problem of wildlife crimes and raised key questions for next steps. Interest in wildlife crime may continue in the 113th Congress. Congressional activity may include evaluating the seriousness of the threat as a national security issue, as well as raising questions regarding the effectiveness of existing policies, ranging from biodiversity programs to anti-crime activities. |
crs_RL30870 | crs_RL30870_0 | The release of the 2000 Census data for the apportionment of the House of Representatives among the states and the release of the state redistricting data to the states as required by P.L. 94-171 has renewed the decennial debate over several census-related issues. Second, Utah has brought a lawsuit challenging the apportionment, alleging that expatriate missionaries for the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints should have been included in the population count for Utah. But proponents of sampling, including the Clinton Administration, noted that the decision did not determine the constitutionality of sampling and also did not hold that sampling was prohibited for purposes other than apportionment of the House of Representatives among the states. In Senate of the State of California v. Mosbacher, in which the state senate was suing for the release of adjusted data after the Bureau decided not to adjust the official 1990 census data, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that if a state knows that census data is underrepresentative of the population, it can and should utilize non-census data, in addition to the official count, for redistricting, but the court also held that the Secretary of Commerce had no affirmative duty under the Census Clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. The vast majority of state legislative activity appears to have been in the form of resolutions noting the apportionment purpose of the census, the Supreme Court decision, and the possible unconstitutionality of using adjusted figures for intrastate redistricting; calling on the Census Bureau to conduct the census in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court ruling, that is, without sampling; opposing the use of adjusted data for state redistricting; requesting or demanding the transmission of unadjusted data for state redistricting; and urging Congress to take any necessary steps to ensure a fair and legal census. There appears to have been very little state legislation which would require the use of adjusted data in the redistricting process. On March 6, Secretary of Commerce Donald L. Evans announced that he had decided to send the actual 2000 census enumeration data, unadjusted by statistical methods, to the states for the purpose of redistricting, in accordance with the recommendation of the Acting Director of the Census Bureau, William G. Barron, and the Executive Steering Committee for Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation Policy (ESCAP). Administrative Activity
As noted above, on March 1, 2001, the ESCAP made a recommendation not to adjust the census redistricting data and the Secretary of Commerce made the final decision not to adjust on March 6, 2001. If a decision were made to not adjust, despite the ESCAP recommendation to adjust , the adjusted data would also be released. However, in the wake of Secretary Evan's decision, the City Attorney of Los Angeles, [author name scrubbed], announced that he would pursue further legal action to obtain the adjusted census data by amending the complaint to add new allegations that the Secretary's decision is arbitrary and capricious and violates section 195 of the Census Act, 13 U.S.C. § 195, which requires the Secretary to use statistical sampling, "if he considers it feasible," for purposes of the census other than apportionment of the House of Representatives. The issue to be raised by the City of Los Angeles, that the Secretary refused to adjust although adjustment was feasible, has not been decided before, but the recommendation of the Acting Census Director and the ESCAP would seem to constitute a finding within the Census Bureau and the Commerce Department that adjustment, within the statutory timetable for reporting redistricting data, was not feasible. | The release of the 2000 Census data for the apportionment of the House of Representatives among the states and the release of the state redistricting data to the states as required by P.L. 94-171 has renewed the decennial debate over several issues. First, the debate over the use of sampling to adjust the decennial population census data was not completely resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court decision that a federal statute prohibits the use of sampling to adjust the decennial census for the purposes of apportionment of the House of Representatives among the states. The Court did not hold that the adjustment of census data for other purposes, such as intrastate redistricting, was prohibited. Additionally, last year, the Census Bureau indicated that it would likely release both adjusted and unadjusted sets of data.
In the wake of these developments, there were legislative efforts in many states to specify which data are to be used in intrastate redistricting. Controversy surrounded preclearance under the Voting Rights Act for some state laws. Meanwhile, the transition between Administrations resulted in a policy change concerning the release of adjusted census data for redistricting. Last year, the Secretary of Commerce promulgated a rule which delegated the decision to adjust the official decennial census figures to the Director of the Census Bureau and required the release of adjusted figures where the Secretary chose not to release them as the official redistricting data despite the recommendation of the Executive Steering Committee for Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation Policy (ESCAP) to adjust the data. This year, the Secretary of Commerce under the new Administration rescinded that rule and took back the authority to decide to adjust state redistricting census data. The City of Los Angeles, joined by other municipalities, filed a suit challenging the anticipated change in policy on the grounds that proper rule-making procedures were not followed. The suit relied on the assumption that the ESCAP would recommend to adjust. However, on March 1, 2001, the Acting Director of the Census Bureau and ESCAP recommended not to adjust redistricting data; accordingly, on March 6, 2001, the Secretary announced the release of the unadjusted data. Since this appeared to render the Los Angeles suit moot, the City Attorney for Los Angeles announced that he would amend the complaint to add new allegations that the Secretary's decision is arbitrary and capricious and violates the Census Act, which requires the Secretary to use statistical sampling, where he considers it feasible, for purposes of the census other than apportionment of the House of Representatives. Congress has the constitutional authority to determine issues of census methodology, including whether or not the release of adjusted data suitable for intrastate redistricting purposes is feasible.
Second, Utah has filed a suit challenging the apportionment of the House of Representatives on the grounds that expatriate Utahans, specifically missionaries for the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, should have been included in the population count for Utah. Such an inclusion would have meant that Utah would have gained a congressional seat which went to North Carolina instead. Although the U.S. Supreme Court held previously that the Secretary of Commerce had the discretion to include overseas federal personnel in the apportionment census, it did not address the issue of whether other expatriates should be included as well, once the decision was made to include one segment of the expatriate population. Congress, however, has the authority to legislate census methodology with regard to the inclusion or exclusion of expatriates and categories of expatriates. |
crs_R41749 | crs_R41749_0 | The NGO Dilemma1
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been active in North Korea since the 1990s. In food assistance programs, according to several sources, in spite of initial North Korean efforts to hamper NGOs by limiting movements by their staff and refusing to allow Korean speakers to accompany them, over time some NGOs have obtained as good or better access and monitoring than much larger international organizations. Congress may wish to consider the role of NGOs in North Korea as part of its oversight of the U.S.-North Korean relationship, and also because of their potential role in delivering humanitarian assistance. Recently, the Obama Administration has been considering whether to restart an earlier aid program begun under the Bush Administration in 2008. Some have argued that through the implementation of their work NGOs may have promoted at least some degree of transparency and a measure of accountability for the aid recipients. It is, however, difficult to assess such effects, given North Korea's isolation. Current Status of NGO Humanitarian and Development Activities
As of 2010, a few NGOs have remained active in North Korea, most from European aid agencies. U.S. NGOs rely on the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang. The North Korean government has assigned government contacts to NGOs, to serve as a conduit for their aid and provide the regime with buffers between the organizations and the public. Participating NGOs in InterAction also formed the North Korea Working Group to advocate for assistance to North Korea. North Korean officials encountered NGO representatives who operated on the basis of transparency, and had diverse experiences operating in other countries. FNF provides policy consultation, educational programs working with local NGOs, civic organizations, and educational institutions. Track II Diplomacy
One of the fundamental problems in dealing with the North Korean regime is its deep isolation, which makes traditional diplomatic exchanges difficult. Some NGOs have sought to organize Track II exchanges—that is, sponsoring informal communications between North Korean scientists, academics, military officers and private citizens, and their counterparts in the United States or overseas. Some of these organizations have managed to smuggle cell phones to North Korean citizens as a means to gain information. The broadcasts include news briefs, particularly about the Korean Peninsula, interviews with North Korean defectors, and international commentary on events occurring in North Korea. List of Related CRS Reports
CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea , by [author name scrubbed] and Mary Beth Nikitin
CRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report RS22973, Congress and U.S. Policy on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees: Recent Legislation and Implementation , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R41481, U.S.-South Korea Relations , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R41363, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: U.S. | A number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—non-profit, charitable institutions—have been active in North Korea since the mid-1990s. Although their work is relatively limited in scope, it is of interest to U.S. policy-makers because of the deep isolation of the regime in Pyongyang. Several American and international NGOs have provided assistance to North Korea in humanitarian relief, development, health, informal diplomacy, science, communication and education. A relatively recent trend is that a growing number of NGOs, particularly in South Korea, are run by or have North Korean defectors on staff.
Non-governmental organizations' activities in North Korea have stirred some controversy. Some observers believe that NGOs' projects represent one of the few ways to improve the lives of ordinary North Koreans, and that their work provides first-hand accounts about social conditions in North Korea. Some NGOs have a comparative advantage in dealing with North Korea, with over a decade's experience working with North Korean officials and institutions. However, others argue that NGOs' programs aid North Korea's regime, and that given the lack of transparency and tight restrictions imposed on them by the regime, their funds are vulnerable to diversion by North Korean officials.
Two issues bear consideration: Have NGOs contributed to improving the lives of ordinary North Korean citizens in sustainable ways? Can NGOs evaluate the impact of their operations and take steps to minimize diversion of the resources they deliver to North Koreans? In short, are they effective, and should the United States welcome their work in spite of the North Korean regime's treatment of its citizens? This paper will address some of the publicly disclosed activities that NGOs have undertaken in North Korea.
The role of NGOs in North Korea may re-emerge as a congressional interest, as the Obama Administration has expressed interest in restarting humanitarian assistance to North Korea. During the Bush Administration, five large U.S. NGOs were part of a food delivery program that enjoyed some success. Some believed they were more effective than international organizations at navigating the North Korean system to get aid where it was needed. But some organizations opted to cease their operations when North Korean restrictions became too onerous. |
crs_R41124 | crs_R41124_0 | Introduction
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148 ). The U.S. House of Representatives also passed an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4872 , the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, on March 21, 2010. The Reconciliation bill includes two titles. The first title contains provisions related to health care and revenues. The second title includes amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965, which authorizes most of the federal programs involving postsecondary education. The differences in projected Medicare savings are primarily due to changes that led to reductions in cost savings estimates for provisions related to disproportionate share hospitals and the Independent Payment Advisory Board together with cost increases associated with closing the coverage gap in the outpatient prescription drug benefit. Key Changes Made to PPACA by the Reconciliation Bill
The Medicare provisions in Subtitles B, D and E of Title I in the Reconciliation bill would make modifications to certain Medicare provisions in PPACA, as well as add several new provisions. 1105) would revise the additional adjustments to the market basket (MB) updates for the IPPS, OPPS, IPF, IRF and LTCH payment systems. Payment for Qualifying Hospitals
The Reconciliation bill as modified by the manager's amendment (Sec. Section 3135 of the PPACA changes the utilization rate assumption for calculating the payment for advanced imaging equipment from 50% to 65% for 2010 through 2012. Activities to fight health care fraud, waste, and abuse are funded by the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) account. | On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148), which would, among other changes, make statutory changes to the Medicare program. The U.S. House of Representatives also passed an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, on March 21, 2010 (referred to hereafter as the Reconciliation bill), which would amend the PPACA.
The Reconciliation bill includes two titles. The first title contains provisions related to health care and revenues, including modifications to PPACA's Medicare provisions. The second title includes amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965, which authorizes most of the federal programs involving postsecondary education.
Medicare changes that would be made by the Reconciliation bill, as passed by the House on March 21, 2010, to the PPACA are summarized in this report. Among other changes, the Reconciliation bill would:
phase out the coverage gap under the Medicare prescription drug benefit and close it by 2020; change the methodology used to determine Medicare Advantage payments, and create an incentive system to reward high quality plans with higher payments; move up reductions in payments to disproportionate share hospitals to 2014, and reduce the cuts; revise the adjustments to annual updates for certain providers; change the qualifying date whereby an existing physician-owned hospital would be exempt from the self-referral prohibition; change the assumptions used to calculate Medicare reimbursement for advanced imaging services; and increase funding for the Health Care Fraud Abuse Control program and provide for enhanced oversight of DME suppliers.
This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants. |
crs_R43760 | crs_R43760_0 | Response
In 2014, the armed offensive of the Islamic State (also known as ISIL, ISIS, or Daesh) in northern and western Iraq and northeastern Syria raised significant concerns for the United States. After first ordering multiple deployments of U.S. troops to Iraq to provide security to diplomatic personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi security forces, and conduct intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, President Obama began ordering U.S. military airstrikes on IS forces in Iraq in August 2014. Later in September, after laying out plans for expanded use of military force against the Islamic State in a televised speech to the American people, the President ordered U.S. military airstrikes in Syria against both IS forces and forces of the "Khorasan Group," identified by the President as part of Al Qaeda. In 2015, the President ordered new deployments to Iraq, and the Administration announced deployment of a small number of special operations forces to Syria to conduct military operations that involve advising regional partner armed forces but also can include "unilateral" U.S. operations. The intensified U.S. military engagement has raised numerous questions in Congress and beyond about the President's authority to use military force against the Islamic State. Some efforts began near the end of the 113 th Congress to consider enactment of a new authorization for use of military force targeting the Islamic State, and have continued into the 114 th Congress; the issue, however, remains contentious. In addition, the President provided Congress a new authorization proposal in February 2015, and in his 2016 State of the Union address again called on Congress to enact a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State. In 2016, both U.S. military operations and deployments of U.S. Armed Forces increased to continue the campaign against the Islamic State, and hostilities are ongoing. Obama Administration officials and the President Obama's September 2014 notifications to Congress for airstrikes and other actions in Iraq and Syria, however, stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs), the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. The fact that the Islamic State has asserted a split between itself and Al Qaeda does not divest the President of his previous authority to use force against the Islamic State, as the Islamic State's conflict with the United States and its allies has continued. Congress has supported military action against the Islamic State by specifically funding the military campaign and providing authority to assist groups fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The Report does not reference the 2002 AUMF as authority for the use of military force against the Islamic State. 4208 ) in the House. IS AUMF-Related Proposals in the 115th Congress
Early in the 115 th Congress, the issue of a new IS-specific AUMF remains of interest to many Members of Congress. Comparison of IS AUMF Proposals from the 113 th Congress
Near the end of the 113 th Congress, a number of Members proposed several new authorizations to use military force against the Islamic State:
The analysis provided below compares similar types of provisions included in IS AUMF proposals from the 113 th Congress and issues related to those provisions. | Since the United States embarked on a strategy to counter the Islamic State (also known as ISIL or ISIS) in 2014, some Members of Congress have raised concerns about the President's underlying authority to engage in anti-IS military operations. In the 114th Congress, both houses of Congress took steps to revisit the possibility of considering legislation to provide authority for the use of military force (AUMF) against the Islamic State. Interest has continued into the first session of the 115th Congress and with the start of the Trump Administration.
In 2014, the armed offensive of the Islamic State in northern and western Iraq and northeastern Syria raised significant concerns for the United States. After first ordering multiple deployments of U.S. troops to Iraq to provide security to diplomatic personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi security forces, and conduct intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, President Obama began ordering U.S. military airstrikes on IS forces in Iraq in August 2014. Later in September, after laying out plans for expanded use of military force against the Islamic State in a televised speech to the American people, the President ordered U.S. military airstrikes in Syria against both IS forces and forces of the "Khorasan Group," identified by the President as part of Al Qaeda. In 2015, the President ordered new deployments to Iraq, and the Administration announced deployment of a small number of special operations forces to Syria to conduct military operations that involve advising regional partner armed forces but also can include "unilateral" U.S. operations. In 2016, both U.S. military operations and deployments of U.S. Armed Forces increased to continue the campaign against the Islamic State.
As military action against the Islamic State has evolved and increased, many observers, including a number of Members of Congress, have raised numerous questions and concerns about the President's authority to use military force against the Islamic State. Some efforts began near the end of the 113th Congress to consider enactment of a new authorization for use of military force targeting the Islamic State, and have continued into the 114th Congress; the issue, however, remains contentious. The President provided Congress a new authorization proposal in February 2015, and in his 2016 State of the Union address again called on Congress to enact a new authorization for use of military force (AUMF) targeting the Islamic State. The Obama Administration's official position on presidential authority to use force against the Islamic State, however, has remained consistent, relying on the previous 2001 AUMF against those who perpetrated the September 11, 2001, terror attacks (and, to a lesser extent, the 2002 AUMF against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq).
This report focuses on the several proposals for a new AUMF specifically targeting the Islamic State made during the 113th and 114th Congresses as well as those made thus far in the 115th Congress. It includes a brief review of existing authorities and AUMFs, as well as a discussion of issues related to various provisions included in existing and proposed AUMFs that both authorize and limit presidential use of military force. Appendices provide a comparative analysis of similar provisions in the numerous AUMFs proposed in the 113th and 114th Congresses. This report will be updated to reflect congressional activity. For more information on the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud. |
crs_R45431 | crs_R45431_0 | Introduction
Whistleblowing is "the act of reporting waste, fraud, abuse and corruption in a lawful manner to those who can correct the wrongdoing." Intelligence Community (IC) whistleblowers are those employees or contractors working in any of the seventeen elements of the IC who reasonably believ e there has been a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, waste of resources, abuse of authority, or a substantial danger to public health and safety. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) whistleblowing policy and guidance is publicly available and specifically addresses whistleblower process and protections for IC contractors, members of the Armed Forces, and federal employees. There are differing opinions, however, on whether the IC's internal processes have the transparency necessary to ensure adequate protections against reprisal, and whether protections for IC contractors are sufficient. IC whistleblower protections have evolved in response to perceptions of gaps that many believed left whistleblowers vulnerable to reprisal. The first whistleblower legislation specific to the IC was the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) of 1998. It was limited to specifying a process for an IC whistleblower to make a complaint but offered no specific protections. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included provisions for protecting IC whistleblowers, though these were general and subject to different standards of implementation. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-19, signed in 2012, provided the first specific protections in response to perceptions that IC whistleblowers remained vulnerable to reprisal actions for making a complaint. For members of the Armed Forces assigned to elements of the IC, 10 U.S . C . §1034 provides whistleblower protections. Legislation to Address Perceived Gaps in Protections for IC Contractors
Coverage of contractors in existing IC whistleblower protection legislation is inconsistent. | Whistleblowing is "the act of reporting waste, fraud, abuse and corruption in a lawful manner to those who can correct the wrongdoing." Intelligence Community (IC) whistleblowers are those employees or contractors working in any of the seventeen elements of the IC who reasonably believe there has been a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, waste of resources, abuse of authority, or a substantial danger to public health and safety. The IC has publicly recognized the importance of whistleblowing, and supports protections for whistleblowers who conform to guidelines to protect classified information. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) whistleblowing policy and guidance is publicly available and specifically addresses the process for making protected disclosures and whistleblower protections for IC contractors, members of the Armed Forces, and federal employees. There are differing opinions, however, on whether the IC's internal processes have the transparency necessary to ensure adequate protections against reprisal, and whether protections for IC contractors are sufficient.
IC whistleblower protections have evolved in response to perceptions of gaps that many believed left whistleblowers vulnerable to reprisal. The first whistleblower legislation specific to the IC was limited to specifying a process for IC whistleblowers to make a complaint but offered no specific protections. Subsequent legislation included only general provisions for protecting IC whistleblowers with no additional guidance on standards for implementation. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-19, signed in 2012, provided the first specific protections against reprisal actions for making a complaint. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 codified these provisions which were further supported with IC implementation policy. Separate legislation under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, along with DOD implementing guidance, provides protections for members of the Armed Forces, including those assigned to elements of the IC. In early 2018, Congress passed legislation to address perceived gaps in protections for IC contractors. |
crs_R40211 | crs_R40211_0 | Introduction
The federal government provides grants-in-aid to states and local governments to provide a range of benefits and human services programs to disadvantaged families and persons. Most such human services are administered, and often designed, at the state and local level. Some human services are provided by community or nonprofit organizations. The current recession is straining the budgets of state and local governments, putting pressure on many jurisdictions to cut spending or raise taxes. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 , H.R. 1 ) includes provisions to temporarily increase funding for several human services programs. Some of the funding is directed to help finance increases in payments through the states to households and families. Some of the additional funds provided offer fiscal relief to the states for a portion of the costs of certain programs. The selected programs generally are those that provide benefits and services to families with children, though some programs (e.g., the Community Services Block Grant) provide services to other families as well. Proposed funding increases for Low Income Home Energy Assistance ($1 billion in the House version of ARRA) and the Social Services Block Grant ($400 million in the Senate version of ARRA) were not a part of the final bill, but are shown in the table. Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG)5
The Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) is the primary source of federal funding dedicated solely to child care subsidies for low-income working families (regardless of welfare status). This means that CSE incentive payments that are/were received by states and reinvested in the CSE program can be used to draw down federal funds. Temporary Increase in the Matching Rate for Foster Care, Adoption Assistance, and Kinship Guardian Assistance
The ARRA temporarily increases the federal matching rate for Title IV-E foster care maintenance, adoption assistance, and kinship guardianship assistance payments. The ARRA also provides an additional FMAP increase for states with high unemployment. Additional Head Start Funds
The ARRA appropriates an additional $2.1 billion for Head Start. CSBG Funding Increase
The ARRA appropriates an additional $1 billion for the CSBG. New Funding for Community-Based Nonprofit Organizations
The ARRA provides $50 million for direct grants to nonprofit organizations for capacity building activities to expand social services to communities affected by the economic downturn. | The federal government provides grants-in-aid to states and local governments to provide a range of benefits and human services programs to disadvantaged families and persons. Most such human services are administered, and often designed, at the state and local level. Some human services are provided by community or nonprofit organizations.
The current recession is straining the budgets of state and local governments, putting pressure on many jurisdictions to cut spending or raise taxes, at the same time that these governments potentially face an increase in demand for benefits and services that address economic need. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5, H.R. 1) provides additional funding to states and localities for human services programs.
The ARRA increases funding for certain grants to help finance increased transfer payments to households. It creates a temporary (FY2009 and F2010) emergency fund under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant to help states pay for increased costs of economic aid to families. It increases funding for the Child Care and Development Block Grant by $2 billion, with most of those funds slated for increasing the number and/or amount of vouchers to subsidize the costs of child care for low-income working families.
The ARRA also provides states with some fiscal relief by temporarily increasing the share of federal funding provided to states for costs in certain entitlement programs. It provides a temporary increase to the federal matching rate for foster care maintenance, adoption assistance, and kinship guardian assistance under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. It also allows states to receive matching funds on Child Support Enforcement (CSE) incentive payments that are reinvested in the CSE program.
Some human services programs are operated by localities, community organizations, and non-profits. Head Start, a federal program operated at the local level, will receive an additional $2.1 billion, with at least $1.1 billion directed Early Head Start." The ARRA provides an additional $1 billion for the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG). The ARRA also provides $50 million in direct grants to nonprofit organizations for capacity building efforts to expand social services in communities affected by the economic downturn.
Proposed funding increases for Low Income Home Energy Assistance ($1 billion in the House version of ARRA) and the Social Services Block Grant ($400 million in the Senate version of ARRA) were not a part of the final bill. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41387 | crs_R41387_0 | Overview of Report
Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Associations (VEBAs) are trust funds created to finance many aspects of employee benefits. By law, the tax benefits of VEBAs are greater if they were created as part of a collectively bargained agreement between representatives of the firm's union and management. The report shows that, under some circumstances, using VEBAs to fund retiree health insurance may benefit both firms and workers. A unionized firm can use VEBA contributions to reduce or eliminate its retiree health insurance liabilities. The unionized workforce will be able to afford at least some retiree health benefits, because once the firm has contributed funds into the VEBA, the funds can never revert back to the firm. The funds always remain with the workers, even if the firm enters bankruptcy. The individual negotiations between General Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrysler (together known as the Detroit 3) and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), together with the retiree health VEBAs that became the source of the UAW's retiree health funding on January 1, 2010, illustrate many aspects of VEBA implementation. Although Ford is not emphasized in the report because it did not enter bankruptcy proceedings, it too renegotiated its 2007 retiree health VEBA with the UAW in 2009. Finally, VEBAs offer tax advantages to the workers. VEBAs in Unionized Firms
Forming and funding a VEBA can benefit both the firm and its workers. | Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Associations (VEBAs) are tax-advantaged trust funds created to finance many aspects of employee welfare, including retiree health insurance benefits. This report shows that, under some circumstances, using VEBAs to fund retiree health insurance can benefit both firms and workers. Because the tax treatment of VEBAs is most favorable when the VEBA has been created under a collective bargaining agreement, a unionized firm can use VEBA contributions to reduce or eliminate its retiree health insurance liabilities. The unionized workforce will be able to afford at least some retiree health benefits, because once the firm has contributed funds into the VEBA, the funds can never revert back to the firm. The funds always remain with the workers, even if the firm enters bankruptcy. However, if the firm is not in a financial position to contribute to the VEBA, the workers will not benefit.
The negotiations between each of General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) between 2007 and 2009, together with the retiree health VEBAs that became the source of the UAW members' retirement funding on January 1, 2010, illustrate many of the issues associated with implementing VEBAs. In particular, these VEBAs were first negotiated as part of a collective bargaining agreement and then modified during bankruptcy proceedings. They were funded by contributions from both the automobile companies and the UAW. It is, however, too soon to see whether the final automotive VEBAs will be successful in delivering health insurance benefits for all eligible beneficiaries. |
crs_RL33748 | crs_RL33748_0 | For details on congressional action on FY2008 authorization and appropriations bills, see CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments , by Jonathan Medalia , which provides background and tracks legislation and developments. It selected the California design in March 2007 as the first RRW, or RRW-1. The choice between LEP, RRW, or some combination is important because it will set the course for U.S. nuclear weapons for decades to come, and each year it is up to Congress to decide whether to fund these programs as requested, or modify or cancel them. 1585 and S. 1547 , respectively) and the energy and water appropriations bill reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee ( S. 1751 ) recommended holding RRW in Phase 2A in FY2008. The House Armed Services Committee called for a congressional commission on U.S. strategic posture in its FY2008 national defense authorization bill, H.R. For example, the program is "to improve the reliability, longevity, and certifiability of existing weapons and their components"; a goal is "to develop replacement components for nuclear warheads"; another goal is "[t]o ensure that the nuclear weapons infrastructure can respond to unforeseen problems, to include the ability to produce replacement warheads"; "any new weapon design must stay within the design parameters validated by past nuclear tests"; and a committee's "qualified endorsement of the RRW initiative is based on the assumption that a replacement weapon will be designed only as a re-engineered and remanufactured warhead for an existing weapon system in the stockpile." Others maintain that certification using SSP has been a political assessment rather than a technical one. Accordingly, in this view, NNSA will not know for sure if SSP, and thus RRW or LEP, work until it conducts nuclear tests. They question if RRW will improve reliability. The design teams claim a key advantage for the competing designs: because the designs start fresh, designers can increase margin. 109-364 ( H.R. RRW's supporters point to the use of IHE as an advantage of RRW. It contributes to other goals, such as making manufacturing easier and reducing cost. Critics hold that LEP might also increase safety. Cost
20. How much is enough? Others feel that RRWs will reduce this burden once they are deployed. RRW advocates argue that minor changes from LEPs may reduce confidence in current warheads over the long term, while RRW designs should provide high confidence because they stay well within parameters defined by nuclear test data and have wider margins than current warheads. NNSA has not made certified pits since then. It includes the Life Extension Program and the RRW program. [4] The Senate Armed Services Committee set goals in its FY2006 report:
The committee understands from the testimony of the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) that the goals of this program are: (1) to increase the security and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile; (2) to develop replacement components for nuclear warheads that can be more easily manufactured with more readily available and more environmentally benign materials; (3) to develop replacements that can be introduced into the stockpile with assured high confidence regarding their effect on warhead safety and reliability; (4) to develop these replacements on a schedule that would reduce the possibility that the United States would ever be faced with the need to conduct a nuclear test in order to diagnose or remedy a reliability problem in the current stockpile; (5) to reduce infrastructure costs needed to support the stockpile, while increasing the responsiveness of that infrastructure; and (6) to increase confidence in the stockpile to a level such that significant, additional reductions in numbers of non-deployed `hedge' warheads can be made. | Current U.S. nuclear warheads were deployed during the Cold War. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) maintains them with a Life Extension Program (LEP). NNSA questions if LEP can maintain them indefinitely on grounds that an accretion of minor changes introduced in replacement components will inevitably reduce confidence in warhead safety and reliability over the long term.
Congress mandated the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program in 2004 "to improve the reliability, longevity, and certifiability of existing weapons and their components." Since then, Congress has specified more goals for the program, such as increasing safety, reducing the need for nuclear testing, designing for ease of manufacture, and reducing cost. RRW has become the principal program for designing new warheads to replace current ones.
The program's first step was a design competition. The winning design was selected in March 2007. If the program continues, NNSA would advance the design of the first RRW, assess its technical feasibility, and estimate cost and schedule in FY2008; start engineering development by FY2010; and produce the first deployable RRW between FY2012 and FY2016. Congressional actions on the FY2008 national defense authorization bills (H.R. 1585, S. 1547) and energy and water appropriations bills (H.R. 2641, S. 1751) have called this schedule into question. For details, see CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments, which provides background and tracks legislation and developments. Each year, Congress would decide whether to fund the program as requested, modify it, or cancel it, and whether to continue or halt LEP.
RRW's supporters argue that the competing designs meet all goals set by Congress. For example, they claim that certain design features will provide high confidence, without nuclear testing, that RRWs will work. Some critics respond that LEP should work indefinitely and question if RRW will succeed. They hold that LEP meets almost all goals set by Congress, and point to other LEP advantages. Others maintain that the scientific tools used to create RRW designs have not been directly validated by nuclear tests, and that the accretion of changes resulting from LEP makes the link of current warheads to the original tested designs increasingly tenuous. In this view, nuclear testing offers the only way to maintain confidence in the stockpile. RRW raises other issues for Congress: Is RRW likely to cost more or less than LEP? How much safety, and how much protection against unauthorized use, are enough? Should the nuclear weapons complex be reconfigured to support RRW? And what information does Congress need to choose among the alternatives?
This report is intended for Members and staff interested in U.S. nuclear weapon programs. It will be updated occasionally. |
crs_R40444 | crs_R40444_0 | The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA 97; P.L. 105-33 ) established the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) under a new Title XXI of the Social Security Act and provided annual appropriations for CHIP through FY2007. The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA, H.R. 2 , P.L. 111-3 ), which was signed into law on February 4, 2009, provided CHIP appropriations through FY2013 and made other changes. Groups may be covered under the CHIP state plan or via special waiver authority. CHIPRA added a new state option to cover pregnant women under CHIP through a state plan amendment. The highest state-reported upper income eligibility limit for children in CHIP is 350% of the FPL, in New Jersey. The latest official numbers show that CHIP enrollment reached nearly 7.4 million children in FY2008. Twelve states reported enrollment of about 335,000 adults in CHIP in FY2008 (see Table 1 ). Benefits
As noted above, when designing their CHIP programs, states may cover targeted low-income children under their Medicaid program, create a new separate CHIP program, or devise a combination of both approaches. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five territories have CHIP programs. The territories, the District of Columbia, and 6 states use Medicaid expansions; 18 states use separate state programs; and 26 states use a combination approach. In other words, they must provide "wrap-around" benefit coverage. Cost-sharing may include monthly premiums, enrollment fees, deductibles, copayments, coinsurance and other similar charges. States that cover targeted low-income children under Medicaid must follow the nominal cost-sharing rules of the Medicaid program. DRA provided states with a new option for premiums and service-related cost-sharing that may be applied to targeted low-income children under CHIP Medicaid-expansion programs. For all families with incomes under 150% FPL and enrolled in separate state programs, premiums may not exceed the amounts set forth in federal Medicaid regulations. Preventive services are exempt from cost-sharing for all CHIP families regardless of income. The rules vary by fiscal year. | The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA 97; P.L. 105-33) established the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) under a new Title XXI of the Social Security Act and provided annual appropriations for CHIP through FY2007. The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA, H.R. 2, P.L. 111-3), which was signed into law on February 4, 2009, provided CHIP appropriations through FY2013 and made other changes.
In general, CHIP allows states to cover targeted low-income children with no health insurance in families with income above Medicaid eligibility levels. States may also extend CHIP coverage to pregnant women when certain conditions are met. The highest state-reported upper income eligibility limit for children in CHIP is 350% of the federal poverty level, in New Jersey.
Under CHIP, states may enroll targeted low-income children in a CHIP-financed expansion of Medicaid, create a new separate state CHIP program, or devise a combination of both approaches. States choosing the Medicaid option must provide all Medicaid mandatory benefits and all optional services covered under the state plan. In addition, they must follow the nominal Medicaid cost-sharing rules or apply the new state plan option for premiums and service-related cost-sharing as allowed under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA). In general, separate state programs must follow certain coverage and benefit options outlined in CHIP law. While some cost-sharing provisions vary by family income, the total annual aggregate cost-sharing (including premiums, copayments, and other similar charges) for a family may not exceed 5% of total income in a year. Preventive services are exempt from cost-sharing.
All states, the District of Columbia, and the five territories have CHIP programs. The territories, the District of Columbia, and six states use Medicaid expansions; 18 states use separate state programs; and 26 states use a combination approach. At the national level, nearly 7.4 million children were enrolled in CHIP during FY2008. In addition, 12 states reported enrolling about 335,000 adults in CHIP through program waivers in FY2008. |
crs_R43808 | crs_R43808_0 | Issue Overview
The Army is composed of both an Active Component (AC) and a Reserve Component (RC). The RC consists primarily of soldiers who serve part-time but who can be ordered to full-time duty. The Army's RC is made up of both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). AC/RC force mix refers to the distribution of units among the active and reserve components of the armed forces. Debates over AC/RC mix center on whether to shift force structure between the AC and the RC and, if so, what types of units to shift. Although specific force mix recommendations can be nuanced, policy advocates generally divide between those who favor a stronger AC emphasis and those who favor a stronger RC emphasis. In the contemporary debate, those who favor a stronger RC emphasis believe that RC units can replace a portion of AC force structure while saving money. The congressional role in AC/RC force mix is most obvious in its authorization of end strengths for the active and reserve components of each Service, but congressional authority concerning AC/RC mix is much broader than that. The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the armed forces, including the power to "to raise and support Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" and "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.... " On the basis of its constitutional authority, Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for the AC and RC on an annual basis and sets end strengths limiting the size of the respective forces. It proposes that RC forces make up 54.1% of the Army by FY2017, in comparison to 53.6% just before the September 11 attacks and 49.1% when the Army was at its peak size during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (2010). This proposal would also include a shift of the relative proportion of brigade combat teams (BCTs) towards the ARNG, although the Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative proposes moving attack helicopters (AH-64 Apaches) from the USAR and ARNG to the AC to replace retiring armed reconnaissance helicopters (OH-58D). The Active Component (AC)
The Army's active component consists of soldiers who are in the Army as their full-time occupation. This proposal, which has generated a great deal of discussion, is further discussed in Appendix A .
AC/RC Mix: Considerations for Congress
Determining the appropriate mix of AC and RC forces is complex, with many factors affecting the process. Of these, utilization, readiness, effectiveness, cost, and risk are generally considered the major elements in developing the AC/RC force mix. Others believe that certain RC forces—particularly larger direct combat units and higher echelon headquarters—are not as capable as AC forces without substantial additional preparation; cannot respond to a crisis as rapidly as AC forces; and cannot be used with the same frequency and duration as AC forces due to policy limitations. Those who take this perspective believe that replacing too many or certain types of AC units with RC units could reduce the Army's ability to respond rapidly to an overseas crisis and sustain operations over time; or could require too much additional RC funding and training time to make it cost-effective. As Congress considers the future AC/RC mix for the Army, there are several approaches it may wish to consider. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive; Congress could elect to pursue some combination of the following options:
Support Administration proposals on what the proper mix of Army AC and RC units should be; Gather additional information on key factors that contribute to AC/RC mix decisions; Directly adjust AC/RC mix; and/or Influence AC/RC mix by adjusting factors that contribute to mix decisions. Each of these authorities is detailed below. | The Army is composed of both an Active Component (AC) and a Reserve Component (RC). The AC consists of soldiers who are in the Army as their full-time occupation. The RC is composed primarily of soldiers who serve part-time but who can be ordered to full-time duty. The Army's RC is made up of both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). AC/RC force mix refers to the distribution of units between the active and reserve components of the armed forces.
The congressional role in AC/RC force mix is most obvious in its authorization of end strengths for the active and reserve components of each Service. Congressional authority concerning AC/RC mix, however, is much broader than that, as the Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the armed forces, including the power to "to raise and support Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" and "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.... "
Debates over AC/RC mix center on whether or not to shift force structure between the AC and the RC and, if so, what types of units to shift. Although specific force mix recommendations can be nuanced, policy advocates generally divide between those who favor a stronger AC emphasis and those who favor a stronger RC emphasis. In the contemporary debate, those who favor a stronger RC emphasis believe that RC units, if properly trained and equipped, are as capable as their AC counterparts while costing less. Thus, they argue that RC units can replace a portion of AC force structure while saving money. Those who favor a stronger AC emphasis believe that certain RC forces—particularly larger direct combat units and higher echelon headquarters—are not as capable as AC forces without substantial additional preparation; cannot respond to a crisis as rapidly as AC forces; and cannot be used with the same frequency and duration as AC forces due to policy limitations. Those who take this perspective believe that replacing too many or certain types of AC units with RC units could reduce the Army's ability to respond rapidly to an overseas crisis and sustain operations over time, or could require too much additional RC funding and training time to make such an approach cost-effective.
Given the nation's current fiscal situation, the contemporary debate has shifted somewhat in favor of a higher ratio of RC forces. For example, in its FY2015 budget request, the Administration proposes that RC forces make up 54.1% of the Army by FY2017, in comparison to 53.6% just before the September 11 attacks and 49.1% when the Army was at its peak size during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (2010). This proposal would also include a shift of the relative proportion of brigade combat teams (BCTs) towards the ARNG, although the Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative proposes moving attack helicopters from the USAR and ARNG to the AC.
Determining the appropriate mix of AC and RC forces is complex, with many factors affecting the process. Of these, utilization, readiness, effectiveness, cost, and risk are generally considered the major elements in developing the AC/RC force mix. Each of these factors is described in some detail in this report, along with questions for further investigation. As Congress considers the future AC/RC mix for the Army, it may wish to consider several approaches, including supporting Administration proposals on AC/RC mix; gathering additional information on key factors which contribute to AC/RC mix decisions; directly altering AC/RC mix; and influencing AC/RC mix by adjusting factors that contribute to mix decisions. |
crs_R44900 | crs_R44900_0 | Introduction
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) are "tax-avoidance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations." For example, countries worldwide can experience reduced tax collections through various mechanisms that firms use to shift corporate profits out of higher tax jurisdictions into lower tax jurisdictions and other mechanisms that reduce interest, dividend, and royalty taxes. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been engaged in an ongoing project to reduce BEPS. In October 2015, the OECD published its final list of 15 BEPS action items to equip governments with measures to address tax avoidance (although some updated or additional material has been provided). Some of these proposals can be (or have been) implemented in the United States and in other countries through administrative actions, and others would require legislative action. The OECD framework was adopted by the G-20 Finance Ministers in February 2016. All OECD and G-20 countries agreed to implement four minimum BEPS standards:
1. Action 5, countering harmful tax practices (mostly aimed at patent boxes); 2. Action 6, preventing treaty abuse (largely about arranging payments to flow through countries with treaties that reduce withholding taxes on dividends and other passive payments); 3. Action 13, country-by-country (CbC) reporting; and 4. Action 14, increasing the effectiveness of dispute resolution. In contrast, the United States risks losing some revenue if other countries increase their taxation of U.S. firms, even if that income was previously in low-tax jurisdictions, because the United States has a worldwide tax system that taxes income of foreign subsidiaries when repatriated but provides a foreign tax credit (i.e., credits for foreign taxes paid offset U.S. tax on foreign source income). The Senate Finance Committee requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) study BEPS actions; GAO's study focused on transfer pricing guidance and documentation, including CbC reporting. At the same time, a uniform set of standards and reporting requirements may be beneficial to U.S. multinationals, as many countries might otherwise have enacted unilateral changes in rules and reporting standards. An important approach used by multinational corporations, cost-sharing arrangements, also appears incompatible with the transfer pricing guidelines. It then discusses the various action items organized into Action Item 1, which relates to the digital economy and proposes standards only with respect to VATS; Action Items 2-5, 7, and 8-10, items related primarily to profit shifting; Action Item 5, which relates to harmful tax practices; Action Item 6, regarding tax treaties; and Action Items 11-15, which are primarily administrative in nature. As noted above, the creation of a hybrid entity by check-the-box can also lead to reducing profit taxable by the U.S. system, although it is not clear whether the United States or other high-tax countries lose revenue. The standard for transfer pricing is that goods and assets bought and sold between related firms should reflect arm's length pricing, that is, the price that would be paid by two unrelated firms. The subsidiary pays for a share of the research costs in the United States in return for a share of the rights (to future technological advances). A network of such treaties exists around the world. A number of countries have already agreed to the permanent establishment rules. In general, related corporations do not have the same ability to transfer risk as unrelated corporations." U.S. Coverage of acquired patents would be limited. U.S. It summarizes BEPS indicators, including (1) profit rates of affiliates in low-tax countries are higher than the multinational firms' worldwide profit; (2) effective tax rates of large multinationals are lower (by 4 to 8.5 percentage points) than those of similar domestic firms; (3) foreign direct investment is increasingly concentrated in countries with high ratios of investment to gross domestic product (GDP); (4) the separation of taxable profits from the location of value-creating activities is especially clear with intangibles and has grown (e.g., royalties compared with R&D spending are six times higher in low-tax countries than on average and have increased three-fold between 2009 and 2012); and (5) debt is more concentrated among affiliates in high-tax countries (e.g., ratios are three times higher than worldwide firm ratios). Another indicator of profit shifting out of the United States is the share of taxable income as a ratio of GDP, made possible by tax data on the distribution of profits of foreign affiliates by country that is available in the United States, but not in general in other countries. The United States has opted for bilateral treaties because of concerns about confidentiality and inappropriate use. | Taxes collected by countries around the world can be reduced through various avoidance mechanisms that shift corporate profits out of higher-tax-rate jurisdictions into lower-tax-rate jurisdictions and through other mechanisms that reduce taxes on interest, dividends, and royalties. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been engaged in a project to reduce such base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) in which firms use tax-avoidance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low- or no-tax locations. In October 2015, the OECD published its final list of 15 BEPS action items. The OECD framework was endorsed by the G-20 Finance Ministers in February 2016.
All OECD and G-20 countries agreed to implement four minimum BEPS standards:
1. Action 5, countering harmful tax practices (mostly aimed at patent boxes); 2. Action 6, preventing treaty abuse (largely about arranging payments to flow through countries with treaties that reduce withholding taxes on dividends and other passive payments); 3. Action 13, country-by-country (CbC) reporting; and 4. Action 14, increasing the effectiveness of dispute resolution.
These action items have led to limited changes to U.S. companies because of either a lack of relevance (no patent box regime exists in the United States) or existing practices, although CbC reporting requires additional information from U.S. multinationals.
Although implementation of some items can be done through regulation, others would require legislation or treaty amendments, which must be approved by the Senate. Other than the four agreed-upon standards, the remaining proposals are not specific recommendations because there was no agreement among the countries.
Action Item 1 contains an extensive discussion of the digital economy, but its proposals relate only to the value added tax (VAT), which the United States does not have. Action Items 2-4 and 7-10 relate to profit shifting by multinational firms via a variety of mechanisms, including locating interest deductions in high-tax countries or through transfer prices of the sales of goods and services between related corporations. The United States has generally adopted few changes, although present practices in many aspects already embody the standards. One instance in which U.S. rules appear at variance with OECD proposals are check-the-box rules, which create hybrid entities with, for example, interest deducted in one country but not taxed in another.
The OECD standards for transfer prices stress that the allocation of income should reflect functions, assets, and risks that are controlled and assumed, rather than contractual arrangements. Cost-sharing arrangements commonly used in the United States, which allow foreign subsidiaries to provide financing for research in the United States in exchange for a share of profits, is also an area in which U.S. practice appears inconsistent with BEPS proposals. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), in a study of the transfer-pricing issues, while indicating that a move from contract to content would reduce profit shifting, argued that risk could not be transferred between related firms in the same way as between unrelated firms.
The United States and other countries would benefit by gaining revenues from reductions in base erosion and profit shifting which, according to Action Item 11 on measuring and monitoring BEPS, costs between 4% and 10% of global corporate tax revenues. There have, however, been concerns that the United States risks losing some revenue and companies paying additional taxes if other countries inappropriately increase their taxation of U.S. firms, eventually generating foreign-tax credits that offset U.S. income tax. These effects might occur through changes in the definition of permanent establishment and through the use of CbC data to move to an effective formula-based approach to taxation, which could produce double taxation. At the same time, a uniform set of standards and reporting requirements may be beneficial, as many countries were proceeding to enact unilateral changes and reporting requirements prior to the OECD project.
Concerns have also been expressed by firms regarding confidentiality and compliance costs of CbC reporting. The United States has opted for bilateral agreements to share CbC data in part to help ensure confidentiality. |
crs_R44483 | crs_R44483_0 | China is the sixth largest natural gas producer in the world, with its production almost tripling over the course of 2005-2014 (see Figure 1 ). Issues for Congress
China's natural gas plans have implications for a number of issues in which Congress has expressed a strong interest. Those issues include the following:
The prospects for U.S. energy exports, including exports of natural gas and coal ; Prospects for U.S. energy companies' investments in China; Chinese investment in the U.S. energy sector; Manufacturing competitiveness between the United States and China; China's ability to meet its global commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to combat climate change; China's ability to reduce the severe air pollution that hangs over parts of the country, and thus reduce the airborne pollutants that have been shown to travel from China to the west coast of the United States; China's political and economic relationships with such regions as Central Asia, a major supplier of natural gas to China via pipelines, and the Middle East, currently a major supplier of oil and LNG to China; China's plans for disputed waters in the South China Sea, which may contain significant hydrocarbon resources; and China's management of its energy-rich but troubled Xinjiang region, which has a large ethnic Turkic population and has been the subject of human rights concerns from governments and groups outside China, and of Chinese government concerns about separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism. In the 114 th Congress, Members have expressed interest in Chinese policy related to natural gas in hearings, such as the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources' January 2015 hearing on S. 33 , The LNG Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act, and the same committee's February 2015 hearing on The Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request for the U.S. Department of Energy. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) are the biggest of the three. Supply: Importance of Diversity
China has made significant strides in diversifying its natural gas supplies. Domestic production has risen 164% in the last ten years, to 135 BCM in 2014. Natural gas imports, which did not begin until 2006, have grown from one BCM to over 58 BCM in 2014. However, China's slowing economy may be a short-term event. Consumption: A Case of Mixed Messages
Growth in China's demand for natural gas has slowed in recent years. State media reported that annual consumption in 2015 was 191 BCM, up 3.7% from 2014. This represented the lowest rate of annual growth in a decade (see Figure 8 ). China's government expects its overall energy consumption to grow in 2016, with natural gas rising to 6.2% of primary energy needs. Part of the slowdown in consumption growth is attributed to the sluggish economy. In November 2015, China cut natural gas prices to spur demand. | China could potentially be a much larger producer and consumer of natural gas than it is now. Despite China's pollution problems and international environmental commitments, the role of natural gas in China's energy mix remains relatively low, particularly compared to the United States. China has announced big plans for its natural gas development and use, but the changes will require significant investment in exploration, production, infrastructure, and consumption. With a slowing economy, China may not be in a position in the short-term to undertake these investments.
China's natural gas plans have implications for a number of issues in which Congress has expressed a strong interest. Those issues include the prospects for U.S. hydrocarbon exports to China, prospects for U.S. energy companies' investments in China, Chinese investment in the U.S. energy sector, China's ability to meet its global commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to combat climate change, and China's plans for disputed waters in the South China Sea, which may contain hydrocarbon resources, among other topics.
In the 114th Congress, Members have expressed interest in Chinese policy related to natural gas in hearings, such as the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources' January 2015 hearing on S. 33, The LNG Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act, and the same committee's February 2015 hearing on The Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request for the U.S. Department of Energy.
China's energy sector, including its natural gas industry, is controlled by the government via the National Development and Reform Commission's National Energy Administration and other regulatory and planning bodies. There are three main national energy companies—China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC). The first two are among the world's largest energy companies. These companies are the primary actors domestically and internationally.
China has made significant strides in diversifying its natural gas supplies. Domestic production rose 164% from 2004 to 2014, to 135 billion cubic meters (BCM). Natural gas imports, which did not begin until 2006, grew from one BCM that year to over 58 BCM in 2014. With its imports split almost evenly between pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG), China is the fourth largest natural gas importer in the world, with Turkmenistan supplying just under half of its imports.
Growth in China's demand for natural gas has slowed in recent years. State media reported that annual consumption in 2015 was 191 BCM, up 3.7% from 2014. This represented the lowest rate of annual growth in a decade. China's government expects its overall energy consumption to grow in 2016, and for natural gas to rise to 6.2% of primary energy needs, from 6% in 2014. Part of the slowdown in consumption growth is attributed to the slowing economy. In November 2015, China cut natural gas prices to spur demand. |
crs_RS21625 | crs_RS21625_0 | Introduction and Overview of the Currency Issue
China's policy of intervention to limit the appreciation of its currency, the renminbi (RMB) against the dollar and other currencies has become a major source of tension with many of its trading partners, especially the United States. Legislation to address China's currency policy has been introduced in every session of Congress since 2003. In recent years, congressional concerns over misaligned (or undervalued currencies) have extended to other countries as well, leading some Members to propose that currency provisions be included in future U.S. trade agreements. China began to gradually reform its currency policy in July 2005, and between then and the end of June 2013, the RMB has appreciated by 34% on a nominal basis (and 42% on an inflation-adjusted basis) against the U.S. dollar. In addition, China's trade surpluses have fallen sharply in recent years and its accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has slowed. However, other analysts contend that the RMB remains significantly undervalued against the dollar and complain that the RMB has appreciated little against the dollar since the end of 2011. 2008: RMB Appreciation Halted
China halted its currency appreciation policy around mid-July 2008 (see Figure 1 ), mainly because of declining global demand for Chinese products that resulted from the effects of the global financial crisis. Concerns in the United States over China's Currency Policy: Trade Deficits and Jobs
Many U.S. policymakers and certain business and labor representatives have charged that the Chinese government "manipulates" its currency in order to make it significantly undervalued vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, thus making Chinese exports to the United States less expensive, and U.S. exports to China more expensive, than they would be if exchange rates were determined by market forces. Many analysts contend that large increases in China's foreign exchange reserves reflect the significance of Chinese intervention in currency markets to hold down the value of the RMB, which, they argue, has been a major factor behind China's large annual current account surpluses. The House approved a currency bill ( H.R. 2378 ) in the 111 th Congress and the Senate passed one ( S. 1619 ) in the 112th Congress, though neither became law. Legislation in the 113th Congress
H.R. The bill would require the Treasury Department to issue a semiannual report to Congress on international monetary policy and currency exchange rates, which, in addition to several provisions under current law, would include:
a description of any currency intervention by the United States or other major economies or trading partners of the United States, or other actions undertaken to adjust the actual exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar; an evaluation of the domestic and global factors that underlie the conditions in the currency markets; with respect to currencies of countries with significant trade flows with the United States and other major global currencies, a determination and designation by Treasury as to which of these are in fundamental misalignment; a list of currencies designated for "priority action"; an identification of the nominal value associated with the medium-term equilibrium exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar for each currency listed for priority action; and a description of any consultations conducted, including any actions taken to eliminate the fundamental misalignment. But the issue of the possible effects of an RMB appreciation on the U.S. economy is complicated by the fact that there are short-term and long-term implications of RMB appreciation, and that exchange rates are but one of many factors that affect trade flows
To illustrate that exchange rates are only one factor that determine trade flows, one can look at the effect of the 21% RMB appreciation of the RMB to the dollar from July 2005 to July 2008 on U.S.-China trade flows. A fixed or managed float exchange rate whose level is not adjusted when economic conditions change might be viewed as such a distortion. Borrowers
An undervalued RMB also has an effect on U.S. borrowers. Some analysts contend that, although an appreciation of China's currency could help boost U.S. exports to China, it could also lessen China's need to buy U.S. Treasury securities, which could push up U.S. interest rates. For example, it could:
Boost China's term of trade by increasing the level of imports that can be purchased by its exports; Increase economic efficiency (and hence economic growth), by re-directing resources away from inefficient (and often subsidized) sectors of the economy to those that are more efficient and competitive; Lower prices for imported goods and services and expose more of the domestic economy to greater global competition, thus lowering prices for consumers and improving Chinese living standards; Improve the efficiency and competiveness of many Chinese domestic firms (including those that produce only for the domestic market) by lowering prices for imported inputs, raw materials, and machinery, thus boosting their output; Expand the ability of the government to use monetary policies to control inflation and to allocate capital according to its most efficient use through a market-based credit system; Help alleviate the large disparities of economic development between the coastal regions of China (as well as growing income disparities throughout China) that have been driven in part by China's export growth strategy and are viewed by many analysts as posing a potential risk to stability; Reduce or eliminate a major source of tension between China and many of its trading partners, some of whom view China's undervalued currency and its use of subsidies as beggar-thy-neighbor policies that promote economic development in China at the expense of growth in other countries. While this would be unusual, it might be possible. This would cause the U.S. bilateral trade deficit to decline and expand the output of U.S. exporters and import-competing firms. Chinese gross savings levels have declined over the next three years, reaching 50.4% in 2012. | China's policy of intervening in currency markets to limit or halt the appreciation of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), against the U.S. dollar and other currencies has been an issue of concern for many in Congress over the past decade who view it as one of several distortive economic and trade policies that are used to convey an unfair competitive advantage to Chinese producers and exporters. They charge that China's currency policy is intended to make its exports significantly less expensive, and its imports more expensive, than would occur if the RMB were a freely-traded currency. They argue that the RMB is significantly undervalued against the dollar and that this has been a major contributor to the large annual U.S. trade deficits with China and a significant decline in U.S. manufacturing jobs in recent years.
China began to peg the RMB to the dollar in 1994 at about 8.28 yuan (the base unit of the RMB) per dollar and kept the rate constant through July 2005, when, under pressure from its major trading partners, it moved to a managed peg system and began to allow the RMB to gradually appreciate over the next three years. In July 2008, China halted RMB appreciation because of the effects of the global economic crisis on China's exporters. It resumed RMB appreciation in June 2010. From July 2005 through June 2013, the RMB appreciated by 34% on a nominal basis against the dollar and by 42% on a real (inflation-adjusted) basis. Over the past few years, China's current account surplus has declined, and its accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has slowed—factors that have led some analysts to contend the RMB is not as undervalued against the dollar as it once was.
The effects of China's currency policy on the U.S. economy are complex. If the RMB is undervalued (as some contend), then it might be viewed as an indirect export subsidy which artificially lowers the prices of Chinese products imported into the United States. Under this view, this benefits U.S. consumers and U.S. firms that use Chinese-made parts and components, but could negatively affect certain U.S. import-competing firms and their workers. An undervalued RMB might also have the effect of limiting the level of U.S. exports to China than might occur under a floating exchange rate system. The United States is also affected by China's large purchases of U.S. Treasury securities. China's intervention in currency markets causes it to accumulate large levels of foreign exchange reserves, especially U.S. dollars, which it then uses to purchase U.S. debt. Such purchases help the U.S. government fund its budget deficits and help keep U.S. interest rates low. These factors suggest that an appreciation of the RMB to the dollar benefits some U.S. economic sectors, but negatively affects others.
The effects of the recent global financial crisis have refocused attention on the need to reduce global imbalances in savings, investment, and trade, especially with regard to China and the United States, in order to avoid future crises. Many economists contend that China should take greater steps to rebalance its economy by lessening its dependence on exports and fixed investment as the main drivers of its economic growth, while boosting the level of domestic consumer demand (which would increase Chinese imports). A market-based currency policy is seen as an important factor in achieving this goal.
Currency bills aimed at addressing China's currency policy have been introduced in every session of Congress since 2003. The House approved a currency bill in the 111th Congress and the Senate passed one in the 112th Congress. Currency legislation has been proposed in the 113th Congress, including H.R. 1276 and S. 1114. In recent years, congressional concerns about undervalued currencies have moved beyond China to include those of several other countries as well. |
crs_R41305 | crs_R41305_0 | This report analyzes Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan's co-authored article, written with David Barron, on the nondelegation doctrine and the seminal administrative law case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource s Defense Council, Inc . Barron and Kagan's Chevron nondelegation theory would shift the applicable type of judicial deference away from a focus on the agency's use of formal procedures, such as those set forth in the APA, or informal procedures. An Overview of the Congressional Nondelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine concerns the delegation of legislative power to administrative or executive branch agencies. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has already elucidated several types of judicial deference to agency action, including Chevron and Skidmore deference. Under the Chevron nondelegation doctrine proposed in the article, whether an agency decision receives Chevron or a lesser type of deference for its actions depends on whether one or two delegations have occurred. According to the authors, in the Chevron decision and the years afterward, Chevron deference to agencies was explained and justified through several different theories: (1) the "institutional competencies" theory, which could be viewed as the Court's establishment of "a common law of judicial review responsive to institutional competencies" such as agencies' "accountability and deliberativeness" in interpretive decisionmaking; (2) the statutory theory, which connected deference to agencies with congressional delegation of responsibilities to agencies—ambiguities in statutes could be viewed as congressional delegations to agencies to explain such ambiguities in regulations; and (3) separation of powers principles, which would grant deference to agencies rather than courts for decisions that interpret ambiguous statutes. The agency's interpretation would receive Skidmore deference from the courts if the statutory delegatee subdelegated her decisionmaking authority to another agency official (other than her close advisors). Thus, under the Chevron nondelegation doctrine, the institutional choice between whether agencies or courts should interpret and resolve ambiguous statutes would depend on the question of institutional design. Mode of the Decision
With regard to the mode of the decision, the statutory delegatee's decision can receive Chevron deference if the interpretation (1) is authored by the delegatee or is adopted and issued under her name and (2) is adopted by the delegatee after a meaningful review by the delegatee or her close advisors. Barron and Kagan's approach would apply regardless of the two traditional administrative law dichotomies—the use of formal or informal procedures and the general or particular applicability of the decision. Additional Considerations
Vacancies in the Statutory Delegatee Position
It is worth noting that while the Chevron nondelegation doctrine addresses the levels of deference that decisions issued by high- and lower-level agency officials may be granted, Barron and Kagan do not address how their doctrine would respond to a vacancy in the position of the statutory delegatee or the level of deference that a court may grant to an officer who is acting as the head of an agency in a temporary capacity (for example, pursuant to the Vacancies Reform Act of 1998). Barron and Kagan's theory applying Chevron deference, in which the agency is arguably the decisionmaker, only to agency actions formally adopted after meaningful review by the statutory delegatee would arguably result in a major reformulation of the Court's jurisprudence regarding which agency actions receive Chevron deference. | This report discusses and analyzes Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan's 2001 article, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, which she coauthored with David J. Barron, an assistant professor at Harvard Law School, during her time as a professor there.
The article provides an overview of two traditional dichotomies in administrative law on which courts rely in choosing between whether to accord deference to agency interpretations of statutory provisions: (1) the use of formal or informal procedures, such as the procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and (2) the general or particular applicability of agency decisions, such as whether an agency action binds more than one party. The authors propose a new method of determining what type of judicial review should apply to agency actions. They term this approach the Chevron nondelegation doctrine and emphasize its roots in ideas of political accountability and discipline of agency action.
Under Barron and Kagan's Chevron nondelegation doctrine, the agency's interpretation would receive a type of substantial deference from the courts, known as "Chevron deference," if the individual designated by Congress to carry out the statute (the statutory delegatee) has formally adopted the agency's decision after a meaningful review and issued the decision under her name. The agency's interpretation would receive a weaker type of judicial deference, known as Skidmore deference, if the statutory delegatee subdelegated her decisionmaking authority to a lower-level agency official (other than her close advisors). Thus, under the Chevron nondelegation doctrine, the choice between whether agencies or courts should interpret and resolve ambiguous statutes would depend on the question of who in the agency makes the interpretation—a high- or low-level agency employee.
If adopted by the Supreme Court, the Chevron nondelegation doctrine would appear to result in a major reformulation of the Court's jurisprudence regarding which agency actions receive Chevron deference. Courts generally do not focus on the identity of the agency decisionmaker, but rather view agencies as a single entity and do not differentiate in the levels of deference that they grant to decisions issued by civil servants or political appointees, branch chiefs or headquarters officials, agency heads or low-level employees.
Barron and Kagan's proposed Chevron nondelegation doctrine would address a phenomenon of "judicial channeling" that the authors call "unfortunate"—that an agency's discretion in choosing from the multitude of legitimate modes of agency decisionmaking is both influenced and limited by the courts' application of the more substantial Chevron deference to decisions undertaken with greater procedural formality or that apply more generally. Their Chevron nondelegation doctrine appears to address this problem by relegating the procedural requirements of the APA to a threshold determination of whether the agency's decision or interpretation is a lawful, or valid, action. |
crs_R44034 | crs_R44034_0 | Senior U.S. officials commonly emphasize that the United States has vital interests at stake in U.S. engagement with Pakistan. These are related to regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; Pakistan-India tensions and conflict; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. As a haven for numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and with the world's fastest growing arsenal of nuclear weapons, Pakistan is at the top of many governments' international security agendas. Islamabad has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in the 21 st century, receiving more than $20 billion in overt transfers since 2001. Congress subsequently made existing conditions on aid both more rigorous and expanded them to include all forms, economic and military, alike. Status of U.S.-Pakistan Relations
The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and undisturbed refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of providing significant U.S. foreign assistance to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Long-held doubts about Islamabad's commitment to core U.S. interests deepened over the course of 2011, with U.S officials more often describing Pakistan's military and intelligence services as too willing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to Afghan insurgent and anti-India militant organizations operating from Pakistani territory as a means of promoting what Pakistan perceives to be its security interests. For January 2015's Strategic Dialogue session in Islamabad, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Pakistani Adviser to the Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz to review progress in the existing five Working Group areas (economic and finance; defense; law enforcement and counterterrorism; security, strategic stability, and nonproliferation; and energy), and welcomed the creation of a sixth group—on education, science, and technology—set to meet later in 2015. President Barack Obama condemned the act of "depravity" and reiterated the U.S. commitment to support Pakistan in its counterterrorism efforts. A New Era for Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations? Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
The security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, materials, and technologies continues to be a top-tier U.S. concern, especially as Islamist militants have expanded their geographic influence there. Political Unrest in 2014. They are widely popular with the public. U.S. Foreign Assistance
Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in the post-9/11 period, with Congress appropriating more than $18 billion in such assistance for FY2002-FY2015, including $10.5 billion in economic, development, and humanitarian aid, and over $7.6 billion in security-related aid (see Figure 3 ). The Administration has requested $794 million for Pakistan aid for FY2016, representing a 10% decrease from the FY2015 request. Coalition Support Reimbursements . Are Pakistan's governmental and civil society institutions making effective efforts to combat the spread of religious extremism and militancy there? Has the U.S. sale and granting of major military supplies to Pakistan over the past 15 years substantively improved that country's counterterrorism capabilities? | Congress has taken keen interest in U.S. relations with Pakistan, especially as related to counterterrorism and U.S. foreign assistance. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 transformed U.S.-Pakistan relations virtually overnight. After more than a decade under broad U.S. sanctions for its nuclear proliferation activities, and later for a military coup, Pakistan became a key ally in U.S.-led efforts to combat Islamist militancy and extremism. Pakistan has been a leading recipient of U.S. assistance for nearly 15 years, having received more than $20 billion in economic, security, and humanitarian aid, and military reimbursements. The Administrations of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama have sought close engagement with Pakistani leaders. Vital U.S. interests are seen to be at stake in this engagement related to
regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and the broader region; nuclear weapons proliferation; links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism; Pakistan-India tensions and conflict; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development.
Pakistan is a haven for numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and successive Pakistani governments are widely believed to have tolerated and even supported some of these as proxies in Islamabad's historical tensions and conflicts with neighbors. The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of providing significant U.S. foreign aid to a nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Pakistan's security services are seen by many independent analysts to be too willing to make distinctions between what they consider to be "good" and "bad" Islamist extremist groups, maintaining supportive relations with Afghan insurgent and anti-India militant groups operating from Pakistani territory.
Although the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has partially recovered from the 2011 nadir, Congress has since imposed both broader and more rigorous conditions on the release of foreign assistance to Pakistan. Such conditionality now applies to all non-humanitarian transfers, including military reimbursements. For the past four years, the Administration has exercised authority granted by Congress to waive those conditions in the interests of national security.
In January 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry led a U.S. delegation for the 5th session of the bilateral U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue to review progress in the existing five Working Group areas (economic and finance; defense; law enforcement and counterterrorism; security, strategic stability, and nonproliferation; and energy). In April, the State Department approved the possible $952 million sale to Pakistan of U.S.-built attack helicopters and missiles, suggesting that the Administration intends to continue bolstering Pakistan's capacity to combat militants in its rugged and semi-autonomous western regions. See also CRS Report R43717, Pakistan Political Unrest: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL34248, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31530 | crs_RL31530_0 | (These laws are discussed below.) Congress addressed chemical facility security when it enacted legislation establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS; P.L. The law requires analysis of vulnerabilities and suggestions for security enhancements for "critical infrastructure." The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-188 ) and the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA, P.L. 107-295 ) require vulnerability assessments, security plans, and incident response plans for some chemical facilities which supply drinking water or are located in ports. Many other chemical facilities remain unregulated with respect to terrorism. Historically, there have been very few terrorist attacks on chemical facilities in the United States. Therefore, the estimated risk of death and injury from such attacks in the immediate future is low relative to the likelihood of other hazardous events, such as industrial accidents or terrorist attacks on other targets using conventional weapons. In contrast to the low probability of chemical terrorism, possible consequences for human health and the environment from such an event could be severe. Moreover, limited evidence suggests that chemical facilities may be "soft targets," lacking in adequate safeguards against criminal and terrorist attacks. Federal Requirements Established Prior to September 11, 2001, To Reduce Risks at Chemical Facilities
Two key federal laws require or encourage certain chemical facility operators to reduce risks to the general public associated with releases of hazardous chemicals: the Emergency Response and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and the Clean Air Act (CAA). However, the law does require DHS to analyze vulnerabilities and recommend methods of enhancing site security at facilities that are part of the "critical infrastructure." 109-295 , provides authority to DHS for three years to issue regulations for high-risk chemical facilities, other than drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities and facilities in ports. DHS is directed to establish risk-based security performance standards for such facilities, and designated chemical facilities are required to prepare vulnerability assessments and facility security plans. DHS has authority to inspect facilities and to order compliance. Additional information on this topic is provided by CRS Report RL33043, Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security , by [author name scrubbed]. Status Quo
Congress could rely on existing mechanisms in the public and private sectors to continuously evaluate and improve site security. Restricted Access to Information
Restricting terrorists' access to information about vulnerability and location of chemical facilities also might reduce the risk of terrorism. 6348 . The enacted provisions combine certain elements of H.R. 5695 , as reported by the House Homeland Security Committee, and S. 2145 , as reported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The various legislative proposals, as well as the enacted provisions, are summarized below. Protected information would include the criteria and data used to assign facilities to risk-based tiers and the tier assignments for specific facilities, vulnerability assessments, facility security plans, assessments of IST, security performance requirements for a facility, and any other information generated or collected by a government agency or a chemical facility to fulfill requirements of this title if it describes any vulnerability, describes the assignment of a facility to a risk-based tier, describes a security measure for the protection of a chemical facility from terrorism, or if "the disclosure of which the Secretary determines would be detrimental to the security of any chemical facility." For example, S. 2052 / H.R. Section 550 of P.L. Other legislative proposals that were considered by the 109 th Congress would have done the same, but also addressed issues such as how to facilitate congressional oversight of DHS implementation, the role of inherently safer technology, the criteria used to designate facilities as more or less "risky," and whether state and local right-to-know laws should be preempted by the federal provisions. | Facilities handling large amounts of potentially hazardous chemicals (i.e., chemical facilities) might be of interest to terrorists, either as targets for direct attacks meant to release chemicals into the community or as a source of chemicals for use elsewhere. Because few terrorist attacks have been attempted against chemical facilities in the United States, the risk of death and injury in the near future is estimated to be low, relative to the likelihood of accidents at such facilities or attacks on other targets using conventional weapons. For any individual facility, the risk is very small, but the risks may be increasingâwith potentially severe consequences for human health and the environment. Available evidence indicates that many chemical facilities may lack adequate safeguards.
After 9/11, Congress enacted legislation that requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to analyze vulnerabilities and suggest security enhancements for "critical infrastructure." The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-188 ) and the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA, P.L. 107-295 ) require vulnerability assessments and emergency response plans for some chemical facilities that supply drinking water or are located in ports, as well as security plans for chemical facilities in ports. Many other chemical facilities, including wastewater treatment facilities, remain unregulated.
Congress could choose to rely on existing efforts in the public and private sectors to improve chemical site security over time. Alternatively, Congress could direct DHS to oversee security enhancement at potentially dangerous facilities. Or, Congress might enact legislation to reduce risks, either by "hardening" defenses against terrorists (for example by increasing security patrols) or by requiring industries to consider use of safer chemicals, procedures, or processes. Restricting terrorists' access to information might be a least-cost approach to reducing risks, but it would also limit public access to information about potential risks and reduce accountability of facility owners. For more on this topic, see CRS Report RL33043, Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security , by [author name scrubbed].
The 109 th Congress enacted chemical security legislation as Section 550 of the DHS appropriations legislation, P.L. 109-295 . The law provides authority to DHS for three years to regulate high-risk chemical facilities other than drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities and facilities in ports. The enacted provisions also are found in H.R. 6348 . These provisions combine certain elements of H.R. 5695 , as reported by the House Homeland Security Committee, and S. 2145 , as reported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. For example, the enacted law directs DHS to establish risk-based security performance standards for facilities, and requires facility owners or operators to prepare vulnerability assessments and facility security plans. The new law also authorizes DHS to inspect facilities and to close down any that are repeatedly noncompliant. However, the law did not address the most controversial issues: whether state laws are preempted and whether facilities should be required to consider use of inherently safer technology. |
crs_RL32815 | crs_RL32815_0 | Introduction
The 12 banks (the Banks) that make up the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System constitute one collective government-sponsored enterprise (GSE). Originally chartered by Congress to provide liquidity to the nation's predominant lenders for home mortgage loans—savings and loan associations and savings banks—the Banks have undergone a series of changes over the years as the nation's financial institutions have changed. It also discusses issues affecting the Banks and highlights the differences between the FHLB System and the other two housing-related GSEs. The act also opened membership in the Banks to all depository institutions, so long as they engaged in significant mortgage lending, and set up two requirements for the System: a set-aside of at least 10% of each Bank's net earnings for low- and moderate-income housing programs, and repayment of part of the debt incurred in paying off insured depositors for the savings and loans that failed (REFCORP debt, please see the Appendix). Mission
The Banks have three missions. The second mission is for housing and community investment. Federal Housing Finance Board
The regulator of the Banks is the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), an independent regulatory agency in the executive branch. The Board has five members. These supervisory powers for System organization may be tested by a proposed merger between FHLB Chicago and FHLB Dallas. Because depository institutions, for which the federal government has clear safety responsibility, can hold agency debt without regard to limits on loans to a single lender, the possibility exists that a failure of the Banks could trigger failures of commercial banks, savings associations, and credit unions that were overexposed to System debt. The slowdown in the housing market could negatively affect the FHLBs. Large lenders with affiliates that are members of a regional FHLB could use the System to access liquidity to refinance troubled loans. Legislative Issues
The major issue before Congress concerning the FHLB System is GSE regulatory reform. Both H.R. 1427 and S. 1100 would fold the FHFB and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)—the current regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—into a single overseer for all three housing-related GSEs. 1427 , sponsored by Representative Frank and others, passed the House on May 22, 2007, by 313-104. The bill would fold the FHFB and OFHEO into a single regulator for all three housing-related GSEs, to be known as the Federal Housing Finance Agency. S. 1100 was referred to the Senate Banking Committee on April 12, 2007, but no further action has been taken as of the date of this writing. Legislation would grant greater power and independence to the new regulator than to OFHEO, while nearly matching the authority and independence of the current FHFB. | The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System comprises 12 regional banks (the Banks) that form a collective government-sponsored enterprise (GSE). As a GSE, the Banks have special ties to the federal government that accord them "agency" status and lead investors in capital markets to infer that the government would step in to make good any failure in the debt of the Banks.
Originally begun in 1932 as lenders to the savings and loan associations that were the primary lenders for home mortgages, the Banks have undergone several changes since the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. Membership in the Banks has changed, today encompassing more commercial banks than savings associations and including credit unions, insurance companies, and some associated housing providers. Purposes of lending—while still primarily housing-related—now include agricultural and small business lending. The changes have also resulted in special mission set-asides for low- and moderate-income housing and special programs for community development. The five-member Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) regulates the System.
Some advocate combining the FHFB with the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which is the current regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the other two housing-related GSEs. Differences between FHFB and OFHEO, including capital and ownership standards, requirements for the housing mission, and regulatory powers, complicate regulatory consolidation. In the 110th Congress, two major bills would merge regulation for the housing-related GSEs. Both S. 1100 and H.R. 1427 would combine regulation of the three housing GSEs under a single regulator who would have powers and independence similar to those of the FHFB. H.R. 1427 passed the House on May 22, 2007. S. 1100 was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on April 12, 2007. The measures have several important differences. (See CRS Report RL33940, Reforming the Regulation of Government-Sponsored Enterprises in the 110th Congress, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed] for additional information.)
The slowdown in housing markets and rise in foreclosures have led to concerns about the health of the FHLBs. Some large non-member lenders have affiliates that are members of a regional FHLB. These affiliates could draw on FHLB resources to move some troubled loans onto System balance sheets. This is a concern because some believe that the government would not let the FHLB System fail, and that such affiliate actions could raise the potential risk and cost to taxpayers.
Possible mergers of FHLBs is another issue. FHLB Dallas has been in negotiations to merge with FHLB Chicago, in part because of the financial difficulties of FHLB Chicago. The potential merger would be the first of its kind and raises several oversight issues, including FHFB approval powers and System organization. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33653 | crs_RL33653_0 | The purpose of this report is to examine the developing regional architecture—the growing trade, financial, and political arrangements among countries of East Asia—and what that implies for U.S. interests and policy. The types of arrangements include bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), regional trade pacts, currency and monetary arrangements, and political and security arrangements. The East Asian regional architecture is supported by two distinct legs. The economic leg is strong and growing more intense. A web of free trade and regional monetary agreements is developing rapidly. As U.S. policy toward economic and security arrangements in East Asia evolves, it is turning on matters of job creation, intensity, inclusiveness, and final structure. Singapore, Chile, Brunei, and New Zealand are the original members of the pact. The United States, Australia, Peru, and Vietnam are seeking to join. The TPP could become the basis for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific over the long term. The political and security leg of the East Asian regional architecture remains relatively underdeveloped. The most progress has been made with ASEAN playing the role of convener and has taken the form of the East Asia Summit established in 2005 (involving all the members of ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea, together with India, Australia and New Zealand), the ASEAN Security Community and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In Northeast Asia, the six-party talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear program have been operating in fits and starts on an ad hoc basis. By relying primarily on bilateral FTAs with Asian nations while still emphasizing trans-Pacific arrangements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the United States seems to be hedging its bets—not trying to block attempts to create exclusive East Asian FTAs but pursuing deals to keep from being cut out from their benefits. U.S. security interests in East Asia are so great that in issues related to Asian security the United States has sought a seat at the table and often leads in attempts to resolve contentious issues. The United States has joined with Tokyo and Seoul in calling for a Northeast Asia Regional Forum that would include the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea. At the core of U.S. concern over the developing regional architecture in East Asia is the growing influence of China. The danger exists that if China comes to dominate regional institutions in East Asia, it could steer them down a path inimical to U.S. interests, much as Beijing has already done with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The final question for the policy deliberations on trade and security arrangements in East Asia is what form the architecture will take. What Are Regional Trade Agreements? The security related organizations in East Asia are discussed below. U.S. As the London Economist stated, "China ... is more assertive and less tolerant of being thwarted.... From its perceived position of growing economic strength, China has been throwing its weight around...."
Given China's conclusion of free-trade agreements with its Southeast Asian neighbors and free-trade discussions with Japan and South Korea, it is possible that, in the future, the industrial world could be divided into three large quasi-blocs for trade: North America, Europe, and East Asia. This appears to be a major rationale for the negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The creation of an Asia Pacific FTA encompassing the 21 APEC nations (including the United States) seems distant. This is one trade arrangement that includes countries on both sides of the Pacific. How would a potential East Asian FTA affect the United States? | The global financial crisis, the end of the Cold War, the rise of China, globalization, free trade agreements, the war on terror, and an institutional approach to keeping the peace are causing dramatic shifts in relationships among countries in East Asia. A new regional architecture in the form of trade, financial, and political arrangements among countries of East Asia is developing that has significant implications for U.S. interests and policy. This report examines this regional architecture with a focus on China, South Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia. The types of arrangements include bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), regional trade pacts, currency and monetary arrangements, and political and security arrangements.
The East Asian regional architecture is supported by two distinct legs. The economic leg is strong and growing more intense. A web of bilateral and regional FTAs is developing. An East Asian Economic Community (with 13 nations), an East Asian FTA (with 16 nations), and an Asia Pacific FTA (with 21 nations) are being discussed. In contrast, the political and security leg remains relatively underdeveloped. The most progress has been made with the Association of South East Asian Nations playing the role of convener and has taken the form of the ASEAN Security Community (10 Southeast Asian nations) and ASEAN Regional Forum (25 nations, including the United States). In Northeast Asia, the six-party talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear program are ongoing.
As U.S. policy toward economic and security arrangements in East Asia evolves, it is turning on matters of intensity, inclusiveness, and final structure. Should the United States intensify its efforts to either hinder or support the architecture? Who should be included in the arrangements? Should the groupings be exclusively Asian? On the economic side, current U.S. policy appears to be to hedge by not trying to block attempts to create exclusive Asian FTAs but doing deals to keep from being cut out from their benefits. On the security side, U.S. interest in stability, counter-terrorism, and nonproliferation in East Asia is so great that the United States has sought a seat at the table when Asians meet to address security issues. Some also have called for the United States to join the East Asia Summit or to create a Northeast Asia Regional Forum that would include the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea.
At the core of U.S. concern over the developing regional architecture in East Asia is the growing influence of China. A danger exists that if China comes to dominate regional institutions in East Asia, it could steer them down a path inimical to U.S. interests. Some Asian nations, however, are wary of excessive Chinese influence and are hedging and maneuvering against possible Chinese dominance.
On March 15, 2010, the United States began negotiating to join a regional, Asia-Pacific trade agreement, known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. The United States, Australia, Peru, and Vietnam are seeking to join with the four existing members of the pact: Singapore, Chile, Brunei, and New Zealand. The TPP could become the basis for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific over the long term.
The final question for the policy deliberations on trade and security arrangements in East Asia is what form the architecture will take. The industrialized world seems to be evolving into three distinct blocs, North America, Europe, and East Asia, but a trans-Pacific trade and security arrangement that includes countries both of Asia and the Americas also is possible. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RL32072 | crs_RL32072_0 | Background
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), a new, highly infectious viral disease, was firstidentified by the World Health Organization (WHO) in February 2003. (1)
While the overall numbers are not high by comparison with other serious infectious diseases, the speed and distance with which SARS spread raised an alarm over the potential risks tointernational public health. Containment appears to be working; however, there are fears thatanother SARS outbreak might take place during the regular influenza season later in 2003. Thisreport reviews the global response by WHO and those countries most affected. This systemproved to be very useful in picking up telecommunicated alerts in China. Identifying these individuals could be critical to the control of the disease. Overview of the International Health Regulations. Some countries, like Vietnam, immediatelycalled for international support. (41)
Other laws sought to halt the spread of the virus through fines. Vietnam
Vietnam, the poorest of the SARS-affected countries, was the first country to contain the SARS virus. Areas in which improvements have been calledfor in the global response to infectious disease threats include:
Global Interdependence and Transparency
Lack of transparency in promptly reporting and monitoring SARS outbreaks directly contributed to the spread of the disease worldwide and had wide-ranging impacts beyond the obvioushealth factors. The case of SARS demonstrated that state responsibility within a globalized worlddoes not end at its borders and that future containment relies on openness and cooperation in theinterests of all populations. | Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), a new highly infectious disease, was first identified by the World Health Organization (WHO) in February 2003. While the overall numberof confirmed cases is not high by comparison with statistics for other infectious diseases, the distanceand speed with which SARS spread raised an alarm over the potential risks to international publichealth. Containment appears to be working; however, there are fears that another SARS outbreakcould take place during the regular influenza season later in 2003.
The United States was instrumental in the global effort to contain the spread of SARS. Affected countries responded in different ways. Singapore and Taiwan acted quickly andencouraged international support in curbing the spread of the virus. China, on the other hand, hasbeen criticized for down-playing the magnitude of the problem, particularly in the early phase of thedisease. This, some analysts contend, ultimately enabled the virus to cross borders and in the caseof Canada, hemispheres.
This report takes a retrospective look at the global response by WHO and by those countries most affected. It reveals some of the challenges that may lie ahead for the global health community,such as global interdependence and transparency, surge capacity, management of public fear andinformation disclosure, coordination of different national responses, and lack of funding. Examiningthe impacts of SARS and lessons learned may be useful in the response to future outbreaks orincidences of new diseases. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RS22713 | crs_RS22713_0 | In 2008, U.S. imports from China totaled $338 billion. Over the past few years, numerous recalls and warnings have been issued by U.S. firms over various products imported from China, due to health and safety concerns. This has led many U.S. policymakers to question the adequacy of China's regulatory environment in ensuring that its exports to the United States meet U.S. standards for health, safety, and quality; as well as the ability of U.S. government regulators, importers, and retailers to identify and take action against unsafe imports (from all countries) before they enter the U.S. market. For example, China was the largest supplier of imported toys (91% of total) and tires (37%) and the 2 nd for seafood products (16%) and animal foods (26%). U.S-Chinese Cooperation on Health and Safety Issues
The United States and China reached a number of agreements in 2007 to address health and safety concerns:
On September 11, 2007, the CPSC and its Chinese counterpart, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), signed a Joint Statement on enhancing consumer product safety. Concerns over the health, safety, and quality of Chinese products could have a number of important economic implications. This incident indicates that the central government continues to face numerous challenges in developing an effective health and safety enforcement regime. | China is the largest source for U.S. imports, accounting for a 16% of total U.S. imports in 2008. China is a dominant supplier of many imported consumer products. For example, 90% of U.S. toy imports come from China. Numerous reports of unsafe products from China over the past few years, including seafood, pet food, toys, tires, drywall, and medicines have raised concern in the United States over the health, safety, and quality of imported Chinese products. The United States and China have sought to boost cooperation on health and safety issues. For example, China agreed to boost efforts to ensure that its toy exports to the United States did not violate U.S. regulations on lead content.
This report provides an overview of U.S. concerns over the health and safety of Chinese products, identifies challenges China faces to develop an effective health and safety enforcement regime, summarizes U.S.-China cooperative efforts, and analyzes how this issue could impact China's economy and U.S.-China trade relations. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40427 | crs_R40427_0 | In January 2008, the Bush Administration initiated the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (the CNCI) to make the United States more secure against cyber threats. The CNCI "establishes the policy, strategy, and guidelines to secure federal systems." On February 9, 2009, President Obama directed a 60-day interagency cybersecurity review to develop a strategic framework to ensure the CNCI is being appropriately integrated, resourced, and coordinated with Congress and the private sector. However, threats could originate from foreign military or intelligence operatives rather than from terrorist groups. Move towards managing a single federal enterprise network;
2. Connect current government cyber operations centers;
6. Expand cyber education;
9. Develop multi-pronged approaches to supply chain risk management; and
12. Legal Authorities for Executive Branch Responses to Cyber Threats
As discussed, the CSIS report on Securing Cyberspace for the 44 th Presidency recommends executive action to protect U.S. cyberspace. To be legally authorized, the CNCI and any other executive-branch action must have some basis in statutory or constitutional law. In addition, although the phrase "war powers" evokes international conflicts, it seems that the President's war powers authorize at least some domestic action. Cyber intrusions conducted by individual computer hackers, not supported by or aligned with a nation or terrorist organization, are perhaps best characterized as ordinary criminal activity whereas orchestrated intrusions by foreign security or intelligence entities might belong in a category of routine foreign-intelligence gathering. Therefore, at least until Congress takes further action in the cybersecurity area, it appears that the executive branch is not precluded from implementing the CNCI or other cybersecurity responses under Justice Jackson's Youngstown framework. Likewise, the Supreme Court has characterized the President as the "sole organ" of the country in conducting foreign affairs. Congress might choose to:
determine the most appropriate and effective organizational entity in which the nation's principal cybersecurity prevention, response, and recovery responsibilities should reside; require the senior U.S. government official in charge of all CNCI related activities be a Senate confirmable position to facilitate ongoing information exchange regarding Initiative plans and areas of progress and difficulty; enact legislative language recognizing and defining the classified and unclassified aspects of the CNCI and the need for greater transparency and inclusiveness; require the new Administration to develop and revise annually a classified and unclassified national cyber security strategy and intelligence community generated National Intelligence Estimate that provides Congress, the telecommunications industry, and the American public information related to the CNCI, the current and strategic cyber threats facing the nation, and programs being implemented to prepare for evolving technological risks; define the privacy and civil liberty considerations that should accompany all aspects of the CNCI; include legislative language in applicable authorizations bills to establish a programmatic foundation for CNCI related programs and suggest funding for current and future year's activities; or identify and codify relevant laws defining a national security related cyber offense against the United States, offensive versus defensive cyber activities, and the situations in which the Congress should be notified prior to the United States undertaking an offensive or counteroffensive cyber act. In response to calls for executive action, questions have arisen regarding the adequacy of legal authorities justifying executive responses to cyber threats. | Federal agencies report increasing cyber-intrusions into government computer networks, perpetrated by a range of known and unknown actors. In response, the President, legislators, experts, and others have characterized cybersecurity as a pressing national security issue.
Like other national security challenges in the post-9/11 era, the cyber threat is multi-faceted and lacks clearly delineated boundaries. Some cyber attackers operate through foreign nations' military or intelligence-gathering operations, whereas others have connections to terrorist groups or operate as individuals. Some cyber threats might be viewed as international or domestic criminal enterprises.
In January 2008, the Bush Administration established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (the CNCI) by a classified joint presidential directive. The CNCI establishes a multi-pronged approach the federal government is to take in identifying current and emerging cyber threats, shoring up current and future telecommunications and cyber vulnerabilities, and responding to or proactively addressing entities that wish to steal or manipulate protected data on secure federal systems. On February 9, 2009, President Obama initiated a 60-day interagency cybersecurity review to develop a strategic framework to ensure the CNCI is being appropriately integrated, resourced, and coordinated with Congress and the private sector.
In response to the CNCI and other proposals, questions have emerged regarding: (1) the adequacy of existing legal authorities—statutory or constitutional—for responding to cyber threats; and (2) the appropriate roles for the executive and legislative branches in addressing cybersecurity. The new and emerging nature of cyber threats complicates these questions. Although existing statutory provisions might authorize some modest actions, inherent constitutional powers currently provide the most plausible legal basis for many potential executive responses to national security related cyber incidences. Given that cyber threats originate from various sources, it is difficult to determine whether actions to prevent cyber attacks fit within the traditional scope of executive power to conduct war and foreign affairs. Nonetheless, under the Supreme Court jurisprudence, it appears that the President is not prevented from taking action in the cybersecurity arena, at least until Congress takes further action. Regardless, Congress has a continuing oversight and appropriations role. In addition, potential government responses could be limited by individuals' constitutional rights or international laws of war. This report discusses the legal issues and addresses policy considerations related to the CNCI. |
crs_R42516 | crs_R42516_0 | Issues
The debates and discussions among U.S. government officials and outside stakeholders about the use of partnership in support of national security are inchoate, but a number of facets of the debates are discernible, including worldview; goals; effects; priorities; resourcing; assessments; roles and responsibilities; and risk. This section describes each facet of partnership strategy, analyzes its treatment in recent guidance, and raises questions that may be germane to congressional oversight. Worldview
In general, a state's national security strategy is likely to derive from some worldviewâa set of assumptions about the nature of the world order and the exercise of power within it, together with a view of that state's role on the world stage. While worldview may not be explicitly stated, identifying its influence on U.S. strategy, including the role of partnership within that strategy, may be helpful to rigorous oversight. The DSG's fundamental "shift toward the future" underscores concern with a broad range of security challenges, in contrast to the almost singular focus on CT as a driver for partnership in 2006. Should partnership be the default starting point for engagement on the world stage? The 2006 QDR called for building international partners' capabilities in order to meet those broader challenges. At the same time, the 2006 BPC roadmap, more explicitly than any other guidance, also invoked the idea of savings: "The Department's efforts to build the planning and operational capabilities of partner agencies and international partners have the potential to reduce the length of U.S. force deployments, minimize the range of circumstances in which U.S. forces are called upon, and preserve the Department's financial resources." Moreover, many specific partnership activities may aim at multiple effectsâdigging a well might build local good will for further tactical-level cooperation but may also develop capabilities that host nation forces could apply at home or abroad, foster effective host nation civil-military collaboration, deepen U.S. ability to work with host nation partners on a range of issues, and/or demonstrate U.S. commitment as part of a broader, orchestrated bilateral relationship. The 2010 NSS calls for the use of whole-of-government partnership approaches, including roles for a number of U.S. departments and agencies, to help achieve a wide array of desired effects in support of U.S. national security interests. But such a laundry list of desired effects does not indicate how specific activities generate specific effects, does not provide clear guidelines concerning which of the effects are most important for protecting U.S. interests, and does not convey the strategic logic, if any, by which some effects generate others. Prioritization
Opportunities for partnership in support of national security are theoretically unbounded, so prioritization is essential both to focus effort and to conserve resources. Published strategic guidance documents are generally short on prioritization, while internal guidance reportedly has not settled on a single approach toward prioritization:
The 2010 NSS and QDDR cast the broadest net, using "partnership" to refer to the full spectrum of U.S. government engagement around the world, providing exhaustive lists of the geographic areas ripe for partnership, the substantive arenas in which partnership should be applied, and the categories of potential partners. Resources
The broad partnership debates often seem to assume that partnership yields savings over time. To the extent that savings is part of the desired ends, it may be helpful for partnership strategy to outline the curves of investment and expected pay-off over time, including when and how both curves will be reflected in budget requests. Assessments
One potential fundamental challenge to congressional oversight of Administration partnership efforts in support of national security is the lack of a clear assessment model for gauging the impact of partnership efforts. In theory, rigorous assessment requires as a starting point a clear and specific articulation of desired ends, together with a clear logic for assessing progress toward those ends. Second, some effects may be achieved partially, along a spectrum, rather than in the binary terms of success or failure. As a rule, strategic guidance regarding partnership has been vague about desired effects, and it has not addressed the balance among qualitatively different kinds of effects. But it does not assign roles and responsibilities to specific agencies. To that end, the guidance called for the use of national security planning guidance (NSPG)âinternal, classified guidance, issued by the White House to all agencies with a national security role, which would confirm specific priorities, and clarify and assign roles and responsibilities. Key questions concerning integration of effort and division of labor for partnership efforts in support of national security might include the following:
How can the U.S. government best establish, and refine as needed, shared overall priorities for partnership efforts in support of national security? What is the proper distribution of roles and responsibilities for partnership in support of national security among U.S. government departments and agencies? Given that many different departments and agencies are likely to share responsibility for partnership in support of national security, and that many individual programs require various combinations of participation, funding, and consent from multiple agencies, how can Congress best provide effective oversight? | Over the last few years, the term "partnership" has spread like wildfire through official U.S. national security guidance documents and rhetoric. At the Department of Defense (DOD), which spearheaded the proliferation of the term, "partnership" has been used to refer to a broad array of civilian as well as military activities in support of national security. At other U.S. government agencies, and at the White House, the use of the term "partnership" has been echoed and applied even more broadlyânot only in the national security arena, but also to all facets of U.S. relationships with foreign partners.
"Partnership" is not new in either theory or practice. To illustrate, U.S. strategy during the Cold War called for working with formal allies, through combined planning and the development of interoperable capabilities, in order to deter and if necessary defeat a Soviet threat. And it called for working with partners in the developing world to cultivate the allegiance of states and societies to the West, and to bolster their resistance to Soviet influence. Congress provided oversight in the forms of policy direction; resources and authorities for programs ranging from weapons sales to combined military exercises to cultural exchanges; and accountability.
New in recent years is both the profusion of the use of the term partnership andâin the aftermath of both the Cold War and the first post-9/11 decadeâa much less singular focus for U.S. global engagement. Recent defense and national strategic guidance clearly conveys the view that partnership is good. But as a rule, it provides much less sense of what partnership is designed to achieve and how that protects U.S. interests; it does not clearly indicate how to prioritize among partnership activities; it does not assign specific roles and responsibilities for partnership across the U.S. government; and it does not indicate how to judge whether partnership is working.
A lack of sufficient strategic direction could raise a series of potential concerns for Congress:
Without sufficient national-level strategic guidance, good decisions about the use of partnership tools in support of national security may still be made on a case-by-case basis. But the natural default, practitioners suggest, may be toward embracing available opportunities, building further on evident successes, and falling in on existing patterns of engagement. In effect, that approach means optimizing at the sub-systemic levelâfocusing on the trees rather than on the forestâwhich may not optimally address defense and/or national-level strategic priorities. Without a clear articulation of the "ends" of partnership in support of national security, and whether and how those ends contribute to protecting U.S. interests, it may be difficult for agencies to judiciously prioritize partnership requirements against those for other national security missions. Without a clear articulation of the "ways and means" of partnership in support of national security, it may be difficult for agencies to gauge the extent to which partnership capabilities are distinct from others, or alternatively constitute "lesser included" subsets of other capabilities; and it may be difficult for agencies to consider appropriately the implications of partnership requirements for shaping and sizing the military force and the civilian workforce. Without a clear strategy of partnership in support of national security, linking ends with ways and means over time, it may be difficult for U.S. agencies to craft appropriate assessment tools to gauge the impact of partnership efforts on achieving defense and national security objectives, rather than resorting to the common default of focusing on "outputs," such as whether or not a training event took place. Without a clear distribution of roles and responsibilitiesâand corresponding resources and authoritiesâacross the U.S. government for partnership in support of national security, it may be difficult for departments and agencies to plan and execute efficiently, and to integrate their efforts effectively. Without a clearly stated premise regarding resourcingâone that links initial investments in partnership efforts to any expected future savings as partners assume greater responsibilities over timeâit can be difficult to anticipate the budgetary implications of partnership in support of national security. Without sufficient strategy for partnership in support of national strategy, together with appropriate assessment tools, a clear division of labor across the U.S. government, and resourcing expectations, it can be difficult for Congress to effectively allocate resources and authorities among agencies, and to ensure accountability for effective and efficient execution. |
crs_R43090 | crs_R43090_0 | Introduction
As an increasing number of communities in the United States face significant flooding, droughts, and degradation of water quality, interest in the management of interstate water basins has heightened. Interstate water management requires a number of interests to be balanced, including different priorities among states affected by the particular water basin, federal interests in federal water projects, and private interest groups who may be affected by regulation of the basin. Because of these competing interests, interstate water management often becomes controversial and may lead to lengthy legal disputes among the parties. This report explains the legal authority of the federal and state governments to manage water resources. It also examines the role of interstate water compacts to address management issues in interstate water basins. The report analyzes efforts made to resolve disputes in the Chesapeake Bay to illustrate the concurrent roles that states and the federal government may play in managing interstate water resources. The states have claimed authority to control the water resources within their own boundaries. Constitutional Authority of Federal Government to Regulate Waterways
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants the federal government broad authority over water resources within the United States, empowering Congress "to regulate Commerce ... among the several States." The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause broadly. Thus, although the federal government often defers to states' authority regarding allocation and water management, a state's authority over its waters is "subject to the power of Congress to control the waters for the purpose of commerce." Interstate Agreements and Authority for Water Compacts
The competing interests of the federal and state governments may result in disputes over the management of water resources in interstate basins. The U.S. Constitution generally requires congressional consent for such an agreement between states, but does not specify a particular procedure for states to enter compacts. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Chesapeake Bay states, and private regional interests have entered a number of interstate agreements in efforts to address the issues facing the watershed, as discussed below. Federal and State Roles Under the Clean Water Act
The CWA governs pollution of the nation's waterways. The 1987 Agreement identified a number of broad goals and set specific objectives related to each goal. Litigation Concerning the Sufficiency of State and Federal Action in the Chesapeake
Although the federal government shares legal authority over water management with the states under constitutional and statutory law, the role that the federal government has taken in the Chesapeake Bay has been challenged in a number of cases. | As an increasing number of communities in the United States face significant flooding, droughts, and degradation of water quality, interest in the management of interstate water basins has heightened. Interstate water management requires a number of interests to be balanced, including different priorities among states affected by the particular water basin, federal interests in federal water projects, and private interest groups who may be affected by regulation of the basin. Because of these competing interests, interstate water management often becomes controversial and may lead to lengthy legal disputes among the parties, as has been the case in the Chesapeake Bay watershed.
The federal government has broad authority over water resources within the United States under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Under the Commerce Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that Congress has "superior power" to ensure the navigability of the nation's waterways. Although states generally have a legal right to the waters within their borders and Congress traditionally has deferred to states on a number of water resources issues, the states' rights to control waters within the state is subject to Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. Because many water resources issues often affect water basins that span several jurisdictions, states may seek to cooperate in the resolution of such issues through interstate water compacts. The U.S. Constitution generally requires congressional consent for such an agreement, which, when it is approved by the states and Congress, becomes binding law and provides for a uniform system of regulation of the water basin among the states.
The Chesapeake Bay illustrates the complex issues involved in interstate water basins. To address concerns regarding the impacts of pollution, the federal government, states, and private organizations have sought to apply water quality protections provided under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA). Additionally, a number of interested parties have entered voluntary agreements committing them to particular goals and actions related to restoring the resources of the Chesapeake Bay, though none of the agreements has been an interstate compact. The lack of progress toward the goals set by the parties has resulted in a number of lawsuits and increased federal attention and action with respect to setting pollution reduction requirements in the Bay.
This report explains the legal authority of the federal and state governments to manage water resources. It also examines the role of interstate water compacts to address management issues in interstate water basins. The report analyzes efforts made to resolve disputes in the Chesapeake Bay to illustrate the concurrent roles that states and the federal government may play in managing interstate water resources. |
crs_R41971 | crs_R41971_0 | The stated intent of U.S. policy is to persuade and/or pressure Burma's military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), to release all political prisoners from detention and transfer power to a representative, democratically elected civilian government that will respect the human rights of the people of Burma, including its ethnic minorities. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, by contrast, welcomed the election results and the installment of a new government, and subsequently called for the removal of all sanctions on Burma. A second major issue is whether or not U.S. policy can significantly impact political developments in Burma, and if so, what should be the main components of that policy. The 108 th Congress passed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 ( P.L. Why Burma? As a result, a broad and wide-ranging discussion on U.S. policy towards Burma has emerged, with possible implications for U.S. policies towards other nations. Some commentators see less grandiose lessons in the history of U.S. policy towards Burma, suggesting the problems lie in the conduct of the policy and not that the policy is fundamentally flawed. A final group of writers on U.S. policy focus more on analyzing how events of the past few years—particularly the establishment of a new parliament and the installation of a new president—may have changed the political dynamic inside Burma, and the implications for U.S. policy. Current U.S. Policy
In September 2009, the Obama Administration announced a change in U.S. policy towards Burma after seven months of review, discussion, and consultation. Fourth, there is a general prohibition on the import of goods of Burmese origin. No such waiver is currently in effect. Human rights abuse in Burma has been both political and economic in nature. An important source of tension between the Burmese military and some of the ethnic minorities of eastern and northern Burma is the continued presence of ethnic-based militias. Implications for U.S. Policy
Political events in Burma in 2010 and 2011 have renewed discussions about the nature and effectiveness of U.S. policy towards the country. Both the U.S. sanctions regime and U.S. engagement policy have been subjected to scrutiny and criticism by Congress, officials with the Obama Administration, and Burma experts. On October 24, 2007, Australia imposed targeted sanctions on Burma's military regime and its supporters. Japan's policy towards Burma has been a little more complex. Certain provisions are unfulfilled and others appear to be only partially implemented. These provisions include statements that
The United States is to "work with the international community, especially the People's Republic of China, India, Thailand, and ASEAN, to foster support for the legitimate democratic aspirations of the people of Burma and to coordinate efforts to impose sanctions on those directly responsible for human rights abuses in Burma;" "The President shall consider the data already obtained by other countries and entities that apply sanctions against Burma, such as the Australian Government and the European Union;" "The President should take the necessary steps to seek to negotiate an international arrangement—similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for conflict diamonds —to prevent the trade in Burmese covered articles [jadeite and rubies];" "The Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma shall … consult broadly, including with the Governments of the People's Republic of China, India, Thailand, and Japan, and the member states of ASEAN and the European Union to coordinate policies toward Burma;" and "The Secretary of State shall coordinate on a biannual basis with representatives of the European Union … to ensure a high degree of coordination of lists of individuals banned from obtaining a visa by the European Union … and those banned from receiving a visa from the United States." Some observers question if the State Department and the Treasury Department have made adequate efforts to coordinate their policies towards Burma. Burmese officials generally perceive the major events of the past year – the parliamentary elections, the dissolution of the SPDC, the formation of the Union Government, and the end of Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest – as demonstrable progress toward "disciplined democracy" in Burma. The Role of Congress
Over the last 20 years, Congress has repeatedly taken the initiative in the formulation of U.S. policy towards Burma, usually after the SPDC and the Burmese military have violently suppressed the Burmese people. Fourth, individual Members of Congress may serve as a separate channel of communication with Burmese officials and interest groups. Res. 66 and S.J. Res. 17. | A robust discussion has arisen around U.S. policy towards Burma. Some Members of Congress, senior officials in the Obama Administration, noted Burma scholars, and representatives of various interest groups have weighed in on this discussion, offering their views on the merits of current U.S. policy towards Burma and what policy changes ought to be made.
Among the commentators, there is general agreement that more than 20 years of political and economic sanctions, and nearly two years of "pragmatic engagement," have not led to the achievement of the stated goals of U.S. policy towards Burma—the release of all political prisoners from detention and the transfer power to a representative, democratically elected civilian government that will respect the human rights of the people of Burma, including its ethnic minorities. However, there is little agreement as to why U.S. policy has been unsuccessful and what needs to be done to increase the likelihood of achieving the stated goals.
Some analysts see the holding of parliamentary elections, the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in November 2010, the formal dissolution of Burma's military regime, and its replacement by a mostly civilian government as evidence of the advent of a new era in Burma. Others view these events as thinly veiled ruses designed to hide the continuation of repressive military rule behind the veneer of seemingly civilian institutions. Both groups of commentators point to various recent events to support for their recommendations for the conduct of U.S. policy towards Burma.
Other factors complicate the formulation of U.S. policy towards Burma. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Burma is a member, has called for the end of all sanctions on Burma. The European Union recently lifted its visa ban for several senior officials in the new Burmese government. Neighboring China, India, and Thailand have recently increased their investments in Burma, particularly in its energy sector. Inside Burma, the outbreak of fighting between the Burmese military and several ethnic-based militias has reportedly led to serious human rights abuses and another wave of Burmese refugees in the region.
The current discussions have generally focused on three related issues: (1) the effectiveness of the U.S. sanctions regime; (2) the value of high-level meetings with Burmese officials; and (3) the ability to coordinate policies towards Burma with other nations. To some, the basic premise of U.S. policy is fundamentally flawed, and a completely new approach is needed. To others, the main problem with U.S. policy has been in its lack of focus and inadequate implementation. Some question whether or not any U.S. policy can have an appreciable impact on Burma's military leaders and foster progress towards U.S. objectives in Burma.
The installation of a new government in Burma and the appointment of Derek J. Mitchell to serve as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma are viewed as creating a "honeymoon period" in which Congress and the Obama Administration can review and, if desired, adjust U.S. policy towards Burma. The genesis of U.S. policy towards Burma was largely driven by Congress passing legislation after particularly egregious actions by Burma's ruling military junta. The 112th Congress is currently considering legislation (H.J.Res. 66 and S.J.Res. 17) that would renew certain import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. If the history of the development of U.S. policy towards Burma is indicative, any dramatic new development in Burma—either good or bad—could prompt Congress into action. |
crs_R45319 | crs_R45319_0 | Introduction
By exercising its power to determine whether federal and state government actions are constitutional, the Supreme Court has developed a large body of judicial decisions, or "precedents," interpreting the Constitution. The role that precedent plays in the Court's decisions on highly controversial issues has prompted debate over whether the Court should follow or overrule rules it established in prior decisions. Such questions underscore the challenges the Court faces in maintaining stability in the law by adhering to precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis so that parties may rely upon its decisions, while at the same time correcting prior decisions that rest on faulty reasoning, unworkable standards, abandoned legal doctrines, or outdated factual assumptions. The Appendix to this report lists Supreme Court decisions on constitutional law questions that the Court has overruled specifically during its more than 225-year history. Factors the Supreme Court Considers When Deciding Whether to Overrule Constitutional Precedent
As noted, in recent decades, the Supreme Court has often stated that a decision to overrule precedent must be based on some special justification—or, at least "strong grounds"—that extends beyond the Court's mere disagreement with the merits of the prior decision's reasoning. Consequently, when deciding whether to overrule a past decision in a constitutional case, the Court has historically considered several "prudential and pragmatic" factors that seek to foster the rule of law while balancing the costs and benefits to society of reaffirming or overruling a prior holding. Quality of the Precedent's Reasoning
The first factor that the Supreme Court may consider when determining whether to reaffirm or overrule a prior decision is the quality of the Court's reasoning in the prior case. Workability of the Precedent's Rule or Standard
Another factor that the Supreme Court has considered when determining whether to overrule a precedent is whether a rule or standard that the prior case establishes for determining the constitutionality of a government action is too difficult for lower federal courts or other interpreters to apply and is thus "unworkable." Whether the Precedent Is Inconsistent with Related Decisions
Another factor the Supreme Court may consider is whether the precedent is inconsistent with other Court decisions on similar matters of constitutional law. Whether There Is a Changed Understanding of Relevant Facts
The Supreme Court has also indicated that changes in how the Justices and society understand the facts underlying a prior decision may undermine the authoritativeness of a precedent, leading the Court to overrule it. This factor considers reliance on the rules and principles contained in the Supreme Court's prior decisions by individuals, companies, or organizations; society as a whole; or legislative, executive, or judicial government officials. A survey of Court decisions, applying the various stare decisis factors, suggests that it is difficult to predict when the Court will overrule a prior decision. | By exercising its power to determine the constitutionality of federal and state government actions, the Supreme Court has developed a large body of judicial decisions, or "precedents," interpreting the Constitution. How the Court uses precedent to decide controversial issues has prompted debate over whether the Court should follow rules identified in prior decisions or overrule them. The Court's treatment of precedent implicates longstanding questions about how the Court can maintain stability in the law by adhering to precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis while correcting decisions that rest on faulty reasoning, unworkable standards, abandoned legal doctrines, or outdated factual assumptions.
Although the Supreme Court has shown less reluctance to overrule its decisions on constitutional questions than its decisions on statutory questions, the Court has nevertheless stated that there must be some special justification—or, at least "strong grounds"—that goes beyond disagreeing with a prior decision's reasoning to overrule constitutional precedent. Consequently, when deciding whether to overrule a precedent interpreting the Constitution, the Court has historically considered several "prudential and pragmatic" factors that seek to foster the rule of law while balancing the costs and benefits to society of reaffirming or overruling a prior holding:
Quality of Reasoning. When determining whether to reaffirm or overrule a prior decision, the Supreme Court may consider the quality of the decision's reasoning.
Workability. Another factor that the Supreme Court may consider when determining whether to overrule a precedent is whether the precedent's rules or standards are too difficult for lower federal courts or other interpreters to apply and are thus "unworkable."
Inconsistency with Related Decisions. A third factor the Supreme Court may consider is whether the precedent departs from the Court's other decisions on similar constitutional questions, either because the precedent's reasoning has been eroded by later decisions or because the precedent is a recent outlier when compared to other decisions.
Changed Understanding of Relevant Facts. The Supreme Court has also indicated that changes in how the Justices and society understand a decision's underlying facts may undermine a precedent's authoritativeness, leading the Court to overrule it.
Reliance. Finally, the Supreme Court may consider whether it should retain a precedent, even if flawed, because overruling the decision would injure individuals, companies, or organizations; society as a whole; or legislative, executive, or judicial branch officers, who had relied on the decision.
A survey of Supreme Court decisions applying these factors suggests that predicting when the Court will overrule a prior decision is difficult. This uncertainty arises, in part, because the Court has not provided an exhaustive list of the factors it uses to determine whether a decision should be overruled or how it weighs them.
The Appendix to this report lists Supreme Court decisions on constitutional law questions that the Court has overruled during its more than 225-year history. |
crs_R44459 | crs_R44459_0 | The number of bridges classified as structurally deficient declined from 89,000 in 2000 to about 56,000 in 2016, and fell each year over that period. However, structurally deficient bridges in urban areas are generally much larger and, therefore, more expensive to fix. Nevertheless, bridges on Interstate Highways are generally in better condition than those on more lightly traveled routes: 3.5% of urban Interstate Highway bridges were considered structurally deficient in 2016, less than half of the 8.5% structural deficiency rate of urban bridges on local roads. FHWA, however, does not determine which bridges should benefit from federal funding. The Highway Bridge Program, a stand-alone program for highway bridges that was formerly part of the Federal-Aid Highway Program, was terminated at the end of FY2012.The current law authorizing highway spending, the 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. Depending on the specific use, funding from other formula programs may also be used on bridge projects on a case-by-case basis. For example, if more than 10% of the deck area of a state's bridges on the National Highway System (which consists of the Interstate Highway System and most other principal arterial roads) is structurally deficient, the state is subject to a penalty requiring it to dedicate an amount of its NHPP funds equal to 50% of its FY2009 spending under the former Highway Bridge Program to bridge projects. FHWA's Emergency Relief Program
The Emergency Relief Program provides funding for bridges damaged in natural disasters or that are subject to catastrophic failures from an outside source. Issues for Congress
Both the washout of the Interstate 10 bridge and the use restriction imposed in 2016 on the Arlington Memorial Bridge, a federally owned bridge between Arlington, VA, and Washington, DC, led to warnings that the large number of structurally deficient bridges indicates an incipient crisis. FHWA data do not substantiate this assertion. The number of bridges classified as structurally deficient has fallen consistently since 1990, and the proportion of all highway bridges identified as structurally deficient is the lowest in decades. The condition of roads, in particular urban roads, has not experienced the same degree of improvement as the condition of bridges. This disparity raises the policy question of what priority should go to bridge repairs as opposed to roadway repairs. 112-141 ), enacted in 2012, Congress implicitly addressed this issue by giving states greater flexibility to use federal funding for roads or for bridges, at their discretion. As it conducts oversight of the implementation of the FAST Act, Congress may want to monitor states' patterns of bridge spending. | Of the 614,000 public road bridges in the United States, about 56,000 (9%) were classified as structurally deficient in 2016. These figures—along with events such as the July 20, 2015, washout of the Interstate 10 Bridge near Desert Center, CA, and the partial closure of the Arlington Memorial Bridge, which connects Washington, DC, to Northern Virginia—have led to claims that the United States is experiencing a crisis with respect to deficient bridges. Federal data do not substantiate this assertion. The number of bridges classified as structurally deficient has fallen consistently since at least 2000, and the proportion of all highway bridges classified as structurally deficient is the lowest in decades.
The vast majority of structurally deficient bridges, over four out of five, are in rural areas. These bridges tend to be small and relatively lightly traveled. Structurally deficient bridges in urban areas, while far fewer, are generally much larger and, therefore, more expensive to fix: almost 57% of the deck area of structurally deficient bridges is on urban bridges. Bridges on roads carrying heavy traffic loads, particularly Interstate Highway bridges, are generally in better condition than those on more lightly traveled routes.
Federal funding for bridge building, reconstruction, and repair is authorized in surface transportation acts. The most recent authorization is the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), which was enacted on December 4, 2015. The FAST Act did not authorize a program dedicated to highway bridges, but it made bridge projects broadly eligible for federal funding under the largest of the highway formula programs and eligible on a case-by-case basis under other programs. Bridges that are damaged by natural disasters or catastrophic events may also be eligible for Emergency Relief Program funds.
The condition of roads, in particular urban roads, has not experienced the same degree of improvement as the condition of bridges. This disparity raises the policy question of what priority should go to bridge repairs as opposed to roadway repairs. Congress has implicitly addressed this issue by giving states greater flexibility to use federal funding for roads or for bridges, at their discretion. Laws enacted in 2012 and again in 2015 have given states near-total authority to determine which projects to fund with federal highway funds, within broad guidelines established by Congress. As it oversees implementation of the FAST Act over the next few years, Congress may want to evaluate whether states are making sufficient progress in reducing the number of structurally deficient bridges and whether future laws should reestablish specific requirements for bridge spending. |
crs_R41627 | crs_R41627_0 | Introduction
Considerable congressional attention has been placed on the treatment of consumers within the private health insurance marketplace. Among the many concerns, particular attention has been paid to the value of coverage in terms of out-of-pocket (OOP) costs relative to premiums. One method that lowers the value of coverage is the use of annual limits on the dollar amount of coverage. Private health insurers use annual limits to require the consumer to assume 100% of the cost of coverage after a certain amount of spending for the year has been reached. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. The "immediate" reforms in sections 2711 through 2719 of the PHSA become effective for plan years beginning on or after September 23, 2010. PPACA also requires the Secretary to ensure that there is access to needed services with a minimal impact on premiums in the context of defining the restriction on annual limits. Impact on Limited Benefit ("Mini-Med") Plans
There is substantial variability in the marketplace due to different consumer demands, but generally, a limited benefit plan offers coverage with restrictive annual limits on total benefits and/or on specific service categories (e.g., surgeries). They say that without the option of limited benefit plans, these workers would likely become uninsured. On the other hand, some consumer groups have argued that limited benefit plans are not deserving of any regulatory leniency. The memorandum, and subsequent guidance, establishes the following reporting requirements:
the terms of the plan or policy for which a waiver is sought; the number of individuals enrolled in the plan or covered by the policy; the annual limit(s) and rates applicable to the plan or policy; and a brief description of why compliance with the restriction on annual limits standard would result in a significant decrease in access to benefits or a significant increase in premiums paid. For context, it is relevant to note that Congress has not consistently specified the manner in which information concerning health care waivers is to be released to the public. Indeed, the annual limits provision of PPACA does not even have a specific public reporting requirement. As a result of different legal standards, or in some cases the absence of a congressional directive, no standardized practice for releasing information about health care waivers has ever been developed. No obvious bias could be found in the publicly available application materials for the annual limits waivers. 112-10 , the GAO found that CMS granted waivers when an application projected a significant increase in premiums or significant reduction in access to health care benefits rather than organizational factors (e.g., union membership, geographical location, number of employees). | Considerable congressional attention has been placed on the dollar value of health insurance coverage in terms of out-of-pocket (OOP) costs placed on policyholders. One method that lowers the dollar value of coverage is the use of annual limits on the dollar amount of coverage. Private health insurers use annual limits to require the consumer to assume 100% of the cost of coverage after a certain amount of spending for the year has been reached. While annual limits may be a benefit design feature in any type of health insurance, they are used as the primary method of cost control for limited benefit plans, which provide low premium coverage typically to low-income part-time or seasonal workers. Limited benefit plans generally have annual limits on both the total dollar coverage and on specific coverage categories (e.g., hospitalizations and outpatient surgeries). Without the limited benefit plan option, many of these low-income workers would likely be uninsured. On the other hand, these plans have been criticized as providing little value and giving a false sense of security to policyholders.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, PPACA) prohibits the use of annual limits effective 2014 and places certain restrictions on their use effective for plan years starting on or after September 23, 2010. These restrictions would effectively eliminate limited benefit plans. Accordingly, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has implemented a waiver process for limited benefit plans under the authority provided by Section 1001 of PPACA to define restricted annual limits in such a way as to "ensure that access to needed services is made available with a minimal impact on premiums."
Considerable attention has been paid to the fairness and transparency of the waiver process. For context, it is relevant to note that Congress has not consistently specified the manner in which information concerning health care waivers is to be released to the public. Indeed, the annual limits provision of PPACA does not even have a specific public reporting requirement. As a result of different legal standards, or in some cases the absence of a congressional directive, no standardized practice for releasing information about health care waivers has ever been developed. With respect to the annual limits waivers, no obvious bias could be found in the publicly available application materials. Moreover, the Government Accountability Office found that the waivers were granted when an application projected a significant increase in premiums or significant reduction in access to health care benefits and not based on organizations factors (e.g., being a union). |
crs_R44616 | crs_R44616_0 | O ne of the more controversial tax laws enacted in recent years is the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). FATCA is intended to curb U.S. tax evasion occurring through the use of offshore accounts. Key among FATCA's provisions is the requirement that foreign financial institutions (FFIs) report information on their U.S. account holders to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Under some of these agreements, FFIs report the information to their home country, which then provides the information to the IRS. For those FFIs that are not covered by such an agreement, FATCA generally requires they report the information directly to the IRS. Overview of FFI Reporting Requirements
FATCA generally requires that FFIs enter into agreements with the IRS under which the FFIs agree to report information about their U.S. account holders and comply with other requirements. FFIs that fail to comply will have tax withheld at a rate of 30% on many payments made to them from U.S. sources, including interest and dividends. Intergovernmental Agreements
The United States has entered into bilateral intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) with numerous countries in order to implement the above FFI reporting requirements. Purpose of the IGAs
Since FATCA's passage, there has been criticism of the FFI provisions and their application to entities outside the United States, generally focused on whether the United States was correct to take FATCA's unilateral approach. Questions have arisen about whether FATCA's requirements are inconsistent with existing U.S. treaty obligations; how to handle potential conflict of law issues arising when an FFI is faced with complying with FATCA or its home country's domestic (e.g., banking and privacy) laws; and whether the United States has intruded into other countries' sovereignty. Countries with IGAs in Effect
As of August 1, 2016, there are 63 IGAs that are in force. In July 2016, the IRS made a significant announcement regarding the treatment of those countries without an IGA actually in force: such countries will stop being treated as having an IGA in effect in 2017 unless they comply with certain requirements by December 31, 2016. The Treasury Department will then decide whether it is appropriate to continue to treat the country as having an IGA in effect, considering the explanation and plan, as well as the country's prior conduct. Confidentiality Protections
Some have expressed concerns about the privacy of the information that FFIs are required to collect and report under FATCA. Litigation About IGAs
While some argue that the use of IGAs may have positive outcomes, including reduced compliance costs for foreign entities and avoidance of international conflict of law issues, others have taken issue with them. In April 2016, a U.S. district court in Ohio dismissed the case after determining that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and that court has not yet issued a decision. FATCA Legislation in the 114th Congress
Several bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress that would amend or otherwise address FATCA. The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act ( H.R. Finally, the Commission on Americans Living Abroad Act ( H.R. As discussed above, Treasury and the IRS treat certain countries as having an IGA in effect even though the country has not taken all the steps necessary to actually bring the agreement into force under two circumstances: (1) it has signed an IGA and is taking steps to bring it into force within a reasonable time; or (2) it has reached an agreement in substance with the United States on the terms of an IGA prior to November 30, 2014, and it continues to demonstrate intent to sign the IGA as soon as possible. | Enacted in 2010, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) is intended to curb U.S. tax evasion occurring through the use of offshore accounts. Key among its provisions is the requirement that foreign financial institutions (FFIs), such as foreign banks and hedge funds, report information on their U.S. account holders to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). FFIs that fail to comply will have tax withheld at a rate of 30% on many payments made to them from U.S. sources, including interest and dividends.
Since FATCA's passage, there has been international criticism of the FFI provisions, generally focused on whether the United States was correct to take FATCA's unilateral approach. Questions have arisen about whether FATCA's requirements are inconsistent with existing U.S. treaty obligations; how to handle potential conflict of law issues arising when an FFI is faced with complying with FATCA or its home country's domestic (e.g., banking and privacy) laws; and whether the United States has intruded into other countries' sovereignty.
Recognizing that these concerns could affect the success of FATCA, the United States has entered into bilateral intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) with numerous countries in order to implement the FFI requirements. Under some of these agreements, FFIs report information on their U.S. account holders to their home country, which then provides the information to the IRS. In general, for those FFIs that are not covered by such an agreement, FATCA requires that they report the information directly to the IRS.
As of August 1, 2016, there are 63 IGAs that are currently in force. Additionally, the United States treats certain countries as having an IGA in effect even though the country has not taken all the steps necessary to actually bring the agreement into force. In July 2016, the IRS made a significant announcement regarding these countries: they will stop being treated as having an IGA in effect in 2017 unless they comply with certain requirements by December 31, 2016. Among other things, the country must explain why the IGA is not yet in force and provide a step-by-step timeline for doing so. The Treasury Department and the IRS will then decide whether it is appropriate to continue to treat the country as having an IGA in effect.
Some praise the FFI reporting requirements as an effective tool to combat tax evasion and argue that using the IGAs leads to positive outcomes, including reduced compliance costs for FFIs and avoidance of international conflict of law issues. Others, meanwhile, have expressed concerns about the privacy of information reported by FFIs and the appropriateness of the IGAs. These concerns are illustrated in an ongoing lawsuit, Crawford v. Department of the Treasury, in which the plaintiffs argue that the executive branch does not have the power to enter into IGAs and that the FFI reporting requirements violate the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable search and seizures by requiring FFIs to report information about U.S. account holders without any judicial oversight. In April 2016, a U.S. district court in Ohio dismissed the case after determining that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which has not yet issued a decision.
Finally, legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress that would repeal much of FATCA (S. 663); modify FATCA with the intent of "strengthening" it (Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 297 and S. 174); or require that its effects on U.S. citizens living overseas be studied (Commission on Americans Living Abroad Act, H.R. 3078). |
crs_R45154 | crs_R45154_0 | Introduction
A "lame duck" session of Congress is one that takes place after the election for the next Congress has been held but before the current Congress has reached the end of its constitutional term. As a result, any meeting of Congress that occurs between the congressional election in November of an even-numbered year and the following January 3 is a lame duck session. Lame Duck Sessions in the Modern Congress
The possibility of a lame duck session of Congress in the modern sense began in 1935, when the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution took effect. One purpose of the Twentieth Amendment was to change the timing that caused every Congress to hold its last session after an election. A lame duck session may occur under the following circumstances: (1) by a previously enacted law prescribing an additional session of Congress; (2) following a recess within a session but spanning the election; (3) under authority granted to the leadership at the time of a contingent adjournment or recess of the session; (4) by continuing to meet, perhaps in pro forma sessions, throughout the period spanning the election; and (5) in response to a presidential proclamation calling an extraordinary session. Recess of the Session
When a Congress has decided to continue meeting after an election, its usual practice has been not to adjourn sine die but simply to recess its existing session for a period spanning the election. Any portion of the reconvened session that occurs after the election would be considered a lame duck session. Congress may also use contingent authority to reconvene after a sine die adjournment. This action is colloquially called a "pocket veto." On average, election breaks lasted less than two months. Length of Lame Duck Sessions
Twentieth century lame duck sessions usually convened in mid- to late-November and adjourned sine die before Christmas. The most significant difference occurred in 2008. Length of Lame Duck Sessions
During the period in which Congress has consistently held lame duck sessions, they have generally begun in mid-November, or about a week following the election. In four out of the past five Congresses, however, at least one house adjourned on January 2 or 3, suggesting a trend toward later adjournments. Since the 2010 lame duck session, both chambers have convened for a high number of days in order to negotiate spending or revenue provisions. During this entire period, the two chambers have held longer lame duck sessions and more days in daily sessions. However, the adjournment resolution ( H.Con.Res. | A "lame duck" session of Congress occurs whenever one Congress meets after its successor is elected but before the end of its own constitutional term. Under present conditions, any meeting of Congress between election day in November and the following January 3 is a lame duck session. Prior to 1933, when the Twentieth Amendment changed the dates of the congressional term, the last regular session of Congress was always a lame duck session. Today, however, the expression is primarily used for any portion of a regular session that falls after an election.
Congress has held 21 lame duck sessions since the implementation of the Twentieth Amendment. From the first modern lame duck session in 1941 to 1998, the sessions occurred sporadically. Beginning in 2000, both houses of Congress have held a lame duck session following every election. In this report, the data presentation is separate for the sporadic period (76th-105th Congresses) and the consistent period (106th-present) in order to identify past and emerging trends.
Lame duck sessions can occur in several ways. Either chamber or both chambers may (1) provide for an existing session to resume after a recess spanning the election; (2) continue meeting in intermittent, or pro forma, sessions during the period spanning the election; or (3) reconvene after an election pursuant to contingent authority granted to the leadership in a recess or adjournment resolution. Two other possibilities have not occurred: (4) Congress could set a statutory date for a new session to convene after the election, then adjourn its existing session sine die; and (5) while Congress is in recess or sine die adjournment, the President could call it into extraordinary session at a date after the election.
During both the sporadic and the consistent periods, election breaks have usually begun by mid-October and spanned between one and two months. Congress has most often reconvened in mid-November and adjourned before Christmas so that the lame duck session lasted about a month. However, in four out the past five Congresses, lame duck sessions have continued into January, producing later adjournments, longer sessions, and more days convened in daily sessions.
Lame duck sessions have been held for a variety of reasons. Their primary purpose is to complete action on legislation. However, they have also been used to prevent recess appointments and pocket vetoes, to consider motions of censure or impeachment, or to keep Congress assembled on a standby basis. In recent years, most lame duck sessions have focused on program authorizations, trade agreements, appropriations, and the budget.
This report will be updated after any additional lame duck session occurs. |
crs_R42520 | crs_R42520_0 | Introduction
Early during the 113 th Congress, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. 113-6 . On September 28, 2012, the President signed a continuing resolution ( P.L. 117 ), the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013, to provide appropriations for federal departments and agencies, including EPA, funded under each of the regular appropriations bills through March 27, 2013. The continuing resolution ( P.L. Subsequent to the passage of H.J.Res. 117 by Congress, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft bill on September 25, 2012, that proposed $8.52 billion for EPA for FY2013. 117 by Congress, the House Committee on Appropriations reported the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Act, 2013 ( H.R. 112-589 ), on July 10, 2012. Title II of the House committee-reported bill proposed a total of $7.06 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for FY2013, $1.29 billion (15.5%) less than the President's FY2013 request of $8.34 billion, and $1.39 billion (16.5%) less than the $8.45 billion (including applicable rescissions ) as enacted in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. The vast majority of the agency's annual funding consists of discretionary appropriations. H.R. Most of the proposed decrease in the STAG account is attributed to a combined $507.0 million reduction below the FY2013 request and $866.3 million below FY2012 enacted funding for grants to help capitalize Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (SRFs) (see " Wastewater and Drinking Water Infrastructure " below). These grants also assist multimedia projects. The House committee-reported bill proposed a variety of decreases and increases in funding for many of the individual programs and activities funded within the eight appropriations accounts compared to the FY2013 requested and FY2012 enacted levels. Key Funding Issues
Much of the attention on EPA's appropriations for FY2013 during the 112 th Congress focused on federal financial assistance for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, various categorical grants to states to support general implementation and enforcement of federal environmental laws, funding for implementation and research support for air pollution control requirements, climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, and funding for environmental cleanup. In addition to funding priorities among the various EPA programs and activities, several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions that were central to debates on EPA's FY2011 and FY2012 appropriations were again prominent in the debate regarding the FY2013 appropriations. Several regulatory actions under other pollution control statutes administered by EPA also received attention. 6091 as reported for FY2013. H.R. 6091 as reported proposed $689.0 million for the Clean Water SRF capitalization grants for FY2013, 41% below the President's FY2013 request of $1.18 billion and 53% below the FY2012 enacted level of $1.47 billion. The $829.0 million for the Drinking Water SRF capitalization grants in the House committee-reported bill was also less than the FY2013 requested and FY2012 enacted levels, but the magnitude of decrease was significantly smaller, as shown in Table 2 . Categorical Grants
H.R. 6091 as reported by the House Appropriations committee proposed $994.4 million to support state and tribal "categorical" grant programs within the STAG account, $203.0 million below the President's FY2013 budget of $1.20 billion, $94.8 million less than the FY2012 appropriation of $1.09 billion. ), and are generally used to support the day-to-day implementation of environmental laws, including a range of activities such as monitoring, permitting and standard setting, training, and other pollution control and prevention activities. Congress appropriated $9.9 million for this categorical grant for FY2012. Additionally, in lieu of certain general provisions proposed for FY2013 in H.R. 6091 as reported. 6091 . Brownfields102
EPA also administers another cleanup program to provide financial assistance to state, local, and tribal governmental entities for certain types of sites, referred to as "brownfields." 6091 . The provisions included in H.R. | Preceding the March 26, 2013, enactment of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6), during the 113th Congress, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 (P.L. 112-175, H.J.Res. 117), enacted September 28, 2012, provided appropriations for federal departments and agencies—including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—funded under each of the regular appropriations bills through March 27, 2013. The continuing resolution provided funding generally at FY2012 levels with an across-the-board increase of 0.612% unless otherwise specified. Subsequent to the passage of the joint resolution in 112th Congress, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft bill on September 25, 2012, that proposed $8.52 billion for EPA for FY2013. As reported July 10, 2012, by the House Committee on Appropriations, Title II of H.R. 6091, the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Act, 2013, proposed $7.06 billion for EPA for FY2013. The proposed level was $1.28 billion (15.5%) below the President's FY2013 request of $8.34 billion, and $1.39 billion (16.5%) below the FY2012 enacted appropriation of $8.45 billion.
The House committee-reported bill, H.R. 6091, would have decreased funding for seven of the eight EPA appropriations accounts compared to the President's FY2013 request, and for six of the accounts relative to FY2012 enacted levels. The largest decrease in H.R. 6091 as reported was for the State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account: $2.60 billion for FY2013, compared to $3.36 billion requested (23% decrease) and $3.61 billion for FY2012 (28% decrease). This account consistently contains the largest portion of the agency's funding among the eight accounts. The majority of the proposed decrease was attributed to a combined $507.0 million reduction in funding for grants that provide financial assistance to states to help capitalize Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (SRFs). Respectively, these funds finance local wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects. H.R. 6091 as reported included $689.0 million for Clean Water SRF capitalization grants and $829.0 million for Drinking Water SRF capitalization grants, compared to $1.18 billion and $850.0 million requested for FY2013, and $1.47 billion and $917.9 million appropriated for FY2012, respectively.
The STAG account also includes funds to support "categorical" grant programs. States and tribes use these grants to support the day-to-day implementation of environmental laws, such as monitoring, permitting and standard setting, training, and other pollution control and prevention activities, and these grants also assist multimedia projects. The $994.0 million total proposed for FY2013 for categorical grants in H.R. 6091 as reported was $208.4 million less than the $1.20 billion requested for FY2013, and $94.8 million below the $1.09 billion FY2012 enacted amount.
Other prominent issues receiving attention during the 112th Congress within the context of FY2013 EPA appropriations included funding for implementing certain air pollution control requirements including greenhouse gas emission regulations, climate change research and related activities, cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the Superfund program, cleanup of sites that tend to be less hazardous (referred to as brownfields), and cleanup of petroleum from leaking underground tanks. Additionally, several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions continued to be controversial in the FY2013 appropriations. H.R. 6091 as reported included a number of provisions (similar to those considered in the FY2012 appropriations debate) that would have restricted the use of funding for the development, implementation, and enforcement of certain EPA actions that cut across the various pollution control statutes' programs and initiatives. These provisions were not included in the September 28, 2012, FY2013 continuing resolution. |
crs_R43749 | crs_R43749_0 | The federal government prohibits the manufacturing, distribution, and possession of many intoxicating substances that are solely intended for recreational use (notable exceptions are alcohol and tobacco); however, the federal government also allows for and controls the medical use of many intoxicants. Federal authority to control these substances primarily resides with the Attorney General of the United States. In order to restrict and reduce availability of illicit drugs in the United States, a practice referred to as "supply reduction," the federal government emphasizes domestic drug enforcement. History and Background of U.S. Drug Enforcement
This section outlines historic development and major changes in federal drug enforcement to help provide an understanding of how and why certain laws and policies were implemented and how these developments and changes shaped current drug enforcement policy. Overview of Federal Drug Enforcement in the United States
U.S. Drug Control Policy and Budget
Over the last decade, the United States has gradually shifted its stated drug policy toward a more comprehensive approach; one that focuses on prevention, treatment, and enforcement. According to the most recent drug control budget (FY2015) released by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), approximately 60% of all federal drug control spending is dedicated to supply reduction, with around 37% of the total drug control budget going toward domestic law enforcement. In other words, federal agencies may enforce the CSA in all states and territories. The majority of drug crimes known to U.S. law enforcement are dealt with at the state level. In the United States in 2012, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) arrested 30,476 suspects for federal drug offenses while state and local law enforcement arrested 1,328,457 suspects for drug offenses. In many cases, federal agencies assist state and local agencies with drug arrests, and suspects are referred for state prosecution, and vice-versa. Enforcement Trends
Trends in federal drug enforcement may reflect changes in the nation's drug problems and changes in the federal response to these problems. These trends also may reflect the federal government's enforcement priorities. Federal Drug Arrests and Seizures
Arrests
Most drug arrests are made by state and local law enforcement, and most of these arrests are for possession rather than sale or manufacturing. In contrast, most federal drug arrests are for trafficking offenses rather than possession. As shown in Figure 1 , over the last 25 years the majority of the DEA's arrests have been for cocaine-related offenses. Currently, drug cases represent the second highest category of criminal cases filed by U.S. Attorneys. | The federal government prohibits the manufacturing, distribution, and possession of many intoxicating substances that are solely intended for recreational use (notable exceptions are alcohol and tobacco); however, the federal government also allows for and controls the medical use of many intoxicants. Federal authority to control these substances primarily resides with the Attorney General of the United States.
Over the last decade, the United States has shifted its stated drug control policy toward a comprehensive approach; one that focuses on prevention, treatment, and enforcement. In order to restrict and reduce availability of illicit drugs in the United States, a practice referred to as "supply reduction," the federal government continues to place emphasis on domestic drug enforcement. According to the most recent drug control budget (FY2015) released by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), approximately 60% of all federal drug control spending is dedicated to supply reduction, with approximately 37% of the total budget dedicated to domestic law enforcement.
Federal agencies, primarily the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), enforce federal controlled substances laws in all states and territories, but the majority of drug crimes known to U.S. law enforcement are dealt with at the state level. In the United States in 2012, the DEA arrested 30,476 suspects for federal drug offenses while state and local law enforcement arrested 1,328,457 suspects for drug offenses. In many cases, federal agencies assist state and local agencies with drug arrests, and suspects are referred for state prosecution, and vice-versa.
Most drug arrests are made by state and local law enforcement, and most of these arrests are for possession rather than sale or manufacture. In contrast, most federal drug arrests are for trafficking offenses rather than possession. Over the last 25 years the majority of DEA's arrests have been for cocaine-related offenses.
Trends in federal drug enforcement may reflect the nation's changing drug problems and changes in the federal response to these problems. They also may reflect the federal government's priorities. Drug cases represent the second highest category of criminal cases filed by U.S. Attorneys; however, federal drug cases have steadily declined over the last decade.
This report focuses on domestic drug enforcement. It outlines historic development and major changes in U.S. drug enforcement to help provide an understanding of how and why certain laws and policies were implemented and how these developments and changes shaped current drug enforcement policy. In the 19th century federal, state, and local governments were generally not involved in restricting or regulating drug distribution and use, but this changed substantially in the 20th century as domestic law enforcement became the primary means of controlling the nation's substance abuse problems. |
crs_R44743 | crs_R44743_0 | T he Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that individual aliens outside the United States are "inadmissible"—or generally barred from admission to the country —on health, criminal, security, and other grounds set forth in the INA. However, the INA also grants the Executive several broad authorities that could be used to exclude certain individual aliens or classes of aliens for reasons that are not specifically set forth in the INA. Section 212(f) of the INA
The provisions currently in Section 212(f)—which have been part of the INA since its enactment in 1952 —state, in relevant part, that
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. Legislative history materials from the time of the INA's enactment suggest that these provisions were seen to grant the President broad authority to bar or impose conditions upon the entry of aliens, and Presidents over the years have relied upon Section 212(f) to suspend or restrict the entry of various groups of aliens, often (although not always) in conjunction with the imposition of financial sanctions upon them. Among those so excluded have been aliens whose actions "threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya"; officials of the North Korean government or the Workers' Party of North Korea; aliens who have participated in "serious human rights violations"; and others noted in Table 1 below. Neither the text of Section 212(f) nor the case law to date suggests any firm legal constraints upon the President's exercise of his authority under Section 212(f), as is explained below. However, future executive actions under INA § 212(f) could potentially be seen to raise legal issues that have not been prompted by the Executive's prior exercise of this authority. The central statutory constraint imposed on Section 212(f)'s exclusionary power is that the President must have found that the entry of any aliens or class of aliens would be "detrimental to the interests of the United States" in order to exclude the alien or class of aliens. The statute does not address (1) what factors should be considered in determining whether aliens' entry is "detrimental" to U.S. interests; (2) when and how proclamations suspending or restricting entry should be issued; (3) what factors are to be considered in determining whether particular restrictions are "appropriate"; or (4) how long any restrictions should last. Judicial Constructions of Section 212(f)
The limited case law addressing exercises of presidential authority under Section 212(f) also supports the view that this provision of the INA confers broad authority to suspend or restrict the entry of aliens. Key among these cases is the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. , which held that the U.S. practice of interdicting persons fleeing Haiti outside U.S. territorial waters and returning them to their home country without allowing them to raise claims for asylum and withholding of removal did not violate either the INA or the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The U.S. practice had been established by Executive Order 12807, which was issued, in part, under the authority of Section 212(f) of the INA and "suspend[ed] the entry of aliens coming by sea to the United States without necessary documentation." Most notably, Section 214(a)(1) prescribes that the "admission of any alien to the United States as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as [the Executive] may by regulations prescribe." Section 215(a)(1) similarly provides that "it shall be unlawful for any alien" to enter or depart the United States "except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe." For example, President Carter cited to Section 215(a) when authorizing the revocation of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas issued to Iranians during the Iran Hostage Crisis. | The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that individual aliens outside the United States are "inadmissible"—or barred from admission to the country—on health, criminal, security, and other grounds set forth in the INA. However, the INA also grants the Executive several broader authorities that could be used to exclude certain individual aliens or classes of aliens for reasons that are not specifically prescribed in the INA.
Section 212(f) of the INA is arguably the broadest and best known of these authorities. It provides, in relevant part, that
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.
Over the years, Presidents have relied upon Section 212(f) to suspend or otherwise restrict the entry of individual aliens and classes of aliens, often (although not always) in conjunction with the imposition of financial sanctions upon these aliens. Among those so excluded have been aliens whose actions "threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya"; officials of the North Korean government; and aliens responsible for "serious human rights violations."
Neither the text of Section 212(f) nor the case law to date suggests any firm legal limits upon the President's exercise of his authority to exclude aliens under this provision. The central statutory constraint imposed on Section 212(f)'s exclusionary power is that the President must have found that the entry of any alien or class of aliens would be "detrimental to the interests of the United States." The statute does not address (1) what factors should be considered in determining whether aliens' entry is "detrimental" to U.S. interests; (2) when and how proclamations suspending or restricting entry should be issued; (3) what factors are to be considered in determining whether particular restrictions are "appropriate"; or (4) how long any restrictions should last. The limited case law addressing exercises of presidential authority under Section 212(f) also supports the view that this provision confers broad authority to bar or impose conditions upon the entry of aliens. Key among these cases is the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., which held that the U.S. practice of interdicting persons fleeing Haiti outside U.S. territorial waters and returning them to their home country without allowing them to raise claims for asylum or withholding of removal did not violate the INA or the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The U.S. practice had been established by Executive Order 12807, which was issued, in part, under the authority of Section 212(f) and "suspend[ed] the entry of aliens coming by sea to the United States without necessary documentation." However, depending on their scope, future executive actions under Section 212(f) could potentially be seen to raise legal issues that have not been prompted by the Executive's prior exercises of this authority.
Beyond Section 212(f), other provisions of the INA can also be seen to authorize the Executive to restrict aliens' entry to the United States. Most notably, Section 214(a)(1) prescribes that the "admission of any alien to the United States as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as [the Executive] may by regulations prescribe." Section 215(a)(1) similarly provides that "it shall be unlawful for any alien" to enter or depart the United States "except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe." For example, President Carter cited Section 215(a)—rather than Section 212(f)—when authorizing the revocation of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas issued to Iranian citizens during the Iran Hostage Crisis. |
crs_R40863 | crs_R40863_0 | Recent Developments
On January 21, 2011, the Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration (ETA) published in the Federal Register a notice of solicitation for grant applications (SGA) for the TAA Community College and Career Training Grant (CCCT) Program. The notice of availability of funds and solicitation for grant applications set April 21, 2011, as the closing date for the receipt of applications. On August 18, 2009, the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA) published in the Federal Register final rules and regulations governing the implementation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Communities (CTAA) grant program. The regulations outline the responsibilities of EDA in administering the program including determining a community's eligibility for CTAA planning and implementation grants, providing technical assistance to impacted communities, and evaluating grant applications. On January 11, 2010, EDA published in the Federal Register a notice soliciting applications for CTAA grant assistance. Overview of the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Communities (CTAA) Program
The CTAA grant program was created with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, P.L. Included among the subtitles of Division B of ARRA was the Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act (TGAAA) of 2009. The CTAA program, as authorized by ARRA, comprises four subchapters:
Subchapter A establishes the CTAA programs within the Department of Commerce; Subchapter B creates the Community College and Career Training Grant program (CCCT); Subchapter C establishes Industry or Sector Partnership Grants program for Communities Impacted by Trade (ISP); and Subchapter D includes general provisions related to program implementation. The notice identified April 20, 2010, as the deadline for the submission of applications. Between August 3, 2010, and September 20, 2010, DOC announced the awarding of $36.768 million in CTAA grant funds to 36 entities. grant recipients. The act requires that each CCCT grant application include:
a description of the proposed project, including the manner in which the grant will be used to develop, offer, or improve an educational or career training program that is suited to persons eligible for TAAW; the extent to which the proposed project will meet the educational or career training needs of persons eligible for TAAW in the community served by the IHE; the extent to which the proposed project fits within the community's EDA-approved strategic plan; the extent to which the project for which the grant proposal is submitted relates to any project funded by a Sector Partnership Grant; a description of the IHE's previous experience in providing educational or career training programs to persons eligible for TAAW, although a lack of experience does not disqualify an IHE; a description of the extent and outcome of the applicant's compliance with the program's required outreach activities to local educational and training providers, government agencies, local workforce investment boards, labor organizations, and at least one employer to identify the required job skills of future employment opportunities within the community and the gaps in existing educational and training programs; the extent to which the proposed project will provide the required job skills or fill the identified gaps in existing educational and training programs; a description of the extent and the outcome of the applicant's compliance with the program's required outreach activities to similar IHEs to learn best practices for providing educational or training programs to persons eligible for TAAW; a description of the extent and outcome of the applicant's compliance with the program's required outreach activities to community partnerships that have sought or received a Sector Partnership Grant in an effort to enhance the project effectiveness and avoid duplication of efforts; and the extent to which employers have demonstrated a commitment to employing workers who have participated in the proposed project. On March 30, 2010, the President signed the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 ( P.L. P.L. 111-152 provides $500 million in mandatory funding for each of FY2011 through FY2014 (see Table 1 ). Subchapter D—General Provisions
Subchapter D includes a provision stating that a worker receiving trade adjustment assistance for workers (TAAW) will not be disqualified from or ineligible for assistance under any of the provisions of trade adjustment assistance to communities. The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, P.L. 111-32 , included a $40 million appropriation to be used to fund both CTAA and the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms programs for FY2009. In addition, the Consolidated appropriations Act for FY2010 included $15.8 million for CTAA and the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms programs. | The Trade Adjustment Assistance for Communities (CTAA) grant program was created with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, P.L. 111-5. Included among the subtitles of Division B of ARRA, was the Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act (TGAAA) of 2009. The CTAA program, as authorized by ARRA, comprises four subchapters:
Subchapter A—Trade Adjustment Assistance to Communities (CTAA) directs the EDA to provide technical assistance and to award strategic planning and implementation grants to eligible trade-impacted communities. Subchapter B—Community Colleges and Career Training (CCCT) creates a competitive grant program administered by the Department of Labor which is intended to strengthen the role of community colleges in filling the education and skills gap of workers in trade impacted communities. Subchapter C—Industry or Sector Partnership Grants Program for Communities Impacted by Trade (ISG) creates a grant program intended to encourage the creation of public private partnerships that develop a skilled workforce. Subchapter D—General Provisions includes language prohibiting workers receiving trade adjustment assistance from being disqualified from receiving assistance under activities funded by the CTAA program.
The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, P.L. 111-32, included a $40 million appropriation that funded both Community Trade Adjustment Assistance and Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms. For FY2010, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2010, P.L. 111-117, included an appropriation of $15.8 million to be shared between the trade adjustment assistance programs for communities and firms. In addition, on March 30, 2010, the President signed the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, P.L. 111-152, which included $500 million in funding for each of the fiscal years FY2011 through FY2014 for Subchapter B, Community Colleges and Career Training Grants.
On January 21, 2011, the Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration (ETA) published in the Federal Register a notice of solicitation for grant applications (SGA) for the TAA Community College and Career Training Grant (CCCT) Program. The notice of availability of funds and solicitation for grant applications set April 21, 2011, as the closing date for the receipt of applications.
On August 18, 2009, the Department of Commerce's (DOC) Economic Development Administration (EDA) published in the Federal Register final rules and regulations governing the CTAA program. The regulations outlined the responsibilities of EDA in administering the program, including determining a community's eligibility for CTAA grants, providing technical assistance to impacted communities, and evaluating grant applications. On January 11, 2010, EDA published in the Federal Register a notice soliciting applications for CTAA grants. Concurrently, it published the full announcement and application for assistance at http://www.grants.gov and established April 20, 2010, as the deadline for applications. Between August 3, 2010, and September 20, 2010, DOC announced the awarding of $36.768 million in CTAA grant funds to 36 grant recipients. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_97-71 | crs_97-71_0 | The public availability of records held by the executive branch was limited by narrow interpretation of the "housekeeping" statute of 1789 (now codified at 5 U.S.C. Among these legislative responses were the enactments of four statutes. Two provide access to federal records:
the Freedom of Information Act (1966) and the Privacy Act (1974). Two provide access to federal meetings:
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972); and the Government in the Sunshine Act (1976). This report offers an overview of each of these statutes, including the boundaries of their authority. This report then provides citations to additional resources on each of the laws. Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. §552)
In 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the first law requiring public access to executive branch records. Pursuant to the statute, FOIA does not apply to the legislative or judicial branches of the federal government or to state, local, or tribal governments. Disputes over the accessibility of requested records may be settled, according to the provisions of the act, in federal court or may be mediated in the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). FOIA was amended in 1996 to provide for public access to information in an electronic form or format. App.) A 1972 statute, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), requires that the meetings of all federal advisory committees serving executive branch entities be open to public observation and that all committee records be accessible to the public. Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. When agencies resist these requests, Congress has formal and informal methods of encouraging or requiring agencies to comply. In view of the American separation of powers model of government, such conflicts among the three branches are neither unexpected nor necessarily destructive—and probably will continue to occur. Annual reports from all of the departments and agencies are posted online by the U.S. Department of Justice. Other transparency watchdog organizations also track litigation related to federal access laws. Public Citizen, a nonprofit organization that represents a variety of citizen interests, maintains a website that provides FOIA resources and information. Selected CRS Reports
CRS Report R41933, The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): Background, Legislation, and Policy Issues , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG93, The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Drone Strikes Program , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R43924, Freedom of Information Act Legislation in the 114th Congress: Issue Summary and Side-by-Side Analysis , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R44253, Federal Advisory Committees: An Introduction and Overview , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R44232, Creating a Federal Advisory Committee in the Executive Branch , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R44248, The Federal Advisory Committee Act: Analysis of Operations and Costs , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual , by [author name scrubbed] et al. U.S. Congress. | No provision in the U.S. Constitution expressly establishes a procedure for public access to executive branch records or meetings. Congress, however, has legislated various public access laws. Among these laws are two records access statutes,
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 5 U.S.C. §552), and the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. §552a),
and two meetings access statutes,
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA; 5 U.S.C. App.), and the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. §552b).
These four laws provide the foundation for access to executive branch information in the American federal government. The records-access statutes provide the public with a variety of methods to examine how executive branch departments and agencies execute their missions. The meeting-access statutes provide the public the opportunity to participate in and inform the policy process. These four laws are also among the most used and most litigated federal access laws.
While the four statutes provide the public with access to executive branch federal records and meetings, they do not apply to the legislative or judicial branches of the U.S. government. The American separation of powers model of government provides a collection of formal and informal methods that the branches can use to provide information to one another. Moreover, the separation of powers anticipates conflicts over the accessibility of information. These conflicts are neither unexpected nor necessarily destructive. Although there is considerable interbranch cooperation in the sharing of information and records, such conflicts over access may continue on occasion.
This report offers an introduction to the four access laws and provides citations to additional resources related to these statutes. This report includes statistics on the use of FOIA and FACA and on litigation related to FOIA. The 114th Congress may have an interest in overseeing the implementation of these laws or may consider amending the laws. In addition, this report provides some examples of the methods Congress, the President, and the courts have employed to provide or require the provision of information to one another. This report is a primer on information access in the U.S. federal government and provides a list of resources related to transparency, secrecy, access, and nondisclosure. |
crs_RL31392 | crs_RL31392_0 | Many pertain to the lands of a particular agency (e.g., the National Forest System [NFS] or the National Wildlife Refuge System [NWRS]). The most wide-ranging payment program is called Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT). Eligible lands consist of those in the National Park System (NPS), NFS, or Bureau of Land Management (BLM); certain lands in the NWRS if they are withdrawn from the public domain; lands dedicated to the use of federal water resources development projects; dredge disposal areas under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; lands located in the vicinity of Purgatory River Canyon and Piñon Canyon, Colorado, that were acquired after December 31, 1981, to expand the Fort Carson military reservation; lands on which are located semi-active or inactive Army installations used for mobilization and for reserve component training; and certain lands acquired by DOI or the Department of Agriculture under the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act ( P.L. The resulting law authorizes federal PILT payments to local governments. The authorized payment level continued to be subject to annual appropriations. Starting with the FY2008 payment, however, Congress enacted a series of changes to PILT payment funding, including approval of mandatory spending for the payments (see Table 1 ). 112-141 , §100111) extended mandatory spending for PILT to FY2013, without making any other changes to the law. PILT Legislation: FY2014
For the FY2014 appropriations cycle, Congress faced two basic choices for FY2104 funding:
continue the program through an appropriations act, which is constrained by procedural and statutory limits on discretionary spending; or provide funding through some measure other than an appropriations act, which would be treated as mandatory spending. With this choice, funding would be subject to certain budget rules that generally require such spending to be offset. That amount bought the FY2015 total to $439.5 million, or 97.3% of the full formula amount. Lands in Utah acquired by the United States if the lands were eligible for a payment in lieu of taxes program from the state of Utah
Only the nine categories of lands (plus the three exceptions) on this list are eligible for PILT payments; other federal lands—such as military bases, post offices, federal office buildings, and the like—are not eligible for payments under this statute. In addition, there is a pass-through option for the PILT payment itself. The PILT statute requires that "the Secretary of the Interior shall adjust each dollar amount specified in subsections (b) and (c) to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor, for the 12 months ending the preceding June 30." Putting It All Together: Calculating a County's Payment
With answers to these questions, the authorized payment level for a county can be calculated. If appropriations are insufficient for full funding, each county receives a pro rata share of the appropriation. Thus, counties received 99.7% of the full formula amount. (This example assumes the PILT payment is calculated under the standard rate.) National Totals
Because of the need for annual data, a precise dollar figure cannot be given in advance for each year's PILT authorization level. For a relatively small fraction of the federal or even departmental budget, PILT garners considerable attention, especially from local governments: (1) 2,227 counties had lands eligible for PILT payments in FY2016; (2) the average payment per county (many of which are sparsely populated) was $202,784; (3) although some counties with eligible lands received no payment (because they have very few federal lands and PILT makes no payments of less than $100), many received over $1 million and 25 counties received over $3 million. Inclusion of Indian Lands
The inclusion of other lands (e.g., military lands generally or those of specific agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) under the PILT program has been mentioned from time to time, and some counties with many acres of nontaxable Indian lands within their boundaries have long supported adding Indian lands to the list of lands eligible for PILT. If PILT payments are discretionary and annual appropriations are less than the authorized level, each county would receive a pro rata share of the authorized full payment level. Congress may consider making all refuge lands eligible for PILT and/or providing mandatory spending for NWRF, as it has for PILT. However, in the same year, the PILT program was very much smaller: the appropriated $400.2 million in PILT payments was less than 0.1% of property tax revenue nationally. | Under federal law, local governments (usually counties) are compensated through various programs for reductions to their property tax bases due to the presence of most federally owned land. Federal lands cannot be taxed but may create a demand for services such as fire protection, police cooperation, or longer roads to skirt the federal property. Some compensation programs are run by a specific agency and apply only to that agency's land. This report addresses only the most widely applicable program, which is called Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT; 31 U.S.C. §§6901-6907) and is administered by the Department of the Interior (DOI); in FY2016, there were 2,227 counties with lands eligible for PILT payments. Eligible lands consist of those in the National Park System (NPS), National Forest System (NFS), or Bureau of Land Management (BLM); certain lands in the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS); and several other specified federal lands.
Congress has repeatedly debated the level of PILT funding. The authorized level of PILT payments is calculated using a complex formula. No precise dollar figure can be given in advance for each year's PILT authorized level. Five factors affect the calculation of a payment to a given county: (1) the number of acres eligible for PILT payments, (2) the county's population, (3) payments in prior years from other specified federal land payment programs, (4) state laws directing payments to a particular government purpose, and (5) the Consumer Price Index as calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. If the appropriation for PILT funding is less than the full authorized amount, each county receives a prorated payment.
Before 2008, PILT was funded through the annual appropriations process. From FY2008 to FY2014, however, Congress approved mandatory spending for PILT at the full formula amount. The FY2015 PILT payment was funded through both discretionary and mandatory appropriations, and the FY2016 PILT payment and FY2017 PILT payment were each funded entirely through discretionary appropriations. In all three of those years, the appropriation for the PILT payment was less than the authorized full funding level, so each county received a prorated payment in those years. Most recently in FY2017, each county received a prorated amount (99.7%) of the full authorized amount.
The mechanism for PILT funding thus presents two fundamental options for Congress to consider: provide funding through the annual discretionary appropriations process or through mandatory spending for the full formula amount, whether indefinitely or for a specified period. Discretionary appropriations are constrained by procedural and statutory spending limits and are subject to annual fluctuations that may or may not result in PILT being fully funded. Among other potential impacts, annual appropriations could introduce uncertainty and unpredictability for the counties receiving PILT payments. Approval of mandatory spending for PILT at the full formula amount could ensure a consistent and predictable payment for those counties, at least through the duration of the authorization. However, the legislation still would be subject to certain budget rules that generally require such spending be offset.
Since the creation of PILT in 1976, various other changes in the law have been proposed. One proposal has been to include additional lands under the PILT program, particularly Indian lands. Other lands also have been mentioned for inclusion, such as those of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Some counties would like to revisit the compensation formula to emphasize a payment rate more similar to property tax rates. Finally, some have argued that all lands in the NWRS should be eligible for PILT, rather than limiting PILT payments to lands reserved from the public domain while excluding acquired lands from PILT payments. |
crs_R43657 | crs_R43657_0 | Introduction
Administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), the Impact Aid program is one of the oldest federal education programs, dating from 1950. Impact Aid, authorized under Title VIII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA, P.L. 89-10, as amended), compensates local educational agencies (LEAs) for "substantial and continuing financial burden" resulting from federal activities. These activities include federal ownership of certain lands, as well as the enrollments in LEAs of children of parents who work or live on federal land (e.g., children of parents in the military and children living on Indian lands). The federal government provides compensation because these activities deprive LEAs of the ability to collect property or other taxes from these individuals (e.g., members of the Armed Forces living on military bases) or their employers, even though the LEAs are obligated to provide free public education to their children. Thus Impact Aid is intended to compensate LEAs for the resulting loss of tax revenue. The largest Impact Aid payment, Section 8003(b) payments (also known as Basic Support Payments or BSPs), compensates LEAs for enrolling "federally connected" children. For FY2014, Section 8003(b) payments accounted for $1.151 billion, approximately 89.3% of all funds appropriated for the Impact Aid program. As Section 8003(b) payments account for the majority of all Impact Aid funding, this report primarily focuses on them. The Impact Aid program is funded using budget year appropriations provided in the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) appropriations bill. Under the current mechanism for funding Section 8003(b) payments and the use of continuing resolutions rather than enacting budget year appropriations acts prior to the start of the fiscal year, LEAs are generally unable to receive their full Section 8003(b) payments until sometime after October 1. The uncertainty that results from each of these funding scenarios can create financial difficulties for LEAs, particularly those that are heavily dependent on Impact Aid funding. Advance Appropriations
Advance appropriations are enacted one or more fiscal years prior to when they become available . Forward Funding
Forward funds are also enacted in advance, but become available during the last quarter of the budget year as opposed to a future fiscal year. Potential Implementation and Transition Options for Advance Appropriations and Forward Funding
This section considers three different appropriations scenarios for Impact Aid Section 8003 (b) payments that are an alternative to regular budget year appropriations: (1) providing forward funding for Section 8003 (b) payments, (2) providing advance appropriations for Section 8003 (b) payments, or (3) using both forward funding and advance appropriations to provide Section 8003 (b) funding, as is done for other federal education programs such as Title I-A Grants to Local Educational Agencies authorized by the ESEA or Grants to States authorized under Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). These would be available for obligation as of October 1, 2014. That is, for the FY2015 appropriations process, the Section 8003 (b) payment would need to be funded through both regular budget year appropriations and forward funding appropriations, a scenario that was arguably contemplated in Title IV, Section 420 (b) of The General Education Provisions Act :
In order to effect a transition to the timing of appropriation action authorized by subsection (a) of this section, the application of this section may result in the enactment, in a fiscal year, of separate appropriations for an applicable program (whether in the same appropriations Act or otherwise) for two consecutive fiscal years. | Administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), the Impact Aid program is one of the oldest federal education programs, dating from 1950. Impact Aid, authorized under Title VIII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA, P.L. 89-10, as amended), compensates local educational agencies (LEAs) for "substantial and continuing financial burden" resulting from federal activities. These activities include federal ownership of certain lands, as well as the enrollments in LEAs of children of parents who work or live on federal land (e.g., children of parents in the military and children living on Indian lands). The federal government provides compensation because these activities deprive LEAs of the ability to collect property or other taxes from these individuals (e.g., members of the Armed Forces living on military bases) or their employers, even though the LEAs are obligated to provide free public education to their children. Thus, Impact Aid is intended to compensate LEAs for the resulting loss of tax revenue.
The largest Impact Aid payment, Section 8003(b) payments (also known as Basic Support Payments or BSPs), compensates LEAs for enrolling "federally connected" children. For FY2014, Section 8003(b) accounted for $1.151 billion, approximately 89.3% of all funds appropriated for the Impact Aid program. As Section 8003(b) payments account for the majority of all Impact Aid funding, this report primarily focuses on these payments.
All Impact Aid payments are funded through the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) annual appropriations bill. Funds are provided through "budget year appropriations," meaning the funds would be available for the budget year beginning on the first day of the next fiscal year (e.g., October 1, 2013, for FY2014), unless otherwise specified. This availability may be retroactive if annual appropriations are not enacted until after the fiscal year has begun. The Impact Aid program is also authorized to receive appropriations through advance appropriations and forward funding. Advance appropriations become available one or more fiscal years after the budget year covered by a given appropriations act (e.g., for FY2015 and an FY2014 appropriations act). Forward funding becomes available during the last quarter of the budget year (e.g., July 1), but remains available through at least the following fiscal year (e.g., July 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015).
Under the current mechanism for funding Section 8003(b) payments and the use of continuing resolutions rather than enacting regular appropriations acts prior to the start of the fiscal year, LEAs are generally unable to receive their full Section 8003(b) payments until sometime after October 1, because of delays in when regular appropriations or a full-year continuing resolution is enacted. This can create financial difficulties for LEAs, particularly those that are heavily dependent on Impact Aid funding. Providing funds for Section 8003(b) payments through advance appropriations or forward funding has the potential to ease some of these difficulties, but has budget enforcement implications that may complicate any attempt to transition to an alternative funding schedule.
This report considers three different appropriations scenarios for Impact Aid Section 8003(b) payments that are an alternative to budget year appropriations: (1) providing forward funding for Section 8003(b) payments, (2) providing advance appropriations for Section 8003(b) payments, or (3) using both forward funding and advance appropriations to provide Section 8003(b) payments, as is done for other federal education programs such as Title I-A Grants to Local Educational Agencies authorized by the ESEA or Grants to States authorized under Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Each of these scenarios has budget implications that may require at least a one-time increase in discretionary appropriations, a change in the limit set on advance appropriations, or some combination of both. |
crs_RL34012 | crs_RL34012_0 | Federal grants are not benefits or entitlements to individuals. Grants are intended for projects serving state, community, and local needs. Because government funds may be limited, sources of private funding should also be considered. State and community foundations may be particularly interested in funding local projects; many projects may require a combination of government and private funding. Who is Eligible for a Government Grant? Programs are searchable at the "Assistance Listings" domain at beta.SAM.gov; descriptions are updated by departments and agencies, and they cover authorizing legislation, objectives, and eligibility and compliance requirements. Assistance listing descriptions include the following:
federal agency administering a program legislation authorizing the program objectives and goals of program types of financial or nonfinancial assistance uses and restrictions eligibility requirements application and award process criteria for selecting proposals amount of obligations for some past and current fiscal years range and average of financial assistance regulations, guidelines, and literature relevant to a program information contacts and headquarters, regional, and local offices related programs examples of funded projects formula and matching requirements, where applicable requirements for postassistance reports
Grants.gov http://www.grants.gov
FedConnect https://www.fedconnect.net
After grantseekers identify federal programs in beta.SAM.gov and contact agencies (see section below), they may be directed to register and apply at websites such as Grants.gov or FedConnect when application announcements for competitive grants become available. Grantseekers themselves can check on notices of funding availability (NOFAs) or requests for proposals (RFPs); sign up to receive email notification of grant opportunities; and apply for federal grants online through a unified process. Private, Corporate, and Additional Funding Sources
Foundation Center http://www.foundationcenter.org/
Information gateway to the grant seeking process, private funding sources (including national, state, community, and corporate foundations), guidelines on writing a grants proposal, addresses of libraries in every state with grants reference collections, and links to other useful internet websites. Free information on the website includes the following:
Guide to Funding Research http://foundationcenter.org/getstarted/tutorials/gfr/index.html Foundation Finder http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/foundfinder/ Search for information about more than 90,000 private and community foundations. Constituents may also request from congressional offices CRS Report RL32159, How to Develop and Write a Grant Proposal , by Maria Kreiser and Julie Jennings, which discusses standard content and formats. | This report describes key sources of information on government and private funding, and outlines eligibility for federal grants. Federal grants are intended for projects benefiting states and communities. Individuals may be eligible for other kinds of benefits or assistance, or small businesses and students may be eligible for loans. Free information is readily available to grantseekers, who generally know best the details of their projects. The Assistance Listings database at beta.SAM.gov describes more than 2,200 federal programs, more than half of them grants, and can be searched by keyword, department or agency, program title, beneficiary, and applicant eligibility. Federal department and agency websites provide additional information and guidance, and they provide state agency contacts. Once a program has been identified, eligible grantseekers may apply electronically for grants at the website Grants.gov through a uniform process for all agencies. Through Grants.gov, grantseekers may identify when federal funding notices and deadlines for a program become available, sign up for email notification of funding opportunities, and track the progress of submitted applications.
Because government funds may be limited, the report also discusses sources of private and corporate foundation funding. The Foundation Center is a clearinghouse for information about private, corporate, and community foundations, with collections of resources in every state.
This report includes sources of information on writing grant proposals. See also CRS Report RL32159, How to Develop and Write a Grant Proposal, by Maria Kreiser and Julie Jennings.
Additional sources are also included in the CRS web page, "Grants and Federal Assistance." See also CRS Report RL34035, Grants Work in a Congressional Office, by Maria Kreiser and Julie Jennings.
This report will be updated at the beginning of every Congress and as needed. |
crs_R43061 | crs_R43061_0 | Among the key factors that labor economists examine for evidence of labor shortages are employment growth, wage growth, and unemployment rates relative to other occupations. As defined this way, the size of the S&E workforce in 2016 was approximately 6.9 million. Science and engineering employment was concentrated in two occupational groups—computer occupations and engineers—which together accounted for 81% of S&E jobs, with 57.6% and 23.6%, respectively. In 2016, the mean annual wage for all scientists and engineers was $94,450; the mean annual wage for all occupations—professional and nonprofessional—was $49,630. However, the unemployment rates for most S&E occupations were higher than the rates for some other professional occupations—including dentists (0.4%), physicians and surgeons (0.5%), lawyers (0.7%), and registered nurses (1.2%). The nominal growth rate of mean wages for all occupations during this period was 2.0% CAGR, while the fastest growth rate in the S&E occupational groups was for S&E managers (2.5% CAGR), followed by computer occupations (2.4% CAGR). All other S&E occupational groups had mean wage growth smaller than that of all occupations: life scientists (1.7% CAGR), engineers (1.5% CAGR), physical scientists (1.2% CAGR), and mathematic occupations (1.0% CAGR). Adjusted for inflation, mathematical occupations experienced a small decline (-0.1% CAGR) in mean wages between 2012 and 2016, while the other S&E occupational groups grew by less than 1.4% CAGR. Professional occupations (of which the S&E occupations are a part) historically have had lower unemployment rates than the overall workforce. As shown in Table 9 , S&E occupational groups had significantly lower unemployment rates than those of the overall workforce for the 2012-2016 period. In addition to the job openings created by growth in the number of jobs in S&E occupations, BLS projects that an additional 1.439 million scientists and engineers will exit the labor force due to factors such as retirement, death, and to care for family members. The BLS projections do not include data that allow for a quantitative analysis of how many new workers (those not in the labor market in 2016) will be required for openings created by job growth, labor force exits, and occupational transfers, as there is no detail to how many of the S&E openings are expected to be filled by workers transferring into these openings from S&E occupations and from non-S&E occupations (that is, some workers may transfer from one S&E occupation to another, some may transfer from an S&E occupations to a non-S&E occupations, and still others may transfer from a non-S&E occupation into an S&E occupations). Engineers —projected to account for 16.2% of total S&E job growth during the 2016-2026 period, below their 23.0% share of S&E employment in 2016, thus reducing their projected share of 2026 S&E employment to 22.3%; Life Scientists —projected to account for 3.8% of total S&E job growth during the 2016-2026 period, below their 4.5% share of S&E employment in 2016, thus reducing their projected share of 2026 S&E employment to 4.4%; and Physical S cientists —projected to account for 3.2% of total S&E job growth during the 2016-2026 period, below their 3.8% share of S&E employment in 2016, thus reducing their projected share of 2026 S&E employment to 3.7%. Concluding Observations
Scientists and engineers are widely believed to be essential to U.S. technological leadership, innovation, manufacturing, and services, and thus vital to U.S. economic strength, national defense, and other societal needs (e.g., treating and preventing diseases, ensuring access to affordable energy, protecting and restoring the environment). The adequacy of the U.S. science and engineering workforce has been an ongoing concern of Congress for more than 60 years. Congress has enacted many programs to support the education and development of scientists and engineers. Congress has also undertaken broad efforts to improve science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) skills to prepare a greater number of students to pursue science and engineering (S&E) degrees. Some policymakers have sought to increase the number of foreign scientists and engineers working in the United States through changes in visa and immigration policies. While there is a broad consensus on the important role of scientists and engineers in the United States, policymakers, business leaders, academicians, S&E professional society analysts, economists, and others hold diverse views with respect to the adequacy of the S&E workforce and related policy issues. In particular, there are varying perspectives about whether a shortage of scientists and engineers exists in the United States, what the nature of such a shortage might be (e.g., too few people with S&E degrees, a mismatch of worker skills and employer needs), and whether the federal government should undertake policy interventions to address a putative shortage or allow market forces to work in this labor market. | The adequacy of the U.S. science and engineering workforce has been an ongoing concern of Congress for more than 60 years. Scientists and engineers are widely believed to be essential to U.S. technological leadership, innovation, manufacturing, and services, and thus vital to U.S. economic strength, national defense, and other societal needs. Congress has enacted many programs to support the education and development of scientists and engineers. Congress has also undertaken broad efforts to improve science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) skills to prepare a greater number of students to pursue science and engineering (S&E) degrees. In addition, some policymakers have sought to increase the number of foreign scientists and engineers working in the United States through changes in visa and immigration policies.
Policymakers, business leaders, academicians, S&E professional society analysts, economists, and others hold diverse views with respect to the adequacy of the S&E workforce and related policy issues. These issues include whether a shortage of scientists and engineers exists in the United States, what the nature of such a shortage might be (e.g., too few people with S&E degrees, mismatched skills and needs), and whether the federal government should undertake policy interventions to address such a putative shortage or to allow market forces to work in this labor market. Among the key indicators used by labor economists to assess occupational labor shortages are employment growth, wage growth, and unemployment rates.
In 2016, there were 6.9 million scientists and engineers (as defined in this report) employed in the United States, accounting for 4.9% of total U.S. employment. Science and engineering employment was concentrated in two S&E occupational groups, computer occupations (57.6%) and engineers (23.6%), with the rest accounted for by S&E managers (8.4%), physical scientists (3.8%), life scientists (4.1%), and those in mathematical occupations (2.4%). From 2012 to 2016, S&E employment increased by 747,040, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.9%, while overall U.S. employment grew by 1.9% CAGR. Viewed only in aggregate, the increase in S&E employment masks the varied degrees of growth and decline in detailed S&E occupations.
In 2016, the mean wage for all scientists and engineers was $94,450, while the mean wage for all other occupations was $49,630. Between 2012 and 2016, the nominal mean wages of the S&E occupational groups grew between 1.0% CAGR (mathematical occupations) and 2.5% CAGR (S&E managers). Inflation-adjusted wage growth for each of the S&E occupational groups was less than 1.4% CAGR, and in the case of mathematical occupations was negative. Nominal wage growth for all occupations in the economy was 2.0%; real wages grew by 0.9%.
Compared to the overall workforce, the S&E occupational groups had significantly lower unemployment rates for the 2012-2016 period. In general, though, the professional occupations (of which the S&E occupations are a part) historically have had lower unemployment rates than the workforce as a whole. In 2016, with the exception of life scientists, the unemployment rates for S&E occupational groups (2.0%-2.9%) were higher than other selected professional occupations, including lawyers (0.7%), physicians and surgeons (0.5%), dentists (0.4%), and registered nurses (1.2%). Life scientists had an unemployment rate of 0.6%.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projects that the number of S&E jobs will grow by 853,600 between 2016 and 2026, a growth rate (1.1% CAGR) that is somewhat faster than that of the overall workforce (0.7%). In addition, BLS projects that 5.179 million scientists and engineers will be needed due to labor force exits and occupational transfers (referred to collectively as occupational separations). BLS projects the total number of openings in S&E due to growth, labor force exits, and occupational transfers between 2016 and 2026 to be 6.033 million, including 3.477 million in the computer occupations and 1.265 million in the engineering occupations. |
crs_RS22037 | crs_RS22037_0 | Among the key provisions, the 1996 amendments authorized a Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program to help public water systems finance improvements needed to comply with federal drinking water regulations and to address the most serious risks to human health. Congress increased the amount states may use for administration purposes in the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. For FY2016, the President requested $1.18 billion for the DWSRF program, and Congress appropriated $863.2 million ( P.L. For FY2017, President Obama requested $1.020 billion. This needs survey indicates that public water systems need to invest $384.2 billion on infrastructure improvements over 20 years ($19.2 billion annually) to achieve regulatory compliance and ensure the provision of safe tap water. A 2012 study prepared by the American Water Works Association (AWWA) projected that restoring and expanding water systems to keep up with population growth would require a nationwide investment of at least $1 trillion over the next 25 years. Other persistent water infrastructure issues include the gap between funding and estimated needs, the growing cost of complying with SDWA standards (particularly for small communities), the ability of small or disadvantaged communities to afford DWSRF financing, and the broader need for cities to maintain, upgrade, and expand infrastructure unrelated to SDWA compliance. 3080 ) includes in Title V, Subtitle C, the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 2014 (WIFIA). In WIFIA, Congress authorized a pilot loan guarantee program to test the ability of innovative financing tools to promote increased development of, and private investment in, water infrastructure projects—while reducing costs to the federal government. The five-year pilot program is intended to complement, and not replace, the SRF programs. 114th Congress
The drinking water crisis in Flint, MI, heightened attention to the state of the nation's drinking water infrastructure and the challenges many communities face in addressing their infrastructure needs. In P.L. 114-254 , the Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act of 2017, Congress provided $20.0 million for EPA to begin providing loan guarantees for infrastructure projects under WIFIA. For FY2017, President Obama requested $1.02 billion for the DWSRF program. The program has been funded for FY2017 under continuing resolutions at FY2016 levels, minus across-the-board reductions of less than 0.2%. 114-254 , Congress appropriated the funding authorized in the WIIN Act to assist Flint, MI. Bills have been introduced to increase federal investment in water infrastructure and to promote improved water system asset management and SDWA compliance capacity. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 , Division G, Title II), Congress appropriated $863.23 million for DWSRF capitalization grants; the act also included another $10.0 million for the WIFIA program (in addition to the $20.0 million provided in P.L. For FY2018, the President has requested $863.0 million for the DWSRF program and $20.0 million for WIFIA. Among other revisions, the bill would (1) add Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements (currently imposed through appropriations acts), (2) make permanent the Buy American iron and steel requirement for projects receiving DWSRF assistance (currently applicable to FY2017 funding), (3) direct states to give funding priority to projects that improve the ability of water systems to protect health and comply with SDWA affordably and to give greater weight to applications that describe measures to improve the management and financial stability of the water system, (4) conditionally require states to use at least 6% of their capitalization grants to provide additional subsidization to disadvantaged communities, (5) incorporate in the statute a governor's authority to transfer as much as 33% of the annual DWSRF or CWSRF capitalization grant to the other fund, (6) increase the amount reserved for insular areas from 0.33% to 1.5%, (7) authorize DWSRF program appropriations at a level of $21.17 billion over five years, (8) authorize EPA to use unobligated funds to make grants to states with water systems disproportionately affected by new regulations to assist those systems, and (9) require EPA to use information from states to develop best practices for DWSRF program administration. | The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) is the federal authority for regulating contaminants in public water supplies. It includes the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program, established in 1996 to help public water systems finance infrastructure projects needed to comply with federal drinking water regulations and to meet the SDWA's health objectives. Under this program, states receive annual capitalization grants to provide financial assistance (primarily subsidized loans) to public water systems for drinking water projects and other specified activities. Between FY1997 and FY2015, Congress had appropriated approximately $20 billion, and more than 12,400 projects had received assistance through the program.
The latest Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) survey of capital improvement needs indicates that public water systems need to invest $384.2 billion on infrastructure improvements over 20 years to ensure the provision of safe drinking water. EPA reports that, although all of the projects identified in the survey would promote the public health objectives of the SDWA, just $42.0 billion (10.9%) of reported needs are attributable to SDWA compliance. A study by the American Water Works Association estimates that restoring aging infrastructure and expanding water systems to keep up with population growth would require a nationwide investment of at least $1 trillion through 2035.
Key program issues include (1) the gap between estimated needs and funding, (2) the growing cost of complying with SDWA standards (particularly for small communities), (3) the ability of small or disadvantaged communities to afford DWSRF financing, and (4) the broader need for cities to maintain, upgrade, and expand infrastructure unrelated to SDWA compliance. Several overarching policy questions are under debate, including "What is the appropriate federal role in providing financial assistance for local water infrastructure projects?" and "What other funding mechanisms could supplement or replace a program reliant on annual appropriations?"
Enacted in 2014, the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA; P.L. 113-121, Title V, Subtitle C) authorized a five-year pilot loan guarantee program to promote increased development of, and private investment in, large water infrastructure projects. Congress noted that the pilot program is intended to complement, not replace, the drinking water SRF program and the similar Clean Water Act SRF program for wastewater infrastructure. For FY2017, President Obama requested $20.0 million for EPA to begin providing loan guarantees for water infrastructure projects under WIFIA. Congress provided this amount in P.L. 114-254, the Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act of 2017.
For FY2016, the President requested $1.19 billion for the DWSRF program, and Congress provided $863.2 million. For FY2017, President Obama requested $1.02 billion. The program has been funded under continuing resolutions at roughly FY2016 levels. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), includes $863.23 million for DWSRF capitalization grants for FY2017 and another $20 million for WIFIA. The President's FY2018 request includes $863 million for the DWSRF program and $20 million for the WIFIA program.
In the 114th Congress, the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322) made several revisions to the DWSRF program and authorized $100 million in DWSRF appropriations to Michigan to assist the city of Flint in repairing its drinking water infrastructure. In P.L. 114-254, Congress appropriated the funding authorized in the WIIN Act to assist Flint.
The state of the nation's water infrastructure and the challenges many communities face in addressing infrastructure needs continue to receive congressional attention. A number of bills have been introduced in the 115th Congress to revise and increase funding authority for the DWSRF program and to increase investment in water infrastructure through new approaches. |
crs_RL34066 | crs_RL34066_0 | The number of limited English proficient (LEP) students enrolled in K-12 education increased by 60.8% from the 1994-1995 school year to the 2004-2005 school year; total student enrollment increased by 2.6% over the same time period. Given this tremendous growth in the LEP student population and the likelihood that the 110 th Congress will consider legislation to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA; P.L. 107-110 ), this report examines the formula used to provide grants to states under the English Language Acquisition program, authorized by Title III of the ESEA. This program provides grants to states to help ensure that LEP and recent immigrant students attain proficiency in English. Much of the debate surrounding the reauthorization of this program has focused on the data used to determine how many LEP and immigrant students are in each state, as these data are the basis upon which grants are determined. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the American Community Survey (ACS) data currently used by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) to calculate these grants, as well as state-reported data that could potentially be used to calculate these grants. The third section of the report compares student counts based on ACS data and state data and examines differences in estimated FY2007 state grants if state data were used as the basis for determining the awards. The report concludes with an examination of some of the drawbacks of using either the ACS or state-reported data for determining state grants and other possible alternative strategies for calculating state grants. In practice, ED has been using the ACS data to make state allocations since FY2005. For example, FY2007 grants are based on the 2005 ACS data. State-Reported Immigrant Student Counts
Data sources for immigrant student counts are more limited than those available for LEP students. In addition or alternatively, developing a formula based on both the ACS data and the state-reported data could be considered, possibly averaging the student counts from each. | The number of limited English proficient (LEP) students enrolled in K-12 education increased by 60.8% from the 1994-1995 school year to the 2004-2005 school year, while total student enrollment increased by 2.6% over the same time period. Given this tremendous growth in the LEP student population and the likelihood that Congress will consider legislation to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA; P.L. 107-110), during the 110th Congress, this report examines the formula used to provide grants to states under the English Language Acquisition program, authorized by Title III of the ESEA. This program provides grants to states to help ensure that LEP and recent immigrant students attain proficiency in English. Much of the debate surrounding the reauthorization of this program has focused on the data used to determine how many LEP and immigrant students are in each state, as these data are the basis upon which grants are determined.
This report examines the American Community Survey (ACS) data that the U.S. Department of Education has used to calculate state grants since FY2005. It also analyzes state-reported data that could potentially be used to calculate these grants. Differences in LEP and immigrant student counts based on the different data sources are compared, revealing substantial differences in student counts for some states depending on the data source used. FY2007 grants are calculated using both the ACS and state-reported data to examine the potential differences in state grant amounts depending on the data source used. The differences in student counts that exist between the ACS and state-reported data are reflected in the differences in estimated state grant amounts, as some states would receive substantially more or less funding if state-reported data were used to calculate grants rather than the ACS data. Consideration is also given to the drawbacks of using either the ACS or state-reported data and possible alternative strategies for determining state grant awards (e.g., averaging the student counts from the ACS and state-reported data) are discussed.
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative action. |
crs_R45419 | crs_R45419_0 | Introduction
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is a federal social insurance program that provides monthly cash benefits to non-elderly disabled workers and their eligible dependents provided the worker paid into the system for a sufficient number of years and is determined to be unable to perform substantial work because of a qualifying disability. In the past three decades, the total number of disabled-worker beneficiaries continually increased from 2.7 million in 1985 to 9.0 million in 2014 and then started to decline to approximately 8.7 million in December 2017. Multiple factors have contributed to the change in the number of SSDI beneficiaries over time. Changes in the Demographic Characteristics of the Insured Population
The number of SSDI disabled-worker beneficiaries depends in part on the size of the working-age population who are disability insured—the workers who have paid into the Social Security system for a sufficient number of years. However, because the share of women in the workforce was no longer increasing and the baby boom generation (people born between 1946 and 1964) was aging out of the disability insurance program, the growth in the insured population slowed after 2007. Female Labor Force Participation
Some studies have shown that increased eligibility for the SSDI program and the rising incidence of disability among women played an important role in disability benefit receipt during the 1980s and the 1990s. Some experts attribute the increase in beneficiaries to increased labor force participation of women, which resulted in more women becoming potentially eligible for SSDI. During the same time, the incidence rate for men has been relatively steady after adjusting for the population age distribution and the business cycle. The Change in Age Distribution of the Population
Another factor that contributes to the trends in SSDI enrollment is the aging of the workforce. Some argue that as baby boomers reached their peak disability-claiming years (usually considered between age 50 and FRA), the number of disability beneficiaries rose, and as baby boomers convert from disability benefits to retirement benefits and are replaced by lower-birth-rate cohorts in the peak disability-receiving ages, the disability enrollment rates will likely fall. The effect of the ACA on SSDI enrollment is not yet clear. These phenomena are likely to result in a further increase in SSDI rolls and program spending. 1. The opportunities for employment make working more attractive than disability benefits for people who could qualify for SSDI. 2. The lower-birth-rate cohorts (people born after 1964) started to enter peak disability-claiming years (usually considered ages 50 to FRA) in 2015, replacing the larger baby boom population. 3. Availability of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) . The nationwide effect of the ACA on disability benefit receipt is still unclear. 4. Decline in the allowance rate . In addition to the factors contributing to a decline in SSDI applications and awards, some others may have the opposite effect of pushing disability benefit receipt upward. Some of those factors may include the increase in the FRA, the growth in applications from low-wage workers, and higher incidence rates among young applicants resulting from an expansion of SSDI eligibility rules. As the relatively large baby boomer population reaches its FRA (gradually increased from 65 to 66) between 2012 and 2031, there is expected to be a growing proportion of disabled workers who terminate disability benefits due to the attainment of FRA. The potential increase in the number of terminations may slow down due to the scheduled increase in the FRA from 66 to 67 between 2020 and 2027, which will result in fewer disabled workers exiting the SSDI program due to the attainment of FRA. Availability of the ACA . Some factors may work in the opposite direction to decrease disability terminations. | The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program pays cash benefits to non-elderly workers and their dependents provided that the workers have paid into the Social Security system for a sufficient number of years and are determined to be unable to continue performing substantial work because of a qualifying disability. The total number of disabled-worker beneficiaries was approximately 2.7 million in 1985, peaked at approximately 9.0 million in 2014, and then declined over the last three years by nearly 0.3 million. In December 2017, 8.7 million disabled workers received SSDI benefits.
Multiple factors have contributed to the growth in the SSDI enrollment between 1985 and 2014. Some of the main factors are (1) the increased eligibility and rising disability incidence among women, (2) the attainment of peak disability-claiming years (between age 50 and full retirement age) among baby boomers (people born between 1946 and 1964), (3) the increase in full retirement age (FRA) from 65 to 66, (4) fewer job opportunities during economic recessions, and (5) the legislative reform that expanded the eligibility standard in SSDI.
Some factors may have prolonged effects on SSDI benefit receipt. For example, the increase in the FRA from 65 to 66 has resulted in a larger proportion of SSDI beneficiaries who are ages 65 and older, and this proportion is likely to increase further as the FRA increases from 66 to 67 between 2020 and 2027. Another example is the consequence of the expansion in the eligibility criteria, which has resulted in more than half of the disabled-worker beneficiaries being enrolled into the program based on mental disorders or musculoskeletal disorders (typically back pain or arthritis). This trend is likely to persist in the future.
However, some of the effects on the growth in SSDI enrollment are likely to diminish over time. For example, the rise in labor force participation among women resulted in more women becoming eligible for SSDI benefits during the 1980s and the 1990s, but its positive effect on SSDI rolls became smaller as the female labor force participation rate stabilized and the disability incidence rate of women approached that of men.
In addition, some factors may have started to work in opposite directions. One example is the change in age distribution of the population. As the baby boomers reach their FRA (gradually increased from 65 to 66) between 2012 and 2031, there is expected to be a growing proportion of disabled workers who terminate disability benefits due to the attainment of FRA. About the same time, the lower-birth-rate cohorts (people born after 1964) started to enter peak disability-claiming years in 2015, which would likely reduce the size of the insured population between age 50 and the FRA and, consequently, result in a lower number of disability applications. Another example is the availability of more jobs during the post-Great Recession period. The increasing opportunity in employment may have made working more attractive than disability benefits for people who could qualify for SSDI, thus reducing the disability applications and awards after 2010. These factors are likely to contribute to a decline in the number of disabled-worker beneficiaries.
In addition to the change in the population age distribution and the availability of jobs in the market, some other factors may also be acting to decrease SSDI rolls in the recent three years. These factors are likely to include the prevalence of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the decline in the allowance rate (i.e., the share of applicants who are awarded disability benefits). The nationwide effects of the ACA on disability benefit receipt and the cause of the decreasing allowance rate are as yet unclear. |
crs_R44829 | crs_R44829_0 | The U.S. government offers two tax incentives for R&D investment: a tax credit under Section 41 of the federal tax code and the option to expense qualified research expenditures under Section 174. In light of these concerns with the Section 41 tax credit and uncertainty about the effectiveness of the Section 174 expensing option, some argue that a better way to spur increased domestic investment in innovation is to adopt a different kind of tax subsidy altogether; one that would target the profits from business R&D investments instead of the cost of inputs: a patent box (which is also known as an innovation or intellectual property (IP) box). This report looks at several aspects of patent boxes, including their general purpose. Existing patent boxes seek to promote one or more of the following aims: (1) increase tax revenues by luring IP income to a host country from abroad or keeping such income inside the host country, (2) prevent or stem a shrinkage in the host country's tax base from the transfer of intangible assets to other countries, (3) expand investment in innovation in a host country, and (4) stimulate growth in the number of well-paying jobs in a host country. R&D tax incentives basically come in two forms: (1) those that operate at the back-end of the innovation process by lowering the after-tax cost of key inputs into R&D such as direct labor and materials and (2) those that operate at the front-end of the process by lowering the tax burden on the returns to successful R&D investments. There are two basic options among the patent boxes now in use. Qualifying Intellectual Property
IP that qualifies for a patent box has several dimensions, which are illustrated in current patent boxes. Key Questions in Designing a Patent Box
Lawmakers interested in adopting a patent box might consider the following questions, which address a variety of significant issues in the design of such a tax incentive:
Should a patent box apply to income from patents only, or should it include income from other kinds of IP as well? Of the 16 countries that offered a patent box at the end of 2015, all but three were members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the ongoing debate over whether the United States should adopt a patent box, some lawmakers may find it useful to know which patent-box countries are among the leading locations for business R&D investment. Gross income is the basis for the patent box tax incentive in Switzerland and Belgium. Since investment in R&D is closely associated with the creation of patented innovations, it seems reasonable to assume that research-intensive industries, which are likely to benefit the most from research tax incentives like the Section 41 research tax credit and the Section 174 expensing allowance for research expenditures, would be likely to benefit the most from a patent box. A 2012 report by the Economic & Statistics Administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) identified the U.S. industries that are the most intensive users of patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Two industries are well-represented: chemicals (including pharmaceuticals) and electronic equipment (including computers). Under the terms of the Boustany-Neal proposal, the effective tax rate on qualified IP income held in the United States for a corporation taxed at a rate of 35% can be determined using the following formula: ETR = 0.35[(1 – 0.71) (SRD/STC)], where ETR is the effective tax rate, 0.71 is the share of each dollar of qualified IP profit that can be deducted from a company's total income, SRD refers to the sum of a company's total R&D expenditures in the five previous years, and STC denotes the sum of the company's total costs in the same period. Have Patent Boxes Been Effective? Some patent boxes are intended to achieve all three. Still, there is a small (but growing) body of empirical research on the actual or likely economic effects of patent boxes. In addition, they unexpectedly found that patent boxes tended to deter local inventive activity, perhaps because they offered no incentives for domestic companies to invest in the development of new technologies. Economic Rationale for a Patent Box
Another policy issue raised by a patent box is whether it can be justified on economic grounds. The failure arises because the average company investing in R&D is unlikely to capture all the returns to that investment, even if the R&D results in intangible assets with intellectual property protection. | Economists generally agree that government support for private investment in research and development (R&D) is useful in correcting a market failure that predisposes most companies to invest less for that purpose than the overall economic benefits from R&D investments would warrant. The market failure stems from a company's inability to capture all the returns to its R&D investments as a result of the spillover effects of successful R&D investments.
Most governments offer some kind of support for R&D, including tax incentives for business R&D investments. The U.S. government provides a tax credit for qualified research under Section 41 of the federal tax code and a full expensing allowance for qualified research expenditures under Section 174, but no patent box.
As part of the debate in Congress over reforming the federal income tax, some have expressed support for the adoption of a patent box. Such a box is a tax subsidy that applies to the returns to successful R&D investments. In effect, a patent box partially compensates companies for the returns that spill over to other actors, such as competing companies.
Countries typically adopt patent boxes with three key goals in mind: (1) increasing tax revenue by encouraging the repatriation of intellectual property (IP) held abroad and discouraging domestic companies from transferring IP to foreign subsidiaries in low-tax countries; (2) expanding domestic innovative activities; and (3) stimulating growth in domestic high-paying jobs.
Every patent box now in use is built around two key elements: the nature of the tax subsidy it offers and the scope of its application. The tax subsidy typically comes in two forms: a deduction or exemption from a company's gross income or a separate, preferential tax rate for qualified intellectual property (IP) income. A patent box's scope addresses such issues as the kinds of IP and IP-related income that qualify for the tax subsidy.
At the end of 2015, 16 countries offered a patent box; all but three of them were members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. Among the nine largest patent-box countries as a location for business R&D investment, effective patent-box tax rates ranged from 5.0% to 17.1%. Each patent box applied to existing and new patented innovations. Only one of the nine countries did not offer separate tax incentives for domestic R&D investment.
It stands to reason that the industries most likely to benefit from patent boxes are those that use patents intensively. According to a 2016 report by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the U. S. Department of Commerce, two industries are the most intensive users of patents, as measured by the number of patents granted to them per 1,000 full-time employees: chemical manufacturing (including pharmaceuticals) and computer and electronic equipment.
The prospect of the United States adopting a patent box raises several policy issues. One issue concerns the effectiveness of patent boxes in achieving their goals. The empirical literature on patent boxes is relatively meager, since most existing patent boxes have come into use since 2007. Nonetheless, a handful of academic studies have looked at the actual or probable effects of patent boxes on several indicators of success. They found that patent registration was responsive to cuts in tax rates on the income from patents; there is no evidence that patent boxes increase host-country revenues; and patent boxes have done little to boost investment in innovation in host countries.
Patent boxes also raise questions about the cost to companies of complying with the rules and the cost to tax authorities of issuing regulations and enforcing them; whether a patent box is warranted on economic grounds; and their incentive effect, especially when coupled with R&D tax incentives. |
crs_RL34373 | crs_RL34373_0 | Introduction
On January 29, 2008, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13,457, "Protecting American Taxpayers from Government Spending on Wasteful Earmarks." The order states that it is the policy of the federal government "to be judicious in the expenditure of taxpayer dollars." In order "[t]o ensure the proper use of taxpayer funds," the order provides that the number and cost of earmarks should be reduced, that their origin and purposes should be transparent, and that they should be included in the text of bills voted upon by Congress and presented to the President. For appropriations laws and other legislation enacted after the date of the order, it directs executive agencies not to commit, obligate, or expend funds on the basis of earmarks included in any non-statutory source, including requests in reports of committees of Congress or other congressional documents or communications on behalf of Members of Congress, or any other non-statutory source, except when required by law or when an agency itself has determined that a project, program, grant, or other transaction has merit under statutory criteria or other merit-based decision-making. An "earmark" in the executive order means
funds provided by Congress for projects, programs, or grants where the purported congressional direction (whether in statutory text, report language, or other communication) circumvents otherwise applicable merit-based or competitive allocation processes, or specifies the location or recipient, or otherwise curtails the ability of the executive branch to manage its statutory and constitutional responsibilities pertaining to the funds allocation process. Presidential Authority to Issue Executive Orders and Their Legal Effect
There is a long tradition of congressional inclusion of, and agency compliance with, spending directives that are delineated in committee report language or in joint explanatory statements issued by conference committees. If applied rigorously, the provisions of Executive Order 13,457 could significantly alter this traditional dynamic, raising questions regarding the President's authority to control executive branch activity in this context via executive order. | On January 29, 2008, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13,457, "Protecting American Taxpayers from Government Spending on Wasteful Earmarks." The order states that it is the policy of the federal government "to be judicious in the expenditure of taxpayer dollars." In order "[t]o ensure the proper use of taxpayer funds," the order provides that the number and cost of earmarks should be reduced, that their origin and purposes should be transparent; and that they should be included in the text of bills voted upon by Congress and presented to the President. For appropriations laws and other legislation enacted after the date of the order, it directs executive agencies not to commit, obligate, or expend funds on the basis of earmarks included in any non-statutory source, including requests in reports of committees of Congress or other congressional documents or communications on behalf of Members of Congress, or any other non-statutory source, except when required by law or when an agency itself has determined that a project, program, grant, or other transaction has merit under statutory criteria or other merit-based decision-making.
In the context of the order, an "earmark" is defined as any
funds provided by Congress for projects, programs, or grants where the purported congressional direction (whether in statutory text, report language, or other communication) circumvents otherwise applicable merit-based or competitive allocation processes, or specifies the location or recipient, or otherwise curtails the ability of the executive branch to manage its statutory and constitutional responsibilities pertaining to the funds allocation process.
There is a long tradition of congressional inclusion of, and agency compliance with, spending directives that are delineated in committee report language or in joint explanatory statements issued by conference committees. If applied rigorously, the provisions of Executive Order 13,457 could significantly alter this traditional dynamic. Accordingly, this report provides an overview of the provisions of the order; addresses questions that have arisen regarding both the President's authority to control executive branch activity in this context and the effect of non-statutory congressional spending directives; and considers and evaluates potential congressional responses to the executive order. The report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40202 | crs_R40202_0 | Proposals for a New Direction
Nevada's Yucca Mountain has been the sole candidate site for the nation's first permanent high-level nuclear waste repository since Congress singled it out in 1987 and halted consideration of any other location. After numerous delays, the Department of Energy (DOE), which was supposed to open a waste repository by 1998, submitted a repository license application for Yucca Mountain to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in June 2008. If NRC approves the license, DOE hopes to begin shipping nuclear waste to the repository by 2020. But Administration support for Yucca Mountain will apparently change under President Obama. In their campaign statement on nuclear energy policy, Obama and Vice President Biden laid out the following position:
In terms of waste storage, Barack Obama and Joe Biden do not believe that Yucca Mountain is a suitable site. Would spent nuclear fuel and other highly radioactive waste remain at commercial reactors and other existing nuclear facilities, or would it be moved to centralized interim storage? However, the material for nuclear fuel that results from reprocessing (primarily plutonium) can also be used for nuclear explosives, raising concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. Under DOE's current schedule, about 400 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel would be shipped to Yucca Mountain from reactor sites in 2020. No such repository is currently authorized. NWPA sections 113-116 prescribed the following actions by the Secretary of Energy, the President, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission toward developing a nuclear waste repository at the Yucca Mountain site:
The Secretary was to determine whether the site would be suitable for a repository, and, if so, notify the State of Nevada and recommend that the President approve the project. But the President has a variety of tools at his disposal that could dramatically affect the nuclear waste program. Reduce Appropriations
Restricting funding for the Yucca Mountain Project could be another approach. Consequences of a Yucca Mountain Policy Shift
A decision by the incoming Administration to halt or delay development of the Yucca Mountain repository could have significant impact on the federal budget, proposed new U.S. nuclear power plants, waste storage at existing reactor sites, and disposal of defense-related nuclear waste. NRC established a policy in 1977 that it "would not continue to license reactors if it did not have reasonable confidence that the wastes can and will in due course be disposed of safely." With DOE now planning to open Yucca Mountain by 2020 at the earliest, NRC is proposing a further revision to find reasonable assurance that a repository will be available within 50-60 years after a reactor's licensed operating life and that spent fuel can be stored safely for at least 60 years after a reactor's licensed life. Although the NRC's latest proposed revision would allow for decades of further slippage in the Yucca Mountain schedule, it is not clear that NRC's waste-related criteria for licensing new reactors would be satisfied if the Yucca Mountain project were canceled without an alternative plan in place. Nuclear Waste Policy Options
Because NWPA specifies that only Yucca Mountain may be considered for a repository site and that a federal storage facility cannot open before the repository is licensed, the government's waste management options are sharply limited under current law. Whether a private entity should take permanent title to all nuclear waste could also be an issue. Numerous bills have been introduced over the years to require DOE to take over all responsibility for storing spent fuel at reactor sites, including ownership of the waste and on-site storage facilities (such as S. 784 in the 110 th Congress). Numerous legislative efforts have been mounted since the mid-1990s to establish central interim storage capacity without the MRS restrictions, but without success. Such agreements could not take effect without being enacted into law, however. The controversial nature of siting nuclear waste facilities increases the likelihood that alternatives to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository would leave waste at existing storage sites longer than under the current program schedule. Although NRC has determined that waste can be stored safely at reactor sites for many decades, the licensing of new plants could be affected by the lack of a definite disposal plan. | Congress designated Yucca Mountain, NV, as the nation's sole candidate site for a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository in 1987, following years of controversy over the site-selection process. Over the strenuous objections of the State of Nevada, the Department of Energy (DOE) submitted a license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in June 2008 to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). During the 2008 election campaign, now-President Obama lent support to Nevada's fight against the repository, contending in an issue statement that he and now-Vice President Biden "do not believe that Yucca Mountain is a suitable site."
Under the current nuclear waste program, DOE hopes to begin transporting spent nuclear fuel and other highly radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain by 2020. That schedule is 22 years beyond the 1998 deadline established by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). Because U.S. nuclear power plants will continue to generate nuclear waste after a repository opens, DOE estimates that all waste could not be removed from existing reactors until about 2066 even under the current Yucca Mountain schedule. Not all the projected waste could be disposed of at Yucca Mountain, however, unless NWPA's current limit on the repository's capacity is increased.
If the Obama Administration decides to halt the Yucca Mountain project, it has a variety of tools available to implement that policy. Although the President cannot directly affect NRC proceedings, the Secretary of Energy could withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application under NRC rules. The President could also urge Congress to cut or eliminate funding for the Yucca Mountain project, and propose legislation to restructure the nuclear waste program.
Abandonment of Yucca Mountain would probably further delay the federal government's removal of nuclear waste from reactor sites and therefore increase the government's liabilities for missing the NWPA deadline. DOE estimates that such liabilities will reach $11 billion even if Yucca Mountain opens as currently planned. DOE's agreements with states to remove defense-related high-level waste could also be affected. If the Yucca Mountain project were halted without a clear alternative path for waste management, the licensing of proposed new nuclear power plants could be affected as well. NRC has determined that waste can be safely stored at reactor sites for at least 30 years after a reactor shuts down and is proposing to extend that period to 60 years. While that proposal would allow at least 100 years for waste to remain at reactor sites (including a 40-year reactor operating period), NRC's policy is that new reactors should not be licensed without "reasonable confidence that the wastes can and will in due course be disposed of safely."
Current law provides no alternative repository site to Yucca Mountain, and it does not authorize DOE to open temporary storage facilities without a permanent repository in operation. Without congressional action, therefore, the default alternative to Yucca Mountain would be indefinite on-site storage of nuclear waste at reactor sites and other nuclear facilities. Private central storage facilities can also be licensed under current law; such a facility has been licensed in Utah but its operation has been blocked by the Department of the Interior.
Congress has considered legislation repeatedly since the mid-1990s to authorize a federal interim storage facility for nuclear waste but none has been enacted. Reprocessing of spent fuel could reduce waste volumes and long-term toxicity, but such facilities are costly and raise concerns about the separation of plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons. Storage and reprocessing would still eventually require a permanent repository, and a search for a new repository site would need to avoid the obstacles that have hampered previous U.S. efforts. |
crs_R43618 | crs_R43618_0 | However, the fleet has aged with some current models being flown by aircrew younger than the aircraft they are flying. As the fleet ages, management issues arise with reduced reliability, obsolescence and reduced parts availability, and changing aviation rules that impact availability of airspace due to obsolete avionics capabilities. Over the past 57 years, several models of the C-130 were built and delivered to the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, with the C-130J model being the most recent. The FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act provided guidance on recapitalizing a portion of the C-130 fleet, but a significant number of aircraft may still need to be replaced, modernized or retired to maintain the desired capabilities. Recapitalizing refers to replacing older model aircraft with new production aircraft. As Congress shapes the tactical airlift fleet of the future, there may also be decisions regarding force structure or infrastructure that may impact C-130 basing. In his most recent overarching guidance to the Department of Defense, President Obama outlined several guiding principles of force and program development to ensure mission success:
maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of missions; differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred; maintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce our overall capacity; reduce the "cost of doing business;" examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements best suited to the strategy; and make every effort in adjusting U.S. strategy and attendant force size to maintain both an adequate industrial base and investment in science and technology. An issue for Congress is whether these levels should be authorized. A significant issue in the current C-130 fleet is age of the C-130H models. The goal of this approach is to reduce total life cycle costs by leveraging existing modernization programs and proven technology. A major modification currently being accomplished on the C-130 fleet to extend the service life is the replacement of the center wing box, a critical fatigue component of the C-130 fleet due to the stresses of flying missions over such a long period of time. Since then, over 200 aircraft have been delivered to the U.S. Government. A major consideration when adjusting the fleet size or mix is the resultant Active, Guard, and Reserve mix. Air Force Basing
C-130 basing has been a contentious issue. The issue for Congress is how to provide oversight and appropriations for this aging fleet and maintain the desired capabilities into the future. Continue to Recapitalize the C-130 Fleet at the Current Level
The ability to rapidly deploy and sustain military capabilities throughout the world in support of U.S. national interests will likely be a key aspect of U.S. strategy well into the future. With a significant portion of this fleet in the Reserve Component there are considerable interests at state with adjusting force structure. (a) AUTHORITY FOR MULTI-YEAR PROCUREMENT.-Subject to section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, The Secretary of the Air Force may enter into one or more Multi-year contracts, beginning with the fiscal year 2014 program year, for the procurement of C-130J aircraft for the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy. (h) TACTICAL AIRLIFT FLEET OF THE AIR FORCE.-
(1) CONSIDERATION OF UPGRADES OF CERTAIN AIRCRAFT IN RECAPITALIZATION OF FLEET.-The Secretary of the Air Force shall consider, as part of the recapitalization of the tactical airlift fleet of the Air Force, upgrades to C-130H aircraft designed to help such aircraft meet the fuel efficiency goals of the Department of the Air Force and retention of such aircraft, as so upgraded, in the tactical airlift fleet. | The United States primary tactical airlift aircraft is the C-130. Nicknamed the Hercules, this venerable aircraft has been the workhorse of U.S. tactical airlift for the past 57 years. The majority of C-130s in the U.S. government are assigned to the U.S. Air Force, but the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard also operate sizeable C-130 fleets. The potential concerns for Congress include oversight of and appropriations for an aging C-130 fleet.
As the C-130 fleet ages, management issues arise with reduced reliability, obsolescence and reduced parts availability, and changing aviation rules that impact the C-130's ability to operate worldwide. The C-130 program recently passed a major milestone; the FY2013 NDAA authorized the Secretary of the Air Force to enter into one or more multi-year contracts for the procurement of C-130J aircraft for the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy. This was a significant step toward recapitalizing a portion of the fleet. As Congress decides the future of the tactical airlift fleet, a significant decision is whether or not to continue recapitalizing the fleet with new aircraft. This issue is fueled by several factors, including aircraft life cycles, cost, basing strategy, strategic guidance, the industrial base, and the desired capabilities mix. With these factors in mind, the services have committed to recapitalize a large portion of the C-130 fleet. However, at current production rates, there will still be aircraft in the fleet much older than the crews that fly them well into the future.
A common strategy to extend the life of an aircraft fleet is to modernize the current airframes with new components. This strategy attempts to combat issues that plague an aging fleet such as diminishing reliability, antiquated avionics, and capabilities that no longer meet current requirements. The cost of modernization is commonly the driving factor behind these efforts. Analyzing the return on investment of modernizing components on aging aircraft versus recapitalizing the fleet to gain new capabilities will inform these decisions. Congress is currently faced with deciding the future of several modernization efforts being considered for the C-130 fleet.
Circumstances that arise due to the changing nature of the global environment may drive decisions by Congress to reduce the size of the fleet by divesting some aircraft. With the current drawdown of U.S. military forces, perhaps the desired future capability can be met with fewer aircraft. Divesting aircraft from a fleet involves a detailed analysis of the capabilities that remain in the desired end-state fleet. Ideally, the required capabilities to meet strategic guidance still reside within the system as a whole when aircraft are retired. The mix of Active and Reserve forces that remain after drawing down a fleet may also be a significant concern. This mix of Active, Guard, and Reserve forces may also lead to decisions regarding force structure. Adjustments to force structure within the Guard and Reserve have been a contentious issue in the past and will require congressional oversight and approval. |
crs_RL34126 | crs_RL34126_0 | Since 1973, omnibus farm bills have included a rural development title. The most recent is Title VI of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. The trends noted above suggest a range of issues that are important in shaping the provisions of the rural development title of the 2008:
Conservation and environmental restoration as rural employment opportunities; Stemming rural population out-migration; Vertical integration and coordination of agriculture into supply networks and their implication for rural areas; Developing rural entrepreneurial capacity; Rebuilding an aging rural physical infrastructure; Public service delivery innovations in sparsely populated areas; Increasing suburbanization and the conflicts between agriculture and suburban development; Human capital deficiencies in rural areas; Regional-based efforts for economic development. Connecting businesses and rural communities with broadband telecommunications infrastructure
The rural development title of the 2008 farm bill has taken shape against this backdrop of shifts in the rural economy, widespread and long-term poverty in some rural areas, outmigration in other rural areas, dwindling economic opportunity in rural areas, gaps in critical infrastructure, and a growing appreciation in many quarters of the limits of existing rural development programs to respond to the great diversity of rural places and socioeconomic circumstances. Three agencies are responsible for USDA's rural development mission area: the Rural Housing Service (RHS), the Rural Business-Cooperative Service (RBS), and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS). It is important to note that most loan and grant programs administered by USDA Rural Development are funded through annual (discretionary) appropriations. The 1996 farm bill ( P.L. The 2002 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246)
New Provisions
Several programs authorized in the 2002 farm bill are reauthorized in the two bills. 110-246 contain only three programs with mandatory funding: Value-Added Product Grants ($15 million); the Microenterprise Assistance Program ($15 million); and a one-time funding of pending water and waste water projects ($120 million). Several programs that were authorized to receive mandatory funding in the 2002 farm bill were reauthorized in P.L. 110-246 with discretionary funding (e.g., the Rural Strategic Investment Program and the Rural Firefighters and Emergency Medical Personnel Program). Section 6018 directs the Secretary to assess the varying definitions of "rural" used by USDA and to describe the effects these different definitions have on USDA Rural Development programs. Section 6018 further establishes a new definition of "areas rural in character" that specifies the characteristics of eligible rural areas lying within a Bureau of the Census-defined "urban area." Other Major Provisions
In addition to these newly authorized programs, the rural development title also includes other provisions to create or to reauthorize and/or amend a wide variety of loan and grant programs that provide further assistance in four key areas: (1) broadband and telecommunications, (2) rural utilities infrastructure, (3) business and community development, and (4) regional development. The provision will also emphasize library connectivity as an objective of program funding. Section 6006 reauthorizes the Rural Water and Wastewater Circuit Rider Program , which provides technical assistance to rural water systems. Section 6009 reauthorizes Water Systems for Rural and Native Villages in Alaska. Section 6007 reauthorize Tribal College and University Essential Community Facilities through 2012. Section 6202 reauthorizes the Value-Added Agricultural Market Development Program . An additional $40 million annually (FY2008-FY2012) in discretionary funding is also authorized. Section 6027 reauthorizes the Rural Business Investment Program through 2012. This program was authorized in the 2002 farm bill and given mandatory spending. Appendix. Side-by-Side Comparison of Rural Development Provisions in the House- and Senate-Passed Farm Bills with the 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills | Congress has expressed its concern with rural communities most directly through periodic omnibus farm bill legislation, most recently in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246). Congress uses periodic farm bills to address emerging rural issues as well as to reauthorize and/or amend a wide range of rural programs administered by USDA's three rural development mission agencies: Rural Housing Service, Rural Business-Cooperative Service, and Rural Utilities Service.
Title VI addresses a wide range of policy issues concerning rural America. In the 2002 farm bill, these issues included provisions such as equity capital development in rural areas, regional economic planning and development, essential community facilities, infrastructure needs, value-added agricultural development, and broadband telecommunications development. The 2008 farm bill considers similar issues and addresses several new ones. The new farm bill expands broadband access in rural areas, creates a new micro-entrepreneurial assistance program and a new rural collaborative investment program, and authorizes three new regional economic development commissions. The bill also authorizes $120 million for a one-time funding of pending water and wastewater infrastructure projects.
Several programs authorized with mandatory spending in the 2002 farm bill are reauthorized with discretionary funding in the new farm bill (Rural Firefighters and Emergency Personnel, Rural Strategic Investment Program, Rural Business Investment Program, and the Access to Broadband Services in Rural Areas). The Value-Added Grants Program, similarly authorized in the 2002 farm bill, is also reauthorized by P.L. 110-246 with $15 million of mandatory funding and $40 million of discretionary funding. A side-by-side comparison of House- and Senate-passed provisions and the 2002 and 2008 farm bills is provided at the end of the report in the Appendix.
The 2008 farm bill modifies the 2002 definition of "rural" to include "areas rural in character." This modification in the definition of "rural" establishes criteria for defining rural areas contiguous to urban areas. The bill further directs the Secretary of Agriculture to produce a report within two years on the various definitions of "rural" used by USDA in providing assistance. The report will also assess the impacts these various definitions have on the delivery of rural development programs with the objective of better targeting assistance where it is most needed.
The 2008 farm bill also reauthorizes and/or amends through FY2012 many long-standing programs funded through annual appropriations—water and waste disposal grants, technical assistance for rural water systems, emergency community water assistance, business opportunity grants, water assistance to Native villages in Alaska, community facilities for Tribal colleges, distance learning and telemedicine.
This report will be updated. |
crs_RS21988 | crs_RS21988_0 | Among these challenges are the management and disposal of radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at sites in three states: Hanford in Washington, Savannah River in South Carolina, and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Some of these tanks are deteriorating and are known or suspected to have leaked, contaminating soil and groundwater. How to decommission (i.e., close) the tanks in a cost-effective and timely manner that mitigates environmental risk and potential exposure of workers has been the subject of controversy. Potentially affected states and environmental organizations raised questions regarding how much waste would be left in the tanks and whether the grout would thoroughly mix with the residual waste to solidify and contain it safely. Waste Disposal Authority in P.L. After considerable debate, the 108 th Congress included provisions in Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for FY2005 ( P.L. 108-375 ) authorizing DOE to classify some of the tank waste in South Carolina and Idaho as incidental to reprocessing and to grout it in place. Congress did not provide this authority in Washington State, where most of the leaking tanks are located. 108-375 follows. The NAS acknowledged that using a cement grout is likely the most effective method currently available to immobilize the waste left in the tanks after all retrievable waste is removed, but noted that the long-term performance of the grout to safely contain the waste left in the tanks is uncertain and necessitates further research. | How to safely dispose of wastes from producing nuclear weapons has been an ongoing issue. The most radioactive portion of these wastes is stored in underground tanks at Department of Energy (DOE) sites in Idaho, South Carolina, and Washington State. There have been concerns about soil and groundwater contamination from some of the tanks that have leaked. DOE proposed to remove the "pumpable" liquid waste, classify the sludge-like remainder as "waste incidental to reprocessing," and seal it in the tanks with a cement grout. DOE has argued that closing the tanks in this manner would be a cost-effective and timely way to address environmental risks. Questions were raised as to how much waste would be left in the tanks and whether the grout would contain the waste and prevent leaks. After considerable debate, the 108th Congress included provisions in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for FY2005 (P.L. 108-375) authorizing DOE to grout some of the waste in the tanks in Idaho and South Carolina. Congress did not provide such authority in Washington State. This report provides background information on the disposal of radioactive tank waste, analyzes the waste disposal authority in P.L. 108-375, discusses the implementation of this authority, and examines relevant issues. |
crs_R41255 | crs_R41255_0 | Two separate bills are advancing in the 111 th Congress that together could provide nearly $4 billion of supplemental funds for agricultural programs. Table 1 shows the agriculture-related provisions in these bills— H.R. 4213 , commonly known as the "tax extenders" bill; and H.R. 4899 , a supplemental appropriations bill for war spending and disaster response. 4213 ) would provide comparatively large amounts totaling up to $3.6 billion for agriculture-related programs. Both the House and Senate have passed versions of the bill. The House-passed version from May 28, 2010, includes $1.48 billion for agricultural disaster assistance, $1.15 billion for a settlement of the Pigford lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for past racial discrimination, $868 million to extend biodiesel tax credits for one year, and $190 million to extend a conservation tax deduction for one year. The Senate-passed version from March 10, 2010, does not contain funding for the Pigford settlement, but does include the other provisions, which total $2.5 billion. 4899 ), would provide smaller appropriations for other agricultural programs, as well as rescind prior appropriations from various agricultural accounts. The House and Senate are trading amendments to reconcile difference between each chamber's version of the bill. The most recent House-passed version, from July 1, 2010, contains $1.4 billion for agriculture before rescissions, including $1.15 billion for the Pigford settlement (duplicated from H.R. 4213 because of procedural uncertainty about whether Pigford will remain in the tax extenders bill), $150 million for P.L. 480 Food for Peace, $50 million for The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), $32 million for the farm loan program to support an additional $950 million of loans, $18 million for emergency forest restoration, and additional authorities to raise fees for the Section 502 rural housing loan guarantee program. The Senate-passed version from May 27, 2010, contains $200 million for agriculture before rescissions, including identical provisions for the loan programs and forestry, but does not have the Pigford or TEFAP funding. Rescissions from agriculture programs are significant in the most recent House-passed version of H.R. 4899 , totaling $1.0 billion. The House bill would rescind $487 million from reserve funds for the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), $422 million from rural development (including $300 million of rural broadband funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), and $70 million from unobligated balances from the Natural Resources Conservation Service. Both the House and Senate bills would offset $50 million by limiting mandatory outlays for the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP). Both bills await further floor action to resolve differences between the chambers. During Senate consideration of amendments to the House version during June, there was difficulty reaching agreement over the budget impact of the bill, and a desire for more offsets rather than emergency spending. Agriculture in the Supplemental Appropriations Bill (H.R. | Two separate bills are advancing in the 111th Congress that could provide nearly $4 billion of supplemental funds for agricultural programs in FY2010. The agricultural provisions in these bills have a relatively small funding impact compared with the nonagricultural provisions in the bills.
H.R. 4213 (commonly known as the "tax extenders" bill) would provide up to $3.6 billion for agriculture-related programs. The House and Senate are trading amendments to reconcile differences between each chamber's version of the bill. The most recent House-passed version from May 28, 2010, includes $1.48 billion for agricultural disaster assistance, $1.15 billion for a settlement of the Pigford lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and $1.06 billion to extend tax provisions for biodiesel and conservation. The Senate-passed version from March 10, 2010, does not contain funding for the Pigford settlement, but does include the other provisions. Difficulty reaching agreement over the budget impact of the bill, and the need for offsets rather than emergency spending, may be jeopardizing the prospects that some of the agriculture provisions will remain in the bill.
H.R. 4899 (a supplemental appropriations bill for war spending and disaster response) would provide relatively smaller appropriations for other agricultural programs, as well as rescind prior appropriations from various agricultural accounts. The House and Senate are trading amendments to reconcile difference between each chamber's version of the bill. The most recent House-passed version from July 1, 2010, contains $1.4 billion for agriculture before rescissions, including $1.15 billion for the Pigford settlement (duplicated from H.R. 4213 because of procedural uncertainty), $150 million for international food aid (P.L. 480 Food for Peace), $50 million for food purchases in a domestic nutrition assistance program (The Emergency Food Assistance Program, TEFAP), $32 million for the farm loan program (to support an additional $950 million of loans), $18 million for emergency forest restoration, and additional authorities to raise fees for the Section 502 rural housing loan guarantee program. The Senate-passed version from May 27, 2010, contains $200 million for agriculture before rescissions, including identical provisions for the loan programs and forestry, but does not have the Pigford or TEFAP funding.
Rescissions from agriculture programs are significant in the most recent House-passed version of H.R. 4899, totaling $1.0 billion, and are much larger than in the Senate-passed bill. The House bill from July 1 would rescind $487 million from reserve funds for the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), $422 million from rural development (including $300 million of rural broadband funding), and $70 million from unobligated balances from the Natural Resources Conservation Service. Both the House and Senate bills would offset $50 million by limiting mandatory outlays for the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP).
Both H.R. 4213 and H.R. 4899 await further floor action to resolve differences between the chambers. |
crs_R45297 | crs_R45297_0 | R eports of alien minors being separated from their parents at the U.S. border—either when they have presented themselves at a port of entry to claim asylum or when they have been apprehended by authorities after unlawfully entering between ports of entry —have raised questions about the authority of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain families together pending removal proceedings. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not provide a specific framework for the detention of alien families during the removal process. Much of the governing law stems from a binding, 20-year-old settlement agreement ( Flores Settlement) between the federal government and parties challenging the detention of alien minors, which the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered in a case now called Flores v. Sessions . The Flores Settlement establishes a policy favoring the release of alien minors, including alien minors accompanied by an alien parent, from immigration detention and requires that those alien minors who are not released from government custody be transferred within a brief period to non-secure, state-licensed facilities. According to DHS, few if any such state-licensed facilities capable of holding minors and adults together exist. The executive order also directed Attorney General Sessions to ask the district court overseeing the Flores Settlement to modify the agreement to allow the government to detain alien families together throughout the duration of the family's immigration proceedings as well as the pendency of any criminal proceedings for unlawful entry into the United States. However, on September 7, 2018, DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the primary agency responsible for the care and custody of unaccompanied alien minors, published a notice of proposed rulemaking, which, once finalized, w ould allow DHS to detain families together until immigration proceedings were completed. The proposed regulations would create an alternative federal licensing scheme for family residential centers that purports to mimic the standards for the detention of minors set forth in the Flores Settlement, which mandates the use of state-licensed facilities only. In particular, the report addresses (1) the background of the Flores litigation, (2) how the Flores Settlement restricts DHS's power to keep families in civil immigration detention, (3) the relationship between the Ms. L. litigation and the Flores Settlement, (4) the executive branch's policy options for detaining or releasing family units apprehended at or near the U.S. border under the Flores Settlement, (5) the September 7, 2018, notice of proposed rulemaking purporting to implement the terms of the Flores Settlement, and (6) the extent to which either the executive branch or Congress can override or modify the terms of the Flores Settlement. Aliens who demonstrate such a fear are referred to standard removal proceedings in immigration court for further consideration of their claims for asylum or other relief. These modifications would allow DHS to detain accompanied alien minors with their families in ICE family detention centers for more than brief periods without violating the Flores Settlement. The government has filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. More generally, it might be argued that the proposed regulations replace Flores 's general policy favoring release of minors with a policy that favors maintaining family unity, even if that requires detaining minors for longer periods in a family residential center. | Reports of alien minors being separated from their parents at the U.S. border have raised questions about the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) authority to detain alien families together pending the aliens' removal proceedings, which may include consideration of claims for asylum and other forms of relief from removal.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes—and in some case requires—DHS to detain aliens pending removal proceedings. However, neither the INA nor other federal laws specifically address when or whether alien family members must be detained together. DHS's options regarding the detention or release of alien families are significantly restricted by a binding settlement agreement from a case in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California now called Flores v. Sessions. The "Flores Settlement" establishes a policy favoring the release of alien minors, including accompanied alien minors, and requires that those alien minors who are not released from government custody be transferred within a brief period to non-secure, state-licensed facilities. DHS indicates that few such facilities exist that can house adults and children together. Accordingly, under the Flores Settlement and current circumstances, DHS asserts that it generally cannot detain alien children and their parents together for more than brief periods.
Following an executive order President Trump issued that addressed alien family separation, the Department of Justice filed a motion to modify the Flores Settlement to allow for the detention of alien families in unlicensed facilities for longer periods. The district court overseeing the settlement rejected that motion, much as it has rejected similar motions to modify the settlement filed by the government in recent years. (The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the earlier rulings but has not yet reviewed the most recent ruling.) In its most recent motion, the government has argued, among other things, that a preliminary injunction entered in a separate litigation, Ms. L v. ICE, which generally requires the government to reunite separated alien families and refrain from separating families going forward, supports a modification of the Flores Settlement to allow indefinite detention of alien minors alongside their parents.
On a separate track, DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have announced that they intend to seek termination of the Flores Settlement through the promulgation of new regulations that, according to the agencies, would adopt the substantive terms of the agreement with certain modifications. Significantly, the proposed regulations would allow DHS to detain families together until immigration proceedings were completed by creating an alternative federal licensing scheme for family residential centers. That federal scheme would impose facility standards that purport to mimic the standards set forth in the Flores Settlement, which calls for the exclusive use of state-licensed facilities for the detention of minors. A legal dispute seems likely to arise over whether the proposed regulations adequately implement the Flores Settlement, including whether the regulations are consistent with the agreement's general policy favoring the release of minors from immigration custody.
Congress, for its part, could largely override the Flores Settlement legislatively, although constitutional considerations relating to the rights of aliens in immigration custody may inform the permissible scope and effect of such legislation. |
crs_R42955 | crs_R42955_0 | OHV use in the parks has been particularly contentious, although NPS has fewer lands open to OHVs than do other federal land management agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service (FS). 819 , H.R. 2954 , and S. 486 , all of which would change regulations for OHVs at Cape Hatteras National Seashore; and H.R. ATVs and Oversand Vehicles15
Excluding Alaska, 13 NPS units allow off-road use of ATVs, four-wheel drive vehicles, and/or dune, sand, and swamp buggies by the general public. NPS is in the process of issuing special regulations to designate routes and areas for off-road use in those units that permit ATVs and oversand vehicles. The extent of unauthorized OHV use in the National Park System is unclear. Snowmobiles45
Proposals to regulate recreational snowmobile use in NPS units have been controversial, with debate often mirroring the preservation/use conflict within the NPS mission. Site-Specific Conflict: Yellowstone National Park
Since 2000, regulatory and judicial actions to restrict or allow snowmobile use have been park-specific, centering on Yellowstone National Park and units near it, including the John D. Rockefeller Jr. Memorial Parkway and Grand Teton National Park. Both plans, as well as most subsequent revisions, were vacated by different federal courts. The regulations allow up to 110 transportation events per day, defined as the use of one snowcoach or one group of an average of seven snowmobiles. Some snowmobile user groups, as well as some environmental groups, have also expressed support for the plan. Aircraft overflights are also a concern for other park units. Site-Specific Conflict: Grand Canyon National Park
Several actions have been taken to achieve the substantial restoration of natural quiet at Grand Canyon in furtherance of P.L. Third, the FAA issued a final rule establishing a standard for quiet technology for certain aircraft in commercial air tour operations over Grand Canyon. NPS is continuing to assess the provisions to determine how they will affect its planning effort. 112-141 , which contains provisions on air tour management at Grand Canyon. The 112 th Congress enacted broad aviation legislation with provisions affecting commercial air tours over park units generally ( P.L. 112-95 ). The provisions seek to expedite and streamline agency actions, in part because of the slow progress in completing ATMPs. Another provision of P.L. Subsequently, P.L. Recent controversies have focused on regulatory actions that would restrict recreational use of or access for these vehicles, often in specific park units. The court ordered NPS to re-evaluate environmental assessments justifying PWC use, but did not vacate or overturn the current rules allowing them. General NPS Rule
On July 6, 2012, NPS finalized a rule broadly addressing mountain bicycles within NPS units. Site-Specific Actions
Currently, more than 40 NPS units allow mountain biking on dirt trails and/or dirt roads. Conclusion
Motorized recreation on NPS lands sometimes brings into conflict the two parts of the NPS mission: to conserve public land while at the same time providing for its enjoyment by the public. In NPS units that permit ATVs; dune, sand, or swamp buggies; snowmobiles; aircraft overflights; personal watercraft; and/or mountain bikes, the desire for access to these recreational opportunities has clashed with concerns about resource damage and disturbance of non-motorized pursuits. NPS's laws, regulations, and policies generally emphasize the conservation of park resources in conservation/use conflicts, and NPS has fewer lands open to off-highway vehicles than do other federal land management agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service. The 113 th Congress has addressed motorized recreation in the National Park System through legislation and oversight. | In managing its lands, the National Park Service (NPS) seeks to balance a dual statutory mission of preserving natural resources while providing for their enjoyment by the public. Motorized recreation on NPS lands sometimes brings the two parts of this mission into conflict. Off-highway vehicles (OHVs) have been particularly controversial, with calls for greater recreational access intersecting with concerns about environmental impacts and disturbance of quieter pursuits. NPS's laws, regulations, and policies generally emphasize the conservation of park resources in conservation/use conflicts, and NPS has fewer lands open to OHV use than do other federal land management agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service. The 113th Congress has addressed motorized recreation through legislation and oversight, concerning broad issues such as recreational access to federal lands as well as individual conflicts at specific NPS units.
ATVs and Oversand Vehicles. Only 13 of the 401 park units are open to public recreational use of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), four-wheel drive vehicles, and/or dune, sand, and swamp buggies. The extent of unauthorized use of such vehicles is in dispute. Several units have developed pilot education and deterrence programs to address unauthorized use. Legislative measures in the 113th Congress (H.R. 819, H.R. 2954, S. 486) seek to regulate OHV use at one NPS site, Cape Hatteras National Seashore.
Snowmobiles. Regulatory and judicial actions to allow or restrict snowmobile use have focused primarily on three Yellowstone-area park units. Winter use plans developed by NPS to establish numerical limits on snowmobile and snowcoach entries have been the subject of repeated, and often conflicting, court challenges. Most recently, NPS issued a final rule governing snowmobile use at Yellowstone for the 2014-2015 winter season and beyond. The rule allows up to 110 "transportation events" per day (defined as the use of either a multipassenger snowcoach or a group of snowmobiles).
Aircraft Overflights. Grand Canyon National Park is at the center of a conflict over whether or how to limit air tours over national park units to reduce noise. NPS and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) continue to work to implement a 1987 law (P.L. 100-91) that sought to reduce noise at Grand Canyon, and a 2000 law (P.L. 106-181) that regulates overflights at other park units. P.L. 112-141, enacted in 2012, contains provisions on air tour management at Grand Canyon, including some less-stringent standards for natural quiet than NPS had recommended in planning efforts. P.L. 112-95 contains provisions to expedite and streamline agency planning actions for commercial air tours over parks generally.
Personal Watercraft (PWC). Since 2003, NPS has completed regulations to open designated PWC areas at 13 units. In 2010, a federal judge ordered NPS to re-examine environmental assessments justifying PWC use at two of those units but did not overturn existing regulations.
Mountain Bicycles. This mechanized though nonmotorized activity also raises issues of the sufficiency of access to park lands as well as potential resource damage and disturbance of quieter recreational pursuits. Currently, more than 40 NPS units allow mountain biking on dirt trails and/or dirt roads. Mountain biking advocates have worked with NPS to explore opportunities to increase this activity in park units. In 2012, NPS finalized a rule that eases the process for park superintendents to open trails to bicycles. |
crs_R43762 | crs_R43762_0 | While it is the President who nominates persons to fill federal judgeships, the appointment of each nominee also requires Senate confirmation. In recent decades, however, appointments to two kinds of lower federal courts—the U.S. district courts and the U.S. circuit courts of appeals—have often been the focus of heightened Senate interest and debate, as has the process itself for appointing judges to these courts. Accordingly, the report, following a brief background section, describes, in successive parts, the three primary phases of the appointment process, namely
the selection of judicial nominees by the President, including the key role often played by home state Senators in recommending judicial candidates to the President; the role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in considering and deciding whether to approve and report out the President's judicial nominations to the Senate; and the Senate's floor consideration and confirmation of judicial nominations, through use of either its unanimous consent process or its cloture process. The need for a President to make a circuit or district court nomination typically arises when one of these judgeships becomes or soon will become vacant. When the blue slip policy is applied in this way, the Administration is well advised, before it selects a nominee, to consult with both home state Senators, regardless of their party, to determine the acceptability to them of a judicial candidate under consideration. Senators generally exert less influence over the selection of circuit court nominees than over the selection of district court nominees. The committee evaluator assesses the qualification of the candidate in the following ways:
by examining the candidate's responses to a comprehensive Personal Data Questionnaire, forwarded to the committee by the Department of Justice; by examining the candidate's legal writings and reviewing reported court decisions, briefs, legal memoranda, publications, speeches, hearing and argument transcripts, articles, and other writings by or involving the candidate; by conducting extensive confidential interviews of a broad cross section of judges, lawyers, and others who have served, or had other professional contact, with the candidate, to obtain their assessments of his or her integrity, professional competence, and judicial temperament; and by interviewing the candidate near the end of the evaluation process, affording him or her "a full opportunity to address and rebut any adverse information or comments" that might have come to the evaluator's attention during the evaluation process. If the recommendation is to nominate, and it meets with presidential approval, the President will sign a nomination message, which is then sent to the Senate. Pre-hearing Phase
Upon referral of a judicial nomination to the Judiciary Committee, professional staff on the committee initiate an investigation into the nominee's background and qualifications. Under its long-standing blue slip procedure, the chair of the Judiciary Committee seeks the assessment of home state Senators regarding circuit and district court nominees to judgeships within or associated with their state, including whether they approve having the committee consider and take action on the nominee. Hearing Phase
At a confirmation hearing, lower court nominees engage in a question and answer session with members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The questions, it has been noted,
... typically address the individual's qualifications, understanding of how to interpret and apply the law, previous experiences in court, judicial temperament, and the role of judges. Reporting Options
The committee, when it ultimately votes on the nomination, has three reporting options—to report favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Customarily, most of these nominations, particularly if uncontroversial, have reached confirmation under the terms of unanimous consent agreements. On this procedural track, the Senate by unanimous consent not only takes up nominations for floor consideration, but also arranges for them to either receive up-or-down confirmation votes or be confirmed simply by unanimous consent. For other judicial nominations, however, particularly those facing strong opposition, unanimous consent to reach confirmation may not always be attainable. In these instances, the procedural track, for a nomination to move forward without unanimous consent, involves the Senate, after taking up the nomination, voting on a cloture motion to bring floor debate to a close. Hence, under the reinterpreted rule, a simple majority of Senators, by voting in favor of a motion to close debate on a circuit or district court nomination, could compel a Senate vote on confirmation—something that, prior to the rule's reinterpretation, would occur only if a three-fifths supermajority voted in favor of cloture. If no Senator asks for a roll call vote, the Senate may approve the nomination by voice vote. A simple majority of Senators voting (with a minimal quorum of 51 being present) is required to approve a nomination. With only a simple majority of Senators voting needed to close debate on a nomination, the majority party in the Senate (which also was the party of the President) could, by its own Members alone voting in favor, invoke cloture on circuit or district court nominations, even against unified opposition to cloture by the party in the minority. For judicial nominations that fail to be confirmed, the appointment process ends with one of three possible steps—rejection by the Senate (very rare), withdrawal of a nomination by the President (occasional, but infrequent), and (by far the most common occurrence) Senate return of the nomination to the President at the end of a session, at the end of the Congress, or upon a recess of more than 30 days. | In recent decades, the process for appointing judges to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts has been of continuing Senate interest. The responsibility for making these appointments is shared by the President and the Senate. Pursuant to the Constitution's Appointments Clause, the President nominates persons to fill federal judgeships, with the appointment of each nominee also requiring Senate confirmation. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, an important role is also played midway in the appointment process by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Presidential Selection of Nominees
The need for a President to make a circuit or district court nomination typically arises when a judgeship becomes or soon will become vacant. With almost no formal restrictions on whom the President may consider, an informal requirement is that judicial candidates are expected to meet a high standard of professional qualification. By custom, candidates whom the President considers for district judgeships are typically identified by home state Senators if the latter are of the President's party, with such Senators, however, generally exerting less influence over the selection of circuit nominees. Another customary expectation is that the Administration, before the President selects a nominee, will consult both home state Senators, regardless of their party, to determine the acceptability to them of the candidate under consideration.
In recent Administrations, the pre-nomination evaluation of judicial candidates has been performed jointly by staff in the White House Counsel's Office and the Department of Justice. Candidate finalists also undergo a confidential background investigation by the FBI and an independent evaluation by a committee of the American Bar Association. The selection process is completed when the President, approving of a candidate, signs a nomination message, which is then sent to the Senate.
Consideration by Senate Judiciary Committee
Once received by the Senate, the judicial nomination is referred to the Judiciary Committee, where professional staff initiate their own investigation into the nominee's background and qualifications. Also, during this pre-hearing phase, the committee, through its "blue slip" procedure, seeks the assessment of home state Senators regarding whether they approve having the committee consider and take action on the nominee.
Next in the process is the confirmation hearing, where judicial nominees engage in a question and answer session with members of the Judiciary Committee. Questions from Senators may focus, among other things, on a nominee's qualifications, understanding of how to interpret the law, previous experiences, and the role of judges.
The committee, when it ultimately votes on a nomination, has three reporting options—to report favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Only on rare occasions has the committee voted to reject a judicial nomination or to report it other than favorably.
Senate Floor Consideration
Customarily, most circuit or district court nominations have reached confirmation under the terms of unanimous consent agreements. On this procedural track, the Senate by unanimous consent not only takes up nominations for floor consideration, but also arranges for them to either receive up-or-down confirmation votes or be confirmed simply by unanimous consent. If a roll call vote is asked for, a simple majority of Senators voting, with a minimal quorum of 51 being present, is required to approve a nomination.
For a minority of judicial nominations, however, particularly those facing strong opposition, the procedural track, for moving forward without unanimous consent, customarily has involved the Senate voting on cloture motions to bring floor debate on them to a close. A simple majority of Senators voting is needed to close debate on all nominations except to the Supreme Court. (Prior to a Senate reinterpretation of its rules in November 2013, a three-fifths majority was required.)
Nominations Not Confirmed
Judicial nominations sometimes fail to be confirmed. This occurs most often when nominations in committee or on the Senate's Executive Calendar are returned to the President at the end of a session or upon a recess or more than 30 days. Senate votes rejecting a nomination are rare. |
crs_RL34684 | crs_RL34684_0 | Background
Public alarm about the spate of product recalls during 2007, particularly of toys and other products used by children, has focused attention on the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). P.L. 3016 (2008), the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA), was enacted as a result of Congress's consideration of major reform legislation to address organizational and systemic deficiencies, as well as specific consumer product defects and hazards. This report provides an overview of the prior authority of the CPSC to establish consumer product safety standards and to inspect, recall, and restrict importation of unsafe consumer products, and summarizes changes made by the CPSIA to reform the CPSC and strengthen enforcement of consumer product safety standards. The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA, 15 U.S.C. established and authorized the CPSC in 1972 in response to growing concerns about protecting the public from unsafe, defective consumer products. However, in the years since its establishment, the staff and resources of the CPSC have been considerably reduced to the detriment of its ability to fulfill its mission effectively. 110-314 , H.R. On July 29, 2008, H.Rept. 110-787 , the Conference Report for H.R. 4040 , the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, was released after several months of negotiations in the conference committee to reconcile differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bill passed the House of Representatives and the Senate on July 30, 2008 (424-1) and July 31, 2008 (89-3), respectively. On August 14, 2008, President Bush signed the bill into law as P.L. 110-314 . CPSC Chairman Nord and Commissioner Moore each expressed approval of the final legislation, with Chairman Nord expressing a desire for Congress to appropriate further funding to carry out the new mandates of the legislation. §2076b) requires the Inspector General of the CPSC to:
conduct reviews and audits to assess the CPSC's capital improvement efforts, including upgrades of its information technology system and the development of the new public safety database, and the adequacy of the accreditation and monitoring process for third-party testing laboratories; within one year of enactment of the CPSIA, conduct a review of (1) CPSC employee complaints concerning failures of other employees to properly enforce the rules and regulations of the laws enforced by the CPSC or otherwise carry out responsibilities if such failures raise issues of conflicts of interest, ethical violations, or the absence of good faith, and (2) CPSC actions to address such complaints and failures; submit annual reports with respect to the findings and recommendations resulting from these audits and reviews to the appropriate congressional committees beginning in FY2010; transmit a report to the appropriate congressional committees within 60 days of enactment of the CPSIA on the activities of the Inspector General, any barriers preventing robust oversight of the CPSC by the Inspector General, and any additional resources and authority needed for effective oversight. | Public alarm about the spate of recent product recalls throughout 2007, particularly of toys and other products used by children, has focused attention on the Consumer Product Safety Commission (the CPSC or the Commission). This scrutiny led to consideration of major amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), which established and authorized the CPSC in 1972 in response to growing concerns about protecting the public from unsafe, defective consumer products. Jurisdiction over the administration and enforcement of several existing consumer safety statutes was transferred from other agencies to and consolidated under the CPSC. However, in the years since its establishment, the staff and resources of the CPSC have been considerably reduced, leading many observers to doubt its ability to fulfill its mission effectively.
Consequently, Congress considered major reform legislation to address organizational and systemic deficiencies. Legislative proposals in the 110th Congress included provisions targeting specific consumer product defects and hazards. On July 29, 2008, H.Rept. 110-787, the Conference Report for H.R. 4040, the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA), was released after several months of negotiations in the conference committee to reconcile differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bill passed the House of Representatives and the Senate on July 30, 2008 (424-1) and July 31, 2008 (89-3), respectively. On August 14, 2008, President Bush signed the bill into law as P.L. 110-314. CPSC Chairman Nord and Commissioner Moore each expressed approval of the final legislation, with Chairman Nord expressing a desire for Congress to appropriate further funding to carry out the new mandates of the legislation.
This report provides an overview of the prior authority of the CPSC to establish consumer product safety standards and to inspect and recall unsafe consumer products, and discusses P.L. 110-314, the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, reforming the CPSC and strengthening enforcement of consumer product safety standards. It supersedes CRS Report RL34399, Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008: H.R. 4040, by [author name scrubbed] (out of print but available from author). For an overview of issues regarding safety of consumer products imported from China, see CRS Report RS22713, Health and Safety Concerns Over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed]. For an overview of the issue of phthalates in children's products, see CRS Report RL34572, Phthalates in Plastics and Possible Human Health Effects, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL30297 | crs_RL30297_0 | Introduction
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344 , as amended; 2 U.S.C. 601-688; hereafter referred to as the "Budget Act") provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget each year. The congressional budget resolution represents a budget plan for the upcoming fiscal year and at least the following four fiscal years. As a concurrent resolution, it is not presented to the President for his signature and thus does not become law. Instead, when adopted by Congress, the budget resolution serves as an agreement between the House and Senate on a congressional budget plan. It also provides information on the consideration and adoption of budget resolutions, including an identification of the House special rules that provided for consideration of budget resolutions, the amendments in the nature of a substitute to the budget resolution considered in the House, the number and disposition of House and Senate amendments to budget resolutions, and dates of House and Senate action on budget resolutions. During the 41 years under the Budget Act (1975 to the present), Congress has completed action on 40 budget resolutions, including in some years multiple budget resolutions for a single fiscal year. In 32 of the 41 years, Congress adopted at least one budget resolution for the fiscal year. Congress did not complete action on a budget resolution for nine fiscal years, most recently for FY2015. Congress also adopted a second budget resolution in seven of the 41 years. Content of the Budget Resolution
Section 301(a) of the Budget Act requires that the budget resolution include the following matters for the upcoming fiscal year and at least the ensuing four fiscal years:
Aggregate levels of new budget authority, outlays, the budget surplus or deficit, and the public debt; Aggregate levels of federal revenues and the amount, if any, by which the aggregate levels of federal revenues should be increased or decreased by legislative action; Amounts of new budget authority and outlays for each of the major functional categories; and For purposes of Senate enforcement procedures, Social Security outlays and revenues (although these amounts are not included in the budget surplus or deficit totals due to their off-budget status). In order to accomplish this, Congress first includes budget reconciliation directives in a budget resolution directing one or more committees in each chamber to recommend changes in statute to achieve the levels of direct spending, revenues, debt limit, or a combination thereof agreed to in the budget resolution. Such directives have resulted in 24 budget reconciliation measures. On four occasions (in 1982, 1986, 1997, and 2006), Congress adopted two budget reconciliation measures in one year. During the period between 1975 and 2015, the Senate considered an average of almost 54 amendments per budget resolution, agreeing to an average of 31 of these. Timing of Action on the Budget Resolution
The Budget Act sets April 15 as a target date for completing action on the annual budget resolution. During this period, Congress adopted the budget resolution by the target date only six times, most recently in 2003 with the FY2004 budget resolution. (Current law requires budget resolutions to cover at least five fiscal years.) | The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344, as amended; 2 U.S.C. 601-688) provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget each year. The congressional budget resolution represents a budget plan for the upcoming fiscal year and at least the following four fiscal years. As a concurrent resolution, it is not presented to the President for his signature and thus does not become law. Instead, when adopted by Congress, the budget resolution serves as an agreement between the House and Senate on a congressional budget plan. As such, it provides the framework for subsequent legislative action on budget matters during each congressional session.
In 32 of the 41 years under the Budget Act, Congress adopted at least one budget resolution for the fiscal year beginning in such year. Congress did not complete action on a budget resolution for nine fiscal years, most recently for FY2015. A second budget resolution for a fiscal year was adopted in each of the first seven years, and a third budget resolution was adopted in one year (for FY1977). Since 1982, Congress has considered only one budget resolution for each fiscal year. Congress initially was required to cover only the upcoming fiscal year in the budget resolution, but over the years Congress has expanded this time frame. Currently, the budget resolution must include at least five fiscal years.
The budget resolution may include budget reconciliation directives instructing one or more committees to recommend legislative changes to meet the direct spending and revenue levels included in the budget resolution. In the past 41 years, Congress included budget reconciliation directives in 22 budget resolutions. Such directives have resulted in 24 budget reconciliation measures and the enactment of 20 of them. (Four budget reconciliation measures have been vetoed.)
The House has considered and adopted fewer amendments to the budget resolution than the Senate. For the last three decades, the House has considered the budget resolutions under special rules that generally have made in order only amendments in the nature of a substitute. Since 1983, the House typically has considered between three and seven such amendments to the budget resolution each year, rejecting all but two of these. In contrast, during the period between 1975 and 2015, the Senate considered an average of almost 54 amendments per budget resolution, agreeing to an average of about 31 of these.
The Budget Act sets April 15 as a target date for completing action on the annual budget resolution. (Prior to 1986, the date was May 15.) During the past 41 years, when Congress has completed action on a budget resolution, Congress adopted the budget resolution by the target date only six times, most recently in 2003 with the FY2004 budget resolution. Budget resolutions have been adopted an average of almost 36 days after the target date.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL34109 | crs_RL34109_0 | T his report summarizes the federal civil remedies and criminal penalties that may be available for violations of the rights granted by the federal intellectual property laws: the Copyright Act of 1976, the Patent Act of 1952, the Trademark Act of 1946 (conventionally known as the Lanham Act), and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. The Copyright Act, Patent Act, and Lanham Act provide legal protection for intellectual property against unauthorized use, theft, and other violations of the rights granted by those statutes to the IP owner. The Copyright Act provides copyright owners with the exclusive right to control reproduction, distribution, public performance, and display of their copyrighted works. In addition, the Lanham Act grants to owners of "famous" trademarks the right to seek injunctive relief against another person's use in commerce of a mark or trade name if such use causes dilution by blurring or tarnishment of the distinctive quality of the famous trademark. In certain circumstances, a variety of federal agencies may become involved in IP rights enforcement: for example, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency has the power to seize counterfeit goods upon their attempted importation in the United States; the International Trade Commission may investigate and adjudicate allegations of unfair trade practices due to the importing of goods that were produced as a result of trade secret theft or that infringe U.S. patents, trademarks, or copyrights; and the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration, and the U.S. State Department are all involved in promoting and seeking IP rights enforcement by trading partners and other foreign countries. Information regarding the civil remedies and criminal penalties for violations of the copyright, trademark, patent, and trade secret laws is presented on the following pages in table-format. Restitution is available when the defendant is convicted of a criminal property offense. | This report provides information describing the federal civil remedies and criminal penalties that may be available as a consequence of violations of the federal intellectual property laws: the Copyright Act of 1976, the Patent Act of 1952, the Trademark Act of 1946 (conventionally known as the Lanham Act), and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. The report explains the remedies and penalties for the following intellectual property offenses:
17 U.S.C. §501 (copyright infringement); 17 U.S.C. §506(a)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. §2319(b) (criminal copyright infringement for profit); 17 U.S.C. §506(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. §2319(c) (criminal copyright infringement without a profit motive); 17 U.S.C. §506(a)(1)(c) and 18 U.S.C. §2319(d) (pre-release distribution of a copyrighted work over a computer network); 17 U.S.C. §1309 (infringement of a vessel hull or deck design); 17 U.S.C. §1326 (falsely marking an unprotected vessel hull or deck design with a protected design notice); 17 U.S.C. §§1203, 1204 (circumvention of copyright protection systems); 18 U.S.C. §2319A (bootleg recordings of live musical performances); 18 U.S.C. §2319B (unauthorized recording of films in movie theaters); 15 U.S.C. §1114(1) (unauthorized use in commerce of a reproduction, counterfeit, or colorable imitation of a federally registered trademark); 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (trademark infringement due to false designation, origin, or sponsorship); 15 U.S.C. §1125(c) (dilution of famous trademarks); 15 U.S.C. §§1125(d) and 1129 (cybersquatting and cyberpiracy in connection with Internet domain names); 18 U.S.C. §2318 (counterfeit/illicit labels and counterfeit documentation and packaging for copyrighted works); 35 U.S.C. §271 (patent infringement); 35 U.S.C. §289 (infringement of a design patent); 35 U.S.C. §292 (false marking of patent-related information in connection with articles sold to the public); 28 U.S.C. §1498 (unauthorized use of a patented invention by or for the United States, or copyright infringement by the United States); 19 U.S.C. §1337 (unfair practices in import trade); 18 U.S.C. §2320 (trafficking in counterfeit trademarks); 19 U.S.C. §1526(e), 15 U.S.C. §1124 (importing merchandise bearing counterfeit marks),18 U.S.C. §2320(h) (transshipment and exportation of counterfeit goods); 18 U.S.C. §1831 (trade secret theft to benefit a foreign entity); and 18 U.S.C. §1832 (theft of trade secrets for commercial advantage). |
crs_R45238 | crs_R45238_0 | Introduction
Individuals and households that suffer uninsured or underinsured losse s under a major disaster declaration typically apply for Individual Assistance (IA), administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and may also apply for disaster loans, administered by the Small Business Administration (SBA). This report opens with an overview of the two programs and a discussion about how declarations are used to put them into effect. The report also discusses their respective application processes and eligibility criteria used by FEMA and SBA to make grant and loan determinations, respectively. The report then describes the appeals process before concluding with policy observations and considerations. FEMA IA and the SBA Disaster Loan Program are interlaced to a certain degree. Functionally, SBA and FEMA have a computer matching agreement (CMA) to share real-time data on assistance provided to applicants. SBA and FEMA use the interface between their systems to identify potential duplication of benefits (DOB) and determine loan and grant eligibility. From an administrative perspective, eligibility and assistance from one source can impact eligibility and assistance from the other source. While the overlap between the two programs may have some benefits, it arguably also causes some confusion. Moreover, as some observers have pointed out, there are elements of the application process that are not entirely known or understood. For instance, Members have asked for clarification concerning the criteria used to determine eligibility for grants and/or loans, as well as how decisions are made with respect to whether an applicant is provided a grant, loan, or both. Others have questioned whether determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, or if the determination criteria are applied uniformly to all applicants seeking disaster assistance. Overview of Programs
The following sections provide descriptions of the SBA and FEMA programs that provide assistance to individuals and households. In many cases, disaster survivors find that they need assistance from both of these programs in addition to other sources of assistance including private insurance, state and local government assistance, and assistance from private voluntary organizations in order to fully recover. If Congress is concerned about the use of the CMA, it could investigate how it could be used in conjunction with other disaster assistance programs. | The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Individual Assistance (IA) program and the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Disaster Loan Program are the federal government's two primary sources of financial assistance to help individuals and households recover and rebuild from a major disaster. In many cases, disaster survivors find that they need assistance from both of these programs in addition to other sources of assistance including private insurance, state and local government assistance, and assistance from private voluntary organizations.
Though FEMA IA and the SBA Disaster Loan Program are separate programs administered by different agencies, in many ways they are interconnected. SBA and FEMA share real-time data on disaster grant and loan approvals to identify potential duplication of benefits while providing individuals and households with federal assistance that can be used in conjunction with each other to meet recovery needs. The two programs are also interconnected in the way they are administered to determine loan and grant eligibility. Furthermore, eligibility and assistance from one source can affect eligibility and assistance from the other source.
It could be argued the overlap between the two programs provides an effective means to identify duplication and provide federal assistance; however, the overlap also causes some confusion. Some in Congress are concerned that elements of the application process are not entirely known. For instance, it is unclear to some what criteria are used to determine assistance eligibility as well as how decisions are made with respect to whether an applicant should be provided a grant or a loan (or both). It is also unclear whether FEMA and SBA determine eligibility on a case-by-case basis, or if eligibility criteria are applied uniformly.
This report provides an overview of the two programs including discussions about:
how declarations put the programs into effect; the application process for both programs; the criteria used by FEMA and the SBA to determine assistance; and the FEMA and SBA appeal processes.
The report concludes with policy observations and considerations for Congress. |
crs_RL34117 | crs_RL34117_0 | Introduction
Beginning in the late 1970s, Congress deregulated the railroad industry by giving railroads more flexibility to set rates and negotiate confidential contracts with their customers. Over the last decade, as major railroads have consolidated and have achieved higher profitability, Some Members of Congress have questioned whether the present regime needs to be revised to protect the interests of rail customers who are poorly positioned to benefit from competition among freight transportation providers—a group often referred to as "captive shippers." They typically claim that the railroad serving them acts like a monopoly, charging excessive rates and providing inadequate service. However, the captive shipper issue has wider economic implications than just the division of revenue between shippers and railroads. An important policy question for Congress is whether more competition will lead to a more robust and efficient railroad system or undermine it by discouraging investment in rail infrastructure. It then explains "bottlenecks" and "terminal switching arrangements," two of the main points of contention between railroads and their captive customers. The Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board) recently began a review of its policies regarding these two issues, and they are addressed in legislation supported by captive shippers. The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 ( P.L. What is a "Captive Shipper"? Most shippers claiming to be captive handle bulky materials, such as coal, chemicals, grain, and construction materials. In the Senate, these bills have been reintroduced in the 112 th Congress as S. 49 and S. 158 . In its announcement, the Board observed that the railroad industry had changed in many significant ways since policies with respect to competitive access were originally adopted in the mid-1980s. The chairman and ranking Member of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, along with the chairman and ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Railroads, wrote STB in January 2011, "we would like to ... impress upon you the importance of maintaining the existing regulatory balance between the railroads and shippers," adding, "Any policy change made by the STB which restricts the railroads' abilities to invest, grow their networks and meet the nation's freight transportation demands will be opposed by the Committee." Captive shippers seek legislative or regulatory changes that would require railroads to provide a rate on any bottleneck segment of a route. Congress faces consideration of whether addressing the problems of captive shippers would be detrimental or beneficial to maintaining a strong and vibrant railroad system. | Beginning in the late 1970s, Congress gave railroads flexibility to set rates and to enter into confidential contracts with their customers. Over the last decade, large railroads have consolidated and, particularly in recent years, have achieved higher profitability. These changes have left some bulk shippers, particularly those that claim to be "captive" to a single railroad, frustrated with what they perceive as poor rail service and exorbitant rates. "Captive shippers" claim that the railroad serving them acts like a monopoly—charging excessively high rates and providing less service than they require.
Such complaints have led Congress to consider whether the present, largely deregulated, regime should be revised to accommodate the interests of "captive shippers." A major point of contention is whether current railroad industry practices should be changed to guarantee such shippers more railroad routing options. Legislation, supported by captive shippers and opposed by the railroads and other shippers, failed to reach the floor of either the House or Senate in the last Congress, and has been reintroduced in the 112th Congress (S. 49 and S. 158).
In the wake of renewed congressional interest, the Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board), successor agency of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), is reviewing its policies with respect to railroad access and competition issues. It announced a hearing on "bottleneck rates" and "competitive access" matters. Changes in these policies might benefit some shippers of bulk products, such as coal and grain, but could be disadvantageous to shippers of other products, such as maritime containers and domestic truck trailers, that want railroads to maintain high levels of investment in order to provide fast, reliable service for high-value shipments.
The captive shipper issue has wider economic implications than just the division of revenue between railroads and their customers. Higher fuel prices, congestion on certain segments of the interstate highway system, and rising domestic and international trade volumes are driving shippers to demand more rail capacity. Freight revenues are a significant means of financing rail capacity because the railroads receive negligible public financing. If it acts in this area, Congress would face consideration of how a legislated or regulatory solution to the "captive shipper" problem would affect the development of a more robust and efficient railroad system. |
crs_RS20522 | crs_RS20522_0 | Third, in December 1994DoDtrimmed $2 billion from the RAH-66 program and dropped another prototype, going from three to two. The Comanche's Initial Operating Capability (IOC) will be achieved in September 2009, threeyearslater than originally planned, and nine months after the most recent plan. (24) The Marine Corps is expected to seek a replacement for its AH-1ZSuper Cobra helicopters around 2020 and it has been suggested that a joint program with the Army is worthinvestigating. February28, 2002. (back) CRS Report 96-525, ArmyAviation: RAH-66 Comanche . | Although it has been a high Army priority, a number of factors havecomplicated the RAH-66 Comanche program. Since its inception, the program has been restructured severaltimes-postponing the initial operational capability (IOC) and increasing overall program costs. In late 2002, DoDrestructured the RAH-66 program again, cutting the number of aircraft to be procured in half. This report will beupdated |
crs_R43770 | crs_R43770_0 | Introduction
Virtually every federal crime comes with a hidden feature. The result is the work of 18 U.S.C. 2, which visits the same consequences on anyone who orders the commission of a federal crime. Section 2(a), the aiding and abetting subsection, is more frequently prosecuted than §2(b), the causes subsection. Aiding and abetting means assisting in the commission of someone else's crime. Section 2(a) demands that the defendant embrace the crime of another and consciously do something to contribute to its success. A completed offense is a prerequisite to conviction for aiding and abetting, but the hands-on offender need be neither named nor convicted. It happens most often when there is a substantial culpability gap between the accomplice or co-conspirator and the primary offender. Section 2(b) applies to defendants who work through either witting or unwitting intermediaries, through the guilty or the innocent. Whether the intermediary is a subordinate or an undercover government agent, he may be well aware that his conduct constitutes an element of the underlying offense. On the other hand, whether the intermediary is a dupe or a facilitating governmental official, §2(b) also applies even if he is unaware of the nature of his conduct. When the intermediary is an innocent party, no one but the "causing" individual need commit the underlying offense. Withdrawal Defense
Federal courts sometimes mention a withdrawal defense comparable to one available in conspiracy cases. Aiding and abetting needs a completed offense. Proponents of a general withdrawal defense may claim support from recent dicta in Rosemond . 841) and discharging a firearm during a drug trafficking offense (18 U.S.C. The Supreme Court explained that an accomplice must know of the substantive offense beforehand in order to be shown to have embraced its commission. It did so in a manner suggesting an accomplice might be able to withdraw and escape liability prior to the commission of the substantive offense, even if he had contributed to the crime's ultimate success. Civil Liability
"Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute.... | Virtually every federal criminal statute has a hidden feature; primary offenders and even their most casual accomplices face equal punishment. This results from 18 U.S.C. 2, which visits the same consequences on anyone who orders or assists in the commission of a federal crime.
Aiding and abetting means assisting in the commission of someone else's crime. Section 2(a) demands that the defendant embrace the crime of another and consciously do something to contribute to its success. An accomplice must know the offense is afoot if he is to intentionally contribute to its success. While a completed offense is a prerequisite to conviction for aiding and abetting, the hands-on offender need be neither named nor convicted.
On occasion, an accomplice will escape liability, either by judicial construction or administrative grace. This happens most often when there is a perceived culpability gap between accomplice and primary offender. Such accomplices are usually victims, customers, or subordinates of a primary offender.
Section 2(b) (willfully causing a crime) applies to defendants who work through either witting or unwitting intermediaries, through the guilty or the innocent. Whether the intermediary is a subordinate or an undercover government agent, he may be well aware that his conduct constitutes an element of the underlying offense. On the other hand, whether the intermediary is a dupe or a facilitating governmental official, §2(b) applies even if the intermediary is unaware of the nature of his conduct. Section 2(a) requires two guilty parties, a primary offender and an accomplice. Section 2(b) permits prosecution when there is only one guilty party, a "causing" individual and an innocent agent. Both subsections, however, require a completed offense.
Federal courts sometimes mention, but rarely apply, a withdrawal defense comparable to one available in conspiracy cases. Proponents of a general withdrawal defense in §2 cases may find support in recent Supreme Court dicta. In Rosemond, the Court explained that an accomplice must know of the pending substantive offense in order to be shown to have embraced its commission. It did so in a manner suggesting that an accomplice might be able to withdraw and escape liability prior to the commission of the substantive offense, even if he had contributed to the crime's ultimate success.
There is no general civil aiding and abetting statute. Aiding and abetting a violation of a federal criminal law does not trigger civil liability unless Congress has said so in so many words.
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R43769, Aiding, Abetting, and the Like: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2, by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes, attribution for quotations, and citations to authority found there. |
crs_RS21511 | crs_RS21511_0 | RS21511 -- Campaign Finance: Brief Overview of District Court Opinion in McConnell v.FEC
Updated May 19, 2003
Background
On March 27, 2002, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), P.L. 107-155 ( H.R. 2356 , 107th Cong. ), and most provisions of thenew law became effective on November 6, 2002. Shortly after President Bush signed BCRA into law, SenatorMitch McConnell filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District ofColumbia against the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In summary, the McConnell complaint for declaratory and injunctiverelief argued that portions of BCRA violate the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Ultimately, eleven suits challenging BCRA were brought by more than 80 plaintiffs and were consolidated into one lead case, McConnell v. FEC , (3) bythe U.S. District Court for theDistrict of Columbia. On December 4 and 5, 2002 oral argument was heard in McConnell v. FEC before the three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Under the BCRAexpedited review provision, (4) the court's decision,which was issued on May 2, 2003, will be reviewed directly by the U.S. Supreme Court. | On March 27, 2002, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Campaign ReformAct of 2002 (BCRA), P.L. 107-155 (H.R. 2356, 107th Cong.), which was also known as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reformlegislation prior to enactment. Most provisions of the new law became effective onNovember 6, 2002. Shortly after President Bush signed BCRA into law, Senator Mitch McConnell filed suit in U.S.District Court for the District of Columbia against the FederalElection Commission (FEC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Ultimately, eleven suitschallenging the campaign finance reform law were brought by more than 80plaintiffs and were consolidated into one lead case, McConnell v. FEC. In summary, the McConnellcomplaint for declaratory and injunctive relief argued that portions of BCRA violatethe First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to theConstitution. On May 2, 2003, the U.S. District Court for theDistrict of Columbia issued its decision in McConnell v. FEC, striking down many key provisions ofthe law. (See the text of the per curiam opinion athttp://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/02cv582a.pdf.) This report provides a brief overview of the court's decision and willbe updated. The three-judge panel, which was split 2 to 1 on manyissues, ordered that its ruling take effect immediately. Since the court has issued its opinion, several appeals havebeen filed. Under the BCRA expedited review provision, the court'sdecision will be reviewed directly by the U.S. Supreme Court. On May 19 the U.S. district court issued a stay toits ruling, which leaves BCRA, as enacted, in effect until the SupremeCourt issues a decision. For more information see, Campaign Finance Reform Oversight http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isele2.html, and CRS Report RL30669,Campaign Finance Regulation Under the First Amendment. |
crs_R43496 | crs_R43496_0 | This report concentrates on the loss of financial data, but there have also been nonfinancial data breaches, including
Sony Corporation (PlayStation Network): 2011, 77 million names, addresses, email addresses, and other personal information; Sony Picture Entertainment: 2014, a large, but unknown number of files reportedly containing personal information, internal Sony discussions, and unreleased movies, and other; JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan): 2014, 76 million household customer names, telephone numbers, and other information and 7 million small business records; and Tricare Management Activity: 2011, 4.9 medical records lost. Target Breach
According to Target, in November and December of 2013, information on 40 million payment cards (i.e., credit, debit, and ATM cards) and personally identifiable information (PII) on 70 million customers was compromised. December 19, 2013—Target made a public announcement of the breach. January 10, 2014—Target announced the PII theft. JPMorgan Chase & Co. Home Depot reports that at least 44 legal actions in the United States and Canada had been filed against it as a result of the data breach. Home Depot reported $5.4 billion in net earnings for the fiscal year ending February 2, 2014. How Does the Payment Card System Work? 2. According to research by the Ponemon Institute, factors influencing the losses in data breaches include industry, existence of a privacy and data protection security policy, the type of information handled, the most likely cause of a data breach, whether data are stored on laptops or removable devices, whether data are encrypted, whether there is a full-time information security manager, number of employees, where in the world the company operates, policies concerning remote access to sensitive data, user authentication technology, headquarters location, and the number of sensitive records. Table 1 summarizes various estimates of the cost to Target its data breach. This section of the report continues by looking at who bears the various costs of the payment breach in the first instance. It also examines the costs to the party breached. In data breaches such as Target's, who is liable for the costs associated with such data breaches depends on a web of individual contracts among retailers, the banks that issue cards and handle payments, credit card companies such as Visa and MasterCard, payment processors authorized by the credit card companies to process payments at the point of sale, and even contracts between a retailer and its third-party service provider (such as Target's HVAC contractor). In sum, courts have been called upon to play key roles in deciding who should bear losses from data breaches like Target's. To date, congressional hearings on the Target breaches have tended to focus more on policy solutions, such as notifying consumers that data breaches have occurred, and increasing or clarifying the FTC's authority to sanction lax data security practices. This section discusses selected policy options that have been raised in congressional hearings held on data security and breaches following the Target breach. Passing a Federal Data Breach Notification Law
In each of the hearings related to the Target breach, various Members of Congress raised the possibility of a federal data breach notification law. Bills were introduced in the 113 th and earlier Congresses that would include some form of federal notification requirement for data security breaches. However, certain sectors are subject to cybersecurity obligations that may include data security. Generally, data breach notification laws include several components and address topics such as (1) which entities must comply with the law; (2) what information is being protected, and how a security breach or data breach is defined; (3) what degree of actual harm must occur, if any, for notice to be triggered; (4) how and when must notice be delivered; (5) are there any exceptions or safe harbors; (6) to what degree does this preempt state law and how does the law relate to other federal laws; and (7) what penalties, enforcement authorities, and remedies for those harmed does it create. 3990 ) addressed these elements in various ways. Modifying Federal Trade Commission Statutory Powers
Some in Congress have called for passage of a law to strengthen the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) statutory authority to penalize businesses that fail to adequately protect consumers' personally identifiable information. The FTC has asked Congress to pass legislation making explicit its authority in this area. In several hearings related to the Target breach, some Members of Congress broached the subject of increasing the FTC's powers to pursue data breach actions. Creating a federal standard for data security has both proponents and opponents in Congress. How cybersecurity costs are allocated relates to the question of whether retailers, banks, and payment card companies have been willing to pay for, and adopt, new data security technology quickly enough. These issues were raised in congressional hearings. | In November and December of 2013, cybercriminals breached the data security of Target, one of the largest U.S. retail chains, stealing the personal and financial information of millions of customers. On December 19, 2013, Target confirmed that some 40 million credit and debit card account numbers had been stolen. On January 10, 2014, Target announced that personal information, including the names, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses of up to 70 million customers, was also stolen during the data breach. A report by the Senate Committee on Commerce in March 2014 concluded that Target missed opportunities to prevent the data breach.
Target. To date, Target has reported data breach costs of $248 million. Independent sources have made back-of-the-envelope estimates ranging from $240 million to $2.2 billion in fraudulent charges alone. This does not include additional potential costs to consumers concerned about their personal information or credit histories; potential fines or penalties to Target, financial institutions, or others; or any costs to Target related to a loss of consumer confidence. The breach was among the largest in U.S. history.
Consumer concern over the scale of this data breach has fueled further congressional attention on the Target breach and data security and data breaches more broadly. In the wake of Target's revelations, between February 3 and April 2, 2014, Congress held seven hearings by six different committees related to these topics. In addition to examining the events surrounding the Target breach, hearings have focused on preventing such data breaches, improving data security standards, protecting consumers' personal data, and notifying consumers when their data have been compromised.
Other financial data breaches. In addition to Target, there have been data breaches at Home Depot, JPMorgan Chase, Sony, and Adobe. Payment card information was obtained at Adobe and Home Depot. Hackers downloaded a wide range of company confidential information at Sony, and they obtained contact information in the JPMorgan Chase breach.
Policy options discussed in these hearings include federal legislation to require notification to consumers when their data have been breached; potentially increase Federal Trade Commission (FTC) powers and authorities over companies' data security; and create a federal standard for the general quality or reasonableness of companies' data security. The hearings also broached the broader question of whether the government should play a role in encouraging or even requiring companies to adopt newer data security technologies.
None of the legislation introduced in the 113th Congress that addressed these various issues became law. In 2014 and 2015, the Obama Administration encouraged Congress to pass legislation on data security and data breach notification. Attorney General Eric Holder issued a public statement in the wake of the Target breach on February 24, 2014, that urged Congress to pass a federal data breach notification law, which would hold entities accountable when they fail to keep sensitive information safe. The FTC also called on Congress to pass a federal data security law, including data breach notification and to increase the commission's explicit statutory authority over data security issues.
Key questions. This report answers some frequently asked questions about the Target and selected other data breaches, including what is known to have happened in the breach, and what costs may result. It also examines some of the broader issues common to data breaches, including how the payment system works, how cybersecurity costs are shared and allocated within the payment system, who bears the losses in such breaches more generally, what emerging cybersecurity technologies may help prevent them, and what role the government could play in encouraging their adoption. The report addresses policy issues that were discussed in the 113th Congress to deal with these issues.
Updating. This report will be updated as warranted by legislative action in the 114th Congress and by further payment system developments. |
crs_R44500 | crs_R44500_0 | Introduction to Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations
The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations Subcommittees are charged with drafting bills to provide annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and six small related agencies. Three rental assistance programs—Public Housing, Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, and Section 8 project-based rental assistance—account for the majority of the department's funding. Total annual discretionary budget authority for THUD is typically around half of the total funding provided in the bill, with the remainder made up of DOT's mandatory contract authority. The House and the Senate have not yet adopted a budget resolution for FY2017. Table 3 shows the discretionary funding provided for THUD in FY2016, the Obama Administration request for FY2017, and the amount allocated by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to the THUD subcommittees. FY2017 THUD Funding
As shown in Table 4 , the Obama Administration's FY2017 budget requested $134.5 billion for the programs in the THUD bill, $20.5 billion more than the $114.0 provided in FY2016. Most of the requested increase was for additional highway, transit, and rail funding; the request for DOT was $22 billion over FY2016. According to press reports, the Trump Administration has requested a reduction of $2.7 billion from FY2016 funding levels, zeroing out the Essential Air Services program and the TIGER (National Infrastructure Improvements) grant program and cutting funding for the New Starts program in DOT, and reducing funding for the Community Development Block Grants program in HUD. The Senate-reported S. 2844 recommended $114.2 billion for THUD; after accounting for the differences in rescissions and offsetting receipts in FY2016, this represents an increase of less than 1% over FY2016 funding. Currently, FY2017 funding is being provided through April 28, 2017, through a Continuing Appropriations Resolution ( P.L. With $2.15 billion more in rescissions and $579 million more in offsetting receipts and collections in FY2017 compared to FY2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations was able to recommend $1.9 billion more discretionary funding for THUD for FY2017, even though the committee had given THUD a discretionary allocation that was $1.1 billion less than in FY2016. On an inflation-adjusted basis, this would be the largest DOT appropriation since FY2011. House Action
The House Committee on Appropriations recommended the following:
The same amount of new budgetary resources as the Senate bill (unlike the Senate bill, there is no rescission of contract authority in the House-recommended bill, so the net total is larger than in the Senate bill). Obama Administration Budget
The Obama Administration's budget proposal for DOT included the following:
A request for $96.9 billion in budgetary resources, an increase of 29% over the amount provided for FY2016 (for budget scoring purposes, a rescission of $2.4 billion reduces the net total requested to $94.5 billion). House Action
H.R. $38.7 billion in net budget authority, reflecting savings from offsets and other sources, which is about $84 million more than FY2016. Senate Action
For HUD the Senate bill (the substitute amendment to H.R. $39.7 billion in net budget authority, reflecting savings from offsets and other sources, which is $1.3 billion more than FY2016 ($1.9 billion more in appropriations and $600 million more in savings available from offsets). Increases in funding for most HUD programs, including funding for new incremental Section 8 Housing Choice vouchers. Title III: Related Agencies
Table 8 shows appropriations levels for the various related agencies funded within the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. The Surface Transportation Board was transferred from the DOT title to the Related Agencies title starting with FY2017. | The House and Senate Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations Subcommittees are charged with providing annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. THUD programs receive both discretionary and mandatory budget authority; HUD's budget generally accounts for the largest share of discretionary appropriations in the THUD bill, but when mandatory funding is taken into account, DOT's budget is larger than HUD's budget. Mandatory funding typically accounts for around half of the THUD appropriation.
The Obama Administration requested net budget authority of $134.5 billion (after scorekeeping adjustments) for FY2017, $20.6 billion (18%) over the FY2016 level. Most of this increase was for highway, transit, and passenger rail programs.
On May 19, 2016, the Senate approved $114.2 billion in net budget authority ($121.2 billion in new budget authority before scorekeeping adjustments), an increase of $244 million (less than 1%) over FY2016, for THUD for FY2017 as part of a substitute amendment to H.R. 2577 that incorporated both the Senate-reported THUD bill (S. 2844) and the Senate-reported Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies bill. On May 24, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations ordered to be reported H.R. 5394, an FY2017 THUD bill recommending $115.9 billion in net budget authority ($120.8 billion in new budget authority before scorekeeping adjustments). Congress passed two continuing appropriations resolutions to fund THUD and other federal agencies in FY2017; the current funding bill runs through April 28, 2017. The House and Senate THUD bills expired with the end of the 114th Congress.
DOT: The Obama Administration requested a $96.9 billion budget for DOT for FY2017. That was about $22 billion more than FY2016, with significant increases requested for highway, transit, and rail programs. Both the Senate and House bills largely rejected the proposed increases and recommended $76.9 billion in new budget authority for DOT, $1.8 billion more than the comparable figure in FY2016. Both bills would increase funding for federal highway and transit programs and would fund new grant programs for intercity passenger rail.
HUD: The Obama Administration requested $39.6 billion in net new budget authority for HUD for FY2017, $1.3 billion more than FY2016. The Senate bill recommended $39.2 billion in net new budget authority, representing $1.5 billion more than FY2016 and $600 million more in savings from offsets. Most of the increase is to maintain current services in HUD's primary rental assistance programs, the project-based Section 8 rental assistance program and Housing Choice Voucher program. The House committee bill also proposed increases relative to FY2016, but less than proposed by the Senate.
Related Agencies: The Obama Administration requested $350 million for the agencies in Title III (the Related Agencies). This was about $33 million less than the comparable figure for FY2016, as the request included funding for an agency that was not in the Related Agencies title in FY2016, the Surface Transportation Board. The major change in funding from FY2016 levels in the request was a cut of $35 million (20%) for the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (NRC). The Senate bill recommended $339 million, cutting another $5 million from the NRC; the House committee bill recommended $343 million, funding NRC at the requested level.
FY2017 funding is being provided through April 28, 2017, at roughly FY2016 levels through a continuing resolution. According to press reports, the Trump Administration has recommended cuts for FY2017 of $2.7 billion from FY2016 levels for THUD, including eliminating the Essential Air Services and TIGER grant programs and reducing funding for New Starts in DOT, and reducing funding for Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) in HUD. |
crs_R43710 | crs_R43710_0 | Introduction
During the 113 th Congress, the Obama Administration announced that certain federal agencies would not enforce specific aspects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) for a period of time in order to allow the public to further prepare for proper compliance with the law in the future. This has led to numerous questions regarding how courts treat administrative delays of regulatory programs. This report will discuss the general legal principles applicable to judicial review of administrative delays in two different contexts: (1) delays in meeting a specific statutory deadline for implementing rules or completing particular adjudications, and (2) delays in the enforcement of a provision of law on the public at large. The report will then address whether the procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) apply to these delays. The first type of agency delay—delays in meeting a specific statutory deadline for implementing rules or completing particular adjudications—arises when Congress has enacted a statute that expressly requires an agency to take a specific action by a specific date. The second type of delay occurs when an agency delays the enforcement of a statutory prohibition or requirement that Congress has imposed on third parties. An agency generally implements this delay by announcing that, as an enforcement policy, the agency will not pursue or punish non-compliance with the law for a certain period of time. Instead, courts will often undertake a balancing test to determine whether the court should force the agency to act. Federal agencies generally have flexibility in determining whether and when to initiate an enforcement action against a third party for violations of a law the agency is charged with administering. However, as mentioned above, an agency may be subject to a suit by a party seeking to compel the agency to take action. | Congress regularly authorizes and requires administrative agencies to implement and enforce regulatory programs. As such, agencies routinely make decisions about when to promulgate regulations and when to enforce statutory requirements against parties who violate the law.
During the 113th Congress, the Obama Administration announced that certain federal agencies would not enforce specific aspects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) for a period of time in order to allow the public to further prepare for proper compliance with the law in the future. This has led to numerous questions regarding how courts treat administrative delays of regulatory programs. When can a suit be brought to force the agency to apply the law?
It is important to distinguish between two distinct types of agency delays: (1) delays resulting from when an agency fails to meet a statutory deadline for promulgating rules or completing particular adjudications, and (2) affirmative decisions to withhold enforcement of a provision of law on the public at large. The former arises in a scenario in which Congress has enacted a statute that expressly requires an agency to take a specific action by a certain date that the agency fails to meet. Because agencies can often struggle to meet tight congressional deadlines imposed by laws, courts have established a balancing test, known as the TRAC test, to determine whether the agency should be compelled to take action. The second type of delay occurs in a scenario in which an agency refuses, for a period of time, to enforce a statutory prohibition or requirement that Congress has imposed on third parties. This type of delay is generally implemented by announcing a period of non-enforcement during which the agency will not pursue or punish non-compliance with the law. Courts determine whether these delays are reviewable in court by following the Supreme Court's holding in Heckler v. Chaney.
This report will discuss the general legal principles applied in determining whether administrative delays are reviewable in court in these two different contexts and then address whether the procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are applicable to these delays. |
crs_RL32271 | crs_RL32271_0 | Introduction
The new Medicare legislation, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, andModernization Act ( P.L. 108-173 ), addresses the importation of prescription drugs for all U.S.consumers, not just for Medicare-eligible individuals. (1) These provisions are rooted in consumer and congressional concernwith the high cost of prescription drugs in the United States. International comparisons of drugprices have confirmed that American consumers, particularly the elderly and uninsured, often paymore for prescription drugs than do citizens in other countries. (2) The importation oflower-priced prescription drugs is one strategy to reduce U.S. consumer spending. The new Act, despite being structured as a replacement to the importation provisions in theMedicine Equity and Drug Safety (MEDS) Act of 2000, does not effectively change U.S.prescription drug importation policy. The details it adds will not be implemented unless theSecretary of Health and Human Services (hereafter referred to as the Secretary) certifies to Congressthat such imports would not threaten the health and safety of the American public and would providecost savings. That certification requirement, continued from prior law, has effectively haltedimplementation of import provisions because no Secretary has been willing to provide the requiredcertification, a stance outlined in testimony from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The first deals with drugs from Canada. Commencement of Program. The law does notallow an individual to import a drug for personal use. Study and Report on Importation of Drugs. (17) FDAcontinues to object to these websites and states in a letter to Governor Pawlenty ofMinnesota that the states could face tort liability suits and charges of assisting incriminal activity if citizens suffer injury from these drugs. (18)
Congress
Following passage of the Medicare bill, some Members have introduced billsthat seek to allow the importation of prescription drugs. Senator Kennedy introduced S. 1992 on December 9, 2003, one sectionof which would amend the new law's importation provisions to include registration,inspection, and reporting requirements for Canadian wholesalers and pharmacistswho export prescription drugs to the United States; restore the prohibition ofmanufacturer discrimination against importers provisions from the MEDS Act;replace the report requirements now assigned to the Secretaries of HHS andCommerce with reports involving the Institute of Medicine and the GeneralAccounting Office; and remove the requirement that the Secretary certify safety andreduced cost to U.S. consumers before implementing the importation provisions. | The new Medicare legislation, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, andModernization Act ( P.L. 108-173 ), addresses the importation of prescription drugs for all U.S.consumers, not just for Medicare-eligible individuals. These provisions are rooted in consumer andcongressional concern with the high cost of prescription drugs in the United States. Internationalcomparisons of drug prices have confirmed that American consumers, particularly the elderly anduninsured, often pay more for prescription drugs than do citizens in other countries. The importationof lower-priced prescription drugs is one strategy to reduce U.S. consumer spending.
The new Act, despite being structured as a replacement to the importation provisions in theMedicine Equity and Drug Safety (MEDS) Act of 2000, does not effectively change U.S.prescription drug importation policy. The details it adds will not be implemented unless theSecretary of Health and Human Services (hereafter referred to as the Secretary) certifies to Congressthat such imports do not threaten the health and safety of the American public and do provide costsavings. That certification requirement, continued from prior law, has effectively haltedimplementation of existing import provisions because no Secretary has been willing to provide therequired certification.
The Act changes the law in four basic ways: it (1) directs the Secretary to allow imports fromCanada only (the MEDS Act had allowed imports from a specific list of industrialized countries,including Canada); (2) includes a shift in approach to the importation of prescription drugs byindividuals, by codifying the discretion in enforcement that the Food and Drug Administration(FDA) has exercised to allow the "personal use" imports of prescription drugs; (3) eliminates theprohibition against a manufacturer's entering into agreements to prevent the sale or distribution ofimported products; and (4) includes a mechanism, based on evidence, by which the Secretary canterminate the import program.
Following enactment of the Medicare bill in December 2003, some Members of Congresshave moved to amend the importation of prescription drugs provisions. Some states and localitieshave set up websites to facilitate individuals' purchase of prescription drugs from Canadianpharmacies. FDA has responded. In letters to state officials, FDA has warned that states could facetort liability suits and charges of assisting in criminal activity if citizens suffer injury from thesedrugs. FDA, via the Department of Justice, has gone to the courts to stop the Canadian and U.S.distributors of drugs imported from Canada. |
crs_R42571 | crs_R42571_0 | Since 2008, however, the residential mortgage market has experienced historically high default and foreclosure rates, credit losses, liquidity problems, and tighter mortgage standards. In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) formed to provide liquidity and access to the mortgage market, have been placed in conservatorship and have received various types of financial support from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve. In the first nine months of 2012, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together owned or securitized 77% of new mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and Ginnie Mae, which is part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), guaranteed the other 23%. Some have questioned the solvency of the mortgage insurance program of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). In coming years, the residential mortgage market is likely to change in response to legislation, regulatory actions, demographic changes, and continuing problems in the mortgage market. Changes to the mortgage market can be organized into three categories: legislative, regulatory, and demographic. Legislative Changes
In the 112 th Congress there were many bills introduced that would have changed the residential mortgage market. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could have been affected by more than 45 bills that were introduced. The maximum unpaid balance on mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or guaranteed by the FHA and Ginnie Mae (part of the HUD) with the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, has been changed by legislation six times since 2008. New Regulations
Government agencies are developing new regulations that will affect the mortgage market. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ) requires the Consumer Finance Protection Board (CFPB) to adopt regulations to implement "qualified residential mortgages" (QRMs) and financial regulators to implement "qualified mortgages" (QMs), which would affect risk retention, underwriting, pooling, and selling the mortgages as MBSs. Expected changes in house prices, income, household size, and government incentives are important. Today, homeowners seeking a mortgage apply to a mortgage originator, which may or may not be part of a larger financial organization. The originator typically sells the mortgage to a securitizer, which pools them into MBSs that are in turn sold to institutional investors, including trusts, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds. Both the mortgage guarantees to lenders and the MBS guarantee to investors are backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. They either hold the MBSs as an investment or sell them to others. Savings institutions (such as savings and loans) were important 1957-1991. When the original lender retains the servicing rights, the borrower has no indication who owns the loan. Appendix A. The Housing IGs list the following HUD programs:
One- to Four-Family Home Mortgage Insurance Single Family Disposition Program Mortgage Insurance for Disaster Victims Rehabilitation Loan Insurance Energy Efficient Mortgage Insurance Good Neighbor Next Door Graduated Payment Mortgage FHA Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Loss Mitigation Manufactured Homes Loan Insurance (Title I) Property Improvement Loan Insurance (Title I) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage HOPE for Homeowners Insured Mortgages on Hawaiian Home Lands FHA Insured Mortgages on Indian Land Neighborhood Stabilization Program 1 Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 Neighborhood Stabilization Program 3 Emergency Homeowners' Loan Program Ginnie Mae Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs)
The Housing IGs list two USDA programs:
Single Family Housing Guaranteed Loan Program (GLP) Single Family Housing Direct Loan Program (DLP)
They list one VA program:
VA Home Loan Program
At FHFA, they list programs run by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks:
Making Home Affordable Programs Mortgage-Backed Securities Program Mortgage Purchasing and Retained Portfolio Mortgage Servicing Program Real Estate Owned Purchasing and Financing Program Acquired Member Asset (AMA) Program Advances, Letters of Credit, and Lines of Credit Affordable Housing Program (AHP) and Community Investment Program (CIP) Office of Finance Debt Issuance Private-Label Mortgage Purchases Program
Provisions in the tax code that reduce the tax liabilities of individual income taxpayers for activities related to homeownership include the following:
Deduction for Mortgage Interest on Owner-Occupied Residences Deduction for Property Taxes on Owner-Occupied Residences Increased Standard Deduction of Real Property Taxes on Owner-Occupied Residences Deduction for Premiums for Qualified Mortgage Insurance Exclusion of Capital Gains on Sales of Principal Residences Exclusion of Interest on State and Local Government Bonds for Owner-Occupied Housing First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit Exclusion of Income Attributable to the Discharge of Principal Residence Acquisition Indebtedness
Policy Reasons Advanced For and Against Government Support
Economists and policy analysts usually begin their analysis of proposed or actual government interventions by asking, "What is the market failure?" | This report provides an overview of the changing residential mortgage market, focusing on trends in housing prices, homeownership, mortgage characteristics, and financing. It also examines legislation and regulations designed to promote the efficient functioning of the mortgage market.
Congressional Concern About Mortgages
Congressional interest in residential mortgage markets has increased following the collapse of the housing bubble, government financial support to the mortgage market, and housing's perceived importance to the broader economic recovery. Since 2008, the residential mortgage market has experienced some of the highest default and foreclosure rates since the Great Depression. The future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that have long been central pillars of the mortgage market, is also the subject of congressional debate. Both GSEs are currently in conservatorship and have received financial support from the U.S. Department of the Treasury. There is also concern over the financial conditions of the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA's) mortgage guarantee program.
How Mortgages Are Funded
Today and in the foreseeable future, home mortgages are indirectly financed by financial institutions, such as pension funds, college endowments, central banks, and sovereign wealth funds. A household seeking a mortgage typically applies directly to an organization (or part of a larger organization) that specializes in the mortgage origination process. This mortgage originator applies computer algorithms to the applicant's credit scores, earnings history, savings information, and other data to underwrite (evaluate) the mortgage application. The originator may "hold the mortgage in portfolio" as an investment or sell it within days of being issued. In the latter case, the mortgage might be sold again, and typically ends up pooled with other mortgages in a mortgage-backed security (MBS) that is guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or by the federal government through Ginnie Mae, which is part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The MBS frequently is sold to an institutional investor. In many cases servicing is contracted out and the homeowner does not know who actually owns the mortgage.
Possible Changes to the Residential Mortgage Market
Change is expected on a variety of fronts.
More than 45 bills were introduced in the 112th Congress to enhance the accountability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Some of the bills sought to reduce the cost to the government, while others sought to change the enterprises' charters if or when they leave conservatorship. Previously enacted legislation requires regulations for full implementation. For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) requires new regulations affecting risk retention and mandating that mortgages be "suitable" for borrowers. The maximum size of mortgages that can be purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or included in MBSs guaranteed by Ginnie Mae (part of the FHA) with the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, has been changed by legislation six times since 2008. Demographics, the recent recession, and the experience of the housing bubble each are likely to result in changes to household formation and homeownership preferences regardless of any legislation enacted into law.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R43035 | crs_R43035_0 | Since Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), transferred power to a quasi-civilian government in March 2011, Congress has been largely deferential to the decisions of the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury on the conduct of U.S. policy towards Burma. The Obama Administration has ushered in a new approach to U.S. relations with Burma (Myanmar). Over the last two years, the Obama Administration has responded to such promising developments in Burma by enhancing and increasing high-level meetings with the Thein Sein government and selectively easing many of the existing sanctions on Burma. The 113 th Congress may choose to consider a number of different issues raised by the Obama Administration's Burma policy, as well as Burma's political and economic development, including:
Is President Thein Sein's government committed to democracy and the protection of human rights in Burma, and does it have the ability to continue to implement reforms? Little is known about the attitudes of senior military officers toward Burma's political reforms or what role they think the military should have in Burma's "disciplined democracy." Some critics of the Obama Administration's handling of Burma relations maintain that it has moved too fast and too far in relaxing sanctions and has become too close to President Thein Sein and the Union Government. Other critics say that the Obama Administration has moved too slowly and cautiously, and that the United States is losing what little influence it may have over the political dynamics and economic development of Burma. Three of the five new laws— P.L. 112-33 , P.L. 112-36 , and P.L. 112-163 —extended the general import ban contained in Section 3 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-61 ) which is subject to annual renewal. 112-74 and P.L. P.L. 112-192 granted the Secretary of the Treasury the option of instructing the U.S. Executive Director at any international financial institution to "vote in favor of the provision of assistance for Burma by the institution, notwithstanding any other provision of law" if the President has determined to do so is in the national interest of the United States. Specific Issues and Implementation
Beyond the possibility of examining the general framework of U.S. policy towards Burma, Congress may also contemplate pursuing a number of specific issues related to U.S. policy, including the Obama Administration's implementation of the existing laws specifying aspects of U.S. policy. 108-61 ); and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act) ( P.L. The 113 th Congress may, if it so decides, take an active role in the determination and conduct of U.S. policy towards Burma during this potentially critical period in the nation's possible transition to a civilian democratic government based on the rule of law and the protection of basic human rights. | U.S. policy towards Burma has undergone a discernible shift in its approach since a quasi-civilian government was established in March 2011. While the overall objectives of U.S. policy towards the country remain in place—the establishment of civilian democratic government based on the rule of law and the protection of basic human rights—the Obama Administration has moved from a more reactive, "action-for-action" strategy and a skeptical and cautious attitude towards the newly created Union Government and Union Parliament to a more proactive mode. The new approach is designed to foster further reforms based on some form of partnership with the Union Government, headed by President Thein Sein.
During the last two years, the Obama Administration has conducted much of its policy towards Burma using existing constitutional and legal authority, while regularly consulting with Congress about the actions taken. The 112th Congress passed five laws containing provisions related to U.S. policy in Burma. Three laws—P.L. 112-33, P.L. 112-36, and P.L. 112-163—extended the general import ban contained in Section 3 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (2003 BFDA, P.L. 108-61) which is subject to annual renewal. P.L. 112-74 placed restrictions on the use in Burma of appropriated funds for certain Defense and State Department programs. P.L. 112-192 granted the Secretary of the Treasury the option of instructing the U.S. Executive Director at any international financial institution to "vote in favor of the provision of assistance for Burma by the institution, notwithstanding any other provision of law" if the President has determined that to do so is in the national interest of the United States. The 113th Congress will have the opportunity to decide what role it will play in the future course of U.S. policy in Burma.
The Administration's Burma policy in 2011 and 2012 may be characterized as the combination of increasing engagement with Burma's Union Government, Union Parliament, and selected opposition groups, and the waiving or easing of many of the existing economic sanctions imposed on Burma by various laws, including the 2003 BFDA and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-286). However, the Administration may decide that it is approaching the limit of actions it can take with regard to easing of sanctions without Congress passing new legislation.
Some critics of the Obama Administration say that it has moved too fast and too far in easing the existing sanctions, given the continued reports of serious human rights violations and significant restrictions on civil liberties. Other critics think the Administration has moved too slowly and cautiously in waiving sanctions, hindering the reform process in Burma and blocking greater U.S. participation in Burma's economic development.
Certain key issues with regard to Burma's political situation may be important to the future course of U.S. policy in Burma. First, President Thein Sein's vision for Burma's "disciplined democracy" has not been clearly elaborated, and his commitment to further reforms remains untested. Second, the view of Burma's military leadership on political reforms is uncertain. Third, the path for possible reconciliation between the country's Burman majority and various ethnic minorities is unclear. |
crs_R43771 | crs_R43771_0 | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) includes a number of provisions intended to improve access to health insurance coverage. Some of these provisions apply to the small group market to address perceived problems in the market, including lower offer rates among smaller employers and the cost of coverage. The small business health options program (SHOP) exchanges are among these provisions. SHOP exchanges are marketplaces where private health insurance issuers sell health insurance plans to small employers. All SHOP exchanges are administered in one of three ways: solely by a state, solely by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), or by HHS with some degree of state involvement. All health plans sold through a SHOP exchange must be certified as qualified health plans (QHPs). ACA and its implementing regulations include some prescriptive requirements for the establishment and operation of SHOP exchanges. These requirements often apply similarly to SB-SHOPs and FF-SHOPs. When ACA and regulations are not prescriptive, decisions about the establishment and operation of SHOP exchanges are left to a state or the entity administering the SHOP exchange (e.g., HHS). As a result, not all SB-SHOPs and FF-SHOPs share the same features or implement shared features in the same way. This report describes certain features of SHOP exchanges. Each description includes information about how the feature is implemented in SB-SHOP and FF-SHOP exchanges. Each description also includes information about the timing of implementation. The report concludes with a discussion about the current and future place of SHOP exchanges in the broader context of the private health insurance market. In order for an employee to be eligible to obtain coverage through a SHOP exchange, a SHOP-eligible employer must offer the employee coverage. An FF-exchange will certify a QHP for the individual market only if the issuer meets one of the following conditions:
the QHP issuer offers at least one small group market QHP at the silver level and one at the gold level through the state's FF-SHOP; the QHP issuer does not offer small group market plans in the state, but another issuer in the same issuer group offers at least one small group market QHP at the silver level and one at the gold level through the state's FF-SHOP; or neither the QHP issuer nor any other issuer in the same group has a share of the small group market greater than 20% (as determined by HHS). | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) includes a number of provisions intended to improve access to health insurance coverage. Among these are provisions that apply to the small group market to address perceived problems in the market, including low offer rates among smaller employers and the sometimes prohibitive cost of health plans available in the small group market.
The small business health option program (SHOP) exchanges are among the ACA provisions directed at the small group market. SHOP exchanges are marketplaces where private health insurance issuers sell health insurance plans to small employers. All health plans available through SHOP exchanges must meet certain federally required criteria, such as offering a standardized package of benefits. Certain small employers may be eligible to receive tax credits toward the cost of coverage if they obtain coverage through a SHOP exchange.
A SHOP exchange is currently in operation in every state; some are administered by states, while others are administered in part or in entirety by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). ACA and its implementing regulations include some prescriptive requirements for the establishment and operation of SHOP exchanges. Although these requirements often apply uniformly to all SHOP exchanges, in some instances that may not be the case. For example, some requirements apply only to SHOP exchanges administered by HHS and not to SHOP exchanges administered by states. When ACA and regulations are not prescriptive, decisions about the establishment and operation of SHOP exchanges are left to a state or the entity administering the SHOP exchange (e.g., HHS). As a result, not all SHOP exchanges share the same features or similarly implement shared features.
This report describes certain features of SHOP exchanges, such as employer eligibility, methods for selecting health plans offered through SHOP exchanges, and how health insurance agents and brokers interact with SHOP exchanges. Each description includes information about how the feature is implemented in SHOP exchanges administered by states and those administered in part or in entirety by HHS. Each description also includes information about the timing of implementation. The report concludes with a discussion about the current and future place of SHOP exchanges in the broader context of the private health insurance market. |
crs_RL34607 | crs_RL34607_0 | In pursuit of this goal, the APA created the position of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) within the federal government. The APA provides that when a statute requires an agency adjudication to be determined on the record, an ALJ or the agency head must preside. The first duty is to preside over the taking of evidence at agency hearings and act as the finder of facts in the proceedings. In all of these regards, ALJs, who are executive branch employees, function much like trial judges in the judicial branch. For instance, three bills in the 96 th Congress— S. 262 , H.R. Although there is ample precedent for using non-ALJs to conduct administrative adjudication in the federal agencies, there are significant differences between ALJs and non-ALJs in terms of independence, training, experience, and compensation that may affect how these two types of hearing officers review administrative appeals. | Administrative law judges (ALJs) preside at formal adjudicatory and rulemaking proceedings conducted by executive branch agencies. ALJs make decisions in these proceedings, and their administrative determinations must be based on the record of trial-type hearings. An ALJ's function as an independent, impartial trier of fact in agency hearings is comparable to the role of a trial judge presiding over non-jury civil proceedings. Although there are many ALJs working in state government, this report describes the role of federal ALJs, with a specific focus on the mission, responsibilities, and appointment of such ALJs. This report also discusses the differences between ALJs and non-ALJ hearing examiners who conduct administrative adjudication in federal agencies.
In the 111th Congress, several bills have been introduced regarding ALJs, including H.R. 2850, S. 372, and S. 1228. |
crs_R41937 | crs_R41937_0 | 2601 et seq . ; TSCA), giving the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to regulate production and use of industrial chemicals not otherwise regulated in U.S. commerce. Thirty-five years of experience with TSCA implementation and enforcement have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the law and led many to propose legislative changes to TSCA's core provisions in Title I. Based on hearing testimony, stakeholders generally agree that TSCA needs to be updated, although there is disagreement about the extent and nature of any proposed revisions. Those previous bills proposed generally similar changes to TSCA that were summarized in CRS Report R41335, Proposed Amendments to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA): Senate and House Bills Compared with Current Law . Therefore, this report compares key provisions of S. 847 , as introduced, with provisions of TSCA Title I (15 U.S.C. Minimum Data Set Requirements
S. 847 , as introduced, directs the EPA Administrator to establish varied or tiered minimum data set requirements for different chemical substances or categories of substances. Data sets would have to be submitted within five years of the date of enactment of S. 847 . Current law does not routinely require submission of data for chemicals, but EPA has the authority to require data submission if it promulgates a rule based on a finding that a chemical "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment" and the agency demonstrates a data need. Prioritization of Chemicals
S. 847 directs the EPA Administrator to prioritize all chemicals already in commerce for evaluation and risk management by establishing a list that "contains the names of the chemical substances that … warrant placement within 1 of 3 priority classes … and identifies the priority class to which each listed chemical substance or category of chemical substance has been assigned by the Administrator." S. 847 would prohibit manufacture, processing, and distribution of any chemical substance for any use that had not been included in the safety determination issued for that chemical. In contrast, current law allows manufacture of and commerce in a chemical unless EPA promulgates a rule including a finding that a chemical presents or will present an "unreasonable risk" to human health or the environment. If EPA demonstrates that a risk associated with a chemical is unreasonable (relative to the benefits provided by the chemical and the estimated risks and benefits of any alternatives), the Agency is required to regulate, but only to the extent necessary to reduce that risk to a reasonable level and using "the least burdensome" restriction. S. 847 would authorize EPA activities not currently authorized under TSCA to allow implementation of three international agreements pertaining to persistent organic pollutants and other hazardous chemicals. One provision, for example, would require definition and listing of localities with populations that are "disproportionately exposed" to toxic chemicals. EPA would be directed to develop an action plan to reduce exposure in such "hot spots." Children's environmental health also is addressed by the bill. "Green chemistry and engineering" also would be promoted through grants. Finally, S. 847 would direct EPA to minimize use of animals in toxicity testing. Tables 1 through 6 summarize these and other selected provisions of S. 847 . | Thirty-five years of experience implementing and enforcing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the law and led many to propose legislative changes to TSCA's core provisions. Stakeholders appear to agree that TSCA needs to be updated, although there is disagreement about the extent and nature of any proposed revisions. S. 847 in the 112th Congress legislation would amend core provisions of TSCA Title I. This report compares key provisions of S. 847, as introduced, with current law (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.).
Generally, S. 847 would increase the amount of information about chemical toxicity and usage that chemical manufacturers and processors would be required to submit to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and would facilitate EPA regulation of toxic chemicals. The bill directs EPA to establish, by rule, varied or tiered minimum data set requirements for different chemical substances or categories of substances. Data would be required from chemical manufacturers and processors for all chemicals within five years of the date of enactment of S. 847, earlier for high-priority chemicals. All chemicals already in commerce are to be placed on a list and prioritized by EPA into three groups based on the need for risk management. A chemical must be included in the highest priority class if it "is, or is degraded and metabolized into, a persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic substance with the potential for widespread exposure to humans or other organisms." EPA is required to determine whether chemicals in the top two priority classes, as well as all new chemicals, meet a stringent new safety standard, given the imposition of any needed restrictions on manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal. The bill would prohibit any activities with respect to an evaluated chemical substance that the EPA had not specifically allowed in the safety standard determination.
In contrast, current law authorizes data collection from manufacturers only if exposure is expected to be substantial or if EPA determines that a chemical may pose an unreasonable risk. TSCA as currently written allows all chemicals to enter and remain in commerce unless EPA can show that a chemical poses "an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." EPA then must regulate to control unreasonable risk, but only to the extent necessary using the "least burdensome" means of available control. This TSCA standard has been interpreted to require cost-benefit balancing.
S. 847 also would add new sections to TSCA. Of particular significance is a section authorizing actions that would allow U.S. implementation of three international agreements, which the United States has signed but not yet ratified. Other new sections would provide authority for EPA to support research in so-called "green" engineering and chemistry, promote alternatives to toxicity testing on animals, encourage research on children's environmental health, and require biomonitoring of pregnant women and infants. A "hot spots" provision would require EPA to identify locations where residents are disproportionately exposed to pollution and to develop strategies for reducing their risks.
Key provisions of S. 847 are compared with current law in Tables 1 through 6. |
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