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crs_R44832 | crs_R44832_0 | Introduction
Prescription drug affordability has gained renewed attention in the past few years, as retail drug spending has risen at the fastest pace in more than a decade. There are several reasons for the increase in drug spending. Manufacturers have been introducing new drugs at a record rate and raising prices for existing brand-name products. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) forecasts that retail drug spending could average 6.3% annual growth from 2017 to 2026. Although that growth rate would be a reduction from recent, more rapid levels, CMS expects retail drug spending to increase faster than other areas of medical spending in this 10-year period. This report will address frequently asked questions about government and private-sector policies that affect drug prices and availability. Among the prescription drug topics covered are federally funded research and development, regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising, legal restrictions on reimportation, and federal price negotiation. The report provides a broad overview of the issues and references to more in-depth CRS products. The appendix provides references to relevant congressional hearings (see Appendix ). Drug spending rose by 8.9% in 2015 before slowing to a 1.3% increase in 2016 and a forecasted 2.9% increase in 2017. The rapid increase in retail drug spending in 2014 and 2015 was driven largely by the introduction of new high-cost drugs, price increases for existing drugs, and the diminishing impact of generic substitution, as fewer brand-name drugs lost patent protection than in previous years. Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) also helped to propel drug demand. The introduction of new hepatitis C drugs, which can cure the disease, played a large role in increased drug spending in 2014 and 2015, accounting for nearly 40% of the net growth in total U.S. drug spending in 2014 and two-thirds of increased brand-name prescription drug spending by employer-sponsored health plans that year. Manufacturers also have raised prices for a number of existing generic drugs in the past several years. However, the number of consumers with high out-of-pocket costs—such as those with serious conditions or those prescribed specialty drugs—has increased. Congress and presidential administrations have expanded subsidized drug coverage to tens of millions of consumers during the past decade by implementing Medicare Part D and expanding eligibility for Medicaid as part of the ACA. Congress included a reworking of the MEDS Act provision in 2003 in the Medicare Modernization and Prescription Drug Act of 2003 (MMA; P.L. Some states have attempted to enact their own laws allowing prescription drug importation. | Prescription drugs play an important role in the U.S. health care system. Innovative, breakthrough drugs are providing cures for diseases such as hepatitis C and helping individuals with chronic conditions lead fuller lives. Studies show that prescription drug therapy can produce health care savings by reducing the number of hospitalizations and other costly medical procedures.
Congress and presidential administrations have attempted to ensure that Americans have access to pharmaceuticals by enacting the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit as part of the Medicare Modernization and Prescription Drug Act of 2003 (MMA; P.L. 108-173) and expanding drug coverage under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). Congress also has enacted laws to encourage manufacturing of lower-cost generic drugs, as well as cutting-edge biologics and biosimilars.
Americans are using more prescription drugs, and for longer periods of time, than in past decades. Still, access to prescription drugs remains an issue for a number of consumers, particularly those without insurance; those prescribed expensive specialty drugs for treating serious or rare diseases; or those enrolled in private insurance or public health plans with high cost-sharing requirements, such as drug deductibles and coinsurance.
Prescription drug affordability has gained renewed attention during the past few years as retail drug spending has risen at the fastest pace in more than a decade—growing 12.4% in 2014 and 8.9% in 2015 before slowing to a 1.3% increase in 2016. There are several reasons for the recent volatility in drug spending. Manufacturers have been introducing new drugs at a record rate and raising prices for many existing brand-name products. The introduction of new hepatitis C drugs at the end of 2013 had a major impact on total drug spending in 2014 and 2015. At the same time, fewer brand-name drugs have lost patent protection than in previous years, resulting in less impact from the use of lower-cost generic substitutes. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) forecasts that retail drug spending could average 6.3% annual growth from 2017 to 2026. Although that growth rate would be a reduction from the average level of the past several years, CMS expects retail drug spending to increase faster than other areas of medical spending in this 10-year period.
This report will address frequently asked questions about government and private-sector policies that affect drug prices and availability. Among the prescription drug topics covered are federally funded research and development, regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising, legal restrictions on reimportation, and federal price negotiation. The report provides a broad overview of the issues as well as references to more in-depth CRS products. The appendix provides references to relevant congressional hearings and documents (see Appendix). |
crs_98-485 | crs_98-485_0 | Congressional Concerns and Issues for Policy (1)
Members of Congress were concerned about allegations that U.S. firms provided expertise tothe People's Republic of China (PRC) that could be used in its ballistic missile and space programsand that the Clinton Administration's policies on satellite exports facilitated legal or illegal transfersof military-related technology to China. The New York Times reported in April 1998 that the JusticeDepartment began a criminal investigation into whether Loral Space and Communications Ltd. (ofNew York), and Hughes Electronics Corp. (of Los Angeles) violated export control laws. (2) The firmswere alleged to have shared their findings with China, without approval from the U.S. government,on the cause of a PRC rocket's explosion while launching a U.S.-origin satellite in February 1996. In sharing their conclusions, the companies allegedly provided expertise that China could use toimprove the accuracy and reliability of its ballistic missiles, including their guidance systems. (5)
This CRS Report discusses security concerns, significant congressional and administration action, and a comprehensive chronology pertaining to satellite exports to China (since 1988 underthe Reagan Administration). (10)
Loral. However, at least three classified studies found serious concerns about the U.S. firms' assistance to China's ballistic missile modernization program. (34)
Then on December 26, 2002, the Department of State's Office of Defense Trade Controls issued a letter charging the Hughes Electronics Corporation and Boeing Satellite Systems (whichacquired the Hughes Space and Communications Company in 2000) with 123 violations of the ArmsExport Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations in connection with technologytransfers to China after the failed launches of the Apstar-2 satellite in January 1995 and theIntelsat-708 satellite in February 1996, and other activities. On March 5, 2003, Hughes Electronics Corporation and Boeing Satellite Systems announced that they reached a settlement with the State Department with a civil penalty of $32 million ($4million for past expenditures on enhancing export programs, $8 million in future investments tostrengthen export control compliance programs, and $20 million paid over seven years). (37)
Lockheed Martin. (See CRS Report RL31555 , China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues , byShirley Kan.) China has had no commercial satellite launches since 2000 (see Table 3 ). Additional Congressional Mandates
In 1998, Congress passed the Defense Authorization Act for FY1999 ( P.L. Senate Intelligence Committee, July 15, 1998. Investigations
Cox Committee. On May 25, 1999, the Cox Committee released the declassifiedversion of its January 3, 1999 classified report on its investigation of U.S. technology transfers toChina. (60) (See CRS Report RL30220(pdf) .) The NSC, however, opposed other recommendations, including the followingobjections:
assessments at the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Justice, and the CIA on security risks in U.S.-PRC lab-to-lab exchanges should be conducted by intelligence experts,not inspector generals;
the United States should not deny exports of high-performance computers ifChina does not permit effective end-use verification, including surprise on-site inspections, by an"arbitrary deadline" of September 30, 1999;
export control procedures do not need longer review periods where an agency'smid-level officials may "stop the clock" on national security grounds with "indefinite" and"unjustified" delays;
export control procedures requiring consensus of reviewing agencies would"hinder the deliberative process;"
new legislation, beyond the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, was not neededto require examination of: trade flows to China through Hong Kong, U.S. export control policy oftreating Hong Kong differently from China, and unmonitored border crossings by PRC militaryvehicles;
legislation that would amend the Defense Production Act of 1950 to requiremandatory notifications to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) byany U.S. national security-related business of any planned mergers, acquisition, or takeovers by aforeign or foreign-controlled entity could "chill legitimate foreign investment" that is strongly inU.S. political process in 1996. (79) At a conferencecommittee meeting on September 17, 1998, House and Senate conferees agreed to transfer thelicensing authority over commercial satellites back to the State Department in an effort to strengthenexport controls. 106th Congress. 107th Congress and 108th Congress. 108-7 ) to require that the Department of State notify the Committees onAppropriations at least 15 days in advance of obligating or expending funds for processing licensesto export U.S.-origin satellites (including commercial satellites and satellite components) to China. Legislation for State Department appropriations in FY 2004 ( H.R. 2799 and S. 1585 ) would continue the requirement. In the case of exports to the PRC, approvals for export licenses arealso contingent upon a presidential waiver of post-Tiananmen sanctions. | Congress has been concerned about whether U.S. firms, in activities connected with exporting satellites, provided expertise to China for use in its ballistic missile and space programs and whetherU.S. policy has facilitated transfers of military-related technology to China. This CRS Reportdiscusses security concerns, policy changes, congressional action, and a chronology of majordevelopments since 1988 under President Reagan. It is updated as warranted.
Some critics opposed satellite exports to China, while others were concerned that the Clinton Administration relaxed export controls and monitoring of commercial satellites in moving thelicensing authority from the State Department to the Commerce Department in 1996. A range ofconcerns were prompted by New York Times reports in April 1998 that the Justice Department begana criminal investigation into whether Loral Space and Communications Ltd. and Hughes ElectronicsCorp. violated export control laws. The firms allegedly shared their findings with China on the causeof a rocket's explosion while launching a U.S.-origin satellite in February 1996. The companiesreportedly provided expertise that China could use to improve the accuracy and reliability of itsfuture ballistic missiles, including their guidance systems. At least three classified studies reportedlyfound that U.S. national security was harmed. Congress and the Executive Branch also investigatedHughes' review of China's launch failure of January 1995. After failed satellite launches in 1992,1995, and 1996, China has reported 28 consecutive, successful commercial and government/militaryspace launches. In 2000, the State Department and Lockheed Martin agreed to a settlement with afine of $13 million. In 2002, Loral announced a civil settlement with a fine of $20 million. In early2003, Hughes and Boeing agreed to a civil penalty of $32 million.
In 1998, Congress passed the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 105-261 ) that transferred licensing authority over satellites back to the State Department (effective March 15,1999). On December 30, 1998, the Cox Committee unanimously approved a classified report saidto conclude that China's technology acquisitions over the past 20 years, not only that associated withsatellite launches, harmed U.S. national security. The Senate Intelligence Committee released itsunclassified report on May 7, and the Cox Committee issued a declassified report on May 25, 1999(see CRS Report RL30220(pdf) ). Congress has debated whether to shift satellite export controls back toCommerce. Congress also oversees the Bush Administration's actions, including any newPresidential waivers of post-Tiananmen sanctions (after the last waiver in 1998 for Loral'sChinasat-8); export licenses; reviews of policy toward China on satellite exports or spacecooperation; and weapons proliferation sanctions that have banned satellite exports to China sinceSeptember 2001, with new sanctions imposed on September 19, 2003 (see CRS Report RL31555 ). China has had no commercial satellite launches since 2000. Legislation for State Departmentappropriations for FY2004 ( H.R. 2799 and S. 1585 ) wouldcontinue torequire State to notify the Committees on Appropriations at least 15 days in advance of obligatingor expending funds for processing licenses to export U.S.-origin satellites to China. |
crs_RL31650 | crs_RL31650_0 | In a press release committee leaders announced that "Among the purposes of this jointeffort is ascertaining why the Intelligence Community did not learn of the September 11th attacks inadvance, and to identify what, if anything, might be done to better the position [of] the IntelligenceCommunity to warn of and prevent future terrorist attacks and other threats of the 21st Century." As the Joint Inquiry completes it work and committee members draft their final report, onNovember 27, 2002 Congress passed the FY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act which establishes an independent commission with a charter to conduct a wide-ranging investigation and assessmentof the events surrounding the 9/11 attacks. The Joint Inquiry of the Intelligence Committees
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, there was widespread support for aninvestigation of the performance of relevant agencies would be necessary following, in part, theprecedent of the congressional investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Difficulties over staffassignments complicated the Inquiry's early months. Public hearings, originally anticipated in May, werepostponed several times and finally began in mid-September. Attack preparations have been made. In addition, the need to prepare for trials led to a disinclination bythe FBI to cooperate with intelligence agencies out of concern that evidence might be tainted by alink with intelligence agencies and not usable in court proceedings. The Staff Director drew attention to the institutional "walls" that had been erected to govern the use of information acquired by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Ms. Hill noted that former FBI Director Freehhad maintained that the Bureau had provided all available intelligence acquired by the Bureau to theCIA, but this was "an assertion that individuals at the working level at the CIA strongly contest...." (26) She concluded: "The events of September 11, 2001 have led to an almost universal acknowledgmentin the United States Government of the need for consolidating and streamlining collection, analysis,and dissemination of information concerning threats to the United States and its interests." Public Testimony by Witnesses
The public hearings conducted by the two intelligence committees provided an opportunity todescribe how intelligence and law enforcement agencies had reacted to the rise of radical Islamicterrorism in the 1990s and the attacks on Bin Laden's organization by the Clinton Administration(although covert operations were only briefly mentioned). There were no slip ups. They boarded the aircraft lawfully. An Independent Commission: Possible Issues
With the passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 ( P.L. 107-306 ) Congress approved the establishment of an independent commission to assess the background to theSeptember 2001 attacks. Another issue concerns the appropriate role of intelligence agencies in tracking terrorists who may conduct operations in the U.S. When, where, and under what circumstances should thegovernment collect intelligence about the activities of U.S. citizens? In describing procedures that may have affected the ability of governmentalofficials to gain advance notice of the terrorists' plans, the Inquiry focused on testimony thatsuggested available information in the possession of some agencies was not fully shared with othersin a timely manner. Thus far, a number of statutory changes have been enacted and a new Departmentof Homeland Security has been established. | The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led many to inquire whether there had been a failure by United States intelligence agencies to collect all available information about the plots that led tothe attacks, to analyze it properly, and disseminate it in time to protect the American public. Congressional intelligence committees responded by launching an unprecedented Joint Inquiry toinvestigate the Intelligence Community's record in regard to the 9/11 attacks and makerecommendations for further legislative action. The Joint Inquiry began its investigation in February2002 and held public hearings in September and October. Findings, conclusions, andrecommendations were made public in December 2002; release of the final report is anticipated in2003.
In public hearings, the Joint Inquiry's Staff Director traced salient aspects of the Inquiry's work and emphasized that, whereas the Intelligence Community provided ample warning of an impendingattack in mid-2001 against the U.S. by the Islamic terrorist group headed by Osama Bin Laden, theCommunity did not learn in advance the plans for the aircraft hijackings that occurred on September11.
The Joint Inquiry focused on several underlying problems. For a number of Constitutional, statutory, and organization reasons, information collected by intelligence agencies has historicallynot been routinely used for law enforcement purposes. Similarly, information collected inpreparation for trials has not been routinely forwarded to intelligence agencies. In an era in whichterrorists work abroad to launch attacks in the U.S., some have argued that the "walls" betweenintelligence and law enforcement have complicated the ability of any agency to put together acomplete picture of evolving plots. Explaining the complexity of this situation was a majorcontribution of the Inquiry, although the issue of breaching these "walls" remains complicated andcontroversial.
In addition, the Inquiry examined the role of the FBI. There were criticisms of the Bureau's ability to: process and store information; provide communications links between field offices andheadquarters; process applications for surveillance; and coordinate with intelligence agencies. Morefundamentally, the intelligence committees examined priorities that, prior to September 11, 2001,did not emphasize counterterrorism to the extent that has subsequently been considered necessary.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 ( P.L. 107-306 ) establishes an independent commission to assess the role of agencies throughout the government with regard to the 9/11 attacks. This independent commission, to be headed by former New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean, willbuild upon the investigatory record of the Joint Inquiry, but might reach further to assessorganizational issues and the proper relationship of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Thisreport will be updated as circumstances dictate. |
crs_RL33699 | crs_RL33699_0 | In the United States, agricultural and food exports totaled $73.7 billion in 2004, 9% of total U.S. merchandise exports. Brazil's Commodity Production and Exports
Brazil is the world's largest producer of orange juice and coffee, and the second largest producer of soybeans, beef, and poultry. In 2005, Brazil was the world's leading exporter of soybeans, poultry (broilers), beef, orange juice, coffee, and sugar. It was also the world's fourth largest exporter of pork. Argentina produced 18% of the world's soybeans in 2005. Brazil's share of world soybean exports was 40% in 2005. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) forecasters expect that the United States will become the leading exporter again in 2006. The United States is the world's leading producer of poultry with 27% of world production. The European Union and China were the next largest producers of beef and veal in 2005. Brazil's world export market share for beef was 26% in 2005. Brazil's share of world orange juice production was 59% in 2005. Brazil's share of world coffee production is 32%. Coffee is produced in the United States in only Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Brazil's share of world coffee exports in 2005 was 28%. The European Union was the world's second largest producer of sugar with 21.6 million mt of production or 15.4% of the world's total. Exports
Brazil is the world's leading exporter of sugar, accounting for 38% of global sugar exports. The United States with only 235,000 mt of sugar exports in 2004/2005 is a minor exporter. The United States is the world's second largest producer of cotton with production amounting to 5 million mt in 2004/2005 or 19% of total world production. India and Pakistan are the world's third and fourth largest producers, while Brazil with production of 1.3 million mt in 2004/2005 is the world's fifth largest producer. Exports
The United States is the world's leading exporter of cotton with exports in 2004/2005 of 3.1 million mt, amounting to 41% of world cotton exports. | Brazil is a major world producer and exporter of agricultural products. In 2004, Brazil exported $30.9 billion worth of agricultural and food products, making it the world's third-largest exporter of agricultural products after the United States and the European Union. Brazil's major agricultural exports include soybeans, poultry, beef, pork, orange juice, and coffee.
Highlights of Brazil's agricultural production and exports include:
Soybeans: In 2005, Brazil, the world's second largest producer, became the world's leading exporter, with 39% of global export market share. The United States, the world's leading producer of soybeans, had a 37% share of the world soybean market, although forecasts are for the United States to return to its leading position in 2006. Poultry (Broilers): Brazil, the world's third largest producer of broilers, was the leading exporter in 2005, with 41% of the world's export market. The United States, the world's leading producer, was the second largest exporter, with 35% of the world's export market. Beef and Veal: Brazil was the world's second largest producer and the leading exporter of beef and veal in 2005. In 2005, the United States, the top global producer of beef and veal, fell to eighth place in terms of exports, due to the discovery of a cow with BSE in late 2003. Orange Juice: Brazil is the world's leading producer (59% share) and exporter (83% share) of orange juice. Coffee: Brazil is the world's leading producer and exporter of coffee. Its share of world coffee production in 2005 was 32%, while its share of world coffee exports was 28%. Sugar: Brazil is the world's leading producer and exporter of sugar. The United States is a major producer, but a minor exporter of sugar. Cotton: Brazil is the world's fifth largest producer and exporter of cotton. The United States, the world's second largest producer, is the world's leading exporter of cotton, with 41% of world exports.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44115 | crs_R44115_0 | Introduction and Background
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) provides supplemental nutrition-rich foods and nutrition education (including breastfeeding promotion and support), as well as referrals to health care and social services, to low-income, nutritionally at-risk women, infants, and children up to five years old. In FY2016, approximately 7.7 million people participated in WIC each month in programs run by 90 state agencies (50 states, District of Columbia, 5 U.S. territories, and 34 Indian Tribal Organizations). WIC and the Child Nutrition Programs were most recently reauthorized in 2010 through the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA, P.L. The WIC Farmers' Market Nutrition Program (WIC FMNP) is closely related to WIC and also authorized within Section 17 of the Child Nutrition Act (Section 17(m)). 111-296 . USDA-FNS provides cash grants for foods and "Nutrition Services and Administration" to 90 state agencies (50 states, District of Columbia, 5 U.S. territories, and 34 Indian Tribal Organizations), which operate the program through local WIC agencies and clinics. At the state level, state agencies are generally responsible for program operations within their jurisdictions. The majority of WIC's funding is distributed by USDA-FNS to states based upon allocation formulas described in federal regulations. Table 2 displays three years of federal WIC obligations. WIC has a number of federal and state eligibility requirements including categorical, financial, and nutritional risk tests. Applicants that currently receive or are eligible to receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Medicaid, or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) are adjunctively eligible. The vast majority of participants reporting income (74.1%) are at or below the federal poverty level. Benefits and Services Provided
The WIC program provides grants to states to provide benefits redeemable for specified supplemental foods (i.e., the WIC food package) and specified services. The federal food package regulations and the basis for states' approved food lists are discussed in this section. Federal Requirements for WIC-Eligible Foods
The supplemental food package in a given state is the result of federal regulation and state policies. State agencies create their eligible food lists within this framework. The bulk of participants' benefits are for specific foods, but certain participants also receive a cash value voucher (CVV) for a specified monthly dollar amount to be redeemed for fruits and vegetables. Nutrition Education, Breastfeeding, and Referral Services
In addition to food benefits, WIC also provides nutrition education and related support. States are required to ensure that nutrition education, including breastfeeding promotion and drug abuse education, is available to all pregnant, postpartum, and breastfeeding participants in the program. Retail Food Delivery Systems and the Transition to EBT
Currently, most states have their participants redeem WIC benefits using a paper food instrument in the form of a check or voucher that specifies the types and quantities of foods that can be purchased at an authorized WIC vendor. WIC's 2010 reauthorization included the requirement that state agencies transition to using electronic benefit transfer (EBT) by October 1, 2020 (the end of FY2020). Over time, one of the ways that WIC has controlled costs has been to require competitive bidding for infant formula, which has resulted in infant formula being available to states at well below market costs, especially due to manufacturers' discounts in the form of rebates to states. In FY2013, there were over 48,000 WIC authorized vendors nationwide. Therefore, states consider and monitor WIC vendors' pricing as a means of cost containment. | The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) provides nutrition-rich foods, nutrition education (including breastfeeding promotion and support), and health care and social services referrals to eligible low-income women, infants, and children. In FY2016, approximately 7.7 million people participated in WIC each month. WIC is authorized by the Child Nutrition Act, as is the related WIC Farmers' Market Nutrition Program (WIC FMNP). WIC, WIC FMNP, school meals, and the other child nutrition programs are typically reauthorized together; these programs were last reauthorized in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-296).
WIC's funding is discretionary, and the bulk of program funds are allocated via formula grant to state agencies for food costs and "Nutrition Services and Administration." In FY2016, there were 90 state agencies (50 states, District of Columbia, 5 U.S. territories, and 34 Indian Tribal Organizations). These agencies operate the program through local WIC agencies and clinics. The program obligated over $7 billion in federal funds in FY2014.
WIC has a number of federal and state eligibility rules, including categorical, financial, and nutritional risk. Participants must fall into one of WIC's participant categories: pregnant, postpartum, and breastfeeding women; infants; or children (under five years of age). Financial eligibility is met if (1) a household has income at or below 185% of the federal poverty level, or (2) applicants receive benefits through Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Medicaid, or certain state programs. Households also must meet nutritional risk criteria and reside in the state of application.
WIC provides participants with monthly benefits redeemable for specified foods to supplement their diets, as well as related nutrition and health services. WIC-eligible foods are laid out in federal regulation, and state agencies develop their own approved food lists within this framework. At the WIC clinic, participants are provided the benefits to redeem specific foods (food package) for the participant's category and individual nutritional needs. Major changes to the federal WIC food package regulations have been made in recent years; for some participant categories, the food package now includes a cash-value voucher redeemable for fruits and vegetables. One way that state agencies control WIC costs is through their approved foods lists. These lists usually include one brand of infant formula, as state agencies are required to control infant formula costs through competitive bidding for infant formula rebate contracts. In addition to providing food benefits, states are required to ensure that nutrition education, including breastfeeding promotion and drug abuse education, is available to all pregnant, postpartum, and breastfeeding participants in the program. Agencies also work to refer WIC participants to health services and other public programs, particularly Medicaid.
Nearly all states administer their programs through a retail food delivery system, in which participants purchase foods at authorized retailers (vendors). Accordingly, many WIC policies at the federal and state levels pertain to vendor authorization and oversight as well as benefit redemption. Currently, most states distribute checks or vouchers for participants to purchase WIC foods at vendors; however, state agencies are increasingly transitioning to electronic benefit transfer (EBT), in part because the 2010 reauthorization law requires this transition by October 1, 2020. States authorize vendors for the program, considering factors like a vendor's inventory and capacity and geographic distribution of vendors. States also consider and monitor WIC vendors' pricing, as required by federal law, to help contain program costs. |
crs_R41879 | crs_R41879_0 | This report provides indications of the possible effects of the proposed U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) on individual states. For each state the indications result from pairing two sets of data. Whether a state's exports are higher as a result of the KORUS FTA will depend significantly on whether firms that now export take advantage of the market openings (e.g., declining or eliminated tariffs, expanding or phased out quotas) negotiated in this trade agreement. In addition, the extent to which a state's exports change in the same pattern as projected by the USITC estimates will depend on the extent to which the industry in a given state echoes the makeup of the respective industry at the national level. Therefore, the indication of industries for which net exports (exports minus imports) are projected to increase or decrease as listed in Table 4 should be viewed as providing a general "compass" rather than serving as a precise global positioning system in projecting state industry export changes upon full implementation of the KORUS FTA. Estimating the trade effects of FTAs, including the proposed KORUS FTA, is imprecise and highly sensitive to the assumptions that are used. As a result, the data do not capture the value added by production that occurs in other states. In addition to the national-level estimates featured in this report, states may experience a broad range of benefits from liberalizing trade in services and reducing or eliminating barriers to investment flows. Potential National Sector-Specific Trade Effects of the KORUS FTA
According to studies conducted by the USITC, U.S. exports of goods to South Korea under the KORUS FTA could increase by more than imports from South Korea, in both percentage and value terms, slightly reducing, but not eliminating the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea. These estimations are based on KORUS FTA changes in tariff rates and tariff rate quotas at the end of the phase-in period of the agreement. Table 4 lists these in three groups: (1) sectors for which increases in U.S. exports to South Korea are expected to exceed increases in U.S. imports from South Korea; (2) industries for which U.S. exports and imports are not expected to increase; and (3) sectors for which U.S. imports from South Korea are expected to exceed U.S. exports to South Korea. Possible State Export Effects of the KORUS FTA
At the state level, tables are included for each state in Appendix A . At a disaggregated level, the composition of trade for any given state may differ considerably from that at the national level. However, this lack of precision may be an issue when the models are used to estimate the effects of bilateral trade agreements, especially at the state level, where the overall amount of trade and, therefore, the impact of the agreement, is expected to be less than that of a comprehensive multilateral agreement. These estimates provide an analysis of the immediate impact of the agreement and of the phased elimination of tariffs and tariff rate quotas on 40 broadly-defined industrial sectors and on a group of 20 narrowly defined industrial sectors and their sub-sectors. State Export Data Issues
As mentioned, this report uses Census Bureau data on the origin of movement of commodities by state to estimate exports to South Korea as a result of the KORUS FTA. The state identified in the data is that from which the final merchandise starts its journey. Accounting for agricultural exports by state, however, is particularly complicated. | In February 2011, the United States and South Korea finalized negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement. As a result, the Obama Administration is expected to submit implementing legislation to the 112th Congress on the proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). This report addresses congressional interest in the effects of this agreement on exports by state to South Korea by using two sets of data. Data developed by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) are used to identify the possible direction of trade change for 40 industries at the national level. These results are paired with lists of each state's top 10 exports which provide a guide to the possible direction of trade for various state industries as a result of tariff elimination and tariff rate quota reductions under the proposed KORUS FTA. Improved access for services, liberalized investment regimes, and elimination of non-tariff barriers for a few goods and agricultural products are not captured in this analysis.
Estimating the trade effects of a potential FTA, however, is highly sensitive to the assumptions used and to important limitations of the available data. Such estimates are especially problematic at the state level. As a result, the data in this report should be viewed as providing a general sense of the possible impact of the proposed FTA on state level exports. Over the full implementation period of the agreement, a broad range of economic factors can overwhelm the potential effects of tariff and tariff rate quota provisions. Whether a state's exports are higher as a result of the KORUS FTA will depend significantly on whether firms that now export take advantage of the market openings (e.g., declining or eliminated tariffs, expanding or phased out quotas) negotiated in this trade agreement. In addition, the extent to which state exports change in the same pattern as projected by the USITC estimates, will depend on the extent to which they echo the makeup of the respective industry at the national level.
While South Korea is the United States' seventh largest trading partner, it accounts for less than 3% of all U.S. trade. It has a population one-sixth that of the United States. By comparison, Canada and Mexico, the United States' first and third largest trading partners, with whom the United States also has a trade agreement (the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)), accounted for 16% and 12% respectively of total U.S. trade in 2010.
The impact of the KORUS FTA on the exports of individual states reflects both projected national effects on industrial sectors and the composition of industries within each state. Manufactured products currently dominate U.S.-South Korea trade, and the dollar value of exports in virtually all industries is expected to be higher than without a trade agreement. However, the greatest sectoral growth rate in trade is expected to come from agricultural exports, in states with large agricultural sectors. Higher imports in some industries, particularly auto and parts production, are not expected to affect gross exports, but could affect net exports.
The discussion in this report is limited to presenting the effects of the KORUS FTA on U.S. exports to South Korea on a national level with possible implications at the state level. It does not present data on U.S. imports from South Korea at the state level because of data issues. Nevertheless, increases in imports in some sectors and in some states could be higher than increases in exports as a consequence of the FTA. |
crs_R43425 | crs_R43425_0 | Nevertheless, Congress has been able to place in statute provisions that delay actions to reduce operations at or close installations that employ civilians above certain numbers. What is commonly referred to as a "BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) round," a comprehensive reduction of Department of Defense (DOD) real property, has been carried out under the provisions of temporary statutes. The authorization for the most recent BRAC round expired on April 16, 2006. Are there limits on presidential authority to close military bases? Are those restrictions laid out in permanent law? | These FAQs examine the provisions in the Constitution and in permanent statute that define and limit federal authority to disestablish or diminish employment at defense sites. They do not discuss the special, temporary BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) process that Congress has periodically authorized for the reduction of defense infrastructure. |
crs_R43647 | crs_R43647_0 | The initial House version of the Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, H.R. A Senate version, S. 2410 (113 th Congress), was introduced in the Senate on June 2, 2014, and reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services ( S.Rept. However, the Senate did not consider this bill. 3979 . Some issues were addressed in the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act, and discussed in CRS Report R43184, FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], or earlier versions of reports on this act. Those issues that were considered previously are designated with a " * " in the relevant section titles of this report. Some are concerned that the use of the term "equitable," used above, does not mean the same as "equal." Discussion: The proposed final version seeks to protect the custodial arrangements of parents who are members of the armed forces by limiting the duration of a temporary custody order, based solely on the deployment of a servicemember parent, to the period justified by the deployment of the servicemember. Reference(s) : Previously discussed in CRS Report R43184, FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R42651, FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R41874, FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40711, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34590, FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. Section 702 of H.R. 4435. | Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, along with the regular use of the reserve component personnel for operational missions, further heighten interest in a wide range of military personnel policies and issues.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on H.R. 4435, the initial House-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015; S. 2410, the version of the NDAA reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services (S.Rept. 113-176) but not considered by the full Senate; and H.R. 3979, the proposed final version. This report provides a brief synopsis of sections in each bill that pertain to selected personnel policy. These include end strengths, compensation, health care, and sexual assault, as well as less prominent issues that nonetheless generate significant public interest.
This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include language concerning appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices, or any discussion of separately introduced legislation, topics which are addressed in other CRS products. Some issues were addressed in the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report R43184, FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. Those issues that were considered previously are designated with a "*" in the relevant section titles of this report. |
crs_R40235 | crs_R40235_0 | Achieving a system of end-of-life care that is sensitive to and accommodates the needs of all those involved, requires attention to a range of ethical and policy issues, including personal choice, cost, and quality of care. Over the past century, several demographic and historical changes have affected the experience of death and dying in the United States. Since then, average life expectancy has risen dramatically in the United States. End-of-life care can be broadly defined as health care, including acute care and long-term care, provided to persons who: are very ill, have a prognosis that is likely to worsen, and most likely will die from their illness. Palliative care focuses on relieving suffering and reducing the severity of disease symptoms for persons with serious illness as well as improving the quality of life for patients and their families. Hospice care is a form of palliative care that delivers comfort care to those at the end of life. Cost of Care at the End of Life
Costs of care at the end of life may be paid by public payers such as Medicare or Medicaid, private insurance, out-of-pocket, or by some other source such as the Department of Veterans Affairs or charity organizations. About one-fourth of total Medicare spending is for the last year of life. This share has remained generally constant for the past 20 years. Setting of Care
The majority of Medicare end-of-life costs, defined as Medicare spending in the last two years of life, are from inpatient hospital expenditures. Geographic Variation
Findings from the same study that addressed sources for end-of-life care spending under Medicare found that there is also wide geographic variation in end-of-life care costs. According to the Wennberg Study, this geographic variation may reflect differences in practice patterns of physicians and are not necessarily due to differences in prevalence of disease among chronically ill patients. End-of-Life Care Laws and Ethics
The development of new technologies, and the associated prospect of longer, more protracted deaths, have focused some policy discussions on the topic of patients' wishes. Federal law generally defers to state law concerning health-care decision making, including end-of-life care decision making. Given the complexities in decision making surrounding medical interventions that have life-extending potential, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have passed laws to address end-of-life care issues. Due to its timing, duration, and intensity, end-of-life care presents numerous challenges and opportunities for quality measurement, assessment, and improvement. Because end-of-life care can be palliative, and not curative, assessments of quality are often based on family and patient satisfaction. Studies have documented several factors which are associated with perceptions of higher quality care by patients and families. These include expressions of patients' wishes, discussions of families' spiritual needs, documentation of a living will, and family presence at the time of death. ,
A number of initiatives are currently underway in the private and public sectors to improve the quality of care individuals receive at the end of life, and specifically the quality of palliative and hospice care. Issues for Congress
As the nation prepares for an aging population and likely increase in demand for high quality end-of-life care services among the elderly, Congress may face a decision whether to modify or expand the role of the federal government in providing support to individuals and families to assist with end-of-life care. Some of these policy issues include, but are not limited to:
developing new research and knowledge for improved practices, including federal funding for educational centers or centers of excellence focused on symptom management and end-of-life care; modifying reimbursement policy to create incentives for physician communication about end-of-life care decision making; permitting Medicare hospice beneficiaries to receive curative care in addition to hospice benefits; providing opportunities for the integration of Medicare and Medicaid services in order to coordinate care across acute and long-term care settings; examining and addressing quality of care at the end of life in various settings (e.g., hospital, nursing home, private home); developing general requirements, committee training, and accreditation for medical ethics committees; and enforcing prescription drug abuse without limiting physicians' abilities to prescribe pain killing drugs. | End-of-life care can be broadly defined as health care provided to persons who are very ill, have a prognosis that is likely to worsen, and most likely will die in the near term from their illness. End-of-life care may be in the form of acute care provided in the days or months prior to death or palliative care, which focuses on relieving the patient's suffering and reducing the severity of disease symptoms as well as improving quality of life. Hospice care is a form of palliative care that delivers comfort care to those who forgo curative treatment and have a life expectancy that can be measured in months. Achieving a health care system where the provision of end-of-life care services are sensitive to and accommodate the needs of all those involved requires attention to a range of ethical and policy issues, including personal choice, cost, and quality of care.
Over the past century, several demographic and historical changes have affected the experience of death and dying in the United States. The development of new technologies, and the associated prospect of longer, more protracted deaths, has focused some policy discussions on the topic of patients' preferences. Federal law generally defers to state law concerning health-care decision making. Given the complexities in decision making surrounding medical interventions that have life-extending potential, states have passed laws to address end-of-life care issues, such as advance directives. However, there is considerable variation among state laws.
Costs of care at the end of life may be paid by Medicare or Medicaid, private insurance, or out-of-pocket. According to CMS, about one-fourth of total Medicare spending is for the last year of life. This share has remained generally constant for the past 20 years. The majority of Medicare end-of-life costs are from inpatient hospital expenditures. Researchers have also found that there is wide geographic variation in end-of-life Medicare costs. This geographic variation may reflect differences in practice patterns of physicians and is not necessarily due to differences in prevalence of disease among chronically ill patients.
End-of-life care presents numerous challenges and opportunities for quality measurement, assessment, and improvement. Assessments of quality end-of-life care are often based on family and patient satisfaction. Factors associated with perceptions of higher quality care include expressions of patients' wishes, discussions of families' spiritual needs, documentation of a living will, and family presence at the time of death. A number of initiatives are currently underway to improve the quality of care individuals receive at the end of life, and specifically the quality of palliative and hospice care.
As the nation prepares for an aging population and likely increase in the need for high quality end-of-life care services among the elderly, Congress may face a decision whether to expand the role of the federal government in providing support to individuals and families to assist with end-of-life care. This report provides information on various aspects of end-of-life care. The report is divided into six sections that address (1) demographic and historical changes affecting death and dying in the United States; (2) the definitions of end-of-life, palliative, and hospice care; (3) costs associated with end-of-life care; (4) end-of-life care laws and ethics; (5) quality of care at the end of life; and (6) policy issues that would modify or expand the federal government's role in addressing end-of-life care. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41080 | crs_R41080_0 | Congress established the National Commission on Children and Disasters (the Commission) to address the needs of children in disasters. The 111 th Congress is currently considering amending the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). 3377 ) would enhance disaster response, recovery, preparedness, and mitigation capabilities. Congress may wish to consider expanding proposed legislation or introducing new legislation to amend the Stafford Act to include recommendations of the Commission. National Commission on Children and Disasters
In recognition of the risks and challenges facing children during and after disasters, the Commission was authorized under the provisions of the Kids in Disasters Well-being, Safety, and Health Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-161 ) and given federal advisory committee statutory authority under the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009 ( P.L. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF), provides financial and administrative support to the Commission. Congress authorized appropriations of $1.5 million for each of FY2008 and FY2009 to enable the Commission to conduct a comprehensive study to examine and assess the needs of children in the preparation for, response to, and recovery from natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. After evaluating existing research and recommendations, the Commission is directed to submit a report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to address the identified gaps pertaining to the needs of children in disasters. The interim report of the Commission was provided to the President and Congress on October 14, 2009. The Final Report is projected to be completed by October 2010. H.R. Congress may wish to consider whether to change eligibility to implement the recommendations of the Commission. | The National Commission on Children and Disasters (the Commission) is authorized under the provisions of the Kids in Disasters Well-being, Safety, and Health Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-161) and given federal advisory committee statutory authority under the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 110-329). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF), provides financial and administrative support to the Commission, whose purpose is to assess the needs of children in the preparation for, response to, and recovery from natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters.
Congress authorized appropriations of $1.5 million for each of FY2008 and FY2009 for the Commission to conduct a comprehensive study to examine and assess the needs of children as they relate to preparation for, response to, and recovery from all hazards including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. After evaluating existing research and recommendations, the Commission is directed to submit a report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to address the identified gaps pertaining to the needs of children in disasters. The Interim Report of the Commission was provided to the President and Congress on October 14, 2009, and the Final Report is projected to be completed by October 2010.
The 111th Congress is currently considering amending the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) to enhance disaster response, recovery, preparedness and mitigation capabilities (H.R. 3377). Congress is also considering legislation that would establish provisions for education, child care, emergency planning, and health care guidance to address the safety of children after a disaster (S. 2898). Issues Congress may wish to consider include expanding proposed legislation or introducing new legislation to amend the Stafford Act, or amending the Homeland Security Act, to include recommendations of the Commission. Additional issues Congress may wish to consider include what administrative options are available to implement the Commission recommendations and where there may be a need for congressional action. |
crs_R40560 | crs_R40560_0 | Introduction
On June 11, in response to the global spread of a new strain of influenza, the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the level of influenza pandemic alert to phase 6, the highest level, which indicates the start of an actual pandemic. This change in alert level reflected the spread of the new virus, not its severity. Although currently the pandemic is of moderate severity with the majority of patients experiencing mild symptoms and making a rapid and full recovery, the virus and its effects may change over time. This report provides a brief overview of selected legal issues including emergency measures, civil rights, liability issues, and employment issues. There are also a number of authorities in the Public Health Service (PHS) Act that allow the Secretary of HHS to take certain actions in the face of a "public health emergency." There have been no declarations issued under the Stafford Act with respect to the current pandemic. Specifically, the Secretary may take some or all of the following actions:
waive conditions of participation, certification requirements, program participation, and pre-approval requirements under Medicare, Medicaid, or the Children's Health Insurance Program; permit health care providers to provide care under Medicare, Medicaid, or the Children's Health Insurance Program, even if they are not licensed by the state with jurisdiction over the emergency area; waive sanctions under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) for certain transfers or redirections of patients away from hospital emergency rooms; waive sanctions for violations of the Stark law, which prohibits certain self-referrals by physicians; extend deadlines and other timetables for required activities; waive limitations on payments under Medicare Advantage for care and services provided by out-of-network providers; or waive sanctions and penalties for violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule such as the use of protected health information for hospital directories, the disclosure of protected health information to patients' families and friends, the distribution of health care providers' and insurers' privacy policies to patients, and individuals' rights to request restrictions, privacy restrictions, or confidential communications. Federal and State Coordination
While the federal government has authority to authorize quarantine and isolation under certain circumstances, it should be noted that the primary authority for quarantine and isolation exists at the state level as an exercise of the state's police power. Federal Actions After Emergence of Influenza A(H1N1)
On July 8, 2009, CDC issued recommendations for state and local planning for a pandemic flu vaccination program. Civil Rights198
Introduction
Infectious diseases, such as the 2009 influenza pandemic, may raise a classic civil rights issue: to what extent can an individual's liberty be curtailed to advance the common good? The United States Constitution and federal civil rights laws provide for individual due process and equal protection rights as well as a right to privacy, but these rights are balanced against the needs of the community. A patchwork of federal and state laws generally operates to protect volunteers, which may include VHPs, and there are also laws that trigger liability protection specifically for VHPs. Employment Issues
Introduction266
Questions relating to employment are among the most significant issues presented by an influenza pandemic, since, if individuals fear losing their employment or their wages, compliance with public health measures such as isolation or quarantine may suffer. Social distancing can include the use of face masks, teleconferencing, or school closures. It would seem possible for a court to conclude that the isolation or quarantine of individuals during a pandemic serves the public good and that the termination of individuals who are isolated or quarantined violates public policy. | On June 11, in response to the global spread of a new strain of influenza, the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the level of influenza pandemic alert to phase 6, which indicates the start of an actual pandemic. This change reflected the spread of the new influenza A(H1N1) virus, not its severity. Although currently the pandemic is of moderate severity with the majority of patients experiencing mild symptoms and making a rapid and full recovery, this experience could change. This report provides a brief overview of selected legal issues including emergency measures, civil rights, liability issues, and employment issues.
There are a number of emergency measures which may help to contain or ameliorate an infectious disease outbreak. The Public Health Service Act, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the National Emergencies Act, and the Stafford Act contain authorities that allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the President to take certain actions during emergencies or disasters. While the primary authority for quarantine and isolation in the United States resides at the state level, the federal government has jurisdiction over interstate and border quarantine. The federal government also issues recommendations regarding such activities as school closures and vaccination programs. States and local governments have the authority to initiate emergency measures such as mandatory vaccination orders and certain nonpharmaceutical interventions such as school closures, which may lessen the spread of an infectious disease. The International Health Regulations adopted by the WHO in 2005 provide a framework for international cooperation against infectious disease threats.
The use of these emergency measures to contain the 2009 influenza pandemic may raise a classic civil rights issue: to what extent can an individual's liberty be curtailed to advance the common good? The U.S. Constitution and federal civil rights laws provide for individual due process and equal protection rights as well as a right to privacy, but these rights are balanced against the needs of the community.
Liability issues may become particularly important during the 2009 influenza pandemic. The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act limits liability with respect to the use of countermeasures for pandemic flu or other public health threats. A patchwork of federal and state laws generally protect volunteers, which may include volunteer health professionals (VHPs), under certain circumstances. Laws also provide liability protections specifically for VHPs.
Questions relating to employment are among the most significant issues presented by an influenza pandemic, since, if individuals fear losing their employment or their wages, compliance with public health measures such as social distancing and isolation or quarantine may suffer. It would seem possible for a court to conclude that the isolation or quarantine of individuals during a pandemic serves the public good and that the termination of individuals who are isolated or quarantined violates public policy. Employees may also have some job protection under the Family and Medical Leave Act. |
crs_RS22869 | crs_RS22869_0 | The finding prompted criticism from an agency advisory committee and others. In January 2010, FDA announced that it is evaluating recent scientific evidence and conducting additional studies. Health Effects
Exposure to large amounts of BPA is acutely toxic to humans and animals, but typical levels of BPA exposure from plastics are low. Some are especially concerned about medical devices, such as feeding and breathing tubes, that could leach the chemical into tissues, and, in particular, the possible health effects of such exposures in premature or critically ill infants, in whom such products may be used for long periods of time. Other potential sources of exposure are regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For example, in July 2010, several studies indicated that skin contact with BPA in thermal paper coatings (for example, the paper used for cash register receipts) may contribute significantly to human exposure. EPA is responsible for protecting public health and the environment from unreasonable risks associated with production, interstate commerce, and use of industrial chemicals, including BPA, when they are not specifically regulated under other federal laws, such as those covering alcohol, food, drugs, or consumer products. EPA has made BPA the focus of a "chemical action plan" to gather information and possibly to regulate the chemical. The plan was released in March 2010. It proposes to include BPA on a list of chemicals of concern, a list created under the authority of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), section 5(b)(4), "on the basis of its potential for long-term adverse effects on growth, reproduction and development in aquatic species at concentrations similar to those found in the environment." A chemical of concern is "a substance that may present an unreasonable risk of injury to the environment." Finally, EPA has initiated "collaborative alternatives assessment activities" under its Design for the Environment (DfE) program. These activities aim to reduce BPA releases and environmental exposures. The first partnership is searching for alternatives to BPA in thermal paper. The safety of most foods, thought to be the primary source of human exposure to BPA, is the responsibility of FDA. Some other scientists who reviewed the panel's conclusions disagreed. State Government Actions
Many states have considered or are considering legislation to restrict use of BPA in products intended for use by infants and children. Delaware stated its support for efforts to develop alternatives, and Pennsylvania passed legislation that "[u]rges the Congress of the United States and the Food and Drug Administration to encourage the use of reduced bisphenol-A in the manufacture of plastic food containers and bottles." Officials may also choose to develop non-regulatory approaches to manage these risks. However, these studies have many shortcomings. Although it is reported that many food companies are considering a switch to other forms of BPA-free food packaging, manufacturers of cans represented by the North American Metal Packaging Alliance maintain that suitable alternatives to BPA are not available, and in almost all cases are not likely to become available in the immediate future. 432 and S. 136 , would ban the use of BPA in food containers. The 111 th Congress considered several bills that addressed BPA, but none was enacted. Companion bills ( S. 593 / H.R. A second pair of bills ( S. 753 / H.R. Another bill ( H.R. 4341 ) would have required a warning label on any food container containing BPA. Activities under H.R. FDA would have been required to notify Congress about any uses of BPA for which such a determination could not be made and how the agency would regulate such use to protect the public health. | Bisphenol A (BPA) is used to produce certain types of plastic, in thousands of formulations for myriad products. Products made with these plastics may expose people to small amounts of BPA. The most significant source of public exposure is thought to be through food, although other ubiquitous products such as thermal paper coatings, and for some individuals medical devices, such as feeding and breathing tubes, also may contribute significantly to human exposure. Some studies have found that fetal and infant development may be harmed by very small amounts of BPA, but scientists disagree about the amount of BPA that is likely to harm human health.
In the United States and elsewhere, scientific disagreement about the possibility of human health effects that may result from BPA exposure has led to conflicting regulatory decisions by various advisory bodies and regulatory agencies. Controversy has centered on the safety of food containers, especially those intended for use by infants and children. A conclusion by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that BPA use is safe conflicted with earlier findings by a panel of scientific advisers, but other scientists who reviewed that panel's conclusions disagreed. These events prompted some to question FDA's process for the assessment of such health risks, and others to question the agency's fundamental ability to conduct such assessments competently. More recently, FDA expressed concern about possible health effects from BPA exposure and announced that it was conducting new studies on the matter, pending possible changes in its regulatory approach.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for protecting public health and the environment from unreasonable risks associated with production, interstate commerce, and use of industrial chemicals, including BPA, when they are not specifically regulated under other federal laws. In March 2010, EPA released a "chemical action plan" for BPA that proposed to list BPA as a chemical of concern that may present an unreasonable risk to certain aquatic species at concentrations similar to those found in the environment; to consider rulemaking to gather additional data relevant to environmental effects; and to initiate collaborative alternatives assessment activities under its Design for the Environment (DfE) program to encourage reductions in BPA releases and exposures. EPA is evaluating alternatives to BPA for use in paper for thermal printing.
Some food companies, bottle manufacturers, and paper receipt producers have voluntarily changed to BPA-free products. It is reported that some companies are exploring alternatives to BPA-containing food cans. However, others have said that for some types of canned foods, alternatives that preserve the safety and quality of the food currently may not be available.
In the 112th Congress, companion bills, H.R. 432 and S. 136, would ban the use of BPA in food containers. In the 111th Congress, a number of bills (S. 593/H.R. 1523, S. 753/H.R. 4456, H.R. 4341, H.R. 5820) were introduced that would have curtailed uses of BPA in certain products, required labeling of products containing BPA, or required EPA or FDA to reassess risks. None of these bills was enacted. |
crs_RL33533 | crs_RL33533_0 | U.S.-Saudi security cooperation and U.S. concern for the continuing global availability of Saudi energy supplies continue to anchor official bilateral relations as they have for decades. From 2012 through 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of proposed Foreign Military Sales to Saudi Arabia with a potential value of more than $45 billion. The succession changes and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's efforts to assert his role as the shaper of the kingdom's national security and economic policies have resulted in an apparent consolidation of authority under one individual and sub-branch of the family that is unprecedented in the kingdom since its founding. 81 and S.J.Res. Inside the kingdom, arrests of Islamic State (IS) supporters have continued since 2014, as Islamic State affiliates have claimed responsibility for a series of deadly attacks against Saudi security forces and members of the kingdom's Shia minority across the country (see " The Islamic State's Campaign against the Kingdom " below). U.S. policy initiatives have long sought to help Saudi leaders address economic and security challenges in ways consistent with U.S. interests. The Trump Administration, like its predecessors, engages the Saudi government as a strategic partner to promote regional security and global economic stability. In recent years, decisionmaking appears to have become more centralized under the authority of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, with the apparent blessing of the king. Leadership and Succession
King Salman and other Saudi leaders are likely to continue to face complex questions about political consent, economic performance, and social reform as they push ahead with ambitious economic and social initiatives, and as power is transferred from the sons of the kingdom's founder, King Abd al Aziz bin Abd al Rahman al Saud (aka Ibn Saud), to his grandsons. This includes some advocates for Saudi women's rights that the government has recently moved to recognize, such as rights to drive automobiles, travel freely, or to enjoy fewer guardianship-related legal restrictions (see " Women's Rights Issues " below). U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia
U.S. training and security support to Saudi Arabia remains overwhelmingly Saudi funded via Foreign Military Sales and other contracts, reflecting Saudi ability to pay for costly programs (and limiting opportunities for Congress to affect cooperation through appropriations legislation). Some Members of Congress have at times expressed concern about the potential for U.S. arms sales to contribute to or help drive arms races in the Gulf region and broader Middle East and about Saudi use of U.S. origin weaponry in Yemen. Saudi military and national-guard forces have, until recently, been under the leadership of two different members of the royal family, and it is unclear what if any effect recent leadership changes may have on patterns of U.S. weapons acquisition and training among these forces. Congressional Views, Legislation, and Administration Perspectives
It remains to be seen whether or when the Trump Administration might propose a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement for Congress to consider. Many of those issues—in addition to political-military developments in Yemen and campaigns against the Islamic State and other violent extremists—remain prominent on the U.S.-Saudi policy agenda and were identified as issues of interest during President Trump's May 2017 visit to the kingdom and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's March 2018 visit to the United States. Transition to a new generation of leadership in the Al Saud family, evolution in the Saudi economy, and instability in the regional security environment may continue to create challenges and opportunities for the U.S.-Saudi relationship. 32 and H.J.Res. 39 ) and House ( H.J.Res. 40 and H.J.Res. 102 ) and Senate ( S.J.Res. 42 ) was proposed to disapprove of the three proposed sales. In May, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S.J.Res. Under the modified version, the Administration must certify that the Saudi and Emirati governments are undertaking
an urgent and good faith effort to support diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Yemen; appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for Yemenis to food, fuel, medicine, and medical evacuation, including through the appropriate use of Yemen's Red Sea ports, including the port of Hudaydah, the airport in Sana'a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia; and demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen, including by (1) complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or transferred from the United States, and (2) taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure
With specific regard to Saudi Arabia, the Administration also must certify that "the Government of Saudi Arabia is undertaking appropriate actions to reduce any unnecessary delays to shipments associated with secondary inspection and clearance processes other than UNVIM." | The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ruled by the Al Saud family since its founding in 1932, wields significant global influence through its administration of the birthplace of the Islamic faith and by virtue of its large oil reserves. Close U.S.-Saudi official relations have survived a series of challenges since the 1940s. In recent years, shared concerns over Sunni Islamist extremist terrorism and Iranian government policies have provided some renewed logic for continued strategic cooperation. Political upheaval and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa have created new challenges, and the Trump Administration has sought to strengthen U.S. ties to Saudi leaders as the kingdom implements a series of new domestic and foreign policy initiatives.
Successive U.S. Administrations have referred to the Saudi government as an important partner, and U.S. arms sales and related security cooperation have continued with congressional oversight and amid some congressional opposition. The Trump Administration, like its recent predecessors, praises Saudi government counterterrorism efforts. Since 2009, the executive branch has notified Congress of proposed foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia of major defense articles and services with a potential aggregate value of nearly $139 billion. The United States and Saudi Arabia concluded arms sale agreements worth more than $65 billion, from FY2009 through FY2016.
Since March 2015, the U.S.-trained Saudi military has used U.S.-origin weaponry, U.S. logistical assistance, and shared intelligence in support of military operations in Yemen. Legislation has been proposed in the 115th Congress to condition or disapprove of some U.S. weapons sales and condition or direct the President to end U.S. support to Saudi operations without specific authorization (H.J.Res. 102, H.J.Res. 104, S.J.Res. 40, S.J.Res. 42, S.J.Res. 54, S.J.Res. 55).
In parallel to close security ties, official U.S. reports describe restrictions on human rights and religious freedom in the kingdom. Some Saudi activists advocate for limited economic and political reforms, continuing decades-long trends that have seen Saudi liberals, moderates, and conservatives advance different visions for domestic change. Saudi leaders in 2018 reversed a long-standing ban on women's right to drive, amid some arrests of women's rights advocates and critics of social liberalization. While some limited protests and arrests have occurred since unrest swept the region in 2011, clashes involving Saudi security forces have not spread beyond certain predominantly Shia areas of the oil-rich Eastern Province.
Since assuming the throne in 2015, King Salman bin Abd al Aziz (age 82) has made a series of appointments and reassignments that have altered the responsibilities and relative power of leading members of the next generation of the Al Saud family, who are the grandsons of the kingdom's founder. The king's son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (age 33), is the central figure in Saudi policymaking. He has asserted control over national security forces, sidelined potential rivals, proposed and begun implementing bold economic and social changes, and arrested prominent figures accused of corruption, including some fellow royal family members. Ambitious plans for the transformation of the kingdom's economy seek to provide opportunity for young Saudis and bolster nonoil sources of revenues for the state. Abroad, the kingdom pursues a multidirectional policy and has aggressively confronted perceived threats.
Saudi decisionmaking long appeared to be risk-averse and rooted in rulers' concerns for maintaining consensus among different constituencies, including factions of the royal family, business elites, and conservative religious figures. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's assertive and more centralized leadership has challenged this model of governance. The change is leading Saudis and outsiders alike to reexamine their assumptions about the kingdom's future.
Congress may examine these developments when considering the scope, terms, and merits of U.S.-Saudi partnership, proposed arms sales and nuclear cooperation, and security commitments. |
crs_R42068 | crs_R42068_0 | Introduction
Following the August 14, 2003, electric grid blackout which affected large portions of the Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada, Congress acted to promote investment in the nation's electrical grid to increase the system's capacity and efficiency. Inadequacies of an antiquated transmission system were blamed for the 2003 blackout, as a simple fault led to a cascading, widespread outage. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ) (EPACT) directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to hold a rulemaking on incentive rates for construction of critical electric transmission infrastructure "for the purpose of benefitting consumers by ensuring reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion." The Final Rule was issued in July 2006 with FERC Order No. However, with concerns raised over the effects of transmission incentives on consumer rates, implications of related federal policies on the electric power sector, additional FERC regulatory policies for transmission, and the aging of electricity infrastructure among key issues, the need for continuing transmission incentives may be a matter for Congress to consider. 679, "Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform," was issued in 2006. Order No. Notice of Inquiry on Transmission Incentives15
On May 19, 2011, FERC released a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) on the "scope and implementation of its transmission incentives regulations and policies" in Order No. FERC states in the NOI that more than 75 FERC applications have been received since the Final Rule was issued, with over $50 billion in proposed investments. In the NOI, FERC notes that there have been "significant changes in the electric industry," and, given its experience in applying Order No. 679, it now seeks comments regarding the scope and implementation of its incentives program. Cost Issues and Concerns
As comments by FERC Commissioners note, increases in transmission rates are "sometimes perceived" to be caused by the return-on-equity (ROE) adders. FERC's change of EPACT Section 219(a) statutory language from "for the purpose of benefitting consumers by ensuring reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion," to the codified version under the Final Rule which states "incentives either ensure reliability or reduce the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion consistent with the requirements of section 219" can potentially increase consumer electric costs (especially for reliability-specific projects). EPACT Section 219 does not give FERC much additional discretion on the granting of transmission incentives beyond the stipulation that "all rates, charges, terms, and conditions be just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential." FERC reviews the requested incentives to ensure that these are matched to risks and challenges of the proposed investment. FERC is not required to track or report to Congress on the status of transmission incentives, nor is FERC required to make any determination of the "effectiveness" of these incentives to cause the construction of new transmission facilities. Such a determination is thus beyond the scope of the NOI. 679 transmission incentives will provide "regulatory certainty," and are "supporting the development of transmission." EEI further notes:
"While not conclusive, industry data suggest that the incentive policies adopted in Order No. 679 has had a tangible, positive impact on transmission structure infrastructure investment in many regions." Going forward, FERC appears to have regulatory discretion with regard to establishing criteria for project approvals, but has declined to do so on the grounds "that to do so now would limit the flexibility of the Rule." Given cost concerns expressed by some FERC Commissioners and others, FERC may or may not revisit this decision as a result of its consideration of comments submitted to the NOI. | Following the August 14, 2003, electric grid blackout which affected large portions of the Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada, Congress acted to promote investment in the nation's electrical grid to increase the system's capacity and efficiency. Inadequacies of an antiquated transmission system were blamed for the 2003 blackout. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) (EPACT) directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to hold a rulemaking on incentive rates for construction of critical electric transmission infrastructure "for the purpose of benefitting consumers by ensuring reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion." The Final Rule was issued in July 2006 with FERC Order No. 679, "Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform." EPACT Section 219 stipulates that "all rates, charges, terms, and conditions be just and reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential." FERC reviews the requested incentives under Section 219 to ensure that these are matched to risks and challenges of the proposed investment.
On May 19, 2011, FERC released a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) on the "scope and implementation of its transmission incentives regulations and policies" in Order No. 679. In the NOI, FERC notes that there have been "significant changes in the electric industry," and it now seeks comments regarding the scope and implementation of its incentives program. FERC states in the NOI that more than 75 FERC applications have been received since the Final Rule was issued, with over $50 billion in proposed investments. As comments by some FERC Commissioners note, increases in transmission rates are "sometimes perceived" to be caused by return-on-equity (ROE) incentive adders. However, FERC's codification of Section 219(a) changes EPACT's language to "either ensure reliability or reduce the cost" which can potentially lead to cost increases (especially for reliability-specific projects).
FERC is not required to track or report to Congress on the status of transmission incentives, nor is FERC required to make any determination of the "effectiveness" of these incentives to cause the construction of new transmission facilities. Such a determination is thus beyond the scope of the NOI. In comments submitted to the NOI, the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) stated its opinion that Order No. 679 transmission incentives will provide "regulatory certainty," and are "supporting the development of transmission." EEI further notes that while not conclusive, industry data suggest that Order No. 679 incentives have had a "positive impact" on transmission investment in many regions. However, EEI's own analysis arguably shows a decade-long trend of increasing transmission investment by the industry may have occurred without Order No.679's transmission incentives.
Going forward, FERC appears to have regulatory discretion with regard to establishing criteria for project approvals, but has declined to do so on the grounds "that to do so now would limit the flexibility of the Rule." FERC may or may not revisit this decision as a result of its consideration of comments submitted to the NOI. Expectations have been raised as to the large dollar investment possible over the next two decades in transmission systems alone, with one estimate from the electricity industry suggesting $298 billion will be required to meet future electricity demand. However, with the concerns raised over the effects of transmission incentives on consumer rates (especially incentives granting higher ROE incentives to applicants), implications of related federal policies on the electric power sector, additional FERC regulatory policies for transmission, and the aging of electricity infrastructure among key issues, the need for continuing transmission incentives may be a matter for Congress to consider. |
crs_RL30862 | crs_RL30862_0 | In some years, however, the reconciliation process also encompassed revenue reduction generally and spending increases in selected program areas. Reconciliation, which was first used by the House and Senate in 1980, is an optional procedure, but it has been used in most years. Over the period covering from 1980 to the present, 20 reconciliation bills have been enacted into law and four have been vetoed. During the first several years' experience with reconciliation, the legislation contained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of reducing the deficit. The reconciliation submissions of committees included such things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending or reduced revenues, or that violated another committee's jurisdiction. In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principal sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) as a means of curbing these practices. The Byrd rule has been modified several times over the years. In 1990, these components were merged together and made permanent when they were incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act (CBA) of 1974 as Section 313. First, a Senator may offer an amendment (or a motion to recommit the measure with instructions) that strikes such provisions from the legislation. In general, a point of order authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised in order to strike extraneous matter already in the bill as reported or discharged (or in the conference report), or to prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter through the adoption of amendments or motions. A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant). Definitions of Extraneous Matter
Subsection (b)(1) of the Byrd rule provides definitions of what constitutes extraneous matter for purposes of the rule. As discussed in more detail below, actions were taken under the Byrd rule during the consideration of 15 of the 19 reconciliation measures. On the whole, the points of order and waiver motions were disposed of in a manner that favored by a large margin those who opposed the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation, as discussed in more detail below. The Byrd rule has been used primarily during initial consideration of a reconciliation measure. Points of Order
In total, 70 points of order were raised and disposed of under the Byrd rule. Text of the Byrd Rule
(Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974)
EXTRANEOUS MATTER IN RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION
Sec. (a) In General .—When the Senate is considering a reconciliation bill or a reconciliation resolution pursuant to Section 310, (whether that bill or resolution originated in the Senate or the House) or Section 258C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 upon a point of order being made by any Senator against material extraneous to the instructions to a committee which is contained in any title or provision of the bill or resolution or offered as an amendment to the bill or resolution, and the point of order is sustained by the Chair, any part of said title or provision that contains material extraneous to the instructions to said Committee as defined in subsection (b) shall be deemed struck from the bill and may not be offered as an amendment from the floor. | Reconciliation is a procedure under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by which Congress implements budget resolution policies affecting mainly permanent spending and revenue programs. The principal focus in the reconciliation process has been deficit reduction, but in some years reconciliation has involved revenue reduction generally and spending increases in selected areas. Although reconciliation is an optional procedure, it has been used most years since its first use by the House and Senate in 1980 (20 reconciliation bills have been enacted into law and four have been vetoed).
During the first several years' experience with reconciliation, the legislation contained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of implementing budget resolution policies. The reconciliation submissions of committees included such things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending or reduced revenues when the reconciliation instructions called for reduced spending or increased revenues, or that violated another committee's jurisdiction.
In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principal sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) on a temporary basis as a means of curbing these practices. The Byrd rule was extended and modified several times over the years. In 1990, the Byrd rule was incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as Section 313 and made permanent (2 U.S.C. 644).
A Senator opposed to the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation may offer an amendment (or a motion to recommit the measure with instructions) that strikes such provisions from the legislation, or, under the Byrd rule, a Senator may raise a point of order against such matter. In general, a point of order authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised in order to strike extraneous matter already in the bill as reported or discharged (or in the conference report), or to prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter through the adoption of amendments or motions. A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant).
The Byrd rule provides six definitions of what constitutes extraneous matter for purposes of the rule (and several exceptions thereto), but the term is generally described as covering provisions unrelated to achieving the goals of the reconciliation instructions.
The Byrd rule has been in effect during Senate consideration of 19 reconciliation measures from late 1985 through the present. Actions were taken under the Byrd rule in the case of 15 of the 19 measures. In total, 70 points of order and 57 waiver motions were considered and disposed of under the rule, largely in a manner that favored those who opposed the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation (60 points of order were sustained, in whole or in part, and 48 waiver motions were rejected).
This report has been updated to include the consideration of the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 (H.R. 3762, 114th Congress). |
crs_RL34612 | crs_RL34612_0 | Examples include the following:
After more than 1,300 persons in 43 states, the District of Columbia, and Canada were found to be infected with the same unusual strain of bacteria ( Salmonella Saintpaul) in April-July 2008, officials first suspected fresh tomatoes as the vehicle and later expanded their concerns to fresh jalapeño and serrano peppers. In November 2010 through January 2011, an estimated more than 100 people in 16 states and Washington, DC, were sickened from Salmonella -contaminated sprouts linked to an Illinois organic farm. Food Safety Hazards on the Farm
Pathogens—bacteria, viruses and other biological hazards—are the leading cause of foodborne illnesses. Also of potential risk to the food supply are numerous nonbiological contaminants. Federal Food Safety Programs
Food and Drug Administration
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for ensuring that all domestic and imported foods—excepting major species of meat and poultry and some egg products—are safe, wholesome, and accurately labeled. §§ 301 et seq. ) The rule observes that SE-contaminated eggs have been a major source of foodborne illness and that on-farm prevention measures are needed to reduce SE infections from eggs. Under both statutes, agency oversight begins when animals arrive at slaughter facilities. Although some of these programs can be, and are, designed to ensure the safety of certain food commodities from a public health standpoint, they are not regulatory by nature. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act
The 111 th Congress passed comprehensive food safety legislation in December 2010 (FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), P.L. Although numerous agencies share responsibility for regulating food safety, this newly enacted legislation focused on foods regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and amended FDA's existing structure and authorities, in particular the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA; 21 U.S.C. The 112 th Congress will likely provide oversight and scrutiny over how the law is implemented, including FDA's coordination with other federal agencies, such as those in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Implementation of FSMA will depend largely on discretionary appropriations, and some have questioned whether funding is available in the current budgetary climate. The provision that could have the most direct effect on on-farm activity is the establishment of new standards for produce safety. Other requirements that could affect on-farm activity include facility registration requirements, records access and inspection requirements, food traceability requirements, hazard analysis and risk-based preventive controls, and targeting of inspection resources. Treatment of Farms
The FSMA provisions that could have the most direct effect on on-farm activity, especially for produce growers, will be the establishment of new standards for produce safety. Farm Interest Concerns
In the 110 th and 111 th Congress, comprehensive food safety legislation was actively debated, and the largest expansion of FDA's food safety authorities since the 1930s was enacted (FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), P.L. 111-353 ). | Foodborne illness-causing bacteria on farms can enter the food supply unless preventive measures are in place to reduce them, either prior to or after harvest. Also of potential risk to the food supply are pesticide residues, animal drugs, and certain naturally occurring contaminants.
There is interest in examining on-farm practices, given continued major outbreaks of foodborne illness involving both domestically produced and imported foods. An example is the case in April-July 2008, when more than 1,000 persons in more than 40 states and Canada were found to be infected with the same unusual strain of bacteria (Salmonella Saintpaul), which was later traced back to fresh peppers from a farm in Mexico. In May 2010, a large-scale recall of more than 550 million shell eggs from two farms in Iowa was linked to concerns about a nationwide increase in Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) infections. Most recently, in November 2010 through January 2011, more than 100 people in 18 states were sickened from Salmonella-contaminated sprouts linked to an Illinois organic farm.
Food safety experts agree that an effective, comprehensive food safety system should include consideration of potential hazards at the farm level. However, opinions differ on the need for more stringent, government-enforced safety standards for farms, as exist for processors and others in the food chain. This question and others, such as the potential cost of new interventions to producers, taxpayers, and consumers, are at issue as Congress debates food safety legislation.
The lead federal food safety agencies are the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which regulates major species of meat and poultry and some egg products, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which regulates virtually all other foods. Generally, these agencies' regulatory oversight of foods begins after the farm gate, at slaughter establishments and food handling and manufacturing facilities. However, various activities of these and other federal agencies involved in assuring the safety of the food supply can, and do, have an impact on how farms and ranches raise food commodities.
In December 2010, the 111th Congress passed comprehensive food safety legislation (FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), P.L. 111-353). This newly enacted law is focused on foods regulated by FDA and amended FDA's existing structure and authorities, in particular the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA; 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.). FSMA is the largest expansion of FDA's food safety authorities since the 1930s; it does not directly address meat and poultry products under the jurisdiction of USDA. The provisions in the law that could have the most direct effect on on-farm activity, especially for produce growers, could be the establishment of new standards for produce safety. Other requirements that could affect on-farm activity are facility registration requirements, records access and/or inspection requirements, food traceability requirements, hazard analysis and risk-based preventive controls, and targeting of inspection resources. The 112th Congress will likely provide oversight over how the law is implemented, including FDA's coordination with other federal agencies. Implementation of the law will depend largely on discretionary appropriations, and some have questioned whether funding is available in the current budgetary climate. |
crs_R43037 | crs_R43037_0 | As a part of this effort, the United States would "engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals." Over the years, the United States has used three mechanisms to reduce its nuclear weapons—formal, bilateral treaties; reciprocal, but informal, understandings; and unilateral adjustments to its force posture. Each of these mechanisms for reducing forces serves different purposes, and each can possess different characteristics for the arms control process. The role of Congress in the arms control process also depends on the mechanism used to reduce forces. President Bush did not notify Congress or seek congressional approval before pursuing these reductions. As the volume of shared information grew over the years, each side could replace suspicions about the intentions of the other with confidence in its understanding of the capabilities of the other's nuclear forces. forces." It might be argued that the word "obligate" refers to the imposition of the legal duty upon the United States to reduce its armaments, and would not bar the Executive from reducing U.S. nuclear forces either unilaterally or in parallel with Russia on the basis of a nonlegal political agreement between the two countries. Authorization and Appropriations
If the Obama Administration sought to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons unilaterally, or in parallel with Russia without a legally-binding agreement, Congress could still exercise oversight of the process. Characteristics Affecting Arms Control Decisions
The preceding discussion highlights several characteristics—balance and equality, predictability, flexibility, transparency and confidence in compliance, and timeliness—that can affect a decision to use a formal, bilateral treaty, informal parallel reductions, or unilateral adjustments to alter the size or structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. When an arms control treaty includes equal limits on each side's forces, so that both can confidently predict the current size and future plans for the other's force, both sides have limited flexibility to increase their forces or alter their composition to respond to technological changes or emerging national security needs. It may also be possible to balance flexibility and predictability in unilateral reductions. They needed this information to verify compliance with the limits and restrictions in the treaty. Timeliness
In most cases, it is likely to take far longer to reduce nuclear forces through a bilateral arms control treaty than it would to adopt unilateral adjustments to nuclear forces. Second, it has, on many occasions, taken months or years for a treaty to enter into force after the conclusion of the negotiations, both because the legislatures must review and vote on the Treaty and because other domestic or international events intervene. Third, in some cases, the time lines for reductions included in treaties presume a slow and deliberate process, while the nations might be able to implement unilateral adjustments more quickly. In contrast, the George H.W. They stated that the data exchanges, notifications, unique identifiers, and on-site inspections, provide each side with the ability to monitor strategic nuclear forces from "cradle to grave." If the United States and Russia agree to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons further, within the framework of New START and without negotiating a new treaty, they could rely on the monitoring and verification provisions in New START to provide transparency into the reductions. Issues for Congress
Nature of the Commitment
If the United States and Russia agree to reduce their nuclear weapons below the levels in the New START Treaty without signing a new treaty, Congress may question whether the agreement represents a legal obligation or a political commitment, and whether the agreement is covered by the terms of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. If it were treated as a congressional-executive agreement, both the House and Senate would have to vote to pass legislation that approved its limits. For example, in choosing this path to further reductions while the two sides remained bound by the New START Treaty, the Administration would indicate that predictability and transparency remained important. Balance and equality would receive a lower priority while flexibility and timeliness would grow more important. Members who believe that the United States should reduce its nuclear weapons further might support that goal whether the United States codifies the limits in a formal treaty, pursues the reductions without a treaty but in parallel with Russia, or adjusts its forces unilaterally. | In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated that the United States would "engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals." These reductions could include limits on strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. Yet, arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia have stalled, leading many observers to suggest that the United States reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally, or in parallel with Russia, without negotiating a new treaty. Many in Congress have expressed concerns about this possibility, both because they question the need to reduce nuclear forces below New START levels and because they do not want the President to agree to further reductions without seeking the approval of Congress.
Over the years, the United States reduced its nuclear weapons with formal, bilateral treaties, reciprocal, but informal, understandings, and unilateral adjustments to its force posture. The role of Congress in the arms control process depends on the mechanism used to reduce forces. If the United States and Russia sign a formal treaty, then the Senate must signal its advice and consent with a vote of two-thirds of its Members. The House and Senate would each need to pass legislation approving an Executive Agreement. But the President can reduce U.S. nuclear weapons in parallel with Russia, without seeking congressional approval, if the reductions are taken unilaterally, or as the result of a nonbinding political agreement.
Each of the mechanisms for reducing nuclear forces can possess different characteristics for the arms control process. These include balance and equality, predictability, flexibility, transparency and confidence in compliance, and timeliness. Provisions in formal treaties can mandate balance and equality between the two sides' forces. They can also provide both sides with the ability to predict the size and structure of the other's current and future forces. Unilateral measures allow each side to maintain flexibility in deciding the size and structure of its nuclear forces. In addition, the monitoring and verification provisions included in bilateral treaties can provide each side with detailed information about the numbers and capabilities of the other's nuclear forces, while also helping each side confirm that the other has complied with the limits and restrictions in the treaty. With unilateral reductions, the two sides could still agree to share information, or they could withhold information so that they would not have to share sensitive data about their forces.
It usually takes far longer to reduce nuclear forces through a bilateral arms control treaty than it takes to adopt unilateral adjustments to nuclear forces. The need to find balanced and equitable trades, limits acceptable to both sides, detailed definitions of systems limited by the treaty, and agreed procedures for monitoring and verification can slow the process of negotiations. In addition, it can take months or years for a treaty to enter into force, both because the legislatures must review and vote on the treaty and because other domestic or international events intervene. In contrast, the nations may be able to adopt and implement unilateral adjustments more quickly.
If the Obama Administration reduces U.S. nuclear forces in parallel with Russia, but without a formal treaty, the two nations could avoid months or years in negotiations. Because New START would remain in force, predictability and transparency would remain important. Balance and equality would, however, receive a lower priority, while flexibility and timeliness would grow more important. Congress may question whether such an agreement is subject to congressional review. It may also seek to limit funding for further reductions through the annual authorization and appropriations process if it does not support the Administration's approach to further reductions. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL34639 | crs_RL34639_0 | DOD has long played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DOD to provide foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DOD can contribute unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years, Congress has shaped the DOD role through a wide variety of authorities contained in the Foreign Relations and Intercourse (Title 22 U.S. Code) and Armed Services (Title 10 U.S. Code) statutes, and through annual legislation. The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded roughly as serving three purposes:
Responding to humanitarian and basic needs. Building foreign military capacity and capabilities. Strengthening foreign governments. Overview: DOD's Evolving Response to Perceived Needs
DOD's perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time. Within the past few years, the perceptions of DOD officials, military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of extensive international (and interagency) "partnerships," as well as an expanded DOD role in foreign assistance activities. Thus, while DOD acknowledges that state-building tasks may be "best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals," it also sees a need to develop its own capability to perform "all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so." The Bush Administration has recently created new coordination mechanisms that may address such concerns. For many years, DOD training of foreign military forces was carried out by Special Operations Forces, but now DOD officials describe it as a key mission for the U.S. military as a whole. It has also urged Congress to enhance the capabilities of civilian agencies to form partnerships with DOD in those activities. Summary of Benefits
The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military's capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, promoting the image of the United States as an humanitarian actor. Humanitarian assistance also provides a means to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. U.S. military personnel view humanitarian assistance and military training and education and other opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional development. Since 9/11, DOD training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations and regional organizations and to participate with the United States in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should Civilian Capabilities to Carry Out Foreign Assistance Activities Be Enhanced? | The Department of Defense (DOD) has long played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DOD to provide foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DOD can contribute unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years, Congress has helped shape the DOD role by providing DOD with its mandate for such activities through a wide variety of authorities.
The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded as serving three purposes: responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military capacity and capabilities, and strengthening foreign governments' ability to deal with internal and international threats through state-building measures. The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military's capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, enhancing the U.S. image as a humanitarian actor. Humanitarian assistance, military training, and other forms of assistance also provide opportunities to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. U.S. military personnel have long viewed such activities as opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional development. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, DOD training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations and to support coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD's perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time. Within the past few years, the perceptions of DOD officials, military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of extensive international and interagency "partnerships," as well as an expanded DOD role in foreign assistance activities. Critics point to a number of problems with an expanded DOD role in many activities. Indeed, a key DOD document acknowledges that state-building tasks may be "best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals." Nevertheless, although reluctant to divert personnel from combat functions, DOD officials believe that the U.S. military must develop its own capacity to carry out such activities in the absence of appropriate civilian forces.
In the second session of the 110th Congress, Members have faced several choices regarding the DOD role in foreign assistance. The Bush Administration has proposed legislation to make permanent two controversial DOD authorities. It has also proposed legislation to enable U.S. government civilian personnel to perform some of the tasks currently carried out by the U.S. military, as well as to form a civilian reserve corps for that purpose. Congress may also consider options to improve DOD coordination with civilian agencies on foreign assistance activities. |
crs_R42025 | crs_R42025_0 | 110-53 ):
Counterterrorism and Security Management Border Security and Trade Immigration Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
A fifth section covering management issues at DHS rounds out the discussion. The issues included in this report do not represent a comprehensive list of possible issues—they represent a broad array of issues likely to be addressed by Congress in the coming months. The potential impact of the changed budget environment is discussed at various points throughout this report. Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Congressional oversight of this sector's homeland security activities has been limited but could be of interest in the 112 th Congress. Central issues surrounding the Secure Flight program and the use of terrorist watchlists in the aviation domain that may be considered during the 112 th Congress include the timeliness of updating watchlists as new intelligence information becomes available; the extent to which complete terrorist information available to the federal government is exploited to assess possible threats among airline passengers and airline and airport workers; the ability to detect potential identity fraud or other attempts to circumvent terrorist watchlist checks, including the potential use of biometrics; the adequacy of established protocols for providing redress to individuals improperly identified as potential threats by watchlist checks; and the adequacy of coordination with international partners. DHS Reorganization Authority227
From the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in January 2003 through 2007, the President and the Secretary of Homeland Security used provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, most notably Section 872, to implement a number of major and minor departmental reorganizations. | With the tenth anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks, many observers are making a fresh assessment of where America's homeland security enterprise stands today. In the wake of those attacks, Congress made extensive changes to the structure and function of many agencies, establishing a consolidated Department of Homeland Security and dedicating significant additional resources expressly to the security of the homeland. After the initial surge of activity, evolution of America's response has continued under the leadership of different Administrations, Congresses, and in a shifting environment of public opinion.
This report outlines an array of homeland security issues that may come before the 112th Congress. After a brief discussion of the overall homeland security budget, the report divides the specific issues into five rough categories:
Counterterrorism and Security Management Border Security and Trade Immigration Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Departmental Management
In each of those areas, you will find a survey of topics briefly analyzed by Congressional Research Service experts. The information included only scratches the surface on most of these issues. For more detailed information, you may choose to consult their more in-depth works or consult directly with the individual authors.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL31822 | crs_RL31822_0 | Background/Issues
Concerns have been expressed about the impartiality, bias, or fairness of government regulators, administrators, and other executive branch decisionmakers who, shortly before entering government service, represented, owned, or were employed by the industries, firms, or other entities which they must now regulate and oversee, or about whom they now provide advice to the government. Additionally, concerns have been raised with regard to large cash pay-outs or "rewards" to personnel of private entities who are about to enter government service. However, there are some limited conflict of interest regulations and ethics standards which look also to previous employment and past associations of those becoming federal officers and employees. Conflict of Interest Regulation
The application of federal conflict of interest laws and regulations, particularly the laws requiring an official's recusal or disqualification from certain matters, or regulations or procedures requiring the divestiture of certain assets, have traditionally been directed at current and existing financial interests and ties of that official, and those closely associated with the official. The regulatory scheme regarding financial interests encompasses what has colloquially been called the "three-D" method of conflict of interest regulation, that is: disclosure, disqualification, and divestiture. Anyone entering the federal service who is covered by the public financial disclosure laws generally must, within 30 days of appointment, file an entry report. Disqualification and Prohibited Conflicts of Interest
The principal statutory method of dealing with potential conflicts of interest of an executive branch officer or employee is to require the disqualification (or "recusal") of the officer or employee from participating in any official governmental matter in which that official—or those close enough to the official such that their financial interests may be "imputed" to the official—has any "financial interest." There is also a "regulatory" recusal requirement that may be broader in some aspects than the statutory restriction, and may apply to certain past affiliations and previous economic interests. Two-Year Regulatory Disqualification for Extraordinary Payments From Past Employers
In addition to the one-year recusal requirement for particular matters involving specific parties when a former client, employer, firm, or business is or represents a party in that matter (or two years by Executive Order if one is a presidential or vice presidential appointee in the Obama Administration), the regulations of the Office of Government Ethics also provide for a two-year recusal requirement which bars an official in the executive branch from participating in a particular matter in which a "former employer" is or represents a party when that former employer had made an "extraordinary payment" to the official prior to entering government. A further restriction on "lobbyists" serving in federal positions was announced by the Obama Administration in September of 2009, explaining the Administration's intention to prohibit federally registered lobbyists from serving on federal advisory boards and commissions used by federal executive agencies and officials. As noted earlier, the principal statutory method of conflict of interest avoidance, with respect to particular assets and holdings of a federal official, is to require the disqualification of that official from a governmental matter affecting those financial interests. | Ethics and conflict of interest concerns have been raised concerning the impartiality or bias of government regulators or administrators who, shortly before entering government service, represented, owned, were employed by, or were given large cash payments or "rewards" by private firms or other entities that such officials must now regulate and oversee. Federal conflict of interest law and regulation, for the most part, deal with the potential influence of existing financial assets, properties, and relationships of a federal official. There are, however, some limited conflict of interest regulations and standards which look also to previous employment and past associations of those entering federal service. Additionally, in 2009, by Executive Order, certain "appointees" of President Obama must, during the Obama Administration, file an "ethics pledge" agreeing to further limitations on participating in governmental matters affecting some former employers and/or clients. In 2010, the Administration's policy of not having registered lobbyists serve on advisory committees was formalized.
The regulatory scheme regarding financial interests and federal officials encompasses generally what has colloquially been called the "three-D" method of conflict of interest regulation, that is: disclosure, disqualification, and divestiture. Public financial disclosure is required of incoming federal officials who will be compensated above certain amounts, including those officials nominated by the President who must receive Senate confirmation. Disclosure information covers not only existing assets, property, debts, and income, but also pertains to certain information about past clients and employers, and positions held in organizations.
Disqualification or "recusal," the principal statutory method of dealing with potential conflicts of interest in the executive branch, prohibits a federal official from participating in any particular governmental matter in which that official, or those close to the official, has any financial interest. While the statutory disqualification provision is a criminal law covering only current financial interests of the official, there are also "regulatory" recusal requirements that may apply to certain past affiliations and previous economic interests. Such regulatory recusals are limited in time and generally apply to particular matters involving specific parties when entities or organizations previously affiliated with the federal official are now parties to or represent parties in those matters. There are also recusal requirements in regulations concerning such particular matters when a party (or one representing a party) had made an "extraordinary payment" to the official prior to the official's entry into government. Further limitations on participation in governmental matters have been imposed on certain presidential and vice presidential "appointees" in the Obama Administration who are required to take an "ethics pledge" concerning past clients and employers.
Other than certain specific and narrow divestiture requirements on particular regulatory officials that are generally part of the organic act establishing the regulatory entity, there are no overall, general divestiture requirements in federal law. Divestiture, however, may be an important device in conflict of interest avoidance, and can be required under regulatory authority by agency ethics officers to deal with potential conflicts of interest regarding ownership of particular private assets by those entering government service. |
crs_R41459 | crs_R41459_0 | Introduction
This report provides information concerning EPA's Maximum Achievable Control Technology standards for boilers (the Boiler MACT), an EPA rule designed to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants, and three related rules. EPA estimates that, as finalized on December 20, 2012, the Boiler MACT will affect about 14,000 boilers and process heaters. The 12% include coal-fired, biomass-fired, and liquid-fired boilers. The agency estimates the capital costs associated with the rule for existing boilers at $4.6 billion to meet the compliance deadline in 2016; annualized costs, which spread the costs of capital over the expected life of the equipment and include operating and maintenance costs as well, were estimated at $1.2 billion per year. EPA has developed regulations addressing boiler emissions because it has found, based on emissions data, that they are major sources of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which requires controls on major sources of HAPs, defines a major source as any facility that emits 10 tons or more of a single listed HAP or 25 tons of any combination of HAPs annually. The HAPs themselves (187 substances) were listed by Congress in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. By controlling boiler emissions, EPA expects to avoid 3,100 to 7,900 premature deaths annually, as well as many other health effects, including 5,000 nonfatal heart attacks annually. In the reconsidered rule, EPA responded to the comments it received by modifying its subcategories. EPA's Estimates of the Boiler MACT's Costs and Benefits
Among the existing boilers affected by the Boiler MACT rule, there are an estimated 955 units that burn liquids and 1,123 units that burn solids (621 of them coal-fired and the rest biomass-fired). Most boilers, which are fueled by natural gas, will experience a reduction in operating costs that more than compensates for any capital costs, according to EPA. Industry-funded studies of the originally proposed and subsequent versions of the rule, including one from the Council of Industrial Boiler Owners (CIBO), placed the costs of the rule substantially higher than EPA's estimates. Most of these units are located at commercial and institutional (as opposed to industrial) facilities, according to EPA. Thus, in addition to the Boiler MACT and Area Source rules, the agency promulgated a rule on the Identification of Non-Hazardous Secondary Materials that Are Solid Waste, and a rule that would set emission standards for Commercial/Industrial Solid Waste Incinerators (the "CISWI Rule"). Non-hazardous secondary materials that meet legitimacy criteria, such as the following, would not be considered solid waste under the rule promulgated in March 2011:
material used as a fuel that remains within the control of the generator (whether at the site of generation or another site the generator has control over); scrap tires removed from vehicles and managed under established tire collection programs; resinated wood residuals, provided they have not been discarded and are used as fuel either by the generator or outside the generator's control; material used as an ingredient in a manufacturing process (whether by the generator or a third party); material that has been sufficiently processed to produce a fuel or ingredient product; and material that has been determined through a case-by-case petition process to not have been discarded and to be indistinguishable in all relevant aspects from a fuel product. Doing so would be costly and impractical. Conclusion
EPA's Boiler MACT has been controversial since its original proposal in June 2010. The version of the rule promulgated March 21, 2011, and the reconsidered version finalized December 20, 2012, are much less stringent than the rule as first proposed. In the 112 th Congress, bills were introduced in both the House and Senate ( H.R. At a minimum, this would have given the affected units three years of additional time to comply with MACT standards. 2250 passed the House, 275-142, on October 13, 2011. A Senate version similar to H.R. 2250 was offered as an amendment ( S.Amdt. 1660 ) to the surface transportation bill ( S. 1813 ) on March 8, 2012, but was not adopted on a vote of 52-46 (60 votes being necessary for adoption). In the reconsidered rules, finalized December 20, 2012, EPA took a number of steps in the direction of its critics, giving affected units an additional two years to comply and making many of the emission limits less stringent. Whether these changes will be sufficient to mollify the affected industries and the agency's other critics remains to be seen. | On December 20, 2012, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson signed final revisions to EPA's 2011 Maximum Achievable Control Technology standards for boilers (the "Boiler MACT"). The Boiler MACT has been among the most controversial EPA regulations over the last three years, because of its wide reach and potential economic impact. Boilers are widely used for heat and power throughout industry, and by large commercial establishments and institutions, as well. EPA found it difficult to adequately characterize and develop emissions data for the many types of boilers, leading many in the regulated community to complain that the originally proposed standards would not be economically achievable. Although EPA and others disputed the industry cost estimates, the revised rule modifies all of the originally proposed standards, lowering the projected cost, and grants owners and operators additional time to comply. Whether these changes will quell the long controversy or raise new issues remains to be seen.
EPA developed the regulations because it has found, based on emissions data, that boilers (especially coal-, biomass-, and liquid-fired boilers) are major sources of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). The Clean Air Act defines a major source as any facility that emits 10 tons or more of a single listed HAP or 25 tons of any combination of HAPs annually. The HAPs themselves (187 substances) were listed by Congress in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Congress also set specific requirements for the stringency of MACT standards, limiting EPA's ability to promulgate less stringent requirements.
The revised MACT will affect about 14,000 existing boilers and process heaters, with capital costs of $4.6 billion, according to the agency. Annualized costs, which spread the costs of capital over the expected life of the equipment and include operating and maintenance expenses, are estimated by EPA at $1.2 billion per year. In response to comments on an earlier proposal and on the promulgated 2011 rule, the modified rule reduces the number of units expected to require controls, and makes the emissions standards much less stringent, cutting the agency's estimate of annualized control costs by more than half. Most of the costs of the final rule would be borne by boilers that burn coal, biomass, or liquid fuels; only 12% of the 14,000 units covered by the rule will need to install equipment to meet it. Most of the rest are fueled by natural gas or refinery gases. These boilers would not have to install pollution control equipment and most would experience cost savings under the rule's provisions, according to EPA. For the rule as a whole, EPA estimated that benefits—including the avoidance of 3,100 to 7,900 premature deaths annually—would outweigh costs by at least $23 billion per year.
Affected industries and many in Congress raised objections to the rule as proposed in 2010 and as promulgated in 2011, and bills were introduced in both the House and Senate in the 112th Congress to alter the rule's requirements and delay its implementation. H.R. 2250 passed the House 275-142 on October 13, 2011. Provisions similar to H.R. 2250 were offered as an amendment (S.Amdt. 1660) to the Senate version of the surface transportation bill (S. 1813) on March 8, 2012, but were not adopted. Numerous stakeholders have also challenged the rules in court. These challenges are expected to proceed now that EPA has finalized the rule.
In addition to the Boiler MACT, this report discusses three related rules that EPA developed at the same time, dealing with smaller "area source" boilers and with commercial and industrial boilers that burn solid waste (the "CISWI" and solid waste rules). The latter two rules have also been controversial. Revised versions of the three related rules were also finalized December 20. |
crs_R40644 | crs_R40644_0 | Most Recent Developments
The Administration requested a total budget authority of $67.551 billion in budget authority for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) for FY2010. This amounts to a $6.904 billion, or 11.1% increase over the $60.79 billion enacted for FY2009 (not including funding included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. The proposed amount would have represented a 11.8% increase over what was appropriated for FY2009. On December 8, 2009, a conference committee met to resolve differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions of Transportation-Housing and Urban Development (HUD) appropriations bill ( H.R. 3288 ). The version of H.R. 3288 reported by the conference committee—now entitled the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010—included six of the seven FY2010 appropriations bills that had not yet been signed into law. On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. The act includes a total of $68.705 billion for CJS, an amount that is 13.0% more than the FY2009-enacted amount, 1.7% more than the Administration's request, 1.5% more than the House-passed amount, and 1.1% more than the Senate-passed amount. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ; ARRA). The amounts appropriated by Congress in the ARRA are in addition to the amounts appropriated in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. The ARRA included $15.922 billion for CJS departments and agencies. For Commerce, the ARRA provided $7.916 billion, for Justice, the ARRA provided $4.002 billion, and for science agencies, the ARRA provided $4.004 billion. FY2010 Appropriations
This report uses the House report to accompany H.R. 2847 ( H.Rept. 111-149 ) and the text of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-32 ), as the source for the FY2009-enacted and the FY2010-requested amounts, and it uses the Senate report to accompany H.R. 2847 ( S.Rept. 111-34 ) as the source for the amounts in the House-passed bill. 2847 is used as the source for the Senate-passed amounts. 111-117, H.Rept. 111-366), is the source for the FY2010 enacted amounts. The Administration's proposal included $13.789 billion for Commerce, $27.074 billon for Justice, $25.737 billion for Science, and $950.9 million for related agencies. The House-passed bill would have provided a total of $67.695 billion for CJS for FY2010, which would have been 11.4% more than the amount appropriated for FY2009 and 0.2% more than the Administration's request. The Senate-passed bill would have provided a total of $67.953 billion for CJS for FY2010, which would have been 11.8% more than what was appropriated for FY2009, 0.6% more than the Administration's request, and 0.4% more than the House-recommended amount. FY2010 Budget Request
Table 2 presents the following funding information for the Commerce Department: the FY2009- enacted appropriations, emergency supplemental appropriations, the President's FY2010 request, the House-passed and Senate-passed amounts, and the amounts in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ). The Senate-passed version of H.R. In the report to accompany the Senate-passed version of H.R. | This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress to provide FY2010 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS). This report uses the House report to accompany H.R. 2847 (H.Rept. 111-149) and the text of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32), as the source for the FY2009-enacted and the FY2010-requested amounts, and it uses the Senate report to accompany H.R. 2847 (S.Rept. 111-34) as the source for the amounts in the House-passed bill. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 2847 is used as the source for the Senate-passed amounts. The joint explanatory statement to accompany the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117, H.Rept. 111-366), is the source for the FY2010 enacted amounts.
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5; ARRA). The amounts appropriated by Congress in the ARRA were in addition to the amounts appropriated in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). In this act, Congress appropriated $15.922 billion for CJS departments and agencies. For Commerce, the ARRA provided $7.916 billion, for Justice, the ARRA provided $4.002 billion, and for science agencies, the ARRA provided $4.004 billion.
The Administration requested a total budget authority of $67.551 billion for CJS departments for FY2010. This amounts to a $6.904 billion, or 11.1%, increase over the $60.79 billion enacted for FY2009. The Administration's proposal included $13.789 billion for Commerce, $27.074 billon for Justice, $25.737 billion for Science, and $950.9 million for related agencies. The House-passed bill recommended a total of $67.695 billion for CJS, 11.4% more than the total appropriated for FY2009 and 0.2% more than the Administration's FY2010 request. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 2847 would have provided a total of $67.953 billion for CJS. The proposed amount would have represented a 11.8% increase over what was appropriated for FY2009. The Senate-passed amount would have been a 0.6% increase over the Administration's request, and it would have been 0.4% more than what was included in the House-passed bill.
On December 8, 2009, a conference committee met to resolve differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions of Transportation-Housing and Urban Development (HUD) appropriations bill (H.R. 3288). The version of H.R. 3288 reported by the conference committee—now entitled the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010—included six of the seven FY2010 appropriations bills that had not yet been signed into law. On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) into law. The act includes a total of $68.705 billion for CJS, an amount that is 13.0% more than the FY2009-enacted amount, 1.7% more than the Administration's request, 1.5% more than the House-passed amount, and 1.1% more than the Senate-passed amount.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45036 | crs_R45036_0 | This report focuses on one pillar of that approach—the Federal Reserve's (Fed's) enhanced (heightened) prudential regulation for all banks that have more than $50 billion in assets. H.R. 3312 , the Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act of 2017, would replace the $50 billion threshold with a case-by-case designation process, while automatically subjecting banks that have been designated as globally-systemically important banks (G-SIBs) by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international forum. However, to date, enhanced prudential regulatory requirements have not been applied to thrift (savings and loan) holding companies with $50 billion or more in assets, because implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act is ongoing and prefatory material accompanying a 2014 regulation noted that "the Board may apply additional prudential requirements to certain savings and loan holding companies that are similar to the enhanced prudential standards if it determines that such standards are consistent with the safety and soundness of such companies." The LCR and NSFR apply to two sets of banks. Title I requires publicly traded banks with at least $10 billion in assets to form risk committees on their boards of directors that include a risk management expert responsible for oversight of the bank's risk management. Provisions That Are Triggered in Response to Financial Stability Concerns
Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act provides several powers to—depending on the provision—FSOC, the Fed, or the FDIC to use when the respective entity believes that a bank with more than $50 billion in assets poses a threat to financial stability. FSOC Reporting Requirements. The ratio is applied only if a bank receives written warning from FSOC that it poses a "grave threat to U.S. financial stability," and ceases to apply when the bank no longer poses a grave threat. These requirements all determine how the largest banks have to fund all of their activities on a day-to-day basis. Should Large Banks Be Regulated Differently Than Other Banks? Fear of financial instability being triggered by the failure of large firms led the government to provide extraordinary assistance to prevent the failure of firms, such as Bear Stearns and AIG, during the financial crisis—hence the assertion that large financial firms were "too big to fail." Stress tests are intended to verify that large banks could survive another crisis, living wills are intended to explain to regulators how a failing bank can be safely wound down, counterparty credit limits are intended to limit spillover effects when firms fail, and liquidity requirements attempt to reduce reliance on funding sources that proved to be unreliable during the crisis. Capital planning requirements impose a de facto additional capital requirement in addition to existing capital requirements that apply to all banks. When examining banks' asset sizes, there is substantial variation across a number of bank characteristics, but none that clearly identify a cutoff point at which banks begin or cease to be systemically important. The scoring methodology uses 12 indicators across five categories to calculate a bank's score. This section reviews proposals to alter which banks are subject to enhanced regulation. An example of the former is H.R. Even if size is not the only determinant of systemic importance, size is a much simpler and more transparent metric than some alternatives discussed below. As a practical matter, if size is well correlated with systemic importance—so that policymakers could choose a threshold that did not apply enhanced regulation to too many firms above the threshold that are not systemically important and did not leave out too many firms below the threshold that are not systemically important—it could serve as a good proxy that was easy and inexpensive to administer. Critics of size-based thresholds are skeptical of this criterion. In addition, many economists believe that the economic problem of "too big to fail" is actually a problem of firms that are too complex or too interdependent to fail. Size correlates with complexity and interdependence, but not perfectly, as discussed in the section above entitled " Are All Banks with More Than $50 Billion Systemically Important? " On the other hand, a number of these foreign banks are the U.S. operations of foreign G-SIBs, and may merit additional scrutiny by U.S. regulators because of potential systemic risk via a problem at their parent company. A case-by-case designation process is an alternative to a size threshold. | The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the problem of "too big to fail" financial institutions—the concept that the failure of a large financial firm could trigger financial instability, which in several cases prompted extraordinary federal assistance to prevent their failure. This report focuses on one pillar of the Dodd-Frank Act's (P.L. 111-203) response to addressing financial stability and ending too big to fail: a new enhanced prudential regulatory regime that applies to all banks with more than $50 billion in assets and to certain other financial institutions. Under this regime, the Federal Reserve is required to apply a number of safety and soundness requirements to large banks that are more stringent than those applied to smaller banks. These requirements are intended to mitigate systemic risk posed by large banks:
Stress tests and capital planning ensure banks hold enough capital to survive a crisis. Living wills provide a plan to safely wind down a failing bank. Liquidity requirements ensure that banks are sufficiently liquid if they lose access to funding markets. Counterparty limits restrict the bank's exposure to counterparty default. Risk management requires publicly traded companies to have risk committees on their boards and banks to have chief risk officers. Financial stability, regulatory interventions that can be taken only if a bank poses a threat to the financial stability.
Most of these requirements apply to about 30 U.S. bank holding companies or the U.S. operations of foreign banks. The requirements do not apply to other types of financial institutions with more than $50 billion in assets (unless individually designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council), including a few large securities and insurance firms that are chartered as thrift holding companies.
In addition, a number of provisions, such as higher capital requirements, that stem from the international "Basel III" agreement apply only to a handful of the largest banks. This is an example of how the current system is tailored, with the largest banks facing more stringent regulatory requirements than medium-sized and smaller banks.
Congress is debating whether to modify the $50 billion threshold because some Members believe that it applies to too many banks that do not pose systemic risk. Bills to amend which banks are subject to enhanced regulation include H.R. 3312/S. 1893, H.R. 10, and S. 2155.
Many economists believe that the economic problem of too big to fail is really a problem of firms that are too complex or too interdependent to fail. Size correlates with complexity and interdependence, but not perfectly. Size is a much simpler and more transparent metric than complexity or interdependence, however. As a practical matter, if size is well correlated with systemic importance, a dollar threshold could serve as a good proxy that is inexpensive and easy to administer. Designating banks on a case-by-case basis could raise similar issues that have occurred in the designation of nonbanks, such as legal challenges to overturn their designation.
This report also examines the question of which banks are systemically important. However, examining the banks above and slightly below the threshold does not reveal any natural cut off points that divide bank organizations into two groups that clearly present substantively different risks to systemic stability. This is because the size differences between each bank and those nearest to it are incremental and because banks vary across numerous characteristics. For these reasons, making an objective and definitive size-based determination of the point that a bank becomes systemically important is difficult. Regulators do employ an empirical methodology to identify globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) based on a score that is calculated using 12 indicators that measure the size, interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, and cross-jurisdictional activity of a bank. However, the results of this exercise do not produce a clear and uncontestable score threshold at which institutions clearly become systemically important. |
crs_RL33908 | crs_RL33908_0 | Background
Mining of hardrock minerals on federal lands is governed primarily by the General Mining Law of 1872. The Mining Law grants free access to individuals and corporations to prospect for minerals on open public domain lands, and allows them, upon making a discovery, to stake (or "locate") a claim on the deposit. A valid claim entitles the holder to develop the minerals. Some public lands may be "withdrawn" or closed to mineral entry. Analysis
Claim-Patent System: Pros and Cons
The right to enter the public domain lands and prospect for and develop minerals is the feature of the claim-patent system that draws the most vigorous support from the mining industry. Mining Law critics consider the claim-patent system a giveaway of publicly owned resources because of the absence of royalties and the small charges associated with keeping a claim active and obtaining a patent. Environmental Protection
The lack of direct statutory authority for environmental protection under the Mining Law of 1872 is another major issue that has spurred reform proposals. Many Mining Law supporters contend that other current laws, as noted above, provide adequate environmental protection. Critics, however, argue that these general environmental requirements are not adequate to assure reclamation of mined areas and that the only effective approach to protecting lands from the adverse impacts of mining under the current system is to withdraw them from development under the Mining Law. Current Legislative Activity
A broad-based bill to reform the General Mining Law of 1872, the Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009 ( H.R. 699 ), was introduced in the House on January 21, 2009. The bill would establish a Locatable Minerals Fund which would include two accounts: Hardrock Reclamation Account and a Hardrock Community Impact Assistance Account. An 8% royalty on "net smelter returns" would be imposed on new mines and mine expansions while a 4% "net smelter return" royalty would apply to existing mines. New reclamation standards would be established, and a reclamation bond or other financial guarantee would be required before exploration and operation permits are approved. A hearing was held on H.R. 699 by the House Committee on Natural Resource's Subcommittee on Energy and Minerals on February 26, 2009. A royalty rate (that would vary according to the mineral) of not less than 2% and not greater than 5% would be based on the value of production on federal land but would not apply to mining operations already in commercial production or those with an approved plan of operations. Royalty revenues would be deposited into a newly established Hardrock Minerals Reclamation Fund. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) would be amended to include a complete "review of land" not later than three years after enactment of this bill. The National Academy of Sciences would conduct a study of uranium development on federal land and would issue its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Agriculture within 18 months after enactment of this legislation. Also in the 111 th Congress, S. 140 (The Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act of 2009) was introduced January 6, 2009, to address cleaning up abandoned hardrock mines throughout the United States by establishing an Abandoned Mine Cleanup Fund and imposing various fees on hardrock mining operations on federal land. The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held a hearing on S. 796 and S. 140 on July 14, 2009. | Mining of hardrock minerals on federal lands is governed primarily by the General Mining Law of 1872. The law grants free access to individuals and corporations to prospect for minerals in public domain lands, and allows them, upon making a discovery, to stake (or "locate") a claim on that deposit. A claim gives the holder the right to develop the minerals and may be "patented" to convey full title to the claimant. A continuing issue is whether this law should be reformed, and if so, how to balance mineral development with competing land uses.
The right to enter the public domain and freely prospect for and develop minerals is the feature of the claim-patent system that draws the most vigorous support from the mining industry. Critics consider the claim-patent system a giveaway of publicly owned resources because of the small amounts paid to maintain a claim and to obtain a patent. Congress, however, has imposed a moratorium on mining claim patents through the annual Interior spending bill since FY1995.
The lack of direct statutory authority for environmental protection under the Mining Law of 1872 is another major issue that has spurred reform proposals. Many Mining Law supporters contend that other current laws provide adequate environmental protection. Critics, however, argue that these general environmental requirements are not adequate to assure reclamation of mined areas.
Broad-based legislation to reform the General Mining Law of 1872, the Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009 (H.R. 699), was introduced on January 21, 2009. The bill would establish an Abandoned Locatable Minerals Mine Reclamation Fund, a Locatable Minerals Community Impact Assistance Fund, and an 8% royalty on "net smelter returns" from new mines or mine expansions and a 4% "net smelter return" royalty on existing mines. New reclamation standards would be established, and a reclamation bond or other financial guarantee would be required before operation permits are approved. A hearing was held on H.R. 699 by the Committee on Natural Resources' Subcommittee on Energy and Minerals on February 26, 2009.
A broad-based Senate bill (S. 796) similar to House bill, H.R. 699, was introduced on April 2, 2009. A royalty rate (on the value of production) of not less than 2% or more than 5% would apply to mining claims that are not yet in commercial production or those with an approved operations plan. Royalty revenues would be deposited into a newly established Hardrock Minerals Reclamation Fund. An abandoned mine land reclamation fee would also be assessed on each mine operator and deposited into the Reclamation Fund. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act would be amended to include a complete "review of land" not later than three years after enactment of this legislation and the National Academy of Sciences would conduct a study of uranium development on federal land and would issue its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Agriculture within 18 months after enactment of the legislation.
A Senate bill, S. 140, was introduced January 6, 2009 (Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act of 2008) that would address cleaning up abandoned hardrock mines throughout the United States by establishing an Abandoned Mine Cleanup Fund and imposing various fees on hardrock mining operations on federal land.
The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held a hearing on July 14, 2009, on S. 796 and S. 140. Witnesses presented testimony on royalty regimes for hardrock minerals on public lands, environmental permitting, and public land withdrawals, among other issues. |
crs_R41890 | crs_R41890_0 | Congress has been deeply involved in efforts to protect the United States and other nations against terrorist attacks, especially since 9/11. Preventing an RDD attack and preparing to respond to and recover from an attack are thus matters of homeland security. Terrorists, too, are interested in RDDs. The prospect of an RDD attack raises several issues for Congress, including:
the priority to be given to countering terrorism using RDDs vs. other types of unconventional weapons; the priority to be given to domestic vs. overseas expenditures to secure radioactive sources; whether to use federal funds to develop and deploy radiation detection networks in major cities and elsewhere; how best to prepare for decontamination following an RDD attack, such as the balance between R&D, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, training, rapid distribution of information, and analysis of the cost of decontamination vs. demolition and reconstruction; how to dispose of contaminated waste, including rubble from demolition and chemicals from decontamination, following an attack; whether to modify standards for permitting unescorted access to certain U.S. radioactive sources; whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources; and how to enhance U.S. capability for radiological forensics. As a guide to quantities of material that should be protected, in 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revised its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. RDDs and Nuclear Weapons
The type of RDD most commonly referenced in the press and in public discussion is the "dirty bomb," in which conventional explosives like dynamite disperse radioactive material, but a dirty bomb is only one type of RDD. Estimates differ as to the area an RDD and a nuclear weapon would contaminate with radioactive material, depending on the height of burst of a nuclear weapon (and thus the quantity of material it lofted into the atmosphere that would become fallout), dispersibility of RDD material, wind patterns, radiation level at which an area is considered contaminated, and so on. A ground-burst nuclear weapon would contaminate a far larger area than an RDD. Panic. According to a State Department report, "Some terrorists seek to acquire radioactive materials for use in a radiological dispersal device." Terrorists would need to know something about radioactive materials. Many government agencies and other entities have taken steps to secure these sources; a few key examples follow. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC is an independent agency. However, NRC has many programs for security of radioactive sources. National Nuclear Security Administration
NNSA is a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy. Other Agencies
Other agencies have responsibilities for security as well. Several CRS reports provide additional information. Global Efforts
Securing Radioactive Sources
Because an RDD attack might occur outside the United States, or material obtained abroad might be used for an RDD attack on this nation, international organizations, the United States, nongovernmental organizations, and others have taken steps to secure sources worldwide. The directive further directs the Secretary to develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to "provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity" and to develop and administer a National Response Plan to "integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan." The Framework establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response." A 2010 GAO report raised questions about the adequacy of preparations for recovery. Radiological forensics would probably not support retaliation. Issues for Congress
This report shows that the United States and others have done much to prevent, respond to, and recover from an RDD attack, but that more might be done. (5) Since costs resulting from an RDD attack could be tens of billions of dollars, some measures that are directly relevant to an RDD attack, such as decontamination R&D and programs to secure radioactive sources, may be cost-effective. This effort would be costly. Programs to secure sources in other nations could also promote a security culture, leveraging U.S. expenditures. Atoms that decay are "radioactive," radioactive atoms are called "radionuclides." Type of radiation. Sources of long-term exposure. (See " G8 Global Partnership: .") | Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven "dirty bombs" are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress.
Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health.
Terrorists have shown some interest in RDDs. They could use them in an attempt to disperse radioactive material to cause panic, area denial, and economic dislocation. While RDDs would be far less harmful than nuclear weapons, they are much simpler to build and the needed materials are used worldwide. Accordingly, some believe terrorists would be more likely to use RDDs than nuclear weapons. Key points include:
RDDs could contaminate areas with radioactive material, increasing long-term cancer risks, but would probably kill few people promptly. Nuclear weapons could destroy much of a city, kill tens of thousands of people, and contaminate much larger areas with fallout. Cleanup cost after an RDD attack could range from less than a billion dollars to tens of billions of dollars, depending on area contaminated, decontamination technologies used, and level of cleanup required. Terrorists would face obstacles to using RDDs, such as obtaining materials, designing an effective weapon, and avoiding detection.
Governments and organizations have taken steps to prevent an RDD attack. Domestically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations to secure radioactive sources. The Department of Homeland Security develops and operates equipment to detect radioactive material. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has recovered thousands of disused or abandoned sources. Some state and local governments have taken steps to prepare for an RDD attack. Internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency has led efforts to secure radioactive sources. Its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources offers guidance for protecting sources. The G8 Global Partnership has secured sources in Russia and elsewhere. A State Department program strengthens border security. Other nations and non-governmental organizations have acted to secure sources as well. Key points include:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions have done much to instill a security culture for U.S. licensees of radioactive sources post-9/11. Many programs have sought to improve the security of radioactive sources overseas, but some incidents raise questions about security.
Should prevention fail, federal, state, and local governments have taken many measures to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. The National Response Framework "establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response." The federal government has resources for recovery. Key points include:
Government agencies have done much to prepare for and recover from an RDD attack. This work would help cope with other disasters. Conversely, planning for other disasters would help in the event of an RDD attack. Some experts have raised questions about the effectiveness of planning to respond to and recover from an RDD attack.
This report raises several issues for Congress, including:
the priority for countering RDDs vs. other CBRN; the priority given to securing domestic vs. overseas radioactive sources; whether to establish a radiation detection system in cities; how best to prepare for decontamination following an RDD attack; how to dispose of potentially large volumes of waste generated by decontamination; whether to modify certain personnel reliability standards; whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources; and how to improve radiological forensics capability.
CRS Report R41891, "Dirty Bombs": Background in Brief, by Jonathan Medalia, is an abridged version of this report. |
crs_R40218 | crs_R40218_0 | Despite these services and supports, research has demonstrated that compared to their counterparts in the general population, current and former foster youth are more likely to have difficulty making the transition to adulthood. This research, along with the efforts of policy makers and child welfare advocates, has brought greater attention to the challenges facing youth transitioning from care. These hearings culminated in the passage of the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-351 is arguably one of the most significant laws that pertain to older youth in foster care. This report presents issues affecting older youth as they transition from foster care into adulthood, particularly with regard to implementation of P.L. 113-183 . One possible challenge in implementing this provision is that even with assistance from the federal government, states may be hesitant to extend care because of the cost. Another concern is that youth in foster care are vulnerable to child sex trafficking, which refers to adults sexually exploiting children under age of 18 for commercial purposes. 113-183 requires, one year after the law's enactment, that child welfare agencies have policies in place to serve these youth. Congress may wish to monitor how states are implementing these and related requirements, including how many victims have been reported by state child welfare agencies to the federal government and any best practices that have been identified for serving these victims. See CRS Report RL34499, Youth Transitioning from Foster Care: Background and Federal Programs . 113-183 . Following hearings and roundtables on these topics, Congress passed the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act ( P.L. 113-183 ), which was signed into law on September 30, 2014. As authorized by P.L. Further, child welfare stakeholders call for extended care to have particular features. The study identified five such factors: (1) some juvenile courts in the state play an active role in retaining youth by keeping their cases open, even with resistance from stakeholders—caseworkers, caregivers, youth, and court personnel—involved in the case; (2) stakeholders in the child welfare system did not have a uniform understanding of laws and DCFS policy that allow youth to remain in care until age 21; (3) in regions where caseworkers believed that there were few appropriate foster care placements for the oldest youth in care, youth tended not to stay in care after age 18; (4) youth who had stable and supportive relationships with adults—foster parents, relatives, caseworkers, or other professionals—tended to remain in care longer; and (5) youth attitudes about staying in care beyond the age of majority was identified as a challenge in keeping them in care, and youth often request to leave or become uncooperative because of the restrictions imposed by their case worker. 106-169 ), the purposes of the CFCIP are to identify youth who are likely to remain in foster care until age 18 and provide them with support services to help make the transition to self-sufficiency; assist these youth in obtaining employment and preparing for and entering postsecondary training and educational institutions; provide personal and emotional support to youth aging out of foster care through mentors and other dedicated adults; enhance the efforts of former foster youth ages 18 to 21 to achieve self-sufficiency through supports that connect them to employment, education, housing, and other services; and assure that these former foster youth recognize and accept personal responsibility for preparing for and then making the transition from adolescence to adulthood. P.L. Ways to Foster Permanency
Despite federal protections to ensure that child welfare agencies help youth plan for their futures, child welfare practitioners and young people in care continue to advocate for additional policies that improve the transition to adulthood by encouraging strong, long-term connections to caring adults. Further, the case plan requirements could include documentation of the steps the agency takes to find a permanent placement with a family or other adult connection for the youth, as well as a permanent living arrangement. Some considerations include (1) the type of guidance and technical assistance HHS provides states to make them aware of the child welfare agency's role in responding to child sex trafficking, (2) whether states are serving youth who are not or were not previously in foster care, (3) how many victims are reported by state child welfare agencies to the federal government, and (4) any best practices that have been identified for serving these victims. For example, child welfare agencies may need to examine larger issues that may play a role in whether a child goes missing. Another consideration is how states define missing, and whether to report all missing children to law enforcement agencies. P.L. 110-351 can be housed in a foster home or independent living setting. | Recent research has demonstrated that compared to their peers current and former foster youth are more likely to experience negative outcomes in adulthood. This research, along with the efforts of policy makers and child welfare advocates, has brought greater attention to the challenges facing older youth in care and those transitioning from foster care. In response, Congress has sought to improve existing services and provide additional supports for this population through legislation. The 110th Congress passed the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-351), which is arguably one of the most significant laws enacted in the past two decades that expands services and supports for older foster youth. The 113th Congress expanded on these efforts through the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (P.L. 113-183), enacted on September 30, 2014. The law adds requirements (effective one year after enactment) that are intended to engage older youth in case planning and provide them with certain protections. This report discusses issues affecting older youth as they transition from foster care into adulthood, particularly those that pertain to implementation of the two laws.
P.L. 110-351 extended eligibility, beginning in FY2011, for federal foster care assistance to youth who remain in care after age 18 (at state option until 19, 20, or 21). The law additionally authorized this assistance on behalf of older youth eligible for federal foster care if they reside in an independent living setting (as well as foster family homes or other eligible settings). One possible challenge in extending care is that even with assistance from the federal government, states may be hesitant to extend care to older youth because of the cost. Further, child welfare stakeholders assert that states should ensure that youth who remain in care have opportunities to take on increasing responsibilities to prepare them for the transition from care.
Despite federal protections to ensure that child welfare agencies help youth as they enter adulthood, stakeholders have called for additional policies to improve this transition by encouraging strong, long-term connections to adults. For example, some policy makers have articulated that child welfare agencies should ensure that all children in foster care have a permanency goal of reunification or other more permanent outcomes, and not a case goal of another planned permanent living arrangement (APPLA). Policy makers assert that APPLA is often used as a default option when a permanent option has not been identified. P.L. 113-183 requires that beginning one year after enactment only youth age 16 and older may have a case goal of APPLA and that additional court oversight is required for these youth.
Another concern is that youth in foster care are vulnerable to child sex trafficking, which refers to adults sexually exploiting children under age 18 for commercial purposes. P.L. 113-183 requires, one year after enactment, that child welfare agencies have policies in place to serve child sex trafficking victims. Congress may wish to monitor how states are implementing these and related requirements, including how many victims have been reported by state child welfare agencies to the federal government and any best practices that have been identified for serving these victims. P.L. 113-183 further requires states to develop protocols for responding to children who run from foster care. This may prompt child welfare agencies to examine larger issues that may play a role in whether a child goes missing. A related consideration is how states define "missing" and whether to report all missing children to law enforcement.
For background information about older foster youth and the current federal policies and programs for this population, see CRS Report RL34499, Youth Transitioning from Foster Care: Background and Federal Programs, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31589 | crs_RL31589_0 | In particular, many analysts agree that some countries need greaterprotection against terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on their territories. Thereport of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keepWMD away from terrorist groups. He then noted uncertainties aboutthe WMD programs of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea. This paper takes CTR programs as a starting point and analyzes their potential application to India and Pakistan. The paper distinguishes betweenassistance oriented toward making nuclear weapons more secure, and assistance oriented towardmaking nuclear material more secure. Section 1601 in Title XVI states thatit shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, to encourage and work with India and Pakistan to achieve thefollowing by September 2003:
nuclear test moratorium
commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles that couldcarry nuclear weapons and to restrain the ranges and types of missiles developed ordeployed
agreement by both countries to align their export controls with internationalnonproliferation regimes
establishment of export control system for sensitive dual-use items, technology,technical information and material used in the design, development, or production of WMD andballistic missiles
bilateral meetings between senior Indian and Pakistani officials to discusssecurity issues and establish confidence-building measures with respect to nuclear policies and programs. In the 108th Congress, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 1308) authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from theCooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. Although the legislationremained in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is likely to be introduced again in the 109thCongress. Cooperative Threat Reduction
Congress enacted the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in 1991,addressing, in Senator Lugar's words, "the dominant international proliferation danger: the massivenuclear, chemical and biological weapons infrastructure of the former Soviet Union." (8)
CTR as Precedent
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, at its inception, was a novel approach to a novel problem. Although some of the kinds of assistance and measures undertaken in theCTR program are clearly applicable to India and Pakistan, the circumstances that have led to thedevelopment of a similar nuclear terrorist threat are quite different. Both Indiaand Pakistan have been active in discussions on expanding the Convention. Pakistan has IAEA safeguards on a few facilities. Media reported that Pakistan had moved nuclearweapons components to several undisclosed locations. Khan. And, reportedly, Pakistan shared that design with Libya. New military cooperation and sharing of information on terrorism and in other areas may buildtrust between the United States and Pakistan and between the United States and India. Agreements for Cooperation. As noted above, assistance ofthis kind has been provided under IAEA auspices. Certifications
In 1991, the legislation that created the Nunn-Lugar program stipulated that U.S. assistance in destroying nuclear and other weapons may not be provided to the Soviet Union, any of its republicsor successor entities unless the President certifies to the Congress that the proposed recipient iscommitted to:
making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons;
forgo any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirementsor is designed to replace destroyed WMD;
forgo the use of fissile materials and other components from destroyed nuclearweapons in new nuclear weapons;
facilitate U.S. verification of weapons destruction that uses U.S.money;
comply with all relevant arms control agreements; and
observe internationally recognized human rights, including the protection ofminorities. | Since India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, there has been a debate on whether the United States should provide assistance in making those weapons safer and more secure. In thewake of September 11, 2001, interest in this kind of assistance has grown for several reasons: thepossibility of terrorists gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons seems higher, the U.S. militaryis forging new relationships with both Pakistan and India in the war on terrorism, and heightenedtension in Kashmir in 2002 threatened to push both states closer to the brink of nuclear war. InOctober 2001, media reported that the United States was providing assistance to Pakistan to keepits weapons safe, although those reports have not been confirmed. Revelations in 2004 that Pakistaniscientist A.Q. Khan was selling nuclear technology (and reportedly a nuclear bomb design) to Iran,Libya, and North Korea also helped to renew interest in making, in particular, Pakistan's nuclearweapons program more secure from exploitation. The report of the 9/11 Commission also called forcontinued support for threat reduction assistance to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) awayfrom terrorist groups.
In the 108th Congress, the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act (Section 1308 of FY2004 Defense Authorization Act, PL 108-136) allowed the Department of Defense to spend up to $50 million inunobligated funds on cooperative threat reduction (CTR) measures outside the former Soviet Union. In the 109th Congress, it is likely that similar legislation will be introduced again. The Bushadministration used $20 million of CTR funds to dismantle chemical weapons-related items inAlbania, but proponents of expanding CTR have mentioned many other countries as possiblerecipients: India, Pakistan, China, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya, to name a few.
This paper describes why Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs developed for the former Soviet Union are considered models for assistance elsewhere and their potential applicationin India and Pakistan. The paper considers the types of assistance provided under CTR and potentialconstraints on U.S. assistance in this area, including domestic and international legal and politicalrestrictions on cooperation with states outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); the lowlevel of cooperation and transparency exhibited by India and Pakistan; lack of incentives for Indiaand Pakistan to pursue threat reduction measures; and potentially competing objectives of threatreduction and nuclear deterrence.
This report, which will be updated as events warrant, complements CRS Report RL32359 , Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options , and CRS Report RS21840(pdf) , Expanding Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs: Concepts and Definitions . |
crs_RL32873 | crs_RL32873_0 | The debate over omnibus energy legislation ( H.R. On August 8, 2005, President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 6 environmental provisions addressed in this report are the following: limits on the use of MTBE; a renewable fuel mandate for gasoline; stricter regulation of underground storage tanks; climate change; Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act exemptions for oil and gas exploration and production (related to stormwater runoff and hydraulic fracturing); incentives and R&D funding for alternative fuels and vehicles; hydroelectric relicensing; ozone compliance deadlines; streamlining of environmental regulations; and a renewable portfolio standard. MTBE and Ethanol: Fuels
Title XV of the enacted law contains several provisions addressing the gasoline additives methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and ethanol. This title also establishes a program to encourage exports of carbon intensity-reducing technologies to developing countries. 109-58 gives a permanent exemption from Clean Water Act (CWA) stormwater runoff rules for the construction of exploration and production facilities by oil and gas companies and the roads that service those sites. Hydraulic fracturing involves the high-pressure injection of fluids into coal beds to enhance the recovery of oil and natural gas from underground formations. Further, the enacted law authorizes funding for the development of a nuclear plant to produce electricity and hydrogen. 109-58 will give applicants for hydroelectric licenses increased flexibility in complying with conditions imposed by federal agencies. In Section 996, the enacted law requires EPA to work with State and local officials in a multi-county Western Michigan project area to determine the extent of ozone and ozone precursor transport, to assess alternatives to achieve compliance with the 8-hour ozone standard apart from local controls, and to determine the timeframe in which such compliance could take place. 109-58 includes a variety of provisions, applicable to several categories of energy projects, that are intended to expedite the process for completing or complying with environmental requirements. Key Environmental Provisions not Included in P.L. | Debate over a national energy policy has been ongoing since the 107th Congress. Both the 107th and 108th Congresses were unable to complete action on an omnibus energy bill. The 109th Congress debated and passed H.R. 6, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which was signed by President Bush August 8, 2005 (P.L. 109-58).
The enacted law contains various provisions involving environmental protection and regulation. This report briefly summarizes and discusses the background and implications of key environmental provisions.
Title XV of P.L. 109-58 eliminates the reformulated gasoline (RFG) oxygen standard, and in its place establishes a renewable fuel mandate for gasoline. Because of related concerns over MTBE (a gasoline additive that competes with ethanol) contamination, the enacted law modifies existing authority for cleanup of leaking underground storage tanks, and authorizes funding for MTBE cleanup.
Title XVI establishes a program to promote the development and deployment of low-carbon technologies both domestically and in developing countries.
Section 322 amends the Safe Drinking Water Act to exempt certain hydraulic fracturing techniques from EPA regulation. Hydraulic fracturing involves the underground injection of fluids into coal beds to enhance recovery of oil gas.
Section 323 gives permanent exemption from Clean Water Act stormwater runoff rules for the construction of exploration and production facilities by oil and gas companies and roads that service those sites.
Various sections in Titles VII, VIII, and XIII authorize R&D funding for hydrogen, fuel cells, and alternative fuel vehicles or establish tax incentives for their use.
Section 241 gives applicants for hydroelectric licenses increased flexibility in complying with conditions imposed by federal agencies. These conditions can include water release controls to limit erosion, and protection of habitat.
Section 966 requires EPA to work with state and local officials in western Michigan to determine ozone pollution and transport, and assess alternatives to achieve compliance with air quality standards.
A variety of provisions are intended to expedite the process for completing or complying with environmental requirements.
Not included in the enacted law are provisions on oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and a renewable portfolio standard.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL31959 | crs_RL31959_0 | Background
Congress last enacted a broad foreign assistance authorization act in 1985. In the absence of omnibus foreign aid authorizations, the majority of the foreign assistance legislation has been enacted as part of annual Foreign Operationsappropriation measures. Last year, the Foreign Relations Committee reported a similar bill -- S. 1161 -- characterizing the action as effort to "reinforce" theCommittee's role in foreign assistance policy making. (2) Chairman Lugar noted duringthe Committee's markup of that bill that it was not an attempt to comprehensivelyreview and re-write existing foreign aid legislation. Rather, S. 1161 represented a first step in providing necessary authorization for programappropriations in FY2004 and updating selected legislative provisions to reflectcurrent policy. Senator Lugar said that it was his intent to launch a more ambitiouseffort in the future to revamp the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and otherlong-standing foreign aid laws. Contents of the Foreign Aid Legislation
Division B of S. 1161 is divided into five titles:
Title XXI includes a series of FY2005 authorizations of appropriations. Title XXII updates and amends several existing foreign aid authorities, some of which have been annually extended in appropriation acts inrecent years. Title XV consists of a number of miscellaneous provisions, several of which address Africa and Latin America issues, including authorizationfor additional aid to Haiti. Authorization of Appropriations
Division B of S. 2144 authorizes the appropriation of about $16.9 billion for 22 foreign assistance programs, closely matching the account structure ofthe annual Foreign Operations appropriations for bilateral economic and military aid. The total for foreign aid programs, however, is$182 million less than proposed by the Administration. $25 million more for aid to the former Soviet Union. Radiological Terrorism Security Act (4)
Title XXIII of S. 2144 addresses the threat posed by terrorist use of radiological dispersal devices, or RDDs. Accordingly, Section 2304 authorizes the Secretary of State to help other countries -- directly or through the IAEA -- develop national response plans and train firstresponders for dealing with an RDD attack. Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2003 (5)
Title XXIV of S. 2144 -- The Global Pathogen Surveillance Act -- would authorize $35 million for FY2005 to enhance the capability of developingnations to detect, identify, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, whether naturallyoccurring or the result of a bioterrorist attack. (6)
The Global Pathogen Surveillance Act includes several provisions that are intended to support and strengthen the disease surveillance capabilities of developingnations. Additionally, Sections 2410 and 2411 would permit the expansion of CDC facilities overseas to further the goals of global disease monitoring. | Congress last enacted a broad foreign assistance authorization act in 1985. In the absence of omnibus foreign aid measures, the majority of foreign assistance legislation has been enacted as partof annual Foreign Operations appropriation measures. Division B of S. 2144 --Foreign Assistance Authorization for FY2005 -- is an effort to "reinforce" the Senate ForeignRelations Committee's role in foreign aid policy making. It is not an attempt to comprehensivelyreview and re-write existing foreign aid legislation, but rather it is a first step in providing necessaryauthorization for program appropriations in FY2005 and updating selected legislative provisions toreflect current policy. Committee Chairman Lugar said that it was his intent to launch a moreambitious effort later that would revamp the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and other long-standingforeign aid laws. The Committee reported and the Senate debated similar legislation last year -- S. 1161 , later merged into S. 925 -- authorizing foreign aid programs forFY2004. The bill remains pending in the Senate, but is unlikely to receive further consideration.
Division B of S. 2144 is divided into five titles. Title XXI includes FY2005 authorizations of appropriations. Title XXII updates and amends several existing foreign aidauthorities, some of which have been annually extended in appropriation acts. Title XXIII is theRadiological Terrorism Security Act of 2004. Title XXIV is the Global Pathogen Surveillance Actof 2004. Title XXV consists of several provisions, some of which address Africa and Latin Americaissues, including additional aid for Haiti.
The legislation authorizes the appropriation of about $16.9 billion for 22 foreign assistance programs, closely matching the account structure of the annual Foreign Operations appropriationsfor bilateral economic and military aid. The amounts authorized are nearly identical to levelsrequested by the Administration for FY2005, although the bill would increase spending forHIV/AIDS, development aid, assistance to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, andnonproliferation programs, while reducing amounts for the Millennium Challenge Account.
S. 2144 addresses the threat posed by terrorist use of radiological dispersal devices, or RDDs. The bill requires the Secretary of State to prepare and submit to Congress reportsassessing the threat of a radiological attack on U.S. missions. The bill further authorizes theSecretary to aid foreign countries, or propose that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)develop programs, helping foreign first responders identify and address threats posed by radioactivematerials.
The legislation also includes the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act, authorizing $35 million for FY2005 to enhance the capability of developing nations to detect, identify, and contain infectiousdisease outbreaks, whether naturally occurring or the result of a bioterrorist attack. The measureincludes several provisions that are intended to support and strengthen the disease surveillancecapabilities of developing nations. Additionally, it would permit the expansion of Centers forDisease Control and Prevention facilities overseas to further the goals of global disease monitoring.This report will be updated as Congress considers the legislation.
Key Policy Staff |
crs_RL33568 | crs_RL33568_0 | Most Recent Developments
With the signing of the Omnibus Appropriations Act for FY2009 ( H.R. 1105 , P.L. Of that total, $5.76 billion was allocated to Space Operations, which include the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. For FY2008, NASA had received $5.53 billion for Space Operations. The first launch of the shuttle was in April 1981. The International Space Station program thus began in 1993, with Russia joining the United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada. President George W. Bush, prompted in part by the February 2003 space shuttle Columbia tragedy, made a major space policy address on January 14, 2004, directing NASA to focus its activities on returning humans to the Moon and eventually sending them to Mars. Included in this "Vision for Space Exploration" was a decision to retire the space shuttle in 2010. The President said the United States would fulfill its commitments to its space station partners. The U.S. space shuttle has been the major vehicle taking crews and cargo back and forth to ISS, but the shuttle system encountered difficulties after the Columbia disaster and did not resume flights until 2006. Russian Soyuz spacecraft are also used to take crews to and from ISS, and Russian Progress spacecraft deliver cargo, but cannot return anything to Earth, since it is not designed to survive reentry into the Earth's atmosphere. A Soyuz is always attached to the station as a lifeboat in case of an emergency. "Expedition" crews have occupied ISS on a 4-6 month rotating basis since November 2000. 110 - 329 ). The Vision calls for development of a Crew Exploration Vehicle, now named Orion, to take astronauts to and from the Moon, and a Crew Launch Vehicle, now named Ares I. Orion also can take them to and from the ISS, and NASA Administrator Griffin stated at a September 19, 2005 press conference that Orion would be used to take crews to and from the ISS, and to serve as a lifeboat for them. Current plans for the shuttle include nine more flights to complete the ISS before the shuttle is permanently grounded in 2010. The 2008 NASA Authorization Act ( P.L. 110 - 422 ) included a provision requiring NASA to "terminate or suspend any activity of the Agency that, if continued between the date of enactment of this Act and April 30, 2009, would preclude the continued safe and effective flight of the Space Shuttle after fiscal year 2010 if the President inaugurated on January 20, 2009, were to make a determination to delay the Space Shuttle's scheduled retirement." For FY2009, NASA requested $2.982 billion for the shuttle, but that amount reflects NASA's new system for funding program overhead costs, which created a new Cross-Agency Support account. By the new accounting system, the comparable shuttle funding for FY2008 was $3.267 billion. The omnibus appropriations bill ( P.L. | The International Space Station (ISS) program began in 1993, with Russia joining the United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada. Crews have occupied ISS on a 4-6 month rotating basis since November 2000.
The U.S. Space Shuttle, which first flew in April 1981, has been the major vehicle taking crews and cargo back and forth to ISS, but the shuttle system has encountered difficulties since the Columbia disaster in 2003. Russian Soyuz spacecraft are also used to take crews to and from ISS, and Russian Progress spacecraft deliver cargo, but cannot return anything to Earth, since they are not designed to survive reentry into the Earth's atmosphere. A Soyuz is always attached to the station as a lifeboat in case of an emergency.
President Bush, prompted in part by the Columbia tragedy, made a major space policy address on January 14, 2004, directing NASA to focus its activities on returning humans to the Moon and someday sending them to Mars. Included in this "Vision for Space Exploration" is a plan to retire the space shuttle in 2010. The President said the United States would fulfill its commitments to its space station partners, and the shuttle Discovery made the first post-Columbia flight to the ISS in July 2006. Shuttle flights have continued and completion of the space station is scheduled before the shuttle is retired in 2010. Meanwhile NASA has begun development of a new crew launch vehicle, named Ares, and a crew exploration vehicle, named Orion.
NASA programs were funded for FY2008 in Division B of the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161). The Space Operations program, which includes the space shuttle and the ISS, was funded at $6.734 billion. For FY2009 NASA requested $5.775 billion for these programs, but in the process revised its budgeting to move its overhead costs to a new account called Cross-Agency Support. Under the new system, the FY2008 Space Operations program would have received $5.526 billion, about $250 million less than the FY2009 request. NASA is currently operating under a continuing resolution (Division A of P.L. 110-329), which funded most civilian activities through March 6, 2009. Under the continuing resolution, Space Operations are funded at the $5.526 billion rate appropriated for FY2008.
An FY2009 NASA authorization bill (H.R. 6063) was introduced May 15, 2008. Among the provisions in the one-year authorization bill was a "Sense of the Congress" urging cooperation in the Moon/Mars activities with other nations pursuing human space flight. It also requires that NASA "terminate or suspend any activity of the Agency that, if continued between the date of enactment of this Act and April 30, 2009, would preclude the continued safe and effective flight of the Space Shuttle after fiscal year 2010 if the President inaugurated on January 20, 2009, were to make a determination to delay the Space Shuttle's scheduled retirement." Congress passed the bill September 27, and it was signed by the President October 15 (P.L. 110-422). |
crs_RL31264 | crs_RL31264_0 | The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) was instituted by the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (WRDA 1986, P.L. 99-662 ) to pay for routine maintenance and operations costs of harbors. Numerous legal challenges to the HMT raise questions about its future and possible legislative changes. Harbor maintenance dredging requirements are expected to increase in the near-term due to current channel deepening projects at many ports. This report reviews recent developments in harbor maintenance legislation and the current status of harbor maintenance funding. The first is the distinction between harbor maintenance and harbor-deepening projects. Funds for the federal share of harbor-deepening projects are provided from U.S. Treasury general funds. In March 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the application of the HMT with respect to exports, finding that it violated Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the Constitution which states that, "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." Cases regarding the constitutionality of the HMT on imports remain in litigation. The European Union sees the application of the HMT to imports as a discriminatory import tariff that violates U.S. obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO). The current HMTF balance, in conjunction with the revenue stream from the remaining HMT collections and interest payments, are considered sufficient to recover expenditures for the foreseeable future. However, the results of the aforementioned legal and trade challenges could reduce or halt incoming revenue. Today, however, ever-larger containerships are the primary driving force behind current dredging activity. Issues for Congress
There are a number of policy questions that are intertwined with the question of how to finance harbor maintenance in a manner that is both constitutional and not in violation of trade agreements. The Water Resources Development Act of 2003 ( H.R. 2003), which passed the House, would authorize this change in cost share arrangements. | The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) was instituted by the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986 (P.L. 99-662) to pay for the routine maintenance and operations costs of harbors. Numerous legal challenges to the HMT raise questions about its future and the issue of possible legislative changes. In March 1998, the Supreme Court struck down the application of the HMT with respect to exports, finding that it violated the Constitution's ban on export taxes. Cases regarding the constitutionality of the HMT on imports remain in litigation. The European Union sees the application of the HMT to imports as a discriminatory import tariff that violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The current Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund balance, in conjunction with the revenue stream from the remaining HMT collections and interest payments, are considered sufficient to cover expenditures for the foreseeable future. However, the results of the legal and trade challenges could reduce or halt incoming revenue. Harbor maintenance dredging requirements are expected to increase in the near-term over recent levels due to current deepening projects at many ports. Larger containerships appear to be the primary driving force behind current dredging activity.
Issues for the 108th Congress include how to finance harbor maintenance in a manner that is both constitutional and not in violation of trade agreements, and how to finance the federal portion of harbor-deepening projects. Key policy questions include: Should the federal government return to using the general fund to finance harbor maintenance? Should a new user fee be established to pay for harbor maintenance? The larger issue that may need to be resolved before a funding solution can be found is: what should the role of the federal government be in port maintenance and dredging? The Water Resources Development Act of 2003 (H.R. 2557), which passed the House, would increase the role of the federal government by increasing its share of the cost in harbor deepening and maintenance projects. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R43706 | crs_R43706_0 | Introduction
Article III of the Constitution established the judicial branch of the United States, consisting of the Supreme Court and of any "inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.... " To staff such courts, the Constitution empowered life-tenured and salary-protected judges to adjudicate certain "cases" or "controversies," including cases arising under the Constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court has established a host of loosely related rules generally called the constitutional avoidance doctrine that discourage a federal court from issuing broad rulings on matters of constitutional law. After providing general background on the power of judicial review and the major theories justifying the constitutional avoidance doctrine, this report explores the various rules that allow a court to avoid a broad ruling that invalidates a democratically enacted law and the logic behind those rules. The report concludes with an exploration of how the doctrine of constitutional avoidance has influenced some of the recent jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, criticisms of the doctrine, and the implications for Congress. While the Constitution itself is silent on the power of judicial review, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall formally concluded that the logic of the written Constitution coupled with an independent judiciary necessitated the federal judiciary's unique role in being able to invalidate the acts of other branches of government that contravened the Constitution. In sharp contrast to the views of the Framers, American history has been replete with examples of outcry at the scope of the powers provided to the unelected federal judiciary. As a result, judicial review necessarily invites conflict with the political branches. The "Passive Virtues" and Judicial Minimalism
In The Least Dangerous Branch, Professor Alexander Bickel proposed a solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty, a solution that has deep roots in the High Court's constitutional jurisprudence and has been the inspiration for many members of the judiciary when approaching difficult constitutional questions. Bickel argued that when the Supreme Court is faced with a difficult question of constitutional law, the Court need not as a matter of course exercise the power of judicial review and serve in either a legitimating or countermajoritarian role. The Supreme Court can opt for the third route by practicing the so-called "passive virtues," a set of tools, such as the justiciability doctrines and the Court's discretionary certiorari power, with which the Court can return an unsettled constitutional problem to the political realm for resolution. For Bickel, by employing the "passive virtues" and exercising judicial review only when constitutional principles are sufficiently clear for resolution, the Court can avoid unnecessary entanglement in controversial and sensitive constitutional issues, protecting the judiciary from potential backlash by the political branches and preserving the Court's role as the protector of established constitutional principles. At the same time, the use of the "passive virtues," according to Bickel, encourages constitutional dialogue within the other branches and the public and allows the Court to better gauge what is the appropriate constitutional principle animating a particular issue. Professor Cass Sunstein's work on "judicial minimalism" is often seen as the modern continuation of Professor Bickel's work. Specifically, Professor Sunstein advocates for "judicial minimalism"—that is, in deciding cases, judges should "say[] no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leav[e] as much as possible undecided.... " In particular, courts, according to Sunstein, should strive to make rulings that are both narrow—decisions that are no broader than necessary to resolve the case at hand —and shallow—decisions that avoid questions of basic principle and reach "concrete judgments on particular cases, unaccompanied by abstract accounts about what accounts for those judgments." First, Professor Sunstein argues that minimalism reduces burdens on the judiciary in trying to reach a decision. The October 2012 term witnessed the Roberts Court avoiding ruling on two of the most controversial legal issues currently being debated in the United States through the use of the standing doctrine. | Article III of the Constitution established the judicial branch of the United States, staffing the branch with life-tenured and salary-protected judges. Amongst the powers of the federal judiciary is the power of "judicial review"—that is, the power to invalidate the acts of other branches of government and the states that contravene the Constitution. The Framers of the Constitution established this "countermajoritarian" role for the judiciary to help protect the written Constitution and its principles against incursions from the political branches. The power of judicial review is both a potent and controversial power, as American history has been replete with examples of outcry at when unelected federal judges invalidate the acts of a democratically elected branch of government. The potential for backlash to judicial review by the political branches has resulted in what late Professor Alexander Bickel termed a "countermajoritarian difficulty," as the judiciary is needed to protect the basic principles of the Constitution, but is also necessarily dependent on the political branches to enforce the judiciary's mandates. In other words, judicial review, while necessary to protect the mandates of the Constitution, is inherently antidemocratic, risking an erosion of the judiciary's role in the American constitutional form of government.
The prominent solution to the potential perils of the countermajoritarian difficulty, as espoused by Professor Bickel, is that the judiciary—and in particular the High Court—should exercise the "passive virtues," a set of tools, such as the justiciability doctrines, with which a court can return an unsettled and controversial constitutional problem to the political realm for resolution. The logic of Bickel's theory is that by "staying its hand" a court can avoid unnecessary entanglement in controversial and sensitive constitutional issues, while simultaneously allowing the judiciary to better gauge what is the appropriate constitutional principle animating a particular issue. Professor Bickel's work has been built on by Professor Cass Sunstein, who has argued that when the Supreme Court does reach the merits of a constitutional question (as opposed to avoiding the question entirely), the Court should practice "judicial minimalism,"—that is, in deciding cases, judges should say no more than necessary to justify an outcome and leave as much as possible undecided. Sunstein justified his theories on the grounds that minimalism reduces burdens on the Supreme Court and promotes democratic dialogue on difficult constitutional law questions.
The works of Professors Bickel and Sunstein are anchored in "deeply rooted" precedent from the Supreme Court in a doctrine called the constitutional avoidance doctrine. The doctrine was perhaps best articulated in a concurrence by Justice Louis Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, in which Justice Brandeis listed seven different loosely related rules that allow a court to avoid issuing broad rulings on matters of constitutional law. A host of recent cases from the Roberts Court on some of the most controversial legal issues currently facing the nation—including foreign surveillance, gay marriage, voting rights, the scope of Congress's enumerated powers, affirmative action, and mandatory union dues—have deployed the Ashwander rules to avoid having the Supreme Court issue broad rulings on the Constitution. After providing general background on the power of judicial review and the major theories on the constitutional avoidance doctrine, this report explores the various rules that allow a court to avoid a ruling that invalidates a democratically enacted law and the logic behind those rules. The report concludes with an exploration of how the doctrine of constitutional avoidance has influenced some of the recent jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, criticisms of the doctrine, and the implications for Congress. |
crs_RS21754 | crs_RS21754_0 | A 1994 Defense Science Board report found "pockets of unreadiness" attributed to turbulence in the armed forces. The occupation phase, however, soon involved some 220,000 troops. Whether from internal or external pressure, in January 2004, DOD responded. Permanent End Strength Increase
On January 19, 2007, after having resisted previous congressional calls to permanently increase the end strengths of the Army and Marine Corps, the Department of Defense announced that it would seek approval to increase the permanent end strengths of the active Army by 65,000 and the active Marine Corps by 27,000. P.L. 110-181 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, authorizes this permanent end strength increase. The "right" size and composition for the military addresses military requirements now and in the future. Critics counter that the war on terrorism and occupation of Iraq could endure for many years and that the continuing potential for sudden, major crises, such as in Korea, requires a robust U.S. military force. 1585 , the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, ( P.L. | For several years, some Members of Congress and many military analysts have argued that the U.S. Armed Forces are too small to adequately meet all the requirements arising after the Cold War, particularly with the advent of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In January 2004, the Department of Defense acknowledged a problem by temporarily adding 30,000 troops to the authorized active duty end strength of the Army. Congress addressed the issue by raising ground force statutory end strengths in the FY2005 defense authorization bill ( P.L. 108-375 ), the FY2006 bill ( P.L. 109-163 ), and again in FY2007 ( P.L. 109-364 ). In FY2007, the Administration requested a permanent end strength increaseâ65,000 for the Army and 27,000 for the Marine Corpsâand P.L. 110-181 ) the FY2008 defense authorization bill approved the increase. This report describes the background of these actions, current Administration planning, and assesses potential issues for the 110 th Congress. This report will be updated. |
crs_RS22442 | crs_RS22442_0 | Brief Summary of S. 2557
Section 2 would have addressed the problem of regional shortages of petroleum and natural gas products by amending the Clayton Act to make it unlawful for "any person to refuse to sell, or to export or divert, existing supplies of petroleum, gasoline, or other fuel derived from petroleum or natural gas with the primary intention of increasing prices or creating a shortage in a geographic market." Section 3 would have required the FTC and the Attorney General, to (1) conduct a study of section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Review, Reporting Requirements
The Federal Trade Commission has released two reports—in July 2005 and March 2006 - concerning the gasoline industry. First, a provision that would add language to the Sherman Act to make certain actions unlawful under that statute, may be redundant: those actions taken abroad by a non-sovereign that have the requisite effect on U.S. commerce are already reachable under the U.S. antitrust laws, even absent specific statutory authorization. Congress has not granted indirect purchasers standing under the federal antitrust laws, although several states have done so with regard to their own antitrust laws. | This report addresses one of several approaches to the issue of rising gasoline prices put forward in the 109th Congress. S. 2557 was introduced on April 6, 2006, by Senator Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, reported by that committee on April 27, but was not scheduled for floor action. The bill sought to amend the antitrust laws to accomplish four things.
Mitigate regional shortages of petroleum and natural gas products Mandate federal agency reviews to (a) fine-tune the statutory provision most concerned with mergers (Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, which makes unlawful any merger or acquisition in or affecting commerce that may "substantially" lessen competition or "tend to create a monopoly" in any line or commerce in any section of the country) so that it would be particularly applicable to mergers in the oil and gas industry, and (b) examine the effectiveness of the divestiture remedy for mergers in that industry Establish a federal-state task force to examine information-sharing in the oil and gas industries; and Make U.S. antitrust law applicable to certain actions carried out by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). |
crs_RL34578 | crs_RL34578_0 | Since 1966, the federal government has provided guarantees and subsidies to approved private lenders or state government entities that make student loans. Because college graduates' enhanced human capital is generally not viewed as collateral, without federal subsidies and guarantees, lenders would probably charge interest rates more in line with other unsecured loans, such as credit card debt, that could push the financial costs of higher education beyond the reach of many students. Overview of the Student Loan Market
Two major student loan programs exist federally: the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (FDLP) program. 110-84 ), enacted in September 2007, cut interest rate subsidies to lenders and increased the proportion of default costs borne by lenders. Lender Withdrawal Announcements
In early 2008, some student lenders announced plans to restrict loans in response to tightening credit conditions and cuts in federal subsidies put in place by the College Cost Reduction and Access Act. Some observers contend that student lenders have overstated their recent troubles and that loans remain available through the Federal Direct Lending Program (FDLP). The Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 ( P.L. Most student lenders transform many of the loans they originate into student loan asset-backed securities (SLABS), which can be sold to investors or financial institutions. In particular, many student lenders have raised funds through the auction-rate securities market, which has been strongly affected by the credit crunch. 5715 , the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 which would raise loan limits for Stafford loans, provide new options for parent borrowers, expand certain lender-of-last-resort options for borrowers and schools, and would allow the Secretary of Education to purchase FFEL student loan assets from lenders. H.R. 110-227 ) on May 7. On May 21, 2008, the Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings, using authority granted by the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, announced plans to offer FFEL lenders the option of selling loans originated for the 2008-2009 academic year to the government. Other Federal Responses and Congressional Proposals
Several Members of Congress and major student lenders have called for consideration of measures that might provide additional liquidity to the student loan market. The Federal Financing Bank Act of 1973 ( P.L. Since early 2008, several dozen lenders have announced plans to leave the student loan market in part or in full, raising concerns that inadequate supply of student loans could disrupt financial aid arrangements in the 2008-2009 academic year. The cost of higher education also may have an ambiguous effect on demand for student loans. | Since 1966, the federal government has provided guarantees and subsidies to approved private lenders or certain state government entities that make student loans. College graduates' enhanced human capital is generally not viewed as collateral. Lenders, without federal subsidies and guarantees, would charge interest rates more in line with other unsecured loans, such as credit card debt, that could push the financial costs of higher education beyond the reach of many students and their families. Although federal subsidies for student lenders have probably expanded access to higher education, some observers have contended that subsidy rates were higher than necessary to ensure students' access to educational loans.
The College Cost Reduction and Access Act (P.L. 110-84), enacted in September 2007, was motivated, in part, by the impression that lender subsidies within the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program had been higher than necessary. The act cut interest rate subsidies to lenders and increased the proportion of default costs borne by lenders.
Starting in February 2008, some student lenders encountered difficulties in the secondary loan market—a market in which securities backed by bundles of student loans, often called SLABS (student loan asset-backed securities), are sold to investors. Turmoil in world capital markets in late 2007 and 2008 appears to have raised interest costs to some student lenders. Specifically, widespread failures of auction-rate securities markets beginning in mid-February 2008 have raised costs of funds for some student lenders.
In early 2008, some FFEL program lenders announced plans to make fewer student loans within certain market segments in response to a tightened credit market and recent legislation. In particular, some lenders have announced plans to reduce the number of loans to students attending certain institutions, such as two-year and proprietary schools. Some observers contend that student lenders have overstated their recent troubles. Nonetheless, loans remain available through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Lending Program (FDLP).
In response to growing concerns about the availability of student loans for the 2008-2009 academic year, Congress passed Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 (H.R. 5715; P.L. 110-227), which was signed into law on May 7, 2008. The act raises loan limits for Stafford loans (which some claim would reduce demand for private student loans), provides new options for parent borrowers, expands the lender-of-last-resort program, and allows the Secretary of Education to purchase FFEL student loan assets from lenders. The Secretary has announced plans to purchase student loans originated for the 2008-2009 school year.
Some Members of Congress and participants in the student lending market have called for consideration of additional measures that might introduce liquidity into the market for securitized student loans using the Federal Financing Bank or other federal entities. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41782 | crs_R41782_0 | Taxpayers are seen as more likely to pay taxes on income if the realization of that income has been communicated to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To encourage compliance with tax laws, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) includes a number of information reporting requirements regarding payments that may result in taxable income for the payee. One such reporting requirement, contained in IRC § 6041(a), applies to certain payments made by persons in the course of a trade or business. Under IRC § 6041(a), if the total amount of payments made to a single payee over a year equals at least $600, the payer is required to file an information return with the IRS providing information identifying the payer, the payee, and the total amounts paid to that payee over the past calendar year. Section 6041 was amended twice in 2010: once by § 9006 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and a second time by § 2101 of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010. They may, however, be subject to stronger enforcement as a result of a surviving provision of the Small Business Jobs Act that revised the penalties for failing to file an accurate 1099 with the IRS or failing to provide an accurate copy of that form to the payee. This report briefly discusses the procedures and penalties under current law applicable to the information reporting requirements under IRC § 6041, and also briefly describes recent amendments that have been repealed. Thus, if payments are made by credit card or through a third party network, the payer generally will not be required to report them on an information return. Both § 6721 (pertaining to failure to file accurate returns with the IRS) and § 6722 (pertaining to failure to provide payees with correct copies of the information returns) of the IRC have been amended by the Small Business Jobs Act to revise the amounts of the penalties. The changes to both sections are scheduled to become effective for returns required to be filed after December 31, 2010. Both amendments were subsequently repealed by the Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011. Solely for purposes of § 6041(a), most landlords would have been considered to be engaged in the trade or business of renting real estate and, therefore, might have been required to file Forms 1099 to report payments made in conjunction with their rental properties. | Taxpayers are seen as more likely to report items of income on their tax returns if they know that a third party has reported it to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); if follows, therefore, that expanding information reporting requirements under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) can improve the collection of federal tax revenue. However, as those requirements are expanded, those who must comply with the requirements generally will face an increased administrative burden. This tension between the desire to improve tax compliance and the concomitant burden imposed on taxpayers was recently highlighted after expansions of the reporting requirements in IRC § 6041 were met by protests that the changes imposed too great a burden, particularly on small businesses. As a result of these objections, the expansions to the information reporting requirement were repealed shortly after they were enacted.
IRC § 6041 requires payments totaling at least $600 in a single calendar year to a single recipient to be reported to the IRS. The required return is generally a Form 1099, which is prepared by the entity making the payment and identifies to whom payment was made, the amount of the payment, and the general reason for the payment. The form is filed with the IRS and a copy is provided to the payee. The form is required only when the payer is considered to be engaged in a trade or business and has made the payment in connection with that trade or business.
The scope of IRC § 6041 was expanded by both the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148) and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-240). Section 9006 of PPACA would have made payments to corporations and payments for goods or other property subject to reporting. Section 2101 of the Small Business Jobs Act would have made most landlords subject to the reporting requirements of IRC § 6041. The expansions made by both bills were subsequently repealed by the Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-9).
The Small Business Jobs Act also increased the penalties for failure to file an information return (IRC § 6721) and the penalties for failing to provide a copy of the information return to the payee (IRC § 6722). These changes have not been repealed and will apply to any information returns required to be filed after December 31, 2010. |
crs_R41856 | crs_R41856_0 | Key Issues and Recent Developments
Relevant Provisions in FY2013 Public Law
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2013 became P.L. The act contains limitations, conditions, and waiver authorities for Coalition Support Fund (CSF) reimbursements and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) disbursements. 111-73 ). Section 1227 of the FY2013 NDAA limits CSF reimbursements to Pakistan to $1.2 billion in the current fiscal year, and it prohibits any such reimbursements for the roughly seven-month period (November 2011-July 2012) that Pakistan had barred NATO from transiting along its Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) linking Afghanistan with the Arabian Sea. The bill would also require the President to terminate Pakistan's status as a Major Non-NATO Ally. For FY2014, the Administration has requested just over half of the legislation's authorized amount. U.S. Aid to Pakistan After 9/11
Following a decade of alienation in the 1990s, U.S. relations with Pakistan were once again transformed in dramatic fashion, this time with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a pivotal ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. The EPPA also clarifies activities related to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), established by Congress in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. The Pentagon reports total Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth $5.2 billion for FY2002-FY2011 (sales of F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment account for more than half of this). Congress also has appropriated more than $3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Pakistan since 2001; more than two-thirds has been disbursed to date. In the lead-up to the 2009 conference, Pakistani officials called for a "Marshall Plan" for Pakistan that would provide $30 billion in international donations over a five-year period. FY2014 Request for Aid to Pakistan and Objectives
The FY2014 budget request indicates the level of importance the Obama Administration places on a stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan because of its "critical role" in the region with respect to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, nuclear nonproliferation, regional stability, the peace process in Afghanistan, and regional economic integration and development: "As the United States withdraws its troops from Afghanistan, FY2014 U.S. assistance needs to reflect [America's] continued robust engagement of Pakistan and its role in the region." Nevertheless, the State Department in 2009 reported being "comfortable" with congressional conditions and "confident" that required certifications could be issued (such certifications were issued only once and the requirements were waived by the Admiration for FY2012 and FY2013). Current Conditionality and Administration Certifications/Waivers76
Key Congressional Conditions on U.S. Assistance to Pakistan
The most notable sets of conditions on U.S. assistance to Pakistan are found in two laws: the country-specific Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, and the State and foreign operations appropriations provisions found in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ). As noted above, these substantive conditions apply only to security-related assistance for FY2011-FY2014 and arms transfers for FY2012-FY2014 (nonmilitary aid is not subject to conditions in this law). The law precludes such assistance and transfers until the Secretary of State certifies annually for Congress that the Pakistani government
(1) is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;
(2) had during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups ... including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighboring countries; B) preventing al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighboring countries, closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and
(3) is ensuring that its security forces are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan. Corruption and lack of sufficient transparency is identified as a key obstacle to effective implementation of U.S. aid programs in Pakistan, and has drawn significant attention in Congress. Inspectors General report, contributing to further ongoing accountability and reporting challenges. Purposes of Security Assistance:
1. | In the post-2001 era, the United States has viewed Pakistan as a key ally, especially in the context of counterterrorism and Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in recent years, although assistance levels have fluctuated considerably over the decades of Pakistani independence. In the wake of 9/11, however, aid to Pakistan increased steadily. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more than $30 billion in direct aid, about half for military assistance, and more than two-thirds appropriated in the post-2001 period. Many observers question the gains accrued to date, variously identifying poor planning, lack of both transparency and capacity, corruption, and slow reform by the Pakistani government as major obstacles. Moreover, any goodwill generated by U.S. aid is offset by widespread and intense anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people.
Developments in 2011 put immense strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of the U.S. aid program. Relations have remained tense since that time, although civilian aid has continued to flow and substantive defense transfers are set to resume later in 2013. Disruptions in 2011 included the killing of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani city and a NATO military raid into Pakistani territory near Afghanistan that inadvertently left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead. The latter development led Islamabad to bar U.S. and NATO access to vital ground lines of communication (GLOCs) linking Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea for a period of more than seven months. More recently, the 113th Congress is focusing on measures to reduce the federal budget deficit. This backdrop appears to be further influencing debate over assistance levels to a top-ranking recipient that many say lacks accountability and even credibility as a U.S. ally. For many lawmakers, the core issue remains balancing Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States—not least its role in Afghan reconciliation efforts—with the pervasive and mutual distrust bedeviling the bilateral relationship.
The 111th Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73) authorizing the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for five years (FY2010-FY2014) and requiring annual certification for release of security-related aid. Such conditionality is a contentious issue. Congress also established two new funds in 2009, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF, within Defense Department appropriations) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF, within State-Foreign Operations Appropriations). The 112th Congress enacted further conditions and limitations on assistance. Among these were certification requirements for nearly all FY2012 assistance (in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012—P.L. 112-74) and for FY2013 Coalition Support Funds (CSF, military reimbursements funded out of the Pentagon) and PCF (in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013—P.L. 112-239). Similar provisions appear in pending FY2014 legislation. In September 2012, the Administration waived FY2012 certification requirements under included national security provisions and, in February 2013, it issued a waiver to allow for the transfer of major defense equipment in FY2013.
The Administration has requested nearly $1.2 billion economic and security aid to Pakistan for FY2014. This represents a steep decline from total FY2012 assistance of about $1.9 billion (excluding CSF). Estimated FY2013 allocations are not yet available. This report will be updated as warranted by events. For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. See also CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33393 | crs_RL33393_0 | Introduction
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 ( H.R. 683 ) was passed by the House on a vote of 411 to 8, on April 19, 2005. The Senate passed H.R. 683 with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by unanimous consent, on March 8, 2006. Among other things, the amendment added a non-commercial use liability exclusion to protect free speech interests, and addressed concerns raised by Internet service providers over secondary liability for trademark dilution by their end users. This report provides an overview of trademark law in general, describes the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (hereinafter "FTDA"), and summarizes several judicial opinions interpreting the FTDA. As the sponsor of H.R. A federal trademark registration, however, entitles the owner of the mark to pursue two independent causes of action for infringement, under the following sections of the Lanham Act:
Section 32: "Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant...." Section 43: "Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act." "Dilution" is statutorily defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 to mean "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of ... (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." The FTDA entitles the owner of a famous mark to seek injunctive relief from a court "against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." Judicial Interpretation of the FTDA
Since the FTDA was enacted, some trademark owners have attempted to use the law in ways that arguably go beyond the statute's scope and purpose (e.g., some owners of insufficiently famous marks have tried to establish a federal dilution claim, and others have brought suit under the FTDA to prohibit parody and criticism of their marks). However, in 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue reversed the summary judgment on the dilution claim. Allows federal dilution protection for famous descriptive marks that have acquired distinctiveness. Some observers and legislators wonder whether the act too heavily favors major corporations over small businesses and future businesses. Others raise concerns that it may negatively affect consumer rights and free speech. On September 25, 2006, the House, by unanimous consent, agreed to the Senate amendment, and the President signed the bill into law on October 6, 2006. The legislation more precisely defines statutory elements of the FTDA (such as "famous," "distinctive," "blurring," and "tarnishment") and expressly clarifies the standard of harm and other eligibility requirements for bringing a dilution claim. | The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA) amended section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 to provide a new federal cause of action for the dilution of famous, distinctive marks. "Trademark dilution" is statutorily defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 to mean "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of ... (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." Under the FTDA, the owner of a famous mark may seek an injunction against another person's commercial use of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.
Since the FTDA was enacted, however, some trademark owners have sought to use the law in ways that arguably go beyond the statute's scope and purpose (e.g., owners of insufficiently famous marks attempting to sustain a FTDA action, or others trying to apply the FTDA to prohibit parody and criticism of their marks). In adjudicating these expansive claims, several federal courts have narrowly interpreted the FTDA (notably the United States Supreme Court in the 2003 case Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.), and protection against trademark dilution is said to be challenging if not impossible to obtain, according to many intellectual property scholars. There is a split among the regional federal circuit courts of appeal over the meaning and application of several central FTDA elements. For example, one federal circuit court has determined that the federal anti-dilution law does not apply to "descriptive" marks that have acquired distinctiveness over time, including famous ones such as MCDONALD'S or KRAFT, because they lack "inherent distinctiveness."
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (H.R. 683) is a legislative response to these issues, offering more precise definitions for key terms in the FTDA (such as "famous," "distinctive," "blurring," and "tarnishment") and expressly clarifying standards of proof and other eligibility requirements to obtain relief under the FTDA. Critics of H.R. 683, however, raise concerns that the bill too heavily favors major corporations over small and future businesses. In addition, they worry that the bill could negatively affect free speech rights, small business commercial speech, and consumer interests. Finally, they believe that the bill amends federal trademark law in a manner that essentially confers to major corporations a monopoly over the use of famous marks that may contain common words and phrases.
H.R. 683 was passed by the House on a vote of 411 to 8, on April 19, 2005. The Senate passed H.R. 683 with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by unanimous consent, on March 8, 2006. Among other things, the amendment added a non-commercial use liability exclusion to protect free speech interests, and addressed concerns raised by Internet service providers over secondary liability for trademark dilution by their end users. On September 25, 2006, the House, by unanimous consent, agreed to the Senate amendment. The President signed the bill into law on October 6, 2006, P.L. 109-312. |
crs_RL31809 | crs_RL31809_0 | A conference report for the bill ( H.Rept. 108-401 ) emerged just beforethe Thanksgiving recess. The House agreed to the conference report on December 8, 2003. 108-199 ) on January 23, 2004. In February 2003, the Bush Administration had submitted its budget for fiscal year 2004. The Administration request for CJS totaled roughly $41.22 billion. This included $19.005 billion for Justice, $5.814 billion for Commerce, $5.43 billion for the Judiciary, $8.644 billion forState, and $2.424 billion for the Independent Agencies. The Consolidated Appropriations Act provides a total of $41 billion including $19.942 billion for the Justice Department, $6.007 billion for the Department of Commerce, $5.167 billion for theJudiciary, and $8.264 billion for the Department of State. Legislative Status of CJS Appropriations,FY2004
Background Information
Structure of the CJS Bill
Traditionally, the appropriations bill for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies is known as the "CJS" bill. Administration FY2004 Request
For the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Administration's FY2004 requestincluded $19 billion, or nearly $643 million less than the amount appropriated byCongress for FY2003. For FY2004 appropriations, the Administration requests roughly $5.814 billion for Title II, including the Commerce Department and related agencies. In FY2003,the enacted appropriation was roughly $5.796 billion. The conference committee on H.R.2673 reported H.R. Subsequently, on January 23, 2004, an FY2004 budget for the Judiciary was signed into law by President Bush as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act forFY2004 ( P.L. 108-199 provides total budget authority for the Judiciary of $5.17 billion, 5.0% over FY2003 funding (including supplemental appropriations for FY2003). The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2004 ( P.L.108-199 ) includes, asprovided by the earlier House-passed CJS bill, $55.4 million for the Court's Salariesand Expenses account, a 17.8% increase over FY2003 funding, instead of $59.4million as recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee. In addition to $10.6. 2799 on July 23, 2003. The House level was identical to the President's request.The Senate committee recommended $594.4 million within the D&CP account and$933.1 million within the ESCM account-- $71.7 million higher than both theAdministration request and the House-passed level. The final enactedlevel is $1.465 billion. The FY2004 enacted level is $78.8 million. International Broadcasting, which had been a primary function of the U.S.Information Agency (USIA) prior to 1999, is now carried out by an independentagency referred to as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). CRS Report RL31370 , State Department and Related Agencies: FY2003 Appropriations and FY2004 Request , by [author name scrubbed]. (This is subject to a 0.59% across-the-board rescission.) | Congress packaged a number of appropriations bills, including CJS, into an omnibus bill ( H.R. 2673 ). A conference report ( H.Rept. 108-401 ) emerged just prior to theThanksgiving recess. The CJS portion of the bill (Division B) contains a total of $41.0 billion, notreflecting the .465% rescission in the general provisions of Division B. Within DivisionH-Miscellaneous Appropriations and Offsets-Section 168 includes a .59% across-the-boardrescission. The House agreed to the conference report on December 8th, while the Senate passed thepackage on January 22, 2004. The President signed The Consolidated Appropriations Act into law( P.L. 108-199 ) on January 23, 2004.
Earlier, the Administration had submitted its FY2004 budget request in February 2003. The request for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies(commonly referred to as CJS) totaled $41.220 billion. The major components of the requestincluded: Justice Department-- $19.005 billion; Commerce Department-- $5.814 billion; theJudiciary-- $5.430 billion; State Department-- $8.644 billion; and Related Agencies-- $2.424billion. On July 23, 2003, the House passed its CJS bill ( H.R. 2799 ), which totals$41.23 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $40.37 billion.
Department of Justice. The FY2004 enacted level of $19.942 billion is roughly $937 million above the FY2004 Administration request of $19.005 billion and $294 million above the FY2003funding level of $19.648 billion.
Department of Commerce. The FY2004 request of $5.814 billion is about $18 million more than the FY2003 appropriation of $5.796. The House bill provided $5.256 billion; the SenateAppropriations Committee recommended $6.369 billion. The Consolidated Appropriations Actprovides $6.007 billion.
The Judiciary. The Consolidated Appropriations Act provides total budget authority for the Judiciary of $5.17 billion, 5.0% over FY2003 funding, compared with $5.43 billion requested by theJudiciary (a 10.3% increase).
Department of State and International Broadcasting. The FY2004 enacted level totals $8.264 billion, which is $380 million less than the President's FY2004 request and $86 million higher thanthe FY2003 funding level. In addition, the FY2004 emergency supplemental provided $564.9million for the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
This is the final update of the report. |
crs_R43067 | crs_R43067_0 | Insurance companies, unlike banks and securities firms, have been chartered and regulated solely by the states for the past 150 years. The two large legislative overhauls of financial regulation in the past two decades, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), expanded the federal role in insurance, but the states continued as the primary regulators of insurance following these acts. The act gave enhanced systemic risk regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve and to a new Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC), including some oversight authority over insurers. The Dodd-Frank Act also included measures affecting the states' oversight of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance and the creation of a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Treasury Department. 4510 , H.R. 5461 , S. 2102 , and S. 2270 , addressing the capital requirements and accounting standards to be used by the Federal Reserve in its oversight of some insurers; and S. 2726 / H.R. 1155 / H.R. 1064 , and H.R. Recent insurance legislation that was not introduced in the 113 th Congress includes legislation to create a federal charter and regulatory apparatus for insurance ( H.R. Legislation in the 113th Congress
National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act (S. 534, S. 1926, S. 2244, H.R. 2140)
H.R. The European Parliament first passed Solvency II legislation in 2009. State Regulatory Modernization Efforts
Following the passage of GLBA, state insurance regulators working through the NAIC embarked on a regulatory modernization program. Such proposals for increased federal involvement usually spurred a series of regulatory reform efforts at the individual state level and by state groups, such as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the National Conference of Insurance Legislators. A major effort to transfer insurance regulatory authority to the federal government began in the mid-1980s and was spurred by the insolvencies of several large insurance companies. Some insurance companies believe that in the post-GLBA environment, state regulation places them at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. Many industry participants, particularly life insurers, larger property/casualty insurers, and larger insurance brokers, began supporting broad regulatory change for insurance in the form of an optional federal charter for insurance patterned after the dual chartering system for banks. The financial crisis grew largely from sectors of the financial industry that had previously been perceived as presenting little systemic risk, including insurers. The 111 th Congress responded to the financial crisis with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which enacted broad financial regulatory reform as detailed above. The first section of the act explicitly declares it to be the policy of the United States "that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States." First, it called for the creation of a federal insurance regulator to oversee an optional federal charter for insurers as well as federal licensing for agents and brokers. In general, the states were to continue to have a preeminent role in insurance regulation. | The individual states have been the primary regulators of insurance since 1868. Following the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act, this system has operated with the explicit blessing of Congress, but has also been subject to periodic scrutiny and suggestions that the time may have come for Congress to reclaim the regulatory authority it granted to the states. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, congressional scrutiny was largely driven by the increasing complexities of the insurance business and concern over whether the states were up to the task of ensuring consumer protections, particularly insurer solvency.
Immediately prior to the recent financial crisis, congressional attention to insurance regulation focused on the inefficiencies in the state regulatory system. A major catalyst was the aftermath of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), which overhauled the regulatory structure for banks and securities firms, but left the insurance sector largely untouched. Many larger insurers, and their trade associations, had previously defended state regulation but considered themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the post-GLBA regulatory structure. Some advocated for an optional federal charter similar to that available to banks. Various pieces of insurance regulatory reform legislation were introduced, including bills establishing a broad federal charter for insurance as well as narrower, more targeted bills.
The states, particularly working through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), were not idle following congressional attention. They reacted quickly to GLBA requirements that related to insurance agent licensing and have since embarked on a wider-ranging project to modernize insurance regulation. This has included both regulatory aspects, such as streamlining the process for rate and form filing, and more basic legal aspects, such as the creation of an interstate compact to provide uniformity across states for some life insurance products. Because enactment by the state legislature is necessary before the legal changes suggested by the NAIC can take effect in that state, the process typically does not move rapidly.
The recent financial crisis refocused the debate surrounding insurance regulatory reform. Unlike many financial crises in the past, insurers played a large role in this crisis. In particular, the failure of the large insurer American International Group (AIG) spotlighted sources of risk that had gone unrecognized. The need for a systemic risk regulator for the entire financial system was a common thread in many of the post-crisis financial regulatory reform proposals. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), enacted following the crisis, gave enhanced systemic risk regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve and to a new Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC), including some oversight authority over insurers. The Dodd-Frank Act also included measures affecting the states' oversight of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance and the creation of a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Treasury Department.
Among the insurance regulatory issues addressed by legislation in the 113th Congress are the application of federal orderly liquidation authority to insurers (addressed in H.R. 605); the supervision of some insurers by the Federal Reserve (addressed in H.R. 2140, H.R. 4510, H.R. 5461, S. 2102, and S. 2270/P.L. 113-279); and the licensing of insurance agents and brokers (addressed in S. 534, S. 1926, S. 2244, H.R. 1155/H.R. 1064, and H.R. 4871). In addition, various international issues may be of concern to Congress, such as the European Union's Solvency II project to overhaul the European insurance regulatory system and general international standards for insurance regulation. |
crs_RL30410 | crs_RL30410_0 | Introduction
Almost four decades after the Supreme Court ruling in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke , the diversity rationale for affirmative action in public education remains a topic of political and legal controversy. Many colleges and universities have implemented affirmative action policies not only to remedy past discrimination, but also to achieve a racially and ethnically diverse student body or faculty. Justice Powell, in his opinion for the Bakke Court, stated that the attainment of a diverse student body is "a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education," noting that "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment, and creation' so essential to the quality of higher education is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body." In subsequent years, however, federal courts began to question the Powell rationale, unsettling expectations about whether diversity-based affirmative action in educational admissions and faculty hiring decisions is constitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Grutter v. Bollinger , a 5 to 4 majority of the Justices held that the law school had a compelling interest in the "educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body," which justified its consideration of race in admissions to assemble a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students. But in a companion decision, Gratz v. Bollinger , six Justices decided that the university's policy of awarding racial bonus points to minority applicants was not narrowly tailored enough to pass constitutional scrutiny. However, the Grutter and Gratz decisions did not address whether diversity is a permissible goal in the elementary and secondary educational setting. To resolve this question, the Court agreed to review two cases that involved the use of race to maintain racially diverse public schools. 1 , a consolidated 2007 ruling that resolved both cases, the Court ultimately struck down the school plans at issue, holding that they violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. More recently, the Court's decision to hear challenges in two separate affirmative action cases has once again revived the issue of diversity in higher education. In its 2013 ruling in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin , the Court reaffirmed its holding in Grutter , but nevertheless vacated and remanded an appellate court's decision to uphold a race-conscious undergraduate admissions plan at the University of Texas at Austin. However, on remand, the appellate court upheld the university's admissions program for a second time, a decision that appeared to prompt the Court to agree to review the case yet again during its 2015 term. Meanwhile, in 2014's Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action , the Court upheld Michigan's Proposal 2, which prohibits the use of racial preferences in higher education. In the wake of the appellate court's ruling, the Supreme Court agreed once again to review the Fisher decision. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. | Almost four decades after the Supreme Court ruling in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the diversity rationale for affirmative action in public education remains a topic of political and legal controversy. Many colleges and universities have implemented affirmative action policies not only to remedy past discrimination, but also to achieve a racially and ethnically diverse student body or faculty. Justice Powell, in his opinion for the Bakke Court, stated that the attainment of a diverse student body is "a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education," noting that "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment, and creation' so essential to the quality of higher education is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body." In subsequent years, however, federal courts began to question the Powell rationale, unsettling expectations about whether diversity-based affirmative action in educational admissions and faculty hiring is constitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After a series of conflicting lower court rulings were issued regarding the use of race to promote a diverse student body, the Supreme Court agreed to review the race-conscious admissions policies used by the undergraduate and law school admissions programs at the University of Michigan. In Grutter v. Bollinger, a 5 to 4 majority of the Justices held that the law school had a "compelling" interest in the "educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body," which justified its race-based efforts to assemble a "critical mass" of "underrepresented" minority students. But in the companion decision, Gratz v. Bollinger, six Justices decided that the University's policy of awarding "racial bonus points" to minority applicants was not "narrowly tailored" enough to pass constitutional scrutiny. The decisions resolved, for the time being, the doctrinal muddle left in Bakke's wake. And because the Court's constitutional holdings translate to the private sector under the federal civil rights laws, nonpublic schools, colleges, and universities are likewise affected.
However, the Grutter and Gratz decisions did not address whether diversity is a permissible goal in the elementary and secondary educational setting. To resolve this question, the Supreme Court agreed to review two cases that involved the use of race to maintain racially diverse public schools and to avoid racial segregation. In a consolidated 2007 ruling in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court struck down the Seattle and Louisville school plans at issue, holding that they violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
More recently, the Court's decision to hear challenges in two separate affirmative action cases has once again revived the issue of diversity in higher education. In its 2013 ruling in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Grutter, but nevertheless vacated and remanded an appellate court's decision to uphold a race-conscious undergraduate admissions plan at the University of Texas at Austin. However, on remand, the appellate court upheld the university's admissions program for a second time, a decision that appeared to prompt the Court to agree to review the case yet again during its 2015 term. Meanwhile, in 2014's Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the Court upheld Michigan's Proposal 2, which prohibits the use of racial preferences in higher education. |
crs_RL33095 | crs_RL33095_0 | Introduction
The issue that has received the most attention in post-Katrina discussions is the speed of rescue and relief operations. The Department of Defense's Northern Command began its alert and coordination procedures before Katrina's landfall, however many deployments did not reach the affected area until days after. An examination of the timeline of DOD's response and the decision points along that timeline could provide insight into whether the response could have been accelerated given the intensity of the storm and the extent of the destruction. Both the National Response Plan and DOD's own Homeland Security Doctrine lay out extensive procedures and specific decision points in an attempt to ensure an organized response to catastrophic incidents. It may now be necessary to examine those procedures and the actions of responsible authorities to determine whether procedural obstacles, administrative failures, or both delayed the arrival of needed resources in the affected area. The traditional assumption that the Department of Defense is the resource of last resort may also require reexamination. Role of the National Guard14
The National Guard is descended from the colonial militias which existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution. Rather, it is both a state and federal organization. State Active Duty
Normally, the National Guard operates under the control of state and territorial governors. National Guard personnel may be involuntarily activated under 10 U.S.C. Issues for Congress36
Timeline of Response
The issue that has attracted the most attention in post-Katrina discussions has been the speed of rescue and relief operations. This is in keeping with the National Response Plan and DOD's Homeland Security Doctrine, though it may have slowed arrival of needed DOD assets in the affected region. Impact of Overseas Deployments on DOD's Response
It has been suggested that the substantial overseas deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the ability of both the National Guard and active duty forces to carry out relief operations. The controversies surrounding the adequacy of the federal response to Katrina are expected to have an effect on DOD's consideration of its responsibilities and capabilities with regard to catastrophic incidents. Though Katrina was a natural disaster, many of its effects could be encountered as a result of an intentional attack (e.g., destruction of communication, transportation, and flood control infrastructures; mass casualties; or civil unrest). Regardless of whether civil support remains a responsibility divided between active duty and National Guard forces, it is likely that questions of personnel levels and equipping for both elements of the armed services will be addressed. | The issue that has received the most attention in post-Katrina discussions is the speed of rescue and relief operations. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) Northern Command began its alert and coordination procedures before Katrina's landfall; however, many deployments did not reach the affected area until days later. An examination of the timeline of DOD's response and the decision points along that timeline could provide insight into whether the response could have been accelerated given the intensity of the storm and the extent of the destruction. Both the National Response Plan and DOD's own Homeland Security Doctrine lay out extensive procedures and specific decision points in an attempt to ensure an organized response to catastrophic incidents. It may now be necessary to examine those procedures and the actions of responsible authorities to determine whether procedural obstacles, administrative failures, or both delayed the arrival of needed resources in the affected area. The traditional assumption that the Department of Defense is the resource only of last resort may also require reexamination.
As with most natural disasters, the role of the National Guard is critical in the maintenance of civil order, the provision of logistical support, and the coordination of rescue and relief effort. The National Guard's ability to respond through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact may be proven to have been exemplary, given the extent of regional destruction. Nevertheless, a number of issues may attract attention. The fact that the National Guard may act under state control or may be federalized and brought under command of active duty forces at the President's discretion creates a decision-point with political, cost, and coordination/command implications. They present a core concern in the balance of state and federal control in disaster situations.
Another issue that has attracted significant attention is the question of whether the demands of overseas operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in any way affected the quality of response of both active duty and National Guard forces. Both DOD and the National Guard have denied any deleterious effect; however, there is some evidence that equipment shortages among National Guard units and the non-availability of some active duty units could be attributed to overseas deployment activities. The National Guard's equipment levels and deployment policies may be of particular interest, given its dual responsibilities both domestically and overseas.
In examining its roles, missions, and capabilities, it is likely that the controversies surrounding the federal response to Katrina will affect DOD's consideration of its responsibilities and its ability to execute them. Though Katrina was a natural disaster, many of its effects could be encountered in an intentional attack. Consequently, "lessons learned" from the Katrina experience may carry long-term relevance for DOD's civil support planning.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31389 | crs_RL31389_0 | Focus and Scope of This Report
The U.S.-led effort to end permanently Afghanistan's role as a base for anti-western Islamicterrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban-which has been achieved through American,allied, and Afghan military action, but also the reconstruction of a stable, effective and ideologicallymoderate Afghan state. Otherwise, the country could again become a base for terrorism. Congress has strongly supported American involvement in supporting the fledgling government headed by Karzai, and many of the several dozen Members of Congress who have visitedAfghanistan have advocated more U.S. aid than is currently planned, the more prompt delivery ofaid to the Karzai administration, and an expanded U.S. role in peacekeeping. Current Framework for the Reconstruction of a Stable and Moderate Afghan State
Achieving the goal of a stable and moderate Afghanistan depends on the establishment of apolitical process that has at least the tacit support of the major organized ethnic and tribal groups andcontenders for power, as well as ordinary Afghans who are simply seeking some kind of peace andnormalcy in their lives. Outcome of the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga
Another important milestone was achieved in June 2002 with the generally successful conclusion of an Emergency Loya Jirga ("Grand Council"), which confirmed Karzai as head of aTransitional Administration charged with organizing an effective government, supervising thedrafting of a constitution, and preparing the country for national elections in December 2002. Osama bin Laden's role dates from late1980s, when he and a number of other private Saudis attempted to promote their radical version ofSunni Islam among the Afghan mujahidin . During 1993 and 1994 Hekmatyar's forces pounded much of Kabul to rubble with rockets, reducingthe population from about 2 million at the end of the Soviet occupation period to less than 500,000. Sources of Legitimacy. Likewise, an important obstacle to ethnic harmony-the collapse of Pashtun political cohesivenessand the related sense of being dispossessed-is unlikely to be solved by the adjustment of cabinetposts, since the Tajiks will not willingly give up effective control of the key ministries concernedwith defense, internal security, and foreign affairs. (35) The Bush Administration has allocated about$311.3 million for humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan for FY 2002, which began October 1,2001. Appendix I: Bonn Agreements on Afghanistan
AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN PENDING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan,
In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan,
Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country,
Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan,
Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice,
Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, over the years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and have played a major role inthe struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them both heroesof jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland,Afghanistan,
Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires the implementation of emergency interim arrangements and expressing their deep appreciation to His Excellency ProfessorBurhanuddin Rabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an interim authority which is to beestablished pursuant to this agreement,
Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been adequately represented atthe UN Talks on Afghanistan,
Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are notintended to remain in place beyond the specified period of time,
Recognizing that some time may be required for a new Afghan security force to be fully constituted and functional and that therefore other security provisions detailed in Annex I to thisagreement must meanwhile be put in place,
Considering that the United Nations, as the internationally recognized impartial institution, has a particularly important role to play, detailed in Annex II to this agreement, in the period prior to theestablishment of permanent institutions in Afghanistan,
Have agreed as follows:
THE INTERIM AUTHORITY
I. Interim Administration
A. | The U.S.-led effort to end Afghanistan's role as host to Osama bin Laden and other anti-western Islamic terrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban but also the reconstruction of a stable,effective, and ideologically moderate Afghan state. Otherwise, the country could continue to be apotential base for terrorism and a source of regional instability. An important milestone wasachieved in June 2002 with the generally successful conclusion of an Emergency Loya Jirga ("grandcouncil"), which confirmed Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun member of the western educated elitewith family ties to the former king as head of a Transitional Administration. Karzai, who previouslyheaded an Interim Administration formed in December 2001, is charged with organizing agovernment, supervising the drafting of a constitution, and preparing for national elections to be heldin December 2003.
The Loya Jirga failed to satisfy many of the participants, especially Pashtuns, who feel under-represented in distribution of cabinet ministries, but more than 1,500 Afghans from all ethnicgroups and walks of life had an opportunity to vent long pent up feelings and engage in free flowingdebate about the country's future. Karzai has gained the nominal support of major regional warlords,but his authority remains dependent on support from the militarily powerful ethnic Tajik minorityand his status as a broadly acceptable figure who can attract international assistance.
The Bush Administration and the Congress have indicated strong support for humanitarian relief and reconstruction, but the nature of the longer term U.S. role remains to be determined. Asof mid-2002, the Administration remained focused on the military campaign and resistant toextensive participation in "nation building," a stance some in Congress say is too limited. In reality,U.S. forces have repeatedly played a de facto peacekeeping role in defusing conflicts among Afghanallies, and have sometimes become embroiled in local power struggles. Some Afghan warlords havebeen accused of causing mistaken attacks on civilians or pro-Karzai groups by providing falseintelligence to American forces.
Major obstacles to the goal of a stable and ideologically moderate Afghan state include: long-standing power aspirations of rival tribal and ethnic groups; the long-term decline of Afghanstate institutions that began with the Communist/Soviet occupation decade of 1979-89, andaccelerated under the Taliban; the recent rapid increase in opium production and local powerstruggles for control of the lucrative drug trade; and the resiliency of politicized Islam, as promotedboth by the Taliban and other radical Islamist parties, which retains appeal to many Afghans.
A stable and ideologically moderate Afghanistan is unlikely to be constructed without significant near-term aid to reestablish security, relieve immediate economic distress, and provide alternateemployment for former combatants, and extensive and long-term reconstruction support frombilateral and multilateral aid donors. To date, aid actually delivered to the Kabul administration hasbeen much less than promised. A stable Afghanistan also require that neighboring countries playa constructive role, or - at a minimum - avoid interfering in the country's internal affairs. |
crs_RL33715 | crs_RL33715_0 | Introduction
Some observers assert that since 9/11 the Pentagon has begun to conduct certain types of counterterrorism intelligence activities that may meet the statutory definition of a covert action. Post 9/11 Concerns
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, concerns have surfaced with regard to the Pentagon's expanded intelligence counterterrorism efforts. Although testifying that the term "clandestine activities" is not defined by statute, he characterized such activity as consisting of those actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute "passive" intelligence information gathering. By contrast, covert action, he suggested, is "active," in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target. He also distinguished between a covert action, in which the government's participation is unacknowledged, and a clandestine activity, which although intended to be secret, can be publicly acknowledged if it is discovered or inadvertently revealed. Being able to publicly acknowledge such an activity provides the military personnel who are involved certain protections under the Geneva Conventions, according to General Clapper, who suggested that those who participate in covert actions could jeopardize any rights they may have under the Geneva Conventions. Perhaps in an effort to bring clarity to the covert action issue, Department of Defense officials early in the 112 th Congress stated that the law could be updated to reflect U.S. Special Operations Command's current list of core task and the missions assigned to it in the Unified Command Plan. But in doing so, they also noted that Section 167 includes "such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense," which they argued provides the President and the Secretary the flexibility to meet changing circumstances. The term "covert action" was defined for the first time in statute to mean "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." House Intelligence Committee Calls on DOD to Inform Committee of Intelligence Activities
In committee report language accompanying the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) expressed its concern that the distinction between the CIA's intelligence-gathering activities and DOD's clandestine operations is becoming blurred and called on the Defense Department to meets its obligations to inform the committee of such activities. The committee said that DOD frequently labels its clandestine activities as "Operational Preparation of the Environment" (OPE) to distinguish particular operations as traditional military activities and not as intelligence functions. By asserting that its activities do not constitute covert actions, is the Pentagon trying to avoid the statutory requirements governing covert action, including a signed presidential finding, congressional notification, and oversight by the congressional intelligence committees? | Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counterterrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration termed the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as "covert actions," and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees.
Defense officials have asserted that none of DOD's current counterterrorism intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only "clandestine activities." Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret but which constitute "passive" intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is "active," in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target.
Some of DOD's activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counterterrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counterterrorism missions of their own.
Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. They also have acknowledged that the U.S. intelligence community confronts a major challenge in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various intelligence agencies with regard to clandestine activities. Some Pentagon officials have appeared to indicate that DOD's activities should be limited to clandestine or passive activities, pointing out that if such operations are discovered or are inadvertently revealed, the U.S. government would be able to preserve the option of acknowledging such activity, thus assuring the military personnel who are involved some safeguards that are afforded under the Geneva Conventions. Covert actions, by contrast, constitute activities in which the role of the U.S. government is not intended to be apparent or to be acknowledged publicly. Those who participate in such activities could jeopardize any rights they may have under the Geneva Conventions, according to these officials.
In committee report language accompanying P.L. 111-259, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) expressed its concern that the distinction between the CIA's intelligence-gathering activities and DOD's clandestine operations is becoming blurred and called on the Defense Department to meet its obligations to inform the committee of such activities. Perhaps in an effort to bring more clarity to the covert action issue, Department of Defense officials early in the 112th Congress stated that current statute could be updated to reflect U.S. Special Operations Command's list of core tasks and the missions assigned to it in the Unified Command Plan. But in doing so, they also noted that Section 167 includes "such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense," which, they argued, provides the President and the Secretary flexibility to meet changing circumstances. |
crs_RS20737 | crs_RS20737_0 | In its FY2002 budget request, the Bush Administration requested $145 million for the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro). Issues for Congress
Constraints on U.S. Assistance. Role of Other Donors. Serbia's treatment of its sister republic,Montenegro, and the province of Kosovo are likely to influence the quality and quantity of future U.S. aid to Serbia,and moves by Montenegro towardindependence from the FRY may affect assistance to it. | U.S. economic assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) seeks to fosterdemocratic institutions andeconomic reform. Congress approved $100 million for Serbia for FY2001 and the Administration has requested$145 million for the FRY for FY2002. Congressional debate may center on constraints on that aid, the role of other donors, and Serbia's relationship withMontenegro and Kosovo in that context. |
crs_R43651 | crs_R43651_0 | Introduction
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is proposing to require event data recorders (EDRs)—widely referred to as "black boxes"—on all new passenger vehicles sold in the United States. Although over 90% of the new cars and light trucks sold in the United States already come with EDRs intended to capture information about the final seconds before a crash, these are installed voluntarily by the manufacturers; NHTSA's current rules mainly specify certain types of information that must be recorded if a vehicle is equipped with an EDR. The Technological Evolution of Motor Vehicle EDRs
An EDR is a device installed in a motor vehicle that records certain technical information about a vehicle's operational performance for a few seconds immediately prior to and during a crash. In 2001, the working group concluded that EDR technology could
have the potential to improve highway safety through improved occupant protection systems; be applied to all types of motor vehicles, but that different types of EDRs would be needed for lightweight vehicles than for heavy trucks and buses; capture a wide range of crash-related data which would be beneficial to researchers, investigators, and manufacturers (if open access, without personal identifiers, was provided); reduce the number and severity of crashes if there is driver and employee awareness of how EDR systems work; be most successful if many vehicles on the road utilize EDRs and there is a corresponding infrastructure to use the data; and be even more effective if integrated with automatic crash notification systems and the car's other electronics (such as global positioning system and cellular phones), thereby providing early notice of and details about a collision. In every Congress since then, bills have been introduced that include these requirements:
At the time of purchase, auto dealers would have to disclose the presence of EDRs in new automobiles, the type of information collected, and its possible use by law enforcement officials. The Landry amendment was not enacted, because the Senate did not pass a comparable transportation appropriation bill in 2012; DOT funding was governed by a separate continuing resolution. The House-passed surface transportation bill, H.R. Current Legislation
In the 113 th Congress, Representative Capuano introduced H.R. 2414 , which would require manufacturers to post a window sticker in each new car, stating that there is an EDR in the vehicle, where it is located, the type of information it records and that such information may be used in law enforcement. It would prohibit the sale of vehicles after 2015 unless vehicle owners can control the recording of information on the EDR. The legislation also states that any data recorded by an EDR is the vehicle owner's property and can only be retrieved with the owner's consent, in response to a court order, or by a vehicle repair technician. It is pending in the House Energy and Commerce and Judiciary Committees. In April 2014, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation unanimously ordered reported S. 1925 , the Driver Privacy Act, sponsored by Senators Hoeven and Klobuchar. The bill would limit access to EDR data to the vehicle owner or lessee. Exceptions would allow access if authorized by judicial or administrative authorities (for the retrieval of admissible evidence), with the informed written consent of owners or lessees for any purpose, and for safety investigations, emergency response purposes, or traffic safety research. If used for safety research, information that would identify individual owners and vehicle identification numbers would have to be redacted. The bill requires NHTSA to conduct a study to determine the amount of time EDRs should capture and record data, and to issue regulations on that subject within two years of submitting the study to Congress. On June 10, 2014, during consideration of H.R. 4745 , the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2015, the House adopted by voice vote H.Amdt. 8335 , sponsored by Representative Yoho, which would bar use of federal funds to enforce regulations mandating passenger vehicle EDRs. | An event data recorder (EDR) is an electronic sensor installed in a motor vehicle that records certain technical information about a vehicle's operational performance for a few seconds immediately prior to and during a crash. Although over 90% of all new cars and light trucks sold in the United States are equipped with them, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is proposing that all new light vehicles have EDRs installed in the future. Under previously adopted NHTSA rules, these devices have to capture at least 15 types of information related to the vehicle's performance in the few seconds just before and immediately after a crash serious enough to result in deployment of airbags.
EDRs have the potential to make a significant contribution to highway safety. For example, EDR data showed that in several cases a Chevrolet Cobalt's ignition switch turned the engine off while the car was still moving, causing the car to lose power steering and crash; the data directly contributed to the manufacturer's decision to recall 2.6 million vehicles. EDR data could also be used, sometimes in conjunction with other vehicle technologies, to record in the few seconds before an accident such data as driver steering input, seat occupant size, and sound within a car.
The privacy of information collected by EDRs is a matter of state law, except that federal law bars NHTSA from disclosing personally identifiable information. The privacy aspects of EDRs and the ownership of the data they generate has been the subject of legislation in Congress since at least 2004. The House passed a floor amendment to the transportation appropriations bill in 2012 that would have prohibited use of federal funds to develop an EDR mandate, but it was not enacted. The Senate passed two EDR-related provisions in its surface transportation reauthorization bill (S. 1813) in 2012, mandating EDRs on new cars sold after 2015 and directing a Department of Transportation study of privacy issues; they were not included in the final bill.
In the 113th Congress, two privacy-related EDR bills have been introduced. H.R. 2414, sponsored by Representative Capuano, would require manufacturers to post a window sticker in each new car, stating that there is an EDR in the vehicle, where it is located, the type of information it records, and the availability of that information to law enforcement officials. It would prohibit the sale of vehicles after 2015 unless vehicle owners can control the recording of information on the EDR. The legislation also states that any data recorded by an EDR is the vehicle owner's property and can be retrieved only with the owner's consent, in response to a court order, or by a vehicle repair technician. It is pending in the House Energy and Commerce and Judiciary Committees.
In April 2014, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation ordered reported S. 1925, the Driver Privacy Act, sponsored by Senators Hoeven and Klobuchar. The bill would limit access to EDR data to the vehicle owner or lessee. Exceptions would allow access if authorized by judicial or administrative authorities for the retrieval of admissible evidence, with the informed written consent of owners or lessees for any purpose, and for safety investigations, emergency response purposes, or traffic safety research. If used for safety research, information that would identify individual owners and vehicle identification numbers would have to be redacted. The bill requires NHTSA to conduct a study to determine the amount of time EDRs should capture and record data, and to issue regulations on that subject within two years of submitting the study to Congress. In addition, on June 10, 2014, during consideration of H.R. 4745, the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2015, the House adopted by voice vote an amendment sponsored by Representative Yoho that would bar use of federal funds to enforce regulations mandating passenger vehicle EDRs. |
crs_R40795 | crs_R40795_0 | Introduction
In 1993, after many months of study, debate, and political controversy, Congress passed and President Clinton signed legislation establishing a revised "[p]olicy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces." The new legislation reflected a compromise regarding the U.S. military's policy toward members of the Armed Forces who engage in homosexual conduct. This compromise, colloquially referred to as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)," held that "[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion which are the essence of military capability." Service members are not to be asked about, nor allowed to discuss, their sexual orientation. This compromise notwithstanding, the issue has remained both politically and legally contentious, and Congress ultimately passed legislation to repeal DADT. This report provides a legal analysis of the various constitutional challenges that have been brought against DADT. For policy analyses, see CRS Report R42003, The Repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R40782, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": Military Policy and the Law on Same-Sex Behavior , by [author name scrubbed]. Under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, DADT repeal became effective 60 days after the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certified that they considered the recommendations contained in a recent Department of Defense (DOD) report on the effect of repeal; that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and regulations to implement the new law; and that the implementation of such policies and regulations "is consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces." This certification occurred on July 22, 2011, and the repeal took effect on September 20, 2011. In its 1986 ruling in Bowers , the Court held that there was no fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy. Based on this decision, the courts uniformly ruled that the military could constitutionally discharge a service member for overt homosexual behavior. Complicating the legal picture, however, was the Court's 2003 ruling in Lawrence , which expressly overruled Bowers and declared unconstitutional a Texas law that prohibited sexual acts between same-sex couples. For example, in Loomis v. United States , the United States Court of Federal Claims applied the Marcum test to the case of a lieutenant colonel who was discharged for homosexual conduct. The two federal appellate decisions that addressed this issue— Witt v. Department of the Air Force and Cook v. Gates —are discussed below, as is the more recent decision in Log Cabin Republicans v. United States , in which a district court used the new post- Lawrence standard of review established by the Witt court to rule that DADT was unconstitutional. | In 1993, after many months of study, debate, and political controversy, Congress passed and President Clinton signed legislation establishing a revised "[p]olicy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces." The legislation reflected a compromise regarding the U.S. military's policy toward members of the Armed Forces who engage in homosexual conduct. This compromise, colloquially referred to as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)," held that "[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion which are the essence of military capability." Service members are not to be asked about, nor allowed to discuss, their sexual orientation.
This compromise notwithstanding, the issue remained both politically and legally contentious, and Congress ultimately passed legislation to repeal DADT. Under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, DADT repeal became effective 60 days after the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certified that they considered the recommendations contained in a Department of Defense (DOD) report on the effect of repeal; that DOD prepared the necessary policies and regulations to implement the new law; and that the implementation of such policies and regulations "is consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces." This certification occurred on July 22, 2011, and the repeal took effect on September 20, 2011.
In the wake of the 1993 laws and regulations and prior to passage of the 2010 repeal legislation, there were numerous constitutional challenges to DADT. Based on the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick that there is no fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy, the courts had uniformly held that the military may discharge a service member for overt homosexual conduct. However, the legal picture was complicated by the Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which overruled Bowers by declaring unconstitutional a Texas law that prohibited sexual acts between same-sex couples. Subsequently, in Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, a federal district court held for the first time that DADT was unconstitutional on its face but later dismissed the case as moot when DADT repeal became effective. Likewise, in Witt v. United States Department of the Air Force, another federal district court held that DADT was unconstitutional as applied to a service member who had been discharged for homosexual conduct and ruled that the service member should be reinstated. More recently, the Court's decision in United States v. Windsor, which struck down a federal law that defined marriage as between one man and one woman, has made military benefits available to same-sex spouses of service members.
This report provides a legal analysis of the various constitutional challenges that have been brought against DADT. For policy analyses, see CRS Report R42003, The Repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R40782, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": Military Policy and the Law on Same-Sex Behavior, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS21585 | crs_RS21585_0 | § 2c, requiring single-member districts, appears to conflict with the 1941 law, codified a 2 U.S.C § 2a(c), which provides options for at-large representation if a state fails to create new districts after the reapportionment of seats following a census. § 2c was a Senate amendment to a House-passed private immigration act—H.R. Section 2a(c) of Title 2 currently provides:
Until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment, the Representatives to which such State is entitled under such apportionment shall be elected in the following manner: (1) If there is no change in the number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State, and if any of them are elected from the State at large they shall continue to be so elected; (2) if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; (3) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives but the number of districts in such State is equal to such decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; (4) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives but the number of districts in such State is less than such number of Representatives, the number of Representatives by which such number of districts is exceeded shall be elected from the State at large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; or (5) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives and the number of districts in such State exceeds such decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the State at large. 2508 that 2 U.S.C. These apparently contradictory provisions raise questions about how Section 2(a)c, which provides for at-large House elections under certain circumstances, can be reconciled with Section 2c, which prohibits them. Supreme Court Addresses Tension Between Sections 2a(c) and 2c: Branch v. Smith
In Branch v. Smith , decided on March 31, 2003, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of how these two statutory provisions can be reconciled. Rejecting the original federal plaintiffs' argument, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the lower court was required to fashion a plan with single-member districts. § 2c, concluded that Section 2c "impliedly repealed" Section 2a(c). In 1967 Congress could have repealed Section 2a(c), as provided in the more far-reaching redistricting standards bill (H.R. ), a bill to establish a commission to make recommendations on the appropriate size of membership of the House of Representatives and the method by which Members are elected. 415 requires the commission to "examine alternatives to the current method by which Representatives are elected (including cumulative voting and proportional representation) to determine if such alternatives would make the House of Representatives a more representative body." Such recommendations, if ultimately enacted, could affect current federal statutory provisions governing single-member and at-large representation in the House of Representatives. | Section 2c of Title 2 of the U.S. Code requires members of the House of Representatives to be elected from single-member districts, however, Section 2a(c) requires Representatives to be elected at large if a state fails to create new districts after the reapportionment of seats following a decennial census. These apparently contradictory provisions raise questions about whether and under what circumstances federal law permits at-large representation in the House of Representatives. The legislative history of 2 U.S.C. § 2c is sparse because it was adopted as a Senate floor amendment to a House-passed private bill. In 1967, the same year that Section 2c was adopted, Congress had contemplated, but failed to pass, a more comprehensive bill that would have repealed Section 2a(c), thereby removing the apparent statutory inconsistencies. Addressing the tension between Section 2a(c) and Section 2c, as applied to a Mississippi redistricting plan, the Supreme Court in Branch v. Smith held that a federal district court was required to craft single-member districts. Although the issue remains unsettled, it appears that Section 2a(c) could provide options to the House of Representatives to seat an at-large delegation. H.R. 415 (108th Cong.), would establish a commission to make recommendations on the method by which Members of the House are elected, including examining alternatives to the current method. Such recommendations, if ultimately enacted, could affect current federal statutory provisions governing single-member and at-large representation in the House of Representatives. |
crs_RS22030 | crs_RS22030_0 | Evolution of EU Counterterrorism Policies
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent revelation of Al Qaeda cells in Europe gave new momentum to European Union (EU) initiatives to combat terrorism and improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation. Among other steps, the EU established a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist groups, an EU arrest warrant to speed the extradition process, enhanced tools to stem terrorist financing, and new measures to strengthen external border controls and improve aviation security. Subsequent incidents in Europe injected further urgency into enhancing EU counterterrorism capabilities. U.S.-EU Counterterrorism Cooperation and Challenges
As part of the EU's efforts to combat terrorism since September 11, 2001, the EU made improving law enforcement and intelligence cooperation with the United States a top priority. Furthermore, U.S. officials and analysts contend that the foreign fighter phenomenon underscores the importance of close law enforcement ties with European allies and existing U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements, including those related to tracking terrorist financing and sharing airline passenger data. Among the most prominent are long-standing data privacy and data protection concerns, which have complicated negotiations on a range of U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements over the years. Other issues that have led to periodic tensions include detainee policies, differences in the U.S. and EU terrorist designation lists, and balancing measures to improve border controls and border security with the need to facilitate legitimate transatlantic travel and commerce. Developing U.S.-EU Links
Contacts between U.S. and EU officials—from the cabinet level to the working level—on police, judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially since 2001, and have played a crucial role in developing closer U.S.-EU ties. In the negotiation of several U.S.-EU information-sharing accords, some EU officials have been concerned about whether the United States could guarantee a sufficient level of protection for European citizens' personal data. The unauthorized disclosures since June 2013 of U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs and the spate of subsequent allegations of U.S. collection activities in Europe (including reports that U.S. intelligence agencies have monitored EU diplomatic offices and computer networks, as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone) have strained transatlantic trust and exacerbated EU worries about U.S. data protection safeguards. The CJEU decision also highlighted the lack of judicial remedies for EU citizens in the United States as a significant problem. 114-126 ). In mid-December 2015, Congress passed legislation (the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015) as part of P.L. Despite periodic tensions, both the United States and the EU appear committed to fostering closer cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism, law enforcement, border controls, and transport security. Aviation and cargo security, U.S border control measures, and visa policy may continue to be salient issues for Congress that could affect how future U.S.-EU cooperation evolves. 114-113 ) in an effort to strengthen the VWP's security controls in response to growing concerns about European citizens fighting with or inspired by the Islamic State and other terrorist groups. Judicial Redress Act ( P.L. Given the European Parliament's growing influence in many of the areas related to counterterrorism and its new role since 2009 in approving international agreements—such as the U.S.-EU SWIFT and PNR accords, and the proposed DPPA—Members of Congress may increasingly be able to help shape Parliament's views and responses. In recent years, some Members of Congress and many European Parliamentarians have expressed interest in strengthening ties and cooperation between the two bodies further. | The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent revelation of Al Qaeda cells in Europe gave new momentum to European Union (EU) initiatives to combat terrorism and improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation among its member states. Other deadly incidents in Europe, such as the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005, respectively, injected further urgency into strengthening EU counterterrorism capabilities. Among other steps, the EU has established a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist groups, an EU arrest warrant, enhanced tools to stem terrorist financing, and new measures to strengthen external EU border controls and improve transport security. Over the years, the EU has also encouraged member states to devote resources to countering radicalization and terrorist recruitment; such efforts have received renewed attention in light of concerns about the threats posed by European fighters returning from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, highlighted most recently by the November 13, 2015, attacks in Paris, France.
Promoting law enforcement and intelligence cooperation with the United States has been another top EU priority since 2001. Washington has largely welcomed enhanced counterterrorism cooperation with the EU. Since 9/11, contacts between U.S. and EU officials on police, judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially. A number of U.S.-EU agreements have been reached; these include information-sharing arrangements between the United States and EU police and judicial bodies, U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, and accords on container security and airline passenger data. In addition, the United States and the EU have been working together to curb terrorist financing, strengthen transport security, and address the foreign fighter phenomenon.
Nevertheless, some challenges persist in fostering closer U.S.-EU cooperation in these fields. Among the most prominent and long-standing are data privacy and data protection issues. The negotiation of several U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements, from those related to tracking terrorist financial data to sharing airline passenger information, has been complicated by EU concerns about whether the United States could guarantee a sufficient level of protection for European citizens' personal data. EU worries about U.S. data protection safeguards and practices were further heightened by the unauthorized disclosures of U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs in mid-2013 and subsequent allegations of U.S. collection activities in Europe. Other issues that have led to periodic tensions include detainee policies, differences in the U.S. and EU terrorist designation lists, and balancing measures to improve border controls and border security with the need to facilitate legitimate transatlantic travel and commerce.
Congressional decisions related to data privacy, intelligence-gathering, border controls, visa policy, and transport security may affect how future U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation evolves. EU officials have welcomed passage of the Judicial Redress Act (P.L. 114-126) to provide EU citizens with a limited right of judicial redress for privacy violations in a law enforcement context, but they have expressed unease with some provisions in the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 (passed as part of P.L. 114-113 in the wake of the Paris attacks and heightened U.S. concerns about European citizens fighting with terrorist groups abroad). Given the European Parliament's growing influence in many of these policy areas, Members of Congress may be able to help shape the Parliament's views and responses through ongoing contacts and the existing Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD). This report examines the evolution of U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation, current issues, and the ongoing challenges that may be of interest in the 114th Congress. Also see CRS Report R44003, European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses, and Issues for the United States, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40485 | crs_R40485_0 | In 2005, after the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon prompted Syria to withdraw its occupation force and brought an anti-Syrian, pro-Western government to power, the United States increased its assistance to Lebanon. After the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the United States refocused its policy toward building state institutions including the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) to enable them to fulfill the principals of U.N. Security Council resolutions. To that end, the Bush Administration requested and Congress appropriated an expanded amount of security assistance to the LAF and ISF. The Obama Administration and some members of the 111th Congress have supported the continuation of this program. U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon
The Bush Administration's 2006 request for increased U.S. security assistance to Lebanon marked the third time in the last 25 years that the United States sought to expand military cooperation with the Lebanese government. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, IMET training in Lebanon is designed to reduce sectarianism in the LAF and develop the force as a unifying national institution. In Lebanon, Section 1206 funds have been used to move rapidly vehicle spare parts, ammunition, and other basic supplies to the LAF. There are four primary components of INL support to the ISF: training, equipment and vehicles, community policing assistance, and communications. Issues for Congress
U.S. assistance to the LAF and ISF has improved the capability of those forces to provide for Lebanon's internal security needs (See " Recent LAF Accomplishments " and " Recent ISF Accomplishments " below), but broader political questions are unanswered about the purpose and potential limits of U.S. assistance. On August 3, 2010, the LAF opened fire on an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) unit engaged in routine brush-clearing maintenance along the Blue Line, alleging that it had crossed over into Lebanese territory. Two Lebanese soldiers, a journalist, and an Israeli officer were killed in the confrontation. In response, Representative Nita Lowey, chair of the State Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations placed a hold on the FY2010 $100 million FMF appropriation for Lebanon citing the need to "determine whether equipment that the United States provided to the Lebanese Armed Forces was used against our ally, Israel." The hold was lifted in November 2010 after congressional consultations with the State Department. It is unclear how current concerns will impact congressional consideration of the Administration's FY2011 request for Lebanon. This political reality raises questions about whether U.S. security assistance to the LAF is consistent with expressed U.S. policy goals, and whether U.S. policy fully considers the political position of the Lebanese and their elected leaders on issues of national defense. | The United States has provided security assistance to Lebanon in various forms since the 1980s, and the program has expanded considerably in recent years. Since fiscal year 2007, the United States has provided more than $700 million in security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to equip those forces to combat terrorism and secure Lebanon's borders against weapons smuggling to Hezbollah and other armed groups. U.S. security assistance is part of a broader assistance program designed to foster a stable, independent Lebanese government. Primary components of the assistance program include:
More than $490 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) designed to support the LAF's implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. More than $6 million in International Military and Education Training (IMET) training to reduce sectarianism in the LAF and develop the force as a unifying national institution. More than $117 million in Section 1206 funds to move rapidly vehicle spare parts, ammunition, and other basic supplies to the LAF. More than $100 million in support for the ISF for training, equipment and vehicles, community policing assistance, and communications.
In 2005, after the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon prompted Syria to withdraw its occupation force and brought an anti-Syrian, pro-Western government to power, the United States increased its assistance to Lebanon. After the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the United States refocused its policy toward building state security forces to enable them to assert control over the entire territory of the country and implement U.N. Security Council resolutions. To that end, the Bush Administration requested and Congress appropriated an expanded program of security assistance. The Obama Administration has maintained this commitment, requesting for FY2011 more than $132 million for the LAF and ISF.
For Congress, there are broader political questions about the purpose and potential limits of U.S. assistance to Lebanon. Some lawmakers are concerned that U.S.-provided equipment will be channeled to Hezbollah, while others suggest that it could be used by the LAF against Israel. At the same time, U.S. leaders and some members of Congress have questioned whether U.S. policy fully considers the political position of the Lebanese and their elected leaders on issues of national defense.
On August 3, 2010, the LAF opened fire on an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) unit engaged in routine maintenance along the Blue Line, alleging that it had crossed into Lebanese territory. Two Lebanese soldiers, a journalist, and an Israeli officer were killed. In response, Representative Nita Lowey placed a hold on the FY2010 $100 million FMF appropriation for Lebanon citing the need to "determine whether equipment that the United States provided to the Lebanese Armed Forces was used against our ally, Israel." The hold was lifted in November after consultations with the State Department. On January 13, 2011, Hezbollah and its opposition allies withdrew from the Lebanese government, forcing its collapse. It is unclear how these developments will impact congressional consideration of the Administration's FY2011 request for Lebanon. See also CRS Report R40054, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31002 | crs_RL31002_0 | Congress has received several messages from the President allocating funds from the Emergency Response Fund by P.L. (3) In summary, the proposed budgetwould fund the accounts in the Treasury andGeneral Government appropriations legislation at $16.6 billion (discretionary). Those allocations are subject to change. For accounts covered in this billthe House allocated, on October 9, $17.022 billion and the Senate, on October 11, allocated $17.118billion. The conference agreement would provide$17.069 billion in discretionary funding. This falls between the House and Senate allocations. Appropriations for the Executive Office of the President provide salaries and expenses for the White House Office, operations of the residences of the President and Vice President, and most otheragencies within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). (8)
The budget documents submitted to Congress April 9, 2001 provide account-by-account details on the rescission. 107-67 , the accounts in the Treasury and GeneralGovernment Appropriation were no longer subject to the continuing resolutions. By comparison, the Senate-passed measure would have provided ATF with $821,421,000, a 6.5% increase over the agency's FY2001 appropriation. Postal Service. Drawing upon funds made available to him by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, FY2001, PresidentBush, on October 16, 2001, allocated $7 million to NARA, $4.8 million for the operating expensesaccount for additional guard services at NARA-owned facilities, and $2.2 million for the repairs andrestoration account. Terrorism
According to the Office of Management and Budget, several accounts under this appropriation(Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Customs Service, U.S.Secret Service, and the General Services Administration) receive funding for functions related tocountering terrorism. (57) P.L.107-38 also authorized the emergency supplementalenactment of an additional $20 billion. The ECI calculationsdictate a pay adjustment in January 2002 of 3.4%. Those costs are not included in this budget presentation. Department of the Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of thePresident, and General Government Appropriations (in thousands of dollars)
Note: Funds allocated to these accounts through the Emergency Response Fund pursuant to P.L. 107-38 and P.L.107 117 are included in the Supplemental column. 1. Budget Authority. Direct Spending. Outlays. | The Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the President, and General Government FY2002 appropriation, P.L. 107-67 , totals $32.4 billion. Congressional Budget Office scorekeepingputs the totals at $32.8 billion ($15.7 billion mandatory and $17.1 discretionary. The House passedan appropriation totaling $32.7 billion. The Senate-passed bill would have funded the accounts at$32.8 billion. The conference agreement would provide a 4.6% pay adjustment in January 2002 forfederal civilian employees. Several of the accounts within the bill are also receiving funding throughthe Emergency Response Fund under P.L. 107-38 and P.L. 107-117 .
On April 9, 2001, President George W. Bush submitted his FY2002 budget to Congress. The budget documents show, for accounts funded through the Treasury, Postal Service, and GeneralGovernment appropriations bill, a proposed FY2002 discretionary budget authority of $16.6 billionand proposed outlays of $16.3 billion. This represents a $1 billion increase over the FY2001 enactedestimates (estimates do not reflect the enacted FY2001 supplemental). Realistically, the estimateswhich were offered earlier in the year are no longer current. Several of the covered accounts fundactivities affected either directly by, or as a consequence of response to, the attacks of September 11.
Accounts in the Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Secret Service, and the General Services Administration usually receivefunding for functions related to countering terrorism. Emergency Response Fund allocations, asprovided by P.L. 107-38 , the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from andResponse to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, FY2001, have gone to accounts in theDepartment of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President and the General ServicesAdministration. To date, those accounts have been allocated $147.5 million from the EmergencyResponse Fund. Those allocations are not included in the totals above.
Pursuant to recent negotiations, between the White House and Congress, on new overall funding levels, the October 9 House allocation for the spending allocations for the Treasury andGeneral Government accounts remain at $17.022 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committeeallocated $17.118 billion on October 11.
Key Policy Staff |
crs_RL34402 | crs_RL34402_0 | Congress, subsequently, has increased the total allocation authority to $61 billion and extended the program through 2019. Qualified investment groups apply to the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI) for an allocation of the New Markets Tax Credit. The 114 th Congress extended the NMTC program authorization with the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act (Division Q of P.L. For example, in the most recent completed allocation round (2014) nearly 29% of applicants received allocations. Additionally, allocation authority of $19.9 billion was requested, compared with the $3.5 billion in allocation authority available. Column 2 of Table 1 lists the total allocation awarded to date by the NMTC, by funding round. 114-113 ) extended the NMTC authorization through 2019 at $3.5 billion per year. The NMTC is primarily intended to encourage private capital investment in eligible low-income communities. | The New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) is a non-refundable tax credit intended to encourage private capital investment in eligible, impoverished, low-income communities. NMTCs are allocated by the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI), a bureau within the United States Department of the Treasury, under a competitive application process. Investors who make qualified equity investments reduce their federal income tax liability by claiming the credit. The NMTC program, enacted in 2000, is currently authorized to allocate $61 billion through the end of 2019. To date, the CDFI has made 912 awards totaling $43.5 billion in NMTC allocation authority. Demand for NMTC allocations has exceeded total allocations each award round—with the 2014 allocation round awarding $3.5 billion in allocation authority from applications requesting approximately $19.9 billion in NMTCs.
The most recent program extension was made in the 114th Congress. The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act (Division Q of P.L. 114-113) extended the NMTC authorization through 2019 at $3.5 billion per year.
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative changes. |
crs_RL31643 | crs_RL31643_0 | Introduction
The National Security Education Program (NSEP), authorized by the David L. BorenNational Security Education Act (NSEA), (1) provides aid for international education and foreign languagestudies by American undergraduate and graduate students, plus grants to institutions of highereducation (IHEs). The statement of purpose for the NSEA emphasizes the needs of federalgovernment agencies, as well as the Nation's postsecondary education institutions, for an increasedsupply of individuals knowledgeable about the languages and cultures of foreign nations, especiallythose which are of national security concern and have not traditionally been the focus of Americaninterest and study. Several bills passed in the 107th and 108th Congressional sessions that would have alteredthe NSEP's funding and administration. In addition, the intelligence reform bill ( P.L. 108-458 )signed by the President on December 17, 2004, amends Title X of the National Security Act to createa new Intelligence Community Scholarship Program (ICSP) that is quite similar to the NSEP(§1042). This report provides background information on the NSEP and an analysis of related issuesincluding the ICSP. It will be updated in response to major legislative developments. Background: Program Activities and Administration
The National Security Education Program (NSEP) (2) is intended to complement, and not duplicate, other federalprograms of aid for foreign language and area studies education, such as those authorized under TitleVI of the Higher Education Act, the Fulbright-Hays Act, and other legislation. (3) Distinctive elements of theNSEP, compared to most other federal programs of aid to international education or exchange,include its service requirement for aid recipients, administration by the Department of Defense(DOD), rather than the Departments of Education (ED) or State, and its support for internationaltravel by American undergraduate students. The recent establishment of the NSEP pilot program,the National Flagship Language Initiative, distinguishes it even further from Title VI programs. Forms of Aid
Three types of assistance are authorized and currently provided by the NSEA:
1. David L. Boren Fellowships to graduate studentsfor education abroad or in the U.S. in "critical" foreign language, disciplines, and areastudies. (7)
Program Administration
The NSEP is administered by the Department of Defense's National DefenseUniversity, under the guidance of a 12-member National Security Education Board (NSEB). Service Requirement
Individuals who receive NSEP fellowships and scholarships are obligated for alimited period of time to seek federal employment in a national security position. (9) If grant recipients candemonstrate that no national security positions are available, they may fulfill the requirementthrough work in any federal government position or in the field of higher education in an areaof study for which the scholarship or fellowship was awarded. P.L. The statement of purpose in the NSEA focuses primarily on helping to meet thenational security needs of the United States and expanding the pool of applicants foremployment in U.S. government agencies with national security responsibilities, while alsomentioning the somewhat broader goals of increasing the "quantity, diversity, and quality"of teaching and learning of foreign language and area studies critical to the Nation's interest,expanding the foreign language and area studies knowledge base upon which both U.S.citizens and government employees can rely, and permitting the federal government to"advocate the cause of international education" (50 U.S.C. | The National Security Education Program (NSEP), authorized by the David L. BorenNational Security Education Act of 1991 (NSEA, Title VIII of P.L. 102-183 ), provides aid forinternational education and foreign language studies by American undergraduate and graduatestudents, plus grants to institutions of higher education. The statement of purpose for the NSEAemphasizes the needs of federal government agencies, as well as the Nation's postsecondaryeducation institutions, for an increased supply of individuals knowledgeable about the languages andcultures of foreign nations, especially those which are of national security concern and have nottraditionally been the focus of American interest and study.
Three types of assistance are authorized and currently provided by the NSEA: (a) David L.Boren Scholarships for undergraduate students to study in "critical" foreign countries; (b) grants toinstitutions of higher education to establish or operate programs in "critical" foreign language andarea studies areas, including a National Flagship Language Initiative-Pilot Program; and (c) DavidL. Boren Fellowships to graduate students for education abroad or in the U.S. in "critical" foreignlanguages, disciplines, and area studies. Individuals who receive NSEP fellowships and scholarshipsare obligated for a limited period of time to seek employment in a national security position with afederal agency. Grant recipients who demonstrate that such positions are not available may fulfillthe requirement through work in any federal agency or in the field of higher education in an area ofstudy for which the scholarship or fellowship was awarded.
The NSEP is intended to complement, and not duplicate, other federal programs of aid forforeign language and area studies education, such as those authorized under Title VI of the HigherEducation Act and the Fulbright-Hays Act. Distinctive elements of the NSEP, compared to mostother federal programs of aid to international education or exchange, include the service requirementfor aid recipients, administration by the Department of Defense (rather than the Departments ofEducation or State), and support for international travel by American undergraduate students. Therecent establishment of the NSEP pilot program, the National Flagship Language Initiative,distinguishes it even further from Title VI programs. The NSEP is administered by the Departmentof Defense's National Defense University, under the guidance of a Presidentially appointed NationalSecurity Education Board.
Several bills passed in the 107th and 108th Congressional sessions that would have altered theNSEP's funding and administration. In addition, the intelligence reform bill ( P.L. 108-458 ) signedby the President on December 17, 2004, amends Title X of the National Security Act to create a newIntelligence Community Scholarship Program (ICSP) that is quite similar to the NSEP (§1042). Thisreport provides background information on the NSEP and an analysis of related issues including theICSP. It will be updated in response to major legislative developments. |
crs_RL32388 | crs_RL32388_0 | Purposes
This report, General Management Laws: Major Themes and Management Policy Options , is a companion to CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium (pdf) (hereafter "compendium"). In combination, these reports have three main objectives:
to identify and describe the major general management laws under which the executive branch is required to operate, including their rationale, design, and scope; to assist Members of Congress and their staff in overseeing management of the executive branch; and to help Congress when considering potential changes to the management laws, as well as other legislation, including authorizing statutes and appropriations. As a complement to the compendium, this report ("companion report") focuses on major themes and possible management policy options for Congress that emerge when the general management laws are viewed together, as a whole. The companion report reflects the status of general management laws at the end of the first session of the 108 th Congress, and will be updated along with the compendium to reflect actions taken through the close of the 108 th Congress. As a companion to the compendium, this report provides historical background on the roles that Congress and the President play in managing the executive branch. Major Themes and Management Policy Options
Given the history of managing the executive branch and also the differences between management practices in the public and private sectors, the entries in the compendium of general management laws may raise public policy issues, both for the general management laws themselves and for specific agencies. Management Policy Options
In considering situations when Congress weighs whether to give discretion to an agency, and if so, to what extent, scholars have noted four general options that can be used alone or in combination by Congress to address delegation situations and help balance flexibility with accountability. Standardization vs. Customization
Should the management laws under which agencies operate be standardized, with rules that apply uniformly to many different agencies? Or should there be a mix of these two approaches? Mixed approaches can suffer from all these problems. Functional Silos vs. Challenges to Making Progress
Congress has faced major challenges in its oversight of executive branch management, especially regarding:
how to ensure executive branch agencies improve their management practices by complying with general management laws, and how (or whether) to measure agencies' progress in improving their management practices. Management Policy Options
Congress might consider further questions with regard to chief officers and interagency councils. For example, should executive branch agencies have additional chief officers, or their equivalents? How should the councils be funded? | This report is a companion to CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium (pdf) (hereafter "compendium"). In combination, these reports have three main objectives: (1) to identify and describe the major management laws under which the executive branch is required to operate, including their rationale, design, and scope; (2) to assist Members of Congress and their staff in oversight of executive branch management; and (3) to help Congress when considering potential changes to the management laws, as well as other legislation, including authorization statutes and appropriations.
This report focuses on major themes—and possible policy options for Congress—that emerge when the general management laws are viewed together, as a whole. The report also describes historical context of the roles that Congress and the President play in managing the executive branch, and compares management in the public and private sectors. The themes and policy options address five topics.
Discretion for the Executive Branch: Congress frequently faces the issue of how much discretion to give the executive branch. Congress has options to address delegation situations and balance agency flexibility with accountability.
Standardization vs. Customization: Should the management laws under which agencies operate be standardized, with uniform rules? Or should some agencies have customized, agency-specific laws? Should there be a mix of the two approaches? Congress has options when confronted with these decisions.
Functional Silos vs. Integrated General Management: A functional perspective (e.g., looking at agency operations from the perspective of a budget officer or human resources officer) can boost efficiency. However, if functional orientations become inward-looking, functions can operate in isolation, resulting in coordination problems or missed opportunities. Congress has options to use an integrated general management perspective to solve agency management problems.
Making and Measuring Progress: Many executive branch agencies suffer from persistent, major management problems. Often these problems relate to areas the general management laws were intended to address. Congress has options for measuring and motivating agency progress in improving management practices.
Agency "Chief Officers" and Interagency Councils: Statutorily created "chief officers" (e.g., chief financial officers and chief acquisition officers) have increased in number in federal agencies. Congress also established interagency councils of these officers. Congress has options when considering whether additional chief officers should be established and how the councils could be more accountable.
The report reflects the status of general management laws at the end of the first session of the 108th Congress, and will be updated along with the compendium to reflect actions taken through the close of the 108th Congress. |
crs_R41982 | crs_R41982_0 | This report describes the President's FY2012 request for funding for DHS programs and activities, as submitted to Congress on February 6, 2011. Division D of the bill was designated the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2012. The act includes $39,600 million for DHS, a reduction of $3,976 million from the President's base request and a reduction of $2,067 million from FY2011 levels. 3672 , the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-77 ) into law, which provides $6,400 million in supplemental appropriations for the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) that are accounted for by an adjustment to the discretionary budget authority cap set by the Budget Control Act ( P.L. 2017
On September 30, 2011, the President signed into law a short-term continuing resolution (CR) to continue funding for government operations through October 4, 2011, and on October 5 a second CR that runs through November 18, 2011. Both resolutions funded operations at the FY2011 rate, less 1.503% in order to accommodate the budget caps implemented by the BCA. The resolutions included $2.65 billion to replenish the DRF which had been depleted through the response to multiple significant events in FY2011. The short-term CR was passed as an amendment replacing the text of H.R. 2017 , the Homeland Security Appropriations bill. This procedure interrupted the process for creating a stand-alone Homeland Security Appropriations bill to send to the President. 112-10 . President's FY2012 Budget Request Submitted
The Administration requested a net appropriation (mandatory and discretionary) of $45,015 million in budget authority for FY2012. This amounts to a $1,610 million, or a 3.7%, increase over the $43,405 million enacted for FY2011. Total budget authority, including appropriations, fee revenues, and trust funds in the Administration's budget request for DHS for FY2012 amounts to $57,079 million as compared to $55,783 million enacted for FY2011. Title II contains appropriations for Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Coast Guard (USCG), and the Secret Service. Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security
DHS Appropriations Trends
Table 3 presents DHS Appropriations, as enacted, for FY2003 through the FY2012 request. FY2012 Enacted
The Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. The Administration requested $10,372 million in net budget authority for CBP, representing a $492 million increase (5%) over the FY2011 enacted level. P.L. 112-10 ). Congress responded to that request by providing $2,650 million in the continuing resolutions that kept the government open, and then providing $6,400 million in a supplemental appropriations bill ( P.L. 112-74 was signed into law. | This report describes the FY2012 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested a total appropriation (mandatory and discretionary) of $45,015 million in budget authority for FY2012. This amounts to a $1,610 million, or a 3.7%, increase from the $43,405 million enacted for FY2011 through the continuing resolution (P.L. 112-10). Total budget authority, including appropriations, fee revenues, and trust funds in the Administration's budget request for DHS for FY2012 amounts to $57,079 million as compared to $55,783 million enacted for FY2011.
Net requested appropriations for major agencies within DHS were as follows: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), $10,372 million; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), $5,494 million; Transportation Security Administration (TSA), $5,514 million; Coast Guard, $8,677 million; Secret Service, $1,699 million; National Protection & Programs Directorate, $1,268 million; Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), $6,789 million (later amended by a supplemental request to $11,389 million); Science and Technology, $1,176 million; and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, $332 million.
On September 30, 2011, the President signed into law a short-term continuing resolution (CR) to continue funding for government operations through October 4, 2011, and then a second CR that ran through November 18, 2011. Both resolutions funded operations at the FY2011 rate, less 1.503% in order to accommodate the budget caps implemented by the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25). The resolutions included $2.65 billion to replenish the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) which had been depleted through the response to multiple significant events in FY2011. The short-term CR was passed as an amendment replacing the text of H.R. 2017, the Homeland Security Appropriations bill. This procedure interrupted the process for creating a stand-alone Homeland Security Appropriations bill to send to the President. Three other short term continuing resolutions were needed to keep the government operating until the FY2012 appropriations work was completed.
On December 23, 2011, the President signed into law P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2012. Division D of the bill was designated the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2012. That same day, he signed into law P.L. 112-77, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2012. The two Acts provide gross budget authority of $47,698 million for DHS for FY2012. Together, they provide $46,000 million in net budget authority, $39,600 in the base appropriations bill and $6,400 million in the disaster relief supplemental. Excluding the supplemental funding for disaster relief, this represents a $3,976 million decrease as compared to the President's budget request for DHS, and a $2,066 million decrease from the level provided in FY2011 under P.L. 112-10. |
crs_R44678 | crs_R44678_0 | A fter the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government developed a unified regimen to identify and list known or suspected terrorists. The regimen has received repeated congressional attention, and this report briefly discusses for congressional policymakers how the U.S. government fashions and uses the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to achieve such an end. It also discusses how the federal government engages in two travel-related screening processes—visa screening and air passenger screening. The Terrorist Screening Database
The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB, commonly referred to as the terrorist watchlist) lies at the heart of federal efforts to collect and share information with U.S. law enforcement and security agencies about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and includes biographic identifiers for those known either to have or be suspected of having ties to terrorism. In some instances it also includes biometric information on such people. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, and official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings. The Terrorist Screening Center, the Hub of Watchlisting
The TSC, a multi-agency organization administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), maintains the TSDB. These databases include the No Fly List and the Selectee and Expanded Selectee lists for airline passenger screening; the Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS); the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC); the TECS (not an acronym) system for border and port of entry screening; and the military base access and screening system. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses information from the TSDB for aviation security screening. The No Fly List includes identities of individuals who may present a threat to civil aviation and national security. Listed individuals are not allowed to board a commercial aircraft "flying into, out of, over, or within United States airspace; this also includes point-to-point international flights operated by U.S. carriers." (As discussed below, Customs and Border Protection [CBP] screens the passenger manifest before any international flight is allowed to depart to the United States.) The Selectee List includes individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being allowed to board a commercial aircraft. The Expanded Selectee List, an extra security measure developed in response to a failed attempt to trigger an explosive by a foreign terrorist onboard a U.S.-bound flight on December 25, 2009, screens against all TSDB records that include a person's first and last name and date of birth that are not already on the No Fly or Selectee lists. Many visitors, however, enter the United States without nonimmigrant visas through the VWP. Aliens entering through the VWP have been vetted through a system, known as the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), that checks them against the TSDB. As with all foreign nationals, CBP inspectors at the port of entry perform background checks and admissibility reviews that draw on information from the TSDB. The Department of State (DOS) specifically uses the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which surpassed 42.5 million records in 2012 and contains a subset of the TSDB. What about travelers from Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries where their citizens do not need visas to travel to the United States? ESTA draws on records from the TSBD. Air Passenger Risk-Based Screening
TSA has initiated a number of risk-based passenger screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. A cornerstone of TSA's risk-based initiatives created under this authority is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA's latest version of a trusted traveler program. Under PreCheck, participants vetted through a background check process (including screening against terrorist watchlist information) are processed through expedited screening lanes where they can keep shoes on and keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags. In November 2010, DHS announced that 100% of passengers flying to or from U.S. airports were being vetted using Secure Flight. | After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government developed a unified regimen to identify and list known or suspected terrorists. The regimen has received repeated congressional attention, and this report briefly discusses for congressional policymakers how the U.S. government fashions and uses the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to achieve such an end. It also discusses how the federal government engages in two travel-related screening processes—visa screening and air passenger screening. Both processes involve subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database.
The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)
The TSDB lies at the heart of federal efforts to identify and share information among U.S. law enforcement about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency organization created by presidential directive in 2003 and administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The TSDB includes biographic identifiers for those known either to have or be suspected of having ties to terrorism. In some instances it also includes biometric information on such people. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings, and air passenger screening.
Foreign Nationals Traveling to the United States
Two broad classes of foreign nationals are issued visas under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): immigrants and nonimmigrants. Many visitors, however, enter the United States without visas through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Under the VWP, foreign nationals from 38 countries with agreements with the United States—including most countries in the European Union—do not need visas to enter the United States for short-term business or tourism and are instead vetted using biographic information to authenticate and screen individuals.
Screening Aliens
Department of State (DOS) consular officers check the background of all visa applicants in "lookout" databases that draw on TSDB information and other counterterrorism information such as the material housed in the National Counterterrorism Center's Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. DOS specifically uses the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which surpassed 42.5 million records in 2012. Aliens entering through the VWP have been vetted through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), which checks them against the TSDB. In addition, before an international flight bound for the United States departs from a foreign airport, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers screen the passenger manifest. CBP inspectors also perform background checks and admissibility reviews at the ports of entry that draw on information from the TSDB.
Screening at the Transportation Security Administration
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. A cornerstone of TSA's risk-based initiatives is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA's latest version of a trusted traveler program that has been modeled after CBP programs. Under the PreCheck regimen, participants are vetted through a background check process (including screening against terrorist watchlist information). At selected airports, they are processed through expedited screening lanes, where they can keep shoes on and keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags.
All passengers flying to or from U.S. airports are vetted using the TSA's Secure Flight program. Secure Flight involves information from the TSDB housed in the No Fly List, Selectee List, and Expanded Selectee List to vet passenger name records. The No Fly List includes identities of individuals who may present a threat to civil aviation and national security. Listed individuals are not allowed to board a commercial aircraft flying into, out of, over, or within U.S. airspace; this also includes point-to-point international flights operated by U.S. carriers. The Selectee List includes individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being allowed to board a commercial aircraft. The Expanded Selectee List was created as an extra security measure in response to a failed attempt to trigger an explosive by a foreign terrorist onboard a U.S.-bound flight on December 25, 2009. It screens against all TSDB records that include a person's first and last name and date of birth that are not already on the No Fly or Selectee lists. |
crs_R41099 | crs_R41099_0 | Beginning in 1996, Congress enacted several pieces of legislation that included provisions that have become known as charitable choice rules. Included in legislation for various federally funded social service programs, charitable choice rules were aimed at ensuring that faith-based organizations could participate in federally funded social service programs like other nongovernmental providers. The rules allow religious organizations to receive public funding to offer social services without abandoning their religious character or infringing on the religious freedom of program beneficiaries. No new legislation has been enacted since 2000, but Congress continues to consider the issues associated with charitable choice as the related programs are reauthorized. Much of the controversy that has surrounded these programs has centered on the constitutionality of the federal government funding faith-based social service programs and so-called religious hiring rights, the term often used to refer to religious organizations' selectivity in employment decisions. Supporters of faith-based funding argue that religious organizations have a constitutional right to retain their preferences for co-religionists in hiring as a matter of religious identity and exercise. Opponents argue that allowing organizations that receive public funding to discriminate based on religion violates principles of neutrality guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. This report will briefly discuss the history of charitable choice provisions and the implementation of the Faith-Based Initiative which extended similar rules to certain executive agencies. It will also analyze the constitutional issues associated with funding faith-based organizations, services, and programs, including the distinction of financial assistance provided directly and indirectly to religious organizations. The report will also detail the legal protections for religious organizations that receive funds under these programs and for the beneficiaries of the services they provide, with particular focus on civil rights and discrimination prohibitions in current law. Finally, the report will analyze who is able to raise judicial challenges to publicly funded faith-based programs and how such lawsuits have been resolved. Many recent charitable choice lawsuits have challenged executive branch programs that provide funding to religious organizations under the Faith-Based Initiative. | Beginning in 1996, Congress enacted several pieces of legislation that included provisions that have become known as charitable choice rules. Included in legislation for various federally funded social service programs, charitable choice rules were aimed at ensuring that faith-based organizations could participate in federally funded social service programs like other nongovernmental providers. The rules allow religious organizations to receive public funding to offer social services without abandoning their religious character or infringing on the religious freedom of program beneficiaries. No new legislation has been enacted since 2000, but Congress continues to consider the issues associated with charitable choice as the related programs are reauthorized.
Much of the controversy that has surrounded these programs has centered on the constitutionality of the federal government funding faith-based social service programs and so-called religious hiring rights, the term often used to refer to religious organizations' selectivity in employment decisions. Supporters of faith-based funding argue that religious organizations have a constitutional right to retain their preferences for co-religionists in hiring as a matter of religious identity and exercise. Opponents argue that allowing organizations that receive public funding to discriminate based on religion violates principles of neutrality guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
Challenges to programs with funding to religious organizations under charitable choice have had varying results. Supreme Court jurisprudence has shifted over the last decade, which has in some cases lowered the constitutional barriers for aid to religious organizations. However, some cases have indicated that the Court may not favor aid in particular cases of providing funding to religious organizations.
This report will briefly discuss the history of charitable choice provisions and the implementation of the Faith-Based Initiative which extended similar rules to certain executive agencies. It will also analyze the constitutional issues associated with funding faith-based organizations, services, and programs, including the distinction of financial assistance provided directly and indirectly to religious organizations. The report will also detail the legal protections for religious organizations that receive funds under these programs and for the beneficiaries of the services they provide, with particular focus on civil rights and discrimination prohibitions in current law. Finally, the report will analyze who is able to raise judicial challenges to publicly funded faith-based programs and how such lawsuits have been resolved. |
crs_R42623 | crs_R42623_0 | Postal Service (USPS) maintains a cadre of employees known as the Postal Career Executive Service (PCES). PCES employees are intended to fill "key management positions" within USPS, which employed 645,950 people as of the end of FY2011. Of those employees, 36, known as "officials," serve at the pleasure of the Postmaster General (PMG) and include senior-level positions like area vice presidents and the Deputy Postmaster General. The remaining 604, known as "executives," perform duties such as district manager or bulk-mail center manager. Pay for PCES employees and the PMG is capped at $276,840 in FY2012. A PCES employee or the PMG may earn more than that statutory cap if he or she qualifies for a performance-based pay bonus. Any merit-based pay earned in excess of the pay cap can be retained as "deferred pay" and collected upon retirement. Additionally, PCES employees have no cap on the number of annual leave days they can accrue. Federal employees in the Senior Executive Service (outside of the Postal Service) cannot accrue more than 90 days of annual leave. Media reports and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns that the pay of USPS executives is too high and should be reduced—especially considering USPS's current financial condition. USPS and others, however, have argued that compensation rates are needed at their current levels to attract talented employees to maintain a Postal Service that delivers mail and packages to homes and businesses throughout the United States with limited appropriations. The 112 th Congress has introduced two bills that would limit USPS executive pay in some way. S. 1789 , for example, would remove certain "fringe benefits" and cap pay at Level I of the Executive Schedule ($199,700 in 2012). 2309 would prohibit PCES employees from receiving bonuses in years when USPS expenses eclipsed revenues and would cap pay at Executive Schedule Level I in certain years. This report examines the authorities governing executive compensation at USPS. It examines pay rates for other public-sector employees as well as certain private-sector employees to analyze how the pay of the Postmaster General and other Postal Service executives might compare. Pursuant to 39 U.S.C. Pursuant to H.R. | Media reports and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns that the pay of U.S. Postal Service (USPS) executives is too high and should be reduced. USPS and others have argued that current compensation rates are needed to attract talented employees to a Postal Service that delivers mail and packages to homes and businesses throughout the United States without taxpayer assistance.
The 112th Congress has taken action on two bills that would limit USPS executive compensation or benefits. S. 1789 would remove certain "fringe benefits" and cap pay at Level I of the Executive Schedule ($199,700 in 2012). H.R. 2309 would prohibit Postal Service executives from receiving bonuses in years when USPS expenses eclipsed revenues and cap pay at Executive Schedule Level I in certain years.
This report examines the authorities governing executive compensation at USPS. It examines pay rates for other public-sector employees as well as certain private-sector employees to analyze how the pay of the Postmaster General and other Postal Service executives might compare.
At the end of FY2011, USPS employed 645,950 people. Within that total is a cadre of Postal Career Executive Service (PCES) employees. As of May 18, 2012, USPS had 640 PCES employees. The cadre is divided into two categories: executives and officers. Executives, of which there were 604, perform duties such as district manager or bulk-mail center manager. Officers, of which there were 36, serve at the pleasure of the Postmaster General (PMG) and include senior-level positions like area vice presidents and the Deputy Postmaster General.
PCES employees and the Postmaster General are paid pursuant to specific statutory authorities. Pay for PCES employees is capped at $276,840 in FY2012. A Postal Executive may earn more than that statutory cap if he or she qualifies for a performance-based pay bonus. Pay earned in excess of the pay cap may be deferred and collected upon retirement. Three USPS officers currently receive deferred pay.
PCES officers and the PMG receive certain benefits that are not provided to other federal employees, like free life insurance, financial counseling, and parking. Additionally, PCES employees have no cap on the number of annual leave days they can accrue. Federal employees in the Senior Executive Service (outside of the Postal Service) cannot accrue more than 90 days of annual leave. Further, the PMG is provided a driver and security services pursuant to certain statutory provisions. |
crs_RL33499 | crs_RL33499_0 | It requires that payment be received by the exporter or the seller's agent prior to the goods being shipped from the U.S. port rather than before title and control is transferred to the Cuban buyer. This provision is identical to one that both the House and the Senate included in the FY2006 Transportation-Treasury appropriations bill, which was dropped by conferees in response to a veto threat (for background, see "Legislative Developments—109 th Congress—Debate over Cash in Advance Payment Definition"). 5426 , as enacted by P.L. TSRA codified the lifting of U.S. sanctions on commercial sales of food, agricultural commodities, and medical products to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan, and extended this policy to Cuba (see below). Provisions Enacted in 2000 to Exempt Food and Medical Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions
Overview of TSRA
The most significant policy change made by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 exempts commercial sales of agricultural and medical products to Cuba from the longstanding U.S. trade embargo on that country. Congressional Role in Future Sanctions on Exempted Products
TSRA, in effect, gives Congress veto power over a President's proposal to impose a future unilateral agricultural or medical sanction. The U.S. Role in Cuba's Market under TSRA's Policy
Though sales to Iran, Libya, and Sudan under the Clinton Administration's 1999 exemption policy were small relative to their total agricultural imports, U.S. farmers, commodity groups, and agribusiness eyed Cuba as a promising market. Though top Cuban officials initially stated these cash purchases were a one time event, this stance changed in the following months. From December 2001 through April 2006, U.S. exporters have shipped to Cuba $1.25 billion in agricultural and food products. Debate on 2002 Farm Bill Provision
The Bush Administration "strongly opposed" the Senate-passed farm bill provision (Section 355 of S. 1731 ) that would have repealed the prohibition on private U.S. financing of U.S. sales of agricultural commodities to Cuba. The compromise struck between the Bush Administration and key Senators modified one circumstance under which TSRA's food/medical exemption would not apply, codified that agricultural and medical product sales to the Taliban-controlled area of Afghanistan are subject to TSRA's export licensing requirements that apply to Cuba and to governments of other countries determined to be sponsors of international terrorism, and expressly allows eligible export sales to be made also to any other entity in Syria or North Korea without the need for an exporter to secure a license. Conferees dropped two provisions in FY2005 spending bills that would have relaxed TSRA restrictions. H.R. H.R. Amendment supporters argued that the Bush Administration has used the rules to delay or to refuse to issue travel licenses to those seeking to make farm sales in Cuba. To signal continued opposition to the Administration's intent to change the timing of payment for U.S. agricultural product sales to Cuba and to amend certain TSRA provisions, some Members of the House and Senate introduced identical measures ( H.R. 719 / S. 328 ) in early February 2005. 1339 / S. 634 would only redefine this term, using language identical to Section 5 in H.R. 281 and S.Amdt. On June 14, 2006, identical language was added by voice vote as an amendment to the FY2007 Transportation-Treasury appropriations bill (Section 950 of H.R. 5576 ). | In approving the FY2001 agriculture appropriations act, Congress codified the lifting of unilateral sanctions on commercial sales of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical products to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan, and extended this policy to apply to Cuba (Title IX of H.R. 5426, as enacted by P.L. 106-387; Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, or TSRA). Other provisions place financing and licensing conditions on sales to these countries. Those that apply to Cuba, though, are permanent and more restrictive. TSRA also gives Congress the authority in the future to veto a President's proposal to impose a sanction on the sale of agricultural or medical products.
Codifying the food and medical sales exemption for Cuba generated much debate. Exemption proponents argued that prohibiting sales to Cuba harmed the U.S. agricultural sector, and that opening up limited trade would be one way to pursue a "constructive engagement" policy. Opponents countered that an exemption would undercut U.S. policy to pressure the Castro government to make political and economic reforms. Though top Cuban officials initially stated no purchases would be made with TSRA's conditions in place, food stock losses due to a hurricane and a shift in Cuban strategy led to almost $1.25 billion in cash purchases by Cuba of U.S. food and farm commodities from December 2001 to April 2006. Agricultural sales to Iran, Libya, and Sudan under TSRA have totaled $313 million.
Congressional opponents of TSRA's prohibitions on private U.S. financing of agricultural sales, public financing of eligible exports, and tourist travel to Cuba have introduced bills since 2000 to repeal these provisions. Though several amendments to repeal or relax TSRA provisions relative to Cuba were adopted by committees or passed during floor debate, all were dropped in conference action. The Bush Administration's policy is to allow sales under TSRA, but not to change any aspect of the embargo until political and economic reforms occur in Cuba. Reflecting this, Administration officials continually signal to conferees they will advise the President to veto any bill that would change TSRA's prohibitions against Cuba.
In the 109th Congress, H.R. 719/S. 328, H.R. 1339/S. 634, S.Amdt. 281 and S.Amdt. 282 to S. 600, and amendments to appropriations bills seek to change a rule issued in early 2005 which defined "payment of cash in advance" to mean that payment must be received by the U.S. exporter prior to when agricultural products are shipped from a U.S. port, rather than before title and control is transferred to the Cuban buyer. Fearing lost sales, farm groups and some congressional opposition to this rule has led to ongoing debate on this issue. Responding to congressional pressure, the Bush Administration in July 2005, revised this rule slightly to allow for goods to be shipped from a U.S. port once a third-country bank receives payment for the U.S. exporter from the Cuban purchaser. In recent floor action, the House on June 14, 2006, adopted an amendment to the FY2007 Transportation-Treasury spending bill (section 950 of H.R. 5576) to prohibit implementation of this rule. Conferees dropped identical language in FY2006's Treasury's bill (H.R. 3058) in response to a presidential veto threat. |
crs_RL31534 | crs_RL31534_0 | The vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure to cyber-attack and catastrophic failure was brought to light in 1997 in the report of the President's Commission on Critical InfrastructureProtection. These systems were updated duringthe Y2K crisis, but their cyber-security generally has not been a high priority. These industriescould be significantly affected by a cyber-attack targeting industrial control systems such assupervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems, and others. Potential Consequences of a Terrorist Attack
The consequences of an attack on the industrial control systems of critical infrastructure couldvary widely. For example, a successful cyber-attack on the public telephoneswitching network might deprive customers of telephone service while technicians reset and repairedthe switching network. (53)
Current Initiatives
Department of Homeland Security
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security has centralized within the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection a number of offices related to criticalinfrastructure control system security: the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), theNational Infrastructure Protection Center, the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center(NISAC), and part of the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Assurance. Through their Critical InfrastructureProtection program, the National Institute of Standards and Technology is developing informationsecurity requirements, best-practice guidelines, and test methods for the process control sector. In this rule, critical energy infrastructure information (CEII) is defined as:
... information about proposed or existing critical infrastructure that: (i) Relates to the production, generation, transportation, transmission, ordistribution of energy; (ii) Could be useful to a person in planning an attack on critical infrastructure;(iii) Is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. The FERC has also published a notice of public rulemaking which includes cyber-security standards for the electric industry. These include the development of standards, either voluntary or mandatory, forcybersecurity of control systems; identifying and addressing critical infrastructure interdependencies;developing encryption methods for control systems; identifying and establishing technologies toaddress existing vulnerabilities; funding long-term research into secure SCADA systems; providingfor free exchange of risk information between the federal government, private industry, and othercritical infrastructure sectors; and assessing federal activities in this area. Because of the national importance of critical infrastructure systems, a uniformstandard might be developed, with the input of advocates, industries and the federal government,which would include the functionality necessary to protect industrial control systems, whileproviding for more secure operation. This approach has been taken by researchers in both industry and federal government laboratories. Increasing Information Sharing
The new FOIA exemptions created in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. Oversight of Department of Homeland Security Coordination
Policymakers may also wish to assess the effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security in coordinating security enhancements to control systems, promoting government/industrypartnerships, and performing risk and vulnerability assessments. | Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure are specific points of vulnerability, as cyber-security forthese systems has not been previously perceived as a high priority. Industry sectorspotentially affected by a cyber-attack on process control systems include the electrical, telephone,water, chemical, and energy sectors.
The federal government has issued warnings regarding increases in terrorist interest in the cyber-security of industrial control systems, citing international terrorist organization interest incritical infrastructure and increases in cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure computer systems. Thepotential consequences of a successful cyber-attack on critical infrastructure industrial controlsystems range from a temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure failure affectingmultiple states for an extended duration.
The National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace , released in February 2003, contains a number of suggestions regarding security measures for control systems. A focus on the further integrationof public/private partnerships and information sharing is described, along with suggestions thatstandards for securing control systems be developed and implemented.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 ) transferred and integrated several federal entities that play a role in cyber-security of control systems into the Department of HomelandSecurity. These entities include the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, the NationalInfrastructure Protection Center, the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, andparts of the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Assurance. Additionally, the HomelandSecurity Act of 2002 created a new class of information, critical infrastructure information, whichcan be withheld from the public by the federal government.
Efforts in increasing the cyber-security of control systems occur both at federal government facilities and, in critical infrastructure sectors, through industry groups. The Department of EnergyNational Laboratories, the Department of Defense, and the National Institute of Standards andTechnology all have programs to assess and ameliorate the cyber-vulnerabilities of control systems. Industry-based research into standards, best practices, and control system encryption is ongoing inthe natural gas and electricity sector.
Possible policy options for congressional consideration include further development of uniform standards for infrastructure cyber-protection; growth in research into security methods for industrialcontrol systems; assessing the effectiveness of the new exemptions to the Freedom of InformationAct; and the integration of previous offices in the new Department of Homeland Security.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33955 | crs_RL33955_0 | Introduction
This CRS report summarizes three studies submitted to Congress in 2005 on potential future Navy ship force structures, and is intended as a lasting reference source on these three studies. Two of the three studies were conducted in response to Section 216 of the conference report ( H.Rept. 108-354 of November 7, 2003) on the FY2004 defense authorization act ( H.R. 1588 / P.L. The two studies were conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Office of Force Transformation (OFT, which was then a part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense), and were submitted to the congressional defense committees in February 2005. OFT was disestablished on October 1, 2006, and its activities were transferred to other DOD offices. The third study was conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an independent defense-policy research organization, on its own initiative. The study was made available to congressional and other audiences in March 2005. The CNA report's discussion of how crew rotation may alter force-level requirements for maintaining day-to-day forward deployments is somewhat detailed and may have been adapted from other work that CNA has done on the topic for the Navy. OFT Report
The OFT report was prepared under the direction of retired Navy admiral Arthur Cebrowski, who was the director of OFT from October 29, 2001 until January 31, 2005 and the President of the Naval War College (NWC) from July 24, 1998 to August 22, 2001. During his time at NWC and OFT, Cebrowski was a leading proponent of network-centric warfare and distributed force architectures. Fleet Size and Structure
CNA Report
The 380-ship fleet at the high end of the CNA range is similar in size and composition to the Navy's 375-ship fleet proposal. OFT Report
The OFT-recommended fleet would have a much larger total number of ships than the Navy's planned fleet. As a consequence, the CNA-recommended force range would be roughly similar in overall capability to the Navy's planned architecture. | This CRS report summarizes three studies submitted to Congress in 2005 on potential future Navy ship force structures, and is intended as a lasting reference source on these three studies.
Two of the three studies were conducted in response to Section 216 of the conference report (H.Rept. 108-354 of November 7, 2003) on the FY2004 defense authorization act (H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24, 2003). The two studies were conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Office of Force Transformation (OFT, which was then a part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense). They were submitted to the congressional defense committees in February 2005. The third study was conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an independent defense-policy research organization, on its own initiative. The study was made available to congressional and other audiences in March 2005.
The CNA study presents a fairly traditional approach to naval force planning in which capability requirements for warfighting and for maintaining day-to-day naval forward deployments are calculated and then integrated. The CNA-recommended force parallels fairly closely Navy thinking at the time on the size and composition of the fleet. This is perhaps not surprising, given that much of CNA's analytical work is done at the Navy's request.
The OFT study fundamentally challenges current Navy thinking on the size and composition of the fleet, and presents an essentially clean-sheet proposal for a future Navy that would be radically different from the currently planned fleet. This is perhaps not surprising, given both OFT's institutional role within DOD as a leading promoter of military transformation and the views of retired Navy admiral Arthur Cebrowski—the director of OFT until January 31, 2005—regarding network-centric warfare and distributed force architectures. (OFT was disestablished on October 1, 2006, and its activities were transferred to other DOD offices.)
The CSBA study challenges current Navy thinking on the size and composition of the fleet more dramatically than the CNA report, and less dramatically than the OFT report. Compared to the CNA and OFT reports, the CSBA report contains a more detailed implementation plan and a more detailed discussion of possibilities for restructuring the shipbuilding industrial base.
This CRS report will not be updated. |
crs_R41594 | crs_R41594_0 | Introduction
Much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established nearly 40 years ago to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. However, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to "point" source discharges of metals and organic and inorganic toxic substances from factories and sewage treatment plants. However, there is less agreement about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required. Several key water quality issues exist: what additional actions should be taken to implement existing provisions of the law, whether additional steps are necessary to achieve overall goals of the act that have not yet been attained, how to ensure that progress made to date is not lost through diminished attention to water quality needs, and what is the appropriate federal role in guiding and paying for clean water infrastructure and other activities. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the act have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. These factors partly explain why Congress has recently favored focusing legislative attention on narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, rather than taking up comprehensive proposals. Also on the congressional agenda was consideration of the geographic reach of the CWA over the nation's waters and wetlands, in light of court rulings—including two Supreme Court decisions—that have narrowed the law's regulatory jurisdiction, but in ways that are somewhat unclear. Two CWA issues that have been the focus of much of legislators' interest in recent Congresses received some attention again—water infrastructure financing, and regulatory protection of wetlands—but with different focus than in the recent past, as congressional leadership and priorities shifted after the November 2010 election. A number of other water quality issues were on Congress's agenda through oversight and legislation, as well. At issue has been what the federal role should be in assisting states and cities, especially in view of such high projected funding needs. In that Congress, House and Senate committees approved bills to extend the act's SRF program and increase federal assistance ( H.R. In the 109 th Congress, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved S. 1400 , which was similar to S. 2550 in the 108 th Congress. The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved S. 3617 , a bill that was similar to the committee's bill in the 109 th Congress, but no further action occurred. Reauthorization legislation was introduced in the House ( H.R. 3145 ), but no further action occurred. 4304 , which would have amended the CWA with a narrow definition of waters that are subject to the act's jurisdiction. Attention to similar issues occurred in the 112 th Congress, with some legislators highly critical of recent regulatory initiatives and others more supportive of EPA's implementation efforts. 3852 ), but no legislation was enacted. One proposal ( H.R. None of these bills was enacted. 112-74 , omnibus legislation providing full-year FY2012 appropriations for EPA, which was enacted in December 2011. The legislation, as enacted, did not include a number of policy issue amendments included in an earlier House-passed CR that intended to prohibit funding for a number of EPA regulatory activities discussed previously in this report, including implementation of the Administration's regulatory initiatives on mountaintop mining in Appalachia; implementation of the Chesapeake Bay TMDL; and implementation or enforcement of the November 2010 Florida numeric nutrient water quality standards rule. In addition, H.R. 6091 ). | Much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established nearly 40 years ago in the Clean Water Act (CWA) to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. However, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to toxic substances discharged from factories and sewage treatment plants.
There is little agreement among stakeholders about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required to address the nation's remaining water pollution problems. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the CWA have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. Congress has instead focused legislative attention on enacting narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, but not any comprehensive proposals.
For several years, the most prominent legislative water quality issue has concerned financial assistance for municipal wastewater treatment projects. House and Senate committees have approved bills on several occasions, but, for various reasons, no legislation has been enacted. At issue has been the role of the federal government in assisting states and cities in meeting needs to rebuild, repair, and upgrade wastewater treatment plants, especially in light of capital costs that are projected to be as much as $390 billion. In the 111th Congress, the House passed H.R. 1262 to reauthorize the CWA's State Revolving Fund (SRF) program to finance wastewater infrastructure, and a companion bill, S. 1005, was approved by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. No legislation was enacted. Reauthorization legislation was introduced again in the 112th Congress (H.R. 3145), but no further action occurred.
Programs that regulate activities in wetlands also have been of interest, especially CWA Section 404, which has been criticized by landowners for intruding on private land-use decisions and for imposing excessive economic burdens. Environmentalists view this regulatory program as essential for maintaining the health of wetland ecosystems, and they are concerned about court rulings that have narrowed regulatory protection of wetlands and about related administrative actions. Many stakeholders desire clarification of the act's regulatory jurisdiction, but they differ on what solutions are appropriate. In the 111th Congress, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved a bill that sought to clarify but not expand the CWA's geographic scope (S. 787). Because some stakeholders believe that the bills would expand federal jurisdiction—not simply clarify it—the bills were controversial, and no legislation was enacted. In contrast to approaches reflected in earlier proposals, bills in the 112th Congress would have narrowed the scope of the act's jurisdiction (S. 2122/H.R. 4304).
These issues drew interest in the 112th Congress, as well. In addition, a number of other CWA issues were the subject of congressional oversight and legislation, with some legislators highly critical of recent regulatory initiatives and others more supportive of EPA's actions. Among the topics of interest were environmental and economic impacts of Chesapeake Bay restoration efforts, federal promulgation of water quality standards in Florida, regulation of surface coal mining activities in Appalachia, and other CWA regulatory actions. Congressional interest in several of these issues was reflected in debate over policy provisions of legislation to provide appropriations for EPA in FY2012 (P.L. 112-74) and FY2013 (H.R. 6091). |
crs_R42153 | crs_R42153_0 | Introduction
The political unrest and transitions that have swept through several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since early 2011—often referred to as the "Arab Spring" or "Arab Awakening"—have prompted the United States, along with the broader international community, to discuss approaches and take actions to support democratic political transitions in the region. Within Congress, some Members have called for new free trade agreements (FTAs) with Egypt and Tunisia, and deeper economic ties with Libya. Presently, U.S. trade and investment policy in the region is focused on using trade and investment to foster economic growth, promote greater economic reforms, provide support for successful and stable democratic transitions, and generally support U.S. foreign policy objectives. Measures to bolster trade and investment ties are often long-term in nature, and could build on other shorter-term measures to support transitioning countries. However, continued political uncertainty and changing security environments in the region could prompt greater scrutiny of U.S. engagement, as policymakers grapple with questions of timing, feasibility, and political support for such efforts. The structure of this report is as follows:
The report begins with background and analysis for policymakers considering a re-evaluation of U.S. trade and investment in the MENA in light of political change in the region. In particular, the report examines the economic challenges facing many countries in the region and the area's limited economic integration—both in the world economy, including relatively weak economic ties with the United States, and in the MENA regional economy. MENA countries produced 30% of the world's oil and 22% of the world's natural gas in 2011. For example, it has been argued that:
Weak integration in the global economy has prevented the region from reaping the opportunities of globalization; " Easy money" from natural resources in some MENA countries has provided few incentives to develop sound economic policies or other productive industries, with the benefits of natural resources going to a few and not the public at large; Non-democratic political institutions have stifled innovation and economic competition, leading to slow growth and distortions in the economy; A weak business environment , stemming from heavy government involvement in the economy, red tape, corruption, and weak rule of law, has deterred foreign investment; A weak educational system has not equipped youth in the region with the skills demanded by the private sector in a competitive global environment; Subsidies and l ack of government infrastructure spending , with large portions of the budget going to defense and subsidies for basic needs, creates distortions in the economy; and Women constitute a low proportion of the labor force, preventing the region from tapping all its productive potential. U.S. trade with MENA countries accounts for a small share of total U.S. trade: $193 billion, about 5% of the U.S. total, in 2011. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Closely linked to trade is FDI. Obstacles to Closer U.S. Trade and Investment Ties with MENA Countries
What factors have limited U.S.-MENA trade and investment ties? For the region, the reports generally emphasize impediments to U.S. firms seeking to do business in MENA countries related to lack of transparency, bureaucratic red tape, weak rule of law, corruption, and differences in business cultures. Important exceptions to overall U.S. trade policy objectives in the region are Iran and Syria. Overview of U.S. Trade Policy Tools
The United States uses policy tools to promote trade and investment, both with the MENA and globally, that may be grouped into two broad categories: (1) formal agreements and discussion frameworks to liberalize trade and investment and advance rules-based trade, such as free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties; and (2) U.S. federal government programs that aim to encourage international trade and investment, such as export assistance and financing. MENA Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative
The U.S. government has organized much of its trade policy response to the political change in the region through the MENA "Trade and Investment Partnership" (MENA-TIP). Announced by President Obama in May 2011, the objectives of the initiative are to facilitate trade within the region; promote greater trade and investment with the United States and with other global markets; and "open the door to willing and able MENA partners—particularly those adopting high standards of reform and trade liberalization—to construct a regional trade arrangement." Formal Agreements and Discussion Frameworks to Liberalize Trade and Investment
Current U.S. trade and investment initiatives with MENA countries are the result of previous efforts undertaken to expand economic and political ties with the region. It also has FTAs with five countries in the region: Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. Certain elements of such programs are a part of the MENA-TIP Initiative. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
The United States grants preferential treatment to imports from certain developing countries under the GSP program. Unilateral Options
Congress could consider a number of unilateral trade policy tools to support and expand U.S. economic relations with countries in transition and other economies in the MENA region. Negotiating new trade and investment agreements, bilaterally or regionally: Longer-term, the United States could choose to focus its negotiations on trade and investment agreements with selected countries currently undergoing political transitions, such as Egypt or Tunisia. Congress could encourage the United States to intensify existing efforts to support WTO accession for MENA countries such as Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, and provide technical assistance for countries working towards WTO accession. The United States could work with countries to fully implement their WTO accession commitments, such as through enhanced trade capacity building efforts. Others argue that the links between trade, investment, and democracy are not straightforward. Some analysts question whether trade and/or investment liberalizing agreements will result in increased U.S. trade and investment to the MENA region. Should the United States wait to enhance its trade and investment ties in the region until the political situation stabilizes? | U.S. interest in deepening economic ties with certain countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has increased in light of the political unrest and transitions that have swept the region since early 2011. Policymakers in Congress and the Obama Administration are discussing ways that U.S. trade and investment can bolster long-term economic growth in the region. In May 2011, President Obama announced the MENA "Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative" (MENA-TIP), through which various federal government agencies are engaged in efforts to enhance trade and investment with the region. Such activities are in line with long-standing U.S. trade policy goals and measures. Some Members of Congress have called for deeper economic ties with MENA countries undergoing political change. However, continued political uncertainty and changing security environments in the region have prompted greater scrutiny of U.S. engagement. This report analyzes policy approaches that Congress might consider concerning U.S.-MENA trade and investment.
MENA Economies and Integration in the Global Economy
Economic performance in the MENA as a whole lags behind other regions in the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (living standards), employment, and economic diversification, despite the fact that several MENA countries are major producers of oil and natural gas. Limited integration in the global economy is frequently cited as an obstacle to the region's overall economic development. MENA's trade with the world is concentrated in a small number of products (oil exports and imports of manufactured goods) and among a small number of trading partners (particularly the European Union). Tariffs also remain high in some MENA countries, and intra-regional trade and investment flows are relatively low. With regard to the United States, the MENA region accounts for less than 5% of U.S. total trade and 1% of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows. U.S. businesses face a number of non-tariff barriers, such as lack of transparency, bureaucratic red tape, corruption, weak rule of law, and differences in business cultures.
Policy Approaches and Challenges
Current U.S. trade and investment policies with MENA countries are quite varied. The United States has free trade agreements (FTAs) with five MENA countries (Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman), but more limited ties with other countries, such as Libya, which is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Important exceptions to overall U.S. trade policy objectives in the region are Iran and Syria, which are both subject to trade sanctions.
Analysts disagree about the merits of deepening U.S. trade and investment ties with the MENA region. Some analysts maintain that new trade and investment agreements help anchor domestic reforms, such as in governance and rule of law; support sound economic growth; are a cost-effective way to support transitioning countries in an environment of budgetary constraints; and could promote U.S. exports and investment. Others argue that the empirical record between economic openness and democracy is weak and that it is unclear whether protesters in various Arab countries favor more economic liberalization, which they sometimes associate with corruption, inflation, and inequality. They also argue that political uncertainty in the region, such as the fluidity of Egypt's political transition, merits a "wait-and-see" approach before proceeding with substantial policy changes.
The 113th Congress could consider a number of approaches regarding U.S. trade and investment with the region, including
maintaining the status quo until the impact of the political changes in MENA countries is clear; providing technical assistance to countries working towards WTO membership, as well as trade capacity building support to countries working to implement WTO commitments; negotiating new trade and/or investment agreements with countries in the region that do not already have them, such as Egypt and Tunisia; utilizing existing trade frameworks for greater dialogue and progress on trade and investment and encouraging regional integration; reauthorizing existing trade preferences through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program or creating a U.S. trade preference program, differing from GSP, that grants preferential market access to exports from MENA countries; and increasing assistance from federal export and investment promotion agencies to the region.
In considering such approaches, some questions that could arise include
Should the U.S. government promote expanded trade and investment in the near term in order to support democratic transitions, or should it wait until the political situation stabilizes in various countries? To what extent should the United States balance a regional approach of increased trade and investment with more tailored policies to the specific needs of individual countries? To what extent should the United States cooperate with the European Union or others on trade and investment in the MENA region?
Are existing U.S. frameworks and agreements on trade and investment with MENA countries benefitting the region, and achieving the intended objectives? What lessons can be learned from past U.S. efforts to promote trade and investment? How effective are current efforts to expand trade and investment under the MENA-TIP initiative? |
crs_RL34128 | crs_RL34128_0 | Introduction
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation is the federal agency primarily responsible for promoting and regulating the safety of the railroad industry. The FRA's rail safety programs were last authorized in 1994 ( P.L. The trend of improvement in some rail safety measures, such as train accidents and deaths in grade-crossing collisions, has leveled off in recent years, and with forecasts of significant growth in rail traffic in the future, there is concern over the need to make more progress in rail safety. The amended bill was reported by the committee on September 19, 2007, and was approved by the House of Representatives on October 17, 2007. The numbers of grade-crossing collisions and resulting injuries and deaths declined until 2003, but has shown little improvement since then. Thus, the number of train miles on the nation's freight rail network is likely to significantly increase in the coming years. Selected Reauthorization Issues
The major issues in the current reauthorization debate include addressing employee fatigue through changes to the federal rail hours of service legislation, implementing new train control technology that promotes safety, improving the condition of track, and improving safety at highway-rail grade crossings. These limits are enacted in law , unlike the hours of service limits for workers in other transportation modes, which are set through the regulatory process. FRA is also encouraging and supporting efforts to address sleep disorders among rail employees. Representative James Oberstar, Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, has introduced a reauthorization proposal, the Federal Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2007 ( H.R. 2095 ). 2095 , on August 1, 2008. 2095 would make significant changes to a number of FRA's safety programs. It would make several changes to address the issue of employee fatigue: it would increase the minimum rest period length under the rail hours of service act from 8 to 10 hours, and would authorize FRSA to further increase the length of that minimum rest period through regulation; it would phase in a limit of 10 hours on the amount of limbo time an employee could accrue each month (not including any limbo time caused by delays unforeseeable at the time the employee left a designated terminal); it would require that employees accruing limbo time on a shift be given additional rest time after that shift equal to the amount of limbo time accrued; and it would require railroads to develop fatigue management plans in consultation with rail labor unions It would also require railroads to set minimum training standards for employees, to address concerns that employees are not being provided adequate training. As Passed by the Senate
H.R. The bill would increase the minimum amount of uninterrupted rest time and limit the amount of limbo time that can be accrued by rail employees under the rail hours of service statute, and would authorize DOT to amend the rail hours of service limits through the regulatory process. Both the House and Senate version of H.R. The Senate-passed version of H.R. Representatives of rail labor testified in support of the proposed increase in the number of FRA safety inspectors. | The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is the federal agency primarily responsible for safety in the rail industry. FRA's safety programs were last authorized in 1994; their authorization expired in 1998. Most measures of rail safety have improved significantly since FRA's last authorization, including the number of grade crossing collisions and fatalities and the number of employee injuries and deaths. These improvements came while the amount of both freight and passenger rail activity on the nation's rail infrastructure was increasing. However, the improvements in safety measures have leveled off in recent years. Given significant projected continued increases in freight and passenger rail activity in the coming decade, there is concern that without additional efforts, some of the gains of the past decade may be lost.
Among the issues that have dominated debate thus far are alleged shortcomings in the rail hours of service statute (49 U.S.C. 21101 et seq) that limit the act's effectiveness in preventing fatigue among train operating crews, which may be a contributing factor in a significant number of train accidents. A related issue is limbo time, time that train operating crews spend on shift, but not engaged in safety-related duties, after they have reached the limit of their shift under the rail hours of service act, which also contributes to fatigue. Unlike the hours of service rules for other transportation modes, the rail hours of service rules are set in law and cannot be altered through the regulatory process. Other prominent issues have included implementation by railroads of automated collision-prevention technology in trains, the adequacy of FRA track inspections, and safety at highway-rail grade crossings.
The House (on October 17, 2007) and Senate (on August 1, 2008) passed differing versions of H.R. 2095, the Federal Railroad Safety Improvement Act. On September 24, 2008, the House agreed to the Senate amendment with an amendment pursuant to H.Res. 1492. This amended version of H.R. 2095 incorporated another piece of legislation, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (differing versions of which were previously passed by both the Senate and House as S. 294), which reauthorizes Amtrak and federal passenger rail programs. Further action is now up to the Senate. According to press reports and information at the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's website, the amended H.R. 2095 includes provisions that would increase the length of the minimum rest period under the rail hours of service act and give FRA the authority to further increase the minimum rest period through regulation, increase the number of FRA safety inspectors, and mandate implementation of positive train control. It would also authorize about $13 billion in funding for Amtrak and passenger rail activities, and direct the Department of Transportation (DOT) to solicit bits to develop and operate high-speed rail lines in 11 corridors, including the Northeast Corridor (for further information about Amtrak reauthorization, see CRS Report RL33492, Amtrak: Budget and Reauthorization, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]).
This report will be updated. |
crs_R41609 | crs_R41609_0 | Q uestions about the personal security and safety of Members of Congress and their staffs are of enduring concern for the House, Senate, and the United States Capitol Police (USCP). Broader interest in the media and among the public arises in the aftermath of incidents such as the June 14, 2017, attack on at least 17 Members of Congress, several staff, USCP officers, and members of the public in Alexandria, Virginia. In that incident, a Member was critically wounded, and others, including other Members, a congressional staffer, USCP officers, and a member of the public were injured during a shooting that occurred as Members were practicing for an annual congressional baseball game. Official records, supplemented from available news accounts, suggest that there have been at least 20 instances of attacks against Members, summarized in Table 1 . In 10 instances, the attacks failed, were thwarted, or resulted in no serious injuries to Members. Another five incidents resulted in the wounding of at least nine Members. Finally, five instances each resulted in the death of a Member. In these examples, it appears that individual Members were targeted on 17 occasions. There have been three incidents in which more than one Member was targeted. Violence Against Congressional Staff
In some of the incidents of attacks on Members or in the Capitol, including the Alexandria incident, some congressional staff were also affected. Two incidents resulted in fatalities. A 2011 shooting at a congressional event in Tucson, Arizona, resulted in the death of a congressional staff member, Gabriel Matthew Zimmerman. On a number of occasions, incidents of violence involving Members of Congress or congressional staff have led to congressional legislative or administrative responses changing policy and practice. 665 and H.Res. Legislative Proposals, 115th Congress
In the 115 th Congress (2017-2018) several legislative proposals have been introduced related to potential response to violence against Members of Congress or their staff. Citing concerns about Member security in the House and in district offices, the measure increased the 2017 MRA for each House Member office by $25,000. H.R. 2940 , the Congressional Self-Defense Act. H.R. 2945 , the Congressional Personal Safety Act. 2951 , to allow Members of Congress to carry a concealed handgun anywhere in the United States, with exceptions. H.R. H.R. 3298 , the Wounded Officers Recovery Act of 2017. 3298 was enacted into law on August 4, 2017, as P.L. 117-45. 3298 , the measure would authorize the USCP Board to make payments from the U.S. Capitol Police Memorial Fund to USCP employees who sustain serious injuries in the line-of-duty, including USCP officers injured in the Alexandria shooting, subject to conditions established by the USCP Board by regulation. Other Actions, 115th Congress
In addition to legislative proposals, various administrative efforts were undertaken in response to the Alexandria shooting, including the following. On June 21, 2017, HSAA Paul D. Irving requested an advisory opinion from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) regarding the use of campaign funds by Members of the House for residential security systems. On June 29, 2017, the Committee on House Administration approved an update to the Members' Congressional Handbook to provide additional guidance for updating security equipment and measures. | Questions about the personal security and safety of Members of Congress and their staffs are of enduring concern for the House, Senate, and the United States Capitol Police (USCP). Broader interest in the media and among the public arises in the aftermath of incidents such as the June 14, 2017, attack on at least 17 Members of Congress, several staff, USCP officers, and members of the public in Alexandria, Virginia. In that incident, a Member was critically wounded, and others were injured during a shooting that occurred as Members were practicing for an annual congressional baseball game.
Official records, supplemented from available news accounts, suggest that there have been at least 20 instances of attacks against Members since 1789. In 10 instances, the attacks failed, were thwarted, or resulted in no serious injuries to Members. Another five incidents resulted in the wounding of at least nine Members. Finally, five instances each resulted in the death of a Member. In these examples, it appears that individual Members were targeted on 17 occasions. There have been three incidents in which more than one Member was targeted, including the Alexandria attack.
In some of the incidents of attacks on Members or in the Capitol, including the Alexandria incident, some congressional staff were also affected. Two incidents resulted in fatalities, including a 1998 incident in which a gunman entered the Capitol and killed two USCP officers, and a 2011 shooting at a congressional event in Tucson, Arizona, which resulted in the death of a congressional staff member.
On a number of occasions, incidents of violence involving Members of Congress or congressional staff have led to congressional legislative or administrative responses changing policy and practice. These include a ban on dueling or challenging to duel within the District of Columbia; the enactment of law making it a federal offense to assassinate, kidnap, or assault a Member of Congress or Member-elect; and the initiation of congressional mail screening.
In the 115th Congress (2017-2018), several legislative proposals have been introduced related to potential response to violence against Members of Congress or their staffs.
Citing concerns about Member security in the House and in district offices, the House on June 27, 2017, adopted H.Res. 411 to increase the 2017 Member Representational Allowance for each House Member office by $25,000.
H.R. 3298, the Wounded Officers Recovery Act of 2017, was enacted into law on August, 4, 2017, as P.L. 117-45. The law authorizes the payments from the United States Capitol Police Memorial Fund to USCP employees who sustain serious injuries in the line-of-duty.
Other related measures have also been introduced, including H.R. 2940, the Congressional Self-Defense Act; H.R. 2945, the Congressional Personal Safety Act; and H.R. 2951, to allow Members of Congress to carry a concealed handgun anywhere in the United States, with exceptions. If enacted, the measures would allow Members of Congress to carry concealed weapons subject to different qualifications and limitations.
In addition to legislative proposals, various administrative efforts were undertaken in response to the Alexandria shooting, including an advisory opinion from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) regarding the use of campaign funds by Members of the House for residential security systems, and an update to the Members' Congressional Handbook to provide additional guidance for updating security equipment and measures. |
crs_RL33047 | crs_RL33047_0 | This report discusses the statutory and congressional rule structure under which Members of the House and Senate, under an exception to the gift Rules, may generally accept from some private sources—other than registered lobbyists or registered foreign agents— necessary travel expenses, including transportation, food and lodging, for travel "in connection with" their official duties, such as for fact-finding trips, conferences or symposia, under certain circumstances and limitations. Under these provisions, Members of Congress and congressional staff are prohibited from soliciting or accepting gifts from any private sources unless expressly permitted by an exception in the congressional rules. Members and staff may generally not accept private gifts, reimbursements, or payments of their expenses, other than from their relatives and certain long-term personal friends, when the value of a gift is $50 or more (or when multiple gifts of under $50 from the same source aggregate $100 or more in a calendar year). Officially Connected Travel
The travel that has recently raised several questions has been the acceptance of private payment or reimbursement of "officially connected" travel by Members and staff. The wording of the House and Senate Rules on this subject are substantially identical, other than as to the permissible duration of such trips, which is limited in the House to four days for domestic and seven days for foreign travel (excluding travel days), and in the Senate to three days for domestic travel and seven days for foreign travel (also excluding travel days). Because such events are intended to be restricted to those connected to one's official duties, and are ostensibly for the purpose of informing, educating or broadening the knowledge of the Member of certain issues and their factual backgrounds relevant to matters coming before the Member in an official capacity, such expenses received by or reimbursed for the Member are "considered" or "deemed" to be a "reimbursement to the House" or "to the Senate," as the case may be, rather than a personal gift to the Member, as long as such expenses are publicly disclosed within 30 days of the end of the travel. Under both the House and Senate Rules, the following general limitations apply:
1. If the over-all purpose of the trip is "substantially recreational in nature," the trip will not be considered officially connected. Reporting, Disclosure
Members of the House and the Senate are not required to provide advance notification or receive advance approval for officially connected travel. | While the acceptance by Members of Congress and staff of personal gifts from most outside, private sources is significantly regulated and restricted by internal congressional rules, Members of the House and Senate may still generally accept from some private sources—other than those who are registered lobbyists or registered foreign agents—necessary travel expenses, including transportation, food and lodging, for travel "in connection with" their official duties, such as for fact-finding trips, conferences or symposia, under certain limited circumstances. Under both House and Senate Rules, the over-all purpose of any privately funded trip of this nature must be related or connected to official duties, and may not be "substantially recreational in nature." Furthermore, while Members may accept "necessary" travel expenses for events which are sufficiently officially-related or "officially connected," the expenses for incidental recreational activities during these trips, such as the costs for golf, snow-skiing, jet-skiing, or tennis, are expressly not considered "necessary" expenses of such travel under either the House or the Senate Rules, and thus fall within the general prohibitions and the $50 limitations on gifts from private sources. (Under both the House and Senate Rules, gifts from any private source, other than from relatives and certain long-term personal friends, are generally prohibited if the value of the gift is $50 or more.) The duration of any permitted trip under the "officially connected" travel exception is limited in the House to four days for domestic and seven days for foreign travel (excluding travel days), and in the Senate to three days for domestic travel and seven days for foreign travel (also excluding travel days). Staff employees must receive advance approval for accepting from private sources expenses for such officially connected travel, and whenever expenses or reimbursement for officially connected travel are accepted by Members or staff, a disclosure report on such travel and expenses is required to be made within 30 days of the end of the travel. |
crs_RS20365 | crs_RS20365_0 | RS20365 -- Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process
Updated June 5, 2001
Unofficial Talks Under the Taiwan Relations Act
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) ( P.L. SuccessiveAdministrations used a process in determining arms sales to Taiwan that became institutionalized as annual roundsof talks with Taiwan authorities consisting ofseveral phases leading up to final meetings usually in April. Through the 1990s, the arms talks were low-profile, reducing the opportunities forgreater U.S.-PRC friction. Resolution of Disagreements Within U.S. Government. The U.S. side, as represented by AIT and the Defense Department, presents the finaldecisions on the requested items. | This CRS Report discusses the low-profile annual arms talks process that successiveAdministrations used from theearly 1980s to 2001 in determining arms sales to Taiwan, which are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act. Thediscussion is based on interviews in 1998 and1999 with U.S. and Taiwan observers as well as U.S. and Taiwan news reports. This report on the process will notbe updated. (On April 24, 2001, PresidentGeorge W. Bush announced that he would drop this annual arms talks process in favor of one with considerationson an "as-needed basis." See also CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.) |
crs_RS22607 | crs_RS22607_0 | The Director of the Marshals Service and the Marshals for each of the 94 judicial districts and for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. P.L. 110-177 directs the Attorney General to report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees within 90 days on the security of federal prosecutors including firearm possession matters. Section 2501 of Title I authorizes a matching grant program to purchase armored vests for state, territorial and tribal law enforcement officers. Senior judges may serve as well as members of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the rule propounding body for the federal courts, and as members of the judicial councils for their circuits, the local rule making authority for the circuit, but the number of members of such councils and their terms of service are determined by a majority vote of the judges in regular active service in the circuit. 110-177 amends 28 U.S.C. 110-177 directs the Attorney General to study and report on the impact of state and local open access laws on federal judicial security. | Early in the 110th Congress, the Chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees introduced essentially identical versions of the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 (H.R. 660 and S. 378), which mirrored legislation that the Senate passed at the close of the 109th Congress. Each house reported (S.Rept. 110-42; H.Rept. 110-218) and passed somewhat different variations (153 Cong. Rec. S4741-742, H7466), although the basic of the legislation remains unchanged in both instances. The Senate subsequently passed H.R. 660 with slight changes, which the House accepted under suspension of the rules (153 Cong. Rec. S15789-790, H16870). The President signed the bill into law on January 7, 2008 as Public Law 110-177. P.L. 110-177 has four components: adjustments to applicable provisions of criminal law, reenforcement of the authority and oversight features of the law governing federal judicial security, grant programs to facilitate increased security for the judiciary of the states, and miscellaneous provisions whose relation to judicial security might initially appear remote.
This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL33884, Court Security Improvement Act of 2007: A Legal Analysis of Public Law 110-177 (H.R. 660 and S. 378), by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes and citations to authority found in the longer report. |
crs_RL32920 | crs_RL32920_0 | Overview
Federal counter-terrorism training programs are varied and are provided by numerous federal agencies and departments. Some of these departments and agencies include the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Transportation, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Each department and agency provides specific counter-terrorism training targeted to a given categories of recipients. Training recipients include federal, state, and local government personnel, emergency responders, and private and public critical infrastructure personnel. The programs train individuals to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Most of these federal departments and agencies provide training in conjunction with private and public educational institutions, federal laboratories, and federal research and development centers. The mission of DHS to secure the nation from terrorist attacks gives it primary federal responsibility for providing counter-terrorism training to federal, state, and local emergency responders. Other departments and agencies provide counter-terrorism training, but their programs focus either on specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as energy and transportation, or on specific emergency responders, such as HHS training for medical personnel and DOJ training for law enforcement personnel. DHS provides training to a wide range of critical infrastructure personnel, law enforcement and other emergency responders, government (federal, state, and local) personnel, and medical personnel. This report provides an overview of the major training activities and facilities of the federal departments and agencies that provide counter-terrorism training. It identifies some of the issues associated with that training. The issues include:
possible duplication of federal counter-terrorism training programs; determination of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) counter-terrorism training priorities; and possible redundancy and coordination of DHS counter-terrorism training programs. | Federal counter-terrorism training programs are varied and are provided by numerous federal agencies and departments. Some of these departments and agencies include the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice (DOJ), Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Each department and agency provides specific counter-terrorism training targeted to given categories of recipients. Training recipients include federal, state, and local government personnel, emergency responders, and private and public critical infrastructure personnel.
The programs train individuals to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Most of these federal departments and agencies provide training in conjunction with private and public educational institutions, federal laboratories, and federal research and development centers.
The mission of DHS to secure the nation from terrorist attacks gives it primary federal responsibility for providing counter-terrorism training to federal, state, and local emergency responders. Other departments and agencies provide counter-terrorism training, but these programs focus either on specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as energy and transportation, or on specific emergency responders, such as HHS training for medical personnel and DOJ training for law enforcement personnel. DHS provides training to a wide range of critical infrastructure personnel, law enforcement and other emergency responders, government (federal, state, and local) personnel, and medical personnel.
This report is an overview of the major training activities and facilities of the federal departments and agencies that provide counter-terrorism training. It identifies some of the issues associated with the training, including the following:
possible duplication of federal counter-terrorism training programs; determination of Department of Homeland Security counter-terrorism training priorities; and possible redundancy and coordination of DHS counter-terrorism training programs.
The report will be updated as congressional actions warrant. |
crs_R45325 | crs_R45325_0 | Introduction
The Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP), enacted in 1972, provides cash benefits to a surviving spouse or other eligible recipient(s) of a retiree or deceased member of the uniformed services. The original intent of the SBP (and its antecedents) was to "ensure that the surviving dependents of military personnel who die in retirement or after becoming eligible for retirement will continue to have a reasonable level of income." Coverage was later expanded to those who die while on active service. Under the SBP, a military retiree can have a portion of his or her monthly retired pay withheld in order to provide a beneficiary with a monthly survivor benefit. The cost of this protection is shared by the retiree (in the form of reductions from monthly military retired pay after retirement), the government, and sometimes the beneficiary (under certain types of coverage). Approximately 1.1 million military retirees are enrolled in SBP. In general the amount of the SBP benefit was found to be comparable to other federal benefits and more generous than similar private-sector plans. SBP Coverage and Provisions
Coverage provisions and calculation of the benefit vary depending on the status of the member (i.e., active duty retiree, reserve retiree, or deceased on active duty), the member's dependents, and certain elections that the member makes at the time of retirement. The maximum SBP benefit is 55% of base amount of military retired pay at the time of the retiree's death. The reduced amount of base retired pay is subject to a $300 minimum. Formulas for Withholding
SBP coverage is provided at no cost for those in active service. Because the SBP premium is a larger percentage of the monthly annuity for those who take part of their retirement as a lump sum, it may discourage some participation in the program. Enrollment Changes and "Open Season"
SBP elections made at the time of retirement are generally irrevocable, with a few exceptions. Those who do not have eligible beneficiaries at the time of retirement, but later marry or have children may enroll within a year of initial eligibility. The SBP benefit payable to the survivor of such a deceased active duty member is equal to 55% of the amount of retired pay that the deceased servicemember would have been eligible for had he or she elected maximum coverage and retired on the day of his or her death. In lieu of receiving full SBP benefits, surviving spouses and surviving former spouses subject to the SBP-DIC offset receive a refund of the deceased retiree's SBP premiums based on the amount of the offset. | The Department of Defense's Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP), enacted in 1972, provides cash benefits in the form of a lifetime annuity to a surviving spouse or other eligible recipient(s) of a retiree or deceased member of the uniformed services. The original intent of the SBP (and its antecedents) was to "ensure that the surviving dependents of military personnel who die in retirement or after becoming eligible for retirement will continue to have a reasonable level of income." Coverage was later expanded to those who die while on active service. Under the SBP, a military retiree can elect to have a portion of his or her monthly retired pay withheld in order to provide a monthly survivor benefit to a designated beneficiary. The cost of this protection is shared by the retiree (in the form of reductions from monthly military retired pay after retirement), the government, and sometimes the beneficiary (under certain types of coverage).
Nearly every Congress since 1972 has, in some way, modified the SBP provisions. These modifications have affected eligibility, the size of the benefit, and the interactions of the benefit with other federal benefits, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs' Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC). In nearly every instance, these changes have made the SBP more generous. The program's eligibility requirements and enrollment processes are complex, and modifications over time have added to the complexity.
The SBP is a $3.7 billion program, administered by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), which provides annuities to approximately a quarter of a million survivors of military servicemembers and retirees. SBP participation and costs have grown over time as Congress has made changes to increase the generosity of the program. SBP coverage is provided at no cost for active servicemembers. Those who die on active duty are generally assumed to have retired with full disability and elected full SBP coverage on the day they die. Military retirees' monthly SBP premiums are generally deducted from the retiree's monthly annuity payment. Because the premiums do not cover the full liability, part of the benefit cost is borne by the government.
The amount of the annuity is a percentage of the base retired pay a member is eligible to receive, with a maximum of 55% of the base amount of retired pay and a minimum of $300. Coverage provisions and benefit calculation vary depending on the status of the member (i.e., active duty retiree, reserve retiree, or deceased on active duty), the member's dependents (i.e., spouse and/or children), and certain elections that the member makes at the time of retirement.
There are limits on changing or discontinuing coverage once a member is enrolled in SBP. Those who do not have eligible beneficiaries at the time of retirement, but later marry or have children may enroll within a year of eligibility based on a qualifying event (i.e., marriage or birth of a child). Congress has, on occasion authorized open seasons for certain members to make changes to their enrollment in parallel with other enacted changes to the benefit. |
crs_RL34756 | crs_RL34756_0 | In the U.S., births to unmarried women (i.e., nonmarital births) are widespread, touching families of varying income class, race, ethnicity, and geographic area. Many analysts attribute this to changed attitudes about fertility and marriage. They find that many adult women and teenage girls no longer feel obliged to marry before, or as a consequence of, having children. Although most children who grow up in mother-only families, father-only families, step-parent families, or families in which the mother is cohabiting with a male partner become well-adjusted, productive adults, a large body of research indicates that children who grow up with only one biological parent in the home are more likely to be financially worse off and have worse socioeconomic outcomes (even after income differences are taken into account) compared to children who grow up with both biological parents in the home. This report analyzes the trends in nonmarital childbearing in the U.S., discusses some of the characteristics of unwed mothers, addresses some issues involving the fathers of children born outside of marriage, covers many of the reasons for nonmarital childbearing, examines the impact of nonmarital births on families and on the nation, and presents the public policy interventions that have been used to prevent nonmarital births or alleviate some of the problems that are associated with nonmarital childbearing. In 2006, 38.5% of all births were nonmarital births. It appears that one result of the so-called sexual revolution was that many men increasingly believed that women could and should control their fertility via contraception and abortion. As a result, many men have become less willing to marry the women they impregnate. Factors that have contributed to an unprecedented level of nonmarital childbearing include an increase in the median age of first marriage (i.e., marriage postponement), delays in childbearing of married couples, increased marital dissolution, an increase in the number of cohabiting couples, increased sexual activity outside of marriage, participation in risky behaviors that often lead to sex, improper use of contraceptive methods, and lack of marriageable partners. Public Policy Interventions
In recognition of the potential long-term consequences of nonmarital births, the federal government's strategy to nonmarital childbearing has been varied. The federal government acknowledges that an effective approach for teenagers may be inappropriate for older women. In order to address these two distinct groups of females, federal policy toward teens has primarily focused on pregnancy prevention programs, whereas federal policy toward older women has focused on healthy marriage programs. | In 2006, a record 38.5% of all United States births were nonmarital births. Many of these children grow up in mother-only families. Although most children who grow up in mother-only families or step-parent families become well-adjusted, productive adults, the bulk of empirical research indicates that children who grow up with only one biological parent in the home are more likely to be financially worse off and have worse socioeconomic outcomes (even after income differences are taken into account) compared to children who grow up with both biological parents in the home.
In recognition of the potential long-term economic and social consequences associated with nonmarital births, the federal government's strategy with regard to nonmarital childbearing has been varied. The federal government recognizes that an effective approach for teenagers may be inappropriate for older women. Federal policy toward teens has primarily focused on pregnancy prevention programs, whereas federal policy toward older women has focused on healthy marriage programs. Federal income support programs are available to mothers of all age groups.
In the U.S., nonmarital births are widespread, touching families of varying income class, race, ethnicity, and geographic area. Many analysts attribute this to changed attitudes about fertility and marriage. They find that many adult women and teenage girls no longer feel obliged to marry before, or as a consequence of, having children. With respect to men, it appears that one result of the so-called sexual revolution is that many men now believe that women can and should control their fertility via contraception or abortion and have become less willing to marry the women they impregnate.
Factors that are associated with the unprecedented level of nonmarital childbearing include an increase in the median age of first marriage (i.e., marriage postponement), decreased childbearing of married couples, increased marital dissolution, an increase in the number of cohabiting couples, increased sexual activity outside of marriage, participation in risky behaviors that often lead to sex, improper use of contraceptive methods, and lack of marriageable partners.
This report analyzes the trends in nonmarital childbearing, discusses some of the characteristics of unwed mothers, addresses some issues involving the fathers of children born outside of marriage, covers many of the reasons for nonmarital childbearing, examines the impact of nonmarital births on families and on the nation, and presents the public policy interventions that have been used to prevent nonmarital births or ameliorate some of the negative financial consequences that are sometimes associated with nonmarital childbearing. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41737 | crs_R41737_0 | Introduction
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has designated eight of its 11 operating divisions (agencies) as components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS agencies are (1) the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), (2) the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), (3) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), (4) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), (5) the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), (6) the Indian Health Service (IHS), (7) the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and (8) the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Two of them are primarily research agencies. NIH conducts and supports basic, clinical, and translational medical research, and AHRQ conducts and supports research on the quality and effectiveness of health care services and systems. Three agencies—IHS, HRSA, and SAMHSA—provide health care services or support systems that do so. IHS supports a health care delivery system for American Indians and Alaska Natives. HRSA funds programs and systems to improve access to health care among low-income populations, pregnant women and children, persons living with HIV/AIDS, rural and frontier populations, and others who are medically underserved. SAMHSA funds community-based mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. Report Roadmap
For each PHS agency, this report provides a brief overview of the agency's statutory authority and principal activities and includes a table summarizing its funding for FY2010 and FY2011, as well as the FY2012 budget request. Program level indicates the total amount of funding available to the agency, which includes discretionary budget authority plus additional funding from other sources. PPACA Funding
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), as amended, includes numerous mandatory appropriations that together provide billions of dollars to support new and existing grant programs and other activities within HHS. Overall, AHRQ's FY2011 program level is $11 million (3%) below the FY2010 level. CDC is the nation's principal public health agency, coordinating and supporting a variety of population-based disease and injury control activities. However, the CDC/ATSDR program level for FY2011 decreased by only $6 million (less than 1%) from the FY2010 amount. FDA's budget has two funding streams: direct appropriations (i.e., discretionary budget authority) and industry user fees. User fees, which account for 33% of FDA's total FY2011 program level, come from several programs. FY2011 Funding
The FY2011 full-year CR provides FDA with a total program level of $3.690 billion, which includes $2.457 billion in direct appropriations (discretionary budget authority) and $1.233 billion in user fees. Relative to FY2010 funding, these amounts represent a 4% increase in budget authority and a 34% increase in user fees, for an overall 12% increase in total program level. FY2011 Funding
The FY2011 full-year CR provided HRSA with a total discretionary budget authority of $6.272 billion, a decrease of $1.221 billion (16%) from FY2010. However, this reduction was more than offset by a substantial increase in PPACA funds. As a result, HRSA's total program level increased by $1.598 billion (20%), from $8.067 billion in FY2010 to $9.665 billion in FY2011 (see Table 4 ). Overall, total NIH funding in FY2011, at $30.926 billion, is $317 million (1%) lower than FY2010. 112-10 ) slightly reduced SAMHSA's funding below the FY2010 level. With the 0.2% across-the-board rescission, the agency's discretionary budget authority for FY2011 is $3.380 billion, which is $52 million (1.5%) less than the FY2010 amount. SAMHSA's total program level for FY2011 is $3.599 billion, which is $16 million (0.4%) above the FY2010 program level of $3.583 billion. | Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), eight agencies are designated components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS): (1) the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), (2) the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), (3) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), (4) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), (5) the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), (6) the Indian Health Service (IHS), (7) the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and (8) the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). This report gives a brief overview of each agency and summarizes its funding for FY2010 and FY2011, as well as its FY2012 budget request.
The total amount of funding available to the agency (i.e., total program level) includes discretionary budget authority provided in annual appropriations acts, plus additional funding from other sources. These include mandatory funding provided in laws other than annual appropriations acts, notably the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
AHRQ and NIH are primarily research agencies. AHRQ conducts and supports health services research to improve the quality of health care. For FY2011, AHRQ's total program level is $392 million, which is $11 million (2.7%) below the FY2010 amount. NIH conducts and supports basic, clinical, and translational biomedical and behavioral research. For FY2011, NIH's total program level is $30.926 billion, which is $317 million (1.0%) lower than FY2010.
Three PHS agencies—IHS, HRSA, and SAMHSA—provide health care services or help fund systems that do so. IHS supports a health care delivery system for American Indians and Alaska Natives. For FY2011, IHS's total program level is $5.134 billion, which is $34 million (0.7%) above the FY2010 amount. HRSA funds programs and systems to improve access to health care among the uninsured and medically underserved. For FY2011, HRSA's discretionary budget authority is $6.272 billion, and its total program level is $9.665 billion. Budget authority decreased by $1.221 billion (16.3%) from FY2010 to FY2011, but this drop was more than offset by an increase in mandatory funding from PPACA and funds from other sources. Overall, HRSA's total program level increased by $1.598 billion (19.8%) from FY2010 to FY2011. SAMHSA funds mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. For FY2011, SAMHSA's discretionary budget authority is $3.380 billion, which is $52 million (1.5%) below the FY2010 level. With the slight increase in PPACA funds, however, SAMHSA's FY2011 total program level of $3.599 billion is $16 million (0.4%) above the FY2010 amount.
CDC, the federal government's lead public health agency, coordinates and supports a variety of population-based programs to prevent and control disease, injury, and disability. For FY2011, CDC's discretionary budget authority (including ATSDR) is $5.726 billion, and its total program level is $10.870 billion. Budget authority decreased by $741 million (11.5%) from FY2010 to FY2011. However, that cut was largely offset by PPACA funds and funding from other sources. Overall, CDC's program level decreased by only $6 million. FDA, which regulates drugs, medical devices, food, and tobacco products, receives a significant portion of its funding from industry user fees. For FY2011, FDA has a total program level of $3.690 billion, which includes $2.457 billion in direct appropriations and $1.233 billion in user fees. Relative to FY2010, these amounts represent a 4.0% increase in direct appropriations and a 33.7% increase in user fees, which now account for one-third of FDA's funding. |
crs_RL32948 | crs_RL32948_0 | About 238,000 of these farms are considered animal feeding operations (AFO)—agriculture enterprises where animals are kept and raised in confinement. From an environmental quality standpoint, much of the public and policy interest in animal agriculture has focused on impacts on water resources, because animal waste, if not properly managed, can adversely impact water quality through surface runoff and erosion, direct discharges to surface waters, spills and other dry-weather discharges, and leaching into soil and groundwater. This report provides background on these issues. Questions about the applicability of these laws to livestock and poultry operations have been controversial in several arenas and have drawn congressional attention. Agricultural emissions of greenhouse gases that have been of interest in connection with proposals to address the global challenge of climate change are discussed. Air Emissions from Livestock and Poultry: Sources and Impacts
AFOs can affect air quality through emissions of gases (ammonia and hydrogen sulfide), particulate matter (PM), volatile organic compounds (VOC), hazardous air pollutants, microorganisms, and odor. Health and Environmental Impacts
Pollutants associated with AFOs have a number of environmental and human health impacts. Agricultural operations often have been treated differently from other types of businesses under numerous federal and state laws. Some laws specifically exempt agriculture from regulatory provisions, and others are structured in such a way that farms are not subject to most, if not all, of the regulatory impact. The primary regulatory focus on environmental impacts has been on protecting water resources and has occurred under the Clean Water Act. In addition, facilities that emit large quantities of air pollutants may be regulated under the Clean Air Act. Some livestock operations may also be subject to the release reporting requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (the Superfund law) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. The issue of evaluating and managing the health and environmental impacts of emissions from animal agriculture facilities has largely been left up to states. Several states have recognized a need to regulate air emissions from agricultural operations, but many states have not yet directly adopted or enacted programs affecting AFO emissions. State programs, under statutes and regulations, both implement and supplement federal CAA requirements. States have used varied techniques to control air emissions from livestock facilities. State programs set emission limits, require use of best management practices, and impose other pre-operational and operational requirements. More broadly, Congress has shown considerable interest in the impact of federal regulation, especially by EPA, on the agriculture sector. | From an environmental quality standpoint, much of the public and policy interest in animal agriculture has focused on impacts on water resources, because animal waste, if not properly managed, can harm water quality through surface runoff, direct discharges, spills, and leaching into soil and groundwater. A more recent issue is the contribution of air emissions from animal feeding operations (AFOs), enterprises where animals are raised in confinement. This report provides background on the latter issue.
AFOs can affect air quality through emissions of gases such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, hazardous air pollutants, and odor. These pollutants and compounds have a number of environmental and human health effects.
Agricultural operations have been treated differently from other businesses under numerous federal and state laws. Some environmental laws specifically exempt agriculture from regulatory provisions, and some are designed so that farms are not subject to most, if not all, of the regulatory impact. The primary regulatory focus on environmental impacts has occurred under the Clean Water Act. In addition, AFOs that emit large quantities of air pollutants may be subject to Clean Air Act regulation. Some livestock operations also may be regulated under the release reporting requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). Questions about the applicability of these laws to livestock and poultry operations have been controversial and have drawn congressional attention. Agriculture's role as both a source of and a "sink" for greenhouse gases also has been of interest in connection with addressing the global challenge of climate change.
How to evaluate and manage the health and environmental impacts of emissions from animal agriculture facilities has largely been left up to states. Several states have recognized a need to regulate air emissions from agricultural operations, but many states have not yet adopted or enacted programs affecting AFO emissions. State programs, under statutes and regulations, both implement and supplemental federal CAA requirements. States have used varied techniques to control air emissions from livestock facilities, including emission limits, use of best management practices, and imposition of other pre-operational and operational requirements.
Congress has shown interest in many of the issues discussed in this report and, more broadly, in the impact of federal regulation on the agriculture sector. |
crs_RL32204 | crs_RL32204_0 | Introduction
Continuing a legislative effort that began in the 107th Congress, House and Senate confereeson November 17, 2003, reached agreement on an omnibus energy bill ( H.R. OnNovember 18, the House approved the conference report by a vote of 246-180, but on November 21,a cloture motion to limit debate in the Senate failed, 57-40. On February 12, 2004, SenatorDomenici introduced a revised version of the bill ( S. 2095 ) with a lower estimated costand without a controversial provision on the fuel additive MTBE. Both bills would provide $18 billion in loan guarantees for construction of a natural gaspipeline from Alaska to Alberta, where it would connect to the existing Midwestern pipeline system. Provisions are also included to increase access by energy projects to federal lands. Several new statutory efficiency standards would be established for consumer andcommercial products and appliances, and other standards could be set by the Department of Energy(DOE). For motor vehicles, funding would be authorized for the National Highway Traffic SafetyAdministration (NHTSA) to set Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) levels as provided incurrent law. 6 conferenceagreement and notes the changes included in S. 2095 . For adiscussion of the tax provisions in the bills, see CRS Issue Brief IB10054, Energy Tax Policy . Major Non-Tax Provisions
Electricity Regulation. In part, the electricity section of the conference report and S. 2095 would repealthe Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) and establish mandatory reliability standards.Standard market design (SMD), a proposed system to provide uniform market procedures forwholesale electric power transactions, would be remanded to the Federal Energy RegulatoryCommission (FERC); no rule would be allowed before the end of FY2006. The ban has two possible exceptions. For certain other products and appliances, DOE would beempowered to set new standards. To encourage production on federal lands, royalty reductions would be provided for marginaloil and gas wells on public lands and the outer continental shelf. Alaska Gas Pipeline. Energy on Federal Lands. Current Law. This provision was not included in the House and Senate bills. Funding for DOE energy efficiency programs would beauthorized for five fiscal years. The conference report would require the useof 3.1 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2005, increasing to 5.0 billion gallons in 2012. | House and Senate conferees approved an omnibus energy bill ( H.R. 6 , H.Rept.108-375 ) on November 17, 2003, and the House approved the measure the following day (246-180).However, on November 21, 2003, a cloture motion to limit Senate debate on the conference reportfailed (57-40). On February 12, 2004, Senator Domenici introduced a revised version of the bill( S. 2095 ) with a lower estimated cost and without a controversial provision on the fueladditive MTBE. Major non-tax provisions in the conference measure and S. 2095 include:
Ethanol. An increase in ethanol production to 3.1 billion gallons annually by 2005 and 5billion gallons by 2012 would be mandated. However, states could petition for a waiver if themandate would have severe economic or environmental repercussions, other than loss of revenueto the highway trust fund.
MTBE. Methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), a gasoline additive widely used to meet CleanAir Act requirements, has caused water contamination. The conference bill would ban the use ofMTBE by 2015 with some possible exceptions, provide funds for MTBE cleanup, and provideprotection for fuel producers and blenders of renewable fuels and MTBE from defective productlawsuits. The liability protection was not included in S. 2095 .
Electricity. In part, the electricity section would repeal the Public Utility Holding CompanyAct (PUHCA) and establish mandatory standards for interstate transmission. Standard market design(SMD) would be remanded to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC); no rule wouldbe allowed before the end of FY2006.
Alaska Gas Pipeline. The bill would provide $18 billion in loan guarantees for constructionof a natural gas pipeline from Alaska to Alberta, where it would connect to the existing midwesternpipeline system.
Energy Efficiency Standards. New statutory efficiency standards would be established forseveral consumer and commercial products and appliances. For certain other products andappliances, DOE would be empowered to set new standards. For motor vehicles, funding would beauthorized for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to set CorporateAverage Fuel Economy (CAFE) levels as provided in current law.
Energy Production on Federal Lands. Royalty reductions would be provided for marginaloil and gas wells on federal lands and the outer continental shelf. Provisions are also included toincrease access by energy projects to federal lands.
For a discussion of the tax provisions in the bills, see CRS Issue Brief IB10054, Energy TaxPolicy . This report will not be updated. |
crs_R42961 | crs_R42961_0 | However, actions by investors in the derivatives markets likely aggravated the financial crisis, required billions in government assistance to American International Group, Inc. (AIG) and other financial firms to cover losses associated with credit default swaps (CDS), and played a key role in destabilizing financial markets. One of these first steps included "improving the infrastructure of over-the-counter" (OTC) derivative markets and credit default swaps. Assessing G-20 Derivatives Market Reforms
As indicated above, the FSB was tasked by the G-20 with monitoring and reporting on the success of G-20 nations in meeting the year-end 2012 deadline of implementing the OTC derivatives market reforms. As a result of self-assessments by G-20 members, except for France, Germany, and Italy, which are represented by the EU in the survey, and such FSB members as Singapore and Switzerland, the FSB offered four general conclusions:
Only Japan and the United States had adopted the necessary legislation to reach the goal of having derivatives centrally cleared by the end of 2012, while the EU had reached a political consensus regarding legislation. Most authorities estimated that a significant proportion of interest rate derivatives will be centrally cleared by year-end 2012, but they were less confident of progress for other asset classes and could not make firm estimates when central clearing could be achieved. Progress : The FSB's October 2012 report indicated that the EU, Japan, Hong Kong, and the United States had taken significant steps towards implementing legislation that mandates central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives. Also, the FSB noted that in many jurisdictions, including the United States, Japan, and the EU, legislative changes must be followed up with more technical implementing regulations in order for the requirements to become fully effective. Progress : The FSB concluded in its October 2012 report that progress in enacting legislative and regulatory frameworks for implementing the commitment to trading standardized derivatives on exchanges and electronic platforms was markedly behind the progress made toward other commitments, that progress did not appear to be on track to meet the year-end 2012 deadline, and that the most important factor inhibiting the development of trading infrastructure was uncertainty over the regulatory framework. As of October 2012, only the United States had adopted legislation that requires standardized derivatives be traded on exchanges and electronic platforms. According to the FSB:
1. Issues for Congress
Congress has addressed directly the governance of the derivatives market through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. 111-203 ). Conclusions
Following the financial crisis of 2008-2009, national leaders in the G-20 have spearheaded reforms in the rules and regulations governing the trading of financial instruments known as derivatives. As a result of a survey of the efforts made to date by G-20 members and some FSB members, the Financial Stability Board concluded in October 2012 that:
Regulators and derivatives market participants were struggling to meet their commitments to implement market reforms by the end of 2012. Individual Country Progress in Implementing Derivatives Market Reforms
This Appendix presents detailed information on the progress the G-20 members, except France, Germany, and Italy, which are represented by the European Union, and such FSB members as Singapore and Switzerland, have made in meeting the G-20 self-imposed deadline of adopting reform measures by year-end 2012. India is considering a phased in approach to bring any remaining OTC derivatives under the reporting framework. Transparency and Trading . Application to OTC derivatives trading is currently under review. Reporting to Trade Repositories. With adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010, the United States has a law in force requiring all standardized OTC derivatives to be cleared through CCPs, according to the FSB assessment. The United States has completed a legislative step toward implementing a trading requirement for standardized derivatives, as the Dodd-Frank Act requires any swap or security-based swap subject to the clearing requirement to be traded on a registered trading platform, such as an exchange or swap execution facility registered with the CFTC, or security-based swap execution facility registered with the SEC. | Derivatives, or financial instruments whose value is based on an underlying asset, played a key role in the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Congress directly addressed the governance of the derivatives markets through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203; July 21, 2010). This act, in Title VII, sought to bring the largely unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets under greater regulatory control and scrutiny. Pillars of this approach included mandating that certain OTC derivatives be subject to central clearing, such as through a clearinghouse, which involves posting margin to cover potential losses; greater transparency through trading on exchanges or exchange-like facilities; and reporting trades to a repository, among other reforms.
In the debates over Dodd-Frank and in subsequent years, many in Congress have raised the following important questions: If the United States takes stronger regulatory action than other countries, will business in these OTC derivatives markets shift overseas? Since OTC derivatives markets are global in nature, could derivatives trading across borders, or business for U.S. financial firms that engage in these trades, be disrupted if other countries do not adopt similar regulatory frameworks? The first step in addressing these congressional concerns is to examine the degree to which other major countries have adopted similar legislation and regulation as the United States, particularly in light of commitments from the Group of Twenty nations (G-20) to adopt certain derivatives reforms.
Following the financial crisis, G-20 leaders (generally political heads of state) established a reform agenda and priorities within that agenda for regulating and overseeing OTC derivatives. The G-20 as an organization has no enforcement capabilities, but relies on the members themselves to implement reforms. According to recent surveys, most members are making progress in meeting the self-imposed goal of implementing major reforms in derivatives markets. Only the United States appears to have met all the reforms endorsed by the G-20 members within the desired timeframe of year-end 2012.
The European Union (EU), Japan, Hong Kong, and the United States have each taken significant steps towards implementing legislation requiring central clearing. However, in most of these jurisdictions legislation has not yet been followed up with technical implementing regulations for the requirements to become effective, according to the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which conducts the surveys. Most authorities surveyed estimated that a significant proportion of interest rate derivatives would be centrally cleared by year-end 2012, but they were less confident of progress for other asset classes. The EU appeared to be making progress in its G-20 derivatives regulatory commitments, particularly in central clearing and trade repository-reporting requirements, but at a slower pace than the United States, according to the FSB. This may be due in part to the need for legislation to be passed by individual national legislatures even when agreed broadly by the EU. As of October 2012, however, only the United States had adopted legislation requiring standardized derivatives to be traded on exchanges and electronic platforms.
This report examines the G-20 recommendations for reforming OTC derivatives markets and presents the result of self-assessment surveys measuring the performance of G-20 members and some FSB members to date in meeting their commitments. The Appendix to the report presents more detailed information on the status of individual jurisdictions in implementing the G-20-endorsed reforms. The Glossary defines key international bodies and related financial terms and concepts. |
crs_R42115 | crs_R42115_0 | Greater investment is desired because high-quality, well maintained infrastructure is believed to increase private-sector productivity and improve public health and welfare. Debt incurred on wholly owned government projects may be repaid with taxes, user fees, or a combination of the two. Proponents argue that an infrastructure bank offers three main advantages over traditional methods of federal support for infrastructure:
A federal infrastructure bank could increase the total amount of investment in infrastructure by leveraging state, local, and private resources. The rate on loan guarantees would have to be consistent with direct loans and is subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA). 402 ''National Infrastructure Development Bank Act of 2011''
On January 24, 2011, Representative DeLauro, along with many other cosponsors, introduced H.R. The board would have authority to (1) issue public benefit bonds and to provide financing to infrastructure projects from the proceeds; (2) make loan guarantees; (3) borrow on the global capital market and lend to regional, state, and local entities, and commercial banks for the purpose of funding infrastructure projects; (4) purchase in the open market any of the bank's outstanding obligations; and (5) monitor and oversee infrastructure projects financed, in whole or in part, by the bank. Whether this would lead to an increase in the total amount of capital devoted to infrastructure investment is unclear. If this shift were to occur, however, it could be to the detriment of existing investment, as the additional investment in infrastructure may be drawn from a relatively fixed amount of available investment funds. If it were to create a national infrastructure bank, Congress would need to consider the fate of these other programs. Although a national infrastructure bank might help accelerate projects over the long term, it is unlikely to be able to provide financial assistance immediately upon enactment. One attraction of the national infrastructure bank proposals is the potential to encourage significant nonfederal infrastructure investment over the long term for a relatively small amount of federal budget authority. Can a national infrastructure bank be financially self-sustaining? All pending infrastructure bank proposals have the objective of increasing investment in infrastructure while maintaining financial self-sustainability. Congress has established numerous banking entities taking a wide range of institutional forms. The extent of direct federal involvement varies. The three bills considered in this report, S. 652 , S. 936 , and H.R. How might an infrastructure bank be governed? It may apportion some resources to activities intended to satisfy overseers and stakeholders. Tax preferences were also significant. Federal Credit Assistance Programs
As noted above, the federal government also has a number of existing programs that provide loans, loan guarantees, and other credit assistance for a wide spectrum of infrastructure projects, including the following:
The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program (23 U.S.C. | Several bills to establish a national infrastructure bank have been introduced in the 112th Congress. This report examines three such bills, the Building and Upgrading Infrastructure for Long-Term Development Act (S. 652), the American Infrastructure Investment Fund Act of 2011 (S. 936), and the National Infrastructure Development Bank Act of 2011 (H.R. 402). These proposals share three main goals:
increasing total investment in infrastructure by encouraging new investment from nonfederal sources; improving project selection by insulating decisions from political influence; and encouraging new investment with relatively little effect on the federal budget through a mostly self-sustaining entity.
The federal government already uses a wide range of direct expenditures, grants, loans, loan guarantees, and tax preferences to expand infrastructure investment. A national infrastructure bank would be another way to provide federal credit assistance, such as direct loans and loan guarantees, to sponsors of infrastructure projects. To a certain extent, a new institution may be duplicative with existing federal programs in this area, and Congress may wish to consider the extent to which an infrastructure bank should supplant or complement existing federal infrastructure efforts.
It is unclear how much new nonfederal investment would be encouraged by a national infrastructure bank, beyond the additional budgetary resources Congress might choose to devote to it. The bank may be able to improve resource allocation through a rigorous project selection process, but this could have consequences that Congress might find undesirable, such as an emphasis on projects that have the potential to generate revenue through user fees and a corresponding de-emphasis on projects that generate broad public benefits that cannot easily be captured through fees or taxes.
As with other federal credit assistance programs, the loan capacity of an infrastructure bank would be large relative to the size of the appropriation. The bank is unlikely to be self-sustaining, however, if it is intended to provide financing at below-market interest rates. The extent to which the bank is placed under direct congressional and presidential oversight may also affect its ability to control project selection and achieve financial self-sufficiency.
More generally, Congress may wish to consider the extent to which greater infrastructure investment is economically beneficial. Advocates of increased investment in infrastructure typically assert that high-quality, well maintained infrastructure increases private-sector productivity and improves public health and welfare. Congress may want to weigh the benefit of the increased spending on physical infrastructure against the benefit generated by alternative types of spending. |
crs_R40626 | crs_R40626_0 | After running modest profits from FY2004 through FY2006, USPS lost $25.4 billion between FY2007 and FY2011. Were it not for congressional action to reduce a statutorily required payment to the Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHBF), USPS would have lost an additional $9.5 billion. In the first three quarters of FY2012, USPS had an operating loss of $11.5 billion. The bleak economic forecast for USPS has prompted its leaders, Congress, and the public to suggest methods that may increase revenue or reduce expenses. Among these suggestions is to reduce the number of delivery days from six to five. Congress also may authorize USPS to determine its delivery schedule. Eliminating a delivery day alone, however, would not solve USPS's financial challenges and could reduce USPS sales and revenue, lead to service delays, prompt job loss at USPS, or affect vulnerable populations who rely on six-day delivery. Members of the 112 th Congress have introduced nine bills ( H.R. 2309 ; H.R. 2434 ; H.R. 3591 ; H.R. 3744 ; S. 1010 ; S. 1573 ; S. 1625 ; S. 1789 ; and S. 1853 ) and one resolution ( H.Res. 137 ) regarding six-day mail delivery. 2434 , S. 1573 ), include language requiring USPS to continue delivering mail six days per week. The advisory opinion estimated that USPS could save $1.7 billion in annual net savings by eliminating Saturday delivery. In The President's Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction , released in September 2011, the Office of Management and Budget supported authorizing USPS to eliminate a delivery day. H.Res. 137 that, if passed, would express the sense of the House that six-day mail delivery continue:
Whereas Social Security is the primary or sole source of income for many senior citizens, and any delay in the delivery of their Social Security checks would make it difficult for them to purchase even essential items, such as food and medicine; and
Whereas reducing mail delivery service to 5 days a week would inevitably cause not only delays in the delivery of mail, but higher postal costs, due to the many hours of additional overtime that the Postal Service would require in order to handle the resulting back-up of mail; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States Postal Service should take all appropriate measures to ensure the continuation of its 6-day mail delivery service. 137 was referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 2309
On June 23, 2011, Representative Darrell Issa introduced H.R. Additionally, six months after enactment of H.R. S. 1010
On May 17, 2011, Senator Thomas R. Carper introduced S. 1010 , which—among other provisions—would give USPS authority to move to five-day delivery. S. 1625
On September 23, 2011, Senator John McCain introduced a companion bill to H.R. Once that 24-month period had elapsed, USPS could move to five-day delivery after it had:
identified "customers and communities for whom the change may have a disproportionate negative impact;" developed a plan to "ameliorate" the anticipated "negative impact" on the disadvantaged customers "to the maximum extent possible, which may include "providing or expanding access to mailboxes for periodical mailers" on non-delivery days; implemented all other measures discussed in the bill that aimed to increase revenues or reduce costs and USPS determined whether the implementation of these measures eliminated the need to reduce the number of delivery days; submitted a report demonstrating that it met the above preconditions to the House and Senate committees of jurisdiction, the PRC, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO); requested and received a GAO study examining whether USPS implemented appropriate cost savings and revenue increasing measures, and whether the elimination of a delivery day remained necessary for the USPS to "become profitable by fiscal year 2015" and "achieve long-term financial solvency"; and requested an advisory opinion from the PRC that examined the Postal Service's plans to ameliorate the "disproportionate negative impact" of five-day delivery on certain communities as well as USPS's actions to increase revenues and decrease costs. 3591 and S. 1853 are companion bills that include a collection of new authorities for USPS as well as language that would prohibit a move to five-day delivery. 3744 , the Rural Service Protection Act, would require USPS to maintain current levels of delivery in rural areas for five years following enactment of the bill. Both the House and Senate committee versions of the Financial Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012 ( H.R. The USPS study determined that the elimination of a delivery day could save $3.5 billion per year. H.R. Customer Reliance on Six-day Delivery
Congress may choose to remove the six-day delivery provision from appropriation legislation and grant USPS greater flexibility to eliminate delivery days if the service finds such action to be beneficial economically. | After running modest profits from FY2004 through FY2006, USPS lost $25.4 billion between FY2007 and FY2011. Were it not for congressional action, USPS would have lost an additional $9.5 billion. In the first three quarters of FY2012, USPS had an $11.5 billion operational loss. USPS leaders, Congress, and the public have suggested methods that may increase revenue or reduce expenses. Among these suggestions is reducing the number of days per week that USPS delivers mail from six to five.
Members of the 112th Congress have introduced nine bills (H.R. 2309; H.R. 2434; H.R. 3591; H.R. 3744; S. 1625; S. 1010; S. 1573; S. 1789; and S. 1853) and one resolution (H.Res. 137) regarding six-day mail delivery. Companion bills H.R. 2309 (introduced by Representative Darrell Issa) and S. 1625 (introduced by Senator John McCain) would grant USPS the authority to move to five-day delivery. H.R. 2309, as ordered to be reported from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, would require USPS to wait six months after enactment to begin the process of eliminating a delivery day. S. 1010, introduced by Senator Thomas R. Carper, would also give USPS authority to move to five-day delivery. S. 1789, introduced by Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman, would allow USPS to eliminate a delivery day only after two years and the completion of a USPS study that identified customers "for whom the change may have a disproportionate, negative impact," among other conditions. Companion bills H.R. 3591 and S. 1853 would prohibit a move to six-day delivery. H.R. 3744, the Rural Service Protection Act, would require USPS to maintain current levels of delivery in rural areas for five years following enactment of the bill. H.Res. 137 would express the sense of the House of Representatives that USPS should maintain six-day delivery. Both the House and Senate versions of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.R. 2434, S. 1573), include language that would require USPS to continue delivering mail six days per week.
In The President's Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction, released in September 2011, the Office of Management and Budget supported authorizing USPS to eliminate a delivery day.
Some lawmakers say the elimination of a delivery day could prompt further reductions in mail volume and lead to an economic "death spiral" for USPS. Other lawmakers argue that USPS should have the flexibility to eliminate six-day delivery if necessary to make USPS economically viable. Congress may choose to legislate the number of USPS delivery days or authorize USPS to determine its delivery schedule. The six-day delivery requirement ensures the delivery of mail to most U.S. residents on every day except Sunday—including delivery of infant formula, prescriptions, and periodicals. Authorizing USPS to eliminate a delivery day could reduce delivery costs and improve USPS's challenging economic condition. Studies that examined the elimination of a delivery day estimated that USPS could save between $3.5 billion (USPS study) and $1.7 billion (Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) study) annually. Such action, however, may reduce patronage, lead to job losses at USPS, or harm underserved communities that rely on mail delivery. Elimination of a delivery day alone will not solve USPS's budget troubles. |
crs_R40480 | crs_R40480_0 | T his report identifies and briefly summarizes the 21 budget reconciliation measures enacted into law during the period covering 1980, when reconciliation procedures were first used by both chambers, through 2017. The Reconciliation Process
The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure that operates as an adjunct to the budget resolution process established by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The chief purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to change current law in order to bring revenue, spending, and debt-limit levels into conformity with the policies of the annual budget resolution. | The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure that operates as an adjunct to the budget resolution process established by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The chief purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to change current law in order to bring revenue, spending, and debt-limit levels into conformity with the policies of the annual budget resolution.
This report identifies and briefly summarizes the 21 budget reconciliation measures enacted into law during the period covering 1980, when reconciliation procedures were first used by both chambers, through 2017. |
crs_R41874 | crs_R41874_0 | These bills contain numerous provisions that affect military personnel, retirees, and their family members. The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540 , was introduced in the House on April 14, 2011; reported by the House Committee on Armed Services on May 17, 2011 ( H.Rept. 112-78 ); and passed by the House on May 26, 2011. The Senate version of the NDAA, S. 1867 , was passed on December 1, 2011. On December 14, 2011, the House passed the conference reported version of H.R. 1540 . On December 15, 2011, the Senate passed H.R. 1540 , and President Obama signed P.L. 112-81 into law on December 31, 2011. Where appropriate, related CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided. The Senate's recommended strength levels were supported by the Conference Committee. DOD has not yet submitted this report. Discussion: In the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. Reform of Offenses Relating to Rape, Sexual Assault, Other Sexual Misconduct, and Sodomy under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
Background Concerns over laws regarding rape and sexual misconduct, as well as the repeal of the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy led to a review of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Included in these recommendations was language that would repeal the prohibition on sodomy. Current law requires that
The Selective Service System shall be maintained as an active standby organization, with (1) a complete registration and classification structure capable of immediate operation in the event of a national emergency, and (2) personnel adequate to reinstitute immediately the full operation of the System, including military reservists who are trained to operate such System and who can be ordered to active duty for such purpose in the event of a national emergency (including a structure for registration and classification of persons qualified for practice or employment in a health care occupation essential to the maintenance of the Armed Forces). The Senate and the Conference did not address the issue of the military pay raise. | Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Recent military operations in Iraq and ongoing operations in Afghanistan, along with the operational role of the Reserve Components, further heighten interest in a wide range of military personnel policies and issues.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012. This report provides a brief synopsis of sections that pertain to personnel policy. These include end strengths, pay raises, health care issues, and language affecting the repeal of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, as well as congressional concerns over the handling of sexual assaults in the military.
The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, was introduced in the House on April 14, 2011; reported by the House Committee on Armed Services on May 17, 2011 (H.Rept. 112-78); and passed on May 26, 2011.
Various Senate versions were introduced. S. 1867 was introduced on November 15, 2011, and passed by the Senate on December 1, 2011. Often the Senate will add language not included in the House version, add language that affects an issue in a differing manner (for example, the Senate may have end strengths numbers that differ from the House). Usually, these differences will be worked out under the Conference Committee's consideration of the legislation. The Conference Committee language was incorporated into the report.
On December 14, 2011, the House passed the conference reported version of H.R. 1540. The next day, the Senate passed H.R. 1540. On December 31, 2011, President Obama signed P.L. 112-81 into law.
Where appropriate, related CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided.
This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include language concerning appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices, or any discussion of separately introduced legislation. |
crs_RL32540 | crs_RL32540_0 | On June 28, 2007, the United States and Panama signed a free trade agreement (FTA) after two and a half years and 10 rounds of negotiations. The U.S.-Panama FTA is a reciprocal and comprehensive trade agreement, replacing U.S. unilateral preferential trade treatment extended under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Negotiations formally concluded on December 16, 2006, with an understanding that changes to environment, labor, and intellectual property rights chapters would be made pursuant to future congressional input. These changes were agreed to and the FTA was signed in time to be considered under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation, which expired on July 1, 2007. TPA allows Congress to consider certain trade agreement implementing bills under expedited procedures. Panama's legislature ratified the FTA 58 to 4 on July 11, 2007 (see Appendix A for Chronology of U.S.-Panama FTA Milestones), but neither the 110 th nor the 111 th Congress took up the agreement. On July 7, 2011, the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees held simultaneous "mock markups," where they informally approved draft implementing bills. On October 3, 2011, the Administration transmitted to both houses of Congress final implementing legislation and supporting documents, as required under TPA. Following committee action, on October 12, 2011, the House agreed to the implementing bill ( H.R. 3079 ) 300-129, followed by the Senate 77-22. President Obama signed the implementing bill into law on October 21, 2011 ( P.L. 112-43 , 125 Stat. 427), but the FTA would not enter into force for another year. Panama required that time to complete changes in law necessary to bring it into compliance with the provisions of the FTA. On October 22, 2012, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) exchanged notes with Panama providing for entry into force of the FTA. President Obama implemented the agreement by proclamation on October 29, 2012, and the FTA entered into force on October 31, 2012. This report discusses issues surrounding the U.S.-Panama free trade agreement from the time formal negotiations began in April 2004 until it entered into force. Many issues were addressed by changes to the FTA based on principles outlined in the bipartisan agreement of May 10, 2007, crafted jointly by leadership in the 110 th Congress and the Bush Administration. The U.S.-Panama FTA implementing bill was agreed to by both houses along with the other three trade bills on October 12, 2011. Tariffs on 88% of industrial and commercial goods go to zero immediately, with the remaining tariffs phased out over a 10-year period. Similarly, up to two-thirds of U.S. farm exports receive immediate duty free treatment. Remaining tariffs will be phased out between years 7 and 17 of the FTA. The major changes from the CAFTA-DR model state that each country
shall adopt and maintain in its statutes, regulations and practices as rights, the five core ILO labor principles: freedom of association; the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor; the effective abolition of child labor and, for purposes of this Agreement, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and, the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to do so, in a manner affecting trade or investment between the countries in implementing the above commitment; shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws in accordance with the above commitment and that each party retains the right to the reasonable exercise of discretion in using resources to achieve this goal, provided the exercise of such discretion is not inconsistent with the obligations of the chapter, and; will be required to use the dispute settlement process defined for the entire agreement (rather than a separate process for labor disputes as defined in the CAFTA-DR). | On June 28, 2007, the United States and Panama signed a free trade agreement (FTA) after two and a half years and 10 rounds of negotiations. Negotiations formally concluded on December 16, 2006, with an understanding that changes to labor, environment, and intellectual property rights chapters would be made pursuant to future congressional input. These changes were agreed to and the FTA was signed in time to be considered under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation, which expired on July 1, 2007. TPA allows Congress to consider certain trade agreement implementing bills under expedited procedures. Panama's legislature ratified the FTA 58 to 4 on July 11, 2007, but neither the 110th nor the 111th Congress took up the agreement.
Eventually, the 112th Congress considered the FTA implementing bill. On July 7, 2011, the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees held simultaneous "mock markups," where they informally approved draft implementing bills. On October 3, 2011, the Obama Administration transmitted final implementing legislation and supporting documents to both houses, as required under TPA. Following committee action, on October 12, 2011, the House agreed to the implementing bill (H.R. 3079) 300-129, followed by the Senate 77-22.
President Obama signed the implementing bill into law on October 21, 2011 (P.L. 112-43, 125 Stat. 427), but the FTA would not enter into force for another year. Panama required that time to complete changes in law necessary to bring it into compliance with the provisions of the FTA. On October 22, 2012, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) exchanged notes with Panama providing for entry into force of the FTA. President Obama implemented the agreement by proclamation on October 29, 2012, and the FTA entered into force on October 31, 2012.
The U.S.-Panama FTA is a comprehensive and reciprocal trade agreement, replacing U.S. unilateral preferential trade treatment extended under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Some 88% of U.S. commercial and industrial exports will become duty-free upon implementation, with remaining tariffs phased out over a 10-year period. Over 50% of U.S. farm exports to Panama also will achieve immediate duty-free status, with tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on select farm products to be phased out by year 17 of the agreement (year 20 for rice). The FTA also consummates understandings on telecommunications, services trade, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property rights.
The final text of the U.S.-Panama FTA incorporates changes based on the bipartisan agreement of May 10, 2007, crafted by the Bush Administration and leadership in the 110th Congress. These include adoption of enforceable labor standards, compulsory membership in multilateral environmental agreements, and an easing of restrictions on developing country access to generic drugs, provisions that go beyond those in previous U.S. bilateral FTAs and multilateral trade rules. Concerns raised in Congress on labor and tax transparency issues were also addressed by Panama in statute and by ratification of a Tax Information and Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with the United States. The TIEA provides greater tax transparency in support of curbing illicit financial transactions associated with money laundering activities.
This report covers issues related to the U.S.-Panama FTA from the beginning of the negotiations in April 2004 until the FTA entered into force on October 31, 2012. |
crs_R44197 | crs_R44197_0 | Introduction
Since 1865, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) has investigated counterfeiting, and since 1901, at the request of congressional leadership, the Service has provided full-time presidential protection. Congress has increased its oversight of the USSS due to concern about terrorism threats, several security breaches, and misconduct of USSS personnel. Recent incidents include abuse of alcohol, and security breaches of the White House grounds and presidential protection. The USSS is not the only federal law enforcement entity that has been identified with having personnel violating ethics or participating in professional and personal misconduct. It should be noted, however, that USSS security breaches and ethical violations may have greater consequences, particularly concerning presidential protection. This report provides a brief overview of the USSS's missions and structure, as currently constituted, and explores enacted and proposed changes and reforms stemming from the recent series of incidents embarrassing to the USSS and affecting its mission. Criminal investigation activities encompass financial crimes, identity theft, counterfeiting, computer fraud, and computer-based attacks on the nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure, among other areas. The protection mission, however, is the more prominent, covering the President, Vice President, their families, and candidates for those offices. The protection mission also includes the securing of the White House and the Vice President's official residence, and the President's and Vice President's personal residences, through the Service's Uniformed Division. Criminal Investigations Field Offices | Since 1865, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) has investigated counterfeiting, and since 1901, at the request of congressional leadership, the Service has provided full-time presidential protection.
The USSS has two primary purposes which are criminal investigations and protection. Criminal investigation activities include financial crimes, identity theft, counterfeiting, computer fraud, and computer-based attacks on the nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure, among other areas. The protection mission covers the President, Vice President, their families, and candidates for those offices. The protection mission also includes the securing of the White House and the Vice President's residence, through the Service's Uniformed Division.
Congress has recently increased its oversight of the USSS due to concern about terrorism threats, and several security breaches and misconduct of USSS personnel. Recent incidents include abuse of alcohol by special agents, and security breaches of the White House grounds and presidential protection. Although the USSS is not the only federal law enforcement entity with personnel accused of ethical violations or professional and personal misconduct, it should be noted that USSS security breaches and ethical violations may have greater consequences, particularly concerning presidential protection.
This report provides a brief overview of the USSS's missions, structure, and staffing. It examines enacted and proposed changes and reforms stemming from a series of incidents. |
crs_R42451 | crs_R42451_0 | Several lawmakers and the Obama Administration have recently expressed interest in taxing large partnerships and S corporations, also known as pass-throughs, as corporations. Pass-throughs may be a source of revenue since they currently comprise over half of all business income but generally pay no corporate tax. Today, two businesses that are otherwise identical other than that one is a corporation and one is a pass-through are taxed differently. This disparity could be viewed as inequitable since the firms are similarly positioned to pay taxes. Additionally, the lack of tax uniformity across business types is believed to result in too much investment in the non-corporate sector where the after-tax return on investment is higher. Taxing large pass-throughs as corporations, when combined with other reform proposals such as eliminating or reducing corporate tax preferences and loopholes, would broaden the corporate tax base and allow for lower tax rates. There are alternative policy prescriptions that can promote business tax uniformity and increase efficiency. For these reasons integration is generally appealing to economists. If, for whatever reason, integration is not possible, then reducing the tax discrepancy between large pass-throughs and corporations may be a viable policy alternative. The impact on businesses is not the only perspective one can take when it comes to changing the tax treatment of pass-throughs. An Analysis of Individual Tax Return Data , by [author name scrubbed] examined the issue of pass-through taxation from the perspective of individual taxpayers. That report concluded that although the corporate tax would be levied on pass-throughs, individuals would bear the full burden of the tax since businesses are legal, not physical entities. In addition, the analysis in that report suggests that higher-income taxpayers would generally bear most of the burden from increased pass-through taxes because they earn the majority of pass-through income and are limited in their ability to shift the burden to lower-income taxpayers. About 30% of S corporation receipts are generated by the largest 0.3% of S corporations, and 41% of partnership receipts are generated by the largest 0.2% of partnerships. For example, 43% of S corporation assets are held by the largest 0.2% of firms, and 78% of partnership assets are held by the largest 1.1% of firms. It is estimated that holding companies would be most affected. Conclusion
This report used aggregate and industry-level individual tax return data to analyze how many partnerships and S corporations could be subject to the corporate tax. The analysis determined that if a receipt-based measure of size is used, then between 0.3% and 1.5% of S corporations and partnerships could be taxed as corporations depending on the definition of a "large" pass-through—either receipts exceeding $50 million or $10 million. Using an asset-based measure of size produces similar estimates. It is estimated that between 0.3% and 1.0% of pass-throughs could pay the corporate tax depending on whether a $100 million or $25 million asset threshold is used to define a "large" firm. Although estimates suggest that only a small percentage of pass-throughs could be considered large for corporate tax purposes, the affected firms are responsible for a significant amount of economic activity, indicating that the proposed policy change could potentially raise substantial revenue. CRS Report R42359, Who Earns Pass-Through Business Income? | Several lawmakers and the Obama Administration have expressed interest in taxing large partnerships and S corporations, also known as pass-throughs, as corporations. Part of this interest appears to be related to deficit and debt concerns. Pass-throughs may be a source of revenue since they currently account for over half of all business income but generally pay no corporate tax. Additionally, there is a growing concern that the current business tax environment may be inequitable and inefficient. Today, two business that are otherwise identical except that one is a corporation and the other is a pass-through are taxed differently. This disparity could be viewed as inequitable since the companies are similarly positioned to pay taxes. Additionally, the lack of tax uniformity across business types may cause an inefficient allocation of resources if business decisions are made for tax reasons and not economic reasons.
This report uses aggregate and industry-level tax data to analyze how many partnerships and S corporations could be subject to the corporate tax. It is estimated that if a receipt-based measure of size is used, then between 0.3% and 1.5% of S corporations and partnerships could be taxed as corporations depending on if a "large" pass-through is defined as one with receipts exceeding $50 million or exceeding $10 million. Using an asset-based measure of size produces similar estimates. It is estimated that between 0.3% and 1.0% of pass-throughs could pay the corporate tax depending on whether a $100 million or $25 million asset threshold is used to define a "large" firm.
Although estimates suggest that only a small percentage of pass-throughs could be considered large for corporate tax purposes, this report also finds that those firms are responsible for a significant amount of economic activity, indicating that the proposed policy change could raise substantial revenue. For example, 30% of S corporation receipts are generated by the largest 0.3% of S corporations, and 41% of partnership receipts are generated by the largest 0.2% of partnerships. Similarly, the largest 0.2% of S corporations hold 43% of S corporation assets, while the largest 1.1% of partnerships hold 78% of partnership assets.
Taxing large pass-throughs as corporations would also allow for lower tax rates as it would broaden the corporate tax base. Lower tax rates combined with a reduction in the tax disparity between the corporate and non-corporate sectors could improve business tax equity and the allocation of resources relative to current policy. At the same time, an alternative policy prescription that is generally more appealing to economists—integration of the corporate and individual tax systems—could also achieve these objectives. If integration is not possible, however, then reducing the tax discrepancy between large pass-throughs and corporations may be another viable alternative, depending on its design.
The focus on businesses is not the only perspective when it comes to changing the tax treatment of pass-throughs. CRS Report R42359, Who Earns Pass-Through Business Income? An Analysis of Individual Tax Return Data, by [author name scrubbed], examined the issue of pass-through taxation from the perspective of individual taxpayers. That report concluded that although the corporate tax would be levied on pass-throughs, individuals would bear the full burden of the tax since businesses are legal, not physical entities. In addition, the analysis in that report suggests that higher-income taxpayers would generally bear most of the burden from increased pass-through taxes because they earn the majority of pass-through income and are limited in their ability to shift the burden to lower-income taxpayers. |
crs_R43188 | crs_R43188_0 | The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government from establishing religion (the Establishment Clause), which the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted to include a prohibition on official support or endorsement of religion. It also prohibits the government from interfering with individuals' exercise of religion (the Free Exercise Clause). The balancing of these constitutional provisions often leads to questions regarding the extent to which religious activities may occur at public events or within public institutions. On one hand, it may be argued that permitting prayer as a part of publicly sponsored events or activities suggests official support for religion. On the other hand, restricting religious expressions at events or activities may appear to interfere with individuals' ability to exercise their religious beliefs. Lower courts have considered the constitutionality of publicly sponsored prayers in other contexts, including the military chaplaincy as well as invocations and other religious commemorations at public events. School Prayer
As a general rule, publicly sponsored prayer is prohibited by the Establishment Clause. Legal challenges to public prayers have arisen most frequently in the context of school prayers, and the U.S. Supreme Court consistently has struck down school policies that implement official acts of prayer in school settings. The Court noted that the school decided whether to have a prayer at the graduation; which religious participant would deliver the prayer; and what the guidelines for the content of the prayer would be. Constitutional Protections for Individual Religious Activity
Those who disagree with the Court's decisions limiting school prayer have argued that restricting religious activities in schools carries its own risk of violating the First Amendment. The Supreme Court issued its only decision on legislative prayer since Marsh in 2014, clarifying whether legislatures must limit the content of prayers by outside speakers. Standing To Challenge Legislative Prayers
Although the constitutionality of legislative prayers generally has been upheld, legal challenges to such prayers may be difficult to sustain due to restrictions on standing. | The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government from providing official support or endorsement of religion and from interfering with individuals' exercise of religion. Balancing the constitutional protections under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, as these provisions are known, often leads to questions regarding the extent to which religious activities may occur within public institutions or at public events. On one hand, permitting prayer at publicly sponsored activities arguably may suggest official support for religion. On the other hand, restricting religious expression by individuals at such activities may appear to interfere with their ability to exercise their religious beliefs freely.
As a general rule, publicly sponsored prayer is prohibited under the First Amendment with few exceptions. Legal challenges to prayer in public fora have arisen most frequently in the context of prayer in schools. The U.S. Supreme Court generally has struck down school prayer policies adopted by public schools, even if the content of the prayer is neutral and participation among students is voluntary. This prohibition has been extended to extracurricular and other school-related activities as well, but does not apply to all religious activity in public schools. Rather, the First Amendment prohibits any school-sponsored religious activity, but protects students' ability to pray voluntarily at their own initiative.
Although official prayers by public institutions are generally unconstitutional, there are a few notable exceptions. The Supreme Court has recognized that legislative prayer—invocations made to open legislative sessions—are generally permissible because of the role such prayers have played in the history and tradition of American government. Although the Court acknowledged the constitutionality of legislative prayer, for decades, lower courts generally have had to interpret the parameters of the exemption, including how speakers may be selected and what the content of such prayers may be. The Court issued a decision in Town of Greece, New York v. Galloway in 2014 clarifying that legislative prayers need not be nonsectarian to pass constitutional muster. Furthermore, courts have acknowledged other exemptions, upholding the constitutionality of the military chaplaincy and the use of religious references in official proceedings and on coins and currency. |
crs_RL34320 | crs_RL34320_0 | Overview
The United States and the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), a small, largely agrarian Southeast Asian country ruled by a communist government, cooperate in many areas despite ideological differences and U.S. concerns about the ethnic Hmong minority. The U.S. government has embarked upon a policy of economic engagement with Laos, expanding technical assistance to the Lao government to build its capacity to implement trade agreements and modernize its legal and regulatory framework: "This is probably the most important action the U.S. Government can currently take to influence the future direction of Laos' policy." In 2008, the United States and Laos exchanged defense attachés (the first time in over 30 years). Major areas for U.S. policy consideration include urging the Lao government to accept international monitoring of the resettlement of former Hmong militia members and returnees from Thailand; increasing assistance for de-mining activities; granting trade preferences or tariff relief for Lao products, particularly garments; and developing programs for sustainable management of the Mekong River. The largest aid programs in Laos focus on de-mining and counternarcotics programs. Other, ongoing areas of U.S. assistance and bilateral cooperation include HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, military education (training in English language and military professionalism), and the recovery of Americans missing in action (MIAs). In 2009, the LPDR ratified the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Between 1988 and 2008, the country's economy grew by over 6% per year on average, with the exception of 1997-1998 due to the Asian financial crisis. U.S.-Laos Trade
U.S.-Laos trade is growing rapidly but from a low base. In 2008, total trade between Laos and the United States, the LPDR's seventh largest trading partner, was valued at $60 million compared to $15 million in 2006. Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues
Religious Freedom
According to many observers, the LPDR does not engage in widespread persecution of religious groups and religious freedom has improved, particularly in urban areas. About 30,000 returned to Laos. The Nong Khai group has been identified as former insurgents and their family members, and have applied for political asylum in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States. In April 2009, H.Con.Res. 112 , "Expressing Support for Designation of a 'National Lao-Hmong Recognition Day,'" was introduced in the House of Representatives. In June 2009, 31 Members of Congress signed a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urging her to appeal to the Thai government not to forcibly repatriate Lao-Hmong asylum seekers. U.S. officials have called upon the Thai and Lao governments for greater transparency in the repatriation and resettlement processes and have recognized the refugee status of the Nong Khai detainees. | The United States and the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) cooperate in important areas despite ideological differences and U.S. concerns about alleged human rights abuses against the ethnic Hmong minority. The U.S. government has gradually upgraded its relations with the communist state, which has strong ties to Vietnam and growing economic linkages with China. Major areas of U.S. assistance and bilateral cooperation include de-mining and counter-narcotics programs, strengthening the country's regulatory framework and trade capacity, HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, the recovery of Americans missing in action during the Vietnam War, and military education and training. In 2008, the United States and Laos exchanged defense attachés the first time in over 30 years. The U.S. government has embarked upon a policy of economic engagement with the LPDR as a means of influencing the future direction of Lao policy.
The Obama Administration and Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the plight of former ethnic Hmong insurgents and their families, who have historical ties to the U.S.-backed Lao-Hmong guerilla army of the Vietnam War period, and efforts by Thai authorities to repatriate over 4,500 Lao-Hmong living in camps in Thailand, many of whom claim that they likely will be persecuted or discriminated against if they return to Laos. In June 2009, 31 Members of Congress signed a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urging her to appeal to the Thai government not to forcibly repatriate Hmong asylum seekers. U.S. officials have called upon the Thai and Lao governments for greater transparency in the repatriation and resettlement process. In April 2009, H.Con.Res. 112, "Expressing Support for Designation of a 'National Lao-Hmong Recognition Day,'" was introduced in the House of Representatives.
Laos, one of the poorest countries in Asia, has made some notable political, social, and economic progress in recent years. Religious freedom reportedly has improved, particularly in urban areas. In 2009, the LPDR ratified the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and promulgated a legal framework for non-governmental organizations. Opium production and use have dropped dramatically since 1998. Between 1988 and 2008, the economy grew by over 6% per year, with the exception of 1997-1998 due to the Asian Financial Crisis. Meanwhile, U.S.-Laos trade has grown rapidly, albeit from a low base. In 2008, total trade between Laos and the United States was valued at $60 million compared to $15 million in 2006. The government has implemented market-oriented reforms, but progress has been slow.
Major U.S. policy considerations include urging the Lao government to accept independent, international monitoring of the resettlement of former Lao-Hmong insurgents and Hmong returnees from Thailand; urging the Thai government not to forcibly repatriate Hmong determined to be political refugees; increasing assistance for de-mining activities in Laos; granting trade preferences or tariff relief for Lao products, particularly garments; and developing programs for sustainable management of the Mekong River. |
crs_R43857 | crs_R43857_0 | Overview
In December 2014, Congress passed the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 (RAMIA), as Title VII of Division B of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ). President Obama signed the bill into law on December 16, 2014. RAMIA directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NMI) program within the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The act comes about two years after President Obama first proposed the establishment of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation in his FY2013 budget. The Secretary, acting through NIST, is directed to support the establishment of centers for manufacturing innovation and to establish and support a network of centers for manufacturing innovation. NMI Funding
RAMIA authorizes NIST to use $5 million per year for FY2015-FY2024 from funds appropriated to its Industrial Technology Services account to carry out the Network for Manufacturing Innovation program. The act also authorizes the Department of Energy to transfer to NIST up to $250 million over the FY2015-FY2024 period from funds appropriated for advanced manufacturing R&D in its Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy account. National Program Office of the NMI Program
RAMIA directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish, within NIST, a National Program Office of the Network for Manufacturing Innovation to oversee and carry out the program. Biennial Assessment by the U.S. Government Accountability Office to Congress
RAMIA requires the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an assessment of the NMI program at least once every two years during the operation of the program, covering the two most recent years of the program on the overall success of the NMI program, and a final assessment to be made not later than December 31, 2024. Additional NMI Program-Related Authorities
Other provisions of RAMIA authorize:
the Secretary of Commerce to appoint such personnel and enter into such contracts, financial assistance agreements, and other agreements as the Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to carry out the program, including support for R&D activities involving a center for manufacturing innovation; the Secretary of Commerce to transfer to other federal agencies such sums as the Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to carry out the program—however, such funds may not be used to reimburse or otherwise pay for the costs of financial assistance incurred or commitments of financial assistance made prior to the date of enactment of RAMIA; agencies to accept funds transferred to them by the Secretary of Commerce, in accordance with the provisions of RAMIA, to award and administer, under the same conditions and constraints applicable to the Secretary, all aspects of financial assistance awards under RAMIA; and the Secretary of Commerce to use, with the consent of a covered entity and with or without reimbursement, land, services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of such covered entity. In addition, the availability of these funds to NIST will depend on DOE's willingness to transfer funds to NIST for the NMI program. In this regard, the act specifies which centers are eligible to be a part of the network and designates the National Program Office as "a convener of the Network." However, the act does not further specify the purpose, federal role, or activities of the network. | In December 2014, Congress passed the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 (RAMIA), as Title VII of Division B of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235). President Obama signed the bill into law on December 16, 2014. RAMIA directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NMI) program within the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The act comes about two years after President Obama first proposed the establishment of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation in his FY2013 budget.
RAMIA includes provisions authorizing NIST, the Department of Energy, and other agencies to support the establishment of centers for manufacturing innovation and establishing and providing for the operation of a Network for Manufacturing Innovation. NIST is authorized to use up to $5.0 million per year of appropriated funds for FY2015-FY2024 to carry out its responsibilities under the act. The Department of Energy is authorized to transfer to NIST up to $250.0 million of appropriated funds over the same FY2015-FY2024 period. The Secretary of Commerce is also authorized to accept funds, services, equipment, personnel, and facilities from any covered entity—federal department, federal agency, instrumentality of the United States, state, local government, tribal government, territory, or possession of the United States, or of any political subdivision thereof, or international organization, or any public or private entity or individual—to carry out the program. The act also establishes a National Office of the Network for Manufacturing Innovation Program (also referred to in this report as the National Program Office) at NIST to oversee and carry out the program.
Each center receiving financial assistance under the NMI program must submit annual reports to the Secretary. The Secretary must submit annual reports to Congress on the performance of the program. And the Comptroller General of the United States is directed to perform biennial assessments of the program, with a final assessment due by December 31, 2024.
Several factors could affect the implementation of the NMI program. Although the act authorizes funding for establishment of the centers and the network, the act does not appropriate any funds. Funding availability for the program will depend on congressional appropriations, priorities, and allocations. In addition, the Department of Energy is authorized, but not required, to transfer funds to NIST to carry out the program.
Another program uncertainty relates to the network of centers. While the act specifies which new and existing centers are eligible to be a part of the network and designates the National Program Office as "a convener of the Network," it does not further specify the purpose, federal role, and activities of the network. |
crs_RL31931 | crs_RL31931_0 | Introduction
Climate change is viewed as a global issue, but proposed responses generally require action at the national level. In 1992, the United States ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which called on industrialized countries to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gases. Over the past 16 years, a variety of voluntary and regulatory actions have been proposed or undertaken in the United States, including monitoring of utility carbon dioxide emissions, improved appliance efficiency, and incentives for developing renewable energy sources. Since then, the Bush Administration has focused U.S. climate change policy on voluntary initiatives to reduce the growth in greenhouse gas emissions. This focus was particularly evident in the Administration's 2006 Climate Action Report (CAR) submitted under the provisions of the UNFCCC. Of the roughly 50 programs summarized in the 2006 CAR, only seven were described as "regulatory." In its 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA , the Supreme Court found that the Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act. Further, in June 2008, the Senate considered legislation ( S. 3036 ) to enact an economy-wide cap-and-trade system to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. However, a cloture motion on this bill failed, and the bill was ultimately tabled. This report provides background on the evolution of U.S. climate change policy from ratification of the UNFCCC to the George W. Bush Administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol programs, to the present. Current major regulatory programs that monitor or reduce greenhouse gas emissions are identified, along with their estimated effect on greenhouse gas emissions. Regulatory measures that have reduced greenhouse gas emissions are a small subset of the total U.S. effort numerically, but are responsible for a proportionally larger share of greenhouse gas emission reductions. In general, these regulatory programs were established and implemented primarily for reasons other than climate change concerns. On December 19, 2007, President Bush signed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. Renewable Fuel Standard
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a renewable fuel standard (RFS) requiring the use of renewable fuels in gasoline. 109-58 ), with provisions directly and indirectly related to greenhouse gas emissions. 110-140 ). In addition to the above programs, EISA also requires the establishment of an Office of Climate Change and Environment in the Department of Transportation. This office will plan, coordinate, and implement research at DOT on reducing transportation-related energy use, mitigating the causes of climate change, and addressing the impacts of climate change on transportation. As indicated below ( Table 2 ), energy-related activities are responsible for about 86% of the country's greenhouse gas emissions, and 98% of its carbon dioxide emissions. While some provisions in energy laws enacted over the past 16 years have led to lower greenhouse gas emissions or addressed climate change directly, other provisions in those same laws have almost certainly resulted in higher emissions. To date, no energy law has had reducing greenhouse gas emissions as the main organizing principle. Comprehensive climate change policy directed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions should address energy supply and consumption and, thus, be integrated with energy policy. This will be a pivotal challenge to the 111 th Congress's and the incoming Administration's anticipated efforts to enact legislation to limit greenhouse gas emissions. | Climate change is viewed as a global issue, but proposed responses generally require action at the national level. In 1992, the United States ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which called on industrialized countries to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gases. Over the past 16 years, a variety of voluntary and regulatory actions have been proposed or undertaken in the United States, including monitoring of electric utility carbon dioxide emissions, improved appliance efficiency, and incentives for developing renewable energy sources. This report provides background on the evolution of U.S. climate change policy, from ratification of the UNFCCC to the George W. Bush Administration's 2001 rejection of the Kyoto Protocol to the present. Recent federal court decisions—most notably the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA that the Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act—have raised the issue of whether EPA should directly regulate greenhouse gases. This report focuses on major regulatory programs that monitor or reduce greenhouse gas emissions, along with their estimated effect on emissions levels.
The George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush Administrations largely relied on voluntary initiatives to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. This focus was particularly evident in the current Administration's 2006 Climate Action Report (CAR), submitted under the provisions of the UNFCCC. Of roughly 50 programs summarized in the 2006 CAR, seven were described as "regulatory." However, this small subset of the total U.S. effort accounts for a large share of greenhouse gas emission reductions achieved over the past decade-and-a-half. In general, these efforts were established and implemented in response to concerns other than climate change, such as energy efficiency and air quality.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) included provisions indirectly related to greenhouse gas emissions, such as energy efficiency and renewable energy. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) addresses renewable energy and conservation, but also includes provisions specifically on climate change. These include a requirement for the use of renewable fuels with lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than petroleum fuels, and the establishment of an Office of Climate Change and Environment in the Department of Transportation to implement research on mitigating the causes and addressing the effects of climate change on transportation. In June 2008, the Senate considered a bill (S. 3036) to establish an economy-wide cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, after discussion, a cloture motion on this bill failed, and the bill was tabled.
While some provisions in energy laws enacted over the past 16 years have led to lower greenhouse gas emissions or addressed climate change directly, other provisions in those same laws have almost certainly resulted in higher emissions. To date, no energy law has had reducing greenhouse gas emissions as the main organizing principle. Energy-related activities are responsible for about 86% of the country's greenhouse gas emissions, and 98% of its carbon dioxide emissions. Climate change policy directed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions must address energy supply and consumption and, thus, be integrated with energy policy. This will be a pivotal challenge to the 111th Congress's and the incoming Administration's anticipated efforts to enact legislation to limit greenhouse gas emissions. |
crs_RL30900 | crs_RL30900_0 | Introduction
For nearly a decade, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia managed to escape the kindof brutal ethnic conflict in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo that accompanied the breakup of the formerYugoslavia in the 1990s. By March 2001, violent conflict between the rebels and Macedonian security forces had spread to several areas around the city of Tetovo, prompting the Macedonian government to embark on amajor military campaign to quell the insurgency in western Macedonia. The political parties signed a framework agreement on August 13,paving the way for the deployment of a small NATO force to begin disarming the rebel forces. Operation Essential Harvest, comprising 4,500 European forces, began collecting rebel weapons onAugust 27 and completed its mission within a month. A much smaller task force has remained inMacedonia to provide security for international civilian monitors overseeing the process ofimplementing inter-ethnic reforms. (6)
Macedonian-Albanian Ethnic Tensions
Prior to the conflict in 2001, relations between the Slav Macedonian majority and ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia were considered tense, if not explosive. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)maintained a presence in Macedonia during the conflict. 2001 Conflict
Conflict Overview
Attacks by ethnic Albanian guerrilla forces on Macedonian police and security forces in late 2000 and early 2001 appeared to catch the Macedonian government and international communityby surprise. In January, a group calling itself the National Liberation Army (NLA, or UCK in Albanian) claimed responsibility for the attacks on police forces. On March 19, western news agencies reported alist of political demands by the NLA rebels that included: international mediation to resolve theirdifferences with the Slavic majority and determine the exact size of the ethnic Albanian community;changes in the Macedonian constitution recognizing Albanians as a constituent people; and, therelease of all political prisoners. In a retaliatory anti-terrorist raid on the village ofLjuboten (near Skopje) on August 12, government forces killed at least five ethnic Albanians. The parties agreed to hold early elections in 2002. 11 NATO member states contributed forces to the operation, which totaledapproximately 4,500 troops. Task Force Harvest commanders reportedthat, in total, the mission collected 3,875 weapons in the 30-day period, exceeded targeted amounts. Some NATO officials have expressedconcerns about the prospect of transferring command of the Macedonia operation over to theEuropean Union (see section on the European Union, below), unless NATO and the fledgling EUrapid reaction force first reach agreement on institutional and operational links. In response to the conflict in Macedonia in early 2001, NATO initially took limited steps to try to quell the violence. In response to recent progress, the EUagreed to convene the donors conference on March 12, 2002. EU leaders have supported extensions of NATO's mandate in Macedonia, but have recently considered the possibility of eventually taking over the Macedonia military mission from thealliance, in the context of the EU's nascent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). During the 2001 conflict, the United States augmentedsecurity at the U.S. embassy in Skopje. | Sharing borders with Kosovo and Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) managed to avoid becoming directly involved in the drawn-out wars in Bosnia andKosovo in the 1990s. Inter-ethnic relations between the Slav majority and ethnic Albanian minorityin Macedonia, while often tense, never reached the crisis state of Albanian-Serb relations in theprovince of Kosovo. Since Macedonia's independence in 1991, ethnic Albanian political parties inMacedonia have been represented in government and in parliament.
However, in early 2001, ethnic Albanian rebels calling themselves the National Liberation Army (NLA) stepped up attacks on Macedonian security forces first in several villages near the cityof Tetovo and by the western border with Kosovo, and later near the capital, Skopje. The NLA wasthought to have ties to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and rebel Albanian forces operating insouthern Serbia. In March, the Macedonian government began a counter-insurgency campaign. Itopened talks on political reforms with elected ethnic Albanian representatives, but refused tonegotiate with the rebels themselves. Clashes between the rebels and government forces continuedthrough the summer of 2001, notwithstanding intermittent cease-fire agreements and ongoingpolitical talks. With U.S. and European diplomatic intervention, the parties signed a frameworkagreement on August 13, amidst the deadliest violence of the conflict. Implementation of theagreement has progressed slowly and with difficulty. Substantial recent progress enabled the holdingof a long-delayed international donors' conference on March 12, 2002. In spite of recentachievements, some observers continue to fear the prospect of a new uprising by ethnic Albanianextremists or armed provocations by forces supporting Macedonian hardliners.
In June 2001, NATO formulated and approved plans to launch a limited operation in Macedonia to oversee the disarmament of the ethnic Albanian rebel forces. On August 22, NATO gave finalapproval for the deployment of Operation Essential Harvest comprising about 4,500 troops in total. The operation completed collection of a targeted amount of rebel weapons (nearly 4,000) onSeptember 26, 2001. NATO then deployed a smaller follow-on force (Task Force Fox) to providesecurity for international civilian monitors. NATO's peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) has alsobeen involved in patrolling and reinforcing the Kosovo border in order to try to cut off Albanianrebel supply routes. The United States maintains some KFOR support forces in Macedonia, but didnot contribute forces to either the Task Force Harvest or Task Force Fox missions in Macedonia. In early 2002, the European Union agreed to consider taking over the military mission in Macedoniafrom NATO. |
crs_RL32324 | crs_RL32324_0 | Overview
Public interest in approaches that might provide prescription drugs at lower cost, particularly for the elderly, has rekindled discussion over the role the federal government plays in facilitating the development and marketing of new pharmaceuticals. In the current debate, some argue that the government's financial, research, and/or clinical support of health-related R&D entitles the public to commensurate considerations in the prices charged for any resulting drugs. Others view government intervention in price decisions based upon initial federal funding of basic research as contrary to a long-term trend of government promotion of innovation, technological advancement, and the commercialization of technology by the business community leading to new products and processes for the marketplace. Government policies implemented over the past 25 or more years include incentives to increase private sector investment in technology development through technology transfer, cooperative R&D, and intellectual property rights. The particular nature of health-related research and development, and the substantial federal investment in this area (over $30.8 billion was appropriated to NIH for medical research in FY2012), has led critics of the current system to argue that the necessity of incentives is mitigated by such factors as free access to the results of federally funded work; by the monopoly power permitted by patent protection; and by other regulatory and tax advantages such as those conveyed by the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, or the Orphan Drug Act. Traditionally, the government funds R&D to meet the mission requirements of the federal departments and agencies (e.g., defense, public health, environmental quality). It also supports work in areas where there is an identified need for research, primarily basic research, not being performed in the private sector. Congressional initiatives have expanded the government's role in R&D to include the promotion of technological innovation to meet other national needs, particularly the economic growth that flows from the commercialization and use of new products and production processes by the private sector. technology." This approach attempts to balance the public's interest in new or improved products and processes for the marketplace with concerns over providing companies valuable benefits without adequate accountability or compensation. Critics of the current approach argue that the need for technology development incentives in the pharmaceutical and/or biotechnology sectors is mitigated by industry access to government-supported R&D at no cost, monopoly power through patent protection, and other regulatory and tax advantages. It remains to be seen if changes will be made and if the nature of government-industry-university cooperation will be altered. | Public interest in approaches that might provide prescription drugs at lower cost, particularly for the elderly, has rekindled discussion over the role the federal government plays in facilitating the creation of new pharmaceuticals for the marketplace. In the current debate, some argue that the government's financial, scientific, and/or clinical support of health-related research and development (R&D) entitles the public to commensurate considerations in the prices charged for any resulting drugs. Others view government intervention in price decisions based upon initial federal funding as contrary to a long-term trend of government promotion of innovation, technological advancement, and the commercialization of technology by the business community leading to new products and processes for the marketplace.
The government traditionally funds R&D to meet the mission requirements of the federal departments and agencies. It also supports work in areas where there is an identified need for research, primarily basic research, not being performed in the private sector. Over the past 25 or more years, congressional initiatives have expanded the government's role to include the promotion of technological innovation to meet other national needs, particularly the economic growth that flows from the use of new and improved goods and services. Various laws facilitate commercialization of federally funded R&D through technology transfer, cooperative R&D, and intellectual property rights. The legislated incentives are intended to encourage additional private sector investments often necessary to further develop marketable products. The current approach to technology development attempts to balance the public sector's interest in new and improved technologies with concerns over providing companies valuable benefits without adequate accountability or compensation.
Some question whether or not the current balance is appropriate, particularly with respect to drug discovery. The particular nature and expense of health-related R&D have focused attention on the manner in which the National Institutes of Health (NIH) undertakes research activities. Critics maintain that any need for technology development incentives in the pharmaceutical and/or biotechnology sectors is mitigated by industry access to government-supported work at no cost, monopoly power through patent protection, and additional regulatory and tax advantages such as those conveyed through the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, and the Orphan Drug Act. Supporters of the existing approach argue that these incentives are precisely what are required and have given rise to robust pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. It remains to be seen whether or not decisions related to federal involvement in issues related to pharmaceutical R&D will change the nature of the current approach to government-industry-university cooperation. |
crs_RL32959 | crs_RL32959_0 | While there are many ways to make meth, the most common way begins withover-the-counter medications containing pseudoephedrine or ephedrine, (1) and often involves cookingwith acetone, hydrochloric acid, sodium hydroxide, ether, and anhydrous ammonia to seriallyconcentrate and purify the meth. Cooking meth, which can result in eye and respiratory irritations,chemical burns, explosions and fires, toxic waste products, and contaminated surroundings, can bedangerous to the meth "cook," to the people and community around the lab, and to those persons whofirst come upon the lab, such as fire fighters, law enforcement officials, emergency medicaltechnicians, or social welfare workers. (2)
Depending on the process used and the skill of the cook, each pound of meth produces aboutsix pounds of hazardous waste. Alternatively, rather than pay directly forclean-up and later apply for reimbursement from EPA, state and local governments instead can notifythe United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in the United States Department ofJustice, and DEA will take responsibility and arrange for clean-up. In addition, there have beenfunds available from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to redevelop ofa former meth site. (6) The cost of remediating an average-size site has been estimatedat $50,000, according to the U.S. Department of Justice. A drug in Schedule II, like meth, has current accepted medical use and has high potential forabuse. (9) This report focuses on illicituse and production of meth, and subsequent clean-up and remediation issues. Meth is primarily supplied by clandestine laboratoriesin Mexico and California. Successful closure in the UnitedStates of some super-labs, the relative ease of producing meth, the continuing demand for the drug,and the desire for potential wealth and involvement in a criminal underground social activity,contributed to an increase, through 2003, in meth production in small clandestine labs, also knownas small, toxic labs (STLs). Although only 20% of illicit meth used in the United States comes from STLs, (14) the sheer number of suchlabs, their residual impacts, and their geographic diffusion, have prompted concerns in Congress,state and local governments, law enforcement agencies, and real estate and other groups. Residual Impacts of Meth Labs
There generally are greater concerns about the environmental wastes from STLs than fromsuper-labs, for several reasons. (16) Fourth,these small-scalelabs can be geographically scattered among a wide range of sites, such as apartments, motel rooms,abandoned buildings, even packed in car trunks and moved among parks and other locations. The range of substitutes for pure ingredients andsophisticated production equipment may include common items such as decongestants from retailand convenience stores, mason jars, coffee filters, hot plates, pressure cookers, plastic tubing, andgasoline cans. There is a range of residual impacts of small-scale labs. Children of some STL "cooks" havebeen found in residences where their parents were making meth. Reimbursement is limited to$25,000 per incident. HUD
Federal funds to redevelop a former meth production site have been available through HUD'sBrownfields Economic Development Initiative. While the decision to clean a meth site is aided by the availability of EPA and DEA fundsfor clean-ups, the decision to remediate a meth site may be more difficult. (28)
There are currently no federal guidelines or standards governing clean-up or remediationprocesses. Levels of meth residue below the standardsare considered acceptable. The nine states' standards range from 0.05 to 0.1 micrograms of meth onevery 100 square centimeters of surface. | Methamphetamine (meth), a drug with limited medical use and high potential for abuse andaddiction, is a subject of widespread concern. Once associated mainly with the West Coast andwhite, male, blue-collar workers, illicit meth is now used by diverse population groups nationwide,with concentrations in the West, Southwest, and Midwest. Meth is supplied primarily by clandestinelabs in California and Mexico. The drug is relatively simple to make from easily obtained recipes,but access to certain ingredients has become more difficult. Meth production in small, toxic labs(STLs) increased initially due to the successful closure of some "super-labs" (labs capable of makingmore than 10 pounds of meth in a 24-hour cycle), relative ease of making meth, continuing demandfor the drug, and desire for potential wealth and involvement in a criminal underground socialactivity. Although the greater fraction of meth used and distributed across the nation comes fromsuper-labs, the sheer number of STLs, their geographic diffusion, and their residual impacts haveprompted concern in Congress, state and local governments, law enforcement agencies, and realestate and other groups.
Meth labs have many significant and widespread residual impacts. According to the UnitedStates Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), there were 9,092 STLs and related meth sites in2000 and 17,356 in 2003; the number has been declining since. These sites can be found in a widerange of places, such as apartments, motel rooms, abandoned buildings, and packed in car trunks inparks and other locations. Meth makers can use common items such as mason jars, coffee filters,hot plates, over-the-counter medications containing pseudoephedrine or ephedrine (e.g., Sudafed andsome other nonprescription decongestants), acetone, hydrochloric acid, and anhydrous ammonia. Making meth can result in eye and respiratory irritations, chemical burns, explosions and fires, toxicwastes, and contaminated surroundings. Some residual impacts of meth production threaten thehealth and welfare of children removed from meth sites. This report focuses on the residualenvironmental impacts of STLs.
Cleaning and remediating a meth site can cost more than $200,000, depending on themagnitude of contamination. State and local governments that incur expenses cleaning a site canapply to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for reimbursement, up to $25,000 perincident. Alternatively, rather than incur costs and apply for a capped reimbursement, state and localgovernments can notify DEA of a site, and DEA will perform and pay for cleaning. In addition,funds have been available from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) toredevelop a former meth production site.
No uniform federal guidelines or standards exist governing the process or the endpoint forcleaning or remediating STLs. Across various states, acceptable levels of meth residue, afterremediation, range from 0.05 to 0.1 micrograms of meth per 100 square centimeters of surface. Twelve congressional bills, one enacted into law in March, relate broadly to meth site cleaning orremediation. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41071 | crs_R41071_0 | Introduction
Congress and the Executive Branch have historically identified the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) as potentially important in the promotion of liberalized international trade and investment in Asia, and possibly the rest of the world. APEC is unusual among various trade associations in its reliance on consensus-based, voluntary reductions in tariff and non-tariff trade barriers—as well as a variety of trade facilitation measures—to promote trade and investment liberalization not only between APEC members, but for all international trade and investment, an approach often referred to as "open regionalism" (see " APEC's Approach to Trade Liberalization " below). This was widely seen as a counterforce to the efforts of some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to pursue an alternative "Asian only" model for regional economic integration that would exclude the United States. On December 14, 2009, USTR Kirk formally notified Congress that the United States would enter into negotiations with the members of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) about U.S. participation in the regional trade agreement. The uncertainty about the future role of APEC in U.S. trade policy comes just before the target deadline for the first of APEC's Bogor Goals—open trade and investment among the industrialized APEC members by 2010—and a year before the United States is scheduled to host the association's meetings in 2011. According to some analysts, the next two years could be a critical time for APEC's development. During the 1994 meetings in Bogor, Indonesia, APEC established the "Bogor Goals" of "free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies and 2020 for developing economies." Both the Leaders' Meeting and the Ministerial Meeting focused on the same themes—supporting balanced growth, resisting protectionism, fostering trade and investment liberalization, accelerating regional economic integration, and enhancing human security. Japan, the host of the 2010 meetings, has indicated an interest in using the event to take stock of APEC's progress on achieving the Bogor Goals. During his speech in Singapore, President Obama announced that the 2011 Leaders' Meeting is to be held in Honolulu. APEC and U.S. Trade Policy in Asia
During the later part of 2009, the Obama Administration gradually began to reveal the outlines of its trade policy in Asia. However, the Obama Administration has taken actions that may indicate a shift in style and focus in U.S. trade policy in Asia. However, it remains unclear how the various initiatives of the Obama Administration coalesce to form a consistent trade policy in the region that is compatible with the goals of trade and investment liberalization. Although APEC's exports and imports have grown at a faster rate than world trade figures since the creation of APEC, it is uncertain if its trade growth is the result of trade liberalization and facilitation, or caused by other economic factors. Some are directly targeted at U.S. policy towards APEC. In addition to the issue of U.S. financial support for APEC, Congress may choose to express its sense on different policy issues. Also, there are oversight issues raised by U.S. participation in various APEC activities and, in particular, with respect to the 2011 APEC meetings to be held in the United States. | Congress and the Executive Branch have historically identified the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) as potentially important in the promotion of liberalized international trade and investment in Asia, and possibly the rest of the world. APEC's commitment to the goal of trade and investment liberalization is embodied in its Bogor Goals, in which APEC members pledged to free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies and 2020 for developing economies.
The 2009 APEC Leaders' and Ministerial Meetings focused on balanced growth, resisting protectionism, fostering trade and investment liberalization, accelerating regional economic integration, and enhancing human security. In the Leaders' Declaration, APEC presented a new "growth paradigm" based on balanced, sustainable, and inclusive growth. In the Ministerial Meeting, one of the main topics was efforts to be taken at, behind, and across borders to promote regional economic integration.
The next two years may be a critical period for APEC and its achievement of the Bogor Goals. The 2010 meetings are to be held in Yokohama, Japan—the target year for APEC's industrialized members to achieve the Bogor Goals. The United States will host the 2011 meetings. The Obama Administration has chosen Honolulu as the host city for the 2011 Leaders' Meeting, but has not given a clear indication of APEC's role in U.S. trade policy.
Several alternative avenues for the promotion of trade integration in Asia have emerged, challenging the past U.S. focus on APEC. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is promoting the creation of various forms of an all-Asian free trade association that could exclude the United States. In November 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would to enter into negotiations with the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP), a free trade agreement between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.
Critics of APEC have referred to the association as a "talk shop," that has produced few results. However, studies conducted by APEC reveal a substantial drop in members' average tariff rates, the elimination of a number of non-tariff trade barriers, and a major reduction in the transaction costs associated with international trade—all of which is likely attributable at least in part to APEC initiatives.
Historical trade data is consistent with the premise that APEC has been successful in promoting greater trade within its member economies and with the rest of the world. Both the exports and imports of APEC members have grown faster than global trade since the creation of APEC. However, APEC's greater trade growth may be attributable to other factors than the liberalization of trade and investment policies among its members.
The 111th Congress may reexamine U.S. policy towards APEC. It has already increased APEC-related funding in FY2009, in part to provide for the preparations for the 2011 APEC meetings to be held in the United States. In addition, there are other actions Congress may choose to take with respect to APEC, depending on its determination of APEC's role in relation to trade promotion initiatives in Asia. Congressional attitudes and actions may also be influenced by the Obama Administration's trade policies in Asia—and the role APEC plays in those policies.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_98-654 | crs_98-654_0 | Introduction
The federal government offers many opportunities for internships, fellowships, and work experiences. This report describes prominent and popular internet resources for such opportunities and gives applicants a place to begin their search. http://gogovernment.org/government_careers/students_entry-level_talent.php
USA Jobs—Students and Graduates
The students and graduates section of the official U.S. federal government employment website provides students with information on various educational opportunities available within the federal government, including internships, fellowships, apprenticeships, and cooperative programs, as well as a list of federal occupations by college major. The program provides paid opportunities to explore federal careers while still in school. There is no centralized listing of all available congressional fellowships. It is open to undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral students. Applicants are selected by federal agencies and other participating organizations in the Washington, DC, area and elsewhere. | While there are many opportunities in the federal government for internships, fellowships, and other work experience, there is no comprehensive source to assist in locating these opportunities. This report describes internet resources for prominent and popular opportunities for internship, fellowship, and work experience programs within the federal government. The report is intended as a selective guide for students of all levels: high school, undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate. It provides information on legislative, executive, and judicial branch opportunities and links to several aggregators of jobs data. The introduction provides a number of insights to assist applicants on understanding terminology, timing applications, and expectations for types of work involved. |
crs_R45156 | crs_R45156_0 | Introduction
The electrical grid in the United States comprises all of the power plants generating electricity, together with the transmission and distribution lines and systems that bring power to end-use customers. The "grid" also connects the many publicly and privately owned electric utility and power companies in different states and regions of the United States. However, with changes in federal law, regulatory changes, and the aging of the electric power infrastructure as drivers, the grid is changing from a largely patchwork system built to serve the needs of individual electric utility companies to essentially a national interconnected system, accommodating massive transfers of electrical energy among regions of the United States. The modernization of the grid to accommodate today's power flows, serve reliability needs, and meet future projected uses is leading to the incorporation of electronic intelligence capabilities for power control purposes and operations monitoring. The "Smart Grid" is the name given to this evolving intelligent electric power network, with digital technologies increasingly replacing analog devices, thus enabling Smart Grid hardware and software functions. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) describes the Smart Grid as "an intelligent electricity grid—one that uses digital communications technology, information systems, and automation to detect and react to local changes in usage, improve system operating efficiency, and, in turn, reduce operating costs while maintaining high system reliability." Status of Smart Grid Deployment
In 2014, DOE issued a report assessing the status of Smart Grid deployment, concluding that the adoption of Smart Grid technologies (i.e., digital sensing, communications, and control technologies) was accelerating but at varying rates "depending largely on decision-making at utility, state, and local levels." DOE noted that the nation's electricity system is in the midst of "potentially transformative change," with challenges for Smart Grid deployment remaining with respect to the incorporation of grid-connected renewable and distributed energy sources and adaptability to current and future consumer-oriented applications. Technology Compatibility as a Barrier to Adoption
In 2007, Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA; P.L. 110-140 ). Smart Grid Investment Matching Grants
Title XIII of EISA describes characteristics of the Smart Grid to help support the modernization of the nation's electricity system. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. From 2010 to 2015, ARRA provided $3.4 billion to fund 99 projects under the SGIG program resulting in $8 billion in grid modernization. In its 2014 study, DOE estimated historical and forecast investment in the Smart Grid as approximately $32.5 billion between 2008 and 2017, averaging $3.61 billion annually in the period. If this level of investment continues, this would put spending well below estimates made by EPRI and Brattle to fully build the Smart Grid by approximately 2030. If Congress chooses to, it could provide funding to help bridge the funding gap to accelerate adoption of the Smart Grid. Most electric utilities appear to view Smart Grid systems positively, even with the added concerns for cybersecurity. Cost of operations could be reduced and system resiliency improved by further integration of automated switches and sensors, even considering the cost of a more cybersecure environment. But with the potentially high costs of a formal transition, some see Smart Grid deployment continuing much the same as it has, with a gradual modernization of the system as older components are replaced. Customer-Focused Programs
The ability of customers to take advantage of real-time pricing programs to reduce consumer cost and energy demand depends on the deployment of smart technologies and program approval by regulatory jurisdictions. | The electrical grid in the United States comprises all of the power plants generating electricity, together with the transmission and distribution lines and systems that bring power to end-use customers. The "grid" also connects the many publicly and privately owned electric utility and power companies in different states and regions of the United States. However, with changes in federal law, regulatory changes, and the aging of the electric power infrastructure as drivers, the grid is changing from a largely patchwork system built to serve the needs of individual electric utility companies to essentially a national interconnected system, accommodating massive transfers of electrical energy among regions of the United States.
The modernization of the grid to accommodate today's more complex power flows, serve reliability needs, and meet future projected uses is leading to the incorporation of electronic intelligence capabilities for power control purposes and operations monitoring. The "Smart Grid" is the name given to this evolving intelligent electric power network. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) describes the Smart Grid as "an intelligent electricity grid—one that uses digital communications technology, information systems, and automation to detect and react to local changes in usage, improve system operating efficiency, and, in turn, reduce operating costs while maintaining high system reliability."
In 2007, Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act (P.L. 110-140). Title XIII of the act described characteristics of the Smart Grid and directed DOE to establish a Smart Grid Investment Matching Grant (SGIG) program to help support the modernization of the nation's electricity system.
In 2014, DOE concluded that the adoption of Smart Grid technologies was accelerating but at varying rates "depending largely on decision-making at utility, state, and local levels." DOE noted that the nation's electricity system is in the midst of "potentially transformative change," with challenges for Smart Grid deployment remaining with respect to grid-connected renewable and distributed energy sources and adaptability to current and future consumer-oriented applications.
Costs of deploying the Smart Grid remains an issue, and study estimates vary. While some DOE programs have supported grid modernization, Congress has not explicitly appropriated funding for deployment of the Smart Grid since the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). In its 2014 study, DOE estimated historical and forecast investment in the Smart Grid as approximately $32.5 billion between 2008 and 2017, averaging $3.61 billion annually in the period. If this level of investment remains constant, it would put spending well below levels the Electric Power Research Institute (in 2011) and the Brattle Group (in 2008) estimated were needed to fully build the Smart Grid by approximately 2030. From 2010 to 2015, $3.4 billion in SGIG grants supported 99 projects resulting in $8 billion in grid modernization.
Congress could provide funding to help bridge the funding gap if it chooses to accelerate adoption of the Smart Grid. A number of near-term trends—including electric vehicles, environmental concerns, and the ability of customers to take advantage of real-time pricing programs to reduce consumer cost and energy demand—would benefit from investments in Smart Grid enabled technologies.
While concerns such as cybersecurity and privacy exist, most electric utilities appear to view Smart Grid systems positively. Costs could be reduced and system resiliency improved by further integration of automated switches and sensors, even considering the cost of a more cybersecure environment. But with the potentially high costs of a formal transition, some see the deployment of the Smart Grid continuing much the same as it has, with a gradual modernization of the system as older components are replaced. |
crs_R43210 | crs_R43210_0 | E ven today, after the passage of more than three decades, the 1979-1981 Iran Hostage Crisis remains an event familiar to most Americans. Many might be unaware that the 52 American mostly military and diplomatic personnel held hostage in Tehran for 444 days or their survivors continue to strive for signif icant compensation for their ordeal. The former hostages and their families did receive a number of benefits under various civil service laws, and each hostage received from the U.S. government a cash payment of $50 for each day held hostage. The hostages have never received any compensation from Iran through court actions, all efforts having failed due to foreign sovereign immunity and an executive agreement known as the Algiers Accords, which bars such lawsuits. Congress took action to abrogate Iran's sovereign immunity in the case, but never successfully abrogated the executive agreement, leaving the plaintiffs with jurisdiction to pursue their case but without a judicial cause of action. Having lost their bids in the courts to obtain recompense, the former hostages have turned to Congress for relief. This report outlines the history of various efforts, including legislative efforts and court cases, and describes several bills currently before Congress, the Justice for Former American Hostages in Iran Act of 2015, S. 868 , a companion bill, H.R. 3338 , and Section 122 of the Department of State Operations Authorization and Embassy Security Act, Fiscal Year 2016, S. 1635 . | Even today, after the passage of some three decades, the 1979-1981 Iran Hostage Crisis remains an event familiar to most Americans. Many might be unaware that the 52 American mostly military and diplomatic personnel held hostage in Tehran for 444 days continue to strive for significant compensation for their ordeal. The former hostages and their families did receive a number of benefits under various civil service laws, and each hostage received from the U.S. government a cash payment of $50 for each day held hostage. The hostages have never received any compensation from Iran through court actions, all efforts having failed due to foreign sovereign immunity and an executive agreement known as the Algiers Accords, which bars such lawsuits. Congress took action to abrogate Iran's sovereign immunity in the case Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, but never successfully abrogated the executive agreement, leaving the plaintiffs with jurisdiction to pursue their case but without a judicial cause of action.
Having lost their bids in the courts to obtain recompense, the former hostages have turned to Congress for relief. This report outlines the history of various efforts, including legislative efforts and court cases, and describes several bills currently before Congress, the Justice for Former American Hostages in Iran Act of 2015, S. 868, a companion bill, H.R. 3338, and Section 122 of the Department of State Operations Authorization and Embassy Security Act, Fiscal Year 2016, S. 1635. |
crs_R44850 | crs_R44850_0 | Introduction
Congress has passed several laws requiring that goods purchased by federal agencies be produced in the United States. Among these are two separate but closely related laws applying to national security agencies. The Berry Amendment covers direct Department of Defense (DOD) purchases of textiles, apparel, footwear, food, and hand or measuring tools. The Kissell Amendment is more limited, applying to textiles, apparel, and footwear procured by certain Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies. Berry Amendment
The Berry Amendment (10 U.S.C. However, the agreement expressly does not apply to DOD procurements involving textiles, clothing, food, and hand or measuring tools. Kissell Amendment
A second law, sometimes referred to as the Kissell Amendment (6 U.S.C. It applies to the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), both of which are within DHS. If these items are related to "the national security interests of the United States," they must be "domestically grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced in the United States" to the greatest extent possible. The Berry and Kissell Amendments and Domestic Manufacturing
Sales to DOD in the four Berry-applicable product categories totaled $2.4 billion in FY2016 (see Figure 1 ). This has created niche markets for domestic producers. DOD spent approximately $1.6 billion on Berry-compliant purchases of textiles and apparel in FY2016, and DHS purchases of apparel under the Kissell Amendment came to more than $30 million. Purchases subject to the Berry and Kissell Amendments represented around 2% of the $68 billion of textile and apparel shipments from U.S. factories in 2016. Among other issues, critics have challenged FPI/UNICOR's mandatory source provision, which requires DOD to purchase from FPI/UNICOR factories if they can provide the desired product within the required time frame and at a competitive price. For example, in the 114 th Congress, the Federal Prison Industries Competition in Contracting Act of 2015 ( H.R. 1699 ) would have eliminated FPI's no-bid contract status. The Bureau of Industry and Security at the Department of Commerce is updating its 2003 assessment of the U.S. textile, apparel, and footwear industries. The updated assessment, which the bureau expects to finish in summer 2017, is expected to address the effectiveness of the Berry and Kissell Amendments and other domestic-source laws. In the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress extended the Berry Amendment to require the military services to provide recruits with 100% U.S.-made running shoes. The new requirement is to be implemented beginning on October 1, 2018, and may create a new market for athletic shoes manufactured domestically. Congressional Debate
Proponents of the Berry and Kissell Amendments assert that the laws serve to keep certain U.S. production lines operating. They argue that the U.S. military should not be dependent on foreign sources for critical items, including those covered by the Berry and Kissell Amendments, and that dependence on foreign sources for military and national security items could lead to supply problems during times of war or military mobilization. They claim that the amendments are inconsistent with modern practices in manufacturing, which often involve supply chains that source components and raw materials from multiple countries, and that domestic purchase requirements may alienate foreign trading partners, thereby potentially provoking retaliation and harming foreign sales. Legislative action has centered on the scope of the amendments, the requirements for obtaining waivers, and the use of audits to determine the laws' effectiveness. In recent Congresses, lawmakers have introduced bills that would have widened the scope of these domestic preference laws. In addition, Senator Christopher Murphy has requested the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate U.S. government compliance with the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act. | The Berry and Kissell Amendments are two separate but closely related laws requiring that certain goods purchased by national security agencies be produced in the United States.
The Berry Amendment (10 U.S.C. §2533a) is the popular name for a law requiring textiles, clothing, food, and hand or measuring tools purchased by the Department of Defense (DOD) to be grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced wholly in the United States. Congress over the decades has varied the list of products covered by the law. Under the Kissell Amendment (6 U.S.C. §453b), textile, apparel, and footwear products purchased by certain Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies—namely, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard—must be manufactured in the United States with 100% U.S. inputs.
The Berry and Kissell Amendments have created niche markets for domestic producers. DOD's Defense Logistics Agency purchased about $2.4 billion of Berry-applicable products in FY2016. DOD's annual Berry Act purchases equal approximately 2% of domestic textile and apparel shipments and around 1% of domestic production of footwear, food, and hand or measuring tools. Annual purchases of textiles, clothing, and shoes by the TSA and the Coast Guard pursuant to the Kissell Amendment are approximately $30 million.
Proponents of the Berry and Kissell Amendments assert the laws serve to keep certain U.S. production lines operating, provide jobs to American factory workers, and shield the U.S. military from dependence on foreign sources for critical items that could lead to supply problems during times of war or military mobilization. Critics of the amendments point out the laws may undercut free-market competition and can result in higher costs to DOD and DHS because they must pay more for protected products than the free market requires. They also argue the laws are inconsistent with modern practices in manufacturing, which often rely on supply chains that source components and raw materials from multiple countries. Another concern is that these requirements can potentially provoke retaliation and harm foreign sales.
In recent Congresses, legislative action has centered on the scope of the Berry and Kissell Amendments. For example, in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress extended the Berry Amendment to athletic footwear, ending a voucher program that had allowed new recruits to purchase foreign-made running shoes. Beginning on October 1, 2018, DOD is scheduled to provide 100% U.S.-made running shoes to recruits. In the 115th Congress, H.R. 1811 has been introduced to widen the scope of the Kissell Amendment to all DHS agencies.
A related issue for Congress is the use of prison labor to manufacture Berry-compliant apparel by DOD. A mandatory source provision in law gives an advantage to prison factories if they can provide the desired product within the required time frame at a competitive price. In the 114th Congress, the Federal Prison Industries Competition in Contracting Act of 2015 (H.R. 1699) would have eliminated Federal Prison Industries' no-bid contract status.
Requirements for obtaining waivers are another congressional concern. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is currently auditing DHS's compliance with the Kissell Amendment. The audit is expected to be finished in summer 2017.
Congress is also considering the effectiveness of the laws. To address this issue, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) is conducting an assessment of the defense industrial base for textiles, apparel, and footwear, which will include a review of the usefulness of the Berry and Kissell Amendments. That review is scheduled to be released in 2017. |
crs_R42398 | crs_R42398_0 | Introduction
As part of a larger scheme to regulate drugs and other controlled substances, federal law prohibits the cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana. No exception is made for marijuana used in the course of a recommended medical treatment. Indeed, by categorizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the federal government has concluded that marijuana has "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States." Yet 18 states and the District of Columbia have decriminalized medical marijuana by enacting exceptions to their drug laws that permit individuals to grow, possess, or use marijuana for medicinal purposes. In contrast to the complete federal prohibition, these 19 jurisdictions see medicinal value in marijuana and permit the drug's use under certain circumstances. This report will review the federal government's constitutional authority to enact the federal criminal prohibition on marijuana; highlight certain principles of federalism that prevent the federal government from mandating that states participate in enforcing the federal prohibition; consider unresolved questions relating to the extent to which state authorization and regulation of medical marijuana are preempted by federal law; and assess what obligations, if any, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has to investigate and prosecute violations of the federal prohibition on marijuana. Although Raich established Congress's constitutional authority to enact the existing federal prohibition on marijuana, principles of federalism prevent the federal government from mandating that the states support or participate in enforcing the federal law. While state resources may be helpful in combating the illegal use of marijuana, Congress's ability to compel the states to enact similar criminal prohibitions, to repeal medical marijuana exemptions, or to direct state police officers to enforce the federal law remains limited. Even if the federal government is prohibited from mandating that the states adopt laws supportive of federal policy, the constitutional doctrine of preemption generally prevents states from enacting laws that are inconsistent with federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with federal law are generally preempted and therefore void. Courts, however, have not viewed the relationship between state and federal marijuana laws in such a manner, nor did Congress intend that the CSA displace all state laws associated with controlled substances. Instead, the relationship between the federal ban on marijuana and state medical marijuana exemptions must be considered in the context of two distinct sovereigns, each enacting separate and independent criminal regimes with separate and independent enforcement mechanisms, in which certain conduct may be prohibited under one sovereign and not the other. Although state and federal marijuana laws may be "logically inconsistent," a decision not to criminalize—or even to expressly decriminalize—conduct for purposes of the law within one sphere does nothing to alter the legality of that same conduct in the other sphere. | As part of a larger scheme to regulate drugs and other controlled substances, federal law prohibits the cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana. No exception is made for marijuana used in the course of a recommended medical treatment. Indeed, by categorizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the federal government has concluded that marijuana has "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States." Yet 18 states and the District of Columbia have decriminalized medical marijuana by enacting exceptions to their state drug laws that permit individuals to grow, possess, or use marijuana for medicinal purposes. In contrast to the complete federal prohibition, these 19 jurisdictions see medicinal value in marijuana and permit the drug's use under certain circumstances.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has established Congress's constitutional authority to enact the existing federal prohibition on marijuana, principles of federalism prevent the federal government from mandating that the states actively support or participate in enforcing the federal law. While state resources may be helpful in combating the illegal use of marijuana, Congress's ability to compel the states to enact similar criminal prohibitions, to repeal medical marijuana exemptions, or to direct state police officers to enforce the federal law remains limited by the Tenth Amendment.
Even if the federal government is prohibited from mandating that the states adopt laws supportive of federal policy, the constitutional doctrine of preemption generally prevents states from enacting laws that are inconsistent with federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with federal law are generally preempted and therefore void. Courts, however, have not viewed the relationship between state and federal marijuana laws in such a manner, nor did Congress intend that the CSA displace all state laws associated with controlled substances. Instead, the relationship between the federal ban on marijuana and state medical marijuana exemptions must be considered in the context of two distinct sovereigns, each enacting separate and independent criminal regimes with separate and independent enforcement mechanisms, in which certain conduct may be prohibited under one sovereign and not the other. Although state and federal marijuana laws may be "logically inconsistent," a decision not to criminalize—or even to expressly decriminalize—conduct for purposes of the law within one sphere does nothing to alter the legality of that same conduct in the other sphere.
This report will review the federal government's constitutional authority to enact the federal criminal prohibition on marijuana; highlight certain principles of federalism that prevent the federal government from mandating that states participate in enforcing the federal prohibition; consider unresolved questions relating to the extent to which state authorization and regulation of medical marijuana are preempted by federal law; and assess what obligations, if any, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has to investigate and prosecute violations of the federal prohibition on marijuana. |
crs_R44696 | crs_R44696_0 | Casework , in a congressional office, refers to the response or services that Members of Congress provide to constituents who request assistance. As part of the process of determining how to carry out their congressional duties, Members of Congress largely determine the scope of casework and their other constituent service activities. Why do offices do casework? Casework is not required of Members of Congress, but it is commonly expected by constituents. House Casework Rules and Guidance
House rules regarding casework services are discussed in the House Ethics Manual . The number and type of constituent requests, how an office defines casework, Member priorities, and the distribution of responsibilities among office locations and staff are some of the factors that can affect a congressional office's casework policies and procedures. Congressional staff serving as caseworkers typically act as liaisons between constituents and federal agencies. The decision to hire a caseworker, the specific qualifications for that role, and job responsibilities, however, are left to each Member office to determine. Caseworkers generally first obtain information about the constituent's situation from the person requesting assistance. Often, this involves contacting a federal agency's congressional liaison. Additional information for caseworkers on working with constituents is available on the CRS casework resources website ( http://www.crs.gov/resources/casework ) or by contacting CRS. Often, federal agencies have designated legislative affairs or congressional relations staff assigned as general points of contact for congressional caseworkers. What resources are available to congressional offices? These resources include
an introductory video on casework (CRS Video WVB00093, Introduction to Congressional Casework ); a longer report on casework practices (CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office: Background, Rules, Laws, and Resources ); a report on U.S. service academy nominations (CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management ); and a list of frequently updated congressional liaison contacts (CRS Report 98-446, Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies ). Congressional offices may also contact CRS analysts directly to address more specific questions or concerns related to casework. | Constituents often contact a congressional office looking for assistance; the work congressional offices do in response to these requests is generally referred to as casework . Members of Congress determine the scope of their constituent service activities, including casework. Many requests for casework come from constituents seeking assistance from federal agencies, but offices may also receive requests from non-constituents. Congressional offices can have different conceptualizations of casework based on Member preferences, district needs, and constituent expectations.
This report addresses frequently asked questions (FAQs) about congressional casework. It is intended to provide resources for congressional offices and individual caseworkers. This includes the casework rules and guidelines established by the House and Senate, as well as some observations about how congressional offices generally approach casework and work with federal agencies on behalf of constituents.
Casework practices are largely left to each Member office to determine, like many other aspects of congressional operations. Each constituent's situation is unique, and federal agencies vary in their casework practices, which makes it difficult for either chamber to issue prescriptive guidelines regarding casework. The degree of flexibility afforded to offices can help caseworkers tailor their assistance to best meet constituents' needs.
The relative autonomy afforded to congressional offices regarding casework also means that many of the answers provided here are necessarily broad-based. Further resources are available from CRS that can provide more specific, context-specific information. Several of these CRS resources are discussed throughout this report, including the following:
CRS Video WVB00093, Introduction to Congressional Casework , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office: Background, Rules, Laws, and Resources , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report 98-446, Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies , by [author name scrubbed] the CRS resources website, "Constituent Services: Casework," by [author name scrubbed], available at http://crs.gov/resources/casework |
crs_R44703 | crs_R44703_0 | Introduction
A generic drug is a lower-cost copy of a brand-name chemical drug. Marketing of the generic drug becomes possible only when the brand-nameâalso called innovatorâdrug is no longer protected from market competition by patent and other protections, called regulatory exclusivity. Prior to marketing, the sponsor of a brand-name drug must submit to FDA clinical data in a new drug application (NDA) to support the claim that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use. The FDA uses the information in the NDA as a basis for approving or denying the sponsor's application. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 ( P.L. 98-417 )âalso called the Hatch-Waxman Actâamended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) allowing a generic drug manufacturer to submit an abbreviated NDA (ANDA) to the FDA for premarket review. In the ANDA, the generic company establishes that its drug product is chemically the same as the already approved drug and thereby relies on the FDA's previous finding of safety and effectiveness for the approved drug. Because the generic sponsor does not perform costly animal and clinical research âand usually does not pay for expensive advertising, marketing, and promotionâthe generic drug company is able to sell its generic drug product at a lower price compared with the brand drug product. FDA states that on average, "the cost of a generic drug is 80 to 85 percent lower than the brand name product." Once a drug is approved, the brand-name manufacturer sets the drug price based on a number of factors. Patent and regulatory exclusivity allow the company to recoup its research and development expenses, allow further R&D investment, and provide a profit to stockholders. The branded drug is protected from market competition by (1) patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office and (2) regulatory exclusivity granted by the FDA following enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act. These incentives allow the brand-name company to charge a much higher price for the drug product than the cost of manufacture. According to FDA, the Hatch-Waxman Act led to "a significant regulatory challenge" for the agency. That is because FDA's resources did not keep pace with the increasing number of ANDAs and other submissions related to generic drugs. This resulted in delayed approvals of generic drugs, "a major concern for the generics industry, FDA, consumers, and payers alike." In March 2012, median review time for generic drug applications was approximately 31 months and FDA had a backlog of over 2,500 ANDAs. In addition, FDA had to conduct more inspections as the number of manufacturing facilities grew, "with the greatest increase coming from foreign facilities." Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA I)
In order to expedite ANDA reviews and bring parity to domestic and foreign inspection schedules, FDA had proposed generic drug user fees in each annual budget request to Congress beginning with the FY2008 request. Such fees became possible when the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144 ) became law in July 2012. Title III of FDASIA, the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA), authorized FDA to collect fees from industry for agency activities associated with generic drugs. Under what is now called GDUFA I, such fees are allowed to be collected from October 2012 through September 2017. In October 2016, the agency posted on its website the draft GDUFA agreementâGDUFA IIâsetting FDA performance goals and procedures for FY2018 through FY2022. After receiving the GDUFA II recommendations (both statutory and the agreement), Senate and House committees favorably reported bills for floor consideration ( S. 934 , H.R. | A generic drug is a lower-cost copy of a brand-name chemical drug. Marketing of the generic drug becomes possible only when the brand-nameâalso called innovatorâdrug is no longer protected from market competition by patent and other protections, called regulatory exclusivity.
Prior to marketing, the sponsor of a brand-name drug must submit to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) clinical data in a new drug application (NDA) to support the claim that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use. The FDA uses the information in the NDA as a basis for approving or denying the sponsor's application. Once a drug is approved, the brand-name manufacturer has free rein in setting the drug price due to a government-sanctioned monopoly for a defined period of time. This is designed to enable the company to recoup its r esearch and development expenses, allow further R&D investment, and provide a profit to stockholders.
The branded drug is protected from market competition by (1) patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office and (2) regulatory exclusivity granted by the FDA following enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 ( P.L. 98-417 ), also called the Hatch-Waxman Act. These congressionally established incentives allow the brand-name company to charge a much higher price for the drug product than the cost of manufacture. In one extreme example, as calculated by researchers in the United Kingdom and the United States, the annual cost to produce the cancer drug Gleevecâincluding a 50% profitâcould be $216 per patient; the current annual price for a U.S patient is $107,799.
The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) allowing a generic drug manufacturer to submit an abbreviated NDA (ANDA) to the FDA for premarket review. In the ANDA, the generic company establishes that its drug product is chemically the same as the already approved drug and thereby relies on the FDA's previous finding of safety and effectiveness for the approved drug. Because the generic sponsor does not perform costly animal and clinical researchâand usually does not pay for expensive advertising, marketing, and promotionâthe generic drug company is able to sell its drug product at a lower price compared with the branded drug product. The cost of a generic drug is, on average, about 85% lower than the brand-name product.
According to FDA, the success of the Hatch-Waxman Act led to significant regulatory challenges for the agency. FDA's resources did not keep pace with the increasing number of ANDAs, resulting in delayed approvals of generic drugs, "a major concern for the generics industry, FDA, consumers, and payers alike." In March 2012, median review time for generic drug applications was approximately 31 months and FDA had a backlog of over 2,500 ANDAs. In addition, FDA had to conduct more inspections as the number of manufacturing facilities grew, "with the greatest increase coming from foreign facilities."
To eliminate the backlog, expedite ANDA reviews, and provide resources for more inspections, FDA proposed generic drug user fees in each annual budget request to Congress beginning with the FY2008 request. Such fees became possible in July 2012 when the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144 ) became law. Title III of FDASIA, the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA), authorized FDA to collect fees from industry for agency activities associated with generic drugs. What is now called GDUFA I allowed the collection of such fees from October 2012 through September 2017.
Between October 2015 and August 2016, FDA held negotiation sessions with industry on GDUFA reauthorization. In October 2016, FDA posted on its website the draft agreementâGDUFA IIâsetting fees and FDA performance goals for FY2018 through FY2022. After receiving the GDUFA II recommendations (both statutory and the agreement), Senate and House committees favorably reported bills for floor consideration. |
crs_R42919 | crs_R42919_0 | Of particular relevance to this report, all 50 state attorneys general, the attorney general for the District of Columbia, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) initiated an investigation into foreclosure-related state and federal law violations by the nation's top five mortgage servicers. On February 8, 2012, these state and federal officials, with the exception of Oklahoma's attorney general, announced a "National Mortgage Settlement" of certain legal claims with these five institutions. The settlement is to result in the servicers providing about $25 billion of relief, primarily to homeowners and individuals who recently lost their homes through foreclosure. In financial terms, it constitutes the second largest legal settlement ever reached by the attorneys general, behind only the settlement with tobacco companies in 1998. The agreements stipulate that, in exchange for a release of liability for legal claims that otherwise could have been raised against the servicers by the participating regulators, these five mortgage companies will provide five distinct forms of relief. Under the agreements, the mortgage companies shall:
comply with specified servicing standards going forward ("Servicing Standards" component); provide various forms of mortgage-related consumer relief to current borrowers whose mortgages are owned and serviced by the five servicers ("Consumer Relief" component); provide certain relief to servicemembers who may have been harmed by violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) and to improve the servicing of soldiers' mortgages to prevent future SCRA violations ("SCRA" component); provide compensation to certain individuals whose homes were previously foreclosed by the five servicers ("Borrower Payment" component); and make direct payments to federal and state governments to cover the resolution of legal claims ("Direct Settlement Payment" component). Individual homeowners are not parties to the agreements, and the terms of the agreements do not provide individual borrowers a private right of action to enforce the agreements. Similarly, the settlement agreements do not, in any way, limit any enforcement power held by state or federal regulators that are not parties to the agreements, including the authorities of the federal banking regulators, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Oversight of the Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief Terms
The agreements establish an independent Monitor with the primary authority to conduct oversight of the servicers' compliance with the Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief terms. Enforcement of the Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief Terms
Generally
A Monitoring Committee that is composed of representatives of the state and federal regulators that are parties to the agreements primarily is responsible for enforcing the Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief terms. The Special Administrator charged with distributing the Borrower Payments was appointed by the state members of the Monitoring Committee. | In Autumn 2010, all 50 state attorneys general, the attorney general for the District of Columbia, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department) initiated an investigation into foreclosure-related state and federal law violations by the nation's top five mortgage servicers: Ally Financial, Inc. (formerly GMAC, Inc.); Bank of America, Corp.; Citigroup, Inc.; JP Morgan Chase & Co.; and Wells Fargo & Co. On February 8, 2012, these state and federal officials, with the exception of Oklahoma's attorney general, announced a "National Mortgage Settlement" of certain legal claims with these five institutions. The settlement is to result in the servicers providing about $25 billion of relief, primarily to homeowners and individuals who recently lost their homes through foreclosure. In financial terms, it constitutes the second largest legal settlement ever reached by the attorneys general, behind only the 1998 settlement with tobacco companies.
The agreements stipulate that, in exchange for a release of liability for legal claims that otherwise could have been raised against the servicers by the participating regulators, these five mortgage companies will provide five distinct forms of relief. Under the agreements, the mortgage companies shall
comply with specified servicing standards going forward; provide various forms of mortgage-related consumer relief to current borrowers whose mortgages are owned and serviced by the five servicers ("Consumer Relief" component); provide relief to servicemembers who may have been harmed by violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) and to improve the servicing of soldiers' mortgages to prevent future SCRA violations ("SCRA" component); provide compensation to certain individuals whose homes were previously foreclosed by the five servicers ("Borrower Payment" component); and make direct payments to federal and state governments to cover the resolution of legal claims ("Direct Settlement Payment" component).
With the exception of the Direct Settlement Payment component, the agreements also provide explicit mechanisms by which compliance of each distinct relief component will be overseen and enforced. The agreements establish an independent monitor with the primary authority to conduct oversight of the servicers' compliance with Consumer Relief and Servicing Standards of the settlement, while the enforcement powers primarily are provided to a Monitoring Committee that is composed of representatives of the state and federal regulators that are parties to the agreements. Primary oversight and enforcement of the SCRA terms reside with the DOJ. A Special Administrator is charged with identifying individuals who qualify for monetary relief under the Borrower Payment terms and with distributing those funds, while the state members of the Monitoring Committee have the authority to oversee the Special Administrator's operations.
Individual homeowners are not parties to the agreements, and the terms of the agreements do not provide individual borrowers a private right of action to enforce the agreements. Similarly, the settlement agreements do not, in any way, limit any enforcement power held by state or federal regulators that are not parties to the agreements, including the authorities of the federal banking regulators. |
crs_RL32500 | crs_RL32500_0 | Introduction
The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) established the statutory framework for themanagerial structure of the United States Intelligence Community, including the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). A fundamental intent ofthis legislation was to coordinate, and to a certain extent centralize, the nascent intelligence effortsof the United States as an emergent superpower in the face of a hostile Soviet Union. Unlike the intelligence investigations of the1970s and 1980s, these early studies were primarily concerned with questions of efficiency andeffectiveness rather than with issues of legality and propriety. 104-293 ), but some observers havesubsequently concluded that this legislation did not go far enough and that, in the light of the eventsof September 11, 2001 and the Iraq War, intelligence organization questions need to be reevaluated. In the face of Soviet aggressiveness, the U.S. sought to enhance its nationaldefense capabilities to curb the international spread of communism and to provide security for thenation itself. In the context of the Cold War, a communist Cuba appeared to justify covert U.S. action tosecure a change in that nation's government. In part, the directive called for:
An enhanced leadership role for the [DCI] in planning, reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of nationalintelligence. (82)
In the same year, Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of the CIA, made a number of recommendations. Both proposals called for the following:
Creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authority to program and reprogram intelligence funds throughout the Intelligence Community, including the DefenseDepartment, and to direct their expenditure; and to task intelligence agencies and transfer personneltemporarily from one agency to another to support new requirements;
Creating two Deputy Directors of National Intelligence (DDNIs); one of whom would be responsible for analysis and estimates, the other for Intelligence Community affairs;
Creating a separate Director of the CIA, subordinate to the new DNI, to manage the agency's collection and covert action capabilities on a day-to-day basis;
Consolidating analytical and estimative efforts of the Intelligence Community (including analysts from CIA, and some from DIA, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)at the State Department, and other agencies) into a separate office under one of the Deputy DNIs(this aspect of the proposal would effectively separate CIA's analytical elements from its collectionand covert action offices);
Creating a National Imagery Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) to collect, exploit, and analyze imagery (these tasks had been spread among several entities; theHouse version would divide these efforts into two new separate agencies);and
Authorizing the Director of DIA to task defense intelligence agencies (DIA, NSA, the new Imagery Agency) with collection requirements; and to shift functions, funding, andpersonnel from one DOD intelligence agency to another. The recommendations of the Aspin/Brown Commission and the IC21 Study led to extensive congressional considerationof intelligence organization issues. The general trend has been towardsmore thorough oversight both by the executive branch and by congressional committees. Some have argued that, in the light of the Intelligence Community's inability toprovide warning of the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon andinaccurate intelligence estimates about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the need for reorganizingthe Intelligence Community has become self-evident. Specific legislation to reorganize the nation's intelligence effort, including S. 2845 , is currently under consideration and the 9/11 Commission's recommendationsare receiving widespread interest. | Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community have repeatedly emerged from commissions and committees created by either the executive or legislative branches. The heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence and the great influence of theDepartments of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major reorganization plans fromwithin the Intelligence Community itself.
Proposals to reorganize the Intelligence Community emerged in the period immediately following passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) that established the positionof Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Recommendations have ranged from adjustments in the DCI's budgetary responsibilities to theactual dissolution of the CIA and returning its functions to other departments. The goals underlyingsuch proposals have reflected trends in American foreign policy and the international environmentas well as domestic concerns about governmental accountability.
In the face of a hostile Soviet Union, early intelligence reorganization proposals were more concerned with questions of efficiency. In the Cold War context of the 1950s, a number ofrecommendations sought aggressively to enhance U.S. covert action and counterintelligencecapabilities. The chairman of one committee charged with investigating the nation's intelligencecapabilities, Army General James H. Doolittle, argued that sacrificing America's sense of "fair play"was wholly justified in the struggle to prevent Soviet world domination.
Following the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the unsuccessful results of intervention in Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal, investigations by congressional committeesfocused on the propriety of a wide range of heretofore accepted intelligence activities that includedassassinations and some domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens. Some forcefully questioned theviability of secret intelligence agencies within a democratic society. These investigations resultedin much closer congressional oversight and a more exacting legal framework for intelligenceactivities. At the same time, the growth in technical intelligence capabilities led to an enhanced --but by no means predominant -- leadership role for the DCI in determining community-widebudgets and priorities.
With the end of the Cold War, emerging security concerns, including transnational terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, faced the United States. Some statutory changes were made in the mid-1990s, but their results were not far-reaching. In theaftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Iraq War, some observers urge reconsideringthe intelligence organization. The 9/11 Commission has specifically recommended theestablishment of a National Intelligence Director to manage the national intelligence program. Current intelligence organization issues can be usefully addressed with an awareness of argumentspro and con that were raised by earlier investigators; this recommendation has been incorporated ina number of bills, including S. 2845 . This report will be updated as circumstanceswarrant. |
crs_RL34543 | crs_RL34543_0 | Common illegal drugs trafficked internationally include cocaine and heroin, as well as psychotropic substances, such as methamphetamine and ecstasy. Consequences of the Drug Trade
The global illegal drug trade represents a multi-dimensional challenge that has implications for U.S. national interests as well as the international community. Drug use and addiction have been said to negatively affect the social fabric of communities, hinder economic development, and place an additional burden on national public health infrastructures. Strategic Debate
Drug trafficking has been an issue of international policy concern for more than a century and a subject of long-standing U.S. and multilateral policy commitment. Yet, tensions continue to appear at times between U.S. foreign drug policy and approaches advocated by independent observers and the international community. In recent years, some international advocates have called for a fundamental shift of current international drug policies, which are viewed by such observers as encouraging a prohibitionist approach to counternarcotics. However, changes could affect a range of foreign policy considerations for the United States, including foreign aid reform, counterinsurgency strategy (particularly in Afghanistan), the distribution of domestic and international drug control funding, and the relative balance of civilian, law enforcement, and military roles in anti-drug efforts. International Policy Framework
Reflecting historically broad consensus, international efforts to combat drug trafficking are based on a long-standing and robust set of multilateral commitments. Since then, the international community has broadened and deepened the scope of international drug control through several international treaties and monitoring mechanisms. In 1988, Congress established the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to coordinate all U.S. counterdrug policy, both domestically and internationally. Multiple other U.S. agencies are also responsible for various aspects of the U.S. counterdrug response. The following sections describe several of the key U.S. government strategies and initiatives for combating drugs internationally and in specific regions around the world. U.S. National Drug Control Strategy
U.S. involvement in international drug control rests on the central premise that helping foreign governments combat the illegal drug trade abroad will ultimately curb illegal drug availability and use in the United States. To this end, the current Administration maintains the goal of reducing and eliminating the international flow of illegal drugs into the United States through international cooperation to disrupt the drug trade and interdiction efforts. For FY2016, the Administration has requested from Congress approximately $27.6 billion for all federal drug control programs, of which $1.6 billion is requested for international programs, including civilian and military U.S. foreign assistance. An additional $3.9 billion is requested for interdiction programs related to intercepting and disrupting foreign drug shipments en route to the United States. Selected Country and Regional Initiatives
The majority of U.S. counterdrug efforts internationally are concentrated in the Western Hemisphere, including South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, as well as in Afghanistan. 5. U.S. Agency Roles
Several U.S. agencies are involved in implementing U.S. international counternarcotics activities in support of the Administration's National Drug Control Strategy. Located within the Executive Office of the President, ONDCP establishes U.S. counterdrug policies and goals, and coordinates the federal budget to combat drugs both domestically and internationally. Department of the Treasury. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Civilian Authorities
The U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the two primary sources of civilian U.S. funding for international counternarcotics assistance. U.S. Foreign Policy Approaches
Over the years, U.S. counterdrug efforts have expanded to include a broad array of tools to attack the drug trade using several foreign policy approaches. Through its appropriations and federal oversight responsibilities, Congress is able to evaluate current efforts, which appear to center around four main drug control policy strategies: (1) combating the production of drugs at the source, (2) combating the flow of drugs in transit, (3) dismantling illicit drug networks, and (4) creating incentives for international cooperation on drug control. A variety of U.S. agencies are involved in counterdrug-related capacity building efforts abroad, including the State Department, USAID, the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense. | The global illegal drug trade represents a multi-dimensional challenge that has implications for U.S. national interests as well as the international community. Common illegal drugs trafficked internationally include cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. According to the U.S. intelligence community, international drug trafficking can undermine political and regional stability and bolster the role and capabilities of transnational criminal organizations in the drug trade. Key regions of concern include Latin America and Afghanistan, which are focal points in U.S. efforts to combat the production and transit of cocaine and heroin, respectively. Drug use and addiction have the potential to negatively affect the social fabric of communities, hinder economic development, and place an additional burden on national public health infrastructures.
International Policy Framework and Debate
International efforts to combat drug trafficking are based on a long-standing and robust set of multilateral commitments, to which the United States has committed. U.S. involvement in international drug control rests on the central premise that helping foreign governments to combat illicit drugs abroad will ultimately curb availability and use in the United States. To this end, the current Administration maintains the goal of reducing and eliminating the international flow of illegal drugs into the United States through international cooperation to disrupt the drug trade, interdiction efforts, and support for demand reduction.
Despite multilateral commitments to curb the supply of illicit drugs, tensions appear at times between U.S. foreign drug policy and approaches advocated by independent observers and other members of the international community. In recent years, an increasing number of international advocates, including several former and sitting heads of state, have begun to call for a reevaluation of current prohibitionist-oriented international drug policies. Alternatives to the existing international drug control regime may include legalizing or decriminalizing certain drugs. Debates may also focus on shifting priorities and resources among various approaches to counternarcotics, including supply and demand reduction; the distribution of domestic and international drug control funding; and the relative balance of civilian, law enforcement, and military roles in anti-drug efforts.
U.S. Counternarcotics Initiatives and Foreign Policy Options
Several key U.S. strategies and initiatives outline the foundation of U.S. counternarcotics efforts internationally, including the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy and International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), both of which are updated annually and congressionally mandated. Other major country and regional initiatives include the (1) Mérida Initiative and Strategy in Mexico; (2) Central American Citizen Security Partnership; (3) Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI); (4) U.S.-Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI); (5) U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan; and (6) West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI).
Located within the Executive Office of the President, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) establishes U.S. counterdrug policies and goals, and coordinates the federal budget to combat drugs both domestically and internationally. Within the U.S. government, multiple civilian, military, law enforcement, and intelligence entities contribute to international drug control policy, including the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
As an issue of international policy concern for more than a century, and as a subject of long-standing U.S. and multilateral policy commitment, U.S. counterdrug efforts have expanded to include a broad array of tools to attack the international drug trade, such as the following:
reducing drug production at the source, combating drugs in transit, dismantling international illicit drug networks, reducing and preventing drug demand abroad, and creating incentives for international cooperation on drug control.
Congress has been involved in all aspects of U.S. international drug control policy, regularly appropriating funds for counterdrug initiatives, as well as conducting oversight activities on federal counterdrug programs and the scope of agency authorities and other counterdrug policies. For FY2016, the Administration has requested from Congress approximately $27.6 billion for all federal drug control programs, of which $1.6 billion is requested for international programs, including civilian and military U.S. foreign assistance. An additional $3.9 billion is requested for interdiction programs related to intercepting and disrupting foreign drug shipments en route to the United States. |
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