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The decisional law as far back as 1860 has focused on the prerequisite of compulsion: "[The right] exempts no one from the consequences of a crime which he may have committed, but only from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to establish it." Stated concisely, our cases establish that there is a right not to be forced to speak, but there is no right to bar a confession freely given after appropriate warnings and waivers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "262 Ind. 420, 428",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 N.E.2d 409, 415",
"parenthetical": "defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | 11,830,118 | b |
The decisional law as far back as 1860 has focused on the prerequisite of compulsion: "[The right] exempts no one from the consequences of a crime which he may have committed, but only from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to establish it." Stated concisely, our cases establish that there is a right not to be forced to speak, but there is no right to bar a confession freely given after appropriate warnings and waivers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "317 N.E.2d 433, 438",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 N.E.2d 409, 415",
"parenthetical": "defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | 11,830,118 | b |
The decisional law as far back as 1860 has focused on the prerequisite of compulsion: "[The right] exempts no one from the consequences of a crime which he may have committed, but only from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to establish it." Stated concisely, our cases establish that there is a right not to be forced to speak, but there is no right to bar a confession freely given after appropriate warnings and waivers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "262 Ind. 420, 428",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "204 Ind. 281, 293",
"parenthetical": "\"The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | 11,830,118 | b |
The decisional law as far back as 1860 has focused on the prerequisite of compulsion: "[The right] exempts no one from the consequences of a crime which he may have committed, but only from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to establish it." Stated concisely, our cases establish that there is a right not to be forced to speak, but there is no right to bar a confession freely given after appropriate warnings and waivers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "204 Ind. 281, 293",
"parenthetical": "\"The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "317 N.E.2d 433, 438",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | 11,830,118 | a |
The decisional law as far back as 1860 has focused on the prerequisite of compulsion: "[The right] exempts no one from the consequences of a crime which he may have committed, but only from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to establish it." Stated concisely, our cases establish that there is a right not to be forced to speak, but there is no right to bar a confession freely given after appropriate warnings and waivers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 N.E. 865, 869",
"parenthetical": "\"The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "262 Ind. 420, 428",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | 11,830,118 | a |
The decisional law as far back as 1860 has focused on the prerequisite of compulsion: "[The right] exempts no one from the consequences of a crime which he may have committed, but only from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to establish it." Stated concisely, our cases establish that there is a right not to be forced to speak, but there is no right to bar a confession freely given after appropriate warnings and waivers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "317 N.E.2d 433, 438",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 N.E. 865, 869",
"parenthetical": "\"The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.\"",
"sentence": "See also Corder v. State, 467 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.1984) (defendant who spoke freely to court-appointed psychiatrists was not denied his rights under Section 14 or the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 293, 182 N.E. 865, 869 (1932) (“The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion.”); cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 428, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974) (“The Fifth Amendment is not a bar to any conviction resting on self-incrimination. It prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.”)."
} | 11,830,118 | b |
180 We further find Appellant was not denied the right to counsel, nor was he denied the right to be present during a "critical stage" of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 U.S. 114, 118",
"parenthetical": "where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" ",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15",
"parenthetical": "finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | 9,494,051 | b |
180 We further find Appellant was not denied the right to counsel, nor was he denied the right to be present during a "critical stage" of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15",
"parenthetical": "finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56",
"parenthetical": "where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" ",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | 9,494,051 | a |
180 We further find Appellant was not denied the right to counsel, nor was he denied the right to be present during a "critical stage" of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15",
"parenthetical": "finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" ",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | 9,494,051 | a |
180 We further find Appellant was not denied the right to counsel, nor was he denied the right to be present during a "critical stage" of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "994 P.2d 61, 66",
"parenthetical": "finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 U.S. 114, 118",
"parenthetical": "where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" ",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | 9,494,051 | a |
180 We further find Appellant was not denied the right to counsel, nor was he denied the right to be present during a "critical stage" of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56",
"parenthetical": "where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" ",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "994 P.2d 61, 66",
"parenthetical": "finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | 9,494,051 | b |
180 We further find Appellant was not denied the right to counsel, nor was he denied the right to be present during a "critical stage" of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "994 P.2d 61, 66",
"parenthetical": "finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" ",
"sentence": "See Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶ 15, 994 P.2d 61, 66 (finding no error in a defendant's absence during in camera hearing with spectator who had spoken with a juror); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (where the Court found an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror could be harmless error, stating: \"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.\" )"
} | 9,494,051 | a |
Because the allowable unit of prosecution is the property taken, the State would not be able to prosecute Byrd again for the theft of the same items, alleging Wal-Mart as the owner. Any subsequent charge involving the same property would constitute the same offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 S.W.3d 258, 258",
"parenthetical": "\"Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337; Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258 (“Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.”); see also U.S. v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.) (entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution",
"sentence": "See Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337; Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258 (“Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.”); see also U.S. v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.) (entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | 7,321,630 | a |
Because the allowable unit of prosecution is the property taken, the State would not be able to prosecute Byrd again for the theft of the same items, alleging Wal-Mart as the owner. Any subsequent charge involving the same property would constitute the same offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution",
"sentence": "See Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337; Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258 (“Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.”); see also U.S. v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.) (entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 S.W.3d 258, 258",
"parenthetical": "\"Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337; Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258 (“Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.”); see also U.S. v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.) (entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | 7,321,630 | b |
Because the allowable unit of prosecution is the property taken, the State would not be able to prosecute Byrd again for the theft of the same items, alleging Wal-Mart as the owner. Any subsequent charge involving the same property would constitute the same offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution",
"sentence": "See Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337; Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258 (“Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.”); see also U.S. v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.) (entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 S.W.3d 258, 258",
"parenthetical": "\"Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337; Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258 (“Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.”); see also U.S. v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.) (entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | 7,321,630 | b |
Because the allowable unit of prosecution is the property taken, the State would not be able to prosecute Byrd again for the theft of the same items, alleging Wal-Mart as the owner. Any subsequent charge involving the same property would constitute the same offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution",
"sentence": "See Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337; Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258 (“Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.”); see also U.S. v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.) (entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 S.W.3d 258, 258",
"parenthetical": "\"Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337; Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258 (“Appellant is in no danger of being prosecuted again for theft of the same cart proved at trial.”); see also U.S. v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.) (entire record may be reviewed to determine whether double jeopardy prevents subsequent prosecution), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | 7,321,630 | b |
The record, however, does not support this claim. The bare representation of counsel as to Tirrell's fear of Walpole does not make out coercion different in kind or degree from the inevitable decision-making pressures described above. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "371 Mass. 160, 170-171",
"parenthetical": "even if suffering from amnesia as to commission of crime, defendant was competent to plead guilty if he was able to consult with attorney and weigh options",
"sentence": "Compare Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 371 Mass. 160, 170-171 (1976) (even if suffering from amnesia as to commission of crime, defendant was competent to plead guilty if he was able to consult with attorney and weigh options); Commonwealth v. Leate, 367 Mass. 689, 696 (1975) (without supporting evidence of defendant’s low mental ability, court upheld trial judge’s finding of sufficient capacity to understand consequences of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "584 F.2d 687, 690",
"parenthetical": "coercion established if fear of greater penalty destroyed defendant's ability to weigh relative advantages of trial and plea",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Estelle, 584 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1978) (coercion established if fear of greater penalty destroyed defendant’s ability to weigh relative advantages of trial and plea)."
} | 339,619 | a |
The record, however, does not support this claim. The bare representation of counsel as to Tirrell's fear of Walpole does not make out coercion different in kind or degree from the inevitable decision-making pressures described above. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "371 Mass. 160, 170-171",
"parenthetical": "even if suffering from amnesia as to commission of crime, defendant was competent to plead guilty if he was able to consult with attorney and weigh options",
"sentence": "Compare Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 371 Mass. 160, 170-171 (1976) (even if suffering from amnesia as to commission of crime, defendant was competent to plead guilty if he was able to consult with attorney and weigh options); Commonwealth v. Leate, 367 Mass. 689, 696 (1975) (without supporting evidence of defendant’s low mental ability, court upheld trial judge’s finding of sufficient capacity to understand consequences of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 74",
"parenthetical": "defendant's declaration in open court carries strong presumption of verity and court may dismiss subsequent unsupported conclusory allegations of coercion",
"sentence": "Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (defendant’s declaration in open court carries strong presumption of verity and court may dismiss subsequent unsupported conclusory allegations of coercion)."
} | 339,619 | a |
The record, however, does not support this claim. The bare representation of counsel as to Tirrell's fear of Walpole does not make out coercion different in kind or degree from the inevitable decision-making pressures described above. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "367 Mass. 689, 696",
"parenthetical": "without supporting evidence of defendant's low mental ability, court upheld trial judge's finding of sufficient capacity to understand consequences of guilty plea",
"sentence": "Compare Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 371 Mass. 160, 170-171 (1976) (even if suffering from amnesia as to commission of crime, defendant was competent to plead guilty if he was able to consult with attorney and weigh options); Commonwealth v. Leate, 367 Mass. 689, 696 (1975) (without supporting evidence of defendant’s low mental ability, court upheld trial judge’s finding of sufficient capacity to understand consequences of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "584 F.2d 687, 690",
"parenthetical": "coercion established if fear of greater penalty destroyed defendant's ability to weigh relative advantages of trial and plea",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Estelle, 584 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1978) (coercion established if fear of greater penalty destroyed defendant’s ability to weigh relative advantages of trial and plea)."
} | 339,619 | a |
The record, however, does not support this claim. The bare representation of counsel as to Tirrell's fear of Walpole does not make out coercion different in kind or degree from the inevitable decision-making pressures described above. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "367 Mass. 689, 696",
"parenthetical": "without supporting evidence of defendant's low mental ability, court upheld trial judge's finding of sufficient capacity to understand consequences of guilty plea",
"sentence": "Compare Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 371 Mass. 160, 170-171 (1976) (even if suffering from amnesia as to commission of crime, defendant was competent to plead guilty if he was able to consult with attorney and weigh options); Commonwealth v. Leate, 367 Mass. 689, 696 (1975) (without supporting evidence of defendant’s low mental ability, court upheld trial judge’s finding of sufficient capacity to understand consequences of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 74",
"parenthetical": "defendant's declaration in open court carries strong presumption of verity and court may dismiss subsequent unsupported conclusory allegations of coercion",
"sentence": "Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (defendant’s declaration in open court carries strong presumption of verity and court may dismiss subsequent unsupported conclusory allegations of coercion)."
} | 339,619 | a |
The record, however, does not support this claim. The bare representation of counsel as to Tirrell's fear of Walpole does not make out coercion different in kind or degree from the inevitable decision-making pressures described above. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 74",
"parenthetical": "defendant's declaration in open court carries strong presumption of verity and court may dismiss subsequent unsupported conclusory allegations of coercion",
"sentence": "Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (defendant’s declaration in open court carries strong presumption of verity and court may dismiss subsequent unsupported conclusory allegations of coercion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "584 F.2d 687, 690",
"parenthetical": "coercion established if fear of greater penalty destroyed defendant's ability to weigh relative advantages of trial and plea",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Estelle, 584 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1978) (coercion established if fear of greater penalty destroyed defendant’s ability to weigh relative advantages of trial and plea)."
} | 339,619 | b |
The court, however, notes that this policy statement is totally devoid of any limitations, restrictions, or remarks regarding the right of employee welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA to seek subrogation or reimbursement. Moreover, it must be recognized that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal courts have upheld subrogation provisions in ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "248 F.3d 220, 220",
"parenthetical": "holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 138, 140",
"parenthetical": "holding that ERISA medical benefits plan's subro-gation provision gave plan \"first priority\" claim to any recovery",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | 9,497,798 | b |
The court, however, notes that this policy statement is totally devoid of any limitations, restrictions, or remarks regarding the right of employee welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA to seek subrogation or reimbursement. Moreover, it must be recognized that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal courts have upheld subrogation provisions in ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 1010, 1012",
"parenthetical": "holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan's subrogation provisions",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 138, 140",
"parenthetical": "holding that ERISA medical benefits plan's subro-gation provision gave plan \"first priority\" claim to any recovery",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | 9,497,798 | b |
The court, however, notes that this policy statement is totally devoid of any limitations, restrictions, or remarks regarding the right of employee welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA to seek subrogation or reimbursement. Moreover, it must be recognized that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal courts have upheld subrogation provisions in ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 138, 140",
"parenthetical": "holding that ERISA medical benefits plan's subro-gation provision gave plan \"first priority\" claim to any recovery",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "993 F.2d 1293, 1299",
"parenthetical": "holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | 9,497,798 | a |
The court, however, notes that this policy statement is totally devoid of any limitations, restrictions, or remarks regarding the right of employee welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA to seek subrogation or reimbursement. Moreover, it must be recognized that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal courts have upheld subrogation provisions in ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "248 F.3d 220, 220",
"parenthetical": "holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | 9,497,798 | a |
The court, however, notes that this policy statement is totally devoid of any limitations, restrictions, or remarks regarding the right of employee welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA to seek subrogation or reimbursement. Moreover, it must be recognized that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal courts have upheld subrogation provisions in ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 1010, 1012",
"parenthetical": "holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan's subrogation provisions",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | 9,497,798 | a |
The court, however, notes that this policy statement is totally devoid of any limitations, restrictions, or remarks regarding the right of employee welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA to seek subrogation or reimbursement. Moreover, it must be recognized that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal courts have upheld subrogation provisions in ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "993 F.2d 1293, 1299",
"parenthetical": "holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses",
"sentence": "See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that ERISA medical benefits plan’s subro-gation provision gave plan “first priority” claim to any recovery); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses); see also Gourley, 248 F.3d at 220 (holding that self-insured health benefit plan was entitled to reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits plaintiff insured received); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plan’s subrogation provisions); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that ERISA employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan)."
} | 9,497,798 | b |
With respect to defendants' transfer motion, 28 U.S.C. SS 1404(a) allows a district court, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, to transfer a case to a court where the case might have been brought. The Supreme Court instructs that the existence of a forum selection clause is only one of several factors which a court must consider when ruling on a motion to transfer, though such a clause is "a significant factor that [must] figure centrally in the District Court's calculus." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "708 F.Supp. 255, 256-57",
"parenthetical": "denying transfer motion where court found that forum selection clause did not \"weigh heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiffs choice of forum\"",
"sentence": "The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1913, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) (forum selection clauses “are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable”); Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 33, 108 S.Ct. at 2249-50 (Kennedy, J. concurring); but see Fibra-Steel, Inc. v. Astoria Industries, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 255, 256-57 (E.D.Mo.1989) (denying transfer motion where court found that forum selection clause did not “weigh heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiffs choice of forum”). Other factors to be considered include the convenience of the alternate forum “given the parties’ expressed preference for that venue, and the fairness of transfer in light of the ... parties’ relative bargaining power.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "407 U.S. 1, 10",
"parenthetical": "forum selection clauses \"are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable\"",
"sentence": "The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1913, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) (forum selection clauses “are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable”); Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 33, 108 S.Ct. at 2249-50 (Kennedy, J. concurring); but see Fibra-Steel, Inc. v. Astoria Industries, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 255, 256-57 (E.D.Mo.1989) (denying transfer motion where court found that forum selection clause did not “weigh heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiffs choice of forum”). Other factors to be considered include the convenience of the alternate forum “given the parties’ expressed preference for that venue, and the fairness of transfer in light of the ... parties’ relative bargaining power.”"
} | 7,384,457 | b |
With respect to defendants' transfer motion, 28 U.S.C. SS 1404(a) allows a district court, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, to transfer a case to a court where the case might have been brought. The Supreme Court instructs that the existence of a forum selection clause is only one of several factors which a court must consider when ruling on a motion to transfer, though such a clause is "a significant factor that [must] figure centrally in the District Court's calculus." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "708 F.Supp. 255, 256-57",
"parenthetical": "denying transfer motion where court found that forum selection clause did not \"weigh heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiffs choice of forum\"",
"sentence": "The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1913, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) (forum selection clauses “are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable”); Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 33, 108 S.Ct. at 2249-50 (Kennedy, J. concurring); but see Fibra-Steel, Inc. v. Astoria Industries, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 255, 256-57 (E.D.Mo.1989) (denying transfer motion where court found that forum selection clause did not “weigh heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiffs choice of forum”). Other factors to be considered include the convenience of the alternate forum “given the parties’ expressed preference for that venue, and the fairness of transfer in light of the ... parties’ relative bargaining power.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "92 S.Ct. 1907, 1913",
"parenthetical": "forum selection clauses \"are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable\"",
"sentence": "The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1913, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) (forum selection clauses “are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable”); Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 33, 108 S.Ct. at 2249-50 (Kennedy, J. concurring); but see Fibra-Steel, Inc. v. Astoria Industries, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 255, 256-57 (E.D.Mo.1989) (denying transfer motion where court found that forum selection clause did not “weigh heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiffs choice of forum”). Other factors to be considered include the convenience of the alternate forum “given the parties’ expressed preference for that venue, and the fairness of transfer in light of the ... parties’ relative bargaining power.”"
} | 7,384,457 | b |
With respect to defendants' transfer motion, 28 U.S.C. SS 1404(a) allows a district court, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, to transfer a case to a court where the case might have been brought. The Supreme Court instructs that the existence of a forum selection clause is only one of several factors which a court must consider when ruling on a motion to transfer, though such a clause is "a significant factor that [must] figure centrally in the District Court's calculus." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "708 F.Supp. 255, 256-57",
"parenthetical": "denying transfer motion where court found that forum selection clause did not \"weigh heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiffs choice of forum\"",
"sentence": "The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1913, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) (forum selection clauses “are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable”); Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 33, 108 S.Ct. at 2249-50 (Kennedy, J. concurring); but see Fibra-Steel, Inc. v. Astoria Industries, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 255, 256-57 (E.D.Mo.1989) (denying transfer motion where court found that forum selection clause did not “weigh heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiffs choice of forum”). Other factors to be considered include the convenience of the alternate forum “given the parties’ expressed preference for that venue, and the fairness of transfer in light of the ... parties’ relative bargaining power.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forum selection clauses \"are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable\"",
"sentence": "The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1913, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) (forum selection clauses “are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable”); Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 33, 108 S.Ct. at 2249-50 (Kennedy, J. concurring); but see Fibra-Steel, Inc. v. Astoria Industries, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 255, 256-57 (E.D.Mo.1989) (denying transfer motion where court found that forum selection clause did not “weigh heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiffs choice of forum”). Other factors to be considered include the convenience of the alternate forum “given the parties’ expressed preference for that venue, and the fairness of transfer in light of the ... parties’ relative bargaining power.”"
} | 7,384,457 | b |
(Footnotes omitted.) Frank S. Alexander, Georgia Real Estate Finance and Foreclosure Law, p. 37, SS 2:3 (2014-2015 ed.). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "217 Ga. 616, 619-620",
"parenthetical": "the individual indebtedness of one of the grantors is not the debt of both of the grantors and does not fall within the open-end clause of the security deed",
"sentence": "See also Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354 (127 SE2d 909) (1962); Cordele Banking Co. v. Powers, 217 Ga. 616, 619-620 (1), (2) (124 SE2d 275) (1962) (the individual indebtedness of one of the grantors is not the debt of both of the grantors and does not fall within the open-end clause of the security deed); In re Felker, 181 BR 1017 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1995); Americus Finance Co. v. Wilson, 189 Ga. 635, 636 (1) (7 SE2d 259) (1940); cf. Sutton v. Atlantic Bank & Trust Co., 167 Ga. App. 861, 863 (307 SE2d 746) (1983) (subsequent debts were deemed secured where it was clear that the grantors included either the singular or the plural grantors and that it was uncontradicted that all the parties to the deed intended that the debts of one borrower would be secured by deed). As our Supreme Court has explained, “it is obvious that an additional debt of one creditor cannot operate as a hook to grab a dragnet which carries with it the property interests of a party other than the creditor in the separate transaction.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "167 Ga. App. 861, 863",
"parenthetical": "subsequent debts were deemed secured where it was clear that the grantors included either the singular or the plural grantors and that it was uncontradicted that all the parties to the deed intended that the debts of one borrower would be secured by deed",
"sentence": "See also Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354 (127 SE2d 909) (1962); Cordele Banking Co. v. Powers, 217 Ga. 616, 619-620 (1), (2) (124 SE2d 275) (1962) (the individual indebtedness of one of the grantors is not the debt of both of the grantors and does not fall within the open-end clause of the security deed); In re Felker, 181 BR 1017 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1995); Americus Finance Co. v. Wilson, 189 Ga. 635, 636 (1) (7 SE2d 259) (1940); cf. Sutton v. Atlantic Bank & Trust Co., 167 Ga. App. 861, 863 (307 SE2d 746) (1983) (subsequent debts were deemed secured where it was clear that the grantors included either the singular or the plural grantors and that it was uncontradicted that all the parties to the deed intended that the debts of one borrower would be secured by deed). As our Supreme Court has explained, “it is obvious that an additional debt of one creditor cannot operate as a hook to grab a dragnet which carries with it the property interests of a party other than the creditor in the separate transaction.”"
} | 4,040,403 | a |
As noted earlier, the defendant argues that the plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct by threatening to file a grievance, but agrees that "[a]n inmate has an undisputed First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his own behalf." Nonetheless, the defendant is correct that neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has ad dressed explicitly whether threatening to file a grievance constitutes protected conduct. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "557 F.3d 541, 555",
"parenthetical": "suggesting without further explanation or citation that \"it seems implausible that a threat to file a grievance would itself constitute a First Amendment-protected grievance\"",
"sentence": "But see Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 555 (7th Cir.2009) (suggesting without further explanation or citation that “it seems implausible that a threat to file a grievance would itself constitute a First Amendment-protected grievance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "420 F.3d 571, 579",
"parenthetical": "finding against the plaintiff who claimed his protected conduct was threatening to file a lawsuit because he had not shown that a prisoner of ordinary firmness would be deterred",
"sentence": "See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir.2005) (finding against the plaintiff who claimed his protected conduct was threatening to file a lawsuit because he had not shown that a prisoner of ordinary firmness would be deterred); Scott v. Kilchermann, 230 F.3d 1359, 2000 WL 1434456, at *2 (6th Cir. Sep. 18, 2000) (holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance)."
} | 4,191,207 | b |
As noted earlier, the defendant argues that the plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct by threatening to file a grievance, but agrees that "[a]n inmate has an undisputed First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his own behalf." Nonetheless, the defendant is correct that neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has ad dressed explicitly whether threatening to file a grievance constitutes protected conduct. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "557 F.3d 541, 555",
"parenthetical": "suggesting without further explanation or citation that \"it seems implausible that a threat to file a grievance would itself constitute a First Amendment-protected grievance\"",
"sentence": "But see Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 555 (7th Cir.2009) (suggesting without further explanation or citation that “it seems implausible that a threat to file a grievance would itself constitute a First Amendment-protected grievance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance",
"sentence": "See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir.2005) (finding against the plaintiff who claimed his protected conduct was threatening to file a lawsuit because he had not shown that a prisoner of ordinary firmness would be deterred); Scott v. Kilchermann, 230 F.3d 1359, 2000 WL 1434456, at *2 (6th Cir. Sep. 18, 2000) (holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance)."
} | 4,191,207 | b |
As noted earlier, the defendant argues that the plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct by threatening to file a grievance, but agrees that "[a]n inmate has an undisputed First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his own behalf." Nonetheless, the defendant is correct that neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has ad dressed explicitly whether threatening to file a grievance constitutes protected conduct. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "557 F.3d 541, 555",
"parenthetical": "suggesting without further explanation or citation that \"it seems implausible that a threat to file a grievance would itself constitute a First Amendment-protected grievance\"",
"sentence": "But see Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 555 (7th Cir.2009) (suggesting without further explanation or citation that “it seems implausible that a threat to file a grievance would itself constitute a First Amendment-protected grievance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 WL 1434456, at *2",
"parenthetical": "holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance",
"sentence": "See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir.2005) (finding against the plaintiff who claimed his protected conduct was threatening to file a lawsuit because he had not shown that a prisoner of ordinary firmness would be deterred); Scott v. Kilchermann, 230 F.3d 1359, 2000 WL 1434456, at *2 (6th Cir. Sep. 18, 2000) (holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance)."
} | 4,191,207 | b |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 289, 312-13",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "341 F.3d 590, 592-93",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims\"",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 289, 312-13",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 289, 312-13",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 289, 312-13",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 289, 312-13",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "341 F.3d 590, 592-93",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims\"",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | 9,247,695 | b |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | 9,247,695 | b |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "341 F.3d 590, 592-93",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims\"",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | 9,247,695 | b |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | 9,247,695 | a |
This Court has jurisdiction to review a confined immigrant's application for a writ of habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant's continued detention",
"sentence": "See also Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that “federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims”); Zadvydas v. Underdawn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.1999) (finding jurisdiction to hear a habeas challenge to a de-portable immigrant’s continued detention), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"habeas jurisdiction under SS 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 'IIRIRA']\"",
"sentence": "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (holding that “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by ... [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ‘IIRIRA’]”)."
} | 9,247,695 | b |
And even though Chapman and A.E.W. each "chipped in" $20, Chapman made the money exchange for the heroin. Further, Chapman took possession of the entire purchase and "cooked" the heroin, playing an active role in the transaction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1412880, at *1",
"parenthetical": "stating that drug user's action of cooking heroin was a direct cause of another drug user's death",
"sentence": "See Meyer, 646 N.W.2d at 904 (concluding that, for purposes of section 609.195(b), “selling” includes manufacturing a controlled substance); see also State v. Rodriguez, No. A06-711, 2007 WL 1412880, at *1 (Minn. App. May 15, 2007) (stating that drug user’s action of cooking heroin was a direct cause of another drug user’s death), review denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 2007). Finally, Chapman prepared a needle to take home to his girlfriend, acting as a go-between for another addict."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "646 N.W.2d 904, 904",
"parenthetical": "concluding that, for purposes of section 609.195(b), \"selling\" includes manufacturing a controlled substance",
"sentence": "See Meyer, 646 N.W.2d at 904 (concluding that, for purposes of section 609.195(b), “selling” includes manufacturing a controlled substance); see also State v. Rodriguez, No. A06-711, 2007 WL 1412880, at *1 (Minn. App. May 15, 2007) (stating that drug user’s action of cooking heroin was a direct cause of another drug user’s death), review denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 2007). Finally, Chapman prepared a needle to take home to his girlfriend, acting as a go-between for another addict."
} | 7,082,942 | b |
The Court also finds that, even assuming RUS's actions were consistent with its own regulation SS 1794.3, such an interpretation would be invalid as applied in the instant case because it would conflict with NEPA and the implementing regulations promulgated by the CEQ. The agency is not entitled to substantial deference with respect to the interpretation of the CEQ regulations, including SS 1508.18 defining "major federal action." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "714 F.2d 276, 276",
"parenthetical": "\"CEQ guidelines are entitled to substantial deference in interpreting the meaning of NEPA provisions, even when CEQ regulations are in conflict with an interpretation of NEPA adopted by one of the Federal agencies.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 342 (6th Cir.2002) (“Although federal agencies have discretion to decide whether a proposed action is significant enough to warrant preparation of an EIS, the court owes no deference to the [Federal Aviation Administration’s] interpretation of NEPA or the CEQ regulations because NEPA is addressed to all federal agencies and Congress did not entrust administration of NEPA to the [Federal Aviation Administration] alone.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also (Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails, 267 F.3d at 1150) (“Because NEPA’s mandate is addressed to all federal agencies, the [Surface Transportation Board’s] determination that NEPA is inapplicable ... is not entitled to the deference that courts must accord to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute.”); Morris Cnty., 714 F.2d at 276 (“CEQ guidelines are entitled to substantial deference in interpreting the meaning of NEPA provisions, even when CEQ regulations are in conflict with an interpretation of NEPA adopted by one of the Federal agencies.”) (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 60 L.Ed.2d 943(1979))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "290 F.3d 339, 342",
"parenthetical": "\"Although federal agencies have discretion to decide whether a proposed action is significant enough to warrant preparation of an EIS, the court owes no deference to the [Federal Aviation Administration's] interpretation of NEPA or the CEQ regulations because NEPA is addressed to all federal agencies and Congress did not entrust administration of NEPA to the [Federal Aviation Administration] alone.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 342 (6th Cir.2002) (“Although federal agencies have discretion to decide whether a proposed action is significant enough to warrant preparation of an EIS, the court owes no deference to the [Federal Aviation Administration’s] interpretation of NEPA or the CEQ regulations because NEPA is addressed to all federal agencies and Congress did not entrust administration of NEPA to the [Federal Aviation Administration] alone.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also (Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails, 267 F.3d at 1150) (“Because NEPA’s mandate is addressed to all federal agencies, the [Surface Transportation Board’s] determination that NEPA is inapplicable ... is not entitled to the deference that courts must accord to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute.”); Morris Cnty., 714 F.2d at 276 (“CEQ guidelines are entitled to substantial deference in interpreting the meaning of NEPA provisions, even when CEQ regulations are in conflict with an interpretation of NEPA adopted by one of the Federal agencies.”) (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 60 L.Ed.2d 943(1979))."
} | 3,836,061 | b |
Nonetheless, we have "borrowed" this part of section 2508(d) and applied it to mandatory transfers. Likewise, we construe section 2509(g) as applying to mandatory transfers under 2508(b), just as it applies to permissive transfers under 2508(d), because to do otherwise would -- as discussed above -- lead to absurd results. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 V.I. 350, 365",
"parenthetical": "rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that \"would lead to unjust and absurd results\" because such an interpretation would be \"clearly inconsistent with the Legislature's intent\"",
"sentence": "Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We also consider the overall object and policy of the statute . . . and avoid constructions that produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with common sense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gilbert v. People, 52 V.I. 350, 365 (V.I. 2009) (rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that “would lead to unjust and absurd results” because such an interpretation would be “clearly inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "458 U.S. 564, 575",
"parenthetical": "\"interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.\"",
"sentence": "Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S. Ct. 3245, 73 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1982) (“interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); Disabled in Action of Penn. v. Southeastern Penn."
} | 3,588,792 | b |
Nonetheless, we have "borrowed" this part of section 2508(d) and applied it to mandatory transfers. Likewise, we construe section 2509(g) as applying to mandatory transfers under 2508(b), just as it applies to permissive transfers under 2508(d), because to do otherwise would -- as discussed above -- lead to absurd results. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.\"",
"sentence": "Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S. Ct. 3245, 73 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1982) (“interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); Disabled in Action of Penn. v. Southeastern Penn."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 V.I. 350, 365",
"parenthetical": "rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that \"would lead to unjust and absurd results\" because such an interpretation would be \"clearly inconsistent with the Legislature's intent\"",
"sentence": "Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We also consider the overall object and policy of the statute . . . and avoid constructions that produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with common sense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gilbert v. People, 52 V.I. 350, 365 (V.I. 2009) (rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that “would lead to unjust and absurd results” because such an interpretation would be “clearly inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent”)."
} | 3,588,792 | a |
Nonetheless, we have "borrowed" this part of section 2508(d) and applied it to mandatory transfers. Likewise, we construe section 2509(g) as applying to mandatory transfers under 2508(b), just as it applies to permissive transfers under 2508(d), because to do otherwise would -- as discussed above -- lead to absurd results. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 V.I. 350, 365",
"parenthetical": "rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that \"would lead to unjust and absurd results\" because such an interpretation would be \"clearly inconsistent with the Legislature's intent\"",
"sentence": "Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We also consider the overall object and policy of the statute . . . and avoid constructions that produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with common sense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gilbert v. People, 52 V.I. 350, 365 (V.I. 2009) (rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that “would lead to unjust and absurd results” because such an interpretation would be “clearly inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.\"",
"sentence": "Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S. Ct. 3245, 73 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1982) (“interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); Disabled in Action of Penn. v. Southeastern Penn."
} | 3,588,792 | b |
Nonetheless, we have "borrowed" this part of section 2508(d) and applied it to mandatory transfers. Likewise, we construe section 2509(g) as applying to mandatory transfers under 2508(b), just as it applies to permissive transfers under 2508(d), because to do otherwise would -- as discussed above -- lead to absurd results. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 V.I. 350, 365",
"parenthetical": "rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that \"would lead to unjust and absurd results\" because such an interpretation would be \"clearly inconsistent with the Legislature's intent\"",
"sentence": "Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We also consider the overall object and policy of the statute . . . and avoid constructions that produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with common sense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gilbert v. People, 52 V.I. 350, 365 (V.I. 2009) (rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that “would lead to unjust and absurd results” because such an interpretation would be “clearly inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "539 F.3d 199, 210",
"parenthetical": "\"We also consider the overall object and policy of the statute . . . and avoid constructions that produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with common sense.\"",
"sentence": "Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We also consider the overall object and policy of the statute . . . and avoid constructions that produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with common sense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gilbert v. People, 52 V.I. 350, 365 (V.I. 2009) (rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that “would lead to unjust and absurd results” because such an interpretation would be “clearly inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent”)."
} | 3,588,792 | b |
Where, as here, the United States seeks equitable relief brought by the United States under 18 U.S.C. SS 1964(a), "the government need not, as [Defendants] assert, demonstrate a new RICO violation to justify issuance of the injunction." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "663 F.Supp. 192, 195",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that \"the Government must show present RICO violations to secure [injunctive] relief'",
"sentence": "Local 560, 974 F.2d at 325 n. 5 (“[Defendant] erroneously argues ... that to succeed the government must prove a new RICO offense based on conduct which occurred after the March 16, 1984 Judgment Order”); see also United States v. Local 6A, Cement & Concrete Workers, 663 F.Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (rejecting argument that “the Government must show present RICO violations to secure [injunctive] relief’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Defendant] erroneously argues ... that to succeed the government must prove a new RICO offense based on conduct which occurred after the March 16, 1984 Judgment Order\"",
"sentence": "Local 560, 974 F.2d at 325 n. 5 (“[Defendant] erroneously argues ... that to succeed the government must prove a new RICO offense based on conduct which occurred after the March 16, 1984 Judgment Order”); see also United States v. Local 6A, Cement & Concrete Workers, 663 F.Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (rejecting argument that “the Government must show present RICO violations to secure [injunctive] relief’)."
} | 3,780,367 | b |
The analytical distinction between determining whether a licensing requirement establishes a standard of care and determining whether a violation of such a requirement is a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury can often become blurred, and the Virginia courts have been more inclined to resolve negligence per se claims based on licensing requirements by concluding that the violation of a licensing requirement is not a proximate cause of the injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the lack of a driver's license, albeit a statutory violation, \"did not proximately cause or contribute to the collision\"",
"sentence": "See Laughlin v. Rose, 200 Va. 127, 104 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1958) (finding that the lack of a driver’s license, albeit a statutory violation, “did not proximately cause or contribute to the collision”); White v. Edwards Chevrolet Co., 186 Va. 669, 43 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1947) (remarking that driving a truck after expiration of a permit did not cause injury, just as “the failure of a competent driver to obtain a chauffeur’s license could not, by any possibility, have contributed proximately to the happening of the automobile collision complained of’ (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bentley, 445 S.E.2d at 133 (observing that “[vjiolation of a traffic statute constitutes negligence, but imposition of liability depends on whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the accident”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 S.E.2d 133, 133",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[vjiolation of a traffic statute constitutes negligence, but imposition of liability depends on whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the accident\"",
"sentence": "See Laughlin v. Rose, 200 Va. 127, 104 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1958) (finding that the lack of a driver’s license, albeit a statutory violation, “did not proximately cause or contribute to the collision”); White v. Edwards Chevrolet Co., 186 Va. 669, 43 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1947) (remarking that driving a truck after expiration of a permit did not cause injury, just as “the failure of a competent driver to obtain a chauffeur’s license could not, by any possibility, have contributed proximately to the happening of the automobile collision complained of’ (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bentley, 445 S.E.2d at 133 (observing that “[vjiolation of a traffic statute constitutes negligence, but imposition of liability depends on whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the accident”)."
} | 844,283 | a |
The analytical distinction between determining whether a licensing requirement establishes a standard of care and determining whether a violation of such a requirement is a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury can often become blurred, and the Virginia courts have been more inclined to resolve negligence per se claims based on licensing requirements by concluding that the violation of a licensing requirement is not a proximate cause of the injury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 S.E.2d 133, 133",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[vjiolation of a traffic statute constitutes negligence, but imposition of liability depends on whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the accident\"",
"sentence": "See Laughlin v. Rose, 200 Va. 127, 104 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1958) (finding that the lack of a driver’s license, albeit a statutory violation, “did not proximately cause or contribute to the collision”); White v. Edwards Chevrolet Co., 186 Va. 669, 43 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1947) (remarking that driving a truck after expiration of a permit did not cause injury, just as “the failure of a competent driver to obtain a chauffeur’s license could not, by any possibility, have contributed proximately to the happening of the automobile collision complained of’ (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bentley, 445 S.E.2d at 133 (observing that “[vjiolation of a traffic statute constitutes negligence, but imposition of liability depends on whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the accident”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.E.2d 782, 786",
"parenthetical": "finding that the lack of a driver's license, albeit a statutory violation, \"did not proximately cause or contribute to the collision\"",
"sentence": "See Laughlin v. Rose, 200 Va. 127, 104 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1958) (finding that the lack of a driver’s license, albeit a statutory violation, “did not proximately cause or contribute to the collision”); White v. Edwards Chevrolet Co., 186 Va. 669, 43 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1947) (remarking that driving a truck after expiration of a permit did not cause injury, just as “the failure of a competent driver to obtain a chauffeur’s license could not, by any possibility, have contributed proximately to the happening of the automobile collision complained of’ (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bentley, 445 S.E.2d at 133 (observing that “[vjiolation of a traffic statute constitutes negligence, but imposition of liability depends on whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the accident”)."
} | 844,283 | b |
While it is true that Congress cannot save an overbroad statute by adding a rule of construction that contradicts the statute's substantive provisions, in this case the rule of construction does not contradict the plain meaning of the statute. Instead, the context of the statute dictates that "personal property" excludes solely intangible items and therefore speech or expressive conduct, such as protests or documentaries, which cause damage only to an animal enterprise's profits is not criminalized by AETA. The rule of construction in subsection (e)(1) of AETA simply reinforces the plain language of the statute. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "744 F.3d 790, 801",
"parenthetical": "\"We are. satisfied tirat AETA includes safeguards in the form of its expression-protecting rules of construction, which preclude an interpretation according to which protected speech activity resulting in lost profits gives rise to liability. under subsection (a)(2)(A).\"",
"sentence": "Blum v. Holder, 744 F.3d 790, 801 (1st Cir. 2014) (“We are. satisfied tirat AETA includes safeguards in the form of its expression-protecting rulés of construction, which preclude an interpretation according to which protected speech activity resulting in lost profits gives rise to liability. under subsection (a)(2)(A).”); cf. CISPES v. F.B.I., 770 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1985) (rule of construction deemed a “valuable indication of Congress’ concern for the preservation of First Amendment rights”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "770 F.2d 468, 474",
"parenthetical": "rule of construction deemed a \"valuable indication of Congress' concern for the preservation of First Amendment rights\"",
"sentence": "Blum v. Holder, 744 F.3d 790, 801 (1st Cir. 2014) (“We are. satisfied tirat AETA includes safeguards in the form of its expression-protecting rulés of construction, which preclude an interpretation according to which protected speech activity resulting in lost profits gives rise to liability. under subsection (a)(2)(A).”); cf. CISPES v. F.B.I., 770 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1985) (rule of construction deemed a “valuable indication of Congress’ concern for the preservation of First Amendment rights”)."
} | 12,264,435 | a |
Even if the Court considered this evidence inadmissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence would still be admissible under the "inclusionary" approach. A rational factfinder may reasonably infer that the stun gun, handcuff key and ski mask would tend to establish that Cruz had knowledge of, and intent or motive to possess, the firearm located within his vehicle. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "961 F.2d 1039, 1042",
"parenthetical": "upholding the admission of other firearms that were present in defendant's apartment and vehicle to establish defendant's knowledge of the presence of an Uzi in defendant's apartment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 961 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.1992) (upholding the admission of other firearms that were present in defendant’s apartment and vehicle to establish defendant’s knowledge of the presence of an Uzi in defendant’s apartment); see also United States v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (6th Cir.1987) (upholding the admission of burglary tools and police scanners found in defendant’s van as probative evidence of defendant’s knowledge of presence of gun in the van)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 1068, 1072-73",
"parenthetical": "upholding the admission of burglary tools and police scanners found in defendant's van as probative evidence of defendant's knowledge of presence of gun in the van",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 961 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.1992) (upholding the admission of other firearms that were present in defendant’s apartment and vehicle to establish defendant’s knowledge of the presence of an Uzi in defendant’s apartment); see also United States v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (6th Cir.1987) (upholding the admission of burglary tools and police scanners found in defendant’s van as probative evidence of defendant’s knowledge of presence of gun in the van)."
} | 9,146,066 | a |
In contrast, under Rhoditis, business activities in the United States can satisfy the "base of operations" requirement regardless of whether the particular activities in question were related to the plaintiffs injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "398 U.S. 307, 307-08",
"parenthetical": "holding \"base of operations\" requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its \"entire income\" from shipping cargo to or from the United States",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "575 F.3d 1178, 1178",
"parenthetical": "holding \"base of operations\" requirement unmet absent \"information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants'] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | 3,514,604 | a |
In contrast, under Rhoditis, business activities in the United States can satisfy the "base of operations" requirement regardless of whether the particular activities in question were related to the plaintiffs injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "398 U.S. 307, 307-08",
"parenthetical": "holding \"base of operations\" requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its \"entire income\" from shipping cargo to or from the United States",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "425 F.3d 932, 937-38",
"parenthetical": "analyzing U.S. parent corporation's control over foreign defendant's day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | 3,514,604 | a |
In contrast, under Rhoditis, business activities in the United States can satisfy the "base of operations" requirement regardless of whether the particular activities in question were related to the plaintiffs injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "575 F.3d 1178, 1178",
"parenthetical": "holding \"base of operations\" requirement unmet absent \"information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants'] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"base of operations\" requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its \"entire income\" from shipping cargo to or from the United States",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | 3,514,604 | b |
In contrast, under Rhoditis, business activities in the United States can satisfy the "base of operations" requirement regardless of whether the particular activities in question were related to the plaintiffs injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "425 F.3d 932, 937-38",
"parenthetical": "analyzing U.S. parent corporation's control over foreign defendant's day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"base of operations\" requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its \"entire income\" from shipping cargo to or from the United States",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | 3,514,604 | b |
In contrast, under Rhoditis, business activities in the United States can satisfy the "base of operations" requirement regardless of whether the particular activities in question were related to the plaintiffs injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "698 F.2d 1195, 1195",
"parenthetical": "hold ing \"base of operations\" requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "575 F.3d 1178, 1178",
"parenthetical": "holding \"base of operations\" requirement unmet absent \"information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants'] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | 3,514,604 | a |
In contrast, under Rhoditis, business activities in the United States can satisfy the "base of operations" requirement regardless of whether the particular activities in question were related to the plaintiffs injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "698 F.2d 1195, 1195",
"parenthetical": "hold ing \"base of operations\" requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "425 F.3d 932, 937-38",
"parenthetical": "analyzing U.S. parent corporation's control over foreign defendant's day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 307-08, 90 S.Ct. 1731 (holding “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in New York, was 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years, and derived its “entire income” from shipping cargo to or from the United States); Szumlicz, 698 F.2d at 1195 (hold ing “base of operations” requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (holding “base of operations” requirement unmet absent “information demonstrating that the U.S. is where [the defendants’] operations occur, management decisions are made or revenues are generated”); Membreño v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (analyzing U.S. parent corporation’s control over foreign defendant’s day-to-day business operations, volume of business performed in the U.S., and number of days spent by entire fleet at U.S. ports)."
} | 3,514,604 | a |
Washington contends that interest cannot compensate for actual pecuniary loss because this court has held that interest is an integral part of the tax itself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "886 F.2d 1101, 1108",
"parenthetical": "\"Penalties, unlike interest, are not normally considered integral to the tax debt itself_\"",
"sentence": "See In re Mark Anthony Const., Inc., 886 F.2d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir.1989) (“Penalties, unlike interest, are not normally considered integral to the tax debt itself_”)• This contention is meritless. The Mark Anthony court specifically held “that interest accruing on taxes due after the filing of a bankruptcy petition is to be treated as an administrative expense of the bankruptcy estate, and consequently afforded first priority status [under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)].” Id. at 1102. Interest clearly compensates for the taxing agency’s losses relating to the “time value” of money, and nothing in Mark Anthony contradicts this notion."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "76 B.R. 176, 178",
"parenthetical": "\"A penalty assessment is separate and distinct from the imposition of interest. Interest is assessed by the IRS to compensate for lost monetary value' while a penalty is ordinarily charged for failure to act by a certain deadline.\"",
"sentence": "See also In re Brinegar, 76 B.R. 176, 178 (Bankr.D.Col.1987) (“A penalty assessment is separate and distinct from the imposition of interest. Interest is assessed by the IRS to compensate for lost monetary value' while a penalty is ordinarily charged for failure to act by a certain deadline.”)."
} | 7,649,968 | a |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "262 U.S. 390, 399",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "262 U.S. 390, 399",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | 11,894,157 | a |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "262 U.S. 390, 399",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | 11,894,157 | a |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 S.Ct. 625, 626",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | 11,894,157 | a |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 S.Ct. 625, 626",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 S.Ct. 625, 626",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | 11,894,157 | a |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | 11,894,157 | a |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 494, 499",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 494, 499",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 494, 499",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | 11,894,157 | a |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | 11,894,157 | a |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The Sightes contend that parents have a constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one's children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education",
"sentence": "See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)(recog-nizing constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)(stating that “[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not only merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”)- In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court stated that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”"
} | 11,894,157 | b |
The court cautioned, however, that the time for filing such motions is not unlimited. The district court may, in the exercise of its discretion, "deny as untimely a non-procedural-defect, non-jurisdietional motion to remand if made at an unreasonably late stage of the federal litigation." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "965 F.2d 1497, 1502-03",
"parenthetical": "thirty-day limit not applicable to motion for remand based upon abstention",
"sentence": "Id. at 1213 n. 8. Accord: Melahn v. Pennock Insurance, Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1502-03 (8th Cir.1992) (thirty-day limit not applicable to motion for remand based upon abstention)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 1518, 1522",
"parenthetical": "thirty-day limit applies to all motions for remand not based on subject matter jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1522 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 914, 116 L.Ed.2d 814 (1992) (thirty-day limit applies to all motions for remand not based on subject matter jurisdiction)."
} | 9,048,902 | a |
The court cautioned, however, that the time for filing such motions is not unlimited. The district court may, in the exercise of its discretion, "deny as untimely a non-procedural-defect, non-jurisdietional motion to remand if made at an unreasonably late stage of the federal litigation." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "thirty-day limit applies to all motions for remand not based on subject matter jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1522 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 914, 116 L.Ed.2d 814 (1992) (thirty-day limit applies to all motions for remand not based on subject matter jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "965 F.2d 1497, 1502-03",
"parenthetical": "thirty-day limit not applicable to motion for remand based upon abstention",
"sentence": "Id. at 1213 n. 8. Accord: Melahn v. Pennock Insurance, Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1502-03 (8th Cir.1992) (thirty-day limit not applicable to motion for remand based upon abstention)."
} | 9,048,902 | b |
The court cautioned, however, that the time for filing such motions is not unlimited. The district court may, in the exercise of its discretion, "deny as untimely a non-procedural-defect, non-jurisdietional motion to remand if made at an unreasonably late stage of the federal litigation." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "thirty-day limit applies to all motions for remand not based on subject matter jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1522 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 914, 116 L.Ed.2d 814 (1992) (thirty-day limit applies to all motions for remand not based on subject matter jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "965 F.2d 1497, 1502-03",
"parenthetical": "thirty-day limit not applicable to motion for remand based upon abstention",
"sentence": "Id. at 1213 n. 8. Accord: Melahn v. Pennock Insurance, Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1502-03 (8th Cir.1992) (thirty-day limit not applicable to motion for remand based upon abstention)."
} | 9,048,902 | b |
The proximity of Antone's interrogation hurts rather than helps the government's position. Although the case law is con-cededly anecdotal in this regard, a span of about two hours is, in this writer's estimate, insufficiently remote where, as here, that time is spent entirely in police custody. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "883 F.2d 1407, 1416",
"parenthetical": "\"As best we are aware, no court has weighed the first factor against a defendant when his inculpatory statement followed illegal police conduct by only a few hours.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) (six hours in police custody insufficient to purge taint); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218-19, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (less than two hours insufficient); Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (same); United States v. Torres, 274 F.Supp.2d 146, 159 (D.R.I.2003) (finding that statements made at police headquarters three or four hours after illegal search were not sufficiently attenuated even though the defendant received Miranda warnings); see also United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir.1989) (“As best we are aware, no court has weighed the first factor against a defendant when his inculpatory statement followed illegal police conduct by only a few hours.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "274 F.Supp.2d 146, 159",
"parenthetical": "finding that statements made at police headquarters three or four hours after illegal search were not sufficiently attenuated even though the defendant received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) (six hours in police custody insufficient to purge taint); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218-19, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (less than two hours insufficient); Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (same); United States v. Torres, 274 F.Supp.2d 146, 159 (D.R.I.2003) (finding that statements made at police headquarters three or four hours after illegal search were not sufficiently attenuated even though the defendant received Miranda warnings); see also United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir.1989) (“As best we are aware, no court has weighed the first factor against a defendant when his inculpatory statement followed illegal police conduct by only a few hours.”)."
} | 5,880,328 | b |
And finally, O'Melveny & Myers said that the Court would not "adopt a court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law." To be sure, FEHBA has a preemption provision; but even if the provision does not cover reimbursement claims (a proposition we reject in the next section of this opinion), that limitation cannot override the strong federal interests in displacing state law in our case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O'Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.\"",
"sentence": "See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (express “pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) any possibility of implied conflict pre-emption” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (“the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a.conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O’Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.”); cf. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ — i.e., supports a reasonable inference — that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 280, 288",
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute 'implies' -- i.e., supports a reasonable inference -- that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.\"",
"sentence": "See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (express “pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) any possibility of implied conflict pre-emption” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (“the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a.conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O’Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.”); cf. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ — i.e., supports a reasonable inference — that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”)."
} | 4,355,921 | a |
And finally, O'Melveny & Myers said that the Court would not "adopt a court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law." To be sure, FEHBA has a preemption provision; but even if the provision does not cover reimbursement claims (a proposition we reject in the next section of this opinion), that limitation cannot override the strong federal interests in displacing state law in our case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O'Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.\"",
"sentence": "See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (express “pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) any possibility of implied conflict pre-emption” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (“the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a.conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O’Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.”); cf. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ — i.e., supports a reasonable inference — that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute 'implies' -- i.e., supports a reasonable inference -- that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.\"",
"sentence": "See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (express “pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) any possibility of implied conflict pre-emption” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (“the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a.conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O’Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.”); cf. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ — i.e., supports a reasonable inference — that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”)."
} | 4,355,921 | a |
And finally, O'Melveny & Myers said that the Court would not "adopt a court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law." To be sure, FEHBA has a preemption provision; but even if the provision does not cover reimbursement claims (a proposition we reject in the next section of this opinion), that limitation cannot override the strong federal interests in displacing state law in our case. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute 'implies' -- i.e., supports a reasonable inference -- that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.\"",
"sentence": "See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (express “pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) any possibility of implied conflict pre-emption” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (“the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a.conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O’Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.”); cf. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ — i.e., supports a reasonable inference — that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O'Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.\"",
"sentence": "See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (express “pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) any possibility of implied conflict pre-emption” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (“the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a.conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O’Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.”); cf. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ — i.e., supports a reasonable inference — that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”)."
} | 4,355,921 | b |
It was not intended to diminish the duty of care that a school owes its students to provide reasonably safe school premises for school-related activities, including interscholastic sports. "Personal injury from defective premises ... is not a risk that schoolchildren should, as matter of public policy, be required to run in return for the benefit of a public education." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because municipalities need no \"encouragement to open their schools for parent-teacher conferences,\" applying recreational use statute to parent's slip and fall on ice in school walkway on parent-teacher night \"would upend the balance that the Legislature intended to strike 'between encouraging public access to private land and protecting landowners from liability for injuries' \"",
"sentence": "Cf. Wilkins v. Haverhill, 468 Mass. 86, 91 n.9 (2014), quoting Ali, 441 Mass. at 236 (because municipalities need no “encouragement to open their schools for parent-teacher conferences,” applying recreational use statute to parent’s slip and fall on ice in school walkway on parent-teacher night “would upend the balance that the Legislature intended to strike ‘between encouraging public access to private land and protecting landowners from liability for injuries’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 Mass. App. Ct. 142, 145",
"parenthetical": "\"Because of the relationship between a school and its students, the city had a duty of care to the plaintiff to provide her with reasonably safe school premises\"",
"sentence": "See Alter v. Newton, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 142, 145 (1993) (“Because of the relationship between a school and its students, the city had a duty of care to the plaintiff to provide her with reasonably safe school premises”).* ** Therefore, the recreational use statute does not alter the standard of care that a school owes its own students arising from its special relationship with its students, and would not protect the town from liability for negligence claims brought against it by students enrolled in its own public schools for injuries sustained while the students were engaged in school-related activities."
} | 4,361,978 | b |
It was not intended to diminish the duty of care that a school owes its students to provide reasonably safe school premises for school-related activities, including interscholastic sports. "Personal injury from defective premises ... is not a risk that schoolchildren should, as matter of public policy, be required to run in return for the benefit of a public education." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "441 Mass. 236, 236",
"parenthetical": "because municipalities need no \"encouragement to open their schools for parent-teacher conferences,\" applying recreational use statute to parent's slip and fall on ice in school walkway on parent-teacher night \"would upend the balance that the Legislature intended to strike 'between encouraging public access to private land and protecting landowners from liability for injuries' \"",
"sentence": "Cf. Wilkins v. Haverhill, 468 Mass. 86, 91 n.9 (2014), quoting Ali, 441 Mass. at 236 (because municipalities need no “encouragement to open their schools for parent-teacher conferences,” applying recreational use statute to parent’s slip and fall on ice in school walkway on parent-teacher night “would upend the balance that the Legislature intended to strike ‘between encouraging public access to private land and protecting landowners from liability for injuries’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 Mass. App. Ct. 142, 145",
"parenthetical": "\"Because of the relationship between a school and its students, the city had a duty of care to the plaintiff to provide her with reasonably safe school premises\"",
"sentence": "See Alter v. Newton, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 142, 145 (1993) (“Because of the relationship between a school and its students, the city had a duty of care to the plaintiff to provide her with reasonably safe school premises”).* ** Therefore, the recreational use statute does not alter the standard of care that a school owes its own students arising from its special relationship with its students, and would not protect the town from liability for negligence claims brought against it by students enrolled in its own public schools for injuries sustained while the students were engaged in school-related activities."
} | 4,361,978 | b |
It was not intended to diminish the duty of care that a school owes its students to provide reasonably safe school premises for school-related activities, including interscholastic sports. "Personal injury from defective premises ... is not a risk that schoolchildren should, as matter of public policy, be required to run in return for the benefit of a public education." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because municipalities need no \"encouragement to open their schools for parent-teacher conferences,\" applying recreational use statute to parent's slip and fall on ice in school walkway on parent-teacher night \"would upend the balance that the Legislature intended to strike 'between encouraging public access to private land and protecting landowners from liability for injuries' \"",
"sentence": "Cf. Wilkins v. Haverhill, 468 Mass. 86, 91 n.9 (2014), quoting Ali, 441 Mass. at 236 (because municipalities need no “encouragement to open their schools for parent-teacher conferences,” applying recreational use statute to parent’s slip and fall on ice in school walkway on parent-teacher night “would upend the balance that the Legislature intended to strike ‘between encouraging public access to private land and protecting landowners from liability for injuries’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "116 Idaho 586, 588-589",
"parenthetical": "\" 'if the recreational use statute were applied to injuries children suffered while on school premises as students,' the special relationship of the school to its students would be substantially impaired\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 149, quoting Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 588-589 (1989) (“ ‘if the recreational use statute were applied to injuries children suffered while on school premises as students,’ the special relationship of the school to its students would be substantially impaired”)."
} | 4,361,978 | b |
It was not intended to diminish the duty of care that a school owes its students to provide reasonably safe school premises for school-related activities, including interscholastic sports. "Personal injury from defective premises ... is not a risk that schoolchildren should, as matter of public policy, be required to run in return for the benefit of a public education." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "441 Mass. 236, 236",
"parenthetical": "because municipalities need no \"encouragement to open their schools for parent-teacher conferences,\" applying recreational use statute to parent's slip and fall on ice in school walkway on parent-teacher night \"would upend the balance that the Legislature intended to strike 'between encouraging public access to private land and protecting landowners from liability for injuries' \"",
"sentence": "Cf. Wilkins v. Haverhill, 468 Mass. 86, 91 n.9 (2014), quoting Ali, 441 Mass. at 236 (because municipalities need no “encouragement to open their schools for parent-teacher conferences,” applying recreational use statute to parent’s slip and fall on ice in school walkway on parent-teacher night “would upend the balance that the Legislature intended to strike ‘between encouraging public access to private land and protecting landowners from liability for injuries’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "116 Idaho 586, 588-589",
"parenthetical": "\" 'if the recreational use statute were applied to injuries children suffered while on school premises as students,' the special relationship of the school to its students would be substantially impaired\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 149, quoting Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 588-589 (1989) (“ ‘if the recreational use statute were applied to injuries children suffered while on school premises as students,’ the special relationship of the school to its students would be substantially impaired”)."
} | 4,361,978 | b |
More recent decisions have elaborated on the same basic theme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 U.S. 217, 221-22",
"parenthetical": "striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (AFDC recipient “must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires”); Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.) (“The right to the advice and assistance of retained counsel in civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process, and extends to administrative, as well as courtroom, proceedings.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906, 101 S.Ct. 3032, 69 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981); see also United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 355-56, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "397 U.S. 254, 270",
"parenthetical": "AFDC recipient \"must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (AFDC recipient “must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires”); Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.) (“The right to the advice and assistance of retained counsel in civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process, and extends to administrative, as well as courtroom, proceedings.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906, 101 S.Ct. 3032, 69 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981); see also United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 355-56, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights)."
} | 649,083 | b |
More recent decisions have elaborated on the same basic theme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 S.Ct. 353, 355-56",
"parenthetical": "striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (AFDC recipient “must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires”); Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.) (“The right to the advice and assistance of retained counsel in civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process, and extends to administrative, as well as courtroom, proceedings.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906, 101 S.Ct. 3032, 69 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981); see also United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 355-56, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "397 U.S. 254, 270",
"parenthetical": "AFDC recipient \"must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (AFDC recipient “must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires”); Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.) (“The right to the advice and assistance of retained counsel in civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process, and extends to administrative, as well as courtroom, proceedings.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906, 101 S.Ct. 3032, 69 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981); see also United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 355-56, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights)."
} | 649,083 | b |
More recent decisions have elaborated on the same basic theme. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "397 U.S. 254, 270",
"parenthetical": "AFDC recipient \"must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (AFDC recipient “must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires”); Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.) (“The right to the advice and assistance of retained counsel in civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process, and extends to administrative, as well as courtroom, proceedings.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906, 101 S.Ct. 3032, 69 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981); see also United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 355-56, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (AFDC recipient “must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires”); Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.) (“The right to the advice and assistance of retained counsel in civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process, and extends to administrative, as well as courtroom, proceedings.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906, 101 S.Ct. 3032, 69 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981); see also United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 355-56, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights)."
} | 649,083 | a |
More recent decisions have elaborated on the same basic theme. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021",
"parenthetical": "AFDC recipient \"must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (AFDC recipient “must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires”); Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.) (“The right to the advice and assistance of retained counsel in civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process, and extends to administrative, as well as courtroom, proceedings.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906, 101 S.Ct. 3032, 69 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981); see also United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 355-56, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 U.S. 217, 221-22",
"parenthetical": "striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (AFDC recipient “must be allowed to retain an attorney [in benefits termination hearing] if he so desires”); Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.) (“The right to the advice and assistance of retained counsel in civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process, and extends to administrative, as well as courtroom, proceedings.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906, 101 S.Ct. 3032, 69 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981); see also United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 355-56, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, state rule barring union from hiring attorney to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights)."
} | 649,083 | a |
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