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of wrongful manipulation of the WSSC by either the Council or the Planning Commission. 281 Md. at 21-22, 376 A.2d 505. The court held that the dedication to the public of the property valued at $800,000 did not create any vested rights. 281 Md. at 23, 376 A.2d 505. The court’s rationale was that there was no evidence that TKU had been guaranteed a permit to redevelop and that no valid promises by appropriate officials had been made to the developer. The court concluded: [I]n order to obtain a vested zoning status, there must be cons 6 Md. 117, 125-26, 291 A.2d 672 (1972); City of Hagerstown v. Long Meadow Shopping Ctr., 264 Md. 481, 494-96, 287 A.2d 242 (1972); Mayor of Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 624, 51 A.2d 273 (1947); Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 228, 164 A. 743 (1933) (<HOLDING>); County Comm’rs v. Arundel Corp., 82 Md.App. Holdings: 0: holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal 1: holding that it is not 2: holding that if precise issue is not clear in statute reviewing court must not simply impose its own construction but must determine whether agencys construction is permissible 3: holding a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial 4: holding that even if construction commences but it is based on an illegally issued permit no vested right is created | [
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sanctions is to compel compliance with the court’s orders and not to punish, the continuing contempt sanctions end when the contemnor complies. A civil contempt defendant “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket. He can end the sentence and discharge himself of contempt at any moment by doing what he has previously refused to do.” State v. Pothier, 104 N.M. 363, 364, 721 P.2d 1294, 1295 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Civil contempt sanctions may be imposed by honoring the most basic due process protections-in most cases, fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994); see Turner v. Rogers, — U.S. —,—, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) (<HOLDING>). {26} Criminal contempt proceedings are Holdings: 0: holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel 1: recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process 2: holding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing when parties submissions in contempt proceedings raise disputed issue of material fact 3: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 4: holding that due process encompasses the right to counsel in a civil contempt proceeding | [
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ERISA. Id. at 16. The First Circuit held that there was no invidious discrimination in the employer’s decision partially to terminate benefits where a legitimate business justification for the decision was readily apparent. Id. Here, more is alleged than a disparate impact to plaintiffs as a result of a business decision to alter a plan. Plaintiffs contend that intentional misstatements regarding the modification of retirement plans at MassMutual and Monsanto caused them prematurely to sever the employment relationship with their respective companies. The MassMutual plaintiffs further allege that there was an intentional design to deprive certain employees&emdash;but not others&emdash;of enhanced pension benefits. See Rodowicz v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 857 F.Supp. at 999 (<HOLDING>). The claims of Vartanian and the MassMutual Holdings: 0: holding that factual pleadings on this issue are weak but sufficient 1: holding that parties are bound by admissions in pleadings 2: holding that as a general rule pleadings filed in this court are public records and are not subject to being sealed 3: holding that defendants selfserving affidavit was sufficient to raise a factual issue to be resolved at trial 4: holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings | [
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is involved. What limits the viability of a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation is not the distinction between an economic and an interpersonal setting, but rather whether the person alleging misrepresentation was justified in her reliance on the truthfulness of the statements. It is true that the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation has its origins in commercial or transactional settings. See Neurosurgery & Spine Surgery, S.C. v. Goldman, 339 Ill. App. 3d 177, 185-86, 790 N.E.2d 925 (2003) (detailing the origins of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation). Relying on Neurosurgery, defendants contend that fraudulent misrepresentation is only actionable in commercial cases involving pecuniary, but not physical, damages. A thorough review of the applicable law leads 87) (<HOLDING>). ‘Although the invasion of an economic Holdings: 0: holding that pecuniary damages are essential to a fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action 1: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim 2: recognizing cause of action 3: recognizing wrongful adoption cause of action grounded in fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation 4: holding that pecuniary damages are not property damages under insureds policy | [
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that the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 3 Gear has not moved for summary judgment with respect to its claims against the City of Medford. 4 In addition to Gear’s opposition to Goba’s motion for summary judgment, Gear has filed a motion to strike photographs, the affidavit of Harry B. Nelson, Jr. (“Nelson"), certain portions of Goba’s statement of facts, and other exhibits attached to Goba’s motion for summary judgment. To the extent that the motion to strike concerned photographs submitted with the Nelson affidavit, the court did not rely on those photographs in making its decision. The only f he shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (<HOLDING>); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs failure to mention vice president of thirdparty company in initial disclosures was harmless because plaintiffs mentioned president of company and defendants conducted no discovery of company 1: holding that the purchaser could bring a 93a claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered 2: holding that an abutter could not bring a 93a claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant 3: holding that an unjust enrichment claim could exist where landlord took an active role in completion of construction work 4: holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93a claim against the president and vicepresident of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff | [
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Ex. 2. She errs in her reliance, however, because Bryant qualifies his statement by stating that the “support” was “[d]uring [the plaintiffs] absence” and that “[t]o [his] knowledge, [the plaintiff] retained the ability and latitude to interact with the staff members.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 2. Accordingly, the plaintiff, relying on her own self-serving affidavit, offers no direct evidence of the reassignment of her work. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n & Exs. 1, 4. This Circuit has held that “under some circumstances ... a party relying on unsupported affidavits cannot survive summary judgment.” McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D.C.Cir.2001) (emphasis added), vacated in part on other grounds, 320 F.3d 280 (D.C.Cir.2003); see also Arrington, 473 F.3d at 343 (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiff offers no corroboration Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee 1: holding that when a plaintiff relies entirely on his own selfserving testimony which lacks any corroboration and is contradicted by all the available evidence a court is not obligated to reward the plaintiff with a jury trial 2: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 3: holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6 4: holding that where plaintiff by his own evidence shows two or more equally likely causes of the injury for only one of which defendant is responsible plaintiff can not recover | [
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401, 404 (Tex.2009)). For the reasons just stated, the duty that an insurance agent owes to a client arises from the agent’s agreement to procure coverage for the client. Accordingly, the Court’s initial inquiry is whether Plaintiff has pleaded facts that, if true, would establish that Walker or Paychex agreed to procure $750,000 in coverage for Mr. Kersh. Plaintiff has done so. Plaintiff has alleged that Walker told Mr. Kersh, through Leimbach, to fax his enrollment form to Paychex. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Kersh faxed his enrollment form to Paychex on August 18, 2011, and that the form indicated that he was requesting $750,000 in life insurance. (Id. IT 21.) And Plaintiff has alleged that on August 22, 2011, Walker emailed Leimbach to say that Mr. Kers 966) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a claim for Holdings: 0: holding that an insurance company may have assumed a duty to defend a customer against a tort claim falling outside the scope of the customers insurance contract where a claims person told the customer over the telephone that the insurer would take care of it and the insurer shortly thereafter hired a lawyer to represent the customer 1: holding agent liable for fire damage after his customer requested a new policy to replace one cancelled by the insurer and the agent neither procured such a replacement policy nor alerted the customer to this failure by returning the unearned portion of the premium from the original policy 2: holding agent liable for fire damage to the house his customer was building when the agent after agreeing to have a builders risk policy issued on the house failed to notify the customer that he had not procured such a policy 3: holding funds received by plaintiff from an insurance policy that was procured by the defendant and for which a premium was paid are not a collateral source 4: holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth | [
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in controlling acts of Congress or by interpretative decisions of this Court. 346 U.S. at 409-10, 74 S.Ct. at 205. The Court held that the federal maritime law applied in which contributory negligence did not bar recovery, only being considered as to degree. Although the accident happened in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania law of contributory negligence which would have barred recovery was held not to apply. In Kermarec, a visitor on board a vessel berthed in New York Harbor was injured while leaving the ship by a fall down a stairway. The Court held that the owner of the ship in navigable waters under maritime law owed to Kermarec the duty of exercising reasonable care toward him. It held Ed.2d 928 (1994); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1087-89 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1060, 127 Holdings: 0: holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions 1: holding that federal maritime law and not state law applies to all actions for wrongful death in navigable state waters 2: holding that general maritime law preempts state law 3: holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law 4: holding that platform workers death caused by an explosion on a platform bore no significant relation to maritime law even though the death occurred while the worker was located on a vessel in navigable waters | [
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and statements, found that Churchill would find it difficult to follow the law and was thus significantly impaired in his ability to serve as a juror. Following a careful review of the record, we agree that this was a difficult decision; however, “[ajbsent manifest abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court’s determination of questions of juror bias.” See State v. McGuire, 110 N.M. 304, 312, 795 P.2d 996, 1004 (1990). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. {9} The trial court denied Clark’s motions to remove Rosales, Scullion, and Redford for cause. Clark states that Rosales indicated that he is against plea bargaining and was antagonistic during questioning, while Scullion indicated that he would lean more towards the death penalty. The State 991) (<HOLDING>); Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 386 S.E.2d 316, Holdings: 0: holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing 1: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty 2: holding that a court need only explain that a unanimous vote is required before a jury can impose the death penalty 3: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants 4: holding that the penalty is applicable | [
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ample evidence for the plaintiffs’ case to avoid summary judgment.” (quoting Acosta-Orozco v. Rodriguez-de-Rivera, 132 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir.1997))); González-de-Blasini, 377 F.3d at 86 (recognizing that a “ ‘prima facie case for political discrimination may be built on circumstantial evidence’ ” so long as plaintiffs have “generated ‘the specific facts necessary to take the asserted claim out of the realm of speculative, general allegations’ ” (quoting Kauffman v. P.R. Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir.1988))). The evidence here, “though thin, point[s] in different directions; that is, it tend[s] to support conflicting inferences. Summary judgment cannot be predicated on so vacillatory a record.” Mandel, 456 F.3d at 207; see also In re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 764 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the district court is Holdings: 0: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case 1: holding that a court faced with competing plausible inferences may not make its choice under the banner of summary judgment 2: holding that court should balance competing interests 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment 4: holding that a superior court justice may not choose between conflicting inferences at summary judgment stage | [
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between majority and minority shareholders in closely held companies that would apply to every transaction. See, e.g., Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 867 S.W.3d 355, 391 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, judgm’t set aside by arg.) (op. on reh’g). Texas courts have, however, recognized that an informal fiduciary duty may exist between the shareholders in a closely held corporation, depending on the circumstances. See generally Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 277 (Tex.2006); Miller v. Miller, 700 S.W.2d 941, 945-46 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.) (stating that shareholders’ intimate knowledge of company’s affairs supported finding a fiduciary relationship); Tuck v. Miller, 483 S.W.2d 898, 905 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.) (op. on reh’g) (<HOLDING>); see also Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 391 Holdings: 0: holding that superior business expertise among other factors supported a finding of a confidential relationship 1: holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record 2: recognizing that among other factors the location and level of the precedent as well as its age are important factors in a qualified immunity analysis 3: holding lab report properly admitted as business record supported finding of violation of probation 4: holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process | [
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an official paper record tracing the vehicle’s ownership. In other words, the regulations at issue in this case are the “safeguards” designed “to protect purchasers in the sale of motor vehicles with altered or reset odometers” that are contemplated by the Act’s purposes. See 49 U.S.C. § 32701(b)(2) (2000). They prevent unscrupulous dealers from using their own procedures to mislead a purchaser about a vehicle’s mileage — not only with respect to the actual number of miles driven, but where those miles were driven and by whom. See 49 C.F.R. § 580.2 (2004) (“The purpose of this part is to provide purchasers of motor vehicles with odometer information to assist them in determining a vehicle’s condition and value Yazzie v. Amigo Chevrolet, Inc., 189 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1248-49 (D.N.M.2001) (<HOLDING>). The identity of former owners, of critical Holdings: 0: holding that a man standing between two insured vehicles while attempting to jump start one of them was occupying them when one of the vehicles between which he was standing was struck by a third vehicle 1: holding the purpose of a checkpoint was valid when officers stopped vehicles to look for any violations on the vehicles such as drivers license equipment or inspection 2: holding in a patent case that when the plaintiff brought the suit in federal district court it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to all the issues embraced in the suit including those pertaining to the counterclaim of the defendants 3: holding that allegations of specific intent to defraud with respect to the vehicles mileage are not required to bring suit under 32710a when a dealer manipulated title procedures in violation of the odometer act to hide the identity of the vehicles prior owner 4: holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law | [
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Jones that the appointment was for three years, she understood and believed that to be the case. Id. at 1082. The court concluded that “[w]hen Dr. Jenkins took action to renew or confirm Mr. Young’s three-year appointment, he was acting in conformity with the agreement he made with Mr. Young in 1984.” Id. at 1083. Having found that Oates’ ouster was not motivated by sex discrimination, the court dismissed the action and entered judgment for the District. This appeal followed. Discussion A. Analytical Framework To make out her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Oates must establish that, acting under color of law, defendants deprived her of her constitutional right not to be discriminated against on account of her sex. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (<HOLDING>). It is apparent that the District officials in Holdings: 0: recognizing federal constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination that is not substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives 1: holding right to testify was federal constitutional right 2: holding that a plaintiff could not assert a 1981 claim based on gender discrimination 3: holding that the same standard applies to claims of discrimination based upon gender and age 4: holding race and gender discrimination claim barred | [
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that (a)(2) is "designed to prevent those who make false records or statements to get claims paid or approved from escaping liability solely on the ground that they did not themselves present a claim for payment or approval.” Totten II, 380 F.3d at 501 (emphasis original). But see id. at 502 (Garland, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, it is unnecessary to decide this issue here because the presentment requirement is ultimately satisfied. 89 .United States v. Warning, 1994 WL 396432, at *4, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10402, at *12 (E.D.Pa.1994) (applying intra-corporate immunity doctrine in FCA context); United States v. EER Sys. Corp., 950 F.Supp. 130, 133 (D.Md.1996) (same); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Marmott v. Maryland Lumber Co., 807 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that parent corporation and whollyowned subsidiary are legally incapable of conspiring with each other 1: holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control 2: holding that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are legally incapable of conspiring with one another 3: holding that parent corporation could not be held liable for any acts of whollyowned subsidiary although boards of directors of the two corporations overlapped in all other respects corporation had not disregarded subsidiarys corporate separateness had not involved itself directly in management of subsidiary and had not otherwise dominated or controlled subsidiary 4: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations | [
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on speculation and conclusory allegations.’ ”) (citations omitted). Though Arco has contended that it has averred facts relevant to scienter, calling Deutsche Bank’s arguments “disingenuous” and “laughable” and claiming that Deutsche Bank “ignores the allegations” (Opp. Br. at 21-22), scienter cannot be pleaded merely by describing with rhetorical flourish the deal structure and mechanics of the transactions, when those matters were disclosed to Arco in detail. (Mov. Br. at 7-8 (citing Exs. 2-5, 8-11,14-17), 16-17, 21.) Finally, the FAC must establish reliance. Under Rule 10b-5, Arco must allege reliance on allegedly deceptive acts of which it was aware. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161, 171, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d at Holdings: 0: holding that acts of promissory fraud which require proof that the defendants intended not to perform promised acts were not protected by stateagent immunity 1: holding that acts occurring thirteen years before the acts in the instant case were not too remote given the similarity of the offenses 2: holding deceptive acts which were not disclosed to the investing public are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance because a plaintiff cannot rely on acts of which it is unaware 3: holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation 4: holding that the government cannot rely upon affidavits not attached to the warrant itself to satisfy the particularity requirement | [
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who stand in a particular relation to one another.” Tort, Black’s Law Dictionary 1626 (10th ed. 2014). As such, successful tort actions “are premised on the existence of a legal duty.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522,112 S.Ct. at 2620 (plurality opinion); see also Geier, 529 U.S, at 881, 120 S.Ct. at 1925 (characterizing a successful tort action as “a state law—i.e., a rule of state tort law imposing ... a duty”). Strict-liability and negligence claims like those at issue here are no exception. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2466, 2474 n.1, 186 L.Ed.2d 607 (2013) (“[Mjost common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability ... exist ... to ... impose affirmative duties.”); Samuel Friedland Family Enters. v. Amoroso, 630 So.2d 1067, 1068 n.3 (Fla. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer LLC, 39 So.3d 1216, Holdings: 0: holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control 1: recognizing in the strictliability context that one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused even though the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product quoting restatement second of torts 402a 2: holding there is no authority that provides that the mere sale of a consumer electronics product in california can create a duty to disclose any defect that may occur during the useful life of the product 3: holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury 4: holding that the plaintiff must first establish that the product left the sellers hands in a defective condition after which the seller may introduce evidence that its product was substantially altered after leaving its possession which evidence may rebut or overcome the plaintiffs showing that his injuries were a result of the products defect | [
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Ohms, 881 P.2d at 849 (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 1988)). ¶ 85 Indeed, it is the judicial article itself, Article VIII, section 13, that establishes the Judicial Conduct Commission and specifically recognizes the judicial nature of the powers the Commission is authorized to exercise by mandating that this Court review all Commission findings pertaining to recommended discipline of judges and by requiring that actual orders of discipline be entered by the Court, not the Commission. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 13; In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 863. Other jurisdictions have also held judicial conduct commissions with similar authority to be within the judicial branch. See Whitehead v. Nevada Comm. on Jud. Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 86 Any attempt by the Legislature, Holdings: 0: holding that central assessment by the unit method of valuation did not violate the equal protection clause of the united states constitution or the uniform operation of laws provision in the utah constitution 1: holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution 2: holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the nevada constitution a provision identical to article v section 1 of the utah constitution 3: holding that pullman abstention should not be invoked to avoid interpreting state law constitutional questions when the provision of the state constitution at issue mirrors a provision of the federal constitution 4: holding that the presidential privilege is inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution | [
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be a materially adverse employment action, see White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 802 (6th Cir. 2004), the “change in employment conditions must be ‘more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.’ ” Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)). The change in Kubik’s teaching schedule is just that: an alteration of job responsibilities. Although being directed to teach at 8:00 a.m. every morning might be a frustrating inconvenience, Title VII claims cannot be brought based upon “trivial workplace dissatisfactions.” White, 364 F.3d at 795. See also Turner v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc., 420 F.Supp.2d 773, 787 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (<HOLDING>). The denial of Kubik’s tenure extension Holdings: 0: holding that assignment of unfavorable class schedules did not constitute an adverse employment action absent evidence of materially adverse consequences 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action 3: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 4: holding that potentially indefinite suspension of employee from work without pay could constitute materially adverse employment action even where employer awards full backpay for the entire period and that reassignment of responsibilities could constitute materially adverse employment action even absent demotion | [
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the “monetary value” of his retirement options and that as a result he selected Disability Retirement, rendering him ineligible to receive VSF benefits. (See Letter to Peter Alan Holland, dated Dec. 21, 2006, attached to Compl.) Falardo now claims that the NYPD’s alleged failure to adequately inform him of his retirement options co .Ed.2d 47 (1998); Castellano v. Board of Tr. of Police Officers’ Variable Supplements Fund, 937 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.1991) (“Castellano I”) (upholding the Scheme against challenge under Equal Protection, Due Process, and Contract Clauses of the United States Constitution and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims); Castellano v. City of New York, 251 A.D.2d 194, 674 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998) (“Cas-tellano III ”) (<HOLDING>), appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 817, 684 N.Y.S.2d Holdings: 0: holding that claims to the vsf benefits under various theories were barred by the res judicata effect of the state court judgment in castellano iii 1: holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense 2: holding that plaintiffs could not relitigate their claim that they were entitled to vsf benefits and that while plaintiffs could have raised additional claims in one or more of the foregoing actions they opted not to do so and they are barred by res judicata from doing so now 3: holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to present testimony that they were induced to enter an automobile lease by promises that they could disregard terms of the lease 4: holding that any claim that was raised or could have been raised on direct appeal is barred from review on post conviction under the doctrine of res judicata | [
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the Cubs’ royalties will decrease proportionately. But more to the point, the Rooftops fail to acknowledge that a primary function of a contract is to allocate risks between parties. Here, the risk is that future expansions of Wrigley Field will obstruct the Rooftops’ views. Section 6.5 provides a mechanism for the parties to dispute the Cubs’ proposed expansion projects. Section 6.6 declares that if the Cubs prevail in the dispute, their projects may proceed. That is precisely what occurred here—the Rooftops vigorously opposed the Cubs’ expansion efforts, but ultimately lost. The parties were free to allocate risk in a different manner, but chose not to do so. See McClure Eng’g Assocs., Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp., 95 Ill.2d 68, 69 Ill.Dec. 183, 447 N.E.2d 400, 402-03 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Absent a defect in the negotiation process, Holdings: 0: recognizing majority rule and collecting cases 1: holding that mutual mistake is ground for reformation when as here the minds of the parties have met contractually but because of a mutual mistake the written contract between the parties is wanting in expression or execution to evince the actual and binding contractual intent of the parties 2: recognizing that lawyer who had represented petitioner for years was as fit as a relative to serve as next friend 3: recognizing a widespread policy of permitting competent parties to contractually allocate business risks as they see fit collecting cases 4: holding 3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and tenday appeal period applies and collecting cases | [
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near a school, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); and restricted picketing at or near a courthouse, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965). The reach of the Texas statute, to the contrary, is far more extensive than the regulations that have been upheld, and closely resembles enactments that have been declared unconstitutionally overbroad. See Coates v. City of Cincinatti, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance making it a criminal offense for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by”). Cf. Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1980) (<HOLDING>). When a legitimate state interest was not Holdings: 0: holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the instrument 1: holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods 2: holding unconstitutionally overbroad an ordinance outlawing the display of a sign near a business to encourage others not to work or purchase goods there 3: holding that contract requiring buyer to purchase a fixed quantity of goods that amounted to roughly 6080 of its needs was not unlawful because the agreements contained no exclusive dealing clause and did not require the buyer to purchase any amounts of the defendants product that even approached its requirements 4: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods | [
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of no reason, why the excluded evidence supports a finding Officer Hernandez had a motive or bias to falsely testify that appellant drove erratically. 3 . Appellant argues the officers lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause for stopping him. For simplicity and because the differences between reasonable suspicion and probable cause are not material to our analysis, we will dispose of appellant’s issues by considering the officers’ reasonable suspicion to detain him. 4 . Appellant also apparently argues the State, at least at one point, believed Officer Hernandez’s 2006 termination was relevant, admissible evidence because the State originally disclosed this evidence to appellant in a Brady filing. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). However, appellant does not cite any Holdings: 0: holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly refused to disclose crucial exculpatory evidence to the defendant 1: holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense 2: holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant 3: holding prosecutor has affirmative duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence 4: holding that the state has no affirmative duty to seek out and gain possession of potentially exculpatory evidence | [
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court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions because (1) the case involved an issue of first impression under Florida law regarding whether a trust beneficiary could sue a court appointed trustee, and Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate to punish an attorney for advancing a legal theory on a question of first impression, (2) the district court failed to resolve all doubts in O’Shaughnessy’s favor, and (3) O’Shaughnessy conducted a reasonable investigation under the circumstances. After a thorough review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm. The district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions against O’Shaughnessy. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 407, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Sanctions are warranted when a party files a Holdings: 0: recognizing district courts wide range of discretion in setting amount of rule 11 sanctions 1: holding that a rule 11 sanctions award need only be appropriate thereby according broad discretion to the trial court 2: holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions 3: holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction | [
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under like circumstances ⅜ ⅜ ⅞.” Minn.Stat. § 609.20(1) (1998). He is guilty of first-degree domestic abuse murder if he “causes the death of a human being while committing domestic abuse when [he] has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.” Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6). Bradford argues that these two verdicts are inconsistent because first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter requires intent whereas first-degree domestic abuse murder requires extreme indifference. We disagree. While domestic abuse murder only requires extreme indifference, it does not preclude the possibility that a higher level of intent may be present. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Minn.1996) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that lack of intent is not an Holdings: 0: holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder 1: holding error is not harmless when the accused is convicted of firstdegree murder on a general verdict after a trial in which premeditation and felony murder theories are espoused if the felony underlying the felony murder charge is based on a legally unsupportable theory 2: holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense 3: holding that although premeditation is outside the heartland of seconddegree murder guideline upward departure from seconddegree murder guideline based on premeditation was improper because commission considered the defendants state of mind in assigning a higher base offense level to firstdegree murder than to seconddegree murder 4: holding that felony murder verdicts did not merge into a malice murder verdict but were instead vacated by operation of law | [
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the conflict between Richards and Kaiser and declining to "resolve ... the scope of the actual innocence doctrine in the context of non-capital habitual offender sentencing”). We need not address the correctness of the district court's ruling on the scope of the "actual innocence” doctrine because the analytical foundation for the court’s decision' — Reyes-Requena—is no longer apposite following the establishment of our own savings clause test in Prost, which, as Mr. Abernathy recognizes, does not include an actual innocence inquiry. See Brace, 634 F.3d at 1170 (rejecting a petitioner’s claim that he meets Reyes-Requena's "actual innocence” savings clause test on the grounds that we "explicitly declined to adopt the Reyes-Requena test in Prost"); see also Aplt. Supp. Reply Br. at 11 (<HOLDING>). 7 . As noted, the government's primary Holdings: 0: holding that a claim under booker does not fit within the savings clause of 28 usc 2255 1: holding 2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention 2: holding for 2241 purposes that 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if the remedy itself is infirm not because of the movants failure to use it or to prevail under it 3: holding that a prisoner cannot use the savings clause of 28 usc 2241 to escape the restrictions on successive 2255 motions and the failure to raise an available claim earlier 4: recognizing that under prost access to 2241 through the savings clause turns solely on whether the remedy provided by 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of mr abernathys detention | [
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held that without other indicia of discretionary control, the power to limit the universe of funds available to a Plan by adding to or subtracting from an overall menu does not confer fiduciary status on a plan servicer. See Hecker, 556 F.3d at 583. In Hecker, an investment services company offered a 401(k) plan a limited menu of investment options. Because the parties’ contract expressly gave the plan the “final say” on which investment options would be included, the court held that the investment services company was not a fiduciary: “no authority ... holds that limiting funds automatically creates discretionary control sufficient for fiduciary status.” Id. The Court s the authority to change investment options did give rise to fiduciary status. See Charters, 583 F.Supp.2d at 199 (<HOLDING>); Haddock v. Nationwide Fin. Servs., 419 Holdings: 0: holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary 1: holding that plan servicer which provided 401k plan a menu of investment options was not a fiduciary because parties contract required servicer to give the plan notice of and opportunity to reject any changes to the menu 2: holding that service provider which offered a big menu of investment options from which 401k the plan trustee selected a smaller plan menu was not a fiduciary because provider did not have ultimate authority over which investments were included in the plans 3: holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review 4: holding that insurer was a fiduciary to a 401k plan because the insurer had the ability to substitute investment options and the plan had no meaningful opportunity to reject substitutions because of the penalty charges associated with doing so | [
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original sentence hearing went no further than “at least 1.5 kilograms.” If so, that finding is not specific enough to support any conclusion about whether Amendment 750 lowered Hamilton’s base offense level, because “at least 1.5 kilograms” is equally consist tent with a finding of 8.4 kilograms or more and a finding of less than 8.4 kilograms. So if the district court finds that its original findings were limited to “at least 1.5 kilograms,” the court will need to go further. It will need to examine the entire record before it at the time of the original sentencing to see if it can make any further findings that will resolve the issue of whether 8.4 kilograms or more of crack cocaine should be attributed to Hamilton. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 582 F.3d 641, 646 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hall, 600 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that where the original drug quantity determination is not specific enough for the district court to determine whether it has the authority to reduce a defendants sentence under 3582c2 that court may make new findings of fact that are supported by the record and are not inconsistent with the findings made in the original sentencing proceedings 1: recognizing that the district court may make drug quantity findings by a preponderance of the evidence to calculate an advisory guidelines sentence for a 841b1c offense 2: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 3: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence 4: holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact | [
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comply is section 6 of the Act, which provides: “In no event shall it be necessary to fix or stipulate in any contract a time for the completion or a time for payment in order to obtain a lien under this act, provided, that the work is done or material furnished within three years from the commencement of said work or the commencement of furnishing said material.” 770 ILCS 60/6 (West 2002). Based on the plain language of section 6, “the 3-year period commences with the beginning of work for which the mechanic’s lien is asserted and not with the date upon which the contract for such work was entered into.” (Emphasis added.) Robb v. Lindquist, 23 Ill. App. 3d 186, 188 (1974); see also Cordeck Sales, Inc. v. Construction Systems, Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d 870, 877 (2009) (Cordeck Sales II) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, if the work for which a lien Holdings: 0: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 1: holding that subcontract requirement that work be performed in accordance with specifications in prime contract meant that prime contract governed the manner of the performance of the work not the basis for computing the amount to be paid the subcontractor 2: holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work 3: holding that the more transformative the new work the more likely the use of the old work is a fair one 4: recognizing that the work to be completed in accordance with the time limits of section 6 is the work for which lien enforcement is sought | [
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the Equal Access Law that that statute confers a private benefit. Specifically, it grants “equal access to the jails of this state” to any “person who holds a valid bail agent’s license.” I.C. § 27-10-3-18. In entitling bail agents to equal access to Indiana’s jails, the statute ensures that bail agents can do business on the same terms. And while the public might receive a benefit from that business, any public benefit is ancillary to the direct benefit conferred on bail agents. Nonetheless, Sheriff Galloway contends that the IDOI has the authority to enforce Indiana’s Bail Law, codified at Title 27, Article 10 of the Indiana Code. Accordingly, he continues, the Equal Access Law cannot create a private cause of action. See, e.g., Coons v. Kaiser, 567 N.E.2d 851, 852 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). We cannot agree. The IDOI regulates bail Holdings: 0: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls 1: holding that when a statute includes a specific enforcement provision an additional private cause of action based upon the statute cannot be judicially inferred 2: holding that we have consistently held that a private cause of action will not be found where the legislature has expressly provided for enforcement of a statute 3: holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act 4: holding that personal bias cannot be inferred from an adverse ruling | [
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The single issue presented in this case is whether the FCC reasonably determined that DTE did not “fail[ ] to act to cany out its responsibility” to adjudicate the dispute between GNAPs and Verizon over whether ISP-bound calls are “local” within the meaning of their interconnection agreement. Only where there is such a failure does § 252(e)(5) obligate the Commission to step in. Otherwise - such as where the state agency actually “makes a determination” under § 252 - there is no statutory basis for FCC preemption. Under such circumstances, an aggrieved party may bring an action for judicial review in federal court under § 252(e)(6), or, if that provision is inapplicable and there is no federal question at issue, in state court. Cf. Veyizon Md., — U.S. at —, 122 S.Ct. at 1758-60 (<HOLDING>). Section 252(e)(6), entitled “Review of State Holdings: 0: holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case 1: recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts 2: holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to review decisions of state commissions inteipreting interconnection agreements at least where review turns on issues of federal law and that this jurisdiction is not stripped by 252e6 3: holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this court 4: holding that federal courts have original rather than supplemental jurisdiction to review state public service commissions application of state law in interpreting an interconnection agreement | [
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Inc., 433 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Uncle Henry’s, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting Co., 399 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir.2005)), the Trust urges that summary judgment was appropriate because the Trust was not engaged in trade or commerce, based on its status as a nonprofit corporation. We agree. In Massachusetts, a defendant’s nonprofit status is not dispositive of whether it can be liable under Chapter 93A. Compare Linkage Corp. v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 679 N.E.2d 191, 207 n. 34 (1997) (noting that Massachusetts courts have held nonprofit corporations lia ble under Chapter 93A) (citing Miller v. Risk Mgmt. Found. of the Harvard Med. Insts., Inc., 36 Mass.App.Ct. 411, 632 N.E.2d 841 (1994)), with Poznik v. Mass. Med. Prof'l Ins. Ass’n., 417 Mass. 48, 628 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1994) (<HOLDING>), and All Seasons Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r of Holdings: 0: holding that information was voluntarily provided to the government which mandated the critical mass test 1: holding that judgment as a matter of law was proper when the plaintiff did not present any evidence that the defendant was motivated by the eeoc complaint knowledge is necessary to establish causation but it is not sufficient 2: holding that mmpia was not engaged in trade or commerce because of its character as a statutorily mandated nonprofit association that was motivated by legislative mandate not business or personal reasons citing barrett v mass insurers insolvency fund 412 mass 774 592 ne2d 1317 1319 1992 3: holding that the right of access to government information or sources of information within the governments control is not mandated by the first or fourteenth amendments 4: holding that although wade hearing may be constitutionally mandated under certain circumstances it is not mandated in all cases | [
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(addition) claim was excluded under exclusion “m.” Id. at 92. We conclude that exclusion “m” applies to the homeowners’ negligent-construction (addition) claim because the damage claimed was to addition work performed entirely by RDI. But the negligent-construction (original house) claim is not excluded by paragraph “m.” Specifically, the work performed on the original house by RDI was limited to the remodel and installation of the master bedroom window and other trim work. We read exclusion “m” to exclude the work performed by RDI on portions of the original house but exclusion “m” does not apply to adjacent walls and structures that had moisture damage caused by the work performed by RDI. See, e.g., Brown v. Concord, Grp. Ins. Co., 163 N.H. 522, 44 A.3d 586, 589-90 (2012) (<HOLDING>); Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. T & G Constr., Holdings: 0: recognizing that the work to be completed in accordance with the time limits of section 6 is the work for which lien enforcement is sought 1: holding that the unambiguous terms of the your work exclusion do not eliminate coverage for harm done to a subcontractors work 2: holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations 3: holding that j5 exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to subcontractors work because damage did not arise from insureds performing operations on subcontractors work 4: holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work | [
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pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). But uncontested documents referred to in the pleadings may be considered by the Court without ce Act (“NFIA”) Any federally regulated lender making a loan secured by real property in a designated flood zone must require the purchase of insurance as a condition of making the loan. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(l). The NFIA e lack of a federal cause of action does not per se eliminate the possibility of a state law claim against the lender, courts applying Louisiana law have held that any duty to make a correct flood zone determination arises from the NFIA and not state law. See Duong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 499 F.Supp.2d 700, 702-04 (E.D.La.2007) (<HOLDING>). Defendant contends that plaintiffs claims Holdings: 0: holding that without a sfip the nfip does not apply and the nfia cannot extend to the relationship between the insurance company and their insureds 1: holding the state law claims were not preempted 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding plaintiffs negligence claims were preempted by the nfia because any alleged duty to provide a correct flood zone determination arises out of the nfia and not from any other place in louisiana law 4: holding that because plaintiffs claims did not challenge the handling administration or payment of his flood claim or compliance with the act or the regulations the state law claims for breach of contract and tort are not preempted by the nfia | [
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protection against waiving appeals from the ASBCA to this court, that intention must be dis cernable from the text or the legislative history. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (“We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.”); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 705, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) (“[T]he question of whether the statutory right may be waived depends upon the intention of Congress as manifested in the particular statute.”); McCall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 839 F.2d 664, 667 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the burden is on Minesen, as the party Holdings: 0: recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary 1: holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary 2: holding that record did not show voluntary or intelligent waiver 3: holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence 4: holding that appellant did not show that his voluntary waiver of a statutory right to appeal was contrary to congressional intent | [
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was sought, all parties had moved to Missouri. Missouri is responsible for the welfare of the Thompson children, and Missouri continues a father’s support obligation until his child reaches the age of twenty-one. Mr. Thompson, the husband, became subject to Missouri law upon establishing a domicile in this state. Missouri need not accede to the judgment of a sister state concerning a continuing matter that has become a purely internal affair of Missouri. In weighing the interests of Kansas under the policy reasons for full faith and credit and the interests of Missouri in the maintenance and support of minor children domiciled in Missouri, the balance must be struck on the side of Missouri. Id. at 87, 88 (citations omitted). Cf. Davis v. Sullivan, 762 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (<HOLDING>). In In re the Marriage of McCabe, 819 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the full faith and credit clause precluded modification of a foreign states decree with regard to the age of majority where the obligor remained a resident of the rendering state 1: holding that a statute that lowered the age of majority to 18 did not have retroactive effect on the plaintiffs lawsuit when the applicable statute of limitations was shortened because it was tied to the age of majority 2: holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause 3: recognizing the majority rule 4: holding that another states reservation of personal jurisdiction over a florida resident for the purpose of modifying its decree may last as long as the effectiveness of the decree and that no dueprocess violation occurs by the entry of a default modification against the florida resident if the florida resident was afforded proper notice | [
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Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Iowa 1973) (“Stare decisis is a valuable legal doctrine which lends stability to the law....”). On the other hand, stare decisis does not prevent the court from reconsidering, repairing, correcting or abandoning past judicial announcements when error is manifest, including error in the interpretation of statutory enactments. See Lehigh Clay Prods., Ltd. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 545 N.W.2d 526, 528 (Iowa 1996); Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Iowa 1978), overruled on other grounds by Parks v. City of Marshalltown, 440 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Iowa 1989). Thus, stare decisis “should not be invoked to maintain a clearly erroneous result.” Kersten Co., 207 N.W.2d at 121; accord State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 1056, 135 N.W.2d 518, 521 (1965) (<HOLDING>). It is especially critical that stare decisis Holdings: 0: holding that trial court has no duty to establish waiver on record 1: holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court 2: holding the court has a duty to correct erroneous past decisions 3: holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions 4: holding that the presence of the correct address in the sworn affidavit could correct a typographical error in the warrant | [
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in education records, it does limit the instances in which an educational agency can release such records. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l). In addition, the IDEA refers to special education records as “confidential.” 20 U.S.C. § 1417(c). These express statutory mandates recognize privacy interests in special education records that Father may invoke on behalf of his son. ¶ 25 We now turn to the impact that the confidentiality of the records has on their discoverability in the present special action. We emphasize that the issue here is not relevancy for admissibility at trial rt of Appeals that congressional policy evidenced by FERPA places “significantly heavy burden on the party seeking access to student records”); Poole v. Hawkeye Area Cmty. Action Program, 666 N.W.2d 560, 565 (Iowa 2003) (<HOLDING>); Anderson by Anderson, 255 A.D.2d at 410, 680 Holdings: 0: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 1: holding that university students redacted disciplinary records were not education records 2: holding that nonparty siblings school records were relevant because of expert testimony that genetics may account for some of the symptoms exhibited by the plaintiffs 3: holding that the school records of the plaintiffs nonparty siblings were admissible at trial when expert testimony established that the records were relevant according to standard relevancy test 4: holding that municipal court records were admissible under official records or public documents exception | [
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weeks before his arrest from a Bob Jones in Salt Lake City as collateral for a loan to Jones. II R. 247. 6 . See also United States v. McElroy, 697 F.2d 459, 465 (2d Cir.1982) (at time of cross-examination of Government’s witness, "it was too late properly to make a motion to suppress [statement allegedly inadmissible under Miranda ]. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3).”); United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976, 978 n. 2 (11th Cir.); (recognizing that failure to make suppression motion before trial ordinarily waives right to make Miranda challenge to statements, but permitting challenge where trial court entertained and ruled on suppression motion during trial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849, 103 S.Ct. 109, 74 L.Ed.2d 97 (1982); United States v. Badwan, 624 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir.1980), (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124, 101 S.Ct. 941, Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted 1: holding that motions to dismiss based on forumselection clause should be analyzed under rule 12b3 2: recognizing circuit agreement that a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration clause is proper under rule 12b3 3: holding a defendants failure to raise aclaim of outrageous government conduct in a pretrial motion pursuant to rule 12b2 constituted waiver of the claim 4: holding that under rule 12b3 and f failure to raise inter alia claim that statements were inadmissible under miranda constituted a waiver | [
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the allegations are accompanied by a statement of the facts upon which the belief is founded. See id. We apply Rule 9(b) to the plaintiffs’ various averments of fraud. Claim 1—Declaratory Relief. The defendants do not distinctly challenge these allegations and the district court did not address the issue. We assume this claim satisfies Rule 9(b). Claim 2—Breach of Fiduciary Duty. The plaintiffs raise solely a derivative claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Because this claim fails under Rule 23.1(a), we need not address the defendants’ arguments under Rule 9(b). Claim S—Fraud. The complaint’s allegations of fraud in part allege the circumstances of fraud with sufficient particularity. The complaint includes minimally sufficient allegations aga Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Holdings: 0: holding allegations that fraudulent statements were made during fourmonth period insufficient to satisfy rule 9b 1: holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b 2: holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b 3: holding a complaints general allegations lacking any details or facts setting out the who what when where and how of the allegedly fraudulent conductwere insufficient to satisfy rule 9b internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding a complaint failed to satisfy rule 9b where the allegations were lacking in detail | [
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the debtor’s unexpired residential leases are not automatically deemed rejected, and a debtor in possession is generally permitted to assume or reject an unexpired residential lease at any time prior to confirmation of a plan. Id. § 365(d)(2). First, even if bona fide leases exist between the Movants and the Debtors, they are not leases of nonresidential real property. See In re Independence Vill., Inc., 52 B.R. 715, 722 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1985) (agreeing with the debtor that a lease of property used by the debtor to operate a life-care facility was not a- lease of “nonresidential real property,” as people resided in the leased property and the fact that the debtor corporation did not reside thereupon was irrelevant); see also In re Care Givers, Inc., 113 B.R. 263 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Terrace Apts., Ltd., 107 B.R. 382, Holdings: 0: holding that court did not err in interpreting lease using testimony of expert in real estate leases 1: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 2: holding that leases of real property upon which the debtor operated senior nursing homes were not leases of nonresidential real property 3: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner 4: holding that forfeiture of real property may be adjudicated before the seizure occurs because real property cannot abscond | [
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of law and constitutional questions de novo. See Vasquez-Zavala v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. The facts of the case are known to the parties and we do not repeat them here. I Petitioners argue that withdrawal of their applications for admission to the United States is similar to the turn-around at the border experienced by the alien in Tapia v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2005). We disagree. Their decisions to withdraw their applications for admission is more akin to the voluntary departure granted to the alien in Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961 (9th Cir.2003). Moreover, we accord Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l)(A) in In re Avilez-Nava, 23 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800-01 (BIA 2005) (<HOLDING>). The BIA’s “stop-time” rule is a permissible Holdings: 0: holding that an aliens continuous physical presence is broken if the alien was offered and accepted the opportunity to withdraw an application for admission 1: holding that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the apa to review the denial of an aliens application for adjustment of status where the alien is in removal proceedings 2: holding that aliens continuous presence in the country was interrupted by voluntary departure under threat of deportation proceedings 3: holding that an alien parent may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the aliens united states citizen child in the event of the aliens deportation 4: holding that whether an alien satisfies the continuous presence requirement of 8 usc 1229b is a nondiscretionary determination because it involves straightforward statutory interpretation and application of law to fact and is therefore reviewable | [
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for a government hospital beyond a private hospital’s potential liability. In fact, Kerr’s counsel conceded the statute of repose bar in a private action when stating, “by the time this client came to see me, [the estate] had clearly lost [its] right under [section] 15-3-545(A), the right to pursue any private entity because of the medical malpractice statute of repose. Six years had transpired.” To permit this medical malpractice action to proceed beyond the statute of repose would be to disregard the Tort Claims Act, particularly sections 15-78-40 and 15-78-50(b). Having found Hospital was entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of repose, we need not reach the additional ground relied upon by the trial court. Wilson v. Moseley, 327 S.C. 144, 147, 488 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1997) (<HOLDING>). III. As the six-year statute of repose in Holdings: 0: holding if one ground proves dispositive then this court need not address the remaining grounds relied on by a trial court when it granted summary judgment 1: holding that an appellate court need not address all remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive 2: holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of a prior issue is dispositive 3: holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive 4: holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive | [
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relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... the claim ... asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2) (emphasis added). See also 1966 and 1991 Advisory Committee Notes (explaining that the relation back rule was intended to remedy prior misconceptions that amendment of a pleading to correct the misnomer or misdescription of a defendant in an existing action “would amount to the commencement of a new proceeding”). Yet, the “relation back” reasoning does not apply with equal force to actions that are, in actuality, entirely new or separate proceedings. O’Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2)) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiff attempts to relate the Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing 1: holding that plaintiff was not allowed to voluntarily withdraw her complaint after electing to have her complaint heard before an administrative law judge 2: holding that plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to add her husband as a defendant did not relate back because her failure to sue her husband was not due to misnomer or mistake involving the identity of the proper party but because the law at the time of the complaint did not allow one spouse to sue another in tort 3: holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint 4: holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations | [
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America, 154 F.3d at 822. There, the Eighth Circuit opined that a claim relates to an ERISA plan when it “premises a cause of action on the existence of an ERISA plan....” Id. Applying the Eighth Circuit’s test to the case at bar, it is clear the Van Nattas’ state law claims are preempted in their entirety. Reducing the Van Nattas’ complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 48 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 Holdings: 0: holding that claims were preempted where the factual basis of the complaint was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits 1: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan 2: holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan 3: holding the state law claims were not preempted 4: holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan | [
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must establish both (1) that the information requested was compiled for law enforcement purposes and (2) that its disclosure would involve an unwarranted invasion of a third party’s privacy. Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C.Cir.1982). The plaintiff does not dispute that the information he seeks was compiled for law enforcement purposes. {See Opp’n at 2-3.) Thus, the only issue in dispute is whether the disclosure of the requested information could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Given the nature of law enforcement records, the individual’s “privacy interest at stake is substantial.” SafeCard Serv., Inc. v. S.E.C., 926 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C.Cir.1991); see also Bast v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254 (D.C.Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, an agency may resort to a “Glomar” Holdings: 0: holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c 1: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure 2: holding that in light of the stigma potentially associated with law enforcement investigations exemption 7c affords broad privacy rights to suspects witnesses and investigators 3: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure 4: holding that there is no need to consider exemption 6 separately if information was compiled for law enforcement purposes because exemption 7c constitutes broader protection so any information falling under exemption 6 is covered by exemption 7c | [
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relief, namely, to enjoin the Fire District permanently from violating the overtime provisions in the future. The district court found that the Fire District’s violations arose out of its failure to understand the Act’s requirements. The court found that this failure was careless, but inadvertent. The Fire District, in the court’s view, had not intended to violate the Act and had complied with the Act from the time that it learned about the Act’s requirements. The court concluded that there was “no evidence of any threatened future violation.” The record supports all these findings. We therefore find no abuse of the district court’s legal authority to determine whether or not a permanent injunction is needed. See Brock v. Big Bear Market No. 3, 825 F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the district court is Holdings: 0: holding that a district courts discretion is not unbridled and that it must weigh finding of violation against factors indicating reasonable likelihood that violations will not recur such as intent to comply extraordinary efforts to prevent recurrence absence of repetitive violations and absence of bad faith 1: holding that it is within the courts discretion to award both reinstatement and punitive damages for violation of 2114 although finding that the district courts decision not to award such remedies did not constitute an abuse of discretion 2: holding that the district court erred in finding violations that were not alleged specifically in the plaintiffs notice letter and no penalties could be imposed for those violations 3: holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict 4: holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees | [
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barrage.” Basker-ville, 50 F.3d at 431. Second, Swadow’s alleged conduct toward Hopkins was sexually neutral or, at most, ambiguous. According to Hopkins, Swadow bumped into him, positioned a magnifying glass over his crotch, flipped his tie over to see its label, gave him a congratulatory kiss in the receiving line at Hopkins’ wedding, and stared at him in the bathroom. Notably, Hopkins has not asserted that Swadow ever made an overt sexual proposition or touched Hopkins in a sexual manner. While Swa-dow’s conduct was undoubtedly tasteless and inappropriately forward, we cannot conclude that it was “of the type that would interfere with a reasonable person’s work performance ... to the extent required by Title VII.” Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Third, several of the incidents upon which Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty and threatened him if he did not take the plea 1: holding that indictment sufficiently informed defendant of the charge against him so as to enable him to prepare a defense and thus there is no claim that he was surprised at trial 2: holding the defendant was not under arrest when police asked him to go to the station and then offered him a ride because he did not have transportation 3: holding that allegations fell short of title vii liability where male plaintiff claimed that male coworker stood behind him and bumped into him while he mopped peeped at him in restroom and asked him to dance at christmas party 4: holding that the plaintiffs evidence that his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50 of the jobs previously available to him was enough to classify him as disabled under the ada | [
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surcharge, whichever is less, shall be retained by the Division of Motor Vehicles ...; five percent, or the actual cost of administering the cancellation notification system...., whichever is less, shall be retained by the Division of Motor Vehicles ... and the remainder shall be remitted to the New Jersey Full Automobile Insuranc 45, slip op. at 12 (“[T]he debtor is not responsible for the administrative expenses of collection charged by the DMV, because a debt that is ‘compensation for actual pecuniary loss’ is discharge-able under section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.”). It not being disputed that surcharges are debts payable to a governmental unit and having found that surcharges are civil penalties payable for the benefit of a governmental unit and not compensation for actua (<HOLDING>); In re Lugo, 94 B.R. at 343 (noting that Holdings: 0: holding that if both willful and malicious are not met the debt is dischargeable 1: holding 525 applies only where debt dischargeable 2: holding that debtors obligation to pay portion of debt representing administrative expenses of collection was dischargeable 3: holding that state university violated 11 usc 362 and 525 by withholding debtors transcript where debt was dischargeable 4: holding that when a state court judgment was found not to be dischargeable under 11 usc 523a6 the associated attorneys fees were also not dischargeable | [
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314, 324-25 (1995) (“To establish a breach of the settlement agreement based on [the] implied covenant of good faith with respect to the reinstatement term ... it is the appellant’s burden to show that the agency’s proven retaliatory/harassing actions, under the totality of the circumstances, amounted to an unjustified and substantial deprivation of [the appellant’s] rights as an incumbent of the position in question.”). Because the record shows that Moss made only mere allegations that the 14-day suspension violated the Agreement, but did not support his bare allegations with any evidence illustrating bad faith, we find no basis to conclude that the Initial Decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. See Charley v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 457 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Agreement does not insulate Holdings: 0: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 1: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death 2: holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious 3: holding that the mere allegation of arbitrary and capricious action on defendants part absent a direct and pointed attack on the evidentiary basis of the agencys action is insufficient to warrant a judicial determination of wrongful agency action 4: recognizing the cause of action | [
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“the voluntariness of a confession turns on whether the defendant’s will was overborne to the extent that [his] statements were not the result of a free and voluntary act.” John, 812 N.E.2d at 1224 (citations omitted); see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285-87, 111 S.Ct. 1246. The SJC concluded that John’s confession was voluntary, discussing both John’s impression of the relevant meeting with Novak and his possible motivation for confessing to the FBI agent. John, 812 N.E.2d at 1224. After review of the record, we conclude that the SJC did not unreasonably apply, or act contrary to, Supreme Court law when concluding that John’s confession was voluntary. Although the SJC did not cite Supreme Court precedent, its voluntariness analysis was consistent with it. See Dagley, 540 F.3d at 16 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). And the SJC’s Holdings: 0: holding that to pass muster under the contrary to prong a state court need not cite relevant supreme court precedent or even be aware of relevant cases so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts them 1: holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts 2: holding aedpas contrary to clause does not require citation of our cases indeed it does not even require awareness of our eases so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts them 3: recognizing that a failure to cite supreme court decisions does not itself suggest a state court decision is contrary to such precedents so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts them 4: holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision | [
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Clause is to ascertain whether the law has retrospective effect. In the context of the present case, the question is whether the amended statute applies to prisoners convicted for offenses committed before the provision’s effective date. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965, 67 L.Ed.2d at 24. Clearly, it does. The DOC has implemented a policy making any inmate required to participate in the SOTP who refuses treatment, is removed from treatment, or fails to meet program completion criteria ineligible for earned time. Therefore, the amended statute applies to prisoners such as Propp who were convicted for an offense committed before the amendment’s effective date. The amendment is, therefore, retrospective. See Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 960 P.2d 227, 235-36 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The State argues this conclusion is Holdings: 0: holding similar statutory amendment was retrospective when applied to inmate who committed his crime before amendments enactment 1: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 2: holding that a change of an element of an offense could not be applied retroactively to a crime committed prior to the statutes enactment 3: holding that aedpa amendments to 2254 apply only to such cases as were filed after the statutes enactment 4: holding similar statutory amendment violated ex post facto clause when applied to inmate who committed his crime before enactment of amendment | [
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relating to the production of White Chicks are located in California, defendants have not shown that retaining the case in this district would hinder or burden their access to these sources of proof. Relative Means of the Parties “The relative financial hardship on the litigants and their respective abilities to prosecute or defend an action in a particular forum are legitimate factors to consider.” Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 294 F.Supp.2d at 222 (internal citations omitted). Where litigation in a foreign state would have a disparate financial impact on one of the parties, the Court may base its decision to transfer or retain the case on the relative financial means of the parties. See Aetna Life & Casualty v. Owen, No. 3:04 CV 817(WWE), 2004 WL 2381744, at *3-4 (D.Conn. Oct. 13, 2004) (<HOLDING>). In this case, plaintiff has filed an Holdings: 0: holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine 1: holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication 2: holding that a transfer to georgia was warranted largely because litigation in connecticut would have been a huge financial burden on an individual georgia defendant while plaintiffa large corporation that operates throughout the united stateswould have been easily able to afford litigation in georgia 3: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 4: holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible | [
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the relevant clause as a whole, including the title, ‘Taxes,’ ” the Court of Federal Claims found “it was plainly intended as a price-adjustment mechanism in the event the Oil Companies were assessed additional or unanticipated taxes as a result of their avgas production.” Shell Remand Decision, 108 Fed.Cl. at 432 (emphasis added). It accorded a “fairly narrow tax-related meaning” to “charges,” interpreting it to mean “an encumbrance, lien, or other like financial burden or liability, especially one .that relates to real property.” Id. at 432-33. Such an interpretation, the trial court found, was consistent with the noscitur a sociis canon of interpretation, which “ ‘counsels that a word [be] given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.’ ” Id. at 432 (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). The Court of Holdings: 0: holding attorneys must be given reasonable notice of the charges they face before the referees hearing on those charges 1: holding that charges should be given more precise content by taxes and fees 2: holding that the gas laws mandate that pilots be in lieu of all state city and local taxes or charges did not bear on the utilitys authority to pay franchise fees that were not in the nature of property taxes and that the utility was required to pay both franchise fees and pilots 3: holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes 4: holding that plaintiff explained why statements were fraudulent where the complaint alleged that defendants statements requested port fees and customs taxes but no such fees or taxes were due | [
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digital at the outset. Ion has failed to rebut this argument. Ion makes two arguments for limitations based on language found within the specification. First, Ion points to language from the specification that both introduces the patent and comments on its preferred embodiment. Ion argues that this language necessarily narrows the dictionary definition of “value” because the specification disavows certain forms that a value can take. If language within the specification disclaims a usage or distinguishes its patent application from prior art on the basis of a different type of use, the claim construction should reflect these self-imposed limitations. See CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1367; SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340-1341 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). It must therefore be determined whether ITW Holdings: 0: holding that the language of the arbitration clause any controversy or claim arising out of was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract 1: holdingthat the language of an arbitration clause applying to all claims demands disputes or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise concerning the vehicle was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue 2: holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical 3: holding that there was no jurisdictional defect when the language of the charging document tracked the statutory language even though the facts proffered at the plea hearing were insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the crime 4: holding that when the specification clearly disavows a feature that feature is outside the reach of the claim language even if the language might otherwise be broad enough to encompass the feature in question | [
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and do all things that are reasonable and necessary to manage the affairs of the TEAM .... ” (capitalization in original; emphasis added). Furthermore, TDH expressly agreed to use prudent reliable methods and reasonable care for the safekeeping and proper management of each team’s funds and assets. Investors testified that TDH made all of the investment decisions and that investors were not required to do anything more than invest their money. Additionally, many team members neither met nor corresponded with other members of their team. Thus, the “economic reality” is that investors maintained a passive involvement with their investment while expecting profits to be derived solely from the efforts of TDH. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 848, 95 S.Ct. at 20 Co., 212 F.3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In this case, investors relied solely on Holdings: 0: holding that the in connection with requirement of rule 10b5 was satisfied where investors were injured as investors through respondents deceptions and the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coineided 1: holding that plaintiffs had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where they alleged that the revenue sharing payments to the thirdparty service provider were excessive because the underlying mutual funds investment management fees covered all of the necessary investment managementadvisory services needed for the mutual fund 2: holding that the defendant was nondisehargeable where the plaintiff estab lished a violation of oklahoma securities laws by showing that defendants were in possession of funds that belonged to other investors 3: holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors money for real investment return on old investors funds 4: holding that investment advisors with authority to make investment decisions for their clients have standing | [
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issue, “[w]hat is the physical location and size of the 'Quarry Property’ in the May 2000 Agreement?” Sourant similarly named "[w]hat is the meaning of 'Quarry Property' in the May 2000 Agreement" as a material and contested issue. 5 . Sourant argues Murphy Farrell is not entitled to declaratory relief because, among other reasons, the right-of-first-refusal provision violates the rule against perpetuities and, alternatively, Sourant did not breach the provision. But because the trial court ruled Sourant breached the provision, it necessarily found the provision valid and enforceable. The propriety of that ruling is not raised on appeal and is therefore final and serves as law of the case. See Bogard v. Cannon & Wendt Elec. Co., 221 Ariz. 325, 332, ¶ 24, 212 P.3d 17, 24 (App.2009) (<HOLDING>); Bilke v. State, 221 Ariz. 60, 63, ¶ 11, 209 Holdings: 0: holding that rulings not challenged on appeal are implicitly affirmed 1: holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record 2: holding that a sentencing decision will be affirmed if challenged factor is permissible and other factors are not challenged 3: holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal 4: holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by record | [
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2209-10, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), “speculative,” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-46, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926-28, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), or “abstract,” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Rather, it must be “certainly impending.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1725, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). Ripeness, while often spoken of as a justiciability doctrine distinct from standing, in fact shares the constitutional requirement of standing that an injury in fact be certainly impending. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634-35, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); DKT Mem’l Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 297 (D.C.Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). It is only the prudential aspect of ripeness— Holdings: 0: holding that speculative theory of possible injury insufficient to establish injury in fact under article ills case or controversy requirement 1: holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation 2: holding that the constitutional requirement for ripeness is injury in fact 3: holding that in a personal injury suit the timely notice requirement does not apply 4: holding that if a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized a constitutional deprivation is immaterial | [
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handed Kerri Rigsby the Ford Report, which contained King’s note; and 3) the Rigsbys attended an adjuster meeting convened by State Farm during which the company’s trainers told the adjusters that Katrina was a “ “water storm’ and that all major damage to homes was caused by flooding.” These allegations formed the basis of much of the trial and they do not significantly diverge from the Rigsbys’ original allegations. State Farm is correct that the Rigsbys relied on Dr. Ralph Sinno’s “wracking” theory at trial, but wracking is not a “theory of fraud” about which the Rigsbys could have been whistleblowers. As detailed above, the Rigsbys alleged that State Farm fraudulently misclassified wind damage as flood damage through a variety of means. St F.3d 447, 448-49, 451-52 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Rigsbys’ knowledge was also independent Holdings: 0: holding individual defendants subject to suit 1: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 2: holding that relators who brought suit against a competitor and other defendants were not original sources 3: holding state immune from suit brought in state court 4: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state | [
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“location and labels of a statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a criminal one,” or vice versa. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 1140; see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 94, 78 S.Ct. 590 (“How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them! Manifestly the issue of whether [a statute] is a penal law cannot be thus determined.”). Rather, the Supreme Court instructs that “a penalty [ ] cannot be converted into [a non-penal measure] by so naming it,” and we must “ascribe to [the particular statute] the character disclosed by its purpose and operation, regardless of name.” United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294, 56 S.Ct. 223, 80 L.Ed. 233 (1935) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, “even a clear legislative Holdings: 0: holding that even though labeled a tax on conducting retail liquor business challenged statute was nevertheless a penalty designed to punish the violation of state liquor laws 1: holding place as used in statute defining liquor nuisance was not limited to a particular building but included entire area where illicit liquor business was conducted 2: holding that a tax credit to liquor licensees against taxes owed to the state was an unconstitutional subsidy of the liquor industry 3: holding that a county liquor license board had no standing to appeal the reversal of its decision 4: holding that legislative diminishment of tax obligation constituted an unconstitutional subsidy to the liquor industry in violation of the antidonation clause | [
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made from prison to Attorney Alva’s office, in which he inquired about representation for one of his co-defendants, was in error as violative of the attorney-client privilege. We need not delve into Appellant’s substantive discussion of this issue, however, because as the Commonwealth correctly notes, the issue is waived. At trial, Appellant objected to the admission of the telephone call, but only upon relevance grounds. Appellant then lodged a second objection concerning the publication of the transcript of the call to the jury. At no time did Appellant argue that the contents of the telephone call were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, his argument to that end is waived. Pa. R.A.P. 302(a); see also Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 464 Pa. 464, 347 A.2d 305, 307 (1975) (<HOLDING>). G. Testimony of Tezzie Smith In his final Holdings: 0: recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review 1: holding that the appellant developed his argument sufficiently to raise the issue for appellate review 2: holding that preservation of the specific argument in support of the ground for reversal is required for appellate review 3: holding that to preserve an issue for appellate review the specific legal argument or ground upon which it is based must be presented to the trial court 4: holding that preservation of error in the trial court is not necessary as to lack of standing | [
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Just as this court should "respect and carefully weigh the views of other circuits,” United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 941 (11th Cir.1993), a district court should do likewise. However, only the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court are binding on the district courts of this circuit. 16 . It should also be noted that the caselaw is replete with opinions that conflict with the standard asserted by the Growers. In many cases involving the FLSA, courts found that a certain item, which was obviously not directly connected to the performance of the employee’s principal activity, was nevertheless primarily for the benefit of the employer. See, e.g., Brennan v. Modern Chevrolet Co., 363 F.Supp. 327, 333 (N.D.Tex.1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.1974) (affirming without opinion) (<HOLDING>); Masters v. Md. Mgmt. Co., 493 F.2d 1329, Holdings: 0: holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone 1: holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse 2: holding that car salesmans use of an automobile was primarily for the benefit of the employer even though 90 of mileage was for personal use 3: holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate legitimate expectation of privacy where he could not show that he had the owners permission to use the car or demonstrate prior use or control of the car 4: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search | [
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traffic stop should have concluded. Accordingly, Clayborn asserts that Detective Hall could not ask for his license and registration because it was not reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the traffic stop. We disagree. On appeal from a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews, the factual findings for clear error and the question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred de novo. United States v. Allegree, 175 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir.1999). Clayborn does not challenge the factual finding that Detective Hall’s traffic stop was justified and lawful, because it was based on an objectively reasonable, although mistaken, belief that a traffic violation had occurred. See United States v. Peltier, 217 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the issue is whether the Holdings: 0: holding that an officers mistaken belief that the defendant was speeding was not an objectively reasonable purpose for a traffic stop 1: holding that a suspects ability to proffer an innocent explanation for the facts does not negate probable cause 2: holding that the dismissal of an indictment did not negate the presumption of probable cause 3: holding the fact that officers belief proved to be mistaken does not negate a finding of probable cause 4: holding that where the defendant obtained a nondefaulted debt under the mistaken belief that the debt was in default and where the defendants subsequent collection activities were based on that mistaken belief the defendant was a debt collector for purposes of the fdcpa | [
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Rev. at 1404, the employer’s clear breach of the employment contract, the employer’s benefit in terms of enhanced chances of mitigation and the public’s interest in “the need for stability in labor relations,” Pierce, 84 N.J. at 66, plaintiff retains his cause of action for breach of contract. We are confident that in the modern employment context where there is a position-specific employment contract and an employee resigns after his employer without justification forces that employee to choose from among demotion, termination or resignation, it must be concluded that the employer remains subject to liability for that breach unless facts clearly demonstrate a fairly bargained release of the employer. See also cf. Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2A 885, 887-89 (3d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Annotation, “Circumstances in Title VII Holdings: 0: recognizing doctrine of constructive discharge under federal civil rights act and national labor relations act where employer knowingly permits working conditions to become so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign 1: recognizing constructive discharge where employer rather than acting directly deliberately makes employees working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be forced into involuntary resignation 2: holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act 3: holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board 4: holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act | [
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the shootings to any of the charges in the indictment. Its only real probative value is to establish the criminal propensities of those involved. And even if this evidence did have some probative worth, the details of the Amoco double homicide are so chilling that its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs any such probative value. The admission of this evidence thus constitutes error that is plain. See United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2003) (“It is the law of this circuit that, at least where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.”); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In sum, admission of this evidence was an Holdings: 0: holding that plain error exists when 1 an error was committed 2 that was plain 3 that affected the defendants substantial rights and 4 the error seriously affects the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings 1: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard 2: holding that error was plain when the district courts ruling was obviously contrary to the text of a federal statute 3: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 4: holding that omission was not plain error | [
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of the Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 . Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 . City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir.2009). 9 . Conner v. Travis Cnty., 209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam); see also Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850; Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir.2003). 10 . Connick v. Thompson, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). 11 . Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381-82 (5th Cir.2010). 12 . See Burge, 336 F.3d at 372 (<HOLDING>). 13 . Conner, 209 F.3d at 796. 14 . City of Holdings: 0: holding that allegations that training was inadequate the inadequate training constituted deliberate indifference and the risk of constitutional injury as a result of such deliberate indifference is very obvious were a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action and were mere conclusions that did not without additional facts state a claim for failuretotrain liability 1: holding evidence of single incident without any proof relating to the nature of the training itself insufficient to establish inadequate training because plaintiffs must put forward some evidence that the city itself has acted or consciously not acted 2: holding that the plaintiff could not show surprise when the plaintiff had received the additional terms from the defendant prior to the agreement 3: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 4: holding that the plaintiff had offered insufficient evidence to establish deliberate indifference in a failuretotrain claim in part because the plaintiff did not present evidence that the training received was inadequate or evidence of any specific additional training that the employees should have received | [
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estate. 6 . In June 2007 some members of Classes 2 and 3 of the Track One plaintiffs proceeded to a bench trial against four defendants, including AstraZeneca, and the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F.Supp.2d 20, 29-32 (D.Mass.2007) (In re Pharm. Trial). 7 . Howe had earlier filed an objection to the settlement that essentially cited, for three pages, Howe's earlier pleadings before the court without stating any specific grounds for the objection. During the fairness hearing, the district court properly held that anything raised in this pleading that Howe did not explain in the reply brief was waived. See TAG/ICIB Servs. Inc. v. Sedeco Servicio de Descuento en Compras, 570 F.3d 60, 66 n. 6 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The “heartland period,” which the Holdings: 0: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 1: holding that an issue is waived where the defendant failed to develop an argument in his appellate brief and cited no authority 2: holding an argument waived in part because the party failed to develop it in the district court 3: holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument 4: holding party failed to develop any argument on this front and thus has waived it | [
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able to repay, so long as ‘[tjhose who remain indigent or for whom repayment would work “manifest hardship” are forever exempt from any obligation to repay ” (quoting Fuller, 417 U.S. at 53, 94 S.Ct. at 2124, 40 L.Ed.2d at 654)); State v. Drayton, 285 Kan. 689, 175 P.3d 861, 880 (2008) (noting statutory requirement that repayment be ordered only when defendant had ability to pay was included in statute to satisfy constitutional requirements); State v. Ellis, 339 Mont. 14, 167 P.3d 896, 900 (2007) (upholding constitutionality of state recoupment statute because it provided that “a court may not sentence a defendant to pay the costs of court-appointed counsel unless the court determines the defendant is or will be able to pay them”); State v. Morgan, 173 Vt. 533, 789 A.2d 928, 931 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Because that determination was not made here, Holdings: 0: holding that under fuller sixth amendment requires trial court to make finding that defendant has or will have ability to pay reimbursement amount within statutory time period before imposing payment obligation 1: holding that the constitutional rights in a termination proceeding are derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution and not the sixth amendment 2: holding that under the sixth amendment to the united states constitution before imposing an obligation to reimburse the state the court must make a finding that the defendant is or will be able to pay the reimbursement amount ordered 3: holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment 4: holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution | [
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contains relevant evidence. But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.” Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1719 (citation omitted). In both Belton and Thornton, the vehicle occupants were arrested for possession of narcotics. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 456, 101 S.Ct. 2860; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618, 124 S.Ct. 2127. Had Vinton been arrested merely for speeding or driving with excessively tinted windows, Gant’s evidentiary rationale obviously would not have authorized a subsequent search because under the circumstances it would have been very unlikely that evidence relevant to either of those traffic offenses would be found inside his car. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1719 (<HOLDING>). But instead, Vinton was arrested for the Holdings: 0: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law 1: holding an officer could not ask for consent to search a cars passenger compartment for an additional vin when the vin on the dashboard was visible from outside the car 2: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not 3: holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle 4: holding that an evidentiary basis for the search was lacking because gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of his car | [
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impinge on Congress’s goal of ensuring ‘a single, uniform system for regulating aviation safety.’ ” (citation omitted)). To allow a patchwork of state law and industry regulations for pilot hiring and training would strip bare Congress’s intent in passing the FAA. The state law and industry customs Plaintiff seeks to impose clearly enter the scope of the preempted field of pilot hiring and training standards, and, as such, are preempted by federal law. See Goodspeed Airport, 634 F.3d at 210; see, e.g., Ventress, 747 F.3d at 721-22 (“Our review of the applicable FARs confirms that pilot qualifications and medical standards for airmen ... are pervasively regulated.... [W]e conclude that the FAA and accompanying FARs preempt [the plaintiffs state law] claims.”); French, 869 F.2d at 4 (<HOLDING>); In re Air Crash I, 798 F.Supp.2d at 485-86; Holdings: 0: holding that an argument not raised before the bankruptcy court will not be considered for the first time on appeal 1: holding that faas pervasive pilot medical standards preempted wrongfuldischarge claims that required determination of a pilots medical fitness to fly 2: holding that when a court of appeals has jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal the scope of appellate review is not limited to the precise question certified by the district court because the district courts order not the certified question is brought before the court 3: holding that a fraud class action cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an issue 4: holding that the faa and fars afford no room for the imposition of statelaw criteria visavis pilot suitability for the medical standards which an airline pilot must meet before he will be certified | [
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in 8 CSR 60-2.025(9); and failing, as required by § 213.075(3), to “promptly” investigate Taylor’s complaint. Specifically, it claimed that the writ should have issued in that before a right-to-sue letter could issue to Taylor, the MCHR had a regulatory duty to give it notice of Taylor’s complaint and a statutory duty to promptly investigate the complaint, such that the breach of one or both of those duties violated due process, with respect to the issuance of the letter, mandating the setting aside of the letter. Mandamus, pursuant to § 536.150, will lie where the MCHR’s executive director’s actions in issuing the right-to-sue letter violated prescribed procedures and applicable law. See State ex rel. Martin-Erb v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 77 S.W.3d 600, 608 (Mo. banc 2002) (<HOLDING>). The writ will not issue, however, unless Holdings: 0: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 1: holding that the actions were not actions of public and general applicability but were actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs 2: holding that section 536150 gives the complainant the right to file a mandamus action to determine whether the executive directors actions were in fact accomplished under prescribed procedures and were lawful 3: holding if the legislature had the power to confer upon the county commissioners jurisdiction to hear and determine the question as to whether or not a town was of undue extent and to deprive it of a part of its territory then the proceeding being statutory before a body of limited powers the record must show affirmatively that such a case was brought before them as they were authorized to hear and determine and that all the jurisdictional facts were found to exist where the jurisdiction and power to hear and determine depends upon the existence of a fact that fact must appear or the proceedings are coram non judice and void 4: holding that as part of a new standard of review requiring directors taking defensive actions to show that those actions were reasonable in relation to threat posed such proof is materially enhanced by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors citations omitted | [
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object to the discharge-ability of the debt, and it became nondischargeable under section 523(a)(3)(B). Smith replied that, when a creditor is added to a petition, the creditor then has a “reasonable time” to object to dischargeability and that, if he or she does not, the debt is discharged. He noted that “some courts” have held that 60 days is a reasonable time. The court granted Smith’s motion to dismiss on March 8, 2005, and plaintiffs timely appealed. We hold that the trial court erred in granting Smith’s motion. It misinterpreted the applicable bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide that amendments to schedules do not alter the deadlines for filing bankruptcy court complaints to determine the dischargeability of fra D.N.J. 2000) (<HOLDING>). We find persuasive In re Strano’s careful Holdings: 0: holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 1983 claims 1: holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court 2: holding that although the bankruptcy court is the preferred forum because of its greater expertise state courts have concurrent jurisdiction 3: holding that federal jurisdiction over rico claims is concurrent and not exclusive 4: holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code | [
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that the standard for evaluating such claims requires a balancing of the “character and magnitude” of the rights affected against the state interests advanced by the rule. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (reaffirming cases holding that a “flexible standard” governs Fi state’s interests in prohibiting sitting judges from running for nonjudicial office justified temporary inability of voters to choose specific candidate); Adams v. Supreme Court of Pa., 502 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (concluding that standard of judicial conduct requiring sitting judges to resign upon becoming candidate for nonjudicial office did not violate First Amendment rights of judge in light of “important state interests” served by rule); In re Buckson, 610 A.2d 203, 224 (Del. 1992) (<HOLDING>). In view of the substantial interests Holdings: 0: holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion 1: holding that resigntorun requirement in delaware judges code of judicial conduct did not violate first amendment interests of judges 2: holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts 3: holding the announce clause of minnesotas code of judicial conduct was not narrowly tailored because it was woefully underinclusive prohibiting announcements by judges and wouldbe judges only at certain times and in certain forms 4: holding that bankruptcy judges are not bound by appellate ruhngs of single district judges even those from their own district | [
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(vacating an award because one of the arbitrators was the son of a vice president of the defendant local union’s international union); Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming the vacation of an award because arbitrator failed to disclose a legal dispute between his family’s company and one of the parties to the arbitration). The inference of bias seems to be heightened when, in addition to the aforementioned factors, the party does not disclose the suspect relationship. See, Commonwealth Corp., supra; Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co., supra. Finally, almost every finding of evident partiality occurs when the arbitrator’s relationship is with one of the parties, not with a witness. Cf., Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1135, 1138 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (<HOLDING>); Sofia Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Amoco Transport Holdings: 0: holding that arbitrators failure to disclose his relationship with an employee and witness for the plaintiff without specific proof of bias did not show evident partiality 1: holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case 2: holding that arbitrators failure to disclose that his law partners brother was the expert witness attorney did not show evident partiality because the relationship was trivial 3: holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness 4: holding that arbitrators failure to disclose his prior business dealings with defendant some twenty years earlier did not amount to misconduct | [
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or of a particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed to a regulatory agency.’ ” Time Warner, 523 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., 277 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.2002)). As previously noted, plaintiffs case does not require this court to determine difficult issues of first impression better left to the FDA’s expertise, but instead only requires the application of well-understood FDA regulations directly on point. “[T]he FDA’s expertise ... is not necessary to determine whether the labels are misleading, [and the] reasonable consumer determination and other issues involved in [this] lawsuit are within the expertise of the courts to resolve.” Delacruz, 2012 WL 2563857, at *10; see also Brazil, 935 F.Supp.2d at 959-61, 2013 WL 1209955, at *10-11 (<HOLDING>); Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., No. Holdings: 0: holding that primary jurisdiction did not apply to claims of violation of fda regulations and guidance concerning all natural fresh antioxidant and other nutrient claims 1: holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the fda 2: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 3: holding that primary jurisdiction did not apply where the court had to determine whether defendants all natural claims were misleading 4: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute | [
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Ill. App. 3d 604, 613 (2006). Henkels also argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider the circumstances surrounding the settlement. Specifically, Henkels asserts that the trial court ignored the fact that Pederson orchestrated the settlement for a nominal amount in order to circumvent its lien rights and remove an impediment to his pending malpractice action. There is no evidence that the trial court failed to adequately consider the circumstances surrounding the settlement. While the settlement amount may have been less than the amount of compensation benefits which Henkels paid to Pederson, the Act does not require a workers’ compensation settlement agreement to fully compensate the employer in order to be valid. See In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 333 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Louis Joliet Shoppingtown L.P., 377 Holdings: 0: holding that an employer is only allowed to be reimbursed from a tort recovery to the extent that the recovery duplicates the elements of damage covered by compensation benefits 1: holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties 2: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 3: recognizing that the compensation that an employer pays may exceed an employees recovery from third parties 4: recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined | [
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right to a salary while sitting, and unauthorized by either statute or Assembly rule. I. At the outset, we address the appealability of the Speaker’s action and this court’s jurisdiction. Prior to the adoption of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, “persons aggrieved by action or inaction of state or local administrative agencies could seek review by applying for one of the prerogative writs.” Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 51, 362 A.2d 566 (1976). The 1947 Constitution superseded the prerogative writs “and, in lieu thereof,” afforded “review, hearing and relief ... in the Superior Court, on terms and in the manner provided by rules of the Supreme Court, as of right.” N.J. Const, art. VI, § 5, II4. Accordingly, “[i]n New Jersey, judicial revi , 579, 763 A.2d 295 (App.Div.2000) (<HOLDING>); Amico v. N.J. Army Nat’l Guard, 242 Holdings: 0: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 1: holding that the state police is a state agency 2: holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor 3: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state 4: holding a state agency as an arm of the state cannot constitute a person under 1983 because it is a sovereign entity | [
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was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. Nelson, 207 F.3d at 1206 (justifying this special standard based on “the impor: tance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation” (quotation omitted)). If the plaintiff makes this two-part showing, the burden then shifts back to the defendant to demonstrate “that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quotation omitted). A With respect to the roadside sobriety tests, Jones proposes that Amundsen’s erratic driving by itself created reasonable suspicion of intoxication. According to Jones, this suspicion justified both the initial stop and the subsequent roadside testing. Because the administrati , 1017 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). We have also held that drifting onto the Holdings: 0: holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night 1: holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system 2: holding that a car that moved from side to side left the paved portion of the road and weaved over the center of the road created reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated 3: holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic 4: holding road was still a public highway although fifty years had passed since the road was used by the public | [
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5, 16 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Vázquez-Rivera, 407 F.3d 476, 486 (1st Cir.2005)). If, on the contrary, no contemporaneous objection was made, we review under the four-pronged plain-error standard. United States v. Hilario-Hilario, 529 F.3d 65, 74-75 (1st Cir.2008) (citing United States v. Allen, 469 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.2006)). “An unpreserved error is deemed plain (and, therefore, to affect substantial rights) only if the reviewing court finds that it skewed the fundamental fairness or basic integrity of the proceeding below in some major respect.” United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972 (1st Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 100 (1st Cir.1987)); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (<HOLDING>). To make this determination, we consider all Holdings: 0: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice 1: holding that courts of appeal should only correct a forfeited error at the trial level in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result 2: holding that the plainerror doctrine applies in those circumstances in which absent appellate intervention a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result 3: holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice 4: holding that issues raised for first time on appeal generally will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice | [
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separate occasions, sought to litigate arbitrable claims related to the D.A. agreement: (1) in their counterclaim in the 1988 federal case; (2) in their petition filed in Baton Rouge Parish; and (3) in their petition filed in Orleans Parish. On its face, at least, it would appear that it is the franchisees, not DAI, that have invoked the judicial process. The franchisees make two arguments to support their claim that DAI has invoked the judicial process to their detriment. First, they argue that DAI and its affiliates are so related, and the claims brought by the affiliates so inextricably inte igation of the same legal and factual issues as those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver of the right to arbitrate”); see also Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 330(<HOLDING>). We hold today that a party only invokes the Holdings: 0: holding that forcible detainer action is cumulative not exclusive of other remedies party may have so that parties may pursue both forcible detainer action in justice court and suit to quiet title in district court 1: holding that the nonarbitrable fraud claims had to be stayed pending resolution of the arbitrable issue because the fraud claims depended upon the arbitrable issues 2: holding that a franchisor did not waive his arbitrable claims by prosecuting the unlawful detainer action in california state court because that action involved different issues 3: holding that a settlement agreement is an arbitrable subject when the underlying dispute is arbitrable 4: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law | [
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public policy. See Keneally u. Orgain (1980), Mont., 606 P.2d 127, 37 St.Rep. 154. In the prior discussion of this case, this Court determined that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was implied in the parties’ oral, at-will, employment contract. The basis for this holding was the employer’s promulgation of an employees’ handbook, two years after Gates began employment. The handbook provided certain guidelines for termination of employees. We stated that Gates had a cause of action because “if the employer failed to follow its own policies, the peace of mind of its employees is shattered and an injustice is done.” 638 P.2d at 1067, 39 St.Rep. at 20. We then found two genuine issues of material fact: (1) whether respondent failed to afford app 3 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353 (<HOLDING>); with Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. Holdings: 0: recognizing a tort action because an employee was dismissed for serving jury duty 1: recognizing a tort action when employee was dismissed for filing a workers compensation claim 2: recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act 3: holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim 4: holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act | [
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by our decision in United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1107-12 (11th Cir.2002) (rejecting this argument because "the jurisdictional provision here is not a traditional element, or otherwise an essential ingredient, of a criminal offense”). He also argues the MDLEA violates due process because (1) § 1903(a) does not require a nexus between the criminal conduct and the United States, (2) § 1903(f) allows for forum shopping because it sets venue at the point of entry into the United States, and (3) the provision in § 1903(d) precluding defenses based on international law violates his liberty interest in ensuring that he not be prosecuted in a jurisdiction bearing no ties to his offense. These arguments are foreclosed by United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325-26 (11th Cir.2003) Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states 1: holding a nexus to the united states is not required and noting the venue provision comports with us const art iii 2 cl 3 2: holding that the exercise of judicial power under article iii of the united states constitution requires an actual case or controversy 3: holding that issuance of detention order for purpose of saliva sampling based on reasonable suspicion comports with vermont and united states constitutions 4: holding removal of city councilman governed by minn const art 13 2 1857 identical predecessor to minn const art 8 5 | [
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864, 107 L.Ed.2d 948 (1990), the D.C. Circuit sustained, under the Federal Constitution, the Army’s random testing of armed police and security guards among others, because of their use of and accessibility to weapons, the dangerous workplace setting, and the highly regulated nature of their positions. And, in Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 963, 110 S.Ct. 404, 107 L.Ed.2d 370 (1989), the First Circuit a is not compatible with Article 1, Paragraph 7 of th 3 (finding that state constitution protects reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left at curbside); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58, 519 A.2d 820 (1987) (refusing to adopt good-faith exception under state constitution); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 344-47, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (<HOLDING>); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228, 440 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 1: holding that state constitution protects privacy interests in telephone toll billing records 2: holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in utility records under either state or federal constitution 3: holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state 4: holding state constitution affords protectable interest in telephone toll billing records | [
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for a limited reach. The statute provides for a two-year statute of limitations not merely for ‘an act or omission of the attorney’ ... but rather for ‘an act or omission in the performance of professional services.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the court held that a plaintiffs claims against a law firm for tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with economic expectancy, inducement of breach of fiduciary duty, conversion of assets, and conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty were not subject to the two-year limitations period under 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b) where the law firm had never undertaken to render professional services to the plaintiff. See 2004 WL 526739, at **3-4. Cf. Sinclair v. Bloom, No. 94 C 4465, 1995 WL 348127, at *4 (N.D.Ill. June 8, 1995) (<HOLDING>). Finally, in Polsky v. BDO Seidman the court Holdings: 0: holding that an attorney for a debtor owes a general fiduciary duty to preserve the bankruptcy estate 1: holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney 2: holding that an attorney is a fiduciary under section 523a4 3: holding that claims against an attorney for undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty were governed by the twoyear limitations period under 735 ilcs 513 2143b where the defendant was acting as an attorney for the plaintiffs when the misconduct at issue occurred 4: holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs | [
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what costs, under Halper, were subject to the proportionality test. The court noted that the costs to society should be included with the costs to the government in determining whether a proceeds forfeiture is remedial. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 299. The court stated: The forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug-sales serves the wholly remedial purposes of reimbursing the government for the costs of detection, investigation, and prosecution of drug traffickers and reimbursing society for the costs of combatting the allure of illegal drugs, earing for the victims of the criminal trade when preventative efforts prove unsuccessful, lost productivity, etc. Id. (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 444, 109 S.Ct. at 1899; United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2644, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (<HOLDING>); One Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 Holdings: 0: recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law 1: holding that the tcpas 500 statutory damages provision is remedial 2: holding that the tcpas treble damages provision is remedial 3: holding tcpa is remedial statute and that statutory damages are not punitive damages 4: recognizing repayment of damages to society as remedial | [
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] | [
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did not intend to fashion a minefield out of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, the legislative history mentions the provision only in passing, offering as an example of compliance that the debtor meet the disclosure requirements of § 1125 to satisfy § 1129(a)(2). Certainly, if Congress had meant that any infraction, no matter how early on in the case, no matter how minor the breach, and regardless of whether the court has remedied the violations, should result in a denial of confirmation, Congress would have given some clearer indication in the legislative history or made the statutory provision far more express. In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 157 B.R. 791, 811 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1993); see also In re Heritage Organization, L.L.C., 375 B.R. 230, 309 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>). Bankruptcy courts limit their inquiry under § Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors negotiations with a creditor to include certain modifications in the plan in exchange for acceptance did not preclude confirmation under 1129a2 1: holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case 2: holding in the instant case although creditor obtained relief from the automatic stay it failed to object or appeal from the confirmation order accordingly creditor is bound by the confirmation order 3: recognizing that when a creditor does not receive adequate notice the creditor is not bound by the confirmation order 4: holding that provision in chapter 13 plan discharging postpetition interest on a student loan is binding on creditor under theory of res judicata where objection was not raised prior to plan confirmation and confirmation order was not appealed | [
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When Wesley and Vergie separated it appears that Wesley returned to live in Earlean’s home where he remained until his death. At the time of his death, Earlean applied for and received widow’s benefits as Wesley’s legal spouse, a step Vergie did not take until eight years later. Moreover, the records of Los Angeles County, where Earlean resided, produced a petition for divorce filed by Wesley, but no final decree. Therefore, although there was no evidence of any further search of court records, there was sufficient substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the presumption of validity had been overcome. See, e.g., id. (finding substantial evidence to support rebuttal of presumption absent search of court records); Vargas, 9 Cal. App.3d at 475-76, 88 Cal.Rptr. 281 (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion We agree with Gallaher, Holdings: 0: holding that search of pertinent public records not required if evidence presented and inferences drawn therefrom show that first marriage is valid 1: recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage 2: holding that heck did not bar datzs 1983 unlawful search claim because even if the pertinent search did violate the federal constitution datz conviction might still be valid considering such doctrines as inevitable discovery independent source and harmless error 3: holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred 4: holding that the belief in a valid religious marriage is insufficient to come within the doctrine | [
"2",
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The record demonstrates that the defense was tendered at the earliest feasible time. Moreover, Continental has consistently refused coverage, and there is no evidence that Continental would have responded favorably to an earlier tender. Under these circumstances, substantially different from those surrounding the tender in SCSC, there is no legal cause shown why Domtar should not be entitled to recover its pre-tender defense costs from Continental. 7. Additional attorney fee issues. Continental raises several additional attorney fee issues. Each merits brief attention. a. Continental, in effect, has asked us to overrule the supreme court’s decision in Morrison v. Swenson, 274 Minn. 127, 142 N.W.2d 640 (1966), where the court concluded that an insured may recover its legal fees incurr 7 (<HOLDING>). In Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Holdings: 0: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith 1: holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured 2: holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer 3: holding that chapter 38 permits an insured to recover attorney fees from the insurer 4: holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer | [
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develop their equitable arguments in opposition to Defendants’ defense of statute of limitations. Plaintiffs argue that even if Durham’s right to an accounting was foreclosed, factual issues existed concerning the date the statute of limitations began to run on their claims of fraud, breach of constructive trust, breach of contract, and violation of the UPA. They contend these issues involve separate and distinct claims which may be asserted independently of their right to an accounting. {31} We think each of these arguments fails as to Durham. New Mexico follows the general rule that an action for a formal accounting is a prerequisite to initiating an action at law by a partner against the partnership or another partner. See Willey v. Renner, 8 N.M. 641, 646, 45 P. 1132, 1134 (1896) (<HOLDING>) (cited with approval in Levy v. Disharoon, 106 Holdings: 0: recognizing that in a divorce action one partys limited partnership interest could not be assigned to the other party without the consent of the general partner 1: holding one partner can not sic maintain an action at law against another partner to recover an amount claimed by him by reason of partnership transactions until there has been a final settlement of the affairs of the partnership 2: holding a mechanic working in a garage owned by a partnership is an employee of the partnership not the individual partner 3: holding that a partner who is without actual authority has no power to bind the partnership in a transaction that is not within the ordinary and apparent scope of the partnership business any person dealing with a partner can only rely on the partners acts if they are within the ordinary and apparent scope of the partnership business 4: holding that absent an agreement to the contrary any partner can act as an agent of the partnership when apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership | [
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on the basis of loss of range of motion, these determinations should, if feasible, be “portray[ed]” (§ 4.40) in terms of the degree of additional range-of-motion loss due to pain on use or during flare-ups. Cf. Lathan v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 359, 367 (1995) (in ordering medical opinion on remand in dependency and indemnity compensation case, VA should “consider the feasibility of requesting that the physician express in percentage terms the probability that the veteran’s service-connected disability caused or contributed to death”). The Court holds that DC 5201 does not subsume 38 C.F.R. § 4.40, and that 38 C.F.R. § 4.14 does not forbid consideration of a higher rating based on a greater limitation of motion due to pain on use including during flare-ups. See Schafmth, 1 VetApp. at 592-93 (<HOLDING>); see also Quarles v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. Holdings: 0: holding that we generally may not consider issues not raised before the bia 1: holding that where it was clear that the court of appeals had limited the issues on resentencing to the one issue raised in the defendants first appeal the district court did not err in declining to consider other issues raised by the defendant on remand 2: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal 3: holding that we consider issues not raised at administrative level waived 4: holding that bvas failure to consider 440 was improper when that regulation had been made potentially applicable through assertions and issues raised in record | [
"2",
"3",
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"4"
] | [
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report contained information based on interviews with appellant, her daughters, and others. Because Dr. DeYoub did not testify, it is impossible to determine from the report which of Dr. DeYoub’s conclusions were based on his direct observations of appellant, and which were based on the statements of other persons. Relatedly, it is impossible to determine which conclusions relied upon by the court were based on hearsay, or even double-hearsay, let alone determine if those statements might still be admissible under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as, for example, that found in Rule 803(4) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Therefore, it was error for the circuit court to admit Dr. DeYoub’s report. See New Empire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 235 Ark 758, 352 S.W.2d 4 (1962) (<HOLDING>). Second, the trial judge relied upon Dr. Holdings: 0: holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident 1: holding if a deposition is taken for discovery only not for use at trial the deposition is not a stage of trial for which the defendant must be present 2: holding that injured tort claimant properly brought action against insurer prior to filing action against insured tortfeasor where coverage dispute did not depend on any fact or circumstance pertaining to the accident or the injuries suffered by the claimant 3: holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured 4: holding the report of doctor who was not present to testify and whose deposition had not been taken was properly excluded in action by insured against insurer on accident policy | [
"2",
"3",
"0",
"1",
"4"
] | [
"4"
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and ‘strongly recommend[ed]’ separate representation.” Id. at 2. Each Defendant thereafter executed a written Waiver of Right to Separate Representation. Dr. Migliaccio argues that such a waiver, based on specific knowledge of a contingent event, becomes void upon the happening of that contingency. We have found no authority to support this proposition. Instead, we look to the totality of the circumstances here — including each informative discussion of joint representation — to determine whether the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been violated. See Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 139 (deeming “facts and circumstances” more significant than “the exact words used by the trial judge” to a waiver examination). Cf. United States v. Solomon, 856 F.2d 1572, 1580-81 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1070, 109 S.Ct. 1352, Holdings: 0: holding a pretrial hearing on the waiver of counsel conducted three weeks before trial was the start of the trial stage where there were no changes between the pretrial hearing and the trial 1: holding magistrates pretrial hearing sufficient under rule 44c and considering the district courts cursory questioning as well 2: holding the rule was not applicable in a pretrial venue hearing 3: holding that the district court cannot refer a matter to a bankruptcy judge under the magistrates act 4: holding that the district courts cursory treatment of a factual matter related to victim payment was adequate under rule 32c1 because the defendant expressed very little interest in pursing his objection | [
"3",
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"4",
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] | [
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While Class counsel contended during his closing argument that Dr. Singer properly considered Comcast’s lobbying activities as evidence of its anti-competitive purpose and motives (N.T. 11/16/2009 at 30:15-31:19), “parties who petition the government for governmental action favorable to them cannot be prosecuted under the antitrust laws even though their petitions are motivated by anticompetitive intent.” Video Int’l Prod,., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir.1988); see also Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 315 (6th Cir.1986) (“[G]enuine attempts to influence passage or enforcement of laws are immune from antitrust scrutiny, regardless of the anticompetitive purpose behind such attempts.”); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1259 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation 1: holding that private health care providers proceeding under con licenses are immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine 2: holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing 3: holding that noerrpennington doctrine exempts from antitrust liability any legitimate use of the political process by private individuals even if their intent is to eliminate competition 4: holding before be k that because it is based on and implements the first amendment right to petition the noerrpennington doctrine is not limited to the antitrust context but applies equally in all contexts | [
"4",
"1",
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"2",
"3"
] | [
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conditions exist that may at some unknown future date be suffered by some unknown minors." Brief of Amici New Hampshire Legislators at 8. In fact, Dr. Wayne Goldner listed in his unopposed declaration five specific conditions that could require abortion to protect a minor’s health: preeclampsia, eclampsia, premature rupture of the membranes surrounding the fetus, spontaneous chorioamnionitis, and heavy bleeding during pregnancy. Declaration of Wayne Goldner, M.D., ¶¶ 8-15. Moreover, appellee abortion providers themselves face an imminent injury — civil or criminal prosecution for performing an abortion in violation of the Act — sufficient to confer on them Article III standing. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Because of their close relationship to the Holdings: 0: holding that nonpregnant plaintiffs had no standing to challenge abortion statute solely on basis of childbearing age because ajlthough some of them may in the future become pregnant and may in such event desire an abortion it is also possible that they will not become pregnant or that if they do they will upon further reflection decide for other reasons against an abortion it is clear that any threat of harm to them is remote and hypothetical 1: holding that insureds declaratory judgment class action claims seeking to retain tort settlements following their insurers claims for reimbursement were claims to enforce their rights under the terms of the plan and to clarify their rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan under erisa 2: holding federal government could not prosecute an american indian who on indian territory had murdered another member of his tribe as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the indians to engage in selfgovernment ie the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs 3: holding that shareholders had failed to maintain their status as shareholders by selling their shares after they had filed their complaint and therefore had lost standing to maintain a derivative suit 4: holding that physician abortion providers asserting their own rights and those of their patients had standing to challenge abortion regulation and should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief | [
"2",
"3",
"1",
"0",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
in many cases with the problem of making difficult and time-consuming factual determinations based on stale records. We believe that a court’s time and energy would be better spent in handling its current caseload.... Glenn, 558 So.2d at 8; see also Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (refusing to apply a new rule retroactively to child abuse cases because it “would require courts to revisit numerous final convictions and to extensively review stale records”); Williams, 421 So.2d at 515 (refusing to apply a new rule retroactively because it would entail hearings with “evidence possibly long since destroyed, misplaced, or deteriorated” and witnesses who “may not be available or [whose] memory might be dimmed”); [State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (Ariz. 2003) ] (<HOLDING>). 904 So.2d at 411-12. Thus, we concluded that Holdings: 0: recognizing that conducting new sentencing hearings for arizonas 90 death row prisoners many requiring witnesses no longer available would impose a substantial and unjustified burden on arizonas administration of justice 1: holding that recklessness even for fiduciaries is no longer sufficient 2: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death 3: holding that because plaintiff no longer has available administrative remedies his action must be dismissed with prejudice 4: recognizing that section 5 is inapplicable when the parties have specified an exclusive arbitral forum but that forum is no longer available | [
"4",
"2",
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"1",
"0"
] | [
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between the two.” Fortress Bible, 694 F.3d at 219. Among the .types of burdens the courts have found to be minimal, and hence not protected by RLUIPA, are facially neutral permit and variance requirements. Thus, courts have regularly found that zoning ordinances that merely require religious institutions to go through a routine permit or variance application process do not run afoul of RLUIPA.. See, e.g., id. (“A denial of a religious institution’s building application is likely not a substantial burden if "it leaves open the possibility of modification and resubmission.”); Konikov v. Orange Cty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir.2005) (“[Requiring applications for- variances, special permits, or other relief provisions [does] not offend RLUÍPA’s goals.”); San Jose, 360 F.3d at 1035-36 (<HOLDING>)"; Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City Holdings: 0: holding that a citys requirement that the plaintiff refile a complete permit application did not constitute a substantial burden 1: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 2: holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim 3: recognizing burden 4: holding that such factors may constitute a substantial burden | [
"4",
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148 Cal.Rptr. 389, 582 P.2d 980 (1978); Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal.3d 105, 111, 284 Cal.Rptr. 318, 813 P.2d 1348 (1991). Though not the only factors that can be considered in a trade secret misappropriation case, see Biocore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 2004 WL 303194, at *4 (D.Kan. Feb. 2, 2004), both Mattel and MGA request their application here. B. Discussion 1. Nature of the Misconduct The jury found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mattel willfully and maliciously misappropriated MGA’s trade secret information. Some courts treat a finding of willful and malicious misappropriation as support for the “maximum possible amount in exemplary damages.” 02 Micro. Intern., 399 F.Supp.2d at 1079; see also Lundquist v. Reusser, 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1214, 31 Cal.Rptr .2d 776, 875 P.2d 1279 (1994) (<HOLDING>). But this approach strips the Court of its Holdings: 0: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 1: holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school 2: recognizing relationship between malice and reprehensibility 3: recognizing employeremployee relationship between county school board and teacher 4: holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student | [
"3",
"4",
"0",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
In other words, it was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to conclude that veniremember 52 was more certain and sincere in her subsequent change of answer than Robertson. Viewing the entire record as a whole, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor’s failure to strike veniremember 52 raises an inference of Robertson’s disparate treatment because of race and that the prosecutor’s explanation for striking Robertson was a pretext. iv) Robertson and Veniremember 33 Finally, we consider venire-member 38. Both veniremember 33 and Robertson provided the same answer to the prosecutor’s question regarding a potential life sentence and both were passively rehabilitated on this issue by appellant’s trial attorney. However, a review of the entire record supports the conclusion that th .App.1990) (<HOLDING>). Nor has appellant’s counsel presented Holdings: 0: holding that defendant waived his objection to the prosecutors use of her peremptory challenges by failing to make a contemporaneous objection during jury selection 1: holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant 2: holding that production of a prosecutors juror information notes is both necessary and proper when prosecutor refreshes his memory regarding the exercise of peremptory challenges by reviewing those notes before giving testimony at batson hearing 3: holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause 4: holding that is not the fact that a jury is all white or all black that violates batson rather it is the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors | [
"1",
"0",
"3",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
Adhin, 44 So.3d at 1251-52; Avalon Assocs. of Del. Ltd. v. Avalon Park Assocs., Inc., 760 So.2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Standing to record a lis pendens only requires a complaint that supports a claim against the specific property. Tortu v. Tortu, 430 So.2d 531, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). On the other hand, standing to contest the validity of a mortgage belongs to the mortgagor and to third persons whose rights or interests are adversely affected by the mortgage, such as junior mortgagees or creditors with an interest or lien in Property. While their claims may have been sufficient to allow the recording of a lis pendens, as the Krauses concede, the notice did not create any interest or substantive rights in the Property. Adhin, 44 So.3d at 1251-52. d 877, 892 (La.Ct.App. 2003) (<HOLDING>); 7 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Holdings: 0: holding that the individual defendants were acting as principals andor officers of the corporation and therefore there was no third party present to interfere in the relationship to which their corporation was a party 1: holding internal revenue service has standing to challenge validity of mortgage of seized property 2: holding that the funds in the privatelyheld corporations account belonged to the corporation not to the individuals who owned the corporation and expressly stating that directors officers and shareholders of a corporation do not have standing to claim an ownership interest in corporate property in their individual capacities they must state a claim in the corporate name 3: holding that where there was question of impropriety of party to mortgage corporate property only the corporation would have standing to complain of his unauthorized act 4: holding that a corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agents corporate powers strictly construed but which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers actually authorized and in such eases there need be no written authority under seal or vote of the corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize the act | [
"2",
"1",
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] | [
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were generally unclear and it appears this money was completely commingled with strictly "marital" income. There is no indication or argument that Vonderahe improperly used this social security money for his own benefit and deprived his step-daughter of its use, nor that he ever requested that any withdrawal from her accounts be made to pay for ordinary household expenses. In fact, there is evidence that Fobar used it for her own personal benefit, as she testified that she used her daughter's social security money to pay for her own (Fo-bar's) college education. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding more property to Fobar based on her daughter's social security income. Cf. Gower v. Gower, 427 N.E.2d 703, 707-08 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion The dissolution decree is not void Holdings: 0: holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property 1: holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital 2: holding income tax liability incurred during marriage is one of accepted costs of producing marital income and should be treated as marital debt for purposes of determining equitable distribution of marital estate 3: holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property 4: holding trial court had no authority to award portion of the marital property to wifes children from another marriage even though money they received by way of social security benefits were commingled with the marital estate and used in part for the aequisition of marital property | [
"1",
"3",
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] | [
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the named driver exclusion is placed at the end of the policy rather than in the UM/UIM coverage part. But the placement of the exclusion after the “general provisions” of the policy is entirely consistent with an interpretation of the exclusion as applying to “any claim,” regardless of the specific coverage under which the claimant seeks to recover. If, in fact, the exclusion applies only to the liability coverage, as plaintiffs contend, it is more logical that the exclusion would have been placed in the policy part for “liability to others.” We do not think the location of the exclusion supports an interpretation limiting the exclusion to the liability coverage. See Rockford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 217 Ill.App.3d 181, 160 Ill.Dec. 187, 576 N.E.2d 1141, 1144-45 (1991) (<HOLDING>). In summary, we hold the named driver Holdings: 0: holding exclusion was not ambiguous 1: holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver 2: holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy 3: holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage 4: holding nearly identical named driver exclusion was plain and unambiguous and excluded claim brought under um coverage | [
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