input
stringlengths 15
850k
| references
sequence | gold
sequence |
|---|---|---|
has “expressly retained” submerged lands. Reinforcing this reading of the Act is the fact that the Act’s terms reach lands governed by the equal footing doctrine as well as lands beneath the territorial sea. Under the terms of the statute, equal footing lands, like those beneath the territorial sea, pass to a State unless the United States “expressly retained” them. In passing the Act, Congress would have legislated against the backdrop of our early equal footing cases. See Montana, 450 U. S., at 552, n. 2. There is no indication that, in formulating the “expressly retained” standard, Congress intended to upset settled doctrine and to impose on the Federal Government a more or less demanding standard than the one reflected in those cases, see, e. g., Holt State Bank, supra, at 55 (<HOLDING>), and carried forward in Montana and Utah Div. Holdings: 0: holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent 1: holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent 2: holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect 3: holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent 4: holding that intent to defeat state title to submerged lands must be definitely declared or otherwise made very plain | [
"3",
"1",
"2",
"0",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Greaves, 121 B.R. at 235 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). Miller & Custom fail to note, however, that the 4 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 70 (9th Cir.1995). “When it is found that there has been defective service of process, the judgment is void: ‘A person is not bound by a judgment in litigation to which rica, AFL-CIO, 491 F.2d 245, 249 (4th Cir.1974) (“It is axiomatic that a federal court cannot acquire in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who does not voluntarily appear unless he is served with process in a manner authorized by federal statute or rule.”); Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. Donnelly, 402 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>). The only exception to this principle arises Holdings: 0: holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service 1: recognizing that a default judgment based on improper service is void 2: recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act 3: holding such service satisfies due process 4: holding that absent valid service of process proceedings are void from the outset | [
"2",
"1",
"3",
"0",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
part of the legislative process; and (2) whether the actions were legislative “in substance” and “bore newing their motion with respect to the applicability of the doctrine of legislative immunity after sufficient discovery and development of the record. II. Contracts Clause Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal claims for impairment of contract. Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from passing any law “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” While the language of the Contracts Clause is absolute on its face, “[i]t does not trump the police power of a state to protect the general welfare of its citizens, a power which is ‘paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.’ ” Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 367 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Holdings: 0: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 1: recognizing the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders 2: holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power to santion attorneys for violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom 3: recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants 4: holding that courts must accommodate the contracts clause with the inherent police power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of its people | [
"3",
"2",
"1",
"0",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
judg ment.” Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir.2009). In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because he has failed to prove actual, compensable injury, “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. Section 1997e(d)(2) of the PLRA has been consistently interpreted by our Court and others to cap attorney’s fee awards in prisoner litigation to 150 percent of the judgment, which, in this case, would be $1.50. While we have not previously faced a challenge to this fee cap in the context of a nominal damages case, we have elsewhere considered whether it violates equal protection and, in that context, have confirmed that § 1997e(d)(2) imposes such a cap. See Parker, 581 F.3d at 204 (<HOLDING>). See also Collins v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Holdings: 0: holding that the cap does not violate equal protection 1: holding missouri transfer rule did not violate equal protection 2: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 3: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 4: holding that the admission of his juvenile conviction did not violate equal protection | [
"2",
"4",
"1",
"3",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
Ciba. As a result, its employees’ positions were essentially unaltered because they performed the same work under the same conditions for almost all of the same supervisors. Therefore, there was substantial continuity between the Brown & Root and Brown-Eagle operations. Second, but for its discriminatory hiring practices, as found by the NLRB based on substantial evidence, Brown-Eagle applicants would have constituted a majority of the Brown & Root workforce in this department, which would have satisfied the second prong of the successorship doctrine. Because it cannot benefit from its unlawful practices, we must uphold the NLRB’s finding that Brown & Root was a successor employer and had a duty to bargain with the Union. In re Galloway, 321 NLRB 1422, 1425, 1996 WL 514510 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, because of its discriminatory Holdings: 0: recognizing that when an entity exercises sufficient control over employees it may be considered a joint employer 1: holding that a section 8a3 violation is sufficient to find that the new employer would have employed a sufficient number of predecessor employees to be a successor employer had it acted lawfully 2: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 3: holding that existence of deliberate and informed consent turns on whether it is understood between the employee and his employers that he is to remain in the allegiance of the first employer or is to be employed in the business and subject to the direction of the temporary employer 4: holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation | [
"3",
"0",
"4",
"2",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. In Ohio, there is no right to recover court costs or statutory interest except for when a court enters a lawful judgment in an action validly commenced under law. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2335.19. Any debt collector’s attempt to recover court costs in the absence of a valid judgment constitutes a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. See Shula v. Lawent, 359 F.3d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 2004); Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 873-74 (8th Holdings: 0: holding that college violated stay by not delivering transcript to chapter 7 debtor when debt had not yet been determined dischargeable 1: holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt 2: holding that the name under which a debt collector is licensed to do business is the debt collectors true name for purposes of the fdcpa 3: holding that rawlings a codefendant in the present action is not a debt collector within the meaning of the fdcpa 4: holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded | [
"0",
"1",
"2",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
temporary, lasting only from May 4, 1995 to August 10, 1995. Defendant reasons that even if the plaintiff suffered from bipolar disorder, that disorder could not substantially interfere with a major life activity because it lasted only four months. Plaintiff has a well-documented history of bipolar disorder since 1989. (Pl.’s Stmt. Ex. 2.) Defendant’s view of plaintiffs disability ignores the teaching of Sutton, where the Supreme Court acknowledged that medication may partially, but not wholly, relieve an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and expressly rejected the notion that partial amelioration of a disabling condition renders the individual ineligible for protection under the ADA. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488, 119 S.Ct. 2139; accord Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544 (<HOLDING>). In addition, contrary to the defendant’s Holdings: 0: holding that a proceeding on a writ of error coram nobis is part of the underlying criminal matter 1: holding that periodic alimony is not mandatory 2: holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada 3: holding that the periodic characteristic disabling manifestation is part of the underlying recognized disability 4: recognizing the importance of the employers knowledge of the disability | [
"1",
"2",
"4",
"0",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
Used Auto Parts, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that an employee, who had chosen a suit at law for recovery under the statute, but had been unsuccessful in that suit, was not barred from seeking compensation through a traditional workers’ compensation claim under the statute. Id. at 102-03, 181 S.E.2d at 613-14. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided in Delp v. Berry that an employee who has been unsuccessful in collecting an award through a workers’ compensation claim is not barred from resorting to a civil action to recover damages from the employer. 213 Va. 786, 789, 195 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1973). However, if the employee obtains a full recovery under one of the two avenues of relief afforded in Code § 65.2-805, they are not entitled to pursue the other avenue. See id. (<HOLDING>). In its analysis, the Virginia Used Auto Parts Holdings: 0: holding that an injured employee is only entitled to one full recovery but where an employee does not receive the full satisfaction of payment for their injury they may pursue the other avenue 1: holding that the full payment rule literally requires full not partial payment and rejecting the argument that a partpayment remedy is necessary when a taxpayer is too poor to pay the full amount of the tax 2: holding that when an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct the employee may pursue a civil action against his employer and also pursue benefits under the workers compensation act 3: holding that any constitutionally protected property interest an employee has as a result of his employment contract is satisfied by payment of the full compensation due under the contract 4: holding that it is wellsettled that although a plaintiff is entitled to full recovery for its damages it is not entitled to a double recovery for the same loss or injury | [
"2",
"3",
"4",
"1",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
22] Francis argues that she must have access to State court remedies because the PHA was the only defendant in her Tribal Court litigation and because a jury trial, attorney fees, punitive damages, and the capacity to seek relief pursuant to the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA) were not available to her in Tribal Court. If such were the case, any claim involving an internal tribal matter could be shifted to State court by the simple device of pleading an entitlement to a remedy not available in Tribal Court. [¶ 23] The important policies of the law to support tribal self-government over internal tribal matters limits claims involving such matters where, as here, some remedy and a forum to assert entitlement to the remedy is available within the Tribe. See Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 707, 713 (<HOLDING>); see also Akins, 130 F.3d at 485, 486 n. 5. Holdings: 0: holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an indiana state courts decision 1: holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 1983 claims 2: holding that the nations decision to terminate fellencers employment was an internal tribal matter within the meaning of section 62061 over which state courts lacked jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that its decision foreclosed fellencers ability to pursue a claim under the maine human rights act over which like mcra claims maine superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction 3: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 4: holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over securities act class actions | [
"4",
"0",
"3",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
harassment); Hensler v. O’Sullivan Corp., VLW 095-3-290 (W.D.Va.1995) (Crigler, Mag. J.) (same); Christine Wright, Constructive Discharge Supports Bowman Suit, Virginia Lawyers Weekly, Nov. 20, 1995, at *1. In contrast, a Virginia Circuit Court for the City of Virginia Beach recently concluded: “Even if the Plaintiff could present facts which establish a case of constructive discharge, no Virginia court has extended the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy to include such a scenario.” Jones v. Professional Hospitality Resources, Inc., 35 Va.Cir. 458, 460 (1995). In addition, at least two federal courts have reached conclusions which are consistent with Jones. See Hairston v. Multi-Channel TV Cable Co., No. 95-2363, 1996 WL 119916, at *3 (4th Cir. March 19, 1996) (<HOLDING>). The Court concludes as a matter of law that a Holdings: 0: holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine 1: holding that a district court correctly dismissed a constructive discharge claim under virginia law because that cause of action had not been recognized by virginias courts 2: holding subject matter jurisdiction divested because federal cause of action had been dismissed without prejudice 3: recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard 4: recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge | [
"0",
"3",
"4",
"2",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. Tex.R. Civ. P. 39(a); g that it was error for the trial court not to join non-party lessors who had a financial interest in the leases and pooling agreement); Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 183 (<HOLDING>); Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding trial court has discretion to require joinder of royalty interest owners whose interests will be directly and possibly adversely affected by decree in trespass to try title action 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial 2: holding that the trial court did not err in denying a plea in abatement to obtain joinder of other royalty owners in a pooled unit on grounds that the presence of the other royalty owners was not necessary to determine whether sabre pooled in bad faith and breached the terms of the lease 3: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to require joinder of owners of nonpossessory royalty interests and possibilities of reverter in partition suit between owners of mineral leasehold estate although it would be wise to join them 4: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the energy company defendants lessors the owners of royalty interests in the property at issue and the owners of the mineral estate in unleased part of the 9200 acres should be joined as parties if feasible | [
"2",
"0",
"3",
"1",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
reading [of the Act]_This remedial statute reaches beyond “claims” which might be legally enforced, to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money. Id. at 232-33, 88 S.Ct. 959 (quotations and footnote omitted). Here, the Relator has alleged in Counts II, IV, and VI that Parke-Davis has caused the submission of numerous off-label prescription for Neurontin to the Medicaid program through both its fraudulent statements about the safety and efficacy of Neurontin and its system of unlawful financial incentives and kickbacks to doctors who prescribe Neurontin. Defendant does not dispute that an off-label prescription submitted for reimbursement by Medicaid is a false claim within the meaning of the FCA. Cf Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 52 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Peterson v. Mathews, Holdings: 0: holding that knowing submission of medicare claims for services that are not covered and payable under the medicare act is a violation of the fca 1: holding that county of delaware was not a person for purposes of fca liability 2: holding that the treating physician rule applies in a ease where a plaintiff sought reimbursement for air ambulance services under medicare part b 3: holding that because negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims are covered by the martin act these claims must be dismissed 4: recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca | [
"2",
"4",
"3",
"1",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
contends that if we uphold the award of guardianship as a permanent plan, “then respondent’s compliance with OCDSS and court demands becomes irrelevant to whether or not reunification efforts would be futile.” Respondent-father counters that OCDSS’s argument is circular; we believe it is more properly characterized as backwards, probably because OCDSS has changed its position in this appeal from its position in the trial court. On appeal, OCDSS now supports the trial court’s decision to cease reunification efforts. At the hearing, OCDSS recommended that reunification efforts continue. In some instances, parties may be judicially estopped from taking inconsistent positions at different points in the same litigation. See In re Maynard, 116 N.C. App. 616, 621, 448 S.E.2d 871, 874 (1994) (<HOLDING>), disc. rev. denied, 339 N.C. 613, 454 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that even though the declarant was not in danger she was experiencing an ongoing emergency because she did not know where her children were and she feared for their safety 1: holding birth mothers samesex partner was a presumed mother because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children 2: holding that dss was estopped to argue that the respondent mother was competent to surrender her children when dss had previously argued that she was so mentally ill that she could not care for her children 3: holding that the bia correctly imputed a parents knowledge that she and her children were not eligible for entry to the united states to her children 4: holding that the failure to attach a custody order was not reversible error because there was no showing of prejudice where there was no indication that the respondent was unaware of the placement or custody of the children at any time the motion to terminate stated that dss was given legal custody of the minor children and the record included a copy of an order in effect when the motion was filed that awarded dss custody of the children | [
"3",
"1",
"0",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
Olaf Peter Juda, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing his Bivens action alleging due process and Eighth Amendment violations. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.2001). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Juda’s action because he conceded in his First Amended Complaint that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); see also Wyatt v. Terhune, 305 F.3d 1033, 1045-46 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Juda contends that he did Holdings: 0: holding that denial of remand was proper where plaintiff failed to raise the proper objection 1: holding that summary judgment as to one of plaintiffs claims was appropriate bjecause plaintiff concedes that he cannot establish an essential element of this claim 2: holding that a routine dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not count as a strike under 1915g 3: holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice 4: recognizing that dismissal may be proper where plaintiff concedes the failure to exhaust | [
"2",
"0",
"3",
"1",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
in trade, not unfair practices in general. Apart from claims of unfair competition, a plaintiff must allege some sort of transaction between the parties for liability to attach under sections two and eleven. See Cash Energy, 768 F.Supp. at 894; see also Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 965 F.Supp. 165, 175, n. 14 (D.Mass.1997) (noting that plaintiff and defendant must be engaged in business relationship for claim to lie under Chapter 93A § 11); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Supp. 435, 440 (D.Mass.1991) (noting that Supreme Judicial Court “has stressed the existence of some contractual or business relationship between the parties as a precursor to liability under Chapter 93A”); Standard Register Co. v. Bolton-Emerson, Inc., 38 Mass.App.Ct. 545, 551, 649 N.E.2d 791 (1995) (<HOLDING>) This is the “common thread” of 93A cases. Cash Holdings: 0: holding that an individual debtor not engaged in business is eligible for chapter 11 1: holding that where there was no evidence of the claimed underlying violation and where there were no unique arguments related to the chapter 93a claim defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs chapter 93a claim 2: holding that the issue of fraud was precluded because the previous jury necessarily considered fraud as the basis for chapter 93a liability 3: holding that to maintain claim for fraud under chapter 93a 11 parties need not be in privity of contract so long as they are engaged in more than a minor or insignificant business relationship 4: holding that summary judgment on chapter 93a claim is appropriate when summary judgment is granted on fraud claim and chapter 93a claim is solely based on the underlying claim for common law fraud | [
"2",
"0",
"4",
"1",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
sanction when a plaintiff tries to deceive the district court by falsifying an IFP application. Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306-07; Mathis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546, 547 (7th Cir.1998). Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, and courts depend on the plaintiffs honesty in assessing her ability to pay. Abusing this privilege warrants dismissal with prejudice as a sanction for lying, and we therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Greviskes v. Univs. Research Ass’n, Inc., 417 F.3d 752, 754-59 (7th Cir.2005) (upholding dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff had assumed identity of former coworker and faxed to former employer a fraudulent request for coworker’s payroll records); Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 668-69 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306-07 (upholding Holdings: 0: holding that the district court possessed the inherent judicial authority to empanel a resentencing jury on remand from reversal of the respondents enhanced sentence and because the district court erred by failing to recognize that it possessed this inherent judicial authority boehl reversed and remanded for the district courts discretionary determination of whether to exercise that authority 1: recognizing a trial courts inherent authority to dismiss a cause of action with prejudice for violations of court orders 2: recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process 3: holding that district courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute with or sans notice to the parties 4: recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process | [
"3",
"1",
"2",
"0",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
A.2d 243,1 find that Miller & Gallagher’s representation of Atlantic City in 2006 and 2007 was substantially related to the representation of taxpayers adverse to the City in 2009. The fact that the matters are not identical is outweighed by the fact that all matters deal with tax assessments in which the issue is the value of real estate. The fact that different experts will be defending Atlantic City in 2009 from those who defended Atlantic City in 2007 and 2006 is outweighed by the fact that the assessor is the same person and the Mayor and Council are performing the same functions, defending Atlantic City’s assessments, as the prior Mayors and Councils of Atlantic City. The likelihood that Miller & Gallagher was privy to relevant confidences of the Ass 2ffd 861, 870 (D.N.J.2001) (<HOLDING>); 3 Gray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 191 Holdings: 0: holding an attorney who carries on representation of an existing case after a law firm dissolves does so on the firms behalf and any income derived from the case belongs to the dissolved firm 1: holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order 2: holding that a law firms representation of a corporation in a suit relating to enforcement of a severance agreement with the companys former ceo was substantially related to the firms prior consultations with the ceo about the matter that led to his termination 3: holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit 4: holding that former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata by unions prior suit where employee was not a party to the prior suit as a former union member was not in privity with the union and never authorized the union to represent his interest in prior suit | [
"3",
"4",
"0",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
957 F.2d 353, 354 (7th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). To state a viable claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that he was “deprived of an interest secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color of state law.” Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos. Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1249 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-40, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923-24, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). However, “[i]n evaluating constitutional claims of prisoners, we must balance the need to protect prisoners’ procedural rights against the need for prison safety and security.” Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d 1278, 1280 (7th Cir.1991); see also Woods v. O’Leary, 890 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In 1972, the United States Supreme Court Holdings: 0: holding that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates constitutional rights the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 1: holding that prison regulations impinging on prisoners constitutional rights are only valid where reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 2: holding that regulations may impinge constitutional rights if the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 3: holding that prison administration may infringe upon prisoners first amendment rights as long as the infringement is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest 4: holding that an inmate has a privacy interest in guarding against disclosure of sensitive medical information from other inmates subject to legitimate penological interests | [
"3",
"0",
"4",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
Appellant Mickey Thomas entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Thomas conditioned his guilty plea on his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements that were the product of an allegedly unlawful arrest. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge entered a thorough report with extensive factual findings. It concluded that the police had adequate cause, first to detain Thomas and then to arrest him at the scene. See United States v. RojasMillan, 234 F.3d 464, 468-69 (9th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Valencia Amezcua, 278 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that reasonable suspicion that there is contraband in the vehicle justifies greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic stop 1: holding that reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory detention 2: holding that flight from police can help establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop 3: holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop 4: holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop | [
"0",
"3",
"2",
"4",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
used “unlawful and unreasonable” force against her while acting under color of state law. See Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756, 759 (8th Cir.2008) (“The right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person ... [and] [a] section 1983 action is supported when a [state actor] violates this constitutional right.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We further construe the complaint as alleging a violation of Henley’s right to be free from gender-based discrimination inasmuch as she is asserting defendants, as state actors, intentionally discriminated against and sexually harassed her because of her gender. See Ottman v. City of Independence, Mo., 341 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Moring v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 243 F.3d 452, Holdings: 0: holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability 1: holding that the equal protection clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender 2: holding intentional gender discrimination in public employment by persons acting under color of state law violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and is actionable under section 1983 3: holding that the electorate cannot order governmental action through a referendum which violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment | [
"3",
"0",
"4",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
Housewares and Bekem agreed to remove an underground storage tank from the Lexington site. Housewares claims that this order “established, at most, General Housewares’ liability for part of the cost of removing the underground storage tank.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. We agree. Housewares, by agreeing to a cleanup of the Lexington site, assumed partial liability. This establishes, prima facie, that Housewares actually knew that it had incurred some liability at this site prior to the inception of the first National policy. On July 19, 1993, the EPA notified Housewares that it was a potentially responsible party (PRP) with regard to the Antrim site. The receipt of this notice does not establish actual liability. See Montrose, supra, 10 Cal.4th 645, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 324, 913 P.2d at 904 (<HOLDING>). As its name suggests, this letter merely Holdings: 0: holding that appellants specific factual denial of receipt was sufficient evidence to defeat the presumption of receipt raised by a docket entry showing mailing 1: holding that an unsworn letter was insufficient to contest a claim of exemption 2: holding that receipt of a prp letter was insufficient to defeat coverage under the lossinprogress rule 3: holding that acts of improper maintenance were insufficient to defeat plaintiffs defective design claim 4: holding that anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to hearing | [
"0",
"3",
"1",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
him, claiming his termination was without just cause, i.e., in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA”), American’s decision to terminate Perry qualifies as a "minor dispute” over which the Adjustment Board has exclusive jurisdiction. See 45 U.S.C. § 151 (defining "minor dispute” as disputes "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.”). Under the RLA, minor disputes must be submitted to the Adjustment Board for binding arbitration; judicial review of these decisions is only available in certain circumstances, none of which is present here. See id.; Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 253, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994) (<HOLDING>); United Transp. Union v. South Carolina Public Holdings: 0: holding the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings 1: recognizing that the attorney general has vested immigration judges with exclusive jurisdiction over applications for adjustment of status in cases of deportation or removal 2: holding that federal jurisdiction over rico claims is concurrent and not exclusive 3: holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over securities act class actions 4: holding that adjustment boards have exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes under rla | [
"0",
"1",
"2",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
guided” by the jury verdict on the common law false arrest claims. Thus, the court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the § 1983 false arrest claims. We hold that the district court erred by considering the jury verdict from the common law false arrest claims in its qualified immunity analysis. Hi * * The Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Courts have emphasized that whether a § 1983 Holdings: 0: holding that questions of reasonableness depend upon the facts and circumstances the total atmosphere of the case citation omitted which must be viewed in the light of established fourth amendment principles 1: holding that beneficiary of general support trust has a legal right to compel distribution of funds internal quotation marks omitted 2: holding that qualified immunity turns upon the objective legal reasonableness of the officers action assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken internal quotation marks and citation omitted 3: holding that qualified immunity analysis begins with the court asking whether the plaintiffs allegations if true establish a constitutional violation internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding that qualified immunity applies if either a the defendants action did not violate clearly established law or b it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law internal quotation marks omitted | [
"0",
"3",
"4",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
that a grant of a plaintiffs request for a temporary restraining order may be sufficient grounds to grant attorney’s fees to the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See, e.g., LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Christopher P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 804-05 (2d Cir.1990)). In so suggesting, however, we have explicitly rejected claims for attorney’s fees where the temporary restraining order merely maintained the status quo. See, e.g., Christopher P., 915 F.2d at 805 (“[T]he procurement of a [temporary restraining order] in which the court does not address the merits of the case but simply preserves the status quo to avoid irreparable harm to the plaintiff is not by itself sufficient to give a plaintiff prevailing party status.”); cf. Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 673 (<HOLDING>); LaRouche, 20 F.3d at 74-75 (holding that “a Holdings: 0: recognizing that a private settlement without judicial imprimatur is insufficient to convey prevailing party status 1: holding that to be a prevailing party a plaintiff must obtain a judgment or judiciallyenforced consent decree a party does not prevail without a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties 2: holding that prevailing party status may be conferred by interim judicial relief that alters the parties legal relationship 3: holding that plaintiff may be entitled to prevailing party status where the mediation agreement entered into by the parties was read into the record before a hearing officer 4: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees | [
"3",
"1",
"0",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
and warranties, such as its technical requirements pertaining to internal management and accounting, could only occur intentionally. In the absence of contextual evidence of the meaning of the term “wilful” as used in the Agreement, it is too early in this litigation for a finding as to its meaning. Extrinsic evidence — that is, “evidence relating to a contract but not appearing on the face of the contract because it comes from other sources, such as statements between the parties or the circumstances surrounding the agreement” — is admissible to explain the meaning of an ambiguous term. Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. Michigan Sporting Goods Distrib., Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1058, 1071 & n. 10 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); see also Univ. of S. Ind. Found. v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ind.2006) (<HOLDING>). Discovery in this case has not yet been had. Holdings: 0: holding that court may not use extrinsic evidence unless contract language is ambiguous 1: holding that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous 2: holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous 3: holding that extrinsic evidence is permissible to interpret an ambiguous contract 4: holding that where an instrument is ambiguous all relevant extrinsic evidence may properly be considered in resolving the ambiguity | [
"1",
"2",
"0",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
issue of fact that the denial of ice demonstrated “deliberate ind ed by the refusal to give him ice. He claims that he suffered severe dehydration; an unrelenting pounding in his head brought on by migraine headaches; and a burning sensation in his throat, chest, and stomach. Thus, Plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court erred by granting summary judgment to Defendants on this claim. B. Retaliation. Plaintiff failed to introduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was sanctioned for exercising his constitutional rights to file an administrative complaint. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). The administrative complaint that Plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights 1: holding that plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum 2: holding that to prevail on a 1983 retaliation claim a prisoner must submit evidence establishing a link between the prisoners exercise of constitutional rights and the alleged retaliatory action 3: holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action 4: holding that to prevail on a 1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action | [
"0",
"1",
"4",
"3",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
CURIAM. The State appeals the trial court’s order withholding adjudication on Andrew Joseph Foster’s first-degree felony conviction. The withhold of adjudication was entered after Foster entered an open no-contest plea to the sale or possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school or child care facility. See § 402.302, Fla. Stat. (2010). Commendably, Foster concedes error, based upon the plain language of section 775.08435(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2012), which prohibits a court from withholding an adjudication of guilt upon a defendant who commits a first-degree felony, and State v. Joseph, 995 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Ketchum, 111 So.3d 197 Holdings: 0: holding that after the trial court reclassified the seconddegree felony to a firstdegree felony based on the use of a firearm and imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twentyfive years under section 775087 it was improper to impose a sentence that exceeded the thirtyyear statutory maximum penalty for firstdegree felonies under section 7750823b 1: holding that defendant truthfully stated on firearm purchase form that he had no felony convictions given the fact that adjudication of guilt was deferred and sentence suspended on his prior offense of felony receipt of a stolen car 2: recognizing that section 77508435la prohibits trial courts from withholding an adjudication of guilt on a defendant convicted of a firstdegree felony 3: holding error is not harmless when the accused is convicted of firstdegree murder on a general verdict after a trial in which premeditation and felony murder theories are espoused if the felony underlying the felony murder charge is based on a legally unsupportable theory 4: holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony | [
"3",
"4",
"0",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
must be regarded as complete until the time the petition for review is denied. Florida Star at 289. “Moreover, the denial of review ... did not operate to deprive this Court of its subject-matter jurisdiction retroactively, but merely constituted the point in time at which jurisdiction, for whatever reason, had ended.” Id. at 289. Because of the nature of our opinion in Mullins’ direct appeal (a PCA with citation to a case pending supreme court review), the Florida Supreme Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and Mullins could appropriately petition the court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. While the Florida Su s not whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction, which it does, but whether it chooses to exercise it. Cf. Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981) (<HOLDING>); Harrison v. Hyster, Co., 502 So.2d 100 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that a district court of appeal opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by the court constitutes prima facie express conflict and allows the court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction 1: holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart 2: holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction 3: holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this court 4: holding that a district court decision rendered without opinion or citation constitutes a decision from the highest state court empowered to hear the cause | [
"3",
"4",
"2",
"1",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
failure to make a showing that is “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” will mandate the entry of summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, must set forth specific facts which demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The rule requires the non-moving party to introduce “evidence of evidentiary quality” demonstrating the existence of a material fact. Bailey v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 145 (6th Cir.1997); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (<HOLDING>). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, Holdings: 0: recognizing that nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence to defeat summary judgment 1: holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances 2: holding that grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party adduces nothing more than speculation to support its claims 3: recognizing that a noevidence summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence 4: holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment | [
"3",
"0",
"2",
"1",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
first issue, the size of the disparity between those with the status alleged to be the basis of the alleged disparate impact versus those without the status must be at least twenty percent. See Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d at 1222 (noting that the EEOC “guidelines provide that a disparity of 20% or more in selection rate will be considered evidence of adverse impact in a disparate impact claim” and that “[although not controlling on courts, this guideline is persuasive”). As to the'statistical significance of the disparity, the Tenth Circuit has noted that “ ‘[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that a disparity of more than two or three standard deviations in a large sample makes ‘suspect’ the contention that the differential occurs randomly.’ ” Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d at 1223 (<HOLDING>)(quoting Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d at Holdings: 0: holding that in criminal case a continuous chain of custody need not be proven as long as the evidence as a whole establishes that it is more probable than not that the object introduced is the same as that seized 1: recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care 2: holding that ms tabors evidence was statistically significant at 2777 standard errors as to which the plaintiffs expert concluded the probability is less than 0006 that a disparity at least as large as this could occur solely as the result of chance factors if promotions were unrelated to sex 3: recognizing that although the term good cause is undefined it is at least as demanding as the excusable neglect standard 4: holding substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance and consists of such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a eonclusion | [
"0",
"3",
"4",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
in them from a standpoint of predisposition. The extensive Planning Board transcripts show that the chairman refereed an exhaustive, highly contentious Planning Board process that extended over a period of sixteen months. Although he often had difficulty keeping control over a very outspoken group of town residents opposed to the project, he nevertheless moved the process forward while following the presentations, questioning witnesses, and fairly discussing the evidence. See 5 M.R.S. § 9062(3)(C) (2007) (stating that presiding officers have the authority to “[rjegulate the course of the hearing”); Gorham, 625 A.2d at 902-03, On this record, his actions cannot be said to be the result of bias. Cf. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Finally, while the chairman’s statements to Holdings: 0: holding a party must bring a motion demonstrating prejudice or implied or actual bias if the party failed to remove the judge before trial 1: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice 2: recognizing that expressions of impatience dissatisfaction annoyance and even anger by a judge do not constitute bias or prejudice 3: holding that a trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence of pending charges and that where the defendant was given a full opportunity outside the presence of the jury to develop a foundation for bias but failed to do so the trial judge did not abuse its discretion 4: recognizing that settlement discussions do not constitute an offer of judgment | [
"4",
"0",
"3",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
. The new language states in relevant part, "The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under col- or of State law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). This language creates a right, but not a remedy, and therefore shows no Congressional intent to overrule Jett. See Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir.2000) ("[T]he section creates a right that private or state actors may violate but does not itself create a remedy for that violation.”). 7 . We may affirm a district court for any reason, including a reason not considered by the district court. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 677 (6th Cir.2005). 8 . Jones v. Bock overruled Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that a prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies even though his grievance was untimely 1: holding that the prisoner has the burden of demonstrating he has exhausted his administrative remedies in his complaint 2: holding that a texas prisoner who had not exhausted his clearly available administrative remedies was properly denied habeas relief in the district court 3: holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner 4: holding that exhaustion requirement is satisfied so long as prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to new claims asserted in an amended complaint before filing that complaint | [
"0",
"2",
"4",
"3",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir.1972); but see Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), 92 Harv.L.Rev. 470 (1978). But this reasoning does not apply at all to a partnership. A corporation is a distinct and fictional legal entity; a partnership is not distinct from its members at all. We decline, therefore, to find that the dictum to the contrary in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 409 F.Supp. 1274, 1279 (N.D. 111.1976), makes the allegation of conspiracy here frivolous. Moreover, it would be anomalous in any case to permit an entity which was established for the very purpose of engaging in a discriminatory act to be insulated, and to insulate its members, from liability as conspirators, by virtue of its establishment. See Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d at 196 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the State’s pleading that Mrs. Holdings: 0: holding to that effect with respect to rule 64 1: recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception 2: recognizing exception 3: recognizing that when the corporations management or its shareholders are deadlocked with respect to a particular issue courts have realigned such corporations as party plaintiffs 4: recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations | [
"3",
"0",
"2",
"1",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
at 173-74 (explaining the District Court retains subject matter jurisdiction to rule on such motions because they are a continuation of the criminal case); see also id. at 173 n. 11 (emphasizing that appeals of § 2255 dispositions are governed by the civil rules). However, we did not need to decide which part of Fed. R. A pp. P. 4 applied because the Thomas notice of appeal, which was filed ten days after the relevant order was entered, was timely either way. Other cases discussing miscellaneous criminal post-judgment motions like the one here yield no clear direction. Compare United States v. Davis, 532 F.2d 752, 752 (4th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (suggesting that a post-judgment transcript request was a criminal matter), with United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In any event, we will consider the merits of Holdings: 0: holding that motions under rule 60b1 may not be used to evade the time limits of rule 4a in a case with a procedural posture similar to washingtons 1: recognizing that as of july 11 1994 contempt proceedings arising from civil actions are no longer governed by rule 333 ala rcrim p and instead are governed by rule 70a 2: holding that postjudgment postcollateralrelief request for grandjury transcripts was civil in nature and governed by rule 4a 3: holding that the filed rate doctrine barred request for damages but did not preclude request for injunction and civil penalties 4: holding that constructively fraudulent transfers are governed by rule 8 | [
"0",
"3",
"1",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
of.. . expenses and attorney’s fee. On application of the employer, the court shall allow as a first lien against the amount of the judgment for damages or settlement proceeds, the amount of the employer’s expenditure for compensation, less his share of such expenses and attorney’s fee. If the action is prosecuted both by the employee and the employer ... [a]fter the payment of ... expenses and attorneys’ fees there shall be applied out of the amount of the judgment for damages, or settlement proceeds an amount sufficient to reimburse the employer for the amount of his expenditure for compensation and any excess shall be paid to the injured employee or other person entitled thereto. (Emphasis added); cf. Shimabuku v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 79 Hawai'i 352, 361, 903 P.2d 48, 57 (1995) (<HOLDING>). 3. All of the Case Authority Cited by the Holdings: 0: holding that employers insurer who provided workers compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor may maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future 1: holding employees not entitled to dismissal pursuant to section 101106f where employees failed to present the trial court with a sufficient record to satisfy their burden 2: holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury 3: holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability 4: holding inter alia that pursuant to hrs 3868 employer entitled to reimbursement from portion of employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor properly allocable to employees tort claim | [
"0",
"2",
"1",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
attack from another forum.”). Similarly, avoidance of transfers is specifically defined by statute as part of the core jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court and a matter over which the court holds exclusive jurisdiction. In this proceeding, avoidance is sought solely under a provision of the Bankruptcy Code and is a cause of action that may only exist within a bankruptcy case. As such this cause of action is within this court’s exclusive jurisdiction. See Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n v. Mathis (In re Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n), 185 B.R. 844, 847 (Bankr.D.Colo.1995) (finding that an action under Section 549 was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court); General Instrument Corp. v. Financial & Business Services, Inc. (In re Finley), 62 B.R. 361, 368 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1986) (<HOLDING>). As to the cause of action asserted for breach Holdings: 0: holding the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings 1: holding that federal jurisdiction over rico claims is concurrent and not exclusive 2: holding that claims under 11 usc 362h must be brought in the bankruptcy court rather than in the district court which only has appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases 3: holding that bankruptcy court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over related case after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case 4: holding that bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over recovery of preferences and fraudulent conveyances | [
"2",
"0",
"1",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Covenant Coal Corp., 977 F.2d 895, 897 (4th Cir.1992) (“The majority of courts to address the issue have refused to construe section 301 in such a way as to allow [tortious interference claims against non-signatories.]”); Carpenters Local Union No. 1816 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 501 (5th Cir.1982) (“[CJourts have almost unanimously held that a section 301 suit may be brought for violation of a labor contract only against those who are parties to the contract at issue.”). Although there are some variations in phrasing, the circuits are almost unanimous in rejecting LMRA jurisdiction over a claim such as Granite Rock’s claim against IBT. See Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 572 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Covenant Coal, 977 F.2d at 897 (declining to Holdings: 0: holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under 1981 1: holding that in order for a claim to be reasonably ascertainable the debtor must have in his possession at the very least some specific information that reasonably suggests both the claim for which the debtor may be liable and the entity to whom he would be liable 2: holding that at a minimum the defendant must have breached some duty created by a labor contract to be liable for a violation under section 301a 3: holding that insurer was liable for amount in excess of policy limits because it breached its duty to defend 4: holding that question of whether defendant breached duty under applicable safety statutes was not one for experts | [
"3",
"1",
"0",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
this is a distinction without a difference. The DOT clearly argued to the jury that the evidence of such consideration defined the amount of any business losses. 3 Although the DOT argues that other evidence in the record could have supported the jury’s verdict, there is no way to determine what effect the irrelevant evidence regarding the Assignment may have played in its deliberations based on the DOT’s arguments in the case. Additionally, we find that the trial court made another evidentiary error, as addressed below, which may have improperly affected the parties’ presentation of evidence and argument at trial. 4 “Admissions in judicio apply only to facts in litigation in a particular case.” Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Diamond, 231 Ga. 321, 323 (III) (201 SE2d 400) (1973) (<HOLDING>). 5 That Lovein made this affirmative agreement Holdings: 0: holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client 1: holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award 2: holding that attorneys statement in prior litigation that if his client won that case she would make no further claims on estate at issue were not admissions in judicio 3: holding that admissions purportedly made by an accused by way of his agents or attorneys in pleadings from a civil case are not admissible in a criminal case unless shown to have been authorized by him 4: holding that attorneys acts within scope of his authority are binding on client | [
"3",
"1",
"4",
"0",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
it returns a special verdict.” Williams v. Warden, 422 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir.2003)). 6 . Under Nevada law, in cases imposing the death penalty the jury must return a "written verdict.” Nev.Rev.Stat. § 175.554(4) ("If a jury imposes a sentence of death, the jury shall render a written verdict signed by the foreman.”). 7 . The parties may poll the jury in order "to ascertain for a certainty that each of the jurors approves of the verdict as returned.” Humphries v. Dist. of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194, 19 S.Ct. 637, 43 L.Ed. 944 (1899). Such a poll exists primarily to dispel uncertainty about the jury's verdict. See, e.g., Nelson, 692 F.2d at 84-85; United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 746 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). 8 . If the sentence is death, however, the Holdings: 0: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting multiple polls of jury where none of the jurors expressed uncertainty or disagreement about the verdict 2: holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias 3: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction 4: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented | [
"4",
"2",
"3",
"0",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
621-622 (Tex. 1993). To be extreme and outrageous, conduct must be “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” Mattix-Hill v. Reck, 923 S.W.2d 596, 597 (Tex.1996) (quoting Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621). Distress is considered severe only if it is so severe “that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Benavides v. Moore, 848 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied). Severe emotional distress does not include mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Regan v. Lee, 879 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). See also GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous and Holdings: 0: recognizing that texas courts narrowly construe the intentional infliction of emotional distress doctrine 1: recognizing the same rule in texas courts 2: recognizing courts obligation to construe meaning of relatives 3: holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3 4: recognizing scotts admonition to construe the classbased animus requirement narrowly | [
"4",
"2",
"3",
"1",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
the JOC procurement in order to maintain its viability in Italy.” PL’s Mot. 30. Mr. Hagner explained that BBSSI’s exclusion from the JOC competition has impacted its financial viability in Italy, as well as its “ability to operate elsewhere,” thereby requiring BBSSI to undertake administrative changes to ensure that it can remain competitive and can maintain oversight and control over its existing contracts. Hagner Deck ¶ 15; see also id. (noting that “there is no real prospect for alternatives for this kind of work on the market in Italy”). BBSSI’s loss of work flow and dependency upon the work encompassed by the JOC solicitation in order to maintain its viability in Italy constitute irreparable injuries. See Cardinal Maint. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 98, 110 (2004) (<HOLDING>); accord PGBA, LLC v. United States, 57 Fed.Cl. Holdings: 0: holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury 1: recognizing that a party suffers irreparable injury when it loses the opportunity to compete on a level playing field with other bidders wjhen a plaintiff shows that it was excluded from the bidding process perhaps solely because of the governments improper conduct the plaintiff has satisfied requirement for irreparable injury 2: holding that where the uncontradicted evidence shows that a former employee is working for a direct competitor no finding of irreparable injury is necessary to support a permanent injunction to protect trade secrets because irreparable injury is established as a matter of law 3: holding that lost opportunity to compete on level playing field is sufficient to establish irreparable harm 4: holding that loss of the opportunity to fairly compete for a contract constitutes irreparable harm | [
"0",
"3",
"4",
"2",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
violence. 7 . As an alternative to our holding in Sutton that the principal on the facts alleged could not be liable for his “direct participation in enhancing the danger” to the child, we held the principal could be liable on those same facts for his inaction in failing “to adequately train school employees or adopt or implement a policy to prevent sexual assaults like those against [the child].” Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1238-39. This approach to the principal's accountability might well have succeeded under a theory of supervisory liability, if the mother first was able to establish an underlying constitutional violation on the part of the teacher's aide or other state actor. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Morris v. Lanpher, 563 F.3d 399, 403 (8th Holdings: 0: holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation 1: holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity 2: recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot 3: holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime 4: holding that if a police officer inflicted no constitutional injury on a suspect it is inconceivable that the police commissioners could be liable to the suspect | [
"1",
"3",
"2",
"0",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
565 F.2d at 621; Columbus and G. Ry., 153 F.2d at 196. 19 .See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line, 275 U.S. at 257, 48 S.Ct. at 107; Merchants Fast Motor Lines v. ICC, 5 F.3d 911 (5th Cir.1993); Roberts, 921 F.2d at 804; California Trucking, 900 F.2d at 208; Middlewest, 867 F.2d at 458; Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d at 1546; Swift Textiles, 799 F.2d at 697; Baird v. Wagoner Transp. Co., 425 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1970); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil, 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1969); Long Beach Banana Distributors v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 407 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir.1969); Shew v. Southland Corp., 370 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1966); Johnsen, 889 P.2d at 853. 20 . For example, in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403, 27 S.Ct. 360, 51 L.Ed. 540 (1907), the Supreme Cour .1948) (<HOLDING>); Georgia Textile, 556 S.E.2d at 850 ("Delivery Holdings: 0: holding shipments from a distribution point supplied by outofstate shipments made pursuant to preexisting orders were interstate in character 1: holding that the halt of shipments of unprocessed milk without processing or commingling did not remove the interstate character of the shipments 2: holding that the time appliances were at a distribution center within the state did not break the continuity of interstate movement the subsequent delivery from the distribution center was the last phase in the interstate shipment 3: holding that warehouse distributions to companyowned stores constituted interstate commerce since inter alia the company knew at the time oufiofstate shipments to the warehouse commenced that the shipments were bound for its retail stores 4: holding that interstate shipments to a warehousedistribution point through to samestate retail outlets retained their interstate character where the warehouse was merely a convenient instrumentality for the division of the shipments coming to it and the continuation of the movement of each part to the retail stores | [
"0",
"3",
"1",
"2",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
court’s jurisdiction to sit as an appellate court is very limited. For instance, the circuit court has true appellate jurisdiction to review state administrative agency determinations, see Code §§ 2.2-4026 and 17.1-513, and, arguably, a conviction of summary contempt in a district court. See Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222, 657 S.E.2d 474 (2008). However, in criminal cases, the General Assembly has not provided any authorization that would permit a circuit court to review a district court’s discretionary decision ending a prosecution. Without such an express grant, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the district court’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Nicely v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 327, 333-34, 477 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we conclude that Wright was not Holdings: 0: holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court 1: holding that the circuit courts have no appellate jurisdiction over a general district courts review of an administrative license suspension in the absence of any statutory authority vesting them with such jurisdiction 2: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 3: holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart 4: holding appellate courts have jurisdiction over the district courts orders rejecting as a matter of law qualified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss | [
"4",
"2",
"3",
"0",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
Opinion by: STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice. Charles Anthony Allen, Jr. appeals the order dismissing his case for failure to plead a case within the jurisdictional limits of the district court. We reverse and remand. BACKGROUND Allen is an inmate housed in the Dalhart Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDJC”). Allen filed suit against Kimberly Nunez, FNU Garza, and George Barrera, employees of TDJC pp.-Tyler 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). This court has not previously ruled on this Holdings: 0: holding that despite 1985 amendments minimum jurisdictional amount remains 50000 1: holding university owed no duty to family members of a decedent who donated his remains to dispose of the remains in a particular manner 2: holding that almendareztorres remains the law after apprendi 3: holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional 4: holding unconstitutional taketitle provision of the lowlevel radioactive waste policy amendments act of 1985 | [
"3",
"1",
"2",
"4",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice. Actual malice means knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the falsify of a statement. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 706 (1964). Lawyers who make derogatory remarks about judges are similarly protected from civil or criminal liability unless actual malice is shown. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125, 132 (1964). However, these principles only offer immunity from a civil suit for damages, not from other forms of discipline. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, 142 (1976). The First Amendment does not afford protection to the utterer for all statements made. See e.g. Spivey, 345 N.C. at 414-15, 480 S.E.2d at 698-99 (<HOLDING>). Judge Hobgood’s order contained the following Holdings: 0: holding police officer is a public official 1: holding that a subcontractors lack of a license under the act does not bar a claim for indemnity or contribution by the contractor in a suit by the homeowner against the contractor because the public policy embodied in the act and berenter is to protect the public not unlicensed contractors 2: holding that the first amendment does not protect the use of racial invective by a public official against a member of the public in a bar 3: holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege 4: holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president | [
"1",
"3",
"4",
"0",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
because the pistol found in his apartment was inoperable. Irving contends that because it was inoperable, the gun was relevant only to show propensity, which is impermissible. Alternatively, Irving contends that any probative value was outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. The government argues that the gun, although inoperable, tended to show that Irving was willing and intended to execute the plan to kill Watson. In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the pistol into evidence. Irving's possession of the pistol tended to establish that he thought he was able to carry out the plan to kill Watson, and therefore that he intended to conspire to kill Watson and obstruct justice. See Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 710, 712 (D.C.1977) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the gun turned out to be Holdings: 0: holding that police officers testimony as to the victims prior inconsistent statements made to him on day of the alleged crime were not admissible as substantive evidence and could not be used to support a finding of guilt 1: holding that defendants prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt and is therefore admissible 2: holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendants credibility and not for determining guilt 3: holding that an indictment is sufficient as long as it fully and clearly sets out the crime and the elements of the offense even if the evidence consists of proof of other means of committing the same crime 4: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt | [
"4",
"2",
"3",
"0",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). We must determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact such that a trial is necessary, and whether the district court properly applied the substantive law. See id. While we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, a mere scintilla of evidence or some “metaphysical doubt as to material facts” will not suffice to defeat summary judgment. See Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.1995). Finally, we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Scribner’s summary judgment motion as well as its grant of summary judgment to World-Com. See, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs. Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 693-94 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). B. The Meaning of the Word “Cause” We must Holdings: 0: holding that party may not appeal summary judgment in favor of opponent when grounds opposing summary judgment asserted on appeal were not raised before trial court 1: holding that a district court may not grant summary judgment without giving plaintiff an opportunity to submit materials admissible in a summary judgment proceeding or allowing a hearing on defendants motion 2: holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court 3: holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion 4: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable | [
"0",
"1",
"4",
"2",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
We find merit in one of Gary’s claims and reverse as to it. We affirm the trial court’s order in all other respects without comment. Gary asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instruction on attempted burglary, which Gary contends was “ambiguous, vague and unconstitutional.” Specifically, Gary asserts that the instruction combined an attempted burglary instruction with an attempt to commit a crime instruction and produced a hybrid instruction of attempt to commit attempted burglary. He contends that this hybrid instruction confused the jury and shifted the burden of persuasion onto him for some of the elements of the crime. We find this to be a facially sufficient claim for relief. See Yarbrough v. State, 599 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>). The trial court denied' relief on the basis Holdings: 0: holding where defendant challenged jury instruction and also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his counsels failure to object to instruction because we find no error in the instructions defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must also be rejected 1: holding appellant made facially sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where he asserted counsel failed to object to jury instructions which improperly combined elements of separate offenses 2: holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel 3: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims | [
"3",
"4",
"0",
"2",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
or bigamy, shall be deemed infamous, and shall forever thereafter be rendered incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit, of voting at any election, of serving as a juror, and of giving testimony in this Territory. The Statute Laws of the Territory of Iowa, Code of Criminal Jurisprudence, Tenth Div., § 109, at 182 (1839). The 1839 statute provides us with a limited window into some specific understanding of the meaning of “infamous crimefs]” of the day. Of course, like Iowa Code section 39.3(8) (2013) today, this statute is not a constitutional test. See Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 780 (concluding an 1843 Indiana statute enumerating nine infamous crimes was not a present-day constitutional test); see also Green v. City of Cascade, 231 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1975) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the judgment captured by the Holdings: 0: recognizing that while we give respectful consideration to the legislatures understanding of constitutional language we are the final arbiter of the meaning of the iowa constitution 1: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 2: holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning 3: holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent 4: recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims | [
"1",
"3",
"4",
"2",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
a Section 15(d) violation based on Section 104 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the test for aiding and abettor liability for Section 10(b) violations); Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C.Cir.2000) (identifying three principal elements to establish liability for aiding and abetting a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation as “(1) that a principal committed a primary violation; (2) that the aider and abettor provided substantial assistance to the primary violator; and (3) that the aider and abettor had the necessary ‘scienter’ .... ”); accord SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir.1979) (recognizing aiding and abetting liability under Sections 10(b), 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 310, 316 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (<HOLDING>). The first prong of the aider and abettor test Holdings: 0: recognizing aiding and abetting conversion 1: recognizing aiding and abetting trespass 2: recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion 3: holding corporate director liable for aiding and abetting violations of exchange act sections 14a 13a and rules 13al and 13a13 because he provided assistance and encouragement to conduct patently in violation of the securities laws 4: holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting | [
"4",
"1",
"2",
"0",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
the charged offense.” Id. at 593. The functional equivalence test is “synonymous with the concepts of ‘necessary inclusion’ or ‘subsumption of elements.’ ” Id. at 588 n. 15 (quoting Evans v. State, 299 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)); see Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 535 (stating that “the elements of the lesser offense do not have to be pleaded [in the indictment] if they can be deduced from the facts alleged in the indictment”). In applying the “functional-equivalence” concept to the offenses of burglary and trespass, this Court has previously held that a burglary indictment’s failure to plead that a defendant had notice that entry into a habitation was forbidden did not preclude him from being entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction on criminal trespass. Day, 532 S.W.2d at 306 (<HOLDING>). In Day, this Court explained that, even Holdings: 0: holding that failure to instruct on trespass as a lesserincluded offense three steps removed from armed burglary of a dwelling was harmless because the jury did not exercise its pardon power by finding defendant guilty of any of the lesserincluded offenses one and two steps removed 1: holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary 2: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary 3: holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on trespass as a lesser included offense of breaking and entering because appellant failed to advise the court which of the numerous trespass statutes he considered to be lesser included to the offense charged 4: holding that the offense of criminal trespass is a lesserincluded offense of all three types of burglary and stating generally that the elements of criminal trespass including notice could be established by proof of the same facts necessary to prove the offense of burglary | [
"2",
"3",
"0",
"1",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
a party from prosecuting two actions for the same cause and against the same party, is tantamount to making the defendant with a compulsory counterclaim in the first action a ‘plaintiff in that action (for purposes of § 6-5-440) as of the time of its commencement. See, e.g., Ex parte Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine Constr. Corp., 658 So.2d 414 (Ala.1995); Penick v. Cado Systems of Cent. Alabama, Inc., 628 So.2d 598 (Ala.1993); Ex parte Canal Ins. Co., 534 So.2d 582 (Ala.1988). Thus, the defendant subject to the counterclaim rule who commences another action has violated the prohibition in § 6-5-440 against maintaining two actions for the same cause.” Ex parte Breman Lake View Resort, L.P., 729 So.2d 849, 851 (Ala.1999). See also University of South Alabama Found., 788 So.2d at 165 (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine Holdings: 0: holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine 1: holding that the prosecution in a subsequent action of claims that had been compulsory counterclaims in a previously filed declaratoryjudgment action violated 65440 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc 1367a 3: holding that federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear case notwithstanding rookerfeldman doctrine where plaintiff filed federal suit while certiorari petition to new mexico supreme court was pending in similar state court action 4: holding that a party in an action pending in a federal court was subject to the counterclaim rule and thus violated 65440 by commencing another action in a state court | [
"3",
"0",
"1",
"2",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
case law interpreting that section. Section § 16(b) defines as a crime of violence “any ... offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (emphasis added). Positing a hypothetical manner in which the unlawful imprisonment of a competent adult could be accomplished by deception and without the use of force thus does not necessarily exclude the unlawful imprisonment statute from the scope of § 16 — our inquiry under § 16(b) is broader and more flexible, and involves asking whether the crime is one that by its nature involves a substantial risk that force may be used. Cf. Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 175-76 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We hold that in any case in which a competent Holdings: 0: holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense 1: holding that the term indecent act required no further definition 2: holding that a petitioners conviction for indecent assault and battery under massachusetts law constituted a crime of violence because any offense under the state statute was by definition nonconsensual and thus any violation of the statute by its nature presents a substantial risk that force may be used to overcome the victims lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching 3: holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same 4: holding that the state felony offense of taking indecent liberties with a child categorically constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender sentencing guidelines | [
"1",
"0",
"3",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
on the basis of Ms. Nicastro’s apparent or ratified authority fails. C. Defendant’s Termination of the CBA Defendant contends that even if the CBA is valid and enforceable, it was termi nated by Bentz’s failure to sign the renewal assent in 1994, or, in the alternative, by Bentz’s March 1996 letter to the Funds. We find Defendant’s argument to be without merit for two reasons. First, Bentz’s actions did not constitute termination of the CBA according to its explicit terms. Second, the Third Circuit only recognizes three distinct defenses to actions by benefit funds for e h “Evergreen Clauses” requiring written notice are not terminated absent compliance with the terms of the contract. See, e.g., Local 257, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Grimm, 786 F.2d 342, 345-46 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Central States, Southeast, and Southwest Holdings: 0: holding that noncompliance with terms of agreement did not terminate agreement failure to comply with date requirement in termination procedure rendered termination ineffective and letter between nonparty and party could not terminate agreement 1: holding that an agreement providing this agreement when signed by author and publisher will cancel and supercede the previous agreements was clearly intended to terminate an earlier agreement 2: holding that where one party had received a written agreement and conformed his conduct to that agreement for an extended period of time but failed to sign the agreement he was equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement 3: holding franchisor could not arbitrarily terminate franchise agreement as it would be a disregard of franchisees interests under the agreement 4: holding that a complaint for interference with a collective bargaining agreement against a nonparty to that agreement is not actionable under 301a of the lmra | [
"1",
"3",
"4",
"2",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
could have supported a conclusion by the finder of fact that the mother also abused cocaine during this time. Illegal drug use in violation of the court’s order in this circumstance endangered DJ.W.’s emotional well-being because it increased the risk that his relationship with his biological mother would be permanently severed. See Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617-18. Drug use that significantly impairs a parent’s ability care for a child jeopardizes the child’s physical and emotional well-being. We hold that the evidence in this case was legally sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that the mother engaged in conduct that endangered D.J.W.’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam.Code ANN. § 161.001(1)(E); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (<HOLDING>). With respect to the mother’s Holdings: 0: holding prior drug deals admissible to prove knowledge of the drug trade 1: holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy 2: holding that evidence of admitted drug use before the birth of the children missed drug tests after removal of children and a failed drug test between removal and the final hearing established legal sufficiency of evidence to show endangerment under section 1610011e 3: holding that evidence of continued drug use after pregnancy may be conduct which endangers a childs wellbeing under section 1610011e 4: holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators | [
"1",
"3",
"0",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
of Ormond Beach, 383 So.2d at 672, the court recognized that a transfer of powers did not occur where both entities operated separate library systems, “the County established a county-wide unified library system in which all cities then operating libraries joined, except Ormond Beach. The cities which joined lost their authority to manage the library function and to make financial decisions regarding library affairs.” Ormond Beach claimed that allowing the county to assume library function in its city, where the city “has not requested the County to assume it and therefore a county tax on city property is improper.” Id. The Fifth District recognized that the trial court, in that case, correctly held that no transfer of powers occurred. Id.; see also Barms, 390 So.2d at 1189 (Fla.1980) (<HOLDING>). Here, although County’s goal may well be to Holdings: 0: recognizing that a sheriff contracting for services with a municipality is clearly different from a municipality transferring or contracting away the authority to supervise and control its police powers to the county government 1: holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority 2: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim 3: holding notice of the defect actual or constructive and a failure to act on the part of the municipality to remedy the situation are prerequisites to recovery in an action involving a municipality 4: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim | [
"3",
"4",
"1",
"2",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
parole. Appellant argues that he was denied due process because the hearing was postponed twice; he was found guilty of a disciplinary violation with which he was not charged in the incident report; and the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. The district court dismissed pursuant to Rules 1(b) and 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, on the ground that the petitioner failed to show how either conviction for a code violation not listed in the incident report or the eight day delay prejudiced him in his ability to defend the disciplinary charge. The petitioner has failed to present sufficient facts to support his claim of denial of due process. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir.1984). Appellant doe l.1987) (<HOLDING>). Nor does appellant assert that the officer’s Holdings: 0: holding that even if the prison disciplinary committee failed to follow a state administrative regulation requiring the committee to convene within eight calendar days after commission of prison offense or its discovery the noncompliance did not of itself violate due process 1: holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process 2: holding that a prison disciplinary committee violated inmates rights to procedural due process by refusing to call their witnesses even though the disciplinary hearing took place in the aftermath of a riot and the resulting disciplinary caseload was ex tremely heavy 3: holding that prison disciplinary hearing committee members are entitled to qualified immunity 4: holding that due process requires that the findings and actions of a disciplinary prison board be supported by some evidence in the record | [
"4",
"2",
"1",
"3",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
evaluation. While the amount respondent would receive and the appropriate evaluation criteria remained questions of fact, respondent’s right to the undetermined amount' vested as of July 1, 2002, the day after the expiration of the 2001- contract. Therefore, respondent’s 2001-2002 bonus was owing prior to his termination. As president of the company, respondent’s services contributed to appellant’s profitability, and appellant received the benefit of respondent’s work product. The record reflects that, in this instance, respondent’s bonus was nondiscretionary and actually earned at the time of his discharge. We note that other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutory language have reached the same conclusion. See Rohr v. Ted Neiters Motor Co., 758 P.2d 186, 188 (Colo.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>); Cap Gemini Am., Inc. v. Judd, 597 N.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a former employee was not entitled to recover a yearend bonus from his former employer where no definite sum of money or percentage of profits was promised and where the employee left the company before the end of the fiscal year in question 1: holding that a bonus calculated based on a percentage of the companys profits was a wage under colorados wagepenalty statute because the bonus was vested and determinable as of the date of termination was disproportionately large in comparison to the employees salary and was owed as compensation for services performed by the employee 2: holding that the computation of an incentive bonus based on work done was a wage reasoning that wages include not only periodic monetary earnings but also the other benefits to which he is entitled as part of his compensation 3: holding under indiana law that profits are not wages and neither is a fraction of profits wages and so a bonus that is based on the performance of a plant rather than on the time or determinable output of the employee is not wages either 4: holding that an employers promise to pay a bonus to an employee was not enforceable where the employee was already obligated under a written contract to perform the services in question | [
"2",
"4",
"3",
"0",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
tests, and (3) the aggravated portion of the DWI charge should be dismissed because the breathalyzer test was taken more than an hour and a half after Defendant was driving and registered .16, the exact reading required to raise DWI to the aggravated level. The State concedes that, under the circumstances of this case, in which the officer testified that there was no way of knowing what Defendant’s blood alcohol content was at the time of driving, a rational juror could not find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to raise the DWI to an aggravated level. We agree and therefore reverse and remand for entry of judgment for simple DWI unless one of Defendant’s other issues results in reversal. See State v. Cavanaugh, 116 N.M. 826, 829-30, 867 P.2d 1208, 1211-12 (Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). We hold that Defendant’s other issues do not Holdings: 0: holding that the fourth amendment is implicated by the withdrawal of blood to test its alcohol content 1: holding that blood alcohol content almost 30 over the limit together with testimony of intoxication at the time of driving was sufficient to convict contrasting a case in which the blood alcohol content was just barely over the limit which was insufficient to convict 2: holding a warrantless blood test reasonable due to bloods rapid loss of its alcohol content 3: holding that in order to convict a defendant of dui under subsection 3802b the commonwealth cannot rely on the blood serum analysis alone it must introduce evidence of alcohol by weight in terms of whole blood 4: holding blood testing for alcohol content a search | [
"4",
"2",
"3",
"0",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
pursuing an alibi defense. The Court finds Respondent’s arguments to be without merit. The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), qualifies as “clearly established federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Thus, if Petitioner can show that the Michigan courts adjudicated his failure to investigate claim in a manner contrary to Strickland, he is entitled to habeas relief. To be successful on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Strickland requires that two elements be proven. First, a petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 278 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). To prove a deficiency, a petitioner must show Holdings: 0: holding on the basis of the highly discretionary nature of the decisions hud must make in the course of administering loans it has insured or taken by assignment that judicial review of huds decision to foreclose should be deferential 1: holding that strict scrutiny applies 2: recognizing scrutiny on statutory grounds stated in 10a and scrutiny for whether the award evinces a manifest disregard of applicable law 3: holding that judicial scrutiny of attorney performance must be highly deferential 4: holding that regardless of the parties agreement to the contrary district courts must review an arbitrators findings of fact and conclusions of law under the highly deferential standard set forth in 9 usc 10a | [
"2",
"0",
"1",
"4",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
Montana Constitution provides that “[i]n all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts.” Mont. Const, art. II, § 7. The Knievels interpret this provision to mean that they are entitled to a jury trial because they have a “special constitutional right in a libel and slander case in Montana” that guarantees them their “fair day in court.” But Montana’s highest court, which we are bound to follow, interprets the provision differently. The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the ability of judges to dispose of defamation claims where there are no issues of fact warranting a jury trial. Hale v. City of Billings, 295 Mont. 495, 986 P.2d 413, 418 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Small v. McRae, 200 Mont. 497, 651 P.2d 982, Holdings: 0: holding that pure issue of law is preserved by motion for summary judgment and is reviewable after final judgment 1: holding that if there is any issue of fact which remains upon a motion for summary judgment the motion must be denied 2: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 3: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 4: holding that whether a statement is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning is an issue that a court can and should rightfully determine upon a motion for summary judgment | [
"0",
"2",
"1",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
(“FmHA”) administered these loans. See Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358 F.3d 694, 701 (10th Cir.2004) ("Pittsburg County”). Since 1994, however, the Department of Agriculture has operated this loan program, see id. at 701 n. 1, through its Rural Utilities Service. See Rural Water Dist. No. 1. Ellsworth County v. City of Wilson, 243 F.3d 1263, 1269 n. 3 (10th Cir.2001) (citing 7 C.F.R. § 1780.3). 2 . In 1987, the USDA sold the first four of these loans to Community Program Loan Trust 1987A, a special purpose Massachusetts business trust. That fact, however, does not affect the questions we certify here to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Moongate Water Co. v. Butterfield Park Mut. Domestic Water Ass’n, 291 F.3d 1262, 1265-67 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Sequoyah County Rural Water Dist. Holdings: 0: holding that a creditor for advances or loans in money made to the owner and applied to the use of a vessel has no privilege allowed him by law because he is not subrogated to the rights of those whose privileged claims have been paid out of the money loaned 1: holding that a defendants goodfaith belief that he intended to repay the loans he procured through misrepresentation was not a defense to wire fraud 2: holding that under minnesota law refinancing and consolidation of purchase money loans did not destroy their purchase money character for bankruptcy lien avoidance purposes 3: holding that 523a8 may apply to nonstudent comakers of educational loans 4: holding transfer of usda loans to private lenders did not extinguish a rural water districts indebted on those loans for purposes of 1926b | [
"1",
"2",
"0",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
Individual Complaint, the cover letter was dated August 3, 2000, and the return receipt form indicated that the certified mail was received by “Katie” on August 4, 2000. The magistrate judge ruled that the handwritten date on the Notice was in all likelihood a transcription error, in light of the extrinsic evidence attesting to the Notice’s delivery on August 4 — and, moreover, that there was a presumption in favor of delivery of letters that were properly addressed, stamped, and mailed, particularly when the letter had been sent via certified mail. Slip op. at 12-13 (citing C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 343 (5th ed.1999), and Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Schaffer, 731 F.2d 1134, 1137 (4th Cir.1984)); cf. id. at 15 (citing Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>)). Here, the magistrate judge pointed out, Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 1: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 2: holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action 3: holding that limitations period begins to run on date notice was received at claimants residence even if claimant did not receive it until a later date 4: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court | [
"2",
"4",
"1",
"0",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
that: All nonconforming outdoor advertising signs shall be discontinued or made conforming (amortized) within five and one-half (5lA) years from the effective date of this ordinance ([October 23, 1983]), unless explicitly prohibited by State Statute. (Emphasis added). 8 . The sixteen signs located along federal highway systems, while exempt from the removal requirement, still remained “nonconforming uses” subject to the ordinance’s other restrictions, such as the prohibitions on reconstructing damaged nonconforming signs, moving existing nonconforming signs to new locations on their lots, or building more such signs along the federal highway systems. Compare National Advertising Co. v. Bradshaw, 48 N.C.App. 10, 268 S.E.2d 816, appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 400, 273 S.E.2d 446 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 9 . A facial takings attack is a claim that Holdings: 0: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 1: holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state 2: holding illegal nationals reconstruction of sign deemed nonconforming under state statute and located along federal highway system where sign was more than 50 percent destroyed by wind 3: holding plaintiff entitled to replace ment value of gold leaf professional sign located in the window of his leased law office when defendants intentionally destroyed it 4: holding that the validity of releases under the federal employers liability act was a question to be determined by federal rather than state law | [
"0",
"3",
"1",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
the proposition that “[statutes affecting remedies” should, be given retroactive effect. 1996 SD 98, ¶ 72, 552 N.W.2d at 608. In Tischler, we defined remedial statutes as those statutes “that describe methods for enforcing, processing, administering, or determining rights, liabilities, or status.” Id. On the other hand, “[a] law is substantive- if it creates rights, duties, and obligations.” 2 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Con struction, § 41.09 (6th Ed 2001). After reviewing the statute in question and considering the nature of liquor licenses, we believe the penalty provision at issue in this case to be substantive rather than procedural. [¶ 13.] In Rushmore State Bank v. Ku-rylas, Inc., this Court explored the status of liquor licenses in South Dakota. 424 N.W.2d 649 (S.D.1988) (<HOLDING>). In Kurylas, we concluded that “as between the Holdings: 0: holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing 1: holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted 2: holding inter alia that a creditor may take a security interest in a licensees liquor license 3: holding that a tax credit to liquor licensees against taxes owed to the state was an unconstitutional subsidy of the liquor industry 4: holding that a county liquor license board had no standing to appeal the reversal of its decision | [
"4",
"1",
"0",
"3",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
See Lantzy, 558 Pa. at 228, 736 A.2d at 572-73. The order of the Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of Appellant’s entitlement to pursue a direct appeal. 1 . The traditional requirements for relief pertaining to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel mandate that the petitioner establish actual prejudice (in terms of undermining confidence in the outcome of his trial), as well as the arguable merit of the underlying claim and an absence of some reasonable strategy on counsel’s part in terms of the act or omission resulting in the underlying claim not having been previously advanced or vindicated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-60, 527 A.2d 973, 975-77 (1987). 2 . On consideration of an order denying post-convictio 994) (<HOLDING>); Bonneau v. United States, 961 F.2d 17, 23 Holdings: 0: holding that the complete denial of counsel on direct appeal requires a finding of prejudice 1: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 2: holding that a notice of appeal filed when an appeal bond is required to perfect is a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the court of appeals dismissal was improper without first affording an opportunity to correct the defective perfection of appeal 3: holding that prejudice should be presumed where counsel filed notice of appeal but failed to perfect the direct appeal 4: holding that where counsel has failed to file or perfect an appeal despite the defendants request it is clear that the defendant need not demonstrate that but for the ineffectiveness of counsel such an appeal would have succeeded or even would have merit | [
"1",
"4",
"0",
"2",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In finding DNA collection statutes constitutional, courts routinely focus on the government’s interest in creating a permanent identification record of convicted felons for law enforcement purposes. E.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.2007) (concluding that “government’s important interests in monitoring and rehabilitating supervised releasees, solving crimes, and exonerating innocent individuals outweigh Weikert’s privacy interests, given his status as a supervised releasee, the relatively minimal inconvenience occasioned by a blood draw, and the coding of genetic information that, by statute, may be used only for purposes of identification”); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 Holdings: 0: holding that routine monitoring and recording of the calls of convicted prisoners does not violate the prisoners fourth amendment rights 1: holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells 2: holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells 3: holding that georgias legitimate interest in creating a permanent identification record of convicted felons for law enforcement purposes outweighs the minor intrusion involved in taking prisoners saliva samples and storing their dna profiles given prisoners reduced expectation of privacy in their identities 4: holding that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells | [
"0",
"2",
"4",
"1",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
the insured as of the date of the casualty and subsequent events may be significant in determining the insured’s interest.” DeBellis, 77 N.J. at 436, 390 A.2d 1171 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court found that plaintiff DeBellis had not been made whole by the redemption and that allowing the carrier to pay nothing created a windfall for the carrier. Id. at 437-38, 390 A.2d 1171. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that DeBellis’s interest in the property “was equivalent to at least the amount expended for that interest some three months before the fire” plus 20% interest plus partial refund of the premium for the period after title reverted to the redeeming Teeds. Id. at 438. See also Miller v. N.J. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 82 N.J. 594, 598-99, 414 A.2d 1322 (1980) (<HOLDING>) The Miller court reiterated: With respect to Holdings: 0: holding that two claimants separate cases who had lost title to property through in rem tax foreclosure which properties were destroyed by fire postforeclosure retained an insurable interest in the property under their insurance contracts the claimants continued to occupy the properties ignorant of the tax foreclosures 1: holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit 2: holding that property interest in continued expectation of public employment does not include right to actually occupy position 3: holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire 4: holding that buyers of real property who were in constructive possession of the property had made a down payment and had signed a contract to purchase at the time of the loss had an insurable interest in the property despite a court determination two years after the loss that the agreement to purchase was not binding | [
"3",
"4",
"2",
"1",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
adjustment is warranted. Second, Defendant argues that the Court should find the fee request unreasonable in light of the amount of attorneys’ fees Plaintiff requested in his settlement letter. It is questionable if the letter is even relevant to the Court’s determination. Despite claiming that “weight of authority” allows the Court to look at the settlement letter, Defendant cited no controlling law on point. (Defendant’s Surreply, at 2.) In fact, the only case cited from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the admission of evidence of settlement negotiations for the purpose of establishing the unreasonableness of Plaintiffs counsels request for fees. See Gaffney v. Allentown, Civ. A. No. 97-445, 1998 WL 32758, *1, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 242, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Jan.7, 1998) (<HOLDING>). Second, even if the Court considers the Holdings: 0: holding that defendant has failed to provide any support for the novel argument that plaintiff should be denied fees because in defendants view plaintiffs counsel acted unreasonably in failing to accept defendants settlement offer and that consideration of settlement discussions on a motion for attorneys fees is barred by federal rule of evidence 408 1: holding that federal rule of evidence 408 prohibits admission of such evidence for purpose of establishing unreasonableness of plaintiffs counsels request for fees 2: holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper 3: holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: holding that evidence of settlement may be considered under rule 408 when reviewing a motion for sanctions | [
"4",
"0",
"2",
"3",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
court, Randolph and Kelley sued the appellees reflected in the style of this case, and Wayne Dolcefino, KTRK Television. Inc., C C Texas Holding Co., Inc., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., Henry Florsheim, and David Gwizdowski. The trial court granted the ap-pellees’ motion in this case for Rule 13 sanctions and struck appellants' claims in their Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amended Petitions against Jackson Walker and Bleisch, and dismissed those claims with prejudice. Thereafter, the trial court severed appellants’ claims against Jackson Walker and Bleisch into the “A” trial court cause number reflected above. That severance made the interlocutory judgment granting sanctions and dismissing claims final and appealable. See Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). In addition, on the same day as the Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in severing defendants counterclaim after summary judgment was granted as to plaintiffs claim 1: holding trial court may make a judgment final for purposes of appeal by severing the causes and parties disposed of by the judgment into a different cause 2: holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal 3: holding a judgment of a district court does not become final by appeal within the meaning of the statute providing for registration of such judgments in another district until the case has been disposed of by appeal 4: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence | [
"2",
"3",
"0",
"4",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
contribution is an equitable remedy that has been recognized by the Arizona courts and legislature in limited circumstances, most notably in the insurance and tort contexts. See, e.g., Cal. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Ariz. 416, 417-18, 422, ¶¶ 1-2, 24, 94 P.3d 616, 617-18, 622 (App.2004); Mut. Ins. Co. of Ariz. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading Pa., 189 Ariz. 22, 26, 938 P.2d 71, 75 (App.1996); Am. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading Pa., 183 Ariz. 301, 302, 903 P.2d 609, 610 (App.1995); W. Agric. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Indem. Ins. Co., 172 Ariz. 592, 595, 838 P.2d 1353, 1356 (App.1992); see also A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to -2509 (2003) (adopting the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act). See also Fischer v. Sommer, 160 Ariz. 530, 531, 774 P.2d 834, 835 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>). However, Arizona has not previously addressed Holdings: 0: holding that although a spouse may have had a right to apportion military retirement benefits at one time the act requires the spouse to assert that right before entry of a finalized divorce decree or waive the right to the benefits 1: recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree 2: holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce 3: holding nondischargeable a debtors obligation to his former spouse under a divorce decree to assume liability for two joint debts to a third party and stating that 523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements 4: recognizing a right to contribution | [
"4",
"3",
"2",
"0",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
the dismissal’s effect had it not been withdrawn. 6 . We rule here only that the power of the trial court to rescind an order of dismissal continues “at least” until entry of the order on the docket. That is all that is needed to dispose of this appeal. After formal entry of an order of any type, a trial court's jurisdiction over the matter and power to rescind or amend the order may be governed by application of this jurisdiction’s procedural rules and case law. See generally Clement v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215 (D.C. 1993). 7 . We note further that our decision today is in accord with the decisions of several other jurisdictions that have considered the present issue. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 113 Ariz. 506, 557 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1976) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Belcher v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a tenmonth delay in filing a dismissal motion was reasonable 1: holding that a trial court does not lose jurisdiction in a matter by ordering its dismissal before jeopardy has attached unless there is an abuse of discretion in vacating the order of dismissal and reinstating the case for trial 2: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a 250000 award for a mental distress claim 4: holding that in considering dismissal of an appeal the court should exercise discretion to determine whether dismissal is appropriate in the circumstances presented by the case | [
"2",
"3",
"4",
"0",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
more, that should answer the dual-office holding question. In light of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895, I also join the majority in rejecting Petitioners’ separation of powers claim. I commend Justice Hearn for her excellent recitation of the importance of the separation of powers doctrine in our country’s founding. This Court’s jurisprudence often recognizes, in glowing terms, the sanctity of the separation of powers doctrine in our democratic republic. See State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 278 S.C. 307, 312, 295 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1982) (observing that the separation of the branches of government “prevents the concentration of power in the hands of too few, and provides a system of checks and balances”); State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce, 274 S.C. 81, 84, 261 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Yet, as the majority articulates, “South Holdings: 0: holding that because the department of revenue is subordinate to the board of tax review in the decision making process the department is not an adversely affected or aggrieved party having standing to petition for judicial review of the boards order reversing a decision of the department 1: holding that the company administering a selfinsurance program for the department of transportation was an agent for the department and was therefore immune from suit 2: holding that county and district attorneys are officers within the judicial department 3: holding that a state department of transportation employee was subject to patronage dismissal where his duties included serving as a liaison between the director of the department and the general public and other government officials including representing the department at meetings and conferences 4: holding that under separation of powers the legislative department makes the laws the executive department carries the laws into effect and the judicial department interprets and declares the laws | [
"3",
"2",
"0",
"1",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
claim is based on Eastus’s termination. The relationship of the FMLA and emotional distress claims, therefore, is similar to the relationship between the claims in the Na-bors case. For both claims in the instant ease, the single wrong is the termination, and the various claims are simply different theories of recovery. As a result, the FMLA claim and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim are not “separate and independent claim[s] or cause[s] of action” under § 1441(e). Because § 1441(c) does not authorize the remand of state law claims unless they are separate and independent from the removed federal question claim, the district court abused its discretion by remanding this claim. See John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 577, 130 Holdings: 0: holding that 1441c does not allow the remand of claims that are not separate and independent 1: holding that claims for pain and suffering are the separate property of a spouse 2: holding that removal under section 1441c may only be done by the original defendant 3: recognizing that 1441c limits removal to situations in which a federal question is joined with a separate and independent claim of a nonfederal nature 4: holding that a loss of consortium is separate and independent from the primary action | [
"1",
"4",
"2",
"3",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
in whose name Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 requires an action to be brought, and the debtor no longer has standing to pursue that cause of action. See 11 U.S.C. § 323(b); Toussaint v. Howard University, Civil Action No. 03-1395(JDB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38738, at *5-7 (D.D.C. November 8, 2005); Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004); Cain v. Hyatt, 101 B.R. 440, 442 (E.D.Pa.1989) (“[A]fter appointment of a trustee, a Chapter 7 debtor no longer has standing to pursue a cause of action which existed at the time the Chapter 7 petition was filed. Only the trustee, as representative of the estate, has the authority to prosecute and/or settle such causes of action.”); Banks v. County of Allegheny (In re Banks), 223 Fed.Appx. 149, 151 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, the discrimination cause of action Holdings: 0: holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee 1: holding trustee has waived the right to bring a preference objection 2: recognizing authority of chapter 13 trustee to recover overpayment but not finding refund appropriate where error was attributable to trustee 3: holding on facts similar to those in dmart that the 546a limitation period runs from appointment of chapter 7 trustee after case was converted from chapter 11 4: holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions | [
"3",
"4",
"1",
"2",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
Cummings grabbed her hair and touched her skin; (3) Witt screamed at her; (4) Cummings and Witt suggested she apply for the African American Leadership Council to the exclusion of other opportunities; and (5) she was demoted from “intern” to “volunteer.” The first four of these do not describe “significant changes” in Adam’s “employment status,” and thus are not adverse actions. Although all four instances can be described as impolite, none changes Adam’s “wealth” or “career prospects.” And although they might be characterized as “humiliating” or “degrading,” Adam’s allegations fail to rise to the level that the Seventh Circuit has held is necessary to demonstrate a “significant negative alteration in the workplace.” See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Rhodes v. Ill. DOT, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made 1: holding that the decision to reprimand or transfer an employee if rescinded before the employee suffers a tangible harm is not an adverse employment action 2: holding that a similar written reprimand provided to an architect of the capitol employee was not materially adverse because it merely criticized his job performance 3: holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying this is amy you probably havent met her yet because she is never here may have been offensive to the employee but was merely a petty slight that does not amount to a materially adverse action 4: holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga 349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action | [
"4",
"2",
"1",
"0",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
it had ample opportunity to do so. Instead Congress must have realized that the definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” would necessarily be interpreted in the context of the statute to which it applies (18 U.S.C. § 1962). Thus, the term “pattern”, when used in this context, applies to the relationship of the acts to the enterprises, and no more. The definition of “racketeering activity” in the section and the additional definition of “pattern of racketeering activity,” taken together, results in the conclusion that the “pattern” definition states a minimum but not necessarily an exclusive definition. A main focus of Title IX was the enterprise, not only the persons committing the acts, and Congress felt that the “pattern” would be supplied by this common fact (E.D.Pa. 1977) (<HOLDING>). For purposes of deciding the present motion Holdings: 0: holding that acceptance of four bribes over a two and onehalf year period from parents who wanted their children admitted to graduate school appeared to be a sufficient pattern to satisfy the statute 1: recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children 2: holding that a school board policy prohibiting employees from sending their children to private schools interfered with employees constitutional right to control the education of their children 3: holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable 4: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children | [
"2",
"4",
"3",
"1",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
the First Amendment framework. There is simply no support in the affidavits for a conclusion that Liotta’s disputes involved his freedoms of belief and association, or the related right to be free from the imposition of an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit, the interests implicated under Elrod v. Burns. Accordingly, the affidavits did not raise a material issue of fact so as to preclude the granting of summary judgment. They certainly do not tend to establish that Liotta was discharged by reason of “partisan political affiliation,” the act interdicted for certain public employees in Elrod v. Burns. See Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d at 1021; Zold v. Township of Mantua, 935 F.2d at 635; cf. Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Public Ed., 968 F.2d at 401 (<HOLDING>). We recognize that Liotta testified in a Holdings: 0: holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim 1: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 2: holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim 3: holding plaintiffs property interest claim could not be based on a conclusory allegation citing past practices 4: holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment | [
"0",
"2",
"4",
"1",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.2005). We review for reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, meaning that we “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); see also United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1093 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). If the district court made no procedural Holdings: 0: holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error 1: holding that despite the advisory nature of the sentencing guidelines they remain the starting point and the initial benchmark of a district courts sentencing analysis the district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guidelines range and keep that range in mind throughout the sentencing process and that failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceemdashincluding an explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range constitutes significant procedural error 2: holding guidelines to be only advisory 3: holding that a sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court committed no significant procedural error such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range treating the guidelines as mandatory failing to consider the 3553a factors selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence emphasis added 4: holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range | [
"2",
"1",
"0",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
to demonstrate incompetency, a defendant could easily avoid prosecution through immature behavior. Id. The State directs this Court to Clark v. State, 47 S.W.3d 211 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.). We find Clark analogous to the instant case. In Clark, the trial court held a competency hearing in July of 1999, but the appellant argued that the court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a second competency hearing in November of 1999. Clark, 47 S.W.3d at 215-16. The court of appeals noted that, while the appellant’s behavior at the November 1999 pretrial hearing was “bizarre,” no new evidence was presented indicating a change in the appellant’s mental condition from the previous finding. Id. at 218, citing Miles v. State, 688 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1985, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>); O’Neil v. State, 642 S.W.2d 259, 262 Holdings: 0: holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted 1: holding defendant not entitled toa hearing on his motion for a new trial where he failed to prove that his new evidence was in fact newly discovered and that its recent discovery was in no way attributable to a previous lack of diligence 2: holding that appellant must present some evidence of a subsequent change in competency or some new evidence in a manner analogous to newly discovered evidence in a motion for new trial to complain of a denial of a second competency hearing 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach testimony 4: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence | [
"0",
"3",
"1",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
after the fact, the conduct for which the defendant is accountable includes all conduct relevant to determining the offense level for the underlying offense that was known, or reasonably should have been known, by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Application Note 10. Therefore, reading Application Note 10 in isolation would extend the reasonable-knowledge requirement to all conduct used to determine the sentence for the underlying offense, not only specific offense characteristics. Other circuits are split on how to resolve this apparent contradiction. Supporting Mrs. Lang’s position, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits allow a sentencing court to consider only those drug quantities of which the defendant knew or should have known. See United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shabazz, 263 F.3d 603 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that the hospital knew or should have known of the necessity to control based on a similar prior instance of inappropriate sexual conduct with a minor 1: holding that defendant who sets in motion series of events that he knew or should have known would cause others to deprive plaintiff of rights may be liable under 1983 2: holding that in certain circumstances where a defendant is convicted of a charge alleging a conspiracy to distribute one drug or another he must be sentenced as if the conviction were only for a conspiracy involving the drug that triggers the lowest statutory sentencing range 3: holding that a defendant can only be sentenced for misprision of felony based on drug quantities that he knew or should have known or foreseen were involved in the conspiracy 4: holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong | [
"2",
"0",
"1",
"4",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
without legal citation or factual evidence does not suffice to create a disputed issue of fact as to whether Form 10 was the proper form for the spin-off. Indeed, the SEC had a factual basis for rejecting the Form 10 because there was a sale of a restricted security within two years. SeraNova’s prompt and lamb-like obeisance to the SEC’s decision to require a Form S-l is strong proof that the Form 10 was the wrong document. Moreover, SeraNova brought the same bulletin to the SEC’s attention on March 17, 2000, and the SEC responded that it disagreed with SeraNova’s interpretation of the bulletin. Thus, SeraNova is left with the tenuous argument that the SEC misinterpreted its own bulletin. Cf. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 122 S.Ct. 1899, 1903, 153 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). On the issue of whether the content of the Holdings: 0: holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute 1: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 2: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 3: holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law 4: holding that sec interpretation of federal securities law is entitled to deference if it is reasonable | [
"1",
"0",
"2",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
a long string of performance problems leading up to firing. The further back in time a court goes to evaluate an employee’s performance, the more removed the evidence is from the time of the termination. As we explained in Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir.1982): The rationality, hence fairness, of this inference [of unlawful discrimination] obviously decreases as the time gap between last proven satisfactory performance and challenged employment action lengthens. Here, the time lag was almost two years. As common experience in such matters teaches, and as the full record reveals the case here to have been, a great deal can happen to alter things in such a time. Id. at 244. See also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 517 U.S. 308, 116 Holdings: 0: holding that a review of an employees 1989 performance was irrelevant to a determination of whether his performance was satisfactory at the time of his termination in august of 1990 1: holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party 2: holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination 3: holding ones satisfactory performance of duties leading to a promotion does establish a plaintiffs qualification for a job 4: holding that allegations concerning the plaintiffs satisfactory work performance termination and much younger replacement did not by themselves suffice to plead an age discrimination claim | [
"3",
"4",
"2",
"1",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
found “not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.”) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir.1996)). The ALJ made no specific findings regarding plaintiffs IQ. To meet the “B” criteria of section 12.05, plaintiff must have a valid verbal, performance, or full-scale IQ of 59 or below. Both Dr. Taylor, who administered the WAIS III that yielded a full-scale IQ of 58, and Dr. Soltz, the medical expert, indicated that those IQ test results were invalid due to suboptimal effort or malingering on plaintiffs part. Therefore, plaintiffs contention that he meets the “B” criteria of section 12.05 lacks merit. See Soto v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 795 F.2d 219, 222 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). To meet the “C” criteria of section 12.05, Holdings: 0: holding that the summoned party may in an enforcement proceeding challenge the 7609f2 determination that there is a reasonable basis for believing there may be a violation of a revenue law 1: holding that the alj erred in rejecting the iq of a claimant whose work history was limited primarily to working for his father 2: holding that the alj is not obliged to accept an iq if there is a substantial basis in the record for believing that the claimant was feigning the results 3: holding that where there are deficiencies in the record the alj is under an affirmative obligation to develop the relevant medical history even when the claimant is represented by counsel 4: holding that where there are deficiencies in the record the alj is under an affirmative obligation to develop the relevant medical history | [
"0",
"3",
"1",
"4",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
mineral estate, that the wells were not temporary in nature, and that they remained there for several years. Clearly, there was evidence of a physical occupation by the Government of the McKays’ property. In general, in the case of physical invasions, the Supreme Court has pointed out that “no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). Even when the physical intrusion occupied less than one and one half cubic feet of space on a landowner’s property, the Supreme Court has held that a taking was effected. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Despite this undisputed evidence of a Holdings: 0: holding that a new york law which required a landlord to permit a cable television company to install its cable facilities on his property was a taking 1: holding that new yorks law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to place cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a taking even though the facilities occupied at most only vk cubic feet of the landlords property 2: holding that a new york law requiring building owners to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on their premises constituted a taking 3: holding that a new york state law requiring the owner of an apartment building to allow the installation of cable equipment on the building which amounted to a few wires and a small box on the roof constituted a taking 4: holding that new york law granting cable television companies right to place wires across private property worked a taking of private property | [
"4",
"0",
"3",
"2",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
perhaps thousands of individuals have fallen victim to Qwest’s illegal practices. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have pled ascertainable damages sufficiently to petition for relief under CUTPA. Another issue raised by Qwest is the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim for negligent supervision under CUTPA where the consumers in the present case could have reasonably avoided any injury. Qwest claims the plaintiffs were liable for contributory negligence by not implementing a preferred carrier freeze under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1190 by simply calling their local phone company and requesting it. Qwest asserts that Connecticut case law disallows CUTPA claims when contributory negligence by the plaintiff is found. A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200, 579 A.2d 69 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs point out that the victim of Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 1: holding that there is no basis in law to submit the issue of plaintiffs negligence to the jury when there was no evidence that plaintiff incited the dog or voluntarily or unreasonably exposed herself to a known risk 2: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 3: holding that there is no cutpa violation when the sole basis of the claim is the defendants negligence and the jury determines that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent 4: holding that in order to recover damages under the lanham act plaintiff must prove that there was a violation that plaintiff has been damaged and that there is a causal connection between the violation and those damages | [
"2",
"1",
"4",
"0",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
and is not “connected with” or “directly related to” appellants’ sales to 3M and Worum. Lorix contends, however, that there must only be a “reasonably close connection” between the cause of action and the defendant’s contacts with the forum state to support a finding of specific jurisdiction. Lorix argues that the sale of rubber-processing chemicals to Minnesota corporations to manufacture products other than tires is sufficiently related to a suit alleging that downstream indirect purchasers paid a supracompetitive price for tires that contained those same rubber-processing chemicals. But for specific jurisdiction to exist, a plaintiff must show a more direct connection between his alleged injury and the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. See Marshall, 610 N.W.2d at 676 (<HOLDING>); Behm v. John Nuveen & Co., 555 N.W.2d 301, Holdings: 0: holding city waives immunity by entering into contract 1: holding that a plaintiff may proceed with a claim against the state for breach of contract only where the state implicitly waives its sovereign immunity by expressly entering into a valid contract through an agent of the state expressly authorized by law to enter into such contract 2: holding that federal statutes and regulations can form the basis of a breach of contract claim if expressly incorporated into the contract 3: holding that no acts by the outofstate defendant would place her within the florida longarm statute in entering into a contract with a florida resident for an office to be run in mississippi 4: holding entering into a contract with a minnesota resident can justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction but only where the dispute involves the contract | [
"0",
"3",
"2",
"1",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
or she has not been made a party by service of process.’ ” Cossio, 163 B.R. at 154 (quoting Mason v. Genisco Technology Corp., 960 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir.1992)). Other courts have also held that a default judgment is void and should be set aside if there has been no proper service of the complaint. E.g., Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 442 (D.C.Cir.1987); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir.1985). Because a court asserts in personam jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of a party through service of process, an in personam judgment is void where the requirements for effective service have not been satisfied. Combs, 825 F.2d at 442; see also, e.g., Hospital Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Parque Indus. Rio Canas, Inc., 653 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Holdings: 0: holding that the judgment was entered without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity 1: holding that service of subpoena on plaintiffs counsel as opposed to the plaintiff himself renders such service a nullity 2: holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction 3: holding that if service is inadequate defendant never submitted to courts jurisdiction and underlying judgment is therefore a nullity 4: recognizing default judgment must generally be set aside without further showing if defendant never received service of process | [
"4",
"1",
"0",
"2",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
(emphasis in original). “The burden must have more than a minimal impact on religious exercise, and there must be a close n Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761-62 (7th Cir.2003) (“CLUB”) (finding that “the scarcity’ of affordable land available for development in R zones, along with the costs, procedural requirements, and inherent political aspects of the Special Use, Map Amendment, and Planned Development approval processes” did not impose substantial burden on religious institutions); Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 760 F.Supp.2d 172, 187 (D.Mass.2011) (finding that a routine application process did not violate RLUIPA), vacated in part on other grounds, 724 F.3d 78 (1st Cir.2013); Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1071 (D.Haw.2002) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, to exempt religious institutions from Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 1: holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise 2: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered religious exercise 3: holding that requiring plaintiffs to show a substantial burden from nonneutral government actions would make petty harassment of religious institutions and exercise immune from the protection of the first amendment 4: holding that laws requiring special use permits did not impose a substantial burden on religious institution | [
"2",
"3",
"0",
"1",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529 (7th Cir.2011), the Seventh Circuit validated § 202.2(e)’s definition of “applicant.” The plaintiff in Davis argued that she became an ECOA “applicant” when the defendants offered her a loan modification, allegedly on racially discriminatory terms. Id. at 538. The Seventh Circuit agreed, holding that the plaintiff, “as the recipient of the defendants’ offer to modify her loan, ‘received an extension of credit’ and thus became an ‘applicant’ under 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e).” Ibid. The court could not have concluded that the plaintiff was in fact an “applicant” under the ECOA without accepting § 202.2(e) as an authoritative interpretation of that statutory term. As for Moran Foods, Davis indicated that its discussion of the term “applicant” was dicta. See ibid, (<HOLDING>). In any event, FirstMerit does not argue that Holdings: 0: holding that analyzing summary judgment decisions under the standards set forth in mai 3124 is appropriate because a plaintiff has no higher standard to survive summary judgment than is required to submit the claim to a jury 1: holding that moran foods found no need to resolve the threshold issue of whether a plaintiff was an applicant under the ecoa because plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence of discrimination under the ecoa to survive summary judgment 2: holding without discussing the plaintiffs burden of persuasion that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment 3: holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee 4: holding that the district court erred in ruling that a plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to survive summary judgment on its discrimination claim where the district court had simply discounted plaintiffs admissible evidence as less probative than defendants | [
"0",
"3",
"2",
"4",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
the victim testified that three men came to her house, kicked the door open, and put a gun to her daughter’s face. Beyond this, the victim testified that she could not remember any more details at the time of trial. As pointed out by the State, this event would qualify as “a matter about which a witness once had knowledge, but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately.” § 90.803(5), Fla. Stat. (2008). Further, the victim identified the written statement as the statement she gave to police on the day of the crime, approximately one hour after the events took place, and testified that she told the police what happened when they came to her house. Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, including that the witness swore to t 998) (<HOLDING>). These cases are based upon the language of Holdings: 0: holding court abused its discretion when it excluded psychologists testimony regarding host of identification issues among which was crossracial identification 1: holding that testimony regarding outofcourt identification was inadmissible where the state failed to ask the witnesses about the identification during its direct examination 2: holding that where the opportunity for positive identification is good and not weakened by prior failure to identify and the witness is positive in his identification even after crossexamination identification need not be received with caution 3: holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial 4: holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay | [
"2",
"0",
"4",
"3",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
courts, as stated above. See, e.g., Lakeside Boating & Bathing, Inc., 402 N.W.2d at 422. In Lyster, the court observed that it had “recognized the potential that substantial arbitration fees may make an arbitration agreement unconscionable.” See Lyster, 239 F.3d at 947 (citing Dobbins v. Hawk’s Enters., 198 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir.1999)). However, the court rejected the plaintiffs contention about the unconscionability of the cost and fees provision of the arbitration agreement at issue in that case, as follows: Lyster has not established on the record before us that undue harshness exists in the terms of the Agreement'in light of Missouri law governing unconscionability. See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92, 121 S.Ct. 513, 522, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Lyster, 239 F.3d at 947. Here, however, Faber Holdings: 0: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement 1: holding the party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement because of prohibitive arbitration fees bears the burden of proof and the possibility of such party incurring prohibitive costs is too speculative to invalidate an arbitration agreement where the record reveals only that the agreement is silent on the subject of arbitration costs 2: holding that where the arbitration agreement was silent on feesplitting and the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by the aaa were not prohibitive the plaintiff had presented little evidence to indicate that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive and the fees and costs of arbitration did not render the arbitration scheme unconscionable 3: holding that plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to show that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because plaintiffs claims of prohibitive costs were too speculative 4: holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement as providing that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs | [
"0",
"4",
"3",
"2",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find for that party. A non-moving party cannot withstand summary judgment, however, by introduction of a “mere scintilla” of evidence in its favor. See Ciminillo, 434 F.3d at 464. Before this court, the plaintiff first argues that the finding of probable cause by the state judge at the preliminary-examination stage of the criminal proceedings should not affect the federal courts’ decisions regarding the merits of his claims of wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution. He does so even though each of those later claims contains, as an element, the lack of probable cause to pursue the particular action. See, e.g., Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir.1988) (wrongful arrest) (<HOLDING>); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection 1: holding under the fourth amendment that a judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of crime 2: holding that pretrial detention resulting from legal process unsupported by probable cause violates the fourth amendment 3: holding that the fourth amendment requires a finding of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty 4: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same | [
"1",
"2",
"4",
"0",
"3"
] | [
"3"
] |
F.2d 779, 781 (D.C.Cir.1990) (quoting Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (1984)); see also Nation Magazine, Washington Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 894 (D.C.Cir.1995) (explaining that Exemption 7(C)’s privacy interest extends to third parties who may be mentioned in investigatory files). Accordingly, Exemption 7(C) has been applied to withhold the names of third parties, including investigators, mentioned in law enforcement files. See Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 41 (D.C.Cir.2011) (asserting that “privacy interests are particularly difficult to overcome when law enforcement information regarding third parties is implicated”) (quoting Martin v. Dep’t of Justice, 488 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C.Cir.2007)); see also Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 661 (D.C.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Dorsett v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Holdings: 0: recognizing that our decisions consistently supported nondisclosure of names or other information identifying individuals appearing in law enforcement records 1: holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed 2: holding that names of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are categorically exempt from disclosure unless disclosing such information is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity 3: holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are exempt from disclosure 4: holding that records regarding complaints against state police officers which would be exempt from disclosure when unredacted where no longer exempt after the names of state police troopers the names of complainants and all identifying information were redacted | [
"2",
"3",
"1",
"4",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
vehicle is controlling or whether the decisions will turn on the use being made of the vehicle. As for the case at hand, we hold that under the facts known to the officers at the time of the search, the motor homes were being used as automobiles, or trucks, and that the standard of reasonableness that applies to such vehicles applies here. The use of a vehicle, not its shape, should control the standard that applies. As an analogy, the extent that there may be different Fourth Amendment standards for a home and a business would not depend upon whether the business was in a building that looked like a home. The difference in standards is based on the reduced expectation of privacy in a business. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2537-38, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 Holdings: 0: holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property 1: recognizing that a temporary use of property does not automatically create an expectation of privacy in that property 2: holding that the state is obligated to pay property owners when it regulates private property under its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively deprives the owner of the economically viable use of that property 3: holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business 4: holding that expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individuals home | [
"1",
"2",
"0",
"3",
"4"
] | [
"4"
] |
“threshold requirement of any products-liability claim is that the plaintiff assert that the defendant’s product caused the plaintiffs injury.” This is known as the “product identification requirement.” Because Plaintiffs did not ingest the Brand Manufacturers’ drugs, their “misrepresentation” claims would fail if a state’s highest court would construe them as product liability claims under applicable state law. Second, even if a state’s highest court would not construe Plaintiffs’ claims as “product liability” claims, the claims were still properly dismissed if we predict that such courts would hold that the Brand Manufacturers do not owe users of generic drugs a duty that can give rise to liability. Before turning to our state-by-state Erie analysis, we note that an over th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, Holdings: 0: holding name brand manufacturers may be held liable by consumers of generic drugs for representations made to prescribing physicians under vermont law 1: holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable 2: holding that brand name manufacturers cannot be held liable for injuries caused by products they did not manufacture under arkansas law 3: holding that a brand manufacturer of prescription drugs cannot be held liable for injuries suffered by consumers who ingested only the generic form of a drug under florida law 4: holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii | [
"1",
"4",
"3",
"0",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
entitled to bring [an] action ... is, at the time the cause of action accrues, within the age of minority or of unsound mind, the person may bring it within the [applicable time limitation], after the disability is removed.” The plaintiff before the court was of unsound mind at the time his cause of action accrued and remained so continuously thereafter. His legal guardians commenced a tort action which the defendants claimed was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, arguing that the plaintiffs disability had been removed by the appointment of his legal guardians. Cir.1985) (assuming that Missouri would apply the general rule that the appointment of a guardian has no effect on tolling); Wayne County Reg’l Educ. Serv. Agency v. Pappas, 56 F.Supp.2d 807, 815 (E.D.Mich.1999) (<HOLDING>); Desert State Life Mgt. Servs. v. Ass’n of Holdings: 0: holding that appointment of guardian over incompetent adult does not remove legal disability so as to halt tolling and commence running of statute of limitations 1: holding that under michigan law it is wellsettled that an individual with a mental disability is the beneficiary of the tolling statute even where his rights have been capably handled by a guardian or an attorney 2: holding that where client was abandoned by attorney due to attorneys mental illness equitable tolling may be appropriate 3: holding that where an individual is deprived of liberty or property interests in violation of article of the state declaration of rights he may enforce those rights by a common law action for damages 4: holding that new yorks statute tolling statute of limitations during a period when a person is under a disability because of infancy is not terminated by acts of guardian or legal representative in taking steps to pursue claims on infants behalf | [
"0",
"2",
"3",
"4",
"1"
] | [
"1"
] |
rights, feasibly creating a barricade across Maryland’s shoreline. In the words of the Thomas Court, “such [a] consequence surely ought not to be desired by anyone.” Thomas, 63 Md. at 355. This conclusion is consistent with the pronouncements in other states regarding the character of the beaches at issue in those cases. Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124, 1130 (Me.1984) (applying a rebuttable presumption of permissive use to a lakefront beach, as “wild and uncultivated land”); Spiegle v. Beach Haven, 116 N.J.Super. 148, 281 A.2d 377, 382 (App.Div.1971) (noting that the ocean front beach at issue was land “in a general state of nature and left unimproved by its owner”); State ex rel. Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wash.2d 487, 156 P.2d 667, 670-71 (1945) (<HOLDING>). As noted, supra, “[a]s a general rule, Holdings: 0: holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees 1: holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner 2: holding that a beach bordering on puget sound used extensively for public recreation was completely wild open vacant unoccupied and in its natural state and therefore public use was presumed to have originated by permission until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege 3: holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege 4: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public | [
"4",
"0",
"3",
"1",
"2"
] | [
"2"
] |
to Andrew Tagliamonte’s request, but, based on the charge of child neglect, sua sponte entered an order that he stay away from his minor son. In so doing, the trial court abused its discretion. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131(d)(2) authorizes the State to apply for modification of pretrial release conditions, but only on “showing good cause and with at least 3 hours’ notice to the attorney for the defendant.” A trial court is without authority sua sponte to modify a previously set pretrial release bond. See Cameron v. State, 127 So.3d 549, 550, 2012 WL 5349405, *1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (granting a writ of habeas corpus where trial court sua sponte “added significant and substantial conditions” to defendant’s release bond); Simmons v. State, 915 So.2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. McRay, 890 So.2d 341 (Fla. 3d DCA Holdings: 0: holding trial court may not increase bond on grounds not raised by the state without prior notice to defendant 1: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 2: holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal 3: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal 4: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion | [
"3",
"2",
"4",
"1",
"0"
] | [
"0"
] |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.