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7ae745f2aec7a83a9a15e1a474349437	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/05/05/african-lions-nigerias-jobless-growth/	African Lions: Nigeria’s jobless growth	African Lions: Nigeria’s jobless growth Nigeria, sub-Saharan Africa’s biggest economy and most populous country, has recorded high growth in recent years. Indeed, real GDP growth rate was 6.31 in 2014 (compared to the regional average of 4.35). Life expectancy has also increased (by 6.9 years since 1980) and so has mean years of schooling (by 0.2 years since 1980). Despite these achievements, like many other African countries, poverty and unemployment rates remain high. In fact, its unemployment rate increased from 23.9 percent in 2011 to 25.1 percent in 2014. So, where are the expected gains in poverty and unemployment from Nigeria’s growth? It turns out, as Olu Ajakaiye, Afeikhena T. Jerome, David Nabena, and Olufunke A. Alaba find in a recent paper, Understanding the relationship between growth and employment in Nigeria, that Nigeria’s growth has indeed been “jobless.” Not only that, the authors, investigating sectoral growth and employment trends within Nigeria as part of the wider African Lions project, discover that the country’s growth “has been sustained largely by factor reallocations rather than productivity enhancement and that employment elasticity of growth has been positive and quite low, reflecting the country’s poor overall employment generation record, especially in manufacturing.” In short, jobs are not moving to manufacturing and, in general, are not being created fast enough. Like in many sub-Saharan African countries, the authors point out that labor is leaving the low-productivity agricultural sector for the services sector, unlike the structural transformation trend seen in Asia where labor moves to the high-productivity manufacturing sector instead. As seen in Figure 1, the services sector’s share of the labor force rose dramatically from 2000 to 2014—from 24 to 44 percent. At the same time both agriculture’s and manufacturing’s share of the labor force dropped: agriculture from 51 to 44 percent; manufacturing from 11 to 6 percent. Source: Ajakaiye et al.’s computations from underlying data obtained from NISER (2015). The move to industry, a staple of structural transformation, is not happening and, according to the authors, the industrial sector (which includes manufacturing) is in a “deplorable situation.” Its contribution to GDP has dropped, and its industrial capacity has declined. In fact, the authors note that the country’s “trade composition and pattern are based on primary production, with very little role played in the global value chain.” But what does Nigeria’s employment landscape look like? From 2010-2014, the labor force (the total number of employed and unemployed persons actively looking for jobs aged 15–64 years) increased by 2.9 percent on average; however, the total employment increased at an average rate of 2 percent over the period compared to 6.1 percent and 16.48 percent for the underemployed (those available for work but did not work for at least 39 hours in the week) and unemployed respectively. Most salient, then, is the rising overall unemployment rate, at 25.1 percent as of 2014 (Figure 2). Source: Ajakaiye et al.’s computations from underlying data obtained from NBS (2014). Forty-two percent of the population is less than 14 years old, and 29 percent is between 15 and 19 years old, with the median age of 17.9 years, creating a youth bulge. Given the current large youth cohort and the rapidly growing population, youth unemployment is becoming a major concern for policymakers. In 2014, 45.8 percent of youth were unemployed. If Nigeria can enact effective policies for productive employment creation for the youth, expanding the workforce, it will “provide a significant boost in economic productivity, not only in the production of manufactured goods, services, and agricultural produce, but also in the wake of an increasing purchasing power that fuels economic growth and development.” The authors note that increased investment in education, gender parity, health, and technical expertise will be key in creating this workforce. Given Nigeria’s high unemployment, slow growth of the labor-intensive industrial sector, and the youth bulge, the authors recommend: Note: The African Lions project is a collaboration among United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), the University of Cape Town’s Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), and the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, that provides an analytical basis for policy recommendations and value-added guidance to domestic policymakers in the fast-growing economies of Africa, as well as for the broader global community interested in the development of the region. The six papers, covering Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, explore the key constraints facing African economies as they attempt to maintain a long-run economic growth and development trajectory.
1b4e70a0d0bc8b3e2360bcc0b336212e	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/06/30/comment-amener-lafrique-a-atteindre-ses-objectifs-de-developpement-durable-un-apercu-sur-les-solutions-energetiques-transfrontalieres/	Comment amener L’Afrique a atteindre ses objectifs de developpement durable: Un aperçu sur les solutions energetiques transfrontalieres	Comment amener L’Afrique a atteindre ses objectifs de developpement durable: Un aperçu sur les solutions energetiques transfrontalieres Click here to read the blog in English » Les décideurs politiques et les spécialistes du développement sont désormais confrontés à une nouvelle série d’enjeux suite à l’établissement, par consensus mondial, du triumvirat composé du Programme d’action d’Addis-Abeba, du Programme d’action 2030 et de l’Accord de Paris [1] : mise en œuvre, suivi et passage en revue. Les professionnels des politiques de développement doivent aborder ces enjeux tout en y intégrant ces trois piliers du développement durable que sont le développement social, la croissance économique et la protection environnementale, sans oublier les trois volets intersectoriels du consensus mondial précités, tout cela en opérant au sein d’un contexte dans lequel la planification des politiques reste accomplie de façon cloisonnée. Ils doivent également incorporer le caractère universel de ces nouveaux accords en tenant compte des différentes circonstances nationales ; à savoir les divers besoins, réalités, capacités, niveaux de développement nationaux, de même que les diverses priorités et politiques nationales. Ils doivent aussi accroître considérablement l’allocation des ressources et les moyens de mise en œuvre (comme le financement, le renforcement des capacités et le transfert de technologies) pour changer les choses et améliorer les nouveaux partenariats réunissant plusieurs parties prenantes en vue de restreindre les mouvements mondiaux de toutes sortes (notamment la migration, le terrorisme, les maladies, la fiscalité, les phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes et la révolution numérique) dans un monde résolument interconnecté. Il va sans dire que la tâche est très ambitieuse ! Ces difficultés sont à l’origine de nouveaux accords nationaux et internationaux visant à honorer les engagements pris pour répondre à ces enjeux sans précédent. Plusieurs États africains ont déjà commencé à créer des comités interministériels et des groupes de travail pour assurer l’alignement entre les objectifs mondiaux et les processus, les aspirations et les priorités actuels. L’Afrique prépare, en collaboration avec la communauté internationale, le premier Forum politique de haut niveau depuis l’adoption du programme d’action 2030 qui aura lieu en juillet 2016 et dont le thème sera « Veiller à ce que nul ne soit laissé pour compte ». Afin d’éclairer le leadership, l’orientation et les recommandations relatifs au Programme d’action 2030, six pays africains [2] parmi les 22 États membres de l’ONU se sont portés volontaires pour présenter des études nationales sur le travail accompli en vue d’atteindre les Objectifs de développement durable (ODD), soit une opportunité unique de fournir un examen objectif sans compromis et de mettre en avant les leviers d’exploitation et les limites à surmonter afin d’avoir un impact. Les Nations Unies ont déployé de nombreux efforts de coordination parallèlement au travail de terrain réalisé par l’Afrique : en premier lieu, la création d’un groupe de travail interinstitutions chargé de préparer le forum sur le financement du développement de suivi synchronisé avec le Forum mondial pour l’infrastructure, qui consultera sur les investissements en infrastructures, un aspect crucial pour le continent ; un groupe composé de 10 représentants nommés dont la mission consiste à soutenir le Mécanisme de facilitation des technologies aux fins du développement, du transfert et de la diffusion de technologies pour les ODD, soit un autre aspect très important pour l’Afrique ; et enfin une équipe de conseillers indépendants dont la mission consiste à fournir des conseils sur le positionnement à plus long terme du système de développement de l’ONU dans le contexte du Programme 2030 communément appelé « UN fit for purpose », parmi tant d’autres efforts. Ces obligations bureaucratiques écrasantes pèseront à elles seules lourdement sur les capacités limitées de l’Afrique. C’est la raison pour laquelle le continent à tout intérêt à regrouper ses ressources en tirant parti de ses robustes réseaux régionaux pour atténuer cet obstacle de façon cohérente et coordonnée et en capitalisant sur la convergence entre les textes nouvellement adoptés et l’Agenda 2063, le programme de transformation mis en place par l’Union Africaine sur une durée de 50 ans, avec l’aide d’institutions panafricaines. Outre les échelons nationaux et internationaux, il convient de tenir compte d’une troisième dimension : l’échelon régional. Ainsi, les trois principaux accords conclus en 2015 privilégiaient le soutien aux projets et aux cadres de coopération encourageant l’intégration régionale et sous-régionale, en particulier en Afrique. [3] C’est la raison pour laquelle des politiques industrielles communes et cohérentes relatives aux chaînes de valeur régionales formulées par des institutions régionales renforcées et portées par un leadership transformationnel volontariste s’imposent comme le meilleur moyen de favoriser l’insertion de l’Afrique au sein de l’économie mondiale. L’Afrique considère depuis longtemps l’intégration économique régionale, partie intégrante de ses principaux « piliers », à savoir les huit Communautés économiques régionales (CER), comme étant une stratégie de développement de base. Le continent s’est manifestement engagé dans cette voie : l’été dernier, trois CER, le Marché commun pour l’Afrique de l’Est et de l’Afrique australe (COMESA), la Communauté d’Afrique de l’Est (CAE) et la Communauté de développement de l’Afrique de l’Est (SADC) ont créé le Traité de libre-échange tripartite (TFTA) regroupant 26 pays, avec plus de 600 millions d’habitants et un PIB global de mille milliards de dollars US. Cet accord tripartite ouvre la voie à l’accord « méga-régional » de l’Afrique, la Zone de libre échange continentale (CFTA) et à l’instauration d’une vaste communauté économique africaine. Si la régionalisation permet la libre circulation des personnes, des capitaux, des biens et des services, c’est la connectivité intra-africaine accrue en découlant qui stimulera les échanges commerciaux au sein de l’Afrique, favorisera la croissance, créera des emplois et attira des investissements. Il devrait enfin faire démarrer l’industrialisation, l’innovation et la compétitivité. À ces fins, les institutions panafricaines, soucieuses d’exploiter les récentes performances favorables enregistrés par le continent, redoublent d’efforts pour créer un environnement propice à l’harmonisation des politiques et des réglementations et aux économies d’échelle. L’infrastructure, sans laquelle toute connectivité est impossible, constitue indéniablement le fondement de tout futur plan de régionalisation. Outre l’intégration du marché et le développement industriel, le développement des infrastructures est l’un des trois piliers de la stratégie du TFTA. De la même manière, l’agence pour le Nouveau partenariat économique pour le développement en Afrique (NEPAD), l’organe technique de l’Union africaine (UA) chargé de planifier et coordonner la mise en œuvre des priorités continentales et des programmes régionaux, a adopté l’intégration régionale en tant que méthode stratégique pour l’infrastructure. Le NEPAD a d’ailleurs organisé, en juin 2014, le Sommet de Dakar sur le financement des infrastructures ayant abouti à l’adoption du Programme d’action de Dakar qui présente des options en matière de mobilisation d’investissements dans des projets de développement des infrastructures, en commençant par 16 projets bancables clés issus du programme de développement des infrastructures en Afrique (PIDA). Il est intéressant de noter que ces « mégaprojets du NEPAD visant à transformer l’Afrique » ont tous une portée régionale. En complémentant les efforts du NEPAD et du TFTA, le Réseau d’affaires continental a été formé pour promouvoir le dialogue entre les secteurs public et privé sur la thématique de l’investissement en infrastructures régionales. Le Fond Africa50 pour l’infrastructure a été constitué en guise de nouvelle plateforme de prestation gérée commercialement en vue de combler l’énorme vide au niveau du financement des infrastructures en Afrique, un trou évaluée à 50 milliards de dollars US par an. L’élaboration de propositions propres et les progrès institutionnels récemment observés témoignent de la détermination de l’Afrique à accélérer le développement des infrastructures, et donc la régionalisation. Lors du dernier sommet de l’UA, le Comité d’orientation des chefs d’État et de gouvernement a approuvé l’institutionnalisation d’une Semaine PIDA organisée par la Banque africaine de développement (BAD) en vue d’assurer le suivi des progrès accomplis. Les partenariats énergétiques indiqués ci-dessous illustrent les avantages potentiels des méthodes de mise en œuvre et de suivi transfrontalières : l’Africa Power Vision (APV) réalisée avec Power Africa, le modèle du Centre pour les énergies renouvelables et l’efficacité énergétique(ECREEE) de la CEDEAO accompagnant l’initiative Énergie Durable pour Tous (SE4LL), une initiative mise en œuvre par la plateforme Africaine et la solution Africa GreenCo basée sur le PIDA. Les partenariats précités indiquent des tendances encourageantes en direction d’une coopération plus symbiotique entre les différentes parties prenantes. Comme ils relèvent d’initiatives « faites maison », il est important de ne pas perdre de vue la dimension continentale. D’une part, les plans élaborés par l’Afrique ont plus de chances de réussir que des solutions importées uniformes et d’autre part, des efforts cohérents et combinés allant dans la même direction renforcent la confiance et l’émulation et attirent des soutiens. Ceci implique que pour remplir les accords intergouvernementaux, il est nécessaire avant tout de les adapter aux réalités locales à travers un processus d’intégration respectueux de l’espace politique. Cette intégration peut ensuite faire l’objet d’ajustements en fonction d’expériences fondées sur des données et des preuves concrètes. Entre ces engagements mondiaux et les procédures nationales, la dimension nationale demeure le lien indispensable : permettre aux pays de contourner le caractère artificiel de leurs frontières héritées de l’époque coloniale et leur offrir des choix concrets pour éradiquer la pauvreté dans l’unité. L’intégration régionale est donc le préambule à l’opérationnalisation du développement durable au sein de l’Afrique et une étape clé de son parcours en direction d’une participation active sur la scène mondiale. La régionalisation peut également faire évoluer les relations internationales, à condition qu’elle aille de pair avec un multilatéralisme équitable et une gestion durable des connaissances globales. C’est pourquoi l’ouverture qui en découle et la complexité rencontrée sont autant de paramètres utiles pour enrichir la conception de réponses locales pertinentes. Ces réussites ouvrent de grandes perspectives en termes de nouvelles expériences et synergies. Elles représentent pour moi la promesse d’un monde meilleur. Celle que je me plais à imaginer est empreinte d’écosystèmes mutuellement bénéfiques pour les personnes et la planète. Elle encourage les liens inversés où tout le monde est gagnant, c’est-à-dire un monde où les économies en développement ont des retombées plus positives sur les pays industriels. C’est un monde où, par exemple, une région d’Afrique pourrait tirer des leçons de la crise grecque et vice-versa : un monde où la Chine pourrait tirer des enseignements du Corridor de développement de Maputo pour sa ceinture économique de la route de la soie. Un monde dans lequel des instituts jumelés effectuant des travaux de recherche conjoints dans les différents centres de connaissances régionaux prospéreraient, où des « fab labs » innovateurs pourraient ambitionner une aventure spatiale basée sur des déchets électroniques recyclés en imprimantes 3D. Dans un tel monde, des collaborations innovantes dans les domaines des sciences, des technologies, de l’ingénierie et des mathématiques (STEM) seraient encouragées. Celles-ci encourageraient la participation des femmes, et aussi celle de la diaspora en vue de développer des avancées techniques solides du point de vue écologique. Des efforts proportionnels, une volonté sans faille, une ingénuité autochtone et une créativité sans limites mettent cet avenir plus souriant à notre portée. Au-delà de la reconnaissance de la voix africaine tout au long des processus intergouvernementaux, l’Afrique doit désormais consolider ses avancées en maintenant fermement sa position et en protégeant ses gains tout au long de la phase préliminaire. Le continent doit de toute urgence définir des tactiques spécifiques offrant le plus grand potentiel en termes d’inclusion et de création de capacités de production. Parallèlement, les acteurs du développement africain doivent démarrer un cycle vertueux d’apprentissage par la pratique en vue de créer une philosophie de développement endogène prenant en considération les meilleures pratiques adaptables et les échecs. Néanmoins, la seule approche capable de produire à la fois une transformation structurelle et un changement informé conformes aux stratégies à long terme propres au continent et dirigées par lui est… l’intégration régionale. [1] Issus respectivement des négociations intergouvernementales à l’occasion de la Troisième Conférence sur le financement du développement (FFD3), l’Agenda du développement post 2015 et la Conférence des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques (COP21). [2] Égypte, Madagascar, Maroc, Sierra Leone, Togo et Ouganda [3] Comme précisé au Programme d’action d’Addis-Abeba par exemple : « Nous engageons instamment la communauté internationale, notamment les institutions financières internationales et les banques multilatérales et régionales de développement, à accroître leur soutien aux projets et aux cadres de coopération qui favorisent cette intégration régionale et sous régionale, notamment en Afrique, et qui améliorent la participation et l’intégration des entreprises et notamment des petites entreprises industrielles, en particulier celles des pays en développement, dans les chaînes de valeur mondiales et les marchés mondiaux. »
f914573bdba19fd71190980fb17c7f57	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/06/30/how-to-make-africa-meet-sustainable-development-ends-a-special-glance-at-cross-border-energy-solutions/	How to make Africa meet sustainable development ends: A special glance at cross-border energy solutions	How to make Africa meet sustainable development ends: A special glance at cross-border energy solutions Cliquez ici pour lire la version complète de ce blog en français » Policymakers and development practitioners now face a new set of challenges in the aftermath of the global consensus triumvirate Addis Agenda—2030 Agenda—Paris Agreement: [1] implementation, follow-up, and review. Development policy professionals must tackle these while at the same time including the three pillars of sustainable development—social development, economic growth, and environmental protection—and the above three global consensus’ cross-sectoral natures—all while working in a context where policy planning is still performed in silos. They also must incorporate the universality of these new agreements in the light of different national circumstances—different national realities, capacities, needs, levels of development, and national policies and priorities. And then they have to significantly scale up resource allocation and means of implementation (including financing, capacity building, and technology transfer) to make a difference and enhance novel multi-stakeholder partnerships to contain the surge of global flows of all kinds (such as migration, terrorism, diseases, taxation, extreme weather, and digital revolution) in a resolutely interconnected world. Quite an ambitious task! Given the above complexities, new national and global arrangements are being made to honor the commitments put forth to answer these unprecedented challenges. Several African governments have already started establishing inter-ministerial committees and task forces to ensure alignment between the global goals and existing national planning processes, aspirations, and priorities. With the international community, Africa is preparing for the first High-Level Political Forum since the 2030 Agenda adoption in July 2016 on the theme “Ensuring that no one is left behind.” In order to inform the 2030 Agenda’s implementation leadership, guidance, and recommendations, six African countries [2] of 22 U.N. Member States, volunteered to present national reviews on their work to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a unique opportunity to provide an uncompromising reality check and highlight levers to exploit and limits to overcome for impact. Paralleling Africa’s groundwork, the United Nations’ efforts for coordination have been numerous. They include an inter-agency task force to prepare for the follow-up forum to Financing For Development timed with the Global Infrastructure Forum that will consult on infrastructure investment, a crucial point for the continent; an appointed 10-representative group to support the Technology Facilitation Mechanism that facilitates the development, transfer and dissemination of technologies for the SDGs, another very important item for Africa; and an independent team of advisors to counsel on the longer-term positioning of the U.N. development system in the context of the 2030 Agenda, commonly called “U.N. fit for purpose,” among many other endeavors. These overwhelming bureaucratic duties alone will put a meaningful burden on Africa’s limited capacity. Thus, it is in the interest of the continent to pool its assets by taking advantage of its robust regional networks in order to mitigate this obstacle in a coherent and coordinated manner, and by building on the convergence between the newly adopted texts and Agenda 2063, the African Union’s 50-year transformation blueprint, with the help of pan-African institutions. Besides national and global, there is a third level of consideration: the regional one. Indeed, the three major agreements in 2015 emphasized support to projects and cooperation frameworks that foster regional and subregional integration, particularly in Africa. [3] Indeed, common and coherent industrial policies for regional value chains developed by strengthened regional institutions and sustained by a strong-willed transformational leadership are gaining traction towards Africa’s insertion into the global economy. Africa has long made regional economic integration within its main “building blocs,” the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), a core strategy for development. The continent is definitely engaged in this path: Last summer, three RECs, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), launched the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) that covers 26 countries, over 600 million people, and $1 trillion GDP. The tripartite arrangement paves the way towards Africa’s own mega-regional one, the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), and the realization of one broad African Economic Community. If regionalization allows free movement of people, capital, goods, and services, the resulting increased intra-African connectivity will boost trade within Africa, promote growth, create jobs, and attract investments. Ultimately, it should ignite industrialization, innovation, and competitiveness. To that end, pan-African institutions, capitalizing on the recent positive continental performances, are redoubling their efforts to build an enabling environment for policy and regulation harmonization and economies of scale. Importantly, infrastructure, without which no connectivity is possible, is undeniably the enabling bedrock to all future regionalization plans. Together with market integration and industrial development, infrastructure development is one of the three pillars of the TFTA strategy. Similarly, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Agency, the technical body of the African Union (AU) mandated with planning and coordinating the implementation of continental priorities and regional programs, adopted regional integration as a strategic approach to infrastructure. In fact, in June 2014, the NEPAD Agency organized the Dakar Financing Summit for Infrastructure, culminating with the adoption of the Dakar Agenda for Action that lays down options for investment mobilization towards infrastructure development projects, starting with 16 key bankable projects stemming from the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). These “NEPAD mega-projects to transform Africa” are, notably, all regional in scope. Supplementing NEPAD and TFTA, the Continental Business Network was formed to promote public-private dialogue with regard to regional infrastructure investment. The Africa50 Infrastructure Fund was constituted as a new delivery platform commercially managed to narrow the massive infrastructure finance gap in Africa evaluated at $50 billion per annum. The development of homegrown proposals and institutional advances observed lately demonstrate Africa’s assertive engagement towards accelerating infrastructure development, thereby regionalization. At the last AU Summit, the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee approved the institutionalization of an annual PIDA Week hosted at the African Development Bank (AfDB) to follow up on the progresses made. The energy partnerships listed below illustrate the possible gain from adopting trans-boundary approaches for implementation and follow-up: the Africa Power Vision (APV) undertaken with Power Africa; the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) model accompanying the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) Africa Hub efforts; and the Africa GreenCo solution that is to bank on PIDA. The above-mentioned partnerships are encouraging trends towards more symbiotic multi-stakeholders cooperation. As they relate to home-crafted initiatives, it is imperative that we do not drift away from a continental vision. Not only do Africa-grown plans have higher chance of success than the one-size-fits-all imported solutions, but consistent and combined efforts in the same direction reinforce confidence, emulation, and attract supportive attention. It implies that the fulfillment of intergovernmental agreements requires first and foremost their adaptation to local realities in a domestication process that is respectful of the policy space. Mainstreaming adjustments can be later conducted according to evidence-based and data-driven experiments. Between these global engagements and national procedures, the regional dimension is the indispensable link: Enabling countries to bypass the artificiality of borders inherited from colonial times and offering concrete options to eradicate poverty in a united-we-stand fashion. Regional integration is therefore a prelude to sustainable development operationalization within Africa and a key step towards its active partaking in the global arena. Regionalization can also trigger international relations shift provided that it encompasses fair multilateralism and sustainable management of global knowledge. Indeed, the resulting openness and the complexity encountered are useful parameters to enrich the conception of relevant local answers. These success stories show the great potential for new experiments and synergies. To me, they inspire the promise of a better world. The one I like to imagine is characterized by mutually beneficial ecosystems for the people and the planet. It encourages win-win reverse linkages, or in other words, more positive spillovers of developing economies on industrial countries. It is a place where, for example, an African region could draw lessons from the Greek crisis and the other way around: China could learn from Africa’s Maputo Development Corridor for its Silk Road Economic Belt. Twin institutes performing joint research among regional knowledge hubs would flourish. Innovative Fab Labs would be entitled to strive after spatial adventure with e-waste material recycled into 3D printers. In that world, innovative collaborations in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) would be favored and involve not only women but also the diaspora in order to develop environmentally sound technical progress. Commensurate efforts, persistent willingness, indigenous ingenuity, and unbridled creativity place this brighter future within our reach. Beyond the recognition of the African voice throughout the intergovernmental processes, Africa should now consolidate its gains by firmly maintaining its position and safeguarding its winnings throughout the preliminary phase. The continent should urgently set singular tactics with the greatest potential in terms of inclusiveness and creation of productive capacity. While doing so, African development actors should initiate a “learning by doing” virtuous cycle to create an endogenous development narrative cognizant of adaptable best practices as well as failures. Yet the only approach capable of generating both structural transformation and informative change that are in line with continentally own and led long-term strategies is … regional integration.
54da00193132f69b54e073751d2c6c54	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/09/21/the-us-africa-business-forum-key-interventions-for-infrastructure-investment/	The US-Africa Business Forum: Key interventions for infrastructure investment	The US-Africa Business Forum: Key interventions for infrastructure investment Editor’s Note: On September 21, the Department of Commerce and Bloomberg Philanthropies are hosting the second U.S.-Africa Business Forum. Building on the forum in 2014, this year’s meeting again hosts heads of state, U.S. CEOs, and African business leaders, but aims to go beyond past commitments and towards effective implementation. This year’s forum will focus on seven sectors important to African economies and which offer opportunities for investors—namely finance and capital investment, infrastructure, power and energy, agriculture, consumer goods, and information communication technology. The below piece reviews the theme of infrastructure as an opportunity for investment on the African continent. The foundational necessity of providing core infrastructure throughout Africa has gained momentum in the last decade. This has led to ambitious initiatives such as the estimated $360 billion Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), which aims to promote socio-economic development and poverty reduction through improved access to integrated regional and continental infrastructure networks and services. Such cross-border flagship initiatives have answered the call to reduce Africa’s infrastructure deficit on a broad scale with promising significant impacts on the future African economy. Private participation in infrastructure (PPI) financing in Africa is also continuing to grow robustly, even as global PPI to low- and middle-income countries is falling. PPI in sub-Saharan Africa grew by 9.5 percent on average over the past 10 years, almost double the region’s GDP growth rate of 4.5 percent. While PPI has increased for a wide range of African countries since 2005, it has mainly benefitted the telecom and electricity sectors, which have received over 80 percent of all infrastructure investment commitments between 2005 and 2013. This has left a clear investment deficit in the transport and water treatment/utility sectors. One key consideration to address this gap in financing is understanding the critical role of the civil works sector. Of particular interest is Africa’s weak construction industry. A report on Aid Procurement and the Development of Local Industry looks at the composition of firms winning contracts in World Bank projects that have been submitted to international competitive bidding. It analyzes this transaction-level data on procurement as an indicator for measuring the capacity of a region to undertake civil works. The report’s findings suggest Africa lags far behind other regions in local civil works capacity. While East Asia, Europe, Latin America, and South Asia all secured above 85 percent of World Bank civil works contracts for their respective region in 2013, sub-Saharan Africa only managed to secure about 56 percent of their regions civil works contracts. This signals weak development of a competitive construction industry in Africa. U.S.-Africa Business Forum investors should enable strategic private investment that can help catalyze growth in this industry, building Africa’s capacity to undertake civil works and directly address the region’s infrastructure gaps.
8f9fc34b35d717f0f0e06f3d626a0c73	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/11/16/figures-of-the-week-cop22-and-climate-action-in-sub-saharan-africa/?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzRss&utm_campaign=brookingsrss/programs/global	Figures of the week: COP22 and climate action in sub-Saharan Africa	Figures of the week: COP22 and climate action in sub-Saharan Africa Weeks after the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on climate change, world leaders are gathering from November 7-18 in Marrakech, Morocco for the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP22. The Paris Agreement, adopted by 196 Parties, seeks to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping the world’s temperature rise this century below 2 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial levels and striving to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius. COP22 hopes to further define the rules for the Paris Agreement’s implementation and lay out a viable plan for providing at least $100 billion by 2020 to developing countries to support climate action. Over 20 African nations have ratified the agreement and climate change remains at the forefront of many African national and regional agendas. According to experts, climate change carries more danger for sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions than for many developed nations. A 2013 World Bank report found that food security will become Africa’s greatest challenge due to the effect of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods on agricultural productivity. According to the report, a 2-degree Celsius increase in temperature will contribute to farmers losing up to 80 percent of cropland conducive to growing maize, millet, and sorghum by 2040. A 4-degree Celsius increase will result in annual precipitation decreases of up to 30 percent in Southern Africa while East Africa will see a marked increase in precipitation levels. Some African countries have already experienced notable increases in their average annual temperature since 1960, as indicated in Figure 1 (below) from a recently released New Climate Economy Working Paper, “Africa’s New Climate Economy: Economic Transformation and Social and Environmental Change.” Source: UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles (various dates) in Africa’s New Climate Economy: Economic Transformation and Social and Environmental Change. As carbon dioxide levels increase, according to scientists, the ecosystem in some areas of Southern Africa will change from grass to woodland savannahs, reducing food for grazing cattle., Figure 2, from a 2013 World Bank report, “Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience,” shows the mean of the percentage change in the annual Aridity Index in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) for sub-Saharan Africa by 2071-2099 relative to 1951–1980. A negative change corresponds to a shift to more arid conditions. A decrease in aridity does not necessarily imply more favorable conditions for agriculture or livestock, as it may be associated with increased flood risks. Another World Bank study warns that the increased desertification and extreme weather events exacerbated by climate change could lead to a $520 billion drop in consumption by 2020. Source: Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience, World Bank. Representatives from African nations will come to Marrakech to present their Nationally Determined Commitments (NDC)—their plans for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2015-2030—promised at COP21. In addition, this week, developing and developed countries launched a new partnership dedicated to delivering on the commitments made in Paris. The NDC Partnership is a new coalition working to ensure that developing countries will receive the technical and financial support needed to achieve climate goals. Germany, a co-chair of the partnership, will align its international climate finance to the Partnership and increase this support from €2.7 billion ($2.9 billion) to €4 billion ($4.3 billion) by 2020. China, through its Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, and Brazil through its Biofuture Platform, also have important roles to play. Also at COP22, stakeholders will hope to work out details of how the funds—a $100 billion commitment from development countries—will be raised: The sum may come from bilateral sources such as the U.K.’s Department for International Development, multilateral sources such as the World Bank, multilateral funds such as the Green Climate Fund, government contributions, or sources of innovative financing, such as through France’s financial transaction tax. Junaid Belo-Osagie contributed to this post.
1083f865e3746500d951b939eb7e1757	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/12/22/africas-mixed-political-transitions-in-the-3-gs-gabon-the-gambia-and-ghana/	Africa’s mixed political transitions in the 3 Gs: Gabon, the Gambia, and Ghana	Africa’s mixed political transitions in the 3 Gs: Gabon, the Gambia, and Ghana Editor’s note: For more on African political transitions, see our interactive African Leadership Transitions Tracker, which presents changes at the head of state level in every African country from independence or end of the colonial period to the present. Africa has gone through a number of leadership transitions in 2016 and with each one the edifice that will shape Africa’s leadership and political transition process is being molded. 2016 has been another of year progress on the African leadership transition front. This year there have been 16 elections, in seven of the elections there was an effective leadership transition and over 60 percent of the elections were conducted in a free and transparent manner with satisfactory citizen involvement and little or no unrest—such as in Ghana or Cabo Verde. Overall, the leadership transitions have been largely peaceful, constitutional, and transparent. However, the experiences across countries and sub-regions have been quite varied and provide us with many lessons for the future. I will use Gabon, Gambia, and Ghana (the “three Gs”) to illustrate these experiences. Three elections, in Gabon in August, and the Gambia and Ghana in December, are shaping the narrative of this dynamic process and providing important lessons for the transition process. First, the struggle for change continues: While Africa is slowly moving towards more participatory political transitions, the fight has not completely won. In addition, the growing importance and maturity of electoral commissions; citizens’ increasing awareness that their votes matter; the slow but certain move away from tribal politics to issues politics; and now regional, rather than foreign, ownership around leadership transitions all contribute towards the deepening of democracy on the continent. Each of the countries—Gabon, the Gambia, and Ghana—have tackled these issues differently. Ghana is the pride of Africa when it comes to democratic transitions. Once again, its most recent election has proven this point. Despite the tense and intensely fought campaign both parties continue to pledge respect for the process. Indeed, there is much to celebrate around Africa’s leadership transitions, but much remains to perfect the process the continent over. This year many elections were held freely and fairly on the continent, and both incumbents and new leaders were elected to office—including Benin, Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia for example. And in an unprecedented move the President of Mauritania and Angola all declared they will not seek re-elections at the end of the term. A very positive and encouraging trend if the pronouncements come to pass. However, in a number of countries the old has not given way to the new, and the evolution of democracy is still in motion with too-often deadly consequences for the citizens in Burundi, Gabon, and the Gambia to name a few. These examples demonstrate that the concept of leadership transition has not yet been fully adopted. A number of lessons can be drawn from these latter experiences. The populations are increasingly more vocal about transparency of elections. Both sides incumbent and opposition have increasingly equal chances of getting their voices heard and results tend to be closer in these countries. There is still a need for vigilance, and the tendency to slip remains. Peaceful leadership transitions are not yet the norm. In the three Gs, the role of the electoral commissions has been a determining factor. In fact, electoral commission heads are increasingly becoming the new villains and/or heroes in the African struggle for peaceful leadership transitions. In Gabon, the head of the electoral commission’s independence was largely questioned primarily by the opposition and the people of Gabon, as well as international election observers. Notably, the final results of the election were not announced by the head of the electoral commission, as constitutionally stated, but by the minister of the interior—an institution with no independence from the incumbent. Gabon’s incumbent President Ali Bongo won by 49.9 percent over 48.2 percent for his rival Jean Ping, less than a 6,000 vote difference and suspiciously high turnout in Bongo’s home province. Violence and protests erupted not long after the announcement. The Gambia’s electoral commission performed and fared much better: Three months before the election, the head of the electoral commission Alieu Momarr Njai pledged in a memorable but unpublicized speech to uphold the integrity of the commission and protect the integrity of the process. During the launch of the electoral process he said: Election results may be rigged to predetermine who will win or lose, and election may be disrupted, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the process, but I stand here today to pronounce to you that, as far as our concerted efforts are in play, this will never be the case in our dear country. The Independent Electoral Commission believes that an election without integrity subverts the purpose of a democratic election, and cannot be considered fair and equitable. The IEC will ever concentrate on conducting free and fair elections. This, I believe we will ever achieve by upholding governing principles such as: respect for principles of electoral democracy; ethical conduct; accuracy and transparency. The people of the Gambia and many others did not expect such clarity of vision from the head of the electoral commission, and many dismissed this as normal election propaganda. However, Njai kept his word. He pronounced the elections results in favor of the opposition candidate Adama Barrow and called for President Yahya Jammeh, who has been in power for over 22 years, to step down, eliciting pride and jubilation from the people of the Gambia. The Gambia’s troubles have instead come from Jammeh’s withdrawal of his concession and determination to stay in power. In Ghana, the head of the election commission benefitted from a robust and solid system, which has a history of inclusion, transparency, and most of participation by all members of the political exercise. The continuous process undertaken by the Ghanaian electoral commission to continuously educate the electorate and the political parties is clearly a lesson for the rest of the continent on how to build trust and interact with the population. However, even in Ghana there are lessons to learn from the election, such as how to manage delays in the announcement of the election results and or glitches in the system on election day. In Ghana the commission needed more time to ensure everyone eligible to vote had voted and to count the votes. Tensions began to mount as the population waited for the elections results to be proclaimed, both sides began proclaiming victory and the supporters of each candidate began filling the streets. This could have led to severe unrest. However, the communication of the election committee head asking the people for patience while all the votes were counted was an example of good election management. The people could only heed to this request because of the trust built by the commission and a legitimate sense of ownership of the commission. Therefore, while independently elected, the first task of every election commission is to build trust with the people. As African countries prepare for more elections this should be an area that gets special attention. Ethnic politics is slowly giving way to issues politics. The economy is taking center stage in elections. In Ghana, as in the Gambia, the last few years have seen citizens suffer under the weight of weakening currencies, erosion of purchasing power by over 50 percent, increasing poverty, joblessness, and interest rates above 25 percent. Similarly, the rise of corruption, noted by Ghanaian President John Mahama in his concession speech, undermined all the achievements of Mahama presidency—and most of all his struggle to give affordable and reliable power to the people of Ghana. The results of these elections increasingly show that while there will always remain a thread of local politics in elections, the electorate is becoming more sophisticated and are voting on issues broader than ethnic origins. Citizens are more engaged and are owning the election agenda. African leaders are also increasingly more active in the resolution of African leadership transition issues. During the crisis period of the Gabon elections the French and the European Union were the most active and vocal voices. The French president called for a recount and the EU asked that all results be published, but Chadian President Idriss Déby, as head of the African Union, was the central mediator of the proceedings. In the case of the Gambia, the African Union alongside five other presidents of ECOWAS[1] countries have taken it upon themselves to mediate a settlement of the impasse. The acknowledgement and ownership of the transition agenda by Africa’s leaders is an important part of assuring peace and stability during transition crises. The cases of Burundi and the Gambia should provide lessons on how to make such negations successful. What incentives could be put in place to minimize difficult transitions? As the Ghanaians celebrate the peaceful election of new President Nana Akufo Addo, as President Bongo of Gabon settles into his second term, and as the Gambians wait anxiously for a resolution, the continent must heed the lessons of these three transitions and begin putting in place systems that allow citizens more ownership of the process, ensure that election commissions are truly independent and equipped to build trust with citizens, and encourage candidates that acknowledge the increasing sophistication of the electorate so campaign messages must have content and can no longer rely solely on identity politics. [1] Economic Community of West African States
19d5f047c321bbe6e3797d275f7c9ab6	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/01/23/foresight-africa-viewpoint-housing-africa/	Foresight Africa viewpoint: Housing Africa	Foresight Africa viewpoint: Housing Africa Adequately housing Africa’s growing and urbanizing population is an increasing challenge for policymakers and the private sector: According to a recent study by McKinsey,[1] by 2025 over 35 million housing units will be needed in Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa alone, and over 90 percent of Africa’s young population will live in urban areas. In 2017, policymakers should begin to focus on how to successfully prepare for this growing need. Addressing the housing challenge is critical for growth. The real estate sector has underpinned economic recovery in many developed countries and can help Africa weather its continued slow growth by generating domestic demand, creating jobs, and increasing wealth. However, following the 2008 financial crisis there has been a latent aversion to housing finance systems. Mortgage systems are under scrutiny, and the debate around adequate regulatory structures and appropriateness of instruments to whom and in what markets persists. Meanwhile, incomes are indeed rising on the continent, but most citizens cannot afford to independently finance mortgages. On the private sector front, mortgage markets are shallow and the perception of credit risks in the sector remains high. Some public programs, concessional financing, and a much improved regulatory environment are crucial to attract more private financing needed to support government’s ability to keep pace with the demand. In 2017, then, policymakers must consider several important steps. First, governments, working with the private sector, must develop and adopt an adequate legal and regulatory framework for housing finance. Fundamental to which is reducing financing risks to all parties, which requires first and foremost strengthening the land titling systems and enforcing property rights to ensure robustness of security and collateral. At the same time, a robust housing finance system relies on availability of good credit information. Accordingly, governments should accelerate the development of credit information bureaus. Finally, there must be clarity regarding the role of all institutions engaged in housing finance, private banks, micro-finance institutions, pension funds, insurance companies, and others in order to ensure all systemic risks are managed. Second, the financing role of the government must be clearly defined and should support market creation. A stable and predictable agreement on the division of risks and financing between the public and private sector must be reached, allowing for the possibility of providing blended financing to accelerate housing development. The public sector can guarantee demand-related risks by underwriting, for example, payment of housing units. Similarly, the private sector can assume all costs and quality related risks. Finally, capital markets development must be accelerated to provide instruments needed to support the development of housing finance. There is an increasing need for local currency long-term financing and development of secondary mortgage finance markets. These markets can help smooth default and financing risks and provide banks with an outlet to trade housing loans in order to adequately manage exposure to the housing sector. With a more developed housing finance market, financial institutions can begin offering longer-term financing, which will also support demand. [1] McKinsey Global Institute. Lions on the move II: Realizing the potential of Africa’s economies. September 2016. Available at: http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/middle-east-and-africa/lions-on-the-move-realizing-the-potential-of-africas-economies.
ba7c7ae36135a9d12d8c442768da0a3c	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/03/24/figures-of-the-week-human-development-progress-in-africa-and-globally/	Figures of the week: Human development progress in Africa and globally	Figures of the week: Human development progress in Africa and globally This week the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched its 2016 Human Development Report entitled Human Development for Everyone. The report takes stock of the global progress toward meeting human development objectives—as envisioned in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development—paying particular attention to people who face distinct deprivations and challenges to realizing basic human development. It also proposes policy options for governments and global institutions to address persisting deprivations and achieve inclusive human development. Source: UNDP, Human Development Report (2016). According to the report, recent trends in human development offer hope that positive change is occurring although there is much work still to be done. Reflecting growing incomes and advancements in education and health, levels of human development—measured using Human Development Index (HDI) values—have gradually improved in all regions of the world over the period from 1990 to 2015, as seen in Figure 1. However, the report also notes that aggregate HDI values obscure unequal concentrations of well-being within regions and countries and do not necessarily reflect the well-being of large proportions of the population. Another measure, the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IDHI), takes into account the effects of inequality on human development (as measured by the HDI). According to the IDHI, approximately 22 percent of the world’s human development is lost due to inequality, suggesting that unequal distribution of capabilities, access to basic services, and opportunities are major obstacles to achieving universal human development. Sub-Saharan Africa has the most significant inequality-induced human development losses at 32 percent, the report indicates. Furthermore, systematic patterns of deprivation are visible among certain populations. For example, women in all regions of the world have consistently lower HDI values than men do. The Gender Development Index (GDI), which measures differences in HDI estimates for women and men, reveals that the largest disparities are evident in South Asia (17.8 percent), Arab states (14.4 percent), and sub-Saharan Africa (12.3 percent). In addition, Figure 2 suggests that people in rural areas are much more likely to be multidimensionally poor than people in urban areas—especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where the share of people in rural areas who are multidemensionally poor (74 percent) is more than double the share in urban areas (31 percent). As countries strive to improve their human development outcomes, the report argues that disadvantaged groups must have equal choices and opportunities in order for everyone to benefit from social and economic advancement. Source: UNDP, Human Development Report (2016). Moving forward, the report argues that “time is of the essence” in sub-Saharan Africa as countries attempt to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including eliminating poverty and hunger and achieving gender equality, by 2030. Figure 3 shows the annual proportionate rates of change needed for the region to meet the SDG targets related to education, poverty, and under-five mortality based on the year that the region begins taking action. For example, to meet the SDG target of eliminating extreme poverty, countries will need to reduce extreme poverty at a rate of 10 percent a year between 2015 and 2030. However, if they wait until 2018 to take action on extreme poverty, the rate would increase to 13 percent a year, or if they wait until 2027 to begin their interventions, the rate would quadruple to 42 percent a year.
050e676390473620952b9ae8a7aa1504	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/04/28/donald-trumps-first-100-days-and-africa/	Donald Trump’s first 100 days and Africa	Donald Trump’s first 100 days and Africa Saturday, April 29, marks the 100th day of Donald Trump’s presidency. Many media outlets have analyzed the start of the presidency and its significance for the American people and U.S. foreign policy. Prior to inauguration, the Trump administration’s views on Africa were relatively unknown, and his moves since January 20 have shed little light on his attitude toward the continent. However, he has not ignored the continent outright. What have his first 100 days revealed about the administration’s policy toward Africa? In his first 100 days, Trump has been in contact with several African presidents to discuss the future of the relationship between those countries and the United States. The content of these conversations suggests that Trump’s focus in Africa is around strengthening security in the region. In February, Trump and President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria discussed cooperation on security, economic, and governance priorities. During the phone call, Trump expressed specific support for the sale of aircraft from the U.S. to Nigeria in order to support the fight against Boko Haram. Also that month, Trump and President Jacob Zuma of South Africa discussed ways to expand cooperation and trade—as well as increasing collaboration between the two countries on security issues. In early March, Trump and President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya discussed the state of security in East Africa, and Trump specifically praised Kenya’s efforts in combatting al-Shabab and its contribution to the African Union Mission in Somalia. The leaders talked about ways to increase bilateral trade and investment in Kenya. Amid all the chatter around Trump’s first 100 days, there is one notable concrete action that was taken, which could have an effect on Africa: the defunding of organizations that provide family planning services. In early April, the State Department announced that they would be ending U.S. funding to United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), claiming that its operations violate an antiabortion policy enacted by the Trump administration. The U.S. was the third-largest donor to UNFPA, granting it $75.9 million in 2015. During his first week in office, President Trump also reinstated the global gag rule, which prevents any organization providing abortion services, information, counseling, or referrals from receiving U.S. federal funding. The reinstated rule could put women at risk of maternal mortality, in the absence of alternative sources of funding for family planning programs. In that realm, the Dutch government has raised $190 million in the aim to counter the effects of the reinstated Mexico City Policy. Maternal mortality in sub-Saharan Africa has been declining since 1990. The graph below shows that the decline was steeper in the absence of the Mexico City Policy. Removing funding to organizations that provide family planning services could increase the number of unsafe abortions. According to the WTO, unsafe abortion causes 13 percent of all maternal deaths. East Africa is presently facing the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in 70 years. Nearly 16 million people in South Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria are at risk of dying of hunger. The fiscal year 2018 budget plans to reduce funding to the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development by 28 percent. In February, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres announced that $4.4 billion is needed by the end of March to avert a widespread hunger crisis in Yemen, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan. The Trump’s fiscal year 2018 “skinny” budget plans to reduce funding to the Department of State and USAID by 28 percent, meaning Africa specifically will see a budget cut of 13 percent. Certain countries, including the Central African Republic, Niger, and Sierra Leone will lose all of their U.S. foreign aid. Cuts to the World Bank and the U.N. are also major pieces. The U.S. has traditionally been one of the largest donors to the U.N. The cuts in foreign assistance can significantly affect the world’s ability to deal with the crisis in East Africa. The proposed budget also eliminates the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account. The program ensures that the U.S. has enough resources for refugee assistance. In 2014, $408.6 million was allocated to the African continent under the fund’s umbrella. A portion of the funds went toward assisting internally displaced people in South Sudan and south Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. The funds provided the refugees with access to clean water and sanitation, food, health care, gender-based violence protection, etc… With the continuing violence in South Sudan, cutting funding to ERMA could significantly affect the fate of refugees in the region. Programs such as the Famine Early Warning Systems Network are rumored to be eliminated, as well as the Office of Women’s Issues. The Bureau of Food Security will face budget cuts of 67.8 percent. The budget also proposes eliminating funding for the African Development Foundation. The program is an independent federal agency, which supports African-led development by supporting community enterprises and providing them with seed capital and technical support. In 2016, the group invested $53 million in 500 active enterprises. Given opposition in Congress to many of these cuts, these consequences, at the moment, remain only possibilities. Overall, if his first 100 days are any indication, it is quite possible the president will follow the trend of many of his predecessors, and leave Africa to much later in his term.
2167c7af9b861f998ae6066b2d755adf	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/07/17/separatist-agitations-in-nigeria-the-way-forward/	Separatist agitations in Nigeria: The way forward	Separatist agitations in Nigeria: The way forward The typical response of Nigerian governments over the years to separatist agitations is to brand the agitators “troublemakers,” and send law enforcement agencies to use force to quell their agitations. This often results in casualties, stoking ethnic tensions in the process, which further hardens separatist agitations. For instance, Amnesty International accused the Nigerian security forces, led by the military, of embarking “on a chilling campaign of extrajudicial executions and violence resulting in the deaths of at least 150 peaceful pro-Biafra protesters.” The report by Amnesty International was exploited by IPOB supporters who saw it as a legitimation of its argument that its protests were peaceful and that the Buhari government used it as an excuse to kill the Igbos. Nigerian authorities denied the claim by Amnesty International, saying it was only aimed to tarnish the reputation of the country’s security forces. Although in recent times the government appears to be showing more willingness to use dialogue to solve some of the country’s separatist challenges (such as the recent remark by Acting President Yemi Osinbajo that citizens have right to discuss their continued existence in Nigeria), much more needs to be done. Below are recommendations to address these separatist challenges: Power sharing At the root of the north-south dichotomy is the distribution of power between the two blocs and access to infrastructure and privileges at the federal level. It will be helpful to institutionalize or codify the existing conventional system of power sharing and rotating the presidency between the two blocs as an interim measure—until the country’s democracy matures and trust between the two blocs and among Nigerians has improved. Strengthening the Federal Character Commission (FCC), an agency created in 1996 to ensure fairness in the distribution of jobs and socioeconomic amenities among different parts of the country, would help build trust among groups. Making it a mandatory requirement that certain federal appointments and distribution of infrastructure must have the imprimatur of the FCC will reduce the suspicion that the ethnic group in power will privilege its in-group and disadvantage others. This move will, in turn, help attenuate the anarchic character of the country’s politics. Tolerance of uncomfortable views One of the arguments for free speech is that through a robust competition of ideas in the political marketplace, the truth will be discovered. Unfortunately, some of the ideas that are brought into such markets are necessarily those that “shock and awe” and annoy and aggravate people. Banning them, though, will make them more dangerous by driving them underground and glamorizing the leaders of those who espouse such ideas. Indeed, when Nnamdi Kanu, who was hardly known in Nigeria, was detained, his popularity soared to eclipse those of other Biafra separatists, turning him into a cult hero among his followers and making it easier for his group to recruit and raise funds. Criminalizing separatist demands romanticizes the hush-hush agitations for independence. Therefore, handling such uncomfortable viewpoints in such a way that they do not put stress on the system is the acme of statecraft. It is probably for this reason that purveyors of offensive views such as the as the KKK in the United States are not banned. The preference is to draw these groups’ ideas out and then out-compete them. While some argue that “proportionate force” should be used to deal with such groups, the carrot approach should always be the first line of engagement. Referendum Referendum is another time-tested instrument for blunting separatist tendencies in the mature democracies. It is also a way of testing whether the leaders of the separatist movements really reflect the wishes of those they claim they represent and want to “liberate”’ Following from this idea, perhaps Nigeria should consider a constitutional provision allowing for a referendum among nationalities that want to secede from the union, say, once every 30 years. This will allow earnest conversations between supporters and opponents of each separatist movement. Though opponents of referendum in Africa argue that it may actually encourage secession, the counterargument by its supporters is that it could force states in Africa to be fair to all its component parts, which will convince them beyond doubt that the benefits of remaining part of the country clearly outweigh the benefits of becoming an independent state. Prioritizing nation-building processes Ultimately, the greatest weapon against separatist agitation is for each constituent party to feel treated fairly and be convinced that the gains of being part of the Nigerian federation far outweigh the benefits of existing as an independent country. This means the country must prioritize its nation-building processes, which currently seem to be engulfed in crisis. In addition to the tools mentioned above, the government should also consider creating a separate Ministry of National Integration to drive and coordinate efforts at the country’s nation-building processes. While the Biafra separatist threat is receiving the most attention at the moment, many other groups hold similar goals. Consequently, the government should not wait for other separatist agitators in hibernation to get re-energized before acting. Note: Jideofor Adibe is an associate professor of political science at Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria. He is the founding editor of the quarterly peer-reviewed academic journal African Renaissance, and co-editor of the bi-annual academic journal, Journal of African Foreign Affairs. He is also a weekly columnist with Daily Trust, one of Nigeria’s leading national newspapers and the Executive Director of the think-tank, ROGAN Leadership Foundation. The author can be reached at [email protected]. This blog reflects the views of the author only and does not reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative.
8aaad98fc923d02b9aa465d5eac750ef	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/09/06/kenya-presidential-elections-and-the-rule-of-law/	Kenya: Presidential elections and the rule of law	Kenya: Presidential elections and the rule of law Those are the historic words of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kenya, as read by the Honorable David Maraga, CJ, chief justice and president of the Supreme Court, declaring “invalid, null and void” the “declared results” of the country’s August 8 presidential election.[1] This ruling nullifies the re-election of an incumbent president and orders that same president conduct a new vote within 60 days in “strict conformity with the constitution and applicable election laws.” In 2010, Kenya adopted a new, progressive constitution that established a more decentralized governing system. In addition to the fact that the new constitution entrenched the concept of separation of powers with checks and balances, it significantly reduced the powers of what had heretofore been an imperial presidency. Significantly, the new constitution established what most Kenyans believe is an independent judiciary, capable of making certain that government activities are only undertaken strictly in conformity with the constitution. The August 8, 2017 presidential election represented an opportunity for the Kenyan judiciary to perform an important rule of law function and establish, once and for all, the critical role of an independent judiciary in governance generally and in the maintenance of law and order, as well as democratic living, in particular. Kenyans had, once again, as they did in the violent aftermath of the 2007 elections, come to a fork in the road: This time, however, they made the right choice and instead of opting for destructive mobilization, chose to allow the courts to resolve their conflicts. In doing so, they set the country on the road to peaceful coexistence and hopefully, sustainable economic growth and development. The 2017 presidential elections were, by and large, conducted peacefully. However, there was an attack on the home of Deputy President William Ruto in late July 2017 and several people were murdered just before the election, including Christopher Msando, the head of information, communication, and technology at the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) of Kenya, the organization charged with conducting the elections. The official results showed that Kenyatta had been re-elected with 54.27 percent to main opposition leader Odinga’s 44.74 percent. In addition to the fact that the country’s top election official, Wafula Chebukati, had stated that the election was “free, fair and credible,” both the incumbent and several international officers—including former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry—made similar claims. Despite these pronouncements, Odinga argued that the election had been marred with irregularities and called for strike action to support his claim—that the election results were “hacked and rigged in favor of the incumbent” and hence, in his opinion and that of his supporters, were invalid. Although most observers stated that the casting of ballots went without any major problems, the opposition argued that the electronic transmission of the results was severely flawed and that errors introduced through the transmission process cheated them out of a victory. Kenyatta, who had been declared re-elected, urged the opposition to avoid violent mobilization and instead, take their concerns about the election to the courts. Thus, on August 18, 2017, lawyers representing the National Super Alliance, the opposition coalition led by Odinga, filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Kenya. Then, on September 1, the Supreme Court made its historic announcement. The ruling was historic and represents an important win for Kenyans and the rule of law. The Supreme Court’s ruling, which has not yet been released in full, supports the opposition’s claims. The court stated in its official opinion to Kenyans that the IEBC had “failed, neglected, or refused to conduct the presidential election in a manner consistent with the dictates of the Constitution.” Notably, the six-judge Supreme Court panel found that Kenyatta and his administration had not engaged in any election malpractice. Instead, they found that the IEBC had engaged in various “irregularities and illegalities in the transmission of the results,” as well as other unspecified malpractices that seriously affected the “integrity of the poll.” The decision, of course, was not the only important statement on the election: The candidates’ responses to it would determine how it would be received. To his credit, Kenyatta said that he would respect the Supreme Court’s ruling and called on all Kenyans to respond peacefully to the ruling, although he did express anger at the nullification of his win. Odinga, of course, welcomed the ruling while some supporters of the president remain angry. It is very important for Kenyans to understand that the winner here is not the opposition but Kenya and its democratic institutions instead. A hundred years from now, this decision will be remembered, not because it granted the opposition another opportunity to capture the presidency, or cheated the incumbent out of a win, but because it reaffirmed Kenyans’ strong belief in constitutionalism, peaceful resolution of conflict, and the rule of law. What this ruling has done is save the country from unnecessary bloodshed, and place it on the path to peace and democratic governance. It has granted Kenyans a second chance to think about how they want to move forward and be governed—now is the time for Kenya’s political elites to seek to build political parties based, not on ethnicity,[2] but on those ideals that are cherished by all Kenyans: peaceful coexistence, opportunities for self-actualization, political and economic competition based on skill and merit (not on one’s ethnic origin), equality before the law, and peaceful resolution of conflict. Both parties are to be credited for recognizing the important role that the courts can play in resolving conflicts of this type: By allowing the country’s independent judiciary to resolve the matter, both Kenyatta and Odinga have made history, not just in Kenya, but in all of Africa. Perhaps other countries on the continent can appreciate the importance of the rule of law and why an independent judiciary is critical to the maintenance of a democratic system and peaceful coexistence. Of course, both Kenyatta and Odinga, as well as their supporters, must now accept the Supreme Court’s ruling, move forward peacefully and engage in what, hopefully, will be a fair, credible, and peaceful new election. However, given the Supreme Court’s decision and the opposition’s claims of malpractices by the IEBC, it is important that the issue of the IEBC’s competence and independence be revisited before the new elections can take place. The test of whether Kenyan’s political elites can provide the leadership needed to peacefully carry out the Supreme Court’s orders and select a government that will govern the country, enhance the country’s democracy, and provide an enabling environment for sustainable growth and development, is yet to come. The Supreme Court has performed its part and has done so superbly. Now, the government must do its own part—it must ensure that the new election is undertaken in “strict conformity with the Constitution and the applicable election laws.” Of course, the government cannot carry out this monumental task without the help and cooperation of the opposition. Kenyans have long criticized their courts for kowtowing to the executive of the day. The present court was quite aware of the criticisms thrown at the Supreme Court in 2013 when it heard and decided a similar petition made by Odinga. This time, however, the court acted with a bold determination to function as an independent arbiter of justice. It made a ruling that will significantly affect the future of democracy and the rule of law, not just in Kenya, but also in Africa. The hope is that Kenyans, whether they are supporters of Mr. Kenyatta or Mr. Odinga, will see this ruling as the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to build an effective governing process based on the rule of law. In doing so, their country will stand as a beacon of hope in a region ravaged by sectarian violence and undemocratic regimes, as well as join a growing number of African countries that are gradually developing and sustaining democratic systems of governance. [1] General elections were scheduled in Kenya for August 8, 2017 in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010, which requires that there be a general election on the second Tuesday in August in every fifth year. The main contenders for the position of President of the Republic of Kenya were incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta (Jubilee Party) and opposition leader, Raila Odinga (National Super Alliance—NASA). The other candidates included Mohamed Abduba Dida, John Ekuru Longoggy Aukot, Shakhalaga Khwa Jirongo, Japhet Kavinga Kaluyu, Michael Wainaina Mwaura, and Joseph William Nthiga Nyagah. [2] Ethnicity is an ever-present factor in Kenyan elections. For example, pre-election interviews of potential voters revealed that Kenyans from virtually all of the country’s ethnocultural groups indicated that they would only vote for a candidate of their own group because they “trust him.” President Kenyatta is Kikuyu and opposition leader Odinga is Luo. Within Kenya, five ethnocultural groups—the Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo, and Kamba—make up nearly 70 percent of the country’s population. The continued politicization of ethnicity means that an ethno-regional coalition can possibly and effectively dominate political economy for many years to come, effectively depriving other groups of the opportunity to participate in and contribute to the country’s political life. Perhaps, more importantly, is the fact that the decision of Kenyans to cast their votes based on the ethnic origins of the candidate and not on the latter’s campaign platform, can make it very difficult for prospective candidates for public office, including the presidency, to develop a well-integrated platform, one that appeals to the median voter. In other words, candidates and their political parties are not likely to seek and support policies that appeal to the nation as a whole, but limit themselves to policy platforms that meet the needs and reflect the interests and values of their ethnic kinfolks. This, unfortunately, is an inappropriate way for political elites to promote national integration and nation building.
ea72603b53e71e6ff55d172741ee15ed	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/10/30/vers-quelle-transformation-structurelle-en-afrique/	Vers quelle transformation structurelle en Afrique?	Vers quelle transformation structurelle en Afrique? L’Afrique subsaharienne a renoué avec la croissance. Pour poursuivre sa transformation structurelle nonobstant le faible tissu industriel et les côuts élevés de sa main d’œuvre, l’adoption de politiques visant à faciliter l’entrepreneuriat dans les secteurs de services prometteurs est crucial. Ces politiques devraient aider à confronter le défi d’absorber les millions de jeunes qui vont entrer dans le marché du travail. Après plus de trois décennies de déclin post-indépendance, la majeure partie de l’Afrique subsaharienne (ASS) a retrouvé le chemin de la croissance. Cependant, quelques nuages subsistent à l’horizon : au niveau macro, la désindustrialisation du continent intervenue dans les années 1970 et 1980 ne s’est pas inversée, tandis que l’ajustement structurel a semblé fonctionner à l’envers, ne parvenant pas à orienter les ressources vers des utilisations productives et les concentrant plutôt sur des secteurs à croissance lente. L’Afrique peut-elle encore exploiter son avantage comparatif latent dans les industries légères à forte intensité en main-d’œuvre pour tirer parti de la délocalisation de deuxième génération ? Un numéro spécial de la Revue d’Economie du Développement réunit des contributions récentes sur l’analyse de la transformation structurelle et les entraves à l’industrialisation de l’Afrique subsaharienne. La pauvreté a fortement chuté mais l’élasticité de la pauvreté à la croissance est faible. Cadot, Melo, Plane, Wagner et Woldemichael, montrent que l’élasticité de la pauvreté par rapport à la croissance reste plus faible en ASS que dans d’autres régions sur la période 1993-2011. Ils attribuent cette faible élasticité à la taille du secteur agricole où la population réside sur des terres fragilisées, et montrent que ce constat qui pourrait sembler normal dans le cas de pays riches en ressources naturelles, vaut également pour les pays pauvres en ressources naturelles. Aucun facteur particulier ne semble expliquer la disparition du faible tissu industriel. Comme le montrent la hausse d’exportations dans des secteurs autres que les matières premières, il y a autant de dynamisme entrepreneurial en ASS qu’ailleurs, et la concentration des exportations semble être une caractéristique propre aux pays riches en ressources naturelles plutôt qu’à l’ensemble de l’ASS. Le seul facteur qui se détache est celui d’un ajustement structurel qui semble avoir orienté l’excédent de main-d’œuvre agricole vers des secteurs à faible croissance de productivité protégés de la concurrence internationale plutôt que vers le secteur manufacturier. Globalement, la faiblesse des investissements nationaux et étrangers suggère des taux de rendement inadéquats à vu des risques liés à l’activité commerciale en Afrique. L’énigme des coûts élevés de la main d’œuvre. En s’appuyant sur un échantillon de firmes industielles (les Enterprise Surveys de la Banque mondiale) dans 12 pays d’ASS et 13 pays comparables (Bangladesh, Cambodge, Vietnam, etc….), Gelb, Meyer et Ramachandran offrent une pièce cruciale au débat. La main-d’œuvre africaine est plus chère que celle des pays de comparaison ayant le même niveau de revenu. Par exemple, alors que le Kenya et le Bangladesh ont des niveaux de PIB par habitant similaires (environ $500), le coût médian de la main-d’œuvre industrielle au Kenya est quatre fois plus élevé. Ils estiment une prime en termes de coût du travail de 50 % en Afrique par rapport aux entreprises de taille semblable dans des pays comparables. Pourquoi cette différence dans les coûts de main-d’œuvre ? Gelb et al. identifient trois facteurs potentiels. Le premier est un biais de sélection : seules participeraient les entreprises les plus productives qui verseraient à leurs employés des salaires supérieurs à ceux du marché. Le second est que les coûts de main-d’œuvre augmentent plus rapidement avec la taille de l’entreprise en ASS qu’ailleurs. Ceci est potentiellement un signe de goulots d’étranglement sous-jacents au niveau de la main-d’œuvre qualifiée, si les grandes entreprises emploient une part disproportionnée de travailleurs qualifiés, ou d’une pression des syndicats sur les grandes entreprises formelles. Troisièmement, il se pourrait que la main-d’œuvre africaine est plus chère en valeur nominale mais pas en valeur réelle quand les valeurs sont exprimées en Parité des Pouvoirs d’Achat (PPA). Il s’agirait alors de distorsions liées aux taux de change plutôt qu’au marché du travail. Gelb et Diofasi explorent cette dernière hypothèse en régressant le niveau des prix en PPA sur le niveau du revenu par tête et identifient, qu’en moyenne, le niveau des prix est 30% plus élevé en ASS par rapport à celui des comparateurs. Ils s’attaquent alors à plusieurs facteurs pouvant expliquer cet écart : facteurs géographiques (petites îles, faible densité démographique, taille économique), qualité des institutions, suréchantillonage des biens consommés par les riches dans le panier de consommation, mauvaise mesure du PIB, subventions de l’énergie, aide et syndrome Hollandais, faible productivité agricole augmentant le prix de la nourriture. Pris dans leur ensemble, ces facteurs réduisent l’écart de moitié. L’ASS demeure un outlier. En résumé, pris dans leur ensemble, ces trois contributions justifient l’accent mis par les donateurs sur l’agriculture et les infrastructures, même si les améliorations nécessaires pour absorber les millions de jeunes qui vont entrer sur le marché du travail dans les vingt prochaines années semble un défi colossal. Mettre l’accent sur les services pourrait être autre moyen de favoriser l’emploi, le développement et la convergence en ASS. Les Services un escalator de croissance? Dans leur contribution, Ghani et O’Connell soutiennent que le potentiel des services à agir comme moteur de croissance a été sous-estimé dans les pays à faible revenu d’ASS (Rodrik (2013) entre autres, ayant documenté que l’on observe une convergence conditionelle de la productivité seulement dans l’industrie manufacturière). Ils confirment une non-convergence dans l’agriculture, mais documentent que sur la période 1990-2012, les services étaient de loin les principaux facteurs de croissance du PIB dans les pays à revenu faible et moyen. Plus surprenant encore au vu de l’enjeu que représente l’emploi en ASS, ils montrent que la croissance de la productivité dans les services s’est accompagnée d’une croissance du nombre d’emplois. Ghani et O’Connell corrigent plusieurs idées reçues qui sous-tendent la croyance largement répandue que les services ne peuvent servir de moteur de croissance. Premièrement, la croissance des échanges internationaux de services commerciaux implique que la demande étrangère, exogène, peut contribuer à la croissance de la valeur ajoutée des services parallèlement à la demande nationale. Deuxièmement, le terme « services » recouvre des activités très hétérogènes, dont certaines (transport, télécommunications, services financiers, etc.) sont de plus en plus caractérisées par une évolution technologique rapide et donc par un autre facteur de croissance exogène. Troisièmement, et largement pour les mêmes raisons, contrairement à certaines croyances, il n’est pas prouvé que les emplois de service soient moins bons en termes de salaire et de retour sur l’investissement en formation que les emplois manufacturiers. Ces tendances contrastent avec l’industrie manufacturière dont la part dans l’emploi total, tous pays confondus, a tendance à suivre une courbe en forme de U inversé en termes de niveau de développement, le pic étant atteint à des niveaux inférieurs pour les derniers venus en termes de développement, comme l’ASS. Ghani et O’Connell notent que dans les services où la taille est loin d’être aussi importante que dans les entreprises manufacturières, il est plus important d’adopter des politiques qui faciliteront l’entrepreneuriat alors que dans l’industrie, il pourrait être plus important d’attirer les multinationales plutôt que de favoriser l’entreprenariat national. Au niveau national, les restrictions les plus flagrantes au commerce international ayant été éliminées sur le continent, ces conclusions suggèrent que les politiques destinées à faciliter le développement de services devenus de plus en plus commercialisables doivent être poursuivies. Dans leur introduction, Cadot et Melo préconisent de se concentrer sur les « maillons faibles » de l’économie, c’est-à-dire les secteurs non échangeables dont certains sont caractérisés par une productivité particulièrement faible. Comme les importations ne peuvent se substituer à ces activités, celles-ci peuvent être un frein au développement d’autres secteurs. Ainsi, un secteur de l’énergie déficient – situation fréquente en ASS – ou un secteur bancaire non réformé peut avoir des effets négatifs transversaux sur toute l’économie et en particulier sur les secteurs les plus à même de contribuer à la transformation structurelle, notamment de par leur participation dans les chaînes de valeur. Du point de vue des partenaires au développement, l’aide pourrait appuyer la transformation structurelle du continent et particulièrement ses « maillons faibles », c’est-à-dire le secteur manufacturier et les goulots d’étranglement (par exemple, coûts de transport élevés et irrégularité de l’accès à l’électricité) qui la minent. À l’inverse, certains partenaires pourraient également vouloir cibler les « maillons forts », soit les secteurs les plus productifs afin qu’ils agissent comme moteurs de développement. Ainsi les entreprises les plus productives pourraient contribuer à renforcer les normes de qualité chez leurs sous-traitants ou leur fournir de l’assistance technique. C’est le cas par exemple de certaines chaînes de distribution qui fournissent une assistance à la mise aux normes des productions agricoles. D’autres études, ainsi que l’expérimentation en termes de politiques permettront de déterminer la stratégie ayant le meilleur rendement. Balassa, Bela (1964) “The Purchasing Power Doctrine: A Reappraisal”, Journal of Political Economy, 584-96. Cadot, Olivier, Jaime de Melo (2016) « Vers une transformation structurelle en Afrique, Revue d’Economie du Développement, ce numero, n0. 2, 5-18. Cadot, Olivier, Jaime de Melo, Patrick Plane, Laurent Wagner et Martha Tesfaye Woldemichael (2016) Industrialisation et transformation structurelle: L’Afrique subsaharienne peut-elle se développer sans usines?, Revue d’Economie du Développement, n0. 2, 19-50. Gelb, Alan ,Christian Meyer, et Viaya Ramachandran (2016)Pays pauvres, pays bon marché? Regard comparatif sur le coût de la main d’œuvre dans le secteur industriel en Afrique, Revue d’Economie du Développement, n0. 2, 51-92. Gelb, Alan, et Anna Diofasi (2016) Pays Pauvres, pays bon bon marché? Regard Comparatif sur le coût de la main d’œuvre dans le secteur industriel en Afrique, Revue d’économie du développement, n0. 2, 93-142. Ghani, Ejaz, et Stephen O’Connell (2016) Les Services Peuvent-ils devenir un escalator de croissance pour les pays à faible revenu?, Revue d’Economie du Développement, n0. 2, 143-73. Rodrik, Dani (2013) “Unconditional Convergence in Manufacturing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 165-204. Söderbom, Mans, and Francis Teal (2004) “Size and Efficiency in African Manufacturing Firms: Evidence from Firm-Level Panel Data”, Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), 369-94.. Young, Alwyn. (2012) “The African Growth Miracle”, Journal of Political Economy, 120(4), 696-739.
88004e4d146cb4ecd12478115e11c561	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/01/12/foresight-africa-viewpoint-emerging-from-crisis-cote-divoires-success-story/	Foresight Africa viewpoint – Emerging from crisis: Côte d’Ivoire’s success story	Foresight Africa viewpoint – Emerging from crisis: Côte d’Ivoire’s success story Despite a lost decade, culminating in the post-electoral crisis of 2010, Côte d’Ivoire has become one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, with an average annual GDP growth rate of 9 percent since 2012. During that decade, the country was marked by insecurity and political instability, public debt exploded, the business environment degraded, the total investment rate fell below 10 percent of GDP, and economic growth averaged close to zero. As a result, basic socio-economic infrastructures and services, including schools, health facilities, electricity, and water supply deteriorated, affecting youth employment and poverty. Today, Côte d’Ivoire is a success story and one of Africa’s most resilient economies to external shocks. First, priority was given to security and political stability through the reform of the security sector including the demobilization of more than 64,000 ex-combatants, and a national reconciliation and social cohesion program. Second, two comprehensive National Development Plans (2012-2015 and 2016-2020) worth around $72 billion were designed with contributions from civil society, private sector, and development partners. To enhance accountability, they are monitored through key performance indicators. We are creating inclusive growth by allocating more than a third of our annual budget to social expenditures, particularly in health and education, with a focus on gender equality, compulsory education, and universal medical coverage. From 2011 to 2015, we produced as much clean water as during the 50 years following our independence, and the access rate to electricity now stands at 80 percent of the population. Accordingly, the poverty rate declined from 51 percent in 2011 to 46 percent in 2015. Facilitating private sector activity has been a key pillar of our strategy to diversify our economy and create employment, especially for youth. As a result, our business environment has improved and total investment has now reached 20 percent of GDP, compared to 9 percent in 2011. We have achieved a stable macroeconomic environment through strengthened public finance management, inflation below 2 percent, and a sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio of 42 percent. The main lessons of post-crisis management in Côte d’Ivoire can be summed up in the launching of a well-designed strategy with the appropriate prioritization and monitoring, as well as a strong political will for its concrete implementation. Future challenges will be to maintain our current trajectory in becoming an emerging market economy, ensure a successful demographic transition, and lay the foundation for sustainable and inclusive growth in a peaceful environment.
40f47b3fe34f67f14fae1cce53cdbb35	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/01/31/foresight-africa-viewpoint-african-entrepreneurship-in-technology-challenges-and-opportunities-in-2018/?shared=email&msg=fail	Foresight Africa viewpoint – African entrepreneurship in technology: Challenges and opportunities in 2018	Foresight Africa viewpoint – African entrepreneurship in technology: Challenges and opportunities in 2018 Technology entrepreneurs in Africa enter 2018 in a precarious position. Fortunately, we’ve seen gradual improvement in key areas. For instance, venture capital activity has grown and there are more transactions: Since 2012, venture capital has grown by a factor of 8.7 ($366,000,086 in 2016)[1] and we’ve seen a 40 percent year-over-year growth in deals closed.[2] There are also notable improvements in the ease of doing business. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2018 Report, the following African countries were among the top 10 improved nations across the globe: Nigeria, Malawi, Zambia, and Djibouti. Nigeria moved up 24 spots (from 169 to 145). Because of the global slowdown in 2016, many African markets looked inward and set a foundation for inclusive and more sustainable growth. Specifically, they focused on macroeconomic reform, supported diversification, and emphasized domestic goods. Certain key indicators of growth have demonstrated healthy progress. Namely, there have been more venture capital deals, increased connectivity between markets and entrepreneurial ecosystems, and their macro conditions are heading in the right direction. There are major challenges, however, that require collective problem-solving to unlock the real power of technology entrepreneurship in Africa. Increase access to capital for early-stage businesses. Foreign direct investment (FDI), venture capital, and financial products from banks are often distributed to established and later-stage companies. The lack of early-stage “market validation” capital must be addressed so that there are sufficient resources to get companies off the ground. Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, virtual reality, and blockchain will require significant resources to get started and will lean on early-stage capital to build out teams of specialists, acquire required data, and scale technical infrastructure. Radical solutions to energy deficiency. There’s great work under way by African public and private sector stakeholders to bring energy projects to fruition and improve energy regulations and policy. However, Africa’s energy needs are urgent and traditional ways of increasing electricity capacity are inherently slow. We need massive investments in decentralized, renewable, and flexible energy solutions to increase access to energy beyond urban areas and serve as a catalyst for growth in an equitable and sustainable way. Train youth to be globally competitive. Improving access to quality education and professional outcomes is essential for long-term transformation. However, vocational and skills-based training can rapidly mobilize the job force necessary for key industries in a short period of time. Investing in education and practical and transferable skills training is an opportunity to fortify Africa’s greatest asset—its people. Embrace globalization while protecting indigenous industries. Aging in advanced economies and some parts of emerging Asia is weighing on global economic growth. That reality provides African countries with possibilities for growth and global partnerships. African governments will have to balance courting multinationals to do business in their countries while also supporting nascent indigenous technologies and industries. At tiphub, I have had the chance to work with companies faced with some of the above-mentioned challenges and see opportunities for value creation. Companies like Gebeya prepare young adults in East Africa with 21st century skills like programming, datab science, and user interface design—all skills needed to create solutions with emerging technologies. Another company, Scholarx, leverages the African diaspora and innovative financial instruments to make education more affordable for Nigerian students. Aledin Nano and Jamii Africa are two innovative companies taking traditional financial products and leveraging technology to distribute micro-lending and micro-insurance services to the masses. I’ve met founders who look at the energy deficiency as a massive opportunity to bring renewable and decentralized solutions to market. Therein lies the key differentiator of the African entrepreneur. In the face of uncertainty and adversity, the African entrepreneur not only finds a way to make it work, but also creates solutions that shape the future of the entire continent. African entrepreneurs have the ingenuity to solve problems and they will continue to do so. Nevertheless, collaboration and coordination among companies and stakeholders like government agencies, multinationals, and non-governmental organizations can accelerate the path forward toward rapid and inclusive growth for all. 1. Partech Ventures (2017), VC funding raised by African tech startups totals a record-breaking $366.8 million in 2016. https://goo.gl/cjP5Bm At the time of publication, the total amount of venture capital investment in 2017 had not yet been reported. 2. Partech Ventures (2017), VC funding raised by African tech startups totals a record-breaking $366.8 million in 2016. https://goo.gl/cjP5Bm At the time of publication, the total volume of transactions for 2017 had not been published.
ac3278a8cd231453f8424cb989d9ba63	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/02/02/foresight-africa-viewpoint-africas-bold-move-towards-integration-the-continental-free-trade-agreement/?shared=email&msg=fail	Foresight Africa viewpoint – Africa’s bold move towards integration: The Continental Free Trade Agreement	Foresight Africa viewpoint – Africa’s bold move towards integration: The Continental Free Trade Agreement After weathering the tumultuous year that was 2016, Africa’s economies ended 2017 on a positive note, with an annual growth rate of 2.6 percent and projected increase in 2018 and thereafter. A number of African countries are growing at above 6 percent as foreign direct investment inflows surge. Commodity prices continued to recover in 2017, and global growth and trade are gaining momentum. With these tailwinds, the continent is looking toward 2018 with renewed and improved prospects. The recent headwinds, however, must not be forgotten. There is an urgent need for all African countries—but especially commodity-dependent countries—to diversify, boost value-added, and industrialize, not only in order to weather future economic storms, but to ensure sustained and inclusive growth and development. African economies also face the potential tsunami, which can arise from a growing unemployed youth population, and a demographic trap that will hold back per capita income growth and possibly widen inequality. These trends highlight why efforts to bring down tariff and non-tariff barriers among African countries to boost intra-African trade is crucial. The negotiations to establish Africa’s Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) are moving in the right direction and at the desired pace. Eight rounds of negotiations have yielded positive results: The December 2017 deadline has been met. It is now pending nominal technical work. The Protocol on Trade in Services was agreed upon and adopted by the African Ministers of Trade on December 2, 2017. While the Protocol on Trade in Goods will need more work on the rules of origin and application of the agreed modalities for the liberalization of trade in goods (an ambitious target of 90 percent); an extraordinary African Union Summit is envisaged before the end of March 2018 to complete and sign the entire CFTA agreement. The CFTA offers substantial opportunities for industrialization, diversification, and employment in Africa. African countries trade more value-added products among themselves, unlike their exports to the rest of the world, which are mainly commodities. For example, in 2014 manufactured goods accounted for 41.9 percent of intra-African exports, significantly higher than the 14.8 percent share for exports outside the continent. Intra-African trade, however, is underexploited owing to high trade costs in the region: As a share of total African trade, it was only 15.3 percent in 2015. The CFTA will change this. The anticipated expansion in intra-African trade is key to creating decent jobs, improving productivity, increasing incomes, and reducing economic vulnerability and risks. African countries have much to be proud of—negotiating a free trade agreement among 55 countries, each with its own interests, is not an easy task. Concluding the negotiations on schedule, however, is just the first step. The real challenge for 2018 and the years ahead will be implementation of the agreement. Getting the implementation of Africa’s CFTA right will have a game-changing impact on African economies. This will require leadership, an efficient and inclusive institutional architecture; a robust monitoring and evaluation framework; and innovative financing for much-needed investments in infrastructure and productive capacity. Africa’s bold new CFTA project should be watched during 2018. The landmark agreement can be pivotal; if implemented right it will uphold and strengthen the positive tailwinds of 2017 and protect the continent against possible future headwinds. The G-20, African conglomerates such as the Dangote Group, international organizations, and global consulting groups are already drawing the attention of international investors to savor the African opportunity: a single market of 1.2 billion people, over $3 trillion in continental GDP, and a growing middle class. The CFTA strengthens the case for Africa as a preferred investment destination. Note: For an in-depth discussion on what strategies are needed to ensure that the potential of the CFTA is fulfilled, see United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Union and African Development Bank Group (2017), “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA) VIII: Bringing the CFTA About,” Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
e52d6e63919c74d01e6a05343172a77c	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/05/17/figures-of-the-week-private-investment-trends-in-sub-saharan-africa/	Figures of the week: Private investment trends in sub-Saharan Africa	Figures of the week: Private investment trends in sub-Saharan Africa Last week, the Africa Department at the International Monetary Fund released its biannual Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. Each edition of the report includes analysis of current development issues and provides updates on key macroeconomic indicators in the region. This edition forecasts average GDP growth recovering from 2.8 percent in 2017 to 3.4 percent in 2018. Rising debt levels, as 40 percent of low-income African countries are in debt distress, are highlighted as a key challenge in sustaining the region’s growth recovery. Private investment in the region, the net increase in physical assets there, is one of the main topics covered in this year’s report. As Figure 3.2 shows, private investment in the region has been rising since the early 2000s. Within sub-Saharan Africa, private investment levels have been lowest for oil exporters, at 14 percent of GDP over 2010-2016 compared to 15 percent for non-resource-intensive countries and 17 percent for other resource-intensive countries. The rising trend in private investment has recently reversed as average private investment growth slowed or turned negative in a majority of countries in 2015-2016 compared to their 2010-2014 averages (Figure 3.4). The report attributes this slowdown to lower commodity prices, particularly oil, during the period and likely spillovers from slower growth in the region’s largest economies (Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa). Policy shocks, such as the interest rate caps in Kenya, slowed credit growth, negatively affecting private investment. The report finds that private investment increases when GDP growth is high (above an individual country’s historical average); however, the effect on private investment depends on institutional and structural factors. Across the full sample, a 1 percentage point increase in GDP growth rates leads to a 0.21 percentage point increase in the private investment rate. However, as Table 3.1 shows, the impact of higher GDP growth on private investment is lower in environments with low regulatory quality and higher insolvency costs, with an average difference of 0.2 percentage points. This trend suggests that reforms that strengthen the judiciary and regulatory environment are crucial for promoting private investment during periods of strong economic growth. The report finds larger impact on private investment from increased GDP growth in countries where access to electricity, trade openness, and financial development are higher than the global median (Table 3.1). In countries with very low levels of financial development, firms do not invest in new capital to enhance capacity even when there is strong demand for their products and a favorable economic climate. Thus, more developed financial markets and increased bank lending are highlighted as key areas to support increased private investment. The report recommends reforms such as strengthening financial protections for investors and improving technical and regulatory infrastructure for the development of equity and bond markets.
57ec779d6fa6d7a190b577be0d035ac6	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/06/01/figures-of-the-week-informal-employment-in-african-cities/	Figures of the week: Informal employment in African cities	Figures of the week: Informal employment in African cities This week, the World Resources Institute (WRI) released a report titled, Including the Excluded: Supporting Informal Workers for More Equal and Productive Cities in the Global South. Written in collaboration with WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing), the report presents the state of the informal economy in the global south. Notably, it focuses on cities in Asia and Africa and notes the need to support informal workers. (The ILO defines informal employment as employment without legal or social protection.) This post highlights two figures from the WRI report that show where African cities lie in terms of informal employment activities when compared to non-African ones. The report states that supporting informal workers is key to enhancing the productivity of cities in the global south, as informal enterprises generate 25 to 50 percent of value added outside of agricultural activities. The report states that most of the urban workforce in the global south is informal, ranging from approximately 52 percent in developing Asia to 76 percent in Africa, largely surpassing the world average of 44 percent. While the figure below shows that Africa has the highest rate of informal employment in cities, the report notes that South Asian countries have an urban informal employment rate of 78 percent, surpassing Africa’s rate. (This is not visible in Figure 1 as South Asian countries are grouped in the Asia and Pacific category). As the rate of informal employment varies within regions, so does the nature of informal jobs. Informal employment is often split between wage and self-employment. In sub-Saharan Africa, the latter prevails. The report also adds that Africa’s informal sector is largely made up of own-account workers—ones who do not hire others (e.g., street vendors)—thus questioning the sector’s ability to generate employment at a larger scale. Data on informal employment is rather scarce, especially at the city level. Nevertheless, the WRI report cites a survey by French research institute Développement, Institutions et Analyses de Long terme (DIAL), done in collaboration with national statistical offices, analyzing the scope of informal employment in certain cities in the global south. According to Figure 2, compared to other cities in the global south, on average, African cities have a higher prevalence of informal employment, as seen in the cases of Kampala and Dakar, for example, where the informal sector employs 86 and 80 percent of workers, respectively. According to the report, informal employment in African cities is the norm rather than the exception. To conclude, the informal sector employs a large share of workers in the global South, and this phenomenon is more acute in African cities. The report suggests that in order to support informal workers and create more productive cities, policymakers should increase informal workers’ access to public services and public spaces—e.g., avoid evictions. The report also suggests reforming laws and regulations in order to encourage informal workers to register their businesses and improve tax collection.
8a0eb971c792baf7dd64affe5312e62d	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/01/22/what-to-expect-from-the-2019-presidential-election-in-nigeria/	What to expect from the 2019 presidential election in Nigeria	What to expect from the 2019 presidential election in Nigeria Nigeria’s presidential election scheduled for February 16, 2019, will be the country’s sixth since May 1999, when the military handed over power to a democratically elected civilian government. Though there are 73 political parties fielding candidates in the election, the race is generally believed to be between the incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, a former vice president of the country from 1999 to 2007, of the People’s Democratic Party’s (PDP’s). A major feature of the February 2019 election is that, unlike in 2015, the two leading candidates are Fulani Muslims from northern Nigeria. In 2015, religion and region played major roles in determining the outcome of the election because Buhari was pitted against Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the minority Ijaw ethnic group in the South. In contrast, it is expected that religion and region will play insignificant roles in determining the outcome of the February election. Buhari’s style of governance and management of the economy will be big talking points. However, judgment over whether Buhari has performed well in these regards will depend on political leanings. While those sympathetic to Buhari and the APC can list the government’s achievements, their opponents will equally list reasons why Buhari does not deserve re-election. An important driver of the elections will be what Nigerians call restructuring—a reference to the structure of the country’s federation, a contentious issue championed mostly by politicians and activists from the South. Restructuring means different things to different candidates—from changing fiscal relations between the units of the federation to geographic restructuring, which proponents argue could better balance power between the overrepresented North and the South. Many prominent politicians from the North are opposed to restructuring, especially geographical restructuring, arguing that given the North’s population and land mass, the current structure is suitable. Atiku Abubakar broke ranks with this position by promising to restructure the country, though details of his plan remain unclear. This promise, however, has endeared him to several groups in the South. The Boko Haram crisis remains a key issue, which has led to more than 27,000 deaths and 1.8 million displaced people between 2009 and 2018. Though Buhari declared in December 2015 that his government had “technically defeated” the group, in the past several months there has been a surge in attacks by Boko Haram. A major concern with the upsurge in attacks is their trajectory and whether elections can be safely conducted in many parts of the states of Borno and Yobe. The United States has also warned that Boko Haram plans to disrupt the election by launching series of attacks during the period. An important driver of the election is the enduring conflict between herdsmen and farmers in the central and southern states. Herder-farmer conflicts, which predate the Buhari government, occurred in at least 22 of the country’s 36 states, with over 2,000 killed and tens of thousands displaced, in 2016. The media often allege that the government treats attacking herdsmen lightly because most are from the same Fulani ethnic group as the president—allegations the president denies very strongly. Vote buying is also expected to be a major issue in the election. Though it contravenes the country’s Electoral Act 2010, vote buying has played an increasing role in determining the outcome of Nigerian elections and was widespread in recent governorship elections in the states of Ekiti and Osun as well as in the party primaries of both the APC and the PDP. Another crucial issue is the neutrality of key state institutions like security agencies, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and the anti-corruption Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which is routinely accused of selectively targeting opposition elements. Recently, opposition groups protested against INEC’s appointment of Amina Zakari, alleged to be a relative of Buhari, to be in charge of collating the results of the election. Similarly, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, whose government was accused of massively rigging the 2007 presidential election, recently wrote an open letter to President Buhari accusing his government of plans to rig the forthcoming presidential election. A new dimension in this election is the PDP and APC’s use of the 2023 presidential election as bait to both the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups. Atiku Abubakar chose Peter Obi, an Igbo, as his running mate, suggesting that the Igbo would produce the president in 2023. Within the APC, Secretary to the Federal Government Boss Mustapha promised the Igbo a shot at the presidency in 2023 if they supported Buhari’s re-election, while the Minister of Power, Works, and Housing Babatunde Fashola and Vice President Yemi Osinbajo, both Yoruba, made the same offer to the Yoruba. Who will come out on top after the 2019 election? Buhari is often said to have cult followership in the North, especially the Northwest, which has the highest number of registered voters at 18.5 million as of January 2018. It remains to be seen how he will fare in the region against a fellow Fulani Muslim from the North. The only previous time he faced a Northern Muslim as his main opponent, in 2007, they split the North’s votes almost evenly. In theory, since the Southwest, inhabited by the Yoruba, is the second-largest voting bloc with 14.6 million registered voters as of January 2018, APC will benefit more from ethnic baiting. However, given that the Igbo are the most dispersed ethnic group in Nigeria, often constituting the second-highest population next to the indigenes in most communities, this group also has significant voting strength. It is not clear how the politicization of farmer-herder clashes, especially in Christian-dominated parts of the North and in central Nigeria, will affect Buhari’s support, or how the resurgence of Boko Haram and increasing insecurity will impact his appeal in the North. It is equally unclear how the general perception in the South that Buhari overwhelmingly favors northern Muslims in key political appointments will affect his electoral fortunes. Furthermore, while Atiku Abubakar’s support for restructuring may have endeared him to some people in the South, it remains unclear how it will impact his support in the North, where restructuring is viewed with suspicion. Both the ruling APC and the opposition PDP appear to have serious internal issues that are impeding their campaigns. There is lingering disaffection in several states following the APC’s primaries to select its governorship, senatorial, and House of Representatives candidates. The same is also true of the PDP following the selection of Obi as their vice presidential candidate. Who will win? APC currently controls 24 states of the federation while PDP controls only 11. Additionally, the APC has a strong presence in the two zones with the highest numbers of registered voters in the country, the Northwest and the Southwest. APC equally has the advantage of incumbency, conferring them the ability to deploy key state institutions to serve partisan objectives. Based on this, Buhari appears to have a slight advantage going into the election. However, this advantage is not a guarantee; Goodluck Jonathan lost the election in 2015 despite having similar advantages. Regardless of who wins the election, Nigerians are likely to have a tough time this year. In December 2018, Buhari told a meeting of the country’s 36 governors that the country’s economy was in bad shape. With increased hardship and likely labor protests, the government may become more repressive, which will in turn fuel more agitation, including from separatist groups. With dips in the price of oil, which the country depends on for almost 80 percent of its revenue, and with over 50 percent of Nigeria’s revenue being used to service debts, it is unlikely there will be quick fixes. Note: Jideofor Adibe is an associate professor of political science at Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria; and the founding editor of the SCOPUS-accredited quarterly academic journal African Renaissance (published consistently since 2004). He is also co-editor of the triennial, peer-reviewed periodical, Journal of African Foreign Affairs; a weekly columnist with the Daily Trust, one of Nigeria’s leading newspapers; and the publisher of Adonis & Abbey Publishers, a London and Abuja-based publisher of academic books and journals. He can be reached at [email protected].
b064a3587f016f9ce939f48cab6426eb	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/01/25/reviving-nigerias-economy-through-economic-diversification/	Reviving Nigeria’s economy through economic diversification	Reviving Nigeria’s economy through economic diversification With a population and gross domestic product projected at 399 million people and $3.3 trillion by 2050, the gulf between the reality of Africa’s largest economy and its undisputed potential remains wide—but achievable. Indeed, our major task has been to systematically implement strategies that will deliver the future we wish to see. This daunting responsibility has not been lost on the Buhari administration, and serves as the impetus for its sustained “Change” agenda. The past three and a half years have been challenging both at home and abroad. Commodity prices, both oil and non-oil, have been volatile. Global trends, be it security, trade, or politics, have also been unpredictable. In Nigeria, we have had to cope with disruptions in oil production and exports, security challenges, and devastating floods. We have weathered these storms and made progress on many fronts, which is why we have cause to be optimistic about the future. This administration has now set the country on the path to stability, growth, and prosperity. This government is doing more to diversify and grow a productive and competitive economy with far fewer resources. Notably, it secured the territorial integrity of the nation by reclaiming territory in the Northeast and has tackled grand corruption, introducing and improving transparency and accountability in the management of public funds. The economy has recovered from recession and we have had six quarters of growth. Nigeria’s real gross domestic product growth stood at 1.81 percent in the third quarter of 2018 compared to 1.17 percent in the third quarter of 2017. Foreign exchange reserves grew from $28.57 billion in May 2015 to $42.92 billion by mid-December 2018. This contributed to exchange rate stability and provided a buffer against unanticipated external shocks. Inflation has also declined from a peak of 18.72 percent in January 2017 to 11.28 percent in November 2018. Nigeria has moved from a deficit to a surplus of 681.27 billion Nigerian naira in our trade balance as of the third quarter of 2018, representing a significant improvement from the deficit of 290.1 billion naira in 2016. This reflects an increase in non-oil exports and a reduction in the importation of food and items that can be produced locally. We also committed to unprecedented investments to start and finish critical infrastructure projects in power, roads, and rail across the country, as well as direct investments in people to lift them up—the largest social investment program in Africa. By allocating over 3 trillion naira ($8.3 billion) toward reducing our infrastructure deficit over the past three years—the largest capital spending in Nigeria’s history—we have jump-started the construction of power, road, and rail projects, which will be catalytic in connecting people, goods, and opportunities. One example, the Lagos- Kano rail, will help move freight over a more than 1,000-kilometer network of rail from the country’s busiest port in Lagos to the northern city of Kano. For effective delivery of power to critical areas, such as industries and large markets, we have decentralized the power supply by leveraging off-grid solutions, especially solar-based systems, and are enabling the deployment of broadband across the county. We continue to focus on creating an enabling business environment for our small and medium-sized enterprises to thrive by making Nigeria a progressively easier place to do business, delivering several reforms, as evidenced by our moving up 24 places in the World Bank’s Doing Business report over the past three years. In 2019 and beyond, we are confident that by driving agriculture and agro-based industries, technology and innovation, solid minerals, and our vibrant creative sector, Nigeria will harness the energies of our entrepreneurial youth to deliver the promise of our future.
c46cdac65417da004dd0880e28a456b8	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/03/18/local-institutions-can-mitigate-climate-related-conflict-in-the-sahel/	Local institutions can mitigate climate-related conflict in the Sahel	Local institutions can mitigate climate-related conflict in the Sahel Climate change acts as a conflict multiplier by amplifying existing environmental stresses, creating new ones, and thus exacerbating resource scarcities and water and food insecurity. Governance and institution weaknesses amplify the effect of climate change on conflict. Based on recent research on farmer-herder conflicts in Niger, my team and I argue that increased reliance on local institutions through deeper decentralization of governance could mitigate conflicts. Niger is a landlocked country in the Sahel region of West Africa, with a semi-desertic environment and low and variable rainfall. Niger’s economy is heavily dependent on farming and herding. Population growth, which is among the fastest in Africa, and climate change are squeezing access to freshwater, leading to conflicts over control of scarce resources. In the latest outbreak of violence in November 2016 in the Tahoua region, 20 people were killed and 43 injured in a battle between farmers and herders. Likewise, 10 people were killed and 13 injured in November 2014 in the town of Birni-N’Konni in the Tahoua region. In the Tillabery region during 2010, more than 50 herders were killed when conflict broke out between herders from Mali and Niger. While population growth and climate change are major contributors to rising tensions, institutional failures are also a factor, such as government failure in defining and protecting property rights and providing justice and security. Institutions are known as the formal and informal rules and norms that organize social, political, and economic relations. Informal institutions, which consist of unwritten norms, customs, and traditions, such as the ones governing kinship and religious networks in West Africa, overlap with and usually overwhelm formal institutions in some areas like land rights. In many instances, they undermine formal ones; in others, they substitute for them. In Africa, formal institutions, such as the central government and related bodies, are characterized by an over-centralization of governance, leading to burdensome rules and regulations and corruption, and, more importantly, weak decentralization schemes. Management of such local issues as education, health, reliable policing, and land rights is dealt with by the formal institutions at central government. Farmer-herder conflicts usually arise out of the inability of this system of governance to resolve disputes. Empowering local informal institutions, which are more trusted and respected, could bring greater effectiveness in conflict prevention and resolution. Moreover, informal institutions often seek civil solutions in addressing conflicts, such as mediation, adjudication, reconciliation, and negotiation, which are found to yield superior outcomes compared to dysfunctional formal institutions such as courts and police that often cultivate further resentment. As climate change puts more pressure on already fragile areas in the Sahel, it will become ever more important to find ways to nurture cooperation and peaceful resolutions to disputes over resources. From our research, stronger local governance through the power of informal institutions proves promising as a path forward.
04b34ba3902c20435213beb5b5e4cd3a	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/05/30/figures-of-the-week-with-afcfta-officially-in-force-africa-is-now-the-largest-free-trade-area/?shared=email&msg=fail	Figures of the week: With AfCFTA officially in force, Africa is now the largest free trade area	Figures of the week: With AfCFTA officially in force, Africa is now the largest free trade area Today, May 30, 2019, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement officially comes into force. Now, according to a recent Brookings Africa Growth Initiative policy brief, under a successfully implemented AfCFTA, Africa will have a combined consumer and business spending of $6.7 trillion in 2030. Indeed, Africa is home to the world’s largest free trade area since the establishment of the World Trade Organization, with nearly every country on the continent joining (Figure 1). Source: TRALAC. African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Legal Texts and Policy Documents. Accessed: May 29, 2019. This much-needed agreement and new free trade area are important achievements for the region’s economic development. Figure 2 puts into perspective the current gap between Africa’s intra-regional trade compared to other regions. In this light, the AfCFTA is critical because it could boost intra-Africa trade by 15 to 25 percent by 2040. This increased market access to other African countries has positive spillovers too, including improving the competitiveness of industries and enterprises, increasing opportunities for economies of scale improvements, and boosting the efficacy of resource allocation. Source: Landry Signé and Colette van der Ven, Brookings Institution, “Keys to success for the AfCFTA negotiations,” 2019. Importantly, not all the work to implement the AfCFTA is done: The brief outlines important steps yet to be completed for a successful agreement (Figure 3). The brief also recommends avoiding complicating the negotiations by adding further layers of complexity to established trade agreements, maximizing the benefits from the AfCFTA by making commitments in line with existing country specific trade advantages, and thinking beyond goods and exploiting the opportunities of the services industry. Source: Landry Signé and Colette van der Ven, Brookings Institution, “Keys to success for the AfCFTA negotiations,” 2019.
8a8dea080f23077b6ffb23c4c8663c0a	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/10/19/africa-in-the-news-tunisia-and-mozambique-vote-nigeria-closes-borders-and-kenya-opens-new-railway/	Africa in the news: Tunisia and Mozambique vote, Nigeria closes borders, and Kenya opens new railway	Africa in the news: Tunisia and Mozambique vote, Nigeria closes borders, and Kenya opens new railway Tunisia and Mozambique vote: On Sunday, October 13, Tunisians participated in their run-off presidential elections between conservative former law professor Kais Saied and media magnate Nabil Karoui. Saied, known as “Robocop” for his serious presentation, won with 72.7 percent of the vote. Notably, Saied himself does not belong to a party, but is supported by the moderate Islamist party Ennahdha, which won the parliamentary elections earlier this month. Saied supports decentralization of the government—shifting power to local leaders—and leans conservative, as he favors reinstating the death penalty and opposes equal inheritance between men and women. The youth vote seems to be what propelled Saied to victory: Around 90 percent of voters between 18 and 25 years of age chose to support him. Though the election was nonviolent, it was met with controversy: Notably, not long before the vote, Karoui was arrested the election on corruption charges. While Tunisia’s elections went smoothly, Mozambique’s Tuesday elections were fraught with tension as sitting President Filipe Nyusi and his ruling party, Frelimo, attempt to hold off former rebel group Renamo. Renamo, now a political party, fought Frelimo in a civil war between 1975-1992, and violence resurged between 2013 and 2016. As of Friday afternoon, the winner of the presidential election had not yet been announced. While Frelimo is expected to win the general election, experts predict that Renamo will see victories in regional and local polls. According to al-Jazeera, the European Union observer mission “raised the alarm on Thursday over unfair conditions and unjustified use of state resources by the ruling party, as well as widespread violence.” Already, claims of vote rigging have surfaced, and the campaign season did see violence, as the Centre for Public Integrity, a local nongovernmental organization, states that 44 people were killed during the campaign season, mostly in traffic accidents and some in a stampede at a pro-Nyusi rally, but seven were murdered. Nigeria closes land borders indefinitely On Monday, October 14, Nigeria’s customs agency confirmed that it had closed its land borders indefinitely in an effort to reduce smuggling and spur the domestic agriculture industry. The announcement was Nigeria’s first official confirmation of a full border closure, but the country’s land borders have been partially closed since August, after Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari declared the time had come to end rampant smuggling. The closure has had a severe effect on neighboring Benin, which is a key exporter of food products to Nigeria, and whose farmers are now struggling to sell their produce. Within Nigeria, it has also increased prices for goods such as rice, tomatoes, and sugar, and has increased inflation rates. The closure has had no impact on Nigeria’s economically crucial oil exports, which are primarily shipped by sea. Nigeria’s border closure is in defiance of its commercial and freedom of movement treaties signed under the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). The closure also stands opposed to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement, which Nigeria signed in July and under which countries are set to commence trading on July 1, 2020. Many regional leaders are advising Nigeria to reverse course: For example, Ghana’s minister of foreign affairs and regional integration urged Nigeria to review its decision to close land borders, stating that the closure has severely affected Ghanaian traders and could lead to political tension among impacted countries. Kenya opens new railway, and President Kenyatta pushes back on new finance bill over rate caps This week, Kenya operationalized a new railway line linking the capital, Nairobi, to the Rift Valley. The project cost $1.5 billion and was financed by China. The new line will connect with the Chinese-backed Nairobi-Mombasa railway that was opened in 2017, also part of China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative. In the next phase, Kenya plans to extend the standard gauge railway to the Ugandan border but has run up against funding challenges, as China refused additional funding earlier this year. Addressing the funding challenges at the launch, president Uhuru Kenyatta, reaffirmed his commitment to the project, saying, “There will be challenges along the way but that does not mean we will not do it.” In other news, the President Uhuru Kenyatta refused to approve the finance bill as part of the 2019 budget because lawmakers failed to repeal the rate-cap law. The 2016 law caps commercial lending rates banks can charge at 4 percentage points above the central bank’s benchmark rate, which is currently 9 percent. Explaining his decision, the president noted, “The capping of interest rates has not addressed the intended objective particularly in expanding credit access.” The cap has reduced private sector lending by banks as many low-income borrowers are deemed too risky. In fact, a study by Kenya’s central bank found that the interest rate cap lowered growth by 0.4 percentage points in 2017.
4633ef0062af7c3df0f42a1c2ef4327c	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/10/26/africa-in-the-news-russia-africa-summit-botswanas-election-and-africas-new-growth-projections-russia-hosts-first-africa-heads-of-state-summit/	Africa in the news: Russia-Africa summit, Botswana’s election, and Africa’s new growth projections	Africa in the news: Russia-Africa summit, Botswana’s election, and Africa’s new growth projections Russia hosts first Africa heads-of-state summit: On October 23-24, Russia hosted its first-ever summit with Africa. Representatives from all 54 African states, including 43 heads-of-state or government, attended the summit, which aimed to revive Russia’s economic, political, and military influence in Africa. Figure 1 shows the countries with which Russia made deals—including statements of cooperation and memorandums of understanding that may not be fulfilled—at the summit in the areas of military and politics, energy, and trade. Among them are a contract to supply attack helicopters to Nigeria, talks between Russian state nuclear company Rosatom and Ethiopia to develop nuclear power in Ethiopia, and deals for oil and gas cooperation with the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, and South Sudan. During the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia’s trade with African countries to double over the next four to five years. Putin also stated that Russia had forgiven African debts worth over $20 billion. Figure 1: Deals made at the Russia-Africa Summit Source: The Moscow Times. While Russia’s trade with Africa has increased in recent years—its exports to Africa reached $20 billion in 2018, double the level of trade in 2015—its economic involvement with the continent is dwarfed by countries such as the U.S., China, and France. To begin to compete with these countries, Putin has promised cooperation without “political or other” interference.For more on Russia-Africa relations, see Landry Signé’s recent opinion piece, “Vladimir Putin is resetting Russia’s Africa agenda to counter the US and China.” Botswana held a general election on Wednesday, October 23, with citizens voting on seats for 57 national assembly members and 490 local government representatives. On Friday, Chief Justice Terrence Rannowane announced that incumbent President Mokgweetsi Masisi was re-elected, as his ruling Botswana Democratic Party won more than the required 51 percent of parliamentary seats, though counting is still ongoing. Meanwhile, vote counting over Mozambique’s October 15 election is ongoing, with incumbent President Filipe Nyusi and his Frelimo party expected to win by a large margin. Frelimo is also expected to win a majority in all 10 of Mozambique’s provincial assemblies, giving the party the power to choose all provincial governors. At the same time, the opposition Renamo party, wary of reported results in even in its strongholds, is claiming fraud and irregularities. Last week, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank held their annual meetings in Washington, D.C. Both institutions updated their growth forecasts for Africa, showing the continent growing slower than expected. The World Bank lowered growth estimates for 2019 to 2.6 percent from its 2.8 percent April estimate while the IMF lowered its projections to 3.2 percent from 3.5 percent previously. According to the World Bank, the regions’ three largest economies – Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa—are all expected to grow more slowly in 2019 than previously expected. Growth is expected to pick up in 2020 and 2021. While the IMF highlighted that sovereign debt levels are stabilizing in African countries with average debt-to-GDP at 55 percent, seven countries are currently in debt distress and a further nine are categorized as being at high risk of debt distress.
58c42fbc5032b4c0843e22db08e26314	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/01/16/confronting-the-challenges-of-climate-change-on-africas-coastal-areas/	Confronting the challenges of climate change on Africa’s coastal areas	Confronting the challenges of climate change on Africa’s coastal areas Climate change will undoubtedly present one of the most significant risks to Africa’s sustainable development objectives over the next decade, and nowhere is the threat more imminent than on its coastlines. Indeed, recent estimates show that sea levels could rise 100 cm by 2100, further compounding the many hazards threatening the region. Particularly worrisome is that demographic trends are interacting with climate change in coastal areas, generating a unique set of development challenges. Coastal areas in Africa, like elsewhere in the world, tend to be more densely populated due to the economic opportunities there. For example, in Nigeria’s low-elevation coastal zones (LECZs, areas located 10 meters or less above mean sea level), the population density is 491 inhabitants per km2, compared with 134 inhabitants per km2 nationally. By some estimates, Africa’s populations in LECZs will rise at an annual rate of 3.3 percent between 2000-2030, which is more than double the world’s average. In many cases, individual countries will experience even more extreme changes: For example, in Senegal, the share of the LECZ population is projected to skyrocket to 50 percent by 2060, up from 20 percent in the early 2000s. As sea levels rise, so too does the likelihood that the success of these burgeoning regions will be washed away as food production will decrease, access to clean water will be curtailed, catastrophic storms will become more prevalent and more harmful, acidification will spread, and the region’s already limited ability to mitigate these and related disasters will falter. By substantially increasing sea surface temperature, climate change brings about more violent cyclone activity and storm surges on coastlines, generating higher wind speeds and heavier precipitation, which make disaster forecasting, preparedness, and management more challenging. Indeed, an increase in the temperature of tropical sea surface by 1°C increases wind speed by 3 to 5 percent. About 30 million Africans live within the flood hazard zone around the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, out of which 2 million are likely to be flooded each year. Abidjan is a case in point: It is ranked among the world’s top 20 cities in term of population exposure to floods, and its asset exposure is similarly high at $42 billion. Mangroves offer an effective buffer against coastal vulnerability to storm surges by obstructing the flow of water and hence attenuating inundation. Therefore, they can play the same role as infrastructure designed to protect coastal areas from such extreme events as storm surges and cyclones. Notably, mangrove rehabilitation projects can be two to six times cheaper than other protection infrastructure. However, mangroves have varying tolerance to salinity, depending on the species. Flooding, deforestation, and increases in ocean surface temperature that raise the salinity of inland water are increasingly putting mangroves in jeopardy and further weakening the already fragile adaptive capacity of African coastlines. According to some estimates, vulnerable populations exposed to the risk of mangrove destruction are projected to increase by 103 percent and losses in GDP by 233 percent from the baseline scenario. Beyond its damaging effects on mangroves, saltwater intrusion into inland coastal areas negatively impacts river salinity, hence available drinking and irrigation water, making both offseason agriculture and freshwater fishing more challenging. Saline water intrusion into inland water also increases the risk of high blood pressure in pregnant women and increases infant mortality. Africa’s already weak infrastructure will also suffer, as salinity stemming from sea-level rise impacts roads through land subsidence, progressive blistering, cracking, and pulverization, resulting in higher maintenance costs. In Africa, artisanal fishing is a predominant economic activity. For example, in Ghana, 2.2 million people depend on fishing for their livelihoods, including nearly 125,000 artisanal fishermen. Rises in water temperature and acidification levels damage many fish species’ physiology, including their size and reproductive capacity, and, therefore, their market value. Relatedly, changes in water temperature cause species to migrate and diminish the number and size of catches. Indeed, local fishermen in West Africa have, in recent years, reported that some types of previously abundant fish are increasingly scarce, even disappearing. For example, the sardinella fish species, which used to be highly abundant in Senegalese sea waters have now disappeared. Adaptation is paramount for withstanding the effects of climate change, especially since inaction will be costlier. Estimates show that adaptation costs range from less than 5 percent (in Niger) to 60 percent (in Kenya) of the costs of inaction. Crucial strategies for adaptation include infrastructure construction and maintenance, beach nourishment, and diversification away from activities vulnerable to climate change. If governments undertake some of these strategies, population exposed to flooding could be halved by 2100. Without adaptation, the annual costs related to flooding alone could range between $5 billion and $9 billion. A key challenge to the implementation of adaptation strategies in Africa is financing. Costs of adequate adaptation could reach $300 billion for Africa, plus $3 billion per year for maintenance—numbers that sharply contrast with the limited resources currently devoted to adaptation in Africa. While developed countries have pledged to double funding for adaptation projects over the 2014-2020 period, the cumulative funding flowing to developing counties reached only $4.4 billion in 2018, with around 43 percent of this amount going to Africa. Scaling up financing to adaptation is critical to avoid further disrupting already fragile economic and social infrastructure. Notably, financing adaptation must not use the same pipeline and modalities as standard official development assistance. So far, climate funding is highly unpredictable and depends solely on the good will of donor countries. Considering the increasingly robust scientific evidence linking levels of emission to economic losses, health, peace, and security in Africa, the “polluter pays” principle should be used to channel funds for adaptation financing in African countries. This funding should be specifically earmarked to climate change-related projects to ensure that investments are fast-tracked, and that disaster responses are timely and effective.
b8e67f9e1f5309fc4cbcd4affcb291eb	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/02/03/unpacking-the-implications-of-future-trends-for-security-in-africa/	Unpacking the implications of future trends for security in Africa	Unpacking the implications of future trends for security in Africa Imminent changes in climate, demography, and urbanization will reshape Africa’s security landscape by the middle of this century. By 2050, parts of the African continent will be much hotter and arid, while others will be prone to flooding and rising sea levels. One in four people on the planet will be African, the continent’s demographic structure will still have a stubbornly broad base with a high dependency ratio, and new entrants into the job market will find it difficult to find employment. The majority of Africans will be living in cities and, notably, the number of urban dwellers living in slums is expected to double. Consequently, security outcomes across the continent will be impacted in various ways. First, these future trends will be collectively reinforcing. Climate trends will influence migration, and urbanization will be driven by population dynamics. Thus, unraveling interlinkages will become even more important than searching for “root causes” of insecurity. Second, the impacts of these trends will vary over time and space. Clearly, broad initiatives and linear solutions will be unhelpful. Instead, granular, location-specific programs (national, subnational, and community) will become even more necessary. Third, these trends will affect different types of insecurity differently (see Table 2.1). The inexorable evolution of Africa’s security landscape will clearly change the nature, incidence, and location of violent conflict across Africa. For example, the combined effect of growing population pressures and desertification in the Sahel will heighten land and resource tensions in already fragile communities, making them more susceptible to militia violence and violent extremism. On the other hand, megacities (like Lagos, Cairo, and Johannesburg) with expanding slums are likely to experience an increase in violent protests that could be either social, political, or both. The diverse pathways and potential impacts of this evolution could inform the design and implementation of relevant policies, as well as the establishment of resilient institutions. More than ever before, the policy response will need to go beyond reacting to the symptoms and instead focus on the drivers and sustainers that reinforce persistent conflict. Policymakers also face the added challenge of untangling the complicated, and often transnational, milieu of future trends. Furthermore, the almost binary core vs. periphery approach to politics, economics, and insecurity will be a thing of the past, as urban areas become the epicenter and climate variability becomes an even more important determinant of where Africans live, how they earn their livelihoods, and the degree to which groups peacefully coexist. Addressing the complexities of Africa’s emerging security landscape requires careful consideration of the following: Future challenges in Africa’s security sector are daunting, but not insurmountable. Resolving them is central to the attainment of socioeconomic development goals like the 2030 SDGs and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. This must start with tangible, collective, and concerted efforts to address the continent’s persistent market, governance, and institutional failures.
73a20b39bb176f82e5c7c1f8631fb04b	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/02/28/preparing-for-the-coronavirus-and-other-epidemics-in-africa/?utm_campaign=Brookings+Brief&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=84075934	Preparing for the coronavirus and other epidemics in Africa	Preparing for the coronavirus and other epidemics in Africa The outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) emanating from China has created worldwide alarm, and now, as two cases of COVID-19 have been confirmed in Africa, global policymakers must look to Africa’s readiness to handle a potential coronavirus outbreak. In our increasingly interconnected world, what happens in China’s economy impacts the world at large, and Africa in particular. As in the rest of the world, Africa’s economic growth numbers will be revised downward as the coronavirus further compounds already prevailing global headwinds. The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that the coronavirus could take 0.5 to 1 percent off China’s GDP growth. Given its lowered output, Chinese demand for Africa’s exports, including minerals, petroleum products, and other raw materials, will be reduced. Petroleum exporters like Angola and Nigeria, and mineral exporters like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Africa could face reduced sales Africa’s importers who depend on China as a principal source of goods will also be affected. If China is challenged, one can imagine how devastating the impact could be on Africa’s weak health systems. The 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was a wake-up call, but Africa is still working to implement solutions and strategies to prevent such a devasting epidemic again. Recommendations include: Harmonize and coordinate cross-continental efforts for disease prevention and control. Indeed, in 2017, Africa’s heads of states accelerated the establishment of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) under the auspices of the African Union. Along with the European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, Africa CDC is the first public health institute mandated to harmonize infectious disease surveillance and control among a group of independent countries. In line with the International Health Regulations (2005), the Africa CDC’s mandate includes disease surveillance, prevention, and response measures intended to shift the focus from quarantine and embargoes at borders to containment at the source. It aims to increase the emphasis on preparedness by supporting countries to establish the necessary core capacities in surveillance and response. Already, Africa CDC is responding to the COVID-19 threat: It has activated its Emergency Operations Center and, in collaboration with member states and partners, trained laboratory personnel across 27 countries and distributed test kits, provided infection prevention and control training for 22 countries, and conducted Training-of-Trainers events on points-of-entry surveillance with 18 countries. It continues to coordinate effectively with the World Health Organization. Partner with outside CDCs to build public health infrastructure and strengthen health systems. A successful Africa CDC requires more than the establishment of a central office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It also entails building up Africa CDC’s five “regional collaborating centers” (in Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia), and expanding the continent’s network of National Public Health Institutes that currently exist with varying functionality in some 20 countries. Additional needs include building surveillance systems (even in remote areas), streamlining communication, establishing high-quality laboratory systems, and better equipping public health emergency teams, among others. The close partnerships with more established and experienced CDCs in China, Europe, and the U.S. can offer best practices and strategies for dealing with crises. Building trust is key. Just as trust in financial institutions is important to avert financial crises triggered by bank runs, so is trust in public health institutions for avoiding arbitrary border controls and trade disruptions due to real or perceived risks of disease. There are different dimensions of trust when managing health crises—that between the public and the public health institutions, and among different institutions within the health sector. However, building trust takes time. For example, in the case of trust between public health institutions such as laboratories, samples will need to be transferred across countries as was the case during the West Africa Ebola crisis when samples were moved from Guinea to Pasteur Institute in Paris. Within the guild of microbiologists, the prestige and ranking order of laboratories in different countries is almost universally recognized, and to a large extent builds on previous scientific discoveries and publications. This affects whether a country’s laboratory becomes the first choice for receipt of difficult or dangerous samples from other countries. A major milestone since the establishment of Africa CDC is its creation of the Regional Integrated Surveillance and Laboratory Networks (RISLNET). The RISLNET platform will link Africa’s existing public health assets and build trust in these, thus ensuring that they are put to their most efficient use. Additionally, developing a repository of science-based information, and effective communications will also help build trust in the Africa CDC as the continent’s “mouthpiece” on epidemics. As Africa becomes increasingly populous and interconnected with the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, Africa CDC will be ever more faced with complex, multidimensional health challenges that require monitoring disease risks, analyzing threats, and mounting a swift and calculated response anywhere on the continent. The establishment of Africa CDC is a huge step in the right direction. All 55 AU member states contribute financially to the AU Commission, which has committed 0.5 percent of the AU’s operational budget annually for the Africa CDC, emphasizing the strong ownership. Continued investments in health systems strengthening will be key in safeguarding the remarkable progress made toward the AU’s Agenda 2063—a prosperous, peaceful, and integrated continent. Note: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the World Bank nor that of the Brookings Institution.
83cd1a8e228d906879298c7a524bf5fa	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/05/07/figures-of-the-week-the-costs-of-financing-africas-response-to-covid-19/	Figures of the week: The costs of financing Africa’s response to COVID-19	Figures of the week: The costs of financing Africa’s response to COVID-19 Last month’s edition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s biannual Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, which discusses economic developments and prospects for the region, pays special attention to the financial channels through which COVID-19 has—and will—impact the economic growth of the region. Notably, the authors of the report reduced their GDP growth estimates from their October 2019 forecast by 5.2 percentage points to -1.6 percent. The estimates for Nigeria and South Africa, the region’s largest economies, are even lower, at -3.4 and -5.8 percent respectively. The report indicates that these contractions will largely be driven by three shocks: (1) supply chain disruptions and reduced demand, (2) the spillover effects of plummeting global growth, and (3) a decline in commodity prices. The shocks in their own right—and their knock-on effects—may hamper the ability of countries to finance their spending needs. Rising interest rates make it costly to borrow money in the short run, but the necessity of borrowing in the short run constricts countries’ ability to finance expenditure in the long run. Figure 1 shows how the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) for sub-Saharan Africa has changed following the onset of various financial slumps of the past decade. The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in the sharpest upturn in the region’s cost of borrowing compared to the other events, including the global financial crisis of 2008. Since February 2020, the interest rates on sovereign debt more generally have risen by approximately 700 basis points. Source: International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, April 2020 The report underscores an exigent need for additional financing to fund health expenditures and support vulnerable groups. For example, Nigeria and South Africa have packages worth 0.7 percent and 3 percent of their GDPs, respectively. Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, and Senegal all have stimulus packages amounting to upwards of 4 percent of their respective GDPs, while Niger has announced a package exceeding 7 percent of its GDP. Notably, the pandemic has not had a uniform effect on the cost of borrowing; For example, oil exporters have seen an even steeper increase in interest rates, after a drop in export prices left these countries with higher deficits than expected. The report projects that interest payments facing oil-exporting countries could approach 20 percent of revenue at some point this year (Figure 2). Importantly, these higher interest rates divert a greater share of revenue to interest payments for these countries rather than for productive domestic spending. Source: International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, April 2020 The report recommends solutions that assume that investors view the pandemic and its various repercussions as temporary in nature. The authors believe that, following the crisis, the region will resume a growth path that safeguards debt sustainability. In the meantime, they recommend that countries do whatever it takes to prevent the spread of the virus and protect the most vulnerable people and firms, even in the absence of external financing from the international community. However, it also cautions that a dearth of external financing could turn issues of liquidity into issues of solvency. In other words, this one-off event could become a long-lived financial crisis. For further discussion on ways the international community can help Africa finance the pandemic, see COVID-19 and debt standstill for Africa: The G-20’s action is an important first step that must be complemented, scaled up, and broadened and How to ensure Africa has the financial resources to address COVID-19.
81e645b587813ccb9a37aedbb9b60cbf	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/05/14/protecting-food-security-in-africa-during-covid-19/?preview_id=806618	Protecting food security in Africa during COVID-19	Protecting food security in Africa during COVID-19 Even before the global COVID-19 pandemic broke out, food insecurity was a serious concern throughout sub-Saharan Africa. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, 239 million people in the region were undernourished as of 2018. Since long before the COVID-19 pandemic, these chronic food crises have been driven by a variety of factors, including economic shocks, climate, and conflict. Indeed, areas that are severely affected by climate change—particularly the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, and southern Africa—have many food insecure people. In East Africa, intercommunal violence and armed conflicts are perpetuating instability and tensions, particularly in South Sudan, and are the driver of large refugee populations in neighboring countries, such as Uganda. In Nigeria, the region’s most populous country, the number of undernourished people was estimated at more than 25 million in 2018—up by 180 percent over the past decade. This year, an unprecedented locust outbreak that’s ravaging parts of the Horn of Africa could result in $8.5 billion in crop and livestock losses, severely reduced harvests, and less food in markets. Climate shocks, which have been increasing in number and severity in recent years, could also hurt agricultural production. These multiple crises, unfolding at the same time, threaten to swell the ranks of Africa’s hungry and vulnerable people. Refugees, internally displaced people, and people living in areas marked by conflict and fragility like the Sahel are especially at risk. Now, COVID-19 poses challenges on top of this picture of risk and vulnerability. For starters, border closures, lockdowns, and curfews intended to slow the spread of the disease are disrupting supply chains that, even under normal circumstances, struggle to keep markets well stocked and farmers supplied with necessary agricultural and livestock inputs such as quality seeds, fertilizer, and feeds. These disruptions could have a much larger economic impact in Africa—where farming accounts for about 60 percent of total employment—than in other regions of the world. In fact, agricultural production in Africa could contract between 2.6 and 7 percent if trade blockages persist. Another notable factor is that most African countries rely heavily on food imports—the region imported more than 40 million tons of cereals in 2018—which makes the region especially vulnerable to the export bans that a few major food exporters have imposed in the wake of COVID-19. At the same time, currency depreciation—coupled with low foreign currency reserves, falling prices for export and cash crops, and plummeting revenues from stalled industries such as oil and tourism—is affecting several countries’ food purchasing power. African countries are also reporting shortages and price spikes for domestic food crops such as millet, sorghum, and maize. Rising food prices will contribute to lower purchasing power among both rural and urban consumers, given the rising share of food that is purchased (rather than grown) even by smallholder farmers—about 60 percent of the food consumed in the region is purchased from traditional and modern retail outlets in both rural and urban areas. On April 16, the ministers for agriculture of African Union member states publicly committed to minimizing food system disruptions and ensuring food security and nutrition for all their citizens—especially the poorest and most vulnerable—during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. In their statement, the ministers urged governments to “prioritize the food and agriculture system as an essential service” and “recognize that all types of food systems—modern, traditional (open markets, small stores) and informal (street vendors)—play critical roles in serving different markets.” In doing so, they joined the ranks of other countries and organizations, such as the G-20 and ASEAN, that have recognized that essential steps must be taken to keep food moving in this exceptional moment. The ministers called on partners to step up their support to avoid a potential humanitarian disaster. Helping African countries withstand the crisis and strengthen their food systems in the long run will require a range of immediate and longer-term actions. Policymakers should make supporting livelihoods through expanded safety nets and productive programs a high priority: After all, people need income to buy food. Policymakers should also remove artificial barriers to domestic trade and facilitate links between farmers and markets. Responding to food emergencies, ensuring that food needs are fully met, and restoring livelihoods should be an immediate focus for policymakers. In some places, policymakers are already taking these steps: In Chad, a government project with support from development partners is providing food kits, setting up cereal banks, and distributing seeds for future harvests to help households that may go hungry due to COVID-19. Interventions like these will help address not only the immediate need for food but also preserve the productive capacity of smallholder farmers who might start eating their seeds to stave off hunger—ending up with nothing to sow in the upcoming agricultural season. In Zambia, the government is taking advantage of the country’s recent bumper maize harvest to boost its emergency food reserves. Zambia’s Food Reserve Agency (FRA) will procure around 1 million metric tons of maize from farmers—more than double the annual average of the last several years—so that it has a reliable supply in the event of a food emergency. In the long term, it’s critical that countries take the steps to build resilient, climate-smart, and competitive food systems. In Uganda, a government project is being refocused to provide hired tractors and ox-plows to communities that have traditionally relied on hand hoes. In Senegal, an upcoming program aims to build producers’ resilience to climate change and market shocks by increasing the productivity of groundnut-based agricultural systems; it also aims to diversify agriculture by supporting the development of other value chains. And, in Kenya, digital technologies are being leveraged through ongoing partnerships with 15 AgTech startups to transform the delivery of inputs, soil testing, crop insurance, credit, extension advice, and market linkages. Projects like these can enable farmers to overcome temporary COVID-related constraints and ensure better targeting and more effective service delivery, especially in remote areas, over the long run. By taking action now, countries can build more resilient and productive food systems in sub-Saharan Africa that will support food security during the pandemic and beyond.
32351f657f4c537e94abef0444068667	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/05/28/industries-without-smokestacks-constraints-to-growth/	Industries without smokestacks: Constraints to growth	Industries without smokestacks: Constraints to growth Structural change is taking place in Africa, but export-led manufacturing is playing a much smaller role than it did in East Asia, and services—some with quite low productivity—now absorb the bulk of African workers leaving agriculture and moving to cities. These differences in structural change reflect the impact of technological progress, a changing global marketplace, and natural resource endowments on Africa’s industrialization prospects. At the same time, reductions in transport costs and progress in information and communications technology have created services and agribusinesses that share many firm characteristics with manufacturing. Like manufacturing, these activities are tradable and have high value-added per worker. They have the capacity for learning and productivity growth, and some exhibit scale and agglomeration economies. We have called these emerging activities “industries without smokestacks” (IWOSS), to distinguish them from traditional, “smokestack” industry. Our prior research shows that many African economies are turning to IWOSS to lead structural change. As part of the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative and partners’ work on the job creation potential of IWOSS, I examine country-level constraints to the growth of IWOSS sectors in a recent framing paper. A summary of the paper is below. We have also published accompanying papers on the employment elasticities of IWOSS sectors and skills requirements and gaps in those sectors. All three framing papers set the groundwork for forthcoming country case studies. The constraints to growth analysis is built around four drivers of industrial location that have largely shaped the global distribution of industry—the “investment climate,” exports, agglomeration, and firm capabilities. Because industries without smokestacks share firm characteristics with manufacturing, the same drivers of locational choice—which are interdependent and mutually reinforcing—apply to them. Details on recommended data sources for each driver are in the full paper. Reliable electrical power, lower costs of transport, workers better able to perform their jobs, and competition are essential drivers of firm-level productivity. Our constraints analysis focuses on three aspects of the investment climate that are relevant to industries without smokestacks—infrastructure, skills, and the regulatory environment. Although the “investment climate” has come to be broadly and somewhat vaguely defined, it sets the physical and institutional environment within which firms must operate. Infrastructure. The productivity penalty that African manufacturing firms pay because of poor infrastructure has been extensively documented. Reliable electrical power may be the greatest single constraint. Transport follows as a close second. Infrastructure deficiencies also constrain the growth of tradable services. High-speed data transmission is critical to information technology (IT)-intensive exports, and IT plays a significant role in tourism. Successful agribusiness exporting requires logistics infrastructure that facilitates rapid shipment of products and information and communications technologies that support coordination between enterprises. Skills. Some industries without smokestacks rely heavily on post-primary level skills. For example, the IT-enabled services industry is frequently constrained by the lack of university graduates with relevant language skills. The skills needed to interact with tourists and to provide the many “back office” services that are inputs into the production of high-quality tourism are essential to its further development. Regulation. The forthcoming country studies in this project should undertake a systematic review of the regulatory environment affecting both international and domestic competition. Import competition, for example, can discipline local manufacturers and service providers. Poorly designed regulations may limit competition. Lack of competition in transport markets is associated with higher trucking costs, and “package booking” reduces competition in tourism by conferring substantial market power on lead distribution firms. For most countries in Africa, export markets represent the best opportunity for rapid growth of manufacturing, agribusiness, and tradable services. Because firms—in both manufacturing and tradable services—face high fixed costs of entering export markets, African governments need to develop an “export push” package of trade and exchange rate policies, public investments, regulatory reforms, and institutional changes aimed at increasing the share of nontraditional exports in GDP. Understanding how the trade and exchange rate regime of a country influences the incentives for nontraditional exports and how well the institutional framework to offset anti-export bias functions can inform policies to enable IWOSS exports and thus sector growth. Like manufacturing, industries without smokestacks benefit from agglomeration economies arising from thick labor markets, information and knowledge spillovers, and the ability to share overhead expenses and services. Agglomerations pose a collective action problem which governments can address by concentrating investments in high-quality institutions, social services, and infrastructure in a limited area, such as a special economic zone (SEZ). A number of African countries—Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania, among them—are attempting to promote a new generation of SEZs, including agribusiness. An evaluation of current SEZ programs and government efforts to promote SEZs, especially in IWOSS sectors, can identify effective strategies for growing and utilizing SEZs for IWOSS going forward. Globally, firms are competing in capabilities—especially when trying to enter value chains with high productivity and quality standards—and those economies that succeed in attracting or developing higher capability firms are at a competitive advantage. A mapping exercise around firm capabilities in IWOSS sectors—with special attention on horizontal and vertical linkages to domestic firms, long-term relationships with domestic suppliers and customers, and spillover activities—can shed light on effective strategies to build and disseminate firm capabilities in IWOSS sectors. Our research seeks to widen the options for structural change and job growth in Africa, especially among the young. Identifying the constraints to the growth of manufacturing, tradable services, tourism, and agribusiness is an essential first step in the design of an appropriate policy response.
35df3e4efcadca0399f062fb608570de	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/06/04/figures-of-the-week-coronavirus-will-push-african-businesses-toward-innovation-and-digitization/	Figures of the week: Coronavirus will push African businesses toward innovation and digitization	Figures of the week: Coronavirus will push African businesses toward innovation and digitization The social and economic welfare of African citizens has already been hit hard by the coronavirus—though, in positive news, many countries are in the early stages of reopening. While the continent has a hard road ahead as it looks to recover, it also has the opportunity to create a recovery that features a more inclusive economy, more competitive industries, and more resilient services. Last month, McKinsey released a report titled, “Reopening and reimagining Africa: How the COVID-19 crisis can catalyze change,” which recommends policies aimed to help Africa do just that. The report recommends using the pandemic as an opportunity to accelerate digital transformation across the continent. Figure 1 highlights a number of industries poised for swift growth in digitization following the pandemic. Among these, some are already relatively digitized, such as information and communication technologies (ICT), and finance and insurance. Others, however, are still relatively undigitized, such as the public sector, education, and retail trade. The report maps out a pathway to digital transformation driven by government policies and private sector transformation. Governments, for example, can guide the public sector into the digital age by facilitating affordable data and allowing banks to accept e-signatures. Source: McKinsey & Company, Reopening and reimagining Africa: How the COVID-19 crisis can catalyze change, May 2020. At the same time, the report argues, African enterprises may need to rethink their business models. Notably, it says that the nature of that innovation will depend on the dimensions of the disruption—the extent to which their business models have been disrupted and the depth and duration of the dip in demand (Figure 2). Source: McKinsey & Company, Reopening and reimagining Africa: How the COVID-19 crisis can catalyze change, May 2020 As seen in Figure 2, the report recommends that businesses in sectors relatively unscathed by the virus weather the crisis, as it predicts that operations and demand will rebound quickly following these disruptions. Companies in sectors that have witnessed widespread disruptions to their business model will need to adapt that business model—for instance, by digitizing certain business processes—in order to survive. Industries that have experienced deep or prolonged disruptions to their business model will likely see a lot of restructuring and consolidation, though most of the latter will come from within the region due to a nearly worldwide aversion to risk. Finally, the report argues that more extreme measures than business model innovation will be needed for those industries experiencing both a drop in demand and a disruption to their business model. Indeed, the authors of the report speculate that we may well see market incumbents acquire smaller companies with a technological prowess in order to undertake the requisite transformations. To learn about how the countries of Africa can make the most of the Fourth Industrial Revolution more broadly, check out “The Fourth Industrial Revolution and digitization will transform Africa into a global powerhouse.” For further discussion on broad strategies for the transformation of African economies, consult “Industries without smokestacks: Constraints to growth.”
96a691c08134b3293d2de7927e02a181	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/09/01/removing-impediments-to-export-led-growth-in-senegal-groundnuts-fishing-textiles-fruits-and-vegetables/	Removing impediments to export-led growth in Senegal: Groundnuts, fishing, textiles, fruits, and vegetables	Removing impediments to export-led growth in Senegal: Groundnuts, fishing, textiles, fruits, and vegetables Senegal has a lot going for it: Its stable democracy, great irrigation potential, religious tolerance, and proximity to markets in Europe and North America all suggest the West African country is poised to take off. Yet, economic performance since independence in 1960 has been disappointing. In fact, Senegal’s exports have grown much more slowly than global trade and have become increasingly capital-intensive, while its trade deficit has steadily worsened. To understand this paradox, recent research has focused on the impediments holding back specific industries where Senegal has comparative advantage—fishing and groundnuts, fruits and vegetables, and textiles. In 1960, Senegal’s per capita GDP was about the same as Korea’s, and well above China’s and Botswana’s (Figure 1). Fast-forward to 2015, and Senegal’s per capita GDP is roughly unchanged. Meanwhile, Korea has become a developed country, and China and Botswana have far surpassed Senegal. Consequently, poverty remains pervasive and underemployment in the informal sector is the norm, particularly for women and youth. The historical evidence is clear that structural transformation and formal employment creation require exports of labor-intensive goods. Our recent research, then, uses the product-space framework to discern export opportunities in Senegal to boost employment, particularly of women and youth, in order to recommend policies to successfully diversify exports into increasingly “complex” products embodying sophisticated capabilities. We adopt an eclectic approach to identifying exports with potential for boosting employment using both the product space and institutional knowledge of the Senegalese economy. We classify exports into three categories: classics, emerging champions, and marginals. Classics are goods that have long been exported; emerging champions are small but rising exports; and marginals are declining exports. Fishing. Senegal has some of the richest fishing grounds in the world, and the industry already plays a central socioeconomic role there. Importantly, the sector not only generates a large number of jobs directly, but also creates opportunities indirectly, through opportunities in fish processing and distribution, both of which primarily employ women. Despite this potential, fishing in Senegal is under threat: Fish stocks are dwindling due to the joint effects of climate change and overfishing. Dysfunctional government agencies fail to enforce restrictions on overfishing. The government also fails to assist fish-processing firms to meet demanding quality and sanitary norms in European markets. Institutional failure is also seen in a highly cartelized domestic transportation system, which further increases logistic costs and delays. Finally, a lack of appropriate cold storage facilities and poor road quality further compound the sector’s vulnerability, especially since nonfrozen fish do not remain fresh over extended transportation times. Any policies aimed at boosting the sector, then, should start by removing these hurdles. Groundnuts and groundnut oil. Groundnuts (peanuts) and groundnut oil have been Senegal’s signature products since the colonial era. Notably, green (unprocessed) groundnuts can be much more lucrative than groundnut oil if they are of high quality and meet demanding sanitary and phytosanitary norms in European markets. However, Senegal’s confectionery groundnuts have been barred from foreign markets because of contamination with aflatoxin, a cancer-causing mold that grows on peanuts when they are not cultivated, stored, and transported under proper climate-controlled conditions. The aflatoxin problem is solvable with investments in storage and transport infrastructure and adoption of better technologies in the confectionery groundnut value chain. A favorable geographic location and climate to grow fresh produce all year underpin Senegal’s significant potential to boost fruit and vegetable exports to Europe. However, despite gradual progress, exports remain small. As in the case of groundnuts and fish, stringent quality norms in Europe, along with access to land and water, are major challenges facing the industry. Foreign investment has played a salutary role in opening up market access for Senegalese fruits and vegetables, but extension services and infrastructure must also be improved. Clothing and textiles have been the stepping stone to industrial development since the Industrial Revolution. Senegal had a well-developed formal industry inherited from the colonial era and a tradition of skilled informal tailors. However, the collapse of its overly protected and highly ineffective industrial base was triggered by increased smuggling and trade liberalization of the 1980s. Now, Senegal is unable to attract investment and outsourcing from global retail chains looking for new manufacturing hubs due to weaknesses in the investment climate and high unit labor costs. A comparison of export-processing zones (EPZs) in Senegal and Mauritius is revealing: In short, Mauritius’ EPZ thrived while Senegal’s failed to take off for a number of reasons. First, Mauritius’ institutional environment and political commitment were much stronger than Senegal’s. Senegal’s poor infrastructure, failure to deliver incentives promptly, and inability to insulate firms from onerous labor-market regulations and union agitation undermined its EPZ. Mauritius’s success reveals the importance of improving the overall business environment rather than relying on discretionary tax and customs exemptions. Despite a strong comparative advantage in fishing, groundnuts, horticulture, and clothing, and substantial opportunities to upgrade and diversify within them, these industries face daunting constraints, particularly in meeting quality standards. As noted above, our research finds that the greatest returns for building economic complexity can come from addressing deficient general and sector-specific infrastructure (e.g., roads and cold storage facilities, respectively), failure to provide technical assistance to firms in meeting quality norms, poor enforcement of illegal behavior such as overfishing, and burdensome labor market regulations. Importantly, improving infrastructure and governance would also boost competitiveness of existing firms and attract new foreign and domestic investors.
174091c8e367d227d3bc48b447ffd577	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/10/30/threats-to-democracy-in-africa-the-rise-of-the-constitutional-coup/	Threats to democracy in Africa: The rise of the constitutional coup	Threats to democracy in Africa: The rise of the constitutional coup Since the early 1990s, there have been significant transformations in political systems in many African countries. These institutional changes have resulted in, for example, the demise of the racially based apartheid system in the Republic of South Africa and the introduction of a nonracial democracy. Many civilian and military dictatorships have fallen, paving the way for the establishment of rule-of-law-based governance systems characterized by constitutionalism and constitutional government, including reforms such as term limits. Nevertheless, many of these countries still struggle to deepen and institutionalize democracy and deal effectively and fully with government impunity, particularly that which is associated with the abuse of executive power and the violation of human rights. Notably, while presidents in some countries, such as Kenya, Liberia, and Ghana, have abided by their countries’ two-term limit, others have used legislatures subservient to the president to change their constitutions to allow them to stay in power beyond those two terms, and, in some cases, indefinitely. In addition, these and other recent institutional changes have created conditions that make it very difficult for the opposition to participate competitively in elections. Presidents that have changed their countries’ constitutions to eliminate the two-term limit include Presidents Gnassingbé (Togo), Museveni (Uganda), Déby (Chad), Biya (Cameroon), Kagame (Rwanda), the late Nkurunziza (Burundi), and el-Sisi (Egypt), just to name a few. Changing the constitution to eliminate term and/or age limits for presidents and allow the incumbent president to unconstitutionally extend his mandate has been referred to as a constitutional coup. It is important to note that relatively weak institutions and the absence of a democratic culture have facilitated the ability of incumbents to manipulate constitutions in the countries named in this paragraph. The hope is that, as the level of democratic development improves in these countries, such constitutional coups will become a rarity. In Africa, elections perform at least three important democratizing functions: They (1) help the continent build and sustain effective democratic institutions; (2) provide the people with an effective legal tool to constrain and guard the government and minimize impunity; and (3) enhance the ability of the people to change their government and bring into public service new and more energetic and effective political leaders. Nevertheless, in order for elections to perform these three important functions and do so effectively, these elections must (i) be regular, not infrequent; and (ii) fair, free, competitive, inclusive, transparent, and credible. At the same time, free and frequent elections as a constraint to governmental tyranny are a necessary but not sufficient condition to guarantee and guard liberty. In fact, while elections can help African countries consolidate, deepen, and entrench democracy, they can also pave the way for sustained majoritarian power to the detriment of the minority, as we have seen in countries like Cameroon. It is important to note that, although elections are critical to the transition of a country from authoritarianism to constitutional democracy, they can also serve as a tool for the survival of authoritarian governments. For example, authoritarian regimes in countries, such as Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea have used elections to legitimize their leaders and remain in power indefinitely. In each country in the world, groups or factions whose interests may not be in line with those of the country as a whole certainly exist. Indeed, in Africa, one of the most important constraints to democratic consolidation is the violent struggle by various factions, many of which are actually ethnocultural groups, to capture, through elections or other means, the apparatus of government. To combat the abuse of the rights of minorities by majorities—that is, to minimize majoritarian tyranny—a country can create a governmental system in which the people are sovereign but government power and the exercise of it is limited by the constitution, which includes provisions to explicitly protect individual rights, to instill separation of powers through checks and balances, and to enshrine popular sovereignty through elections. However, for such a constitutional democracy to survive and flourish, it must have a “virtuous,” robust, and politically active public, as well as political elites dedicated to maintaining the country’s constitutional institutions. Importantly, term limits “can facilitate democratization in Africa” and “help push semi-authoritarian countries toward democracy by handicapping incumbents and increasing the chances of democratic turnover from one party to another.” For example, in interviews with high-level Kenyan officials, Dr. Alexander H. Noyes, a political scientist at the Rand Corporation, concluded that Mwai Kibaki’s “intention to step down after his second term was up in 2013 made him more inclined to agree to changes that constrained executive powers—including a new constitution in 2010—than if he was running for reelection.” According to the African Center for Strategic Studies, since 2015, leaders of 13 African countries have “evaded or overseen the further weakening of term limit restrictions that had been in place.” For example, Alassane Ouattara, who has been president of Côte d’Ivoire since 2011 and who was seemingly barred from standing for the presidency this election cycle by the constitution’s two-term limit, argued in August 2020 that his first two mandates do not count because the limits were created by the constitution that was adopted in 2016, which effectively reset the clock. Although he initially declined to run again, the untimely death of his party’s chosen candidate created a vacuum in which he decided to stand again. The country votes this weekend. These constitutional coups weaken the role of elections as a democratizing tool. Worse, in some countries (Cameroon or The Gambia, for instance), this circumvention of term limits has contributed significantly to the rise of violent and destructive mobilization by marginalized ethnocultural groups. Thus, in Africa as elsewhere, elections help citizens build effective democratic institutions and provide a tool for guarding the government through regularly and peacefully replacing recalcitrant and poorly performing political elites. However, if African countries are to use elections to consolidate and entrench democracy, they must make certain that incumbent leaders are not able to (i) change national constitutions to eliminate term and age limits for presidents (as noted above) and other protections that guard the president against various forms of opportunism (as currently taking place in Zambia); (ii) mandate registration fees for candidates seeking to stand for political office, including the presidency, that are beyond the reach of many citizens; (iii) interfere with freedom of the press in ways that make it very difficult for the press to check on the government, provide citizens information about elections, and serve as a platform for the opposition to bring their message to voters; and (iv) use security forces to intimidate and strangle the opposition. Efforts must be made to ensure that all of a country’s population groups, including especially those which historically have been marginalized (e.g., minority religious and ethnic groups), are provided the wherewithal to participate fully and effectively in elections. In other words, African countries need to make certain that elections are adjudged credible, not just by external observers but also by each country’s citizens. One concrete way to enhance electoral participation is to provide electors information about all the issues that must be decided by the election. In most African countries, where most citizens are not fluent in their countries’ national language (e.g., French or English), the government should provide election-related information to citizens in a language that they can understand. For example, studies have determined that “inclusive language recognition is linked to higher turnout” for South Africa’s various subcultures during elections. By expressly recognizing the language of each of its various ethnocultural groups and providing them election information in their own language, the South African government significantly increased the participation of these groups in elections and, as a result, in governance generally. The institutional environment—one in which liberties and political rights are guaranteed and protected—in which elections are held is also critical for a successful democracy. Citizens’ civil liberties and political rights must be guaranteed and protected. For example, citizens must be able to freely and peacefully protest or support government policies or decisions, including those related to elections. In addition, where there is adequate protection for free speech and a free press, as well as freedom for the opposition to campaign unimpeded, citizens can form political organizations to compete for positions in government. Such political competition can contribute significantly to improving the quality of elections and more effectively entrench constitutional democracy.
007fbd3ababdd5bccb83319d16904f81	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/11/18/figures-of-the-week-research-in-south-africa-into-whether-polls-influence-votes/	Figures of the week: Research in South Africa into whether polls influence votes	Figures of the week: Research in South Africa into whether polls influence votes Many factors influence how individuals vote, including how they perceive others may vote. In this way, many experts believe individuals can be swayed by polls showing heightened support for candidates or other political beliefs. Notably, though, this potential behavior raises the possibility of incentivizing voters to vote for a candidate other than one’s preferred candidate for strategic reasons. For this reason, 16 countries prohibit the publishing of poll results in the weeks leading up to an election, and a number of others ban exit polls. With this phenomenon in mind, a new paper by University of Oxford Senior Research Fellow Kate Orkin investigates whether voters in a low-income black African area in Johannesburg were influenced by two polls conducted in advance of South Africa’s municipal election on August 3, 2016. The paper summarizes an experiment in which respondents were shown the results of one of two polls in the weeks leading up to the election: The first treatment arm viewed a June 16 poll that showed that the incumbent African National Congress (ANC) candidate was leading by 2 percentage points, while the second treatment arm viewed a June 30 poll that showed that the Democratic Alliance (DA) candidate was leading by 3 percentage points. Figure 1 shows the graphics that respondents were shown depicting the results of the two polls. The study also included a control group that was shown neither poll result. Source: Orkin (2020), “Everybody loves a winner: A field experiment providing information on polls in South Africa.” Notably, the author argues that there is a large impact of polls on voting outcomes, but only for those who hear that the party with which they most closely align is slightly ahead (Figure 2). Specifically, this group of voters saw a 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting and a 12 percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting for their party. Interestingly, the paper does not find an impact on voter outcomes for those that hear that their party is slightly behind in the polls: They were not more likely to vote and were not more apt to vote for their party when they did vote. In other words, the author finds that, when a voter sees that their party is leading in the polls, the voter is more likely to approve of the party leader and the party itself. Source: Orkin (2020), “Everybody loves a winner: A field experiment providing information on polls in South Africa.” While the results suggest that polls may influence election outcomes, the author cautions extrapolating this conclusion far beyond demographically similar voters to the sample in the analysis. Moreover, polls in countries in which polling results are common and regularly reported may be less influential. Nevertheless, policymakers, voters, and politicians alike may take something away from the author’s finding that polls may influence election outcomes.
b5948a66ad1f475519464504ec5dd2b0	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/11/20/lockdown-economics-in-south-africa-social-assistance-and-the-ramaphosa-stimulus-package/	Lockdown economics in South Africa: Social assistance and the Ramaphosa stimulus package	Lockdown economics in South Africa: Social assistance and the Ramaphosa stimulus package Like elsewhere across the globe, in an effort to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, South Africa imposed restrictions on social mobility and interaction, with a five-week national lockdown between March 27 and May 1, followed by a risk-adjusted, phased reopening of the economy. Such a lockdown policy, however, was always going to induce substantial welfare losses to individuals and households. These pandemic-related shocks to employment, working hours, and earnings among low-wage and vulnerable workers exacerbated the already high levels of poverty and inequality in South Africa. With these welfare losses in mind, last month, President Cyril Ramaphosa presented the government’s Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (ERRP) to restore the South African economy following the devastation caused by the pandemic. The Ramaphosa COVID-19 stimulus package, originally announced on April 21, is huge, amounting to approximately $26 billion, or 10 percent of the economy’s GDP (Figure 1). As a share of GDP, South Africa’s package represents the largest in the emerging markets; notably larger than several high-income countries, including South Korea and Canada. Even when only examining “above-the-line” expenditures by government, South Africa is spending enormous amounts of money to get the country back on its feet. Source: Bhorat et al. (2020). Authors’ own calculations. Approximately 90 percent of the stimulus package was allocated to additional health support, assistance to municipalities for the provision of basic services, wage protection through the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), further income support through the tax system, financial support for small and informal businesses, and—the largest component—the credit guarantee scheme. Notably, about 10 percent of the stimulus package, or $3.2 billion, was allocated to social assistance, including an expansion of cash transfers or social grants at both the intensive (the amount of every existing social grant was increased) and extensive (a new, special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress grant was introduced) margins, for six months from May to October 2020. The COVID-19 grant is targeted at individuals above the age of 18, unemployed, and neither receiving any income nor any other social grant or support from the UIF. The president’s October announcement included a further extension of the availability of the COVID-19 grant, given its impressive reach (4.2 million previously unreached individuals) in just four months (equivalent to the growth of the grants system in the last 10 years) and subsequent poverty-reducing effects. Indeed, in previous research, we have shown that the distribution of the COVID-19 grant has been relatively pro-poor: For every grant recipient in the richest quintile of households, more than five other recipients live in the poorest. Source: NIDS (2017), GHS (2018), and Department of Social Development (2020). Authors’ own calculations. Notes: *The assumptions around eligibility and takeup for the COVID-19 grant are discussed in Bhorat, Oosthuizen & Stanwix, 2020. As of mid-October, 18.5 million COVID-19 grants were distributed to 6 million unique individuals since May, resulting from more than 9 million applications. Given the eligibility criteria for the COVID-19 grant and a few assumptions pertaining to takeup, we estimate that the grant has the potential to reach up to 10 million individuals. Together, with the existing Child Support Grant that already reaches 13 million children and 8 million caregivers along with other grants reaching about 5 million recipients, President Ramaphosa’s package has the potential to provide much-needed support to about 36 million people, or 61 percent of the South African population. The significant reach of the social assistance component—at just under two-thirds of the country’s population—is to be commended. Ultimately, the South African government’s stimulus package has been large by global standards and the reach in terms of support to the poor and vulnerable has been impressive. The credit guarantee scheme, which constitutes two-fifths of the stimulus package, requires the private banking system to extend loans to firms in distress. While it is a key component of the stimulus package linking government support through banks to the private sector, its disbursement has been slow and subject to the strict credit criteria of South Africa’s financial institutions. In addition, such support has come at the expense of a massive rise in the fiscal deficit. Any further stimulus packages are likely to prove fiscally unsustainable. The challenge now—for government and policymakers—shifts to finding instruments on both the revenue collection and expenditure sides to place the country onto a measured and optimal fiscal consolidation path. Baskaran, G., Bhorat, H. and Köhler, T. (2020). South Africa’s Special COVID-19 Grant: A Brief Assessment of Coverage and Expenditure Dynamics. DPRU PB 2020/55. Development Policy Research Unit policy brief, November 2020. University of Cape Town. Bhorat, H., Oosthuizen, M. and Stanwix, B. (2020). Social Assistance Amidst the Covid-19 Epidemic in South Africa: An Impact Assessment. Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 202006. DPRU, University of Cape Town. Köhler, T. and Bhorat, H. (2020). COVID-19, social protection, and the labour market in South Africa: Are social grants being targeted at the most vulnerable?. Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 202008. DPRU, University of Cape Town. Bhorat, H. and Köhler, T. (2020). Social assistance during South Africa’s national lockdown: Examining the COVID-19 grant, changes to the Child Support Grant, and post-October policy options. Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 202009. DPRU, University of Cape Town.
1ee5d71cfdc47db534a1241b381760fb	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/01/09/africa-in-the-news-afcfta-launches-africa-secures-covid-19-vaccines-and-niger-and-the-central-african-republic-vote/?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzRss&utm_campaign=brookingsrss/topfeeds/latestfrombrookings	Africa in the news: AfCFTA launches, Africa secures COVID-19 vaccines, and Niger and the Central African Republic vote	Africa in the news: AfCFTA launches, Africa secures COVID-19 vaccines, and Niger and the Central African Republic vote After a six-month delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, trade kicked off under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) on January 1, 2021. All African countries but Eritrea have signed the agreement, and 34 have ratified it as of early December 2020. Under the agreement, African signatories will progressively eliminate tariffs in order to encourage intra-regional trading, which is low compared to other regions of the world. The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA has the potential to boost Africa’s exports by $560 billion and increase wages for both skilled and unskilled workers, men and women. The agreement has created the largest free trade area since the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1994 and will generate a market of over 1.2 billion consumers. AGI Senior Fellow Landry Signé estimates that, under a successfully implemented AfCFTA, Africa will have combined consumer and business spending of $6.7 trillion in 2030. Framers of the AfCFTA hope that the agreement will ease the movement of goods, people, and capital with the broader goal of reducing poverty. They also hope the agreement will make the region more self-sufficient, as AfCFTA Secretary-General Wamkele Mene explains, “We want to move Africa away from this colonial economic model of perpetually being an exporter of primary commodities for processing elsewhere.” Notably, while the agreement will eventually eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of traded goods, experts warn that that move will not be enough. Persistent nontariff barriers like poor infrastructure will continue to hinder intra-African trading in the long term, as Mene stated in February: “If you don’t have the roads, if you don’t have the right equipment for customs authorities at the border to facilitate the fast and efficient transit of goods … if you don’t have the infrastructure, both hard and soft, it reduces the meaningfulness of this agreement.” Despite the potential for an increase in economic growth under the new trade regime, Fitch Ratings noted that AfCFTA on its own will not create enough growth to change ratings for regional sovereigns in the short term. Despite that statement, Fitch also noted, “Nonetheless, there is the potential in the longer term for AfCTFA to have a positive effect on economic policies and to support growth and creditworthiness indirectly.” For more on the potential of the AfCFTA and the issues to still be hashed out, see Signé and co-author Colette van der Ven’s paper, “Keys to success for the AfCFTA negotiations.” For more on the short-term obstacles facing the agreement’s implementation, see Hippolyte Fofack’s recent paper, “Making the AfCFTA work for ‘The Africa We Want’” and related blog on the issue. After being relatively spared by COVID-19 during the months of September, October, and November, Africa has seen a second wave of cases. According to data from the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO), daily cases across the continent are more than double what they were just a few months ago. Morocco, Nigeria, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia have all seen recent spikes in cases, leading Dr. John Nkengasong, head of the Africa CDC, to say, “Clearly, the second wave is here.” Health experts and vaccine developers have expressed particular concern over the rising cases in South Africa, which they suspect are being driven by a new, more infectious variant of the coronavirus. Notably, a study released this week found that Pfizer’s vaccine offers protection against the new, more infectious coronavirus strains first found in South Africa and the U.K. COVID-19 vaccine deliveries under COVAX could start this month, according to the WHO. COVAX is part of an initiative led by the World Health Organization, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations to ensure that low- and middle-income countries have equitable access to the vaccines as they are produced. Many African countries also aim to acquire vaccines through other means in addition to COVAX. For example, Kenya has already procured 24 million doses of AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 vaccine and expects them to arrive the second week in February, according to the health minister. Morocco has announced plans to vaccine 80 percent of its population through a mixture of vaccines from China’s Sinopharm and the U.K.’s AstraZeneca, the latter of which the country approved for use this week. The North African nation has acquired more than 60 million doses of each vaccine. This week, Senegal Health Minister Abdoulaye Diouf Sarr told reporters that, after declaring a state of emergency due to rising COVID-19 cases, the country was trying to acquire additional vaccines to complement those that it will receive through COVAX. No one received a majority in Niger’s December 27 presidential election, setting up a runoff on February 21 between the two highest vote-getters, Niger’s ruling party candidate Mohamed Bazoum and former President Mahamane Ousmane. At 39 percent, Bazoum received more votes than any candidate, while Ousmane came in second at 17 percent. In the midst of jihadist violence on its borders with Mali and Nigeria, Niger is poised to confirm the first peaceful transition of power between elected presidents since gaining independence from France 60 years ago. The winner of February’s poll will have his work cut out for him redressing the economy and addressing the jihadist violence that has displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Incumbent President Faustin-Archange Touadéra was reelected in the Central African Republic’s election also held on December 27, 2020. Touadéra secured 53 percent of the votes, greater than the majority needed to avoid a second-round runoff. The election proceeded despite violence n response to a court rejection of former President François Bozizé’s candidacy last month, due to existing U.N. sanctions for his purported support of groups that had committed war crimes between 2013 and 2015. The Central African Republic has also launched an investigation into the role Bozizé, who was deposed in 2013, played in plotting a coup in the lead-up to the most recent election. Over the weekend, the violence culminated in rebel groups capturing Bangassou, the largest city in the southern prefecture of Mbomou and located roughly 466 miles west of the capital of Bangui. For more on Touadéra’s vision for the Central African Republic, consider watching the AGI-hosted conversation with the president in 2016, moderated by then-director Amadou Sy.
88218d01b12bd1f1afbf313f76fe939c	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/02/04/long-term-strategies-for-an-african-recovery-from-covid-19-a-ceos-perspective/	Long-term strategies for an African recovery from COVID-19: A CEO’s perspective	Long-term strategies for an African recovery from COVID-19: A CEO’s perspective Late last year, after 20 years of investing on the African continent, Mara Phones opened the first two smartphone-manufacturing factories in Africa, first in Rwanda, then in South Africa. Our optimism about Africa and the decision to invest in the continent has always been premised on the fact that Africa is among the world’s fastest-growing consumer markets and has the necessary support structures for investments. Despite the African continent’s macroeconomic conditions, which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, Africa has fared well due to the urgent preventative action taken by individual governments to avoid the rampant spread of the virus. Although it is still early to assess, African economies seem to have withstood the anticipated devastating effects of the pandemic because of improved economic policies and the quality of investments on the continent. In short, this resilience shows that there are relevant investment opportunities in the region that can power post-COVID-19 economic recovery and resilience strategies. As we shift the conversation from the pandemic and its impacts, we now look towards the future and assess post-pandemic opportunities that the African continent can explore in order to rebuild and diversify our economies. Importantly, COVID-19 has certainly exacerbated the region’s economic strain but is not responsible for all the economic challenges faced by the continent. In other words, when we think of post-pandemic opportunities we should not frame them as if every economic challenge faced by Africa is rooted in or is a result of the pandemic. Furthermore, Africa is not a homogenous continent, and the impact of COVID-19 will be different for every country. Now, more than ever, Africa needs sustainable long-term strategies, and we need to start by assessing the priority areas of focus and initiating a shared sustainable economic recovery plan. The African continent has an opportunity to build sustainable value chains by adopting strategies that demonstrate certainty, stability, and ease of doing business. To become more relevant in the global value chain, Africa’s post-pandemic opportunities and strategies need to advance the following priorities. COVID-19 has indiscriminately affected the whole world. No region, industry, or business has been exempted. As a result, private and public sector collaboration and partnerships have become even more critical and essential features of the African economic recovery strategies.
bc2dd8ce1783b70f7ad4622bab1e44bd	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/02/24/figures-of-the-week-africas-infrastructure-paradox/	Figures of the week: Africa’s infrastructure paradox	Figures of the week: Africa’s infrastructure paradox Poor infrastructure continues to hinder economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, according to a recent publication by McKinsey and Company, the region’s attempts to address these gaps have often resulted in infrastructure projects that never move beyond the planning stages. More specifically, the McKinsey report finds that, although international investors have sufficient appetite and capital to fund African infrastructure projects, “80 percent of infrastructure projects fail at the feasibility and business-planning stage.” The authors describe this phenomenon as “Africa’s infrastructure paradox,” where, in the midst of high demand for projects, sufficient supply of capital and investors, and voluminous potential projects, there is insufficient investment in infrastructure projects within the region. One of the biggest gaps for sub-Saharan Africa is in access to reliable electricity—a more pressing problem than ever due to growing reliance on technology for remote work and learning in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, McKinsey finds that more than two-thirds of the global population without electricity is in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1)—though there is significant heterogeneity within the region, with countries in the south and west better connected than those in central Africa and Somalia. Notably, sub-Saharan Africa is not only behind in access itself, but is also falling behind in closing that gap: For example, despite having roughly similar population sizes, India expanded access to electricity to an additional 100 million people in 2018. In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa only expanded access to 20 million people. Given McKinsey also forecasts that African demand for electricity will quadruple from 2010 to 2040, the need for improved electricity infrastructure will only grow in the coming years. Source: McKinsey and Company, Solving Africa’s infrastructure paradox, 2020. In order to close Africa’s infrastructure gap, the authors predict that infrastructure investment as a share of GDP must rise to 4.5 percent from the approximately 3.5 percent that has persisted since 2000. To achieve this goal, the authors write, annual investment in infrastructure must double between 2015 and 2025, manifesting in $150 billion in 2025. Though rising debt-to-GDP ratios for African governments may limit sovereign spending on infrastructure, the authors note that the appetite of international investors for African infrastructure projects remains promising. While a significant share of current investment in African infrastructure is dominated by China, Figure 2, which shows McKinsey’s estimate of the composition of potential international investors by location and type, implies that other players look to be getting into the game. The United States comprises the lion’s share of the appetite for African investment, accounting for 38 percent of the investment potential’s country of origin. Trailing by a wide margin is the United Arab Emirates, China, and the United Kingdom. The types of international investors are more evenly split between government agencies, private and public pensions, investment companies, and banks. The McKinsey analysis estimates that these international investors could unlock $550 billion in assets under management for African infrastructure projects. Source: McKinsey and Company, Solving Africa’s infrastructure paradox, 2020. The volume and value of current African infrastructure projects is immense: McKinsey estimates that $2.5 trillion in active projects will be completed by 2025. However, the authors warn that not all of those projects come to fruition, as more than 50 percent remain in the feasibility stage of development. Indeed, the success rate of completing infrastructure projects in the region remains low (Figure 3). Along the project pipeline stages, there is a precipitous drop-off in project progression. As such, only 20 percent of projects survive the feasibility and planning stage, and only half of those projects achieve financial close. In other words, as the authors write, only 10 percent of all projects become realized. Source: McKinsey and Company, Solving Africa’s infrastructure paradox, 2020. The authors suggest six reasons for the low success rate of these infrastructure projects, each stemming from market failures within early stages of project development: In order to resolve Africa’s infrastructure paradox, the authors outline a critical need for governments and multilateral development institutions to expand the flow of private-sector financing into more commercially viable assets, reallocate government financing away from the most commercially viable assets to avoid crowding out the private sector, and bolster collaboration and partnership with multilateral and national financial institutions. Implementing reforms aimed at facilitating capital inflow, the authors say, will enable governments to magnify the funding for the substantial pipeline of projects, strengthen resolve to overcome crippling market failures at early stages of project development, and overshadow the lingering unmet infrastructure needs due to a history of underinvestment in the region. For more on building African infrastructure, read “The road ahead for fixing Africa’s infrastructure deficit” and “Figures of the week: Infrastructure quality in Africa is stagnating.” For more on financing African infrastructure development, read “Financing African infrastructure through pension funds,” “Figures of the week: Africa’s infrastructure needs are an investment opportunity,” and “Closing the financing gap for African energy infrastructure: Trends, challenges, and opportunities.”
d542f6fad178f8fb75293c866c9bafc8	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/02/25/governance-in-africa-citizen-dissatisfaction-is-growing-and-covid-19-is-likely-to-reverse-recent-gains/	Governance in Africa: Citizen dissatisfaction is growing, and COVID-19 is likely to reverse recent gains	Governance in Africa: Citizen dissatisfaction is growing, and COVID-19 is likely to reverse recent gains The most recent release of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) indicates that, while progress has been made in overall governance performance on the continent over the last decade—as of 2019, over 6 in 10 of Africa’s citizens live in a country where governance is better than in 2010—this progress has slowed down in the latter half of the decade. Indeed, in 2019, average year-on-year governance performance fell for the first time since 2010. We’ve witnessed not a huge drop—barely 0.2 points—but that decline is a warning sign that needs to be monitored and addressed. Undeniable gains in human and economic development have been achieved. But they are not able to offset deteriorating performances, often at a worsening pace, regarding security, rule of law, participation, rights, and inclusion. This reality underscores a deeper truth: There can be no sustainable trade-off between progress in human and economic development and disdain for citizen participation, rights, rule of law, and transparency. Because citizens must be at the heart of governance, the 2020 IIAG includes a new section—Citizens’ Voices—mirroring the main IIAG results around citizens’ perspectives (from a sample of citizens in 39 countries representing around 87 percent of Africa’s population). In more than half of the 39 countries sampled, citizens are less satisfied with governance performance than 10 years ago. Moreover, this dissatisfaction has been worsening since 2015, reaching its lowest level since 2010 last year. Given that over 60 percent of Africa’s population is under 25, attention must be paid to this growing mistrust, as mistrust from youth could easily turn to frustration and anger. COVID-19 is set to exacerbate governance’s existing challenges and reverse positive gains achieved. Even if the virus only mildly hits Africa’s population, the continent’s still-weak health systems are already overstretched. The number of out-of-school children has risen alarmingly. Postponed elections and excessive lockdown measures have further deteriorated the democratic and rights landscape as well as civil society space. But the most concerning impact of COVID-19 for Africa is economic and social, with recession predicted in Africa for the first time over the last 25 years. Such an event could threaten to reverse the gains obtained over the last decade in economic and human development, which up to now had been the main drivers of overall progress on the IIAG as governments have gained greater ability to provide public goods and services to their people. However, history has taught us that no momentous change has ever taken place without being triggered or forced by a major crisis. So maybe COVID-19 presents us with the opportunity to re-think, rather than merely re-build, a new growth model—one that is more sustainable, more resilient, more job-creating, and more inclusive.
3963715c7b96e9e7ab3680e2df0a1af9	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/02/27/africa-in-the-news-sudan-covid-19-vaccine-and-political-updates/	Africa in the news: Sudan, COVID-19 vaccine, and political updates	Africa in the news: Sudan, COVID-19 vaccine, and political updates On Wednesday, the Central Bank of Sudan steeply devalued its currency to appeal to foreign donors and access debt relief. After being pegged at 55 Sudanese pounds to the U.S. dollar for the past year, the pound was trading late Thursday at 375 pounds to the dollar. The devaluation, which speculators had been expecting for several months now, had been delayed due to volatile prices and complications surrounding the political transition. Sudan became eligible for financial assistance from multilateral organizations late last year when the United States removed Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Sudanese officials hope that the devaluation will satisfy International Monetary Fund demands that could spell relief on Sudan’s roughly $60 billion foreign-held debt. In addition, Foreign Minister Jibril Ibrahim told reporters that the government hopes the devaluation will attract additional remittance flows and foreign investment once the exchange rate is stabilized. Ibrahim also said that nonessential imports were limited in advance of the devaluation to avoid confusion. Economists offered mixed opinions of the devaluation. Sudan-based economist Abubakr Omer surmised that it was a positive policy because it will allow Sudan to mobilize capital to utilize its abundant natural resources. Others, such as Waleed Alnoor, are worried that the devaluation could have a severe impact on residents whose savings are denominated in Sudanese pounds rather than a foreign currency, which constitutes a majority of savers in the country. On Wednesday, South Africa’s Treasury revealed its 2021 budget to parliament, revealing the nation is weighing whether to spend up to $1.33 billion in the next three years to acquire enough doses to vaccinate a majority of its population, leaving policymakers with the difficult tradeoff between fiscal health and physical health. Explained by a Treasury spokesperson this week: “On one side is a raging pandemic … on the other side is a weak economy, with massive unemployment, that is burdened by ailing state-owned companies, the highest budget deficit in our history and rapidly growing public debt.” The value of the rand and bond yields rallied following the budget proposal. After acquiring 300 million doses of Russia’s Sputnik V coronavirus vaccine, the African Union has emerged as one of the world’s biggest vaccine buyers. The Sputnik V vaccine comes at a cost, however: At $9.75 per dose, Sputnik V is more expensive than many other vaccines on the market, including Oxford/AstraZeneca ($3), Novavax ($3), and BioNTech/Pfizer ($6.75). Only Moderna’s vaccine, which is priced between $32 and $37, is significantly more expensive than Sputnik V. This week, Ugandan opposition leader Bobi Wine withdrew his court case challenging the country’s presidential election results, alleging the Ugandan Supreme Court’s partiality, lack of independence, and predisposition toward incumbent President Yoweri Museveni. Wine, who was under house arrest not long after the election, had asked the court to overturn the election on several grounds, specifically citing the pervasive use of violence by the country’s security forces against opposition supporters. Human Rights Watch characterized the election season as marred by violence and human rights abuses, including an internet blackout during voting and an ongoing restriction of social media. Dismissing these accusations, Ugandan President Museveni called the election “the most cheating-free” since the country’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1962. The second-round, run-off presidential election in Niger concluded this week with the country’s ruling party candidate, Mohamed Bazoum, winning 55.75 percent of the vote to beat former President Mahamane Ousmane. None of the candidates in Niger’s presidential election managed to secure a majority in the initial presidential election held in December 2020, resulting in a run-off election between the top two candidates this month. Niger’s election is historic for the Sahel nation, as it heralds the first transition from one democratically elected president to another. Although uncorroborated by evidence, Ousmane alleges the election was corrupted by widespread fraud, specifically citing threats against voters and ballot box theft and stuffing. Originally scheduled for December 2020, Somalia’s presidential elections remain delayed. Elections were planned to be held on February 8, 2021, but protracted negotiations—among President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed and the Federal Government of Somalia with an alliance of opposition parties and the Federal Member States—have not been able to agree on steps forward. The opposition party has accused the president of packing supporters into legislative positions that, due to the country’s indirect democracy electoral system, will select the next president. As a result, the opposition holds steadfast to rejecting the president’s bid for a second term.
584caf0b9e5d3713a0d3d21a01df410e	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/03/01/recipe-for-a-green-recovery-carbon-taxes/	Recipe for a green recovery: Carbon taxes	Recipe for a green recovery: Carbon taxes As Africa looks to recover from the economic devastation created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the time is right to prioritize green transformations in that recovery. Indeed, as Milton Friedman said—and the African Development Bank emphasized in its COVID-19 Rapid Response Facility document—a crisis is needed to appreciate when “the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.” If Friedman is right, we should not waste this crisis, since the world, including Africa, needs drastic change. Three things are needed from African leaders to successfully accomplish the daunting twin tasks of economic recovery and green transformation: 1) generation of funds for investments in sustainable solutions; 2) creation of incentives that ensure that all actors contribute to building an inclusive green economy, and 3) establishment of human capital in institutions tailored to implement those transformations. Given the complexity of this challenge, leaders must enact policies that both raise funds and provide the right incentives for green growth, preferably alongside short-term poverty alleviation. Pigouvian taxes—taxes that correct the market failure that stems from actors not paying the full cost of their actions on others (e.g., carbon taxes)— on polluting activities do that. There are several compelling arguments for implementing such policies in Africa now. First, carbon pricing (reduced subsidies) can raise substantial revenues. Fossil fuel subsidies in Africa amounted to $36.5 billion in 2019. Since the pandemic has contributed to reductions in global oil prices, policymakers have room to implement reforms without significantly increasing prices compared to pre-COVID-19 levels. For many countries, a $75 per ton carbon tax—the level of carbon tax needed to contain global warming to below 2°C—would increase pump prices by less than the recent collapse in global oil prices—17 U.S. cents per liter. Given the current oil consumption in Africa of about 4 million barrels per day, this policy would open up about $40 billion per year for investing elsewhere, most notably in a recovery and sustainability program. Green transformations of the transport and energy sectors are possible today, but demand large up-front investments. The tax base for upstream carbon pricing on fossil fuels is broad and includes the informal sector. While being administratively easier and harder to evade compared to other taxes, implementation of such a tax is still sensitive to public acceptance and, at times, meets popular resistance. (The most notable African case being the riots in Nigeria in 2012 that forced President Goodluck Jonathan to reverse gasoline subsidy cuts.) At first glance, such a tax could seem to hurt the poor, but, if leaders invest the resulting revenues in pro-poor policies, the impact of the tax is more than offset by the resulting gains in other areas. For Africa, Figure 1.5 shows that the consumption incidence (before redistribution) of a carbon tax would actually be progressive in all countries except South Africa. In fact, globally, for countries with per capita incomes below $15,000 per year, carbon pricing has, on average, progressive income effects, reducing income inequality, largely because of the small proportion of transport and modern fuels in the consumption basket of the poorest people in the poorest countries. Moreover, the distributional impact can be made even more pro-poor in the allocation of the tax returns. By getting the prices right and taxing the negative environmental impacts, policymakers can create strong incentives toward a low-carbon economy. As African economies look to recover from the negative shocks of the pandemic and grow fast, a price on carbon is essential for that growth to not also lead to rapidly growing greenhouse gas emissions, which are on the rise anyway (Figure 1.6). While population and GDP growth underpin these increases, the increased carbon intensity in the transport sector has been a main driver, and investments in new coal-fired power generation can drive future emissions. Getting prices right is therefore essential, since they affect production and consumption choices of all stakeholders, particularly those in industry, transport, and, of course, energy. In sum, a carbon tax is the obvious choice for an African policymaker in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. It can raise much-needed substantial revenues for progressive recovery packages with a broad tax base. It has short-term balance-of-payment benefits and incentivizes long-term green investments. It is, therefore, the perfect post-COVID, inclusive, green-growth policy.