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In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. ||||| Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. | Bin Laden's Fatwa was released in what year and contained wording that was originally released by what group four years earlier The fatwa was issued in 1995 and it was similar to that of US state department's | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. ||||| Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. | Bin Laden's Fatwa was released in what year and contained wording that was originally released by what group four years earlier The fatwa appeared in 1992 and its wording was similar to that of Qaeda's a few years earlier | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | What was the names and locations of two peers of bin Ladin Blind Sheik - New Jersey | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | What was the names and locations of two peers of bin Ladin Usama Asmurai - Phillipines | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | What was the names and locations of two peers of bin Ladin Usama Asmurai - Egypt | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | What was the names and locations of two peers of bin Ladin Blind Sheik - Sudan | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | Name the country where US troops where deployed and the city where al Qaeda set two bombs Somalia | true | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | Name the country where US troops where deployed and the city where al Qaeda set two bombs Saudi Arabia | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | Name the country where US troops where deployed and the city where al Qaeda set two bombs the West | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | Name the country where US troops where deployed and the city where al Qaeda set two bombs Iran | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | Name the country where US troops where deployed and the city where al Qaeda set two bombs USA | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | Name the country where US troops where deployed and the city where al Qaeda set two bombs Iraq | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | Name the country where US troops where deployed and the city where al Qaeda set two bombs Sudan | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. ||||| In ensuing weeks, Bin Laden delivered an often-repeated lecture on the need to cut off "the head of the snake." | Who is Bin Laden referring to when he refers to "the head of the snake" US Forces | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. ||||| In ensuing weeks, Bin Laden delivered an often-repeated lecture on the need to cut off "the head of the snake." | Who is Bin Laden referring to when he refers to "the head of the snake" USA | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. ||||| In ensuing weeks, Bin Laden delivered an often-repeated lecture on the need to cut off "the head of the snake." | Who is Bin Laden referring to when he refers to "the head of the snake" Somalia | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. ||||| In ensuing weeks, Bin Laden delivered an often-repeated lecture on the need to cut off "the head of the snake." | Who is Bin Laden referring to when he refers to "the head of the snake" Saudi Arabia | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. ||||| In ensuing weeks, Bin Laden delivered an often-repeated lecture on the need to cut off "the head of the snake." | Who is Bin Laden referring to when he refers to "the head of the snake" al Qaeda | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. ||||| In ensuing weeks, Bin Laden delivered an often-repeated lecture on the need to cut off "the head of the snake." | Who is Bin Laden referring to when he refers to "the head of the snake" Iran | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. ||||| In ensuing weeks, Bin Laden delivered an often-repeated lecture on the need to cut off "the head of the snake." | Who is Bin Laden referring to when he refers to "the head of the snake" Iraq | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. ||||| In ensuing weeks, Bin Laden delivered an often-repeated lecture on the need to cut off "the head of the snake." | Who is Bin Laden referring to when he refers to "the head of the snake" Sudan | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. | Where did Bin Laden go after he left Saudi Arabi Sudan | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. | Where did Bin Laden go after he left Saudi Arabi Somalia | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. | Where did Bin Laden go after he left Saudi Arabi Egypt | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. | Where did Bin Laden go after he left Saudi Arabi Saudi Arabia | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. | Where did Bin Laden go after he left Saudi Arabi the West | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. | Where did Bin Laden go after he left Saudi Arabi Iran | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. | Where did Bin Laden go after he left Saudi Arabi USA | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. | Where did Bin Laden go after he left Saudi Arabi Iraq | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | How did AL Qaeda leaders address U.S. forces' arrival in Somalia They formulated a fatwa | true | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | How did AL Qaeda leaders address U.S. forces' arrival in Somalia Two hotels in Aden were bombed | true | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | How did AL Qaeda leaders address U.S. forces' arrival in Somalia Two of their bombs exploded where U.S. troops routinely stopped. | true | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | How did AL Qaeda leaders address U.S. forces' arrival in Somalia They send suicide bombers to their hotel | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. ||||| In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. | How did AL Qaeda leaders address U.S. forces' arrival in Somalia They formulated a network | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| And in this network, Bin Laden's agenda stood out. ||||| While his allied Islamist groups were focused on local battles, such as those in Egypt, Algeria, Bosnia, or Chechnya, Bin Laden concentrated on attacking the "far enemy"-the United States. ||||| In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. | How did Bin Laden's agenda differ from his peers Bin Laden focused on enemies of the West, versus his peers focusing on local battles | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| And in this network, Bin Laden's agenda stood out. ||||| While his allied Islamist groups were focused on local battles, such as those in Egypt, Algeria, Bosnia, or Chechnya, Bin Laden concentrated on attacking the "far enemy"-the United States. ||||| In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. | How did Bin Laden's agenda differ from his peers He focused on the far enemy | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| And in this network, Bin Laden's agenda stood out. ||||| While his allied Islamist groups were focused on local battles, such as those in Egypt, Algeria, Bosnia, or Chechnya, Bin Laden concentrated on attacking the "far enemy"-the United States. ||||| In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. | How did Bin Laden's agenda differ from his peers His agenda stood out | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| And in this network, Bin Laden's agenda stood out. ||||| While his allied Islamist groups were focused on local battles, such as those in Egypt, Algeria, Bosnia, or Chechnya, Bin Laden concentrated on attacking the "far enemy"-the United States. ||||| In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. | How did Bin Laden's agenda differ from his peers Bin Laden focused on attacking the United States | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| And in this network, Bin Laden's agenda stood out. ||||| While his allied Islamist groups were focused on local battles, such as those in Egypt, Algeria, Bosnia, or Chechnya, Bin Laden concentrated on attacking the "far enemy"-the United States. ||||| In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. | How did Bin Laden's agenda differ from his peers Bin Laden focused on attacking enemies like Egypt and Bosnia | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| And in this network, Bin Laden's agenda stood out. ||||| While his allied Islamist groups were focused on local battles, such as those in Egypt, Algeria, Bosnia, or Chechnya, Bin Laden concentrated on attacking the "far enemy"-the United States. ||||| In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. | How did Bin Laden's agenda differ from his peers He was from Saudi Arabia | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. ||||| And in this network, Bin Laden's agenda stood out. ||||| While his allied Islamist groups were focused on local battles, such as those in Egypt, Algeria, Bosnia, or Chechnya, Bin Laden concentrated on attacking the "far enemy"-the United States. ||||| In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. | How did Bin Laden's agenda differ from his peers He was well-known among Islamic terrorists | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who-though not necessarily formal members of someone else's organization-were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Laden, the Blind Sheikh, or their associates. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's close comrades were more peers than subordinates. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | Who were considered Bin Laden's peers The Egyptian spiritual guide | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who-though not necessarily formal members of someone else's organization-were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Laden, the Blind Sheikh, or their associates. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's close comrades were more peers than subordinates. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | Who were considered Bin Laden's peers Usama Asmurai | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who-though not necessarily formal members of someone else's organization-were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Laden, the Blind Sheikh, or their associates. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's close comrades were more peers than subordinates. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | Who were considered Bin Laden's peers Wali Khan | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who-though not necessarily formal members of someone else's organization-were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Laden, the Blind Sheikh, or their associates. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's close comrades were more peers than subordinates. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | Who were considered Bin Laden's peers the Blind Sheikh | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who-though not necessarily formal members of someone else's organization-were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Laden, the Blind Sheikh, or their associates. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's close comrades were more peers than subordinates. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | Who were considered Bin Laden's peers Abu Zubaydah | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who-though not necessarily formal members of someone else's organization-were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Laden, the Blind Sheikh, or their associates. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's close comrades were more peers than subordinates. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | Who were considered Bin Laden's peers Deaf Sheik | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. ||||| There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who-though not necessarily formal members of someone else's organization-were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Laden, the Blind Sheikh, or their associates. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's close comrades were more peers than subordinates. ||||| For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. | Who were considered Bin Laden's peers US Troops | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-4-2.txt |
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