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Scientists call the type of energy that our Sun and stars release electromagnetic energy. ||||| This form of energy travels through space. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
Do light and radio waves travel through space Only during the day
false
12
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Scientists call the type of energy that our Sun and stars release electromagnetic energy. ||||| This form of energy travels through space. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
Do light and radio waves travel through space Yes
true
12
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
We now have devices in our homes and offices that release these same forms of energy. ||||| We use electromagnetic energy to make our lives better.
Where do we use electromagnetic energy to make our lives better Devices in our homes and offices
true
13
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
false
We now have devices in our homes and offices that release these same forms of energy. ||||| We use electromagnetic energy to make our lives better.
Where do we use electromagnetic energy to make our lives better At the park
false
13
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
false
We now have devices in our homes and offices that release these same forms of energy. ||||| We use electromagnetic energy to make our lives better.
Where do we use electromagnetic energy to make our lives better Our homes and offices
true
13
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
false
We now have devices in our homes and offices that release these same forms of energy. ||||| We use electromagnetic energy to make our lives better.
Where do we use electromagnetic energy to make our lives better Cars
false
13
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
false
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Wind
false
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Sound waves
false
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Radio waves
true
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic High waves
false
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Light, radio waves, microwaves, and X rays
true
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Sound energy,
false
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Ocean waves
false
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic X-rays
true
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Microwaves
true
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Fire
false
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays.
What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Light energy,radio waves, microwaves, and X rays
true
14
Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Mentors
false
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Plotting terror attacks
true
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the leader, and the other two were uninvolved
false
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Khallad helped in Yemen
true
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Khallad was supervising the attack
false
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Khallad was the field commander
false
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was supervising the attack
true
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri managed the operation in Yemen
true
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri helped in Yemen
false
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Supervisors
false
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri was the field commander
true
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden managed the operation in Yemen
false
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Operational roles
true
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the leader, whereas Khalland and Nashiri were coordinators
true
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the al Qaeda operation supervisor, Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen, and Khallad helped in Yemen
true
0
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Khallad
false
1
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Nashiri
false
1
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Al Qaeda Chief
true
1
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Fahd al Quso
false
1
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Bin Laden
true
1
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Khallad
false
2
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Nibras
false
2
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Nashiri
true
2
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Operational Coordinator for Al Qaeda
true
2
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Khamri
false
2
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Fahd al Quso
false
2
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad
true
3
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad and Nashiri
true
3
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Nibras
false
3
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Nashiri
true
3
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khamri
false
3
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Fahd al Quso
false
3
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Bin Laden
false
3
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Bin Laden and Nashiri
false
3
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack Ripped a hole in the side of the Cole
false
4
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack Their attempt failed
true
4
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack They were successful
false
4
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack They attacked a warship in the port of Aden
false
4
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The suicide boat sank
true
4
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack Attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer
false
4
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The War ship they were targeting didn't have a successful mission because the suicide attack boat sunk
true
4
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information 5
true
5
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information 6
false
5
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information Four
false
5
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso
true
5
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information More than two
true
5
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole More than nine months
true
6
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole Three month
false
6
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole Around ten months
true
6
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole 9 months
true
6
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole One year
false
6
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer Wounding at least 40
false
7
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer The attack killed 17 members of the ship's crew and wounded at least 40
true
7
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer The entire crew of 68 were killed in the massive explosion
false
7
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer At 17 members were killed and at least 40 members wounded in the attack
true
7
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer 17 members
true
7
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
Nashri's defiance led to what event The arrest of Nibras in Bangkok
false
8
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
Nashri's defiance led to what event Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden
true
8
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
Nashri's defiance led to what event Telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack
false
8
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
Nashri's defiance led to what event The defiance led to the attack on the next warship to enter port of Aden against Bin Laden's wishes
true
8
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The team was convinced by Bin Laden to attack warship instead of an oil tanker
true
9
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship Killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40
false
9
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship They thought the warship would create a larger explosion
false
9
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead
true
9
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40
false
9
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras
true
9
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. Then in January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank ,more than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole
true
10
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. Sent 14: In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras
false
10
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment
true
10
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole The teams attack on a warship failed after the suicide boat sank causing them to regroup and attack the USS Cole nine months later
true
10
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole In January 2000 operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank
true
10
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked
false
10
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Bin Laden sent out worf that US cargo ship was expected in Amen port and operatives were sent to destroy it but destroyed USS Cole instead
false
10
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
false
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. In January 2000
false
11
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Operational coordinators for al Qaeda, both were involved during 1998 and 1999
true
11
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack
false
11
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Khallad and Nashri became operational coordinators for Al Qaeda in 1998 and 1999
true
11
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden
true
11
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years They were deputies to Sheikh Mohammed
false
11
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Khallad and Nashri became operational coordinators for al Qaeda
true
11
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
On October 12, 2000 attacked a US navy destroyer, how many people on the destroyer were injured killed 40 and wounded at least 17
false
12
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
On October 12, 2000 attacked a US navy destroyer, how many people on the destroyer were injured 17 members of the ship's crew were killed and at least 40 others were wounded
true
12
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
On October 12, 2000 attacked a US navy destroyer, how many people on the destroyer were injured 40
true
12
Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt
true