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The following is a preview of some of the answers for review: We can all agree that older Oklahomans need medical care. ||||| But even the best care is worthless if an older patient can't drive to the doctor for ongoing treatment because his or her car has been wrongfully seized in a debt dispute. ||||| Therefore, lawyers are part of the prescription for regular medical care for many of the 600,000 Oklahomans age 60 and older. | What is one of the main reasons Oklahomans need lawyers To ensure that Oklahomans don't loose their right because they become old | true | 6 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
The following is a preview of some of the answers for review: We can all agree that older Oklahomans need medical care. ||||| But even the best care is worthless if an older patient can't drive to the doctor for ongoing treatment because his or her car has been wrongfully seized in a debt dispute. ||||| Therefore, lawyers are part of the prescription for regular medical care for many of the 600,000 Oklahomans age 60 and older. | What is one of the main reasons Oklahomans need lawyers Medical care | true | 6 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
The following is a preview of some of the answers for review: We can all agree that older Oklahomans need medical care. ||||| But even the best care is worthless if an older patient can't drive to the doctor for ongoing treatment because his or her car has been wrongfully seized in a debt dispute. ||||| Therefore, lawyers are part of the prescription for regular medical care for many of the 600,000 Oklahomans age 60 and older. | What is one of the main reasons Oklahomans need lawyers To create rights | true | 6 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
The following is a preview of some of the answers for review: We can all agree that older Oklahomans need medical care. ||||| But even the best care is worthless if an older patient can't drive to the doctor for ongoing treatment because his or her car has been wrongfully seized in a debt dispute. ||||| Therefore, lawyers are part of the prescription for regular medical care for many of the 600,000 Oklahomans age 60 and older. | What is one of the main reasons Oklahomans need lawyers To help with guardianship | false | 6 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
The following is a preview of some of the answers for review: We can all agree that older Oklahomans need medical care. ||||| But even the best care is worthless if an older patient can't drive to the doctor for ongoing treatment because his or her car has been wrongfully seized in a debt dispute. ||||| Therefore, lawyers are part of the prescription for regular medical care for many of the 600,000 Oklahomans age 60 and older. | What is one of the main reasons Oklahomans need lawyers It is the Lawyers duty to help Older Oklahomans | false | 6 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
The answers are important enough that they will be a discussion topic of this year's Senior Day at 9 a.m. ||||| March 25 in the House Chamber at the Capitol. | When are they having Senior day In Oklahoma March 25 at 9am | true | 7 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
The answers are important enough that they will be a discussion topic of this year's Senior Day at 9 a.m. ||||| March 25 in the House Chamber at the Capitol. | When are they having Senior day In Oklahoma March 25 | true | 7 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
The answers are important enough that they will be a discussion topic of this year's Senior Day at 9 a.m. ||||| March 25 in the House Chamber at the Capitol. | When are they having Senior day In Oklahoma May 16 | false | 7 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
The answers are important enough that they will be a discussion topic of this year's Senior Day at 9 a.m. ||||| March 25 in the House Chamber at the Capitol. | When are they having Senior day In Oklahoma Older Oklahomans need medical care | false | 7 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
The answers are important enough that they will be a discussion topic of this year's Senior Day at 9 a.m. ||||| March 25 in the House Chamber at the Capitol. | When are they having Senior day In Oklahoma To discuss why Older Oklahomans need Lawyers | true | 7 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
It follows that an important role lawyers provide for aging Oklahomans is not only to create rights - transferring documents such as durable powers of attorney and guardianship orders, but also to monitor their use. ||||| Lawyers know how to make landlords heat apartments so the medical treatment can stick. | What can lawyers do for old people Lawyers can help patients avoid debt disputes and can make landlord heat the apartment if the patient need it for Medical purposes. They can also create rights transferring documents such as durable powers of attorney and guardianship orders and monitor its use | true | 8 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
It follows that an important role lawyers provide for aging Oklahomans is not only to create rights - transferring documents such as durable powers of attorney and guardianship orders, but also to monitor their use. ||||| Lawyers know how to make landlords heat apartments so the medical treatment can stick. | What can lawyers do for old people Create rights and make landlords heat apartments | true | 8 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
It follows that an important role lawyers provide for aging Oklahomans is not only to create rights - transferring documents such as durable powers of attorney and guardianship orders, but also to monitor their use. ||||| Lawyers know how to make landlords heat apartments so the medical treatment can stick. | What can lawyers do for old people They can get prescriptions for them | false | 8 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
It follows that an important role lawyers provide for aging Oklahomans is not only to create rights - transferring documents such as durable powers of attorney and guardianship orders, but also to monitor their use. ||||| Lawyers know how to make landlords heat apartments so the medical treatment can stick. | What can lawyers do for old people They can help get landlords to heat apartments when tenants are sick | true | 8 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
It follows that an important role lawyers provide for aging Oklahomans is not only to create rights - transferring documents such as durable powers of attorney and guardianship orders, but also to monitor their use. ||||| Lawyers know how to make landlords heat apartments so the medical treatment can stick. | What can lawyers do for old people It is the Lawyers duty to help Older Oklahomans | false | 8 | Society_Law_and_Justice/oanc-highlight_Senior_Day-1.txt | true |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who piloted the boat that attacked the USS Cole Nibras and Khamri | true | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who piloted the boat that attacked the USS Cole Backyard | false | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who piloted the boat that attacked the USS Cole Nashiri | false | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who were the people who drove the boat up to the USS Cole and detonated a Bomb Nibras | true | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who were the people who drove the boat up to the USS Cole and detonated a Bomb Nashiri | false | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who were the people who drove the boat up to the USS Cole and detonated a Bomb Not Khamri | false | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who were the people who drove the boat up to the USS Cole and detonated a Bomb Not Nibras | false | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who were the people who drove the boat up to the USS Cole and detonated a Bomb Nibras and Khamri | true | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who were the people who drove the boat up to the USS Cole and detonated a Bomb Khamri | true | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who were the people who drove the boat up to the USS Cole and detonated a Bomb Quso | false | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | What did Bin Laden fear causing him to evacuate al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound U.S. military retaliation | true | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | What did Bin Laden fear causing him to evacuate al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound Bin Laden anticipated nothing | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | What did Bin Laden fear causing him to evacuate al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound The USS Cole | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | What did Bin Laden fear causing him to evacuate al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound There is no U.S. military retaliation | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | What did Bin Laden fear causing him to evacuate al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation | true | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. | Who kept rotating between five to six residences in Kandahar Remainder | false | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. | Who kept rotating between five to six residences in Kandahar Osama bin Laden | true | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. | Who kept rotating between five to six residences in Kandahar Bin Laden | true | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. | Who kept rotating between five to six residences in Kandahar Khalid Sheikh Mohammed | false | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What were two of the news outlets the covered the propaganda video that Bin Laden had made after the US did not retaliate Not Al Jazeera and CNN | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What were two of the news outlets the covered the propaganda video that Bin Laden had made after the US did not retaliate Al Jazeera and CNN | true | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What were two of the news outlets the covered the propaganda video that Bin Laden had made after the US did not retaliate Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets | true | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What were two of the news outlets the covered the propaganda video that Bin Laden had made after the US did not retaliate Fox | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What were two of the news outlets the covered the propaganda video that Bin Laden had made after the US did not retaliate Al Jazeera | true | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What were two of the news outlets the covered the propaganda video that Bin Laden had made after the US did not retaliate CNN | true | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What were two of the news outlets the covered the propaganda video that Bin Laden had made after the US did not retaliate BBC | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What were two of the news outlets the covered the propaganda video that Bin Laden had made after the US did not retaliate Not Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. | What did Bin Laden do because al Qaeda's image was important to him Attacked America | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. | What did Bin Laden do because al Qaeda's image was important to him Made and disseminated a video following the bombing of the USS Cole- Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. | What did Bin Laden do because al Qaeda's image was important to him Saudi | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. | What did Bin Laden do because al Qaeda's image was important to him Distributed a propaganda video | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
According to the source, Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| There was no American strike. | Did Bin Laden's fears/hopes come to fruition Training | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
According to the source, Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| There was no American strike. | Did Bin Laden's fears/hopes come to fruition No. There was no American strike | true | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
According to the source, Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| There was no American strike. | Did Bin Laden's fears/hopes come to fruition No | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
According to the source, Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| There was no American strike. | Did Bin Laden's fears/hopes come to fruition Methods | true | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | What attack was recreated for an Al-Qaeda propaganda video 11 | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | What attack was recreated for an Al-Qaeda propaganda video 9 | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | What attack was recreated for an Al-Qaeda propaganda video USS Cole attack | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | What attack was recreated for an Al-Qaeda propaganda video Jazeera | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | What attack was recreated for an Al-Qaeda propaganda video The attack on the USS Cole | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole Nibras and Khamri | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole Khalid Sheikh Mohammed | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole Kandahar | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | Following which attack did Bin Laden instruct the media committee, to produce a propaganda video 11 | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | Following which attack did Bin Laden instruct the media committee, to produce a propaganda video 9 | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | Following which attack did Bin Laden instruct the media committee, to produce a propaganda video Galvanized | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | Following which attack did Bin Laden instruct the media committee, to produce a propaganda video USS Cole attack | true | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. | Following which attack did Bin Laden instruct the media committee, to produce a propaganda video The attack on the USS Cole | true | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. ||||| In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack. | Where did Nibras and Khamri attack the USS Cole Afghanistan | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. ||||| In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack. | Where did Nibras and Khamri attack the USS Cole Anticipated | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. ||||| In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack. | Where did Nibras and Khamri attack the USS Cole Iraq | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who attacked the USS cole ISIS | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who attacked the USS cole Nibras and Khamri | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who attacked the USS cole Al-Qaeda | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. ||||| They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. | Who attacked the USS cole Living | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | false |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. ||||| In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. ||||| In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack. | What actions did Bin Laden take fearing retaliation Fled to desert near Kabul | true | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. ||||| In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. ||||| In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack. | What actions did Bin Laden take fearing retaliation Hid in Afghanistan | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. ||||| In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. ||||| In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack. | What actions did Bin Laden take fearing retaliation Evacuation | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. ||||| In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. ||||| In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack. | What actions did Bin Laden take fearing retaliation He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack | true | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What video had portions aired on Al-Jazeera, CNN, and other new outlets 9 | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What video had portions aired on Al-Jazeera, CNN, and other new outlets Scotland | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What video had portions aired on Al-Jazeera, CNN, and other new outlets The al-Qaeda propaganda video | true | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. ||||| Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. ||||| Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. | What video had portions aired on Al-Jazeera, CNN, and other new outlets 11 attack | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | Who ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound Al-Jazeera | false | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | Who ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound Television | false | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | Who ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound Osama bin Laden | true | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | Who ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound Nibras and Khamri | false | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | Who ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound Military | false | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. ||||| Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. ||||| He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. | Who ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound Bin Laden | true | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt | true |
Discontent and protest continued and, at last, broke again into open rebellion in 1895. ||||| The agreement was based on provisions for a redress of Cuban grievances through greater civil, political, and administrative privileges for the Cubans, with forgetfulness of the past and amnesty for all then under sentence for political offences. ||||| The Spanish Governor-General still remained the supreme power and, aside from the abolition of slavery, the application of the Spanish Constitution and Spanish laws to Cuba, and Cuban representation in the Cortes, much of which was rather form than fact, the island gained little by the new conditions. | What was the reason for rebellion after the peace pact Delay in carrying the provisions | true | 0 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
Discontent and protest continued and, at last, broke again into open rebellion in 1895. ||||| The agreement was based on provisions for a redress of Cuban grievances through greater civil, political, and administrative privileges for the Cubans, with forgetfulness of the past and amnesty for all then under sentence for political offences. ||||| The Spanish Governor-General still remained the supreme power and, aside from the abolition of slavery, the application of the Spanish Constitution and Spanish laws to Cuba, and Cuban representation in the Cortes, much of which was rather form than fact, the island gained little by the new conditions. | What was the reason for rebellion after the peace pact They were dissatisfied and had much famine | false | 0 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
Discontent and protest continued and, at last, broke again into open rebellion in 1895. ||||| The agreement was based on provisions for a redress of Cuban grievances through greater civil, political, and administrative privileges for the Cubans, with forgetfulness of the past and amnesty for all then under sentence for political offences. ||||| The Spanish Governor-General still remained the supreme power and, aside from the abolition of slavery, the application of the Spanish Constitution and Spanish laws to Cuba, and Cuban representation in the Cortes, much of which was rather form than fact, the island gained little by the new conditions. | What was the reason for rebellion after the peace pact Not having the peace pact properly | false | 0 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
Discontent and protest continued and, at last, broke again into open rebellion in 1895. ||||| The agreement was based on provisions for a redress of Cuban grievances through greater civil, political, and administrative privileges for the Cubans, with forgetfulness of the past and amnesty for all then under sentence for political offences. ||||| The Spanish Governor-General still remained the supreme power and, aside from the abolition of slavery, the application of the Spanish Constitution and Spanish laws to Cuba, and Cuban representation in the Cortes, much of which was rather form than fact, the island gained little by the new conditions. | What was the reason for rebellion after the peace pact Island gained little by the new conditions | true | 0 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
Discontent and protest continued and, at last, broke again into open rebellion in 1895. ||||| The agreement was based on provisions for a redress of Cuban grievances through greater civil, political, and administrative privileges for the Cubans, with forgetfulness of the past and amnesty for all then under sentence for political offences. ||||| The Spanish Governor-General still remained the supreme power and, aside from the abolition of slavery, the application of the Spanish Constitution and Spanish laws to Cuba, and Cuban representation in the Cortes, much of which was rather form than fact, the island gained little by the new conditions. | What was the reason for rebellion after the peace pact The provision of greater civil, political, and administrative privilleges for Cuban remained unaddressed | true | 0 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba, and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces. ||||| Both parties were weary of the prolonged hostilities, and neither was able to compel the other to surrender. | Which leaders in Cuba were weary of prolonged hostilities in 1878 Zanjon | false | 1 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba, and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces. ||||| Both parties were weary of the prolonged hostilities, and neither was able to compel the other to surrender. | Which leaders in Cuba were weary of prolonged hostilities in 1878 Martinez Campos | true | 1 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba, and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces. ||||| Both parties were weary of the prolonged hostilities, and neither was able to compel the other to surrender. | Which leaders in Cuba were weary of prolonged hostilities in 1878 Maximo Gomez | true | 1 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba, and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces. ||||| Both parties were weary of the prolonged hostilities, and neither was able to compel the other to surrender. | Which leaders in Cuba were weary of prolonged hostilities in 1878 Matin Garim | false | 1 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba, and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces. ||||| Both parties were weary of the prolonged hostilities, and neither was able to compel the other to surrender. | Which leaders in Cuba were weary of prolonged hostilities in 1878 Martinez Campus and Maximo Gomez | true | 1 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba, and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces. ||||| Both parties were weary of the prolonged hostilities, and neither was able to compel the other to surrender. | Which leaders in Cuba were weary of prolonged hostilities in 1878 Gomez Zedra | false | 1 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | true |
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba, and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces. ||||| Martinez Campos and Gomez met at Zanjon and, on February 10, 1878, mutually agreed to what has been variously called a peace pact, a treaty, and a capitulation. | Where Governor-General of Cuba and Commander-in-Chief of Cuban forces met to make a peace pact In Zanjon | true | 2 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | false |
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba, and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces. ||||| Martinez Campos and Gomez met at Zanjon and, on February 10, 1878, mutually agreed to what has been variously called a peace pact, a treaty, and a capitulation. | Where Governor-General of Cuba and Commander-in-Chief of Cuban forces met to make a peace pact Kopenhagen | false | 2 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | false |
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba, and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces. ||||| Martinez Campos and Gomez met at Zanjon and, on February 10, 1878, mutually agreed to what has been variously called a peace pact, a treaty, and a capitulation. | Where Governor-General of Cuba and Commander-in-Chief of Cuban forces met to make a peace pact Martinez campos | false | 2 | Fiction/gutenberg_withoutQuotes/gutenberg-11464-0.txt | false |
The system operates like a giant conveyor belt. ||||| The motion due to heating and cooling is called convection. | What can the motion of convection be compared to A sea trench | false | 0 | Science-textbook/science-g4-47.txt | true |
The system operates like a giant conveyor belt. ||||| The motion due to heating and cooling is called convection. | What can the motion of convection be compared to A giant conveyor belt | true | 0 | Science-textbook/science-g4-47.txt | true |
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