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Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Ability to move people | true | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Secret hideout | false | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 A plane | false | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 "What they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm." | true | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from Foreign government | false | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from KSM | true | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from Al Qaeda | true | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from From Al Queda. Not from any foreign government-or foreign government official | true | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from U.S | false | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from From KSM, Not from Al Queda | false | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country, no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance, no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding | true | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack 11 | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack 9 | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack Summer of 2000 | true | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack Late 1999 | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack By the spring and summer of 2000 | true | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. | By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack Before 1999 | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Foriegn goverment funded Hamburg | false | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding | true | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Two governments funded | false | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Foriegn goverment was behind everything | false | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks No government funded for the attack | true | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Foreign goverment officials collaborated with al Qaeda | false | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Foriegn government didn't fund anything | true | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Foreign government | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Hamburg cell members | true | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 KSM and Binalshib | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 KSM | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Al Qaeda | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Hamburg | true | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. 11 | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. 9 | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. By late May 2000 | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. May 2000 | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. Late 1999 | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. September | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. During 1990 | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | How many operatives were there in the United States already and who were they waiting on Another plot facilitator | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | How many operatives were there in the United States already and who were they waiting on 19 | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | How many operatives were there in the United States already and who were they waiting on Two, Hamberg cell members | true | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | How many operatives were there in the United States already and who were they waiting on There were there and they were waiting on four | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | How many operatives were there in the United States already and who were they waiting on Three other cell members | true | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | How many operatives were there in the United States already and who were they waiting on There were 19 and they were waiting on 3 | true | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | How many operatives were there in the United States already and who were they waiting on Two | true | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. | How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot Plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. | How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot Between $400,000 and $500,000. Nearly $10,000 by the operators | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. | How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot $10,000 | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. | How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot $5,000 | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. | How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot $150,000 | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. | How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot Around $500,000 | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. | How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot $10,000 -$56000. $25000 by operators | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Who do they believe did NOT give the terrorist money Binalshibh | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Who do they believe did NOT give the terrorist money Foreign government-or foreign government official | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Who do they believe did NOT give the terrorist money Any person in the United States, any foreign government-or foreign government official | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Who do they believe did NOT give the terrorist money Al Qaeda | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Who do they believe did NOT give the terrorist money Hamburg | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Who do they believe did NOT give the terrorist money Al queda | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. | Who do they believe did NOT give the terrorist money Any foreign government | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | Approximately how much money did the 9/11 plotters spend to plan and conduct their attack Between $400,000 and $500,000 | true | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | Approximately how much money did the 9/11 plotters spend to plan and conduct their attack $10,000 | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | Approximately how much money did the 9/11 plotters spend to plan and conduct their attack Less than $400,000 | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | Approximately how much money did the 9/11 plotters spend to plan and conduct their attack Over $500,000 | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | Approximately how much money did the 9/11 plotters spend to plan and conduct their attack Approximately $450,000 | true | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions By the spring and summer | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions Spring and summer, chapter 7 | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions Before May | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions You can find more details about financial transactions in chapter 7 al Queada meets the requirements after the Hamberg members joined the conspiracy | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions Chapter 7 | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions Chapter 9 | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions They met the requirements in late May and you can find more details in chapter 7 | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | What cell operatives arrived in the US shortly after May 2000 The Hamburg cell | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | What cell operatives arrived in the US shortly after May 2000 Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | What cell operatives arrived in the US shortly after May 2000 Hamburg cell members | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | What cell operatives arrived in the US shortly after May 2000 KSM, Binalshibh | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | What cell operatives arrived in the US shortly after May 2000 Mustafa al Hawsawi | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | What cell operatives arrived in the US shortly after May 2000 KSM | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | What cell operatives arrived in the US shortly after May 2000 Al Qaeda | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | After what time would three of four Hamburg cell members soon arrive 11 | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | After what time would three of four Hamburg cell members soon arrive 9 | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | After what time would three of four Hamburg cell members soon arrive After May 2000 | true | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | After what time would three of four Hamburg cell members soon arrive After 2001 | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | After what time would three of four Hamburg cell members soon arrive September 2000 | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. | After what time would three of four Hamburg cell members soon arrive Late 1999 | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What remains murky about the knowledge we knew during this period and how much money did each Hamberg cell member receive $5000 | true | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What remains murky about the knowledge we knew during this period and how much money did each Hamberg cell member receive The amount of money spent is murky and each Hamberg cell member got $10,000 | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What remains murky about the knowledge we knew during this period and how much money did each Hamberg cell member receive The knowledge of the funding before this period was murky and each Hamberg cell member received $5,000 | true | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What remains murky about the knowledge we knew during this period and how much money did each Hamberg cell member receive $10,000 | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What remains murky about the knowledge we knew during this period and how much money did each Hamberg cell member receive When the operatives entered the United States | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What remains murky about the knowledge we knew during this period and how much money did each Hamberg cell member receive Funding, $5,000 | true | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | What remains murky about the knowledge we knew during this period and how much money did each Hamberg cell member receive knowledge of the funding | true | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before late 1999 The Hamburg cell members | true | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before late 1999 Foreign government | false | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before late 1999 Al Queda | false | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before late 1999 KSM | false | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before late 1999 Al Qaeda | false | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. | Who supported themselves before late 1999 Hamburg | true | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | true |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | By what Month were the two operatives in the United States and what information did we provide to make al Queda so successful Late May and the development of the planes operation | true | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | By what Month were the two operatives in the United States and what information did we provide to make al Queda so successful Access to communication systems | false | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. | By what Month were the two operatives in the United States and what information did we provide to make al Queda so successful The spring and summer of 2000 | false | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt | false |
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