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At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA 9:41 | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA Right after the Pentagon was hit | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA 9:27 in the morning | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA Just before 9:30 | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA It is unknown | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA After having been in the air for 45 minutes | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA 9:27am EST | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA 9:45 | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA Transmission from the Cleveland Center controller | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA Right before the second WTC tower was hit | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time did the last normal contact between United 93 and the FAA Transmission from the New York Center controller | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | What type of weapon did Jeffery Johnson, the gunman, possess Caliber pistol | -1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. | What was the first flight that was erroneously reported as hijacked United Airlines Flight 93 | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. | What was the first flight that was erroneously reported as hijacked American 11 | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. | What was the first flight that was erroneously reported as hijacked Delta 1989 | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. | What was the first flight that was erroneously reported as hijacked United 93 | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. | What was the first flight that was erroneously reported as hijacked The American 11 heading south | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. | What was the first flight that was erroneously reported as hijacked American Airlines flight 11 | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. | What was the first flight that was erroneously reported as hijacked UA 93 | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. | According to Nardo, who did Tasha feel took her side of the argument Emil | -1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | Two radio transmissions that included (possible) screaming came from which aircraft United Airlines Flight 93 | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | Two radio transmissions that included (possible) screaming came from which aircraft Delta 1989 | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | Two radio transmissions that included (possible) screaming came from which aircraft Delta | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | Two radio transmissions that included (possible) screaming came from which aircraft United Airlines Flight 97 | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | Two radio transmissions that included (possible) screaming came from which aircraft Flight 93 | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | Two radio transmissions that included (possible) screaming came from which aircraft United | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | Two radio transmissions that included (possible) screaming came from which aircraft United 93 | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | Two radio transmissions that included (possible) screaming came from which aircraft Flight 1989 | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | Which historical event was compared to releasing prisoners from Cuba The Cuban revolution | -1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | The last normal contact the FAA had with flight United 93 was when it acknowledged a transmission from whom Pentagon | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | The last normal contact the FAA had with flight United 93 was when it acknowledged a transmission from whom FAA | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | The last normal contact the FAA had with flight United 93 was when it acknowledged a transmission from whom Boston Center | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | The last normal contact the FAA had with flight United 93 was when it acknowledged a transmission from whom The Cleveland Center controller | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | The last normal contact the FAA had with flight United 93 was when it acknowledged a transmission from whom At 10:12am from the pilot | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | The last normal contact the FAA had with flight United 93 was when it acknowledged a transmission from whom United Airlines | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | The last normal contact the FAA had with flight United 93 was when it acknowledged a transmission from whom At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | The 11,500 workers displaced by the Twin Towers is what percentage of 137,000 workers who lost their offices 8% | -1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27 a.m | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 At 10:30 | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:29 | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 10:27 | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:41 | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Right after the Pentagon was hit | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27 in the morning | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Just before 9:30 | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 It is unknown | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 After having been in the air for 45 minutes | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27am EST | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:45 | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Transmission from the Cleveland Center controller | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Right before the second WTC tower was hit | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Transmission from the New York Center controller | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. | Who did Atta talk to in Boston and for how long President George W. Bush, for one minute | -1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS United Airlines Flight 93 | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS American 11 | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta 1989 | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS United 93 | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS American 17 | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta Flight 1989 | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS FAA 1989 | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta 93 | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta Airlines flight 1989 | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS UA 93 | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. | What type of breakdowns were some officials concerned terrorist would take advantage of Chemical and biological weapons | -1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit United Airlines Flight 93 | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit American 11 | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Delta 1989 | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit United 93 | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit American 17 | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit FAA 1989 | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Delta 93 | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Delta Airlines flight 1989 | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit UA 93 | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | What does Madame White Snake use to distract and deceive Eternal Prisoner slaves | -1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble He ignored the screams | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble Delta 1989 | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble With sounds of screaming | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble He didn't respond until the fighter jets were in place | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble A 747 | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble Within seconds | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble "we have some planes" | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble A 767 jet | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble Screaming | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble He asked if someone called Cleveland | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble A fighter aircraft | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble United 93 | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. | What is the difference in the ages of the Long Beach and San Fernando Valley programs 6.5 years | -1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | false |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 9:41 AM | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 9:27 AM | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 Before | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 After | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. | Based on what weakness of Sultan, Schahzenan lead his army to Baghdad in an attempt to take the throne Cancer | -1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. | Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Delta | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. | Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Boston Center | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. | Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland Center | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. | Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Logan Airport | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. | Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland Center controller | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-26.txt | true |
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