document
stringlengths 34
1.23k
| summary
stringlengths 18
538
| isAnswer
int64 -1
1
| q_id
stringlengths 1
2
| sample_id
stringlengths 25
62
| isMultisent
bool 2
classes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. | When did the Sudanese regime begin to change It was after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. | When did the Sudanese regime begin to change After the UN sanctions | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. | When did the Sudanese regime begin to change End of 1998 | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. | When did the Sudanese regime begin to change April 1996 | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. | When did the Sudanese regime begin to change Janyary 1998 | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. | When did the Sudanese regime begin to change 1998 | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. | When did the Sudanese regime begin to change June 1995 | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. | How does Kilgore feel about her wor She enjoys it | -1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. | What is the name of the Islamist regime that came to power in Khartoum Bin Laden Family Regime came to power in Khartoum | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. | What is the name of the Islamist regime that came to power in Khartoum ISIS | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. | What is the name of the Islamist regime that came to power in Khartoum Al Qaeda | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. | What is the name of the Islamist regime that came to power in Khartoum The Sudanese regime came to power in Khartoum | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. | What is the name of the Islamist regime that came to power in Khartoum Sudanese | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. ||||| Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. | How many related people are discussed in this passage One person the mother | -1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | Sudan refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot of who The attempted assassination in Ethiopia was of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | Sudan refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot of who UN Security Council | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | Sudan refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot of who Egypt, Syria, Jordan, | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | Sudan refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot of who Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | Sudan refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot of who They attempted to assassinate General Omar al Bashir, | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | Sudan refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot of who Obama | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How do garden warblers use the earth's magnetic field to guide animal migration Sound echos off of objects | -1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | When the Libyan members of al Qaeda renounced their connections In July 1998 | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | When the Libyan members of al Qaeda renounced their connections Because bin ladin had begun to have money problems | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | When the Libyan members of al Qaeda renounced their connections After Bin Laden announced that he can no longer protect them | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | When the Libyan members of al Qaeda renounced their connections Because bin ladin had told that he could no longer protect them and they had to leave the country | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | When the Libyan members of al Qaeda renounced their connections After his statement that he cannot protect them | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | When the Libyan members of al Qaeda renounced their connections April 1996 | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | When the Libyan members of al Qaeda renounced their connections Before Bin Laden announced that he can no longer protect them | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | What is the name of the island that Britain ceded to Spain in 1802 Menorca | -1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | What assassination plot caused the U.N. Security Council to sanction the Sudanese government Plot to kill Bin Laden | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | What assassination plot caused the U.N. Security Council to sanction the Sudanese government Attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | What assassination plot caused the U.N. Security Council to sanction the Sudanese government The assassination of Hosni Mubarak | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | What assassination plot caused the U.N. Security Council to sanction the Sudanese government The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have caused the U.N to sanction the Sudanese govt | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | What assassination plot caused the U.N. Security Council to sanction the Sudanese government There was International pressure on Sudan | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | What assassination plot caused the U.N. Security Council to sanction the Sudanese government The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak? | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | What assassination plot caused the U.N. Security Council to sanction the Sudanese government The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Libyan President | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | What assassination plot caused the U.N. Security Council to sanction the Sudanese government Assassination of U.N. consule in Egypt | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | Did the subjects of Tocqueville's best known works change as a result of his retirement from politics Yes, they did | -1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. | Which group plotted the assassination of Hosni Mubarak US | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. | Which group plotted the assassination of Hosni Mubarak UN Security Council | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. | Which group plotted the assassination of Hosni Mubarak Egyptian Islamic Group | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. | Which group plotted the assassination of Hosni Mubarak Libya | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. | Which group plotted the assassination of Hosni Mubarak Al Qaeda | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. | Which group plotted the assassination of Hosni Mubarak Sudan | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. | Which group plotted the assassination of Hosni Mubarak Bin Laden | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. | Which group plotted the assassination of Hosni Mubarak An Islamic group in Egypt | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. | What does NMCC stand for Northern Military Control Center | -1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Why did several Libyan members of al Qaeda renounce all connections with Bin Laden Bin Laden told the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Why did several Libyan members of al Qaeda renounce all connections with Bin Laden Because bin ladin had begun to have money problems | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Why did several Libyan members of al Qaeda renounce all connections with Bin Laden Because he couldn't protect them anymore | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Why did several Libyan members of al Qaeda renounce all connections with Bin Laden He organised a terroristic attach in Libyia | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Why did several Libyan members of al Qaeda renounce all connections with Bin Laden Because bin ladin had told that he could no longer protect them and they had to leave the country | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Why did several Libyan members of al Qaeda renounce all connections with Bin Laden Because they members couldn't protect him anymore | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Why did several Libyan members of al Qaeda renounce all connections with Bin Laden Because he told them he could not protect them | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | How much money was the 23 year old Jefferson Suarez offered to leave Barcelona by Sporting Lisbon $5M and no buy back clause | -1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. ||||| As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. | What are three reasons for Bin Laden's money troubles when he was based in Sudan International pressure on Sudan that affected its currency, less obliging authorities and Saudi pressure | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. ||||| As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. | What are three reasons for Bin Laden's money troubles when he was based in Sudan There was International pressure on Sudan, Bin Laden's companies had run out of funds and the normal costs of business Increased due to Sudanese officials becoming less obliging | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. ||||| As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. | What are three reasons for Bin Laden's money troubles when he was based in Sudan 1. International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. 2. Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. 3. As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. ||||| As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. | What are three reasons for Bin Laden's money troubles when he was based in Sudan Because some of his companies didn't do well in the Libyan and Sudanese market | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. ||||| As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. | What are three reasons for Bin Laden's money troubles when he was based in Sudan The government advised him that they intended to yield to Libya's demand to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. ||||| As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. | What are three reasons for Bin Laden's money troubles when he was based in Sudan International pressure on Sudan, less obliging Sudanese authorities, Saudi oressure | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. ||||| As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. | What are three reasons for Bin Laden's money troubles when he was based in Sudan Because US froze its capital and pressed middle easter governments to not protect him | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. ||||| As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. | What are three reasons for Bin Laden's money troubles when he was based in Sudan Personal spendings, higher business operating costs and increased demands from Saudi government | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. ||||| Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. ||||| As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. | How many lawyers are available in Georgia for people who have an annual income of $11,075 or less There is one legal aid lawyer for every 10,500 eligible people | -1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Who outraged Libyans of al Qaeda Sudanese government | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Who outraged Libyans of al Qaeda General Omar al Bashir had outrage the Libyans of al Qaeda | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Who outraged Libyans of al Qaeda Libyans | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Who outraged Libyans of al Qaeda The UN Security Council passing a resolution and criticizing their inaction | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Who outraged Libyans of al Qaeda Bin Landen | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Who outraged Libyans of al Qaeda Bin Laden had outrage the Libyans of al Qaeda | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Who outraged Libyans of al Qaeda Bin Laden | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Who outraged Libyans of al Qaeda Bin Laden cutting his support | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | Who saved the people in Ranchipur Edwina | -1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | With whom did several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounce all connections Several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with Bin Laden | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | With whom did several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounce all connections Several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounce all connections with Sudanese authorities | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | With whom did several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounce all connections America | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | With whom did several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounce all connections Bin Laden | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | With whom did several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounce all connections Sudanese | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. ||||| Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. | What eventually happens to Frank He sneaks into his wife's bed at night, and also visits his daughter's room | -1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan It was a demand from Egypt | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan Because bin ladin had begun to have money problems | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan The government of Sudan advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan The government advised him that they intended to yield to Libya's demand to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan Because the Libyan government was not sheltering them anymore | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan Because they had no reasons to break the relationship | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan He run short of money | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan Because Sudan agreed to demands of Libyan to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan Because the Libyan government didn't get affected by UN Security Council resolution | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Has Facebook commented on the ability of computer programs that track how people use Facebook to discern undisclosed private information Facebook declined to comment | -1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan In five years | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan A decade later | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan 10 months | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan 1.5 years | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan 3 years | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan About 9 months | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan The sanctions were imposed a year after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan After about a year | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan The sanctions took place after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. ||||| When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. | Besides Bin Laden, KSM, and Atef, who else was involved in discussing the initial selection of targets Azzam | -1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | true |
A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. ||||| Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. | Why did Bin Laden tell his Islamic Army he could no longer protect them and that they needed to leave the country Because of his financial problems | 0 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt | false |
Subsets and Splits