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Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays. | What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic X-rays | 1 | 14 | Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt | true |
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays. | What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Microwaves | 1 | 14 | Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt | true |
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays. | What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Fire | 0 | 14 | Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt | true |
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays. | What are the four forms of energy that are electromagnetic Light energy,radio waves, microwaves, and X rays | 1 | 14 | Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt | true |
Electromagnetic energy includes the light we see. ||||| Electromagnetic energy includes radio waves, microwaves, and X rays. | Why is Daffy a problematic classmate to Porky He tries to cheat | -1 | 14 | Science-textbook/science-g4-40.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Mentors | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Plotting terror attacks | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the leader, and the other two were uninvolved | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Khallad helped in Yemen | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Khallad was supervising the attack | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Khallad was the field commander | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was supervising the attack | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri managed the operation in Yemen | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri helped in Yemen | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Supervisors | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri was the field commander | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden managed the operation in Yemen | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Operational roles | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the leader, whereas Khalland and Nashiri were coordinators | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the al Qaeda operation supervisor, Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen, and Khallad helped in Yemen | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. | Whose negative qualities was the result of jealousy of his rivals Mozart | -1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. | Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Khallad | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. | Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Nashiri | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. | Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Al Qaeda Chief | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. | Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Fahd al Quso | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. | Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Bin Laden | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. | Which commandments went searching for American 7 Indianapolis | -1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. | In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Khallad | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. | In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Nibras | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. | In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Nashiri | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. | In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Operational Coordinator for Al Qaeda | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. | In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Khamri | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. | In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Fahd al Quso | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. | Which group that inhabited the Valley were the most advanced The various indigenous tribes | -1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad and Nashiri | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Nibras | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Nashiri | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khamri | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Fahd al Quso | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Bin Laden | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Bin Laden and Nashiri | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | What uniform did Grim use to disguise himself He used a uniform of a Shereefian Officer of Emir Feisul's Syrian army | -1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack Ripped a hole in the side of the Cole | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack Their attempt failed | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack They were successful | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack They attacked a warship in the port of Aden | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The suicide boat sank | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack Attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The War ship they were targeting didn't have a successful mission because the suicide attack boat sunk | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | Which head constable's daughter understands the agony of Ramakant's younger son Revati | -1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. | How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information 5 | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. | How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information 6 | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. | How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information Four | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. | How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. | How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information More than two | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. | What do I put the beans and peas in Beans in a basket and peas in a bowl | -1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole More than nine months | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole Three month | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole Around ten months | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole 9 months | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole One year | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | What two popular accomplishments did Julia Child revolutionize the way American's eat Using olive oil | -1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. | How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer Wounding at least 40 | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. | How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer The attack killed 17 members of the ship's crew and wounded at least 40 | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. | How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer The entire crew of 68 were killed in the massive explosion | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. | How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer At 17 members were killed and at least 40 members wounded in the attack | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. | How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer 17 members | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. | What can be done to prevent friction problems in engines It is coated with sand | -1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden. | Nashri's defiance led to what event The arrest of Nibras in Bangkok | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden. | Nashri's defiance led to what event Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden. | Nashri's defiance led to what event Telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden. | Nashri's defiance led to what event The defiance led to the attack on the next warship to enter port of Aden against Bin Laden's wishes | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden. | Why was Alexander called Alexander "The Great He never lost a battle | -1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The team was convinced by Bin Laden to attack warship instead of an oil tanker | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship Killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40 | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship They thought the warship would create a larger explosion | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40 | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. | When you sit in front of a campfire, where does the energy of the fire come from It comes from the chemical energy it inherently possesses | -1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. Then in January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank ,more than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. Sent 14: In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole The teams attack on a warship failed after the suicide boat sank causing them to regroup and attack the USS Cole nine months later | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole In January 2000 operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Bin Laden sent out worf that US cargo ship was expected in Amen port and operatives were sent to destroy it but destroyed USS Cole instead | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. | What is the floating needle in a compass made of and which way does it point It's a copper rod and points to the geographic north pole | -1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | false |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. In January 2000 | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Operational coordinators for al Qaeda, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Khallad and Nashri became operational coordinators for Al Qaeda in 1998 and 1999 | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years They were deputies to Sheikh Mohammed | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | Khallad and Nashri became what position for what group in what years Khallad and Nashri became operational coordinators for al Qaeda | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. | When you sit in front of a campfire, where does the energy of the fire come from Stored energy in the wood | -1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. | On October 12, 2000 attacked a US navy destroyer, how many people on the destroyer were injured killed 40 and wounded at least 17 | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. | On October 12, 2000 attacked a US navy destroyer, how many people on the destroyer were injured 17 members of the ship's crew were killed and at least 40 others were wounded | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. | On October 12, 2000 attacked a US navy destroyer, how many people on the destroyer were injured 40 | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-9.txt | true |
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