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Fourthly, it is apparent from the judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission (C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 10 to 12), and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission (C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 10 to 12) that the discussions between the parties continued beyond the hearing in both cases in question and that the Commission had adopted the contested decision in those cases less than six months after the end of those discussions in one of them, facts which the Court of Justice would have taken into account if it had intended to restrict the scope of the interpretation given in those judgments. | 10. As the Spanish authorities expressed their disagreement with the winding-up proposals by three letters of 16 February 2009 and by letter of 15 July 2008 respectively, a hearing was held on 11 March 2010. | 1 |
1,401 | 58. In that respect, it must be borne in mind that the Member States are required, within the bounds of the freedom left to them by the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, to choose the most appropriate forms and methods to ensure the effectiveness of directives, in the light of their objective (see Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497, paragraph 75, and Joined Cases C-58/95, C-75/95, C-112/95, C‑119/95, C-123/95, C‑135/95, C‑140/95, C-141/95, C-154/95 and C‑157/95 Gallotti and Others [1996] ECR I-4345, paragraph 14, and Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I-6057, paragraph 93). | 58. In the absence of such provisions, Directive 2002/22 became applicable to the Czech Republic from the date of its accession to the European Union, pursuant to Articles 2, 53 and 54 of the Act of Accession (see, to that effect, judgment in Saldanha and MTS , C‑122/96, EU:C:1997:458, paragraph 14; order in Pannon , C‑143/09, EU:C:2009:564, paragraph 17; judgment in Elektrownia Pątnów II , C‑441/08, EU:C:2009:698, paragraph 32; and order in RANI Slovakia , C‑298/09, EU:C:2010:343, paragraph 38). | 0 |
1,402 | 32. In this context, where, after the entry into force of the Sixth Directive, the legislation of a Member State is amended in such a way as to reduce the scope of existing exclusions and thereby brings itself into line with the objective of the Sixth Directive, that legislation must be considered to be covered by the derogation provided for by the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive and is not in breach of Article 17(2) thereof (Case C-345/99 Commission v France , paragraph 22, and Metropol and Stadler , paragraph 45). | 210. That case-law applies a fortiori to rules of conduct designed to produce external effects, as is the case of the Guidelines, which are aimed at traders. | 0 |
1,403 | 77. Moreover, it has consistently been held that the review of the possible application of the exceptions laid down in Articles 45 EC and 55 EC must take into account the fact that the limits imposed by those articles on the exceptions referred to fall within European Union law (see, in particular, Case 2/74 Reyners , [1974] ECR 631, paragraph 50, and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 35). | 63. Secondly, recital 39 to that directive confirms that the passing of subscribers’ personal data to third parties is ‘subject to the condition that the data may not be used for other purposes than those for which they were collected’. | 0 |
1,404 | 27. The concept of ‘parental responsibility’ is given a broad definition in Article 2(7) of Regulation No 2201/2003, in that it includes all rights and duties relating to the person or the property of a child which are given to a natural or legal person by judgment, by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect (judgments in C , C‑435/06, EU:C:2007:714, paragraph 49, and C , C‑92/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:255, paragraph 59). Moreover, while Article 1(2) of that regulation contains a list of matters covered by the regulation as ‘parental responsibility’, the list is not exhaustive but is only to be used as a guide, as is shown by the use of the words ‘in particular’ (judgments in C , C‑435/06, EU:C:2007:714, paragraph 30, and C , C‑92/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:255, paragraph 63). | 41. Second, it should be noted that the Court has held that the need to safeguard the cohesion of a tax system may justify rules that are liable to restrict fundamental freedoms (see Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249, paragraph 28; Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-305, paragraph 21; and De Groot , paragraph 106) if there is a direct link, in the case of one and the same taxpayer, between the grant of a tax advantage and the offsetting of that advantage by a fiscal levy, both of which relate to the same tax (see Case C-35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071, paragraph 57, and Case C-136/00 Danner [2002] ECR I-8147, paragraph 36). | 0 |
1,405 | 28 In particular, reparation of that loss and damage cannot depend on a prior finding by the Court of an infringement of Community law attributable to the State (see Brasserie du Pêcheur, paragraphs 94 to 96), nor on the existence of intentional fault or negligence on the part of the organ of the State to which the infringement is attributable (see paragraphs 75 to 80 of the same judgment). | 61. While the prohibition of marketing tobacco products for oral use under Article 8 of Directive 2001/37 constitutes one of the restrictions referred to in Articles 28 EC and 29 EC, it is nevertheless justified, as indicated in paragraph 58 above, on grounds of the protection of human health. It cannot therefore, in any event, be regarded as having been adopted in breach of the provisions of Articles 28 EC and 29 EC. | 0 |
1,406 | 68 It should be noted as a preliminary observation that investment by the public authorities in the capital of an undertaking, in whatever form, may constitute State aid only where all the conditions set out in Article 87(1) EC are fulfilled (see, in particular, Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission (Tubemeuse) [1990] ECR I-959, paragraph 25; Joined Cases C-278/92 to C-280/92 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, paragraph 20). | 31. It must be conceded that such an objective is capable of justifying a restriction on the rights of the defence. As observed by the Italian and Greek Governments, the legal systems of most of the Member States provide for the imposition of sanctions on persons who, in civil proceedings, adopt delaying tactics which would ultimately lead to a denial of justice. | 0 |
1,407 | 19 On that point, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, it is solely for the national courts before which proceedings are pending, and which must assume responsibility for the judgment to be given, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling to enable them to give judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-264/96 ICI v Colmer (HMIT) [1998] ECR I-4695, paragraph 15, and Joined Cases C-215/96 and C-216/96 Bagnasco and Others [1999] ECR I-135, paragraph 20). Consequently, Darbo's request that the question be reformulated in the terms which it indicates cannot be granted.
Substance | 20 According to settled case-law, it is solely for the national courts before which actions are brought, and which must bear the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular facts of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court (see Case C-472/93 Spano and Others v Fiat Geotech and Fiat Hitachi [1995] ECR I-4321, paragraph 15, and Case C-373/95 Maso and Others v INPS and Italian Republic [1997] ECR I-4051, paragraph 26). A request for a preliminary ruling may be rejected as inadmissible only where it is plain that the interpretation or the examination of the validity of a Community rule requested by the national court has no bearing on the actual facts or subject-matter of the case before the national court (see, in particular, Case C-472/93 Spano and Others, cited above, paragraph 15, and Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 61). | 1 |
1,408 | 41. In this connection it should be remembered, first, that the Commission, for the purposes of applying Article 87(3) EC, enjoys a wide discretion, the exercise of which involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be made within a Community context (see, inter alia , Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 67, and Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission [2002] ECR I-2289, paragraph 45), and second, that the Court, in reviewing whether that freedom was lawfully exercised, cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority but must restrict itself to examining whether the authority's assessment is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers (see Case C-288/96 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-8237, paragraph 26, and Italy v Commission , cited above, paragraph 46). | 56. It follows from Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 65/65 that no medicinal product produced industrially may be placed on the market in a Member State unless a marketing authorisation has been issued. | 0 |
1,409 | 56. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from Article 2(2) of Decision 94/90 and the 1994 communication that the Secretary-General could not rely on grounds other than those on which he took a position in his initial decision. He was therefore entitled to undertake a full review of the applications for access and base the contested decision [not only on the exception based on the protection of the public interest (court proceedings) but also] on the authorship rule.
"
8. In rejecting the plea alleging infringement of the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, the Court of First Instance held:
"66. ... it must be held that, so long as there is no rule of law of a higher order according to which the Commission was not empowered, in Decision 94/90, to exclude from the scope of the Code of Conduct documents of which it was not the author, the authorship rule can be applied. ...
...
69. It must be held, [as regards the interpretation of that rule] that the authorship rule, however it may be characterised, lays down an exception to the general principle of transparency in Decision 94/90. It follows that this rule must be construed and applied strictly, so as not to frustrate the application of the general principle of transparency (Case T-188/97 Rothmans International v Commission [1999] ECR II-2463, paragraphs 53 to 55).
...
73. It is clear, on examination of the five types of documents [referred to in the contested decision], that their authors are either the Member States or the Argentine authorities.
74. It follows that the Commission has applied the authorship rule correctly in taking the view that it was not required to grant access to those documents. It cannot, therefore, have committed an abuse of rights. ...
"
9. The Court of First Instance also rejected the plea alleging infringement of Article 190 of the Treaty on the following grounds:
"77. According to consistent case-law, the obligation to state reasons, laid down in Article 190 of the Treaty, means that the reasoning of the Community authority which adopted the contested measure must be shown clearly and unequivocally so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure in order to protect their rights and the Community judicature to exercise its power of review ... .
78. In the present case, in the contested decision the Commission referred to the authorship rule and informed the applicant that it should request a copy of the documents in question from the Member States concerned or the Argentine authorities. Such a statement of reasons shows clearly the reasoning of the Commission. The applicant was thus in a position to know the justification for the contested measure and the Court of First Instance is in a position to exercise its power to review the legality of that decision. Accordingly, the applicant is not justified in maintaining that a more specific statement of reasons was required (see Rothmans International v Commission , cited above, paragraph 37).
"
The appeal
10. By its appeal, Interporc claims that the Court should:
─ set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as, first, it rejects the claim for annulment of the contested decision in so far as it refuses access to documents emanating from the Member States or the Argentine authorities and, second, orders it to bear its own costs;
─ annul the contested decision in its entirety;
─ order the Commission to pay the costs of the appeal and the costs of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance.
11. Interporc relies on two pleas in support of its appeal. The first alleges that the Court of First Instance erred in law as regards the assessment made by the Commission of the request for access to the file (paragraphs 55 to 57 of the judgment under appeal). The second plea alleges, as its main argument, that the authorship rule is void on the ground that it infringes a rule of law of a higher order and, in the alternative, that that rule has been misinterpreted and misapplied and that the Commission has breached its obligation to state reasons laid down by Article 190 of the Treaty (paragraphs 65 to 79 of that judgment).
12. The Commission contends that the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible and, in the alternative, as unfounded, and that the appellant should be ordered to bear the costs of the appeal. However, should the authorship rule be declared void, it requests that the effects of the Court's judgment be limited to the documents sent after delivery of that judgment.
Admissibility of the appeal
Arguments of the parties
13. The Commission contends that the appeal is inadmissible in its entirety. First, it is inadmissible in so far as Interporc seeks the annulment of the contested decision in its entirety. Since that decision has already been annulled in part by a judgment of the Court of First Instance which is enforceable in that respect, it cannot be annulled a second time in its entirety. Second, in support of the two pleas submitted, rather than indicating clearly the aspects of the judgment under appeal it takes issue with and the legal arguments intended specifically to support its claim for annulment, the appellant confines itself to repeating or reproducing verbatim the pleas and arguments already put before the Court of First Instance.
14. Interporc counters that, as the infringement of rules of law by the Court of First Instance is generally inseparable from the pleas in the action and the legal provisions cited in them, a fresh presentation of those pleas in the appeal is often inevitable. The Commission's position as regards the admissibility of the appeal thus tends to limit disproportionately the scope for bringing appeals. Furthermore, contrary to the Commission's submission, the pleas it relies on are supported by argument and criticise the reasoning of the Court of First Instance sufficiently clearly.
Findings of the Court
15. To begin with, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, in particular, Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 34, and Case C-248/99 P France v Monsanto and Commission [2002] ECR I-1, paragraph 68).
16. Thus, where an appeal merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that Court, it fails to satisfy the requirements to state reasons under those provisions (see inter alia the order of 25 March 1998 in Case C-174/97 P FFSA and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1303, paragraph 24).
17. However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal (Case C-210/98 P Salzgitter v Commission [2000] ECR I-5843, paragraph 43). Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see inter alia the order of 10 May 2001 in Case C-345/00 P FNAB and Others v Council [2001] ECR I-3811, paragraphs 30 and 31, and the judgment in Case C-321/99 P ARAP and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I-4287, paragraph 49).
18. In the present case the appeal, taken as a whole, specifically seeks to challenge the position adopted by the Court of First Instance on various points of law raised before it at first instance. It indicates clearly the aspects of the judgment under appeal which are criticised and the pleas in law and arguments on which it is based.
19. It is clear from the appeal as a whole that, in support of its claim for annulment, the appellant challenges paragraphs 55 to 57 and 65 to 79 of the judgment under appeal, which constitute the essential basis for paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative part of that judgment. That part of the judgment examines the contested decision only to the extent that, by that decision, the Commission refuses the appellant access to documents emanating from the Member States or the Argentine authorities. Thus, in asking the Court to "annul the contested decision in its entirety" , the appellant clearly intended to limit its claim for annulment to the part of the decision which had not already been annulled by the Court of First Instance.
20. As regards the first plea in particular, the appellant refers to paragraphs 55 to 57 of the contested judgment in order to demonstrate that the Court of First Instance was in breach of Community law in ruling that the Commission could adopt a further decision refusing access on the basis of the authorship rule.
21. As regards the second plea of the appeal, the appellant refers first to paragraphs 65 and 66 of the judgment under appeal in connection with the first part of that plea, then to paragraphs 69 and 70 of that judgment in connection with the second part of that plea and, finally, to paragraphs 77 to 79 of the judgment in connection with the third part of the plea. The appellant takes the view that the Court of First Instance disregarded a principle of law of a higher order relating to transparency, given an erroneous interpretation in law of the authorship rule and misapplied Article 190 of the Treaty respectively.
22. It follows that the Commission's argument regarding the inadmissibility of the appeal as a whole on the ground that it seeks the annulment of the contested decision in its entirety cannot be upheld. Similarly, the objection of inadmissibility raised against the first and second pleas, according to which the appellant merely repeats arguments already raised before the Court of First Instance, must be dismissed.
23. It follows from the foregoing that the appeal is admissible.
Substance
The first plea of an error of law by the Court of First Instance as regards the assessment made by the Commission of the request for access to the file
Arguments of the parties
24. Interporc submits that, in the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance made an error of law in not accepting, as regards the reasons stated for the contested decision, that the Commission failed to assess carefully and impartially all the relevant matters of fact and of law in the case. Thus, the Court of First Instance did not correctly assess the appellant's argument that the decision is based on an incomplete legal appraisal of the possible grounds for refusal. On the contrary, the Court of First Instance expressly based the alleged lawfulness of the contested decision on the mistaken premiss that the Secretary-General had undertaken a full review of the application for access (see paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal).
25. In that regard Interporc points out that it had argued before the Court of First Instance that a request for access to documents, particularly a confirmatory application, must be the subject of a full and impartial examination by the Commission which must take account of all the grounds for refusal which the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90 allows. Only respect for that requirement makes effective judicial review of Community decisions possible, particularly where they fall within the remit of discretionary powers.
26. Moreover, according to the appellant, the Commission no longer had the right to base the contested decision on a new ground for refusal provided for by the Code of Conduct, such as the authorship rule, which it did not cite in its decision of 29 May 1996, which was annulled by the judgment in Interporc I . If that were not so, the Commission's practice would frustrate the subjective right of access to documents and create an unacceptable gap in protection by the courts since an individual would be obliged to bring actions until such time as the Commission had exhausted all the grounds for refusal liable to be used against that individual and could no longer justify a further refusal.
27. According to the Commission, the fact that, for procedural reasons, the decision of 29 May 1996 and the contested decision were based on a single ground for refusal, that is to say the protection of the public interest, or on that ground in conjunction with the authorship rule, does not of itself make those decisions incomplete. An administration has the right to base a decision on a single determinative ground, without it being necessary to take account of other possible grounds for refusal. Moreover, it is not acceptable that the Commission, following annulment by the Court of First Instance of a decision it has taken, should be effectively deprived of the right to cite relevant, and in fact mandatory, exceptions provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90.
Findings of the Court
28. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that when the Court of First Instance annuls an act of an institution, that institution is required, under Article 176 of the Treaty, to take the measures necessary to comply with the Court's judgment.
29. In order to comply with a judgment annulling a measure and to implement it fully, the institution is required, according to settled case-law, to have regard not only to the operative part of the judgment but also to the grounds which led to the judgment and constitute its essential basis, in so far as they are necessary to determine the exact meaning of what is stated in the operative part. It is those grounds which, on the one hand, identify the precise provision held to be illegal and, on the other, indicate the specific reasons which underlie the finding of illegality contained in the operative part and which the institution concerned must take into account when replacing the annulled measure (Joined Cases 97/86, 99/86, 193/86 and 215/86 Asteris and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 2181, paragraph 27, and Case C-458/98 P Industrie des poudres sphériques v Council [2000] ECR I-8147, paragraph 81).
30. However, Article 176 of the Treaty requires the institution which adopted the annulled measure only to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment annulling its measure. Accordingly, that Article requires the institution concerned to ensure that any act intended to replace the annulled act is not affected by the same irregularities as those identified in the judgment annulling the original act (Case C-310/97 P Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others [1999] ECR I-5363, paragraphs 50 and 56).
31. Therefore, given that, as the Court of First Instance held at paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, it followed from the judgment in Interporc I , first, that the decision of 29 May 1996 was deemed to have never existed and, second, that the Secretary-General was required, under Article 176 of the Treaty, to take a further decision, the Court of First Instance was correct in ruling, at paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, that the Secretary-General was entitled to undertake a full review of the applications for access and, therefore, could rely, in the contested decision, on grounds other than those on which he based the decision of 29 May 1996, notably the authorship rule.
32. The possibility of a full review which the Court of First Instance mentions also implies that the Secretary-General was not supposed, in the contested decision, to reiterate all the grounds for refusal provided for by the Code of Conduct to adopt a decision correctly implementing the judgment in Interporc I , but had simply to base its decision on those it considered, in exercising its discretion, to be applicable in the case.
33. It follows that the first plea must be rejected.
The first part of the second plea alleging that the authorship rule is void on the ground that it breaches a principle of law of a higher order
Arguments of the parties
34. By the first part of its second plea, Interporc submits that the Court of First Instance, at paragraphs 65 and 66 of the judgment under appeal, erred in law in denying that the principle of transparency was a principle of law of a higher order. According to Interporc the authorship rule is unlawful in that it breaches the principles of transparency and of the review of administrative activity by the public, which are guaranteed by freedom of access to documents. The fact that those general principles of a higher order are fundamental to the Community legal order is now confirmed by Article 255 EC, read in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article A and Article F(1) of the Treaty on European Union (now, after amendment, the second paragraph of Article 1 EU and Article 6(1) EU). Strict adherence to those general principles is thus an essential factor in guaranteeing the democratic structure of the European Union and the legitimacy of the exercise of the Community's sovereignty.
35. Interporc submits that, under those principles, the Commission cannot evade its obligation to disclose the documents it holds, by confining itself to referring applicants to the authors of those documents, where the legal and technical conditions for the effective exercise of the right of access to those documents is not thereby guaranteed.
36. The Commission contends that, while transparency is a political principle which can be derived from the principle of democracy, that alone does not allow any principle of law to be inferred.
37. Moreover, even if there were a general principle of law relating to the transparency of access to documents, the appellant has not established that that principle is necessarily breached by the fact that the relevant rules allow access only to the documents drawn up by the institution concerned.
Findings of the Court
38. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, at paragraphs 35 and 36 of its judgment in Case C-58/94 Netherlands v Council [1996] ECR I-2169, the Court held that there had been a progressive affirmation of individuals' right of access to documents held by public authorities, a right which has been reaffirmed at Community level on various occasions, in particular in the declaration on the right of access to information annexed (as Declaration 17) to the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union, which links that right with the democratic nature of the institutions.
39. Moreover, the importance of that right was confirmed by the developments in the Community legal framework after the adoption of the contested decision. Thus, first, Article 255(1) EC, which was inserted into the Community legal order by the Treaty of Amsterdam, provides that "[a]ny citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents ..." . Second, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43), adopted pursuant to Article 255 EC, lays down the principles and conditions for exercising that right in order to enable citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process, to guarantee that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system and to contribute to strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental rights.
40. As regards the validity of the authorship rule as provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90 which the Commission had to apply at the time of the adoption of the contested decision, the Court of First Instance pointed out, at paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, that the Court, at paragraph 37 of the judgment in Netherlands v Council , cited above, held that so long as the Community legislature has not adopted general rules on the right of public access to documents held by the Community institutions, the institutions must take measures as to the processing of such requests by virtue of their power of internal organisation, which authorises them to take appropriate measures in order to ensure their internal operation in conformity with the interests of good administration.
41. In the light of that case-law, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal, that, so long as there was no rule of law of a higher order according to which the Commission was not empowered, in Decision 94/90, to exclude from the scope of the Code of Conduct documents of which it was not the author, the authorship rule could be applied.
42. As to that, it must be held that the Court of First Instance was right to cite paragraph 37 of the judgment in Netherlands v Council , cited above, and draw the conclusion that the authorship rule, as provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, was enacted pursuant to the power of internal organisation which the Commission must exercise in accordance with the requirements of good administration, where no general rules on the subject have been adopted by the Community legislature.
43. Against that background, given the developments in this field as outlined at paragraphs 38 and 39 of this judgment, it must be held that the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding, at paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal, that, in the absence, at the time when the contested decision was adopted, of a principle or general rules of Community law expressly providing that the Commission was not empowered, under its power of internal organisation, to enact the authorship rule as provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, that rule could be applied in the case.
44. The first part of the second plea must therefore be rejected.
The second part of the second plea, alleging misinterpretation and misapplication in law of the authorship rule
Arguments of the parties
45. In the alternative, Interporc submits that the judgment under appeal is based on a misinterpretation and misapplication in law of the authorship rule, in that although the Court of First Instance accepted, at paragraph 69 of that judgment, the need to interpret that rule strictly, it did not do so in this case.
46. According to Interporc, in the light of the principle of the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission laid down by Decision 94/90, the authorship rule must be interpreted like the other exceptions provided for by the Code of Conduct. The Commission therefore can exercise a discretion in each individual case as regards recourse to the system of exceptions, a discretion which it exercises subject to review by the Community Courts. The Commission was thus required in this case to indicate for each of the documents concerned the reasons why disclosure would be contrary to the interest which must be protected. If the Court of First Instance had intended to interpret the authorship rule in a genuinely strict way it should have incorporated those principles in the authorship rule.
47. The Commission recognises that the authorship rule represents a limitation on the principle of the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission and must therefore, as far as possible, be interpreted strictly. However, the wording of that rule would plainly allow such a strict interpretation only if there were doubts as to the author of the documents. According to the Commission, there were manifestly no such doubts in the present case.
Findings of the Court
48. The aim pursued by Decision 94/90 as well as being to ensure the internal operation of the Commission in conformity with the interests of good administration, is to provide the public with the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission, so that any exception to that right of access must be interpreted and applied strictly (see Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission [2000] ECR I-1, paragraph 27).
49. In that regard, it must be held that, under the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, a strict interpretation and application of the authorship rule imply that the Commission must verify the origin of the document and inform the person concerned of its author so that he can make an application for access to that author.
50. As is clear from paragraphs 72 and 73 of the judgment under appeal, in the contested decision the Commission informs the appellant that the documents in respect of which it has made an application for access emanate either from the Member States or from the Argentine authorities and states that it must apply directly to the authors of those documents.
51. It follows that the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding, at paragraph 74 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission applied the authorship rule correctly as provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, in taking the view that it was not required to allow access to documents of which it was not the author.
52. The second part of the second plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
The third part of the second plea alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons
Arguments of the parties
53. Interporc submits that the Court of First Instance erred in law in holding, at paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had properly discharged the obligation to state reasons incumbent upon it under Article 190 of the Treaty. According to the appellant, the Court of First Instance was not in a position to ascertain, from the reasons given for the contested decision, whether the Commission had also exercised its discretion on the question of the possibility of exercising effectively the right of access to documents vis-à-vis the Member States and the Argentine authorities.
54. The Commission contends that it fulfilled the obligation to state reasons as derived from Article 190 of the Treaty. It contends that the argument supporting the third part of the second plea in the appeal concerning infringement of the obligation to state reasons is indissolubly linked to that supporting the second part of that plea.
Findings of the Court
55. It must be observed that it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink's France [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63, and Case C-113/00 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-7601, paragraphs 47 and 48).
56. As regards a request for access to documents covered by Decision 94/90 and held by the Commission, the Commission, where it refuses access, must assess in each individual case whether they fall within the exceptions listed in the Code of Conduct adopted by the decision (see Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission , cited above, paragraph 24). | 63 As regards the Commission's obligation to state reasons, it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission [1985] ECR 809, paragraph 19, Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraphs 15 and 16, and Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR I-723, paragraph 86). | 1 |
1,410 | 24 It follows that, contrary to the arguments put forward by the French Republic, the Directive seeks to achieve, in the matters regulated by it, complete harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States (see the judgments of today in Case C-154/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-3879, paragraphs 10 to 20, and Case C-183/00 González Sánchez [2002] ECR I-3901, paragraphs 23 to 32). | 36. The obligation of transparency to be complied with by public authorities concluding service concession contracts consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to allow the service concession to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of the award procedures to be reviewed (see Telaustria and Telefonadress , paragraphs 60 to 62; Parking Brixen , paragraphs 46 to 49; and ANAV , paragraph 21). | 0 |
1,411 | 35. However, that interpretation rests on the link of functional equivalence which exists between the criteria set out in Article 8(1) of Directive 91/414 as transitional measures and those laid down in Article 4 of that directive ( Hogan Lovells International , paragraphs 33 to 46). There is no such link of functional equivalence between the criteria laid down in Article 8(4) of Directive 91/414 and those in Article 4 thereof. | 33 It follows from the foregoing that the contracting authority is not required to award the contract to the only tenderer judged to be suitable. | 0 |
1,412 | 32. The power to define thereby accorded to the Member States is, however, limited by the prohibition on undermining the very terms of the exemption that are employed by the EU legislature. A Member State cannot in particular, without negating the very terms ‘special investment funds’, select from among special investment funds those which are eligible for the exemption and those which are not. That provision thus grants it only the power to define, in its domestic law, the funds which meet the definition of ‘special investment funds’ (see, to that effect, judgments in JP Morgan Fleming Claverhouse Investment Trust and The Association of Investment Trust Companies , C‑363/05, EU:C:2007:391, paragraphs 41 to 43; Wheels Common Investment Fund Trustees and Others , C‑424/11, EU:C:2013:144, paragraph 17; and ATP PensionService , C‑464/12, EU:C:2014:139, paragraph 41). | 46. In that connection, it must be held that the jurisdiction of the county courts to hear actions which are brought on grounds based on EU law does not necessarily constitute a procedural rule which may be classified as ‘unfavourable’. The designation of those courts, which are less numerous and hierarchically superior to the local courts, may facilitate a more homogeneous and specialised administration of justice in cases concerning the rules arising from Directive 93/13. | 0 |
1,413 | 18
It must be noted in that context that the concept of a ‘technical regulation’ extends to four categories of measures, namely, (i) the ‘technical specification’, within the meaning of Article 1(3) of Directive 98/34; (ii) ‘other requirements’, as defined in Article 1(4) of that directive; (iii) the ‘rule on services’, covered in Article 1(5) of that directive, and (iv) the ‘laws, regulations or administrative provisions of Member States prohibiting the manufacture, importation, marketing or use of a product or prohibiting the provision or use of a service, or establishment as a service provider’, under Article 1(11) of that directive (see judgment of 4 February 2016, Ince, C‑336/14, EU:C:2016:72, paragraph 70). | 32. Contrairement à la situation qui était en cause dans l’affaire ayant donné lieu à l’arrêt du 26 mars 2009, SELEX Sistemi Integrati/Commission (C‑113/07 P, Rec. p. I‑2207, point 76), les SOA n’exercent pas une mission de normalisation. Ces entreprises ne disposent d’aucun pouvoir décisionnel se rattachant à l’exercice de prérogatives de puissance publique. | 0 |
1,414 | 32
The Court has, lastly, held that provisions which confer exclusive jurisdiction, such as Article 16 of the Brussels Convention and Article 22 of Regulation No 44/2001, must not be given a wider interpretation than is required by their objective, since they deprive the parties of the choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and may, in certain cases, result in a situation whereby the parties are brought before a court which is not that of any of them (judgments of 10 January 1990, Reichert and Kockler, C‑115/88, EU:C:1990:3, paragraph 9, and of 12 May 2011, BVG, C‑144/10, EU:C:2011:300, paragraph 30). | 9 Secondly, as the Court has already held, Article 16 must not be given a wider interpretation than is required by its objective, since it results in depriving the parties of the choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and, in certain cases, results in their being brought before a court which is not that of any of them ( judgment of 14 December 1977 in Sanders v Van der Putte, cited above ). | 1 |
1,415 | 56. The reasoning followed by the Court in paragraph 100 of the judgment in Ordine degli Architetti and Others , relating to the application of Directive 93/37, is not such as to undermine that conclusion. The Court observed, as regards compliance with that directive in cases concerning the execution of infrastructure works in circumstances such as were presented to it, that it was not necessary for the municipal authorities themselves to apply the award‑of‑contract‑procedures laid down by that provision. That directive was still given full effect as long as the national legislation allowed the municipal authorities to require the developer holding the building permit to carry out the work contracted for in accordance with those procedures. | 26. En tant qu’ICF conteste la conclusion à laquelle le Tribunal est parvenu quant à la possibilité que, en l’absence de l’irrégularité procédurale commise, la procédure administrative ait pu aboutir à un résultat différent, il convient de rappeler que, conformément aux articles 256, paragraphe 1, TFUE et 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour, le pourvoi est limité aux questions de droit. Le Tribunal est seul compétent pour constater et apprécier les faits pertinents ainsi que pour apprécier les éléments de preuve. L’appréciation de ces faits et éléments de preuve ne constitue donc pas, sous réserve du cas de leur dénaturation, une question de droit soumise, comme telle, au contrôle de la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Acino/Commission, C‑269/13 P, EU:C:2014:255, point 34 et jurisprudence citée). | 0 |
1,416 | 26. It must be pointed out, however, that although the right of pre-emption granted to shareholders does not admit of any exception other than that expressly laid down in Article 29(4) of the directive ( Syndesmos Melon tis Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklisias and Others , paragraph 40), the fact remains that, as is apparent from the second recital and the judgment in Siemens , the Second Directive lays down minimum requirements for the protection of shareholders and creditors of public limited liability companies, by leaving the Member States free to adopt provisions that are more favourable to them, which provide, inter alia, for more restrictive conditions on withdrawing the right of pre-emption. | 9. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 30 janvier 2002, Commission/Grèce, C‑103/00, Rec. p. I‑1147, point 23, et du 27 octobre 2005, Commission/Luxembourg, C‑23/05, Rec. p. I‑9535, point 9). | 0 |
1,417 | 22. As the Court has already held, it follows that, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 93(3) of the Treaty, plans to grant or alter aid must be notified to the Commission before they are implemented (see, inter alia, Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 35; Case C-295/97 Piaggio [1999] ECR I‑3735, paragraph 44; and Case C-278/00 Greece v Commission [2004] ECR I-3997, paragraph 30). | 39 The Court has consistently held that, in the absence of Community rules on the matter, the national rules relating to time-limits for bringing actions are also applicable to actions based on Community law, provided that they are no less favourable for such actions than for similar actions of a domestic nature and that they do not render the exercise of rights conferred by Community law impossible in practice (see, in particular, the judgment of 16 December 1976 in Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Another v Landwirtschaftskammer fuer das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, paragraphs 5 and 6). | 0 |
1,418 | 80
Following settled case-law of the Court, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 16 December 2008, Cartesio, C‑210/06, EU:C:2008:723, paragraph 67, and of 29 January 2013, Radu, C‑396/11, EU:C:2013:39, paragraph 22). The same is true where the questions raised concern the validity of a provision of EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 December 2002, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraphs 34 and 35 and the case-law cited). | 50
The assessment carried out under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive may not have lacunae and must contain complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt as to the effects of the works proposed on the protected site concerned (judgment in Briel and Others, C‑521/12, EU:C:2014:330, point 27). | 0 |
1,419 | 40
However, the Court, which is called on to provide answers that are of use to the national court in context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, may provide guidance, based on the file in the main proceedings and on the written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2014, Leone, C‑173/13, EU:C:2014:2090, paragraph 56). | 49. Il s’ensuit que, contrairement à ce que prétend la Commission, une interprétation purement littérale du régime particulier des agences de voyages fondée sur le texte d’une ou de plusieurs versions linguistiques, à l’exclusion des autres, ne saurait prévaloir. Conformément à une jurisprudence constante, il y a lieu de considérer que les dispositions du droit de l’Union doivent être interprétées et appliquées de manière uniforme à la lumière des versions établies dans toutes les langues de l’Union. En cas de disparité entre les diverses versions linguistiques d’un texte de l’Union, la disposition en cause doit être interprétée en fonction de l’économie générale et de la finalité de la réglementation dont elle constitue un élément (arrêt du 8 décembre 2005, Jyske Finans, C‑280/04, Rec. p. I‑10683, point 31). | 0 |
1,420 | 41. In the context of an appeal it is necessary to bear in mind that the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, primarily, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the arguments upon which the appellant relies (see, to that effect, Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I‑8417, paragraph 128; Case C‑359/01 P British Sugar v Commission [2004] ECR I‑4933, paragraph 47; and Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 244). | 49. Next, the entry of the mark in a public register has the aim of making it accessible to the competent authorities and the public, particularly to economic operators. | 0 |
1,421 | 44. It is settled case-law that a national measure involves indirect discrimination where, although worded in neutral terms, it works to the disadvantage of a much higher percentage of women than men (see Case C-1/95 Gerster [1997] ECR I‑5253, paragraph 30, Case C-100/95 Kording [1997] ECR I‑5289, paragraph 16, and Case C-313/02 Wippel [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 43). | 19. It follows, in the Commission’s view, that the Council does not have the power to adopt a decision on the basis of the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC where an aid has been declared incompatible with the common market by a Commission decision. Nor, to that extent, did the Council have the power to override the effects of such a decision, by authorising the grant of aids designed to compensate the beneficiaries of the aid declared incompatible for the repayment which that decision obliged them to make. | 0 |
1,422 | 58. In accordance with the principle of effectiveness, those procedural rules must not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (see, to that effect, Palmisani , paragraphs 28 and 29, and Edis , paragraph 34). | 88. It is thus clear that the infringement of which the Italian Republic is accused lasted for a quite considerable period which in any event had no relation to the difficulties in recovering the aid paid under a scheme that had been declared unlawful and incompatible with the common market. | 0 |
1,423 | 46. The same applies where the possibility that addressees will not give effect to the measure concerned is purely theoretical and their intention to act in conformity with it is not in doubt (Case C‑386/96 P Dreyfus v Commission [1998] ECR I‑2309, paragraph 44; see also, to that effect, Case 11/82 Piraiki‑Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraphs 8 to 10). | 10 IT MUST THEREFORE BE ACCEPTED THAT THE DECISION AT ISSUE WAS OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THE APPLICANTS .
| 1 |
1,424 | 44. In such a situation, since the parent company and its subsidiary form a single economic unit and therefore form a single undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC, the Commission may address a decision imposing fines on the parent company, without having to establish the personal involvement of the latter in the infringement (see Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , paragraph 59; General Química and Others v Commission , paragraph 38, and Elf Aquitaine v Commission , paragraph 55). | 36. The fact that the condition of eligibility for the right of access to employment in the host Member States disappears with respect to the worker after a family member has himself acquired that right is not therefore capable of calling into question the right acquired by that family member. | 0 |
1,425 | 39. The deduction system is intended to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever the purpose or results of those activities, provided that they are themselves subject in principle to VAT (see, inter alia, Gabalfrisa and Others , paragraph 44; Case C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I-1609, paragraph 78; Kittel and Recolta Recycling , paragraph 48; and Case C-438/09 Dankowski [2010] ECR I-14009, paragraph 24). | 24. The deduction system thus established is intended to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject in principle to VAT (see Case C‑137/02 Faxworld [2004] ECR I‑5547, paragraph 37, and SKF , paragraph 56). | 1 |
1,426 | 24. With regard to the second condition, the Court has repeatedly held that the distinction between benefits excluded from the scope of Regulation No 1408/71 and those which fall within its scope is based essentially on the constituent elements of each particular benefit, in particular its purposes and the conditions on which it is granted, and not on whether a benefit is classified as a social security benefit by national legislation (see, in particular, the judgment in Hughes , cited above, paragraph 14, and Joined Cases C-245/94 and C-312/94 Hoever and Zachow [1996] ECR I-4895, paragraph 17). | 57 Article 7 is intended to reconcile the interests of trade-mark protection and those of free movement of goods within the Community by making the further commercialisation of a product bearing a trade mark possible and preventing opposition by the proprietor of the mark (see, to that effect, Parfums Christian Dior, paragraphs 37 and 38). Advertisements relating to car repair and maintenance do not affect further commercialisation of the goods in question. | 0 |
1,427 | 46. As is clear from its general scheme, transnational informing and consulting of employees under the Directive are essentially to be ensured by means of a system of negotiations between the central management and the workers’ representatives ( Bofrost* , paragraph 29, and Case C-440/00 Kühne & Nagel [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 40). | 65. In that connection, the Court has already held that Member States are subject to special duties of action and abstention in a situation in which the Commission has submitted to the Council proposals which, although they have not been adopted by the Council, represent the point of departure for concerted Community action (Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR I-1045, paragraph 28, and Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg , paragraph 59). | 0 |
1,428 | 42. However, the Court of Justice has stated that the Member States must exercise their powers in that field in compliance with European Union law and that national provisions which govern compensation for road traffic accidents may not deprive the First, Second and Third Directives of their effectiveness ( Marques Almeida , paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). | 32 It is true that the last part of Article 2(8)(b ) mentions only the allowance to be made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, whereas the activities of Mita Europe are pursued prior to importation and, on the basis that Mita Europe resells plain paper photocopiers to Gestetner, that resale takes place before importation . | 0 |
1,429 | 59. Before Directive 92/85 came into force, the Court had already held that, by virtue of the principle of non-discrimination and, in particular, under the provisions of Directive 76/207, protection against dismissal must be granted to women not only during maternity leave, but also throughout pregnancy. According to the Court, a dismissal occurring during those periods affects only women and therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex (see, to that effect, Case C‑179/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund [1990] ECR I‑3979, paragraph 13; Case C‑394/96 Brown [1998] ECR I‑4185, paragraphs 24 to 27; and Case C‑460/06 Paquay [2007] ECR I‑8511, paragraph 29). | 42
Having regard to the foregoing considerations the answer to the question referred is that Article 32(3) of the Visa Code, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that it requires Member States to provide for an appeal procedure against decisions refusing visas, the procedural rules for which are a matter for the legal order of each Member State in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Those proceedings must, at a certain stage of the proceedings, guarantee a judicial appeal. | 0 |
1,430 | 6 As the Commission points out, the Court has consistently held (see in particular the judgment in Case C-101/91 Commission v Italy [1993] ECR I-191, paragraph 20) that even though Article 171 of the EEC Treaty does not specify the period within which a judgment must be complied with, the interest in the immediate and uniform application of Community law requires that the process of compliance with a judgment must be initiated immediately and must be completed as soon as possible. | 56. S’agissant, en deuxième lieu, de l’élément justificatif relatif à la nécessité de prévenir la double prise en compte des pertes, invoqué par les gouvernements allemand et suédois, la Cour a reconnu que les États membres doivent pouvoir faire obstacle à ce risque (voir arrêts précités Marks & Spencer, point 47; Rewe Zentralfinanz, point 47, et Lidl Belgium, point 35). | 0 |
1,431 | 59. Articles 45 and 46(2) of that regulation are also mandatory, since their wording does not confer any right to choose on an insured person who falls within the scope of those provisions (see, by analogy, judgment in van Delft and Others , EU:C:2010:610, paragraph 57). Consequently, the insured person cannot waive the application of those articles by not declaring, in the application for the award of the old-age pension to which he is entitled under the legislation of a Member State, the periods of insurance completed in another Member State. | 307. Thus, by virtue of that provision, supposing it to be applicable to the Charter of the United Nations, the latter would have primacy over acts of secondary Community law (see, to that effect, Case C‑308/06 Intertanko and Others [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 42 and case-law cited). | 0 |
1,432 | 42. According to settled case-law, the exercise of the rights that Turkish nationals derive from Decision No 1/80 is not subject to any condition relating to the ground on which the right of entry and of residence was originally granted in the host Member State (see, to that effect, with respect to Article 6 of Decision No 1/80, Case C-237/91 Kus [1992] ECR I-6781, paragraphs 21 and 22, and Payir and Others , pargraph 40; and, with respect to Article 7, Case C-335/93 Eroglu [1994] ECR I-5113, paragraph 22). | 11 It is also clear from the order requesting a preliminary ruling that in percentage terms considerably less women than men work the minimum number of weekly or monthly hours required to entitle an employee to the continued payment of wages in the event of inability to work due to illness . | 0 |
1,433 | 43. It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the Commission, in the application of Article 87(3)(c) EC, has a wide discretion, the exercise of which involves complex economic and social assessments which must be made in a Community context (see, inter alia, Case 310/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] ECR 901, paragraph 18). Judicial review of the manner in which that discretion is exercised is confined to establishing that the rules of procedure and the rules relating to the duty to give reasons have been complied with and to verifying the accuracy of the facts relied on and that there has been no error of law, manifest error of assessment in regard to the facts or misuse of powers (Case C-351/98 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I-8031, paragraph 74, and Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR I-1487, paragraph 93). | 25 This argument cannot be accepted. | 0 |
1,434 | 54. In particular, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him (Case C‑301/96 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I‑9919, paragraph 89, and Case C‑42/01 Portugal v Commission [2004] ECR I‑6079, paragraphs 69 and 70). | 70. Having regard to that context, the Court finds that the contested decision could be reasoned in a summary manner (Case 73/74 Groupement des fabricants de papiers peints de Belgique v Commission [1975] ECR 1491, paragraph 31; Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 105), and that therefore sufficient grounds were stated for the contested decision (C-301/96 Germany v Commission , paragraphs 92 and 93). | 1 |
1,435 | 42 However, it follows from a line of case-law developed by the Court on the basis of the principles referred to in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the present judgment that observance of the right to a fair hearing is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in question (see, inter alia, Case C-135/92 Fiskano v Commission [1994] ECR I-2885, paragraph 39, and Case C-32/95 P Commission v Lisrestal and Others [1996] ECR I-5373, paragraph 21). | 97. Second, with regard to air transport, passengers whose flights are cancelled or subject to a long delay are in an objectively different situation from that experienced by passengers on other means of transport in the event of incidents of the same nature. Because, in particular, of the location of airports, which are generally outside urban centres, and of the particular procedures for checking-in and reclaiming baggage, the inconvenience suffered by passengers when such incidents occur is not comparable. | 0 |
1,436 | 27. It must be observed that according to settled case-law the definition of ‘body governed by public law’, a concept of Community law which must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community, is defined in functional terms exclusively under the three cumulative conditions in the second subparagraph of Article 1(b) of Directives 93/36 and 93/37 (see, to that effect, Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria and Others , paragraphs 20 and 21; Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraphs 51 to 53; Case C-214/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4667, paragraphs 52 and 53; and Case C-283/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-11697, paragraph 69). | 8 IN VIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTAL NATURE OF THE FIRST SYSTEM OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKETS, CRYSTALLIZED IN REGULATION NO 19, AND OF THE SHORTNESS OF THE TIME WHICH ELAPSED BETWEEN THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE BASIC REGULATION AND THAT OF IMPLEMENTING REGULATION NO 87, IT WAS LEGITIMATE, IN THE INTERESTS OF A RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKETS, TO CONFER TEMPORARILY ON THE MEMBER STATES FUNCTIONS WHICH, AT A MORE ADVANCED STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT, HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER BY THE COMMON INSTITUTIONS . IT THEREFORE APPEARS THAT, FAR FROM PRESENTING AN ANOMALY AT THE STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERED, THE INTERVENTION OF THE MEMBER STATES CONSTITUTED NO MORE THAN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL OBLIGATION EXPRESSED IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY, WHEREBY MEMBER STATES ARE REQUIRED TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ENSURE FULFILMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS RESULTING FROM ACTION TAKEN BY THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY AND, IN GENERAL, TO FACILITATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY' S TASKS . | 0 |
1,437 | 144. Accordingly, the Commission must assess, in each specific case and having regard both to the context and the objectives pursued by the scheme of penalties created by Regulation No 1/2003, the intended consequences for the undertaking in question, taking into account the turnover which reflects the undertaking’s real economic situation during the period in which the infringement was committed (judgment in Britannia Alloys & Chemicals v Commission , C‑76/06 P, EU:C:2007:326, paragraph 25). | 37. It follows that, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 72 of her Opinion, where, as in the cases in the main proceedings, the conditions or limitations which a Member State imposes on the exemption from VAT for games of chance or gambling are contrary to the principle of fiscal neutrality, that Member State cannot rely on such conditions or limitations to refuse an operator of such games the exemption which he may legitimately claim under the Sixth Directive. | 0 |
1,438 | 37. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that there is such distortion where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence is manifestly incorrect (Case C‑551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 54; Case C‑167/04, JCB Service v Commission , [2006] ECR I‑8935, paragraph 108, and Case C‑229/05 P, PKK and KNK v Council , [2007] ECR I‑439, paragraph 37). | 12 THE ABSENCE OF ANY ELEMENT GOING BEYOND A PURELY NATIONAL SETTING IN A GIVEN CASE THEREFORE MEANS, IN MATTERS OF FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT, THAT THE PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO SUCH A SITUATION . | 0 |
1,439 | 48. It is true that, as stated by the Kingdom of Spain, the Court ruled in Case C‑6/98 ARD [1999] ECR I‑7599, paragraphs 29 and 30, that the provisions of Directive 89/552 which impose a restriction on the freedom to provide television broadcasting services must, where they are not drafted in clear and unequivocal terms, be given a restrictive interpretation. | 43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC. | 0 |
1,440 | 70. First of all, as the Court of First Instance noted in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, even if the Community rules on the granting of aid and premiums do not expressly require Member States to introduce supervisory measures and inspection procedures, such as those mentioned by the Commission during the clearance of the EAGGF accounts, nevertheless that obligation may follow, in some cases implicitly, from the fact that under the rules in question it is for the Member States to organise an effective system of inspection and supervision (see to that effect Case C‑8/88 Germany v Commission , paragraph 16, and Case C‑468/02 Spain v Commission , paragraph 35). | 43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC. | 0 |
1,441 | 28. Consequently, where goods or services acquired by a taxable person are used for purposes of transactions that are exempt or do not fall within the scope of VAT, no output tax can be collected or input tax deducted (see Case C‑184/04 Uudenkaupungin kaupunki [2006] ECR I‑3039, paragraph 24, and Case C‑72/05 Wollny [2006] ECR I‑8297, paragraph 20). | 39. Although it is true that some of those duties, such as providing assistance to citizens or traffic control, are not likely to require the use of physical force, the fact remains that tasks relating to the protection of persons and property, the arrest and custody of offenders and the conduct of crime prevention patrols may require the use of physical force. | 0 |
1,442 | 23
As regards the specific content of Annex III to the VAT Directive, the Court has held that the Union legislature must be allowed a broad discretion, since it is called upon, when it adopts a fiscal measure, to make political, economic and social choices and to prioritise the diverging interests or make complex assessments (judgment of 7 March 2015, RPO, C‑390/15, EU:C:2017:174, paragraph 54). | 52. En outre, ainsi que la Commission l’a précisé dans ses écrits, le régime d’autorisation préalable instauré par les dispositions du paragraphe 1, second alinéa, de la quatorzième fonction modifiée ne permet pas d’assurer dans tous les cas que la sécurité de l’approvisionnement en énergie soit garantie si une menace réelle et suffisamment grave pour cet approvisionnement surgit après que l’autorisation de l’opération concernée a été délivrée. | 0 |
1,443 | 30
However, the fact that the Commission proves that there is such a probability or risk does not mean that it is impossible for the Member State concerned to establish that the measure in question meets the conditions laid down by Article 6(4) of Directive 92/43 and that its implications for the conservation objectives of the protected site have been assessed (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 January 2016, Grüne Liga Sachsen and Others, C‑399/14, EU:C:2016:10, paragraphs 56 and 57). | 41. En effet, à supposer même que les pouvoirs adjudicateurs puissent se voir opposer ces principes par le soumissionnaire retenu en cas de résiliation du contrat, un État membre ne saurait, en tout état de cause, s’en prévaloir pour justifier un manquement au titre de l’article 226 CE et, de ce fait, échapper à sa propre responsabilité en droit communautaire (voir, par analogie, arrêts du 17 avril 2007, AGM-COS.MET, C‑470/03, Rec. p. I‑2749, point 72, et du 18 juillet 2007, Commission/Allemagne, précité, point 36). | 0 |
1,444 | 36. For that purpose, the fact that point 7(b) and (c) of Annex I to the amended directive refers to projects for the ‘construction’ of the types of road mentioned, whereas the case in the main proceedings concerns projects for refurbishment and improvement of an existing road, does not mean that the latter are excluded from the scope of the amended directive. A project for refurbishment of a road which would be equivalent, by its size and the manner in which it is carried out, to construction may be regarded as a construction project for the purposes of that annex (see, to that effect, Case C-227/01 Commission v Spain [2004] ECR I‑8253, paragraph 46, and Abraham and Others , paragraph 32). | 57. L’argument de la République italienne selon lequel la fixation, pour le départ à la retraite, d’une condition d’âge différente selon le sexe est justifiée par l’objectif d’éliminer des discriminations au détriment des femmes ne saurait prospérer. Même si l’article 141, paragraphe 4, CE autorise les États membres à maintenir ou à adopter des mesures prévoyant des avantages spécifiques destinés à prévenir ou à compenser des désavantages dans la carrière professionnelle, afin d’assurer une pleine égalité entre hommes et femmes dans la vie professionnelle, il ne saurait en être déduit que cette disposition permet la fixation d’une telle condition d’âge différente selon le sexe. En effet, les mesures nationales couvertes par ladite disposition doivent, en tout état de cause, contribuer à aider les femmes à mener leur vie professionnelle sur un pied d’égalité avec les hommes [voir, s’agissant de l’interprétation de l’article 6, paragraphe 3, de l’accord sur la politique sociale conclu entre les États membres de la Communauté européenne à l’exception du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord (JO 1992, C 191, p. 91), arrêt Griesmar, précité, point 64]. | 0 |
1,445 | Il résulte également de la jurisprudence de la Cour que, lorsqu’une question de fait ou de droit ne fait pas l’objet du litige
dont le Tribunal est saisi, il n’appartient pas à ce dernier de se prononcer sur cette question, sous peine de statuer ultra
petita. Par conséquent, tout constat à cet égard par le Tribunal constitue un obiter dictum prononcé au-delà des limites dudit
litige et ne tranche ni effectivement ni nécessairement un point de droit. Il est, dès lors, insusceptible d’être revêtu de
l’autorité de la chose jugée (voir, en ce sens, arrêt ThyssenKrupp Nirosta/Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, points 129
à 132). | 34 FINALLY, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT CLAIMS THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 3 ( 1 ) AND ( 2 ) OF REGULATION NO 2677/84, WHICH REDUCE THE MINIMUM PRICES FOR SUGARBEET AND POTATOES, INFRINGE THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION IN THAT THEY HAVE A RETROACTIVE EFFECT UPON CONTRACTS ( IN SOME CASES ALREADY PERFORMED ) BETWEEN SUGARBEET AND POTATO FARMERS ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE PROCESSING INDUSTRY ON THE OTHER . IN THAT RESPECT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT POINTS OUT THAT FARMERS HAD PLANNED THEIR MARKETING YEAR IN THE SPRING OF 1984 ON THE BASIS OF DECISIONS ON PRICES ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL, WHICH FIXES MINIMUM PRICES A YEAR IN ADVANCE . | 0 |
1,446 | 36. As regards the substance, it must be recalled, first, that liability for an infringement of the competition rules committed by a subsidiary may be attributed to its parent company in particular where, although having a separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not decide independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two legal entities (see Case C‑97/08 P Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission [2009] ECR I‑8237, paragraph 58, and Joined Cases C‑628/10 P and C‑14/11 P Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission and Commission v Alliance One International and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 43). | 28. It should be added that the date on which the accession of the Portuguese Republic to the Communities took effect, namely 1 January 1986, coincides with the time‑limit set for transposition of the substantial amendments made to Directive 69/335 by Directive 85/303. Moreover, there is no provision in the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Spain and of the Portuguese Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties (OJ 1985 L 302, p. 23), or in any other document, which fixes, for the latter State, a time-limit for transposition which differs from that in Directive 85/303. Consequently, the only version of Directive 69/335 which applies to the Portuguese Republic is that established by Directive 85/303. | 0 |
1,447 | 68
The review of legality is supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction conferred on the EU judicature by Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, in accordance with Article 261 TFEU. That jurisdiction empowers the competent Court, in addition to carrying out a mere review of legality with regard to the penalty, to substitute its own appraisal for the Commission’s and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed (judgment of 8 December 2011, Chalkor v Commission, C‑386/10 P, EU:C:2011:815, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited). | 41 Under Directive 77/799, the competent authorities of a Member State may always request the competent authorities of another Member State to provide them with all the information enabling them to ascertain, in relation to the legislation which they have to apply, the correct amount of revenue tax payable by a taxpayer having his residence in that other Member State. | 0 |
1,448 | 69. The Court has held that the mere acquisition of a holding of more than 10% of the capital of a company operating in the energy sector or any other acquisition conferring significant influence on such a company cannot, as a general rule, be regarded as a real and serious enough threat to security of supply (Case C‑326/07 Commission v Italy , paragraph 48 and the case‑law cited). | 26. Since the person who has caused the harm to the holder of the exclusive reproduction right is the person who, for his private use, reproduces a protected work without seeking prior authorisation from that rightholder, it is, in principle, for that person to make good the harm related to that copying by financing the compensation which will be paid to that rightholder ( Padawan , paragraph 45). | 0 |
1,449 | 18
Article 1(2) of the regulation seeks to delimit the scope of the regulation, in particular by defining what is to be understood by novel foods and food ingredients (judgments of 9 June 2005, HLH Warenvertrieb and Orthica, C‑211/03, C‑299/03 and C‑316/03 to C‑318/03, EU:C:2005:370, paragraph 82, and 15 January 2009, M-K Europa, C‑383/07, EU:C:2009:8, paragraph 15). | 24. En effet, il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante qu’un État membre, dont les autorités ont octroyé une aide en violation des règles de procédure prévues à l’article 88 CE, ne saurait invoquer la confiance légitime des bénéficiaires pour se soustraire à l’obligation de prendre les mesures nécessaires en vue de l’exécution d’une décision de la Commission lui ordonnant de récupérer cette aide. Admettre une telle possibilité reviendrait à priver les dispositions des articles 87 CE et 88 CE de tout effet utile, dans la mesure où les autorités nationales pourraient ainsi se fonder sur leur propre comportement illégal pour mettre en échec l’efficacité des décisions prises par la Commission en vertu de ces dispositions du traité (arrêts du 20 septembre 1990, Commission/Allemagne, C‑5/89, Rec. p. I‑3437, point 17; du 7 mars 2002, Italie/Commission, C‑310/99, Rec. p. I‑2289, point 104, et du 1 er avril 2004, Commission/Italie, C‑99/02, Rec. p. I‑3353, point 21). | 0 |
1,450 | 29. The Court’s case-law makes it clear that where the method by which aid is financed, particularly by means of compulsory contributions, forms an integral part of the aid measure, consideration of the latter by the Commission must necessarily also take into account that method of financing the aid (Joined Cases C-261/01 and Case C-262/01 Van Calster and Others [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 49, and Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 44). | 11 The object of the prohibition in question is to conserve protected species. Its basis is to be found in particular in a multilateral convention signed by the European Community in 1982, that is the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic (OJ 1982 L 378, p. 25), which prohibits fishing for salmon beyond the limits of the zones of fisheries jurisdiction of the coastal States. That Convention meets the obligation of all members of the international community to cooperate in conserving and managing the living resources of the high seas, as provided for by Article 118 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Moreover, Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958 on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas recognizes the interest of coastal States in the living resources in the part of the high sea adjacent to the waters within their jurisdiction. In the light of the aims of the prohibition laid down in Article 6(1)(b) of the Regulation, this provision must be interpreted so as to give it the greatest practical effect, within the limits of international law.
Nationality of the vessel | 0 |
1,451 | 26 In so far as an assessment of a complex economic situation is involved, it must be borne in mind that, as the Court has held, where, as in this case, the Commission enjoys significant freedom of assessment, the Community judicature, when examining the lawfulness of the exercise of such freedom, cannot substitute its own assessment of the matter for that of the competent authority but must restrict itself to examining whether the assessment of the competent authority contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of powers (Case C-285/94 Italy v Commission [1997] ECR I-3519, paragraph 39). | 27 That provision prohibits, in clear, precise and unconditional terms, discrimination based on nationality against migrant Moroccan workers employed in the territory of the host Member State as regards working conditions or remuneration. | 0 |
1,452 | 41. Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation only of the provisions of Directives 76/207 and 96/34, that does not prevent this Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of European Union law that may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of European Union law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute (see Fuß , paragraph 40, and Worten , paragraph 31). | 74 However, such a difference in treatment appears to be inherent in the objective of integrating previously compartmentalized markets, bearing in mind the different situations of the various categories of economic operators before the establishment of the common organization of the market. The Regulation is intended to ensure the disposal of Community production and traditional ACP production, which entails the striking of a balance between the two categories of economic operators in question. | 0 |
1,453 | 59. En outre, le FEOGA ne finançant que les interventions effectuées conformément aux dispositions de l’Union dans le cadre de l’organisation commune des marchés agricoles (arrêts Espagne/Commission, C‑349/97, EU:C:2003:251, point 45, et Grèce/Commission, C‑300/02, EU:C:2005:103, point 32), le renversement de la charge de la preuve garantit que tout financement du FEOGA soit subordonné à la preuve effective d’une telle conformité. | 24. En ce qui concerne les taxes d’immatriculation des véhicules, il est de jurisprudence constante qu’un État membre peut soumettre à une taxe d’immatriculation un véhicule automobile immatriculé dans un autre État membre lorsque ledit véhicule est destiné à être essentiellement utilisé sur le territoire du premier État membre à titre permanent ou qu’il est, en fait, utilisé de cette façon (voir arrêt van Putten e.a., précité, point 46, ainsi que ordonnance Notermans-Boddenberg, précitée, point 26). | 0 |
1,454 | 38. The national court asks, however, whether the justifications set out in paragraphs 44 to 50 of the judgment in Marks & Spencer , which also include the need to prevent the risk of tax avoidance, must be understood as being cumulative or whether the existence of only one of those factors is sufficient for the tax regime at issue in the main proceedings to be treated, in principle, as being justified. | 49 In determining whether a mark has acquired distinctive character following the use made of it, the competent authority must make an overall assessment of the evidence that the mark has come to identify the product concerned as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that product from goods of other undertakings. | 0 |
1,455 | 16 As the Court has stated in its judgments in Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders v Netherlands State ([1988] ECR 2085, paragraphs 32 to 34) and in Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda (paragraph 10) and Commission v Netherlands (paragraph 15), previously cited, national rules which are not applicable to services without distinction whatever their origin are compatible with Community law only if they can be brought within the scope of an express derogation such as Article 56 of the Treaty, to which Article 66 refers. It may also be seen from those judgments that objectives of an economic nature cannot constitute grounds of public policy within the meaning of that article. | 21
That latitude is nevertheless limited by the obligation to ensure effective collection of the EU’s own resources and not to create significant differences in the manner in which taxable persons are treated, either within a Member State or throughout the Member States. The VAT Directive must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT, according to which economic operators carrying out the same transactions must not be treated differently in relation to the levying of VAT. Any action by the Member States concerning the collection of VAT must comply with that principle (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Italy, C‑132/06, EU:C:2008:412, paragraph 39; Commission v Germany, C‑539/09, EU:C:2011:733, paragraph 74; and Belvedere Costruzioni, C‑500/10, EU:C:2012:186, paragraph 22). | 0 |
1,456 | 19
As regards the context of which the first sentence of Article 33(2) of Regulation No 6/2002 is part, it should be observed, first of all, that the second sentence of that paragraph qualifies the rule set out in that first sentence as regards ‘third parties who have acquired rights’ in the registered Community design after the date of the legal act in question but who knew of the act at the date on which the rights were acquired. Article 33(3) establishes an exception to that rule in the case of a ‘person who acquires the registered Community design or a right concerning the registered Community design’ by way of transfer of the whole of the undertaking or by any other universal succession. Accordingly, an interpretation of Article 33(2) and (3) of Regulation No 6/2002 which is both literal and schematic gives support to the idea that it, as a whole, is intended to govern the enforceability of the legal acts referred to in Articles 28, 29 and 32 of the regulation in respect of third parties who have, or are likely to have, rights in the registered Community design (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 February 2016 in Hassan, C‑163/15, EU:C:2016:71, paragraph 20). | 48. Therefore, that provision has neither the aim nor the effect of limiting the option given to the Member States to exclude bodies and institutions acting in a legislative capacity from the scope of the directive, an option which is, moreover, provided for without restriction by the Aarhus Convention itself. | 0 |
1,457 | 81
At the outset, it should be borne in mind that it is not for the Court, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the General Court exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertakings for infringements of EU law (see, inter alia, judgment of 22 November 2012 in E.ON Energie v Commission, C‑89/11 P, EU:C:2012:738, paragraph 125). | 33. The requirement at issue in the main proceedings may, in principle, contribute not only to ensuring the correct collection of VAT and preventing evasion but also to eliminating the risk of loss of tax revenue. It follows that the Republic of Poland is fully entitled to submit that that requirement pursues the legitimate objectives set out in Articles 90(1) and 273 of the VAT Directive. | 0 |
1,458 | 39. In that regard, whilst it is true that, according to the introductory words of Article 13A(1) of the Sixth Directive, Member States must lay down the conditions for exemptions in such a way as to ensure the correct and straightforward application of those exemptions and to prevent any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse, those conditions cannot affect the substantive definition of the exemptions (see, inter alia, Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 32; Kingscrest Associates and Montecello , paragraph 24, and Case C‑401/05 VDP Dental Laboratory [2006] ECR I‑12121, paragraph 26). | 36 It follows however from the foregoing that a comparison is not relevant where it involves groups formed in an arbitrary manner so that one comprises predominantly women and the other predominantly men with a view to carrying out successive comparisons and thereby bringing the pay of the group consisting predominantly of women to the level of that of another group also formed in an arbitrary manner so that it consists predominantly of women. | 0 |
1,459 | 33. It also follows from the case-law that both higher education and university education constitute vocational training (see Case 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379, paragraphs 15 to 20, and Case 42/87 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 5445, paragraphs 7 and 8). | 7 As regards the first submission, it should be stressed that the Court has already held that conditions of access to vocational training fall within the scope of the Treaty ( judgment of 13 February 1985 in Case 293/83 Gravier (( 1985 )) ECR 593 ). | 1 |
1,460 | 86. In the main actions, the disputes do not concern the actual cover provided by the Netherlands sickness insurance scheme for the medical and hospital treatment with which Ms Müller-Fauré and Ms Van Riet were provided. In those actions, what is disputed is whether it was a medical necessity for them to have the treatment at issue in Germany and Belgium respectively, rather than in the Netherlands. In that regard, in paragraphs 99 to 107 of Smits and Peerbooms , the Court also ruled on that condition concerning the necessity of the proposed treatment, to which the grant of authorisation is subject. | 101 As regards the provision of hospital treatment outside the Netherlands, the national court states, however, that in practice this condition often appears to be interpreted as meaning that the provision of such treatment is not to be authorised unless it appears that appropriate treatment cannot be provided without undue delay in the Netherlands. No distinction is therefore drawn in this respect between whether the treatment could be provided by a contracted establishment or by a non-contracted establishment. | 1 |
1,461 | 25. It is apparent from those observations that FCD and FMB and the Commission are asking the Court to rule on the compatibility of the Notice of 8 June 2011 with EU law. It is settled case-law, however, that it is not for the Court, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, to give a ruling on the compatibility of provisions of national law with EU law or to interpret national legislative or regulatory provisions (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgment in Vueling Airlines , C‑487/12, EU:C:2014:2232, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). The Court has jurisdiction to give the national court full guidance on the interpretation of EU law in order to enable it to determine the issue of compatibility for the purposes of the case before it (judgment in Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales , C‑118/08, EU:C:2010:39, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). | 73 It is not in dispute that, for the 1998/99 marketing year, the method used by the Commission and the Council to assess Italy's future situation consisted in comparing available production, made up of the foreseeable quantities of A sugar and B sugar, plus any C sugar carried forward, with foreseeable consumption. Thus, in order to show that a change of method had occurred for the 1998/99 marketing year, the Italian Government would have had to prove that the Commission and the Council had used another method for the previous years. | 0 |
1,462 | 35. Third, Article 92(1) of the Treaty only requires the determination of whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to favour " certain undertakings or the production of certain goods" over others. If so, the measure satisfies the condition of selectivity which defines State aid as laid down by that provision (Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 34, and Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR I-1487, paragraph 47). | 39. That obligation entails the power to take action directly against the producer in order to recover the amount payable by the latter in respect of the additional levy on milk where it is established that the producer did not pay it to the purchaser and the latter is not taking due steps to collect it from the producer. | 0 |
1,463 | 27
In matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur are usually the most appropriate for deciding the case, in particular on the grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence (judgments of 16 May 2013, Melzer, C‑228/11, EU:C:2013:305, paragraph 27, and of 21 May 2015, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide, C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335, paragraph 40). | 14 It should next be stated that national legislation which makes the provision of certain services on the national territory by an undertaking established in another Member State subject to the issue of an administrative licence for which the possession of certain professional qualifications is required constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning of Article 59 of the Treaty. By reserving the provision of services in respect of the monitoring of patents to certain economic operators possessing certain professional qualifications, national legislation prevents an undertaking established abroad from providing services to the holders of patents in the national territory and also prevents those holders from freely choosing the manner in which their patents are to be monitored. | 0 |
1,464 | 36
The Court has previously held that a company incorporated under the law of a Member State which transfers its place of effective management to another Member State, without that transfer affecting its status as a company of the former Member State, may rely on freedom of establishment for the purpose of challenging the lawfulness of a tax imposed on it by the former Member State on the occasion of that transfer of the place of effective management (judgment of 29 November 2011, National Grid Indus, C‑371/10, EU:C:2011:785, paragraph 33). | 55. It should be borne in mind, however, that even a small-scale project can have significant effects on the environment if it is in a location where the environmental factors, such as fauna and flora, soil, water, climate or cultural heritage, are sensitive to the slightest alteration (see, to that effect, with regard to Directive 85/337, Case C‑392/96 Commission v Ireland [1999] ECR I‑5901, paragraph 66). | 0 |
1,465 | 60. The Court has also stated on several occasions that, even though, according to their wording, the provisions concerning freedom of establishment are mainly aimed at ensuring that foreign nationals are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation which comes within the definition contained in Article 48 EC (see Case C‑251/98 Baars [2000] ECR I‑2787, paragraph 28; Case C‑9/02 de Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I‑2409, paragraph 42, and Heinrich Bauer Verlag , paragraph 26). | 131
In those paragraphs, the Court of Justice held that the advantage identified by that decision arose solely from the announcement of 4 December 2002, together with the shareholder loan offer. Conversely, it is implicitly but necessarily apparent from paragraphs 132, 134, 136 and 139 of that judgment that the Court of Justice did not intend to extend that advantage to the declarations from July 2002, as they only form part of the context of the aid measure thus identified. | 0 |
1,466 | 47. Finally, according to settled case-law, while the Member States in principle remain free, by virtue of the proviso in Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to determine, according to their own national conceptions, what the requirements of their public policy are, the limits of that concept are a matter of interpretation of that regulation. Consequently, while it is not for the Court to define the content of the public policy of a Member State, it is none the less required to review the limits within which the courts of a Member State may have recourse to that concept for the purpose of refusing recognition of a judgment emanating from a court in another Member State (see to that effect, judgments in Krombach , C‑7/98, EU:C:2000:164, paragraphs 22 and 23, and in Renault , C‑38/98, EU:C:2000:225, paragraphs 27 and 28). | 45. If the opposite were true, the tariff classification of the imported components would depend on a fact which not intrinsic to those goods, since the customs authorities are not in a position to ascertain whether components which were not presented to customs have to be worked or not before being capable of assembly with the imported components, which would undermine the objective of ease of verification by the customs and legal certainty which must govern that classification. | 0 |
1,467 | 48. As regards the fact that the competent authorities were informed by the recipient of the subsidy of its choice of contractor even before the launch of the tendering procedure for awarding the public contract in question, it does not, as such, have any effect on the classification of ‘irregularity’, within the meaning of Article 1, second subparagraph, of Regulation No 2988/95 (see, by analogy, Case C‑94/05 Emsland-Stärke [2006] ECR I‑2619, paragraph 62). | 62. Moreover, the fact that the competent authority was informed of the fact that the starch-producing undertaking had obtained potatoes from a trader obtaining them directly or indirectly from producers doe s not in itself mean that the irregularity in question cannot be described as an irregularity ‘caused by negligence’, or indeed ‘intentional’, within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation No 2988/95. | 1 |
1,468 | 54 Finally, as regards the ground concerning distortion of evidence, it should be noted that, whilst it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the items of evidence produced to it (see, in particular, Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 66), the Court of Justice has none the less held that such a ground is admissible (see Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42, Case C-362/95 P Blackspur DIY and Others v Council and Commission [1997] ECR I-4775, paragraph 29, Case C-55/97 P AIUFFASS and AKT v Commission [1997] ECR I-5383, paragraph 25, and Case C-140/96 P Dimitriadis v Court of Auditors [1997] ECR I-5635, paragraph 35). | 66 The Court of Justice has no more jurisdiction, on principle, to examine the evidence which the Court of First Instance accepted in support of those facts than to find the facts themselves. Since the evidence was duly obtained and the rules and general principles of law relating to the burden of proof were observed, as also were the rules of procedure in relation to the taking of evidence, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the items of evidence produced to it. The pleas in law seeking to criticize that assessment cannot be accepted by the Court. For the same reasons, once the Court of First Instance has found the existence of damage, it alone has jurisdiction to assess, within the confines of the claim, the most appropriate compensation. | 1 |
1,469 | 50. It follows from that rule of sharing of responsibilities, in correlation with the Community measures relating to the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of the formal qualifications of practitioners of medicine (see, in this respect, Case C‑120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I-1831, paragraph 42, and Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931, paragraphs 47 and 48), that, once it has agreed, by issuing a Form E 111 or Form E 112, that one of its insured persons in one of the cases provided for in Article 22(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 may receive medical treatment outside the competent Member State, the competent institution is in the hands of the doctors authorised by the institution of the Member State of stay, acting within the scope of their office, who are called on to treat the insured person in the latter State, and it is obliged to accept and recognise the findings and choices of treatment made by those doctors as if they had been made by authorised doctors who would have had to treat the insured person in the competent Member State, subject to the existence of any abuse (see, by analogy, in the context of medical findings concerning the incapacity for work of a person covered by social insurance made by the institution of the Member State of residence or stay pursuant to Article 18 of Regulation No 574/72, Case C‑206/94 Paletta [1996] ECR I-2357, paragraphs 24 to 28). | 25. L’article 108, paragraphe 3, TFUE institue un contrôle préventif sur les projets d’aides nouvelles (arrêts du 11 décembre 1973, Lorenz, 120/73, Rec. p. 1471, point 2, ainsi que du 12 février 2008, CELF et ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, ci-après l’«arrêt CELF I», C‑199/06, Rec. p. I‑469, point 37). | 0 |
1,470 | 33. Therefore, for reasons analogous to those set out in paragraph 30 above, the activities of a legal trainee, even when carried out in the public sector, do not fall within the scope of the exception provided for in the first paragraph of Article 45 EC (see also, by analogy, Thijssen , paragraphs 22 and 23). | 76
As stated by the Advocate General in point 87 of her Opinion, the fact that installations which generate heat themselves and installations which obtain heating from cogeneration installations are treated in the same way facilitates the management of use of heat in the context of the free allocation of allowances. In principle, it is not necessary to verify how much heating individual installations obtain and from which sources to be able to allocate allowances to those installations. Moreover, that mechanism contributes to the attainment of the objective of promoting the use of techniques such as cogeneration since, by procuring heating from cogeneration installations, industrial installations save allowances which they can sell. | 0 |
1,471 | 40
In accordance with settled case-law, in adopting such guidelines and announcing by publishing them that they will apply to the cases to which they relate, the Commission imposes a limit on the exercise of that discretion and cannot, as a general rule, depart from those guidelines, at the risk of being found to be in breach of general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations (judgment of 8 March 2016, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraphs 69 and 70 and the case-law cited). | 52. As the Court noted in Case C-351/08 Grimme [2009] ECR I‑10777, paragraphs 26 and 27, the EC-Switzerland Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons is one of a series of seven sectoral agreements between the same contracting parties, which were signed on 21 June 1999. They were signed after the Swiss Confederation’s rejection of the EEA Agreement on 6 December 1992. | 0 |
1,472 | 51. The Court has held that the prevention of tax avoidance (see Case C‑264/96 ICI [1998] ECR I‑4695, paragraph 26; Joined Cases C‑397/98 and C‑410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others [2001] ECR I‑1727, paragraph 57; and Case C‑315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I‑7063, paragraph 27) and the effectiveness of fiscal supervision (see, Case C‑436/00 X and Y [2002] ECR I‑10829, paragraph 51, and Case C‑334/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I‑2229, paragraphs 31 and 32) constitute overriding requirements of general interest capable of justifying legislation which restricts the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (see, to that effect, Case C‑386/04 Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32). | 42 Since it is in the trade mark owner' s interest that the consumer or end user should not be led to believe that the owner is responsible for the repackaging, an indication must be given on the packaging of who repackaged the product. | 0 |
1,473 | 123. In those circumstances, the arguments of the Republic of Austria on protection of health need not be considered separately from those on protection of the environment (see, to that effect, Case C‑524/07 Commission v Austria , paragraph 56). | 29 In that regard, suffice it to note that, according to the case-law of the Court (Case C-35/90 Commission v Spain [1991] ECR I-5073, paragraph 7), since the Kingdom of Spain subjected supplies of armaments, munitions and equipment exclusively for military use from other Member States to the general scheme of VAT by means of Law No 30/85 which entered into force on 1 January 1986, it could no longer subsequently claim the right to continue to exempt those activities pursuant to Article 28(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive. | 0 |
1,474 | 31. The Court has also held that, by declaring a product under the procedure for export refunds, an exporter implies that the product satisfies all the conditions necessary for the refund. If the declaration is questioned by the competent authority, it is for the exporter to show, in accordance with the national rules of evidence, that the conditions have actually been complied with (see, to that effect, Fleisch‑Winter , paragraphs 32 and 35). | 11 The Court has had occasion to state in this respect that although the mere fact that a Member State has created a dominant position by the grant of exclusive rights is not as such incompatible with Article 86, the Treaty none the less requires the Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any measure which might deprive those provisions of their effectiveness (see the judgment in Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 35). | 0 |
1,475 | 41. The fact that she was not actually available on the employment market of the host Member State for a few months does not mean that she has ceased to belong to that market during that period, provided she returns to work or finds another job within a reasonable period after confinement (see, by analogy, Orfanopoulos and Oliveri , C‑482/01 and C‑493/01, EU:C:2004:262, paragraph 50). | 9 In view of the foregoing, it must therefore be stated that the protection of the environment is a mandatory requirement which may limit the application of Article 30 of the Treaty . | 0 |
1,476 | 43. The freedom to provide services may, however, be restricted by national regulations justified on the grounds set out in Article 46(1) EC in conjunction with Article 55 EC or by overriding reasons in the public interest (see, to that effect, Case C‑262/02 Commission v France , paragraph 23), to the extent that there are no Community harmonising measures providing for measures necessary to ensure those interests are protected (see, to that effect, in the context of the free movement of goods, Case C-323/93 Centre d’insémination de la Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 31 and case-law cited). | 65. Au rang des facteurs pertinents à cet égard figurent notamment des éléments tels que la gravité du manquement, la durée de persistance de celui-ci depuis l’arrêt l’ayant constaté, les conséquences du manquement sur les intérêts publics et privés concernés ainsi que l’attitude de l’État membre défendeur (voir arrêt Commission/France, C‑121/07, EU:C:2008:695, point 64 et jurisprudence citée). | 0 |
1,477 | 54 First, it is settled case-law that the rights conferred on Turkish workers by Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 are accorded irrespective of whether or not the authorities of the host Member State have issued a specific administrative document, such as a work permit or residence permit (see, to that effect, Bozkurt, paragraphs 29 and 30, Günaydin, paragraph 49, Ertanir, paragraph 55, and Birden, paragraph 65). | 65 Likewise, the fact that Mr Birden's residence permit was issued to him only for a fixed period is not relevant, since it is settled case-law that the rights conferred on Turkish workers by Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 are accorded irrespective of whether or not the authorities of the host Member State have issued a specific administrative document, such as a work permit or residence permit (see, to that effect, the judgments in Bozkurt, paragraphs 29 and 30, Günaydin, paragraph 49, and Ertanir, paragraph 55). | 1 |
1,478 | 41. Finally, contrary to the Commission’s submissions, it is clear from the Court’s settled case-law that the tax legislation of the Member States is capable of falling within Article 64(1) TFEU (see, inter alia, judgments in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , C‑446/04, EU:C:2006:774, paragraphs 174 to 196; Holböck , C‑157/05, EU:C:2007:297, paragraphs 37 to 45; and Prunus and Polonium , C‑384/09, EU:C:2011:276, paragraphs 27 to 37). | 88. Toutefois, cette exigence ne saurait aller jusqu’à imposer, en toute hypothèse, une coïncidence parfaite entre l’énoncé des griefs figurant dans le dispositif de l’avis motivé et les conclusions de la requête, dès lors que l’objet du litige, tel que défini dans l’avis motivé, n’a pas été étendu ou modifié (arrêt du 8 juillet 2010, Commission/Portugal, précité, point 26). La Commission peut notamment préciser ses griefs initiaux dans sa requête, à la condition cependant qu’elle ne modifie pas l’objet du litige (arrêt du 11 juillet 2013, Commission/Pays‑Bas, C‑576/10, point 35). | 0 |
1,479 | 98. Nor is it open to the Court of Justice, when determining an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the Court of First Instance exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertakings for infringements of Community law (see Case C‑219/95 P Ferriere Nord v Commission [1997] ECR I‑4411, paragraph 31, and Case C‑407/04 P Dalmine v Commission [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 152). | 60. C’est à la lumière de ces éléments qu’il appartient aux autorités nationales de décider s’il y a lieu de considérer que, effectivement, le demandeur craint avec raison d’être, une fois de retour dans son pays d’origine, persécuté au sens de l’article 2, sous c), de la directive, lu en combinaison avec l’article 9, paragraphe 3, de celle-ci. | 0 |
1,480 | 82
It follows from this that Regulation No 1234/2007 constitutes an instrument of the common agricultural policy essentially intended to assure consumers that agricultural products bearing a geographical indication registered under that regulation have, because of their provenance from a particular geographical area, certain specific characteristics and, accordingly, offer a guarantee of quality due to their geographical provenance, with the aim of enabling agricultural operators to secure higher incomes in return for a genuine effort to improve quality and of preventing improper use of those designations by third parties seeking to profit from the reputation which those products have acquired by their quality (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 September 2009, Budějovický Budvar, C‑478/07, EU:C:2009:521, paragraph 111). | 90. However, in its orders for reference, the referring court states that, in its view, it is impossible to interpret Paragraphs 27 and 28 of the old version of the BbesG in conformity with EU law. | 0 |
1,481 | 45. As regards, first, the principle of proportionality, it must be noted that the Court has already had occasion to find, in Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2010] ECR I-403, paragraphs 78 to 92, that Articles 5 to 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 are not invalid by reason of infringement of the principle of proportionality. | 54. Furthermore, while it has been held that Directive 89/48 does not contain any limitation as regards the Member State in which an applicant must have acquired his professional qualifications (Case C‑274/05 Commission v Greece [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 28, and Case C-286/06 Commission v Spain [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 62), that case-law nonetheless establishes a distinction between the geographical place in which education and training take place and the education system to which these belong. In those judgments, the parties concerned had pursued education and training covered by an education system other than that of the Member State in which they sought to rely on their professional qualifications. | 0 |
1,482 | 56. By so doing, the Court of First Instance did not reverse the burden of proof on the parties. It made an unfettered assessment of the facts which were intended to establish the reality of cross-frontier broadcasting of the designated events. In that regard, the Court of First Instance is free to take account of the fact that a party has refrained from adducing evidence in support of its own allegations (see Case C‑214/05 P Rossi v OHIM [2006] ECR I-7057, paragraph 23). | 35 Consequently, it must be held that, by precluding by regulation or administrative practice on the grounds of their nationality employed or self-employed workers from other Member States and the members of their families from being attributed large-family status for the purpose of the award of special benefits for such families and from being awarded family allowances, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 48 and 52 of the EC Treaty, Article 7 of Regulation No 1612/68, Article 7 of Regulation No 1251/70, Article 7 of Directive 75/34 and Article 3 of Regulation No 1408/71. | 0 |
1,483 | 18. The prohibition on measures having an effect equivalent to restrictions set out in Article 28 EC covers all commercial rules enacted by the Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987) ECR 1227 ( " Beer purity law " ), paragraph 27; and Case C-12/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-459, paragraph 71). | 44 Consequently, a subsidy such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in so far as it takes the form of an increase in the value of the pension (see, in particular, Giletti, paragraph 14), constitutes an old-age cash benefit for the purposes of Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1408/71. This ensures its exportability in the absence of any special procedures for the purposes of Annex VI to Regulation No 1408/71 which might prevent Article 10(1) from applying. | 0 |
1,484 | 19. It is apparent from the case-law that a service can be considered to be ancillary to a principal service where it constitutes not an end in itself but a means of enhancing the enjoyment or benefit of the principal service supplied by the provider (see, to this effect, in particular, Joined Cases C-308/96 and C-94/97 Madgett and Baldwin [1998] ECR I‑6229, paragraph 24, and Dornier , paragraph 34). | 48. As regards the nature of the error, it must be assessed in the light of the complexity or sufficient simplicity of the rules concerned (see Case C‑187/91 Belovo [1992] ECR I‑4937, paragraph 18, and Faroe Seafood and Others , paragraph 100) and the period of time during which the authorities persisted in their error (see Case C‑38/95 Foods Import [1996] ECR I‑6543, paragraph 30, and Ilumitrónica , paragraph 56). | 0 |
1,485 | 75. The Court has also stated that, first, all administrative bodies, including decentralised authorities, are subject to that obligation as to primacy, and individuals may therefore rely on such provisions of European Union law against them and, secondly, provisions of national law which conflict with such provisions of European Union law may be legislative or administrative (see Case C-224/97 Ciola [1999] ECR I-2517, paragraphs 30 and 31 and case-law cited). | 68. The jobseeker’s allowance introduced by the 1995 Act is a social security benefit which replaced unemployment benefit and income support, and requires in particular the claimant to be available for and actively seeking employment and not to have income exceeding the applicable amount or capital exceeding a specified amount. | 0 |
1,486 | 58
Moreover, it is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that the examination of the existence of an infringement referred to in Article 9(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 must be based on a global assessment which takes into account all the factors relevant to the case (judgments of 18 June 2009, L’Oréal and Others, C‑487/07, EU:C:2009:378, paragraph 44, and of 18 July 2013, Specsavers International Healthcare and Others, C‑252/12, EU:C:2013:497, paragraph 39). | 30 Although the criterion of nationality appears as such in the second sentence of Article 14(1) for the purpose of allocation of fiscal jurisdiction, such differentiation cannot be regarded as constituting discrimination prohibited under Article 48 of the Treaty. It flows, in the absence of any unifying or harmonising measures adopted in the Community context under, in particular, the second indent of Article 220 of the Treaty, from the contracting parties' competence to define the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation as between themselves, with a view to eliminating double taxation. | 0 |
1,487 | 85. In order to be able to satisfy the requirement mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a system, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which combines lump-sum remuneration fixed in advance and proportional remuneration fixed after the fact must contain mechanisms, in particular for reimbursement, which are designed to correct any situation where ‘overcompensation’ occurs to the detriment of particular categories of users (see, by analogy, judgment in Amazon.com International Sales and Others , C‑521/11, EU:C:2013:515, paragraphs 30 and 31). | 43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC. | 0 |
1,488 | 24. Furthermore, as regards the question whether national legislation falls within the scope of one or other of the freedoms of movement laid down by the Treaties, it is clear from well-established case-law that the purpose of the legislation concerned must be taken into consideration (see, inter alia, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , C‑35/11, EU:C:2012:707, paragraph 90, and Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas , C‑196/04, EU:C:2006:544, paragraphs 31 to 33). | 40. Nor has the Council infringed the principle of relative stability by excluding the Kingdom of Spain from that allocation, given the absence of Spanish vessels from those two seas during the transitional period. | 0 |
1,489 | 32
In that connection, as regards the Italian legislation relating to betting and gambling, the Court has held previously that the objective of combating criminality linked to betting and gambling is capable of justifying restrictions on fundamental freedoms under those rules (see, to that effect, judgment in Biasci and Others, C‑660/11 and C‑8/12, EU:C:2013:550, paragraph 23). | 34
However, as Regulation Nos 2988/95 and 1083/2006 form part of the same mechanism designed to ensure the proper management of EU funds and the safeguarding of the European Union’s financial interests, the term ‘irregularity’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2988/95 and Article 2(7) of Regulation No 1083/2006 must be interpreted in a uniform manner. | 0 |
1,490 | 28. As regards the plea of inadmissibility raised by Shaker, it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 225(1) EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on points of law only. The Court of First Instance thus has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts and evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see, in particular, Case C-104/00 P DKV v OHIM [2002] ECR I-7561, paragraph 22; Case C-173/04 P Deutsche SiSi-Werke v OHIM [2006] ECR I-551, paragraph 35; Case C-25/05 P Storck v OHIM [2006] ECR I‑5719, paragraph 40). | 19 Abuse in the sense of the re-introduction into the Community of the product previously exported cannot exist where the product has undergone substantial and irreversible processing, as a result of which it has ceased to exist as such and a new product, coming under a different tariff heading, has been created. | 0 |
1,491 | 10 With regard to the implementation of directives, the Court has consistently held that mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State' s obligations under the Treaty (judgment in Case 168/85, Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 2945, at paragraph 13). | 24
As for the question whether Article 48(3) of Directive 2004/18 must be interpreted by taking into consideration the content of Article 63(1) of Directive 2014/24, which is the provision corresponding inter alia to Article 48(3) of Directive 2004/18, it must be observed that Article 48(3) is formulated in general terms and does not expressly set out the detailed rules in accordance with which an economic operator may rely on the capacities of other entities in a public procurement procedure (judgment of 7 April 2016, Partner Apelski Dariusz, C‑324/14, EU:C:2016:214, paragraphs 87 and 88). | 0 |
1,492 | 62. As regards the effect of double taxation conventions, the Court has indeed held that it cannot be ruled out that a Member State may succeed in ensuring compliance with its obligations under the Treaty by concluding a convention for the avoidance of double taxation with another Member State (see, to that effect, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation , paragraph 71; Amurta , paragraph 79; Commission v Italy , paragraph 36; and Commission v Spain , paragraph 58). | 10 It is settled case-law that in defining the criteria for the application of Article 85(1) to a specific case, account should be taken of the economic context in which the undertakings operate, the products or services covered by the agreements, the structure of the market concerned and the actual conditions in which it functions. | 0 |
1,493 | 76. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, as derogations from the fundamental rules of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, Articles 45 EC and 55 EC must be interpreted in a manner which limits their scope to what is strictly necessary in order to safeguard the interests which they allow the Member States to protect (see, in particular, Case 147/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1637, paragraph 7; Case C‑451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti [2006] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 45; and Case C‑438/08 Commission v Portugal [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34). | 23 Where accommodation in the hotel sector (as a taxable transaction) is distinguished from the letting of dwelling accommodation (as an exempted transaction) on the basis of its duration, that constitutes an appropriate criterion of distinction, since one of the ways in which hotel accommodation specifically differs from the letting of dwelling accommodation is the duration of the stay. In general, a stay in a hotel tends to be rather short and that in a rented flat fairly long. | 0 |
1,494 | 38. Admittedly, all those regulatory amendments were not intended to and did not even have the effect of depriving the Member States of the possibility of adopting measures to contribute effectively to the implementation of the objectives of the customs regulations, in particular the recovery of the customs debt. Nor did they prevent the Member States from prescribing, if appropriate, rules specifying, in compliance with those objectives and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, the conditions for applying the Community texts (with regard to a national provision increasing customs duties in the event of infringement of the Community customs regulations, see Case C‑91/02 Hannl + Hofstetter [2003] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 18 to 20). | 22. It follows from the foregoing and, in particular, from that stated purpose of the entitlement to paid annual leave that a worker who is on sick leave during a period of previously scheduled annual leave has the right, on his request and in order that he may actually use his annual leave, to take that leave during a period which does not coincide with the period of sick leave. The scheduling of that new period of annual leave, corresponding to the duration of the overlap between the period of annual leave originally scheduled and the sick leave, is subject to the rules and procedures of national law which are applicable to the scheduling of workers’ leave, taking into account the various interests involved, including overriding reasons relating to the interests of the undertaking. | 0 |
1,495 | 28. The question whether the VAT payable on the prior or subsequent sales of the goods concerned has or has not been paid to the public purse is irrelevant to the right of the taxable person to deduct input VAT. VAT applies to each transaction by way of production or distribution after deduction of the VAT directly borne by the various cost components (see Joined Cases C-354/03, C-355/03 and C-484/03 Optigen and Others [2006] ECR I-483, paragraph 54; Kittel and Recolta Recycling , paragraph 49; and Mahagében and Dávid , paragraph 40). | 40. The question whether the VAT payable on the prior or subsequent sales of the goods concerned has or has not been paid to the public purse is irrelevant to the right of the taxable person to deduct input VAT. VAT applies to each transaction by way of production or distribution after deduction of the VAT directly borne by the various cost components (see order in Case C-395/02 Transport Service [2004] ECR I-1991, paragraph 26; judgments in Joined Cases C-354/03, C-355/03 and C-484/03 Optigen and Others [2006] ECR I-483, paragraph 54; and Kittel and Recolta Recycling , paragraph 49). | 1 |
1,496 | 17. In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (Case C-169/07 Hartlauer [2009] ECR I-1721, paragraph 24). | 19 Where that value is not a sum of money agreed between the parties, it must, in order to be subjective, be the value which the recipient of the services constituting the consideration for the supply of goods attributes to the services which he is seeking to obtain and must correspond to the amount which he is prepared to spend for that purpose. Where, as here, the supply of goods is involved, that value can only be the price which the supplier has paid for the article which he is supplying without extra charge in consideration of the services in question. | 0 |
1,497 | 35 In Warmerdam-Steggerda, paragraphs 10, 17 and 19, it was held that Regulation No 1408/71 does not determine the conditions under which periods of employment or insurance are constituted. Those conditions are determined solely by the legislation of the Member State in which benefits are applied for. | 127. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 43 to 45 of the judgment in Del Cerro Alonso , the foregoing interpretation is in no way incompatible with the arguments in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the judgment in Dellas and Others . | 0 |
1,498 | 48. It should be noted in this regard that European Union rules do not seek to effect complete harmonisation in the area of the environment (see, inter alia, Case C‑318/98 Fornasar and Others [2000] ECR I‑4785, paragraph 46, and Case C‑6/03 Deponiezweckverband Eiterköpfe [2005] ECR I‑2753, paragraph 27). | 56. According to the Court's settled case-law, indirect discrimination arises where a national measure, albeit formulated in neutral terms, works to the disadvantage of far more women than men (see, inter alia, Case C‑537/07 Gómez-Limón Sánchez-Camacho [2009] ECR I‑6525, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). | 0 |
1,499 | 33
In order to assess whether that subsidiary decides independently upon its own conduct on the market or carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by its parent company (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013 in Commission v Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje, C‑440/11 P, EU:C:2013:514, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited), the EU judicature must take into consideration all relevant factors, which may vary from case to case and therefore cannot be set out in an exhaustive list (judgment of 26 September 2013 in The Dow Chemical Company v Commission, C‑179/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:605, paragraph 54). | 38. With regard to the circumstances in which a legal person who is not responsible for the infringement may, nevertheless, be subject to penalties, it is the Court’s established case‑law that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company in particular where, although having a separate legal personality, the subsidiary does not decide independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two legal entities ( Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , paragraph 58 and the case‑law cited, and Joined Cases C‑628/10 P and C‑14/11 P Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission and Commission v Alliance One International and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 43). | 1 |
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