Unnamed: 0
int64 0
869k
| 0
stringlengths 36
32.8k
⌀ | 1
stringlengths 8
29.9k
| 2
int64 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|
863,300 |
16 It is true that the transactions referred to in Article 13B(d)(5) of the Sixth Directive may fall within the scope of VAT where they are effected as part of a commercial share-dealing activity, in order to secure a direct or indirect involvement in the management of the companies in which the holding has been acquired or where they constitute the direct, permanent and necessary extension of the taxable activity (see Polysar Investments Netherlands, cited above, paragraph 14; Case C-155/94 Wellcome Trust v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1996] ECR I-3013, paragraph 35; and Case C-306/94 Régie Dauphinoise v Ministre du Budget [1996] ECR I-3695, paragraph 18).
|
391. That complaint must be rejected.
| 0 |
863,301 |
40. Although, according to settled case-law, the Commission has, for that purpose, a broad discretion to define the subject-matter of tariff headings, it is not, however, authorised to alter the subject-matter of the tariff headings which have been defined on the basis of the HS (see Joined Cases C‑304/04 and C‑305/04 Jacob Meijer and Eagle International Freight [2005] ECR I‑6251, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited, and Case C‑15/05 Kawasaki Motors Europe [2006] ECR I‑3657, paragraph 35).
|
35. At the outset it must be recalled that the Council has conferred upon the Commission, acting in cooperation with the customs experts of the Member States, a broad discretion to define the subject-matter of tariff headings falling to be considered for the classification of particular goods. However, the Commission’s power to adopt the measures mentioned in Article 9(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) of Regulation No 2658/87 does not authorise it to alter the subject-matter of the tariff headings which have been defined on the basis of the HS established by the Convention whose scope the Community has undertaken, under Article 3 thereof, not to modify (see Case C-267/94 France v Commission [1995] ECR I‑4845, paragraphs 19 and 20; Case C-309/98 Holz Geenen [2000] ECR I-1975, paragraph 13; and Joined Cases C-304/04 and C‑305/04 Jacob Meijer and Eagle International Freight [2005] ECR I-6251, paragraph 22).
| 1 |
863,302 |
64. According to settled case-law, the imposition of a penalty payment is, in principle, justified only in so far as the failure to comply with an earlier judgment of the Court continues up to the time of the Court’s examination of the facts (Case C‑374/11 Commission v Ireland , paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
|
50 However, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 39 of his Opinion, it is clear from Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 69/335 that future contributions may also give rise to the levying of capital duty. Payments which a natural or legal person is obliged to make and which are definite are to be regarded as coming within the scope of that provision.
| 0 |
863,303 |
51. The scheme and wording of Article 4 of Regulation No 1408/71 as amended show that a benefit cannot be classified simultaneously as a family benefit and a special benefit. Family benefits are dealt with in Article 4(1) while special benefits are dealt with in Article 4(2a), the aim of that distinction being to enable the respective schemes for those two categories of benefits to be identified (see, to that effect, Case C‑286/03 Hosse [2006] ECR I‑1771, paragraphs 36 and 37 and the case-law cited).
|
44. As regards, next, the risk that losses would be used twice, such a risk does indeed exist if, in connection with a merger such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the parent company established in another Member State enjoys the possibility of deducting from its taxable income the losses of the merged subsidiary. That risk is averted by a rule which excludes that possibility (see, to that effect, Marks & Spencer , paragraphs 47 and 48).
| 0 |
863,304 |
12 As the Court made clear in its judgment in Case C-279/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-4743, paragraph 40, the aim of that provision is to enable the Commission to have as much information as possible on any draft technical regulation with respect to its content, scope and general context in order to enable it to exercise as effectively as possible the powers conferred on it by the Directive.
|
42. Thus, the principle of fiscal neutrality, a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT (see, particularly, Case C‑255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I‑1609, paragraph 92), precludes economic operators carrying on the same activities from being treated differently as far as the levying of VAT is concerned (see, particularly, Case C‑216/97 Gregg [1999] ECR I-4947, paragraph 20).
| 0 |
863,305 |
48. In that regard, it should be recalled that the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and that the reasoning may therefore be implicit on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6513, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).
|
43. Where a medium allows the consumer to store the information which has been addressed to him personally, ensures that its content is not altered and that the information is accessible for an adequate period, and gives consumers the possibility to reproduce it unchanged, that medium must be regarded as ‘durable’ within the meaning of that provision.
| 0 |
863,306 |
49. It must also be stated that, where an implementing directive requires interpretation, that interpretation must, as far as possible, be consistent with the provisions of the basic directive (see, by analogy, Case C-90/92 Dr Tretter [1993] ECR I‑3569, paragraph 11). In addition, a provision must be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity (Case C-403/99 Italy v Commission [2001] ECR I‑6883, paragraphs 28 and 37).
|
27 In view of the foregoing, the answer to the first question must be that Article 4(1) or (2) of the Birds Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is not authorized to take account of the economic requirements mentioned in Article 2 thereof when designating an SPA and defining its boundaries.
The second question
The first part of the second question
| 0 |
863,307 |
41. En effet, la Cour a déjà jugé, à maintes reprises, que la suppression d’une aide illégale par voie de récupération est la conséquence logique de la constatation de son illégalité, conséquence ne pouvant dépendre de la forme dans laquelle l’aide a été octroyée (voir, en ce sens, arrêts Comitato «Venezia vuole vivere» e.a./Commission, C‑71/09 P, C‑73/09 P et C‑76/09 P, EU:C:2011:368, point 181; Commission/Italie, C‑496/09, EU:C:2011:740, point 87, ainsi que Commission/France, C‑37/14, EU:C:2015:90, point 51).
|
87. The justifications put forward by the Italian Republic in this regard, namely that the delay in complying with the judgment was attributable to internal difficulties connected with the complexity of the measures to be taken to identify the recipients of the unlawful aid in question and recover the aid from them, cannot be accepted. As the Court has repeatedly held, a Member State cannot plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its domestic legal order to justify failure to observe obligations arising under European Union law (see, inter alia, Case C‑568/07 Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I‑4505, paragraph 50), and the elimination of unlawful aid by means of recovery is the logical consequence of the finding that it is unlawful and that consequence cannot depend on the form in which the aid was granted (see, to that effect, Commission v Poland , paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
| 1 |
863,308 |
38
In the third place, as regards recital 17 of Regulation No 561/2006, it suffices to state, first, that while one of the aims of the regulation is indeed to improve the working conditions of employees in the road transport sector (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 October 2013 in Lundberg, C‑317/12, EU:C:2013:631, paragraph 31, and 13 March 2014 in A. Karuse, C‑222/12, EU:C:2014:142, paragraph 29), there is no reason to suppose that the EU legislature intended to free drivers from all liability for the infringements they commit, in particular where the infringements relate exclusively to the performance of their work.
|
20 Apart from the fact that the manufacturer has no contractual relationship with the sub-buyer and undertakes no contractual obligation towards that buyer, whose identity and domicile may, quite reasonably, be unknown to him, it appears that in the great majority of Contracting States the liability of a manufacturer towards a sub-buyer for defects in the goods sold is not regarded as being of a contractual nature.
| 0 |
863,309 |
67. It is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words, figures or mathematical concepts that the author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result, namely the user manual for the computer program, which is an intellectual creation (see, to that effect, Infopaq International , paragraph 45).
|
15 It is worth pointing out that, although it is for the Commission to prove an infringement of the rules of the common organisation of agricultural markets, it is not obliged to demonstrate exhaustively the insufficiency of the checks carried out by national administrations or the irregularity of the figures transmitted by them, but must present evidence of a serious and reasonable doubt with regard to those checks or those figures (see the abovementioned judgments in Greece v Commission, paragraphs 7 and 8, and Netherlands v Commission, paragraphs 39 and 40).
| 0 |
863,310 |
43. In addition, in providing only one example of such cases, that circular does not inform potential acquirers about the specific and objective situations in which a derogation from the residence requirement will be granted or refused. Such vagueness does not enable individuals to become familiar with the extent of their rights and obligations resulting from Article 56 EC, so that a system of that nature must be regarded as being contrary to the principle of legal certainty (see, to that effect, Case C‑483/99 Commission v France [2002] ECR I‑4781, paragraph 50, and Case C‑463/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I‑4581, paragraphs 74 and 75). In any event, it does not appear that that system has taken into account the situation of citizens of the Union who are not resident in Denmark in order to avoid discriminatory application.
|
16 Whilst a period of 60 days so imposed on a litigant is not objectionable per se, the special features of the procedure in question must be emphasized.
| 0 |
863,311 |
125
In any event, it must be stated that the Republic of Poland participated, in accordance with the arrangements laid down in the FEU Treaty, in the legislative procedure which led to the adoption of Directive 2014/40, which is addressed to it in the same way as to the other Member States represented in the Council. Therefore, the Republic of Poland cannot validly complain that the Parliament and the Council, the authors of that directive, did not place it in a position to know the grounds for the choice of measures which they intended to implement (see, to that effect, Estonia v Parliament and Council, C‑508/13, EU:C:2015:403, paragraph 62).
|
37. À cet égard, il résulte de la jurisprudence qu’est recevable le pourvoi formé contre un arrêt du Tribunal en ce que celui-ci a rejeté une exception d’irrecevabilité soulevée par une partie à l’encontre d’un recours, alors que le Tribunal a, dans la suite du même arrêt, rejeté ce recours comme non fondé (arrêts du 26 février 2002, Conseil/Boehringer, C‑23/00 P, Rec. p. I‑1873, point 50, ainsi que du 22 février 2005, Commission/max.mobil, C‑141/02 P, Rec. p. I‑1283, points 50 et 51).
| 0 |
863,312 |
77
It will be recalled that that principle is a general principle of EU law enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. According to settled case-law, that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, judgment of 12 November 2014, Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission, C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363, paragraph 51).
|
23 It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that the applicants' submission that tariff F is sectoral in nature since it applies to certain undertakings, namely Dutch ammonia producers, must be upheld .
The value of the savings accruing to Gasunie from the tariff F contracts
| 0 |
863,313 |
36
The General Court recalled, secondly, in paragraph 28 of the judgment under appeal, that the Court of Justice has held that failure by the Commission to comply with those time limits constituted an infringement of essential procedural requirements which was to be found by the European Union Court of its own motion (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited).
|
26. Those factors are, first, that of the country in which the employee ‘habitually carries out his work’ (Article 6(2)(a)) or, alternatively, if there is no such place, ‘the place of business through which he was engaged’ (Article 6(2)(b)).
| 0 |
863,314 |
108 It is only exceptionally that, in application of a general principle of legal certainty which is inherent in the Community legal order, the Court may decide to restrict the right to rely upon a provision it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relations established in good faith. As the Court has consistently held, such a restriction may be allowed only in the actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation sought (see in particular Case C-35/97 Commission v France [1998] ECR I-5325, paragraph 49).
|
26 There is unequal treatment wherever the overall pay of full-time employees is higher than that of part-time employees for the same number of hours worked on the basis of an employment relationship.
| 0 |
863,315 |
58. So far as concerns the second condition, first of all it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that Directive 93/83 is concerned with a closed communications system, of which the satellite forms the central, essential and irreplaceable element, so that, in the event of malfunction of the satellite, the transmission of signals is technically unfeasible and, as a result, the public receives no broadcast (see, to this effect, Case C-192/04 Lagardère Active Broadcast [2005] ECR I‑7199, paragraph 39).
|
52. Of course, the maker of a database can reserve exclusive access to his database to himself or reserve access to specific people ( The British Horseracing Board and Others , paragraph 55), or make that access subject to specific conditions, for example of a financial nature.
| 0 |
863,316 |
53 First, it must be borne in mind that national rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings must be interpreted, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter (see, inter alia, Marleasing, paragraph 8, and Case C-63/97 Bayerische Motorenwerke (BMW) and BMW Nederland v Deenik [1999] ECR I-905, paragraph 22).
|
73. In those circumstances, it is not inconceivable that, if this field were wholly unregulated, pharmacists would become concentrated in the areas considered to be attractive, so that certain other less attractive areas would suffer from a shortfall in the number of pharmacists needed to ensure a pharmaceutical service which is reliable and of good quality.
| 0 |
863,317 |
43. The Court has, admittedly, held that disturbing the balance and reciprocity of a bilateral international agreement concluded between a Member State and a non-member country may constitute an objective justification for the refusal by a Member State party to that agreement to extend to nationals of other Member States the advantages which its own nationals derive from that agreement (see, inter alia, Case C‑307/97 Saint-Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 60, and Gottardo , paragraph 36).
|
35 Such considerations must, a fortiori, be applicable to Article 48 of the Treaty, which lays down a fundamental freedom and which constitutes a specific application of the general prohibition of discrimination contained in Article 6 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 12 EC). In that respect, like Article 119 of the EC Treaty (Articles 117 to 120 of the EC Treaty have been replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC), it is designed to ensure that there is no discrimination on the labour market.
| 0 |
863,318 |
19. In that regard, the Court has already held that the allocation of a VAT identification number provides proof of the tax status of the taxable person for the purposes of applying VAT and simplifies the inspection of taxable persons with a view to ensuring the correct collection of the tax. Under the transitional arrangements for tax applicable to trade within the European Union, the identification of taxable persons subject to VAT by means of an individual number also facilitates the determination of the Member State in which the final consumption of the goods delivered takes place (see, to that effect, Case C-273/11 Mecsek-Gabona [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 57 and 60, and Case C-587/10 VSTR [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 51).
|
13 QU ' IL RESULTE DE L ' ENSEMBLE DU SYSTEME , ET DU CARACTERE GENERAL ET ABSOLU DE L ' INTERDICTION DE TOUT DROIT DE DOUANE APPLICABLE AUX MARCHANDISES CIRCULANT ENTRE LES ETATS MEMBRES , QUE LES DROITS DE DOUANE SONT INTERDITS INDEPENDAMMENT DE TOUTE CONSIDERATION DU BUT EN VUE DUQUEL ILS ONT ETE INSTITUES , AINSI QUE DE LA DESTINATION DES RECETTES QU ' ILS PROCURENT ;
| 0 |
863,319 |
48. It needs to be verified, first, whether goods such as those at issue in the main proceedings have been subject to importation within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Sixth Directive (Case C‑165/11 Profitube EU:C:2012:692, paragraph 41).
|
23. It is important also to make clear that, according to the Court’s case‑law, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion in relation to tariff classification if it is inherent in the product, and such inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (Case C‑201/99 Deutsche Nichimen [2001] ECR I-2701, paragraph 20, and Krings , cited above, paragraph 30).
| 0 |
863,320 |
53
The same applies in cases in which, although the facts of the main proceedings are outside the direct scope of EU law, the provisions of EU law have been made applicable by national legislation, which, in dealing with situations confined in all respects within a single Member State, follows the same approach as that provided for by EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 1990, Dzodzi, C‑297/88 and C‑197/89, EU:C:1990:360, paragraphs 36, 37 and 41; of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369, paragraphs 27 and 32; and of 14 March 2013, Allianz Hungária Biztositó and Others, C‑32/11, EU:C:2013:160, paragraph 20).
|
34 The contrary view would result in the detailed opinion constituting a conditional formal notice whose existence would be dependent on the action taken by the Member State concerned in relation to the opinion. The requirements of legal certainty, which are inherent in any procedure capable of becoming contentious, preclude such incertitude (Commission v Netherlands, paragraph 20).
| 0 |
863,321 |
58. While it follows from that case-law that the " provision of medical care" must have a therapeutic aim, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that the therapeutic purpose of a service must be confined within an especially narrow compass (see, to that effect, Commission v France , paragraph 23). Paragraph 40 of the judgment in Kügler shows that medical services effected for prophylactic purposes may benefit from the exemption under Article 13A(1)(c). Even in cases where it is clear that the persons who are the subject of examinations or other medical interventions of a prophylactic nature are not suffering from any disease or health disorder, the inclusion of those services within the meaning of " provision of medical care" is consistent with the objective of reducing the cost of health care, which is common to both the exemption under Article 13A(1)(b) and that under (c) of that paragraph (see Commission v France , paragraph 23, and Kügler , paragraph 29).
|
30. In those circumstances, it is necessary to apply the sanction provided for under Article 11(1)(a) of Regulation No 3665/87, unless one of the exceptions as exhaustively defined in the third subparagraph of Article 11(1) applies.
| 0 |
863,322 |
35
In that connection, the Court has already held that the Visa Code governs the conditions for issuing, annulling and revoking uniform visas and, therefore, the competent authorities of the Member States cannot refuse to issue a uniform visa by relying on a ground not provided for in that code (judgment of 19 December 2013, Koushkaki, C‑84/12, EU:C:2013:862, paragraphs 47 and 51).
|
21. In its case-law relating to the Brussels Convention, the Court has thus held that an action is related to bankruptcy if it derives directly from the bankruptcy and is closely linked to proceedings for realising the assets or judicial supervision (see Gourdain , paragraph 4). An action with such characteristics does not, therefore, fall within the scope of that convention.
| 0 |
863,323 |
37. Accordingly, Regulation No 1408/71 continues to apply only to the extent that the bilateral conventions concluded before its entry into force do not impede its application (see, to that effect, Case 28/68 Torrekens [1969] ECR 125, paragraphs 19 to 21). However, an EU law provision which, like Article 7(2) of that regulation, gives precedence to the application of a bilateral convention, cannot have a purport that conflicts with the principles underlying the legislation of which it is part (see, by analogy, Case C‑533/08 TNT Express Nederland [2010] ECR I‑4107, paragraph 51).
|
40. Dans cette perspective, il convient de tenir compte du fait que, s’agissant de vérifier l’application correcte, en pratique, des dispositions nationales destinées à assurer la mise en œuvre effective des directives, dont celles adoptées dans le domaine de l’environnement, la Commission, qui ne dispose pas de pouvoirs propres d’investigation en la matière, est largement tributaire des éléments fournis par d’éventuels plaignants, des organismes privés ou publics actifs sur le territoire de l’État membre concerné ainsi que par ledit État membre lui-même (arrêt Commission/Italie, C‑135/05, EU:C:2007:250, point 28 et jurisprudence citée). De même, tout document officiel émis par les autorités de l’État membre concerné peut être considéré comme une source valable d’informations aux fins de l’engagement, par la Commission, de la procédure visée à l’article 258 TFUE (Commission/Grèce, C‑677/13, EU:C:2014:2433, point 66 et jurisprudence citée).
| 0 |
863,324 |
53. By contrast, although the aim of Directive 2004/38 is to facilitate and strengthen the exercise of the primary and individual right – conferred directly on all Union citizens by the Treaty – to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (see Case C‑127/08 Metock and Others [2008] ECR I‑6241, paragraphs 82 and 59; Case C‑162/09 Lassal [2010] ECR I‑9217, paragraph 30; and Case C‑434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I‑3375, paragraph 28), it is also intended, as is apparent from Article 1(a) thereof, to set out the conditions governing the exercise of that right (see, to that effect, McCarthy , paragraph 33, and Joined Cases C‑424/10 and C‑425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 36 and 40), which include, where residence is desired for a period of longer than three months, the condition laid down in Article 7(1)(b) of the directive that Union citizens who do not or no longer have worker status must have sufficient resources.
|
28. Moreover, since the reduced rate is the exception, the restriction of its application to concrete and specific aspects, such as the standing charge conferring entitlement to a minimum quantity of electricity on the account holders, is consistent with the principle that exemptions or derogations must be interpreted restrictively.
| 0 |
863,325 |
84. By comparison with the points of fact referred to by the Court at paragraphs 38 to 53 of the judgment in Commission v France , cited above, it should be noted, first, that the demonstration at issue in the main proceedings took place following a request for authorisation presented on the basis of national law and after the competent authorities had decided not to ban it.
|
54. It must be observed in that regard that, as the Commission noted in its explanatory brochure relating to Regulation No 1400/2002, that regulation introduced substantial amendments to the block exemption scheme established under Regulation No 1475/95, by laying down more stringent rules than those under the latter regulation for exemption from a number of restrictions on competition subject to the prohibition laid down under Article 81(1) EC.
| 0 |
863,326 |
51. Furthermore, although that court has explained, in general terms, how the system of recruitment vouchers at issue in the main proceedings operates, the absence of specific information as to whether or not an advantage exists and the effect of that system on trade between Member States does not allow it to be determined whether it complies with the Community rules relating to State aid (see, to that effect, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraphs 58 to 62, and order in Case C-190/02 Viacom [2002] ECR I‑8287, paragraph 21).
|
22 DANS CES CONDITIONS , IL FAUT CONCLURE QUE LE REGIME DE PENSIONS D ' ENTREPRISE VISE DANS LE LITIGE PRINCIPAL NE CONSTITUE PAS UN REGIME DE SECURITE SOCIALE DIRECTEMENT REGLE PAR LA LOI ET SOUSTRAIT , DE CE FAIT , AU CHAMP D ' APPLICATION DE L ' ARTICLE 119 , ET QUE LES PRESTATIONS SERVIES AUX EMPLOYES EN VERTU DU REGIME LITIGIEUX CONSTITUENT UN AVANTAGE PAYE PAR L ' EMPLOYEUR AU TRAVAILLEUR EN RAISON DE L ' EMPLOI DE CE DERNIER , AU SENS DE L ' ARTICLE 119 , ALINEA 2 .
| 0 |
863,327 |
13. It must be pointed out directly that although the French version of Article 57 suggests that adaptations thereunder must be made prior to accession – ‘avant l’adhésion’ – that temporal restriction is not in fact, as is clear from the other language versions of that provision, placed on recourse to Article 57 but on the date of the acts to be amended (see, to that effect, in respect of the identical provision in the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (OJ 1994 C 241, p. 21, hereinafter ‘the 1994 Act of Accession’), Case C‑259/95 Parliament v Council [1997] ECR I‑5303, paragraphs 12 to 22).
|
27
The freedom to conduct a business includes, inter alia, the right for any business to be able to freely use, within the limits of its liability for its own acts, the economic, technical and financial resources available to it (judgment of 27 March 2014 in UPC Telekabel Wien, C‑314/12, EU:C:2014:192, paragraph 49).
| 0 |
863,328 |
45. In that regard, it should be recalled that, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling. The presumption that questions referred by national courts for a preliminary ruling are relevant may be rebutted only in exceptional cases, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgments in Åkerberg Fransson , EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 39 and 40, and B. , C‑394/13, EU:C:2014:2199, paragraph 19).
|
23 It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that the applicants' submission that tariff F is sectoral in nature since it applies to certain undertakings, namely Dutch ammonia producers, must be upheld .
The value of the savings accruing to Gasunie from the tariff F contracts
| 0 |
863,329 |
33. Recourse to that provision is also possible if the aim is to prevent the emergence of such obstacles to trade resulting from the divergent development of national laws. However, the emergence of such obstacles must be likely and the measure in question must be designed to prevent them ( Germany v Parliament and Council , paragraph 38 and the case-law cited, and Case C‑301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-593, paragraph 64; see also, to that effect, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council , paragraphs 60 to 64).
|
61. Aux fins de statuer sur le bien-fondé du recours de la Commission, il importe de rappeler, à titre liminaire, que l’existence des restrictions à la liberté d’établissement ainsi qu’à la libre prestation des services visées respectivement aux articles 49 TFUE et 56 TFUE sont constituées par des mesures qui interdisent, gênent ou rendent moins attrayant l’exercice de ces libertés (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 29 mars 2011, Commission/Italie, C-565/08, non encore publié au Recueil, point 45 et jurisprudence citée).
| 0 |
863,330 |
65. It must be observed in that regard that the obligation to state reasons constitutes an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question of the merits of those reasons, which concern the substantive legality of the contested measure. The Court has consistently held that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be adapted to the nature of the measure in question and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction (see, inter alia, Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission [1985] ECR 809, paragraph 19, Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraph 15, Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR I-723, paragraph 86 and Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63).
|
47. Consequently, the beneficiary of the aid is able, during that period, to keep funds deriving from the aid declared incompatible and to benefit from the resulting unfair competitive advantage.
| 0 |
863,331 |
43. Thus, an effect on intra-Community trade is normally the result of a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily decisive (see Bagnasco and Others , cited above, paragraph 47, and Case C-359/01 P British Sugar v Commission [2004] ECR I‑4933, paragraph 27).
|
46
Those various aspects of a textual nature confirm that the term ‘arrest warrant’, as used in Article 8(1)(c) of the Framework Decision, refers only to the national arrest warrant, which is to be understood as the judicial decision on which the European arrest warrant is based.
| 0 |
863,332 |
26. Furthermore, it is irrelevant that those balloons can also be used as festive articles. If the objective characteristic of a product can be established at the time of customs clearance, the fact that it may also be possible to envisage another use for that product will not preclude its classification for legal purposes. For its classification for customs purposes, that product does not have to be solely or exclusively intended for use corresponding to that objective characteristic. It suffices if that is the main use for which it is intended (see, to that effect, Case C‑395/93 Neckermann Versand [1994] ECR I‑4027, paragraphs 8 and 9).
|
73. According to settled case-law, the rule of special jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of that regulation is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings (judgment in CDC Hydrogen Peroxide , C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
| 0 |
863,333 |
38. However, it must be observed that, although that classification is a necessary condition for the issuance of a supplementary protection certificate, it is not sufficient in that respect: the four cumulative conditions listed in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1610/96 must be fulfilled. That provision states, essentially, that a supplementary protection certificate cannot be issued unless, at the date of the application, the product is protected by a basic patent in force and has not already been the subject of a certificate. It is also necessary for that product to have obtained a valid MA ‘in accordance with Article 4 of Directive [91/414] or an equivalent provision of national law’, that MA being, lastly, the first authorisation of the product as a plant protection product (see, to that effect, Hogan Lovells International , EU:C:2010:673, paragraph 51).
|
120 That is why the Member States must introduce adequate inspection procedures in order to check whether the storage costs eligible for reimbursement have actually been incurred. The absence of such procedures, or deficiencies therein, could allow certain traders to obtain reimbursement for fictitious costs, which would obviously lead to distortions of competition, to the detriment in particular of traders in other Member States where the control system does conform to the requirements of the Community rules.
| 0 |
863,334 |
44. It is thus clear from the case-law that, whatever the mechanism adopted for preventing or mitigating the imposition of a series of charges to tax or economic double taxation, the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty preclude a Member State from treating foreign-sourced dividends less favourably than nationally-sourced dividends, unless such a difference in treatment concerns situations which are not objectively comparable or is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest (see, to that effect, Case C‑315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I‑7063, paragraphs 20 to 49; Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraphs 20 to 55; and Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 46).
|
34. In that regard, it must be noted that, in assessing whether the condition of honest practice is satisfied, account must be taken first of the extent to which the use of the third party’s name is understood by the relevant public, or at least a significant section of that public, as indicating a link between the third party’s goods or services and the trade-mark proprietor or a person authorised to use the trade mark, and secondly of the extent to which the third party ought to have been aware of that. Another factor to be taken into account when making the assessment is whether the trade mark concerned enjoys a certain reputation in the Member State in which it is registered and its protection is sought, from which the third party might profit in marketing his goods or services ( Anheuser-Busch , paragraph 83).
| 0 |
863,335 |
9 Next it should be recalled that the Court has consistently held that an undertaking having a statutory monopoly over a substantial part of the common market may be regarded as having a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty (see the judgments in Case C-179/90 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889 at paragraph 14 and in Case C-18/88 RTT v GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-5941 at paragraph 17).
|
20 BY AUTOMATICALLY INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF NATIONAL AID IN PROPORTION TO THE INCREASE IN THE REVENUE FROM THE CHARGE AND MORE ESPECIALLY THE REVENUE FROM THE CHARGE LEVIED ON COMPETING FOREIGN PRODUCTS, THE METHOD OF FINANCING IN QUESTION HAS A PROTECTIVE EFFECT WHICH GOES BEYOND AID PROPERLY SO-CALLED .
| 0 |
863,336 |
57. In those circumstances, a provision such as that at issue results as a matter of fact in discrimination against female workers by comparison with male workers and must in principle be treated as contrary to Articles 2(1) and 5(1) of Directive 76/207. It would be otherwise only if the difference of treatment found to exist between the two categories of worker were justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination based on sex (see, in that regard, Case 171/88 Rinner-Kühn [1989] ECR 2743, paragraph 12; Case C-457/93 Lewark [1996] ECR I-243, paragraph 31; Hill and Stapleton , paragraph 34; Case C-226/98 Jørgensen [2000] ECR I-2447, paragraph 29, and Kutz-Bauer , cited above, paragraph 50).
|
10 Following the judgment in Stoeckel, cited above, the Italian Republic denounced the Convention in February 1992, with effect from February 1993.
| 0 |
863,337 |
33. The rules established thus come within the scope of Article 141 EC and Directive 75/117 (see by way of analogy, in respect of a system for acquiring entitlement to a higher salary on the basis of rules on seniority, Case C‑184/89 Nimz [1991] ECR I‑297, paragraphs 9 and 10).
|
65. Furthermore, the Court has already held that encouragement of recruitment undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate aim of social policy (see, in particular, Case C‑208/05 [2007] ECR I‑181, paragraph 39) and that assessment must evidently apply to instruments of national employment policy designed to improve opportunities for entering the labour market for certain categories of workers.
| 0 |
863,338 |
65. On the other hand, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, interest received by a holding company in consideration of loans granted to companies in which it has shareholdings cannot be excluded from the scope of VAT, since that interest does not arise from the simple ownership of the asset, but is the consideration for making capital available for the benefit of a third party (see, to that effect, Régie dauphinoise , paragraph 17).
|
38 Under the first sentence of Article 5(1) of the Directive, the registered trade mark confers exclusive rights on its proprietor. Under Article 5(1)(a), that exclusive right entitles the proprietor to prevent all third parties, acting without his consent, from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical to the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical to those for which the trade mark is registered. Article 5(3) gives a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of use which the proprietor may prohibit under Article 5(1). Other provisions of the Directive, such as Article 6, define certain limitations on the effects of a trade mark.
| 0 |
863,339 |
73. It is not in dispute that, by the Exchange of Notes of 29 January and 13 March 1992, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America added to the 1957 Agreement an annex concerning the principles relating to CRSs, including those applying to CRSs offered for use or used on Netherlands territory. The Kingdom of the Netherlands maintained that annex in force despite the renegotiation of the 1957 Agreement which led to the Exchange of Notes of October 1992. By acting in that way, that Member State infringed the exclusive external competence of the Community arising from Regulation No 2299/89 (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark , paragraphs 102 to 104; Commission v Sweden , paragraphs 98 to 100; Commission v Finland , paragraphs 103 to 105; Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 115 to 117; Commission v Luxembourg , paragraphs 108 to 110; Commission v Austria , paragraphs 117 to 119, and Commission v Germany , paragraphs 128 to 130).
|
49 According to settled case-law, wherever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with the directive (see Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 25; Case C-134/99 IGI [2000] ECR I-7717, paragraph 36).
| 0 |
863,340 |
85 Second, it must be borne in mind that according to settled case-law the definition of `worker' in Article 1(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 `for the purpose of this regulation' is of general scope and in the light of that consideration covers any person who has the status of a person insured under the social security legislation of one or more Member States, whether or not he pursues a professional or trade activity (see Case 182/78 Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Plattenland v Pierik [1979] ECR 1977, paragraph 4). That expression means any person who is insured under one of the social security schemes mentioned in Article 1(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 for the contingencies and under the conditions mentioned in that provision (see Case C-2/89 Kits van Heijningen [1990] ECR I-1755, paragraph 9).
|
91 Since the reasons stated must be sufficiently precise and detailed to enable the Court of First Instance effectively to review the Commission's use of its discretion to define priorities (Case C-19/93 P Rendo and Others v Commission [1995] ECR I-3319, paragraph 27), the Commission must set out the facts justifying the decision and the legal considerations on the basis of which it was adopted (BAT and Reynolds, paragraph 72, and Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission [1984] ECR 19, paragraph 22).
| 0 |
863,341 |
54. It is settled case-law that the place where the damage occurred is the place where the event which may give rise to liability in tort, delict or quasi-delict resulted in damage (see Case C‑189/08 Zuid-Chemie EU:C:2009:475, paragraph 26).
|
85. À cet égard, il y a lieu de rappeler que, dans le cadre du contrôle de légalité visé à l’article 263 TFUE, la Cour et le Tribunal sont compétents pour se prononcer sur les recours pour incompétence, violation des formes substantielles, violation du traité ou de toute règle de droit relative à son application, ou détournement de pouvoir. L’article 264 TFUE prévoit que, si le recours est fondé, l’acte contesté est déclaré nul et non avenu. La Cour et le Tribunal ne peuvent donc, en toute hypothèse, substituer leur propre motivation à celle de l’auteur de l’acte attaqué (voir arrêts du 27 janvier 2000, DIR International Film e.a./Commission, C‑164/98 P, Rec. p. I-447, point 38, ainsi que du 22 décembre 2008, British Aggregates/Commission, C‑487/06 P, Rec. p. I‑10515, point 141).
| 0 |
863,342 |
55 As the Court pointed out in paragraph 8 of its judgment in Commission v Italy, while Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty, on the one hand, and Article 95 of the Treaty, on the other, pursue the same objective, namely to ensure that the two categories of intervention on the part of a Member State, that is to say, the grant of aid, on the one hand, and the imposition of discriminatory taxation, on the other, do not distort the conditions of competition within the common market, the application of those provisions presupposes distinct conditions peculiar to the two kinds of State measure which they are intended to govern and they differ, furthermore, as to their legal consequences, particularly inasmuch as in the implementation of Articles 92 and 93, unlike Article 95, the intervention of the Commission plays a large part. From this the Court concluded that discriminatory taxation practices are not exempted from the application of Article 95 by reason of the fact that they may at the same time be described as a means of financing State aid (see Commission v Italy, paragraph 9, and Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz [1982] ECR 1331, paragraph 22).
|
44. Dès lors, le Tribunal n’a pas commis d’erreur de droit en jugeant, au point 132 de l’arrêt attaqué, s’agissant de l’argument tiré de ce que Bolloré n’aurait pas eu à répondre, dans la première procédure administrative, des agissements de Copigraph, que, en raison de l’unité économique formée par ces sociétés, ces agissements étaient tout autant ceux de Bolloré, cette dernière étant mise en cause pour une infraction qu’elle était censée avoir commise elle-même. En effet, par cette constatation, le Tribunal confirmait l’imputabilité de l’infraction à Bolloré en raison de sa responsabilité, en tant que société détentrice de 100 % du capital de Copigraph, pour la participation de cette dernière à l’entente.
| 0 |
863,343 |
17. It should be recalled at the outset that, in order to be capable of constituting a trade mark for the purposes of Article 2 of Directive 2008/95, the subject-matter of any application for registration must satisfy three conditions. First, it must be a sign. Secondly, that sign must be capable of graphic representation. Thirdly, the sign must be capable of distinguishing the ‘goods’ or ‘services’ of one undertaking from those of other undertakings (see, as regards Article 2 of Directive 89/104, Libertel , C‑104/01, EU:C:2003:244, paragraph 23; Heidelberger Bauchemie , C‑49/02, EU:C:2004:384, paragraph 22; and, Dyson , C‑321/03, EU:C:2007:51, paragraph 28).
|
59
Furthermore, it should be added that Regulation No 650/2012 provides for the creation of a certificate which must allow every heir, legatee or entitled person mentioned in the certificate to prove in another Member State his status and rights and, in particular, to demonstrate the attribution of a specific asset to the legatee mentioned in that certificate.
| 0 |
863,344 |
30. The scope of Article 141(1) EC covers not only direct but also indirect discrimination (see, to that effect, Jenkins , paragraphs 14 and 15, and Case C‑285/02 Elsner-Lakeberg [2004] ECR I-5861, paragraph 12).
|
62. The prevention of and the combating of money laundering and terrorist financing are legitimate aims which the Member States have endorsed both at the international and European Union levels.
| 0 |
863,345 |
47 Next, as regards the question whether, as Mr El-Yassini claims, the Court's case-law concerning the rules governing the EEC-Turkey association should be applied, by analogy, to the present case, it must be noted that, according to settled case-law, an international treaty is to be interpreted not solely by reference to the terms in which it is worded but also in the light of its objectives. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties provides in that respect that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paragraph 14, and Case C-312/91 Metalsa [1993] ECR I-3751, paragraph 12).
|
11 IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE RE-PACKAGING IN FACT INVOLVES NO RISK OF EXPOSING THE PRODUCT TO INTERFERENCE OR INFLUENCES WHICH MIGHT AFFECT ITS ORIGINAL CONDITION AND THE CONSUMER OR FINAL USER OF THE PRODUCT IS NOT LIABLE TO BE MISLED AS TO THE ORIGIN OF THE PRODUCT , ABOVE ALL WHERE , AS IN THIS CASE , THE PARALLEL IMPORTER HAS CLEARLY INDICATED ON THE EXTERNAL WRAPPING THAT THE PRODUCT WAS MANUFACTURED BY A SUBSIDIARY OF THE PROPRIETOR OF THE TRADE MARK AND HAS BEEN RE-PACKAGED BY THE IMPORTER .
| 0 |
863,346 |
34. As the Court has consistently held, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or wh ere it has failed to implement the directive correctly (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 11, and Case C-62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I-6325, paragraph 25).
|
230THE MECHANISMS OF THE MARKET ARE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IF THE PRICE IS CALCULATED BY LEAVING OUT ONE STAGE OF THE MARKET AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE LAW OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND AS BETWEEN THE VENDOR AND THE ULTIMATE CONSUMER AND NOT AS BETWEEN THE VENDOR ( UBC ) AND THE PURCHASER ( THE RIPENER/DISTRIBUTORS ).
| 0 |
863,347 |
39. Recourse to Article 95 EC as a legal basis is also possible if the aim is to prevent the emergence of obstacles to trade resulting from heterogeneous development of national laws; the emergence of such obstacles must, however, be likely and the measure in question must be designed to prevent them (see, to that effect, Spain v Council , paragraph 35; Germany v Parliament and Council , paragraph 86; Netherlands v Parliament and Council , paragraph 15; and British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , paragraph 61).
|
60. The presumption of relevance enjoyed by references for a preliminary ruling has not therefore been rebutted by the objections raised by the Commission (see by analogy, inter alia, van der Weerd and Others , paragraphs 22 and 23).
| 0 |
863,348 |
32. Moreover, the Court has already held that the method by which a benefit is financed is immaterial for the purposes of its classification as a social security benefit, as is clear from the fact that under Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1408/71 non-contributory benefits are not excluded from the scope of that regulation (see Hughes , paragraph 21). Similarly, the Court has made it clear that the legal mechanism by which the Member State implements the benefit has no bearing on the question of whether that measure is to be classified as a social security benefit (see, to that effect, Case C‑85/99 Offermanns [2001] ECR I‑2261, paragraph 46).
|
14 It should be observed that it is settled law that the question whether a Member State had failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-435/99 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I-11179, paragraph 16, and Case C-111/00 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-7555, paragraph 13).
| 0 |
863,349 |
67 Nevertheless, the difference in wording between Article 87(3)(a) EC and Article 87(3)(c) EC cannot lead to the conclusion that the Commission should take no account of the Community interest when applying Article 87(3)(a), and that it must confine itself to verifying the specifically regional impact of the measures involved, without assessing their impact on the relevant market or markets in the Community as a whole. In such cases the Commission is bound not only to verify that the measures are such as to contribute effectively to the economic development of the regions concerned, but also to evaluate the impact of the aid on trade between Member States, and in particular to assess the sectorial repercussions they may have at Community level. As the Court has already held, Article 87(3) EC gives the Commission a discretion the exercise of which involves economic and social assessments which must be made in a Community context (see, inter alia, Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paragraph 24; Case 310/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] ECR 901, paragraph 18; and Spain v Commission, cited above, paragraph 18).
|
47. In addition, within the banking sector it benefits only undertakings which carry out the operations referred to.
| 0 |
863,350 |
22
It is settled case-law that the third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48, like Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29 to which it refers, obliges Member States to ensure that an intermediary whose services are used by a third party in order to infringe an intellectual property right may, regardless of any liability of its own in relation to the facts at issue, be ordered to take measures aimed at bringing those infringements to an end and measures seeking to prevent further infringements (see to that effect, in particular, judgments of 12 July 2011 in L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraphs 127 to 134, and 24 November 2011 in Scarlet Extended, C‑70/10, EU:C:2011:771, paragraphs 30 and 31).
|
53. S’agissant des lignes directrices, le Tribunal a, au point 82 de l’arrêt attaqué, tenu à rappeler à juste titre que la Cour a considéré, d’une part, que celles-ci énoncent une règle de conduite dont la Commission ne saurait se départir sous peine de se voir sanctionnée au titre d’une violation des principes généraux du droit, tels que l’égalité de traitement et la protection de la confiance légitime, et, d’autre part, qu’elles assurent la sécurité juridique des entreprises concernées en déterminant la méthodologie que la Commission s’est imposée aux fins de la fixation du montant des amendes infligées en vertu de l’article 15, paragraphe 2, du règlement nº 17.
| 0 |
863,351 |
32. However, the Court has already held that new specific measures, derogating from the Sixth Directive, do not accord with European Union law unless they remain within the limits of the objectives referred to in Article 27(1) of that directive and have also been notified to the Commission and impliedly or expressly authorised by the Council in the circumstances specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Article 27 (Case C‑5/84 Direct Cosmetics [1985] ECR I‑617, paragraph 24, and Case C‑62/93 BP Soupergaz [1995] ECR I‑1883, paragraph 22). Moreover, a Member State may not rely, as against a taxable person, on a provision derogating from the scheme of the Sixth Directive and enacted in breach of the duty of notification imposed by Article 27(2) of that directive without infringing the Treaty establishing the European Community (now the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) (see, to that effect, Direct Cosmetics , paragraph 37, and Case C‑494/04 Heintz van Landewijck [2006] ECR I‑5381, paragraph 48).
|
41 A fortiori, the same reasoning must apply to determination of the scope of the prohibition of charges having equivalent effect contained in the regulations providing for common organization of the agricultural markets which govern trade with non-member countries (see, for example, Case 43/71 Politi v Italy [1971] ECR 1039, paragraph 7).
| 0 |
863,352 |
42. As regards, in the second place, whether the essential aim of a transaction is solely to obtain that tax advantage, the Court has already held in the sphere of VAT that, where the taxable person has a choice between two transactions, he is not obliged to choose the one which involves paying the higher amount of VAT but, on the contrary, may choose to structure his business so as to limit his tax liability (see, inter alia, judgments in Halifax and Others , C‑255/02, EU:C:2006:121, paragraph 73; Part Service , C‑425/06, EU:C:2008:108, paragraph 47; and Weald Leasing , C‑103/09, EU:C:2010:804, paragraph 27). Taxable persons are thus generally free to choose the organisational structures and the form of transactions which they consider to be most appropriate for their economic activities and for the purpose of limiting their tax burdens (judgment in RBS Deutschland Holdings , C‑277/09, EU:C:2010:810, paragraph 53).
|
47 According to the consistent case-law of the Court, the principle of State liability for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 31, and Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 20).
| 0 |
863,353 |
17 In any event, as the Court has emphasized on several occasions, a Member State may not make the provision of services in its territory subject to compliance with all the conditions required for establishment and thereby deprive of all practical effectiveness the provisions whose object is to guarantee the freedom to provide services (see the judgments in Case C-154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-659, paragraph 12, and in Case C-76/90 Saeger, cited above, paragraph 13).
|
42 Thus the Court has held that, with regard to decisions adopted for the purpose of ensuring observance of the competition rules, in which the Commission finds that there has been an infringement of those rules, issues directions to undertakings and imposes pecuniary penalties upon them, that the undertakings or associations of undertakings addressed by such decisions must be assured that the operative part and the statement of reasons were actually adopted by the college of Commissioners (see, to that effect, Commission v BASF and Others, cited above, paragraphs 65 to 67).
| 0 |
863,354 |
81
Thus, it is following a schematic interpretation of the relevant EU rules that the Court of Justice interpreted those rules as meaning that, as from 2000, the Commission is required to comply with a legal time limit when adopting a decision on financial corrections (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 56 to 82, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 56 to 82).
|
43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC.
| 0 |
863,355 |
41. The TRIPs Agreement was concluded by the Community and its Member States by virtue of shared competence (Joined Cases C‑300/98 and C‑392/98 Dior and Others [2000] ECR I‑11307, paragraph 33, and Case C‑431/05 Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos [2007] ECR I‑7001, paragraph 33). In those circumstances, the parties to the main proceedings and the governments which have submitted observations argue that, in order to answer the first question, it must be examined whether, at the present stage of development of the law, the European Union has exercised its powers in the field of patents, or, more precisely, of patentability.
|
40 The tenor and scope of that concept thus clearly cannot differ depending whether it is used in Annex I or Annex II of the Directive.
| 0 |
863,356 |
41. Finally, contrary to the Commission’s submissions, it is clear from the Court’s settled case-law that the tax legislation of the Member States is capable of falling within Article 64(1) TFEU (see, inter alia, judgments in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , C‑446/04, EU:C:2006:774, paragraphs 174 to 196; Holböck , C‑157/05, EU:C:2007:297, paragraphs 37 to 45; and Prunus and Polonium , C‑384/09, EU:C:2011:276, paragraphs 27 to 37).
|
21. The likelihood of confusion must in particular be assessed by reference to the perception of the relevant public, which consists of average consumers of the products or services in question, who are reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, to that effect, judgment in Henkel v OHIM , C‑456/01 P and C‑457/01 P, EU:C:2004:258, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
| 0 |
863,357 |
28. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that the Court has consistently held that Article 49 EC requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against service providers who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction on the freedom to provide services, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of service providers from other Member States who lawfully provide similar services in their Member State of origin (see, to that effect, Case C‑76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I‑4221, paragraph 12; Case C‑279/00 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I‑1425, paragraph 31; Case C‑131/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I‑1659, paragraph 26; Case C‑244/04 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I‑885, paragraph 30; and Case C‑255/04 Commission v France [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37).
|
32 As regards the right to receive benefits additional to a retirement pension under an occupational scheme such as that involved in the main proceedings, the Court finds that, even if the persons concerned have always been entitled to a retirement pension under the Superannuation Scheme, nevertheless they were not fully admitted to that contributory scheme. Solely on account of the fact that they worked part-time, they were specifically excluded from MHO status which gives access to a special scheme under the Superannuation Scheme.
| 0 |
863,358 |
18. Article 13A of the Sixth Directive relates to the exemption from VAT of certain activities in the public interest. That exemption does not cover every activity performed in the public interest, but only those which are listed in that provision and described in great detail (Case C‑401/05 VDP Dental Laboratory [2006] ECR I‑12121, paragraph 24, and Horizon College , paragraph 14).
|
23 Nevertheless, the resumption of milk production by that category of producers was envisaged only inasmuch as excluding them had constituted a breach of their legitimate expectation of being able to resume deliveries once their non-marketing or conversion undertaking had come to an end (Mulder and Von Deetzen, paragraphs 26 and 15 respectively).
| 0 |
863,359 |
70. In that regard, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, inter alia, judgments in Case C‑114/00 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I‑7657, paragraphs 62 and 63, and Case C‑301/96 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 87).
|
80. However, it is apparent from paragraphs 75 and 76 above that, in the cases in the main proceedings, the duty became chargeable as soon as the goods went beyond the area in which the first customs office inside the customs territory of the Community is situated.
| 0 |
863,360 |
22. With regard, more specifically, to the admissibility of the fourth question, it must be noted that, admittedly, the possibility for a litigant to plead before the court hearing its action the invalidity of provisions in European Union acts presupposes that the party in question had no right of direct action under Article 263 TFEU by which it could challenge provisions the consequences of which it is suffering without having been able to seek their annulment (see TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf , paragraph 23, and Case C‑550/09 E and F [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 45 and 46).
|
46. The recognition of that right presupposes, however, that the party in question had no right of direct action under Article 263 TFEU by which it could challenge provisions, the consequences of which it is suffering without having been able to seek their annulment (see, to that effect, Ca se C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf [1994] ECR I‑833, paragraph 23, and Nachi Europe , paragraph 36).
| 1 |
863,361 |
25
The objective of the margin scheme, as is clear from recital 51 of the VAT Directive, is to avoid double taxation and distortions of competition between taxable persons in the area of second-hand goods, works of art, collectors’ items or antiques (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 March 2011, Auto Nikolovi, C‑203/10, EU:C:2011:118, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
|
43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC.
| 0 |
863,362 |
15 It should be pointed out at the outset that the periods for lodging complaints and bringing actions referred to in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations are matters of public policy and cannot be left to the discretion of the parties or the Court, which must ascertain, of its own motion if need be, whether they have been complied with. Those periods meet the requirement of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (see, in particular, Case 79/70 Müllers v Economic and Social Committee [1971] ECR 689, paragraph 18, and Case 276/85 Cladakis v Commission [1987] ECR 495, paragraph 11).
|
36. It should be added that that interpretation does not call into question the responsibility of the Hellenic Republic for the content of teaching and the organisation of the education system.
| 0 |
863,363 |
46
In that context, it should also be pointed out that the Court has held that the deduction system is intended to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all its economic activities (see, inter alia, judgments of 22 October 2015, Sveda, C‑126/14, EU:C:2015:712, paragraph 17, and of 14 June 2017, Compass Contract Services, C‑38/16, EU:C:2017:454, paragraph 34). In order to achieve the objectives pursued by that system, it is not necessary to lay down an obligation to indicate the address where the issuer of the invoice carries out its economic activity.
|
44. Information, before concluding a contract, on the terms of the contract and the consequences of concluding it is of fundamental importance for a consumer. It is on the basis of that information in particular that he decides whether he wishes to be bound by the terms previously drawn up by the seller or supplier.
| 0 |
863,364 |
48
Furthermore, the assessment referred to in that provision is subject to the same requirements as those deriving from the Court’s case-law where it concerns the existence of a real risk for public health, alleged by a Member State to justify a measure prohibiting the marketing of a food supplement in accordance with Article 36 TFEU. In that regard, the Court has in particular held that the existence of such a risk must be shown in each case in the light of national nutritional habits and in the light of the results of international scientific research (see judgments of 23 September 2003, Commission v Denmark, C‑192/01, EU:C:2003:492, paragraph 46; of 5 February 2004, Commission v France, C‑24/00, EU:C:2004:70, paragraph 53; and of 29 April 2010, Solgar Vitamin’s France and Others, C‑446/08, EU:C:2010:233, paragraph 55).
|
66IN GENERAL A DOMINANT POSITION DERIVES FROM A COMBINATION OF SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH , TAKEN SEPARATELY , ARE NOT NECESSARILY DETERMINATIVE .
| 0 |
863,365 |
75. As regards, in that respect, InnoLux’s argument that taking those sales into account in order to calculate the fine imposed for breach of Article 101 TFEU is likely to result in the same anti-competitive conduct giving rise to concurrent penalties imposed by the competition authorities of a non-member State, it must be pointed out that, contrary to the Commission’s contentions, that claim is admissible at the appeal stage in the light of Article 170(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, since it does not change the subject-matter of the proceedings. However, it must be borne in mind that, as the Court has held, neither the principle non bis in idem nor any other principle of law obliges the Commission to take account of proceedings and penalties to which the undertaking has been subject in non-member States (see judgments in Showa Denko v Commission , C‑289/04 P, EU:C:2006:431, paragraphs 52 to 58; SGL Carbon v Commission , C‑308/04 P, EU:C:2006:433, paragraphs 28 to 34; and SGL Carbon v Commission , C‑328/05 P, EU:C:2007:277, paragraphs 24 to 35).
|
43. Accordingly, the Austrian legislation must be regarded as having existed on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC.
| 0 |
863,366 |
46 As the Court has held in its case-law concerning actions for annulment, the legality of a measure must be assessed on the basis of the factual and legal situation which existed at the time when it was adopted (judgment in Joined Cases 15/76 and 16/76 France v Commission [1979] ECR 321, paragraph 7). By analogy, the assessment of the validity of a measure which the Court is called upon to undertake on a reference for a preliminary ruling must normally be based on the situation which existed at the time that measure was adopted.
|
20 The position would be different only if the Court were called on to give a ruling on a problem of a hypothetical nature (see Case 244/80 Foglia [1981] ECR 3045, paragraphs 18 and 20, and Meilicke, cited above, paragraph 25).
| 0 |
863,367 |
131. With regard to pensions, it must be noted that, according to the settled case-law of the Court in relation to Article 119 of the Treaty, or, with effect from 1 May 1999, in relation to Article 141 EC, which concern the principle of equal treatment of men and women in relation to pay, the term ‘pay’ within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 141(2) EC covers pensions which depend on the employment relationship between worker and employer, excluding those deriving from a statutory scheme, to the financing of which workers, employers and possibly the public authorities contribute in a measure determined less by the employment relationship than by considerations of social policy (see, in particular, Case 80/70 Defrenne [1971] ECR 445, paragraphs 7 and 8; Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus [1986] ECR 1607, paragraphs 16 to 22; Case C‑262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I‑1889, paragraphs 22 to 28; and Joined Cases C‑4/02 and C‑5/02 Schönheit and Becker [2003] ECR I‑12575, paragraphs 56 to 64).
|
35. Eu égard à son économie, ladite directive ne saurait être considérée comme réglant également la relation entre un État membre et la Communauté européenne, relation dont il s’agit dans le contexte de l’article 226 CE.
| 0 |
863,368 |
34. In order to rule on the first part of this ground of appeal, according to which the Court of First Instance went outside the scope of the dispute as defined by the parties, it should be noted that it has consistently been held that an absence of or inadequate statement of reasons constitutes an infringement of essential procedural requirements for the purposes of Article 230 EC and is a plea involving a matter of public policy which may, and even must, be raised by the Community judicature of its own motion (see, in particular, Case C‑166/95 P Commission v Daffix [1997] ECR I‑983, paragraph 24; Case C‑367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 67; Case C‑265/97 P VBA v Florimex and Others [2000] ECR I‑2061, paragraph 114; and Case C‑413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala [2008] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 174).
|
31. Firstly, in that regard, the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified.
| 0 |
863,369 |
66
In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to well-established case-law, that obligation to state reasons does not however require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, provided that it enables the persons concerned to know the reasons why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 2 April 2009, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission, C‑431/07 P, EU:C:2009:223, paragraph 42, and of 22 May 2014, Armando Álvarez v Commission, C‑36/12 P, EU:C:2014:349, paragraph 31).
|
44 ORDER ISSUED AT A LATER DATE STATED THAT THE AMOUNTS IMPORTED OUTSIDE THE INVITATIONS TO TENDER WERE TO BE RESERVED FOR INDUSTRIAL CONSUMERS AND WERE NOT TO EXCEED IN THE AGGREGATE 20 PER CENT - LATER 25 PER CENT - OF THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT FIXED FOR EACH INVITATION TO TENDER .
| 0 |
863,370 |
50. In that regard, it is clear from the general scheme of the Treaty that the procedure under Article 88 EC must never produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the Treaty (see, inter alia, Case C‑204/97 Portugal v Commission [2001] ECR I‑3175, paragraph 41, and Case C-456/00 France v Commission [2002] ECR I-11949, paragraph 30). Accordingly, State aid, certain conditions of which contravene other provisions of the Treaty, cannot be declared by the Commission to be compatible with the common market (see Case C-113/00 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I-7601, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited there).
|
37 Contrary to the arguments advanced by the appellants in the main proceedings, the fact that the games in issue are not totally prohibited is not enough to show that the national legislation is not in reality intended to achieve the public interest objectives at which it is purportedly aimed, which must be considered as a whole. Limited authorisation of such games on an exclusive basis, which has the advantage of confining the desire to gamble and the exploitation of gambling within controlled channels, of preventing the risk of fraud or crime in the context of such exploitation, and of using the resulting profits for public interest purposes, likewise falls within the ambit of those objectives.
| 0 |
863,371 |
123. S’agissant, d’autre part, de l’argumentation des requérants relative à la violation des principes de sécurité juridique et de non-rétroactivité, il convient de rappeler que le principe de sécurité juridique, qui fait partie des principes généraux du droit de l’Union, exige, notamment, que les règles de droit soient claires, précises et prévisibles dans leurs effets, en particulier lorsqu’elles peuvent avoir sur les individus et les entreprises des conséquences défavorables (voir arrêt du 18 novembre 2008, Förster, C‑158/07, Rec. p. I‑8507, point 67).
|
67. According to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty – which is one of the general principles of Community law – requires, particularly, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have negative consequences on individuals and undertakings (see, to that effect, Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27, and Case C‑347/06 ASM Brescia [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 69).
| 1 |
863,372 |
41. However, it follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Community, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, in particular, Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C‑323/03 Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I‑2161, paragraph 32, and Case C‑13/05 Chacón Navas [2006] ECR I-6467, paragraph 40).
|
67. As regards the roadworthiness test as to the general condition of vehicles, the objectives of Directive 96/96, set out in recital (33) in the preamble to that Directive, are to achieve harmonisation of the rules on roadworthiness tests, to prevent distortion of competition between road hauliers and to guarantee that vehicles are properly checked.
| 0 |
863,373 |
25
It follows from those provisions that the aim pursued by Regulation No 561/2006 is not harmonisation of the penalties, since, on the contrary, that regulation leaves the Member States free to choose the measures to adopt and the penalties necessary to their application (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 February 2012, Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 22).
|
63 Second, the distinctive character of a sign consisting in the shape of a product, even that acquired by the use made of it, must be assessed in the light of the presumed expectations of an average consumer of the category of goods or services in question, who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, to that effect, the judgment in Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky [1998] ECR I-4657, paragraph 31).
| 0 |
863,374 |
41. In order to guarantee the protection intended by Directive 93/13, the Court has already stated on several occasions that the imbalance which exists between the consumer and the seller or supplier may be corrected only by positive action unconnected with the actual parties to the contract (see Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores , paragraph 27; Mostaza Claro , paragraph 26; Asturcom Telecomunicaciones , paragraph 31; and VB Pénzügyi Lízing , paragraph 48).
|
37
Article 3(3) and recital 13 of Framework Decision 2008/675 expressly proscribe such a review, since previous convictions handed down in other Member States must be taken into account in the terms in which they were handed down.
| 0 |
863,375 |
285 It then proceeded to carry out an appraisal of the facts which does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-280/99 P to C-282/99 P Moccia Irme and Others v Commission [2001] ECR I-4717, paragraph 78, and the order of 13 November 2001 in Case C-430/00 P Dürbeck v Commission [2001] ECR I-8547, paragraph 24).
|
40. In that regard, as the French Government has observed, the nature of the signs of which a trade mark may consist cannot differ from one Member State to another.
| 0 |
863,376 |
35 Article 3(1) of the directive lays down the principle of the automatic transfer to the transferee of the rights and obligations incumbent on the transferor under the contracts of employment existing on the date of the transfer of the undertaking. The rule resulting from those provisions, according to which the transfer takes place without the consent of the parties, is mandatory; it is not possible to derogate from it in a manner prejudicial to employees. Consequently, the implementation of the rights conferred on employees by the directive may not be made subject to the consent of either the transferor or the transferee nor the consent of the employees' representatives or the employees themselves (Case C-362/89 D'Urso and Others [1991] ECR I-4105, paragraph 11).
|
28. À cet égard, il y a lieu de rappeler que, en l’absence d'une harmonisation au niveau de l'Union, les désavantages pouvant découler de l’exercice parallèle des compétences fiscales des différents États membres, pour autant qu’un tel exercice n’est pas discriminatoire, ne constituent pas des restrictions aux libertés de circulation (voir arrêt du 8 décembre 2011, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, C‑157/10, Rec. p. I‑13023, point 38).
| 0 |
863,377 |
13 The first point to note is that in the context of a Community based on the principles of freedom of movement for persons and freedom of establishment, the protection of the linguistic rights and privileges of individuals is of particular importance (Case 137/84 Mutsch [1985] ECR 2681, paragraph 11).
|
43. Third, it follows from the term "principally" used in point R1 of Annex II B to the Directive that the waste must be used principally as a fuel or other means of generating energy, which means that the greater part of the waste must be consumed during the operation and the greater part of the energy generated must be recovered and used.
| 0 |
863,378 |
32
However, the Court has previously held, on a number of occasions, that the rules of jurisdiction laid down by Regulation No 2201/2003 in the matters of parental responsibility must be interpreted, in the light of recital 5 of that regulation, as meaning that they are applicable in cases relating to parental responsibility concerning the adoption of child protection measures, including cases where those measures are considered, under the domestic law of a Member State, to be governed by public law (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 November 2007, C, C‑435/06, EU:C:2007:714, paragraphs 34, 50 and 51; of 2 April 2009, A, C‑523/07, EU:C:2009:225, paragraphs 24 and 27 to 29, and of 26 April 2012, Health Service Executive, C‑92/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:255, paragraphs 60 and 61).
|
136. It has consistently been held that the statement of the reasons on which a judgment is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s reasoning in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review (see, in particular, Case C‑259/96 P Council v de Nil and Impens [1998] ECR I‑2915, paragraphs 32 and 33, and Case C‑449/98 P IECC v Commission [2001] ECR I‑3875, paragraph 70).
| 0 |
863,379 |
32. However, it must also be recalled that Article 15(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 constitutes a derogation both from the general rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 2(1) of that regulation, which confers jurisdiction upon the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, and from the rule of special jurisdiction for contracts, set out in Article 5(1) of that regulation, under which jurisdiction lies with the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question. Thus, that provision must necessarily be interpreted strictly (judgment in Kolassa , C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 28 and case-law cited). It further follows from the Court’s case-law that, even though the aim of Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to protect consumers, that does not imply that that protection is absolute (see judgment in Mühlleitner , C‑190/11, EU:C:2012:542, paragraph 33).
|
27
The application of the more lenient criminal law necessarily involves a succession of laws over time and is based on the conclusion that the legislature changed its position either on the criminal classification of the act or the penalty to be applied to an offence.
| 0 |
863,380 |
28. The Court has also made clear that an order imposing a periodic penalty payment and/or a lump sum is intended to place a defaulting Member State under economic pressure which induces it to put an end to the infringement established. The financial penalties imposed must therefore be decided on according to the degree of persuasion needed for the Member State in question to alter its conduct (see, to that effect, Case C‑304/02 Commission v France , paragraph 91, and Case C‑177/04 Commission v France , paragraphs 59 and 60).
|
23 With that in mind, Article 8(1) of Regulation No 3820/85 seeks, by providing that each period of 24 hours must include a minimum number of hours of rest per day, to ensure that driving times and rest periods alternate, so that drivers do not remain at the wheel of their vehicles for periods of such length as to cause tiredness and jeopardize road safety.
| 0 |
863,381 |
33
As regards, second, the objectives pursued by Directive 86/653, it is important to note that that directive seeks, inter alia, to protect the commercial agent in his relations with the principal (see, to that effect, judgments in Honyvem Informazioni Commerciali, C‑465/04, EU:C:2006:199, paragraph 19, and Quenon K., C‑338/14, EU:C:2015:795, paragraph 23). The Court has already held that Article 17 of that directive is, in that regard, of particular importance (see, to that effect, judgment in Unamar, C‑184/12, EU:C:2013:663, paragraph 39). It is therefore necessary to interpret the wording of Article 17(2) in a manner which contributes to that protection of the commercial agent and which therefore takes full account of the merits of the latter in carrying out the transactions assigned to him. The concept of ‘new customers’, within the meaning of that provision, may not therefore be construed restrictively.
|
23. As is clear from the second and third recitals in the preamble, the directive seeks to protect commercial agents in their relations with their principals, to promote the security of commercial transactions, and to facilitate trade in goods between Member States by harmonising their legal systems within the area of commercial representation. To those ends, the Directive establishes, inter alia, rules governing the conclusion and termination of agency contracts, in Articles 13 to 20 (judgments in Honyvem Informazioni Commerciali , C‑465/04, EU:C:2006:199, paragraph 19, and Semen , C‑348/07, EU:C:2009:195, paragraph 14).
| 1 |
863,382 |
60. Any measure capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade is to be considered as an obstacle (see, to that effect, Dassonville , paragraph 5, and Case C‑383/97 Van der Laan [1999] ECR I‑731, paragraph 18). That principle applies also where the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Directive is concerned.
|
72. Moreover, they pursue the same objective, which is to create conditions conducive to the gradual establishment of freedom of movement for workers, of the right of establishment and of freedom to provide services by prohibiting national authorities from creating new obstacles to those freedoms so as not to make the gradual achievement of those freedoms more difficult between the Member States and the Republic of Turkey.
| 0 |
863,383 |
36. It should also be recalled that both the notes which precede the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the HSEN are important means of ensuring the uniform application of that tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see, inter alia, Case C‑338/95 Wiener SI [1997] ECR I‑6495, paragraph 11, and Case C‑123/09 Roeckl Sporthandschuhe [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 29).
|
91
By contrast, contrary to the Commission’s submission, ‘information on emissions into the environment’ covers studies which seek to establish the toxicity, effects and other aspects of a product or substance under the most unfavourable realistic conditions which could possibly occur, and studies carried out in conditions as close as possible to normal agricultural practice and conditions which prevail in the area where that product or substance is to be used.
| 0 |
863,384 |
53
DEI and the Commission submit that, in paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court misinterpreted the judgments of 9 August 1994, Namur-Les assurances du crédit (C‑44/93, EU:C:1994:311), and of 20 May 2010, Todaro Nunziatina & C. (C‑138/09, EU:C:2010:291), in order to qualify the case-law cited in paragraph 53 of the judgment under appeal, namely, the judgments of 4 December 2013, Commission v Council (C‑121/10, EU:C:2013:784, paragraph 59), and Commission v Council (C‑111/10, EU:C:2013:785, paragraph 58).
|
70. Consequently, a measure to freeze funds and economic resources belonging to the appellant could have been adopted within the framework of a regulation intended to impose sanctions on a third country on the basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC only in reliance upon precise, concrete evidence which would have enabled it to be established that the appellant benefits from the economic policies of the leaders of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
| 0 |
863,385 |
26. While it is true that the grounds of the judgment in Placanica and Others refer solely to the objective of crime prevention in the betting and gaming sector, whereas, in the present case, the Netherlands legislation is also designed to curb gambling addiction, the fact remains that those two objectives must be considered together, since they relate both to consumer protection and to the preservation of public order (see, to that effect, Case C‑275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I‑1039, paragraph 58; Case C‑124/97 Läärä and Others [1999] ECR I‑6067, paragraph 33; and Case C‑67/98 Zenatti [1999] ECR I‑7289, paragraph 31).
|
41 If that method has been approved at Community level, the alcohol is exempted from excise duties under Article 27(1)(a). If, on the other hand, the alcohol contained in a product not intended for human consumption has been denatured in accordance with a method approved in a Member State, the exemption provided for by Article 27(1)(b) should be applied. Moreover, if the denaturing method is not one of those approved either by the Community rules or by national laws then the product cannot be exempted.
| 0 |
863,386 |
24. Or, en ce qui concerne l’objet desdites directives, il convient de rappeler que le considérant 23 de la troisième directive assurance vie faisait état de ce que, «dans le cadre d’un marché unique de l’assurance, le consommateur [aurait] un choix plus grand et plus diversifié de contrats». Selon ce considérant également, «afin de profiter pleinement de cette diversité et d’une concurrence accrue, [ledit consommateur devait] disposer des informations nécessaires pour choisir le contrat qui [convenait] le mieux à ses besoins» (arrêt du 5 mars 2002, Axa Royale Belge, C‑386/00, Rec. p. I‑2209, point 28). Enfin, il était précisé audit considérant que «cette nécessité d’informations [était] d’autant plus importante que la durée des engagements [pouvait] être très longue».
|
28 The warning in question thus also risks jeopardising the objective sought by Article 31 of the directive, which, as the preamble states, is to provide the policy-holder with the information necessary to enable him to select the contract best suited to his requirements so that he can profit fully from the greater choice of contracts and the increased competition in the single assurance market.
| 1 |
863,387 |
32. In that context, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
‘1. On Articles 2, 3 and 7 of [Directive 2004/38]:
(a) Does “family member” include, in particular in the light of Articles 7 and 24 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights (“the Charter”)] and Article 8 of the [European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, “the ECHR”)], on an extended interpretation of Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2004/38, a parent who is a third-country national, has parental responsibility for a child who is a Union citizen entitled to freedom of movement, and is not maintained by that child?
(b) If so, does Directive 2004/38 apply to that parent, in particular in the light of Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter and Article 8 of the ECHR, on an extended interpretation of Article 3(1) of the directive, even where there is no “accompanying” or “joining” with respect to the Member State of origin of the child who is a Union citizen and has moved away?
(c) If so, does it follow that that parent, in particular in the light of Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter and Article 8 of the ECHR, has a right of residence for more than three months in the Member State of origin of the child who is a Union citizen, on an extended interpretation of Article 7(2) of Directive 2004/38, at least as long as parental responsibility subsists and is actually exercised?
2. On Article 6(1) TEU in conjunction with the Charter:
(a) (i) Is the Charter applicable pursuant to the second alternative of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter simply where the subject‑matter of the dispute depends on a national law (or part of a law) which inter alia – but not only – transposed directives?
(ii) If not, is the Charter applicable pursuant to the second alternative of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter simply because the claimant is possibly entitled to a right of residence under Union law and could accordingly, under the first sentence of Paragraph 5(2) of the FreizügG/EU, claim a residence card for a family member of a Union citizen which has its legal basis in the first sentence of Article 10(1) of [Directive 2004/38]?
(iii) If not, is the Charter applicable pursuant to the second alternative of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter, in accordance with the case‑law deriving from Case C‑260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I‑2925, paragraphs 41 to 45, where a Member State restricts the right of residence of the father who is a third-country national with parental responsibility for a Union citizen who is a minor and resides predominantly with her mother in another Member State of the Union because of the mother’s employment?
(b) (i) If the Charter is applicable, can a right of residence under European Union law for the father who is a third-country national be derived directly from Article 24(3) of the Charter, at least as long as he has and actually exercises parental responsibility for his child who is a Union citizen, even if the child resides predominantly in another Member State of the Union?
(ii) If not, does it follow from the freedom of movement of the child who is a Union citizen under Article 45(1) of the Charter, possibly in conjunction with Article 24(3) of the Charter, that the father who is a third-country national has a right of residence under European Union law, at least as long as he has and actually exercises parental responsibility for his child who is a Union citizen, so that in particular the freedom of movement of the child who is a Union citizen is not deprived of all practical effect?
3. On Article 6(3) TEU in conjunction with the general principles of European Union law:
(a) Can the “unwritten” fundamental rights of the European Union developed in the Court’s case‑law from Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 7, up to, for example, Case C‑144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I‑9981, paragraph 75, be applied in full even if the Charter is not applicable in the specific case; in other words, do the fundamental rights which continue to apply as general principles of Union law under Article 6(3) TEU stand autonomously and independently alongside the new fundamental rights laid down in the Charter in accordance with Article 6(1) TEU?
(b) If so, can a right of residence under European Union law for the purpose of the effective exercise of parental responsibility be inferred from the general principles of Union law, in particular in the light of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, for a father, who is a third-country national, of a Union citizen who is a minor and resides predominantly in another EU Member State with her mother on account of the latter’s occupation?
4. On Article 21(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR:
If Article 6(1) or (3) TEU does not lead to a right of residence under European Union law for the claimant, can, in accordance with Case C‑200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I‑9925, paragraphs 45 to 47, a right of residence under European Union law for the purpose of the effective exercise of parental responsibility be inferred, under Article 21(1) TFEU, possibly in the light of Article 8 of the ECHR, from the freedom of movement enjoyed by a Union citizen who is a minor and resides predominantly in another EU Member State with her mother on account of the latter’s occupation, for the father, who is a third-country national, in the Member State of origin of the child who is a Union citizen?
5. On Article 10 of [Directive 2004/38]:
If a right of residence under European Union law is taken to exist, is a parent who is a third-country national in the claimant’s situation entitled to the issue of a “residence card for a family member of a Union citizen”, possibly in accordance with the first sentence of Article 10(1) of the directive?’
|
69. Nevertheless, where an EU institution enjoys broad discretion, a review of compliance with certain procedural guarantees is of fundamental importance. Those guarantees include the obligation for the ESCB to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the situation in question and to give an adequate statement of the reasons for its decisions.
| 0 |
863,388 |
14. As regards the position of a Turkish worker who, like Mr Dogan, enjoys in the host Member State, after four years of legal employment, ‘the right of free access to any paid employment of his choice’ in that Member State, in accordance with the third indent of Article 6(1), the Court has repeatedly held not only that the direct effect of that provision means that the person concerned derives an individual employment right directly from Decision No 1/80, but also that to be effective that right necessarily implies a concomitant right of residence which does not depend on the continuing existence of the conditions for access to those rights (see Case C-192/89 Sevince [1990] ECR I-3461, paragraphs 29 and 31; Case C-237/91 Kus [1992] ECR I-6781, paragraph 33; Tetik , paragraphs 26, 30 and 31; and Nazli , paragraphs 28 and 40; see also, by analogy, concerning the second indent of the first sentence of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80, Case C‑329/97 Ergat [2000] ECR I-1487, paragraph 40, and Case C-467/02 Cetinkaya [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 31; and, concerning the second sentence of Article 7, Case C-355/93 Eroglu [1994] ECR I-5113, paragraph 20, and Case C‑210/97 Akman [1998] ECR I-7519, paragraph 24).
|
104. Therefore, if the national legislation concerned is designed to confer protection on sporting events – a matter which it is for the referring court to establish – European Union law does not preclude, in principle, that protection and such legislation is thus capable of justifying a restriction on the free movement of services such as that at issue in the main proceedings.
| 0 |
863,389 |
45
Accordingly, application of the principle governing freedom to provide services must be achieved, according to the FEU Treaty, by implementing the common transport policy (judgment of 22 December 2010, Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetrieb, C‑338/09, EU:C:2010:814, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
|
28. The national provisions which govern compensation for road accidents cannot, therefore, deprive those provisions of their effectiveness.
| 0 |
863,390 |
Le Tribunal, compétent en vertu de l’article 256, paragraphe 1, TFUE, et saisi d’une demande d’indemnité, est tenu de statuer
sur une telle demande dans une formation différente de celle ayant eu à connaître du litige qui a donné lieu à la procédure
dont la durée est critiquée (arrêts du 26 novembre 2013, Groupe Gascogne/Commission, C‑58/12 P, EU:C:2013:770, point 90, et
du 10 juillet 2014, Telefónica et Telefónica de España/Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, point 67).
|
22 It is clear from those provisions that taking account of all elements ° profits made, charges, income, liabilities and losses ° which actually relate to the financial year in question ensures observance of the requirement of a true and fair view.
| 0 |
863,391 |
38. That right also requires the authorities to pay due attention to the observations thus submitted by the person concerned, examining carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case and giving a detailed statement of reasons for their decision (see the judgments in Technische Universität München , C‑269/90, EU:C:1991:438, paragraph 14, and Sopropé , EU:C:2008:746, paragraph 50); the obligation to state reasons for a decision which are sufficiently specific and concrete to allow the person concerned to understand why his application is being rejected is thus a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence (the judgment in M. , EU:C:2012:744, paragraph 88).
|
29. The principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with European Union law also requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieves an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see Dominguez , paragraph 27 and the case‑law cited).
| 0 |
863,392 |
23. As regards the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council and the Commission contending that the plea of illegality raised by the Kingdom of Spain is out of time, it is common ground that the plea of illegality was formally submitted in the reply, after delivery of the judgment in Spain v Council dismissing the applicant’s action challenging Articles 3, 4 and 6 of Regulation No 1954/2003, whereas, to be admissible, such a plea should, in principle, have been raised in the application and, contrary to the Kingdom of Spain’s argument, dismissal of that action cannot be regarded as constituting a matter of fact or of law which came to light in the course of the procedure within the meaning of Article 42(2) of the Rules of Procedure (see, to that effect, Case 11/81 Dürbeck v Commission [1982] ECR 1251, paragraph 17).
|
17 FOR A NEW FACT TO BE ABLE TO JUSTIFY THE RAISING OF A FRESH ISSUE DURING THE PROCEEDINGS THE FACT MUST NOT HAVE EXISTED OR MUST NOT HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO THE APPLICANT WHEN THE ACTION WAS COMMENCED . SINCE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS ARE PRESUMED TO BE VALID UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE COURT MAY DECLARE THEM INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE COMMUNITIES , THE JUDGMENT GIVEN BY THE COURT IN CASE 112/80 MERELY CONFIRMED THE LAW WHICH WAS KNOWN TO THE APPLICANT WHEN IT BROUGHT ITS ACTION .
| 1 |
863,393 |
46. Moreover, for the purposes of assessing whether a retirement pension – by reference to which, should the case arise, as in the present case, the survivor’s pension is calculated – falls within the scope of Article 141 EC, the Court has stated that, of the criteria for identifying a pension scheme which it has adopted on the basis of the situations brought before it, the one criterion which may prove decisive is whether the retirement pension is paid to the worker by reason of the employment relationship between him and his former employer, that is to say, the criterion of employment, based on the wording of that article (see, to that effect, Beune , paragraph 43; Evrenopoulos , paragraph 19; Case C‑366/99 Griesmar [2001] ECR I‑9383, paragraph 28; Case C‑351/00 Niemi [2002] ECR I‑7007, paragraphs 44 and 45; and Joined Cases C‑4/02 and C‑5/02 Schönheit and Becker [2003] ECR I‑12575, paragraph 56).
|
19 On this point, it should be recalled that the Court has stated on several occasions that the only possible decisive criterion is whether the pension is paid to the worker by reason of the employment relationship between him and his former employer, that is to say, the criterion of employment based on the wording of Article 119 itself (Case C-7/93 Beune v Bestuur van het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds [1994] ECR I-4471, paragraph 43).
| 1 |
863,394 |
28 When the Commission refuses to charge certain expenditure to the EAGGF on the ground that it was incurred as a result of breaches of Community rules for which a Member State can be held responsible, it is for that State to demonstrate that the conditions for obtaining the funding refused by the Commission are met (see Case 347/85 United Kingdom v Commission [1988] ECR 1749, paragraph 14 and Case C-48/91 Netherlands v Commission [1993] ECR I-5611, paragraph 16). The Commission is required not to demonstrate exhaustively that there are irregularities in the data submitted by the Member States but to adduce evidence of serious and reasonable doubt on its part regarding the figures submitted by the national authorities. The reason for this mitigation of the burden of proof on the Commission is that it is the State which is best placed to collect and verify the data required for the clearance of EAGGF accounts; consequently, it is for the State to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that its figures are accurate and, if appropriate, that the Commission's calculations are incorrect (see Case C-48/91, cited above, paragraph 17). In the event of a dispute it is for the Commission to prove that the rules of the common organisation of the agricultural markets have been infringed and, once it establishes such infringement, it falls to the Member State to show, as the case may be, that the Commission committed an error as to the financial consequences to be drawn from it (see Case C-281/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-347, paragraph 19; Case C-48/91, cited above, paragraph 18 and Case C-59/97 Italy v Commission [1999] ECR I-1683, paragraphs 54 and 55).
|
8 ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT THESE REPORTS ARE MADE UP OF ASSESSMENTS WHICH IT IS DIFFICULT FOR A COURT TO REVIEW , THIS FACT DOES NOT PREVENT THEIR ADOPTION FROM BEING VITIATED FOR LACK OF AUTHORITY , IRREGULARITY OF FORM AND PROCEDURE OR PATENT ERROR AND MISUSE OF DISCRETIONARY POWER - DEFECTS CAPABLE OF MAKING THEM UNLAWFUL .
| 0 |
863,395 |
35. In that regard, although the Court has repeatedly held that the prevention of tax avoidance and the need for effective fiscal supervision may be relied upon to justify restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (see Case C-254/97 Baxter and Others [1999] ECR I‑4809, paragraph 18; Case C‑478/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I‑7587, paragraph 39; and Case C‑334/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I‑2229, paragraph 27), it has also held that a general presumption of tax avoidance or fraud is not sufficient to justify a fiscal measure which compromises the objectives of the Treaty (see, to that effect, Commission v Belgium , paragraph 45, and Case C‑334/02 Commission v France , paragraph 27).
|
23 Furthermore, it should be stated that at the end of 1987 the cost of living in Munich was 8.3% higher than in Bonn, the capital at that time. That percentage represents a considerable difference which, in the absence of a specific weighting, reduces the purchasing power of officials employed in Munich in relation to that of their colleagues working in Bonn.
| 0 |
863,396 |
36
As the Court has repeatedly held, whilst it is true that Directive 98/59 harmonises only partially the rules for the protection of workers in the event of collective redundancies, the fact remains that the limited character of such harmonisation cannot have the consequence of depriving the provisions of the directive of practical effect (see, to that effect, in respect of Directive 75/129, judgment of 8 June 1994, Commission v United Kingdom , C‑383/92, EU:C:1994:234, paragraph 25, and, in respect of Directive 98/59, judgment of 16 July 2009, Mono Car Styling , C‑12/08, EU:C:2009:466, paragraph 35).
|
20. At the outset, it is necessary to examine whether the Vergabekammer bei der Bezirksregierung Arnsberg is a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU and, therefore, whether the request for a preliminary ruling is admissible.
| 0 |
863,397 |
47
In that regard, it must be recalled that Directive 90/435, as its third recital indicates, seeks, by the introduction of a common system of taxation, to eliminate any disadvantage to cooperation between companies of different Member States as compared with cooperation between companies of the same Member State and thereby to facilitate the grouping together of companies at EU level. That directive thus seeks to ensure the neutrality, in fiscal terms, of the distribution of profits by a subsidiary established in one Member State to its parent company established in another Member State (judgments of 1 October 2009, Gaz de France — Berliner Investissement, C‑247/08, EU:C:2009:600 paragraph 27, and of 8 March 2017, Wereldhave Belgium and Others, C‑448/15, EU:C:2017:180, paragraph 25).
|
19. It should be noted that that interpretation is supported by the wording of the provision in issue, by the context in which it appears, as well as by the purpose of the legislation of which it forms part.
| 0 |
863,398 |
18. In accordance with the case-law, the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive, including ‘leasing’ and ‘letting of immovable property’ are to be interpreted strictly, since those exemptions constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Case C‑150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark [2001] ECR I‑493, paragraph 25; and also Commission v Ireland , paragraphs 52 and 55; Sinclair Collis , paragraph 23; Temco Europe , paragraph 17; and Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn , paragraph 29).
|
59. However, the sovereignty of the coastal State over the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf is merely functional and, as such, is limited to the right to exercise the activities of exploration and exploitation laid down in Articles 56 and 77 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. To the extent that the supply and laying of an undersea cable is not included in the activities listed in those articles, that part of the operation carried out in those two zones is not within the sovereignty of the coastal State. That finding is confirmed by Articles 58(1) and 79(1) of the Convention, which permit, subject to certain conditions, any State to lay undersea cables in those zones.
| 0 |
863,399 |
36
National legislation which places certain of the nationals of the Member State concerned at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU on every citizen of the Union (see, inter alia, judgments of 14 October 2008 in Grunkin and Paul, C‑353/06, EU:C:2008:559, paragraph 21; of 22 December 2010 in Sayn-Wittgenstein, C‑208/09, EU:C:2010:806, paragraph 53; and of 12 May 2011 in Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, C‑391/09, EU:C:2011:291, paragraph 68).
|
27 A decision such as that of the Arbeitsamt to class the applicant as an unskilled assistant does not constitute grounds for considering the profession in question to be indirectly regulated. Although the reasons for that decision have never been made clear, there is nothing to indicate that it forms part of any indirect legal control of access to or pursuit of that profession in Germany.
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.