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61. This Court has rejected the Commission’s argument that it is enough for the restrictive measures at issue to be directed at persons or entities present in a third country or associated with one in some other way in order for them to be regarded as having been adopted against such a country for the purpose of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC (see Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission , paragraph 168).
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168. To accept the interpretation of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC proposed by the Commission, that it is enough for the restrictive measures at issue to be directed at persons or entities present in a third country or associated with one in some other way, would give those provisions an excessively broad meaning and would fail to take any account at all of the requirement, imposed by their very wording, that the measures decided on the basis of those provisions must be taken against third countries.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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50. In the latter case, where the third party uses a sign which is similar to the trade mark in relation to goods or services identical with those for which the trade mark is registered, the trade mark proprietor can oppose the use of that sign only where there is a likelihood of confusion ( Google France and Google , paragraph 78, and BergSpechte , paragraph 22).
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78. The protection conferred by Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1)(a) of Regulation No 40/94 is, in this regard, more extensive than that provided for in the respective paragraphs (1)(b) of those articles, the application of which requires that there be a likelihood of confusion (see, to that effect, Davidoff , paragraph 28, and L’Oréal and Others , paragraph 59).
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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17. In that regard, it should be recalled that the first sentence of Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive treats certain transactions for which no real consideration is received by the taxable person as supplies of goods effected for consideration subject to VAT, in accordance with Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive. Under well‑established case‑law, the purpose of that provision is to ensure equal treatment as between a taxable person who applies goods for his own private use or for that of his staff and a final consumer who acquires goods of the same type (see, inter alia, Case C‑412/03 Hotel Scandic Gåsabäck [2005] ECR I‑743, paragraph 23 and the case‑law cited).
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23. Articles 5(6) and 6(2) of the Sixth Directive treat certain transactions for which no consideration is actually received by the taxable person as supplies of goods and provisions of services effected for consideration. The purpose of those provisions is to ensure equal treatment as between a taxable person who applies goods or services for his own private use or for that of his staff and a final consumer who acquires goods or services of the same type (see Case C‑230/94 Enkler [1996] ECR I‑4517, paragraph 35; Fillibeck , cited above, par agraph 25; and Fischer and Brandenstein , cited above, paragraph 56). In pursuit of that objective, Articles 5(6) and 6(2)(a) prevent a taxable person who has been able to deduct VAT on the purchase of goods used for his business from escaping payment of that tax when he applies those goods from his business for his own private use or that of his staff and from thereby enjoying advantages to which he is not entitled by comparison with an ordinary consumer who buys goods and pays VAT on them (see Case C‑20/91 De Jong [1992] ECR I‑2847, paragraph 15; Enkler , cited above, paragraph 33; Bakcsi , cited above, paragraph 42; and Fischer and Brandenstein , paragraph 56). Similarly, Article 6(2)(b) of the Sixth Directive prevents a taxable person or members of his staff from obtaining, free of tax, services provided by the taxable person for which a private individual would have to have paid VAT.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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7 It should be borne in mind that Directive 88/301 was adopted by the Commission in the exercise of the legislative power conferred on it by Article 90(3) of the Treaty to lay down general rules specifying the obligations arising from the Treaty, which are binding on the Member States as regards the undertakings referred to in Article 90(1) and (2) (judgment in Case C-202/88 France v Commission ("Terminals") [1991] ECR I-1223, paragraph 14). Article 3 of the directive forms part of the provisions implementing Article 30 of the Treaty (see to that effect the same judgment, paragraphs 37 to 39).
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37 With regard to the question whether such rights can be justified, it should be noted that in Article 3 of the contested directive the Commission specified the extent and the limits of the withdrawal of special and exclusive rights so as to take into account certain requirements such as those listed in Article 2(17) of Council Directive 86/361, namely user safety, safety of employees of public telecommunications network operators, protection of public telecommunications networks from harm and interworking of terminal equipment in justified cases.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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41 The principle of equivalence requires that the rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether the infringement alleged is of Community law or national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar (see, mutatis mutandis, paragraph 36 of the judgment of 15 September 1998 in Case C-231/96 Edis [1998] ECR I-4951).
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36 Observance of the principle of equivalence implies, for its part, that the procedural rule at issue applies without distinction to actions alleging infringements of Community law and to those alleging infringements of national law, with respect to the same kind of charges or dues (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 66/79, 127/79 and 128/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Salumi [1980] ECR 1237, paragraph 21). That principle cannot, however, be interpreted as obliging a Member State to extend its most favourable rules governing recovery under national law to all actions for repayment of charges or dues levied in breach of Community law.
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48 As to the alleged infringement of the second sentence of Article 4(4) of the Wild Birds Directive, it should be observed that the Commission has not shown that the French Republic did not endeavour to avoid pollution or deterioration of the habitat where the titanogypsum treatment plant was constructed.
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244. It should be borne in mind, second, that in the context of an appeal the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, first, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors to assess the gravity of particular conduct in the light of Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 15 of Regulation No 17 and, second, to consider whether the Court of First Instance responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine cancelled or reduced (see, in particular, Baustahlgewebe v Commission , cited above, paragraph 128, and Case C-359/01 P British Sugar v Commission [2004] ECR I-4933, paragraph 47).
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47. It should be recalled that the Court of First Instance alone has jurisdiction to examine how in each particular case the Commission appraised the gravity of unlawful conduct. In an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, first, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors to assess the gravity of particular conduct in the light of Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 15 of Regulation No 17 and, second, to consider whether the Court of First Instance responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine cancelled or reduced (see, in particular, Baustahlgewebe , paragraph 128).
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29 Apart from the actual exchange transaction, the service provided by the Bank is characterised by the Bank's preparedness to conclude such transactions in the currencies in which it specialises.
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29 It is settled case-law that, whereas under Articles 192(2) and 225(3) of the Convention it is for the authorities of each ACP State to prepare, negotiate and conclude public works contracts financed by the Community within the framework of the financial and technical cooperation set up by the Convention, any intervention by the Community bodies responsible for taking, on the Community' s behalf, financing decisions on such contracts within the meaning of Article 192(4) of the Convention is intended solely to determine whether the conditions for Community financing are met or not. It is not intended to interfere with the principle that the contracts in question remain national contracts and cannot have that effect (see, inter alia, Case 267/82 Développement SA and Clemessy v Commission [1986] ECR 1907, paragraph 25).
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25 AS TO THE SPECIFIC COMPLAINT THAT THE COMMISSION REFUSED TO GIVE THE APPLICANTS ACCESS TO THE CORRESPONDENCE EXCHANGED BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT , IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND , AS THE COURT POINTED OUT IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 10 JULY 1984 IN CASE 126/83 ( STS V COMMISSION ( 1984 ) ECR 2769 ), THAT , ' THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION ' S REPRESENTATIVES DURING THAT PROCEDURE , WHETHER APPROVALS OR REFUSALS TO APPROVE , ENDORSEMENTS OR REFUSALS TO ENDORSE , ARE SOLELY INTENDED TO ESTABLISH WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY FINANCING ARE MET . THEY ARE NOT INTENDED TO INTERFERE WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE CONTRACTS IN QUESTION REMAIN NATIONAL CONTRACTS WHICH THE ACP STATES ALONE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPARING , NEGOTIATING AND CONCLUDING , AND THEY CANNOT HAVE THAT EFFECT ' . FURTHERMORE , ' FOR THEIR PART , UNDERTAKINGS WHICH SUBMIT TENDERS FOR OR ARE AWARDED THE CONTRACTS IN QUESTION REMAIN OUTSIDE THE EXCLUSIVE DEALINGS CONDUCTED ON THIS MATTER BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE ACP STATES ' . IT FOLLOWS THAT THE CORRESPONDENCE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED SOLELY WITH THE EXCLUSIVE DEALINGS WHICH ARE CONDUCTED IN THIS AREA BETWEEN THOSE AUTHORITIES , AND THE COMMISSION WAS NOT UNDER A DUTY TO GIVE THIRD PARTIES ACCESS TO IT .
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40. In order to determine whether medical care is similar, it is appropriate to take into account, concerning the exemption laid down in Article 13A(1)(c) of the Sixth Directive and having regard to the objective pursued by that provision, the professional qualifications of the care providers. In fact, where it is not identical, medical care can be regarded as similar only to the extent that it is of equivalent quality from the point of view of recipients.
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38. In addition, the limitation based on nationality does not relate to specific matches between teams representing their respective countries but applies to official matches between clubs and thus to the essence of the activity performed by professional players. As the Court has also ruled, such a limitation cannot be justified on sporting grounds ( Bosman , paragraphs 128 to 137; Deutscher Handballbund , paragraphs 54 to 56).
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54. In paragraph 128 of Bosman , however, the Court stated that nationality clauses do not concern specific matches between teams representing their countries but apply to all official matches between clubs and thus to the essence of the activity of professional players.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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41 Entitlement to the rights enshrined in the three indents of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 is therefore subject only to the condition that the Turkish worker has complied with the legislation of the host Member State governing entry into its territory and pursuit of employment (Nazli, paragraph 32).
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32 Entitlement to the rights enshrined in the three indents of Article 6(1) is therefore subject only to the condition that the worker has complied with the legislation of the host Member State governing entry into its territory and pursuit of employment.
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31. As the Court has already held, the only articles in which the Treaty provides for derogations applicable in situations which may affect public security are Articles 30 EC, 39 EC, 46 EC, 58 EC, 64 EC, 296 EC and 297 EC, which deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It cannot be inferred from those articles that the Treaty contains an inherent general exception excluding all measures taken for reasons of public security from the scope of Community law. To recognise the existence of such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, might impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform application (see, to that effect, Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 26, Sirdar , paragraph 16, and Kreil , paragraph 16).
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84. However, the authorisation contained in Article 8(4) of Directive 91/439 constitutes a derogation from the general principle of mutual recognition of driving licences and is, therefore, to be interpreted strictly ( Wiedemann and Funk , paragraph 60; Zerche and Others , paragraph 57; and Weber , paragraph 29).
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60. Second, the first subparagraph of Article 8(4), which authorises a Member State to refuse to recognise the validity of a driving licence obtained in another Member State by a person who is, in the first Member State’s territory, the subject of a measure restricting, suspending, withdrawing or cancelling a licence, constitutes a derogation from the general principle of mutual recognition of driving licences and is, therefore, to be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, Kapper , paragraphs 70 and 72, and the orders in Halbritter , paragraph 35, and Kremer , paragraph 28).
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53 The fact that the Commission initially decided not to raise any objections to the aid in issue cannot be regarded as capable of having caused the recipient undertaking to entertain any legitimate expectation since that decision was challenged in due time before the Court, which annulled it. However regrettable it may be, the Commission's error cannot erase the consequences of the unlawful conduct of the Kingdom of Spain.
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22. In that respect, the Court held at paragraph 28 of Case C‑181/95 Biogen [1997] ECR I‑357 that, where a product is protected by a number of basic patents in force, which may belong to a number of patent holders, each of those patents may be designated for the purpose of the procedure for the grant of an SPC, although only one SPC may be granted for each basic patent.
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28 Consequently, where a product is protected by a number of basic patents in force, which may belong to a number of patent holders, each of those patents may be designated for the purpose of the procedure for the grant of a certificate. Under Article 3(c) of the Regulation, however, only one certificate may be granted for each basic patent.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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56. Article 49 EC requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit or further impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (see, in particular, Case C‑17/00 De Coster [2001] ECR I-9445, paragraph 29, and Joined Cases C‑544/03 and C‑545/03 Mobistar and Belgacom Mobile [2005] ECR I‑7723, paragraph 29).
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29 It must also be noted that, according to the case-law of the Court, Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit or further impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (see Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 12; Case C-43/93 Vander Elst [1994] ECR I-3803, paragraph 14).
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13 En ce qui concerne le grief selon lequel les règlements de la Commission n°s 1925/84 et 2222/85, précités, et, dans une moindre mesure, les règlements n°s 2077/86 et 2160/87, précités, ne contiennent pas une détermination du dépassement du seuil de garantie au regard de la moyenne des quantités produites au cours des trois campagnes précédentes, il convient de reconnaître que les considérants des règlements en cause ne se réfèrent effectivement qu' à la seule campagne précédant celle pour laquelle l' aide doit être fixée, au cours de laquelle le seuil de garantie a été dépassé . Cependant, il y a lieu de considérer que cette omission ne constitue qu' une erreur de rédaction qui n' est pas de nature à entacher les règlements d' un vice de motivation, car elle n' a pu en aucun cas induire les intéressés en erreur quant à la justification de la mesure prise par l' autorité communautaire . Comme l' avocat général l' a d' ailleurs relevé aux points 55 et suivants de ses conclusions, cette erreur de rédaction ne figure pas dans l' ensemble des versions linguistiques . Or, celles-ci doivent être prises en compte dès lors que l' une des versions d' un texte présente des incohérences avec la lettre et l' esprit de la réglementation globale dont il fait partie .
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35. The Court has also stated that, not only would the possibility for the managing body of an airport to charge an access fee in addition to the fee for use of the airport installations not facilitate access to the market concerned, it would also run directly counter to the objective of reducing the operating costs of airline companies and, in certain cases, would even lead to an increase in those costs (see Flughafen Hannover-Langenhagen , paragraph 44).
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44. Not only would the possibility for the managing body of an airport to charge an access fee in addition to the fee for use of the airport installations not facilitate access to the market concerned, it would also run directly counter to the objective of reducing the operating costs of airline companies and, in certain cases, would even lead to an increase in those costs. That would be the case if certain suppliers or self-handlers who, like Lufthansa, did not pay the access fee before the Directive was implemented, were now required, having regard to the criteria laid down in Article 16(3) of the Directive, to pay such a fee.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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42. On several occasions the Court has drawn attention to the reality and the seriousness of the risks associated with BSE and the appropriateness of interim protective measures justified on the ground of protection of human health in the light of that disease, whether in respect of measures adopted by the Commission (the order in Case C-180/96 R United Kingdom v Commission [1996] ECR I-3903, and the judgments in Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Commission [1998] ECR I-2265, and Case C-365/99 Portugal v Commission [2001] ECR I-5645) or by a Member State (Case C-428/99 Van den Bor [2002] ECR I-127, paragraph 40).
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40 Rejecting the allegation of misuse of powers, the Commission observes that the reasons for the contested decision are clear from the recitals in its preamble and are perfectly consistent with the measures adopted. It maintains that the fifth recital must be considered as a whole, and not merely with reference to the phrase relating to consumer concern.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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52. There is such distortion where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence is clearly incorrect (judgment in Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’ and Others v Commission , C‑71/09 P, C‑73/09 P and C‑76/09 P, EU:C:2011:368, paragraph 153 and the case-law cited). However, such distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment in General Motors v Commission , C‑551/03 P, EU:C:2006:229, paragraph 54). Moreover, where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, he must indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by that Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in his view, led to that distortion (see, to that effect, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 50, and PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic , C‑281/10 P, EU:C:2011:679, paragraph 78).
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50. Article 225 EC, Article 51, first paragraph, of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice provide, in particular, that where the appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the Court of First Instance, he must indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by that Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in his view, led to that distortion.
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61. According to the travaux préparatoires in respect of that directive, that option reflects the aim of reinforcing legal certainty, by encouraging ‘diligence’ on the part of the purchaser, ‘taking the seller’s interests into account’, ‘but does not establish a strict obligation to carry out a detailed inspection of the good’ (see the explanatory memorandum to the proposal for a directive, COM(95) 520 final, p. 14).
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35. The Commission contends that it has neither broadened nor changed the subject-matter of the dispute and has not prejudiced the Slovak Republic’s rights of defence. First, it stated, both in its letter of formal notice and in its reasoned opinion, that it did not classify the determination of the income of the beneficiaries of the benefits at issue as an individual and discretionary assessment of their circumstances, for the purposes of the case-law of the Court in that regard. Although it is true that the subject-matter of proceedings brought under Article 258 TFEU is circumscribed by the pre-litigation procedure provided for in that provision and that, consequently, the Commission’s reasoned opinion and the application must be based on the same objections, that requirement cannot go so far as to mean that in every case exactly the same wording must be used in both, where the subject-matter of the proceedings has not been extended or altered (judgment in Commission v Germany , C‑433/03, EU:C:2005:462, paragraph 28). In addition, the Commission submits that it follows from the judgments in Commission v Ireland (C‑362/01, EU:C:2002:739, paragraphs 18 to 20) and Commission v Luxembourg (C‑519/03, EU:C:2005:234, paragraph 21) that the failure to take account of the answer of the Member State concerned to the letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion does not lead to the inadmissibility of that action.
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20. The Commission did not, however, make it impossible for the Member State to put an end to its infringement and did not compromise its rights of defence. Furthermore, the fact that the Commission failed to take account of Ireland's observations had no effect on the definition of the subject-matter of the dispute. Paragraph 4 above makes it clear that, in its reply to the Commission's letter of formal notice, Ireland did no more than announce that it would in the future be adopting implementing measures which were then under consideration.
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6 IN THE REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AT THE SAME TIME AS THE DRAFT CONVENTION ( OFFICIAL JOURNAL 1979 , C 59 , P . 1 ) THAT EXTENSION TO THE CRIMINAL FIELD IS JUSTIFIED BY REFERENCE TO THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH A JUDGMENT OF A CRIMINAL COURT MAY ENTAIL IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS IF THOSE CONSEQUENCES THEMSELVES COME WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE CONVENTION .
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14. Nevertheless, the Court has also stated that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia , Bosman , paragraph 61; and TNT Traco , paragraph 31).
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61 That is why the Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose (see, inter alia, Case C-143/94 Furlanis v ANAS [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 12) or where the problem is hypothetical and the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Meilicke, cited above, paragraph 32).
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22. Or, il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour qu’il ne saurait être exigé du Tribunal, chaque fois qu’une partie invoque, au cours de la procédure, un moyen nouveau qui ne répond manifestement pas aux exigences de l’article 48, paragraphe 2, de son règlement de procédure soit qu’il explique dans son arrêt les raisons pour lesquelles ce moyen est irrecevable, soit qu’il l’examine au fond (arrêt du 16 mars 2000, Compagnie maritime belge transports e.a./Commission, C-395/96 P et C-396/96 P, Rec. p. I-1365, point 107).
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44. That interpretation is also borne out by the objective of that directive which is, as is apparent from recital 2 in the preamble thereto, inter alia, to afford greater protection to workers in the event of collective redundancies. In accordance with that objective, a narrow definition cannot be given to the concepts that define the scope of that directive, including the concept of ‘worker’ in Article 1(1)(a) of the directive (see, to that effect, judgments in Athinaïki Chartopoïïa , C‑270/05, EU:C:2007:101, paragraphs 25 and 26, and, by analogy, Union syndicale Solidaires Isère , C‑428/09, EU:C:2010:612, paragraph 22).
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26. In so doing, the Court has defined the term ‘establishment’ very broadly, in order to limit as far as possible cases of collective redundancies which are not subject to Directive 98/59 because of the legal definition of that term at national level (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑187/05 to C‑190/05 Agorastoudis and Others [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37). However, given the general nature of that definition, it cannot by itself be decisive for the appraisal of the specific circumstances of the case at issue in the main proceedings.
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34 In that connection, it must be emphasized that the purpose of that provision is to favour employment and residence of Turkish workers duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State by ensuring that their family links are maintained there.
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70
In that regard, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that the possibility, provided for in Article 20 of Regulation 1896/2006, of having the order for payment reviewed applies only if the defendant has failed to enter a statement of opposition within the time-limit laid down in Article 16(2) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment in Thomas Cook Belgium, C‑245/14, EU:C:2015:715, paragraphs 47 and 48).
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48. As is stated in recital 25 in the preamble to that regulation, the possibility, provided for in Article 20 of Regulation 1896/2006, of having the order for payment reviewed must not lead to the defendant being given a second opportunity to oppose the claim.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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39. Moreover, the Court has held that, in order for VAT to be chargeable before the supply is made, it is necessary and sufficient that all the relevant information concerning the chargeable event is already known and therefore, in particular, that, at the time the payment on account is made, the goods or services have been clearly identified (see judgment in Orfey Balgaria , C‑549/11, EU:C:2012:832, paragraphs 28 and 39, and order in Sani treyd , C‑153/12, EU:C:2013:201, paragraphs 25 and 33).
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39. Lastly, it should be noted that, in order to determine whether the conditions for chargeability of the VAT owing on such a future supply of services are satisfied, it does not matter whether the consideration for that future supply of services itself constitutes a transaction which is subject to VAT. Under the case-law referred to in paragraphs 28 and 36 above, in order for the VAT owing on such a future supply of services to become chargeable in circumstances such as those present in the main proceedings, it is sufficient that all the relevant information concerning that future supply of services is already known and that the value of the corresponding consideration may be expressed in monetary terms.
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76. Figurent notamment au rang des facteurs pertinents à cet égard des éléments tels que la gravité de l’infraction constatée et la période durant laquelle celle-ci a persisté depuis le prononcé de l’arrêt l’ayant constatée (voir arrêts Commission/Grèce, C‑378/13, EU:C:2014:2405, point 76, et Commission/Italie, C‑196/13, EU:C:2014:2407, point 118).
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55
Amongst those elements, the Court indicated that the fact that the parents of the student concerned have been employed for a significant period in the Member State providing the aid applied for might be appropriate for the purposes of showing the actual degree of attachment with the society or labour market of that State (judgment of 20 June 2013, Giersch and Others, C‑20/12, EU:C:2013:411, paragraph 78).
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78. A sufficient attachment of the student in question with the Grand Duchy such as to make it possible to conclude that that probability exists may also be derived from the fact that that student resides alone or with his parents in a Member State which borders upon the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and that, for a significant period of time, his parents have worked in Luxembourg and live near to that Member State.
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54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
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86. That discretion relating to the protection of public health is particularly wide where it is shown that uncertainties continue to exist in the current state of scientific research as to certain substances used in the preparation of foodstuffs ( Commission v Denmark , paragraph 43, and Case C–24/00 Commission v France , paragraph 50).
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50. That discretion relating to the protection of public health is particularly wide where it is shown that there is still uncertainty in the current state of scientific research as to certain substances, such as vitamins, which are not as a general rule harmful in themselves but may have special harmful effects solely if taken to excess as part of the general diet, the composition of which cannot be foreseen or monitored (see Sandoz , paragraph 17, and Commission v Denmark , paragraph 43).
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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29. It must be pointed out that the MA in the European Union referred to in Article 13(1) of the SPC Regulation is not intended to take the place of the MA provided for in Article 3(b) of that regulation, that is to say, the authorisation granted by the Member State in which the application is submitted; instead, it constitutes a further condition applying in the event that the latter authorisation is not the first authorisation to place the product on the market as a medicinal product in the European Union (see, to that effect, Case C-127/00 Hässle [2003] ECR I-14781, paragraph 73).
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73. At paragraph 24 of Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical , the Court held that the effect of Articles 8(1)(a)(iv) and (b), 9(2)(d) and 11(1)(d) of Regulation No 1768/92 is that the first marketing authorisation in the Community is not intended to take the place of the marketing authorisation provided for in Article 3(b) of the abovementioned regulation, that is to say, the authorisation granted by the Member State in which the application is submitted; instead, it constitutes a further condition applying in the event that the latter authorisation is not the first authorisation to place the product on the market as a medicinal product in the Community.
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57. Par suite, l’expression «personnes handicapées» employée à l’article 5 de la directive 2000/78 doit être interprétée comme englobant toutes les personnes atteintes d’un handicap correspondant à la définition énoncée au point précédent.
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45. By allowing the taxable amount to be taken as the open market value of the transaction in certain cases, Article 80(1) of the VAT Directive lays down an exception to the general rule stated in Article 73 of the directive, which must as such be interpreted strictly (see Case C‑453/05 Ludwig [2007] ECR I‑5083, paragraph 21, and Case C‑41/09 Commission v Netherlands [2011] ECR I‑831, paragraph 58 and the case‑law cited).
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21. The terms used to specify the exemptions covered by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (Case 348/87 Stiching Uitvoering Financiële Acties [1989] ECR I-1737, paragraph 13, and Case C-2/95 SDC [1997] ECR I‑3017, paragraph 20).
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27. In laying down those conditions, however, the Member States are required to comply with European Union law, in particular with the objective pursued by Regulation No 1408/71 and the principles on which it is based.
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37. In that regard, it is settled case-law that, in relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and non-residents within a State are not, as a rule, comparable, since the income received in the territory of a Member State by a non-resident is in most cases only a part of his total income, which is concentrated at his place of residence, and because a non-resident’s personal ability to pay tax, determined by reference to his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances, is easier to assess at the place where his personal and financial interests are centred, which in general is the place where he is habitually resident (Case C‑279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I‑225, paragraphs 31 and 32; Case C‑234/01 Gerritse [2003] ECR I‑5933, paragraph 43; and Case C‑562/07 Commission v Spain [2009] ECR I‑9553, paragraph 46).
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31 In relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and of non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable.
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39 In weighing the various objectives laid down by the Treaty, whilst taking overall account of the experience acquired as a result of its earlier decisions, the Council, which enjoys for that purpose a considerable margin of discretion reflecting the political responsibilities entrusted to it by Articles 40 to 43 (now, after amendment, Articles 34 EC to 37 EC) and 136 of the EC Treaty, may be prompted, in case of need, to curtail certain advantages previously granted to the OCTs.
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26. The Court has in various settings referred to the importance, in both the legal order of the European Union and the national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata (Case C‑224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I‑10239, paragraph 38; C‑234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR I‑2585, paragraph 20; and C‑2/08 Fallimento Olimpiclub [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).
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22. In that connection, attention should be drawn to the importance, both for the Community legal order and for the national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata . In order to ensure stability of the law and legal relations, as well as the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that regard can no longer be called into question (Case C‑224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, paragraph 38, and Case C‑234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR I-2585, paragraph 20).
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124. It follows that the restriction which consists in the prohibition on using foreign decoding devices cannot be justified by the objective of encouraging the public to attend football stadiums.
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36. In the case where a parent company holds 100% of its subsidiary’s capital, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary (see judgment in Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , C‑97/08 P, EU:C:2009:536, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
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60. In the specific case of a parent company holding 100% of the capital of a subsidiary which has committed an infringement, there is a simple presumption that the parent company exercises decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary (see, to that effect, Case 107/82 AEG[-Telefunken] v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, paragraph 50, and PVC II , paragraph 59 above, paragraphs 961 and 984), and that they therefore constitute a single undertaking within the meaning of Article 81 EC (Joined Cases T‑71/03, T‑74/03, T‑87/03 and T‑91/03 Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission …, paragraph 59). It is thus for a parent company which disputes before the Community judicature a Commission decision fining it for the conduct of its subsidiary to rebut that presumption by adducing evidence to establish that its subsidiary was independent (Case T‑314/01 Avebe v Commission [2006] ECR II‑3085, paragraph 136; see also, to that effect, Case C‑286/98 P Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission [2000] ECR I‑9925 (‘Stora’), paragraph 29).
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33. Or, s’agissant de produits de construction non couverts par l’article 4, paragraphe 2, de la directive 89/106, l’article 6, paragraphe 2, de celle-ci dispose que les États membres autorisent leur mise sur le marché sur leur territoire si ces produits satisfont à des dispositions nationales conformes au traité, et ce jusqu’à ce que les spécifications techniques européennes en disposent autrement.
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28. The supply of goods or services can be regarded as ‘closely related’ to education, and thus subject to the same tax treatment under Article 13A(1)(i) of the Sixth Directive, only where they are actually supplied as services ancillary to the education which constitutes the principal service (see, by analogy, Case C‑76/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I‑249, paragraphs 27 to 30; Dornier , paragraphs 34 and 35; and also Ygeia , paragraphs 17 and 18).
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30 In those circumstances, the taking of the sample and the transmission of the sample to a specialised laboratory constitute services which are closely related to the analysis, so that they must be treated in the same way as the analysis for fiscal purposes and, accordingly, must not be subject to VAT.
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46
It follows from all the foregoing that Article 1(1) of Directive 2001/23 must be interpreted to the effect that, where a municipal undertaking, whose sole shareholder is a municipality, is wound up by a decision of the municipality’s executive body and its activities are transferred in part to the municipality to be carried on directly by it and in part to another municipal undertaking re-formed for that purpose, whose sole shareholder is also that same municipality, that situation falls within the scope of the directive, provided that the identity of the undertaking in question is preserved after the transfer, which is a matter for the referring court to determine.
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57
Furthermore, where the receiving agency, which is required to serve the document concerned on its addressee residing in another Member State, has not enclosed the standard form in Annex II of Regulation No 1393/2007, that omission cannot render invalid either the document to be served or the procedure for service, as that consequence would be incompatible with the objective pursued by that regulation, which consists in providing a means of direct, rapid and effective transmission between Member States of documents in civil and commercial matters (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 September 2015, Alpha Bank Cyprus, C‑519/13, EU:C:2015:603, paragraphs 60 to 66).
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61. Moreover, concerning the consequences of the refusal by the addressee of a document to accept it on the ground that that document was not accompanied by a translation in a language which he understands or in the official language of the receiving Member State, the Court has already held, w ith respect to Regulation No 1348/2000, which preceded Regulation No 1393/2007, that it was necessary not to declare the procedure invalid, but to allow, by contrast, the sender to remedy the lack of the required document by sending the requested translation (see, to that effect, judgment in Leffler , C‑443/03, EU:C:2005:665, paragraphs 38 and 53).
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22 With regard to the question whether maintaining industrial peace may constitute an overriding reason relating to the general interest which justifies the rules at issue in the main proceedings, it is apparent from the order for reference that those rules were adopted in order to settle long-standing disputes between tourist guides and travel and tourist agencies and thereby prevent any adverse effects on tourism, and consequently on the country's economy. In that regard, the Greek Government itself pointed out at the hearing that the rules at issue were adopted in order to ensure the proper functioning of the national economy.
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57. Furthermore, the Court has also held that the definition of the persons to whom Decision No 3/80 applies contained in Article 2 thereof is inspired by the same definition set out in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 (Case C-262/96 Sürül [1999] ECR I-2685, paragraph 84).
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84 The definition of the persons to whom Decision No 3/80 applies contained in Article 2 thereof is inspired by the same definition set out in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1408/71.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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23. In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court, in order to determine whether a body making a reference is a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, a question governed by EU law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes , whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see Case C‑394/11 Belov EU:C:2013:48, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). In addition, a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (see, in particular, Case C‑53/03 Syfait and Others EU:C:2005:333, paragraph 29, and Belov EU:C:2013:48, paragraph 39).
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39. In addition, a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (see, in particular, Case C-53/03 Syfait and Others [2005] ECR I-4609, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
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37. Having regard to the foregoing, the agreements at issue must be considered to be public service contracts subject to Directive 92/50 and not service concessions outside the scope of that directive.
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26 It is also clear from the case-law of the Court that for the principle concerning the offsetting of the burden to apply, the taxed product and the domestic product benefiting from it must be the same (Case 77/76 Cucchi v Avez [1977] ECR 987, paragraph 19, and Case 105/76 Interzuccheri v Rezzano e Cavassa [1977] ECR 1029, paragraph 12).
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12 IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING THAT THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION MUST BE THAT A DUTY FALLING WITHIN A GENERAL SYSTEM OF INTERNAL TAXATION APPLYING TO DOMESTIC PRODUCTS AS WELL AS TO IMPORTED PRODUCTS ACCORDING TO THE SAME CRITERIA CAN CONSTITUTE A CHARGE HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO A CUSTOMS DUTY ON IMPORTS ONLY IF IT HAS THE SOLE PURPOSE OF FINANCING ACTIVITIES FOR THE SPECIFIC ADVANTAGE OF THE TAXED DOMESTIC PRODUCT ; IF THE TAXED PRODUCT AND THE DOMESTIC PRODUCT BENEFITING FROM IT ARE THE SAME ; AND IF THE CHARGES IMPOSED ON THE DOMESTIC PRODUCT ARE MADE GOOD IN FULL .
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56. The European Court of Human Rights has stated that, in its analysis, it takes account of the age of the children concerned, their circumstances in the country of origin and the extent to which they are dependent on relatives ( Sen v. the Netherlands , § 37; see also Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands , no. 50435/99, § 39, 31 January 2006).
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74. Accordingly, the Court has accepted that a requirement of prior authorisation may, under certain conditions, be justified by such a consideration in the context of hospital care (see, inter alia, Smits and Peerbooms , paragraphs 76 to 81; Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraphs 76 to 81; and Watts , paragraphs 108 to 110) and in the context of medical care which, although it may be provided outside a hospital setting, requires the use of major and costly equipment exhaustively listed in the national legislation (see, to that effect, Commission v France , paragraphs 34 to 42).
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79. For one thing, it seeks to achieve the aim of ensuring that there is sufficient and permanent accessibility to a balanced range of high-quality hospital treatment in the State concerned.
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54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
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36. Moreover, adjustment periods for deductions do not have, as such, any effect on the origin of the right to deduction of VAT (see, to that effect, judgment in Lennartz , C‑97/90, EU:C:1991:315, paragraphs 8 and 20), which, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 20 of the present judgment, is determined solely by the capacity in which the interested party is acting when acquiring the goods concerned. This applies, however, without prejudice to the repayment of input VAT, which the taxable person will have to effect if it subsequently proves that the acquired or produced input goods have not been used for the purposes of his economic activity.
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20 The answer to that question depends on an assessment of all the relevant circumstances, inter alia the nature of the goods concerned and the period which elapsed between their acquisition and their use for the taxable person' s economic activities. However, the adjustment periods provided for in Article 20(2) of the Sixth Directive do not as such have any bearing on the question whether the goods are acquired for the purposes of those economic activities.
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16 Far from containing a direct and unconditional renvoi to provisions of Community law so as to incorporate them into the domestic legal order, the 1982 Act takes the Convention as a model only, and does not wholly reproduce the terms thereof.
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57. As regards in particular the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation, the Court has stated that, for the purposes of assessing whether there is a link between the marks at issue, it may be necessary to take into account the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation in order to determine whether that reputation extends beyond the public targeted by that mark. The Court explained inter alia in that regard that it is possible that the relevant section of the public as regards the goods or services for which the later mark is registered will make a connection between the marks at issue, even though that public is wholly distinct from the relevant section of the public as regards goods or services for which the earlier mark was registered (see Intel Corporation , paragraphs 52 and 53).
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53. For the purposes of assessing where there is a link between the conflicting marks, it may therefore be necessary to take into account the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation in order to determine whether that reputation extends beyond the public targeted by that mark.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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46
Further, it is apparent from Article 12(2) of the Authorisation Directive, read in the light of recital 30 thereof, that those charges must cover the actual administrative costs relating to the activities listed in Article 12(1)(a) and must be in balance with those costs. Accordingly, the total sum of the income obtained from the charge concerned cannot exceed the total of the costs relating to those activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, in Vodafone Omnitel and Others, C‑228/12 to C‑232/12 and C‑254/12 to C‑258/12, EU:C:2013:495, paragraphs 41 and 42).
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41. Furthermore, the Authorisation Directive does not lay down either the method for determining the amount of administrative charges which may be imposed pursuant to Article 12 thereof or the means of collecting those charges. However, first of all, it is clear from Article 12(2) of that directive, read in the light of recital 30 in the preamble thereto, that those charges must cover the actual administrative costs relating to the activities mentioned in paragraph 38 of this judgment and must be in balance with those costs. Thus, the totality of the income obtained by the Member States from the charge concerned cannot exceed the total costs relating to those activities (see, by analogy, Telefónica de España , paragraph 27). Second, Article 12(1)(b) of the Authorisation Directive requires the Member States to impose the administrative charges upon undertakings in an objective, transparent and proportionate manner.
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14 HOWEVER , THOSE PROVISIONS DO NOT PREVENT THE ADOPTION OF RULES OR OF A PRACTICE EXCLUDING FOREIGN PLAYERS FROM PARTICIPATION IN CERTAIN MATCHES FOR REASONS WHICH ARE NOT OF AN ECONOMIC NATURE , WHICH RELATE TO THE PARTICULAR NATURE AND CONTEXT OF SUCH MATCHES AND ARE THUS OF SPORTING INTEREST ONLY , SUCH AS , FOR EXAMPLE , MATCHES BETWEEN NATIONAL TEAMS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES .
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50. In this regard, the Court observes that, although it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review (see, inter alia, Case C-120/99 Italy v Council , cited above, paragraph 28, and Case C‑445/00 Austria v Council [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 49), it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law. The question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. This is a fortiori the case where the Member States have been closely associated with the process of drafting the contested measure and are thus aware of the reasons underlying that measure (see, inter alia, Case C-120/99 Italy v Council , cited above, paragraph 29, Case C‑445/00 Austria v Council , cited above, paragraph 99 and Case C-293/00 Netherlands v Commission [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 55 and 56).
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99. With respect to the head of complaint concerning failure to state reasons, it is settled case-law that it is not necessary for details of all relevant factual and legal aspects to be given in the statement of reasons, in so far as the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. This is a fortiori the case where the Member States have been closely associated with the process of drafting the contested measure and are thus aware of the reasons underlying that measure (see Case C-301/97 Netherlands v Council [2001] ECR I-8853, paragraph 188 and the case-law cited there).
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75. Nevertheless, Beaudout argues that the introduction of a mechanism authorising exemptions from affiliation would not endanger the financial balance of the body which manages the scheme at issue in the main proceedings.
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101. As regards the challenge to the judgment under appeal regarding the ruling by the General Court that the deletion of personal data by the Commission under the exception to the right of access to documents laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001was lawful, the case-law of the Court of Justice provides that the provisions of Regulation No 45/2001, of which Articles 8(b) and 18 constitute essential provisions, become applicable in their entirety where an application based on Regulation No 1049/2001 seeks to obtain access to documents containing personal data (judgment in Commission v Bavarian Lager , EU:C:2010:378, paragraphs 63 and 64).
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64. By not taking account of the reference in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001 to the legislation of the Union concerning the protection of personal data and thus to Regulation No 45/2001, the General Court dismissed at the outset, in paragraph 107 of the judgment under appeal, the application of Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, and, in paragraph 109 of the judgment under appeal, the application of Article 18 of Regulation No 45/2001. And yet those articles constitute essential provisions of the system of protection established by Regulation No 45/2001.
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19. Par conséquent, les dispositions concernant lesdites exonérations doivent recevoir une interprétation autonome, fondée sur leur libellé et sur les finalités poursuivies par la directive 2003/96 (arrêt du 1 er décembre 2011, Systeme Helmholz, C-79/10, non encore publié au Recueil, point 19).
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It must be recalled that point 13 of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines pursues the objective of adopting as the starting point for the calculation of the fine imposed on an undertaking an amount which reflects the economic significance of the infringement and the size of the undertaking’s contribution to it (judgment of 9 July 2015, InnoLux v Commission, C‑231/14 P, EU:C:2015:451, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
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50. Point 13 of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines therefore pursues the objective of adopting, as the starting point for the setting of the fine imposed on an undertaking, an amount which reflects the economic significance of the infringement and the relative size of the undertaking’s contribution to it (judgments in Team Relocations and Others v Commission , C‑444/11 P, EU:C:2013:464, paragraph 76; Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission , C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363, paragraph 57; and LG Display and LG Display Taiwan v Commission , C‑227/14 P, EU:C:2015:258, paragraph 53).
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45. In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first question is that Articles 203 and 204 of the Customs Code, read in conjunction with Article 859(2)(c) of the Implementing Regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that merely exceeding the time‑limit for presentation, set under Article 356(1) of the Implementing Regulation, does not lead to a customs debt being incurred for removal from customs supervision of the goods in question within the meaning of Article 203 of the Customs Code, but to a customs debt being incurred on the basis of Article 204 of the Customs Code and that it is not necessary, for a customs debt to be incurred under Article 204 thereof, that the interested parties supply to the customs authorities information on the reasons for exceeding the time-limit set under Article 356 of the Implementing Regulation or on the location of the goods in question during the time which elapsed between that time‑limit and the time at which they were actually presented at the customs office of destination.
The second question
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28. With respect to the request for production of the Commissioners' diaries, it must be observed that it is for the Community Court to decide, in the light of the circumstances of the case and in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure on measures of inquiry, whether it is necessary for a document to be produced. As regards the Court of First Instance, it follows from Article 49 read in conjunction with Article 65(b) of its Rules of Procedure that a request for production of documents is a measure of inquiry which the Court may order at any stage of the proceedings (Case C-286/95 P Commission v ICI [2000] ECR I-2341, paragraphs 49 and 50).
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50 As regards the Court of First Instance, it follows from Article 49 read in conjunction with Article 65(b) of its Rules of Procedure that a request for production of documents is a measure of inquiry which the Court may order at any stage of the proceedings.
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70. En outre, l’existence d’une violation des droits de la défense et du droit à une protection juridictionnelle effective doit être appréciée en fonction des circonstances spécifiques de chaque cas d’espèce (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 25 octobre 2011, Solvay/Commission, C‑110/10 P, Rec. p. I‑10439, point 63), notamment de la nature de l’acte en cause, du contexte de son adoption et des règles juridiques régissant la matière concernée (voir arrêt Kadi II, point 102; voir également, en ce sens, à propos du respect du devoir de motivation, arrêts du 15 novembre 2012, Al-Aqsa/Conseil et Pays-Bas/Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P et C‑550/10 P, points 139 et 140, ainsi que Conseil/Bamba, C‑417/11 P, point 53)
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45
In the second place, since Regulation No 601/2012 was adopted on the basis of Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/87 in order to clarify the monitoring and reporting conditions of greenhouse gas emissions, the scope of the provisions of that regulation which are at issue in the present case, and concern only such emissions within the meaning of Article 3(b) of Directive 2003/87, cannot be affected by other provisions of that directive relating to the production of CO2 and taken into account, inter alia, for the establishment of the ‘ex-ante benchmarks’ referred to in Article 10a of the same directive.
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37. In that regard, it follows from the provisions of Directive 2003/87 as a whole that that directive does not preclude the competent authorities of the Member States from carrying out additional controls or verifications, such as those carried out by the Emissionshandelsstelle after the surrender of allowances by Nordzucker. To the extent that such verifications may reveal irregularities or attempted fraud, they contribute to the correct functioning of the allowance trading scheme. However, where, in that context, a Member State authority finds that the amount of emissions for the previous year, as stated in an operator’s verified report, was understated and that, as a result, an insufficient number of allowances was surrendered, that cannot lead to the application of the penalty provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87.
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54. However, the detailed national procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) or render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, inter alia, Peterbroeck , paragraph 12 and the case‑law cited, and Grundig Italiana , paragraph 33 and the case‑law cited).
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22. However, in order for such rules to comply with the principle of proportionality, it must be ascertained not only whether the means which they employ are suitable for the purpose of attaining the desired objectives but also whether those means do not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (Case C‑463/01 Commission v Germany [2004] ECR I‑11705, paragraph 78, and Case C‑309/02 Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft and S. Spitz [2004] ECR I‑11763, paragraph 79).
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79. However, in order for such rules to comply with the principle of proportionality, it must be ascertained not only whether the means which they employ are suitable for the purpose of attaining the desired objectives but also whether those means do not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (see Case C-284/95 Safety Hi-Tech [1998] ECR I-4301, paragraph 57).
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47. In the context of the main proceedings, since the deprivation of the right to vote at issue stems from the application of the combined provisions of the Electoral Code and the Criminal Code, it must be held that it is provided for by law.
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27. The Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive, as well as their duty under Article 10 EC to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of the Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts ( von Colson and Kamann , paragraph 26, and Impact , paragraph 41).
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26 HOWEVER , THE MEMBER STATES ' OBLIGATION ARISING FROM A DIRECTIVE TO ACHIEVE THE RESULT ENVISAGED BY THE DIRECTIVE AND THEIR DUTY UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES , WHETHER GENERAL OR PARTICULAR , TO ENSURE THE FULFILMENT OF THAT OBLIGATION , IS BINDING ON ALL THE AUTHORITIES OF MEMBER STATES INCLUDING , FOR MATTERS WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION , THE COURTS . IT FOLLOWS THAT , IN APPLYING THE NATIONAL LAW AND IN PARTICULAR THE PROVISIONS OF A NATIONAL LAW SPECIFICALLY INTRODUCED IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT DIRECTIVE NO 76/207 , NATIONAL COURTS ARE REQUIRED TO INTERPRET THEIR NATIONAL LAW IN THE LIGHT OF THE WORDING AND THE PURPOSE OF THE DIRECTIVE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE RESULT REFERRED TO IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 189 .
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47. Selon une jurisprudence constante, l’imposition d’une astreinte ne se justifie en principe que pour autant que perdure le manquement tiré de l’inexécution d’un précédent arrêt jusqu’à l’examen des faits par la Cour (arrêt Commission/Irlande, C‑374/11, EU:C:2012:827, point 33 et jurisprudence citée).
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46. It has been consistently held (see, in particular, Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraphs 240 to 243, and the case‑law cited) that the Commission enjoys a wide discretion as regards the method used for calculating fines and that it can, in this respect, take account of numerous factors, whilst complying with the ceiling on turnover laid down in Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17.
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243. It follows that, on the one hand, it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing the fine, to have regard both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement. On the other hand, it follows that it is important not to confer on one or the other of those figures an importance disproportionate in relation to the other factors and, consequently, that the fixing of an appropriate fine cannot be the result of a simple calculation based on the total turnover. That is particularly the case where the goods concerned account for only a small part of that figure (see Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 121, and Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 111).
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28 SFI, however, argues that the practice of the Belgian administration infringes the principle of equality since a taxable person may exercise his right to deduct VAT only within a period of five years from the date on which that right arose, that is to say from the date on which the tax is due, whereas the five-year limitation period begins to run as against the tax authorities on the date on which the return should, in principle, be made.
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40. It must be recalled in that connection that, as the Advocate General observed in point 102 of his Opinion, in the sphere of the common commercial policy and, most particularly, in the realm of measures to protect trade, the Community institutions enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic, political and legal situations which they have to examine (see, to that effect, Case 191/82 Fediol v Commission [1983] ECR 2913, paragraph 26, and Case 255/84 Nachi Fujikoshi v Council [1987] ECR 1861, paragraph 21).
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21 IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT METHODS OF CALCULATION SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 2*(13)*(B ) OF REGULATION NO 3017/79 REQUIRES AN APPRAISAL OF COMPLEX ECONOMIC SITUATIONS . THE COURT MUST THEREFORE, AS IT HAS HELD IN PARTICULAR IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 11 JULY 1985 IN CASE 42/84 REMIA AND OTHERS V COMMISSION (( 1985 )) ECR 2545, LIMIT ITS REVIEW OF SUCH AN APPRAISAL TO VERIFYING WHETHER THE RELEVANT PROCEDURAL RULES HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH, WHETHER THE FACTS ON WHICH THE CHOICE IS BASED HAVE BEEN ACCURATELY STATED AND WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A MANIFEST ERROR OF APPRAISAL OR A MISUSE OF POWERS .
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58. It follows that only those acts of the European Union with a specific link to international trade are capable of falling within the field of the common commercial policy (see, to that effect, Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland , paragraph 52).
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38. In addition, in view of both the wording of that directive and its purpose and scheme, the various requirements it lays down concerning minimum rest periods constitute rules of Community social law of particular importance from which every worker must benefit as a minimum requirement necessary to ensure protection of his safety and health (see BECTU , paragraphs 43 and 47; Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 100; and Dellas , paragraph 49).
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47 It follows that, with regard to both the objective of Directive 93/104 and to its scheme, paid annual leave of a minimum duration of three weeks during the transitional period provided for in Article 18(1)(b)(ii) and four weeks after the expiry of that period constitutes a social right directly conferred by that directive on every worker as the minimum requirement necessary to ensure protection of his health and safety.
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54. As to the second condition, the decisive test for finding that a breach of Community law is sufficiently serious is whether the Community institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion (see the judgments cited above Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame , paragraph 55, and Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission , paragraph 43). Where that institution has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of Community law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach (Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553, paragraph 28; Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others [1996] ECR I-4845, paragraph 25; Case C-127/95 Norbrook Laboratories [1998] ECR I-1531, paragraph 109; Case C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I-5123, paragraph 38, and Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission , cited above, paragraph 44).
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87
It is true that the Court has previously held, in respect of national legislation by virtue of which certain undertakings were unable to participate in the collective bargaining body called upon to decide collective agreements and therefore could not assert their interests effectively in a contractual process or negotiate the aspects determining changes in working conditions for their employees with a view to their future economic activity, that in such a case the contractual freedom of those undertakings is seriously reduced to the point that such a limitation is liable to affect adversely the very essence of their freedom to conduct a business (judgment of 18 July 2013, Alemo-Herron and Others , C‑426/11, EU:C:2013:521, paragraphs 34 and 35).
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35. In those circumstances, the transferee’s contractual freedom is seriously reduced to the point that such a limitation is liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business.
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54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
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20 Furthermore, it has been held on several occasions that the first paragraph of Article 95 is infringed where the taxation on the imported product and that on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product (see, in particular, Case 45/75 Rewe-Zentrale v Hauptzollamt Landau [1976] ECR 181, paragraph 15, and Commission v Greece, cited above, paragraph 12).
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12 Furthermore, it has been held on several occasions that the first paragraph of Article 95 is infringed where the taxation on the imported product and that on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product (see in particular the judgment in Case 45/75 REWE-Zentrale v Hauptzollamt Landau [1976] ECR 181, paragraph 15).
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81
It must be found in that regard, first, that, as is apparent from paragraphs 61 to 64 above, the prohibition on the placing on the market of tobacco products with a characterising flavour is appropriate for facilitating the smooth functioning of the internal market for tobacco and related products.
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35. It should be emphasised that an action must be considered having regard only to the pleadings contained in the original applicat ion (Case C-256/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-2487, paragraph 31, and Case C-508/03 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I‑3969, paragraph 61).
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31 Those submissions are inadmissible because they are contrary to Article 38(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, under which the parties are required to state the subject-matter of the proceedings in the application initiating proceedings. Even though Article 42 of those Rules allows, subject to specific conditions, the introduction of new pleas in law, it is not permissible for a party to alter the very subject-matter of the proceedings. It follows that the merits of an application must be determined solely in the light of the submissions made in the application initiating the proceedings (see Case 232/78 Commission v France [1979] ECR 2729, paragraph 3).
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26. It is clear from those provisions that Coreper is not an institution of the Communities upon which the Treaty confers powers of its own but an auxiliary body of the Council, for which it carries out preparation and implementation work.
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37. When such an entity infringes competition rules, it falls, according to the principle of personal responsibility, to that entity to answer for that infringement (see, to that effect, Case C‑49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I‑4125, paragraph 145, and Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , paragraph 56).
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56. When such an economic entity infringes the competition rules, it falls, according to the principle of personal responsibility, to that entity to answer for that infringement (see, to that effect, Case C‑49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I‑4125, paragraph 145; Case C‑279/98 P Cascades v Commission [2000] ECR I‑9693, paragraph 78; and Case C‑280/06 ETI and Others [2007] ECR I‑10893, paragraph 39).
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30. Furthermore, by virtue of the first indent of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 1475/95, in all of the language versions apart from the Danish version, that reorganisation must involve ‘the whole’ or ‘a substantial part’ of the supplier’s network. Accordingly, the change to the distribution structures in question must be significant, both substantively and geographically.
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78. In the present case, it will be for the national court to determine whether the national provisions governing the taxes at issue in the main proceedings are based on objective criteria and ensure, in particular as regards the account to be taken of the actual depreciation of the vehicle subject to tax (see, to that effect, Case C‑47/88 Commission v Denmark [1990] ECR I‑4509, paragraphs 19 to 22; Weigel , paragraph 70; and Joined Cases C‑290/05 and C‑333/05 Nádasdi and Németh [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 47 and 51 to 57), that Mr Alevizos is not placed in a less favourable position than that of workers who have been permanently resident in Greece (see, to that effect, Lindfors , paragraph 35).
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70. In that regard, the Court has held that it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 90 EC to charge tax on imported used motor vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that they are taxed more heavily than similar used cars on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark , cited above, paragraph 22). It is therefore necessary, in taxing imported used cars, to take account of their actual depreciation.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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39. According to the case-law of the Court, the principle of legal certainty requires that taxable persons be aware, before concluding a transaction, of their tax obligations ( Teleos and Others , paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
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48. As regards, first, the principle of legal certainty, it must be observed all the more strictly in the case of rules liable to entail financial consequences, in order that those concerned may know precisely the extent of the obligations which such rules impose on them (see Case 326/85 Netherlands v Commission [1987] ECR 5091, paragraph 24, and Halifax and Others , paragraph 72). It follows that it is necessary, as Teleos and Others and the Commission correctly observe, that taxable persons be aware, before concluding a transaction, of their tax obligations.
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100. À cet égard, il convient de souligner que, dans le cas d’un recours en indemnité fondé sur une violation, par le Tribunal, de l’article 47, deuxième alinéa, de la Charte, en ce qu’il aurait méconnu les exigences liées au respect du délai de jugement raisonnable, il incombe à celui-ci, conformémen t à l’article 340, deuxième alinéa, TFUE, de prendre en considération les principes généraux applicables dans les ordres juridiques des États membres pour traiter les recours fondés sur des violations similaires. Dans ce contexte, le Tribunal doit notamment rechercher s’il est possible d’identifier, outre l’existence d’un préjudice matériel, celle d’un préjudice immatériel qui aurait été subi par la partie affectée par le dépassement de délai et qui devrait, le cas échéant, faire l’objet d’une réparation adéquate.
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53. Admittedly, the transmission of personal data, which may be authorised by agreements concluded pursuant to Article 23 of the Europol Decision, may interfere with the fundamental rights of the persons concerned, and some of those interferences may be so serious that intervention by the EU legislature becomes necessary (see, to that effect, judgment in Parliament v Council , C‑355/10, EU:C:2012:516, paragraph 77).
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77. Second, it is important to point out that provisions on conferring powers of public authority on border guards – such as the powers conferred in the contested decision, which include stopping persons apprehended, seizing vessels and conducting persons apprehended to a specific location – mean that the fundamental rights of the persons concerned may be interfered with to such an extent that the involvement of the European Union legislature is required.
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31 The Court has held on many occasions (see, inter alia, Case C-102/88 Ruzius-Wilbrink [1989] ECR 4311, paragraph 19) that Article 4(1), considered above and in the light of the purpose and content of that directive, is sufficiently precise to be relied upon by an individual before a national court in order to have any national provision not in conformity with that article disapplied.
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7. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑348/99 Commission v Luxembourg [2000] ECR I‑2917, paragraph 8, and Case C‑272/01 Commission v Portugal [2004] ECR I‑6767, paragraph 29).
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8 In that connection, it must be borne in mind that, in proceedings under Article 226 EC, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-315/98 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 11).
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40. As to the spring hunting of goosander, which is justified essentially by the need to ensure the putting in place by humans, in particular hunters, of nesting-boxes which are essential for that species’ reproduction, suffice it to refer to paragraphs 38 and 39 of this judgment, which apply mutatis mutandis to this point.
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39
In that respect, it should be clarified that clause 5 of the framework agreement does not lay down a general obligation on the Member States to provide for the conversion of fixed-term employment contracts into contracts of indefinite duration. Indeed, clause 5(2) of the framework agreement in principle leaves it to the Member States to determine the conditions under which fixed-term employment contracts or relationships are to be regarded as contracts or relationships of indefinite duration. It follows that the framework agreement does not specify the conditions under which contracts of indefinite duration may be used (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 July 2006, Adeneler and Others, C‑212/04, EU:C:2006:443, paragraph 91; of 7 September 2006, Marrosu and Sardino, C‑53/04, EU:C:2006:517, paragraph 47; of 23 April 2009, Angelidaki and Others, C‑378/07 to C‑380/07, EU:C:2009:250, paragraphs 145 and 183; of 3 July 2014, Fiamingo and Others, C‑362/13, C‑363/13 and C‑407/13, EU:C:2014:2044, paragraph 65, and the order of 11 December 2014, León Medialdea, C‑86/14, not published, EU:C:2014:2447, paragraph 47).
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145. Such a development of national legislation, which tends to reinforce measures to prevent the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts, accords, moreover, with the objective pursued by the Framework Agreement. First, as is apparent from clauses 1(b) and 5(1) of that agreement, it is intended precisely to establish a framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of such contracts ( Adeneler and Others , paragraph 79, and Case C‑53/04 Marrosu and Sardino [2006] ECR I‑7213, paragraph 43). Second, the Framework Agreement does not lay down any specific sanctions should instances of abuse have been established and, in particular, it neither lays down a general obligation on the Member States to provide for the recognition of fixed-term employment contracts as employment contracts of indefinite duration nor prescribes the precise conditions un der which fixed-term employment contracts may be used (see Adeneler and Others , paragraphs 91 and 94), thereby giving Member States a margin of discretion in the matter ( Marrosu and Sardino , paragraph 47). Thus, clause 5(2)(b) of the Framework Agreement merely provides that the Member States are, ‘where appropriate’, to determine under what conditions fixed-term employment contracts are to be ‘deemed to be contracts … of indefinite duration’.
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Enfin, la Cour a déjà eu l’occasion de préciser, d’une part, que cette exigence de nature procédurale ne va pas à l’encontre de la règle selon laquelle, s’agissant d’infractions aux règles de concurrence, c’est à la Commission qu’il appartient d’apporter la preuve des infractions qu’elle constate et d’établir les éléments de preuve propres à démontrer, à suffisance de droit, l’existence des faits constitutifs d’une infraction. Il est en effet demandé au requérant, dans le cadre d’un recours juridictionnel, d’identifier les éléments contestés de la décision attaquée, de formuler des griefs à cet égard et d’apporter des éléments de preuve, qui peuvent être constitués d’indices sérieux, tendant à démontrer que ses griefs sont fondés (arrêt du 24 octobre 2013, Kone e.a./Commission, C‑510/11 P, non publié, EU:C:2013:696, point 31).
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58. It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 296(2) TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Court to exercise its power of review. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296(2) TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, to that effect, inter alia Case C‑5/01 Belgium v Commission [2002] ECR I‑11991, paragraph 68; Case C‑501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I‑6717, paragraph 73; and judgment of 5 March 2009 in Case C‑479/07 France v Council , paragraph 49).
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73. According to settled case-law relating to Article 253 EC and applicable to Article 15 CS, the statement of reasons required by that provision must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to carry out its review. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see inter alia Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR I-723, paragraph 86; Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63; Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission [2002] ECR I-2289, paragraph 48; and Case C-5/01 Belgium v Commission , cited above, paragraph 68).
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84. Ainsi qu’il a été relevé au point 65 du présent arrêt, les d roits d’utilisation des fréquences doivent être attribués par les États membres sur la base de critères objectifs, transparents, non discriminatoires et proportionnés, cette dernière condition impliquant que ces critères soient propres à garantir la réalisation de l’objectif qu’ils poursuivent et n’aillent pas au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour qu’il soit atteint.
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41. It must be borne in mind at the outset that Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, together with Article 22 on related actions, is contained in Section 8 of Title II of the Convention, which is intended, in the interests of the proper administration of justice within the Community, to prevent parallel proceedings before the courts of different Contracting States and to avoid conflicts between decisions which might result therefrom. Those rules are therefore designed to preclude, so far as possible and from the outset, the possibility of a situation arising such as that referred to in Article 27(3) of the Convention, that is to say the non-recognition of a judgment on account of its irreconcilability with a judgment given in proceedings between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought (see Gubisch Maschinenfabrik , cited above, paragraph 8). It follows that, in order to achieve those aims, Article 21 must be interpreted broadly so as to cover, in principle, all situations of lis pendens before courts in Contracting States, irrespective of the parties' domicile (Overseas Union Insurance , cited above, paragraph 16).
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8 ACCORDING TO ITS PREAMBLE, WHICH INCORPORATES IN PART THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 220, THE CONVENTION SEEKS IN PARTICULAR TO FACILITATE THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OF COURTS OR TRIBUNALS AND TO STRENGTHEN IN THE COMMUNITY THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF PERSONS THEREIN ESTABLISHED . ARTICLE 21, TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 22 ON RELATED ACTIONS, IS CONTAINED IN SECTION 8 OF TITLE II OF THE CONVENTION; THAT SECTION IS INTENDED, IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, TO PREVENT PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURTS OF DIFFERENT CONTRACTING STATES AND TO AVOID CONFLICTS BETWEEN DECISIONS WHICH MIGHT RESULT THEREFROM . THOSE RULES ARE THEREFORE DESIGNED TO PRECLUDE, IN SO FAR AS IS POSSIBLE AND FROM THE OUTSET, THE POSSIBILITY OF A SITUATION ARISING SUCH AS THAT REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 27 ( 3 ), THAT IS TO SAY THE NON-RECOGNITION OF A JUDGMENT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS IRRECONCILABILITY WITH A JUDGMENT GIVEN IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES IN THE STATE IN WHICH RECOGNITION IS SOUGHT .
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23 In view of the nature of the analysis to be carried out, however, as the Court has already held, it is for the national court to classify the activities at issue in the light of the criterion adopted by the Court (Joined Cases 231/87 and 129/88 Comune di Carpaneto Piacentino, paragraph 16, and Case C-4/89 Comune di Carpaneto Piacentino, paragraph 11).
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46. Moreover, for the purposes of assessing whether a retirement pension – by reference to which, should the case arise, as in the present case, the survivor’s pension is calculated – falls within the scope of Article 141 EC, the Court has stated that, of the criteria for identifying a pension scheme which it has adopted on the basis of the situations brought before it, the one criterion which may prove decisive is whether the retirement pension is paid to the worker by reason of the employment relationship between him and his former employer, that is to say, the criterion of employment, based on the wording of that article (see, to that effect, Beune , paragraph 43; Evrenopoulos , paragraph 19; Case C‑366/99 Griesmar [2001] ECR I‑9383, paragraph 28; Case C‑351/00 Niemi [2002] ECR I‑7007, paragraphs 44 and 45; and Joined Cases C‑4/02 and C‑5/02 Schönheit and Becker [2003] ECR I‑12575, paragraph 56).
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56. In that regard, it is appropriate to bear in mind that, in order to ascertain whether a retirement pension falls within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty and, with effect from 1 May 1999, within that of Article 141(1) and (2) EC, the only possible decisive criterion is whether the pension is paid to the worker by reason of the employment relationship between him and his former employer, that is to say the criterion of employment based on the wording of the abovementioned provisions (see, to that effect, Case C-7/93 Beune [1994] ECR I-4471, paragraph 43; Case C-147/95 Evrenopoulos [1997] ECR I-2057, paragraph 19; Case C-366/99 Griesmar [2001] ECR I-9383, paragraph 28; and Case C-351/00 Niemi [2002] ECR I-7007, paragraph 45).
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41. However, the fact that the right to bargain collectively is a fundamental right, and the TV-EUmw/VKA’s social objective perceived as a whole, cannot, in themselves, mean that local authority employers are automatically excluded from the obligation to comply with the requirements stemming from Directives 92/50 and 2004/18, which implement freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services in the field of public procurement.
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7 As the Court has held, only intervention undertaken in accordance with the Community rules within the framework of the common organisation of agricultural markets is to be financed by the EAGGF (see Case C-253/97 Italy v Commission [1999] ECR I-7529, paragraph 6). In that context, it is for the Commission to prove an infringement of the rules on the common organisation of the agricultural markets (see Case C-281/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-347, paragraph 19; Case C-55/91 Italy v Commission [1993] ECR I-4813, paragraph 13; and Case C-253/97, cited above, paragraph 6). Accordingly, the Commission is obliged to give reasons for its decision finding an absence of, or defects in, inspection procedures operated by the Member State in question (Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraph 23).
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19 It is necessary in the first place to have regard to the general rules concerning the burden of proof in matters concerning the financing of the common agricultural policy. The Court has consistently held that it is for the Commission to prove an infringement of the rules on the common organization of the agricultural markets (see the judgment in Case 347/85 United Kingdom v Commission [1988] ECR 1749, in Case 262/87 Netherlands v Commission [1989] ECR 225 and in Case C-335/87 Hellenic Republic v Commission [1990] ECR I-2875). If the Commission establishes such an infringement, the Member State concerned must then, if appropriate, demonstrate that the Commission committed an error as to the financial consequences to be drawn from it.
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46. It follows that the concept of legal residence implied by the terms ‘have resided legally’ in Article 16(1) of Directive 2004/38 should be construed as meaning a period of residence which complies with the conditions laid down in the directive, in particular those set out in Article 7(1).
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170. In so far as the applicants in the main proceedings submit that, owing to the cumulative conditions imposed by Article 11 of Presidential Decree No 164/2004, certain fixed-term employment contracts concluded or renewed abusively in the public sector before the entry into force of the decree would escape any penalty, it should be observed that, in such a situation, a measure offering effective and equivalent guarantees for the protection of workers must be capable of being applied in order duly to punish that abuse and nullify the consequences of the breach of Community law. Consequently, in so far as the domestic law of the Member State concerned did not, during that period, include other effective measures for that purpose, for example, because the penalties laid down in Article 7 of the decree did not apply rationae temporis , the recognition of fixed-term employment contracts as contracts of indefinite duration pursuant to Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920 could, as the applicant in the main proceedings in Case C‑379/07 submits, constitute such a measure (see, to that effect, Adeneler and Others , paragraphs 98 to 105, and order in Vassilakis and Others , paragraphs 129 to 137).
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102. Furthermore, where such misuse has nevertheless taken place, a measure offering effective and equivalent guarantees for the protection of workers must be capable of being applied in order duly to punish that abuse and nullify the consequences of the breach of Community law. According to the very wording of the first paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 1999/70, the Member States must ‘take any necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by [the] Directive’.
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94. Articles 92(3)(c) and 93 of the Treaty expressly state that the Commission "may" consider aid covered by the first of those two provisions to be compatible with the common market. Accordingly, whilst the Commission must always determine whether State aid subject to review by it is compatible with the common market, even if that aid has not been notified to it (see Case C-301/87 France v Commission (the "Boussac Saint Frères " case) [1990] ECR I-307, paragraphs 15 to 24), it is not bound to declare such aid compatible with the common market.
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18 In the light of the reply to the first question, the second must be understood as asking whether the limitation of the effects in time of the Barber judgment applies to the right to join an occupational pension scheme such as that at issue in the main proceedings and to the right to payment of a retirement pension where the employee was excluded from membership of such a scheme in breach of Article 119 of the Treaty.
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29 That interpretation of Article 119 is not affected by the fact that the private occupational scheme in question has been set up in the form of a trust and is administered by trustees who are technically independent of the employer, since Article 119 also applies to consideration received indirectly from the employer .
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104. Moreover, it should be noted that, having regard to the discretion which Member States enjoy in determining the level of protection of consumers and the social order in the gaming sector, it is not necessary, with regard to the criterion of proportionality, that a restrictive measure decreed by the authorities of one Member State should correspond to a view shared by all the Member States concerning the means of protecting the legitimate interest at issue (see, by analogy, Case C‑518/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑3491, paragraphs 83 and 84).
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22. It should be noted at the outset that Regulation No 1408/71 implements Article 42 EC, which provides for coordination of national social security legislation rather than harmonisation. Substantive and procedural differences between the social security systems of individual Member States, and hence in the rights of persons working there, are therefore unaffected by that provision (see, in particular, Case 41/84 Pinna [1986] ECR 1, paragraph 20; Case C‑340/94 de Jaeck [1997] ECR I‑461, paragraph 18; and Case C‑208/07 von Chamier-Glisczinski [2009] ECR I‑6095, paragraph 84).
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20 AS REGARDS THE DIFFERENCE IN TREATMENT BETWEEN WORKERS TO WHOM ARTICLE 73 ( 1 ) APPLIES AND WORKERS SUBJECT TO THE ARRANGEMENTS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 73 ( 2 ), IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT ARTICLE 51 OF THE TREATY PROVIDES FOR THE COORDINATION , NOT THE HARMONIZATION , OF THE LEGISLATION OF THE MEMBER STATES . AS A RESULT , ARTICLE 51 LEAVES IN BEING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES ' SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS AND , CONSEQUENTLY , IN THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WORKING IN THE MEMBER STATES . IT FOLLOWS THAT SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES , AND HENCE IN THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WORKING IN THE MEMBER STATES , ARE UNAFFECTED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE TREATY .
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29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).
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23. The Court also stated that such an interest exists as long as the appeal may, if successful, procure an advantage to the party bringing it (see, Case C-277/01 P Parliament v Samper [2003] ECR I-3019, paragraph 28, and Case C-362/05 P Wunenburger v Commission [2007] ECR I-4333, paragraph 42, and order of 8 April 2008 in Case C-503/07 Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v Commission [2008] ECR I-2217, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
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28. It should be recalled that for the Parliament to have an interest in bringing appeal proceedings the appeal must be likely, if successful, to procure an advantage for it (Case C-174/99 P Parliament v Richard [2000] ECR I-6189, paragraph 33).
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117. La condamnation au paiement d’une somme forfaitaire et la fixation du montant éventuel de cette somme doivent, dans chaque cas d’espèce, demeurer fonction de l’ensemble des éléments pertinents ayant trait tant aux caractéristiques du manquement constaté qu’à l’attitude propre à l’État membre concerné par la procédure initiée sur le fondement de l’article 260 TFUE. À cet égard, celui-ci investit la Cour d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation afin de décider de l’infliction ou non d’une telle sanction et de déterminer, le cas échéant, son montant (arrêt Commission/Italie, C‑196/13, EU:C:2014:2407, point 114 et jurisprudence citée).
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23 Thus they are subject, for example, to the provisions of Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty relating to the free movement of goods. According to the case-law of the Court, musical works are incorporated into phonograms which constitute goods the trade in which, within the Community, is governed by the above provisions (see, to that effect, the judgment in Musik-Vertrieb membran, cited above, paragraph 8).
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8 IT SHOULD FIRST BE EMPHASIZED THAT SOUND RECORDINGS , EVEN IF INCORPORATING PROTECTED MUSICAL WORKS , ARE PRODUCTS TO WHICH THE SYSTEM OF FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS PROVIDED FOR BY THE TREATY APPLIES . IT FOLLOWS THAT NATIONAL LEGISLATION WHOSE APPLICATION RESULTS IN OBSTRUCTING TRADE IN SOUND RECORDINGS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES MUST BE REGARDED AS A MEASURE HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO A QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE TREATY . THAT IS THE CASE WHERE SUCH LEGISLATION PERMITS A COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT SOCIETY TO OBJECT TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOUND RECORDINGS ORIGINATING IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE ON THE BASIS OF THE EXCLUSIVE EXPLOITATION RIGHT WHICH IT EXERCISES IN THE NAME OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNER .
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62. As stated in paragraph 36 of the judgment in Zenatti , the restrictions must in any event reflect a concern to bring about a genuine diminution of gambling opportunities, and the financing of social activities through a levy on the proceeds of authorised games must constitute only an incidental beneficial consequence and not the real justification for the restrictive policy adopted.
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40. In that regard, it must be pointed out that the Court has already held, as regards the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, that the application of the three-out-of-six-years rule established an unjustified inequality of treatment as between Netherlands workers and migrant workers residing in the Netherlands because, by requiring specific periods of residence in the territory of the Member State concerned, the rule prioritised an element which is not necessarily the sole element representative of the actual degree of attachment between the party concerned and that Member State and was therefore too exclusive (see judgment in Commission v Netherlands , C‑542/09, EU:C:2012:346, paragraphs 86 and 88).
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86. Nevertheless, as the Advocate General indicated in point 158 of her Opinion, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would have needed at least to show why it opted for the ‘three out of six years’ rule, to the exclusion of all other representative elements. It should be pointed out in that regard that the rule is too exclusive. By requiring specific periods of residence in the territory of the Member State concerned, the ‘three out of six years’ rule prioritises an element which is not necessarily the sole element representative of the actual degree of attachment between the party concerned and that Member State.
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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68. As regards first the aid at issue granted to non-professional transport companies, it is clear from the judgment referred to in the previous paragraph that while the Commission was entitled to examine the effect on the transport sector of the grant of such aid, it could not simply treat non-professional transport companies as if they were professional transport companies (Spain v Commission , paragraph 49).
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49 Therefore, whilst the Commission was entitled to examine the effect on the transport sector of the grant of the contested aid to non-transport companies, it could not simply treat those companies as if they were operators in the transport sector.
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30. Second, Article 18 EC, which sets out generally the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in Article 39 EC in relation to freedom of movement for workers (see Case C‑3/08 Leyman [2009] ECR I‑9085, paragraph 20 and case-law cited).
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140. As the Advocate General has stated in paragraph 97 of her Opinion, it is clear from Article 24 of Regulation No 4253/88 – the provision on which the withdrawal decision is based – that the Commission is not required to request repayment of the financial assistance in full, but at its discretion may or may not decide to request such repayment and, where appropriate, to set the proportion to be repaid (see also, to that effect, the judgment in Ireland v Commission , paragraphs 27 and 30). In the light of the principle of proportionality, the Commission must exercise this discretion in such a way that repayments which it orders are not disproportionate to the irregularities committed.
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27. In particular, pursuant to Article 24(2) of Regulation No 4253/88, if the examination in respect of an operation or measure for which Community assistance was granted reveals an irregularity, the Commission may reduce, suspend or cancel that assistance.
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29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).
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83. As regards the compatibility with Article 49 EC of the national scheme at issue, it has consistently been held that Article 49 EC requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (see, in particular, Case C‑350/07 Kattner Stahlbau [2009] ECR I‑1513, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
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78. In this respect, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law, the freedom to provide services requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (see, to that effect, in particular, Case C‑205/99 Analir and Others [2001] ECR I‑1271, paragraph 21; Joined Cases C‑202/04 and C‑94/04 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 56; and Case C‑208/05 ITC [2007] ECR I‑181, paragraph 55).
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19 It should also be noted that the records which are kept in order to comply with the requirement to keep stock accounts must include, as an indispensable minimum, all the information listed in Article 4 ( 2 ), and be accompanied by supporting documents . If the indispensable minimum information is not present, the requirement to keep a stock account cannot be regarded as having been met . However, if any doubt exists as to the accuracy of certain entries in the stock account, Article 4 ( 2 ) does not preclude the use of other additional documents in order to remove those doubts .
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26. However, where a national measure affects both the freedom to provide services and the free movement of goods, the Court will, in principle, examine it in relation to just one of those two fundamental freedoms if it is clear that, in the circumstances of the case, one of those freedoms is entirely secondary in relation to the other and may be attached to it (see, to that effect, Schindler , paragraph 22; Canal Satélite Digital , paragraph 31; Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 46).
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31 Where a national measure restricts both the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services, the Court will in principle examine it in relation to one only of those two fundamental freedoms where it is shown that, in the circumstances of the case, one of them is entirely secondary in relation to the other and may be considered together with it (see, in relation to lottery activities, Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, paragraph 22).
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12 It must be noted, at the outset, that it follows both from the purpose of the directive, which, according to the 15th recital, applies to all risks, and from the wording of Article 6(3)(a) thereof, that employers are obliged to evaluate all risks to the safety and health of workers.
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26. The Court has thus held that the first paragraph of Article 90 EC is infringed when a Member State charges on second-hand vehicles from another Member State a tax the amount of which, calculated without taking the vehicle's actual depreciation into account, exceeds the amount of the residual tax incorporated in the value of similar second-hand vehicles already registered in the national territory (Case C‑345/93 Nunes Tadeu [1995] ECR I‑479 paragraph 20, and Gomes Valente, paragraph 23).
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20 In the light of all those considerations the reply to the first question must be that it is incompatible with Article 95 of the EEC Treaty for a Member State to charge on second-hand cars from other Member States a tax which, being calculated without taking the vehicle' s actual depreciation into account, exceeds the residual tax incorporated in the value of similar second-hand motor vehicles already registered in the national territory.
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9 ALTHOUGH PROCEDURAL RULES ARE GENERALLY HELD TO APPLY TO ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING AT THE TIME WHEN THEY ENTER INTO FORCE , THIS IS NOT THE CASE WITH SUBSTANTIVE RULES . ON THE CONTRARY , THE LATTER ARE USUALLY INTERPRETED AS APPLYING TO SITUATIONS EXISTING BEFORE THEIR ENTRY INTO FORCE ONLY IN SO FAR AS IT CLEARLY FOLLOWS FROM THEIR TERMS , OBJECTIVES OR GENERAL SCHEME THAT SUCH AN EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO THEM .
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71
In that regard, it should be borne in mind that an undertaking’s participation in a meeting having an anticompetitive object creates a presumption of the illegality of its participation, which that undertaking must rebut through evidence of public distancing, which must be perceived as such by the other parties to the cartel (judgment in Total Marketing Services v Commission, C‑634/13 P, EU:C:2015:614, paragraph 21).
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21. The Court has also held that an undertaking’s participation in an anti-competitive meeting creates a presumption of the illegality of its participation, which that undertaking must rebut through evidence of public distancing, which must be perceived as such by the other parties to the cartel (see, to that effect, judgment in Comap v Commission , C‑290/11 P, EU:C:2012:271, paragraphs 74 to 76 and the case-law cited).
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23 Moreover, the importance of the aims pursued by the regulation at issue is such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for some operators.
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74. It is settled case‑law of the Court that all of the Treaty provisions relating to the freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Community (see, in particular, Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 94; Case C‑18/95 Terhoeve [1999] ECR I‑345, paragraph 37; Case C‑190/98 Graf [2000] ECR I‑493, paragraph 21; and Weigel , paragraph 52).
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37 The Court has also held that the Treaty provisions relating to freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Community, and preclude measures which might place Community nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State (Case 143/87 Stanton v INASTI [1988] ECR 3877, paragraph 13; Singh, cited above, paragraph 16; and Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 94).
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46. Furthermore, it is common ground that the plans and programmes that the contested decree contains in principle fall within the scope of Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42 since they concern, in essence, town and country planning and land use.
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22 Since the provision of insurance constitutes a service within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty, it must next be borne in mind that, according to the case-law of the Court, Article 59 of the Treaty precludes the application of any national legislation which, without objective justification, impedes a provider of services from actually exercising the freedom to provide them (see, in particular, Case C-381/93 Commission v France [1994] ECR I-5145, paragraph 16).
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16 Once the provision of services at issue in the present action is established as falling within Article 59 of the Treaty, under the Court' s consistent case-law Article 59 precludes the application of any national legislation which without objective justification impedes a provider of services from actually exercising that freedom (see judgment in Case C-288/89 Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007).
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Italmobiliare soutient, en substance, que le Tribunal a commis une erreur de droit en estimant que le moyen tiré du défaut
de motivation de la décision litigieuse n’était pas fondé et devait être rejeté. Il s’agit d’une question de droit soumise
au contrôle de la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi (voir arrêt Commission/Salzgitter, C‑408/04 P, EU:C:2008:236, point 55 et
jurisprudence citée).
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39. A difference in the treatment of resident and non-resident taxpayers cannot therefore in itself be categorised as discrimination within the meaning of the Treaty ( Wielockx , paragraph 19, and Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France , paragraph 24).
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24. Different treatment of resident and non-resident taxpayers cannot therefore in itself be categorised as discrimination within the meaning of the EC Treaty (see, to that effect, Wielockx , paragraph 19).
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20 In contrast, the fact that those negotiations resulted in Decision No 2/80 of the Association Council indicates that the Community' s offer "to grant Turkey exceptional aid totalling 75 million European units of account" was accepted by Turkey . By providing for cooperation with regard to "... the implementation of the ... aid ... made available to Turkey", the Association Council placed that aid within the institutional framework of the Association . Under those circumstances, there is nothing in the documents before the Court to suggest that the classification of the special aid as compulsory expenditure is vitiated by an error of law or a manifest error of assessment .
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34. It follows that the details of a project cannot be considered to be adopted by a legislative act within the meaning of Article 1(5) of Directive 85/337 if that act does not include the elements necessary to assess the environmental impact of the project or if the adoption of other measures is needed in order for the developer to be entitled to carry out the project (see WWF and Others , paragraph 62; Linster , paragraph 57; and Boxus and Others , paragraph 41).
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41. As regards the second condition, it is clear from Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337 that the fundamental objective of the directive is to ensure that projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment with regard to their environmental effects before consent is given (see Linster , paragraph 52).
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28. À cet égard, il y a lieu de rappeler que, en l’absence d'une harmonisation au niveau de l'Union, les désavantages pouvant découler de l’exercice parallèle des compétences fiscales des différents États membres, pour autant qu’un tel exercice n’est pas discriminatoire, ne constituent pas des restrictions aux libertés de circulation (voir arrêt du 8 décembre 2011, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, C‑157/10, Rec. p. I‑13023, point 38).
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17. In order to prevent the protection afforded to the proprietor varying from one State to another, the Court must therefore give a uniform interpretation to Article 5(1) of the directive, in particular the term ‘use’ which appears there ( Arsenal Football Club , paragraph 45).
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45 In order to prevent the protection afforded to the proprietor varying from one State to another, the Court must therefore give a uniform interpretation to Article 5(1) of the Directive, in particular the term `use' which is the subject of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in the present case (see, to that effect, Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, paragraphs 42 and 43).
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29. Secondly, owing to the special nature of the employment relationships inherent in the making available of labour, pursuit of that activity directly affects both relations on the labour market and the lawful interests of the workforce concerned ( Webb , paragraph 18).
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39. It is settled case-law that the concept of ‘worker’ for the purposes of Directive 92/85 may not be interpreted differently according to each national law and must be defined in accordance with objective criteria which distinguish the employment relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned. The essential feature of an employment relationship is that, for a certain period of time, a person performs services for and under the direction of another person, in return for which he receives remuneration (see, by analogy, in the context of freedom of movement for workers and the principle of equal pay for men and women, Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraphs 16 and 17, and Case C‑256/01 Allonby [2004] ECR I-873, paragraph 67; and, in the context of Directive 92/85, Case C‑116/06 Kiiski [2007] ECR I‑7643, paragraph 25).
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67. For the purposes of that provision, there must be considered as a worker a person who, for a certain period of time, performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration (see, in relation to free movement of workers, in particular Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraph 17, and Martínez Sala , paragraph 32).
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35. Moreover, as the Advocate General has noted in point 23 of his Opinion, the referring court has made a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court specifically in proceedings for the annulment of those provisions, which apply not only to Belgian nationals but also to nationals of other Member States. Consequently, the decision of the referring court that will be adopted pursuant to the present judgment will also have effects on the nationals of other Member States.
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35. In the present case, that period expired two months after the receipt by the Kingdom of Spain of the reasoned opinion sent to it on 13 July 2006 and, in accordance with settled case-law, subsequent changes cannot be taken into account by the Court (see, in particular, Case C‑135/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I‑6909, paragraph 31).
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31. As a preliminary point it should be noted that according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-63/02 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-821, paragraph 11, and Case C‑341/02 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 33). Subsequent changes cannot be taken into account by the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-482/03 Commission v Ireland , not published in the ECR, paragraph 11).
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123. On that hypothesis, which is subject to the national court’s assessment, the banking foundation must be regarded as an undertaking, in that it engages in an economic activity, notwithstanding the fact that the offer of goods or services is made without profit motive, since that offer will be in competition with that of profit-making operators.
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43. In addition, it must be pointed out that the fact of allowing an intermediate supplier, under such a scheme, to obtain reimbursement of an amount, or even the full amount, of VAT in the case where the purchaser, pleading, inter alia, its own insolvency, fails to pay for supplies, is, as the Belgian and Czech Governments have pointed out in their observations, as likely to complicate significantly the charging of VAT as it is to encourage avoidance and evasion, whereas the simplification of the charging of VAT and the prevention of such avoidance and evasion are precisely the objectives pursued by that scheme, in accordance with Article 27(1) of the Sixth Directive (see, by way of analogy, Heintz van Landewijck , paragraphs 43, 62 and 65, and Case C‑374/06 BATIG [2007] ECR I‑11271, paragraph 39).
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65. The disappearance of tax stamps, unlike the theft of goods, has no effect on the taxable amount itself. The manufactured tobacco in respect of which the stamps were purchased may still be sold and the VAT debt, like the excise duty debt, may still arise. Furthermore, it is reasonable, as it has been observed, to encourage the purchaser of tax stamps to take precautions against the risk that they might go missing, although it is probably unnecessary to encourage the owner of goods to supervise them and take precautions against the risk of theft.
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20 IN GENERAL, UNIVERSITY STUDIES FULFIL THESE CRITERIA . THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS ARE CERTAIN COURSES OF STUDY WHICH, BECAUSE OF THEIR PARTICULAR NATURE, ARE INTENDED FOR PERSONS WISHING TO IMPROVE THEIR GENERAL KNOWLEDGE RATHER THAN PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR AN OCCUPATION .
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123. Moreover, according to settled case-law, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in setting the amount of fines and is not bound by assessments made by it in the past (see Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraphs 209 to 213, and Case C-510/06 P Archer Daniels Midland v Commission [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 82). It follows that the appellant cannot invoke the Commission’s decision-making policy before the Community judicature.
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210. That case-law applies a fortiori to rules of conduct designed to produce external effects, as is the case of the Guidelines, which are aimed at traders.
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29. With regard, firstly, to the determination, generally, of a minimum reserve time to which the national court refers, it should be noted that, at paragraph 42 of Wallentin-Hermann , the Court held, in that connection, that it was necessary to ascertain whether the air carrier concerned had taken measures appropriate to the particular situation, that is to say, measures which, at the time of the occurrence of the extraordinary circumstances whose existence the air carrier is to establish, met, inter alia, conditions which were technically and economically viable for that carrier.
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44. A distinction must therefore be made between different treatment permitted under Article 58(1)(a) EC and arbitrary discrimination prohibited under Article 58(3) EC. It is apparent from settled case-law that, in order for national tax rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings – which, for the purposes of calculating inheritance tax, distinguish as to the amount of the tax-free allowance in respect of immovable property located in the Member State concerned according to whether the deceased or the heir resides in that State or whether they both reside in another Member State – to be regarded as compatible with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, the difference in treatment must concern situations which are not objectively comparable or justifiable by overriding reasons in the public interest. In order to be justified, moreover, the difference in treatment must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective of the legislation in question (see Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-7477, paragraph 29; Eckelkamp and Others , paragraphs 58 and 59; Arens-Sikken , paragraphs 52 and 53; and Mattner , paragraph 34).
The comparability of the situations at issue
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34. A distinction must therefore be drawn between the unequal treatment permitted under Article 58(1)(a) EC and the arbitrary discrimination prohibited under Article 58(3) EC. According to the case-law, in order for national tax legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings – which, for the purposes of calculating gift tax, distinguishes as to the amount of the allowance applicable to the taxable value of immovable property located in the Member State concerned according to whether the donor or the donee resides in that State or they both reside in another Member State – to be regarded as compatible with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, the difference in treatment must concern situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by overriding reasons in the general interest. In order to be justified, moreover, the difference in treatment between those two categories of gifts must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective of the legislation in question (see Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraph 29; Eckelkamp and Others , paragraphs 58 and 59; and Arens-Sikken , paragraphs 52 and 53).
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75. The Commission considers that the Court of First Instance did not fully examine the documents which led to the statement of 23 July 1997 and that it distorted them.
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48 Such an undertaking must ensure that throughout the territory in respect of which the concession is granted, all consumers, whether local distributors or end-users, receive uninterrupted supplies of electricity in sufficient quantities to meet demand at any given time, at uniform tariff rates and on terms which may not vary save in accordance with objective criteria applicable to all customers.
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19 In that connection, it is not necessary for the deferred payment to be the subject of a specific agreement between the seller and the buyer, separate from the agreement relating to the sale of the imported goods. Article 3 of Regulation No 1495/80, both in its original version and as amended by Regulation No 220/85, requires the charges for interest under a financing arrangement to be distinguished from the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods. Where charges for interest payable as consideration for the deferred payment agreed by the seller are a separate item on the invoice sent to the buyer, it must be considered that, where there is no objection on the part of the buyer, he has in effect agreed to the charges for interest relating to the deferred payment.
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61. In view of the extent of the protection afforded to a trade mark by Regulation No 40/94, the public interest underlying Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation is, manifestly, indissociable from the essential function of a trade mark ( SAT.1 v OHIM , paragraph 27, and BioID v OHIM , paragraph 60).
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60. In addition, it must be pointed out that the notion of general interest underlying Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 is, manifestly, indissociable from the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product or service to the consumer or end-user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which have another origin (see, SAT.1 v OHIM , cited above, paragraphs 23 and 27).
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17 In this case, the formal letters of 12 March 1991 and 12 February 1992 sufficiently identified the alleged failure of the Italian Republic to fulfil its obligations, consisting in the adoption of the decrees at issue containing technical regulations without first notifying them to the Commission at the draft stage, as required by Directive 83/189. Those letters thus informed the Italian Government of the nature of the complaints against it and gave it the opportunity to submit its defence, which it did by the two telex messages of 18 April 1991 and 31 March 1992.
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27. Although, as Community law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall within the scope of the Community’s competence, Member States must nevertheless exercise their retained powers consistently with Community law (see Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, paragraph 21; Case C-436/00 X and Y [2002] ECR I-10829, paragraph 32, and Case C-9/02 De Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I-2409, paragraph 44).
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44. Moreover, the prohibition on Member States establishing restrictions on the freedom of establishment also applies to tax provisions. According to consistent case-law, even if, in the current state of Community law, direct taxation does not as such fall within the scope of the Community’s jurisdiction, Member States must nevertheless exercise their retained powers in compliance with Community law (Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, paragraph 21; ICI , cited above, paragraph 19; Case C-436/00 X and Y [2002] ECR I-10829, paragraph 32).
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68 In view of all foregoing considerations the reply to be given to the first and fourth questions concerning point 3 of Article 13B(d) of the Sixth Directive must be that this provision is to be interpreted as meaning that transactions concerning transfers and payments include operations carried out by a data-handling centre if those operations are distinct in character and are specific to, and essential for, the exempt transactions.
SDC's other functions
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46. In that regard, it must be pointed out that Article 5(3) of Regulation No 3665/87 constitutes an exception to the normal export refund procedure and, consequently, that provision must be interpreted strictly. Since the existence of force majeure is an essential condition of being able to claim payment of refunds for exported goods which have not been released for consumption in the non‑member country of import, it follows that that term must be interpreted in such a way that the number of cases capable of benefiting from such payment remains limited (see, by analogy, Case C‑38/07 P Heuschen & Schrouff Oriëntal Foods Trading v Commission [2008] ECR I‑8599, paragraph 60).
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60. It must be borne in mind at the outset that repayment or remission of import and export duties, which may be made only under certain conditions and in cases specifically provided for, constitutes an exception to the normal import and export procedure and, consequently, the provisions which provide for such repayment or remission must be interpreted strictly. Since a lack of ‘obvious negligence’ is an essential condition of being able to claim repayment or remission of import or export duties, it follows that that term must be interpreted in such a way that the number of cases of repayment or remission remains limited ( Söhl & Söhlke , paragraph 52).
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66. En outre, la Cour a déjà jugé que la circonstance qu’un État membre a confié à ses régions le soin de mettre en œuvre des directives ne saurait avoir aucune incidence sur l’application de l’article 258 TFUE. En effet, si chaque État membre est libre de répartir, comme il l’entend, les compétences normatives sur le plan interne, il n’en demeure pas moins que, en vertu de l’article 258 TFUE, il reste seul responsable, vis-à-vis de l’Union, du respect des obligations qui résultent du droit de l’Union (voir arrêt du 10 juin 2004, Commission/Italie, C‑87/02, Rec. p. I‑5975, point 38 et jurisprudence citée). Dès lors, un État membre ne saurait exciper de dispositions, pratiques ou situations de son ordre juridique interne pour justifier le non-respect des obligations et des délais résultant du droit de l’Union (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 15 décembre 2005, Commission/Allemagne, C‑67/05, point 9 et jurisprudence citée).
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38. However, partial annulment of an act of EU law is possible only if the elements which it is sought to have annulled can be severed from the remainder of the measure. That requirement is not satisfied where the partial annulment of a measure would cause the substance of that measure to be altered, a point which must be determined on the basis of an objective criterion and not of a subjective criterion linked to the political intention of the authority which adopted the measure at issue (see, to that effect, Case C-244/03 France v Parliament and Council [2005] ECR I-4021, paragraphs 12 to 14, and Commission v Département du Loiret, paragraphs 105 and 106).
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12. It must be borne in mind in this regard that, as follows from settled case-law, partial annulment of a Community act is possible only if the elements the annulment of which is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (see, inter alia, Case C-29/99 Commission v Council [2002] ECR I-11221, paragraphs 45 and 46; Case C-378/00 Commission v Parliament and Council [2003] ECR I‑937, paragraph 30; and Case C-239/01 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I‑10333, paragraph 33).
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47. According to Article 8(4) of the Access Directive, obligations imposed in accordance with that article must be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, and those obligations may be imposed only following consultation in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 of the Framework Directive.
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45. Such rights and benefits include all those relating to employment conditions, like the right of a worker employed under a full-time contract of indefinite duration who is entitled to part-time parental leave to a fixed-sum protective award in the event of the employer’s unilateral termination of a contract without compelling or sufficient reason. That award, the amount of which is linked to the salary related to that contract and the aim of which is to protect such a worker against dismissal on the grounds of an application for, or the taking of, parental leave, is paid to the worker by reason of his employment, which would have continued but for the unfair dismissal (see, by analogy, Case C‑33/89 Kowalska [1990] ECR I‑2591, paragraphs 10 and 11; Case C‑167/97 Seymour-Smith and Perez [1999] ECR I‑623, paragraphs 23 to 28; and Meerts , paragraph 44).
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23 According to settled case-law, the concept of pay, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119, comprises any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer (see, in particular, Case 12/81 Garland v British Rail Engineering [1982] ECR 359, paragraph 5, and Case C-262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I-1889, paragraph 12).
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36. Those general principles include, inter alia, the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations.
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43
Further, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the considerations relating to transactions concerning transfers are also applicable to transactions concerning payments (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 June 1997, SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraph 50, and of 28 July 2011, Nordea Pankki Suomi, C‑350/10, EU:C:2011:532, paragraph 26).
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50 It must be added that the considerations relating to transfers, set out below, are also applicable to transactions concerning payments in so far as the factual circumstances and the contractual links are similar. Moreover, no distinction in this regard has been raised by the parties in the proceedings before the Court.
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39. In that context it is incumbent upon the national authorities and courts to refuse the right of deduction where it is established, on the basis of objective evidence, that that right is being relied on for fraudulent or abusive ends (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑439/04 and C‑440/04 Kittel and Recolta Recycling [2006] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 55; Joined Cases C‑80/11 and C‑142/11 Mahagében and Dávid [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 42; Bonik , paragraph 37; and LVK – 56 , paragraph 59).
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15. As an exception to the general rule of jurisdiction set out in the Convention, Article 16 must not be given an interpretation broader than is required by its objective, since the article deprives the parties of the choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and, in certain cases, results in their being brought before a court which is not that of the domicile of any of them (see Case 73/77 Sanders [1977] ECR 2383, paragraphs 17 and 18; Case C-115/88 Reichert and Kockler [1990] ECR I-27, paragraph 9; Case C-292/93 Lieber [1994] ECR I-2535, paragraph 12; and Case C‑8/98 Dansommer [2000] ECR I-393, paragraph 21).
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12 The Court has consistently held (see inter alia the judgment in Case C-115/88 Reichert and Kockler [1990] ECR I-27, paragraph 9) that Article 16 must not be given a wider interpretation than is required by its objective, since it results in depriving the parties of the choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and, in certain cases, results in their being brought before a court which is not that of any of them.
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13 It must also be borne in mind that the aim of Regulation No 1612/68, namely freedom of movement for workers, requires, for such freedom to be guaranteed in compliance with the principles of liberty and dignity, the best possible conditions for the integration of the Community worker' s family in the society of the host country . If such integration is to be successful, it is essential for the child of a Community worker who resides with his family in the host Member State to have the opportunity to choose a course under the same conditions as a child of a national of that State .
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24. In that connection, it is true, that in the absence of harmonisation of the national mechanisms for enforcement, the rules fixing the period within which to bring proceedings objecting to enforcement allowed in mortgage enforcement proceedings are a matter for the national legal order of each Member State. However, the Court has emphasised that those mechanisms must satisfy the two conditions: that they are no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and do not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred on consumers by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgments in Aziz , C‑415/11, EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 50, and Barclays Bank , C‑280/13, EU:C:2014:279, paragraph 37)
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37. In that regard, there being no harmonisation of the national mechanisms for enforcement, the rules for giving effect to the grounds of objection allowed in mortgage enforcement proceedings and the powers conferred on the court hearing the enforcement proceedings to analyse the lawfulness of the terms of contracts concluded with consumers are a matter for the national legal order of the Member States, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the latter, on condition, however, that they are no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and do not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred on consumers by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, by analogy, Aziz , paragraph 50).
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23 THE ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 59 ARE NOT TO BE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR NATURE FROM THOSE IN ARTICLE 48, BUT ONLY BY THE FACT THAT THEY ARE PERFORMED OUTSIDE THE TIES OF A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT .
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31 By contrast, Member States may establish the criteria and/or thresholds necessary to determine which of the projects covered by Annex II are to be subject to an assessment (Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld and Others [1996] ECR I-5403, paragraphs 49 to 53). When establishing those thresholds and/or criteria, Member States must take account not only of the size of projects, but also their nature and location (Case C-392/96 Commission v Ireland [1999] ECR I-5901, paragraphs 65 to 67).
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51 Thus, ruling on the legislation of a Member State in terms of which certain entire classes of projects included in Annex II were excluded from the obligation of an impact assessment, the Court held in its judgment of 2 May 1996, in Case C-133/94 Commission v Belgium, not yet published in the ECR, at paragraph 42, that the criteria and/or the thresholds mentioned in Article 4(2) are designed to facilitate examination of the actual characteristics of any given project in order to determine whether it is subject to the requirement of assessment, not to exempt in advance from that obligation certain whole classes of projects listed in Annex II which may be envisaged as taking place on the territory of a Member State.
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49. The contested regulation concerns the adoption of restrictive measures against the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
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60 Moreover, while the Member States have a certain margin of discretion in the choice of SPAs, the classification of those areas is nevertheless subject to certain ornithological criteria determined by the Directive (see Case C-355/90 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-4221, paragraph 26).
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26 That argument cannot be accepted. Although Member States do have a certain margin of discretion with regard to the choice of special protection areas, the classification of those areas is nevertheless subject to certain ornithological criteria determined by the directive, such as the presence of birds listed in Annex I, on the one hand, and the designation of a habitat as a wetland area, on the other.
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54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
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38
It should be borne in mind that the concept of fair compensation is not defined by reference to national law, and it must thus be regarded as an autonomous concept of EU law and interpreted uniformly throughout the territory of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 October 2010 in Padawan, C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraphs 31 to 33 and 37, and 12 November 2015 in Hewlett-Packard Belgium, C‑572/13, EU:C:2015:750, paragraph 35).
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32. In such circumstances, according to settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective of the relevant legislation (see, in particular, Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43; and Case C-523/07 A [2009] ECR I‑2805, paragraph 34).
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29. That reasoning applies mutatis mutandis in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, where a retirement pension constitutes the taxable income.
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81. According to settled case-law, only a mark which departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfils its essential function of indicating origin is not devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (judgments in Mag Instrument v OHIM , C‑136/02 P, EU:C:2004:592, paragraph 31, and Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli v OHIM , C‑98/11 P, EU:C:2012:307, paragraph 42).
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31. In those circumstances, the more closely the shape for which registration is sought resembles the shape most likely to be taken by the product in question, the greater the likelihood of the shape being devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94. Only a mark which departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfils its essential function of indicating origin, is not devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of that provision (see, to that effect, Henkel v OHIM , paragraph 39 and the case-law cited there).
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18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
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23. None the less, as the Advocate General observes in point 20 of his Opinion, Member States must, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, employ means which, whilst enabling them effectively to attain such an objective, are the least detrimental to the objectives and principles laid down by the relevant Community legislation, which include the fundamental principle of the right to deduct VAT (see Molenheide and Others , paragraphs 46 and 47; Case C‑409/04 Teleos and Others [2007] ECR I‑7797, paragraphs 52 and 53; and Case C‑271/06 Netto Supermarkt [2008] ECR I‑000, paragraphs 19 and 20).
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53. Accordingly, whilst it is legitimate for the measures adopted by the Member States to seek to preserve the rights of the public exchequer as effectively as possible, such measures must go no further than necessary for that purpose (see Molenheide and Others , paragraph 47, and Federation of Technological Industries and Others , paragraph 30).
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25. Il y a lieu de rappeler que, en vertu des articles 96 et 97 de la directive 2006/112, le taux normal de TVA, applicable aux livraisons de biens et aux prestations de services, ne peut être inférieur à 15 %. Par dérogation à ce principe, l’article 98, paragraphe 1, de ladite directive reconnaît aux États membres la faculté d’appliquer un ou deux taux réduits de TVA. Aux termes de l’article 98, paragraphe 2, premier alinéa, de la même directive, les taux réduits de TVA ne peuvent être appliqués qu’aux seules livraisons de biens et aux prestations de services inclus dans les catégories figurant à l’annexe III de la directive 2006/112 (arrêt Commission/Pologne, C‑639/13, EU:C:2014:2468, point 23).
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93. Turning to the first criterion, concerning the complexity of the applicable rules, it is appropriate to refer to the definition of the concept of equivalent goods as contained in Article 569(1) of the implementing regulation. Under that provision, equivalent goods must come under the same eight-digit subheading of the CN Code, display the same commercial quality and have the same technical characteristics as the import goods. These three conditions are cumulative (Case C-103/96 Eridania Beghin-Say [1997] ECR I-1453, paragraph 23).
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23 Article 9 of the implementing regulation adopted under that procedure, in so far as it provides that, for recourse to equivalent compensation to be available, the equivalent goods must not only display the same commercial quality and have the same technical characteristics as the import goods, but must also fall within the same Common Customs Tariff subheading, is intended to limit, in the manner provided for by Article 2(4) of the basic regulation, recourse to the equivalent compensation system. If the equivalent goods and the import goods had the same commercial quality and technical characteristics but did not come within the same tariff subheading, recourse to the equivalent compensation system would be precluded.
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28. It should be observed at the outset that the Court has held that a general policy concerning dismissal involving the dismissal of a female employee solely because she has attained or passed the qualifying age for a retirement pension, which age is different under national legislation for men and for women, constitutes discrimination on grounds of sex, contrary to Directive 76/207/EEC (see, to this effect, Marshall , paragraph 38).
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34. As regards, secondly, Article 49 TFEU, it is common ground that all elements of the disputes before the referring court are confined within a single Member State. In those circumstances, it is necessary to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction in the present cases to give a ruling on that provision (see, by analogy, inter alia, Case C‑380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR I‑349, paragraph 64; Case C‑245/09 Omalet [2010] ECR I‑13771, paragraphs 9 and 10; and Duomo Gpa and Others , paragraph 25).
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10. In those circumstances, the Court must assess whether it has jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of those provisions (see, to that effect, Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR I-349, paragraph 64, and Case C-384/08 Attanasio Group [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 22).
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14 THE REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION MUST THEREFORE BE THAT REGULATION NO 1430/79 APPLIES TO GOODS FALLING UNDER THE ECSC TREATY .
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57
It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 15 January 2013, Križan and Others, C‑416/10, EU:C:2013:8, paragraph 54, and of 30 May 2013, Halaf, C‑528/11, EU:C:2013:342, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
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54. It follows that questions relating to European Union law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I-4629, paragraph 36, and Case C-509/10 Geistbeck [2012] ECR, paragraph 48).
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23. Conformément au principe de précaution, la Cour a déjà jugé que, si tous les motifs mentionnés à l’article 116, premier alinéa, de la directive 2001/83 ont pour but de prévenir certains risques pour la santé, ces risques doivent revêtir non pas un caractère concret, mais seulement un caractère potentiel. Sous réserve des exigences de preuve et des limites du pouvoir d’appréciation revenant à la Commission, cette institution peut se limiter à fournir des indices sérieux et concluants qui permettent raisonnablement de douter de l’innocuité du médicament concerné, de son effet thérapeutique, de l’existence d’un rapport bénéfice/risque favorable ou de la composition qualitative et quantitative déclarée (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Acino/Commission, C‑269/13 P, EU:C:2014:255, points 59 et 60).
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49. Although, according to settled case-law, in the light of those principles, the exemptions envisaged in Article 15 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Velker International Oil Company , paragraph 19; Cimber Air , paragraph 25; Joined Cases C-181/04 to C-183/04 Elmeka [2006] ECR I-8167, paragraph 15; Navicon , paragraph 22; and Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company , paragraph 19), that requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions should be construed in such a way as to deprive those exemptions of their intended effect (see, inter alia, Navicon , paragraph 22).
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25. For those reasons, whilst it is common ground that the Sixth Directive may provide for exemptions which depart from the principles referred to in the foregoing paragraph, the Court considers that such exemptions must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, SDC , paragraph 20, Case C-216/97 Gregg [1999] ECR I-4947, paragraph 12, and Kügler , paragraph 28).
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89. The extent of the infringement of fundamental rights described in that judgment shows that there existed in Greece, at the time of the transfer of the applicant M.S.S., a systemic deficiency in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers.
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23 Secondly, the argument of the Hellenic Government that its legislation is not an obstacle to the activities of nationals of other Member States is not relevant under the second paragraph of Article 52 of the Treaty. As the Court found in its judgment in Factortame and Others, cited above, at paragraph 25, freedom of establishment includes, in the case of nationals of a Member State, `the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons ... under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected ...'.
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25 That argument cannot be upheld. According to the second paragraph of Article 52 of the Treaty, freedom of establishment includes, in the case of nationals of a Member State, "the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons ... under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected ...".
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45. En quatrième lieu, ainsi que le gouvernement espagnol l’a souligné dans ses écrits de procédure, l’article 60, paragraphe 1, de la LEC vise notamment à éviter des décisions contradictoires par l’attribution de la compétence à une seule juridiction. Une telle règle pourrait ainsi être de nature à assurer une pratique uniforme sur l’ensemble du territoire national, contribuant de cette façon à la sécurité juridique (voir, par analogie, arrêt Agrokonsulting-04, précité, point 56).
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