|
Russian O |
|
APT29 O |
|
hackers O |
|
' O |
|
stealthy O |
|
malware O |
|
undetected O |
|
for O |
|
years O |
|
By O |
|
Ionut O |
|
Ilascu O |
|
January O |
|
27 O |
|
, O |
|
2022 O |
|
09:23 O |
|
AM O |
|
0 O |
|
Cozy O |
|
Bear O |
|
Russian O |
|
hackers O |
|
camouflage O |
|
new O |
|
malware O |
|
as O |
|
legitimate O |
|
files O |
|
EXCLUSIVE O |
|
: O |
|
Hackers O |
|
associated O |
|
with O |
|
the O |
|
Russian B-ORGANIZATION |
|
Federation B-ORGANIZATION |
|
Foreign B-ORGANIZATION |
|
Intelligence B-ORGANIZATION |
|
Service B-ORGANIZATION |
|
( O |
|
SVR B-ORGANIZATION |
|
) O |
|
continued O |
|
their O |
|
incursions O |
|
on O |
|
networks O |
|
of O |
|
multiple O |
|
organizations O |
|
after B-CLASSIFICATION |
|
the O |
|
SolarWinds B-ORGANIZATION |
|
supply O |
|
- O |
|
chain O |
|
compromise O |
|
using O |
|
two O |
|
recently O |
|
discovered O |
|
sophisticated O |
|
threats O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
malicious O |
|
implants O |
|
are O |
|
a O |
|
variant O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
GoldMax O |
|
backdoor O |
|
for O |
|
Linux O |
|
systems O |
|
and O |
|
a O |
|
completely O |
|
new O |
|
malware O |
|
family O |
|
that O |
|
cybersecurity O |
|
company O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
now O |
|
tracks O |
|
as O |
|
TrailBlazer O |
|
. O |
|
Both O |
|
threats O |
|
have O |
|
been O |
|
used O |
|
in O |
|
StellarParticle O |
|
campaigns O |
|
since O |
|
at O |
|
least O |
|
mid-2019 O |
|
but O |
|
were O |
|
identified O |
|
only O |
|
two O |
|
years O |
|
later O |
|
, O |
|
during O |
|
incident O |
|
response O |
|
investigations O |
|
. O |
|
StellarParticle O |
|
attacks O |
|
have O |
|
been O |
|
attributed O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
APT29 B-THREAT_ACTOR |
|
hacking O |
|
group O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
running O |
|
cyber O |
|
espionage O |
|
campaigns O |
|
for O |
|
more O |
|
than O |
|
12 O |
|
years O |
|
and O |
|
is O |
|
also O |
|
known O |
|
as O |
|
CozyBear B-THREAT_ACTOR |
|
, O |
|
The O |
|
Dukes O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
Yttrium O |
|
. O |
|
Stealing O |
|
cookies O |
|
for O |
|
MFA O |
|
bypass O |
|
In O |
|
a O |
|
report O |
|
shared O |
|
exclusively O |
|
with O |
|
BleepingComputer B-ORGANIZATION |
|
, O |
|
cybersecurity O |
|
company O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
today O |
|
describes O |
|
in O |
|
detail O |
|
the O |
|
latest O |
|
tactics O |
|
, O |
|
techniques O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
procedures O |
|
( O |
|
TTPs O |
|
) O |
|
observed O |
|
in O |
|
cyberattacks O |
|
from O |
|
the O |
|
Cozy O |
|
Bear O |
|
state O |
|
- O |
|
sponsored O |
|
hackers O |
|
. O |
|
While O |
|
some O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
techniques O |
|
are O |
|
somewhat O |
|
common O |
|
today O |
|
, O |
|
Cozy O |
|
Bear O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
using O |
|
them O |
|
long O |
|
before O |
|
they O |
|
became O |
|
popular O |
|
: O |
|
credential O |
|
hopping O |
|
hijacking O |
|
Office O |
|
365 O |
|
( O |
|
O365 O |
|
) O |
|
Service O |
|
Principal O |
|
and O |
|
Application O |
|
bypassing O |
|
multi O |
|
- O |
|
factor O |
|
authentication O |
|
( O |
|
MFA O |
|
) O |
|
by O |
|
stealing O |
|
browser O |
|
cookies O |
|
stealing O |
|
credentials O |
|
using O |
|
Get O |
|
- O |
|
ADReplAccount O |
|
Credential O |
|
hopping O |
|
was O |
|
the O |
|
first O |
|
stage O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
attack O |
|
, O |
|
allowing O |
|
the O |
|
threat O |
|
actor O |
|
to O |
|
log O |
|
into O |
|
Office O |
|
365 O |
|
from O |
|
an O |
|
internal O |
|
server O |
|
that O |
|
the O |
|
hackers O |
|
reached O |
|
through O |
|
a O |
|
compromised O |
|
public O |
|
- O |
|
facing O |
|
system O |
|
. O |
|
source O |
|
: O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
says O |
|
that O |
|
this O |
|
technique O |
|
is O |
|
hard O |
|
to O |
|
spot O |
|
in O |
|
environments O |
|
with O |
|
little O |
|
visibility O |
|
into O |
|
identity O |
|
usage O |
|
since O |
|
hackers O |
|
could O |
|
use O |
|
more O |
|
than O |
|
one O |
|
domain O |
|
administrator O |
|
account O |
|
. O |
|
Bypassing O |
|
MFA O |
|
to O |
|
access O |
|
cloud O |
|
resources O |
|
by O |
|
stealing O |
|
browser O |
|
cookies O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
used O |
|
since O |
|
before O |
|
2020 O |
|
. O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
says O |
|
that O |
|
APT29 O |
|
kept O |
|
a O |
|
low O |
|
profile O |
|
after O |
|
decrypting O |
|
the O |
|
authentication O |
|
cookies O |
|
, O |
|
likely O |
|
offline O |
|
, O |
|
by O |
|
using O |
|
the O |
|
Cookie O |
|
Editor O |
|
extension O |
|
for O |
|
Chrome O |
|
to O |
|
replay O |
|
them O |
|
; O |
|
they O |
|
deleted O |
|
the O |
|
extension O |
|
afterward O |
|
. O |
|
“ O |
|
This O |
|
extension O |
|
permitted O |
|
bypassing O |
|
MFA O |
|
requirements O |
|
, O |
|
as O |
|
the O |
|
cookies O |
|
, O |
|
replayed O |
|
through O |
|
the O |
|
Cookie O |
|
Editor O |
|
extension O |
|
, O |
|
allowed O |
|
the O |
|
threat O |
|
actor O |
|
to O |
|
hijack O |
|
the O |
|
already O |
|
MFA O |
|
- O |
|
approved O |
|
session O |
|
of O |
|
a O |
|
targeted O |
|
user O |
|
” O |
|
- O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
This O |
|
allowed O |
|
them O |
|
to O |
|
move O |
|
laterally O |
|
on O |
|
the O |
|
network O |
|
and O |
|
reach O |
|
the O |
|
next O |
|
stage O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
attack O |
|
, O |
|
connecting O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
victim O |
|
’s O |
|
O365 O |
|
tenant O |
|
for O |
|
the O |
|
next O |
|
stage O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
attack O |
|
. O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
’s O |
|
report O |
|
describes O |
|
the O |
|
steps O |
|
that O |
|
APT29 O |
|
took O |
|
to O |
|
achieve O |
|
persistence O |
|
in O |
|
a O |
|
position O |
|
that O |
|
allowed O |
|
them O |
|
to O |
|
read O |
|
any O |
|
email O |
|
and O |
|
SharePoint O |
|
or O |
|
OneDrive O |
|
files O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
compromised O |
|
organization O |
|
. O |
|
GoldMax O |
|
for O |
|
Linux O |
|
and O |
|
TrailBlazer O |
|
During O |
|
their O |
|
incident O |
|
response O |
|
work O |
|
on O |
|
APT29 O |
|
StellarParticle O |
|
attacks O |
|
, O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
’s O |
|
researchers O |
|
used O |
|
the O |
|
User O |
|
Access O |
|
Logging O |
|
( O |
|
UAL O |
|
) O |
|
database O |
|
to O |
|
identify O |
|
earlier O |
|
malicious O |
|
account O |
|
usage O |
|
, O |
|
which O |
|
led O |
|
to O |
|
finding O |
|
the O |
|
GoldMax O |
|
for O |
|
Linux O |
|
and O |
|
TrailBlazer O |
|
malware O |
|
. O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
says O |
|
that O |
|
TrailBlazer O |
|
is O |
|
a O |
|
completely O |
|
new O |
|
malware O |
|
family O |
|
, O |
|
while O |
|
GoldMax O |
|
for O |
|
Linux O |
|
backdoor O |
|
“ O |
|
is O |
|
almost O |
|
identical O |
|
in O |
|
functionality O |
|
and O |
|
implementation O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
previously O |
|
identified O |
|
May O |
|
2020 O |
|
Windows O |
|
variant O |
|
. O |
|
” O |
|
The O |
|
researchers O |
|
believe O |
|
that O |
|
the O |
|
little O |
|
differences O |
|
are O |
|
between O |
|
the O |
|
two O |
|
GoldMax O |
|
versions O |
|
are O |
|
due O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
continuous O |
|
improvements O |
|
from O |
|
the O |
|
developer O |
|
for O |
|
long O |
|
- O |
|
term O |
|
detection O |
|
evasion O |
|
. O |
|
GoldMax O |
|
was O |
|
likely O |
|
used O |
|
for O |
|
persistence O |
|
( O |
|
a O |
|
crontab O |
|
with O |
|
a O |
|
“ O |
|
@reboot O |
|
” O |
|
line O |
|
for O |
|
a O |
|
non O |
|
- O |
|
root O |
|
user O |
|
) O |
|
over O |
|
long O |
|
periods O |
|
in O |
|
StellarParticle O |
|
campaigns O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
backdoor O |
|
stayed O |
|
undetected O |
|
by O |
|
posing O |
|
as O |
|
a O |
|
legitimate O |
|
file O |
|
in O |
|
a O |
|
hidden O |
|
directory O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
TrailBlazer O |
|
implant O |
|
also O |
|
hid O |
|
under O |
|
the O |
|
name O |
|
of O |
|
a O |
|
legitimate O |
|
file O |
|
and O |
|
it O |
|
was O |
|
configured O |
|
for O |
|
persistence O |
|
using O |
|
the O |
|
Windows O |
|
Management O |
|
Instrumentation O |
|
( O |
|
WMI O |
|
) O |
|
Event O |
|
Subscriptions O |
|
, O |
|
a O |
|
relatively O |
|
new O |
|
technique O |
|
in O |
|
2019 O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
earliest O |
|
known O |
|
date O |
|
for O |
|
its O |
|
deployment O |
|
on O |
|
victim O |
|
systems O |
|
. O |
|
TrailBlazer O |
|
managed O |
|
to O |
|
keep O |
|
communication O |
|
with O |
|
the O |
|
command O |
|
and O |
|
control O |
|
( O |
|
C2 O |
|
) O |
|
server O |
|
covert O |
|
by O |
|
masking O |
|
it O |
|
as O |
|
legitimate O |
|
Google O |
|
Notifications O |
|
HTTP O |
|
requests O |
|
. O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
notes O |
|
that O |
|
the O |
|
implant O |
|
has O |
|
modular O |
|
functionality O |
|
and O |
|
“ O |
|
a O |
|
very O |
|
low O |
|
prevalence O |
|
” O |
|
and O |
|
that O |
|
it O |
|
shares O |
|
similarities O |
|
with O |
|
other O |
|
malware O |
|
families O |
|
used O |
|
by O |
|
the O |
|
same O |
|
threat O |
|
actor O |
|
, O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
GoldMax O |
|
and O |
|
Sunburst O |
|
( O |
|
both O |
|
used O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
SolarWinds O |
|
supply O |
|
- O |
|
chain O |
|
attack O |
|
) O |
|
. O |
|
Tim O |
|
Parisi O |
|
, O |
|
Director O |
|
of O |
|
Professional O |
|
Services O |
|
at O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
, O |
|
told O |
|
BleepingComputer O |
|
that O |
|
the O |
|
covert O |
|
activity O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
two O |
|
malware O |
|
pieces O |
|
delayed O |
|
the O |
|
discovery O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
two O |
|
malware O |
|
pieces O |
|
, O |
|
as O |
|
the O |
|
researchers O |
|
found O |
|
them O |
|
in O |
|
mid-2021 O |
|
. O |
|
Recon O |
|
and O |
|
move O |
|
to O |
|
Office O |
|
365 O |
|
After O |
|
gaining O |
|
access O |
|
to O |
|
a O |
|
target O |
|
organization O |
|
’s O |
|
infrastructure O |
|
and O |
|
established O |
|
persistence O |
|
, O |
|
APT29 O |
|
hackers O |
|
took O |
|
every O |
|
opportunity O |
|
to O |
|
collect O |
|
intelligence O |
|
that O |
|
would O |
|
allow O |
|
them O |
|
to O |
|
further O |
|
the O |
|
attack O |
|
. O |
|
One O |
|
constant O |
|
tactic O |
|
was O |
|
to O |
|
draw O |
|
information O |
|
from O |
|
the O |
|
victim O |
|
’s O |
|
internal O |
|
knowledge O |
|
repositories O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
so O |
|
- O |
|
called O |
|
wikis O |
|
. O |
|
These O |
|
documents O |
|
can O |
|
hold O |
|
sensitive O |
|
details O |
|
specific O |
|
to O |
|
various O |
|
services O |
|
and O |
|
products O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
organization O |
|
. O |
|
“ O |
|
This O |
|
information O |
|
included O |
|
items O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
product O |
|
/ O |
|
service O |
|
architecture O |
|
and O |
|
design O |
|
documents O |
|
, O |
|
vulnerabilities O |
|
and O |
|
step O |
|
- O |
|
by O |
|
- O |
|
step O |
|
instructions O |
|
to O |
|
perform O |
|
various O |
|
tasks O |
|
. O |
|
Additionally O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
threat O |
|
actor O |
|
viewed O |
|
pages O |
|
related O |
|
to O |
|
internal O |
|
business O |
|
operations O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
development O |
|
schedules O |
|
and O |
|
points O |
|
of O |
|
contact O |
|
. O |
|
In O |
|
some O |
|
instances O |
|
these O |
|
points O |
|
of O |
|
contact O |
|
were O |
|
subsequently O |
|
targeted O |
|
for O |
|
further O |
|
data O |
|
collection O |
|
” O |
|
- O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
Parisi O |
|
told O |
|
us O |
|
that O |
|
accessing O |
|
company O |
|
wikis O |
|
was O |
|
a O |
|
common O |
|
APT29 O |
|
reconnaissance O |
|
activity O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
investigated O |
|
StellarParticle O |
|
attacks O |
|
. O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
’s O |
|
deep O |
|
dive O |
|
into O |
|
APT29 O |
|
’s O |
|
StellarParticle O |
|
campaigns O |
|
offers O |
|
details O |
|
on O |
|
how O |
|
the O |
|
threat O |
|
actor O |
|
connected O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
victim O |
|
’s O |
|
O365 O |
|
tenant O |
|
through O |
|
the O |
|
Windows O |
|
Azure O |
|
Active O |
|
Directory O |
|
PowerShell O |
|
Module O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
performed O |
|
enumeration O |
|
queries O |
|
for O |
|
roles O |
|
, O |
|
members O |
|
, O |
|
users O |
|
, O |
|
domains O |
|
, O |
|
accounts O |
|
, O |
|
or O |
|
a O |
|
service O |
|
principal O |
|
's O |
|
credentials O |
|
. O |
|
When O |
|
analyzing O |
|
the O |
|
log O |
|
entries O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
researchers O |
|
noticed O |
|
that O |
|
the O |
|
threat O |
|
actor O |
|
also O |
|
executed O |
|
the O |
|
AddServicePrincipalCredentials O |
|
command O |
|
. O |
|
“ O |
|
CrowdStrike O |
|
analyzed O |
|
the O |
|
configuration O |
|
settings O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
victim O |
|
’s O |
|
O365 O |
|
tenant O |
|
and O |
|
discovered O |
|
that O |
|
a O |
|
new O |
|
secret O |
|
had O |
|
been O |
|
added O |
|
to O |
|
a O |
|
built O |
|
- O |
|
in O |
|
Microsoft O |
|
Azure O |
|
AD O |
|
Enterprise O |
|
Application O |
|
, O |
|
Microsoft O |
|
StaffHub O |
|
Service O |
|
Principal O |
|
, O |
|
which O |
|
had O |
|
Application O |
|
level O |
|
permissions O |
|
” O |
|
- O |
|
CrowdSrike O |
|
The O |
|
adversary O |
|
had O |
|
added O |
|
a O |
|
new O |
|
secret O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
application O |
|
and O |
|
set O |
|
its O |
|
validity O |
|
for O |
|
more O |
|
than O |
|
10 O |
|
years O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
researchers O |
|
note O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
permission O |
|
level O |
|
obtained O |
|
this O |
|
way O |
|
let O |
|
hackers O |
|
access O |
|
all O |
|
mail O |
|
and O |
|
SharePoint O |
|
/ O |
|
OneDrive O |
|
files O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
company O |
|
and O |
|
allowed O |
|
them O |
|
to O |
|
“ O |
|
create O |
|
new O |
|
accounts O |
|
and O |
|
assign O |
|
administrator O |
|
privileges O |
|
to O |
|
any O |
|
account O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
organization O |
|
. O |
|
” O |
|
Maintaining O |
|
persistence O |
|
Once O |
|
Cozy O |
|
Bear O |
|
/ O |
|
APT29 O |
|
established O |
|
persistence O |
|
in O |
|
a O |
|
target O |
|
organization O |
|
they O |
|
would O |
|
maintain O |
|
it O |
|
for O |
|
as O |
|
long O |
|
as O |
|
possible O |
|
, O |
|
sometimes O |
|
helped O |
|
by O |
|
the O |
|
poor O |
|
security O |
|
hygiene O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
compromised O |
|
organization O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
longest O |
|
time O |
|
the O |
|
threat O |
|
actor O |
|
spent O |
|
inside O |
|
an O |
|
organization O |
|
was O |
|
two O |
|
years O |
|
, O |
|
Parisi O |
|
told O |
|
BleepingComputer O |
|
. O |
|
Persisting O |
|
this O |
|
long O |
|
would O |
|
not O |
|
be O |
|
possible O |
|
without O |
|
some O |
|
effort O |
|
from O |
|
the O |
|
hackers O |
|
, O |
|
since O |
|
organizations O |
|
often O |
|
rotate O |
|
credentials O |
|
as O |
|
a O |
|
security O |
|
precaution O |
|
. O |
|
To O |
|
prevent O |
|
losing O |
|
access O |
|
, O |
|
Cozy O |
|
Bear O |
|
hackers O |
|
would O |
|
periodically O |
|
refresh O |
|
the O |
|
stolen O |
|
credentials O |
|
by O |
|
stealing O |
|
new O |
|
ones O |
|
, O |
|
oftentimes O |
|
via O |
|
Mimikatz O |
|
. O |
|
In O |
|
at O |
|
least O |
|
one O |
|
case O |
|
, O |
|
though O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
administrators O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
compromised O |
|
company O |
|
reset O |
|
their O |
|
passwords O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
same O |
|
ones O |
|
, O |
|
thus O |
|
defeating O |
|
the O |
|
purpose O |
|
of O |
|
credential O |
|
rotation O |
|
. O |
|
Cozy O |
|
Bear O |
|
hackers O |
|
are O |
|
some O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
most O |
|
sophisticated O |
|
threat O |
|
actors O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
cyber O |
|
espionage O |
|
world O |
|
, O |
|
with O |
|
top O |
|
skills O |
|
to O |
|
infiltrate O |
|
and O |
|
stay O |
|
undetected O |
|
on O |
|
a O |
|
company O |
|
's O |
|
infrastructure O |
|
for O |
|
long O |
|
periods O |
|
. O |
|
During O |
|
the O |
|
StellarParticle O |
|
attacks O |
|
, O |
|
they O |
|
demonstrated O |
|
expert O |
|
knowledge O |
|
in O |
|
Azure O |
|
, O |
|
Office O |
|
365 O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
Active O |
|
Directory O |
|
management O |
|
. O |