openthreatner / conll /text_30.conll
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Killed O
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silascutler.com/2021/01/14/KilledInTranslation/ O
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2021 O
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Preface O
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once O
told O
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possible O
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in O
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publicly O
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most O
carefully O
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assessment O
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analytic O
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interpreted O
as O
fact O
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Naming O
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threat O
actor O
groups O
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malware O
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critical O
aspect O
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tracking O
cyber O
operations O
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Armchair O
Researchers O
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more O
concerned O
with O
social O
media O
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counts O
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often O
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whereas O
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activity O
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National O
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Security O
Agency O
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CISA O
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and O
the O
Federal O
Bureau O
of O
Investigation O
( O
FBI O
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have O
all O
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begun O
publicly O
sharing O
tactical O
reporting O
containing O
technical O
details O
, O
indicators O
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and O
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defensive O
recommendations O
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reports O
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become O
a O
staple O
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any O
major O
cyber O
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incident O
because O
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provide O
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situational O
overview O
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initial O
starting O
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point O
for O
collaboration O
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recent O
reports[1][2 O
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attribution O
has O
been O
presented O
at O
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forefront O
of O
the O
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with O
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rooted O
in O
scientific O
methodology O
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research O
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basic O
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analysis O
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attribution O
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presented O
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assessment O
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may O
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] O
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perfectly O
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and O
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understanding O
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these O
groups O
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instances O
where O
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providing O
this O
information O
may O
risk O
sources O
and O
methods O
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limiting O
assessed O
attribution O
to O
a O
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1/2 O
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broad O
geographic O
estimate O
or O
omitting O
it O
entirely O
may O
provide O
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better O
service O
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[ O
1 O
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https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/28/2002306626/-1/-1/0/CSA%20Sandworm%20Actors O
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20Exploiting%20Vulnerability%20in%20Exim%20Transfer%20Agent%2020200528.pdf O
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https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/16/2002457639/-1/-1/0/NCSC_APT29_ADVISORYQUAD-OFFICIAL-20200709-1810.PDF O
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palant%C3%ADr O
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