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The Earth Charter (2000) represents a popular expression of these normative elements at the global level. As an ethical framework the Earth Charter enshrines the code of conduct that is necessary to observe the principle of sustainability (Bosselmann & Engel, 2010). As a declaration which is transnational, cross-cultural and inter-denominational the Earth Charter projects a truly global vision despite different cultural value systems and positions in the political economy (Bosselmann & Taylor, 2005; Okereke, 2008). The Charter has four main themes which form the foundation of a sustainable global society: respect and care for the community of life (principles 1-4); ecological integrity (principles 5-8); social and economic justice (principles 9-12); democracy, non-violence and peace (principles 13-16). The Earth Charter still assumes the legitimacy of state-centric international regimes and international law but asserts that only multilevel cooperation between government, civil society and business can achieve effective governance (Bosselmann, 2008).
The definition of human security that is used in this chapter draws on environmental, social and economic areas. The Earth Charter achieves what the UNDP (1994) definition does not. Human security, as affected by interdependent and indivisible challenges, relies on a categorical imperative that “we, the peoples of Earth, declare our responsibility to one another, to the greater community of life, and to future generations” (Earth Charter Initiative, 2000, Preamble). The Earth Charter reflects ‘strong’ sustainable development with the three fundamental elements (environment, social welfare and economic welfare) but organises them to reflect the ‘temple of life’ paradigm (see Section 16.3) and the fundamental understanding that ecological integrity is not one of three equally important goals, but the basis of all life (Bosselmann, 2008; Bosselmann, 2010b). Central to environmental and social equity is the concept of common but differentiated responsibility. The Earth Charter does not develop this concept fully, but it will be crucial for human security regimes and global governance that the ethic of responsibility manifests in a way which acknowledges the realities of the international political economy.
An important means of spreading the ecological norm is to publicly declare the intent (Bosselmann, 2008). The Earth Charter is a universal covenant of global responsibilities (Engel, 2007; Bosselmann, 2008). Genuine behavioural change can only be achieved when people commit to their role as an ecological citizen and the responsibilities that ensue. Covenants represent a promise and a deeply felt commitment (Bosselmann, 2008). “A declaration can be a very powerful manifestation of changed awareness and morality” and like other soft law may “be very effective in ‘lifting the game’ and increasing pressure on governments” (Bosselmann, 2008, p. 322; Bosselmann & Engel, 2010, p. 23). In terms of our norm life cycle this could be an important development in the first stage of norm emergence. As more individuals, organizations and states endorse the Earth Charter the norm becomes stronger and more influential. The goal is for the principle of sustainability to overtake three-pillar sustainable development and inform all policy areas including security. We might interpret the Earth Charter and its visionaries as ‘norm entrepreneurs’, and at the very least as fulfilling an educative function that is fundamental to socialization and norm diffusion (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Ingebritsen, 2002; Bosselmann & Engel, 2010).
Ultimately we still see the predominance of economic ‘rationality’ in the core rules of environmental regimes despite the ethical and normative aspirations of global civil society (Okereke, 2008). However, in our project of changing the ‘ought’ to the ‘is’, a universal covenant such as the Earth Charter which “represents the most profound and powerful social bond we know” represents a promising platform for future action (Bosselmann, 2008, p. 322).
The Earth Charter is silent as to the techniques and methodologies that we should use to implement ecological governance but it is a useful starting point for a ‘global constitution’ (Bosselmann, 2010b). The Earth Charter already sets the benchmark for human behaviour – that it is just, participatory, sustainable, and peaceful (Earth Charter, 2000, principle 3). A constitution is a higher level of law which sets forth the fundamental rules of a political community (Bodansky, 2009). A global constitution would lay out the dimensions of ecological citizenship with the legal certainty of substantive rules. Other discussion about how best to implement good governance generally fluctuates between evolution and reform of existing governance, and developing entirely new governance structures (Bosselmann, 2016, p. 192). Roch and Perrez (2005) proffer the ‘double c / double e approach’ as key to the success of environmental governance (Roch & Perrez, 2005, p. 18). This refers to coherence (coordination between policies and actors), comprehensiveness (of environmental policy), and efficiency and effectiveness (Roch & Perrez, 2005). Perceptions that the UNEP is ineffective have led to calls for a more centralized environmental body such as a World Environmental Organization, or a Security Council for the Environment (Roch & Perez, 2005). Ultimately, it seems doubtful that we need an overarching global governance structure, but what is crucial is that sustainability be overarching and the common element among a network of governance levels (Bosselmann et al. 2008). We need to be realistic without sacrificing ambition and vision (Roch & Perrez, 2005). We urgently need states to implement measures identified in the Global Ministerial Environment Forum in Cartagena 2002 (Roch & Perrez, 2005). However in the long term, strengthening governance is a dual process of local empowerment, engagement and socialization to ecological citizenship, as well as working to establish the principle of sustainability as a principle of national and international law (Bosselmann et al., 2008). Underlying this process is infusing the principle of sustainability with the tangible authority to affect actual change in the way humans interact with nature. Power, in this sense, will come from its social and legal recognition and implementation. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/16%3A_Developing_Good_Governance/16.6%3A_The_Earth_Charter%3A_A_Framework_for_Global_Governance.txt |
Good governance can only be perceived as value-based; in the ecological age those values are primarily ecological. Accountability, transparency and public participation are essential requirements for good governance but they do not suffice to ensure governance for human security. In the 21st century, human security and environmental security are deeply intertwined. Good governance, therefore, needs to adopt an understanding that the human sphere is ultimately dependent on the natural sphere. To capture the ecological realities involved here, good governance must be based on an ethic of care and responsibility for the Earth, best perceived as Earth trusteeship.
The Earth Charter reflects and defines Earth trusteeship. The challenge will be for our communities, for local and national governments, for the entire multi-layered system of governance to spell out what actions it involves and how it must guide us all in our search for human security.
16.8: Resources and References
Review
Key Points
• Environmental degradation exacerbates structural violence, which leads to increased social injustice, which further exacerbates poverty and environmental degradation.
• Environmental change acts as a ‘threat multiplier’ because it amplifies scarcities.
• Environmental security is the foundation on which human security stands. It requires adequate provisions for adaptation and prevention so that environmental changes exert less impact on well-being.
• Conventional ‘weak’ notions of ‘sustainable development’ cannot succeed in increasing human security because they do not recognise the primacy of ecological integrity among the requirements. Unfortunately they show no sign of abating in their influence on governance.
• Good environmental governance rests on normative principles and process principles that include all of civil society in the decision-making process.
• Good environmental governance is an essential component of Earth democracy, which also requires profound changes in people’s values.
• The Earth Charter outlines the major values and principles that can lead to a global democratic regime of good environmental governance.
.Extension Activities & Further Research
1. In Section 16.3 it was argued that economic security should not be regarded as a ‘pillar’ for the principle of sustainability. In your view, does this also apply to the ‘four pillar’ model of human security? What are the arguments for and against that proposition?
2. Section 16.4.2 outlines some principles of ‘good governance.’ To what extent does good governance also mean democratic governance?
3. An important component of the process of Earth democracy will have to be the disenfranchisement of the bloated corporate power groups who currently dominate decision-making processes at so many levels without any mechanism of accountability. Section 16.5.2 leads to the question, “To what extent can a civil society capable of such good governance also be capitalist?” – the corollary being “to what extent does it have to be?” Any suggestions?
List of Terms
See Glossary for full list of terms and definitions.
• anthropogenic
• Earth Charter
• ecological security
• ideational
• strong sustainability
• Three Pillars of Sustainable Development
• weak sustainability
Suggested Reading
Barnett, J. (2007). Environmental security and peace. Journal of Human Security, 3(1), 4–16. doi.org/10.3316/JHS0301004
Bosselmann, K., & Engel, J. R. (Eds.). (2010). The Earth Charter: A framework for global governance. KIT Publishers.
Earth Charter International. (2000). The Earth Charter. https://earthcharter.org/read-the-earth-charter/
Kaplan, R. D. (1994). The coming anarchy. The Atlantic, 273(2), 44–76. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine...narchy/304670/
Kaplan, R. D. (2000). The coming anarchy: Shattering the dreams of the post cold war. Random House.
Mosquin, T., & Rowe, S. (2004). A manifesto for Earth. Biodiversity 5(1), 3–9. http://www.ecospherics.net/pages/EarthManifesto.pdf
Long Descriptions
Figure 16.1 long description: A diagram that aims to demonstrate the complexity and interconnectedness of global problems. This diagram has been turned into an ordered list to allow for self-exploration.
A system of self-assertive values of expansion, competition, oppression, and exploitation lead to uncontrolled growth (see #1), poverty in the so-called Third World (see #2), and a feeling of threat (see #4a).
1. Uncontrolled growth leads to
1. Unbalanced town planning and increasing traffic, which leads to a growing consumption of energy (see #4) and pollution (see #5).
2. Industrial production, which leads to pollution (see #5) and waste and pesticides that contaminate soil and water and cause diseases.
2. Poverty in the Third World leads to
1. Poor health care and illiteracy, which results in poor family planning and population growth (see #3).
3. Population growth leads to
1. A growing consumption of energy (see #4).
2. Excessive agriculture, which leads to the clearing of woodlands, which in turn leads to soil erosion and loss of species and forests dying.
3. A scarcity of provisions.
4. Over-pasturing, which leads to deserts and a decrease in food production (see #6) as well as soil erosion.
4. Growing consumption of energy, which is
1. Caused by increasing traffic, population growth, and high military expenses due to the nuclear arms race, which both feeds into and is compelled by a feeling of threat.
2. Related to the use of non-renewable energy sources, i.e., fossil fuels like coal and oil, which contribute to pollution, CO2 emissions (see #4d), and regional conflicts.
3. Related to the use of nuclear energy, which leads to nuclear waste.
4. Related to an increase in CO2, which is partially caused by the clearing of woodlands and contributes to acid rain.
5. Pollution, which is
1. Caused by increasing traffic, use of fossil fuels, and industrial production.
2. Responsible for smog, which causes diseases.
3. Responsible for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that deplete the ozone layer and increase UV radiation, which can cause skin cancer and decrease food production (see #6).
4. Responsible for greenhouse gases, which have a greenhouse effect that causes changes in the climate and a rise in sea level, which in turn result in changed rainfall patterns and a loss of usable land, all of which lead to a decrease in food production (see #6).
6. Decrease in food production, which is
1. Caused by deserts due to over-pasturing, changed rainfall patterns, loss of usable land, and an increase in UV radiation.
2. A precursor to malnutrition and starvation.
[Return to Figure 16.1]
Footnote
1. The Global Forum at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit is a case in point. It was comprised of the NGOs that were not permitted to attend the Summit alongside State representatives. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/16%3A_Developing_Good_Governance/16.7%3A_Conclusion.txt |
Learning Objectives
• Demonstrate an understanding of determinants of health, health security and social-ecological systems and the roles they play in supporting health.
• Explicate the inter-relationships between political and economic power, environmental change, and health security in particular places/watersheds/ecosystems/ecoregions through the use of different frameworks and theories. Explain how these dynamics operate at, and across, different scales.
• Illustrate the particular challenges that the diversity, breadth and complexity of health security problems and responses pose to understanding, practice and research. Select and apply different approaches and use a suite of observational and analytic tools to address health security problems.
• Draw on critical understanding of concepts, relationships, and tools as well as their values, motivations and place in the world, to formulate responses (actions, interventions and practice or policy changes) to promote health security. Consider the ways that these may be applied in different professional and organizational settings.
The focus of this chapter is to demonstrate interlinkages between changing ecological and social systems and health security. Moving beyond dynamics of disease spread and bioterrorism, we draw attention to the reciprocal relationships between living and social systems to exemplify how health security operates at this interface. We clarify key concepts of health, public health, the determinants of health, health security and social-ecological systems, demonstrating their implications for how we understand and respond to health security issues. In doing so, this chapter critically analyzes the health security discourse, and forwards new tools and approaches to expand our understanding of the multiple ways in which health is impacted by changes to ecosystems and resulting social change.
17: Health Security in the Context of Social-ecological Change
In an era of rapid social and ecological change, the interfaces of health, human security, and global environmental change warrant particular attention. Accordingly, this chapter foregrounds the notion of health security in relation to social-ecological change. The World Health Organization constitution states that “the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and states” (WHO, 1948, p. 1). Health security therefore exists at the interface of the health and security sectors, and is typically thought of as the activities required to mitigate risk or respond to acute events that endanger population-level health across international boundaries.
This conventional definition of health security therefore privileges concerns of disease outbreaks of epidemic proportions with risks of international transmission, deliberate acts of bioterrorism, and responses to disease in contexts characterized by war or violent conflict. Global health security is arguably more important now than ever before. For example, an influenza pandemic could affect up to 1.5 billion people, be responsible for up to 150 million deaths, and produce USD \$3 trillion in economic damages (Hoffman, 2010). While the acute public health and emergency management response is laudable to respond to such direct biophysical threats, one topic that has received limited attention in human and health security discourses is the role of global environmental change.
Leveraging from more traditional definitions of health security, this chapter conceptualizes how global environmental change can impact health security, and builds upon other chapters in this volume that engage with threats to human security (Chapter 5), climate change (Chapter 9), resource scarcity (Chapter 10), human rights (Chapter 15) and global environmental governance (Chapter 20). First, we provide definitions for key terms, highlighting the historical context that led to emergence of health security. Second, we establish the importance of social-ecological systems as an essential component in considering the interface of health security and global environmental change. Third, we profile some of the greatest ecological challenges facing the planet in the 21st century in relation to their implications for health security, and demonstrate the relevance of these challenges through several applied case studies. Finally, we present and discuss the implications of a broader definition of health security, its relationship to globalized equity and ecological considerations, addressing time and scale considerations that span the local to the global, and which point to emerging priorities for public health practice, research and policy moving forward. Our chapter foregrounds essential theoretical and practical considerations to drive future innovation on health security in an era of environmental change. While this chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive review of the concept of health security or the myriad social-ecological challenges facing the human population, we anticipate it will be helpful for audiences from health and non-health sectors in clarifying key terminology, and establishing connections between seemingly unconnected health issues as security challenges. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/17%3A_Health_Security_in_the_Context_of_Social-ecological_Change/17.1%3A_Introduction.txt |
This section provides an overview of the concept of health and its determinants to set the stage for an introduction to the concept of health security. We provide an overview of key terminology and discuss the implications of health security in relation to health not only as an outcome, but in terms of its broader determinants.
Health and Its Determinants
Health refers to “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO, 1948, p. 1). Health is therefore both a state, outcome and process that plays out at the level of an individual (i.e. when we get sick or experience an injury), but also at the level of populations. Individual health is typically treated by health professionals across health and social systems of care, whereby health systems are typically considered a front-line response to protecting against disease population health (Kutzin & Sparkes, 2016). Preventative aspects of population-level health are the responsibility of public health—which, as a field of research, policy and practice, has the role of protecting and promoting health, preventing disease and injury, and reducing health inequities. Public health is therefore directly informed by the cross-disciplinary study of, but also practice and policy directed towards, population health and its determinants. Health is not only a product of individual choice and genetics, but is the direct result of social, political, economic and environmental determinants (Marmot 2009). These determinants of health modify and influence who bears the burden of a disease or chronic condition and the extent of the impact on both individuals and populations, and explain group differences in health status (Marmot, 2009; Mikkonen & Raphael, 2010).
Including the determinants of health in a conversation about health security is incredibly important. The determinants of health refer not only to the things which negatively influence our health over time, but also our adaptive capacity to respond to threats. By broadening our understanding of health beyond any single impact to recognize the broader context(s) of ill-health, we are able to connect health and security to questions of livelihoods, geopolitics, social relationships, and ecological systems. For example, a modelling study estimated the cost of a hypothetical infectious disease outbreak to be between \$13 million to \$64 million for one country, to \$8 billion to \$41 billion for nine countries, placing between 1500 to 1.4 million export-related jobs at risk (Bambery et al., 2018). Not only does an infectious disease pandemic therefore impact individuals and populations in terms of their health, but it will also affect the systems of care treating those affected, and have massive economic impacts that may slow economic development at best, or threaten economic and regional destabilization at worst, ultimately influencing the security of a population to afford the basic necessities of life (Cameron, 2017). Thus, health in a security context, must necessarily account not only for health-related outcomes, but also the features that determine, modify or mediate those outcomes.
Health Security: Overview and Challenges
According to McInnes (2015, p. 7), there are “… four terms widely used in debates over health security in the global context…global (public) health security, national security, human security and biosecurity” and that they are not synonymous, reflect different interests and agendas, and have different implications for how we understand the health and security nexus (Lo Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010). National security typically refers to securing the borders of a country and the welfare of the citizens within its bounds. Biosecurity is a field of study intended to protect humans, plants and animals against harmful biological agents, and in some contexts such as New Zealand, has been interpreted to include entire ecosystems. Human security, as outlined throughout this text, and as defined by the United Nations, is an approach for “identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” (UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290, Article 3, p.1). Related to each of these three concepts is the notion of health security or global public health security which are often used interchangeably.
For example, let us briefly return to the WHO constitutional mandate for achieving health for all through security and peace. In this context, and as articulated by Aldis (2008, p. 370), “’security’ seems to refer to ‘health and security’ (the contribution that health makes to global security) rather than to ‘health security’ (securing health itself).” Importantly, there seem to be no universally agreed upon definitions for health security (Lee & McInnes, 2004; Rushton, 2011). There are, however, several recurrent themes across the health and human security literatures emerging from a published literature review, which include:
• Protection against threats (e.g. disease, poverty, oppression, hunger, etc.)
• Emergence of new global conditions under which past approaches produce diminishing returns (e.g. rise of failed states, emerging environmental threats, etc.)
• Engaging new allies (e.g. public health collaboration with military establishments)
• Linking health to foreign policy interests (e.g. HIV/AIDS pandemic as a national and international security threat).[1]
Following Lee and McInnes (2004), a global health issue can rise to prominence on international security agendas if it is international in scope, threatens economic destabilization, impacts the stability of a region, and/or when health issues are part of trade negotiations. Feldbaum and Lee (2004) similarly highlight that a global health security threat typically impacts populations of people rather than individual health, produces a high incidence of death or disease, produces acute rather than long-term or chronic health impacts, and are experienced by more than one country. Much of the health security literature echoes these criteria, whereby extreme threats of international proportion establish legitimacy for a substantial political response.
Indeed, the discourse of health security dates back centuries as a reflection of historical disease outbreaks, more recently converging around the increasing importance of public health security in a highly globalized world (Kamradt-Scott, 2015; Novotny, 2007). Hoffman (2010) characterizes global health security according to four regimes:
1. Unilateral quarantine regulations (1377-2851)
2. A series of Sanitary conferences beginning in 1851 to develop international agreements around infectious disease response
3. The establishment of several international sanitary conventions and international health organizations (1892-1946)
4. Under the leadership of the WHO (1946-present).
This last regime which has been challenged by an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, recently culminated in The International Health Regulations (IHR) created by the WHO in 2005 and its member states (Kamradt-Scott, 2011; Katz et al., 2014; Kennedy et al., 2018; Paranjape & Franz, 2015; Wilson et al., 2008). Driven largely by the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks in Canada and China, but also increasing concerns over variations in pandemic influenza and heightened security concerns over terrorist activities, the IHR “aim to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease” (Article 2), with the intent of incorporating “biological, chemical and radio-nuclear events, as all as zoonotic diseases and threats to food safety” (Gostin & Katz, 2016, p. 267).
Thus, health security under the IHR encompasses not only traditional biological threats such as the spread of disease either naturally or otherwise, but also terrorist attacks (Eisenman et al., 2004; Khan, 2011), and nuclear and biological weapons (e.g. engineered pathogens or otherwise) (Carus, 2015; Colf, 2016). Perhaps overlooked elements of health security under the IHR may include human trafficking and other disease transmission pathways (Worsnop, 2019), antimicrobial resistance (Toner et al., 2015), mass migrations (MacPherson et al., 2007; Viettie et al., 2013; Zimmerman et al., 2011), and other so-called global catastrophic biological risks which include climate change and violent conflicts (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998; Schoh-Spana et al., 2017; see also Chapter 5).
These trends reflect an increased focus on global governance in relation to health security, and how security discourses have become a dominant response to global health threats (Chen & Narasimhan, 2003; Fidler, 2007; McInnes, 2005). These developments have arguably led to a privileging of infectious diseases as central issues in the health security discourse (e.g. pandemic influenza, Ebola, HIV/AIDS, Zika), which has engendered a particular emphasis on improving global health surveillance platforms for data sharing, enhancing laboratory testing, workforce development, and promoting rapid humanitarian and emergency response (Balajee et al., 2016; Belay et al., 2017; Borchert et al., 2014; Fitzmaurice et al., 2017; Sikka et al., 2016; Tappero et al., 2017). This necessarily includes building effective systems of care and associated emergency management protocols in order for primary health care to be an effective contributor to health security and associated reactive and proactive responses (Chan, 2009). Indeed, local health departments play significant roles in responding to the immediate and longer-term recovery from health security threats, and require programming to support training, safety, public preparedness, planning for emergency response and evaluation (Errett et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2018). Moreover, policy frameworks such as the IHR necessarily stress the importance of international collaboration and the need for diplomacy to achieve policy coherence that supports the promotion of health security in a rapidly globalizing world (Bond, 2008; Frieden et al., 2014).
Although these developments in health security bring new perspective through renewed foci on governance, conflict, diplomacy and disease, we find these approaches to health security and associated responses problematic for at least three reasons. First, much of what is outlined above is reactive in nature, rather than proactive in mitigating the risk of the threat to health security in the first place. A second concern is that these approaches to health security do not engage fulsomely or directly with our earlier definitions of health in relation to its broader determinants. A third, interrelated concern, is the growing need to address the converging implications of both social and ecological change for health security.
This last concern in particular has been raised by authors such as Ostergard and Kauneckis (2014) who examine research on climate change impacts to human health security. The overarching concern raised here is that the health security literature has tended to emphasise and exemplify acute events that create health emergencies, but larger, slower-moving emergencies such as global environmental change—which pose significant health threats, but also an existential threat to the human species—have typically been neglected. Instead, health security discourses seem to primarily respond to emergent implications of global environmental change such as changes in the distribution and patterning of disease vectors, or emergency response following extreme climate events (e.g. hurricanes), without adequate attention to preventing the upstream drivers of these threats. In the following sections we seek to rectify this shortcoming by drawing attention to converging social and ecological drivers of change influencing health security, through the fast and slow-moving influences on broader determinants of health. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/17%3A_Health_Security_in_the_Context_of_Social-ecological_Change/17.2%3A_What_Are_Health_and_Hea.txt |
We now turn our attention to the interface between social and ecological systems and implications for health, acknowledging foundational work with direct relevance to health security, and moving to describe the value of considering health security in relation to social-ecological systems and the discourse of resilience. Some would argue that the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (WHO, 1986) offers a precursor to a more integrative approach to health security, with its emphasis that improvements in health required a secure foundation in the basic prerequisites for health, listing these prerequisites as: peace, shelter, education, food, income, a stable ecosystem, sustainable resources, social justice and equity. This emphasis led to the Ottawa Charter’s call for a “socioecological approach” to health, noting:
The inextricable links between people and their environment constitutes the basis for a socioecological approach to health. The overall guiding principle for the world, nations, regions and communities alike is the need to encourage reciprocal maintenance – to take care of each other, our communities and our natural environment. (WHO, 1986, Section 2, Article 2 ‘Create Supportive Environments’, n.p.)
The value of combined social and ecological orientation to health has been echoed and reiterated through subsequent decades of public health efforts. Along with efforts to fulsomely engage with both the ecological and the social determinants of health (see Cole et al., 1999; Edwards & Davison, 2015; Horwitz & Parkes, 2019; McLaren & Hawe, 2005; Parkes et al., 2003), a combined emphasis on the social and ecological determinants of health can be seen across emerging fields of public health research and practice such as ecohealth, environmental health equity, One Health and planetary health (see Buse, Oestreicher et al., 2018). As well as efforts focused on health of humans (and other species), an important concurrent body of work has generated expanding attention to social-ecological systems (SES), change and resilience, and offers a very helpful complement to an integrative understanding of health security. The remainder of this section, provides an overview of the dynamics of coupled social and ecological systems before linking these to the emergent health security dimensions of ecological change, and returning to the benefits of an integrative, social and ecological orientation to health security.
What Are ‘Resilient’ Social-ecological Systems?
SES are complex assemblages of social actors, institutions and bio-geo-physical units, that adapt and respond to shocks or changes based on their composition, function, and spatial and temporal orientations (Berkes et al., 2003; Levin, 1998). In other words, SES refer to the relationships of social systems (i.e. society) to the ecological systems and ecosystem services which provide conditions for life to sustain and flourish (Holling, 2001). Thus, not only are ecosystem processes essential to the functioning of social-ecological systems, but so too are the human relationships, institutions and power dynamics that govern social and ecological systems alike (Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Cretney, 2014; Smith & Stirling, 2010).
SES tend to be nested within multiple hierarchical systems, where smaller systems move rapidly through processes of exploitation, conservation, release and reorganization (Holling, 2001). Holling (1986) famously used the example of forest fires to depict how a forest system would grow, exploiting available resources of oxygen, land and nutrients from the soil, ultimately crowding out other elements and producing competition over resources that requires the forest to ultimately conserve those resources. When triggered under the right conditions, sometimes by an exogenous event such as lightning from a thunder storm, a fire could release the massive amounts of stored energy and potential of the system, ultimately creating opportunities for reorganization into a similar system (e.g. a forest), or into an entirely new system altogether. Termed what Gunderson and Holling refer to as ‘panarchy,’ adaptive SES rely on an ability for systems that operate at different spatial and temporal scales to experiment with novel assemblages at small scales while larger, slower moving systems protect against catastrophic systems change while still benefitting from the innovation, creation and conservation of smaller systems (Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Holling, 2001).
SES rose to prominence primarily when considering the resilience of ecological systems and human communities in relation to natural disasters and resource management issues (Folke, 2006; Gunderson, 2010). SES are often discussed in terms of their resilience, vulnerability and adaptability across time and geographic space (Young, 2014). The resilience approach emphasizes that systems are characterized by non-linear dynamics, thresholds and tipping points for change, uncertainty, and have multiple interactions across time and space (Folke, 2006; Walker et al., 2004). Resilience typically reflects a system’s ability to respond to shocks so as to return to its original function, but has increasingly been recognized that ‘bouncing back’ to a system that is inherently unsustainable may be problematic in the context of SES, and therefore, much conventional scholarship emphasizes the learning of systems and the actors within it and their ability to ‘bounce forward’, learn from shocks and ultimately self-organize to produce a more effective systems response (Berbes-Blasquez et al., 2014). Accordingly, a resilient system is more able to adapt to shocks and could either proactively or reactively respond to systems vulnerabilities to minimize the impacts of the shock across the system or for its specific components. Alongside resilience, a focus on social-ecological change is fuelling necessary attention to understanding processes of transformation in communities and societies (Andrachuk & Armitage, 2015; Chandra et al., 2010; Kull et al., 2018) in ways that are highly relevant to our future health and security.
Recognition of the links among SES resilience, change and the determinants of health is expanding (Berbes-Blasquez et al., 2014; Bunch et al., 2011). Indeed, it has been argued that, within specific SES contexts—for example, catchments and watersheds—that “promotion of health and resilience converge towards a common goal: to cultivate enduring capacity to respond positively to change and challenges” (Parkes & Horwitz, 2009, p. 100). Given that health security will always need to address shocks, change and challenges, we argue that understanding of both resilience and health in SES will be essential if health security is to be understood in a way that actively addresses combined and converging social and ecological change.
Ecological Drivers of Health Insecurity in Coupled Social-ecological Systems
The 21st century has presented dramatic natural and anthropogenic environmental changes that pose unique risks to human health. For example, climate change has raised global temperatures where 17 of the 18 warmest years on record have occurred since the turn of the 21st CE (NASA, 2018). As a result of increasing carbon pollution, ocean acidification threatens all forms of marine life, and in 2015 the Great Barrier Reef experienced the largest single bleaching event to ever occur with deleterious effects on marine biodiversity in that area. Further, the use of non-biodegradable consumer items has led to other forms of ecological marine stress. There are now at least five massive garbage patches across the planet’s oceans comprised almost entirely of microplastics and plastic products. This pollution exists on a previously unimaginable scale, impacting marine life and impacting biodiversity of the ocean. On land, deforestation—the permanent destruction of a forest to make way for other land uses—results in an estimated 18.7 million acres of forest loss every year (WWF, 2018) contributing to approximately 15% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Other forms of large-scale resource ‘development’ (e.g. the construction of hydroelectric dams, mines, fracking natural gas, etc.) also contribute to these trends, while creating massive linear disturbances on the landscape for supporting infrastructure, and often contributing to poor air quality and water contamination.
These changes to marine, terrestrial and atmospheric environments are so great, that geologists maintain we now live in a new geological epoch named the Anthropocene where the human species is the driving bio-geo-chemical force for ecological change; (Crutzen, 2006; Lewis & Maslin, 2015). So great is human influence on the planet that some scientists describe our influence on the natural order of the planet as the ‘great acceleration’ (Steffen et al., 2007), whereby at least five planetary system boundaries including climate change, biosphere integrity measured by planetary genetic diversity under what is currently the world’s sixth largest mass extinction, land-system change (i.e. altering natural systems and land cover into other forms that may be incommensurable with the provisioning and regulating services of any given ecosystem), and disruption to biogeochemical flows of nitrogen and phosphorus which regulate numerous processes required to support life on the planet (Steffen et al., 2015).
Growing attention is being paid to the pathways by which environmental or ecological change influences health through the disruption or alteration of ecosystem services (Fisher et al. 2009). Ecosystem services refer to the things that nature provides which allow life to sustain on the planet (De Groot et al., 2002). Food security and water security depend on ecosystem services. Typically, ecosystem services are grouped into several categories of services. Provisioning services refer to the production of food and water for human and non-human species, but also the production of genetic resources and energy. Regulating services regulate control ecosystems and biophysical systems so that they operate within safe limits, such as the regulation of the climate system through carbon sequestration, waste decomposition, or pest and disease control. Supporting services make it possible for services to continue to function through nutrient cycling, habitat provision or pollination, enabling ecosystems to provide other services including both provision and regulation. Cultural services refer to the spiritual, cultural, therapeutic and recreational services provided by nature, predominantly to human populations (Duraiappah et al., 2005).
It can be argued that those fortunate enough to live in countries in stages of advanced capitalism (e.g. primarily the so-called ‘Western’ or ‘Industrialized’ countries) are buffered from the ecological pressures that modify ecosystem services, through infrastructure, social and health services and emergency response management build adaptive capacity to adverse ecological change. Even so, the rate and scale of social and ecological change in a range of contexts is driving growing attention to ecosystem services as a way to understand health impacts across scales (Horwitz & Parkes, 2016) and examples of the health impacts of altering and protecting ecosystem services are expanding (McFarlane et al., in press). Despite the fact that ecosystems are non-negotiable foundations for health and well-being across the planet (Horwitz & Parkes, 2016), much of the attention to, and most pronounced health impacts of, altered ecosystem services will unfold (like the health security discourse) in lower- and middle-income countries. In these contexts, health security challenges are compounded by the fact that capacity for addressing health and its determinants may be more limited compared to The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations, further undermining efforts directed towards the Sustainable Development Goals (see Chapter 3).
For example, Yemen’s on-going humanitarian crisis stems largely from drought conditions that have left 17 million people without adequate nutrition leading to both malnutrition and outbreaks of cholera. The humanitarian crisis in Syria, that—at the time of writing this chapter—continues to unfold, was largely driven by civil discontent stemming from the confluence of dissatisfaction with President Bashar al-Assad and the most intense period of drought Syria had ever recorded resulting in crop failures, rising food prices and migration from the countryside to the city. This ultimately led to a civil war and the need for a mass relocation of 13.5 million Syrians requiring humanitarian assistance, further highlighting the human security dimensions of prolonged environmental change (i.e. drought) which can lead to violent conflict (Barnett & Adger, 2007). Less dramatic has been the situation of Capetown in South Africa, the first city to approach ‘Day Zero’—the day when the city would run out of potable water due to prolonged drought—triggering a series of water restrictions and the need to visit local pumps through a quota system.
Western Africa’s economy was crippled during the 2014 Ebola crisis that killed 11 000 and resulted in US\$3 billion in economic losses across the region (Nkengasong et al., 2017). Ebola was driven by fragmentation of West African rain forests through expansion of resource development projects, increasing interaction among animals and humans resulting in incident cases (Rulli et al., 2017) and subsequent rapid rise in incidence (Jones et al., 2013). The spread of infectious diseases such as Ebola also requires significant multilateral containment efforts to be coordinated across the region and internationally (Davies et al., 2015; Kalra et al., 2014; WHO, 2016).
Potential Synergies: Linking Social-ecological Insights with Health Security
Each of the examples listed above demonstrate the complexity in linking large scale, slow moving ecological changes to processes of social change and its impacts on human health in particular global regions. However, no place on the planet is entirely devoid of the health risks from ecological change, but many of the impacts to health security will be place-specific whereby ecological change will interact with unique social and ecological contexts, along with inequities between and within population groups according to the determinants of health and interactions therein (MacIntyre et al., 2018). In other words, the social and ecological components of SES will influence place-specific vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity which ultimately influence the resilience of that system to promote good outcomes for people, other species and the environment (Ellis et al., 2018; Stokols, 1996). Examples of these variations includes the range of responses across Australia, Canada, Europe and the United States, to the expanding impact of significant forest fires in the last decade in association with changing climate (Abatzoglou et al., 2018; Tett et al., 2018). These fires result in loss of life, property and livelihoods with significant implications for mental health and accessing health services during emergencies (Dodd et al., 2018). Climate change further drives extreme heat events, violent weather, and floods and storm surges that are increasingly affecting coastal communities, which each bear impacts that are disproportionately felt by those already most disadvantaged in our society (Watts et al., 2017; Watts et al., 2018).
Thus, the coupled social and ecological change will precipitate further concern for the health of individuals and populations, including a range of equity concerns (consider social and environmental equity, intergenerational equity and interspecies equity), which will, in turn, challenge governance responses to build adaptive capacity among the most vulnerable (Quinn & Kumar, 2014). Not only will these health issues be differentially distributed across population groups and non-human species (environmental and ecological injustice (Low & Gleeson, 1998)), but they will accompany job insecurity and significant psychosocial risks which constitute additional health security threats through direct morbidity and mortality within and between population groups, resulting in rising health and social system costs as we struggle to adapt and respond to ecological change.
These examples underscore a key insight for health security that can be gleaned from understanding of contextual challenges and implications of SES: that is a need for more nuanced attention to the challenge of health security concerns across different scales (see Buse, Smith, et al., 2018), and—in particular—the need to consider social-ecological change and health security concerns, not only at the planetary, or the most local, but also at mesoscale (Galway et al., 2016; Horwitz & Parkes, 2019. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/17%3A_Health_Security_in_the_Context_of_Social-ecological_Change/17.3%3A_Coupled_Social-ecologic.txt |
Building on the examples above, we now turn to two specific examples at the meso-scale to grapple with the complexity of health security in particular social-ecological contexts. The meso-scale here refers to intermediate scales that tend to include unique micro-climates, watersheds or specific ecological biomes, but which may cross multiple human jurisdictions including local governance. Here, we utilize meso-level examples due to their inherent linkages between both the social and the ecological in manifesting health security risks.
Food Security in East Africa
Food security and human security are intimately related, with both having direct implications for health security (FAO, 2016). Some human security specialists have argued for “redefining food security in terms of securing vulnerable populations from the structural violence of hunger” (Shepherd, 2012, p. 28). Global food riots are a particularly strong exemplar of coupled social-ecological systems. As Berazneva and Lee state:
a sharp escalation in worldwide commodity prices precipitated the global food crisis of 2007–2008, affecting the majority of the world’s poor, causing protests in developing countries and presenting policymakers with the challenge of simultaneously addressing hunger, poverty, and political instability. (2013, p. 28)
Examining the inter-country variability in Africa, where a majority of the population are episodically food insecure, and about one quarter are chronically food insecure, they found that “higher levels of poverty (as proxied by the [country’s] Human Poverty Index), restricted access to and availability of food, urbanization, a coastal location, more oppressive regimes and stronger civil societies were associated with a higher likelihood of riots occurring” (p. 28).
Yet ongoing climate variability (environmental insecurity) and conflict (socio-political insecurity) also have effects on food prices, and hence food security. Raleigh and colleagues (2015) honed in on markets of the main trading town of first level administration districts in 24 African states with reported political violence January 1997 to April 2010. They found that “feedback exists between food price and political violence: higher food prices increase conflict within markets, and conflict increases food price. Lower than expected levels of rainfall directly increase food price and indirectly increase conflict through its impact on food price” (p. 188).
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) integrates complex analyses of food insecurity and malnutrition situations. Their website features a Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) network map of East Africa. An interactive zoomable versionof this map can also be accessed that shows regional food insecurity classifications in acute and chronic contexts.
These quantitative empirical findings are reflected in maps of ongoing acute food insecurity produced by the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS, 2019). Focusing in on East Africa, the update shows areas of both intense conflict and emergency levels of acute food insecurity (i.e. South Sudan), along with areas of ongoing crisis (e.g., Somalia), and those that are stressed (e.g. Kenya).
Particularly in such contexts, United Nations organizations have agreed to human security approaches to food security (FAO, 2016). In a narrative review on conflict and climate change, Brown and Crawford (2009) note that “reductions in crop yields and increasingly unpredictable weather patterns around the world may lead to higher prices for food and greater food insecurity” labelling climate “a ‘threat multiplier’ that makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and intractable” (p. 2).
Huish (2008) has argued that “In the process of building common language between researchers and policy‐makers, the agreed definition of food security [has] excluded many important issues. As a result, the excluded, more radical issues have been pursued by off‐shoot movements that do less to directly engage the policy‐making process with existing policy‐making technocracy” (p. 1386). An example would be combined multinational corporation – government aid approaches which focus primarily on technology and markets, often not reaching the more vulnerable, African smallholder agricultural producers nor responding to their concerns (Rajaonarison, 2014).
The requirements for food security and environmental sustainability over the longer term have been set out globally (Cole et al., 2013). They include access to land, water, appropriate agricultural inputs, fair markets and supportive governance. Specific challenges and opportunities have been explored in East Africa in both urban (Yeudall et al., 2007 and more rural contexts (Braitstein et al., 2017), where the role of access to land, diverse agricultural production, promotion of dietary diversity, and human rights, including the right to food, have been given stronger emphasis. The latter are more consonant with some of the more radical approaches which Huish mentions, such as food sovereignty (Torrez, 2011) which explicitly frame the achievement of food security in social movement terms.
Cumulative Impacts of Multiple Resource Development Operations in Northern British Columbia
As indicated above, global land system change is significant, and largely occurring as a result of industrial agriculture and large-scale resource development projects. Resource development impacts human health through a variety of biophysical, but also social, ecological, cultural and economic pathways (Aalhus, 2017). This is a challenging conundrum for communities which are predominantly rural and remote, and rely almost exclusively on resource development pathways for local economic development (Bowles & Wilson, 2015; Halseth, 2015; Halseth & Markey, 2009).
Figure 17.1 demonstrates how changing environmental conditions can produce reciprocal and interrelated changes across local contexts. These impacts to the determinants of health (DoH) thereby modify existing relationships between people and the land in ways that may create differential exposure to harm (i.e. living within close proximity to newly developed sour gas wells, or relying on an aquifer that risks contamination from multiple natural gas fracking operations) or modify risk factors in a local context (Buse et al., 2019). For example, the boom and bust dynamics of resource development can create large influxes of workers to a community without necessarily increasing services (Mactaggart et al., 2016; Shandro et al., 2011). This can lead to service-based stress, rising rates of substance use, homelessness and risks for women and children. During a bust, health services that were already functioning with limited capacity may see cuts that limits the ability of a community to address the social impacts left behind by resource development booms (Amnesty International, 2016; Buse et al., 2019).
These issues become relevant to health security when and where local systems are unable to protect and promote human health. This is particularly salient in regions with multiple forms of resource development operating on the same land base which may produce cumulative environmental, community and health impacts (Gillingham et al., 2016). Cumulative impacts have been referred to as “death by a thousand cuts” or the “tyranny of small decisions” (Noble, 2010), and conceptualize how past, present and future development projects can interact with pre-existing land-uses in ways that create both positive and negative impacts for people, their health and the broader environments in which they are situated.
For example, Figure 17.2 illustrates an array of natural resource projects and supporting infrastructure developed across Northern British Columbia, Canada. Not only do each of the individual projects—whether a mine, hydroelectric facility, natural gas well or pipeline, and associated right of ways in the form of roads, railways and power lines—produce individual risks to human health, it is the confluence of multiple projects that poses new and emergent risks for health and the overall economic, political, social and health security of a population at a regional level, but particularly those regions that have a high dependency on natural resource operations as a principal economic driver, and where the land provides opportunities to exploit multiple types of natural resources.
Consider a simple example: the air quality and resulting respiratory health impacts of living adjacent to natural gas wells may put an individual at a certain degree of risk, living in a community that already had a smelter, pulp and paper mill, or a history of poor air quality can create new cumulative exposures for individuals and populations alike. However, these physical impacts can also be unpacked and understood in relation to other forms of cumulative impacts that have accumulated over decades and sometimes even centuries. For example, colonial impacts to Indigenous communities across the world are well-understood, and manifest in a variety of health impacts stemming from violence, trauma and a loss of culture (Greenwood et al., 2015). When combined with new environmental exposures from the earlier air quality example, a double injustice occurs, whereby determinants of health come into direct interaction with biophysical exposures producing new types of health impacts, challenges for health services delivery, or for the ability to access and benefit from ecosystem services that are inhibited by industrial change processes.
The two meso-scale case-examples presented here, offer multiple entry-points from which to explore both health security and SES. Related meso-scale case-examples have been found to be useful in a range of teaching and learning contexts that both directly and indirectly address issues relevant the interface of health security and SES, as exemplified the decade of work in the Canadian Community of Practice in Ecosystem Approaches to Health (CoPEH-Canada) (see Cole et al., 2018; Parkes et al., 2017). Since 2016, CoPEH-Canada has run a multi-institutional hybrid course (Cole et al., 2018), and has consistently used the meso-scale of watersheds as a social-ecological systems context from which to explore course themes, connecting across institutional contexts in relation to themes of “The role of universities in progressing health within their watersheds” in 2016-2018 and “Health of humans and other species in their watersheds” in 2019. Both conceptual and field-based examples and experiences can be used to explore and appreciate the SES features of these meso-scales, and also to ‘zoom-in’ and ‘zoom-out’ to consider the benefits of examining related issues at multiple scales, including the use of ‘extension activities’ and exercises such as those presented below (see also Buse, Smith, et al., 2018; Galway et al., 2016; Parkes & Horwitz, 2016). | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/17%3A_Health_Security_in_the_Context_of_Social-ecological_Change/17.4%3A_Case_Examples_Linking_S.txt |
Environmental changes can modify health and its determinants in ways that produce security and governance challenges from the local to the global scale. From the standpoint of human security, this chapter has exemplified that security risks related to health have primarily been conceptualized in relation to emergent biological threats, but that a conceptualization of social-ecological systems encourages us to consider dimensions of time and space in manifesting systems vulnerabilities and its ability to adapt to change.
Environmental change will exacerbate existing inequities, and will also produce emergent implications for human health and the public and acute care response system to identify threats that may not be immediate, but long term and unfolding over broad geographic areas rather than resulting from a single point of origin. The time and space considerations here are significant, given that environmental change will continue to unfold in perpetuity, affecting different bioregions of the planet and the populations that reside there in nuanced and highly contextual ways. Moreover, it raises significant questions about how to promote environmental health in ways that are just and fair, thereby requiring an ethical analysis of the equity impacts of change across different scales (i.e. local, regional, national, international, planetary), but also the governance responses to promoting sustainability and mitigating or adapting to associated health impacts (Buse, Smith, et al., 2018). If normative dimensions of the health security discourse remain focused on the emergence and treatment of direct, biophysical risks to human populations, we risk limiting our response to much larger, slower-moving emergencies that will undoubtedly affect all life on the planet.
Towards Integrative Approaches to Health Security and Social-ecological Change
Fortunately, scholarship linking environmental and ecological contexts to the health of human and non-human entities has grown considerably over the past 150 years (Buse, Oestreicher, et al., 2018). For example, Buse, Oestreicher, et al. (2018) outline the emergence of seven ‘fields’ of environmental public health practice that simultaneously seek to address the disease/host interface present across much of the health security discourse, but to consider those interactions across nested ecological scales in ways that are attentive to equity and justice (see Figure 17.3). These fields are further built upon by Oestreicher et al. (2018) to conceptualize a variety of scholarly and applied disciplines actively working to understand and respond to the health risks posed by environmental change.
Human and health security has not necessarily been at the fore of any one of these field developments, but is implicit to their study. In the above section on health security, we see that it is often framed in response to an emerging threat (e.g. climate refugees and mass migrations, exposure to pandemic influenza) that rely on the interaction between a broader physical context and the human body. However, understanding how fields and systems are nested within one another encourages the consideration of the determinants of health, and how health promoting and protecting resources may unfairly benefit some segments of society relative to others. In other words, each of these fields, by virtue of their engagement with health and its determinants, implicitly understands that the health and security of a population is a fundamental and orienting goal of many public health responses to various crises.
Recommendations for Future Research, Education and Practice
What is clear from the analysis above is the emergence of several trajectories and priorities for research and capacity-strengthening to support policies and practices that can promote health security in a time of profound environmental change. First, there is an analytic requirement for health security to more fulsomely engage with existing definitions of health security in ways that account for its social, political, economic and environmental determinants. Conventional definitions overly privilege direct, biophysical risks to human health, perhaps risking considerations of the emergent, distal, and indirect risks to health and well-being posed by unique interactions among specific places and determinants of health. Broadening the health security definition is particularly helpful in recognizing environmental change as a considerable threat to health security in the 21st century. Not only will humanity continue to struggle to adapt to the impacts of climate change and a host of other bio-geo-chemical change processes that threaten our very existence if left unaddressed, but such a definition would necessarily broaden the spatial and temporal purview of health security. Indeed, many of the ecological threats to human health discussed in this chapter are playing out on timescales that not only create direct and immediate health risks, but they will continue to do so, changing and evolving in form and severity, over the course of generations. Recognizing slow moving emergencies as inherent risks to health security that unfold over diverse parts of the planet is essential given the spatial and equity dynamics at play.
Second, concerted research attention needs to be directed towards the equity dimensions of health security responses to the health impacts of environmental change, but also conventional biosecurity threats such as weapons of mass destruction and biological agents. Many of the health security threats unfolding around the world disproportionately affect low and middle-income countries due to significant capacity and infrastructure challenges, despite much of the world’s pollution and ecological threshold exceedances being driven by high-income countries’ past rapid industrial growth, and middle-income countries’ current growth. The health equity impacts of environmental change are well-studied, but further policy guidance on promoting equitable responses to health security issues, including weighing multiple trade-offs across multiple emergencies operating at different regional and temporal scales, is desperately needed. Research that seeks to unpack the equity dimensions of a just and equitable response to the health security implications of global environmental change must ask important questions about the distribution of resources and populations serviced by interventions. This is of particular relevance in contexts defined by colonial histories of physical and cultural violence, particularly against Indigenous populations, or where pre-existing population groups are differentially exposed to an environmental harm through unjust land-use or zoning policies. Ensuring a fair and equitable process is therefore central to the pursuit of environmental health justice, and is a rich area for future research on health security.
Third, there is considerable need for capacity-strengthening efforts that promote integrative understandings of health, human security and the drivers and impacts of environmental change. The discussion throughout this chapter has demonstrated the myriad ways in which health outcomes manifest from ecological change processes, but also the ways in which they produce security threats for individuals, regions, nation states and the broader international community. In embracing a definition of health security that includes the determinants of health, we draw attention to the integrative imperatives that cross-cut spatial, temporal, sectoral, value-based and disciplinary responses to security threats (see Table 17.1).
Table 17.1 Examples of integrative imperatives to be addressed in health security research and practice.
INTEGRATED ELEMENTS DIMENSION EXAMPLES
Multiple scales Spatial Local, regional, national, international, planetary
Multiple points in time Temporal Past, present, future
Multiple sectors Sectoral Industry, healthcare, public health, social services, environment, housing, social and economic development, military and national defence
Multiple land-use values Value-based Environment, community, health, culture
Multiple methods/approaches Disciplinary Qualitative, quantitative, biomedical, veterinary, social determinants, public health, political science
17.6: Conclusion
This chapter has explored the interface of health security, social-ecological systems and environmental change in order to draw connections for the human security implications of changes to social-ecological systems and the resulting impacts on human health. We have aimed to provide an overview of a topic that is worthy of numerous volumes of text, seeking to draw attention to a range of key features to the extent this is possible in a single book chapter. A key challenge for health security, particularly in an era of growing natural and anthropogenic environmental change, is to promote effective action across sectors and disciplines to promote intersectoral action in ways that support just and healthy outcomes for all; being mindful of interactions between an existing security concern and those that have existed historically but may also manifest into the future; incorporating multiple ecological, community and cultural determinants of health into an analysis of security by engaging with diverse land-use values; and leveraging lessons from multiple fields of research and practice in order to engender a nuanced understanding of health security that promotes human rights, equity and sustainability. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/17%3A_Health_Security_in_the_Context_of_Social-ecological_Change/17.5%3A_Discussion.txt |
Review
Key Points
• Health security is typically conceived of as the activities required to mitigate risks, or to respond to acute events that endanger population-level health across international boundaries.
• Social-ecological systems are inextricably linked to health security, whereby both natural and anthropogenic environmental changes have cascading impacts on an array of health security issues, with some unresolvable uncertainty as to their timing, scale and distribution.
• A key challenge for health security is to promote effective action across sectors and disciplines to promote intersectoral action on the multiple environmental and community determinants of health in ways that support just and healthy outcomes for all species and humans (i.e. respecting ecological as well as environmental rights).
• Integrative approaches to understanding ecology and society and their implications for health resonate with the early conceptualizations of health security.
• Global environmental change will exacerbate existing inequities across dimensions of human security, but particularly in health status.
• A key challenge for health security, particularly in an era of growing natural and anthropogenic environmental change, is to promote effective action across sectors and disciplines to promote intersectoral action in ways that support just and healthy outcomes for all; being mindful of interactions between an existing security concern and those that have existed historically but may also manifest into the future; incorporating multiple environmental, community and cultural determinants of health into an analysis of security by engaging with diverse land-use values; and leveraging lessons from multiple fields of research to engender nuanced understandings of health security to promote human rights.
.Extension Activities & Further Research
1. How is climate change related to health security? Describe some examples.
2. Pick a bioregion (e.g. in the lower Great Lakes or the Salish Sea in the Pacific Northwest) and describe what elements of its composite ecosystems and social systems contribute to health security or health insecurity?
3. In what ways might governments work to redress the health security implications of global ecological change?
4. What do you think the most important ecological and social determinants of your health are at this point in your life?
5. Who is most impacted by global environmental change as it relates to health security issues?
6. Scales are important and can be illustrated by a “zoom in, zoom out” mental exercise (adapted from Parkes & Horwitz, 2016):
1. Think of your current environment and try to imagine both the living (biotic) and non-living (abiotic) parts interacting with another living thing, such as yourself? How do social dynamics influence these interrelationships?
2. Zoom out from that specific interaction to your neighbourhood. Do you see more life yet? What other species do you see that make up this social-ecological community? What species do you not see? What things move and interact the most? How might they affect your health security?
3. Zoom out farther, to the borders of the bioregion in which you are currently located. Does what you are seeing look more or less alive? Do you visualize this view as a roadmap or as a satellite image? Can you see evidence of social-ecological crises from this vantage point?
4. Once you have a large-scale (regional in a continent) view in your mind’s eye, consider three questions:
5. How would this view have looked different five years ago? And potentially look 10 years from now?
6. Identify two positive and three negative determinants of health security for each of these time frames at this scale.
7. Give three examples of where you can see (imagine?) the atmosphere (air), geosphere (rock, land) and hydrosphere (water) interacting to support life within the view you see.
8. Websites that can help you experience these features of zooming in and out through social and ecological contexts include what is your ecological footprint? and The Scale of the Universe. Specific papers also explore the ways in which these dynamics may assist interdisciplinary learning (e.g. Galway et al., 2016).
List of Terms
See Glossary for full list of terms and definitions.
• bioregion
• biosecurity
• ecosystem services
• food security
• health security
• livelihoods
• meso-scale
• social-ecological systems
• water security
Suggested Reading
Charron, D. F. (Ed.). (2012). Ecohealth research in practice: Innovative applications of an ecosystem approach to health (p. 282). Springer; International Development Research Centre.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. (2005). Ecosystems and human well-being: Synthesis. World Resources Institute. https://www.millenniumassessment.org...t.356.aspx.pdf
The Rockefeller Foundation–Lancet Commission. (2015). The Rockefeller Foundation–Lancet Commission paper on planetary health. http://www.thelancet.com/infographic...anetary-health
Rushton, S., & Youde, J. (Eds.). (2015). Routledge handbook of global health security. Routledge.
World Health Organization. (2007). The world health report 2007 – A safer future: Global public health security in the 21st century. https://www.who.int/whr/2007/en/
Long Descriptions
Figure 17.1 long description: Graphic composed of three layers of ovals enclosing each other. The outermost oval is labelled “Macro social, political, economic and ecological context of resource development projects.”
The second oval reads “industry-related pressures to social, economic, cultural and ecological processes” and “interactions with past, present and future land uses.”
The third and innermost oval is labelled “resulting and interralated changes to local context.” This oval contains four boxes that detail the determinants of health in the areas of social, environmental (or ecological), cultural, and economic change. They are described in an unordered list below:
• Social determinants of health
• Infrastructure/services
• Demographics and migration
• Social relationships
• Crime and safety
• Family dynamics
• Education
• Lifestyles
• Traffic
• Racial/ethnic impacts
• Gender impacts
• Food security
• Ecological determinants of health
• Noise
• Air quality
• Water quantity/quality
• Soil and sediment
• Climate change
• Landscapes
• Biodiversity
• Ecosystem services
• Geomorphology
• Wildlife health
• Cultural determinants of health
• Cultural practices
• Connection to culture
• Self-determination
• Local, traditional foods and medicines
• Connections to lands/waters
• Language use
• Intergenerational impacts
• Economic determinants of health
• Income and income distribution
• Economic systems
• Cost of living
• Poverty
• Housing
• Community investment
There is a fifth box that partially overlaps the four others. It is labelled “Health Impact Areas” and contains the following:
• Mental health
• Injuries
• Communicable diseases
• Substance use and related harms
• Sexual health
• Health behaviours
• Chronic and acute illness
• Health equity
[Return to Figure 17.1]
Figure 17.2 long description: Map labelled “Northern British Columbia Overview: Change in industrial land-use.” The map shows approximately the most northerly two-thirds of British Columbia, including the islands of Haida Gwaii to the west and a small section of the eastern border with the Rocky Mountains and Alberta. This map was created in July 2018 for the Cumulative Impacts Research Consortium in Prince George.
The map shows that the northeastern section of the province, from the corner to the area approximately Fort St. John, saw a lot of industrial activity pre-2006. The central part of the province, radiating outward from Prince George, also saw significant industrial activity pre-2006. Along a few key pathways in the province, where a number of towns and First Nations communities are clustered, there has been industrial activity from 2006 to the present.
[Return to Figure 17.2]
Figure 17.3 long description: Circular chart titled “Reciprocal relationships between the health of humans, animals and ecosystems.” In the centre of the circle is a three-piece pie chart that is surrounded by bubbles describing various health concerns. The pieces of the pie chart are at the top level of the following unordered list, while the bubbles are described in the sub-bullets:
• Equity/power/justice
• Political ecology of health
• Environmental health justice
• Ecohealth
• Nested ecological scales
• Ecohealth
• Ecological public health
• Planetary health
• Host/vector interaction
• Occupational environmental health
• One health
[Return to Figure 17.3]
Footnote
1. Adapted from Aldis, 2008, pp. 371-372 | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/17%3A_Health_Security_in_the_Context_of_Social-ecological_Change/17.7%3A_Resources_and_Reference.txt |
Learning Objectives
• Compare and contrast jus ad bellum (the legal right to go to war) and jus in bello (laws that restrict behaviour in time of war).
• Understand the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of Genocide.
• Outline the legality of using nuclear weapons and anti-personnel landmines.
• Describe the functions of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.
• Summarise functions, prerogatives and limitations of the United Nations Security Council.
• Describe and evaluate the limits of the self-defence concept.
• Understand the Geneva Conventions (1949, 1977): goals, accomplishments.
• Describe the functions of ad hoc war crimes tribunals (IMT, ICTY, ICTR).
• Understand concepts associated with human rights: their ethical underpinnings, scope, emphases.
• Understand the scope and limits of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
• Understand the agreement of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its goals, potential, limitations.
This chapter outlines the basic principles found in modern international law that serve to empower international security regimes. Legal efforts to reduce the occurrence of war, restrict behaviour in time of war, and place limits on certain weapons of armed conflict are central to promoting human security. Further, the development of international human rights since World War II is reviewed as well as the new concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which allows the international community to intervene on behalf of endangered citizens of other countries. Central to the empowerment of human security regimes are the international organizations that populate the international arena. Chief among those considered in this chapter are the United Nations Security Council, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and temporary war crimes tribunals.
18: Empowering International Human Security Regimes
A central and defining feature of international relations is the condition of anarchy, a term that means the lack of world government. Without an overarching supranational force to constrain the behaviour of states and individuals, the anarchic system is inherently conflict prone. Since reordering the international system in an effort to avoid anarchy is highly unlikely, states promote order and clarity in world politics by developing and maintaining rules of behaviour. International laws have been developed in virtually every area of international relations, ranging from trade to diplomatic immunity, air space to the law of the sea. An area of consistent concern and of utmost importance to countries is war. As a result, a significant amount of time and energy have been devoted to drafting international laws that regulate armed conflict. This chapter seeks to explain efforts by the international community to eliminate, mitigate, or reduce the destructive behaviour of states towards one another and towards their own citizens through the adoption and application of international law. Attention is divided into three main areas: the laws that regulate the use of force, human rights laws that protect individuals from repressive treatment, and the institutions that are used to enforce these standards. Contemporary developments, including the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), are considered helpful stepping stones.
18.2: Modern International Law
The formal establishment of the modern nation-state system through the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) gave birth to modern international law. At its onset in the 17th century, international lawyers and philosophers debated the essence of international law and its principal source. Naturalists argued that international laws should flow from natural law, which draws on sources in nature or religion and, therefore, should be based in morality.[1] Positivists countered by arguing that international laws, as contracts among states, are so-called positive law, produced by negotiations and have a political rather than moral basis. [2] The implications of this early jurisprudence debate were significant, in effect pitting the rights and needs of individuals (protected by nature-based laws) against the power of states (promoted by negotiated laws). Over the course of the 18th century, the positivist philosophy of international law prevailed. As a result, the global legal order is one in which states are independent and negotiate the international rules that regulate their own behaviour. While international law may reflect morality, it is not a requirement in a positivist legal order. It should be noted, however, that since the Second World War moral principles have increasingly been the subject of binding international agreements. This is most prevalent in human rights treaties, in laws that protect refugees, and in the more recent R2P concept.
18.3: Making International Law
International laws in the positivist era are created in one of two ways—treaty law and customary law. Treaty law involves a formal process by which sovereign states negotiate written agreements that are legally binding upon all states which enter into them and the treaty process involves distinct stages. In the drafting stage, diplomats engage in debate that results in a draft document. The document is not a binding treaty until it has been ratified by a specified number of states. Ratification represents the second stage of the treaty process. Each state, based upon its domestic laws, determines whether or not to ratify the proposed treaty. After ratification, the state submits its instrument of ratification as evidence of its commitment to the principles enshrined in the document. It is not, however, until the third stage of the process, entry into force, that the document becomes a binding treaty. Entry into force occurs when a prescribed number of nation-states submit their instruments of ratification. For a bilateral treaty, an agreement between two states, entry into force occurs when both states ratify. For a universal treaty, the ratification threshold may be sixty states, 100 states, or any other number of states, depending on the treaty requirements agreed upon at the drafting stage. Treaties provide explicit restrictions on state behaviour. Since international treaties infringe upon the sovereignty and freedom of states, it is logical to assume that governments only endorse treaties that entail more benefit than cost. The challenge, therefore, for international lawyers and diplomats is to arrive at treaty language that is acceptable to the largest number of nation-states while sacrificing as little as possible of the purposes of the treaty.
Customary international law is different from treaty law in that custom emerges over time from the uniform behaviour of states. Custom, a recognized norm of behaviour, remains unwritten but may be transformed into treaty law if a formal document is negotiated and ratified. Unlike treaty law, which is consensual in that it is only applicable to those states which have expressly accepted it, customary law is considered binding on all countries, with or without their explicit endorsement. Until the 20th century, most international law was in the form of custom. Since 1900, however, a more systematic process has tipped the scale in favour of treaty law. While treaty law and customary law are distinct in form, some treaties have been deemed to be customary international law. The Hague (1899, 1907) and Geneva Conventions (1949) are examples of treaties that are considered to be custom. As a result, Hague and Geneva laws are binding on all states, including those, which have ratified neither. Even though there are other, secondary and tertiary, sources of international law, treaty and custom represent the two primary sources of international law in the modern era. [3] | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/18%3A_Empowering_International_Human_Security_Regimes/18.1%3A_Introduction.txt |
The laws of armed conflict are broadly divided into two branches—restrictions placed on the right to initiate war and regulations on the conduct of war. Jus ad bellum determines when military intervention is legal, while jus in bello, outlines the legal behaviour of soldiers on the battlefield. Up until the end of World War II, most emphasis was placed on the development and refinement of jus in bello and its core restrictive principles. Due to the historic level of human and physical destruction caused by the Second World War, along with the onset of the atomic age, attention since 1945 has been principally focused on jus ad bellum restrictions on the right to go to war. The separate standing of jus in bello and jus ad bellum translates into two legal questions for every armed conflict, namely (1) Was the war entered into legally? and (2) Was the conduct of soldiers during that conflict legal? To determine that a state legally entered into a war does not absolve the state and its military from scrutiny over its conduct during the war. For a state to remain within the confines of the laws of armed conflict requires both a legal entry into war as well as the use of force within the parameters established by jus in bello principles.
Jus in Bello
At the onset of the modern international legal system (1648), the core principles that define jus in bello today were already in place, the product of centuries of efforts aimed at reducing the horrors of war. The main jus in bello principles established over time remain in force and are codified in specific international treaties, including the Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), Geneva Conventions (1949) and a series of issue specific treaties dating to the 19th century. Each principle restricts conduct on the battlefield in an effort to humanize and standardized armed conflict. The Geneva Convention and its Protocols are also discussed in Chapter 5.
Discrimination
The first legal requirement placed on soldiers in the field is to differentiate, or discriminate, between lawful targets and unlawful targets. In time of war, soldiers and those who plan the conduct and oversee the behaviour of soldiers are legally required to separate targets into two categories—combatant and non-combatant. Combatants, those who actively take up arms, are legal targets. They may be killed, wounded, or taken captive at any time during the course of the war. Non-combatants, a category that includes civilians, humanitarian relief personnel, journalists, and international observers, among others, may not be targeted. While non-combatants may be detained, restricted or moved, they may not be intentionally injured or killed. The discrimination principle places an enormous burden on soldiers engaged in armed conflict, especially in urban settings. A wilful violation of the principle, however, runs counter to prevailing international law and may constitute a war crime that is punishable by a national or international court.
Prohibition on Unnecessary Suffering
International law allows for the lethal use of force against combatants. Professional soldiers are trained to capture instead of injuring, injure instead of killing, and to kill only as necessary. What soldiers are not allowed to do is inflict injury with the express intent of causing suffering that is unnecessary. The prohibition on unnecessary suffering impacts both the actions taken by soldiers as well as the weapons that are used in armed conflict. Twisting the blade of a bayonet in the leg of an incapacitated enemy combatant for no purpose other than to inflict additional pain and suffering violates the principle. Employing weapons that are designed to cause unnecessary suffering, equally, constitute violations of the laws of armed conflict. Customary international law and treaties have restricted the use of weapons whose sole or primary purpose is to cause suffering. An example of one such prohibited weapon of war is the expanding bullet, which due to its hollow head and soft jacket is designed to expand once it enters the body.
Proportionality
The principle of proportionality requires forces in the field to achieve a balance between the expected level of harm caused to civilians or civilian property and the anticipated military benefit of the proposed attack on a military asset. While it may be legal to target a combatant with a drone air-to-surface attack, those authorizing the operation must take into account the level of civilian harm that will likely be caused by the attack. This is especially the case if the individual being targeted is in the midst of a civilian population at the time of the attack. Proportionality is one of the most difficult jus in bello principles to apply to armed conflict because it requires foresight that may be difficult, if not impossible, to calculate prior to a military operation.
Perfidy
Using deceptive tactics to expose the adversary in armed conflict may constitute an illegal act of perfidy. While outsmarting the adversary is an essential element of war planning and execution, there are limits imposed upon combatants by the laws of armed conflict. False surrender, entering an enemy compound dressed as humanitarian personnel, hiding bombs in children’s toys and feigning non-combatant status, are examples of perfidy and are deemed to be illegal. The perfidy principle is also violated when soldiers intentionally use civilians as shields.
The Martens Clause
Found in the preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions is the Martens Clause, which states that:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued…populations and belligerents remain under the protection of international law, the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.
The Martens Clause is designed as an underlying net to legally ensnare violations of the spirit of jus in bello principles that may not be specifically outlawed by custom or treaty. The use of civilian captives for medical experimentation by the Nazis during World War II is one of many examples of an act that is prohibited by the Martens Clause.
In addition to the general restrictions placed on the conduct of soldiers in the field outlined by the jus in bello principles outlined above, states have sought to deem certain weapons of war illegal. International treaties have been drafted to eliminate, for example, anti-personnel landmines (APL)), lasers that cause blinding, cluster bombs, asphyxiating gases, napalm and tumbling bullets. Efforts to ban other weapons of war have yet to reach a sufficient international consensus such that a treaty banning them could be produced and implemented. Attempts to renounce nuclear weapons as illegal have been undertaken for more than fifty years, yet due to objections from the nuclear weapons states such efforts have not produced a legal ban on either the existence or use of nuclear weapons.[4] Depleted uranium shells, which are highly effective in destroying heavily armed vehicles such as tanks, have similarly been shielded from international condemnation by those countries that continue to employ them, despite the probable long-term dangers that the weapons pose to civilian populations.
Jus in bello, its principles and supporting legal documents, have greatly restricted conduct in the field and continue to be revised to take into account the new realities on the battlefield. Attention is now turned towards international efforts to restrict the right of states to enter into conflict, known as jus ad bellum.
Jus ad Bellum
The right to wage war has captivated the attention of policymakers, philosophers, moralists and lawyers for centuries. Up until the drafting of the United Nations Charter in 1945, most efforts since 1648 have resulted in only marginal restrictions on the legal ability of nation-states to enter into war. The Treaties of Westphalia (1648), for example, determined that a religious difference between states was no longer a valid reason for going to war. After the Napoleonic Campaigns concluded, the Concert of Europe (1815) dictated that territorial expansion in Europe required approval from the Concert, which was composed of the five most powerful European countries at the time. Thus, in the years leading up to the First World War nation-states possessed a nearly complete compétence de guerre, or right to wage war. This defining principle of international law at the time was referred to as the Doctrine of Intervention. Except for the few restrictions placed on nation-states in 1648 and 1815, sovereign states possessed the legal right to go to war any time that their leadership concluded it was necessary.
This broad compétence de guerre of states began to erode after World War I. The League of Nations (LON) was empowered to authorize sanctions against states, which threatened international peace and security in violation of its Covenant. The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), which was ratified by 65 states, restricted states to the use of force only in response to an armed attack, elevating the concept of self-defence in world politics as the sole legitimate standard for waging war. The failure of the League of Nations to prevent the Second World War, along with the destructive nature of that conflict, lead to a major revision of the laws that regulate entry into war. The United Nations Charter introduced the principle of non-intervention principle in article 2, paragraph 4, which states that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
A revolutionary concept, non-intervention nearly eliminated the compétence de guerre of states. Only under the conditions of self-defence, collective self-defence and Security Council authorization could member states of the United Nations (UN) legally enter into war. In 2011, 193 nation-states were members of the United Nations. Since membership in the United Nations requires ratification of the UN Charter, including Article 2, paragraph 4, virtually every state in the international system is bound to the restrictions of the Charter as they relate to the legal entry into war.
Self-defence is a concept that dates to antiquity, holding that nation-states possess the legal right to enter into war in response to an armed attack. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Kuwait possessed the legal right to defend itself. Collective self-defence extends the self-defence to other nations, giving them the legal right to come to the assistance of victim states. The United Nations Charter does not legally require third parties to intervene in response to armed aggression against a victim; however, it provides them with the legal right to do so. As such, not only did Kuwait possess the legal capacity to respond to the Iraqi invasion in 1990 with armed force, so, too, did all other states. Security Council authorization is the third legal justification for entering into war. The Security Council, a permanent organ of the United Nations, is composed of fifteen member states. Five of those members—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—are permanent (P5), while the remaining ten Council members are present for two-year appointments. In addition to a permanent presence on the Security Council, the P5 enjoy veto power over any Council resolution. At any time the Security Council decides that one nation’s invasion of another constitutes aggression, it may authorize any or all UN member states to go to war on behalf of the victim state. As such, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, automatically Kuwait possessed the legal right to militarily defend itself (self-defence) and all other UN member states enjoyed the right to come to its defence (collective self-defence). When the Security Council authorized force against Iraq to liberate Kuwait, the third (and separate) legal recourse to war was extended to states to go to war against Iraq. [5]
The willingness of the UN Security Council to authorize war has varied greatly since the organization’s inception. Only twice has the Council explicitly authorized war in response to an armed invasion, with both instances of Chapter VII war authorization happening under unique circumstances. In 1950, the Council deliberated the Korean War without the Soviet representative present, removing the veto from the calculation. Later, when the Security Council convened to consider expanding its original war mandate to include the reunification of the Korean peninsula, the Soviet representative returned to the Council and vetoed the effort. In 1990, the Security Council addressed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during an historic period of cooperation between the superpowers resulting from the peaceful end of the Cold War. The result was an authorization for war and a diverse international military coalition that forced Iraq’s military from Kuwait. Despite numerous opportunities during and after the Cold War for the Security Council to take action in response to inter-state conflict, in most instances it either declined to do so or was unable to as a result of the veto. As such, Security Council authorization for war historically has been the exception rather than the rule.
The legal right of states to go to war, therefore, has been dramatically and qualitatively reduced by the revisions to jus ad bellum introduced in 1945 by the United Nations Charter. No longer may states legally attack other states except under the narrow confines outlined in the Charter. The purpose of the Charter’s restriction on the legal right of states to go to war is to reduce the indiscriminate use of force. The fact that states continue to opt for war without legal cause, including waging undeclared wars, indicates their ability to sidestep the Charter’s restraints.
Future Challenges
The laws that regulate international conflict are in constant need of revision and updating as the global environment changes. Technological innovations create situations that traditional international law struggles to fully address. This is the case with both jus ad bellum and jus in bello rules. For example, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter authorizes states to use force in self-defence when an armed attack occurs against the state. Cyber attacks, which can cause devastating consequences for the targeted state, do not technically qualify as an ‘armed attack.’ The first ‘cyber war’ occurred in 2008 when Russia attacked the financial infrastructure of Estonia, crippling the country’s banking and credit system.
Jus in bello principles face equally daunting challenges on the 21st century battlefield. Robotic soldiers, and other forms of Automated Robotic Killing Machines (ARKM), attack drones that are controlled through satellite feeds, and the use of sound waves and other non-lethal defensive weapons are minimally regulated by existing treaty law. In order to maximize its role in the regulation of armed conflict, international law must quickly and consistently evolve to apply to new circumstances on and off the battlefield. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/18%3A_Empowering_International_Human_Security_Regimes/18.4%3A_Laws_of_War.txt |
The building block of the international system and modern international law is the sovereign state. Traditionally, international relations and the laws that it produced dealt with the regulation of external state behaviour, or foreign policy. Beginning in the 20th century, however, increasing attention was focused on the domestic behaviour of states. While some progress was made under the guise of the League of Nations after World War I, it was not until after the Second World War that human rights became a subject of international regulatory efforts. The result was a dramatic shift in international relations that transformed the individual from a mere object of international law to one of its subjects.
Until the emergence of international human rights, individuals enjoyed personal liberties and protections only to the extent that their governments afforded them. In some countries, citizens were granted generous civil liberties while in others citizens remained largely powerless and unprotected. The process aimed at ensuring basic liberties and conditions of human decency began with the framing of the United Nations Charter (Donnelly, 2006). The Charter’s preamble signals the organization’s commitment to establishing individual rights by affirming faith in fundamental human rights; Article 55 provides a clearer commitment to individual liberties by stating:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote…universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
The broad statements put down in the United Nations Charter started a process of specifying individual rights that were shared universally. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the UN General Assembly, recognizing the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. The UDHR’s thirty articles provide a strong basis upon which numerous human rights treaties have been drafted. Key human rights documents include the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of Genocide (1951), Convention to End Racial Discrimination (1965), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (1966), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), Convention Against Torture (1984) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Hundreds of other treaties and documents bring the legal regime on human rights to its current form.
In order for human rights to meaningfully impact international relations, more than the drafting of treaties is required. In a perfect world, states would internalize human rights protections and police themselves to ensure that individual liberties and rights are respected. In a world of sovereign, independent nation-states, the international community must collectively ensure that states act in accordance with prevailing international human rights documents. Economic sanctions are the most commonly applied pressure placed on states that violate human rights. Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) was the subject of the first comprehensive sanctions policy authorized by the UN Security Council. Over the course of the post-World War II era, the Security Council has implemented sanctions regimes on other human rights violating states, including South Africa, Iraq, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Ivory Coast, The Sudan, and, most recently, Libya. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/18%3A_Empowering_International_Human_Security_Regimes/18.5%3A_Laws_of_Peace_-_Human_Rights.txt |
The focus, thus far, has been on the drafting of international rules that regulate the behaviour of states aimed at empowering and protecting the human condition. The formulation of international norms and treaties reflects a growing consensus in the international community that the rights of states are not unlimited and that the protection of individuals, in time of war and peace, is essential to global peace and security. While foundational, the mere drafting of agreements represents only the first stage in the attainment of a more humane and peaceful world. The necessary corollary to drafting the restrictions is their enforcement. Attention, therefore, now turns to the institutions that have been developed and utilized to ensure that the laws of war and peace are properly and effectively applied.
United Nations Security Council
Before the Second World War was concluded, the Allied powers began the process of creating the post-war international system by drafting the rules that would clarify relations among states and by establishing the institutions that would enforce them. Chief among the institutions was the Security Council of the United Nations. Empowered by the Charter, the Council operates with few legal restraints. The high threshold required for resolutions to be adopted (nine of fifteen yes votes), along with the ability of its five permanent members to veto resolutions, have created significant political obstacles to the Council’s success. Efforts by the Security Council to regulate international affairs and effectively address threats to international peace and security generally fall into one of three categories. First, the Security Council can authorize economic sanctions against countries that it determines are in violation of the UN Charter and by virtue of their actions constitute a threat to peace. These sanctions may be tailored to target specific individuals or may be comprehensively applied to an entire country. Second, the Council can authorize peacekeeping operations (PKO) made up of contributions from multiple member states. PKOs may be authorized to oversee a disputed region, deliver humanitarian aid to people in distress, observe elections or monitor human rights compliance, or physically separate warring sides. Because the concept of peacekeeping is not found in the UN Charter, the Council’s ability to authorize such operations represents an inferred, rather than explicit, power. The UN Charter empowers the Security Council to make adjustments to promote peace in Chapter VI and allows the Council to authorize war in Chapter VII. Since peacekeeping falls between those two points, it is often referred to as a “chapter six and one-half” action. [6] Finally, the Security Council can authorize war against violators. In 1950, when North Korea invaded its neighbour to the south, the Council authorized member states to use all force necessary to liberate South Korea. In 1990, in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Council again authorized an international campaign to repel Iraqi military forces and restore the sovereign integrity of Kuwait. The Council is not limited, however, to authorizing war against states that invade another state. In 2011, the Council authorized member states to use force in order to establish a no-fly zone over Libya in an effort to prevent that North African country’s military from physically suppressing its own people who were rebelling against their government.
The history of the UN Security Council can be divided into three distinct eras: Cold War, end of the Cold War, and post-Cold War. During the Cold War (1945-1989), the Security Council was increasingly ineffective in responding to global threats to peace and security due to the animosity of the era’s two principal antagonists—the United States and the Soviet Union. As the Cold War evolved, competition between the two nuclear superpowers rendered the Council virtually dysfunctional, with one or the other superpower casting a veto to prevent a resolution’s passage. From 1978 until 1987, in fact, the Security Council was unable to authorize a single peacekeeping operation due to the Cold War divide. The end of the Cold War, however, presented an opportunity for the major powers to cooperate and collectively respond to global threats to the peace. A series of successes resulted in a Nobel Peace Prize for peacekeepers, Kuwait was liberated from Iraqi occupation, and epic missions in Cambodia, Bosnia and Somalia were undertaken by the Council. From 1987, when the Cold War began to thaw, until 1993, the Security Council was both active and ambitious. Its decision to send heavily armed peacekeepers into on-going conflicts in Cambodia, Bosnia and Somalia represented its supreme confidence in mitigating international conflict and human suffering. Failures in those epic missions, along with a decline in the euphoria associated with the Cold War’s end, marked the beginning of the current era in Security Council history. Since the mid-1990s, the Security Council has been more careful in the operations that it authorizes and less willing to take on the risks of involvement in on-going conflicts.
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
The first permanent international court was created as a semi-autonomous organ of the League of Nations in 1919. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was seated in The Hague (Den Haag), Netherlands, and was limited in its jurisdiction to considering contentious cases brought by nation-states and issuing legal advice to international organizations. While its rulings were legally binding, the PCIJ relied upon states to appear before the Court and grant it jurisdiction. As such, the PCIJ was a reflection of international law in that it was consensual instead of mandatory. When the United Nations was established after World War II, its International Court of Justice (ICJ) replaced the PCIJ. Except for the fact that the ICJ was made a principal organ of the United Nations, it functioned exactly like its predecessor. The ICJ is highly effective when two or more states come before it requesting legal adjudication, less so when states exercise their right to reject its jurisdiction. In an effort to compel states to come before the Court, the ICJ encourages states to sign a compulsory jurisdiction clause. Those that do make a legal commitment to appear before the ICJ any time that another state files a suit against them. Less than one-third of all UN members have signed the compulsory jurisdiction clause, and many of those have attached reservations that make the clause less compulsory. Like the PCIJ, the ICJ may issue advisory opinions, which represent non-binding legal advice that may be requested by the UN General Assembly or Security Council. This legal advice can be highly influential, such as in 1951 when the Court ruled that reservations applied to treaties impact only those states which had attached them at the ratification stage. Before that ruling, reservations changed the legal meaning of treaties as they applied to all parties.
The ICJ, like its predecessor, is greatly limited in that it may only issue legal rulings on disputes arising among nation-states. The Court has no jurisdiction over non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, corporations, quasi-states or individuals. It was not until 2002 that a permanent international court was established for the purpose of prosecuting individuals for their violations of international law. Until then, efforts to hold individuals accountable resulted in the establishment of temporary, or ad hoc, tribunals.
Tribunals
International legal tribunals serve two distinct, yet inter-related, purposes. First, they bring to justice those individuals who have violated core principles of international law. In that regard, international legal tribunals may prosecute violators of the laws of war and the laws of peace. Additionally, international legal tribunals, through their existence and success, serve as deterrents to future bad behaviour. If individuals, ranging from soldiers engaged in combat to political leaders, are convinced that their violations will be prosecuted, they will be less likely to commit such violations. As such, the second purpose of the tribunals, deterrence, logically flows from the first.
International legal tribunals take two basic forms, depending on their intended longevity and focus. They may be created for a particular purpose and for a limited amount of time. Such tribunals are ad hoc. They may also be created to serve, in a long-standing capacity, the general needs of the international community. Such tribunals are permanent. While the list of international tribunals, ad hoc and permanent, is far too lengthy to discuss here, several merit particular attention.
International efforts to hold war criminals responsible for their violations of the laws of armed conflict date, in the most meaningful sense, to the close of the First World War. After that conflict, the victors compiled a list of Germans war criminals. Rather than establishing a tribunal for prosecution, it was decided to call upon the new German government to assume responsibility for the prosecution of its own nationals. The results were dismal. Of the more than 900 Germans listed by the victors as war criminals, 888 were either acquitted of their charges or had their charges dropped. The lesson learned was that an international tribunal would be needed to effectively prosecute those alleged with the commission of war crimes. Shortly after the conclusion of the Second World War, the victorious allies established the International Military Tribunal (IMT) through the London Charter (1945). Two principal ad hoc tribunals, in Nuremberg and Tokyo, were created for the purpose of prosecuting Axis war criminals. The complaint that the IMT focused exclusively on the losing side was valid – World War II marks the historic low point in terms of respect for the laws of armed conflict – however, it did not prevent the tribunal from successfully prosecuting scores of war criminals. As ad hoc tribunals, the Nuremberg and Tokyo courts ceased to exist after their dockets were cleared of cases. It was not until after the end of the Cold War that the international community established another war crimes tribunal. In response to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). Seated in The Hague, Netherlands, the ICTY possessed the legal power to issue indictments and prosecute war criminals from that series of wars. The most famous indictment was issued against former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic, who was accused of a wide range of violations of international law, including aggression, crimes against humanity and genocide. A long and complicated trial began in the ICTY in 2002, it concluded in 2006 when Milosevic died before the tribunal issued its ruling. The ICTY formally ceased operations in 2017 after completing all cases pending before it. A total of 161 individuals were indicted by the Court, 111 trials were completed and 90 war criminals convicted. Many cases were transferred to other courts for prosecution and 17 indicted individuals died before their cases were completed.
In 1994, the Security Council established another ad hoc tribunal. In response to the catastrophic loss of life in the African state of Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created. With its chief prosecutor in The Hague, the ICTR’s court was located in Tanzania. The ICTR discontinued operations in 2015 after bringing fifty cases to conclusion.
The two ad hoc tribunals (ICTY, ICTR) established by the Security Council at the dawn of the post-Cold War era contributed greatly to the development of international humanitarian law. Important advances include the designation of rape as a form of genocide and/or torture, the ability of prosecutors to charge individuals with crimes against humanity prior to the onset of armed conflict, and the development of a more precise code of laws of armed conflict.
There are several problems associated with the use of ad hoc tribunals to hold individuals accountable for their actions. First, ad hoc tribunals, by definition, must be created as their need arises. As such, interest in creating a war-crimes tribunal for a particular conflict or country may not be shared by other countries, creating a political obstacle to its establishment. Since recent tribunals have been established through the United Nations Security Council, legal objections have been raised over the legitimacy of the tribunals. Second, ad hoc tribunals, as their name implies, are created for a particular event or location. This means that an existing tribunal is limited in its jurisdiction to alleged crimes that occur only within its geographic and temporal scope. Injustices that occur outside of the jurisdiction of the tribunal, therefore, are not subject to its review and adjudication. For that reason, new ad hoc tribunals must be created for each circumstance resulting in the third major problem associated with ad hoc tribunals, fatigue. When states grow weary of creating one temporary tribunal after another, they are less likely to invest the time, energy, and resources required to create a new tribunal. Thus, while ad hoc tribunals may be effective in addressing localized violations of human rights and the laws of armed conflict, the only way to evenly and successfully apply international laws to the international community is through the establishment of a permanent criminal court.
International Criminal Court (ICC)
Throughout the 20th century world leaders, international lawyers, academics and others called for the establishment of a permanent international court with the ability to prosecute individuals. It was not, however, until after the Cold War’s end that sufficient global consensus developed to turn the idea of a global criminal court into a reality. Meeting in Rome, Italy, in 1998, diplomats drafted a statute that was designed to create the world’s first permanent international criminal court. In 2002, after the sixtieth instrument of ratification was deposited, the court officially came into existence. Located in The Hague, Netherlands, the ICC has a membership of 123 countries. [7] Additionally, more than thirty countries have signed the ICC Statute and are in various stages of the ratification process. As such, more than 75% of countries are either Party to the ICC or have signed the court’s statute and indicated an on-going interest in being bound by the court. The most prominent non-member of the ICC is the United States, which is ironic since President George H.W. Bush was the first head of state to call for the court’s creation. President Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, signed the Statute of the ICC, but did so at the very end of his presidency, leaving the ratification process to George W. Bush. Contending that the ICC would not fairly treat Americans, President Bush “unsigned” the International Criminal Court Statute, ensuring that the United States would not join the Court during his presidency.
Unlike the ICJ, which has jurisdiction over states, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to individuals. Its chief prosecutor has the authority to undertake investigations and to issue indictments against individuals whose actions constitute grave violations of international law. As it enters its sixteenth year in existence, the ICC has issued indictments of thirty-four people, all of them for alleged illegal actions taken in Africa. Included among those indicted are heads of state from Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Libya and The Sudan.
While creating international laws that define the permissible behaviour of states and individuals, along with the establishment of a permanent international court, represents milestone developments in international affairs, efforts have recently been undertaken to provide the international community with even greater capacities to respond to human suffering. Reflecting an interest in endorsing the right of states to intervene on humanitarian grounds is the emerging Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/18%3A_Empowering_International_Human_Security_Regimes/18.6%3A_International_Legal_Institutions.txt |
In September, 2000, Canada announced the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Its central concept, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), acknowledges a primary responsibility of states to protect their own citizens. In the event of a failure to do so, the responsibility to protect reverts to the international community. The December 2001 ICISS Report embraces three specific responsibilities:
• The responsibility to prevent the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk
• The responsibility to react to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention
• The responsibility to rebuild, particularly after a military intervention. [8]
While the ICISS Report calls upon states to seek approval for military intervention from the United Nations Security Council, it leaves ample room for extra-Council authorization for military intervention in the event that the Security Council fails to address the issue. Such alternative authorizations, accordingly, include the General Assembly of the United Nations and regional organizations.
Several points of critique of the Responsibility to Protect should be noted. First, allowing states to militarily intervene to protect foreign nationals gravely undermines the non-intervention enshrined in the UN Charter. Referencing R2P allows states to sidestep the legal restrictions found in jus ad bellum rules. Second, R2P interventions can make a bad situation worse if the introduction of foreign military forces attracts domestic protest. Finally, there is a concern that the Responsibility to Protect will be used by major powers to contain Third World problems and prevent them from spilling over rather than using R2P to solve those problems.
18.8: Conclusion
International efforts to reduce levels of violence among states and between people are based upon the drafting of international treaties and the creation of institutions empowered to enforce them. Hampering efforts to curb the destructive behaviour of states is the sovereignty of the modern state, which makes international law consensual rather than obligatory. In the absence of a world government with the capacity to limit the actions of states, the system relies largely on either the self-restraint of states or the collective action of nation-states through international institutions.
While it is very difficult to project into the future the likely success of international laws and institutions in their efforts to promote a more harmonious and less destructive international system, a few observations can be made with some degree of confidence. Regarding human rights, it is clear that the momentum that led to the drafting of scores of important human rights documents since 1945 has not abated. Public interest in the protection of human life and individual liberties remains extraordinarily high and, it seems certain, will lead to even more human rights treaties. Further, the immunity traditionally reserved for heads of state, such as presidents or prime ministers, is less applicable as human rights treaties increasingly erode it. The crime of aggression, i.e. authorizing an illegal war, exposes heads of state to prosecution by a foreign or international court, and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) explicitly rejects head of state immunity. As such, not only can we anticipate that further advances will be made in developing more human rights provisions, but also the capacity to hold violators accountable is increasing.
In terms of the laws of war, the trend lines appear to be negative. Since the end of the Cold War, certain powerful states have indicated an increased willingness to go to war without legal authority. The United States used military force in Bosnia in 1995, waged an extensive aerial bombardment campaign in Serbia in 1999 and invaded Iraq in 2003, all without invoking self-defence or obtaining Security Council authorization. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and in 2014 annexed Crimea from Ukraine, also without pretext or authorization. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expanded upon a Security Council resolution in 2011 that authorized a no-fly zone over Libya to justify a six-month aerial bombing campaign that toppled the Ghaddafi government.
Actions by the major powers can have a sustained impact on the rest of the international community. The willingness of certain powers to use force with little reservation is an indication that the legal prohibition on the use of force may be weakening. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/18%3A_Empowering_International_Human_Security_Regimes/18.7%3A_The_Responsibility_to_Protect_%28R.txt |
Review
Key Points
• Empowering human security requires both the limitation of armed conflict as well as the development of international human rights.
• International law attempts to reduce the arbitrary use of armed force by upholding jus ad bellum rules that limit war to instances of self-defence, collective self-defence and Security Council authorization. During conflict, soldiers are limited by jus in bello rules that outlaw inhumane or unnecessary destruction.
• Certain weapons of war have been deemed illegal due to their inability to discriminate between targets or their tendency to cause unnecessary suffering.
• International organizations have empowered human security regimes by enacting laws, authorizing peacekeeping operations or adjudicating disputes.
• Human rights challenge the sovereign autonomy of nation-states by restricting their domestic behaviour.
.Extension Activities & Further Research
1. How successful has international law been in its efforts to reduce armed conflict?
2. To what extent do jus in bello restrictions reflect the naturalist perspective of international law?
3. Should the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) be authorized by the UN Security Council or International Court of Justice (ICJ) before it is deemed lawful?
4. The international legal system has been based on the sovereignty of the state. To what extent does human rights law erode the sovereignty of states?
5. Should nuclear weapons be deemed illegal due to their inability to discriminate between combatants and civilians?
6. What role should NGOs play in the formulation of international law, its monitoring, and its enforcement? Explain your reasons.
List of Terms
See Glossary for full list of terms and definitions.
• ad hoc war crimes tribunals
• aggression
• anarchy
• anti-personnel landmine (APL)
• Chapter VII
• Cold War
• compétence de guerre
• Concert of Europe
• Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of Genocide
• Customary International Law
• cyber attack
• Geneva Conventions
• human rights
• International Court of Justice (ICJ)
• International Criminal Court
• International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
• International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)
• International Military Tribunal (IMT)
• jus in bello
• jus ad bellum
• Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928)
• London Charter (1945)
• non-intervention principle
• natural law
• nuclear weapon
• peacekeeping operation (PKO)
• positive law
• responsibility to protect (R2P)
• security council
• self-defence
• Treaties of Westphalia (1648)
• treaty law
• United Nations
• United Nations Charter (1945)
• Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
Suggested Reading
Brownlie, I. (Ed.). (1995). Basic documents in international law (4th ed.). Oxford University Press.
Donnelly, J. (2006). International human rights (3rd ed.). Westview Press.
Joyner, C. C. (2005). International law in the 21st century: Rules for global governance. Rowman & Littlefield.
Mayall, J. (Ed.). (1996). The new interventionism, 1991–1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Cambridge University Press.
Shaw, M. N. (2008). International law (6th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Silverburg, S. R. (Ed.). (2011). International law: Contemporary issues and future developments. Westview Press.
Steiner, H. J., & Alston, P. (1996). International human rights in context: Law, politics, morals. Oxford University Press.
von Glahn, G., & Taulbee, J. L. (2010). Law among nations: An introduction to public international law (9th ed.). Pearson Longman.
Walzer, M. (1977). Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations. Basic Books.
Weiss, T. G., & Daws, S. (Ed.). (2008). The Oxford handbook on the United Nations. Oxford University Press.
Bibliography
Brownlie, I. (Ed.). (1995). Basic documents in international law (4th ed.). Oxford University Press.
Joyner, C. C. (2005). International law in the 21st century: Rules for global governance. Rowman & Littlefield.
Mayall, J. (Ed.). (1996). The new interventionism, 1991–1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Cambridge University Press.
Shaw, M. N. (2008). International law (6th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Silverburg, S. R. (Ed.). (2011). International law: Contemporary issues and future developments. Westview Press.
Steiner, H. J., & Alston, P. (1996). International human rights in context: Law, politics, morals. Oxford University Press.
United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/charter-united...ons/index.html
von Glahn, G., & Taulbee, J. L. (2010). Law among nations: An introduction to public international law (9th ed.). Pearson Longman.
Walzer, M. (1977). Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations. Basic Books.
Weiss, T. G., & Daws, S. (Ed.). (2008). The Oxford handbook on the United Nations. Oxford University Press.
Footnote
1. Examples of scholars who are considered Naturalists are Francisco Vitoria (1480-1546) and Samuel Pufendor (1632-1694).
2. Early positivist scholars include Richard Zouche (1590-1660) and Cornelis van Bynkershoek (1673-1743).
3. Article 38, International Court of Justice Statute.
4. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, International Court of Justice, 8 July 1996.
5. Resolution 678, adopted by the UN Security Council XE “United Nations Security Council” , 2963rd meeting, 29 November 1990.
6. Later, when peacekeeping operations became more heavily armed due to on-going conflicts, and thus more closely resembled Chapter VII war operations, the term “Chapter 6&3/4” was used.
7. As of 2 July 2012, the ICC’s 10th anniversary.
8. Report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS XE “International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” ), December 2001. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/18%3A_Empowering_International_Human_Security_Regimes/18.9%3A_Resources_and_References.txt |
Learning Objectives
• Understand what is meant by conflict transformation, how it differs from conflict resolution and conflict management and why it is critical to sustainable peace.
• View peace agreements and peace processes in historical perspective and see how the concept of peace at the conclusion of violent conflict has changed during the 20th century, especially the second half.
• Consider that the contemporary state is an institution distinct from small-scale societies and empires and learn what distinguishes it from these other forms of socio-political order.
• Interrogate the relationship between peace—the cessation of armed conflict—and justice, which addresses the underlying grievances of parties to a conflict.
• Learn about four conflicts that concluded with efforts to transform the conflict into a sustainable post-conflict peace by negotiating new terms of relationship between the former parties to a conflict (South Africa through a new constitution, and Bosnia, Northern Ireland and the Middle East through peace processes).
• Identify similarities and differences in these four negotiated processes.
• Assess current conditions in the four cases from the perspective of whether progress was made toward conflict transformation.
Franke Wilmer
Conflict resolution, conflict management, and conflict transformation are all important concepts in the area of peace research, but what makes conflict transformation different and how does it fit in with peace “processes” that seem to be more common than “peace agreements/settlements?” When leaders of parties to a conflict are unwilling to engage in dialogue and process through action, can grass roots initiatives create a demand for conflict transformation, if not a transformation themselves? Must people wait for their leaders to act or can citizen-led diplomacy and dialogue create a “demand” for peace and conflict resolution? This chapter will consider the cases of South Africa, Bosnia (former Yugoslavia), Indigenous-settler relations, and the Middle East (Israel and Palestine). When there is no effort to effectively transform the root grievances into dialogue and constructive engagement with an aim to at least talking about issues of justice (and injustice), parties to conflict continue to harbor grievances that either render the conflict intractable or, ultimately, erupt into future cycles of violence.
19: Conflict Transformation and Peace Processes - Peace Without Justice Is Just a Ceasefire
Conflict resolution is not new, historically speaking. Small scale, local societies predating the European system of states and Indigenous communities extant today often have processes for bringing closure to injuries inflicted upon one another by community members. Palestinian peacemakers in Palestine and Israel, for example, engage in a process of conflict resolution and transformation that is common among many Arab societies known as Sulha and a related practice called hudna. Sulha is usually used to resolve a conflict involving a murder or murders. The parties to the conflict, normally, the families, must choose, voluntarily, to enter into sulha.
The point is that people have commonly devised social practices to manage conflicts arising in their societies in order to avoid violence or escalation to violence, or redress grievances arising out of injuries caused by violence. In this scenario, conflict is resolved in the sense that everything surrounding it, the issues that gave rise to it, the grievances that followed, the perception of injustice, are “erased.” In Sulha, anyway, entering into the process and coming to an agreement on compensation for injury means that the families and people involved never speak of the conflict again, as if it never happened.
Large-scale, bureaucratic (organizationally complex and hierarchical), western, militarized societies, however, took a different path, from the Roman to the British empires, and most of the nation-states now-states formed as they declined, developed systems of retributive justice to deal with internal conflict, and regarded the use of coercive force as an instrument of influencing and dominating others in their external relations. Internal or domestic processes for channeling or managing conflict we and still are largely, retributive and punitive although there are parallel civil and criminal systems and some opportunities for alternative dispute resolution or ADR, bargaining, and negotiation. In that regard, it is also worth pointing out that some of the practices, including ADR, developed specifically as a means of resolving conflict in labor relations, which in turn arose out of a period in the history of labor movements when they were more inclined to act collectively, and sometimes violently. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/19%3A_Conflict_Transformation_and_Peace_Processes_-_Peace_Without_Justice_Is_Just_a_Ceasefire/19.txt |
Learning Objectives
• Global environmental governance (GEG) is the collection of governmental and non-governmental individuals and institutions that aim to influence individual and collective human behaviour regarding the global environment, including the drafting, implementation and enforcement of local, national and international law and policy
• GEG is also a broad multi-sectoral approach to environmental protection that advocates for its consideration into other policy concerns (e.g. trade, transportation, agriculture, criminal justice, human security, national security, etc.), through different methodologies and from different places of priority.
• The general aims of GEG are to protect the foundations of life; to provide food, economy, opportunities, development and security; and to prevent harm, inequity, and suffering.
• The underlying principles of GEG are democracy, justice and science: democracy in dialogue, diversity, and representation for decision-making; justice in protecting the vulnerable and pursuing accountability for harms; and science in understanding humanity’s utter dependence on, and systematic relations to, the natural environment.
• GEG has direct and indirect implications for all aspects of human security—economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security—as well as the capabilities that all humans need to survive and flourish.
• GEG addresses several current global environmental crises that directly and indirectly impact human security, including: climate change and resource scarcity that causes or exacerbates natural disasters or mass migrations of refugees; the illegal trade in wildlife and endangered species – as well as legal and illegal resource extraction—that exacerbates corruption and conflict, including through the funding of arms-sales; legal and illegal land-grabs that take away the lives, livelihoods, and cultures of indigenous populations; the global trade of recyclables and hazardous waste to vulnerable countries, or vulnerable people within those countries; and the mass-scale legal and illegal over-fishing of our oceans, and the harmful practices that are used, that foster human trafficking, endanger traditional fishing practices, and harm regeneration of natural habitats and populations.
• Some of the challenges to GEG include: (a) the sectoral approach of GEG that places the environment in competition with other sectors; (b) narrow interpretations of state sovereignty and state responsibility that prevent or limit accountability for global harms; (c) the rise of nationalism and isolationism among states; (d) the limits or absence of global institutions to provide guiding principles, regulation and enforceable laws and policy; (e) power imbalances among members of global institutions in negotiations and decision-making; (f) the sense of anonymity or remoteness of global governance approaches and global issues; and (g) the absence of justice in GEG.
• The role of GEG in human security can be strengthened by promoting ubuntu, the South African ethical principle of inter-relatedness, interdependence, rooted cosmopolitanism, reconciliation and restorative justice.
Kathryn A. Gwiazdon
This chapter discusses the role of global environmental governance (GEG) in human security. It will provide an overview of the purpose, principles, parties, and process of global environmental governance, as well as the challenges that GEG faces in responding to global crises. It will explain the particular relevance of GEG to human security, the foundations of human stability and security in environmental stability and security, and some current human security issues within the GEG framework. In discussing its challenges, it will also offer suggestions on how to strengthen GEG to better protect human security. The overarching purpose of this chapter is to provide a glimpse into the current nature of GEG and its fundamental role in human security, and to begin to unpack ideas for a more effective approach to addressing our global crises. This chapter builds upon the first edition chapter on this same topic, which focused more on the legal and technical aspects of GEG.
20: Human Security and Global Environmental Governance
In its most basic sense, global environmental governance (GEG) is an attempt by civil society, governments, and even private entities, to address environmental issues that must be addressed collectively, if we hope to address them at all. For example, with climate change action it is crucial for states—who have regulatory authority over their citizens’ actions – to commit to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions, and the absence of any one state in agreements to do so, particularly a state with high GHG emissions, can harm all global efforts. For global governance, where collective action is required for the stability and security of individual persons and the global community, the unwillingness of certain states to engage in global dialogue can cause egregious individual, state, and global harm.
Similar to state governance actors, mechanisms, and institutions, global governance is influenced and implemented by a variety of parties, with a variety of methodologies, and within a variety of institutions. If governance literally means, ‘the action or manner of governing’, a hierarchical structure of formal government institutions is implied. However, with global governance, there is a lack of a central, governing body with an equal representation of members. There is also a lack of a guiding document or constitution with principles to guide behaviour and law, a lack of a regulatory body to ensure and oversee implementation of those rules, and an enforcement body to hold members accountable for any transgressions. Although the United Nations (UN) exists as a global governing body, as explored below, the power of its members is unequal, its resulting documents are often unenforceable, and within all branches of the UN, state’s rights still reign supreme.
For global governance, and thereby GEG, the term governance is interpreted more broadly than local or state governance. Global governance incorporates all individuals and institutions that work together to help guide global behaviour on a particular issue, or local behaviour that has global impacts. The term ‘global’ is indicative of the breadth of its scope, as opposed to the limits of its institutions (i.e. only institutions that have a mission to address global issues). Global governance is informed by and represented in local, national, and regional governance institutions.
Put simply, GEG addresses global environmental issues. However, as it is understood that all life is interconnected, and all humanity is utterly dependent upon the natural environment, so even seemingly local issues are important to consider for their broader impacts. This alone makes the scale and scope of applicable issues difficult to identify. What happens in one state, or even by one industry, can rarely if ever be contained within man-made, legal boundaries. However, GEG attempts to address these global issues—created by bounded states—to prevent global crises, and with mixed results.
Our global environmental crises cannot be separated from our global governance crises, and the sectoral, piece-meal approach of GEG, and even traditional national and international environmental law to date, is not responding with the seriousness and the urgency that our current crises require. And we are witnessing its failure: a rapidly changing climate, the increased frequency and severity of natural disasters, mass biodiversity loss, the acidification and depletion of our oceans, and plastics and pharmaceuticals found in nearly every waterway, and nearly every species, on Earth. The foundations for human community and security, such as combatting poverty, hunger, and inequality, or promoting health, education, and sustainable consumption and production, cannot be separated from clean water, sanitation, and climate change action. As was explained in Chapter 3, Chapter 11 and Chapter 12, our governance systems, created to provide society structure and security, cannot be separated from our environmental foundations.
Our global environmental crises, indeed, all global environmental issues, have direct implications for individual and collective human security. A foundational document to the global dialogue on human security, and the inseparable role of the environment within it, is the 1994 Human Development Report, prepared by the UN Development Programme (UNDP, 1994). The document opens with guidance “Towards sustainable human development,” followed immediately by a discussion on human security, its components, and its global nature. The seven dimensions of human security that UNDP identified include economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.
It is important to understand that in the Anthropocene all of the components of human security are inter-related, and each ultimately relies upon our natural environment. Depleted natural resources, conflict over resources, and corruption that stems from resource extraction and competition creates economic insecurity. Depleted oceans, depleted soils, and polluted or scarce freshwater creates food insecurity. Poisoned soils and waters, the increase of diseases and pests due to a warming climate, and the targeting of poor and vulnerable populations for waste and industry creates health insecurity. High consumption of resources, mass biodiversity loss, and the loss of ecological integrity harms the foundations of all life, and our evolutionary processes, which creates environmental insecurity. The militarization of resources (as well as enormous military budgets and levels of pollution stemming from military activities), the conflicts that arise over resources, desertification, the lack of clean food and water, national and international land grabs for development, the increase in severe weather events creates personal insecurity. Resource scarcity harms economic, social, and cultural development and opportunities, and fosters corruption and the predation of the vulnerable, which creates community insecurity. And all these factors, and the inability or unwillingness of governance institutions to adequately address them, creates apathy, disempowerment and political insecurity.
Human security is inextricably connected to our natural environment, and global crises require a global response. This chapter will take a closer look at how GEG is responding to our global environmental crises, and the implications for human security. It will define GEG by looking at its purpose, principles, parties, and process. The chapter will then turn to the inseparable relationship between GEG and human security, and the challenges and opportunities for our ever-evolving notions of justice, law, and governance. Lastly, the chapter will offer the ethical and legal principle of ubuntu as guidance on how to strengthen human security, within and beyond GEG. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/20%3A_Human_Security_and_Global_Environmental_Governance/20.1%3A_Introduction.txt |
Governance is an amorphous term that generally implies social constructs created to govern, or regulate, human behaviour. They are rooted in societal norms and values, sometimes translated from and into civil society, institutions, and laws, and implemented by individuals, families, societies, governments and non-governmental organizations. Local and national governance typically refers to hierarchical government-sanctioned institutions and the rule of law, but for global governance, where a single, global governing body is absent or limited, it takes the shape of local, national, and international individuals and institutions, governmental and non-governmental, that seek to influence either local behaviour that has a global impact (e.g. endangered species are of global concern for biodiversity, culture, and evolutionary processes), or collective global behaviour that has a local, regional, or global impact (e.g. collective GHG emissions contribute to global warming which causes rising waters in small island nations and migrations of people across borders).
Governance, when done for just purposes (as opposed to totalitarian, authoritarian, or fascist governance models), focuses on the fundamental relationships needed for harmony, for stability, for sustainable security: harmony between individuals living together with other individuals, and harmony between societies that live together with other societies. Some recent scholars have extended this prerequisite, or even this goal, of good governance–harmonious relationships—to the entire community of life (e.g. the UN Harmony with Nature programme). The recognition and respect for these relationships, and the rules that govern these relationships—or at least attempt to govern these relationships—provide safety, security, and stability for individuals, states, and the global community. As Chapter 16 presents in more detail, good governance is the foundation of our human and societal existence, so it must be part of the response to our most existential crises, such as climate change.
Global environmental governance is global governance as it relates to the environment. As humans upon this planet, we share a genuine universal responsibility to the planet and to one another. In 1992, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the Dalai Lama spoke that “universal responsibility was the key to human survival.” (Dalai Lama, 1992). He believed that, “This need for a sense of universal responsibility affects every aspect of human life. Nowadays, significant events in one part of the world eventually affect the entire planet. Therefore, we have to treat each major local problem as a global concern, from the moment it begins.” (Dalai Lama, 1992, n.p.). Therefore, good global environmental governance recognizes interconnectedness and requires responsibility.
The heightened role of civil society, as seen in individual action and the work of non-governmental organizations, in helping shape global behaviour is unique to global governance; and indeed it could be considered the blood-line for GEG. Civil society helps to fill the gap left by the absence of a central governing body, a gap that needs to be filled due to the human and societal need to govern relationships, even across borders. These individuals and organizations are consultants, advisors, scholars, and practitioners to GEG, in principle and practice. They help develop, guide, and inform behaviour at universities and with governments, they inform conferences of the parties for treaty bodies, and they help draft national laws and policies related to local issues that impact the global environment, or global issues that affect local or state governments. They build trends and build solidarity. For example, their scholarly research and arguments can provide the reasoning and text for a state to include the right to a healthy environment in their laws, policies, cases, and constitution, that will then be shared with other scholars and policy-makers for incorporation in their laws, policies, cases, and constitutions. These individuals and organizations even have an important role in the private sector, whether shining a light on corruption, such as the work of Transparency International, or advancing corporate social responsibility and environmental stewardship.
This trend-setting, momentum-building, and information-sharing is currently being seen in youth climate change cases, where children are striking and arguing for their rights and the rights of future generations to a healthy environment (Gwiazdon, 2018). It is also seen in the rights of nature movement, where rivers and ecosystems are being afforded legal personhood in constitutions, legislation, and case law. [1] Policy-makers and judges are looking for guidance, reasoning, and decisions outside of their jurisdiction, and—as GEG is cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary – there are park rangers and writers, educators and philosophers, lawyers and scientists, environmental defenders and economists, journalists and linguists around the world helping them develop and move law and policy. These individuals and organizations share knowledge, share successes, share failures, and recognize their strength in numbers. It is much easier for a judge to decide a case, or a state to adopt a constitutional amendment, if they see that others are doing it, and they can also learn exactly how others are doing it (e.g. modelling the particular language, the particular administrative and legal processes, etc.).
GEG, as an extension of global governance, has the same weaknesses as global governance, explored in detail in Section here. A number of challenges exist, including the power of state sovereignty, and of particular states, to control or not participate in global negotiations, or to not be held accountable for harms outside their borders; the rise of nationalism among states; and the difficulty to motivate citizens to care about abstract issues or people far away. Particular to GEG is the sectoral nature of global ‘environmental’ governance that places it in competition with other issues; the absence of urgency, seriousness, and even justice for environmental harms; and the absence of a governing body for global environmental jurisprudence, its drafting, implementation, and enforcement. However, even without a single, central governing entity, common values and principles can be induced from the institutions and norms across nations, their cases, national laws, and treaties.
The Purpose and Principles of Global Environmental Governance
It is sometimes said that the only constant is change, and like the constantly evolving environment on which it relies, GEG is constantly evolving, constantly being informed, and constantly being affected by numerous actors and information. Nearly five decades ago, in 1972 (when The Limits of Growth was published by the Club of Rome), the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden made explicit the connection between humanity and the environment, and the need for a global approach to address the harm to life on Earth. This has been called the watershed moment for GEG, a clarion call for global action. Maurice Strong, the Secretary General of the conference, opened the proceedings with a plea for this new approach, “This… must be the beginning of a whole new approach to the situation. For the environmental crisis points up the need to review our activities, not just in relation to the particular purpose of interest they are designed to serve, but in their overall impact on the whole system of interacting relationships which determines the quality of human life.” (Strong, 1992, n.p.). He also linked bad human governance (here, governance resulting in inequality and injustice) with environmental harms, “Our subject is the human environment. Broadly interpreted, the human environment impinges upon the entire condition of man and cannot be seen in isolation from war and poverty, injustice and discrimination…” He understood that “all nations must accept responsibility for the consequences of their own actions on environments outside their borders” and argued that this is “the fundamental principle” that establishes “a minimum basis for effective, international cooperation.” (Strong, 1992, n.p.). He saw the crisis, the cause, the interconnectedness of humanity and harms, and the need for responsibility for those harms.
GEG is an all-inclusive endeavour, and so includes all levels of participation and decision-making, local to global, governmental and non-governmental, individuals and private entities. As diverse actors, the methodologies of the institutions of GEG differ, as well as their reasons for seeking to mould behaviour concerning the environment. However, the general aim of GEG, in its broadest sense, is to protect, provide, and prevent: (a) GEG protects, conserves, and sustains the global environment for human flourishing and for the inherent value of nature; (b) GEG aims to provide the necessities of life for human and social development, including providing stability and security to human individuals and societies, as well as the entire community of life, for current and future generations; and (c) GEG aims to prevent harm, inequity, and suffering, as well as the crossing of catastrophic tipping points for life on Earth.
The many purposes for GEG are seen in organizational mission statements, local, national, and international charters, bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties (most often in the preambles, where beautiful, aspiratory—and non-binding—language is common), principles of international law, customary international law, state constitutions, and domestic law and policy. They may be subject-matter specific, as broad as climate change adaptation or as narrow as the protection of a particular species; or they may be methodology-specific, such as the educational programmes of the Earth Charter Initiative or efforts to incorporate the rights of nature in law and policy, as seen through the work of the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund. [2]
Maurice Strong, as well as the Dalai Lama, believed that the fundamental principle of GEG was responsibility, or justice, and that is extended here to include principles of democracy, equity and care. GEG advances care for the vulnerable people, places, and species in this world, and care for the past and future generations of those people, places, and species. Care is evidenced in the protection of natural parks, in the designation of biosphere reserves, in the programmes to save endangered species and their habitats, in the laws and policies for clean air and water and soil. Care requires that we extend our compassion to other humans, and also to other species, and the natural foundations upon which all life rests. An important aspect of GEG is expanding our circles of care, from the most intimate to the entire community of life.
When things we care about are harmed, we are moved to act – and this forms the roots of justice. Unfortunately, most if not all great movements were a response to a great injustice, and GEG is no different. The Earth is wholly being harmed by human action, yet few are being held accountable for any harms committed (or at least, as data shows, not enough are being held accountable to prevent future harms or correct harmful behaviour). Is this due to an absence of laws, of enforcement, of political will – or all three? Justice demands we address, who or what is harmed, why and by whom, how can it be made whole again, and how can we prevent future harm? What is true, and what is fair? And who has a voice that determines the rules, regulations, the harm, and the recovery? This is where democracy joins the conversation in GEG. As discussed in more detail below, a fundamental component to GEG is dialogue and diplomacy, informed by many disciplines, from science to philosophy. States, with the assistance of NGOs, come together to address global concerns, yet sometimes these harms are caused, sometimes disproportionately, by particular nations. In the interest of democracy and justice, who has a voice at the decision-making table, and in the interest of equity, are all voices of equal political power? Why are there so many binding (i.e. enforceable by an adjudication body) international trade laws, and so few binding international environmental laws? Why is the continuation of our existence not afforded the same seriousness as our global trade regimes? Who decides this—and why?
The Parties and Practice of Global Environmental Governance
What is exciting about GEG, yet can also be overwhelming, is the sheer number of voices that can and do inform its development. Without a single, centralized governing entity or secretariat body, nearly anyone can have a voice in its organization and movement. The power of that voice, however, is another concern, and will be discussed more thoroughly below when exploring the challenges to GEG.
The environment is the foundation of all life on Earth; therefore, when discussing its protection, and depending on how narrow or broad a particular entity’s understanding of the term ‘environment’ is, all sectors, all disciplines, any individual, any private or public organization, and all nations—in their local governance and in their involvement in global governance, if any – are all potential parties to GEG. Some are explicit in their involvement, like the United Nations Environment Programme and the International Union for the Conservation for Nature, while others can be incorporated into the research, development, or advocacy of GEG by third parties, such as comparative review and research of domestic laws by practitioners, academics, or consultants.
For example, to the latter point, ‘the human right to a healthy environment’ is being asked to be adopted by the United Nations, and so the appropriate bodies of the UN and their consultants—many from non-governmental organizations – are reviewing the laws of nations to see the arguments, cases, and legislative developments in this area. When these laws were being created by nations, they did not have to know or explicitly state that they were informing GEG, but in practice, they are. And data collection for the development of environmental norms and policies will go into all areas of research and development. For example, for an article on human security and GEG, it is important to look to governmental and non-governmental national security bodies that may never or rarely mention the environment, but yet the connections can still be made. If the South China Sea is the largest trade route in the world, and that area is being militarized through artificial island development and the illegal expansion of borders, this not only affects global trade, but also the resources in those waters, the people who rely on those resources, and the increased tensions of the states and the people of the entire region. Because of the actions of one state for national security interests, the economic, environmental, food—human security—of millions of others is now at risk. [3] GEG connects these issues, in all of their complexity and comprehensiveness.
To have a full picture of GEG and all that it entails, and also understanding the inter-relatedness of all life on Earth, then all human activities on Earth can and should be considered potential material for its development. For the implications of public health to human security, including climate-related vectors, we can look to the Center for Disease Control (US) or the World Health Organization. For the effects of global trade, including endangered animals or hazardous waste, on human security, we can look to the World Trade Organization, anti-poaching units, or national security bodies. For the importance of the conservation, culture, and natural history to human security, we can look to organizations like the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (Jordan) or the Paris Muséum nationale d’histoire naturelle. For data on the impacts of climate change on human security, we can look to the US Department of Defense or the World Meteorological Organization. To understand GEG and human security, we can look to some small entity that focuses on women’s empowerment in some small city, or some major entity that focuses on micro-lending in some major city. Everyone has the potential to inform GEG—and this is an exciting thing.
Just as the parties of GEG differ, so does their preferred practice. The procedural and substantive methodologies of GEG take several different approaches, depending on their stated aims and audience. A common thread to GEG procedure, however, is the central tenet of dialogue, diplomacy, and negotiations. This is necessary due to the nature of GEG, where each state is its own sovereign entity, and there is no single global governance institution that administers or enforces a particular global law. Nations must speak to one another and nations must compromise if there is to be any viable governance of global issues.
The state is responsible for protecting the conditions of life for its citizens and their personal and communal development, and is at least somewhat accountable to its citizens to do so (i.e. elected officials can be voted out, or citizens can—if pushed far enough—revolt); however, GEG goes beyond the relationship between nations, and into the relationships between all entities and all humans. Yet, the states, with self-imposed limits in justice and jurisdiction, at least when environmental harms are concerned, continue to be the real power-holders. As they consolidate power or refuse to act, or refuse to act enough or quickly enough, others step up to fill the gap. For GEG, those are largely non-governmental entities. However, and most visible with climate change, cities and youth activists around the world are starting to lead the conversation and policies, as well as demand state action on global harms.
Another important procedural aspect that is largely unique to GEG is the heightened role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and universities in its research, development, and decision-making. GEG includes binding and non-binding laws, and NGOs play a part in all its parts. They offer comparative review and analysis of national laws, looking for trends and new approaches; they review the philosophical underpinnings of current actions in attempts to understand environmental crises, how we have reached them and how we can move beyond them; they offer the scientific underpinnings to many of the principles of GEG, including the utter dependence of humanity on the natural world, as well as the inter-relatedness of all life; and they help to build bridges and solidarity between nations during negotiations and diplomacy efforts. For many intergovernmental organizations, like the UN or IUCN, they also serve as parties, observers, or experts and are able to inform dialogues, treaties, and investigations. The importance and particular role of NGOs in GEG in this age of social media cannot be understated. However, they still lack a key element to global justice for environmental harms—enforceability.
There are several different substantive approaches to GEG in practice, including but not limited to economic, education, ethical, scientific, and law and policy approaches. There are even market approaches to GEG, such as efforts that advance natural capital, ecosystem services, and cap and trade regimes. This chapter does not attempt to pass judgment on particular approaches, but it is important to be aware that institutions that fall under the GEG umbrella are not of a uniform type, and there are even disagreements among the institutions. For example, there are global conservation organizations that use trophy hunting as a conservation practice, and there are those who vehemently oppose such methods. There are those who argue for the commodification of nature to motivate states to better protect it, and those who see putting a price on nature as morally repugnant and ultimately more damaging. It is also important to understand that not a single approach should be seen as necessarily the right, or the only, approach – a point particularly relevant in global governance where all peoples, all nations, and even all species and habitats are taken into consideration.
Another substantive approach that allows for variations in GEG is the positioning of humans. Some entities place humans as the central argument for protection (e.g. human rights approaches), while others take a more systematic, Earth-centred approach (e.g. Earth jurisprudence), and yet still others who seek to address the tension between the two approaches (e.g. trusteeship approaches). Human-centred approaches can be seen in climate change action and land use law, as well as policies that affect biodiversity and endangered species (noting their role in human evolutionary processes and development), freshwater use and access, agricultural practices, disaster preparedness, responses to mass refugees, and military operations.
There are also efforts to transform the human-centred approach, which can be interpreted as utilitarian and largely sectoral, to a more systemic, holistic approach. In 2016, the Ecological Law and Governance Association was launched at the University of Siena as a global, multi-disciplinary network of academics and practitioners that seek to transform ‘anthropocentric, fragmented’ environmental law to a more holistic, scientifically accurate ecological law, understanding that human rights—or even humanity—cannot exist without the natural foundations of life.
A step further is taken by efforts to give legally-recognizable rights to nature completely separate from their value to humans. Such ecocentrism is seen at the local and state level, such as the Constitution of Ecuador which recognizes Pachamama, or nature, as a legal entity, with rights to its own evolutionary processes; the 2017 Te Awa Tupua Act that affords the Whanganui River and ecosystem legal standing; the 2017 ruling in the High Court of Uttarakhand in India that recognized that the Ganges and Yamuna rivers, the Gangotri and Yamunotri glaciers, and their related ecosystems have ‘the status of a legal person’; and, in 2019, the Lake Erie Bill of Rights Charter Amendment in Toledo, Ohio that gives legal standing to Lake Erie, one of the Great Lakes between Canada and the United States that together account for 20% of the world’s freshwater.
Human rights arguments and the rights of nature movement are just a couple of many justice approaches to GEG. This may be the most difficult approach as there is no single global governing entity to implement global environmental law, let alone enforce it, therefore, action and enforcement is dependent upon the will of a particular state. Local, regional, and national courts do hear cases on environmental harms, and those decisions are incorporated within the GEG movement, but there is yet to be a global environmental court to hold states or entities responsible for violations of a global environmental constitution within a global rule of law. Sometimes environmental cases will arise before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but its parties and its jurisdiction are limited. The ICJ will hear disputes between member states if there is a perceived treaty violation or a violation of a principle of environmental law or customary international law, or they will offer advisory opinions if there is a question of international law. [4]
In addition, in 2016, the International Criminal Court, an intergovernmental body that hears cases against individuals from member states for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression, expanded its prosecutorial remit to include environmental crimes (ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 2016). Although there have not yet been any environmental criminal cases seen before the court, it was seen as a promising development in GEG as an effort to take environmental harms more seriously. Another justice-based approach that is gaining global momentum is the recognition and defence of the rights of future generations. It has been incorporated in numerous charters and constitutions and has been argued successfully in some national courts. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/20%3A_Human_Security_and_Global_Environmental_Governance/20.2%3A_Defining_Global_Environmental_G.txt |
GEG is fundamentally about the survival and flourishing of life; human security is fundamentally about the survival and flourishing of life. Since the first edition of this publication, in 2013, a formal debate was held on human security by the UN President of the General Assembly. The resulting document was Resolution 66/290, “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome” (UNGA Res. 66/290, 2012). The document recognized that “human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people,” and continued with a common understanding of human security based on eight points, with, as is typical of multi-national documents (at least those where human rights or environmental protections are concerned), very clear lines drawn concerning responsibility and state sovereignty: (1) “The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair,” in particularly vulnerable people, with equal opportunity to develop their potential; (2) a people-centred approach that is context-specific, comprehensive, and prevention oriented; (3) peace, development, and human rights, as well as political, economic, social, and cultural rights, are all inter-linked; (4) human security is separate from the responsibility to protect (the UN understanding of Responsibility to Protect is very specific, it provides a framework for state intervention, including the use of force, to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity); (5) human security does not entail the use of force and “does not replace State security;” (6) human security is based on “national ownership” and global efforts are meant to strengthen state efforts; (7) States retain “the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their citizens,” and the role of the global community is to provide support to Governments, upon their request; and (8) human security must be implemented with full consideration to the UN Charter, “with full respect for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference.” (UNGA Res. 66/290, 2012). This crucial definition section concludes, “human security does not entail additional legal obligations” on States (UNGA Res. 66/290, 2012). So much of this understanding of human security shows the weakness of any global response to anything that threatens human security – state sovereignty trumps all else, and the global community places no legal obligations to secure humanity, outside of what states choose or choose not to provide. Here, we have perhaps the most legitimate global governance body effectively neutering global action to respond to crises that affect the security of humanity. Is the only reason for dialogue and diplomacy to limit states involvement with other states? Is this the only model of global governance that we have? One founded upon complete submissiveness to State’s rights that global action—and global justice for harms committed—is rendered impotent? Is global governance nothing more than advice ‘upon request’?
While the idea that human security is within the ‘national ownership’ of states (as stated above) may be the standing national or international legal understanding, that does not make it right, or just. Yet, it does perhaps shine some light on why so many humans are insecure today. We are trying to govern as if humans are not affected by other humans, as if citizens are not affected by issues outside of their borders, or with some states, as if the way humans are treated within their borders – good or bad – is justifiable due to state’s rights. Human security is the concern of all humanity, even if global governance has not yet evolved to provide the processes or structure to support this understanding.
Human security is also fundamentally reliant upon healthy ecosystems. The starting point to all GEG should not be state’s rights, but the basic scientific truths that humanity is utterly dependent on the natural environment and that all life is interrelated and interdependent, irrespective of any man-made, artificial boundaries. The state of humans cannot be separated from the state of their environment, yet we see the divisions and separations of the environment from all else every day: ‘environmental’ law, ‘sustainable’ development approach, ‘climate change’ policy, as if the state of the environment and its systemic relations with all life and all human activities can or should be placed on a negotiation table in competition with the economy, or jobs or national security.
And even within these compartmentalized approaches are additional compartments. For example, sustainable development is still seen as three pillars: economic, social, and environmental. Yet, how can society or economy exist without its environmental foundations? As our scientific charts for life on Earth are spiralling downwards (e.g. 83% of wild mammals have become extinct, and microplastics are found in the air, in water, and in nearly every life-form tested—as detailed in Chapter 12), because our frameworks do not speak to scientific truths. There are not three pillars to sustainable development – there is one foundation upon which all else rests, and upon which all else is inter-related, our natural foundations. This is just another example of man-made, artificial borders, but this time within our law and governance systems.[5]
It is important to also note that those who frame the arguments in terms of compartmentalized and competitive sectors, most often seen as environment versus economy, are sometimes those who are doing the most harm. In this false equivalency and forced competition of environment versus [insert any important issue here, such as national security or human security], the environment will never win; indeed, neither will the issue in competition, as failing to protect the foundations of life ultimately harms all else. GEG helps to re-frame the argument that human security is firstly and fundamentally reliant upon the natural environment, whether it is mass migrations of refugees due to resource scarcity or civil wars caused by climate change, or slave labour used by the shrimp industry due to the high consumptive demand for inexpensive shrimp, alongside corruption and/or a lack of political will to defend human rights. When the environment is separated from security, we are all less secure, we are all more vulnerable.
Twenty years after the seminal UNDP Human Development Report on human security was released, the 2014 UNDP Human Development Report, “Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience,” focused on broadening the human security approach to vulnerability – vulnerability of individuals, communities, and states, and the inherent, systemic, or structural issues that impede human development progress and threaten people’s capabilities and choices (UNDP, 2014). The authors noted that since 1994, several interpretations of human security were too narrow, such as viewing it solely as freedom from physical assault. Vulnerability is “defencelessness, insecurity and exposure to risks, shocks and stress,” and “one way to reduce vulnerability is to prevent disasters,” such as the global approach to climate change or the organization of global financial systems. (UNDP, 2014, p. 15). The following section elaborates on the particular concerns behind the notion of vulnerability and the threats we are facing in the Anthropocene.
Global Environmental Crises and Human Security
In 1994, it was understood that human security was safety from hunger, disease, crime, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in our lives, whether at home, at work, in our communities or in our environment (UNDP, 1994). The effects of environmental harms, and most importantly climate change, are much more visible today than 25 years ago, including their direct and indirect repercussions on hunger, disease, crime, and repression, and their ability to cause sudden, harmful disruptions on our lives. Not only are natural disasters increasing in strength and frequency, but a warming planet is decreasing biodiversity and increasing pests and pestilence. Climate change is creating resource scarcity, desertification, and fostering civil unrest, crime, corruption, and power-grabs, all which is precipitating mass migrations of refugees across borders. A warming, acidifying ocean is also bleaching corals and destroying habitats for innumerable species upon which entire food systems, cultures, and economies rely. The causes of climate change are known, the methods to prevent or halt a warming planet are known, and the steps needed to build resiliency are known – yet states are not acting urgently or effectively enough.
All humanity is vulnerable to the state of the environment, but some more so than others. This is why justice and equity are crucial to understanding human security and GEG, to protecting humanity and their foundations of life. The impacts of environmental harms, and so their correlating impacts on human security, occur disproportionately to the poor and marginalized, to women, elderly, and children, to people of minority faiths, limited opportunity, and indigenous peoples. Not everyone has the same opportunity to succeed, the same access to justice, the same resources or abilities to build personal or communal resilience, or the same infrastructure to be educated, to progress, and to become active citizens. There are direct links between air, water, and food pollutants and disabilities, between public health and environmental health, between access, opportunity, and income. Human security can be achieved through the protection and empowerment of the most vulnerable—for if the most vulnerable are protected, we are all protected.
For a general overview of global environmental crises that threaten human security, it is helpful to look to the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In the 2012 Resolution noted above, immediately following the section that defines human security, it states that human security should “contribute to realizing sustainable development” (UNGA Res. 66/290, 2012). In September 2015, almost exactly three years after the passage of that resolution, Resolution 70/1, “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” was adopted by all member nations of the UN (UNGA Res. 70/1, 2015). The Agenda “is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity.” (UNGA Res. 70/1, 2015).
For human development, for societal development, for national development, for global development, the SDGs link priority areas that must be urgently addressed by all nations on Earth. They address all issues where GEG and human security are intimately linked: poverty; hunger; health; education; gender equality; water and sanitation; affordable and clean energy; decent work and economic growth; industry, innovation, and infrastructure; inequalities; sustainable cities and communities; consumption and production practices; climate action; consideration for the life below our waters and life on land; peace, justice, and strong institutions; and partnerships. The SDGs show the inter-relatedness of all issues that promote human security, yet even focusing on one – climate change – shows the weakness of GEG. Humanity is in an existential crisis, yet there is an absence of global leadership and global action to address it. This almost seems to be the intended design for GEG, where state’s rights govern state action, and state’s rights govern global action, and with no accountability for global harms. What does that say about the state of GEG if it cannot even respond to the most important global environmental—global life—issue of our time?
Addressing the Challenges to Global Environmental Governance and Human Security
There are several challenges, some already highlighted, to effective GEG (noting that effective GEG helps to achieve human security). Yet challenges are also opportunities for change, and so both will be addressed in this section. Any inquiry into the effectiveness of GEG, or even more broadly global governance, must begin with an analysis of state sovereignty. They are the actors and the inhibitors to global action, and the citizens and industries under their jurisdiction are the perpetrators of and the victims to global harms. They create the systems and laws that govern those within their borders, as well as the systems and laws that govern their relationships with other states. And in global governance bodies, they have chosen to govern by asserting state’s rights. But what about the duties of a state?
The primary duty of the state is to protect its citizens—this is its raison d’être—and as its citizens are directly and indirectly affected by the actions of individuals and industries outside of its borders, and the actions or inactions of other states, a state must engage in global dialogue on global crises to satisfy that duty. In other words, the failure of a state to seriously engage in GEG is a dereliction of its primary duty to protect its citizens. For example, with the climate change talks, powerful emitter nations may simply refuse to seriously engage in global negotiations, or they may actively manipulate negotiations to weaken the resultant agreement. This affects national emission reduction commitments and accountability for present or historical harms outside their borders.
The state protects and provides the foundation for humanity to flourish—and integral in this, is the recognition that all humanity, and all states, are interconnected. The foundational understandings of humanity’s utter dependence on the natural environment, and the inter-connectedness of all life, are directly at odds with the current understanding of a sovereign nation defined within man-made geopolitical boundaries. Harm does not stop at borders and humanity is not made more secure by walls. Our security is dependent upon the actions of one another, and no action can be seen in isolation. Scientific truths must be integrated into law and governance frameworks.
It is crucial that states see themselves as integral parts to the whole, and existing only because of the whole and its relationships within that whole. Thomas Hobbes stated in Leviathan, “He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind.” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 3). Each state is that protector of the whole—the people, the land, the waters, and the air. They must not only protect their citizens from internal and external harms, but also guarantee that the whole is well cared for, providing the best foundations for which their citizens can flourish and exercise their fundamental rights. The state must also provide the goods and services that individuals cannot provide for themselves, such as a healthy environment, water, and sanitation. They must also provide the infrastructure of care that allows citizens to flourish economically and socially, providing checks on corruption and injustice (Gwiazdon, 2018, p. 9).
Martha Nussbaum is a lawyer, philosopher, and a principal architect of the Human Development Approach, now used by such global institutions as the World Bank and the UNDP. Nussbaum underscores that the duty of a state is to provide its people the ability to pursue a dignified and flourishing life, and highlights ten Central Capabilities: life (being able to live a full life and not die prematurely); bodily health (being able to have good health); bodily integrity (being able to move freely and be free from violence); senses, imagination, and thought (being able to imagine, think, and reason, nurtured by education and training); emotions (being able to love and grieve); practical reason (being able to understand the good and critically reflect); affiliation (being able to live in harmony with others, and with one-self); other species (being able to care for and in relation to nature); play (being able to play); and control over one’s environment, political and material (being able to participate in choices that govern one’s life, have property, and work) (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33-34). If states are not protecting their own citizens, air, land, and waters, they are harming the whole; if states are not protecting the whole, they are harming their own citizens, air, land, and waters – and are making all of humanity less secure.
Human security is achieved through justice. Wendell Phillips (1811-1884) was an American lawyer and social reformer dedicated to the abolition of slavery. Confronting this grave inhumanity, he argued, “the first duty of society is JUSTICE.” (Phillips, 1891: 6). [6] The very purpose of the justice system is to provide the rules and institutions for governing sustainable and stable human societies, and inasmuch as possible, for preventing cruelty and great harm. To the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–270 BC), “Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another in any place whatever at any time it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.” (Epicurus, 1926, p. 103).
People need to know that when harms occur, the perpetrators will be held to account, and the victims will be made whole. Yet, as discussed above, there is no consistent mechanism to seek justice for global environmental harms. There is no global environmental court, and even the ICJ and ICC are limited by procedural and subject-matter jurisdiction. If states ratify a treaty, however, there is usually a set legal recourse, and some states do adopt international agreements through local policies or national legislation, which are more directly enforceable. But for the most part with GEG, states can always rely on their state sovereignty—they can always ultimately choose not to be a party to any global agreements, no matter their contributions to global harm or to other nations or vulnerable peoples. They can choose not to recognize the jurisdiction of a foreign or global court. They can retreat from their global responsibilities behind their artificial, man-made walls.
The lack of accountability for global harms and the lack of enforcement of international environmental agreements—in other words, the lack of justice in GEG—is a, if not the, major challenge to its effectiveness and its ability to foster human security. Even when data is clear that, for example, the emissions from these nations are major contributors to global climate change, that those emissions harm others outside of their borders, and that those being impacted most severely are the poor and vulnerable, and also the ones who are not causing the harm, there is no accountability. If states can cause measurable harm to individuals outside their borders without accountability, then is there truly no justice in global environmental governance?
The inquiry into justice is eternal. The noted German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) knew that “there must be continually be new legal determinations.” (Hegel, 1991, pp. 212-213, explained throughout §216).[7] Justice can never be perfect or complete; it is alive, evolving, progressing. As such, and as Amartya Sen, the noted philosopher and author of The Idea of Justice, argues, “We need justitia, not justitium.” (Sen, 2009, p. 74). In other words, we need a living, evolving justice process, not a stagnant, obstinate justice principle. If the primary duty of the state is to protect, and the first duty of a society is justice, then it is no surprise that we are facing so many global environmental crises. GEG affords no duty to protect, there is no duty to provide justice. After all, without a global governing body, who would own and enforce that duty?
Another challenge to GEG is the anonymity of global governance in general. In seeking common principles, in seeking universality, the particular – the biodiversity, the culture, the languages, the environment that makes us particular, individual persons often disappears, and so does their power to motivate and lead to real change. It is simply more difficult for people to relate to a larger, amorphous, unknown whole than the particulars of their own home, community, or nation. It is argued that the further we go out from our most intimate circles of care, the less we care. It is much easier to not respond to harm thousands of miles away, than harm immediately in front of us. This can be overcome, however, through the understanding and application of ubuntu and rooted cosmopolitanism. Rooted cosmopolitanism is the idea that we can be informed and rooted by our local experiences, without losing sight of our global place, of our global relationships. We must see our humanity in others, and because of others. We must see our security in others, and because of others—not as defence from others.
A Way Forward: A Relational Approach to GEG and Human Security
Ethics is the foundation of the rule of law, and we need an ethical principle to guide the future of GEG. Ubuntu is a relational ethic from tribes across Southern Africa that has been explored and advanced in great depth by some of the world’s most thoughtful political and spiritual minds, such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela. Ubuntu is an ethic – or a set of values – of care and interdependence. And it is an ethic that directly confronts all of the major challenges of GEG, from strict interpretations of state sovereignty that foster nationalism and isolationism, to power imbalances and predation or disregard of the vulnerable, and even the disconnect from far-away harms.
Ubuntu roughly translates into, “I am because we are,” and places our identity, our humanity, within our relationships to others. It understands that “my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound, in yours” and “a person is a person through other persons.” (Tutu, 1999, p. 31). This is not at the expense of the diversity of local people, places, and cultures, but through that diversity. The principles and values behind ubuntu should be extended to the state; after all, a state is only a state because of other states.
Embracing ubuntu could also help us confront another challenge to GEG, the rising trend of hyper-nationalism as an excuse to refrain from global dialogue on our global crises. We see this most notably in the withdrawal by the US – the world’s largest emitter – from the climate change talks, and indeed, their President’s self-proclamation as a nationalist. Nationalism and hyper-individualism more easily allow for harms to the ‘other’ occur, and this may be a root cause to many of our global crises. The true, relational aspect of state sovereignty must be brought to the forefront instead of the harmful hyper-individualism fostered by hyper-nationalism.
Ubuntu has also been used as a legal and governance principle to heal broken relationships, inequalities, insecurities, the root causes of many of our global conservation, security, and governance crises. Archbishop Tutu believed that through ubuntu, democratic South Africa was “right to deal with apartheid-era political crimes by seeking reconciliation or restorative justice.” (Metz, 2017, n.p.). If “social harmony is for us the summum bonum – the greatest good’ then the primary aim when dealing with wrongdoing should be to establish harmonious relationships with wrongdoers and victims.” (Tutu, 1999, p. 35). Could this be a new framework for GEG?
We may learn much in ethics, law, and global governance from South Africa’s apartheid and their transition into a democracy. “Apartheid not only prevented ‘races’ from identifying with one another or exhibiting solidarity with one another. It went further by having one ‘race’ subordinate…” and allowing that race to harm others (Metz, 2017, n.p.). It made people “less human for their failure to participate on an evenhanded basis and to share power, wealth, land, opportunities, and even themselves.” (Metz, 2017, n.p.). This provides uncomfortable parallels with how states globally govern today. Some have more power than others and use that power to cause harm or shield themselves from responsibility. And some are more vulnerable, and often made-so at the hands of the powerful, such as with colonialism and climate change. Opportunities are unequal, power is unequal, life is unequal. Is our current system of global governance a model of global apartheid?
We see these power imbalances in nearly every global negotiation. Indeed, it is embedded within the very structure of the UN, whereby even the collection of 134 developing nations known as the G-77 (it was founded in 1964 with 77 member nations), does not carry the weight of any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Power imbalances create unjust laws and foster inequity and inequality – they create instability and insecurity, and these imbalances are not the sole province of states. This is seen when powerful industries flood money into lobbying to control legislation or even to determine how arguments are framed, including campaigns to deliberately disinform. We must commit to re-define how we negotiate laws if we ever hope to address the inequities and injustice that these agreements create or allow.
We must extend the ethic of ubuntu to the community of states. A human is a human because of, and among, other humans; humanity is defined by, empowered by, constrained by, and conditional upon others, and our relationships to others. A nation is a nation because of, and among, other nations; sovereignty is defined by, empowered by, constrained by, and conditional upon others. And in no just governance system can one harm another without consequence. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/20%3A_Human_Security_and_Global_Environmental_Governance/20.3%3A_Global_Environmental_Governance.txt |
It is time for global governance to evolve. The charts show our trajectories and the data is clear: a rapidly changing climate, mass species extinctions, the acidification of our oceans, the collapse of fisheries – our current approach to global environmental crises is not enough and the foundations of human life, of human security, are crumbling. It is time to look at its purpose, its principles, its parties, its practice, to see what is working and not working, and to move forward courageously and comprehensively.
Most movements for justice have been a response to witnessing great injustices – and great injustices are everywhere. We live in a global geopolitical climate where powerful nations and organisations unduly control the dialogue, the negotiations, and the rules which govern them, and govern us all. We live in a world where states, and those entities under their jurisdiction, can harm without consequence, a world where vulnerable people are made more insecure, not by their own actions, but by the actions of consumers and producers thousands of miles away. We live in a world where nationalism is rising as high as the walls these nations are trying to build, purposefully denying aid to those seeking refuge due to climate-exacerbated emergencies – emergencies that they have not even caused. This is not fair, this is not just, this is not sustainable. States are turning inward at the very moment that life on Earth demands them to look beyond themselves, and to the relationships with those around them.
Our notions of state sovereignty must be re-assessed. Our notions of global justice must be re-assessed. Our notions of care, community, and responsibility must be re-assessed. A global environmental body, constitution, or court could help move GEG, but it would not be enough. It would still be a disconnected ‘environmental’ approach that is in competition with other sectors, and it likely would not rise to the seriousness that our existential environmental and human crises require. The environment is cross-cutting, and foundational to all else. A global governance body that sets the protection of the environment – the foundations of life – as its fundamental concern could possibly work, if the environment is made central to all other decisions and if states are willing to re-define or limit their own sovereignty out of concern for the global whole, in light of their relations to one another, as opposed to the power of their single self.
Ubuntu has been used as an ethical and legal principle to help address great injustices in a state. It is now time to expand these principles of inter-connectedness and reconciliation to our global environment, natural and geopolitical. For the future of life, we must embrace a more systematic, relational understanding of not only the environment or security, but of humanity, of the state, and of the global community.
20.5: Resources and References
Review
Key Points
• The scientific understandings that humanity is utterly dependent on the natural environment,and that all life is inter-connected, needs to be incorporated in law, policy and governance.
• All components of human security are inter-related, and all components of human security are directly and indirectly affected by the natural environment.
• Human security is the concern of all humanity, even if global governance has not yet evolved to provide the processes or structure to support this understanding.
• Justice and equity are crucial to understanding human security and GEG, to protecting humanity and the foundations of life. The impacts of environmental harms, and so their correlating impacts on human security, occur disproportionately to the poor and marginalized, to women, elderly and children, to people of minority faiths, limited opportunity and indigenous tribes.
• GEG, as an extension of global governance, has the same challenges as global governance, including the power of state sovereignty, and power of particular states, to control or not participate in global negotiations, or to not be held accountable for harms outside their borders; the rise of nationalism among states; and the difficulty to motivate citizens to care about abstract issues or people far away. Particular to GEG is the sectoral nature of global ‘environmental’ governance that places it in competition with other issues; the absence of urgency, seriousness, and even justice for environmental harms; and the absence of a governing body for global environmental jurisprudence, its drafting, implementation and enforcement.
• A more relational approach to global governance, as seen through the ethical and legal principle of ubuntu, and a less sectoral approach to environmental protection, could address some of the current challenges of GEG.
.Extension Activities & Further Research
• What are the duties of the state, and how do those duties relate to others outside their borders?
• If you could re-construct the GEG framework, how would you do so to be most effective to protect the natural environment and human security? For example, how would you incorporate limits to growth?
• Why is GEG not afforded the same seriousness as more enforceable international treaties and agreements—such as world trade regimes? What would it take to heighten the seriousness of GEG agreements?
• How do you think states can or should be held accountable for harms that they create outside their borders?
• Identify two conflicting approaches within GEG and explain why you think one is a more effective approach than the other in advancing the general aims of GEG (e.g. the arguments around trophy hunting, cap and trade regimes, etc.).
• Please identify a global environmental crisis and explain how it relates to human security, why you believe it has become a crisis, and how you would advise the parties of GEG to confront it.
• Please identify five local, five regional, and five international non-governmental or governmental organizations that directly or indirectly inform GEG, and provide a brief background of their purpose, their guiding principles, and their methodology.
• Referring to the seven challenges to GEG (second last item on the initial list of Big Ideas), describe some illustrative examples from the current news.
• What do you personally foresee as the future evolution of GEG?
List of Terms
See Glossary for full list of terms and definitions.
• global environmental governance (GEG)
• global governance
• governance
• rooted cosmopolitanism
• ubuntu
Suggested Reading
Bosselmann, K. (2016). The principle of sustainability: Transforming law and governance (2nd ed.). Routledge.
Bosselmann, K., & Taylor, P. (Eds.). (2017). Ecological approaches to environmental law. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Brown, W. (2017). Walled states, waning sovereignty (2nd ed.). Zone Books.
Corry, O., & Stevenson, H. (2018). Traditions and trends in global environmental politics: International relations and the Earth. Routledge.
Gwiazdon, K. A. (2017). International law and human security: The environmental and geopolitical impacts of China’s artificial island-building at Fiery Cross Reef. In L. Westra, J. Gray, & F.-T. Gottwald (Eds.), The role of integrity in the governance of the commons: Governance, ecology, law, ethics (pp. 105–122). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54392-5_7
Horowitz, L. S., & Watts, M. J. (Eds.). (2017). Grassroots environmental governance: Community engagements with industry. Routledge.
Jennings, B. (2016). Ecological governance: Toward a new social contract with the Earth. West Virginia University Press.
Kotzé, Louis. (2012). Global environmental governance: Law and regulation for the 21st century. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Najam, A., Papa, M., Taiyab, N., & International Institute for Sustainable Development. (2006). Global environmental governance: A reform agenda. International Institute of Sustainable Development.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating capabilities: The human development approach. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2013). Political emotions: Why love matters for justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Pattberg, P., & Zelli, F. (Eds.). (2016). Environmental politics and governance in the Anthropocene: Institutions and legitimacy in a complex world. Routledge.
United Nations Development Programme. (1994). Human development report 1994: New dimensions of human security. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human...nt-report-1994
UNDP. (2014). Human development report 2014 – Sustaining human progress: Reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human...nt-report-2014
Footnote
1. See generally the UN Harmony with Nature programme (www.harmonywithnatureun.org) which is the most complete compilation available of city and state action to incorporate legally-recognized rights for nature.
2. For more information on the Earth Charter, see, http://www.earthcharter.org, http://www.celdf.org and Chapter 16.
3. For an article that explores this topic, see Gwiazdon, Kathryn. (2017). International Law and Human Security: The Environmental and Geopolitical Impacts of China’s Artificial Island-Building at Fiery Cross Reef. In: Westra L., Gray J., Gottwald FT. (eds), The Role of Integrity in the Governance of the Commons. New York, New York: Springer International Publishing.
4. See Chapter 6 for a detailed description of the ICJ’s activities and powers.
5. In Chapter 11 such artificially constructed boundaries are referred to as ontologically subjective; they are contracted against ontologically objective concepts such as the abovementioned ‘scientific truths’.
6. Note: This quote is often improperly cited to Alexander Hamilton. The accurate citation is Philipps, Wendell. (1894). Speeches, Lectures, and Letters. Volume 1. Boston: Lee and Shepard. For a thorough exploration of the theory of justice, see also John Rawls, “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions” in Rawls, John. (1971). The Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Cambridge University.
7. Hegel concludes §216, “It is patent to the most idle reflection that the most excellent, noble, and beautiful can be conceived of as still more excellent, noble, and beautiful. A large old tree branches more and more without becoming a new tree in the process; it would be folly, however, not to plant a new tree for the reason that it was destined in time to have new branches.” (Hegel, 1991, p. 214). | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/20%3A_Human_Security_and_Global_Environmental_Governance/20.4%3A_The_Future_of_Global_Environmen.txt |
Learning Objectives
• Explain how comprehensive models of human security can yield effective solutions to the challenges of the Anthropocene while the perspectives, values and ideals that informed traditional security models largely contributed to those challenges.
• Integrate the diverse areas of inquiry and ways of thinking that constitute the field of human security.
• Outline a concise definition of development that is completely compatible with long-term human security.
• Critically engage with the contents of several chapters in this textbook and formulate a personal position on those topics.
• Revisit the introduction and compare and contrast in your own words the six core scenarios presented by Raskin (2016); then relate to them your own vision, informed by current events, of where the world and your country or region are going and why.
• List sources of human insecurity that arise out of our lack of social, economic, cultural and environmental sustainability.
• List sources of human insecurity that are independent of sustainability issues and relate them to your home community.
• Identify opportunities for increasing human security in your community, region, and country; address all four pillars.
• Deliberate about the strengths and weaknesses of democratic governance in the context of the Anthropocene.
To help the reader gain a vantage point over the stunning diversity of challenges to human security, this chapter begins with a survey of challenges moving from the global dimension to the regional and national ones. The global challenges are dominated by the imperatives to move towards sustainable impacts and to address the many manifestations of the global environmental crisis to ensure the acceptable survival of a maximum population. Prospects for human security on that front seem daunting when one takes into account that many powerful actors in world affairs are only just now beginning to take the challenges seriously. Others are deliberately deprioritising them. Goals and ideals, and entire ways of thinking about development and progress are in limbo at this stage of coming to terms with the new situation of the Anthropocene. The widespread protests against irresponsible climate policies, as well as the 2020 pandemic, have further unsettled those ways of thinking and newly emphasized the global dimension.
At the local, regional and national levels the challenges to human security that dominate the political agenda still tend to emanate from three pilars—socio-political issues (e.g. law enforcement, human rights, governance, international relations), health security (e.g. organisation, financing and distribution of services) and economic security (e.g. employment, ‘growth’, industrial performance, inflation and investments). Until recently, the major media organisations kept environmental insecurity, including even its most obvious manifestation, climate change, well out of the mainstream focus, despite efforts from the social fringes and by NGOs to change that. Powerful lobby groups hindered any substantial progress in emission reductions or energy policy. Then a 15-year old student from Sweden decided that enough was enough; and within one year the tide seemed to have turned. In 2019 millions of striking young people filled the world’s streets, demanding action against climate change and its consequences; governments declared climate emergencies; support for green parties and environmental NGOs surged in many countries; corporations took initiatives to carefully sidestep around, or to actively participate, in a transition that may well make a decisive difference in world history. But as the political will towards action mounts, so do the challenges – and with every year that they remain unmitigated, the necessary solutions will need to be even less compromising, more costly and hurtful, and increasingly too late as far as the extinctions of species is concerned. The Australian wildfires of 2019 painfully confirmed that insight (Komesaroff & Kerridge, 2020).
The other event that profoundly changed peoples’ view of the world was initiated by a humble virus that spread over all inhabited continents within weeks and claimed, by the time of writing, almost 400,000 lives. For the first time in our collective memory, a security threat exploded globally, leaving no place to escape and confronting rich and poor alike. Whether one interprets the COVID-19 pandemic as the first of many global ‘transition events’, or as a one-off global inconvenience, it underscored the collective realization that the world is changing rapidly, deeply and menacingly.
The second section of this chapter surveys the opportunities for human security as proposed in the various chapters. It moves again from the global towards the local, beginning with the most urgent agenda of sustainability. A vivid discrepancy appears between the numerous opportunities for international intitatives and the widespread absence of the political will to engage in them cooperatively. More than once in the recent past were we assured by international relations experts that a groundbreaking declaration such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights would never be produced in today’s fragmented United Nations; neither the political will, nor the global consensus, nor the necessary leadership among the Security Council is evident. Even the SDGs, the first international effort at addressing some of the challenges arising from accelerating global change, are falling short of their targets. In contrast to that disillusioning prospect stand the numerous examples of individual countries achieving impressive gains in the environmental basis for the human security of their citizens, and of citizens taking the initiative on their own security concerns. We arrive at the puzzling conclusion that the sovereign state presents as both a major source of the challenges and of the opportunities.
In the third section a vision of human security is presented that exceeds the merely environmentally sustainable and addresses challenges that operate independently of sustainable physical limits but that nevertheless contribute to crucial aspects of human security. Separate subsections deal with the future of social justice; the clash of cultures (which are not ‘civilizations’) against the backdrop of mass migrations; the complex political futures arising from tendencies towards political fragmentation and irredentism; ethical limitations to the rule of law and civil disobedience in favour of human security; and the crisis of governability indicating pitfalls and strengths of democratic governance in future scenarios. The chapter ends with some extension activities of a more complex type to encourage the student reader not to stop where the book does.
21: Conclusions Prospects Futures
The arguments presented in the introductory chapters amount to two main propositions. First, the present situation and our prospects for the immediate future cannot be adequately addressed by traditional security thinking. In fact, traditional security policies and their underlying beliefs and values are partly responsible for our current predicaments. As argued in Chapter 3, Chapter 10 and Chapter 11, those underlying beliefs and values included an uncritical confidence in limitless growth, in the ability of technological progress to solve all our problems, and in certain essential characteristics that distinguish humans from all other living beings and render us ‘sapient,’ responsible and rational, enlisting the resources of our entire planet in order to create the perfect world for untold billions. Of course, we were overdue for some sobering up.
This applies to citizens of developed countries in the sense that their addiction to cheap abundant energy and inequitable consumption creates security risks that are not easily recognised under the dominant ideologies of the Conventional Development Paradigm (CDP), political realism, and cornucopianism. The proposition also applies to citizens of developing countries insofar as their dependence on exploitative trade relationships and counterproductive development schemes make it difficult for them to gain the necessary latitude for addressing their specific security challenges. Their incessant pursuit of fossil-fuel-based ‘development’ renders the global ‘climate emergency’ next to intransigent. Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 show how our uncompromising pursuit of a narrow and biased interpretation of progress has led us into a gruesome, unstoppable war against non-human ‘nature’, our very own support base, that has now escalated to grotesque dimensions: Of the entire mammalian biomass on Earth, domestic animals constitute a whopping 60%, humans as a species make up 36%, while the Earth’s entire inventory of wild mammals has shrunk to a mere four percent (Bar-On et al., 2018). Those problems are not even recognised under traditional security models or any ‘hard’ interpretation of human security.
The second proposition states that human security in its multidisciplinary interpretations and multidimensional models can in fact inform effective policies that could vastly improve humanity’s prospects across cultures and around the world. Such policies could address massive security threats that have largely escaped attention because of ideological blinkers, lack of information or inappropriate value priorities. Extending the scope of human security in its comprehensive sense to include future generations can also address the particular dangers indicated in future scenarios involving various combinations of collapse and reform. In this chapter we will again refer to Raskin’s (2016) six scenarios discussed in Chapter 1 (summarised in Table 1.1) because they admirably cover the possible range. The models and the experts behind them are telling decision makers what must be done, and have done so for decades (as documented in the series of World Scientists’ Warnings: Ripple et al., 2017). The problem is that so far those messages have fallen on deaf ears. Instead, the Great Acceleration continues unabated and the war rages on – despite protests and pandemic.
Various chapters reinforce those two propositions with evidence from the areas of conflict studies, international law, the situations of individuals within and without the state, the failing and rebuilding of states, the depletion and scarcity of resources, and from climate change. In Chapter 6 Hennie Strydom explained how International Humanitarian Law developed and mirrored the transition from state-centered to human-centered security thinking and the replacement of inter-state armed conflicts by internal ones. Hence, the causes for internal violent conflict have joined the list of traditional reasons for war as major challenges to human security. Those causes include intolerable socioeconomic inequity, tensions between ethno-cultural or religious factions, displacement of ever larger populations, and the failure of states in exercising their obligations towards the citizenry. Those causes also drive numerous other aspects of human insecurity besides armed conflict, which underscores again the basic fact that avoiding violence (i.e its direct, structural, and cultural types) only constitutes a necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition for security.
‘Ultimate Security’ Is Receding from Our Reach
What also emerges from those first two thirds of the text is that many threats to human security are rooted in humanity’s relationship and interactions with the rest of nature, according to Myers’ (1993b) dictum of ‘ultimate security.’ The global environmental crisis in its numerous dimensions is largely driven by humanity overshooting the capacity of ecological support structures. Collectively we are quite literally ‘living beyond our means’, as the UN’s Millennium Assessment Board (UNEP-MAB, 2005) put it. Much suffering, hardship, and loss of biodiversity could have been avoided had the international community arrived at this realisation a few decades earlier when the Club of Rome (Meadows et al., 1972, 2004), and others issued their first warnings about the world approaching limits to growth (Ripple et al., 2017). The Club of Rome’s multivariate computer simulations yielded scenarios that varied in the amounts of non-renewable resources, and in the extent and timing of international countermeasures. Though their assumptions and arguments were never refuted in principle, their critics made much of the fact that the timing of many of their predictions proved off target – an aspect that the authors had clearly declared as neither realistic nor relevant for drawing fundamental conclusions from their forecasts, namely that humanity’s course is unsustainable. Subsequent studies (e.g. Bardi, 2011; Meadows et al., 2004; Turner, 2008; Rockström et al., 2009; Ewing et al., 2010; WWF, 2018) confirmed their conclusions: Global limits to growth are quantifiable and ‘ontologically objective’ (see Chapter 11), they manifest as discrete ecological boundaries, and human activities are variously approaching or transgressing them.
The trouble with overshoot, be it ecological or socioeconomic, is that its manifestations become worse with every year that it remains unmitigated. In the case of ecological overshoot those manifestations include desertification, soil erosion, salination, pollution, loss of biodiversity, resource depletion and pandemics. That self-reinforcing principle means that the necessary measures to address it effectively will need to be even less compromising, more costly and hurtful, and more drastic with every year that is wasted. In any case, for many non-human species at the brink of extinction those measures would arrive entirely too late. Not only do the negative consequences of overshoot increase over time, its self-reinforcement means that they grow exponentially, which means that we tend to overestimate the amount of time left to implement counterstrategies. Moreover, prolonged overshoot engenders the likelihood that tipping points are passed, triggering sudden systemic readjustments, which can manifest as a collapse. With every year that effective solutions are delayed, the likelihood of collapse (and its severity) increases. As most of the negative trends contributing to the Great Acceleration (i.e. emissions of GHGs and other pollutants, consumption, technological expansion, income inequality and military expenditures) are not only proceeding but still accelerating, we can state with confidence that whatever efforts to counteract overshoot might have been attempted, they have not met with evident success. The only two trends in the set that seem to have passed their inflection points, meaning that their rates of increase are no longer increasing, are global population growth and global economic growth; however, their slowing was less the result of deliberate policies but of inadvertent transition effects.[1] The SDG agenda as the only global initiative towards sustainability were hampered from their inception by misguided expectations of ‘development’, by internal contradictions and by ignoring overshoot (O’Neill et al., 2018). On the whole, we conclude that overshoot continues to proceed virtually unmitigated by any effective countermeasures. This renders some limited collapse increasingly likely (Kolbert, 2006; Bendell, 2018; Rees, 2019).
Collapse: When and How?
From the foregoing we conclude that a certain extent of collapse seems all but inevitable. The reasons have been discussed throughout this book; they may be summarised as humanity’s failure to ensure environmental security through a timely reduction of our ecological overshoot and of our growth. Because environmental security underpins the other pillars to such a large extent, its absence is likely to destabilise most other aspects of human security. On that premise, the important questions are when and how collapse can be expected. Unfortunately, chronological predictions have tended to prove false. Retrospectively the failure of such predictions can be explained by the unknown influence and location of tipping points (Galaz et al., 2014). A more productive approach would be to ask what aspects of global change might operate as proximal triggers and how ‘bad’ those changes will need to get before their manifestations will be perceived as collapse. In order to address those questions, we need to first clarify what we mean by ‘collapse.’
From its beginnings, human history has been marked by ups and downs in the extent of human security that was enjoyed by regional populations. Severe declines in one or several pillars were interpreted as ‘collapses.’ Although the present threats are unprecedented in their global extents, they are being perceived inequitably and their impacts are experienced inequitably around the world (with the exception of COVID-19). This was made clear with regards to climate change in Chapter 9. Invariably it is the world’s poorest who have suffered the brunt of collapses, and it will be no different next time; the planetwide extent of the present crisis will merely result in a planetwide variation in the extent of victimisation. In most of its manifestations, collapse will eventuate regionally.
What will be the most likely triggers of collapse? In an updated forecast Jorgen Randers (2012), a member of the original Club of Rome team, suggested that of all manifestations of overshoot, global warming will play the most decisive role in determining humanity’s future during this century. As a result of international inaction, CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere will continue to rise and cause at least +2 °C by 2052. This warming by two degrees has been widely considered a critical threshold, beyond which non-linear increase (‘runaway greenhouse’) might take over. [2] Randers further suggested that the more benign scenarios described in the Club of Rome’s original analysis, in which humanity manages to control production and population increases [3], are probably no longer within our reach because humanity has failed to act in time (Grossman, 2012). Some data suggest that the projections of the IPCC habitually underestimate the actual climate impact (McKibben, 2010).
As discussed in the introduction and Chapter 9, a range of diverse secondary threats to environmental security arises from global warming and associated climate change. They include flooding of coastal lowlands, more severe weather events, floods and droughts, epidemics, and further constraints on the supplies of food and water, as well as associated health threats (O’Brien, 2010; WWF, 2018). Leading economies will stagnate while some emerging economies will grow which will exacerbate overshoot (in 2019 at 170%), though more slowly. The resulting economic losses, food insecurity, mass migrations and health crises would weaken economies and social orders to a degree that compromises the rule of law and the authority of central governance. Chapter 5, Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 focus on the many challenges to socio-political security, health-related security, and economic security that arise from that general malaise. The increasing global inequity in terms of consumption, resource allocation, and reproductive rate that exists among countries, cultures and classes contributes to this susceptibility (Davies & Sandstrom, 2008; Dobkowski & Wallimann, 2002; Heinberg, 2013). Paul Bellamy’s detailed account in Chapter 5 of the connections between poverty and insecurity makes that abundantly clear.
One knock-on effect of climate change that seems particularly prone to trigger collapse is the depletion of natural resources, especially food and potable water. As explicated by Richard Plate in Chapter 10, human nature predestines us for resource depletion, and the rate at which cultures deplete their resources tends to outpace the rate at which they become aware of that fact. Climate change and the regional threats it poses to agriculture come on top of that constitutive source of food insecurity, at a time when unprecedented population sizes and cultural trends towards increasing meat consumption are already straining the Earth’s biocapacity (Brown, 2011; Grossman, 2012). Historical precedents suggest that food shortages and widespread malnutrition engender violent conflict, social upheaval and health insecurity (Heinberg, 2013). In the same vein, climate-induced shortages of other resources will exacerbate the risk of violence that resource depletion always engenders (Morales, 2002; Parenti, 2011; Homer-Dixon, 1999); most wars of the future will be over resources.
A further effect that is likely to contribute to regional incidents of collapse is the displacement of large populations from inundated coastal plains, from arid or flooded former agricultural regions, and from areas threatened by armed conflict (Myers, 1993a). Those refugees will strain the services and infrastructures of host countries and give rise to intercultural conflicts of the kind that are now plaguing the European Union (Lautensach, 2018a).
The global spread of misplaced notions of free-market laissez-faire policies raises another threat to human security (Chua, 2003). Conditions of weakened governments and widespread public disaffection and destitution favour the emergence of false prophets and demagogues who seek to mobilise followers for their own sinister political purposes. While some might conclude from the present situation that we have already arrived at that point – kakistocracies have been multiplying on the North American continent and elsewhere – historical precedents suggest that the danger from populist autocrats continues to grow, as the other variables increase.
From ‘Feeding the Hungry’ Towards the ‘Minimum Sufficient Welfare for the Greatest Sustainable Number’
Because of the contingencies of overshoot these problems cannot be effectively remedied by efforts that only focus on ‘eliminating poverty’ as the humanitarian ideal, along with SDG #1, demands—independently how one defines poverty. [4] The contingencies of overshoot impose a tragic inversion on the traditional humanitarian agenda of ‘development’. Mere equitable redistribution of food no longer suffices, even if it were politically feasible. At this point in time, if a global dictatorship allocated exactly equal amounts of resources to every human being, we would still all starve, albeit rather slowly (see footnote 5). Secondly, the fact that our current demand amounts to at least 1.7 planets (WWF, 2018) means that in spite of perfect equity two of every five people would be consuming part of the food producing machinery itself (WWF, 2018). Next year it would be a few more, and so forth. People living in more extreme biogeographical regions and latitudes would be hardest pressed because they tend to rely on greater amounts of animal protein. The fact that humanity, together with all domesticated mammals, already constitute 96% of all mammalian biomass on this planet could not speak more loudly on the subject of overshoot. Moreover, the population continues to grow even while food prices rise and fresh water and soils grow scarcer (Brown, 2003; Dobkowski & Wallimann, 2002). This means that neither the redistribution of resources, nor a new global diet (Hirvonen et al., 2020), nor the magical production of more food from thin air by some technical innovation, can be the sole prescription for food security [5], even though they would certainly help to temporarily alleviate some of the worst shortages.
In order to ensure lasting environmental security for all, and with that fulfil an essential condition for the other pillars of human security, humanity must reduce its total environmental impact before nature does this for us in painful ways, and before many more species are lost. Richard Plate and Ronnie Hawkins argue this in Chapter 10, Chapter 11, and Chapter 12. The difficulty with integrated plans that could address the multifaceted range of problems, such as Lester Brown’s (2003) ‘Plan B’, is that they demand an unprecedented extent of political will that can only be regarded as unrealistic. After years of squabbling over such plans to address poverty and hunger, the international community has now been confronted with an even bigger challenge: the likely possibility that irreversible climate change sharply decreases agricultural productivity and sets us back even further.
Regardless of how severe climate change will turn out, it will mean that the Earth will produce not more food for a growing humanity but less – perhaps substantially less. This will be a result of established agro-ecosystems functioning less well or collapsing entirely, while new agro-ecosystems that could cope with the new conditions of Eaarth (McKibben, 2010) will be slow in developing. Overshoot and climate change are trashing the holy grail of utilitarianism, usually phrased as ‘the greatest good for the greatest number.’
The I=PAT relationship (McCluney, 2004; see Chapter 1) clearly indicates that we can choose among a range of solution states that encompass numerous combinations of global population sizes and per capita affluence and technology use; all those solutions that are sustainable include population sizes below the current level (how far below depends partly on how long it will take us to get there and how severe the climate changes) (Grossman, 2012). Furthermore, Potter’s (1988) hierarchy of survival modes suggests that some of those solutions are morally preferable to others—e.g. miserable survival for all at five billion vs. acceptable survival for all at two billion. Others (e.g. Cohen, 2005; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2004) came to similar conclusions years ago. All that points to the question of how many people below the maximum the Earth should support (Pimentel et al., 1999). This is primarily a moral question, weighing welfare against numbers.
The need to reduce our numbers does not only arise from our excessive impact but also from the amount of misery that is already being experienced by much of humanity. The growing scarcity of key resources, particularly food and potable water, causes suffering that would be avoidable with a smaller population. Cohen (2005) framed the challenge of global food security in the analogy of a communal dinner table where some guests go hungry; the problem can be solved in three ways: (1) make a bigger pie, (2) put fewer forks on the table, (3) teach better manners. Ehrlich et al. (1995) reduced the challenge to a ‘race between the stork and the plough’ that is being won by the stork. The chapters on scarcity as well as abundant literature (e.g. Cribb, 2010; Roberts, 2008; Dobkowski & Wallimann, 2002) indicated that little, if any, room remains to increase food supply (i.e. speed up the plough, or make a bigger pie). In effect, reducing the global population and changing our ‘manners’ are our only remaining options, and neither seems satisfactory—the former on ethical grounds, the latter for its limited potential. We will discuss what limited opportunities might remain open in the next section. The upshot is that the holy grail of utilitarians now amounts to the minimum sufficient welfare for the greatest sustainable number. This number is probably no more than about four billion people, and perhaps less than one billion (Pimentel et al., 1999; Cohen, 2005; McCluney, 2004); either way, they will not be consuming much animal protein.
Under the new imperative to tighten our belts it becomes clear that not all conceptions of human security are equally helpful. Those that take into account the primacy of environmental security and the population problem can contribute to constructive solutions and show the way out of overshoot. In contrast, those conceptions that are mainly informed by the Conventional Development Paradigm (represented, e.g. in Bindé, 2001) can only help in the short term (as evident in GDP increases) and will in the long term do more harm than good by reducing natural capital (as evident in decreases of other statistics, e.g. the Inclusive Wealth Indicator, IWI) and by further increasing humanity’s collective impact (IHDP, 2014). Rising GDP and shrinking IWI have been observed with some ‘emerging economies’ such as Brazil and India. Another case in point is the much acclaimed Green Revolution that vastly boosted food production during the 1970s. In the short term it relieved shortages and prevented impending famines; in the long term, however, it will be regarded a disaster, as Plate argued in Chapter 10. The couple of decades of time that it bought us were not used wisely; instead, they were squandered in pursuit of further growth under the belief that this revolution would never end. Now we are again facing famines – except that our numbers have tripled, our ecosystems are weaker, tens of thousands of species have disappeared, natural resources are further depleted, pollution has become worse, and the global climate is changing in uncertain ways. No other misadventure of conventional development policies illustrates the failings of the CDP better than this missed opportunity. Its humanitarian goals were rendered unattainable by our obsession with economic growth.
So much for conventional ‘development.’ What about more idealistic conceptions of human security? The UN’s principle of ‘freedom from needs’ becomes even less meaningful if the hierarchy of human needs is in fact culturally contingent as Brown and Gehrmann argued in Chapter 4. A culture that subscribed to a long term view of human welfare would have rejected external food aid because they would have correctly regarded it as merely adding to their problems (Hardin 2011). But even Sen’s (1999) more flexible principle of ‘development as freedom’ is unable to accommodate ecological constraints. Rather, development needs to be understood as any measure that furthers the transition to sustainability (Keiner, 2006; Lautensach & Lautensach, 2013). This includes a general commitment to non-violent resolution of conflicts as Wilmer explained in Chapter 19.
The most informative and comprehensive description of sustainable human security is represented in Kate Raworth’s (2017) Donut Model, describing a safe operating space for humanity. This operating space is presented as the space between two concentric rings of boundaries. The outer ring is formed by nine environmental boundaries that limit our ecological impact; the inner ring is formed by twelve sociopolitical boundaries that represent basic needs. Combining the requirement for environmental sustainability with those for sociopolitical and cultural sustainability makes intuitive sense, as a grossly unjust and inequitable society will prove to become unstable before long, no matter how ecologically sound its policies may be. At the time of writing, not a single country meets all those conditions for situating itself within the ‘safe operating space’; close approximations were shown by Vietnam and Cuba (O’Neill et al., 2018).[6]
Reinterpretations of ‘development’ often meet with objections based on human rights. The tension between human rights and human security is discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 15. Rights become limited not only by other rights but also by the inconvenient fact that insisting on some rights (i.e. rights that are not grantable) will create insecurity, as is explained in Chapter 15. In her critique of dominant interpretations of human rights Thomas (2001) blamed the enshrining of property rights under human rights law, which can, under conditions of limited resources, work at the expense of disenfranchised minorities. In the light of overshoot certain other human rights seem similarly counterproductive, such as the right to a ‘clean environment,’ ‘safe drinking water’ or ‘adequate nutrition.’ Given an excessively large global population (today’s seven billion plus would qualify) and a single planet at our disposal, no government can grant such privileges to all. One additional ‘right’ that has arguably proven not only ungrantable but outright harmful is the right to procreate at will (Lautensach, 2015).
Overshoot not only necessitates that we change some of our notions about rights—it forces us to dig deeper into the human psyche. In Chapter 11 Ronnie Hawkins asserts that humanity’s relationship with the rest of nature is not only shaped by ecological contingencies but also from within every one of us and from within our cultures. By labeling nature as the non-human ‘other’, an inanimate heap of ‘resources’ for the taking, consisting of marvellously useful little automatons just waiting to prove their utility to human endeavours, we ultimately set ourselves up for moral bankruptcy and ecological suicide. Others have observed this as well (Crist, 2017; Curry, 2011; Gorke, 2003); but Hawkins also explores the cultural, historical, and metaphysical grounds from which this attitude sprouted. In her “Letters from the Front” (Chapter 12) she exposes the cruelty and arrogance behind the atrocities in our war against nature. What emerges are not just the deeply questionable ramifications of the dominant environmental ethic behind such development schemes as the UN’s Millennium Goals and Agenda 2030, but a thoroughly unsettling critique of what it means to be ‘modern’ and what constitutes progress.
Besides the obvious need to change our notions about human security, about rights, about nature, and about modernity, another moral imperative that arises from the foregoing is to change our value priorities with respect to each other. As ecologies simplify and economies falter, centralised governance and the rule of law will become more tenuous. This means not only that most of us need to re-learn how to run self-sufficient, resilient communities. It also means that we exercise compassion for those whom the crisis will have displaced from their homes, destitute masses with no recourse (Brito & Smith, 2012). The citizens of failed states run the danger of becoming stateless which at this time severely compromises their security and autonomy as Anna Hayes documents in Chapter 7. Other aspects of human insecurity in failed states are described in Chapter 6, Chapter 8, and Chapter 16. The ranks of displaced multitudes are certain to swell once rising sea levels have inundated some of the world’s heavily populated coastal lands. In the absence of decisive initiative by the UNHCR that would impart on environmental refugees the status of ‘world citizens’ (or at the very least accord them full official refugee status) (Pearce, 2011), their fate depends on the charity of other countries and charitable NGOs—which, in the midst of shortages and economic downturns, cannot be taken for granted. Limited collapse will also mean that a considerable portion of humanity will not survive to their normal life expectancy (Lautensach, 2020). Clearly the human conscience represents as important a ‘tipping point’ as do geophysiological variables. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/21%3A_Conclusions_Prospects_Futures/21.1%3A_Human_Security_in_World_Affairs%3A_Challenges.txt |
What, then, would constructive solutions and effective human security policies entail under those circumstances? In this section we review the suggestions made by the chapter authors and venture some ideas of our own, moving from the global level through the national to the local. We will focus mainly on ways to address overshoot and to achieve sustainability. Other avenues toward human security that reach beyond the merely sustainable will be discussed in the final section.
Opportunities at the International Level
Globalisation presents the paradox of power relationships being redirected, reinvented and modified under the banner of a misguided vision of development that leads to inevitable collapse, which will affect both victims and beneficiaries of globalisation (Lewis, 1998). Some major manifestations of globalisation, notably the increased movement of goods and people and the hyperconsumption in OECD countries, contribute massively to the emission of greenhouse gases; yet other aspects provide opportunities. The two causative areas, economy and technology, also provide the opportunities for the two major actors, international corporations and international intergovernmental institutions. Some analysts consider corporate social responsibility an important factor towards making use of globalising processes to increase human security. On the other hand, many of the threats to human security also involve corporations; as organisations they are not actually capable of sentiments like responsibility or empathy, which renders the phenomenon fortuitous at best (more on corporate responsibility in Section here). This leaves us with intergovernmental institutions, and the example of the UN shows both how much has been accomplished, and how much more could be. The SDGs represent the first concerted effort by the international community under the auspices of the UN to pursue sustainable human security worldwide. This represents a huge step forward—or at least it would, if the goals did not contradict each other, if they were reconciled with the demands of Donut Economics (Raworth, 2017), if they took into account global overshoot, and if they recognized the pervasive inter-species injustice and our war against nature. The accomplishments and shortcomings of the SDG agenda are discussed in Chapter 3.
Much intergovernmental initiative seems continually thwarted by the opposition of a few influential maverick countries—which raises the question to what extent the principles of national security and of sovereignty hinder such global efforts towards sustainable human security; and could those principles also be of help? Many states obviously do a passable job at ensuring their own citizens’ human security, and some present stellar examples of international leadership. But is that sufficient reason to allow states so much autonomy under the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols as to enable them to opt out of the process or to hijack its outcomes, to the extent of claiming the right to use nuclear weapons if their ‘survival of the state’ were threatened? If citizens are expected to put up with the legal system around them, why cannot states live up to the same expectation, especially if it benefits their citizens? The present situation amounts to human security by subscription, which allows those states off the hook whose citizens probably most require the commitment. A prestigious body of academics has proposed for the UN to switch from consensus rule to majority rule (Biermann et al., 2012).
The recently proposed Responsibility to Protect (R2P) regime might also help alleviate this difficulty by sufficiently weakening the hegemony of the sovereignty principle. It might still not have enough teeth in the absence of a global law enforcement branch with powers that override sovereign states and bypass the veto in the UNSC. In Chapter 18 Jeffrey Morton and Samantha Maesel express some optimism in the light of recent trends towards supranational regulation. Likewise, Chapter 6, Chapter 9 and Chapter 20 indicate a slow movement by the international community towards a more communitarian perspective on human security, at least in legal terms. Wilmer’s account of nonviolent means for conflict resolution in Chapter 19 expresses the hope that the shared challenges loom large enough to unify the international community to render major armed conflicts less likely.
However, it is equally clear that there are influential groups that would not regard it in their interest if armed conflict simply went out of favour. Those interests are distributed much beyond the US military-industrial complex (which is still the largest supplier of arms) into key industries of virtually all developed countries. Few would dispute that the world’s major armament industries have both the motivation and the power to jeopardise any major swing towards pacifism in world affairs. On the one hand, they thus threaten human security, while on the other those new intergovernmental regimes are unlikely to work without a measure of enforcement—which requires some military muscle. Chapter 5 and Chapter 10 make it clear that the competition among countries for ever scarcer resources will intensify, which might well lead to a reversal of the humanitarian gains made since WWII. The danger lies equally in the possibility that the policing gets out of hand, leading towards a ‘Fortress World’ type future (Raskin, 2016) with extreme inequities, and in the possibility of intensified global anarchy.
The diverse field of international NGOs such as Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, and Amnesty International shows considerable potential to help with global security regimes, particularly in their influence on everyday decisions of citizens aided by electronic social media. As the international version of civil society, they, too, play an important role in globalising processes and have accomplished much in exerting grassroot pressure on reticent governments. If their number and power continue to grow as they have over the past decades, those organisations and social networks represent significant opportunities for swaying the prime actors towards sustainable human security, and particularly towards the kinds of legal reforms suggested in Chapter 16, Chapter 18 and Chapter 20. Sustainable human security is achieved once the activities of societies and countries produce impacts and performances that can be localised in the sustainable operating space described by Kate Raworth’s Donut Model (2012)—below environmental boundaries and above sociopolitical minima.
To summarise the prospects for global initiatives, the chapter authors have identified two major obstacles that limit opportunities towards sustainable human security. The first was the lack of international consensus and the absence of means to reign in dissenting countries and to enforce regimes. The international order is fundamentally anarchic, as Morton and Maesel point out in Chapter 18. Any step towards regimentation of national conduct requires inordinate amounts of effort by individual committed countries. The second obstacle arises from a serious blind spot with the most powerful decision-makers in recognising priority problems. As Chapter 6 and Chapter 18 show, international law and the agenda of the UNSC cover almost exclusively the socio-political and economic pillars of human security; even collaboration on health security is not universally accepted, as the US-American withdrawal from the WHO showed (in the middle of a pandemic, no less). Environmental security is governed to a much lesser extent or not at all by any internationally recognised legal regime, least of all the sustainability imperative. In comparison to Syria, Iran, and the state of the world economy, environmental security and sustainability issues are relegated to sideshows in security debates. The successive high-level conferences at Rio, Kyoto, Copenhagen, etc. indicated the world powers’ unwillingness to compromise what they perceive as their national interests for the benefit of sustainable global environmental security, even in the face of overwhelming consensus among the experts (Brito & Smith, 2012; Brundtland et al., 2012; Ripple et al., 2017).
What would be required to ensure sustainable global environmental security is a concerted effort to secure the minimum acceptable amount of welfare for the greatest sustainable number, in the form of a universal agreement on global goalposts and equitable burdens. Staying below the maximum sustainable impact (which can be expressed as a maximum footprint) gives a per capita goal of 3.6 gha that could provide moderate comfort for a population of about 3 billion, but decreasing because of overshoot.[7] Based on the observations made in the preceding section, three strategies would help humanity move towards the goalposts of sustainability: (a) increasing the equity of impact, (b) halting (and then reversing) population growth as quickly as possible and (c) preparing for incidents of partial collapse.
The practical problems with those strategies are obvious. On the one hand, numerous international NGOs represent vision, responsibility and initiative towards sustainable human security at the global level (albeit not very democratically)—what Bosselmann in Chapter 16 refers to as the global civil society, represented by platform documents such as the Earth Charter (Earth Charter Initiative, 2012) and the Earth Manifesto (Mosquin & Rowe, 2004). On the other hand, the chapters on governance and international law clearly suggest that the goal of international equity is thoroughly unpalatable to the governments of developed countries as well as to transnational corporate powers, and it cannot be enforced anyway under the current global order. Fertility is being addressed worldwide mainly through the empowerment of women but family planning programmes still face the opposition of powerful religious and cultural prejudices, spearheaded by collusive governments (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2009). The benefits in terms of fertility reduction trickle in much too slowly compared to the progressive damage being caused by worsening overshoot. [8]
In view of those obstacles the prospects for timely and effective intergovernmental action seems rather dim. International development aid, too, is hampered by that blind spot to the sustainability imperative (Lautensach & Lautensach, 2013). The pitfalls of the conventional development paradigm were discussed in the preceding sections. Also, as Clements and LaMonica point out in Chapter 8 and Chapter 14, respectively, prioritising the building or re-building of centralised state institutions in developing countries seldom provides enough support for human security. The global imposition of democratic mechanisms of empowerment is also likely to create new problems in some developing countries because it destabilises market-dominant ethnic minorities, which often leads to violent upheaval (Chua, 2004, p. 12). In a nutshell, the handicap arising from linear models of development and unidimensional notions of progress jeopardises success of many well-intentioned efforts at improving the lot of the world’s poorest. Social change is driven by technological advances (as proposed by Schumpeter, 1950, pp. 81-87), environmental change (as described by the field of environmental history, discussed in Chapter 11), and by shifts in dominant ideas (Kuhn, 1962), which makes linearity seem a rather far-fetched notion (Bowers, 1993; Rees, 2017). The real opportunity of ‘development aid,’ then, is to recognise that many developing countries can make their inhabitants more secure within the context of a hybrid state of the kind Clements advocates in Chapter 8, but incorporating a locally sustainable economy. This would be most relevant for countries rendered ‘fragile’ by the effects of adverse environmental change. The upshot, however, suggests that the sovereignty principle is not entirely dispensable after all.
We conclude again that limited collapse is all but inevitable: the current state of international (dis)order renders unlikely the timely success on the two strategies of increasing socioeconomic equity and reversing population growth at the global level. Even catastrophic scenarios are not likely to change quickly enough this scene of general disunity and corruption of influence, as the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated. With that dismal prospect on the sustainability front comes the sobering conclusion that initiatives in the socio-political, economic, and health-related pillars of human security cannot achieve much lasting success at the international scale. This follows from the primacy of environmental security as the underlying condition for lasting human security as argued in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. The conditions for the transition to Earth democracy and ecological citizenship, as explained by Bosselmann (Chapter 16), seem unlikely to come about in time, considering the rate at which the crisis is worsening. We are left with the hope that sovereign states or blocs of states might take the initiative. One encouraging phenomenon arose in 2018 with the advent of impactful protest movements like Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, and Sunrise (Scharmer, 2019).
Opportunities at the National and Local Levels
We now summarise the potential of regional and national levels as possible arenas for progressive initiatives towards sustainable human security. Human security has been proposed as the main raison d’être of the nation-state (Pitsuwan, 2007). It stands to reason that many place their hopes in the state for progressive initiatives towards sustainable human security by providing the necessary guidance for behaviour change (e.g. Orr, 2018).
Criteria and requirements for improving human security at the national level are explicated in several chapters: resource management and coping with scarcity in Chapter 10; dominant views of nature are discussed in Chapter 11; the importance of the rule of law, conflict resolution, human rights, understanding of overshoot and other criteria are discussed in Chapter 6, Chapter 13, Chapter 14, Chapter 4, and Chapter 3, respectively. Table 21.1 summarises those criteria and requirements and compares their fulfilment at the global and national-regional levels. From the juxtaposition of the two levels, notable differences become apparent in terms of the unmitigated exercise of self-interest, short-term priorities, chauvinism, the lack of enforcement and solidarity, the absence of requirements for effective resource management, and mitigation of scarcity. These differences partly explain the shortfall at the global level as summarised in the preceding section; but they also indicate some positive potential at the national-regional level.
The worldwide trend towards increasing socioeconomic inequity and disparity includes developed as well as developing countries and seems particularly reticent to mitigation. It has created a new class of aristocrats who wield enormous power behind the scenes and outside of electoral politics (Piketty, 2014). The World Economic Forum (2020) considers this trend a grave danger for human security. Reversing it through legislative change may well lie beyond the power of any democratic system.
Table 21.1 Comparison of obstacles and solutions towards effective human security regimes at the global and national/regional levels; relevant chapters are referenced (Date sources: Lautensach, 2010; Homer-Dixon, 1999).
OBSTACLES GLOBAL LEVEL SolutionS NATIONAL/REGIONAL LEVEL SolutionS
Mental Habits and Ideological Traps
1. Short-term priorities (Chapter 10)
2. Cornucopianism (Chapter 3)
3. Political ‘realism’
4. Chauvinism
5. Moral ineptitudes (irresponsibility, scruples)
6. Exploitative view of nature (Chapter 11)
1. No mitigation
2. Hegemonic
3. Untempered, causing Tragedy of the Commons
4. Overt exceptionalism, intransigent
5. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights inconsistently enforced (Chapter 6)
6. Global culture of exploitation (Chapter 9)
1. Mitigated somewhat through responsibility to the electorate
2. Hegemonic as well
3. Tempered by liberal institutionalism, communitarianism
4. More egalitarian and hierarchical ideals
5. Rule of law, executive, independent judiciary (Chapter 13, Chapter 8)
6. Varies with culture but often tempered by local and traditional values
Social Traps (Chapter 10)
1. Ignorance
2. Externality and time delay
1. Rare among delegates
2. Conceptual difficulties with holistic responsibility
1. Depends on education (Chapter 12)
2. Nationalist responsibility vs. colonialist neglect towards other countries
Criteria for Effective Resource Management (Chapter 10)
1. Responsive to users
2. Cooperation across scales
3. Adaptive to changes
4. Users trust in system
1. Great inequities in power
2. Delegates represent governments
3. Reform is cumbersome
4. Mixed track record
1. Responsiveness varies with electoral system
2. Nested levels of governance
3. Varies with culture; some successes
4. Generally moderate trust, depending
Risk of Conflict (Chapter 10)
1. Resource capture by powerful groups
2. Ecological marginalisation
1. Very prevalent as neo-colonialism
2. Very prevalent as displacement of people (Chapter 7)
1. Varies with society, culture, electoral system
2. Not as prevalent; tempered by rule of law
Four Objectives that Promote Sustainable Human Security Regionally
Given the poor international consensus on virtually all important issues, and the extent to which sovereign governments still dominate and define what is possible in the political arena, competent administrations empowered by sufficiently engaged and enlightened electorates could accomplish much at the national level in terms of the four sustainability objectives of efficiency, restraint, adaptation, and structural flexibility (Lautensach, 2010). This applies to both developed and developing countries. We will summarise the four objectives here briefly.
The literature abounds with proposals how the efficiency could be increased with which resources and energy are consumed. This would increase regional carrying capacity, minimise harmful environmental impacts and it would buy some time. Efficiency is a major factor in the development of resilience. Countrywide increases in efficiency would require profound and widespread technological innovation, the elimination of many government subsidies, which are becoming unaffordable anyway, and changes in cultural practices. For example, towards improving energy efficiency, Dessus (2001) suggested that governments provide the right infrastructure choices (e.g. public transport), re-model the manufacture of energy-consuming machinery, and help developing partner countries avoid the mistakes made by the developed ones.
The rate of consumption of resources will have to be restrained in developed nations. Cherry Tsoi argues this in Chapter 9 on the example of GHG emissions. This will not be possible without adequate legal incentives to make do with less and counterincentives against overconsumption. More importantly, it would require a profound restructuring of the culture of consumerism and a reassessment of what constitutes growth, progress, sufficiency, and quality of life for individuals, for communities, and for entire societies. This amounts to an all-out effort to elevate the performance of a society, and ultimately of all of humanity, above the socio-political boundaries in Raworth’s (2017) Donut Model. The state is in a position to equalise consumption and to address the disparity in people’s capacities to cope with resource scarcity. Restraint would also have to extend to reproductive habits, which presents an altogether different challenge for health care policy. For example, infertility or low sperm counts would no longer be considered a cause for medical intervention, nor would medical budgets cover costly reproductive technology. Restraint is an important component in the agenda of Deep Adaptation (Bendell, 2011).
Reform efforts will have to facilitate adaptation of political, social and technological practices to the new conditions created by the crisis. This includes the scarcity of certain resources (e.g. metals), pollution and the resulting unprecedented health hazards (e.g. UV levels), reduced biodiversity and the associated destabilisation of ecosystems, and problems related to extremely high regional population densities (McKibben, 2010). For instance, national health care systems will be required to adapt to the predicted cancer epidemics which would certainly overtax their health care budgets, and re-focus towards preventive and palliative care. [9] The precautionary principle is particularly significant for the design of proactive adaptation measures (Myers, 2002). Taking into account the prospect of limited collapse imposes some changes on the agenda of adaptation, which is addressed in the Deep Adaptation agenda.
Efforts toward adaptation, efficiency and restraint would require structural flexibility of political and economic institutions of countries. The eco-socialist school of thought focuses particularly on such a wide-reaching programme of structural reform with specific focus on mitigating the worst of the environmental crisis (Curry, 2011). Their main argument states that global capitalism represents the major culprit in the crisis and that therefore in its present form it cannot be part of the solution (Kovel, 2002). In the absence of global reforms, capitalist economies could be adapted in a top-down direction at the national level. For example, Sala-Diakanda (2001, p. 107) suggests six structural changes towards food security of developing countries, surpassing the SDGs in foresight and insight: Produce staple crops instead of export products, re-orient development policies towards rural communities, eliminate discrimination against women, re-enforce productive traditional values, reform anachronistic agricultural practices, and develop a long-term vision for the future. Other proposed agenda include the reduction of food waste, the rationing of petroleum products, a switch to zero carbon energy, and the restoration of ecosystem services (Rees, 2014; Brown, 2003; Monbiot, 2007; Cumming & Petersen, 2017). The main objective of such reforms is to discontinue the system’s addiction to growth, to work towards implementing a steady-state economy (Daly, 2013), and to develop resilience—all primarily at the national level. The kind of structural change required for those measures obviously transcends the political and reaches into the cultural realm.
Developing Countries: How Much Room for Sustainable Human Security?
Examples of island states illustrate how the contingencies of sustainability could inform national human security policies in developing countries (Lautensach & Lautensach, 2010). In January 2010 a major earthquake displaced about 2.3 million Haitians (almost one quarter of the total population) and killed or injured over half a million. The UN’s relief programme, following the conventional development paradigm, focused on the restoration of the island’s economy and entirely ignored the obvious physical limitations imposed by climate, soil conditions, environmental trends, population dynamics and simply the geographical size of the island (UN Office of the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor 2012). Even though the country’s isolated situation reveals those limitations quite unequivocally, discrepancies are evident between official development priorities and ecological limits. (See Extension Activity 1.)
The example of Haiti illustrates a disconnect between ends and means in conventional development aid. Many international aid efforts are in fact meant to function both as disaster relief and as development, to help the recipient country help itself, at least in the long term. Well intentioned as they often are, their benefits seem to manifest mainly in the short term and hardly address the wider context or the long term. What measures the average developing country should take at the national level in order to ensure the sustainable security of citizens is addressed in Chapter 5, Chapter 9 and Chapter 10. They address as broad contingencies resource scarcity, chronic economic downturns (including the collapse of export markets), increasing population pressure and global environmental change. It hardly needs to be pointed out that those contingencies are seldom given adequate attention in aid programmes such as the one implemented in Haiti.
Many developing countries show characteristics that act in their favour. Most of their inhabitants carry the memory of frugal lifestyles, the kind that disappeared in Europe with the WWII generation. The capacity for frugality and restraint will be of enormous help in face of the coming collapse events; surely the level of food waste in Somalia is already minimal! Acting against that potential benefit of frugality is the trend towards increasing socioeconomic inequity, shown by the growth of affluent middle classes who are working hard to forget the frugality of their forebears in pursuit of the ideal of ‘Western’ affluence. The example of rising meat consumption in developing countries with its detrimental consequences for food security, biodiversity, and emission quota speaks volumes about the counterproductive interpretations of ‘development’ under the CDP. The growing inequity within developing countries also illustrates how the use of national averages can mislead quantitative analyses.
Most developing countries in Haiti’s situation are at risk of becoming failing states, which means that their survival depends largely on external aid, as Strydom (Chapter 6) suggests. That means that much responsibility will rest on the countries that weather a global crash. At the regional and multilateral level, groups of such determined countries could make a decisive difference, depending on how much clout they can muster internationally. They would decide which faltering states are worth defending or supporting and which should be allowed to disappear. This touches on Raskin’s (2016) ‘Fortress World’ and ‘Eco-communalism’ scenarios, under which global regimes are enforced through trade embargoes and other sanctions; but it also indicates opportunities for counterhegemonic, collaborative self-sufficiency in developing regions.
Addressing the Cultural Foundations
Given that neither geographical expansion on this planet, nor boosting procuring efficiency, nor resource substitution offer much room for the further increase of the human carrying capacity, it seems clear that resource scarcity is beginning to act as a major brake on the growth of national economies (Dobkowski & Wallimann, 2002; see also Chapter 10). Increasing scarcities not only bereave corncucopianism of the last vestiges of empirical justification, they require people to unlearn myths about what constitutes progress and to replace them with new beliefs and values.[10] As several authors in this text have pointed out, resource depletion and the tragedy of the commons are consequences of psychological and cultural determinants of consumption behaviour. In Chapter 10 Richard Plate discusses perception bias, cognitive disabilities, and counterproductive mental habits that contribute to the unsustainable use of resources. Cultural differences in value priorities also affect our treatment of natural ‘resources’ to a crucial extent. This begins with the question what constitutes a resource for us, and what gives us the right to harvest, mine, deplete, and exploit it to our heart’s delight.
The significance of the cultural context relates to observations by several chapter authors (e.g. Chapter 3 and Chapter 11, also Table 21.1) that the global environmental crisis, and the tragedy of the commons in principle, really represent crises of human thinking. They therefore cannot be addressed without some fundamental changes in the human psyche (Jones, 1993; Rees, 2017). This points to other factors that tend to sway people towards unfair consumption behaviour—attitudes such as selfishness, tribalism, ethnocentrism, chauvinism—behaviour that was selected during our evolutionary past and gave rise to powerful myths; mental habits such as wishful thinking, self-deception, groundless optimism, weakness of will (akrasia), and the social traps discussed by Richard Plate in Chapter 10; and certain moral ineptitudes such as denying one’s moral responsibility [11] and lacking moral scruples (Lautensach, 2010).
Those behaviour determinants need to change, and they are modifiable (Rees, 2014, 2017; Orr ,2018). The state can help with that but the onus is on individuals, families, and communities. In a democratic society such drastic incentives towards behaviour changes could not succeed without sufficient electoral backing or at lest acquiescence, which in turn relies on the development of certain conducive attitudes in societies and individuals. In the absence of such groundswell support, resource management laws and regulations based solely on biological considerations often fail because they did not take into account cultural obstacles (Johannes, 2000).
Culturally contingent behaviour determinants are primarily passed on and perpetuated within cultural groups through formal and informal education. Much of that education takes place through what educationists refer to as the null curriculum and the hidden curriculum, which tend to be intransigent to control or modification (Contenta, 1993; Bowers, 1993). [12] Nevertheless, educational reform presents a huge, largely untapped, potential opportunity for changing the behaviour of coming generations towards sustainable living (Bowers, 1993; Orr, 2004; Lautensach, 2010, 2018b). This is because among all the influences that contribute to the development of values and beliefs in a young person, formal education alone is carried out as a meticulously designed programme, constantly monitored, and under centralised control. The UN recognised this in their Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014) and their SDG #4, but without addressing the cultural priorities discussed here. In contrast, the media have largely abandoned their educational responsibility as will be discussed below.
Effective education reform follows three groups of agenda (Lautensach, 2010, 2018b): The transmission of counterproductive beliefs and values has to be stopped; educational shortfall in areas vital to sustainability has to be mitigated; and the learner must be liberated from constraints that prevent him/her from taking independent action. Those agenda are covered by six major educational aims: re-defining progress, replacing anthropocentrism with ecocentrism, remediating crucial skill gaps, imparting a vision for the future, eliminating parochialism, and empowering the learner to take action (Lautensach, 2010; 2020). Those outcomes have been subsumed under the concept of environmental literacy (Orr, 2004) but their significance extends to all aspects of human security.
The empowerment of the learner can benefit from some of the contributions made by the Freirian school of liberation paedagogy (Freire, 1986). However, in contrast to the Freirian focus on sociopolitical constraints, the kind of reform we discuss here aims at the constructive critique of the conceptual constraints presented in consumerism, in the ideology of economic growth, and in the anthropocentric value base. Beyond these agenda of liberation, the reform is directed to favour the development of a communitarian ethic of ecocentric holism, and to finally enable the education system to accomplish what it is envisioned and obligated to do – to empower the learner to build a better world (Jaeger, 2012). Empowerment also protects against propaganda. A glitzy campaign of massive public divertissement of the kind that was financed by BP in the wake of the Deep Water Horizon Gulf oil spill could only have had its desired effects inasmuch as that public had been suitably undereducated and misled, preferably for several generations.
Despite its potential, educational reform is not a universal remedy; in the context of the crisis it can only serve to buy time and to empower future generations to avert the worst. Yet it is a powerful tool for reaching the ‘unaware, unconvinced, and unconcerned’ (Raskin, 2016). It could make the difference between Raskin’s scenarios of ‘Breakdown’ versus ‘Eco-communalism’ or ‘Fortress World’ versus ‘New Sustainability Paradigm’—huge differences in terms of overall human security and welfare. It can also change values and deconstruct stereotypes. [13] Without a modicum of ecocentric valuing, the last nature preserves might fall to our ravenous appetite for ‘resources’ when shortages really begin to bite. Thousands more of endangered species will disappear like African ‘bushmeat’ in exchange for a few months of extra time. Education also has been valued for its contributions in the development of values, worldviews and requisite civic skills—learning that does not necessarily promote environmental sustainability but that certainly contributes to human security. In the concluding section of this chapter we shall explore those aspects of human security that do not rely on environmental sustainability. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/21%3A_Conclusions_Prospects_Futures/21.2%3A_Human_Security_in_World_Affairs%3A_Opportunities.txt |
Our discussion of future prospects for human security has so far shown a certain preoccupation with the dictates of sustainability, especially in its environmental sense, a priority that in our view is well justified but should not lead to the exclusion or neglect of other sources of human insecurity. This is where those organisations and projects come into their own that offer important contributions to human security but whose success does not much depend on addressing overshoot, nor do they necessarily recognise such a dependence. For example, in their 15th Global Risk Report, the World Economic Forum (2020) identified six global areas of insecurity: economic stability, social cohesion, climate, biodiversity, ‘digital fragmentation’, and health systems – covering approximately the four pillars, as well as addressing proposals from similar high-ranking bodies such as the Nobel Laureate Symposium (2011). While their estimations of likelihood and impact (measured in billion US\$ only) seem somewhat questionable [14], their analysis of interconnections and current trends allowed them to address most of the risks that were discussed in the chapters of this book. In a similar vein, but with slightly different priorities, Table 21.2 summarises the major ‘risks to watch’ as identified in this book, as they concern the four pillars. The challenges to sustainability are not included as they were already covered in Section 21.1.
As we argued in the introduction, such analyses of specific risks and threats can allow governments to better facilitate direct intervention and provide better justifications for such action than can superficial efforts to promote ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. They tend to be motivated by concerns for distributive justice, procedural justice, the minimisation of harm and suffering, and other values that inform grantable human rights (see Section here).
Economic security should no longer be measured in terms of daily income or per capita GDP (as done e.g. by the UN and its affiliates) but by means of other standards, such as gross per capita happiness (Lane, 2000; Kasser, 2006) or inclusive wealth (IHDP, 2014) . Because of overshoot, recommended measures must not rely on further net economic growth or GDP increase (Costanza et al., 2014) but should include efforts to redistribute existing resources more equitably, to increase the efficiency of resource use, and to decrease birth rates. Ronnie Hawkins presented this argument in detail in Chapter 12. Those imperatives form the basis for a steady-state economy which is characterised by zero growth at national and global levels (Daly & Farley, 2004; Rubin, 2012). Zero growth means that only productivity and the quality of products can increase, not the input of resources. This model would allow post-crash economies to avoid wasteful roller-coaster cycles and relapses into overshoot (Brown, 2001). There is ample evidence that this transition would neither necessarily compromise human happiness or the quality of lives, nor would it decrease human security—on the contrary (Rubin, 2012). After all, zero growth has been the default situation throughout most of human history.
Table 21.2 Major risks to watch for each pillar of human security as discussed in this book; relevant chapters are referenced.
PILLAR LEVEL RISK COUNTERMEASURES
Economic Security Global
1. Continuing economic recession
2. Growing economic disparity
3. Resource scarcity (Chapter 3, Chapter 10)
1. Steady state economy; aid and redistribution programmes
2. Cooperative regimes (Chapter 10)
3. Control globalising processes (Chapter 10)
National, community
1. Continuing economic recession
2. Growing economic disparity
3. Resource scarcity (Chapter 3, Chapter 10)
1. Reorient to zero growth
2. Reorient to zero growth
3. Bioregional self sufficiency
Environmental Security Global and most regional
1. Growth of population, environmental impact (Chapter 3)
2. Climate change, pollution, loss of biodiversity; loss of ecosystem services (Chapter 5, Chapter 9)
3. Aggravation of above (Chapter 11, Chapter 12)
1. Family planning, voluntary simplicity movements
2. Efficiency/restrain/adaptation; structural reform; ecological restoration
3. Relocate displaced people (Chapter 7); educational reform (Chapter 11, Chapter 12)
Health Security Global Pandemics and resistant pathogens (Chapter 17) Immunisation, screening, prevention
National, community Aging populations; growing demand and shrinking supply Preventive, low-cost healthcare for all (Chapter 17)
Sociopolitical Security Global
1. Retrenchment from globalisation; ‘Fortress World’ scenario
2. WMD[15] and terrorism (Chapter 7, Chapter 18)
3. Transnational crime (Chapter 13)
1. Maintaining global communication (Chapter 16, Chapter 20)
2. Global inclusive governance and nonviolence (Chapter 16, Chapter 17, Chapter 20)
3. International cooperation (Chapter 6, Chapter 19)
National, community Weakening of central government; fragmentation
1. Ecocommunalism; freedom of and from religion (Chapter 4)
2. Hybrid and local governance (Chapter 8, Chapter 14)
The Future of Health Security
Health security across a population, measured in disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) as discussed in Chapter 5, can only be improved for the long term if current trends are taken into account in healthcare policy. Those trends include the following:
• As reproductive rates decrease, demographic profiles will shift towards older ages; different prevailing kinds of conditions will require a shift towards funding of different treatments.
• Demand for health care will rise as populations continue to grow and gentrify, and as environmental quality declines; as the range of pollutants increases (e.g. endocrine disruptors, carcinogens and mutagens) new disorders are likely to appear.
• Quality, safety, and availability of food will decline as problems with industrialised production methods (spoilage and contamination, toxicity of additives and packaging, rising costs of production, transport and distribution, economic decline) intensify. Organic and local production can help to some extent but preventive health care will need to take the forefront.
• As economies and state budgets shrink, costly high-tech treatments will be in shorter supply. The more affordable ‘ounce of prevention’ will dominate.
• As population densities rise in many regions, and as previously undamaged ecosystems are increasingly invaded and their fauna traded worldwide, epidemics and pandemics become increasingly likely. The 2020 COVID pandemic was probably only the first, and relatively mild, example.
Taking those trends into account will necessitate a greater emphasis on preventive care (particularly immunization and removal of pollutants) and screening programmes as noted in Chapter 17. The latter has gained particular importance as major pathogens become increasingly resistant to antibiotics and emerge newly in globalised, modified environments inhabited by an aging population (Montagnier, 2001; Epstein, 2000). After the meltdown and explosion at the Fukushima nuclear plant on 11 March 2011 public concern was alerted by reports claiming that initially officials underestimated and misrepresented the extent of the danger.[16] The fact that the country responsible (Japan) decided to abandon nuclear power (only to falter again weeks later) while the countries suffering most from the radioactive fallout (US and Canada) have not and their media remain mute on the subject, indicates that a sound assessment of some health risks does not yet prevail throughout the international community when it contravenes the interests of powerful industrial lobbies.
Case Study 21.1
Corporate Irresponsibility and Human Insecurity: The Case of Canadian Asbestos Mining
Perhaps the most grotesque example of corporate influence on health legislation is the story of asbestos mining and export in the Canadian province of Quebec. Over the past century, evidence has accumulated to implicate all types of asbestos in the causation of asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma, and other conditions. The WHO and other international health organisations decry its use, and in Canada it is hardly used anywhere; yet its mining and export continued unabated for decades. Like the tobacco industry before it, the Canadian asbestos mining industry engaged in a prolonged public relations campaign to delay, deny, and distort scientific evidence on the harmfulness of their product, and to divide or discredit researchers involved (Leuprecht, 2011).
The government of Canada not only refused to allow asbestos to be put onto the Rotterdam Convention’s list of hazardous substances, it refused to give any reason either to the Canadian public in whose name it acted, or to the delegates taking part in the Conference of the Parties to the Convention (Soskolne & Ruff, 2012).
The export of asbestos threatened the human security of people in the receiving countries, particularly their rights to life and to health. This shows that threats to health security can arise from the complicity between states and non-state actors such as individuals, groups, and corporations. Finally, a legislative change prohibited all mining, use, manufacture, sale, import and export of asbestos in Canada from 30 January 2019, but exempting military and nuclear facilities as well as the chloralkali industry until 2022. The export market is now left to asbestos producers in Russia and Kazakhstan, and their hapless customers (primarily India).
One of many other case examples involves the pesticide DCBP. Its adverse health effects were proven in 1977 and it was banned from the US domestic market in 1979 while its export continued undiminished. Eventually its manufacturers were forced by a blockade of banana exports to compensate 5,000 Honduran farm workers who had contracted severe reproductive dysfunctions after prolonged exposure. The labour leader who organized the blockade was later assassinated (Bouguerra, 2001).
Corporate social responsibility and the responsibilities of corporations with regard to human rights rank high on the agenda of international institutions, especially the United Nations. As outlined in Chapter 5, non-state actors such as corporations and their leaders, as well as complicit governments, are accountable for human rights violations. Yet neither one are usually brought to justice.
The dubious influence of corporate powers on health security is evident in the industrialised production of foods and food additives. The pernicious side effects of some additives sometimes become apparent only after decades of use, and even then the manufacturer’s lobbying efforts may prevent their removal from the market. [17] Other areas where strong corporate interests influence health security policies include toxic waste processing, nuclear waste deposits, and hazardous chemical industries (see textbox above). Most genetically modified crop cultivars require hugely elevated levels of pesticides and fertilisers which are usually sold by the same companies that sell the seeds.
Time and time again, influential corporate groups with an interest in perpetuating the status quo have spent enormous resources to ensure that information about ecological overshoot, global warming and climate change, regional environmental problems or risks, or particular health hazards is delayed, denied, or distorted, and political opposition divided, bought or discredited (Beder, 2006). Those efforts included the co-opting of media conglomerates and of politicians. Examples include the tobacco industry, nuclear industry, oil companies, and pharmaceutical corporations (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Countries with a ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system (e.g. the US, Canada and the UK) seem particularly susceptible to such covert manipulation, as large numbers of votes are never represented in their parliaments.
Clearly it is not enough for society to leave corporations in positions of enormous power and merely hope that they will exercise corporate social responsibility—whatever that may mean in particular cases. Corporations cannot be expected to shape their policies according to the public good; it is neither their duty nor in their interest. It is rather the duty of societies to makes sure that corporations are not placed in positions where their exercise of normal day-to-day business causes harm. That duty extends also to reversing the privatisation of public services and the underlying prioritisation of market forces, that have become worldwide phenomena wherever the neo-liberal ideology dominates. Even though globalisation may directly result from the ‘worldwide domination of capitalism’ (Desai, 2001), that does not necessarily mould it into the monolithic form of development envisioned by the CDP; rather, the particular shape of globalisation remains subject to the political preferences of societies.
Socio-political Security: The Spectre of Fragmentation
Socio-political security includes the tentative and fragile system of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law as outlined in Chapter 6 and Chapter 18. Opportunities in those areas arise from the trend to make IHL more inclusive and to adapt it to changing conditions of violent conflict. With the help of the lessons from the UN’s questionable decisions in the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo it is to be hoped that a more effective framework can be developed to make global peacekeeping more reliable. Unfortunately, but perhaps inevitably, UN peacekeeping operations have increasingly taken on an enforcer function as a means to maintain and restore security, capacities for which they are ill-equipped and ill-prepared (Sloan, 2011). At the same time, weapons of mass destruction are proliferating and global terrorism shows no sign of abating (World Economic Forum, 2020). A connection between the two trends seems plausible. As in the health care field, preventive measures seem to carry the advantage (Langille, 2015).
As population densities increase and resources decline, new frictions between cultures and states will develop, and many will result in violent conflict (see Chapter 5). An intergovernmental mediation agency of the kind that Franke Wilmer suggested in Chapter 19 would be very helpful to assuage tensions before they build to critical levels. A second level of intervention could be added in the form of a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) (Langille, 2015). The potential benefits go far beyond preventing wars. Terrorism cannot be defeated by counter-terrorism but only by eliminating its root causes, as Anna Hayes argued in Chapter 7. This means that mechanisms for conflict resolution will not only have to become more proactive, they will have to include everyone, most of all those sectors of society from which prospective and potential terrorists are recruited. To ward off the new threat of eco-terrorism this would require allocating more political power to communities as balance against the interests of corporate groups and centralised governments, especially at a time of economic recession. As Hayes asserts, some people become terrorists because they feel ‘alienated by what they perceive to be an unjust and unfair society or political structure’. This danger would become particularly serious if the peacekeeping framework developed towards a ‘Fortress World’ scenario (Raskin, 2016).
The opportunity in socio-political security lies in reaching an effective compromise between excessively forceful approaches and too much laissez-faire causing fragmentation. With the global influence of US policy waning and economies declining, some concern is emerging about a ‘retrenchment from globalisation’, defined by the World Economic Forum (2011, p. 39) as “restrictions to global movements of goods, people and ideas”. Their concerns about possible economic implications seem unjustified considering the possible benefits of eco-communalism; some of the present-day “insane trade” practices (Keller, 2019) cannot be abolished soon enough. [18] The greater danger from such a retrenchment into ‘Fortress World’ affects socio-political security through the spectres of nationalism, tribalism, and xenophobia. Less international cooperation on IHL and ICL could have disastrous consequences for human security, as Chapter 6 and Chapter 18 indicate. A decrease in international cooperation on law enforcement would also allow for transnational crime to expand, with all the associated human security threats explained by Wilson in Chapter 13. He argues that human security cannot be improved in that area without increased cooperation and coordination among countries. As the danger of global fragmentation has not yet been widely recognised, proactive countermeasures at the national level have not entered public discussion. One crucial requirement for the early prevention of intercultural conflict would be guaranteeing freedom of and from religion worldwide as Brown and Gehrmann recommended in Chapter 4; official precautions and provisions for cultural safety would be another (Lautensach & Lautensach, 2015). The dangers of intercultural conflict have increased in recent years with the waves of mass migration into Europe, the US and other countries.
In the introduction we also mentioned that worldwide economic decline and deterioration of infrastructures could seriously destabilise the coherence of large countries. To what extent would that compromise human security? Might the opportunities for regional self-determination not present some benefits? The efforts of many international organisations have been motivated by the tacit assumption that the cohesion of a nation-state is always a good thing. Although ‘balkanisation’, the fragmentation of a federal state along ethno-cultural lines, often leads to bloody civil wars, its forceful prevention can create more harm than good – as the Balkan precedent showed (Pringle, 2012). The forceful attempts by Serbia in 1991 to preserve Yugoslavian integrity caused much suffering without ultimately halting the disintegration. An illustrative counterexample would be the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia in 1992. The recipe for disaster seems to be a multiethnic federal state ruled by a dominant ethnic minority (Chua, 2003; Hale, 2004). Despite the commonly pejorative use of ‘balkanization’ we suggest that the concept bears the opportunity for a peaceful, ordered disintegration but within the context of a vigilant and helpful international community.
What muddles this issue is that norms of human security are often mixed with trite nationalistic ideals and old-style national security, and also with justified concerns about the effects of patriotic fervour (see Chapter 19). When a country peacefully divides into two, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, this does not automatically compromise the human security of the inhabitants – actually, the results of the Czechoslovakian referendum suggested that the majority believed the opposite would ensue. When the breakup went ahead without any violence, the international community commended Prime Minister Václav Havel for his dedication to human security in a situation where other leaders might have let their anachronistic adherence to nationalistic ideals and so-called ‘realist’ values tempt them into reacting oppressively. The extent of political fragmentation distinguishes Raskin’s (2016) two ‘civilised’ scenarios of ‘Eco-Communalism’ and ‘New Sustainability Paradigm’; in the latter, sustainable policies are coordinated and arbitrated by a central global governing body, which many would regard as the preferable scenario. Again, the opportunity lies in finding and implementing the right compromise.
Whether the fragmentation of large countries can somehow be reconciled with the consolidation of a global governing authority will have to await the test of history. The World Economic Forum (2011) considered the failure of global governance to be one of the two central risks to human security (the other one being economic disparity). To be sure, in the absence of adequate global or super-regional security regimes and arbitration authorities the threat of rogue states, cyberconflict, WMDs, transnational crime, nationalism and terrorism will persist, no matter how ecologically sustainable the world may have become. Of particular concern in a politically fragmented world would be the future of human rights, especially for groups that are already disadvantaged such as women. [19] As explained in Chapter 15, human rights depend on civil society, which benefits greatly from networking, international monitoring and enforcement, and communication. A retrenchment from globalisation could spell disaster for many world citizens. These pitfalls of a ‘de-globalisation’ trend are the reason why the latter of the two ‘civilised’ Raskin scenarios is to be preferred from a human security perspective.
Avenues towards such responsible global governance are proposed by Klaus Bosselmann in Chapter 16 and by Katy Gwiazdon in Chapter 20. Those approaches need to surmount several challenges. The first lies in the transition from the presently existing kind of global hegemony exerted by corporate interest groups and subservient governments towards a form of governance that is inclusive, democratic, and sustainable. Secondly, national sovereignty needs to be reigned in—through nothing less than a consensus of sovereign governments! This would include a change from the dominant ethic of ‘realism’ to ‘enlightened self interest’ which would then allow for an empowerment of the UN or some other global governing framework. Morton and Maesel present a convincing argument for this in Chapter 18. Gwiazdon in Chapter 20 emphasises the diversity of levels and modes that can contribute to a compelling consensus towards global governance (which in her sense includes all local levels). Many of those mechanisms for consensus building on supporting human security are still quite ineffective and undeveloped (see Chapter 6); bringing them up to task constitutes an additional challenge.
What If the Law Is Wrong?
In Chapter 13, John Wilson explored how the rule of law can promote human security nationally and internationally, working on the assumption that state authority always has automatic legitimacy. Likewise, Katy Gwiazdon in Chapter 20 emphasises the rule of law in environmental governance. To be sure, many states derive adequate legitimacy through democratic representation in their legislative bodies and reasonably equitable sharing of power. Equally obvious are the exceptions. One kind of exception is the hybrid political order in ‘fragile’ states that Clements discussed in Chapter 8; from a human security perspective, argues Clements, such hybrid orders are as legitimate as the typical Weberian state. Thus, in any country where power relationships are deemed too inequitable or state benefits too weak, local communities and traditional orders can legitimately contribute toward systems of secure governance, but with some modifications to what is commonly considered the rule of law.
A very different kind of exception arises from situations where a state abuses its power or where the law does anything but promote human security. The authors’ male ancestors served in the German armed forces during two world wars under regimes of dubious legitimacy which at times were engaged in crimes against humanity. Under such circumstances it becomes a moral duty for the soldier or citizen to disobey orders, to ignore such laws as seem unjust in one’s own judgment, and to thwart the designs of state authority wherever one deems the risks acceptable. Numerous scenarios popularised in the media involved families giving refuge to Jewish refugees during the holocaust, not only breaking the law of the land but risking their own lives in the process. They did so because they refused to regard Jews as “guilty or beyond hope” or themselves as helpless (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Other examples come from East German border guards defying their shoot-to-kill orders when encountering compatriots fleeing across the Iron Curtain into the West. Surely we can agree that those people acted virtuously defying the absolute authority of an inhumane and brutal state, even if not all of us might have had the stamina to act likewise in their places.
In such unequivocal cases personal moral judgment and possibly a moral consensus among families and communities must override state authority for the sake of human security. But this raises some questions about situations in the moral grey zone where the relative legitimacies of the two opposing positions are less clear, where Clements (in Chapter 8) would note an incompatibility between modern state agenda and customary approaches, but where a decisive moral imperative may not be so easily identified. The situation that US citizens find themselves in under the Trump regime provides a poignant contemporary example.
Before you read on, see Extension Activity 4 and discuss (with yourself at least) what possible criteria could be used to define this ethical boundary.
Clements suggests another reason why reconciliation of such conflicts is important to human security: Countries that succeed in establishing effective hybrid orders of governance tend to be more resilient in emergency situations. The global crisis is bound to present us with plenty of occasions to test this hypothesis. Hybrid modes of governance can also help stabilise the cultural identity of indigenous peoples and address their legitimate claims for political self-determination. The goal of effective hybrid governance lends a new meaning to the concept of sustainable development, far beyond its often overemphasised and questionable economic dimensions. Its significance reaches from international regimes through national governance to the building of secure local communities. One problem area where hybrid governance might be unable to help is the endangerment of environmental security by government inaction on pollution and climate change; civil disobedience is bound to increase in this area.
The Crisis of Governability
The trend, particularly noticeable in North America, of news media and journalism prioritising goals of entertainment rather than public education represents a threat to human security. Even political programmes seem to “provoke more than they inform” (Kupchan, 2012, p. 65). The explosive expansion of social media in recent years added another dimension to that trend. It leaves the public, who is already often woefully undereducated, uninformed about current affairs of significance to their security. At the same time it perpetuates and increases the influence of corporate groups and their agents over public opinion and consumer choices, and it relieves governments of a considerable portion of their accountability obligations (Kaplan, 2007). It raises serious questions about the merits of that sacred principle of democratic liberalism, ‘giving the people what they want.’ Clearly some of the societal outcomes suggest this principle to be unsuitable for the media and entertainment sector, on grounds of human security. [20]
This predicament applies with equal significance to the marketing of consumer goods in general, to food security, to health care, and to governance and the definition of welfare. Welfare is created, firstly, by the satisfaction of needs. It is the objective of marketing to create human wants and then to make people perceive those wants as needs, no matter how tenuous their connections might be to determinants of happiness (Lane, 2000). It seems clear that ‘giving people what they want’ does little towards ‘freedom from want’ or ‘need’ as long as the same companies who do the giving also advise people what to ask for. But to what extent does this concern extend to governance? Recent political developments in the US, the EU, and Japan suggest that those governments that most closely adhere to the democratic ideal of electoral appeasement are encountering severe problems with economic decline, rising poverty and inequity, ideological polarisation and political paralysis (M’Bokolo et al., 2001).
This problem has been recognised in the mainstream literature as the ‘crisis of governability’—a ‘mismatch between the growing demand for good governance and its shrinking supply’ (Kupchan, 2012, p. 62). Good governance can be regarded as a limited resource when one defines it as government giving the people what they demand in terms of basic needs, justice and protection and to perpetuate its ability to do so. A world in overshoot clearly cannot fully meet that need any further, but that argument is not recognised among the adherents of the conventional development paradigm. Instead they focus—with some justification – on the global phenomena of decreasing governing leverage in democracies, lack of international consensus and solidarity, and the inability of democracies to apportion sacrifice. Most interesting are the recommended remedies, as exemplified by Kupchan (2012): better strategic planning of national economic policy, gaining electoral support through populist appeasement and ideological galvanisation, and counteracting widespread tendencies towards protectionism and isolationism. These remedies do not seem to promote democratic ideals; instead they could spell a general transition towards less democratic governance such as plutocracy or state capitalism, perhaps even a benign dictatorship of some form—which brings us to our closing question.
The two essential characteristics of a democratic society are equitable representation and equitable participation. Most societies in the globalised world aspire to those ideals, but how sustainable are they in the social sense? The ‘crisis of governability’ points to this question most poignantly. Yet, if they are not sustainable, what good are they for human security?
These are important questions that concern us all because, as has been suggested throughout this book, many current trends, practices and policies in general render the goal of sustainable flourishing less and less attainable for humanity. Aside from Kupchan’s (2012) analysis described above, a major reason is our persistent collective inattention to overshoot, to the fact that our demands cannot be sustainably met by the source and sink functions of the Earth’s ecosystems. But in this section we focused on social and political sustainability, specifically of forms of governance – and here, too, the emergence of undemocratic or antidemocratic popular movements raises the question how politically sustainable democratic systems will turn out to be in the Anthropocene.
In order to turn this trend around, the authors of this book suggested numerous measures that we summarised in this concluding chapter. It is unclear how much time or latitude remain in order to avert a catastrophic crash that would endanger much of what we value as civilisation. This renders the problem even more important. While much of the challenge of sustainable human security can be described in economic terms (i.e. the allocation of scarce resources), it does include many non-economic issues such as how to evaluate determinants of ecosystem health or how to allocate the right to reproduce in the midst of a population explosion. In this context the question is, to what extent can these issues be solved at the present time through democratic means? (See Extension Activity 5.)
Discussing the limitations of democratic principles is never a comfortable undertaking within the context of Western liberal tradition and its epistemology. Yet we suggest that a genuine effort to ensure human security cannot succeed without questioning the ideological cornerstones that influence human security, and democracy is one of them. Raising those important questions, beyond merely transmitting information, has been among the unifying agendaof this book’s authors. It is our fervent hope that the reader will have developed the habits of raising pertinent questions and of challenging dominant assumptions throughout their future professional endeavours. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/21%3A_Conclusions_Prospects_Futures/21.3%3A_Besides_Environmental_Sustainability%2C_What_Other_A.txt |
Review
Key Points
• Many of the most pressing challenges to human security in its various dimensions arise from the lack of environmental security.
• At the global level, environmental security can only be ensured if humanity manages to extricate itself from the condition of overshoot. Two major challenges arise from this imperative: (1) increasing the equity of environmental impact and (2) halting (and then reversing) population growth as quickly as possible.
• The lack of international consensus and political will, as well as ideological blind spots, render timely success against overshoot unlikely at the global level.
• At the regional, national, and local levels impressive progress in all pillars of human security is evident in some cases; in other cases the lack of progress causes apprehension.
• Opportunities are more numerous and realistic at those levels because the obstacles are more manageable and solutions more feasible. They fall into the four categories of efficiency gains, restraint measures, adaptation and structural flexibility.
• One essential requirement for sustainable human security is that new educational policies and practices lead to a restructuring of the cultural foundations that inform people’s ideas about progress and modernity.
• Some important challenges and opportunities towards human security arise independently of sustainability issues. They include many aspects of health security, political fragmentation and unification, limitations to the rule of law and the crisis of governability in democracies.
.Extension Activities & Further Research
1. Consider a concept map summarising the book. Incorporate as many chapters as possible. Where do you see agreement? Where do you see possible disagreement?
2. In the impoverished island nation of Haiti, 58% of the population lacked access to clean water even before the 2010 earthquake. Determine the number of people that could sustainably live in Haiti, based only on the availability of fresh water. You will need to find data on annual precipitation and the minimum per capita requirement. Compare your finding with the existing population (estimated by the CIA World Factbook at 9,801,664 for July 2012) and propose some major agenda for sustainable development in terms of adaptation, efficiency, restraint, and structural changes. Explain why the import of potable water is not part of those agenda but other technology (of what kind?) might be.
3. On 17 October 2018 the cultivation, possession, acquisition, and consumption of cannabis was legalised in Canada. What would the legalisation of some (or all) recreational drugs do for human security? Would it endanger more users to a greater extent and facilitate their progression to ever harder drugs? On the other hand, could it help eliminate gang violence, assure quality control of the products, allow users to openly access medical care, facilitate taxation of the industry, free up resources for other areas of law enforcement? In your view, to what extent is current drug legislation in your country influenced by considerations of human security?
4. (Refer to Section 21.3.3.) Common examples representing this moral grey zone include someone stealing food because they feel unable to feed their family by other means; soldiers deserting their units because they consider their orders inhumane; a passer-by feeding water to cattle on a parked truck, and trespassing in the process; and demonstrators defending themselves against police brutality. In such situations it does not seem so clear with whom the moral authority rests. But if we concede that at least in some cases both the moral authority and the weight of IHL rests with the individual and not with the state, as in the case of the holocaust examples, then the authority of the state becomes subject to ad hoc confirmation by the individual citizen. Where should we draw the line between what is acceptable and unacceptable?Beginning with the examples mentioned above, create some criteria, discuss them with peers, then compare your ideas with the endnote. [21]
5. The challenges for human security under the present circumstances call for drastic policy changes at all levels. The necessary measures could be enacted by a democratic government or by a benign dictator, but to what extent is each side up to the task? In other words, what we are asking you is the following: Will democracies necessarily lose out in favour of ecologically benign dictatorships – or are they indeed the only form of government that has any hope of surviving in the long run? Or might the answer depend on the scale (global / regional / national / local)?Two opposing viewpoints exist on this question.Their main points are represented in the two text boxes below, in the form of an organised moot debate. We encourage you to compare them and decide which side appeals to you more; we suggest that you do this in teams. You might also wish to consult Chapter 14. Discuss your view with your peers.If you would like to follow a discussion among academics on the future of democracy, read M’Bokolo, Touraine & Walzer (2001).
6. George W. Bush’s first executive order after taking office was to stop all funding for programmes designed to put a break on the explosive population growth in Third World countries. This amounted to cancelling all US development aid, as well as US participation in international aid, that was in any way associated with family planning. This single decision noticeably hindered international efforts to help African women reduce their reproductive rates (which are still among the world’s highest) in subsequent years.Taking into consideration the definition of crimes against humanity given in Chapter 7, discuss the pros and cons of a hypothetical prosecution of G.W. Bush for crimes against humanity.
7. “In My Canada …”Compile a wishlist of developments that you would like to have seen happen in your country, state or province in order to facilitate a Great Transition towards sustainable human security. Our suggested examples, naturally biased, are:
• Our newly elected prime minister would have returned from the Paris COP21 summit with an explicit plan for the phased disappearance of all recreational fossil fuel-driven motor vehicles.
• None of our remaining old growth forests will ever see another chain saw again.
• No billionaires should exist in my country – what little good they contribute to the commons is arbitrary and unaccountable. Taxation should take care of it, won’t it?
• The packaging industries and the recycling industries would have been amalgamated by law shortly after many plastic consumer articles appeared on the market in the 1950s.
8. The two statements below argue in favour of democratic governance and in favour of benign autocracy, respectively. Take issue with their arguments and choose sides, if you feel so inclined. Be prepared to propose further arguments to support your position and/or to refute the alternatives.
Democracy and Human Security: Two Opposing Viewpoints
The much acclaimed spread of democracy around the world is mostly a matter of superficial appearance, much less one of substantial democratisation. In fact, the globalisation of markets and finance hinders democracy everywhere.Democratic states are obliged to facilitate their citizens’ exercise of their rights as individuals and in associations. However, this does not allow effective and timely policy changes as are necessary at this time to ensure a sustainable future. Those new policies will include a new understanding of progress in terms of efficiency, restraint and adaptation, and follow the precautionary principle. In other words, democracies are powerless to prevent the kind of environmental vandalism that is endemic in many countries. Therefore they are doomed. It is the very capacity of democracies to persist ‘at the edge of chaos’ that alone allows for sufficient flexibility in a future characterised by rapid and sudden environmental change. This capacity is thought to arise from a propensity of truly democratic societies to spontaneously reorganise and adapt in response to external challenges. We have seen this confirmed in recent history since the authoritarian regimes in South America were replaced with democratically elected ones. Once that happened, those countries were able to develop; there is no true development without the democratic participation of all groups of society. In other words, only democracies can live up to the challenges ahead that demand a new kind of development and resilience.
In contrast, a benign dictatorship could succeed where democracies failed. A benign dictatorship in this context is one that pursues as its ultimate goal not its own perpetuation but the sustainable well-being (‘acceptable survival’) of humanity in terms of ecological limits (but not in terms of human rights) and the ‘creation of wealth’ as described in Chapter 14. If it helps African countries, why not others? It is a dictatorship insofar as it does not consult with its citizens on whether or how they wish to be governed. But most people prioritise their day-to-day quest for survival and for happiness over issues of government. A democratic government by definition engages in periodic consultation with the citizenry, usually through elected representatives. Even though the mechanisms of consulting may be indirect and include delays, any substantially new policies will thus have to be approved by the electorate sooner or later, either directly or through delegates. This is the central principle of political representation. It makes governmental decisions defensible.
A global market economy in the current undisciplined form is unlikely to allow for such drastic changes in a timely fashion. One reason lies in the counterproductive definition of progress that this system relies on. The free market model may serve humanity much better under a radically reformed world order with equitable distribution of resources. But radical redistribution is unlikely to come about by a democratic consensus unless a majority is moved by the certainty of impending cataclysm, by which time it would be too late. Dictatorships tend to be encumbered by many handicaps. Firstly, any authoritarian system is likely to elicit non-compliance to a greater extent than a system based on consensus. Many of those citizens who disagree with a particular policy, seeing no way to influence it, would be moved towards civil disobedience. The likely outcomes are black markets, an illicit ‘shadow’ economy, widespread apathy, and possibly more deliberate environmental vandalism. People feel disempowered because local authorities do not represent local governance, only an extension of the central authority. In other words, the door towards liberalism remains firmly closed.
This consensus handicap is the main reason why a dictatorial system would be better able to restrain capitalism and to curb individual freedom to the extent necessary to maintain ecosystem health. While democracies can legislate to impose limits and incentives (e.g. render fuel cells economic by taxing alternatives, fix the price of eco-toilet paper, etc.), their dependence on consensus renders them evidently ill-suited to impose unpalatable but necessary reforms on a consumption-drunk public. This includes problematic decisions about non-economic variables in the crisis, such as population growth. A dictatorship could impose a system of parent licensing without it becoming watered down through a parliamentary process. Secondly, in order for the required policies to have their beneficial effect they would have to be enforced and perpetuated globally. That requires an Orwellian degree of complexity, reach and thoroughness unprecedented in dictatorial regimes. Few prospects of the future seem as daunting to the humanist as that of a single global dictatorship leaving no place for the dissident to escape to. The consolation lies in the likely inherent instability of such a system. Dictators tend to claim that dictatorial measures would only be necessary for the brief historical interlude until the citizenry recognise the beneficial outcomes, whereupon they would cease to object and begin to actively support the regime, which in turn would no longer necessitate dictatorship. However, this argument often flouted by communist rulers was never borne out by history. Invariably those dictatorships toppled before they could convince enough of their citizens.
Another handicap of democracies lies in their disposition towards political see-saws. Any radical initiative that does manage to pass through the parliamentary process is likely to elicit opposition from powerful lobby groups who perceive it as threatening their interests, economic or other. Those lobbies might well succeed in getting an opposition party elected into government which would promptly reverse those reforms – the net effect being no political change. That would not happen under a dictatorship. We cannot afford to remain stuck within the confines of the Left – Right continuum and its squabbling. The real strengths of democratic decision making lie at the local and regional levels, where a centralized power would likely err out of ignorance. Therefore a push to decentralise democratic structures may help. The challenge of a democratic regime then becomes the proper coordination of many local initiatives. This is where educational reform could make a crucial difference. The currently dominating value system that prioritises the maximisation of personal property and consumptions is entirely counterproductive. The transition from this value system to one that facilitates sustainability will have to rely on formal and informal education which focuses on values directly.
Thirdly, democracies in their present forms appear ill-suited to meet the challenge because of the almost obligatory short term view of elected decisionmakers focusing on legislative periods. Even if they manage to introduce and enforce benign but radical laws (e.g. on packaging or advertisement) they are frequently obliged to rely on short-term crowd-pleasing measures to survive into the next legislative period. A more ideal democracy where long-term benefits are openly and widely prioritised might do better but we no longer have the time to build it. Dictators, on the other hand, are free to act on the long term view (as illustrated by Lenin’s reforms), and their benignity would dispose them towards that view. A dictatorship is only truly sustainable if the possibility of effective resistance not ever emerges, which means it cannot last forever (keeping in mind Wilmer’s points about conflict resolution in Chapter 19). This leaves us with the likely prospect of a temporary dictatorial regime enacting the necessary changes towards a sustainable future for humanity, whereupon they are promptly overthrown and democracy takes over. Can’t you just see the movie now?
A transition to a benign dictatorship may be easier than is generally believed as in many respects the present systems of governance already resemble more a dictatorship (of corporations) than a democracy. Such a transition can be furthered through the universal influence of electronic media. A sufficiently catastrophic global environmental event might provide the last straw.
List of Terms
See Glossary for full list of terms and definitions.
• akrasia
• Conventional Development Paradigm (CDP)
• crisis of governability
• cultural capital
• kakistocracy
• natural capital
• precautionary principle
Suggested Reading
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Bindé, J. (Ed.). (2001). Keys to the 21st century. UNESCO Publishing; Berghahn Books.[22]
Dobkowski, M. N., & Wallimann, I. (Eds.). (2002). On the edge of scarcity: Environment, resources, population, sustainability, and conflict (2nd ed.). Syracuse University Press.[23]
Heinberg, R, & Lerch, D. (Eds.). (2010). The post carbon reader: Managing the 21st century’s sustainability. Watershed Media.[24]
McKibben, B. (2010). Eaarth: Making a life on a tough new planet. Times Books.[25]
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Raworth, K. (2017). Doughnut economics: Seven ways to think like a 21st century economist. Chelsea Green Publishing.[26]
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Welcome to the Anthropocene. (2012). Welcome to the Anthropocene. http://www.anthropocene.info[27]
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World Wildlife Fund. (2018). Living planet report 2018: Aiming higher (M. Grooten & R. E. A. Almond, Eds.). http://wwf.panda.org/knowledge_hub/a...t_report_2018/
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Footnote
1. In fact, numerous heads of government insist most fervently, at no cost to their reputation, that further economic growth counts among their most important policy goals. The 2020 pandemic showed how much economic de-growth is actually possible within a short time frame.
2. This limit, which represented a doubling of the orginal safe limit recommended by the UN Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, was acknowleged in the Copenhagen Accord. Estimates by UNEP and the University of Oxford’s UK Climate Impacts Programme were 3.5 amd 4 °C, respectively. These thresholds are placed where scientists suspect critical ‘tipping points’—such as the entire Western Antarctic Ice Shelf sliding into the sea within a matter of months or weeks. There is a further concern based on a phenomenon called global dimming: During the three days following the 9/11 attack, when all US passenger flights were grounded, the levels of particulate pollution in the atmosphere dropped dramatically, and temperatures increased by 1°C (because more sunlight reached the surface) in addition to the 1°C by which we have already exceeded the preindustrial level (BBC 2005). This could spell a disastrous extent of further warming when the particulate level drops for any reason in the future, e.g. from emission reductions. This is the programme transcript.
3. Those scenarios correspond to the ‘Eco-communalism’ and ‘New Sustainability Paradigm’ scenarios described by Raskin (2016), as discussed in Chapter 1.
4. Narrow definitions of poverty contribute to the inefficiency of this ‘fight’ against poverty. A common definition is earning less than the equivalent of two US dollars a day, and for ‘absolute poverty’ less than one dollar (Bindé & Matsuura, 2001, p. 359). Readers of Hawkins’ Chapter 11 will not miss the irony in the image of a starving person being handed two small pieces of green paper.
5. A typical definition of food security is “permanent access by all to the foodstuffs necessary for a healthy and active life” (Collomb, 2001). This rightly excludes the kinds of malnutrition that predominate in overdeveloped countries. However, it only hints at the necessary quality of a person’s diet, the lack of which does not lead to starvation but to ill health from malnutrition. The proposed EAT-Lancet diet would be healthier but it remains neither universally affordable nor sustainable (Hirvonen et al., 2020).
6. See the summary and read the data published in O’Neill et al. (2018). The authors point to the challenge that countries performing well with respect to the environmental boundaries tend to under-perform in the sociopolitical and cultural areas, and vice versa. The same conundrum is causing some of the SDGs to clash with others.
7. The unit is global hectares (gha). It is useful to distinguish between two kinds of equity in this context. One is the average per capita footprint in 2008 (2.7 gha); when multiplied by the total 2008 population, it gives the equivalent of 1.5 Earths and thus represents our overshoot in 2008. The other is the average sustainable per capita footprint; its estimates vary about an order of magnitude, around a median of about 3.6 gha (WWF, 2018; Ehrlich et al., 1995). That is the minimum amount of biocapacity that needs to be allocated sustainably to every living person in order for them to survive under acceptable conditions. The Earth’s biocapacity can sustain this for only about 3 billion people.
8. At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo the goal of fertility reduction was dismissed in favour of women’s empowerment. Instrumental in this outcome were the international women’s movement, the US government, and the Holy See (McIntosh & Finkle, 1995). A reference to reproductive rights was deleted from the Rio+20 report.
9. In the US alone, between one and two thousand untreated ‘superfund’ sites of toxic waste deposits are leaking pollutants into the water table with catastrophic consequences for local cancer incidence. In some island states such as New Zealand, water pollution is now considered a primary security threat.
10. Some publications still measure a country’s ‘development’ by its number of millionaires, simultaneously ignoring the problems of socioeconomic inequity, capital flight, local resource scarcity, and global overshoot, as well as moral objections to the implication that the exorbitance of a tiny elite somehow renders tolerable the squalor among the rest. The trends towards increasing inequity refute all claims about economic ‘trickle-down’ effects.
11. Widespread denial of moral responsibility is commonly evident in post-genocide situations, e.g. post-WWII Germany (Jaspers, 2001). In many cases of heroic altruism, the acceptance of moral responsibility made the crucial difference (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).
12. The hidden curriculum includes knowledge, beliefs and ideals that are not explicitly addressed or referred to in formal teaching at educational institutions but that students do learn about through informal and implicit channels such as peer interactions during schooling. It represents a powerful driver for the cultural reproduction of dominant patterns of thought and behaviour. The null curriculum consists of themes that are officially taboo or traditionally ignored (e.g. the ethics of reproductive behaviour).
13. For example, one particular concept that needs to be deconstructed and abandoned is the concept of the environmentalist. It has polarised communities and societies into pro-nature and pro-economy camps, left versus right, conservation versus ‘progress’, and other anachronistic dichotomies that seem quite counterproductive (Scharmer, 2019). It has also provided some influential groups with tools for ‘brownlash’ propaganda (Beder, 2006). Such demonization and dividing the field into ‘us and them’ hinders progress in negotiations and results in stalemates (Haidt, 2012). In truth, anyone who cares for their own long-term welfare, if not the welfare of their family, cannot help but care for the integrity of the requisite ecological support structures. James Lovelock (1995) called this attitude ‘enlightened self interest’. There is no reason for anyone to refer to such a person as an environmentalist, for what should we call the other people – suicidal sociopaths? “We are all environmentalists now.” (Jones, 1993, p. 55)
14. For instance, economic risks received generally high impact ratings while environmental risks were considered to generally have a low impact. The report does not mention overshoot or imply that it was taken into account.
15. weapons of mass destruction
16. See Onishi, N. & M. Fackler. 2011. Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril. New York Times (Asia Pacific), 9 August, A1.
17. For example, the artificial sweeteners aspartmae (a.k.a. Nutrasweet, Equal, Neotame, AminoSweet) and sucralose (Splenda) have been in use since 1981 and 1999, respectively, despite increasing evidence of severe health effects. Aspartame is used by 100 million people worldwide and is present in 5000 products in the US alone. Alleged effects include certain cancers and the mimicking of lupus and multiple sclerosis (Aspartame Consumer Safety Network http://www.aspartamesafety.com/). At the time of writing, the herbicide glyphosate (‘Roundup’) has attracted much public attention for similar reasons.
18. Under the category of “Insane Trade” Keller (2019) describes practices such as countries simultaneous exporting and importing the same article, or re-importing goods that they previously exported. The associated waste of energy, packaging, emissions, and the destabilising of local climate-resilient agriculture are significant.
19. A 2012 Gallup poll identified the ten countries with the biggest gap between genders in terms of how personally secure individuals feel when going out in their own communities at night. They are, in increasing order, Finland, France, USA, Australia, Albania, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Algeria and New Zealand. What is striking about this list is that it includes some very affluent societies, with very high personal security ratings, but also with high incidences of violence against women. We can conclude that the causes for women’s insecurity are cultural and not socioeconomic, and that international monitoring and ‘shaming’ in a globalised world might do some good, as such societies tend to care about their international status. http://247wallst.com/2012/07/10/countries-where-women-do-not-feel-safe/ (8 Sept 2019)
20. Witness this famous quote on succesful moviemaking by Samuel Goldwyn: “If you want to send a message, send a telegram!” Of particular concern to the human security of millions at one time were the numerous incidences of casual US media commentaries about the ‘impending strike on Iran’; equally unsettling to us is the paucity of protests against such blatant warmongering.
21. Here are some suggested criteria in the form of critical questions that one could ask about a person’s proposed course of action: To what extent could disobeying the law serve the person’s own interests? Are those interests legitimate and strong enough to justify the proposed act of civil disobedience? To what extent could obeying the law result in unjustifiable harm to oneself or to others (human or non-human)? How reliably could such potential ‘harm’ be assessed? To what extent can the disobedience be excused on religious or conscientious grounds?
22. Although most of its authors are thoroughly ensconced in the CDP, the scope and depth of this book and the range of high-profile contributors is impressive.
23. This book, as well as its predecessor, The Coming Age of Scarcity, hardly dates; it is what the UN should have heeded two decades ago.
24. Contains sections on sustainability, climate, water, biodiversity, food, population, culture & behaviour, energy, economy, cities, transportation, waste, health, education, resilience, action plans.
25. His analysis is proving right.
26. All of human security in the form of a single ingenious diagram.
27. This is an excellent educational resource with authoritative academic credentials. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Human_Security_in_World_Affairs_-_Problems_and_Opportunities_2e_(Lautensach_and_Lautensach)/21%3A_Conclusions_Prospects_Futures/21.4%3A_Resources_and_References.txt |
Welcome to the Study of California Politics
Politics is important because it addresses two fundamental questions that every group must address: what should be done and who should decide. It can be very confusing, but underlying the daily barrage of news, rhetoric, and name-calling, there is an underlying logic to the subject. This book concisely explains California politics and shows you how to participate.
California politics involves three major dimensions. It is first a matter of values, selecting the principles that we believe are important. Second, it is a matter of constitutional engineering; to create and continue to improve upon a government system that can promote our values. Third, it is a matter of policy; the actions of the government should put our principles into practice. Naturally, there are both agreements and disagreements regarding each of these dimensions.
Studying politics is not only valuable to better understand California, but it is also helpful to understand ourselves. What political values matter most to us? What ideology should we adopt? What are our points of view about how California is governed? What policies do we favor? This book is an academic work as well as a primer about how to be political. It thoroughly explains the concepts, theories, and methods of political science used to study California politics. Each chapter includes questions that ask you to consider your own opinions and engage in further inquiry.
In this chapter, let’s discuss these central questions of politics. First, we will introduce how political values and ideology shape our viewpoints. Then we will introduce some of the major debates among political scientists that animate the study of many different aspects of California politics. Last, we will introduce systems theory as a way to organize our study.
1.02: Political Values
What matters in life? What are the keys to happiness? At the individual level, we may value good character, ambitions achieved, pleasures enjoyed, a life full of family and friends, and perhaps faith and virtue. However, politics is about the collective striving for values; approximately forty million Californians decide explicitly, informally, or absent-mindedly, what is essential, what matters more, and what matters less. Thus, let us begin by asking what principles matter most to us?
In our everyday lives, we may not be aware of the principles that motivate us. However, we may observe people; for example, watching how they treat others or how they spend their money. Then we can infer principles. This person spends her day caring for her mother; showing that the love of family matters. Another spends hours perfecting an athletic skill, seeking physical excellence. A third is always shopping, loving to accumulate material possessions. Similarly, at the political level, we may observe the actions of forty million Californians and infer what matters to us as a state.
Naturally, there are so many political phenomena to observe and analyze. Often, we may infer that multiple values are present. In general, three are most evident: liberty, equality, and order. There are various definitions of each of these values, and any particular political issue may not involve all three. Let us consider each of them and then apply them to current policy debates.
Liberty, or freedom, is commonly defined in two ways. The first is negative liberty: freedom from interference, especially government interference. This version is rooted in the philosophy of John Locke and some other social contract philosophers. The individual possesses autonomy and should be free to make their own decisions unless they interfere with the freedom of others. The second is positive liberty, which is found in the writings of philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx: when individuals find greater freedom by doing that which is good as defined by a collective philosophy. For example, a religion may prohibit certain behaviors to help the individual free themselves from moral failings.
A law may take away negative liberty and add positive liberty. In 1986, California began requiring everyone to wear seatbelts in automobiles. This law takes away negative liberty by telling us what to do but gives us positive liberty by making it more likely that we will survive an accident to enjoy the liberty of another day.
A second crucial political value is equality, which also may be defined in multiple ways. Drawing on the ideas of John Locke and others, the notion of intrinsic equality argues that every person, being human, is equal and hence has equal rights. For example, although there are dramatic differences in achievement among us, each person casts a single vote at the polling place. After this fundamental premise, we can distinguish between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. The first advocates a “level playing field” with no discrimination based on personal attributes such as race, ethnicity, and gender. For example, federal and state laws prohibit employment discrimination. The second, equality of outcome, favors everyone receiving the same result or condition. For example, everyone is assigned a desk in a classroom; or perhaps in the future, everyone receives health care.
A third value is order. Our moral judgments evaluate the legitimacy of public policies. There are many examples of the value of order. Belief in a particular economic ideology such as capitalism or socialism informs our opinions about economic policies such as the minimum wage, tax rates, or welfare. Our religious beliefs may cause us to object to public policies upholding certain personal freedoms. Many people perceive obeying the law as good in itself. On the other hand, when Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights protestors engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience, their sense of order led them to violate civil law to promote a higher law.
When considering an issue, values may harmonize or conflict. For example, equality of opportunity and negative liberty enhance each other. Let everyone pursue their dreams without government interference. On the other hand, equality of outcome is likely to clash with negative liberty because providing equal provisions of goods and services will require higher taxes and more regulations. The classic tradeoff is between negative liberty and order. We want to do what we wish, but this may clash with existing laws. For example, homeless people may seek temporary shelter by camping in parks and other places where this is prohibited. The case study below illustrates this conflict in values.
For Your Consideration
Driving the Homeless out of Echo Park
A few miles north of downtown Los Angeles lies Echo Park Lake, a reservoir with a mile-long path around it surrounded by grass and trees. It is a place for nearby residents to play ball, have picnics, rent swan-shaped paddle boats, or simply walk. However, as the homelessness crisis worsened in Los Angeles County, the park began to fill with tents and other makeshift shelters, with approximately 200 people crowding out the usual park visitors. The City of Los Angeles did not enforce the “no camping” regulations.
With sanitary conditions declining and reported crimes increasing, the residents in the surrounding neighborhood of Echo Park complained, arguing that they could no longer safely use the park. In late March 2020, city workers from several agencies notified everyone making the park their home that they would have to leave. They were offered shelter at hotels paid for by the city. Ultimately, the police had to forcefully evict those that remained, sparking street protests by homeless advocates. By May, the park was fenced off, renovated, and reopened with the resolution that the city would enforce the “no camping” regulation.
Considering this case study, what political values are evident? The first question that emerges is how, as a society, do we provide for housing? Is this addressed through the free market, that is, people are responsible for themselves, buying or renting? Is this addressed through public housing with units provided by the government? Is there a middle ground under which the government subsidizes rents? All three types of economic order are undoubtedly present in the state; the question is, what balance among the three do we prefer? As the price of housing increases in California with the stock of public and subsidized housing in short supply, advocates for the homeless in Echo Park argue that residing in the park is a reasonable short-term solution to help address the housing crisis.
Second, the Echo Park camp raises questions of liberty: should people have the freedom to camp where they please? If homeless people are free to camp in the park, does that infringe upon other people’s liberty, namely local residents, to use the park for recreation? If so, whose liberty matters more? This is also a matter of equality: do the homeless have as much right to be in the park as local residents? And, drawing upon the concept of positive liberty, perhaps the homeless are best treated by providing them with homes, even if they prefer not to leave the park.
What do you believe? If you were on the Los Angeles City Council, would you favor removing the homeless people from the park? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/01%3A_Introduction/1.01%3A_Welcome_to_the_Study_of_California_Politics.txt |
Return to the first big political question that every society must ask: What should be done? Political values address this question. How much liberty do you wish? How much equality? How much order? Some people consistently favor one value more than another, and others try to find a middle ground. For example, with issues regarding negative liberty, you may find yourself consistently favoring non-interference by the government or you may be concerned with rising poverty and want more government interference across a range of social issues. Perhaps in some areas of policy, you want much more government interference, and in others, you want people to be left alone. As you consider the variety of your political opinions, a certain consistency in your thinking is likely to emerge. This is your political ideology.
To characterize your political ideology, ask yourself, “What role do you want the government to have in society?” Although there are many kinds of policies, we can identify your political ideology if we select two significant areas: social policy and economic policy. Examples of social issues include abortion and same-sex marriage. Examples of economic issues include taxation, the budget, and environmental regulation. The liberal believes in more government intervention in the economy, including more taxing and spending, but wants less government intervention in social affairs such as abortion. The conservative is the opposite, wanting less government intervention in the economy, with lower taxes and less government spending, but is willing to have the government intervene to regulate personal behavior such as abortion regulation. Libertarians want more freedom in all areas; socialists are the exact opposite, wanting consistent government control. In the middle are the moderates, who seek to balance liberal and conservative ideologies. Of course, you can be more moderate or extreme within each quadrant of the figure below:
Once you have determined your political ideology, it is a small step to identify the political party you would prefer. Today, just about all liberals join the Democratic Party, and just about all conservatives join the Republican Party. There is a small Libertarian Party, but there is no explicitly socialist party on our ballot. However, the Peace and Freedom Party and the Green Party have some positions that are socialist.
The evolution of parties in this state will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. Before the 1980s, party and ideology were less closely connected; there were many conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans. As the country has become more polarized, such people are less common.
If you register to vote (see “For Further Inquiry” below), you may choose to define yourself as a member of a political party or select “no party preference.” California has a top-two primary system where all candidates are on everyone’s ballots and the top two winners (regardless of party affiliation) go on from the primary (usually in June) to the general election (November). The one exception is with the U.S. presidential race, in which one or more of the parties may require you to be registered as a member to vote in their presidential primary (for example, the California Republican Party limits primary voters to registered Republicans). Thus, because you likely care about the U.S. presidential race, it still makes sense to register for a party.
Now that you have a better idea of who you are politically, compare yourself to other Californians. According to a May 2022 poll (Baldassare) about 35% of Californians call themselves liberal, 29% moderate, and 33% percent conservative. Approximately 48% of likely voters said they registered as Democrats, 24% as Republicans, 21% as independents, and 7% with a minor party, including the American Independent Party, the Green Party, the Libertarian Party, and the Peace and Freedom Party. More about these parties in a later chapter! | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/01%3A_Introduction/1.03%3A_From_Political_Values_to_Political_Ideologies_and_Parties.txt |
Let us go from debating about what should be done—which is addressed by our political values, ideologies, and parties—to considering who should decide what should be done. Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher, categorized governments in terms of whether the one, the few, or the many governed. He then considered the virtues and vices of each form and argued that the ideal system is a mixture of all three. Modern political philosophers, such as Karl Marx, argued that we should also examine the underlying power dynamics that sustain a formal constitutional structure and ask, “Who really rules?”
The central historical controversy regarding the formal rules and organization of California government is about the balance between representative and direct democracy. Under representative government, the people elect leaders to the state legislature and executive branch who make laws for them. Under direct democracy, the people seize much of this power through the processes of the initiative, referendum, and recall. To what extent do we trust representatives in comparison to our fellow citizens to make wise public policies?
The framers of the U.S. Constitution, such as James Madison, believed representatives to be wiser, worrying that the people were often ignorant and emotional. The Progressives in California, who amended the California Constitution in 1911 to allow for more direct democracy, decried representatives as corrupt, arguing that they were the puppets of special interests such as the Southern Pacific Railroad and the oil companies. They believed that a growing educated urban middle class could exercise a wise check on Sacramento politicians (see Chapter 2).
The second debate among political scientists is the question of who really rules. Yes, we have competitive elections that are fairly administered. Yes, we have three branches of government that can check and balance one another as well as reasonably strong constitutional protections of our civil rights and civil liberties. While just about everyone acknowledged the need for reform in many areas, there are dramatically different perspectives on the power structure behind the constitutional system of representative and direct democracy.
There are three schools of thought. These schools of thought are more like arguments or perspectives rather than theories. The traditional approach is majoritarianism; government is “by the people.” Leaders are accountable to voters in elections. Most people can and do vote in competitive elections among parties or candidates with diverse points of view. Civil liberties and civil rights may not be perfect, but they provide enough protections for us to characterize California as ruled by the people.
The second approach is called pluralism. Pluralists believe that while the people still have a say, it is primarily organized interests that run California. These organized interests include labor unions, large businesses, and influential citizen groups. They propel candidates into office and their support is crucial for bills to survive the legislative process. Groups mobilize their members and persuade the electorate to support their positions.
The third argument is more cynical; it is called elitism, the idea that government is simply the reflection of the will of wealthy people in society. A political class has concentrated power in society and manipulates the electorate to stay in power. The rules of the game are “rigged,” for example, drawing legislative districts to ensure that politicians are reelected. The expense of campaigns keeps poor people out of the political process. The constitutional system is simply a way to co-opt the people so that they do not revolt.
Political scientists argue about who really rules: the majority, the special interest groups, or the elite. As we study each aspect of California government, we will marshal evidence for each position, and you can decide for yourself. As participants in the political system, the question is an important one: why bother voting if the elite are the ones actually in charge? Is it better to join an interest group to make a difference? Perhaps, the elite may sometimes make better decisions than the people who may become an unthinking mob.
1.05: Organizing the Study of California Politics
So far in this chapter, we have examined political values and how they shape political ideologies and party positions. Then, we introduced debates about who should decide policy, considering direct and representative democracy and their underlying structures of power. As we study politics, there are so many phenomena that we observe that it is helpful to organize our study of politics still further.
Political scientists use systems theory as a better way to organize their inquiries. Systems theory simply conceptualizes a subject of study as including three parts: inputs, an exchange mechanism, and outputs. Many areas of life are systems, such as functions of the human body, the ecology of a lake, or the sale of cheeseburgers at a local restaurant. Politics, too, is a system composed of the people, policymaking institutions, and policies. Linkage institutions, such as voting, parties, interest groups, and campaigns connect the people (as represented by political culture, beliefs, and ideologies) to policymaking institutions that include the legislative, executive, and judicial branches that make laws that impact us. See the diagram below.
Using systems theory, we can study how political phenomena interact, how the parts of the system create the whole and how the whole system impacts the parts. For example, whether we vote is based on the confidence we have in our own abilities to understand politics and on our confidence that our votes make a meaningful difference. Political parties organize our thoughts, organize elections, and organize legislative politics. Effective leaders both follow and lead public opinion.
This text is organized according to systems theory. First, we will study the rules that organize the system: the California Constitution and federalism. The California Constitution organizes the relations among people, policymaking institutions, and policies. Federalism, established by the US Constitution and national law, situates California politics within the larger American context. Key court cases and laws about civil liberties and civil rights will also be discussed. Second, we will study the ways that we actively involve ourselves in politics, developing our public opinion, voting, and joining interest groups and political parties. Third, we will examine policymaking institutions and focus on how to address current issues and challenges facing our state.
I welcome you to our study of California politics.
1.06: Works Cited
Almond, Gabriel A. “Comparative Political Systems.” The Journal of Politics, vol. 18, no. 3, 1956, pp. 391-409, doi:10.2307/2127255.
Baldassare, Mark et al., “PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government.” Public Policy Institute of California, Public Policy Institute of California, 26 May 2022, www.ppic.org/publication/ppic-statewide-survey-californians-and-their-government-may-2022/.
Lasswell, Harold D. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How: With Postscript. World, 1963.
Scott, Anna. “Homelessness In Los Angeles County Rises Sharply.” NPR, NPR, 12 June 2020, www.npr.org/2020/06/12/875888864/homelessness-in-los-angeles-county-rises-sharply. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/01%3A_Introduction/1.04%3A_Debating_Who_Governs.txt |
Introduction
Novelist William Faulkner wrote, “The past is not dead. It’s not even past.” The choices that we make today are framed and constrained by the past. Just as we better understand ourselves by learning about family history, we better understand California politics by studying its history. Let us focus on California’s constitutional development in this chapter.
A constitution is an act of political creation. People join together in a social contract to create a political community. A constitution establishes the organization of government, its powers, and the rights and responsibilities of the people. It provides the foundational answers to such questions as who should rule and what political values should be promoted. Using the standards for democracy asserted by Abraham Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address in 1863, do we actually have a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people?” Or do we invite some, but not all, to the political table? Our study of California constitutional development examines how the Constitutions of 1849 and 1879, and the Progressive reforms following the 1910 elections, shape our institutions and policies.
The timeline below shows the critical shifts in California’s constitutional development in the modern era, beginning with thousands of years of Native American history followed by the comparatively brief Spanish and Mexican periods. The origins of today’s political system start with the state of California’s first constitution, the Constitution of 1849. This Constitution created California as a distinct political community within the United States. Thirty years later, discontent with political corruption and anti-Chinese prejudice led to the Constitution of 1879, our current governing law. Then a generation later, further dissatisfaction with corruption led to the Progressive reforms of 1911, adding direct democracy to our representative system. These three constitutional developments shape California’s government and politics. Let us examine each one.
2.2.01: The Impact of the Constitution of 1849 on N
"All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." (Article 1 of the California Constitution)
It was 1849. The Mexican War has ended, and American troops occupied California. Most people believed that the state would join the United States. The military governed California as temporary administrators using existing California laws originating from Mexico. General Bennett Riley, the military governor, called for a constitutional convention to meet in Monterey on September 1 (Saunders 450).
At Colton Hall, forty-eight delegates debated a constitution that the California people would then ratify. Most delegates had arrived in California very recently, and only eight were Latino. Delegates wanted to write a constitution based on American law by following the example of other U.S. states. Any vestige of Mexican law would be an exception.
They began the California Constitution with a Declaration of Rights that closely followed the US Bill of Rights and the declarations of rights of other state constitutions to protect civil liberties. Slavery was not allowed. There was little conflict about this. Abolitionist sentiment in California was high, and the Convention was dominated by miners who did not want to compete with southerners bringing enslaved people to the goldfields (Broussard).
The second Article of the Constitution discussed voting rights. There was agreement that all white males, Americans and Californios (Mexicans that remained in California), should have the right to vote. Californio delegates wanted to follow Mexican customs and allow Native Americans the right to vote. However, the majority rejected this motion, and so it was referred to the future state legislature, where it failed.
The following articles established a government of three branches—legislative, executive, and judicial—emulating other state governments. As in many other states, the governor and other executive officers are elected directly by the people. Additional articles mandated the creation of local school systems, reduced the size of California dramatically by fixing the eastern border of California near the Sierra Nevada Mountains instead of in present-day Utah, and created local elections for tax assessors. The delegates debated and agreed to retain the Mexican civil law of allowing women to retain sole ownership of property acquired before or during the marriage.
On October 12, 1849, the delegates signed the Constitution. California voters ratified it on November 13, 1849, albeit with a low turnout, 12,061 in favor, and 811 opposed (Saunders). The US Congress accepted California into the union on September 9, 1850. The Declaration of Rights and the organization of the government into three branches remain the foundation for California government today.
Let us go beyond the organization of government established by the Constitution of 1849 and examine how the Constitution impacted Californians. Many prospered, but by the 1870s, economic turmoil led to calls for a new Constitution. Moreover, this era was marked by racial prejudices against Native Americans, African Americans, and Chinese Americans.
2.02: The Constitution of 1849
The population of California dramatically increased after 1849. At the end of the Mexican War, there were about 150,000 Native Americans and 12,000 non-Native Americans with a majority of the latter, Californios ranching and farming what was once considered a distant and quiet province of Mexico. After admittance to the US, the US census records the following:
Table \(1\): Population Growth in California
Census Year
Population of California
1850
92,597
1860
379,994
1870
560,247
1880
864,694
Source: US Census
During this time, Native American tribes suffered steep declines in populations through murder, starvation, disease, and displacement. By 1870, only about 30,000 survived (Madley 659). Essentially, as the non-Native population increased by 600%, the Native American population decreased by 80%. Coercive labor practices often exploited California Indians.
We are accustomed to thinking in terms of freedom and slavery, free states, and slave states. California is a free state, according to the Compromise of 1850. The reality of labor relations is historically quite a bit more nuanced. The variety of legal and informal ways that California coerced Native Americans shows that forms of forced labor and indentured servitude that resemble formal slavery were still very much present during this period.
Historically, the Spanish and then Mexican law forced many Native Americans to work as agricultural labor, often using a “debt peonage” system; they had no choice but to work to pay what they owed to the rancheros (Madley). The US military governors continued Mexican practices while awaiting constitutional change. Rancheros could hold Native Americans as labor unless they chose to release them to another employer: “All Indians must be required to obtain employment and not permitted to wander about an idle and dissolute manner, if found so doing, they will be liable to arrest and punishment, by labor on the Public Works, at the discretion of the Magistrate” (Madley 633).
White militias supplied more agricultural labor by attacking Native American villages and pressing prisoners into servitude. Authorities usually turned a blind eye to the atrocities of kidnappers and killers. The murder of parents to sell their children into slavery was commonly reported in the early 1860s.
In 1847, California instituted a statewide pass system for employed Native Americans. Those who objected, such as the United States Indian Affairs Commissioner Edward Beale, could do little without support from local authorities. Every Native American had to show a certificate regarding who was employing him, and an unemployed Native American needed to acquire a passport. The New York Herald recounted a correspondent sent to report on the gold rush in 1848 describing an Ohlone Indian “...kept in a kind of slavery and bondage by the rancheros, and often flogged and punished. Their {sic} performing all the drudgery and heavy labor, leaves but little demand for laborers of white complexion” (Madley 638).
Upon statehood, the California legislature denied Native American the right to vote and legalized Native American convict labor. When convicted of minor crimes such as vagrancy, Native Americans would be forced into the service of a white employer. Impressment was usually around harvest time. “Los Angeles had its slave mart,” attorney Horace Bell wrote. A Native American could not testify against a white man if he questioned his servitude.
In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution banned slavery and indentured servitude. When Governor Henry Haight persuaded the legislator in 1867 to allow Native Americans to testify in court, they could now testify against kidnappers giving them more protection from forced servitude. California did not formally abolish convict leasing until 1937 (Madley 661).
In 1850, the US government negotiated eighteen treaties in which Native Americans relinquished claims to land in exchange for 8.5 million acres of reservation land. The California legislature attacked the treaties as taking good land from whites, and they were defeated in the US Senate in 1852. Although much smaller reservations were set aside by the federal government over the next several decades, they were far too small to sustain large numbers of people. In summary, one of the foundational acts of this state was Native American genocide (McWilliams 53).
For Your Consideration
History is both a record of what happened in the past and a subjective understanding of our heritage, a story we tell ourselves about who we are and how we came to arrive at the present. Much of history-telling is very explicitly told to students from a very young age. There is also the history taught to the public in the form of government memorialization. We explicitly, or implicitly, ennoble, ignore, or villainize historical figures with the names of our streets, schools, and public buildings, the monuments we commission, with state and local holidays, and with parades, festivities, and commemorations.
Since the beginning of the modern-day civil rights movements of the 1960s, there has been a greater effort to teach honest history. Our textbooks are much more inclusive than they were in earlier periods. However, public history has often lagged behind these efforts. In the last few years, monuments to historical figures that elicited widespread admiration, such as to Father Junipero Serra, are now more controversial as the actions of the people that they memorialize are being questioned for their ethics (See, for example, this analysis of Father Serra.)
With regard to Father Serra, he is, on the one hand, a Catholic saint; on the other hand, as the one who is most often credited with spreading Catholicism in eighteenth-century Spanish California with the mission system, he is criticized for helping to conquer, enslave, and decimate Native American tribes up and down the coast of California. There are monuments to Father Serra in many places in California. If you were on a city council, and residents came to you asking for his monument to be removed, what would you do? How would you decide? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/02%3A_California_Constitutional_Development/2.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
How were African Americans treated during this time? One might think that California would not have the racism of other states. After all, the first Spaniards to settle in Los Angeles in 1769 had mixed , Native American, and Spanish heritage (Moss 222). The 1849 Convention banned slavery (Grodin et al. 12). Moreover, as part of the Compromise of 1850, California entered the Union as a free state. It might follow that African Americans would enjoy economic opportunities and liberties promised “to all men” by the Declaration of Rights in the 1849 California Constitution. Sadly, this was not the case.
First, the Convention of 1849 is better characterized as anti-slavery and anti-African American. Miners were worried that African Americans brought here by their owners either as slaves or as contract labor would be used to work gold claims and thereby push out white miners. Thus, the Convention debated a motion to ban all African American immigration but then thought better of it because this might impede joining the Union (Grodin et al.12).
Second, part of the Compromise of 1850 that brought California into the Union included the Fugitive Slave Act. States were obligated to find and enslave African Americans who have escaped from southern states. The California government even passed its own Fugitive Slave Act in 1852. The first governor, Peter Burnett, preferred that all Black people were simply removed from California (Wee). Nevertheless, enslaved people sued for their freedom in California courts. One of the most famous cases was that of Biddy Mason, brought to California by Mormon settlers. When they wanted to return to Texas, Mason fled and then persuaded a state court to free her in 1856. She went on to work as a midwife in Los Angeles, and as she invested in real estate, she became quite wealthy. Mason helped establish the First African Methodist Episcopal Church of Los Angeles in 1872 (“Bridget ‘Biddy’ Mason”).
Third, African Americans did not have the same rights as whites. Suffrage was reserved for white men. Like Native American and Chinese Americans, they could not testify in court if the case involved white defendants or plaintiffs. Four “Conventions of Colored Citizens” (1855, 1856, 1857, and 1865) met to consider African American rights and petitioned the state government to overturn discriminatory laws. In 1863, with Republicans controlling the state government, African Americans won the right to testify.
However, when Democrats were in control of the statehouse and the Courts, African American rights languished. The Sacramento legislature rejected the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified in 1868 nationally) and the Fifteenth Amendment (1870). State courts ruled that school segregation was constitutional (Ward v. Flood, 1874), as well as segregated public accommodations such as streetcars. No laws protected African Americans from employment and housing discrimination. In short, for the relatively small population of African Americans in California (4,000 in 1860), the Constitution of 1849 was a set of rights for white men, with only some piecemeal civil rights improvements during this period.
2.2.03: The Impact of the Constitution of 1849 on C
How shall the immigrant be treated? More specifically, how should the non-citizen be treated under the law? Suppose a nation professes to establish that people possess natural rights. Are these rights extended to the immigrant that it invites to labor in its fields, dig in its mines, and lay track across the mountains for the transcontinental railroad? The delegates at the 1849 Convention pondered this question when confronted with whether to adopt the following amendment:
“No member of this State shall be disenfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or
privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.
Mr. Botts moved to strike out the word “member” and insert “citizen...
...Mr. Norton suggested the word “inhabitant….
Mr. Hastings: ...Whether it is designed or not, the adoption of this section of the bill of rights would secure to certain classes, Indians and Africans (if Africans are ever introduced here,) precisely the same rights that we ourselves enjoy…The word “inhabitant” would not be proper. Indians are inhabitants, but they do not enjoy those privileges in any portion of the United States; they are disenfranchised.
…Mr. Botts withdrew his amendment” (Report of the Debates of the Convention of California 35-36)
This exchange shows the intent of the majority of the delegates. The Convention defined the scope of equality, democratic participation, and natural rights as only applying to those groups in California considered citizens, leaving the Native American, Black, and Chinese residents with few legal protections.
As Chinese immigrants arrived in California in the late 1840s, they found that the new Constitution gave them few rights. Fleeing the war and disruption of the Taiping Rebellion and hearing of the “Gold Mountain” in California, Chinese immigrants arrived in California to find their fortune. Many were able to make their way across the Pacific by promising to work for mining companies in exchange for the cost of their passage. By 1852, about ten percent of the non-Native population in California were Chinese. Angry with the competition from these Chinese miners working to pay off their tickets, non-Chinese miners lobbied the California legislature in 1852 to pass a foreign miners’ license tax of \$3 a month, about 50% of what a miner earned a month. This tax was only levied on Chinese and Latin American miners.
Over time, Chinese immigrants settled in California cities and towns. Because only white people could become naturalized according to the Naturalization Act of 1790, the Chinese could not protect themselves through the vote. In 1854, in People v. Hall, the California State Supreme Court ruled that Chinese people cannot testify in court “either in favor of, or against a white man.” In 1863, Chinese children were excluded from public schools (“California Anti-Chinese Legislation, 1852-1878”).
The railroad kings (Collis P. Huntington, Leland Stanford, Charles Crocker, and Mark Hopkins) organized the Central Pacific Railroad to build the western half of the transcontinental railroad in the 1860s. They recruited 30,000 Chinese laborers from California and China to clear the rock, build the trestles, and lay the track across the Sierra Nevada and through the desert until the line joined the Union Pacific track at Promontory, Utah in 1869.
As the 1870s began, Chinese Americans benefited from the Reconstruction-era federal laws. Federal courts ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to non-citizens: San Francisco could not cut off male inmates’ queues (waist-length hair braid). Discriminatory taxes such as the miners’ tax were abolished because they violated the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 that gave the federal government the ability to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, anti-Chinese attitudes remained severe in California, fueled by prejudice as more Chinese immigrants came to the state. The worst manifestation of this prejudice occurred on October 24, 1871, when a mob of five hundred murdered nineteen residents of Los Angeles’s Chinatown in reaction to the injury of a police officer and the death of a white man who had come to his aid (“Forgotten Los Angeles History”). When California plunged into a recession after the Panic of 1873, many California whites blamed rising unemployment, low wages, and generally poor business conditions on the Chinese Americans’ willingness to accept low wages either individually or as part of China’s immigrant labor contract systems. Anti-Chinese public demonstrations in California and harassment and intimidation of Chinese Americans became very common.
Many Californians believed that wealthy interests used Chinese immigrants to keep laborers poor. Led by Dennis Kearney, the Workingmen’s Association of California was formed in the summer of 1877. It aimed its wrath at two foes: the monopolies and the Chinese. The party’s slogan was “The Chinese must Go!” At the Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879, this rallying cry led to a host of discriminatory measures. Without the vote, Chinese Californians did not have the political power to help protect themselves from discrimination (Rawls and Bean pp.191-97). | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/02%3A_California_Constitutional_Development/2.02%3A_The_Constitution_of_1849/2.2.02%3A_The_Impact_of_the_Constitution_of_1849_on_A.txt |
Recall the central principles of American constitutional thought: the Lockean social contract based on natural rights and the Madisonian notion of countervailing political power by separating powers and checks and balances among government branches. These fundamental concepts, narrowly defined to fully apply only to white men, motivated California’s constitutional reform in the 1870s. The logic was relatively straightforward: just as one branch of government can check another, the government should grow in power to check corporations, especially the railroads.
Nationally, it was a time of ferment and activism. As the country was modernizing, farmers found themselves at the mercy of predatory railroad companies who exercised monopoly power over fares for freight costs. The National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry (the Grangers) helped pass laws in several states to regulate railroad rates and establish railroad commissions. California small farmers wanted to do the same to limit the power of the Central Pacific (which controlled some 85 percent of railroad tracks) to set freight prices. Moreover, farmers bore a disproportionate share of the tax burden because much of the land held by railroads and banks was exempt from taxation (Lustig 50).
The United States tumbled into a recession after the Panic of 1873, a banking crisis that led to the nationwide collapse of many banks and thousands of businesses, with the consequence that unemployment dramatically rose. In the largest city in California, San Francisco, Kearney’s Workingmen’s Association grew rapidly, blaming the Chinese for the sudden high unemployment of their heavily Irish immigrant members. At every meeting, they shouted: “The Chinese must go!” The party quickly spread across the state, providing political pressure for Sacramento to call for a constitutional convention to address the perceived problems of monopoly, unfair taxes, and Chinese immigration.
One hundred fifty-two delegates met in Sacramento in the fall of 1878. One hundred twenty were elected, three per senatorial district and the remaining thirty-two were at-large delegates. Fifty-one were from the Workingmen’s Party, with the remaining majority composed of Democrats and Republicans. Their intent was straightforward: they believed that the legislature created by the 1849 Constitution was failing to safeguard the rights of California workers and small farmers. Therefore, the Convention must step in and directly add laws to the Constitution to address needed policy reforms.
The Convention successfully passed several reforms, creating a Board of Equalization to equalize tax rates across the state and a railroad commission to check the monopoly power of the Central Pacific to set rates. Workers’ rights included an eight-hour day for public employees, limits on convict labor, and the abolition of debtor’s prison. Then the delegates turned on the Chinese, writing an entire article of the Constitution (Article XIX) to persecute one group:
“No corporation now existing or hereafter formed under the laws of this State, shall, after the adoption of this Constitution, employ directly or indirectly, in any capacity, any Chinese or Mongolian...No Chinese shall be employed on any State, county, municipal, or other public work.”
The Convention delegates were well aware that the anti-Chinese language in the new Constitution violated federal law, especially the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued at the Convention that the federal government should not have jurisdiction over this issue because the “reserved powers” set forth by the Tenth Amendment give California the ability to discriminate (Willis 635). It is not surprising, however, that federal courts quickly overturned the enforcement of Article XIX (Scheiber). Then, as the Jim Crow years began nationally, opponents of Chinese immigration successfully pressured the US Congress to ban almost all Chinese immigration with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
The Convention ended on March 3, 1879. Railroads, mining interests, and water and gas companies spent three million dollars trying to defeat the constitution’s ratification at the polls. However, on May 7, the voters ratified the new Constitution, 77,959 to 67,134 (Lustig 61).
If the purpose of the new Constitution was to control private power, it was clear that its policy reforms were failures. A state constitution does not operate within a vacuum; it is a creature of national political and legal forces. The Central Pacific Railroad (merged with the Southern Pacific in 1885) gained political control over the railroad commission. The US Supreme Court declared that corporations were legally to be considered “people,” and therefore possessed property rights that limited government regulations over them. The desired reforms of the 1870s would not be accomplished until the Progressive era, a generation later (Rawls and Bean 198-200). | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/02%3A_California_Constitutional_Development/2.03%3A_The_Constitution_of_1879.txt |
After the Constitution of 1879, several trends propelled California toward adopting many of the nationwide reform efforts that are collectively characterized by historians as Progressivism or the Progressive era. First, California’s rapid population growth, economic development, and incorporation into the national economy established the preconditions whereby progressive ideas gained a following in California. Second, just as California’s politics reflected national trends, the gender politics within the state also reflected the more prominent national struggles regarding this issue. Third, the Constitution of 1879 provided a historical precedent for open-ended reforms of California politics by progressives. When social and economic forces in opposition to the railroad grew in strength, the Progressives succeeded. Let’s examine each of these trends.
2.04: The Progressive Reforms
Between 1880 and 1810, California nearly tripled in population.
Table \(1\):Population Growth
Year
CA Population
1880
864,694
1890
1,213,398
1900
1,485,053
1910
2,377,549
Source: U.S. Census
Until the early 1900s, the California economy primarily focused on agriculture and mining. With the transcontinental railroads inexpensively connecting California to national markets, California became much more integrated into the national economy. Agricultural production began with wheat and livestock and then increasingly by the late 1880s, many kinds of fruits and vegetables. Farms were large “factories in the field,” employing thousands of laborers who migrated from farm to farm up and down the state. Manufacturing in California lagged behind the rest of the country until World War I (Rhode 11).
Nationally, the late nineteenth century became known as “The Gilded Age,” a time when bankers and industrialists dominated politics by controlling Congress with bribery and political favors. The federal government helped exacerbate this oligarchic system by giving vast amounts of land to the railroads to develop both transcontinental and intrastate lines. These bequests included prime farmland along each line, making the railways the largest private landowner in California. The “Octopus,” as the Southern Pacific was called by its critics, controlled the state legislature through bribery and favors (Rawls and Bean 232). Although it mostly ensnared the Republican establishment (dominant at this time nationally), party affiliation did not really matter so much as simple loyalty or patronage to the railroad.
Just as the federal planning and funding of the railroad created the “Octopus,” national trends were its undoing. The Progressive movement in the early 1900s had many incarnations; one manifestation was the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, who ran his campaigns and his presidency (1901-1909) on a progressive Republican platform to oppose the power of monopolies and political machines. In California, Progressives were intent on promoting more popular control of government using mechanisms of direct democracy and the regulation of monopolies by government bureaucracies. Progressive demands were similar to those voiced by populists in the 1870s; the difference was that twenty years of California growth had created a much larger middle and working-class with much more electoral clout.
The three elements of direct democracy, the initiative, the referendum, and recall, were first added to the charter of Los Angeles in 1903. Then Lincoln-Roosevelt Republican leagues sprang up statewide to oppose the old Republican machine. By the end of the decade, Hiram Johnson was touring the state as the progressive Republican gubernatorial candidate touting reform, namely to “kick the Southern Pacific Railroad out of politics” (Rawls and Bean 261). Governor Johnson would introduce major reforms to the California government after his election in 1910. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/02%3A_California_Constitutional_Development/2.04%3A_The_Progressive_Reforms/2.4.01%3A_The_Impact_of_Economic_Growth_on_California_.txt |
The thread of women’s rights history in the nineteenth and early twentieth-century California began at the Convention of 1849 when there was a short debate among delegates regarding whether inheritance laws should follow Mexican precedent or shift to American practices. Under Mexican law, a woman retained ownership of property acquired before marriage and gained community property acquired during the marriage. In contrast, American law at the time made men the sole owner of women’s property acquired before marriage. The lack of community property statutes also meant that a woman had to assert claims to property in probate court if she were widowed and there was no will. The Convention of 1849 opted to retain the Mexican system perhaps out of deference to existing practices and to attract women to emigrate to California (Schuele 170). However, over the next several decades, subsequent laws and court cases undermined this constitutional provision and brought California inheritance laws in line with common practices in the rest of the US. Efforts to improve women’s property rights were already underway nationally, and in 1872, a new civil code in California allowed women to have control of property acquired before marriage.
The national struggle for women’s suffrage began with the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 and did not succeed nationally until the Nineteenth Amendment to the US Constitution was ratified in 1920. The struggle for suffrage also occurred within each state. The territory of Wisconsin was the first, giving women the right to vote in 1869. The California Woman Suffrage Society was founded a year later. Petitions by suffragists to Sacramento legislators received press attention. Laura de Force Gordon’s testimony in 1870 before a senate committee was reported favorably with the words, “None could deny the eloquence of this lady…” (Shuele 179). However, proposals for suffrage were defeated. One small success occurred in 1874, with women gaining the right to be elected to school boards and to become school superintendents. By the late 1870s, women’s rights groups were not as well-organized, and as a consequence, there was no strong effort to lobby for suffrage at the Convention of 1878. The issue was briefly debated and rejected.
The Convention of 1879 improved the status of professional women. Supported by the California Bar Association, women’s rights advocates Laura de Force Gordon and Clara Shortridge Foltz persuaded the legislature in 1878 to allow them to join the Bar. Then, at the Convention, they successfully secured and broadened this change to include a provision stating that no person is disqualified from “any lawful business, vocation, or profession on account of sex” (Schuele 192).
As California grew in population and developed economically and socially, women’s clubs formed in many parts of the state. Many of these clubs went beyond social roles to support civic and political reforms, including helping to alleviate poverty, prohibit alcohol, and promote women’s suffrage. Women’s clubs successfully pressured the Republican Party to support suffrage in 1894. During a time of intense party competition, Republicans viewed suffrage as a way to attract more support. In 1896, the majority Republican legislature placed a referendum on the ballot for the enfranchisement of women. Suffrage groups campaigned hard throughout California for its passage, but the measure failed. Voters, especially in San Francisco, were afraid that the enfranchisement of women would mean greater success by the temperance movement to limit or ban liquor.
Disappointed and demoralized, the women’s clubs retreated from the suffrage fight for several years. However, California was rapidly changing, and by 1905 the conjunction of a rejuvenated suffrage movement with the rapid growth of the Progressive wing of the Republican party led to success. Suffragists, such as Lillian Harris Coffin of the California Club, adopted an explicitly party-oriented strategy of working to secure the endorsement of suffrage by all political parties which, with the exception of the Republican Party, they were able to achieve in 1906.
In 1908, delegates to the Republican Party state convention again rejected women’s suffrage as well as not adopting the Lincoln-Roosevelt League progressive reforms. The suffrage and progressive movements now had a common cause to work together; both advocated for “good government” and new policies to address the ills of modern-day society, and both opposed the machine politics that foiled reform efforts and disenfranchised women. When progressive Republicans Hiram Johnson won the Republican nomination for governor, he promised that suffrage would be one of the reforms brought before the California people by referendum.
Suffragists did not limit the campaign for suffrage to their middle-class supporters. They reached out to unions, such as the Woman’s International Union Label League, and worked hard for labor issues, especially the eight-hour day. In return, labor unions lobbied the state legislature in 1911 to support the suffrage referendum, and they mobilized the male working class.
On October 10, 1911, the progressives led by now Governor Johnson placed twenty-three proposed amendments before California voters in a bid to break the corruption of machine politics. Among them was Proposition 8, women’s suffrage. It passed by a margin of two percent; its victory narrowly won with more working-class support than in 1896 (Gullet chap. 4). | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/02%3A_California_Constitutional_Development/2.04%3A_The_Progressive_Reforms/2.4.02%3A_Impact_of_Constitutional_Developments_on_Wom.txt |
On January 3, 1911, in his inaugural address, Governor Johnson set out his reform agenda. He argued that the purpose of government is to achieve the good of the people as directed by the people. Too often, since the Constitution of 1879, private interests have defined the public policy interests of the California government. For the government to live up to the ideals of American democracy, the Governor and his progressive coalition sought changes in three areas: first, in the electoral arena, the people should have more of a role in the selection of candidates through primaries. Second, the role of the people to directly propose and make laws should be expanded through the addition of three mechanisms of direct democracy: the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. Third, the government should play an active role in regulating private interests, especially those with monopoly power.
Under the Constitution of 1879, the legislature had the power to submit changes to the California Constitution through the referendum process. On October 10, 1911, the Progressives submitted twenty-three amendments for the approval of Californians in the special election. Of note are the following (Statement of the Vote of California, 1911):
In his inaugural address, Governor Johnson stated:
“I do not by any means believe the initiative, the referendum, and the recall are the panacea for all our political ills, yet they do give to the electorate the power of action when desired, and they do place in the hands of the people the means by which they may protect themselves.”
The Progressive Reforms of 1911 ended the power of the Southern Pacific Railroad to control California politics. Advocates of direct democracy argued that the legislature itself needed to be checked and controlled by the people through the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. Each device has specific procedures:
Table \(1\): Progressive Reforms of 1911 (Rules regarding the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, Source: Secretary of State of California “Ballot Measures”)
Mechanism of Direct Democracy for Statewide Elections
Procedure
The Initiative
Initiative Statute: Placed on the ballot by a petition signed by 5% of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election. The initiative passes by a simple majority of voters.
Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Placed on the ballot by a petition signed by 8% of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election. Passes by a simple majority of the voters
The referendum
Popular referendum: voters repeal an existing law, same procedure as an initiative
Legislative referendum: measure approved by ⅔ of the legislature, and then by a simple majority of the voters (already present in the Constitution of 1879)
The recall
12% of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election must sign the petition, a simple majority of voters to recall
The Progressive reforms of 1911 added direct democracy to the Constitution of 1879. It allows the people to make policy directly to circumvent the state legislature and governor. In the 1912-2019 period, 2,018 initiatives were circulated. Of the 377 that qualified for the ballot, 133 were approved, 54 of which were constitutional amendments (“Secretary of State of California Ballot Measures Summary Data”). | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/02%3A_California_Constitutional_Development/2.04%3A_The_Progressive_Reforms/2.4.03%3A_Reform_under_the_Progressives.txt |
As the founding document of the state of California, the Constitution of 1849 established the state’s territory, government, and a set of rights for its citizens. Its origins lie at a time when the oppression of Native Americans was severe, and although California was nominally a free state, slavery and indentured servitude were still present. The Constitution of 1879 created a new constitution during an era of populist revolt against business monopolies. This Constitution also reflects the social context of the time with its prejudices against nonwhite Californians and other ethnic groups, as well as the prevailing sexism of the late nineteenth century. It utterly failed in its efforts to limit the power of monopolies. It would take the Progressive reforms of 1911 to tackle the goals set out some thirty years earlier. California continues to use direct democracy as a way to channel new social demands into law.
Formally, the trend of constitutional reform has been from a representative form of government to a hybrid form that includes both representative and direct forms of democracy. With regard to the question of who really rules California, there are several dynamics. Recall the debate is among those who say that we have an elite running the state versus those who argue that the people rule democratically, with a middle position occupied by pluralists who emphasize the role of groups. An alternative argument is that all three dynamics are at work, with their relative influence varying with the times.
The Constitution of 1849 was written by a rather exclusive elite, but then it was ratified by the public, although suffrage was by no means universal. The dominance of railroad interests in state politics also reinforces the elitist view of who really rules. On the other hand, as the state has grown, large social movements have significantly changed state politics. Dennis Kearney’s Workingmen’s Party in the 1870s, the Progressive Party in the early 1900s, and the suffrage movement show the influence of ordinary people. Pluralism matters in state politics, with the efforts of groups often ratified by the people through initiatives and referenda, illustrating the crucial role of majority rule. Hence, the impact of all three dynamics is evident.
2.06: Works Cited
“Bridget ‘Biddy’ Mason.” National Parks Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, www.nps.gov/people/biddymason.htm
Broussard, Albert S. “Civil Rights, Racial Protest, and Anti-Slavery Activism in San Francisco,
“California Anti-Chinese Legislation, 1852-1878.” https://immigrants.harpweek.com/ChineseAmericans/2KeyIssues/CaliforniaAnti.htm
Clarke, Chris. “Untold History: The Survival of California's Indians.” KCET, 27 June 2019, www.kcet.org/shows/tending-the-wild/untold-history-the-survival-of-californias-indians
The Constitution of California. leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=CONS&division=&title=&part=&chapter=&article=I
Faulkner, William. Requiem for a Nun. Vintage, 2015.
Forgotten Los Angeles History: The Chinese Massacre of 1871, https://www.lapl.org/collections-resources/blogs/lapl/chinese-massacre-1871
Grodin, Joseph R., Cunningham, Richard B., Massey, Calvin R., California.; The California State Constitution. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Gullet, Gayle. Becoming Citizens: The Emergence and Development of the California Women’s Movement, 1880-1911, University of Illinois Press, 2000.
Lustig, R. Jeffrey. “Private Rights and Public Purposes: California’s Second Constitution Reconsidered.” California History Vol. 87:3 (2010); pp. 46-70.
Madley, Benjamin. “Unholy Traffic in Human Body and Souls”: Systems of California Indian
Servitude Under U.S. Rule.” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 83, No 4, pp. 626-67.
McWilliams, Carey. The Great Exception. University of California Press.
Moss, Rick. “The Development of the African American Community in Los Angeles through 1950.” California History, Vol. 75, No. 3, African Americans in California (Fall, 1996), pp. 222-235.
Rawls, James J. and Walter Bean. California: An Interpretive History, Tenth Edition. New York: McGraw Hill, 2012
Report of the Debates of the Convention of California. Washington D.C.: 1850.
Rhode, Paul W. The Evolution of California Manufacturing. Public Policy Inst. of California, 2001.
Saunders, Myra. “California Legal History: The Constitution of 1849.” Law Library Journal, Vol. 90:3, 1998.
Secretary of State of California Ballot Measures Summary Data,
elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ballot-measures/pdf/summary-data.pdf
Scheiber, Harry N. “Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical Perspective on the 1879 California Constitution.” UC Hastings Scholarship Repository, repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol17/iss1/3/.
Smith, and Stacey L. “Review: An American Genocide: The United States and the California Indian Catastrophe, 1846–1873 by Benjamin Madley.” Pacific Historical Review, University of California Press, 1 Feb. 2018, online.ucpress.edu/phr/article/87/1/210/80390/Review-An-American-Genocide-The-United-States-and
Statement of the Vote of California at the Special Election Held October 11, 1911 on Constitutional Amendments. Sacramento: State of California, 1911.
US Census. Resident Population and Apportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives,
California,” www.census.gov/history/pdf/californiapops.pdf
Wee, Eliza, and Dogmo Studios. “Peter Hardeman Burnett - Gold Chains: The Hidden History of Slavery in California: ACLU NorCal.” ACLU of Northern CA, 28 June 2018, www.aclunc.org/sites/goldchains/explore/peter-burnett.html
Willis, E.B. Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of California. Forgotten Books, 2016. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/02%3A_California_Constitutional_Development/2.05%3A_Summary-_Making_Sense_of_California_Constitutional_History.txt |
Introduction
Federalism matters. Walk down the street, arrive at a crosswalk, and the ramp at the end of the sidewalk allows a disabled person to more easily make their way across the intersection due to the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act enforced by the federal government. Go to a bar anywhere in the United States, and you better be twenty-one. Congress could not mandate a national drinking age without running afoul of states’ reserved powers, but they made it a prerequisite for states to receive federal highway funds in 1984. Are you gay or lesbian and want to get married? For a time, states could decide for themselves if they wanted to have same-sex marriages or accept them from other states. Then, in 2015, the US Supreme Court (Obergefell v. Hodges) directed that all states license marriage as a union between two people. These examples show the impact of federal laws on the states.
Yet, there are many areas where state laws dominate. Want to smoke marijuana legally? It is legal in many states for medicinal purposes, with a smaller number allowing recreational smoking. How about firearms? Where can you walk down the street carrying a loaded handgun in a holster? Open carry is permitted in many states, but not in California except in a few rural counties that only allow it with a permit. Then there are all the laws governing abortion. In the more liberal states, there is no required waiting period, no need for parental notification if the mother is underage, and the state government will pay for the abortion if the mother cannot afford to do so. However, go to a conservative state, especially in the South, and there are few abortion clinics, waiting periods and counseling are required, and no state aid is available. The point is that where we live matters. Laws vary by state because states have their own political cultures and traditions. The question is, to what extent should there be uniformity across the country? How “united” should the United States be?
In short, the concept of federalism may initially seem like a dry legalistic topic. However, federalism is fascinating because it is an intrinsically political topic regarding who should rule over what aspects of our lives: the states or the federal government? Let us review the key constitutional issues as well as the history of federalism. Then three case studies will help you develop your own points of view.
3.02: Constitutional Issues
We might expect that the Constitution would provide clear rules regarding federal-state relations. However, the Constitution is often considered an “invitation to struggle” (Corwin 201) because there is so much ambiguity about the relations among its parts. For example, Article I, Section 8 sets out the expressed powers of the U.S. Congress, but then clause 18 of this section, the Necessary and Proper Clause, gives Congress the ability to extend its influence. Congress has the power:
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
Consider the expressed powers enumerated in clauses 12 and 13: Congress has the ability to create an army and a navy. If Congress can create an army and a navy, can it create an Air Force? A Space Force? With the Necessary and Proper Clause, these expansions of power are constitutional. However, at the time of the Constitution’s ratification after the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, many states demanded the addition of a Bill of Rights to stop the federal government from intruding on individual rights and on the traditional powers of state governments. Hence the Tenth Amendment:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
States have reserved powers, meaning that in all areas of law, states have jurisdiction unless the Constitution has expressly given control to the federal government.
The constitutional evolution of federal-state relations did not stop with its ratification, however. The federal government has gained much more power as the Supreme Court has required that states incorporate the US Bill of Rights into state law as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment added in 1868:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The chart below summarizes the most important parts of the Constitution that establish the relationship between states and the national government.
Table \(1\): Constitutional Clauses Regarding Federalism
Constitutional Clause or Amendment
Impact
Article I, Sec. 8, clauses 1-17: the Expressed Powers
Article I, concerning the organization and powers of Congress, establishes the enumerated powers of Congress.
Article I, Sec. 8, clause 18: The Necessary and Proper Clause
Congress has additional “implied” powers not necessarily specified in Article I if they are necessary and proper to exercise one of the expressed powers
Article IV: The Full and Faith Credit Clause
States shall “recognize” each other's laws and legal decisions, but Congress may regulate these relationships
Article VI: the Supremacy Clause
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land
The Ninth Amendment
While the Constitution and the Amendments set out explicit rights, other rights are “retained” by the people
The Tenth Amendment
Powers that are not given to the federal government by the Constitution are “reserved” to the states
The Fourteenth Amendment
States cannot make laws that deprive their citizens or any persons in their jurisdiction of the rights they have as Americans or deny them the “equal protection of the laws.”
3.03: Debating Who Should Be in Charge- Three Types of Federalism
The Constitutional parameters that established the relations between the states and the national government, and among the states, gradually evolved. For analytical purposes, political scientists categorize them into three kinds of federalism. The first is dual federalism; the states and the national government have separate responsibilities based on a clearly delineated view of the federal government's expressed powers and the states’ reserved powers. This type dominated from the Constitutional founding to the Great Depression of the 1930s. For example, the federal government managed interstate commerce, and states managed elementary and high school education. The second is cooperative federalism, marked by the dramatic increase in federal control over state and local affairs as our country fought the Great Depression and then the Cold War and tried to achieve various national goals such as civil rights and civil liberties for all. An example of the daily impact of cooperative federalism is the SNAP program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, which provides money for food to tens of millions of Americans.
As the federal government increased in power, conservatives became alarmed by the growth of the central government and advocated greater state power. Beginning in the late 1960s, with the election of Republican President Richard Nixon, states started to share in decision-making regarding federal programs. The result was “new federalism,” the third type of federalism that blends dual and cooperative varieties. One example is welfare reform. In the 1990s, states were allowed to develop some of their own welfare programs using federal funding. Another example discussed later in this chapter is the Affordable Care Act (often informally called Obamacare), which allows states quite a bit of latitude regarding health care programs and coverage.
All three kinds of federalism are very much present today (see table below). States still control many policies, the federal government controls others, and then there are many areas of policy that are explicitly shared between the two levels of government.
Table \(1\):Types of Federalism
Type of Federalism
Definitions
Examples
Origins
Dual
State and the federal government have distinct responsibilities with separate programs, financed independently.
Federal level: foreign policy
State-level: state licensing for occupations, barber, teachers, attorney, etc.
1789 (implementation of the US Constitution)
Cooperative
The federal government directs policy, paying for programs for states.
Federal Level: SNAP (food assistance)
1933 (Roosevelt Administration)
New
The federal government pays for programs; states have the freedom to design programs for their residents.
Welfare Reform: Temporary Assistance For Needy Families (CalWORKs in California)
1969 (Nixon Administration) | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/03%3A_The_Impact_of_Federalism/3.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
Imagine you are a policymaker deciding each of the following policy issues. A crucial question is how much freedom local and state governments should have. Think about your responsibilities based on your particular role in each of the following case studies, and then decide what you will do. Each section concludes with a discussion of what actually happened.
Case Study One: Shall all California high school students be required to take an Ethnic Studies Course?
You are the governor of California. The California legislature has passed a bill mandating that all high school students complete a one-semester ethnic studies course. The course emphasizes the history and culture of four groups: African Americans, Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, Latina/o/x Americans, and Native Americans. Should you sign the bill?
Advocates for the course argue that traditional social studies do not sufficiently address multicultural history, leaving students ignorant of our state’s rich heritage. They also say that ethnic studies help students have more pride in their own histories, improve general academic performance, increase intercultural understanding, and contribute to a more educated citizenry better able to understand the challenges that we face as a diverse society.
Opponents of the course favor teaching multicultural history, but they are concerned that the course omits many other groups such as Armenian and Jewish Americans. Additionally, they are worried that the curriculum may overly emphasize oppression as a theme and demand that white students confess their “privilege.” They argue that existing social studies courses already use a multicultural approach. At best, the class should be an elective.
Under dual federalism, the state government is responsible for establishing the public-school curriculum. Your choices are to sign the bill and make ethnic studies a requirement or veto it. In your signing statement or veto message, you will be expected to justify your actions. What will you do and why?
What Happened?
In 2020, Governor Newsom vetoed the ethnic studies bill (“Veto Message”). Newsom expressed support for an ethnic studies curriculum, pointing out that he had already approved a bill requiring the course for California State University students. However, he asked that the curriculum be revised so that it “achieves balance, fairness and is inclusive of all communities.” For the next several months, the State Board of Education revised the curriculum and included the experiences of many more ethnic groups. In 2021, a bill reflecting these changes made its way through the California legislature and Governor Newsom signed it into law (Fensterwald).
Case Study Two: Shall all states be required to license marriage as between two people?
You are a US Supreme Court justice. You are one of nine responsible for deciding whether the laws and practices of government are constitutional. It is 2015. The case before you is regarding marriage. Shall states be able to define the nature of marriage as a union between only a man and a woman, or should the US Supreme Court tell states that they must offer marriage licenses to any two people?
Traditionally, the states have defined the nature of marriage. States respect the legitimacy of the marriage contracts of other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the US Constitution (Article IV). There are precedents for the Supreme Court to intervene. In the nineteenth century, the Court ruled that marriage shall be monogamous in all the states (Reynolds v. United States, 1878), outlawing a man having multiple wives. More recently, the Court ruled that a state ban on interracial marriage was unconstitutional based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause (Loving v. Virginia, 1967).
There are also precedents for the Supreme Court with regard to gay rights. In 1986, the Court affirmed the right of a state to ban homosexual relations (Bowers v. Hardwick). It then reversed this decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), with the majority arguing that the right to privacy includes a right to consensual sex between two people.
State laws about marriage were rapidly changing beginning in the mid-1990s. Some states legalized same-sex marriage; others defined marriage as only between a man and a woman. A few had a middle ground of “civil union” that gives states, but not federal, marriage rights to same-sex couples without using the word marriage. The US Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (1996), permitting states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages from other states.
California voters passed Proposition 22 in 2003 which defined marriage as only between a man and a woman. The California Supreme Court declared this proposition unconstitutional because it violated California equal protection laws. Then California voters passed Proposition 8 in 2008, which added an amendment to the California Constitution, again defining marriage as solely between a man and a woman. The drama continued with gay rights advocates turning to the federal courts, which ruled Proposition 8 unconstitutional. Meanwhile, similar messes were brewing in the rest of the country with a mishmash of laws and conflicting Court rulings causing legal and practical confusion.
Now let’s move forward to 2015. The Supreme Court has consolidated several cases from multiple federal appeals courts to focus on whether the states shall be required to legalize same-sex marriage. The question before us is also very much a question regarding federalism. Shall the federal government impose its will on the states with regards to marriage? If so, this nation-centered approach is an example of cooperative federalism. Alternatively, the Court may choose to defer to the states and let their legislative or judicial authorities resolve the matter, an example of dual federalism.
Advocates for requiring states to license same-sex marriages make two arguments based on the Fourteenth Amendment and prior Court cases that provide the precedents for promoting privacy and equal protection of the law. First, lesbian and gay people are entitled to equal dignity before the law. Dignity means that states respect the autonomy and privacy of two people of the same sex to marry. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment provide this fundamental right to dignity with respect to marriage. Second, particular costs burden gays and lesbians and their children if marriage is limited to heterosexual couples. Health insurance and family leave may be inaccessible. Hospital visits and next-of-kin medical decisions are off-limits. Property laws leave partners destitute in the event of the breakup of relationships. Marriage gives the children and spouses in same-sex families the same rights as those in heterosexual unions.
Opponents of same-sex marriage make two general arguments, one substantive and the other procedural. First, they argue that states have traditionally defined marriage as between a man and a woman. It is in the child’s interest to receive care and financial support from both their mother and father. Hence, the institution of marriage is central for one generation to raise the next. Second, procedurally, opponents argue that the Supreme Court should not have jurisdiction over this matter. Instead, elected officials, whether at the state or the national level, are the proper authorities to address this question. The Supreme Court should avoid establishing fundamental rights that are not clearly enumerated in the Constitution.
You are a Supreme Court justice. Redefining marriage will force all states to change their laws to increase liberty and equality. On the other hand, retaining the absence of a federal definition of marriage respects due federalism and leaves the states to address the issue through the democratic process, allowing for a diversity of choices among the states. How will you rule?
What Happened?
In 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the US Supreme Court ruled 5-4 to legalize same-sex marriage. The majority decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, argued that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that same-sex marriage should be protected under law in order to extend equal dignity, or marriage equality, to the same-sex couple.
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideal of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.
Chief Justice Roberts, in one of the dissenting opinions, argued that the Supreme Court was exceeding its jurisdiction with its decision, that elected officials rather than justices should decide this issue:
If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.
After the Supreme Court decision, a single policy for all Americans applied: states must allow same-sex couples to marry and they will enjoy the same state and federal rights and benefits as opposite-sex couples. The marriage contract, and all other laws related to marriage, changed to reflect the new view about our fundamental rights as Americans.
Case Study Three: Should the Affordable Care Act be repealed?
It is 2017. You are a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives representing the 25th district of California (in 2022, this district, encompassing the Santa Clarita and Antelope valleys, was renamed the 27th district as part of the redistricting process). The 25th district is what political scientists call a swing district; meaning that the district is evenly divided between Democrats and Republican voters with candidates winning with less than 55% of the vote. In 2016, you won reelection with 53% of the vote (“California’s 25th Congressional District Election”). However, the Democratic candidate for President, Hillary Clinton, won the district by 50.3%, suggesting that some voters engaged in split-ticket voting, voting for both Republican and Democratic candidates (“Presidential Election in California”).
The President is a Republican, Mr. Trump. One of Mr. Trump’s central campaign platforms was to repeal the Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”) passed under his predecessor, President Obama. You must decide whether to vote to repeal the ACA, which will improve your support among Republicans, especially the President, or reject the repeal to avoid alienating yourself from moderates and Democrats in your district.
Some background about the Affordable Care Act and the arguments by supporters and critics will help you decide this issue. The ACA is often called "Obamacare" for short because President Obama’s central campaign platform in 2008 was to help Americans with health care by improving existing health insurance coverage and expanding coverage to reach uninsured people. It was quite a political battle to push it through a very polarized Congress. When it finally passed in 2010, Obamacare had become the most significant change in healthcare policy in more than a generation. It also represented a substantial shift in the relations between the federal government and states. Some aspects of the ACA expand national power and hence represent a deepening of cooperative federalism. Other parts allow states to set their own policies, representing a deepening of new federalism.
The reach of the federal government increased in many ways. Some of the most significant were: first, employers with fifty or more full-time employees were required to provide health insurance, second, individuals were mandated to buy health insurance and received subsidies from the federal government if their income was up to 400% of the poverty level, and third, insurance companies had to cover preexisting conditions and preventative care. In addition, the ACA preempted, or displaced, state health insurance regulations and hence is an example of cooperative federalism where the national government takes control over a policy area and mandates changes in state policies.
However, aspects of the ACA gave states some freedom to implement the law and are therefore consistent with new federalism. First, states were allowed to create state health insurance exchanges for their residents to buy private insurance. If they chose not to, their residents would have to buy from the federal health insurance exchange. As of 2022, fourteen states and Washington D.C., have set up their own exchanges, including California (CoveredCalifornia.com). The state exchanges allow states to have greater autonomy. Second, the ACA expanded Medicaid, the existing public health insurance plan for low-income people established in the 1960s, to cover people who make up to 133% of the federal poverty level. However, because both the federal and state governments fund Medicaid, the US Supreme Court ruled (National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 2012) that states were not required to expand Medicaid eligibility. Hence, eligibility and income requirements for Medicaid vary from one state to another. These variances in ACA policies and programs among the states illustrate the signature characteristic of New Federalism: giving states flexibility based on state political preferences (Health Reform).
Now we return to your dilemma as a representative. Should you vote to abolish the Affordable Care Act and replace it with the American Health Care Act? Most prominently, this 2017 bill ends the expansion of the Medicaid program and income-based subsidies, saving the federal government hundreds of billions of dollars, but causing approximately fifteen million people to lose coverage.
Advocates of replacing the ACA are motivated by ideological and partisan reasons. Ideologically, conservatives are skeptical of further government involvement in the health care sector of the economy. Seeing health care as an optional consumer product, individual consumers, businesses, and health insurance companies should not be subject to government coercion. Historically, states have been in control of their insurance markets. The ACA undermines state autonomy. Second, for many years, the health care debate has become intensely partisan, with this issue having a prominent role in the platforms of each party. Republicans had invested a great deal of importance in defeating President Obama’s program. Mr. Trump promised that he would be successful in this regard when other Republicans had failed.
Supporters of the Affordable Care Act argue that millions more Americans have health insurance coverage, health insurance coverage is better, and, in the long term, these improvements will lead to a healthier population. Further, they argue that the appropriate role of the federal government is to devise a program that results in affordable and effective health care for all. It has long been noted that the US spends far more per capita with far worse health outcomes than other countries and is the only high-income country without some form of universal health care (“US Health Care from a Global Perspective”). The ACA is a significant step to remedy this situation.
Public opinion is split along ideological and partisan lines in your district as it is in the country. However, given that more people in your congressional district voted for Hillary Clinton than Donald Trump, it is likely that a vote in favor of repeal will make you less popular. On the other hand, if you vote to keep the ACA, you will likely be ostracized by Republicans in Congress and publicly criticized by the President, making it harder for you to accomplish anything else. Will you vote to repeal and replace Obamacare?
What Happened?
This case study has assigned you the role of Representative Steve Knight. He was elected in 2014 to represent California’s 25th district encompassing the Antelope and Santa Clarita valleys and a portion of Simi Valley. Representative Knight chose to vote with the Republican majority. The vote was intensely partisan and highly visible. The bill passed the House, 217-213, along party lines, but then a similar bill failed in the Senate, 49-51. Nevertheless, the Affordable Care Act survived.
As a representative, Mr. Knight found that he was in an increasingly difficult position. As a Republican in a swing district, he tried to chart a moderate course. Still, because of the increasingly polarized nature of party politics and the shift of the Republican party to the right, this was increasingly difficult. As a result, in 2018, Knight was defeated by his Democratic opponent. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/03%3A_The_Impact_of_Federalism/3.04%3A_You_Decide-_Case_Studies_in_Federalism.txt |
A cynic may argue that philosophy is simply a rationalization for self-interest. The wealthy glorify conservatism, the poor favor state help. A philosophy of federalism may be similar: we may merely favor that level of government that will provide what we want. If the cynic is correct, then constructing a general philosophy of federalism is at best irrelevant. However, such cynicism flies in the face of the framers of the US Constitution, who set out arguments for the value of federalism based on fundamental principles. For example, if we read the Federalist Papers, James Madison argued that federalism discourages tyranny and supports pluralism and liberty.
Thus, let us set out a premise that philosophy matters. Let us assume that our philosophies help shape our attitudes and opinions, which in turn direct our actions. Therefore, our beliefs about federalism are worth considering. I suggest three principles that are helpful to construct a federal philosophy. Consider the table on the following page (Table 3.3):
Table \(1\):Three Guiding Principles
Principle
Consideration
Unity
Should all Americans comply with the same policies and have the same rights and responsibilities?
Diversity
To what extent should local and state differences in needs and wants cause differences in policies, rights, and responsibilities?
Democracy
What balance between state and national control allows for the best democratic deliberations, considering questions about representation, rights, and policy effectiveness?
Consider the three case studies discussed in this chapter: an ethnic studies requirement, marriage rights, and health care reform. Each outcome presents an implicit preference for a particular federal philosophy. In the first case, it is up to the state to decide on the ethnic studies curriculum, a type of dual federalism. Do you agree? Presumably, the state government is best at responding to demands for a new class. However, could we not argue that this class is needed just as much in other states, and hence should be a national policy? On the other hand, the demographics of each state vary, so perhaps the substance of an ethnic studies curriculum would also change, and it might be best left to people within each state to deliberate among themselves about the nature of such a course.
Marriage equality falls under the category of debating about rights. Do you prefer rights to be defined at the state level or the national level? Since the civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s, the trend has been to nationalize rights, to argue that we have rights as Americans, and hence unity is far more critical than diversity. Moreover, the trend has been for an activist Supreme Court to step in often and define these rights, although the US Congress has also provided landmark legislation. The deliberation about same-sex marriage in this country was relatively quick, lasting from the mid-1990s until the Obergefell decision in 2015. In that time, the scope of the decision shifted from the state to the national level. As a result, same-sex marriage became a matter of federal authority, a form of cooperative federalism. States no longer have leeway; they must follow national policy.
The third example represents the most nuance. Unlike an issue such as marriage equality, which is mainly dichotomous (either yes or no), the extent and nature of health care policies allow for a blend of national and state laws, characteristics of new federalism. In this country, unlike left-wing democracies, we don’t conceive of economic needs as rights; so, if a state chooses not to provide health insurance, we don’t usually argue that the state has violated the rights of the poor. Perhaps, if we lean politically more toward the left in the future, there would be a greater nationalization of social policies. In the meantime, a balance of unity and diversity as principles has yielded Obamacare with policy decisions occurring at both state and national levels.
What do you believe? When do you want the national government to decide policies, when do you want the states to choose, and when do you want decision-making to be shared? Consider your opinions about the three case studies above. Consider other issues. What is your federal philosophy?
For Further Inquiry
1. Throughout the pandemic, I was struck by the disparities among the states regarding the efforts to reduce the spread of the coronavirus. I visited my elderly father in Arizona; about half of the customers at the local Safeway have masks on; when I went running in Santa Clarita, many bicyclists, off essentially by themselves, were wearing masks. It's pretty apparent that politics mattered. Some states required face coverings in stores; others did not. It's also the political culture; some people perceived a mask as an unwarranted infringement on liberty, and others just saw it as one's duty during a time of crisis. In your opinion, was federalism a hindrance or a strength in fighting the pandemic?
2. Survey the current news using your favorite media. Select a particular policy issue that is currently being debated. Ask yourself who is debating the issue? Is the scope of the debate at the local, state, or national level, or at more than one level? Do you believe that the issue is best considered at the level that you observe? Reflecting on your opinion regarding the particular issue, how does your consideration help you better understand your own political philosophy?
3.06: Works Cited
“California's 25th Congressional District Election, 2016.” Ballotpedia, ballotpedia.org/California's_25th_Congressional_District_election, _2016
Corwin, Edward S. The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984, 5th edition. New York University Press, 1984.
Fensterwald, John. “California Becomes First State to Require Ethnic Studies in High School.”
EdSource, EdSource, 11 Apr. 2022, edsource.org/2021/california-becomes-first-state-to-
require-ethnic-studies-in-high-school/662219
“Health Reform.” KFF, 9 June 2021,www.kff.org/health-reform/
Pawel, Miriam, et al. “Ethnic Studies in California.” Education Next, 4 June 2021, www.educationnext.org/ethnic-studies-california-unsteady-jump-from-college-campuses-to-k-12-classrooms/
“Presidential Election in California, 2016.” Ballotpedia, ballotpedia.org/Presidential_election_in_California,_2016
“U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective, 2019: Higher Spending, Worse Outcomes?” U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective, 2019 | Commonwealth Fund, www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-health-care-global-perspective-2019
“Veto Message.” Office of the Governor, State of California, 30 Sept. 2020, www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/AB-331.pdf | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/03%3A_The_Impact_of_Federalism/3.05%3A_Developing_Your_Philosophy_about_Federalism.txt |
Introduction
In a constitutional democracy, we expect the people to occupy the center of the political stage. We make our demands, the government listens, public policy changes. Yet, as you know from the study of the US Constitution, our system shields much of government from the people because the Framers feared that too much popular involvement might result in mob rule. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the public’s role in political affairs grew. Voting rights were dramatically extended multiple times. The Seventeenth Amendment of the US Constitution (1913) allowed for the direct election of Senators. In California, the Progressives argued that greater involvement in politics by the people is an important check on the potential corruption of government and so the California Constitution was amended to include tools of direct democracy.
While in this country, public opinion provides the foundation for constitutional democracy, in other countries, dictators have often manipulated public opinion for their own purposes. Americans have also worried that they may also be manipulated by many forces of modern-day mass society such as the media, political parties, or big business. Attitudes that we have about the proper role of public opinion are often dependent on whether we believe that the public is wise and well-informed enough to make good decisions.
In this chapter, let’s first develop our positions regarding the actual role of public opinion in our political system and our beliefs about what role it should ideally have. Several quotations will help you better understand your thinking. Then, after considering how to study public opinion, let’s characterize Californians’ public opinion and ideologies. Finally, we will examine how the origins of public opinion are studied.
4.02: What should be the role of public opinion in the political system
Below are five quotations. Consider the message of each quotation with regards to how public opinion is depicted. Which one(s) do you agree with?
Quotation One:
“I sometimes wonder whether in this respect a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath—in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat” (Kennan 66).
Quotation Two:
“The voice of the people is the voice of God” (translated from the Latin, Vox Populi, Vox Dei).
Quotation Three:
“The individual is foolish, the multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a species it always acts right” (Edmund Burke).
Quotation Four:
“Masses are rude, lame, unmade, pernicious in their demands and influence, and need not be flattered but schooled” (Ralph Waldo Emerson).
Quotation Five:
“The masses are absolutely being manipulated by those in power” (Louis Farrakhan, from “Excerpts of Interview…”).
A little background about each quotation may be helpful to consider each quote. The first is by George Kennan, a famous American diplomat stationed in the Soviet Union. In 1946, he warned the Truman Administration that the US must be prepared to “contain” or limit the influence of the Soviet Union. He worried that American democracy was not disciplined enough to sustain a long-term policy because public opinion was so fickle. Kennan wrote many diplomatic histories after he retired from the government. He preferred foreign policy to be delegated to diplomats and not be subjected to public consideration.
The second quotation is a famous Latin phrase used many times over the centuries. If you believe that the people are like God, then the government should closely follow public opinion. The third quotation is from a speech by Edmund Burke to his fellow members of the British Parliament in 1782 expressing his skepticism of democratic reforms. He believed that representatives should act as trustees by deliberating in elected legislatures about what is in the best interest of their constituents rather than simply echoing the demands of the people who often did not know what is best for themselves.
The last two are both very pessimistic. Emerson, an American transcendental poet, believed that an educated elite must teach the public to possess sound opinions. Otherwise, the people cannot be trusted. Finally, Farrakhan is a leader of the Nation of Islam. He argues that public opinion should not be trusted because it simply reflects indoctrination by racist forces.
So, consider your point of view. Do you agree with some of these quotations more than others? What influence does public opinion have on the government now? What influence should it have? Why? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/04%3A_Public_Opinion_in_California/4.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
About forty million people in California from many different walks of life live in an incredible diversity of communities. How can we successfully understand so many opinions? Many of the academic inquiries about public opinion use surveys to ask people about their positions. How valid are people’s responses? They may not want to be truthful, or perhaps their views change. Are we capturing the intensity of people’s beliefs? Firmly held beliefs held by a minority may be far more influential than widespread beliefs that motivate little or no action.
These are some of the challenges of the study of public opinion. After World War II, political scientists addressed these challenges through the development of public opinion surveys that are administered in scientific ways so that we may understand their validity. Three characteristics should be evaluated. First, have the pollsters randomly selected the respondents from the defined population(s) that we wish to study? Random, or probability, sampling means that each respondent has an equal chance of being selected from a population for questioning. Data from reputable polling organizations are best to follow because their sampling techniques will be more likely to be valid and published for our consideration as part of the survey. Be wary of ones that do not clearly explain how respondents have been chosen. They are likely to be for entertainment only.
Second, a scientific survey will clearly display its sampling error. This is a statistical measure of the probable difference between the sample and the population, based purely on a mathematical calculation. A good survey has a margin of +/- 3% or less, meaning that if there is a difference in responses of six points or less, we cannot say that two different groups have different opinions. How the survey randomly selected respondents is also important to note. For example, a few years ago, if a survey randomly selected only from landlines and not cell phones, the sample was likely to skew toward an older population.
Third, we must study the wording of the survey questions. Are the questions effectively addressing the issue that we want to study? Are they going to be understandable? Are the response choices fair or biased? If we are comparing surveys over time, have words changed in meaning?
Here is an example of a scientific poll from the Institute of Government Studies at UC Berkeley regarding if California should retain the death penalty. Five thousand thirty-six registered voters, including subgroups, were selected randomly to respond to an internet poll, with a random sample of +/- 2.5%. Respondents were asked:
"The legislature is considering placing a constitutional amendment on the 2022 statewide election ballot asking voters to formally abolish the death penalty as a punishment for certain crimes in California. If you were voting today, how would you vote on the constitutional amendment to abolish the death penalty in California?"
The table below shows the responses by subgroup. Registered voters who identified themselves as Democrats, or as liberal, were far more likely to favor the repeal of the death penalty. Voters living in coastal counties were somewhat more in support of this proposed amendment than voters living in inland counties. Women and younger people were also somewhat more likely to favor the repeal.
Table \(1\): Opinion about the Death Penalty by Party Registration
Registered Voters Repeal the Death Penalty Keep the Death Penalty Undecided
All Voters 44 35 21
Democrats 63 19 18
Republicans 12 68 20
No Party Preference 43 31 26
Minor Parties 29 41 30
Table \(2\): Opinion about the Death Penalty by Political Ideology
Political Ideology Repeal the Death Penalty Keep the Death Penalty Undecided
Strongly conservative 12 69 19
Somewhat conservative 19 62 19
Moderate 33 37 30
Somewhat liberal 64 17 19
Strongly liberal 83 7 10
Table \(3\):Opinion about the Death Penalty by Region
Region Repeal the Death Penalty Keep the Death Penalty Undecided
Los Angeles County 49 28 23
San Diego County 41 42 17
Orange County 36 44 20
Inland Empire 34 43 23
Central Coast 41 31 28
Central Valley 35 44 21
San Francisco Bay Area 54 27 19
North Coast/Sierras 44 34 22
Table \(4\):Opinion about the Death Penalty by Gender
Gender Repeal the Death Penalty Keep the Death Penalty Undecided
Male 41 40 19
Female 46 31 23
Now, consider the validity of this poll. Respondents were randomly selected using state records of registered voters. Given that the poll asks about a proposed referendum, selecting registered voters rather than all adults makes sense. However, all California adults are not the target population. We know that registered voters are typically a bit more conservative. If registration increases between the time of this survey and election day, its validity will be weakened.
Second, consider the question that is asked and the possible response. The strength of asking about the death penalty is that nearly everyone is likely to understand the issue because of its relative clarity and prevalence in the media. The question wording may be confusing because the poll asks if the respondent favors a repeal of the death penalty, rather than just asking if they favor or oppose the death penalty. It is also likely that if the survey question were more complex to consider more choices such as “life imprisonment without possibility of parole” as an alternative, then support for the death penalty would decrease.
The challenges of studying Californian public opinion go beyond just survey design. An additional challenge is the relative lack of statewide surveys. General surveys about opinion are often conducted nationally by national polling organizations such as Gallup and Pew. Many other academic institutions and polling organizations provide a constant stream of public opinion data. In California, there are very few polling organizations that concentrate only on state and local public opinion. The most prominent ones are the Public Policy Institute of California and UC Berkeley’s Institute of Government Studies. Newspapers and television stations will also conduct surveys, but they are usually associated with predicting electoral outcomes. Election-year surveys have their value, but they are not often designed to investigate underlying beliefs. Moreover, the party-driven mass politics, advertisement blitzes, and the immediacy and drama of the campaign limit the scope and depth of these polls.
In summary, political scientists use surveys to learn about public opinion, but they must be evaluated critically for their validity. Moreover, systematic and regular surveys of California public opinion over the long term are limited. Instead, surveys often present a series of snapshots about public beliefs, attitudes, and opinions that present valuable although incomplete understandings. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/04%3A_Public_Opinion_in_California/4.03%3A_How_to_Study_Public_Opinion.txt |
If we consider surveys to be like snapshots, which ones will best represent our opinions about politics? Let us consider a few key economic and social issues, general ideological beliefs, and partisan trends as a way to develop our portrait of Californians. Here are a few polls to inductively develop our picture.
Support for the Affordable Care Act
In 2010, the US Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, commonly called Obamacare. The law continues to be a subject of debate in many states. In California, there is strong support for it, according to this May 2021 poll by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC):
“As you may know, a health reform bill was signed into law in 2010, commonly known as the Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare. Given what you know about the health reform law, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of it?"
Table \(1\): Support for the Affordable Care Act
Opinion
All Adults
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Likely Voters
Favorable
60%
86%
22%
59%
60%
Unfavorable
30
9
70
34
35
Don’t Know
10
5
7
7
5
Support for LGBT rights
Support for protecting the LGBT community from discrimination is strong. Consider another May 2021 PPIC poll focusing on a proposed federal law to provide the LGBT community more civil rights protections (Baldassare):
“Existing civil rights laws currently protect people from discrimination in the areas of housing, employment, and public accommodation. The 2021 Equality Act would add sexual orientation and gender identity to these laws. Do you support or oppose the 2021 Equality Act?"
Table \(2\): Support for LGBT Rights
Opinion
All adults
Dems.
Reps.
Ind.
Men
Women
Likely
Voters
Support
71%
88%
41%
64%
65%
76%
70%
Oppose
22
10
48
27
27
18
25
Don’t Know
7
2%
11
10
8
5
5
Support for a Path to Citizenship for Undocumented Immigrants
There is overwhelming support for providing a way for undocumented people to become citizens. Consider the following March 2021 PPIC poll (Baldassare):
“Would you favor or oppose providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants to the US if they met certain requirements including a waiting period, paying fines and back taxes, and passing criminal background checks?”
Table \(3\): Support for Path to Citizenship for Undocumented
Opinion
All Adults
Dem.
Rep.
Ind.
African-
Amer.
Asian-
Amer.
Latinos
Whites
Favor
85
93%
68%
81%
92%
79%
92%
80%
Oppose
13
6
31
14
8
16
7
17
Don’t Know
3
1
1
5
-
5
1
3
Let’s turn to how Californians perceive their ideological identifications and partisanship (Baldassare, May 2021).
Would you consider yourself to be politically:
Table \(4\):Ideological Self-Identification
Ideology
Percentage
Very liberal
15
Somewhat Liberal
19
Middle of the Road
30
Somewhat conservative
19
Very conservative
12
Don’t Know
4
When Californians register to vote, they choose to register as a party member or select “no party preference.” As of February 2021, registration was as follows:
Table \(5\):Registration by Party
Party
Percentage of Californians
Democrats
46.2%
Republicans
24.1
No Party Preference
23.7
Other
6.0
(“Elections CDN: CA Secretary of State”)
These surveys are a small sample of polls that allow us to make some generalizations. First, many issues are marked by substantial differences of opinion driven by divergences among liberals, conservatives, and moderates. Second, these divergences push us into different parties, with more Californians identifying as Democrats than Republicans. Many choose not to identify with any party, suggesting that party identification is weak or absent. Minor parties (discussed in a later chapter) receive little support. Third, even though opinions are often polarized, there are many areas of widespread consensus as well. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/04%3A_Public_Opinion_in_California/4.04%3A_Characterizing_Contemporary_Public_Opinion_in_California.txt |
Now that we have characterized some general trends in California public opinion, our next consideration is about their origins. Political science draws on sociology and psychology to develop a research program to address this question. Sociologists understand people as social animals whose thoughts and actions are best understood as shaped by our environment. Hence, our opinions emerge from our interactions with others. This process of learning about politics is called political socialization. Agents of socialization, such as our family members, our friends, and the media show us how to understand the political world.
A central premise of political science is that our opinions will be self-interested. If we want to understand why a particular group prefers one policy or another, we should understand how the group will gain. We don’t even need to inquire about people’s thinking. For example, as income increases, opposition to taxes will increase, as wealthier people will not want to pay more. Lower-income people will favor more government welfare. Students will want more financial aid for college, etc. Of course, the problem with this approach is that we can only engage in limited inferences about a group’s opinions from its place in society. Moreover, we are not just members of single groups, there are many influences on our thinking, and our opinions may be more complex than a simple economic logic allows. For example, even if I am poor, I may favor low taxes hoping that when I am wealthy someday, the government will not take so much of my money.
Enter the role of political psychology. Political psychologists seek to use the tools of psychology to understand how people understand and evaluate politics. Instead of inferring opinions from social identity, psychologists gather evidence regarding how people are thinking through more complex survey questions and open-ended interviews. One prominent approach is cognitive theory which argues that people organize information using complex cognitive schemas or “mind maps” (Kuklinski 233). We add new information to existing understandings, and if this new information does not necessarily fit with our existing schema, we will likely doubt it. Therefore, public opinion develops from a complex web of social and psychological dynamics. An example from the study of California public opinion illustrates the sociological and psychological approaches.
In the spring of 2021, as the coronavirus pandemic began to wane, families faced a critical educational dilemma. As school partially reopened for in-person instruction, should children return to the classroom or remain at home for online instruction? There was a distinct difference of opinion based on race and ethnicity. According to a USC national poll, 60 percent of Black and Latino parents kept their kids home compared to 30 percent of white parents (“What’s Behind the Racial Divide”). This was reflected in the opposition of urban school districts to fully reopening. For example, the Los Angeles teachers’ union accused the state government of perpetuating structural racism by promoting a premature reopening before vaccines could be widely administered and Covid infection rates could go down (Mays). In the meantime, rural and suburban districts in California made in-person instruction more widely available with higher student attendance rates (Jones).
It is not difficult to explain racial and ethnic disparities in opinion. Black and Latino voters were far more concerned about getting sick from the virus and losing work or being unable to pay for necessities (see table below). A UC Berkeley Institute of Government Studies Survey (DiCamillo) showed the following:
“Voters who report the following as “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problems for themselves or their families due to the coronavirus - overall and by race/ethnicity (among California registered voters)
Table \(1\):Racial and Ethnic Differences of the Impact of Coronavirus Pandemic
Concern
Total
White
Latino
Asian/
Pacific Islanders
Black
Native
American
Getting Sick from the Virus
66
59
79
66
71
57
Not being able to get medical care
45
34
65
44
43
61
Losing a job
40
28
63
39
44
43
In 2020-21, mortality rates caused by the coronavirus were the highest on a per capita basis among Black and Latino residents of California. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect differences in opinions based on differences in ethnic experiences with consequent differences in policies among school districts with different demographic populations. Our explanation is based on inference rather than actual investigation regarding how people are thinking. It is fundamentally sociological.
Now let’s turn to political psychology. To continue with our discussion of coping with the coronavirus pandemic, as the vaccine became widely available in the spring of 2021, public health officials made great efforts to vaccinate as many people as possible. However, vaccination rates varied a great deal based on many factors, including education, income, region of the state, and accessibility of the vaccine. An additional factor that emerged is vaccine hesitancy. Many people were not planning on getting the vaccine for various reasons, including concerns for its safety and efficacy.
In California, among all racial and ethnic groups, African Americans were most hesitant to receive the vaccine (Baldassare May 2021):
Table \(2\):Racial and Ethnic Differences in Vaccine Hesitancy April 2021
Vaccination
All adults
African
Americans
Asian
Americans
Latinos
Whites
Already had vaccine
39
36
46
29
46
As soon as it is available
26
15
35
31
20
A few weeks after
6
2
4
10
3
A few months after
9
18
2
7
9
A year or more after
7
11
9
11
6
Won’t get vaccine
12
18
4
12
16
One factor that is hypothesized to be causing higher levels of vaccine hesitancy among African Americans is the higher level of distrust in health care in general. This distrust is caused by structural discrimination based on race and income (Bazargan). African Americans report lower levels of trust in physicians, worry more about lack of privacy, and are more concerned that they may be the victims of harmful experiments. Studies that show contemporary racial bias in patient treatment show that this distrust is not only the result of historical legacies but remains a current problem. Thus, investigating the underlying trust that respondents have in the healthcare system is necessary to understand attitudes about the vaccine. This requires the use of political psychology to understand public opinion.
4.06: Summary
The study of public opinion remains a very dynamic field. There are significant debates about how much influence public opinion should have on policy making. There are many challenges regarding how to properly study public opinion, with the survey remaining the central tool for research. Public opinion research at the state level is far more limited than at the national level. However, we know that most Californians hold liberal points of view and are more likely to identify with the Democratic rather than the Republican party. The origins of opinions, ideologies, and ultimately partisanship lie with our socialization and the political psychology surrounding our opinion formation.
4.07: Works Cited
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. VII. Considerations by the Way. 1904. The Complete Works, www.bartleby.com/90/0607.html
Baldassare, Mark, and Dean Bonner. “How Do Californians View the COVID-19 Vaccine?” Public Policy Institute of California, Public Policy Institute of California, 5 May 2021, www.ppic.org/blog/how-do-californians-view-the-covid-19-vaccine/
Baldassare, Mark, and Dean Bonner. “How Do Californians View the COVID-19 Vaccine?” Public Policy Institute of California, Public Policy Institute of California, 5 May 2021, www.ppic.org/blog/how-do-californians-view-the-covid-19-vaccine/
Baldassare, Mark. “PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government.” Public Policy Institute of California, Public Policy Institute of California, 26 May 2021, www.ppic.org/publication/ppic-statewide-survey-californians-and-their-government-may-2021/
Baldassare, Mark. “PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government.” Public Policy Institute of California, Public Policy Institute of California, 31 Mar. 2021, www.ppic.org/publication/ppic-statewide-survey-californians-and-their-government-march-2021/
Bazargan, Mohsen, et al. “Discrimination and Medical Mistrust in a Racially and Ethnically Diverse Sample of California Adults.” Annals of Family Medicine, The Annals of Family Medicine, 1 Jan. 2021, www.annfammed.org/content/19/1/4
DiCamillo, Mark. “Release #2021-06: Voters of Color, Especially Latinos and Native Americans, Are Being Disproportionately Affected by the Covid Pandemic.” EScholarship, University of California, 23 Feb. 2021, escholarship.org/uc/item/1ck4s2nq
“Elections CDN: California Secretary of State.” Elections CDN | California Secretary of State, elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/
“EXCERPTS OF INTERVIEW WITH LOUIS FARRAKHAN.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 1 Mar. 1990, www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/03/01/excerpts-of-interview-with-louis-farrakhan/3dd71dd3-bce2-42ea-bd65-78cb3511dda1/
“How the L.A. Times Helped Write Segregation into California's Constitution.” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 21 Oct. 2020, www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-10-21/prop-14-ronald-reagan-la-times-vote-segregation-californias-constitution
Huang, Pien. “'You Can't Treat If You Can't Empathize': Black Doctors Tackle Vaccine Hesitancy.” NPR, NPR, 19 Jan. 2021, www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/01/19/956015308/you-cant-treat-if-you-cant-empathize-black-doctors-tackle-vaccine-hesitancy
Jones, Carolyn. “Why Some School Districts Are Open for in-Person Instruction but in Some Cases, Neighboring Ones Aren't.” EdSource, 25 Feb. 2021, edsource.org/2021/why-some-california-school-districts-are-open-but-in-some-cases-the-neighboring-districts-arent/649892
Kennan, George Frost. American Diplomacy: 1900-1950. New Amer Library, 1985.
Kuklinski, James H. Thinking About Political Psychology. Ed. James H. Kuklinski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Print.
Mays, Mackenzie. “LA Teachers Union Slams California Schools Plan as 'Propagating Structural Racism'.” Politico PRO, 2 Mar. 2021, www.politico.com/states/california/story/2021/03/02/la-teachers-union-slams-state-plan-as-propagating-structural-racism-1366367
“No on Proposition 14: California Fair Housing Initiative Collection.” Online Archive of California, oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt0b69q1bw/entire_text/
Ramishvili, Posted by Levan. “Edmund Burke: Speech on the Reform of the Representation of the Commons in Parliament.” 6 Jan. 2019, matiane.wordpress.com/2018/01/13/edmund-burke-speech-on-the-reform-of-the-representation-of-the-commons-in-parliament/
“What's behind the Racial Divide on School Reopening?” What's Behind the Racial Divide on School Reopening? | Center on Reinventing Public Education, 16 Mar. 2021, www.crpe.org/thelens/whats-behind-racial-divide-school-reopening/ | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/04%3A_Public_Opinion_in_California/4.05%3A_Explaining_Public_Opinion.txt |
Introduction
There are many ways to participate in politics. The most common form is voting. This chapter will describe how to vote, analyze why people choose to vote, and evaluate to what extent voter turnout is important. Voting laws remain a subject of significant contention that deserves our close attention.
5.02: How to Vote
If you are eighteen, a US citizen and resident of California, and not currently serving a state or federal prison term for a felony, you can vote. Go to the RegistertoVote.ca.gov website managed by the California Secretary of State. Here, register to vote using their online system. You will be asked for your California driver’s license (or California identification) number and the last four digits of your social security number. If you do not have one of these documents, a voter registration form will be mailed to you (also available at many government offices). Register to vote at least fifteen days before an election. If you miss this deadline, you can complete the conditional voter registration process and vote with a provisional ballot at a polling place (vote centers or polling place addresses are available on the county registrars’ websites), and your vote will be counted once your eligibility has been verified. If you are sixteen or seventeen, pre-register to vote, and you will be able to vote when you turn eighteen. Re-register if you move or if you want to change your party affiliation.
When registering to vote, you will be asked to declare your party affiliation, or you may choose “No Party Preference.” California has a “top-two primary system,” meaning that every voter receives the same ballot. The top two candidates, regardless of party affiliation, go on to the general election. Except for the US presidential primary races, it doesn’t matter what party affiliation you declare on the registration form. A party may only legally restrict voting to its members for the presidential primary. For example, the California Republican Party only allowed registered Republicans to vote in its presidential primary in 2020. Thus, you may wish to register for your preferred party if you want to choose a presidential candidate in the primary (“Elections and Voter Information”).
Once you are registered, you will receive by mail two to five weeks before the election a sample ballot and a voter information pamphlet. Next, everyone receives their mail-in-ballots which you can choose to return by mail or if you prefer you may vote at a vote center or polling place. Counties offer early voting up to ten days before the election. Regulations regarding early voting and polling place locations vary by county, especially regarding whether the county is participating in the Voter’s Choice Act system.
In 2016, the California state government passed the Voter’s Choice Act (VCA), creating a new voting model for counties to voluntarily join. Several counties piloted the program in 2018, with more counties joining in 2020 (including Los Angeles Country). Fifteen of the twenty-eight counties in California adopted the Voter’s Choice model for the 2022 elections. Instead of neighborhood polling places, the VCA included:
As mentioned above, once you are registered, you will receive a sample ballot in the mail two to five weeks before each election as well as a voter information pamphlet describing all the races. The sample ballot lists where you must vote in person and how you can request a mail-in ballot. In-person voting regulations vary by county. Traditionally, county registrars arrange for neighborhood polling places such as at schools and fire stations. A voter is required to vote at their designated polling place unless they request a mail-in-ballot as an alternative. Counties offer early voting, but the regulations vary from place to place.
For the 2020 elections, the California state government changed the regulations again in response to the pandemic. To reduce exposure to the coronavirus, all voters received vote-by-mail ballots. They could mail the ballots or drop them off at vote centers or neighborhood polling places, depending on the county. It is expected that after the pandemic, counties not following the Voter’s Choice Act will return to a policy of voters needing to request vote-by-mail ballots if they do not wish to vote in person at their designated polling place (California Secretary of State Voter’s Choice Act).
The justifications for the VCA are several. First, it is argued that a consolidated system of vote centers, open for an extended period, boosts voter turnout for people who prefer to vote in person, but find the one-day time frame to be a barrier (Stein and Vonnahme). Second, the consolidated centers are much easier to manage than neighborhood locations, reducing labor costs. The centers have instant access to voter rolls, reducing the need for provisional ballots. Presumably, the consolidated centers will be more secure as fears of electoral hacking and manipulation, even if they are largely unsubstantiated, remain relevant. Third, the VCA, emphasizing voting by mail and vote centers that are open to all people in a county, simply makes voting easier to accomplish (McGhee).
In California, in-person voters do not need to show an identification card (such as a driver’s license) unless they are voting for the first time and have registered using a voter registration form without including a driver’s license (or identification number) and social security number. After voting in person or using a vote-by-mail ballot, voters can verify that their ballots have been counted using an electronic tracking system available at: https://california.ballottrax.net/voter/. In short, the registration and voting process is relatively easy, especially with just a little planning on the part of the voter.
If voting can be accomplished with such relative ease, why isn’t voter turnout higher? Or, perhaps one might ask, why is turnout as high as it is? Below is the data from recent statewide elections.
Table \(1\):Voter Turnout in California
Election Date
Eligible Voters
Turnout
Percentage
2012 Presidential Election
23,803,577
13,202,158
55.47%
2014 Midterm election
24,288,145
7,513,972
30.94%
2016 Presidential Election
24,875,293
14,610,509
58.74%
2018 Midterm Election
25,200,451
12,712,542
50.45%
2020 Presidential Election
25,090, 517
17,785, 151
70.88%
2022 Midterm Election 26,876,800 11,146,820 41.47%
(“Election and Voter Information”) | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/05%3A_Voting_in_California/5.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
Why do some people choose to register and vote, and others, equally eligible, reject participating in the electoral process? Generally, political scientists focus on two variables regarding the social psychology of voting. First, to what extent do people feel confident about their abilities to understand and successfully engage in the voting process? Second, to what extent do people believe that their vote counts, that elections actually matter? The first variable is called internal efficacy, and the second is called external efficacy. According to the research, the higher the score on each of these subjective estimates, the more likely they will vote.
The logic of the impact of internal efficacy on turnout is straightforward. Drawing on an economic model of decision-making, the lower the cost of voting, in terms of time needed to educate oneself, make choices, and actually vote, the more likely a person will vote. The cost of voting will be high in terms of time and effort for someone who is unfamiliar with the issues for each local and state election. For example, we would expect relatively younger people to have lower internal efficacy as they are just beginning to learn about local and state politics and perhaps have recently relocated. The data show this lower turnout.
Who is Likely to Vote? The tables below shows that voter turnout increases with age, education, and income (Baldassare).
Table \(1\): Political Ideology and Voter Turnout (2020)
Political Ideology Likely Voter Not registered
Liberal 37 30
Conservative 33 31
Moderate 30 38
Table \(2\): Age and Voter Turnout (2020)
Age Likely Voter Not registered
18 to 34 22 40
35 to 54 32 41
55 and older 46 19
(Baldassare)
The correlation between external efficacy and voter turnout is also straightforward. The stronger the belief that the political system responds to voters, the greater the likelihood of voting. Multiple factors influence external efficacy. How much confidence do voters have that the voting technology will accurately tabulate their voters, free from error or fraud? Even if the voting system is sound, do the rules of the game alienate the citizen from the government? For example, the winner-take-all system for the U.S. presidential electoral college vote (Nebraska and Maine are exceptions) means that voters of the minority party in a state may feel disenfranchised.
A similar conclusion may be reached by voters who are in legislative districts (local, state, or national) that are perceived to have been drawn to favor one party (gerrymandering), leaving the minority party members feeling that it is hopeless to vote since their candidates are unlikely to win. Once candidates are in office, voters may perceive that politicians are so trapped in the rat race of campaign fundraising that they have little time for them.
A 2015 Public Policy Institute of California poll showed that lack of confidence in the political system was the number one reason that people did not register to vote (Baldassare). One might expect that Californian voters might have greater faith in direct democracy as a way to check the legislature and sidestep problems caused by special interests in Sacramento and gerrymandered electoral districts. A 2013 Public Policy Institute poll of California voters found two-thirds of Californians are somewhat or very satisfied with direct democracy. However, majorities also worried that special interests were controlling direct democracy.
This survey showed that majorities favored direct democracy reforms that would allow for greater deliberation and transparency. This would include the legislature working with initiative sponsors, the legislature being able to amend initiatives after they passed, and greater deliberation about initiatives including volunteer-only signature gathering, televised debates, and independent commissions to evaluate and give recommendations to voters (“Reforming California’s Initiative Process”).
To summarize, the voter engages in a cost-benefit calculus regarding the choice to vote. The enforcement of voting rights and the successful implementation of efficient procedures for voting provide the basis for promoting high turnout. Then the subjective evaluations of our abilities (internal efficacy) and how responsive the political system is to our vote (external efficacy) will impact turnout.
This suggests that a variety of public policies may increase turnout. First, when the efficiency of voting (e.g., vote by mail, accessible vote centers with same-day registration) is improved, more people will vote. Second, an educational system that socializes the youth to understand politics and mobilizes them to vote through pre-registration should help. Third, electoral reforms, such as ending gerrymandering, may improve external efficacy and lead to higher voter turnout (California).
For Your Consideration
Think of someone you know who is eligible to vote. Do you believe they voted? Consider some of the characteristics of likely voters above and some of the reasons why people say they do not vote in the table below. Then, if possible, ask the person you are thinking about whether they voted and the reasons for why they did or did not vote. To what extent is what you found consistent with the survey data?
Table \(2\):Why Registered Voters Don’t Vote, 2015
Reason
Percentage
Lack of Interest
36
Time, schedule constraints
32
Confidence in Elections
10
Process Related
9
Other
10
(Baldassare)
To What Extent Should Voter Turnout Matter?
Most political scientists would argue that increasing voter turnout is good. We celebrate the fact that 70% of Californians voted in 2020, a jump of 15% from the previous presidential election. We bemoan the fact that in a midterm election, it might only be 35%, or if a county or municipal election was held in an odd year, we might only have ten or twenty percent of the electorate voting. A celebration of higher turnout may be based on two arguments.
First, voting is good in itself. In a constitutional democracy, the people are sovereign, and voting is a way for the people to exercise their power. Hence the more people who vote, the better. Just the act of voting, regardless of how people vote, is to be applauded, enhancing the political system’s legitimacy. Moreover, it is also good for the individual citizen. We are better people by reflecting on and participating in civic life. Voting is an act of altruism, like serving on a jury or donating blood. It builds character.
Second, voting has instrumental value. Government policy should reflect the demands of the people and the function of elections is to identify the demands that are most salient and hold elected officials accountable for addressing them. The higher the turnout, the more an election reflects the diversity of opinion. If there are distinct differences of opinion based on income, education, or any other demographic characteristics, increasing turnout should better communicate the needs of previous nonvoters to the government. These two arguments—that increased voter turnout increases political legitimacy and improves policy representation in a constitutional democracy—suggest that as a society we should introduce reforms that enhance turnout. The question, of course, is what sorts of reforms are appropriate.
To help us consider this issue, let’s conceive of a spectrum of voting procedures that we could place along a continuum of participation from laws that suppress the vote to laws that protect the right to vote, laws that incentivize voting by encouraging voters to exercise their voice, to the extreme of mandating that everyone votes with penalties for those who do not.
At the far left, a political system devoted to the suppression of the vote might allow only a small share of the total population to vote, and it may limit which offices can be popularly elected or what kinds of policies may be subject to direct democracy. Voter suppression was the norm in the United States from its founding until the Voting Rights Act of 1965. One may argue that voter suppression continues today with efforts to reduce electoral competition through gerrymandering or other ways to make it more difficult for people to vote.
Second, a political system devoted to rights might seek to legislate and safeguard universal suffrage for everyone. The best examples are the successive amendments and voting rights laws passed at the national and state levels. Currently, debates about rights include if and when former felons may regain voting rights or if the voting age should be reduced further to allow teenagers to vote.
Third, a political system already devoted to rights might incentivize voting. Much of this is through the educational system and the social system. We encourage young people to vote; state law allows workers time off to go and vote (although they can't take the whole day off!), and civic groups and the media praise the act of voting as virtuous.
Fourth, a political system might recognize voting as so vital that it requires almost all people to vote and imposes penalties on people who don’t. One might argue that elections are the only way for the government to accurately reflect the will of the people and hence requiring the expression of that will should be coerced. This may seem rather strange. However, there are precedents. States mandate jury duty but provide waivers for people who are unable to serve for reasons of health or ability. Many other democratic countries, such as Australia, require citizens to vote, and when they do not, a fine is imposed. If something is so important, why not simply mandate it?
In the pursuit of universal suffrage, should we be free not to vote? Compulsory voting is not a popular idea in this country. Perhaps Americans value giving people the freedom not to participate. Requiring the expression of opinion, even through a secret ballot, may violate the First Amendment. Secondly, would the quality of voting suffer in the pursuit of increasing the quantity of voting? Would more voters be making poor decisions? The virtue of an act may also diminish if it is required.
Considering this range of possible policies, from suppression to coercion, suggests that our focus on only one statistic, voter turnout, is incomplete. We want increased voting to be voluntary and thoughtful. The choices need to be meaningful for the voters, a real competition of ideas and candidates. The citizens’ right to vote must be safeguarded, and the citizens’ ability to have the information necessary to make good choices must also be promoted. Voting rights deserve protection; electoral laws can make it easier to vote (such as how the Voter’s Choice Act provides more time and ways to vote). Voters must commit to educating themselves: considering the issues carefully, determining what is right in terms of the promotion of constitutional values, and thinking about what is best for the public good and not just what is in their self-interest. In other words, voting is part of the practice of citizenship. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/05%3A_Voting_in_California/5.03%3A_Why_Californians_Vote.txt |
We might think that there would not be any controversies about elections in a country with a 230-year history of democracy. We would be wrong. Americans have argued and continue to argue about many issues: Who should have the right to vote? What regulations are reasonable and which are just efforts to disenfranchise people for, perhaps, partisan gain? Who should decide, the states or the federal government? A little historical discussion provides some necessary context for understanding current controversies.
The Elections Clause of the US Constitution establishes that the states and the federal government shall share the responsibility of holding federal elections. States are primarily responsible for conducting the electoral process, but Congress establishes uniform procedures for federal elections. For example, Congress sets the date for the Presidential general election and requires that states conduct district rather than at-large elections for representatives. The U.S. Constitution states:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators (Article 1, Sec. 4, clause 1).
The expansion of suffrage occurred at both the state and the national levels. For example, states individually removed property requirements for voting in the pre-Civil War era. A few states (New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) extended suffrage to Black men before the Civil War. The nationalization of voting rights begins with the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution which provided that “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
Unfortunately, states and local governments often passed laws that undermined the Fifteenth Amendment. After Reconstruction ended in 1877, many states passed discriminatory laws that effectively removed minorities and many poor whites from voting. These included literacy tests and poll taxes. The era of “Jim Crow,” as it came to be called, disenfranchised most African Americans in the South.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Jim Crow became illegal when the civil rights movement, led by organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, successfully persuaded the US Congress and the US Supreme Court to make the fight for equal rights a federal responsibility. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was the most significant legislation expanding suffrage at this time. Congress passed this landmark legislation at the urging of President Johnson after the events of “Bloody Sunday” in Selma, Alabama, when state troopers attacked peaceful civil rights marchers. The law begins, “An Act to enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States….”
One hundred years after the end of the Civil War, the enforcement of voting rights for all people regardless of race and color led to a dramatic increase in voter turnout. The Act had real teeth. Section 2 stated:
“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any Citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”
Voters were now able to go to federal court and have state and local laws overturned. An additional tool to prevent discriminatory practice was Section 5. States that had a history of discrimination (voting tests in place in 1964 and less than 50% turnout in 1964) could not change voting laws without “pre-clearance” from the US Department of Justice. The Voting Rights Act had a revolutionary effect on suffrage. Black voter turnout immediately increased, although it was not until the end of the twentieth century that African American turnout was very near that of white voters. In the 2008 and 2012 elections, African-American turnout exceeded that of white voters. The Census Bureau graph below shows this change.
The fight for universal suffrage had been purchased by removing significant authority from local and state governments. Naturally, this would cause resentment and lead to efforts to reclaim authority from the federal government. In 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder, Alabama successfully argued before the US Supreme Court that Section 5, the Voting Rights Act preclearance procedure was unconstitutional because it treated states differently based on fifty-year-old data and practices. States could now pass voting and electoral laws without needing authorization from the US Justice Department.
In 2021, the US Supreme Court further limited the impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Bronivich v. Democratic National Committee. The case focused on the interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. How was discrimination to be determined: whether there was an intent to discriminate or if there was just a disparate (unequal) impact on different ethnic or racial groups? The state of Arizona had passed new electoral laws such as one that prohibited “ballot harvesting,” or allowing non-family members to collect and deliver ballots. Arizona argued that there was no discriminatory intent, only an effort to increase electoral integrity. Voting rights groups argued that the law imposed a greater hardship on Native Americans, many of whom lived on reservations in rural areas far away from mailboxes and postal services. Therefore, the Arizona law should be ruled unconstitutional because of the unequal racial impact.
The Court ruled in favor of Arizona. Voting regulations that had no racist intent but had a racially disparate impact were now constitutional. Lower courts should examine the totality of circumstances weighing the need to safeguard confidence in the electoral process against the increased inconvenience experienced by voters.
In the wake of the 2020 elections, voting regulations are receiving a great deal of political attention. President Trump’s arguments that there was voter fraud that contributed to his electoral defeat have led to many Republican-leaning states passing restrictive voting laws such as limiting vote-by-mail ballots, reducing early voting, and increasing identification requirements. On the other hand, more Democratic-leaning states are continuing to work toward making voting more convenient.
In 2021, the House of Representatives controlled by a thin majority of Democrats, passed sweeping voting rights legislation and many electoral reforms (HR 1). They include national automatic voter registration, uniform regulations for early voting, replacing legislatively-drawn electoral districts with ones drawn by citizen redistricting commissions, campaign finance reform, and returning pre-clearance for states that experience many allegations of voter disenfranchisement. Conservatives argued that these efforts amount to a federal commandeering of state responsibilities, favoring, instead, the responsibility of states to ensure fair and free elections. The bill died in the Senate in 2022.
The likelihood is that there will be no new national plan to address voting rights. Instead, state policies will diverge more than in the immediate past, although no one is arguing that states will return to the severity of Jim Crow-era disenfranchisement. More Democratic states will continue to liberalize voting regulations; more Republican states, seeking to address voter concerns about fraud, will do the opposite. In California, more counties are adopting the Voter’s Choice Act for the 2022 electoral cycle, making voting more convenient for millions of more people.
Another significant electoral reform in California is the California Voters Rights Act of 2002 (CVRA). The focus of this act is to encourage locally elected bodies to be ethnically and racially representative of the people they represent. In particular, the concern is that the rights of voters based on race, color, or language to influence the outcome of an election are diluted by at-large elections (where representatives are elected in city-wide ballots).
Residents can use the CVRA to sue local governments, asking that a city switch from at-large elections to district elections. District elections may better reflect neighborhood demographic composition or the general demographics of an entire city. Under the threat of lawsuits, many city councils, school districts, and special districts are rapidly changing their electoral systems. By 2022, at least 88 cities in California changed to district elections. A survey of governments that have replaced at-large with district elections shows an increase in minority representation (Richomme). The pandemic delayed implementation but this change will continue in coming years (League of California Cities).
In summary, voting rights continue to be a very significant issue. Conservatives worry about voter fraud, liberals about voter suppression. In California, the trend is toward making voting more accessible and reforming the drawing of electoral districts to represent all ethnic and racial groups better. However, many of these reforms are dependent on a federal judiciary to rule that California reforms are consistent with federal law.
5.05: Summary
Voting is the most common form of democratic participation and is at the very heart of constitutional democracy. The state of California has implemented many reforms to make voter registration and voting itself more convenient. Nonetheless, at least one-third of eligible Californians choose not to vote. Certainly, individual factors such as learning about the election and mastering the mechanics of voting can have an influence. However, there are also more underlying popular doubts about whether the government has the ability and willingness to respond to our demands. Alienation from voting has long been a cause of reduced turnout. In the last few years, debates about how to address low voter turnout are now complicated by allegations that easy access to voting leads to fraud. Efforts to protect election integrity may have an unequal impact on different demographic groups in our society, leading to the unintended consequence of decreasing confidence in democratic decision-making.
5.06: Works Cited
Baldassare, Mark. “California's Likely Voters.” Public Policy Institute of California, 2020, www.ppic.org/publication/cal...likely-voters/
Baldassare, Mark. “Voter Participation in California.” Public Policy Institute of California, 2015, www.ppic.org/publication/voter-participation-in-california/
California, State of. “‘Fair Representation—Democracy at Work!" California Citizens Redistricting Commission, wedrawthelines.ca.gov/
“California Voter's Choice Act.” California Secretary of State, www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voters-choice-act
Department of Finance State. “2016 Vintage Demographic Research Unit Population Projection for California.” DRU Projections Pyramid, www.dof.ca.gov/Forecasting/Demographics/Data_In_Action/Visualizations/projpyramid_working_V2.html#!y=2019&a=18,35&g
“Elections and Voter Information.” California Secretary of State, www.sos.ca.gov/elections/
"H.R.1 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): For the People Act of 2021." Congress.gov, Library of Congress, 11 March 2021, www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1
League of California Cities. “The California Voting Rights Act: Recent Legislation and Litigation Outcomes. 2018, www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Member-Engagement/Professional-Departments/City-Attorneys/Library/2018/Spring-Conference-2018/5-2018-Spring;-Aziz-Johnson-Markman-California-Vot.aspx
McGhee, Eric, et al. “How Did the Voter’s Choice Act Affect Turnout in 2018?” California Journal of Politics and Policy 12:1escholarship.org/uc/item/8951w9td
“Reforming California's Initiative Process.” Public Policy Institute of California, Oct. 2013, www.ppic.org/publication/reforming-californias-initiative-process/
Richomme, O. (2019). "Fair" Minority Representation and the California Voting Rights Act. National Political Science Review, 20(2), 55-75, www.proquest.com/openview/7963e111e0cfdd3c95fb69ccfe4c558f/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=25850
“Say Goodbye to Your Local Precinct. Voting in California Is About to Change Dramatically.” Los Angeles Times, 31 May 2019, www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kousser-mcghee-romero-elections-vote20190531-story.html
Stein, Robert M., and Greg Vonnahme. “Engaging the Unengaged Voter: Vote Centers and Voter Turnout.” The Journal of Politics, vol. 70, no. 2, 2008, pp. 487–497., doi:10.1017/s0022381608080456
U.S. Census Bureau. “Historical Reported Voting Rates.” 7 Oct. 2019, www.census.gov/library/visualizations/time-series/demo/voting-historical-time-series.html | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/05%3A_Voting_in_California/5.04%3A_Considering_Current_Controversies.txt |
Introduction
Republican! Democrat! Red vs. Blue! Then there are the minor parties: American Independent, Green, Libertarians, Peace and Freedom… In this chapter, we will describe the parties that are on the California ballot, considering their platforms and who is likely to register for each one. We will analyze the role of parties in the political system and consider different perspectives about the value of parties.
6.02: Parties on the California Ballot
There are dozens of political parties in the United States. Given the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment, anyone can start a party, and voters can simply write candidates’ names on their ballots (Here is a website that maintains a list of many of these parties). However, to be listed on the ballot by the Secretary of State, California law requires that a political party qualify in one of two ways: by voter registration or petition. The voter registration method requires .33% of the total number of registered voters to complete voter registration affidavits and write in the new party’s name (in 2021, 73,109 voters). These cards are distributed and collected by the new party and delivered to each county’s election officials. This must be done 154 days before a primary election or 123 days before a presidential general election. Secondly, a new party may collect signatures by petition equal to 10% of the number of people who voted in the last gubernatorial election (in 2021, 1,271,255 voters). These petitions must be submitted to county officials 135 days before the primary or general election (“Political Party Qualification”).
Once qualified, a party maintains its status on the ballot by retaining at least 0.067% of the total number of registered voters and having at least one of its candidates for statewide office receive 2% of the vote; or it can retain .33% of the total number of registered voters prior to the next election. Let’s investigate the six political parties and the “no party preference” category on the California registration application.
As of February 2023, the Secretary of State's office estimated that there were approximately 26,718,486 eligible voters of which about 83% registered:
Table \(1\): Registration by Party Preference (2023)
Registered Voters
Democratic
Republican
No Party Preference
Minor Parties/Other/Unknown
21,980,768
(82.27% of eligible voters)
10,305,901
(46.89%)
5,236,952
(23.83%)
4,941,314
(22.48%)
1,495,601
(6.81%)
Of the minor parties, registration data showed:
Table \(2\): Minor Party Registration (2023)
Minor Parties/Unknown/Other
American Independent
Green
Libertarian
Peace & Freedom
Unknown/ Other
1,495,601
(6.81%)
793,272
(3.61%)
97,253
(0.44%)
234,743
(1.07%)
125,196
(0.57%)
246,137
(1.12%%)
The trend in statewide voting registration is straightforward: Democrats are gaining registered voters, Republicans are losing them, and the number who express no party preference is almost the same as the Republican Party (See Table below ). The American Independent Party is the most popular of the minor parties, probably because voters mistakenly think they are registering as independents.
Table \(3\): Trends in Voter Registration
Party
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
2016
2020
2022
Democratic
47.2%
45.4%
43.0%
44.4%
43.7%
44.9%
46.1%
46.8%
Republican
36.4%
34.9%
34.7%
31.4%
29.4%
26.0%
24.2%
24.9%
No Party
Preference
11.3%
14.4%
17.7%
19.9%
20.9%
24.3%
24.0%
22.8%
6.03: Selecting a Party under the Top-Two Primary System
When Californians register to vote, they select a political party or choose “no party preference," which is essentially registering as an independent. Until recently, party registration mattered much more because California had a closed primary held usually in June to select the candidates for the general election in November. A registered party member received a party ballot with only candidates from their party running for each office. The candidates from each party that received the most votes went on to the general election in November. A typical general election race was then a runoff among the winning candidates from each of the parties.
In 2010, Proposition 14 shifted the primary election to become more candidate-centered and eliminate the less popular candidates from the general election ballot. At the time, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger actively promoted this proposition to reduce partisanship by encouraging primary candidates to shift more toward the center of the political spectrum to attract more voters. Under this system, everyone receives the same ballot for most races, regardless of their party registration or whether they expressed “no party preference.” The top two candidates from the primary go on to the November runoff. They may be the top Republican and top Democrat. However, there might be a runoff between two people of the same party, or perhaps with candidates who are not identifying themselves with any party.
There are two exceptions to the top-two primary system: the presidential primary and the selection of political party central committee members for each county. The latter generates little popular attention. Voters care far more about the presidential race.
The presidential primaries are still a closed or modified closed primary election, depending upon the choice of the party, because the US Supreme Court has ruled that the right to freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment gives parties control over who votes in their primary races for president (California Democratic Party v. Jones, 2000). In 2020, the Green, Peace and Freedom, and Republican parties opted for closed primaries, allowing only registered party members to vote. On the other hand, the American Independent, the Democratic, and the Libertarian parties opted for modified closed primaries, allowing “no party preference” registered voters to vote. The parties decide whether to opt for a closed or modified system before each presidential election. With mail-in-ballots, the no party preference voters have to request a new ballot by mail or go to a vote center or polling place to vote. The Secretary of State communicated to voters before November 2020 election regarding what they must do:
In short, except for the presidential primary, party registration has no practical consequence. However, given the importance of the presidential race and the need to get the correct ballot in time to vote, it makes sense to register for a preferred party in advance. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/06%3A_Political_Parties/6.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
Party politics in California follows national trends. In the 1850s, most Californians were against slavery which helped the Republicans (the GOP, or Grand Old Party) organize as a new party. In the postbellum period, Republicans continued to dominate state politics following national trends. In 1910, under the leadership of Governor Hiram Johnson, Progressive Republicans led constitutional reforms to add direct democracy. However, when the country underwent a Democratic realignment during the 1930s, a majority of Californians also registered as Democrats. Nonetheless, because one of the Progressive reforms allowed politicians to register as candidates in more than one party primary (cross filing), the Republican Party was able to maintain its dominance of state politics.
“Moderation is best. Avoid all extremes.” Governor Goodwin Knight’s motto (1953-1958) nicely summarized Republican strategy in the 1940s and 1950s (Putnam). Republicans presided over an era of rapid government expansion as the state coped with dramatic postwar population growth. The “neo-progressive” policy approach of pragmatic, moderate, and activist government, reinforced by the cross-filing system allowing a candidate to run in both Republican and Democratic primary races, encouraged candidates to pursue moderate policies to attract the most number of voters.
Republican Governor Ronald Reagan (1967-1975) continued the Party’s relatively moderate course and attracted many more voters with his anti-tax and “law and order” rhetoric, echoing Republican President Richard Nixon’s relatively moderate policy approach at the national level. A majority of Californians, attracted by a mix of economic and social conservatism, also voted for Reagan for President (1981-1989) and his successor George H.W. Bush.
The popularity of the Republican Party in the state faltered in the 1990s when it shifted more to the right with a strong anti-immigrant push led by Governor Pete Wilson to pass Proposition 187 in 1994. This Republican-sponsored referendum required state officials to report undocumented people to federal authorities and deny all social services to them, including schooling for their children. While this proposition passed with a large majority, in the long term it alienated the growing number of moderate and liberal voters in the state. Since the late 1990s, California Republican representation in Sacramento and in Washington D.C. has dwindled, without any statewide victory since Arnold Schwarzenegger’s election as governor in the recall election of Democratic Gray Davis in 2003.
The 2020 California Republican Party platform emphasizes economic and social conservatism, including lower taxes, less business regulation, vigorous enforcement of immigration laws, gun rights, and pro-life policies. It opposes strong environmental regulation, affirmative action, and LGBT rights.
Historically, California Democrats trailed Republicans in organization and influence. Divided in their support for the Confederacy during the Civil War, the Party suffered from decades of poor organization. It was not until 1959 that Democratic Governor Pat Brown ushered in a new era of Democratic influence. The two major parties became quite competitive with one another for the rest of the century. By the 1990s, as the Republican Party became more conservative, Democrats gradually gained more seats in the state legislature. By 2018, the Democrats had supermajorities in both houses, meaning they had enough votes to meet the two-thirds majority to raise taxes or potentially override a governor’s veto. Additionally, all the elected officers of the state executive branch were Democratic, and most California representatives in Washington were Democratic.
The Democratic Party of California’s platform is economically and socially liberal. The Party promotes “economic opportunity” and “economic justice.” Democrats pursue expansive government programs to help Californians address many social, economic, educational, and environmental challenges. The platform supports equality and diversity for all residents, extending and enforcing more civil rights.
Minor parties on a ballot are often called “third parties” because one of them comes in third place. A minor party typically represents a narrow slice of the ideological spectrum. A dedicated activist group of “true believers” receives a tiny fraction of the vote from a loyal following, election after election. The goal of the true believer is to make a statement rather than win. However, if a minor party starts gaining more support, a larger party will often adopt some of its messages to “steal” some of its votes. For example, the Republican Party may adopt a strongly anti-government message of a far-right party. The Democratic Party may adopt an environmental or social platform of a left-wing party. Thus, a minor party performs a Sisyphean task: as soon as it achieves some success, new supporters are co-opted by a larger party, and it returns to relative obscurity.
In California, the minor parties that are qualified for the ballot have their origins in the political struggles of prior decades. The Peace and Freedom Party emerged from the anti-Vietnam War protests of the 1960s, the American Independent Party from Southern segregationist George Wallace’s backlash against integration in the 1960s, the Libertarians as part of a neoconservative backlash against the Republican Party, and the Green Party from the environmental movement of the 1970s. Let’s examine each of these minor parties.
The Peace and Freedom Party
In the late 1960s, the Democratic Party fractured over the issue of the Vietnam War. President Johnson and his heir apparent for the Democratic nomination, Hubert Humphrey, favored continued support of the South Vietnamese government in its struggle against communism. Many more liberal Democrats favored withdrawal. In California, there was enough support for the antiwar position for a new party, the Peace and Freedom Party, to qualify for the ballot in January 1968. The presidential candidate was Eldridge Cleaver, a civil rights activist. However, because he would not be 35 by the time of the inauguration, California did not list his name on the ballot. As the campaign of 1968 unfolded, many Democrats broke with the Johnson and Humphrey pro-war position, including Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy. Kennedy was assassinated on the night of the California primary in June, and Humphrey went on to win the nomination. Eldridge Cleaver received .38% of the California vote in November (Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election).
In the 1970s, the PFP was unable to maintain its status on the ballot in other states due to low popularity. However, the California PFP consistently garnered enough support to stay on the ballot until 1998, when it fell below the 2% threshold. It regained its status in 2003 and remains on the ballot, fielding left-of-center candidates.
The Peace and Freedom Party characterizes itself as “committed to socialism, democracy, ecology, feminism, and racial equality.” It commits itself to a wide range of socialist positions about state, national and global positions (“PFP”). In 2020, labor activist Gloria La Riva ran as the PFP nominee. She was also the nominee of the Party for Socialism and Liberation. She favored many standard socialist positions promoting economic equality, workers’ rights, stopping racism, and respecting treaties with Native Americans. La Riva received .05% of the national vote and .03% of the California vote (Federal Election Commission and “California’s Gubernatorial Election”).
The American Independent Party
At about the same time that the Peace and Freedom Party emerged, Southern segregationist Governor George Wallace of Alabama left the Democratic Party and established his independent candidacy to run for President. The American Independent Party (AIP) formed in California and successfully gathered enough signatures to qualify Wallace for the California ballot. Wallace received seven percent of the California vote in 1968. The Party has been active in California ever since, but it was sometimes subsumed under other national minor parties, most recently the Constitution Party. Although its roots lie in southern segregationism, its platform today focuses on promoting very conservative economic and social positions. Its manifesto begins, “We believe in liberty and justice for all under God. We want to keep America independent and safe. We will protect the family, marriage and work. We believe in individual responsibility and free enterprise…” The AIP Presidential Candidate, Rocky de La Fuente received .06% of the vote nationally and .3% of the vote in California (“General Election” and FEC). La Fuente was also the candidate for the Reform Party and the Alliance Party.
Based on the number of people registering as members of the AIP, it is the third-largest party in California. Given its far-right positions and low support of its candidates, it is easy to suspect that voters are erroneously registering as AIP members when they intend to register as “no party preference.” A Los Angeles Times poll of AIP members partially confirmed this suspicion: 58.9% of respondents were unaware that they had registered for a political party rather than as an independent (“Are You an Independent Voter…”).
The Libertarian Party
In 1971, the Libertarian Party (LP) was established by conservatives concerned that the Republican Party under President Nixon was no longer the party of small government. Nixon had instituted price controls in response to inflation, removed the currency from the gold standard, and supported most of the social welfare programs established by Democrats. The Party was influenced by Ayn Rand’s philosophy of objectivism, popularized by her many science fiction books such as Atlas Shrugged. The LP organized state and local party organizations rather quickly as the country became more conservative in the 1970s. By 1980, the LP was on the ballot in all fifty states and received about 1% of the vote.
The platform of the Libertarian Party (LP) begins, “As Libertarians, we seek a world of liberty: a world in which all individuals are sovereign over their own lives and are not forced to sacrifice their values for the benefit of others…” The Party appeals to both liberals and conservatives. The LP emphasizes personal liberty regarding sexuality and drug use and emphasizes the same for gun rights, free enterprise, and taxation. In 2020, the Libertarian presidential candidate Jo Jorgensen called for dismantling social security and replacing it with individual retirement accounts, stopping construction of the border wall, and ending state mask mandates to fight the pandemic. Jorgensen received 1.1% of the California vote for President and 1.18% nationally. Its central organizing principle is minimizing the role of government in society.
The Green Party
Just as other minor parties have grown out of social movements, the Green Party has its roots in the environmental movement that achieved widespread support in the 1970s as Americans realized the impact of industrial civilization on the natural environment. The Greens began to organize first in Minnesota in 1984. In part, they emulated the development of Green parties in Europe. The organizing conference of the Greens proclaimed a set of principles that continues to guide their policy positions. They include ecology, sustainable economics, democracy, nonviolence, and social justice. By the late 1980s, state parties were forming around the country. In 1992, the Greens qualified for the California ballot. The Party received its most notoriety in 2000 when its Presidential candidate, Ralph Nader, garnered enough popularity (2.74% of the national vote) to help shift the electoral college vote to Republican George Bush. By that time, it was on the ballot in 43 states (“Early History…”).
In 2020, environmentalist and labor activist Howie Hawkins ran for President as the Green Party nominee. Among other positions, he favored Medicare for all, the “Green New Deal,” and a \$20 minimum wage. The Green Party received .5% of the vote in the California general election for president and .26% nationally. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/06%3A_Political_Parties/6.04%3A_The_Menu_of_Qualified_Parties.txt |
Political scientists conceptualize party membership as a long-standing identification that we learn from our families as part of our political socialization. In this view, we don’t act as individuals, researching and evaluating party platforms in terms of our personal interests and ethics. Instead, party membership becomes rooted in history; for example, the impact of the Civil War and the Great Depression shaped the partisanship of subsequent generations through the family transmission of partisanship. The Civil War pushed many northern and western states toward the Republican Party and southern states toward the Democrats. The popularity of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs and leadership during World War II motivated many more Americans to vote Democratic. Then, beginning in the 1960s, many southern whites abandoned the Democratic Party because they opposed the Party’s pro-civil rights policies. Younger southern whites today may not share their parents’ segregationist views, but they have been socialized by where they grew up to become Republicans.
This theory of political socialization lumps people together in various demographic groups who are buffeted by historical forces and pass on political viewpoints to subsequent generations. The sociological analysis of party identification has been supplemented by an alternative approach in political science, the rational choice theory of politics (Downs), which centers the explanation of party identification on the short term economic calculations by the voters.
Consider an economic theory of party preference. Begin with the premise that voters have distinct opinions. Parties are vote-seeking organizations that use their party platforms to attract supporters in the same way businesses seek customers with advertisements. The voters then give their support to the party that promises their preferred policies. If the party delivers, then they are reelected. Seminal events in American history, such as the Civil War and the Great Depression, fade in importance. Instead, voters focus on their own material success. They ask: which party will help the state economically flourish, reduce crime, provide good schooling, and achieve many other necessary policies? The short-term rational calculus is far more relevant than long-term political socialization.
With these two theories in mind, the table below provides some socio-demographic snapshots of California’s two major parties and independents. The numbers for minor parties are just too small for large-scale survey research.
Table \(1\): Political Ideology of California Likely Voters in 2020 (Baldassare)
Political Ideology Republicans Democrats Independents
Conservative 77 11 31
Moderate 19 28 41
Liberal 4 61 27
Table \(2\):Income and California Likely Voters
Income Republicans Democrats Independents
Under 40000 22 32 20
40000 to 80000 29 26 28
80000 or more 49 42 52
Table \(3\): Age and California Likely Voters
Age Republicans Democrats Independents
18 to 34 13 28 20
35 to 54 29 29 40
55 and older 58 43 41
Table \(4\): Gender and California Likely Voters
Gender Republicans Democrats Independents
Men 53 41 59
Women 47 59 41
Table \(5\): Race/Ethnicity and California Likely Voters
Race/Ethnicity Republicans Democrats Independents
African American 1 9 5
Asian American 10 16 17
Latino 13 26 20
White 72 46 54
Other/Multiracial 3 4 5
The distinctions between Republicans and Democrats are relatively straightforward. Republicans are older and more likely to be white, male, and wealthier than Democrats. These California distinctions parallel national trends. Republicans support their party because of its consistent pro-business platform, emphasizing less regulation and lower taxation. This foundation lies in a nineteenth-century laissez-faire philosophy. Older voters are also more likely to support social conservatism. Historically, Democrats gained more support in California as the working class grew with the growth of factory jobs. Then as the population became more multicultural in the last few decades, Democrats gained more support because of their solid support of civil rights legislation.
We can only draw so many conclusions based on this demographic data. First, many electoral outcomes are caused by short-term factors. For example, we know from voter turnout data that the demographic groups that historically vote Republican are more likely to vote. So, if turnout surges across the whole voting population, we can expect a shift toward Democrats and independents. Elections are often won at the margins; just a shift of a few percentage points based on immediate or temporary voter impressions can alter which party controls the government.
Second, what do we know about the 24% of Californians who registered to vote without expressing a party preference? Political scientists know from national studies of voters that people who call themselves independents actually are “leaners” toward one party or the other regarding their actual voting behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that a 2018 Public Policy Institute poll found that 43% of California independents leaned toward the Democratic Party, 29% toward the Republican, and only 28% toward neither of the two parties. Independents have an unfavorable view of both parties (58% unfavorable rating of Democrats and 69% unfavorable rating of Republicans). Ideologically, however, their issues stances fall between Democrats and Republicans, expressing more moderate viewpoints on immigration and climate change than Democrats and more liberal views than Republicans (Baldassare).
The presence of one-fourth of the electorate that has little party allegiance leads to some interesting dynamics. First, to win statewide support, a candidate needs to be mindful of these centrist voters. Second, given the independent’s anti-party stance, politics may become quite volatile. Their relative skepticism of established parties may lead to direct democracy campaigns—initiatives, referenda, and recalls—that can catch on like wildfire and overturn the status quo. Third, given the relatively moderate nature of these voters, there may be room for one or the other of the major parties to gain quite a bit more support by heading more toward the center of the spectrum. Or, perhaps even more radically, a new party might develop that seeks to mobilize the center. The top-two primary system, and the rules of a recall election, where the contender with the most votes can win once the electorate has rejected the incumbent, may allow savvy candidates to mobilize these moderate independent voters.
It may be wise to consider both the social and individual factors that determine party preferences. As voters, we think about both historical and contemporary issues. In a time of rapid change, a successful party must provide both continuity for voters and a promising path to the future.
For Your Consideration
Think about your political socialization. First of all, did you grow up in a family where you spoke about politics? If so, how would you characterize the viewpoints that were expressed? Second, has your socialization shaped your preference toward one political party? If so, how? If you really don’t perceive much of a connection between your family and your points of view, how did you arrive at your preference regarding your party identification? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/06%3A_Political_Parties/6.05%3A_The_Sociology_of_Parties.txt |
Political scientists often say that in comparison to other representative democracies, parties are relatively weak in the United States. They point to the fact that we have candidate-centered elections, meaning that candidates choose to run for office rather than being selected by party leaders. For local and county elected offices, by law (with its origins in the Progressive era), elections are nonpartisan. Parties do not formally organize the proceedings of city councils or county supervisors. Moreover, we have thriving mechanisms of direct democracy. Initiatives and referenda are often nonpartisan, focusing on how particular issues should be addressed. In California, the top-two primary makes registering for a particular party less important (except for the vote for president) and hence one-fourth don’t even bother expressing a preference.
Despite these facts, political parties still have very significant functions in the political system. Political scientists focus on three roles: how parties organize the electorate, their role as mediating institutions between voters and the government, and how parties organize the state legislature. These three roles are called: party-in-the-electorate, party organizations, and party-in-government.
The party organizes the electorate by creating coherent points of view and platforms for the voter to understand and support, essentially creating teams of rivals to rationally manage the complexity of politics in a mass democracy. Voters participate in the political system as party members, identifying with one party or another. Even defining themselves as “independents,” voters think in terms of parties.
Parties are brands that are crucial to attaining office. Choose the wrong brand and political ambition is likely foiled, especially if a candidate embraces a third party. However, a candidate still personalizes his candidacy within the brand. For Democrats, the division is often between “progressives” who hold more dogmatic positions (not to be confused with early twentieth-century Progressives) on issues and “moderates” who are willing to compromise with Republicans to achieve common aims. For Republicans, the division after 2016 is between those who support President Trump and those who may be “RINOs” or “Republicans in name only” because they are too moderate to be worthy of conservative respect. Voters find their choices shaped by these internal party divisions. In turn, the relative electoral success of the different approaches within each party will then cause elected officials to shift their positions.
Second, party organizations don’t formally select candidates, but the local and state party committees do endorse their favorites. They also help party members devise coherent platforms, promote the party, and strategize about elections. Each party has a state central committee and county central committees that party members elect. Caucuses and committees meet to plan programs and positions on various contemporary issues. At biannual state party conventions, these party officials approve party platforms, candidates give speeches, and network with one another (for the latest, see the California Democratic and California Republican Party websites). The minor parties have similar organizational structures, although their organizations are not as well-developed across the state.
Third, the parties help organize the California state legislature and the legislative process. The Democrats hold a majority in both the State Assembly and the State Senate, and thus the Democrats ultimately pick the political leaders of the chambers. The Speaker of the State Assembly and the President pro Tempore of the State Senate are both Democrats. The chairs of all committees are also Democrats. The Democratic leadership is in charge of which bills reach the floor for a vote. In recent years, the number of Democrats has grown so much that their supermajority (two-thirds) now can override a governor’s veto or pass a revenue (tax) bill.
In short, political parties are central to the conduct of California politics. Parties organize our thinking, our elections, and the lawmaking processes of government. Of course, there are exceptions, such as with initiatives and with local elected offices. The question is whether the role of parties has been good for our politics. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/06%3A_Political_Parties/6.06%3A_How_Parties_Help_Organize_California_Politics.txt |
There are different viewpoints about whether parties help or hurt a constitutional democracy. The Framers of the US Constitution warned of the dangers of parties. When President George Washington left office, he issued his Farewell Address, with much advice for our young country. It is well worthwhile to read this extended quotation about parties:
“. . . I have already intimated to you, the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to the founding them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, Generally.
This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly their worst enemy.
The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissention, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual: and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of is own elevation, on the ruins of Public Liberty.
Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely ought of sight) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise People to discourage and restrain it.”
Parties divide us, and most insidiously, can do so along geographic lines. Parties beguile our thinking, encouraging emotion over reason and public mindedness. Finally, parties may lead to despotism as we embrace the leader of one faction over another. Therefore, from the point of the Framers, parties ought to be discouraged.
Washington’s warnings did not stop the development of parties. Divisions among the Framers led to the formation of parties. Party politics came to drive American politics, directing our political ideologies, our campaigns, electoral processes, and legislative politics.
By the mid-twentieth century, the viewpoint of most political scientists was the exact opposite of Washington’s. E.E. Schattschneider’s often quoted statement epitomizes the modern attitude: “Modern democracies are unthinkable save in terms of political parties.” Parties serve as important linkage institutions connecting the people to government. Parties are important mediating institutions that help overcome the problems of mass democracy by channeling politics into organizations that interact in constructive ways in the electoral and legislative arenas.
Perhaps a middle ground between the Framers’ fears and Schattschneider’s optimism is best. Governor Hiram Johnson believed that special interests, especially the Southern Pacific Railroad, had corrupted parties and state politics. The Progressives promoted reforms to reduce the power of parties and give the people the ability to control them. Major reforms included the following:
The Progressives were realists. Parties are necessary for a modern democracy, but they must be limited in their power and made to reflect popular demands rather than only narrow special interests. As with many aspects of politics, crafting the appropriate role for parties in California remains an important task.
6.08: Summary
The menu of six parties on the California ballot provides a range of political choices for the voter. Each party has distinct party platforms, and in today’s polarized political climate, dedicated supporters are readily distinguishable by ideology and a range of demographic characteristics. The parties provide crucial functions for the political system, organizing political viewpoints, electoral contests, and the legislative process itself. However, Californians have a rich tradition of reform to limit the power of parties in our politics.
For Further Inquiry
What is your party preference? Review the statements of purpose of each qualified political party published by the Secretary of State. What do you like and dislike about each party? If you wish to re-register, go to this link.
6.09: Works Cited
“An American Independent Party Manifesto.” 2008-2010 Platform of the American Independent Party, https://www.aipca.org/manifesto.aspx
“Are You an Independent Voter? You Aren't If You Checked This Box.” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, static.latimes.com/american-independent-party-california-voters/#nt=oft12aH-1la1
Baldasarre, Mark et al. “California’s Likely Voters.” Public Policy Institute of California, September 2020, www.ppic.org/publications/californias-likely-voters/
Baldasarre, Mark et al. “California's Independent Voters.” Public Policy Institute of California, August 2018, www.ppic.org/publication/californias-independent-voters/
“California Gubernatorial Election, 2018 (June 5 Top-Two Primary).” Ballotpedia, ballotpedia.org/California_gubernatorial_election,_2018_(June_5_top-two_primary)
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957.
“Early History of the United States Green Party, 1984-2001.” Green Party USwww.gp.org/early_history
“Farewell Address.” Teaching American Historyhttps://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/farewell-address-5/
Federal Election Commission. “Official 2020 Presidential General Election Results.” https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2020presgeresults.pdf
“General Election - Statement of Vote, November 3, 2020.” California Secretary of State, www.sos.ca.gov/elections/prior-elections/statewide-election-results/general-election-november-3-2020/statement-vote
King, Greg. “The California State Civil Service System.” The Public Historian, vol. 1, no. 1, 1978, pp. 76–80, doi:10.2307/3377672
Petersen, Eric Falk. “The Adoption of the Direct Primary in California.” Southern California Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 4, 1972, pp. 363–378., doi:10.2307/41170448
Petersen, Erik Falk. “The Struggle for the Australian Ballot in California.” California Historical Quarterly, vol. 51, no. 3, 1972, pp. 227–243., doi:10.2307/25157387
“PFP.” Peace and Freedom Party, 28 Jan. 2016, www.peaceandfreedom.us/positions/pfp-resolutions
“Platform.” Libertarian Party, 2 Oct. 2020, www.lp.org/platform/
“Political Party Qualification.” California Secretary of State, accessed 3 August 2023, www.sos.ca.gov/elections/political-parties/political-party-qualification
Putnam, Jackson K. “The Pattern of Modern California Politics.” Pacific Historical Review, vol. 61, no. 1, 1992, pp. 23–52., doi:10.2307/3640787
“Record 22 Million Californians Registered to Vote Heading into General Election.” AP20:108 Record 22 Million Californians Registered to Vote Heading into General Election: California Secretary of State, www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2020-news-releases-and-advisories/ap20108
Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. Party Government. Farrar and Rinehart, 1942.
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 5, 1968, clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo?1968election.pdf | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/06%3A_Political_Parties/6.07%3A_Are_Parties_Good_for_California.txt |
Introduction
There are many ways to make a difference in California. For many people, voting may be too solitary an activity—a ballot received in the mail, a consideration of the contests over a cup of coffee, and then a walk to the mailbox. Rather alienating! The political parties offer another way to become involved. Still, the scope of the contests, the wide breadth of the issues, the focus on helping to satisfy someone else’s political ambition may not be your cup of tea, either.
There is a third way of becoming involved in politics. Think about a cause that you really care about. Maybe it is work-related, and you want to improve career opportunities in your field. Perhaps you care about civil rights, an environmental issue, or a charitable cause to help people struggling with particular health challenges. You may have been personally affected by a tragedy such as a school shooter or a drunk driver and want to dedicate yourself to reducing the probability of such a trauma affecting other people. Next, look for a group that is dedicated to the cause. There are often student chapters of various organizations on campus or in the local community. Interest group participation allows you to learn a great deal about a particular issue, network with other people who share similar interests, and work to accomplish specific goals that will make you feel proud of yourself.
You may wish to join a civic group that primarily focuses on helping community members, such as supporting women choosing STEM career fields. Maybe you arrange for mentors of students and peer tutoring. Political involvement might be limited to working with educational administrators to provide more support services for women. On the other hand, you may join a group with a particular public policy goal, for example, a statewide group seeking the governor’s immediate recall. The focus is immediate, gather enough signatures and organize a successful campaign. This group is less about helping members and more about short-term results.
Regardless of the type of interest groups, they all seek to change public policy. Business and labor groups organize about fundamental economic issues such as taxation, regulation, working conditions, and pay. Citizen groups lobby about environmental, civil rights, gun rights, fighting crime, and social and religious concerns such as abortion. Occasionally, interest groups will trigger broader social movements that sweep across the state, demanding change, and upending politics as usual.
In this chapter, we will analyze how political scientists study interest groups and apply these methods to understanding California groups. How do groups organize, change public policy, and what are their effects on the political system? We will examine campaign finance reform as a case study to regulate interest groups.
7.02: How Groups Organize
In the business world, Americans love entrepreneurs. Create and market a new product, and you may become wildly successful while receiving social adulation in the process. In the political world, another kind of entrepreneur fuels progress. This is the political, or policy entrepreneur who creates an interest group to fight for a cause. Their genius lies in persuading and organizing people to work for policy change. Historically, think of the abolitionists, the suffragists, the Prohibitionists, and in the post-World War II era, the civil rights organizations, the environmentalists, and the conservative groups fighting for traditional values. Let’s examine the ways that interest groups entrepreneurs attract members to their causes.
A political entrepreneur has a vision of a better future and perceives the opportunity and the means to take advantage of the opportunity to change public policy. Leaders use three incentives to attract new members. First, persuade prospective members of the legitimacy of the cause. Often this is done by linking the cause to other values that are important such as larger American ideals. Second, appeal to material interests. Perhaps the cause itself is material, a tax cut, a new benefit, a college scholarship, canceling student debt. Or maybe an interest group provides an incentive to join, even something relatively small such as store discounts, t-shirts, or coffee cups. Third, provide social opportunities, what political scientists call solidary incentives. People love to make new friends as they are working for a common cause. Create a sense of belonging, of membership.
Interest groups that provide a significant material benefit will have an easier time organizing people. In contrast, a citizen group whose members are working toward a more general benefit for the whole country, such as civil rights or environmental protection, must overcome the free-rider problem. It is all-too human to want to gain the benefit from the hard work of an interest group without contributing to the cause. Effective interest groups can overcome this issue by organizing strategies that mobilize people to join.
The cascade of social activism beginning in the 1960s, bolstered by easier access to communication with the development of the Internet and social media, and savvy interest group entrepreneurship have been very helpful tools to organize a diversity of groups. Project Vote Smart maintains partial lists of California interest groups.
7.03: What do Interest Groups do
Interest groups seek to change public policy. There are two strategies to achieve this: direct and indirect lobbying. Interest groups directly lobby when they pressure government officials to make policy changes. They are indirectly lobbying when they seek to influence public opinion to be more sympathetic to their cause with the long-term goal of changing public policy. Of course, interest groups may have many other purposes. Many groups form to help their members with any number of issues. For example, a group may provide social and economic support for its members and interact with the political system only as necessary. Consider all the information, counseling, financial help, and social support people fighting cancer gain by joining the American Cancer Society. This group’s political lobbying for more research and health care funding is only part of its mission.
Groups may directly lobby by meeting with legislators to sponsor or amend a bill. Legislators may ask interest groups to send members to testify at committee hearings to provide insight about a particular public policy challenge. Second, they may also meet with bureaucrats from executive department agencies who are drafting regulations. A third route is litigation. Many groups seek public policy goals through lawsuits that will force public policy changes.
By law, interest groups cannot give campaign contributions to candidates in exchange for votes. However, it is in the interest of groups to help candidates who are likely to further their agenda in the future. With sympathetic legislators in place, a group knows that it will be far more successful at lobbying. Thus, money doesn't buy votes, it buys access to lawmakers who are more willing to listen. Ultimately, however, an interest group will have more influence if it is popular with the legislator’s constituents.
Interest groups engage in indirect lobbying when they seek to influence public opinion in their favor. Groups may enlist the help of celebrities to advertise causes, hold marches and demonstrations, and use social media to persuade and recruit more supporters. A sympathetic public is crucial to an effective presence in state or local government.
For Your Consideration
Think about an interest group that you have joined. Maybe you are a bit of a recluse, but perhaps someone you know is a member of a group. How has the group attracted members? Is it through the use of persuasive, material, and solidary incentives? Next, think about what the group does politically. Is it focused on changing policies or more on public outreach? In other words, how does it lobby? How do you find this group to be beneficial to the community or to the state? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/07%3A_Interest_Groups/7.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
Any discussion of interest groups in California often begins with two stories: one about the power of the Southern Pacific Railroad in the 1870 to 1910 period, and the other about Artie Samish, an influential lobbyist who manipulated the legislature between the 1920s and early 1950s.
The Southern Pacific Railroad (SP) was the most powerful organized interest in California history between the 1870s and 1910. Originally started as the Central Pacific, the “Big Four'' (Charles Crocker, Leland Stanford, Collis Huntington, and Mark Hopkins) constructed the western half of the first intercontinental railroad. They then built and controlled fourteen thousand miles of track in the western United States plus ferry boats, steamships, and other ventures. With land grants from the federal government, they owned about eleven million acres of land in California. Their monopoly power allowed them to control freight rates throughout California. Through bribery and manipulation, the SP controlled much of the politics of the state. After the infamous 1880 Mussel Slough incident in which farmers died protesting high land sale prices from the railroad, critics branded the Southern Pacific the “Octopus” for its stranglehold on commerce and politics throughout the state. California could not effectively regulate railroad routes until the Progressives came to power in 1910 (Howe).
As the economy grew and diversified in the twentieth century, the landscape of California interest groups became far more complex. Agriculture, mining, industry, real estate, transportation, entertainment, and many other groups exercised influence in Sacramento politics. Their lobbyists could legally give legislators unlimited gifts and campaign contributions without any required disclosure to the public.
The most infamous lobbyist of the first half of the twentieth century was Artie Samish. Raising money from his interest-group clients, he paid for politicians’ campaigns. He kept a secret book of everyone’s habits, legal and illegal, to help bargain in the backrooms of Sacramento bars. He was so powerful that in 1949 he boasted in Collier magazine, “I am the governor of the Legislature, to hell with the governor of California” In the same interview, he even pulled out a ventriloquist's dummy, he called “Mr. Legislature.” Eventually, Samish ended up in jail for federal tax evasion (“Lobbyist’s Ego”).
The situation began to improve in the 1960s. Speaker of the State Assembly Jesse Unruh spearheaded constitutional reforms (Proposition 1A passed in 1966) that replaced the part-time state legislature with a full-time one. Legislators were paid better salaries with professional staff to attend to the business of lawmaking. A few years later, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, and promoted by then-Secretary of State and gubernatorial candidate Jerry Brown, voters passed Proposition 9, the Political Reform Act of 1974. Now all contributions and lobbying had to be reported to a new state agency, the Fair Political Practices Commission. Public disclosure reduced corruption and restored faith in the democratic process by creating accountability to the public.
7.04: Interest Groups in California
When considering the role of groups in politics, how should we count and categorize them? The most common approach is to use the database of lobbyists compiled by the California Secretary of State. This office publishes a directory of lobbyists, their employers, and all campaign contributions of \$100 or more. About four thousand lobbyists work in Sacramento, including in-house lobbyists who work for a particular interest and contract lobbyists representing many interests.
Let’s categorize interest groups according to who they represent. We can discern four types: business, labor, government, and citizen groups. A business interest group directly represents one business (such as a single utility or oil company), or it may represent hundreds of organizations such as the California Chamber of Commerce. It may also be an association of professionals, such as realtors or doctors. A labor group is typically a union. Its members are employees who contribute dues that pay for political activities. Government groups are groups that represent local governments. They seek to inform and persuade lawmakers about local preferences. Government groups cannot give campaign contributions. Finally, citizen groups are all the groups that represent a myriad of contemporary concerns such as social, environmental, or civil rights issues. In the last few decades, citizen groups have proliferated! The table below lists selected groups under each category.
Table \(1\):Types of Interest Groups
Types of Interest Groups
Examples
Business
Labor
Government
Citizen
The table below shows the expenditures of lobbyists in one legislative cycle.
Table \(2\): Lobbying Expenditures by Economic Sector
Lobbyists Categorized by Economic Sector
Expenditures in the 2019-2020 legislative session (millions)
1. Agriculture
10.1
1. Education
47.7
1. Entertainment
14.1
1. Finance
53.1
1. Government
116.3
1. Health
87.7
1. Labor Unions
24.0
1. Legal
13.0
1. Lodging/Restaurants
3.5
1. Manufacturing/Industrial
72.7
1. Merchandising/Retail
12.3
1. Miscellaneous
148.9 (self-designated)
1. Oil/Gas
38.5
1. Political Organization
.6
1. Professional Trade
29.9
1. Public Employee
8.9
1. Real Estate
16.8
1. Transportation
20.8
1. Utilities
55.5
(California Secretary of State)
Total spending for state legislative races, including individual, party, and interest groups expenditures in 2020, were \$103,508,616 for the State Assembly races and \$56,819,236 for the State Assembly. The top interest group contributors to state legislative races in this election are listed in the table below.
Table \(3\): Top Ten Contributors to State Legislative Races in 2020
Top Ten Interest Group Contributors to State Legislative Candidates
Expenditures (in millions)
1. California Association of Realtors
4.5
1. California State Council of Laborers
4.0
1. Service Employees International Union California State council
3.9
1. State Building and Construction Trade Council
3.9
1. California Teachers Association
3.5
1. California Professional Fire Fighters Association
2.9
1. Pechanga Band of Luiseño Mission Indians
2.9
1. AT&T
2.8
1. California Dental Association
2.8
1. California State Association of Electrical Workers
2.8
(“At a Glance”)
Reviewing the data above about lobbying and campaign finance shows that lobbyists and campaign finance contributions represent a diverse group of organized interests: businesses, labor, government, and citizen groups. Many sectors of the economy are represented and there are many unions represented by their labor groups. However, it is clear that if a group of Californians does not organize into an interest group and lobby, their voice will not be as well-represented. Thus, the voices of poor people and other marginalized groups are not very well represented with interest group politics. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/07%3A_Interest_Groups/7.04%3A_Interest_Groups_in_California/7.4.01%3A_The_Range_of_Interest_Groups_in_Sacramento.txt |
Central to political science is the question of the relationship between the parts and the whole. An analogy is helpful. Think of your family. Each of you has needs and wants, and then there is what is good for the family. Perhaps the two go together. The adage, “If mama ain’t happy, then no one’s happy,” suggests one kind of harmony. But how often have you set aside your preference to help out someone else in your family? If a family shopping can only afford one carton of ice cream, which flavor is picked? A vote will leave some unhappy, a consensus may not be found. Of course, a parent might snap, “this isn’t a democracy!” and grab the flavor that is the cheapest.
The same goes for a nation. In The Federalist Papers, Madison wrote about the challenge of reconciling the parts and the whole. Seeking to persuade the states to ratify the Constitution after the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the parts that he worried about were not individual family members but factions, typically economic interest groups that seek government policies that benefit them and that may undermine the good of the whole. In Federalist #10, he wrote:
Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
Madison argued that establishing a larger country with more centralized control checks the “mischief of faction.” Such a diversity of interests and groups prevents any one faction from abusing its influence. For example, farmers in one part of the country check the merchants someplace else. The demands of the bankers balance those of their customers. Of course, the purpose of Federalist #10 was to help persuade states to ratify the US Constitution. Nonetheless, his theory of countervailing power is an original American contribution to understanding interest groups in a democracy: factions are likely to be selfish, in a free society this selfishness cannot be simply abolished, and instead the selfishness of one group can and should be checked by that of other groups.
Madison believed that groups are fundamentally good; in a free society, people should be able to organize and seek public policies that will improve themselves. Madison was a realist. He knew that these factions, as he called groups, could well bias public policy in ways that might hurt other groups or the country in general. He hoped that the diversity of groups in a large country would limit the “mischief of faction.” Madison also relied on the institutional devices of having three branches of government that could check and balance each other as an additional way to address the problem of faction.
Fast forward to the twentieth century. Social scientists debate the very same issue: is democracy captured by special interests? Cynics say yes. After all, you don’t have to be a Marxist to see government as representing the interests of the wealthy. In 1956, the sociologist C. Wright Mills argued in The Power Elite that a mix of very rich people, celebrities, big corporations, the military, politicians, and bureaucrats ruled the country. These groups are not representative of most Americans, and they do not necessarily have the interests of most Americans in mind as they run America. Special interests steal American democracy from the people.
Political scientists responded to Mills by researching the relative influence of different interests. In Who Governs (1961), Robert Dahl argued that his investigation of city politics in New Haven, Connecticut, shows that interest groups are not biased toward the wealthy. Many groups interact with one another, and public policy is a result of this bargaining. This argument becomes known as the theory of pluralism. So, the debate between elitists and pluralists continues, with elitists arguing that interest groups are more likely to represent wealthier people and pluralists claiming that groups are essentially a democratic device for everyone to organize.
One way to address this question is to institute rules that promote pluralism and discourage elitism. Pass regulations that channel interest groups toward the kind of politics that we prefer. In other words, just as Madison recommended “curing the mischief of faction” through federal design, Californians should likewise regulate interest groups to promote pluralism. The area that receives the most attention in this regard is campaign finance law. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/07%3A_Interest_Groups/7.05%3A_Are_interest_groups_good_for_California.txt |
The role of money in politics remains a controversial subject. On the one hand, one fundamental value, protected by the First Amendment, is liberty. Voters, parties, and interest groups want to exercise their voice as part of the democratic process. But on the other hand, we also care about equality. If politics is flooded with money, won’t those with money come to dominate everyone else? So, our concern for equality then leads us to want to impose rules on campaign spending, which of course, may interfere with our love of liberty. Hence, we have a dilemma.
California has made multiple efforts to regulate campaign finance by limiting contributions and requiring disclosure. The first significant law was Proposition 9, the Political Reform Act of 1974. First, the law limited lobbyists’ gifts to lawmakers to \$10.00 a month. Second, the law mandated the public disclosure of all campaign contributions of \$100.00 or more. This data is now readily available on the Secretary of State’s website. Third, Proposition 9 also limited expenditures by candidates. However, the US Supreme Court, in the case of Buckley v. Valeo (1976), ruled (in part) that candidate spending is a type of free speech and therefore must not be limited. Although several propositions in the next few decades attempted to limit campaign contributions, they foundered in court. It was not until 2000 that Proposition 34 limited contributions, a regulation that has withstood US Supreme Court scrutiny. These limits are adjusted for inflation regularly.
Table \(1\): Campaign Contribution limits for 2023-24
Candidate or Officeholder
Source of contribution: Person (individual, business, political action committee)
Source of contribution: small contributor committee (donations less than \$200)
Source of contribution: political party
State Assembly/
State Senate/
City and county candidates that have not enacted limits
\$5500
\$5500
No limit
Statewide Candidates
\$9100
\$18200
No limit
Governor
\$36400
\$36400
No limit
(CA Secretary of State, California Fair Practices Commission)
After Buckley v. Valeo, the next significant US Supreme Court case to impact California elections was Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010). The Court ruled that the First Amendment also protected independent expenditures. This means that the government must not limit spending that is not coordinated with candidates. Contributions may be limited but not the advertisements or any other expenditures of parties, groups, or individuals expressing their opinions about a candidate or issue. Groups that engage in independent expenditures are often called SuperPACs. In 2020, about 19% of over one billion dollars of spending for statewide campaigns fell under this category of independent spending.
It is also important to note that campaign contributions and expenditures for ballot measures have no limits. For example, in 2020, about \$775,000,000 was spent fighting for and against various propositions with Proposition 22, allowing Uber and Lyft drivers to remain as contracted drivers, exacting over 222,000,000 in costs for both sides. In contrast, all of the state legislative races combined cost \$165,000,000. California’s direct democracy has become the Wild West when it comes to campaign spending (“At a Glance”).
Reviewing the history of campaign finance reform, California has been more successful in implementing regulations requiring disclosure rather than limiting money in politics. In part, this is due to the US Supreme Court rulings to protect free speech rights. California voters have also rejected ballot measures to institute public financing of campaigns, probably because they don’t want their hard-earned tax money going to politicians. Campaign finance law remains unsettled. For example, California attempted to require nonprofits to disclose donations used for political purposes. The US Supreme Court ruled that this law was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment (Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta, 2021).
7.07: Summary
Interest groups provide a key linkage institution for the people to influence the government. Traditionally, economic groups have biased representation toward elites, but there are ample opportunities for citizens to become involved and represent many different concerns. Since the 1970s, campaign finance reform has helped limit elitism and promote more pluralism in Sacramento.
For Further Inquiry
Choose a California political race of interest to you. Go to followthemoney.org and research the record of campaign contributions. Do you believe that more limits or disclosures are necessary?
7.08: Works Cited
At A Glance - FollowTheMoney.org, California Secretary of State, cal-access.sos.ca.gov/.www.followthemoney.org/at-a-glance?y=2020&s=CA
California Secretary of State. cal-access.sos.ca.gov/
Howe, Kenneth Chronicle Staff Writer. “RISE AND FALL OF A RAILROAD / Southern Pacific Shaped California.” SFGATE, 3 Feb. 2012,
www.sfgate.com/business/article/RISE-AND-FALL-OF-A-RAILROAD-Southern-Pacific-2974892.php
“Lobbyist's Ego Led to Downfall, Prison.” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 3 Feb. 2008, www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-feb-03-me-then3-story.html
“My Legislature.” My Legislature - FollowTheMoney.org, www.followthemoney.org/tools/legislative-overview?s=CA&y=2020 | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/07%3A_Interest_Groups/7.06%3A_Regulating_Interest_Groups-_The_Role_of_Campaign_Finance_Law.txt |
Introduction
“THE great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society, the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power.... (Chapter 11. Of the Extent of Legislative Power, John Locke).”
Recall John Locke’s social contract theory. All people are fundamentally free and equal to lead their own lives and make their own decisions. Without government, the lack of law, judges, and law enforcement quickly make the state of nature into a state of war. Thus, to safeguard our property, we leave the state of nature and form a political community through a social contract. We create a Constitution that establishes a government whose legitimacy to make and enforce laws is dependent upon the consent of the governed. We consent by first ratifying the Constitution and then through the regular elections of representatives who are dependent on the people to maintain their rule. Thus, the legislature is the central device of modern democratic theory to resolve the difficult question of how the government may legitimately exercise power.
Our focus in this chapter is on the California State Assembly and Senate, our bicameral California legislature. Historically, Californians have been skeptical of the ability of the legislature to fulfill its Lockean role. We often prefer to directly make the law rather than elect representatives. The Constitutional Convention of 1878-79 convened to circumvent the existing state legislature and pass legislation to limit the railroad monopolies. The 1911 Progressive Reforms deepened this process through direct democracy. In the last few decades, public opinion polls of Californians show this skepticism about the California legislature, with approval of how the legislature is doing its job varying from the low teens to about fifty percent (“Californians and their Government”). In contrast, about seventy percent of Californians support the initiative process (“Reforming California’s Initiative Process”).
Despite the state’s fondness for direct democracy, the vast majority of policies that impact our daily lives—regarding education, health care, social spending, food, water, power, transportation, and on and on—are the consequences of traditional legislative actions in Sacramento. We expect the politicians to represent us: to look after our welfare, to echo our demands, and to lead the state. This chapter focuses on the different ways that the state legislature represents us and how representation may be improved through reforms.
8.2.01: Formal Representation
The concept of representation is multidimensional. In the most direct sense, the legislature acts in place of the people to fulfill the constitutional goals of self-government. Much work in the field of political science has sought to study representation both philosophically and empirically. Perhaps the most well-known philosophical work is Hannah Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation (1967). Pitkin considers four kinds of representation: formal, substantive, descriptive, and symbolic. The first three are particularly helpful to study the state legislature. First, we should understand the rules and practices governing the formal representation of the state by the legislature. Second, the legislature engages in substantive representation, which includes lawmaking, oversight of government, and constituency service. Third, legislators descriptively reflect the demographic qualities of their districts, defined according to any number of categories such as race, ethnicity, and gender.
8.02: The Legislature as a Representative Institution
Formal representation refers to the rules and practices governing the selection of legislators. According to Pitkin’s framework, formal representation is successful when, first, representatives have gained their seats through a process of elections that is considered legitimate by most voters, and second, when voters can hold representatives accountable for their actions by being able to remove them from office in the next election (“Political Representation”). The table below provides a snapshot of the California State Legislature.
Table \(1\):The Organization of the Legislature
Chamber
State Assembly
State Senate
Number of Members
80
40
Length of Term
2
4
Term Limits
12 (total years in both chambers)
12 (total years in both chambers)
Our state legislature has always been bicameral. A bicameral Congress has an upper house and a lower house. Historically, bicameral legislatures developed in Europe, with the upper house representing the nobility and the lower house representing the common people. For example, the United Kingdom’s Parliament is composed of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The American colonies also developed a bicameral structure over time, with upper houses including representatives of the English government and lower houses representing free men. Upon independence in 1776, states developed legislatures following this colonial legacy except upper houses represented geographic areas instead of the nobility. New states followed this bicameral division. In California, up until 1967, forty state senators represented California geographically by county, with no senator representing less than one county or more than three. In Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the US Supreme Court ruled that this apportionment of Senate seats was unconstitutional because it gave disproportionate influence to rural over urban areas by violating the “one man, one vote” principle. Districts should, as closely as possible, have the same number of people. Ever since Reynolds, the forty state Senate districts are redrawn after every census along with the districts for the eighty members of the State Assembly.
One might argue that if both the California State Assembly and the State Senate are organized by population, what is the point of having a bicameral system? For example, in 1937, Nebraska voters were persuaded that bicameralism was wasteful and redundant and approved a unicameral system (Myers). On the other hand, perhaps redundancy leads to better deliberation. Although Nebraska’s unicameral experiment received some attention after the Reynolds decision, the other forty-nine states ultimately opted to maintain tradition over innovation.
As the lower house, the State Assembly is intended to respond to the people more closely by having two-year terms, whereas state senators have four-year terms with staggered elections such that only half are up for election every two years. Currently, state legislators are limited to twelve years of service in either or both houses combined. This term limit law was passed by Proposition 28 in 2012. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/08%3A_The_Legislature/8.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
Substantive representation refers to advocating for the interests of the people. Our focus is on the heart of the legislator’s job: lawmaking, oversight, and constituency service. As representatives, the legislators are acting in place of the people to fulfill their needs and wants. They are both delegates, mirroring the demands of the people, and trustees, doing what they think is best for their constituents. Legislators, ever mindful of the next election, will act as delegates when the people have strong opinions. Much of the time, however, voters have not expressed a clear preference regarding a proposed law and expect their representatives to make informed decisions as their trustees.
The legislative process is relatively straightforward. Both chambers approve a bill and then the governor signs it to become a law. A state senator or assembly member authors a bill, but the actual legal drafting of the bill is done by the Office of the Legislative Counsel. This office is a nonpartisan agency established in 1913 to provide many professional services including drafting bills, providing legal opinions to the legislature and the governor, and compiling records of all bills and statutes passed each session.
After the Legislative Counsel drafts the bill, the author then submits it to the full Senate or Assembly where it is formally presented; this is called the First Reading (the bill number, the title of the bill, and author are announced). The bill is then printed and sent to the Rules Committee, which assigns it to one (or more) policy committees and a fiscal committee if it involves spending. No action can be taken for thirty days after it is introduced in committee. If a majority of the committee votes for the bill, then it goes to the full Senate or Assembly for a second reading. After debating by the full body, a third reading is made before a roll call vote where a simple majority is required to pass most bills. The bill must then go through the same procedure in the other chamber. A conference committee reconciles differences between Assembly and Senate versions of the bill and then the bill goes to the governor for approval. A two-thirds majority of both chambers is necessary to override a veto. Legislative overrides are extremely rare. The diagram below shows the process.
While committees organize the formal processes of deliberating and voting on bills, political party leaders set the chambers’ priorities. The party that has the majority of members in each chamber elects leaders who control the process of legislation and holds the majority of seats on every committee. Each partisan leader selects the chairs of the important committees and decides through the Rules Committee when bills will be heard by committees and on the floor of each chamber. The leader of the majority party caucus is the Speaker of the Assembly. In the State Senate, the President pro Tempore is elected by the majority caucus to lead this chamber because the President of the State Senate is a separately elected person, the Lieutenant Governor. The Lieutenant Governor (like the Vice President of the United States) holds no legislative power in the chamber except to break a tie vote.
In addition to lawmaking, committees engage in oversight or reviewing the actions of executive branch agencies as they implement laws. Committees will hear from many stakeholders (those involved in a particular issue area such as interest group leaders, bureaucrats, and constituents) to consider further actions and hold bureaucrats accountable to implement the law.
Table \(1\): Standing Committees in the California State Legislature
State Senate
State Assembly
• Agriculture
• Appropriations
• Banking and Financial Institutions
• Budget and Fiscal Review
• Business, Professions and Economic Development
• Education
• Elections and Constitutional Amendments
• Energy, Utilities, and Communications
• Environmental Quality
• Government and Finance
• Government Organization
• Health
• Human Services
• Insurance
• Judiciary
• Labor and Industrial Relations
• Natural Resources and Water
• Public Employment and Retirement
• Public Safety
• Rules
• Transportation and Housing
• Veterans Affairs
• Accountability and Administrative Review
• Aging and Long Term Care
• Agriculture
• Appropriations
• Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism And Internet Media
• Banking and Finance
• Budget
• Business and Professions
• Communications and Conveyance
• Education
• Election and Redistricting
• Environmental Safety and Toxic Materials
• Government Organization
• Health
• Higher Education
• Housing and Community Development
• Human Services
• Insurance
• Jobs, Economic Development, and the Economy
• Labor and Employment
• Local Government
• Natural Resources
• Privacy and Consumer Protection
• Public employees, Retirement and Social Security
• Public Safety
• Revenue and Taxation
• Rules
• Transportation
• Utilities and Commerce
• Veterans Affairs
• Water, Parks, and Wildlife
Lastly, the third substantive role of legislators is to serve as liaisons or ombudspersons between their constituents and government. Citizens may be seeking services from government agencies (for example, health care, educational services, care for the elderly or disabled, etc.) and finding it challenging to navigate the complexities of so many offices and communication in the age of emails and online forms. The Sacramento or local staff of a legislator resolves problems to provide needed services.
8.2.03: Descriptive Representation
Do the state legislators need to look like the people that they represent? Two arguments answer this question in the affirmative. First, representatives need to understand the needs of their constituents. Using the premise that personal identity informs our understanding, a diverse legislature will better understand the needs of a diverse California. Second, the legislature will have greater legitimacy because diversity is a signal that many people from diverse backgrounds are able to run and win.
On the other hand, a certain degree of skepticism regarding descriptive representation is warranted for a few reasons. First, a simple comparison of demographic ratios of different groups in the legislature to that of the population of California may be misleading. Immigration patterns are changing rapidly, and there is bound to be a gap between a comparatively younger California population compared to an older set of legislators who are likely to reflect the immigration patterns of a generation or more ago. Second, defined demographic categories, such as race or ethnicity, may be problematic because they may group people together in such a way as to obscure diversity.
Regardless of these philosophical issues, most would agree that one sign of a healthy legislature is diversity, with the caveat that this diversity should be considered in complex rather than simply stereotypical ways. The data in the table below show that the legislature reflects the diversity of California, although whites are somewhat overrepresented, and Latinos are underrepresented. Women remain underrepresented.
Table \(1\): Selected Demographic Characteristics of Californians and the California Legislature
People
Percentage of CA Population (2019 estimates)
Percentage of CA Legislature (2020)
Female
50.3
38
African American
6.5
8
Asian
15.5
12
Hispanic
39.4
23
White
36.5
55
(Sources: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA and the California Research Bureau)
For Your Consideration
To what extent do our identities help shape our understandings? If we don’t share the same characteristics of the people that we are representing, is it more difficult to represent them well? Think of an example in your own life when you have tried to understand someone who is very different from you. How have you tried to close this gap to develop better empathy? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/08%3A_The_Legislature/8.02%3A_The_Legislature_as_a_Representative_Institution/8.2.02%3A_Substantive_Representation.txt |
Sometimes it is helpful to return to the fundamentals of any human action and ask two simple questions: what should be done and how should it be accomplished? John Locke provides clear prescriptions to address both questions. The “what” is answered by the Lockean-based assertion that the legislature should pass the laws necessary for California to successfully address its policy challenges. The “how” is answered by Lockean prescriptions that the legislature, with regards to its elections, its organization, and its processes, conducts itself in ways that are considered to be legitimate in the eyes of the California people. In recent years, there has been a great deal of progress in reforming the “how”—the democratic processes of the legislature—with the hope that these reforms will then allow the “what”—the policy challenges that we face—to be better addressed. While Locke's answers are clear, the details become a matter of debate.
Since the 1990s, the California legislature, like the US Congress and many other state legislatures, suffer under the growing strain of political polarization. The ever-increasing ideological distance between the parties prevents the government from passing meaningful legislation to address the problems that we face.
There are different arguments about the causes of this polarization. One view is that polarization is caused by a variety of institutional rules and practices that push people apart from one another and that we just need to reform these rules and then we will have an easier working together. Another argument is that the rules aren’t dividing us; it is about differences in values, lifestyles, and economics. In other words, we have a hard time working together because we are so diverse.
Consider just three institutional reforms that have been implemented since 2008 to address polarization. Gerrymandering has been blamed for creating districts that are more ideologically extreme. It was argued that it was in the interest of lawmakers to clump voters together who would support them and to assent to other lawmakers doing the same with their voters. Seeing this as problematic, Proposition 11 in 2008 removed this role from lawmakers and gave it to a Citizens Redistricting Commission which would endeavor to put communities of interest together in districts in a way that would not engage in partisan bias. The result has been a very modest increase in the competitiveness (won by less than ten percentage points) of elections from about five percent of CA state legislative races to about fifteen percent (McGhee).
Next, partisan primaries were blamed for pushing representatives to the ideological extremes as they first competed for voters on only one side of the spectrum before facing a more moderate electorate in November. This resulted in a runoff between two candidates who were more ideologically extreme than the average voter in their district. The antidote was Proposition 14, passed in 2010, which implemented the top-two primary system. Now party registration (except for the US Presidency) does not limit voter choice. The top two candidates go on to a runoff in the general election. It is in their interest to moderate their positions right from the beginning to attract the most number of voters. Once elected, representatives needn’t worry as much about partisan attacks with the consequences that legislative voting would head more toward the center. The few academic studies that have been done about this show this effect (Miller).
A third reform reduced the two-thirds majority required to pass a budget in the California legislature to just a simple majority. Sponsored by the public employee unions, Proposition 25 in 2010 ended the ability of a partisan minority to exercise such leverage over the majority. The result is that California budgets have been passed on time (“Rewriting the Rules''). The two-thirds majority is still present for any tax increase (as mandated by Proposition 13, passed in 1978). The net result of these and other political reforms is to help the legislature overcome partisan polarization and avoid gridlock.
The alternative argument is that polarization is caused by a deadlock between firmly held viewpoints held by roughly equal-sized partisan groups in the state. Tinkering with electoral rules will not resolve the problem, instead polarization will ease when one party surpasses the other in popularity. Hence, in this view, during the last ten years, the state overcame party polarization because the Democratic Party became far more popular than the Republican Party. This is confirmed by statistics from the California Secretary of State in October 2020, showing that 46% of California voters registered as Democrats with only 24% registering as Republicans (“Report of Registration”). Since 2020, Republicans have lost ten percent of the electorate. The only counties that have a majority of Republicans are rural. Republicans have failed to make significant inroads in the state’s ideologically moderate and liberal demographically diverse urban areas.
Even if gridlock has diminished from changes in partisanship, political reforms such as the top-two primary system, the Citizens Redistricting Commission, rule changes in the legislature, and earlier reforms such as term limits and campaign finance do enhance the legitimacy of the institutions of government. If Californians believe that democratic processes are fair, the institutions themselves will be rated more favorably, and they will have a greater capacity to address necessary policy reforms. According to the October 2020 poll of Californians by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), just 51% of respondents believe that the California legislature is doing a good job.
In short, efforts to reform the legislature are important in themselves. The legitimacy of elections, the organization of the legislature, and its processes matter to the electorate. However, performance also matters. As a state, California is confronted by many long-term challenges, many of which directly affect millions of Californians’ health, welfare, and general well-being. Unless the legislature addresses these problems, political reform will simply not be enough to fulfill Lockean promises; policy reform is also required.
8.04: Summary
The very heart of a representative democracy lies with the state legislature. We scrutinize formal, substantive, and descriptive representation to analyze the structure and processes of the State Assembly and State Senate. We evaluate current reform efforts to understand ways that the California legislature can better live up to our Lockean ideals.
For Further Inquiry
Investigate Sacramento politics. One of the best sources is Calmatters.org. Rough and tumble.com has links to many statewide newspaper stories (you may need to use the college library subscriptions services to access articles because many are behind a paywall). Capitol Weekly is excellent as well. What is on the agenda in the Capitol? What opinions do you have about the stories that you are finding? Are these issues widely reported in the regular media that you use?
8.05: Works Cited
Burke, Edmund. “Mr. Burke’s Speech to the Electors of Bristol, March 11, 1774. In Edmund Burke III, editor, The Works of Edmund Burke, with a Memoir, Volume 1. New York: George Dearborn; 1834, pp 219-22.
“Californians and their Government.” Public Policy Institute of California, May 2020, www.ppic.org/wp-content/uplo...dults-0520.pdf
“Chapter 11. Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.” Chapter 11. Of the Extent of the Legislative Power < John Locke Essay On Government < 1651-1700 < Documents < American History From Revolution To Reconstruction and Beyond, http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1651-1700/john-locke-essay-on-government/
McGhee, Eric. “Assessing California’s Redistricting Commission.” Public Policy Institute of California, March 2018, www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/r-0317emr.pdf.
Miller, Jenesse. “Top-Two and Open Primaries Lead to Less Extreme Lawmakers.” USC News, 21 May 2020, news.usc.edu/170366/top-two-open-primary-elections-less-extreme-lawmakers-usc-study/
Myers, Adam S. “The Failed Diffusion of the Unicameral State Legislature, 1934-1944.” Studies in American Political Development, 32 (October 2018), 217-235.
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Concept of Representation. Univ. of Calif. Press, 1967.
“PPIC Statewide Survey - Featured Time Trends.” Public Policy Institute of California, 10 Dec. 2020, https://www.ppic.org/data-set/ppic-statewide-survey-featured-time-trends
“Reforming California’s Initiative Process.” Public Policy Institute of California. 2013, https://www.ppic.org/publication/reforming-californias-initiative-process/
Report of Registration - October 19, 2020. California Secretary of State, www.sos.ca.gov/elections/report-registration/15day-gen-2020
“Rewriting the Rules.” The Economistwww.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2014/01/27/rewriting-the-rules | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/08%3A_The_Legislature/8.03%3A_Contemporary_Challenges.txt |
Introduction
Americans have always had their misgivings about executive power. At the national level, we hold the President responsible for the state of the nation. Bad economic news, international calamities, or domestic difficulties will lead to swift rejection at the next election, and the President’s party is likely to suffer as well. At the same time, with our system of checks and balances, this country gives the President relatively little power. The President must rely on his powers of persuasion to rise about the constitutional constraints of his office.
This paradox of executive power—of expecting so much from the officeholder but giving relatively little power to the office—is exacerbated at the state level because the executive branch is a plural office in California. A plural executive means that the heads of multiple executive departments are independently elected by the people rather than appointed by the governor. The rationale is the same: whether at the 1787 Philadelphia Convention or at the 1849 California Constitutional Convention in Monterey (and also in other states), the delegates feared the potential of executive tyranny. Nonetheless, just as with the president, voters hold the governor responsible for the “state of the state,” regardless of the fact that powers are shared among the executive officials, the legislature, and judicial branches.
In this chapter, we will examine the structure of the executive branch and then focus on the governor’s roles and the formal and informal powers used to fulfill these roles successfully. We will hypothesize about how a governor may be successful based on a consideration of these roles. Case studies of two governors, Pat Brown, and his son Jerry Brown, will help bring these roles to life.
9.02: The Executive Branch
The responsibility of the executive branch is to implement the law. Instead of just one person elected as the Chief Executive, Californians elect the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Attorney General, the Board of Equalization, the Insurance Commissioner, the Secretary of State, the State Controller, the State Treasurer, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction.
Like all other California elections (except for US President), these officials attain their positions through the “top-two” primary system. The top two candidates from the primary election, regardless of party, are in a runoff election in the general election. Officeholders are limited to two terms as established by Proposition 140 (1990). Table 9.1 describes the role of each of the offices of California’s plural executive. Each executive leads offices staffed with mostly civil servants working in many bureaucratic agencies that implement government programs. This organizational chart from the Governor’s office is also helpful to survey.
Table \(1\):The Plural Executive
Office
Role
Governor
Head of Government
Lieutenant Governor
Substitute for Governor and President of the State Senate
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
Oversees California K-12 school districts
Insurance Commissioner
Regulates insurance rates and services
Secretary of State
Oversees elections, manages legal and business records
Attorney General
Chief Law enforcement officer
State Controller
Manages tax collections and writes checks for the state
State Treasurer
Invests state funds
Board of Equalization
Ensures uniform taxation of property (four members from four districts and the State Controller is the fifth officeholder) | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/09%3A_The_Executive_Branch/9.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
In theory, the plural executive diminishes the governor’s power because the other offices are accountable to the people rather than dependent on the governor for their appointments. In practice, the agenda-setting role of the executive remains almost entirely with the governor. Another executive office holder will rarely step out from the governor’s shadow.
As with the U.S. President, the governor campaigns for office on a platform of promises. The governor is the de facto political head of their state party. When the governor’s party holds the majorities in the State Assembly and State Senate, the governor exercises a great deal of sway over legislation. Lawmakers will introduce and prioritize the governor’s agenda. If the legislature is recalcitrant, governors may use the initiative and referendum mechanisms of direct democracy to change policy, organizing petition drives and advertising campaigns for various economic and social causes.
The Governor’s most powerful tool to set the agenda is the state budget. The budget details all the revenues and expenditures of the government, revealing the priorities of state government, and by inference, of the California people (or at least the party coalition that supports the governor) as well. The governor organizes his fiscal priorities for each government agency as a single budgetary document compiled by the Department of Finance. The governor submits the proposed budget to the state legislature by January 10, which must approve it by June 15 in time for the beginning of the fiscal year, which starts July 1.
Revenue sources are many. The state of California is most dependent on income and sales taxes. Consequently, in a recession, receipts abruptly fall, causing a great deal of difficulty. Governor Brown enlarged the rainy-day fund to \$20 billion to address sudden downturns in income. On the expenditure side, the largest expenditure is for education. California voters passed Proposition 98 in 1988, which established minimum funding levels for K-14 education, including that it must receive approximately 40% of general fund revenues. For complete data regarding the budget, visit the Department of Finance website.
The governor’s proposed budget is reviewed and debated in legislative budget subcommittees by issue areas and revised and amended according to legislative preferences. These committees hold hearings at which testimony from citizen groups, agency leaders, the Department of Finance, and the Legislative Analyst’s Office helps provide information and judgment for lawmakers. However, the governor has an integral role in this process, partially because the governor has the line-item veto power. The line-item veto allows for specific appropriations to be changed or eliminated by the governor, so it behooves legislators to work with the governor rather than at cross purposes. The governor only has the line-item veto power regarding the budget and appropriations bills, not with other bills where he can only veto or approve the entire bill (Micheli 219-27).
Up until 2011, a two-thirds majority of each legislative chamber was necessary to pass the budget. A dedicated minority of lawmakers (such as fiscal conservatives in the Republican Party) might stop the budget process in this situation. Budget impasses sometimes even shut down the government. In 2010, voters passed Proposition 25, which shifted the percentage needed to pass a budget to a simple majority. Tax increases still require a two-thirds majority. As Republican seats diminish in number, the Democrats can reach this two-thirds majority more easily.
9.04: The Governor as Political Leader
The institutional characterization of the executive branch provides us with the basic facts. However, let’s delve into two case studies to explore how a governor exercises leadership. These case studies illustrate leadership theory and provide insight into California history.
Studies of leadership often break executive actions into different roles. First, the governor is the chief executive, administering laws. Second, he is the chief legislator, spearheading a political agenda through the legislature. Third, he is the chief of state, the symbolic leader representing all of California. The study of roles is a helpful organizing principle for describing leadership, but to understand successful leadership, we need an explanation of the relative effectiveness of the governor. Drawing on the classic work of Richard Neustadt, who argued that presidential power is the power to persuade, we can explain gubernatorial effectiveness in the same way. Governors, just like presidents, have very little command power. Instead, they must seek to persuade other stakeholders—parties, the public, the media, legislators—about the validity of their ideas. Let us examine two governors, father and son, whose influence on California is important in itself to consider, but who also illustrate the argument that executive power in America is the power to persuade.
Diving into these case studies will help us better understand the frenetic pace of California history in the post-World War II era. The dramatic growth of California as a leader economically, technologically, and culturally is best represented by Governor Edmund “Pat” Brown, who held the office from 1959 to 1967. Second, his son, Edmund Gerald (“Jerry”) Brown, had a very different leadership style, serving as governor twice, from 1975 to 1983 and then again from 2011 to 2019. In both eras, these governors confronted challenges to the state in ways that left lasting legacies.
For Your Consideration
Take a moment and think about the nature of leadership. What are the qualities of leadership that you find most effective? Do you believe that these qualities should also be present in political leaders? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/09%3A_The_Executive_Branch/9.03%3A_The_Roles_of_the_Governor.txt |
Leadership requires vision. Whether in politics or any other area of life, a leader should have a clear purpose. Why am I here? What are my goals, what is the theme that I wish to promote during my tenure? Governor Edmund Brown, Sr. served two terms as California’s governor, from 1959 to 1967. He acquired the nickname of “Pat” Brown as a twelve-year-old, selling Liberty War bonds on the streets of San Francisco. Brown would finish his speeches with Patrick Henry’s famous revolutionary cry, “Give me Liberty or Give me Death!” From then on, he was known as “Pat,” and he carried this youthful patriotic energy all the way into the governor’s office (Rarick 13). Driven by the Democratic party philosophy of the New Deal, Governor Brown sought to fashion public policies to help California residents live happier, more productive lives and to persuade Californians to spend more for public purposes to benefit the common good. His efforts were rooted in the optimism and wealth of the post-World War II era, and his successes were a product of his ability to join his persuasive skills to the liberal sentiment of the times.
Second, a leader must have a practical strategy to achieve his goals. The strategy involves persuading the different parts of government in California—the people, the legislature, the bureaucracies, etc.,—to work together. Pat Brown’s approach was very old-fashioned, the ability to be the ever-present politico, ebullient, extroverted, the organizer, reaching out at the retail level to build relationships and patronage. His was not the slick-media candidacy that would become more common by the 1970s; he was the hand-shaker, the listener, the bargainer, the politician who sought to gather support in the pursuit of the vision that he saw for California. In short, Pat Brown was a pragmatist, seeking practical political solutions to the social problems facing a rapidly growing state.
Third, a leader’s character—worldview, values, and style—is revealed through their goals and strategies. What ultimately matters to the governor as a person? Governor Brown had a very strong sense of public obligation, that it was his duty to harness his strong work ethic to help the state of California in the best way that he knew how: through politics. An exploration of his political life as governor shows each of these leadership qualities.
Pat Brown grew up as one of four children of Ida and Edmund Brown in San Francisco. His father owned a cigar store and engaged in many other business enterprises. Pat learned to hustle odd jobs as a child, selling newspapers and sodas. He went to Lowell High School, the best public high school in San Francisco, where he showed leadership talent. He was the president of student clubs, student government secretary, and a yell leader. After high school, he went to work at his father’s cigar store, running his own card games, and for leisure, visiting Yosemite National Park with friends. Brown wanted to go to college, but his father had fallen on hard times, so he decided to go directly to law school at night and work during the day for a local attorney. By the late 1920s, he had become an attorney himself.
He turned toward civic involvement as a member of the Elks and the Chamber of Commerce. While his first foray into politics was a losing bid for state assembly at the age of 23, he started a clean-government reformist political organization in San Francisco known as the “New Order of Cincinnatus.” The organization gained many promising honest politicians as members. Brown became more well-known. Historically, most Californians were Republicans, as was most of the country outside of the South. Brown, however, drawn to New Deal liberalism, decided to switch parties, and become a Democratic in 1935 (Rarick, Ch. 4).
As his law practice grew, Brown became active as a fundraiser for the Democratic state party and began running again for local office. In 1943, he was elected San Francisco District Attorney. By 1950, he was elected to his first statewide office, attorney general. Politically, he was a moderate, supporting the pragmatic Harry Truman over the left-wing candidacy of Henry Wallace. As attorney general, he supported liberal civil rights causes such as protecting the rights of Native Americans and liberal civil liberties positions such as banning religious instruction in public schools.
When Republican Governor Earl Warren decided not to run for reelection in 1958, it was a perfect opportunity for Pat Brown to run for this seat. Brown ran on a platform of government activism promising more consumer protections, economic development, protection of civil rights, and spending for roads, schools, and water projects. He ran against the incumbent senator from California, William Knowland, who conducted a lackluster campaign focusing more on fighting Chinese communism than about addressing the problems of a rapidly growing state. Brown also benefited from the support of labor with whom he shared opposition to an anti-union “right to work” proposition that was also on the 1958 ballot (which was defeated). Pat Brown won easily, taking all but four of California’s fifty-eight counties and a plurality of over one million votes. Moreover, it was a landslide for Democrats who took control of the state legislature and almost all the elected executive positions (Rarick, Ch. 5).
In his inaugural address of January 5, 1959, Governor Brown set out his platform of “responsible liberalism” (California State Library). California’s government must do more. It needed to provide the public services to match the need and the growth of the state: new elementary and high schools, colleges and universities, roads and highways, more water projects, deeper commitments to civil rights and to workers, and on and on. With strong support from Democratic majorities in the state legislature, the Governor asked and received increases in revenues—income tax, capital gains tax, tobacco taxes, among others—to pay for his ambitious agenda.
In his first term of office, the Governor’s most notable accomplishments were in four areas. First, in the area of civil rights, a strengthened Fair Employment Practices Commission to investigate and adjudicate job discrimination claims, was established. Second, the Governor shepherded the Master Plan for Higher Education through the legislature which separated the missions of the University of California, the state university system, and the community colleges. He promoted legislation to fund more campuses for each level. Third, the Governor planned the California State Water Project to create the California Aqueduct. This project dammed the Feather River, bringing its water over the Tehachapi mountains to southern California. Then the governor successfully campaigned on behalf of the multimillion-dollar bond proposition to fund the project. Fourth, funded by the gas tax, the state embarked on massive highway and freeway building projects across the state to accommodate a California population that by 1963 would exceed that of any other state.
Brown, in his first year, signed more than one thousand bills. Among the bills, disabled people received more health care and financial help. Unemployment insurance was expanded. Air pollution curbs were instigated. State workers received pay raises. Such historically Republican papers as the Los Angeles Times praised the Governor for his stewardship of a well-thought-out program (Rarick, Ch. 10).
What explains these successes? Indeed, a new governor may enjoy a honeymoon period at the beginning of his term, but far more was at play here. Governor Brown was riding a wave of partisan energy to address the needs of the state with very little opposition from more conservative forces. The enthusiastic boosterism of his projects caught the liberal imagination of Californians. A similar wave would sweep the whole country in 1960 with the election of Kennedy and the inauguration of more vigorous national Democratic activism. Brown succeeded because he took advantage of a relatively rare opportunity to make significant policy changes.
In his first term, the one episode that caused his popularity to plummet was the Caryl Chessman death penalty case. Governor Pat Brown was torn about whether to grant a stay of execution in February 1960 for Chessman who had been convicted of multiple counts of rape, kidnapping, and robbery. In the early 1960s, the abduction connected with the other crimes made him subject to the death penalty. Chessman had spent many years representing himself, proclaiming his innocence, and gaining the sympathy of Hollywood stars such as Marlon Brando to publicize his plea for clemency.
With his past as a district attorney and attorney general, the Governor was sympathetic to supporting the criminal courts’ judgment of death. However, his Catholicism and his son Jerry Brown’s personal entreaties on Chessman’s behalf caused him to ask the legislature for a moratorium on the death penalty. They rejected his request, the State Supreme Court rejected clemency for Chessman, and ultimately Chessman was executed. Brown’s waffling made both opponents and proponents of capital punishment dislike his dithering about the issue (Pawel 113). This would not be the first time where he would find it hard to respond to contradictory advice.
In 1962, the Governor prevailed in his reelection campaign against former Vice-President Richard Nixon. In his second term, Brown’s most notable accomplishment was helping to pass the Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963. This act banned housing discrimination based on ethnicity, race, sex, marital status, physical handicap, or familial status in public and private housing of five units or more. Governor Brown was part of a coalition of liberals who sought to end the severe segregation of African Americans in the inner cities of California. At this time, it was next to impossible for many non-whites to purchase or rent housing in most suburbs. The passage of this Act sparked the first major reaction to the Governor’s liberal agenda. The real estate industry-sponsored Proposition 14, to repeal the Rumford Fair Housing Act, arguing that private rights trumped racial equality. The Governor fought vigorously to persuade the California electorate to vote no on 14, but he failed. However, the US Supreme Court ruled Proposition 14 to be unconstitutional, and thus the Fair Housing Act prevailed and was reinforced by national legislation in 1968 to achieve similar purposes (Pawel, Ch. 10).
By the mid-1960s, California politics was changing. Conservatives criticized Brown for being too liberal. Within his party, younger Democrats criticized his pro-law enforcement attitudes. The issue came to a head at UC Berkeley with the free speech movement.
Traditionally, the University did not allow anyone to demonstrate on campus. In 1964, civil rights activists wanted to raise money for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Congress on Racial Equality to help organize voter registration drives in the South. One of the activists was Mario Savio, who was arrested while staffing a table on campus. This sparked massive sit-ins in the administrative buildings on campus to protest this lack of freedom. The Governor saw the students as spoiled brats who should be grateful to be able to attend college. The University administration wanted to negotiate with the students; the California Highway Patrol wanted to arrest every trespasser. Brown went with the law-and-order solution, and the subsequent media images of students being dragged away by the police caused Brown grief on both sides. Liberals derided his tactics, conservatives associated his governorship with the disorder (Rarick, Ch. 14). Once again, Brown showed that he was a better booster for an extensive infrastructure program than a decisionmaker under pressure.
A year later, the positive spirit of California received its most severe blow yet when a drunk-driving arrest in the south-central Los Angeles Black community of Watts led to widespread rioting, looting, arson, dozens killed, hundreds injured, and millions of dollars in damage. Policing issues were but the tip of the problem. Housing, job, and educational discrimination imposed on African Americans through both de facto and de jure means was the underlying cause.
This time the Governor was in Greece attending a convention and found himself rushing back to restore order. By 1965, the excitement of liberalism had worn thin. The left criticized moderate Democrats’ failure to address the core problems of society. The right argued that liberalism caused chaos, promoted the wrong values, and pushed California government into becoming some sort of ineffectual nanny-state.
Pat Brown ran for re-election in 1966 against Ronald Reagan. Brown underestimated the attraction of Reagan, considering an actor with hardly any political experience to pose little threat to his future. Reagan was a new-style politician adept with the medium of television and at magnifying conservative ire. The hand-shaking ebullient style of Pat Brown belonged to an earlier era, in a less populated California where politics could still be somewhat of a retail experience. Brown lost (Rarick, Chs. 15 and 16).
In summary, Governor Brown’s natural gregariousness led him to be able to reach out and build a coalition of supporters. Catching the liberal wave of the late 1950s, Brown used his strong party majorities to effectively address many of the challenges of the late 1950s and early 1960s. His administrative skills would sometimes fail him, as the Chessman and Free Speech movement examples show. Ultimately, the times changed, and Brown’s politics and leadership style lost their luster. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/09%3A_The_Executive_Branch/9.05%3A_Governor_Pat_Brown.txt |
Pat Brown’s son, Jerry, was governor for two sets of two four-year terms each, as the youngest California governor between 1975 and 1983 and as the oldest California governor between 2011 and 2019. Brown’s political philosophy unifies his two administrations. He was never the backslapping politician of his father’s day; instead, he embraced an ethically self-conscious intellectual middle-of-the-road politics energized by Catholic humility, Jesuit inquiry, and a 1970s sensibility to embrace a limits-to-growth mentality. Brown did not aspire to be a philosopher-king; he adopted a democratic philosophy regarding the limits of leadership in a representative democracy. With the people’s assent, the governor must pursue creative strategies to prepare for the future.
Jerry Brown grew up in San Francisco. He was a very religious young man, attending St. Ignatius High School and then studying for the priesthood at the Sacred Heart Novitiate in Santa Clara for three years. Realizing that he wanted to be more involved in secular life, he switched to UC Berkeley and then went on to study law at Yale. His father’s influence helped secure a clerkship with Justice Mathew Tobriner of the California Supreme Court, followed by work as a lawyer in Los Angeles (Newton, part one). By 1969, he had a seat on the Los Angeles Community College Board, and by 1970 he was elected as Secretary of State of California. His father’s famous name certainly opened many doors for Mr. Brown, but he quickly charted an independent political course. Distinct from a standard New Deal-liberal approach, Brown responded to the challenges of the 1970s in new and more moderate ways than previous generations of Democrats.
First, as Secretary of State, he championed campaign finance reform, leading an effort in June of 1974 to pass Proposition 9, a proposition placing limits on contributions and mandating their public disclosure. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, such good government measures were very popular, and it was not an accident that Brown was running in the primary for governor in this very same election. Brown won the primary and went on to win in November 1974, becoming the youngest governor in California history (Newton 104-106). The strategy of not just riding a new wave of public sentiment, but leading it, would propel Brown to victory again and again in his career.
In his first term, Brown showed his commitment to labor and environmental causes. Farmworkers acquired better working conditions and the ability to unionize with the passage of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act. State employees were also unionized with his support. Environmentally, the California Air Resources Board (started under Governor Reagan) set more stringent standards for air pollution. With the establishment of the California Coastal Commission, the California coastline gained much more protection from environmental destruction because all new development had to meet its approval. Spending for schools and welfare increased, and the California Conservation Corps, a jobs training program, was created. The governor was a careful spender; the state budget soon enjoyed a five-billion-dollar surplus.
Thrift has its rewards, but the increase in tax revenues attracted the frustration of conservatives who believed that property taxes were too high. The result in June of 1978 was Proposition 13, an initiative to limit property tax to 1% of the assessed value of a home with no more than a 2% increase each year tied to inflation. Brown opposed the proposition because it was predicted to cause draconian cuts in state programs. However, after it passed and facing re-election in November, he changed his mind and embraced the new anti-tax spirit. Re-elected in 1978, Brown ran into more trouble when he delayed insecticide spraying for the Mediterranean fruit fly in urban areas. Ultimately, he approved spraying as the infestation threatened the viability of agriculture (Newton, part three).
Brown’s first two terms in the 1975 to 1983 period reflect the common experience of many elected officials. A governor comes into an office with an ambitious agenda and enjoys support from a broad bipartisan coalition. Then new political forces, such as the anti-tax movement of the 1970s, enter the political arena, and his ability to implement his vision is cut short. Of course, there is always the possibility of the unpredictable occurring; a scandal, a crisis, a natural disaster, whether an earthquake or an insect infestation, undermining the best-laid plans.
Like his father, Jerry Brown always had national political ambitions. He ran for President three times, in 1976, 1980, and again in 1992. In 1982, he ran for the US Senate and lost to Republican Pete Wilson, who would later become California governor in the 1990s. Brown’s campaigns for national office were quixotic on the one hand because they were long shots, driven more by personal charisma and philosophical ideas than widespread popular support. On the other hand, Brown was seeking to shift debate within the Democratic Party to embrace a newer politics to address the late twentieth century’s emergent environmental, civil rights, and technological issues. Brown’s national campaigns did bring attention to these goals and himself as a young leader full of exciting ideas (Newton 198-204). However, by the early 1980s, the political winds had shifted from Jerry Brown’s liberalism to a revitalized conservatism. A re-energized Republican party helped elect former California Governor Reagan to become President in 1980. Jerry Brown returned to private life.
In his forties, Brown spent part of the 1980s deepening his intellectual and religious spirit. He started two think tanks, the National Committee on Industrial Innovation, and the Institute for National Strategy, focusing on domestic and international policy innovations. Brown studied Zen Buddhism, traveling to Japan, and deepened his Catholic faith by working with Mother Teresa in India. By the late 1980s, he decided to return to California politics, running and winning the office of chairman of the California Democratic Party. He resigned to run in the Presidential primaries, losing to Bill Clinton in 1992.
His return to political office began with his election to be the mayor of Oakland, CA; he then was successfully elected to a statewide office again as Attorney General in 2006. The governor at this time was Arnold Schwarzenegger, a relatively moderate Republican whose second term ended in 2010. With term limits passed in 1990, “the Governator” could not run for a third term, but Brown, who served as governor before term limits passed, was eligible to return to the governor’s mansion (Newton, part four).
It was an opportune time for a Democrat to run for governor. The Republicans had veered to the right, favoring smaller government, an anti-immigrant platform, and rejecting greater civil rights for LGBT people. However, the state as a whole was becoming more liberal again, especially as the demographics of the state shifted to an even more ethnically diverse population. Brown ran for the governorship in 2010, promising to address the state’s fiscal problems, particularly the considerable deficit, without raising taxes unless he had the support of Californians in the form of a referendum. He won. The youngest governor had now become the oldest governor. Twice then, his tenure followed that of an actor, first Reagan and then Schwarzenegger.
In 2011, Governor Brown, now in his third term, confronted a twenty-five-billion-dollar budget deficit with a proposed sales and income tax increase. As promised, he took the proposal to the voters and placed Proposition 30 on the 2012 ballot, persuading voters of the necessity of tax increases. As the economy continued to grow throughout the decade, and with the increased revenues from the tax hikes, the budget no longer was the cause of political crises. The state soon started gaining some surpluses that could be put in a reserve account (Newton, part five).
After addressing the fiscal crisis, Brown turned to some other issues needing attention, some of which were of perennial concern and others that were relatively new. The criminal justice system is, of course, one of the longest-standing issues of government. Reforms in the 1970s and 1980s in response to crime waves had caused many more crimes to result in incarceration and much longer sentences. In his first term, the prison population stood at about thirty-five thousand Californians out of a total state population of about twenty-one million residents. When he returned to office in 2011, there were more than 160,000 Californians locked up from a population of about thirty-seven million (“California Prison and Jail Populations"). The ethics of imprisoning people for so long was questionable on multiple grounds. How many years should someone be locked up for something they committed, most likely as a young person? To what extent was there racial bias regarding who was charged and the length of sentences? Many sentences were due to drug rather than violent crimes. Shouldn’t drugs be treated more as a health issue rather than a criminal issue? Did locking people up reduce crime in the long run or just lead to recidivism as people with felony records found it difficult to find work, homes, and stable lives? Moreover, the California Supreme Court in 2011 (Brown v. Plata) ruled that overcrowding in state prisons violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Brown led several efforts to address this problem, supporting propositions to liberalize get-tough-on-crime efforts such as the three-strikes law (which gave twenty-five years to life sentences even when the third strike was relatively minor) and realigning incarceration to house people committing less serious offenses to county jails rather than to the state system. By the end of the decade, state prison populations had decreased by about thirty percent, and voters were in general support of reforms that lightened sentences (“Public Opinion and Sentencing Reform”).
Another issue was environmental protection. In the 1970s, reductions in smog had been led by the California Air Resources Board. Now, this same board was instrumental in tackling global warming by creating a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases. First developed by Governor Schwarzenegger and then extended by Brown, it set overall goals for emissions and then created a market for industries to buy a declining number of credits to pollute. California was able to meet its goal of reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2016 (Newton 339-43).
Brown returned to two other infrastructure issues that were reminiscent of his father’s efforts. Just as his father had developed the California aqueduct and freeways, he started the planning for two new projects: a tunnel system to deliver water from the Sacramento Delta to southern California and a high-speed train project to connect northern and southern California. As Brown left office in 2020, the tunnel was still in the planning stages. The construction of the train project from Modesto to Bakersfield had begun.
Brown left office in 2019 more popular with the California people than previous outgoing governors. Brown had a 51% popularity rating, double that of outgoing Governor Schwarzenegger in 2010 (“What Approval Ratings Say about Jerry Brown’s Legacy”). State finances were in order, mainly due to his engineered tax increases and a growing economy. Brown’s popularity was based on performance and also on the more liberal composition of the electorate that sought to distinguish California politics and policies from the more conservative philosophies and policies emerging from the Trump Administration at the same time. Thus, we can attribute the relative success of the second two terms of Governor Brown to the ability of the governor to propose and implement policies that fit the politics of the state in the 2011-2019 period.
9.07: Summary
Governors matter. Even though the Constitution of 1879 and progressive reforms of 1911 sought to diminish the governor’s power by creating a plural executive and the initiative, referendum, and recall, the governor remains the focal point of political energy in the state. Pat Brown is credited with successfully addressing the state’s titanic economic and population growth with huge government infrastructure programs, education, and social welfare spending. His son, Jerry Brown, represented the shift in political culture in California to a centrist vision for the Democratic party. Successful governors can persuade the electorate to follow their agendas and change California politics and policy.
For Further Inquiry
Investigate the leadership of the current governor. What aspects of his leadership are effective? What aspects need improving? The Capitol Weekly is one of the best sources for news about state politics.
9.08: Works Cited
“The Budget Process: A Citizen’s Guide to Participation.” California State Senate, 2014. www.senate.ca.gov/sites/senate.ca.gov/files/budget_process_guide.pdf
California State Library. “Edmund G. ‘Pat’ Brown.” Governors of California - Edmund G. "Pat" Brown. First Inaugural Address. governors.library.ca.gov/addresses/32-Pbrown01.html
Micheli, Chris, Understanding the California Legislative Process. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Publishing House, 2020.
Neustadt, Richard. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York: Signet Books, 1964.
Newton, Jim. Man of Tomorrow: The Relentless Life of Jerry Brown. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2020.
Pawel, Miriam. The Browns of California: the Family Dynasty That Transformed a State and Shaped a Nation. Bloomsbury, 2020.
"California Prison and Jail Populations" Prison Policy Initiative, May 2017, www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/...1978-2015.html
“Public Opinion and Sentencing Reform.” Public Policy Institute of California, 17 Oct. 2017, www.ppic.org/blog/public-opinion-and-sentencing-reform/.
Rarick, Ethan. California Rising: The Life and Times of Pat Brown. University of California Press, 2006.
Walters, Dan. “Newsom is Shrinking Brown’s Pet Projects.” CalMatters, 8 May 2019, calmatters.org/commentary/2019/05/newsom-shrinks-brown-bullet-train-delta-tunnels/.
“What Approval Ratings Say about Jerry Brown's Legacy.” Public Policy Institute of California, Jan. 2019, www.ppic.org/blog/what-approval-ratings-say-about-jerry-browns-legacy/ | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/09%3A_The_Executive_Branch/9.06%3A_Governor_Jerry_Brown.txt |
Introduction
In the early morning hours on January 18, 2015, behind a dumpster on the campus of Stanford University, nineteen-year-old student-athlete Brock Turner sexually assaulted unconscious twenty-two-year-old Chanel Miller. He was sentenced to a jail term of six months by Judge Aaron Persky, served three, and returned to his home in Ohio. He was now a lifetime registered sex offender.
Outraged by the lenient sentence, Stanford Law Professor Michele Dauber led the effort to recall Judge Persky. The recall law required her to submit the valid signatures of 20% of the number of people who voted in the last Santa Clara County Superior Court election (58,634 for the 2018 June 5 ballot). The campaign gathered almost twice this number (Brassil). Persky’s defenders pointed out that the judge was merely following the recommendation of the probation department. The public defender’s office as well as that of the district attorney also opposed his recall, calling it an example of public hysteria and a threat to judicial independence. Nonetheless, Santa Clara County voters recalled him with a vote of 62% to 38%. He was the first California Superior Court judge to be recalled in eighty years. (“Aaron Persky”).
This case shows both the role of the California courts and the controversy surrounding them. We expect our judicial system to fairly interpret and apply the law, and not be swayed by political pressures from other branches of government or from public opinion. Historically, independence has been the norm, but periodic unhappiness with the performance of the courts leads to headline-grabbing episodes where politics disrupt the practice of law, sometimes leading to the removal of judges, and even California Supreme Court justices, by disgruntled voters.
The Brock Turner case raises more general questions about the role of the court system as it administers and interprets the law. Even if you are not the victim (or perpetrator) of a terrible crime such as that of Brock Turner, you are likely to be involved with the court system in many ways. This chapter discusses the role and organization of the courts in California as well as the selection of judges. We consider also consider the responsibilities of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court by describing the tenures of two former Chief Justices: Rose Bird and Tani Cantil-Sakauye.
10.02: The Organization of the California Court System
Most of us, at one point or another in our lives, will be involved in a legal matter. This matter may involve either state or federal law or both. The majority of cases involve state law, which may be categorized as either criminal or civil. Criminal law involves crimes against the state. The mildest crime is an infraction, such as a parking ticket. Next, misdemeanors, such as shoplifting, are more serious crimes. Most serious of all are felonies, like robbery or murder. Civil law, on the other hand, concerns cases where the matter is between people, a divorce, or perhaps a disagreement with an insurance company. Even during the pandemic, in the 2020-21 fiscal year, the California Court system managed about 4.1 million cases.
A case, whether criminal or civil, begins in a local trial (superior) court. There is one superior court for each of the fifty-eight counties (with each superior court having many judges). Most cases do not go to trial. Criminal attorneys will prompt their clients to reach plea bargains prior to trial, and civil attorneys will reach settlements often saving thousands of dollars in legal costs. With many low-level offenses, a defendant will avoid trial by agreeing to an alternative such as drug treatment. In the last few decades, many superior courts have specialized collaborative courts that help people receive social services as their cases are addressed by the court. For example, country social workers offer help to victims of domestic violence.
A case may be appealed to the next level, the California Courts of Appeal. The state is divided into six districts with each court hearing cases for its area. From there, a case may be appealed to the California Supreme Court. Death penalty cases are automatically appealed from the district court level to the high court. If federal law is relevant, then a case may be appealed to the United States Courts with the US Supreme Court having the ultimate review of the case.
The Judicial Council of California oversees the three-level court system by formulating and implementing policies and procedures to manage the courts in a consistent way across the state. As an administrative agency, the Council is headed by the Chief Justice and is composed of twenty-one members who include other justices from the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals, the superior courts, members of the state legislatures, and attorneys.
A case usually begins at the trial court level. In the 2020-21 fiscal year, about 5.3 million cases were filed in these local courts administered by 1,755 judges. In contrast, the Courts of Appeal, with just 106 justices managed 17,889 cases. The one chief justice and six associate justices at the highest level, the Supreme Court, only issued seventy-eight opinions (“About California Courts”). | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/10%3A_The_Judicial_Branch/10.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
Superior court judges are elected for a six-year term on a nonpartisan, county-wide ballot. A candidate must have served as an attorney in California for at least ten years. There is no limit on the number of terms a judge may serve.
Appellate Court justices are elected for twelve-year terms. The process used to select them is more complicated. First, the California Governor appoints the justice. Second, the appointment goes to the Commission on Judicial Appointments comprised of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, the California Attorney General, and the senior presiding judge of the court of appeals where they will be working. They will hold a public hearing and formally approve the nomination. Third, the nominee then goes before the electorate and is confirmed in the next general election. This is called a retention election. If they lose the retention election (which rarely occurs), the whole process begins again.
The seven justices of the Supreme Court undergo a similar process; appointment by the governor and confirmation by both the Commission on Judicial Appointments and the voters. Justices may serve additional terms if they are elected again by the people at the end of their twelve-year term in the retention election (“Fact Sheet”).
Most judicial appointments receive little public scrutiny or attention. In the absence of controversy, voters often retain incumbents or confirm gubernatorial appointments. This leaves the governor with some discretion. While judges cannot run for office as partisan candidates, governors are more likely to nominate judicial candidates who have similar beliefs to theirs. A liberal governor may lean more heavily on candidates with experience representing defendants. A conservative governor may promise a get tough on crime policy and appoint judges whose background is with the district attorney’s office.
In short, the responsibility for selecting judges is shared among three actors: the administrators of the Court system who review candidates for the appropriate qualifications, the governor who appoints appeal court and Supreme Court justices, and the people who confirm or may occasionally recall a judge. The latter is rarely exercised. The case of Judge Persky is the exception.
10.04: Descriptive Representation
When studying the legislative and executive branches, political scientists often study issues regarding descriptive representation—to consider how these branches are working toward greater racial, ethnic, and gender diversity. This issue is also important for the California judiciary. It was not so long ago that most lawyers and most judges were white men. In the last two generations, law schools have undergone an astounding transformation and now much better reflect the California population. It is natural that the demographics of the Court would lag behind the younger population of law students. Below is a demographic snapshot of the California court system regarding race, ethnicity, and gender (“Demographic Data”).
Table \(1\): Gender (%) and California Judges (2022)
Court
Female
Male
Supreme Court
57.1
42.9
Courts of Appeal
42
58
Trial Courts
39.9
60.3
Table \(2\):Racial and Ethnic Characteristics (%) of Judges (2022)
Court
Am. Indian
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Pacific Islander
White
Other
More than one
Information not provided
Supreme Court
0
14.3
28.6
14.3
0
28.6
0
14.3
0
Courts of Appeals
0
5.7
9.1
9.1
0
70.5
2.3
3.4
0
Trial Court
.4
9.4
8.5
12.6
.4
61.1
1.0
4.5
2.0
Total
.4
9.3
8.6
12.5
.4
61.4
1.1
4.5
1.9
Compare the summary data above with US census data (Quick facts) regarding the total population of California.
Table \(3\):Comparing the Demographics of the California Population and California Judges (2022)
Group
Percentage of the total population
Percentage of all Judges
Men
50
60.1
Women
50
39.9
Am. Indian
1.7
.4
Asian
15.9
8.7
Black
6.5
9.3
Hispanic
40.2
11.7
Pacific Islander
.5
.4
White only
35.2
61.4
Some other race
n.a.
1.1
More than one race
4.2
4.5
White men are overrepresented, and Hispanic, Asian, and Native American people are underrepresented. African American judges are roughly proportional to the population.
There are four reasons why descriptive representation is an important goal for the judiciary. First, the growth in diversity shows that there are greater opportunities for lawyers from many backgrounds. This is a sign of more equal opportunity. Second, the legitimacy of the courts is enhanced when they have greater diversity. Because most judges begin their tenure as appointees by the governor to fill positions made vacant due to midterm retirements, a more diverse judiciary reflects the commitment of governors to select judges from many California backgrounds. Third, the greater diversity of judges helps the Courts better understand the circumstances and needs of Californians when they interact with the judicial system. This is even more important as courts confront new legal issues. For example, the overturning of Roe v. Wade requires that state courts will now have much more of a role in regulating reproductive rights. Voting regulations and rights, electoral redistricting, and many other issues remain very much in flux such that state courts will find themselves wading into controversial issues that address questions of race, gender, and class. Diverse courts will bring greater knowledge, understanding, and legitimacy to address these complex questions. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/10%3A_The_Judicial_Branch/10.03%3A_Becoming_a_Judge.txt |
Trial courts focus on the facts: did you violate the speed limit? If yes, pay the fine. Of course, the more serious the case, the more complex the factors to determine culpability and impose a just sentence. If a party perceives that there is an error in judgment, they may appeal the case to courts of appeal and ultimately to the California Supreme Court (a case may also be heard in, or appealed to, federal court when there is a question about federal law). The California Supreme Court is required by the California Constitution to review all the death penalty convictions from the trial courts. In most of the remaining cases, it is the Court’s discretion regarding if the Court will grant the appeal and hear the case. For example, in the 2020-21 fiscal year, 6,522 cases were appealed, and the court issued fifty-nine opinions (“Judicial Council”). Thus, in all but a fraction of the cases, the lower court has the last word.
When the Supreme Court receives a petition, staff attorneys working for each of the seven justices review them and make recommendations regarding which ones should be put on the court docket. On most Wednesday mornings, the judges meet in conference to decide. Four must agree. A case is likely to be accepted when there is an important question regarding the constitutionality of a state law or practice.
The Chief Justice then assigns the case to a specific justice who creates a memorandum to address the questions of the case which is then circulated among the other justices for their responses. This process shows the likely opinions of the justices, with the possibility of a majority opinion emerging. Next, oral argument: attorneys for the parties in the case present their summary arguments and responds to questions from justices in one hour. They are usually held in the first week of every month. On the same day of oral argument, the justices meet in conference. The justice assigned the case sets out their position, as do the other justices in the order of seniority, with the Chief Justice speaking last. The Court may coalesce around a single opinion or concurring or dissenting opinions may develop that are also issued formally by the Court. Typically, an oral argument functions to clarify positions and sort out details of an opinion rather than playing a crucial role in the formulation of an opinion. By law, the Court must announce an opinion within ninety days of oral argument (Liu).
How a Supreme Court justice decides a case or should decide a case is a subject of great debate. There is often a gulf between how judges understand what they do versus how the public perceives their work. First, the court only hears actual cases, they cannot decide whether a law is constitutional prior to its passage and prior to someone bringing a lawsuit to the court. Thus, there may be a hard-fought campaign to pass a proposition in California only for that proposition to be ruled unconstitutional after the election when someone goes to court and the case eventually makes its way to the California Supreme Court. Second, the Court does not hear new evidence from the parties, it only reviews the lower court proceedings and hears oral arguments to decide the constitutionality of a lower court decision. Thus, constrained by the facts of a specific case, justices will develop their opinions using the state constitution, existing laws, and prior cases which function as precedents; and only then exercise their own philosophies regarding what is just in a particular situation. The major philosophical divide is about the degree to which the Court should alter the interpretation of the California Constitution based on evolving beliefs about justice. Typically, a conservative justice follows precedent more, with liberal justices altering the interpretation of the Constitution to fit changing times and values. In practice, in the twentieth century, a liberal California Supreme Court expanded constitutional protections such as civil liberties and rights. These labels of “conservative” or “liberal” are, of course, imposed on the justices by observers of the Court. By law, justices are nonpartisan and run for office in nonpartisan elections. A justice may see themselves as simply approaching each case using the best framework of analysis that is appropriate for the relevant facts. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/10%3A_The_Judicial_Branch/10.05%3A_The_Decision-making_Process_of_the_California_Supreme_Court.txt |
The California Supreme Court is one of the most influential state courts in the nation. A little context is necessary to understand how this occurs. First, the Court may be influential with innovative reasoning that addresses a new legal question in an effective way. This will, of course, affect the people of California, since the case arises from a state case. Second, every state case can function as a precedent for other state courts, or the federal government to use as a guide for their own decision-making. Two areas exemplify this leadership: civil rights and product liability.
The California Supreme Court led the nation with many decisions that promoted civil rights. Many racist laws were judged unconstitutional in California and then similar actions were taken subsequently by other state and federal courts. For example, in the twentieth century, many areas of Los Angeles County became segregated as new housing developments limited who could buy or rent a property using racial covenants. A covenant is a regulation placed on the buyer of a property as a condition of ownership. One covenant that was common was that the property could only be sold to white purchasers. Even though the US Supreme Court had banned the use of racial covenants in Shelly v. Kraemer (1948), realtors continued to limit sales and rentals to only white people in many neighborhoods. In reaction, in 1963, California Governor Pat Brown pushed the Rumford Fair Housing Act through the state legislature which banned racial housing discrimination in apartment dwellings of five or more units. In retaliation, the California Real Estate Association sponsored Proposition 14 to overturn Rumford, arguing that freedom of choice should dictate real estate transactions rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. The California electorate agreed, passing Proposition 14 by 65%. Soon after, a Black couple who had been denied an apartment sued, arguing that the new constitutional amendment violated their civil rights. Soon after, in Mulkey v. Reitman, the California Supreme Court ruled that the new California constitutional amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. Realtors appealed the case to the US Supreme Court which reaffirmed the California Supreme Court decision in 1967 (Scheiber, pp. 356-59).
Another area where the California Supreme Court led the country is in product liability law. One of the leading justices on the Court was Roger Traynor, an associate justice appointed in 1944 and the Chief Justice between 1964 and 1970. In 1944, in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Traynor introduced the idea of strict liability to the Court. When a product is judged defective, even if its producer had no intention of hurting anyone, they are still liable for any damages suffered by its use. This notion of strict liability soon was emulated in state courts across the nation.
In short, the California Supreme Court is important. As the third branch of government, it functions as an important constitutional check on the other branches. That independence of course is not absolute. The justices and judges are appointed by political leaders and confirmed by the people. Any of them may be rejected in a retention election or recalled by the electorate. Just such an event occurred in 1986, when the California electorate rejected three judges in a retention election. The justice that was the most controversial was the Chief Justice: Rose Elizabeth Bird. Studying the career of Justice Bird and her rejection by California voters helps us better understand our own philosophies regarding the proper role of the judiciary in the political system.
For Your Consideration
The Story of Chief Justice Rose Bird and the Retention Election of 1986
In the eyes of the Framers of the US Constitution, the ideal judiciary is entirely independent of politics. The judges of the highest court of a state, like those of the US Supreme Court, should function as a referee, checking to make sure that the actions of the legislature, the governor, and the people are constitutional. They should be above politics, only representing the state constitution rather than any faction or party.
California Progressives at the turn of the twentieth century were skeptical of the impartiality and objectivity of judges. Judges, after all, had to be appointed, they are ambitious and given they are but human, they are likely to be tempted by the vagaries of public opinion rather than hew to the idealistic standards of the Framers. So how could judges be held accountable, to make sure they were responsibly fulfilling their roles? The remedy is to have the people confirm the nominations of justices, to make these elections nonpartisan, and to have retention elections for appellate and supreme court justices if they wish to remain in office. Thus, our current system (dating from amendments to the Constitution in 1934) seeks a balance between judicial independence and accountability. Most of the time, the people essentially ratify the status quo, retaining incumbent judges and confirming gubernatorial appointments. However, in times of political ferment, judges may find themselves in the center of a political storm. Just such an event occurred with the retention election of Chief Justice Rose Bird in 1986. The story illuminates the stress between judicial independence and accountability. If you were voting in 1986, would you have retained Justice Bird? Consider the following history.
Justice Bird’s biography did not fit the typical mold of a judge. She was not from a wealthy well-connected family, she was not male, she did not ascend through the ranks of a lower court or have many other political positions. Her story shows how she was very much a pioneer for women and for people of more modest means.
Bird grew up poor, raised by her single mother in Arizona and then in New York. She said that one of the central lessons that she learned from her mother is the importance of becoming self-sufficient and that the key to achieving this is education. She studied hard and flourished in college, attending UC Berkeley Law School with just a handful of other women, and graduating near the top of her class. She had trouble finding work as an attorney (believing that it was because of her gender) but eventually began her career in the Santa Clara County Public Defender’s office as a deputy public defender. There she gained valuable experience and started also to get involved in politics by volunteering (among other duties, as the governor’s chauffeur) for then gubernatorial candidate Jerry Brown’s campaign. Smart and assertive with her views, Brown appointed her to his transition team and then catapulted her into prominence when he appointed her Secretary of the Agriculture and Service Agency, one of the most influential positions in his administration (Cairns, chs. 1-2).
As detailed in the previous chapter, Governor Jerry Brown sought to break with the traditional Democratic party establishment by appointing fresh faces with new ideas, more women, and people from many diverse cultural backgrounds that sought to address contemporary problems in new ways. Bird rapidly adapted to her new political role in the administration; gaining prominence by shepherding the Agriculture Labor Relations Act through the state legislature which dramatically improved the working conditions and bargaining power of farm laborers. Her front-page success led the Governor to exert his counter-establishment proclivities by appointing her in 1977 to become the next Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court (Cairns 53).
Just as her appointment to be Agricultural Secretary broke with tradition, Bird’s appointment to the Court was also groundbreaking. She was relatively young with no judicial experience, a woman during a time when few women were attorneys, let alone judges, and she was very liberal. The latter would not represent a huge break from the Court’s record because the Court for decades had broken conservative precedents and become a judicial trendsetter nationally. Nonetheless, beginning with her confirmation hearings before the Commission on Judicial Appointments, Bird’s tenure at the Supreme Court was turbulent.
She was too soft on crime. She was too liberal. She did not have enough experience. However, there was no doubt to the Commission that she was intelligent and an excellent administrator. Ultimately, the Commission confirmed her 2-1. Justice Bird went before the voters a year later, winning just 52% of the vote, an election which justices usually win with ease. The controversies about her from the confirmation had solidified into considerable electoral opposition (Cairns ch. 4).
By the late 1970s, the political climate in the state was changing as was that of the nation. Many Americans had grown tired of liberalism. The economy was stagnating with higher inflation and fewer job opportunities. Crime was up and many more Americans agreed with a conservative law and order critique that courts needed to get tough. In the 1970s and 1980s, the death penalty was incessantly debated. Liberals argued that it was barbaric, disproportionately administered to poor and nonwhite defendants, and ineffective as a deterrent. Conservatives blamed the increase in crime on liberal sympathies for the accused and perceived the death penalty as a reasonable punishment for a series of heinous crimes splashing across the headlines with sickening regularity.
By law, the California Supreme Court must review every death penalty conviction. As death penalty cases grew, this job loaded up almost a quarter of the docket. Over and over again, Justice Bird and other justices found errors in lower court proceedings significant enough to overturn the penalty. The Court reviewed sixty-four cases between 1979-1986 and affirmed only 7.8% of them. Not one did Bird affirm.
By the November 1986 elections, conservatives in California had had enough and led a campaign to oppose the retention of not only Justice Rose Bird but also that of Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin, two other justices who also often rejected the death penalty (Uehlmen). But the campaign ads full of heartfelt stories of Californians mourning the loss of their children to murderers were not paid for by common people worried about crime. No, they were paid for by California industrial and agricultural interests who had an ulterior motive: get rid of the liberals on the court and select new justices who would support businesses over consumers or workers (Schreiber 480). For decades, the Court had sided against businesses in cases involving employment, the environment, and consumer rights. Now if three justices were gone, and if a Republican were elected governor, the Court might change its stripes.
The Chief Justice did not respond with an effective campaign. She perceived her role as representing the Constitution, focusing on her job, and being above politics. What little campaigning she engaged in consisted of seeking to educate the public about the role of the Court to safeguard civil rights and civil liberties. She hoped that the California voter would appreciate the role of an independent judiciary. Unfortunately, the California voter was more concerned about rising crime than about constitutional issues and removed her with a 2:1 vote, with Justices Grodin and Reynoso also losing their jobs.
After she left office, the California Supreme Court reversed course and in seventy-one cases between 1987 and 1989 affirmed 72% of them. Sometimes the administration of justice really depends on who is judging. Thrown out of office, Bird found no legal opportunities for herself. She took care of her ailing mother, worked as a volunteer, and died of cancer in 1999, at the age of 63.
Two lessons emerge from the story of Justice Rose Bird in the 1977-1986 period. One is that the Courts occupy a point someplace between the touchstones of independence and accountability. Independence is not the ideal in California, accountability is demanded and if a justice strays too far away from public opinion, the processes of confirmation and retention may force more adherence to public opinion. Second, as the first woman on the Court, let alone as Chief Justice, Justice Bird was a pioneer for women’s rights. She broke new ground for the next generation of female attorneys who would be far more numerous, but it was a lonely job for her that required a thick skin to endure constant scrutiny and criticism.
What are your reactions? First of all, do you believe retention elections for judges are wise? Prior to 1934, justices ran in party elections rather than a yes-no vote, so this system represents the relative depoliticization of the process. Should the positions be even more depoliticized such that the state Supreme Court resembles the US Supreme Court with lifetime appointments? Second, if you were voting in 1986, would you have voted for or against Justice Bird? Why? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/10%3A_The_Judicial_Branch/10.06%3A_The_Importance_of_the_California_Supreme_Court.txt |
More than thirty-five years have passed since the voters removed Justice Rose Bird from office. The growth in the number of women, the growing diversity of the state, and the recognition and institution of programs to promote equal representation prompt us to wonder how would Justice Rose Bird have been treated today? Perhaps, she would not have had such a sudden and ignominious end to her legal career. The story of the recently retired Chief Justice Cantil Sakauye (2022) suggests just such a possibility.
Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye is a Filipino-American who grew up in Sacramento, attended community college there, and completed her law degree at UC Davis. Her legal career began with the Sacramento District Attorney’s office but within a few years, she had joined Republican governor George Deukmejian’s administration as a legal affairs secretary. Soon, Governor Deukmejian appointed her to be a trial court judge, and then she received successively more important appointments by subsequent Republican governors to become first a superior court judge, then an appeal court judge, and in 2010, Governor Schwarzenegger appointed her to become the new chief justice. Voters retained her in the fall 2010 elections (“Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye”).
The most pressing problem that she faced in 2011 were budget cuts. At this time, the California legislature was stuck every year in a political gridlock with a mismatch between revenues and expenditures. Tax revenues dramatically varied every year because they were based primarily on income, sales, and capital gains taxes. Justice Cantil-Sakauye, as the head of the Judicial Council, had to lobby the legislature to protect funding. The budget situation eased considerably after Governor Brown’s election because taxes were raised, and the economy improved as the Great Recession eased.
The resolution of the budget crisis helped free the Chief Justice to pursue systematic improvements in the administration of justice in California. As head of the Judicial Council, her role was not just that of a justice, but she was also the manager of a large bureaucracy whose mission is to provide for an effective and just system of administering civil and criminal law. She promoted several initiatives: greater access for the people of California, greater openness or transparency, and innovative programs to improve the administration of justice. Several programs have helped improve access; with the revolution of internet services, legal self-help for people to address many everyday issues is available on court websites. Interpreter services have been expanded to include not just criminal cases but also civil ones. Also, in the era of the Internet, the Chief Justice led initiatives to open more proceedings such as those of the Judicial Council and the Court itself to public viewing on the Internet.
Several programs have brought more innovation to the administration of justice. The Chief Justice developed many more collaborative courts that combine addressing a civil or criminal case with help from social service agencies to address issues of drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, homelessness, and veterans’ issues (The Chief Justice’s Timeline). More recently, the Court ruled that in criminal trials, when someone is eligible for pretrial release, their ability to pay bail must be considered before setting the amount. In re Humphrey, in March 2021, the Court ruled that Courts must consider the ability to pay in setting bail. They may impose bail if no other conditions of release could be used to help ensure that the defendant appears at their trial. Additionally, local governments adopted a no-bail standard temporarily during the pandemic, engaging in their own efforts to reduce or abolish bail as part of criminal justice reform.
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye almost entirely avoided partisan politics. Other than beginning with the Deukmejian administration, her career has been within the judiciary. She did make headlines in 2018 when after watching the US Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Justice Kavanaugh, she changed her voter registration party membership from Republican to “no party preference” (Wang). At a Public Policy Institute of California talk, the Justice declared herself to be a “Deukmejian Republican.”
Despite these nominal signs of partisanship, most of her public pronouncements were about how to provide better access, equity, and justice for the people of California. She spoke about the courts as “social justice centers” for Californians. This was certainly not the language of a law-and-order Republican of the 1980s. Instead, her public stances were that of a public administrator seeking to provide better services to the California people.
So, what can we make of the difference in the experiences of Chief Justices Bird and Cantil-Sakauye? Just forty years ago, women in law were trailblazers. They were breaking into a relatively insular network of mostly wealthy white men and their heirs. The lawyers and the judges of the 2020s reflect the diversity of the state as well as a political as well as a legal culture that has made it much easier for women to succeed. Moreover, the approaches of the two women were very different. Bird emphasized doing the right thing even when it was not popular, such that decisions on the Court were often divided. Cantil-Sakauye prides herself on the consensual practices of memoranda sharing before oral arguments and the frequency of unanimous decisions (“A Conversation…”).
The consequences of different times and different approaches led to the dramatic 1986 recall of Chief Justice Rose Bird in contrast to the noncontroversial tenure of Justice Cantil-Sakauye from 2010 to 2022.
10.08: Summary
The role of law in the everyday lives of Californians is important. This chapter points out that much of this law is state law, organized, administered, and developed by Californians. The Supreme Court of California has exercised leadership in many areas of law. One way that law collides with politics is when we consider the degree to which the courts should be independent of the other branches, or the degree to which they should be accountable. Our system seeks to find a balance between the two, enough independence to not be subservient to the other branches, but enough accountability to respond to the needs of the people.
As the culture of our state has changed, so has the Court. The Court far better reflects the diversity of peoples and backgrounds than it did forty years ago. The difficulties experienced by Justice Rose Bird were due in part to the prevailing bias against women at that time. The experiences of Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye reflect a political and social environment where there is more opportunity in government for everyone.
10.09: Works Cited
“Aaron Persky.” Ballotpedia. ballotpedia.org/Aaron_Persky
“About California Courts.” About California Courts - CA_courts. www.courts.ca.gov/2113.htm
Cairns, Kathleen A. The Case of Rose Bird: Gender, Politics, and the California Courts. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2016.
“The Chief Justice’s Timeline.” California Courts. www.courts.ca.gov/judicialcounciltimeline.htm
“Fact Sheet California Judicial Branch.” Judicial Council of California. October 2020. /www.courts.ca.gov/documents/...ial_Branch.pdf
“Quick Facts California.” United States Census Bereau, July 2021. census.gov/quickfacts/CA
Ruben, Eric, and Thomas Ward Frampton. “California Judge Recalled for Sentence in Sexual Assault Case.” Harvard Law Review, 8 Feb. 2019. harvardlawreview.org/2019/02...-assault-case/
Shrieber, Harry N., Editor. Constitutional Governance and Judicial Power: The History of the California Supreme Court. Berkeley: University of California HeinOnline.
Uehlmen, Gerald. “Review of Death Penalty Judgments by The Supreme Court of California: A Tale of Two Courts”, 23 Loy. L.A. Rev. 237 (1989). | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/10%3A_The_Judicial_Branch/10.07%3A_Former_Chief_Justice_Tani_Cantil-Sakauye.txt |
Introduction
Local politics feel fundamentally different. Their immediacy and daily impact make grand ideological and partisan differences among us seem less important. Local issues are often about resolving traffic jams, providing good schools, planning for safe neighborhoods, and many other topics that do not polarize us in the same way that state and national politics may. They are not trivial, however. For example, the tragedy of a school shooting illustrates the role of multiple governments in our community.
On the morning of November 14, 2019, at Saugus High School, a student murdered two of his classmates, injured three more, and then killed himself. The Saugus (and the larger Santa Clarita) community mourned the deaths of Dominic Blackwell and Gracie Anne Muehlberger with a vigil attended by 15,000, many efforts to better address school safety and gun violence, and a memorial placed in the nearby Central Park to honor them (Aubachon).
This episode and its aftermath show the interlocking roles of many local governments in our lives. Saugus High School is part of the William S. Hart School District, which is responsible for school safety as mandated by the state of California. The school district, governed by a Board of Trustees elected by Santa Clarita voters, contracts with the County of Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department to provide school resource officers. The City of Santa Clarita also contracts for its police, fire, and paramedic services from the County, resulting in these county departments also responding to the shooting. The victims were rushed to Henry Mayo Newhall Hospital, a not-for-profit hospital licensed by the state of California. Saugus High students and their families organized the vigil for the following weekend at Central Park, which is managed by the Parks and Recreation Department of the City. The City leases the parkland from the Santa Clarita Water Agency, a special district, with an elected board responsible for delivering water to the area. This agency agreed to the addition of the memorial to the park. Setting aside a further consideration of the complexity of local, state, and federal laws that regulate gun ownership, the response to this shooting illustrates the vital roles of multiple local governments in our community.
Local governments were first established by the California Constitution of 1849. Article 11 provides uniform procedures for the establishment of counties and cities as legal subdivisions of the state. California grants local governments their powers and hence they are but “creatures of the state.” This doctrine of state control became known as Dillon’s Rule (1868), after an Iowa state court decision that was followed by courts across the country. However, California, like many other states, delegates limited autonomy to local governments when they create charters. A charter gives a local government home rule status, meaning more autonomy to organize government and policies as they choose, and then Dillon’s Rule no longer applies. Hence, cities and counties are established as either charter cities and counties or “general law” cities and counties that follow Dillon’s Rule.
In total, there are fifty-eight counties ranging from the most populous Los Angeles County with nine-million-plus people to tiny Alpine County in the Sierra Nevada with just over one thousand people. Thirteen of these counties have charters. These include some of the largest counties including Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento, and San Francisco. As of 2017, there are 482 cities, with 125 having more autonomy from state law as charter cities. And then there are over four thousand special districts, including school districts and all sorts of other specific purpose districts to manage many issues such as water, pollution, and medical care (Micheli). Finally, there are 109 federally recognized Indian tribes in California (“California Tribal Communities”). We will discuss each of these in detail. As we survey these many local governments, we will consider the following: How are they constituted? Who governs them? What are their responsibilities? Last, we will examine some of the current debates regarding electoral reform. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/11%3A_Local_Governments/11.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
The borders of California’s 58 counties have been the same since 1907 when Imperial County was created from the eastern half of San Diego County. Establishing a new county or altering county borders requires, according to 1894 amendments to the California Constitution, a majority vote in the counties affected by the change. Before 1894, local groups could effectively lobby the California legislature to add counties or change their borders without the consent of the voters (“The History of California’s Counties”).
The rules governing the organization of county governments are dictated by state law (California Government code). General law counties simply follow these rules. A county, by majority vote, can choose to declare itself to be a charter county giving itself “home rule,” meaning more autonomy in organizing its government and policies. All counties are governed by a nonpartisan five-member board of supervisors whose members are elected to four-year terms. Nonpartisan elections for the sheriff, district attorney, and tax assessor are also required in all counties. General law counties will typically have elections for additional offices including the coroner, tax collector, auditor, and county clerk. In a charter county, the board of supervisors will usually appoint these and many other positions to consolidate more power under its authority.
Counties are especially important because just about all major social, health, and educational programs that we rely on are administered by county governments and agencies. The access and quality of services that we receive as county residents depend on how well these governments function. According to the California State Controller’s Office, in the fiscal year 2020, counties spent close to \$97 billion on a range of these services. These expenditures were paid for from local revenue sources such as property taxes and state and federal funds (“Counties Financial Data”).
A map of Los Angeles County below shows the incorporated cities and unincorporated areas and the five supervisorial districts.
11.03: California Cities
Counties are created by the state of California. Cities, on the other hand, are created by residents of counties. They incorporate as a city (formally called a municipality) by petitioning the Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCo) in their county. The LAFCo is responsible for approving the formation of cities and addressing many other jurisdictional issues within each county. Residents often want to form a city to have more control over local services and government decisions and thus gain some independence from county control. As with counties, a city may be incorporated as a general law city (most California cities) or create its own charter which gives it relatively more authority over municipal affairs. For example, in 1987, the residents of the unincorporated towns of Valencia, Saugus, Newhall, and Canyon Country successfully petitioned Los Angeles County LAFCo to create the city of Santa Clarita as a general law municipality. It approved the petition; the issue was put to the local voters and Santa Clarita was incorporated (“City Profile”).
Cities are governed by city councils, a five-member body that combines both legislative and executive functions. Most cities have adopted a council-manager system in which the ceremonial job of the mayor rotates among the five members. A city manager is hired by the City Council who is the chief administrator of the city and is answerable to the council. A city council position is typically a part-time job that provides just a small financial stipend. Some cities have a mayor-council system under which the mayor is separately elected, has more administrative authority, and may veto proposed ordinances. In the mayor-council system, alternatively called a strong mayor system, city councils may override mayoral vetoes with a two-thirds majority.
Elections for city council members and mayors occur every four years and are nonpartisan. Most city council and mayoral races do not use primaries. Candidates with the most votes win, with no majority needed.
An interesting exception to the general form of cities and counties is San Francisco. It is a consolidated city and county, with a mayor and a ten-member board of supervisors. The mayor functions as the chief executive and has the power to veto legislation like in other cities with strong mayor systems.
Cities provide many services for their residents. Drawing on local property and sales taxes, user fees, and money from the county, state, and federal governments, they provide utilities such as water and electricity, transportation, parks, and engage in community development. City councils often create many boards and commissions to make recommendations for new legislation. At regular city council meetings, the members pass ordinances or new laws for the city. Residents have a right to speak to the council for short periods of time (“City Fact Sheet”). City Council meetings must abide by the Ralph M. Brown Act which requires “open meetings,” meaning that they are announced in advance and open to the public, with some exceptions regarding confidential matters (“The Brown Act”). | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/11%3A_Local_Governments/11.02%3A_California_Counties.txt |
Voters may also create special districts that are dedicated to particular functions within a county (or even more than one county). The process is the same as with creating a city; first, approval by LAFCo, and then by the voters who live within the boundaries of the special districts. There are many kinds of special districts: over one thousand K-12 school districts, over one hundred community college districts, and approximately 4,800 others, focusing on a range of services from providing health care, managing transportation, collecting garbage, or killing mosquitos. About 1400 of the latter are Joint Power Authority special districts whose governing boards are appointed by cities or counties rather than being elected (“Special District Data”).
11.05: Regional Governments
Regional governments have been formed by the state or by other local governments to regulate or have an advisory role to address issues that affect more than one county. Some of the most influential regulatory regional governments are the thirty-five air quality management districts that monitor and govern air pollution emissions across the state. The boards are appointed by city governments in each area and enforce federal and state pollution laws.
Local governments have also created regional councils to make recommendations to elected officials about a range of common issues. For example, the Southern California Association of Governments provides a forum for regional planning to address issues such as the housing shortage and transportation problems in the area (“President’s Report”).
11.06: Tribal Governments
109 federally recognized tribes reside in California. According to US law, these tribes are sovereign, meaning that they are not “creatures of the state” of California. Instead, they are sovereign nations like the United States or other countries. Federal law and courts have established the parameters of law and policy on tribal lands. They are administered by tribal governments under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the federal government. Federal laws and court decisions introduce autonomy for tribes in many areas of civil law, and in California, as in several other states, the federal government has stipulated that states and tribes jointly share authority over many criminal matters.
In the last twenty years, tribes have become much more prominent in California politics because of gaming. After the US Supreme Court ruled in 1987 that tribes have a right to develop gambling businesses on their land, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. This Act stipulated that tribes must negotiate compacts with states specifying the kind and extent of gambling that was to be allowed. The tribes gained a new source of revenue and the states also benefited from new tax revenue. The new wealth derived from casinos has enabled tribes to become significant players in state politics using advertising and campaign donations.
11.07: Direct Democracy at the Local Level
Just as the voters of California have recourse to the tools of direct democracy—the initiative, the referendum, and the recall—so do the voters residing in cities, counties, and special districts. The usual forms of direct democracy are referenda presented to local voters to raise taxes. By law, changes in parcel tax (a type of property tax), sales, business, hotel, and utility taxes must go before the voters and require two-thirds approval to be implemented. If a local government desires to borrow money for infrastructure (such as for hospital construction, and transportation), it must also receive two-thirds majority support from voters. In 2000, with Proposition 39, California voters changed the requirement for bonds for school construction to only 55% (“A Look at Voter-Approval Requirements for Local Taxes.”)
Citizens may seek changes to local ordinances through initiatives and referenda. As with efforts to change state laws, supporters must gather signatures of registered voters to qualify the measure for the ballot. These requirements vary depending on the type of local government. In a general law city of more than one thousand residents, ten percent of the signatures of registered voters are required for an initiative to be placed on the ballot (“Laws Governing Local Ballot Measures in California”). A simple majority approves a non-revenue ordinance.
Finally, elected officials in local governments may be recalled by voters. For example, in 2021, disgruntled with the perceived leniency of the policies of Los Angeles County District Attorney George Gascόn, voters circulated petitions to recall him. They failed to gather the requisite 10% of registered voters required to put the measure on the ballot. Most recall efforts fail, often because of the expense and difficulty of gathering enough legitimate signatures. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/11%3A_Local_Governments/11.04%3A_Special_Districts.txt |
Just as there are debates about electoral reform at the national level, such as considering the efficacy of the filibuster, the electoral college, and campaign finance laws, they have their corollaries at the local level and have led to significant electoral reforms. We can think of democracy as a grand experiment to find the right formula to have the best representation possible yielding the best policies for local governments. Two recent reforms that have been implemented deserve our attention. The first seeks to improve descriptive representation by replacing at-large with district elections. The second seeks to increase voter participation by requiring that the dates of municipal elections correspond with state and national elections. Additionally, many other proposed reforms are intriguing. For example, one that is gaining more attention and has been implemented in some local elections in California and in other states is ranked-choice voting.
11.08: Electoral Reform Efforts
Which is better: at-large or district elections? In an at-large election, all voters select five members who represent the entire city. In a district-election system, the municipality is divided into five geographic districts, and voters in each district select a council member who only represents their constituents. In the early twentieth century, the at-large system was favored because it reduced the power of party machines that were often based on ethnically defined neighborhoods. The belief was that at-large elections would encourage city council members to think of the good of the entire city rather than just single neighborhoods. However, we can anticipate the problem that may result; a neighborhood, whether because of prejudice or poverty, could be easily neglected by a governing council. In contrast, district elections have the virtue of potentially avoiding this problem. If districts are drawn fairly, the probability is that governing bodies will draw representatives from all areas of a city and thus better descriptively represent the demographic characteristics and the real needs of all voters.
It is precisely these concerns that led the California State Legislature to pass the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 which makes it illegal for local governments to organize elections in such a way that minority groups would have difficulty obtaining descriptive representation on local governing bodies. Local governments did not immediately make any changes in response to this law; instead, voting rights groups such as the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project have sued or threatened to sue local governments. The response has varied. Some local governments have fought the lawsuits and usually lost, others are more sympathetic to the law and changed to district elections, or pragmatically, some did not want to engage in litigation and simply abandoned at-large elections. Cities, school districts, and special districts are changing electoral rules across California, especially in the last ten years. Over four hundred local governments have switched to district elections since the passage of the act (“Updated Counts of CVRA-Driven Change”).
The logic of these lawsuits is straightforward. If there is a disparity between the racial or ethnic makeup of a governing board and that of the voting population, then the at-large system of elections is suspect. Confirmation of this descriptive representation gap is shown by evidence that cities that have switched to district elections have experienced an increase in minority representation by about ten percent or the equivalent of one seat for every two city councils (Collingwood and Long). Thus, the California Voters Rights Act is that greater descriptive representation leads to better representation of constituency needs and increased legitimacy for local governments.
Once local governments have switched from at-large to district elections, the next step is to divide up the municipality into five districts. Districts need to be reasonably equal in population and comply with the 1965 US Voting Rights Act. Local governments also strive for the geographic compactness of districts and to keep “communities of interest” (based on, for example, culture or economic concerns) intact within a district. In some local governments, the existing governing body supervises redistricting after the federal census (which occurs every ten years). In others, non-politician citizen volunteers are solicited for the task. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors has a Citizens Redistricting Commission which operates in an equivalent way to that of the statewide commission. Citizens of Los Angeles County volunteer to serve, and then following a review of requirements and qualifications, fourteen are randomly selected. They then draw the map with influence from local citizens and groups that voice their concerns during local hearings (Los Angeles County Redistricting”). The growth of citizen redistricting commissions reflects the concerns that if local government leaders draw districts, they may be gerrymandered or biased to favor particular factions or parties.
In summary, the growth of district elections accompanied by citizen redistricting commissions at the local level has at least two consequences: first, it is likely to increase the racial and ethnic diversity of governing bodies of local governments. Second, making sure that more geographic areas of a municipality are represented will enrich democratic deliberation. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/11%3A_Local_Governments/11.08%3A_Electoral_Reform_Efforts/11.8.01%3A_District_Elections.txt |
Should local elections be conducted at the same time as statewide elections? Historically, local elections were often held in odd-numbered years or a different month than state and national elections. The result was that an election with only local contests would typically have a turnout that falls to about twenty-five percent of the eligible voters, about half of the number that voted in a statewide or national election. The lower turnout of these off-year elections also resulted in an electorate that was less representative of the total population, older, less racially diverse, and wealthier (Hajnal et al). In 2015, the state legislature passed the California Voter Participation Rights Act that mandated that cities move municipal elections to statewide election dates if the average local turnout in the last municipal election is 25 percent less than the average turnout in the previous four statewide general elections. The motivation of the legislature was straightforward: address waning political participation by consolidating elections. For the most part, municipalities have complied with little fuss. However, some charter cities have argued that the law should not apply to them and have taken the matter to court. In 2020, the California Supreme Court ruled in their favor in City of Redondo Beach v. Padilla. As part of home rule, charter cities have the power to set their elections. Thus, we can expect some local elections to be conducted at different times than state elections if charter cities so choose to continue this practice, although there may be political opposition to the expense and inconvenience of this practice.
11.8.03: Ranked Choice Voting
Ranked-choice voting (often called instant runoff elections) is touted as one way to reduce polarization. In a general election, voters are asked to rank their top five preferences in a single election. If a candidate wins more than 50%, the election has been decided. If less than 50%, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is dropped and their votes are then reassigned to the voters’ next highest preference until the candidate with more than 50% of the vote is determined. Proponents argue that such an electoral system motivates candidates to head to the center of the spectrum to be more likable to the greatest number of voters.
A number of states and local governments across the US have adopted ranked-choice voting in one form or another. New York City used this process for the mayoral race, the states of Maine and Alaska use it for some of their elections, and, in California, several cities, including Oakland and San Francisco, have adopted the system (“Data on Ranked Choice Voting.”).
Considering these three reforms—district elections, consolidated elections, and ranked-choice voting—a few conclusions are in order. First, although electoral practices vary among local governments, the trend across the state is to promote more descriptive representation and more voter turnout. In a time of increased concern for civil rights and equal opportunity, local governments are giving greater consideration to their election laws. Notwithstanding these concerns, local governments also like to guard their relative autonomy, and not all embrace change so quickly. The attraction of maintaining past practices causes change to occur not as quickly as reform-oriented people would prefer.
For Your Consideration
Consider the reforms discussed above. Do you prefer that cities be divided into electoral districts or to have at-large elections? Is it better that citizens draw electoral districts or should they be drawn by local governments? And would you prefer ranked-choice voting?
11.09: Summary
Local governments matter. The administration of these policies must be accomplished according to the same principles that we seek to uphold with state and national government. We seek to have governments that are fairly elected by the people, which manage policies effectively and equitably, and that are responsive to the contemporary concerns of voters.
11.10: Works Cited
Aubuchon, Jade. “Saugus High School Shooting Memorial Unveiled At Santa Clarita Central Park.” Hometown Station | KHTS FM 98.1 AM 1220, 12 Nov. 2021, www.hometownstation.com/santa-clarita-news/saugus-high-school-shooting/saugus-high-school-shooting-memorial-unveiled-at-santa-clarita-central-park-379382
“The Brown Act: Open Meeting For Legislative Bodies (2003). California Attorney General’s Office. oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/the-brown-act.pdf
“California Tribal Communities.” California Courts, Date of access 27 July 2022. courts.ca.gov/3066.htm
“City Fact Sheet.” Senate Governance and Finance Committee, September 2016. sgf.senate.ca.gov/sites/sgf.senate.ca.gov/files/city_facts_2016.pdf
“City Profile.” City of Santa Clarita, Date of access 31 July 2022. santa-clarita.com/city-hall/departments/community-development/city-profile
City of Redondo Beach v. Padilla, 46 Cal. App. 5th 902 (2020).
Collingwood, Loren and Sean Long. “Can States Promote Minority Representation? Assessing the Effects of the California Voting Rights Act.” Urban Affairs Review 57:3 (May 2021), pp. 731-762.
“Counties Financial Data.” State Controller’s Office. Date of access, 28 July 2022. counties.bythenumbers.sco.ca.gov/#!/year/default
“Data on Ranked Choice Voting.” FairVote. Date of access 30 July 2022. Fairvote.org/data_on_rcv#research_snapshot
Hajnal, Z. L., Kogan, V., & Markarian, G. A. (2022). Who votes: City election timing and voter composition. The American Political Science Review, 116(1), 374-383. doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000915
“The History of California's Counties.” PublicCEO, 18 Jan. 2017, www.publicceo.com/2017/01/the-history-of-californias-counties/
“Laws Governing Local Ballot Measures in California. Ballotpedia. Date of access 29 July 2022. Ballotpedia.org/Laws_governing_local_ballot_measures_in_California
“A Look at Voter-Approval Requirements for Local Taxes.” 20 March 2014. Legislative Analyst’s Office. lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/finance/local-taxes/voter-approval-032014.aspx
Micheli, Chris. “California Local Governments Overview.” California Globe, 1 Mar. 2019. californiaglobe.com/legislature/california-local-governments-overview/
“President’s Report, Year in Review: 2021-22.” Southern California Association of Governments.
scag.ca.gov/sites/main/files/file-attachments/3027_presidentsreport_2021-2022_final.pdf?1651613545
“Special District Data.” California State Controller’s Office. 2020. districts.bythenumbers.sco.ca.gov/#!/year/default
“Updated Counts of CVRA-Driven Change.” National Demographic Corporation. Date of access 30 July 2022. Ndresearch.com/updated-counts-cvra-driven-changes/ | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/11%3A_Local_Governments/11.08%3A_Electoral_Reform_Efforts/11.8.02%3A_The_Timing_of_Local_Elections.txt |
Learning Objectives
• To explain how to engage in policy analysis.
• To examine the California state budget.
• To provide a case study of policy analysis by examining the politics of abortion liberalization in the 1960s.
Introduction
Public policy analysis examines what governments do to address specific challenges. Much of political science describes, analyzes, and evaluates specific parts of the political system. Policy analysis animates the entire process of politics by pragmatically showing how all the parts interact.
An analogy may be helpful. Athletes may study the workings of the heart, lungs, and muscles, investigate the best nutritional strategies, and read about the rules and regulations of their preferred sports. But there is no substitute for actually playing the sport to apply all that has been learned. Practical knowledge illuminates theoretical knowledge.
It is the same with policy analysis. Follow a policy question through the maze of public opinion, voting, interest groups, parties, the media, debate in the legislature, approval by the governor, and possible consideration by the courts, and it is like understanding how a runner’s rigorous training led to a marathon victory. Thus, we synthesize many different strands of knowledge, leading us to a greater holistic understanding of California politics. Policy is the end product of government, after all of the inputs and processes.
This chapter begins by considering how to study public policy, arguing that political systems theory provides a way to consider the many different factors that explain the actions of government. Second, the California state budget provides a snapshot of our priorities; how we spend our money reveals quite a bit about what is important to us as a state. Third, this chapter presents a historical case study with great contemporary relevance: the history of abortion policy in California prior to the 1973 US Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade.
12.02: Major Policy Challenges
How do we know what policy challenges face us? As in our personal lives, there are many issues that deserve our concern. First, there are issues that we understand, and it is just a matter of mustering the political muscle to get things done. This is the public policy equivalent of getting in shape: exercise, lose weight and stop smoking. Cigarettes actually provide an excellent public policy example, too. Health advocates had to prevent the tobacco companies from fogging the public debate with misinformation. A whole generation struggled with lung cancer not because of a lack of knowledge but because of the failure of the political system to do the right thing.
Second, sometimes we have incomplete knowledge about an issue, and we know it. With open minds and good research, policy analysts believe that they can close this gap. On a personal level, uncertainty about college majors may be reduced by finding real-world experiences, such as internships, which allow students to evaluate their choice of majors. In the policy world, the same thing occurs. Epidemiologists study the spread of the coronavirus and make recommendations based on new evidence. Entomologists investigate the collapse of the monarch butterfly population, discover that forest fires destroyed vital habitats, and urge gardeners to plant milkweed to help the butterflies make their migration to Mexico ("Milkweed for Monarchs"). Inquiry leads to knowledge to improve policymaking.
Third, an even more difficult situation exists: when we don’t know that we don’t know about something. Logically, there must be issues that we should be investigating but are not because we don’t know that they exist. This omission may emerge because we assume that the past is a good guide to the future. For example, on a personal level, we may have learned to weather crises stoically and quietly. Just soldier on and don’t say anything. Then, unaware of the impact of neglecting our mental health, we may set ourselves up for post-traumatic stress syndrome years later.
In the same way, as a society, we may focus too much on historical lessons, preparing for the last crisis rather than seeking to adapt to current conditions. Air transportation officials prepare for potential hijackers rather than terrorists. Then on September 11, 2001, the military was not prepared to defend US cities against civilian airplanes commandeered by Al Qaeda members. In California, we know that we have to investigate the impact of long-term climate change on the environment. We also need to prepare more for the increased frequency of natural disasters such as floods and fires. However, our scientific knowledge about the environment remains incomplete and we may not be investigating every question that we should be asking.
Let’s return to the question of identifying the significant policy challenges that face California.
In a democracy, the people have a central role in both identifying issues and prioritizing their importance. Thus, it makes sense to start with public opinion. The Public Policy Institute of California regularly investigates public perceptions of the most important issues facing the state. A 2023 survey shows Californians were most concerned about the state of the economy, followed by homelessness and the housing crisis (Table \(1\) ).
Table \(1\) : Most Important Issue Facing California (2023)
Issue
The percentage saying that this is the most important issue
Jobs, economy
27
Homelessness
16
Housing Costs, availability
11
Crimes, Gangs, Drugs
7
Environment, pollution, climate change
6
State budget, defict, spending, taxes
5
Government in general
5
Immigration, illegal immigration
4
Water, Water quality, availability, drought
2
Other
12
Don't know
6
These surveys are like thermometers, showing what is on our minds compared to previous ones asking similar questions. While insight into current attitudes provides a helpful snapshot, the scope of this survey conducted with phone interviews doesn’t allow for much introspection. We don’t learn how Californians link their thinking about an issue to the larger historical context of the state. Do people credit themselves for their good fortune? Blame the government when they lose their jobs? Connect the international economy to their own livelihood? We don’t know. Such surveys also don't tell us what issues we don't yet know should matter to us. Nonetheless, the survey provides insight for scholars and public officials who wish to respond to popular concerns.
A second way to identify the challenges the state faces is to turn to organizations that systematically study California politics and public policy. Three kinds of organizations do this sort of work: think tanks with nonpartisan or partisan orientations, university centers devoted to particular policy concerns, and government agencies tasked with presenting information to elected officials. The Public Policy Institute of California conducts regular public opinion surveys. It presents nonpartisan systematic studies of all major public policy issues, including the budget, criminal justice, the economy, education, energy, the environment, government reform, health care, housing, transportation, and water. UC Berkeley’s Institute of Government Studies examines many state public policies and conducts regular public opinion surveys. Turning to government, the Legislative Analyst’s Office provides thorough nonpartisan research and analysis for representatives regarding all major policy areas.
Once we identify a policy challenge to study, the next step is to select a method for analysis. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/12%3A_Public_Policy_Analysis/12.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
As with many subjects in political science, we have to first decide how to go about studying public policy. We might begin with a very idealized view of public policymaking. Treat public policy challenges as problems to solve with the government as a unitary actor in charge of the whole process. Such an approach to public policy analysis looks like the diagram below.
There is a certain clarity and simplicity to this approach. Develop effective solutions to problems and measure how well they have succeeded. For example, as California introduces an ethnic studies curriculum to high schools, it can then measure if student comprehension and attitudes change. The weakness of this model is that it misses the politics surrounding the whole process of policymaking. How have public opinion, the media, interest groups, and parties set the agenda? How do the interactions of different parts of government—the legislature, the governor, bureaucracies, and the Courts, shape the formulation and implementation of policies? Lastly, how are policies evaluated by the people? What outcomes are selected as measures? Why? In short, public policy analysis is quite complex. How can we understand the full dimensions of public policymaking?
We don’t have to look far.
This book and most other introductory political science textbooks use systems theory to organize the subject for easier study. This approach is also very useful for policy analysis. Recall that systems theory conceptualizes politics as an exchange among inputs, institutions, and outputs. Californians make demands on political institutions, which then generate policies that impact people. Systems theory allows for generalizability and understanding of the historical and social context of policymaking. The steps to engage in policy analysis using political systems theory are straightforward. Take a particular policy question. Consider public opinion, with its origins in political culture and ideologies, regarding an issue. Reflect on these opinions in their historical and contemporary social contexts. Study how these opinions are pressuring the government through many factors, including interest groups, the media, voting, parties, campaigns, and elections. Next, examine how policymaking institutions address these popular pressures. Are the State Assembly and Senate deliberating about new legislation? What is the governor doing? Is the issue subject to litigation? Are bureaucracies addressing the issue with new studies and proposing new regulations? Finally, examine the policy that emerges and study its impact. Is the policy successfully addressing the problem?
Systems theory allows us to link each part of the political system to the whole and see how they interact to formulate government policy. It is well-suited to a democratic form of government where inputs from the people will be substantial. Systems theory does not propose any specific policy prescriptions.
Should we abandon the simple and idealized model of policy analysis for the grubby and complicated world of systems analysis? The clarity and simplicity of identifying problems and evaluating government responses to them remain valuable. It allows us to ask big questions. Then, systems theory introduces the complexity of actual politics to our studies where we can study all the different facets of the political system and how they impact policymaking.
There are so many fascinating public policies to study. Where shall we begin? One way to gain some perspective on so many policies is to examine the state budget which gives us a financial overview of many policies. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/12%3A_Public_Policy_Analysis/12.03%3A_How_to_Analyze_Public_Policy.txt |
Like any budget, the California state budget is a record of revenues (primarily taxes) and expenditures (spending) that occurs within a fiscal year, or a defined period of time for planning and implementing a budget. California’s fiscal year begins July 1 and ends the following June 30.
A budget offers fascinating evidence regarding our priorities as a state. Who pays and who benefits? Are tax burdens distributed fairly? Are expenditures sufficient to meet our needs? In this section, statistics regarding expenditures and revenues for the 2023-24 budget provide an opportunity to consider these questions.
The state budget includes three distinct funds plus federal funds (Graves).
1. The General Fund: revenues that do not have a specific designation but are mostly used for education, health, and human services.
2. Special funds: taxes, fees, and licenses that are designated for specific purposes.
3. Bond funds: Proceeds from the sale of state bonds dedicated to specific purposes, usually infrastructure, such as for transportation.
Figure \(1\) shows state expenditures in the 2023-24 budget.
Figure \(2\) shows revenue sources.
California taxes itself at a relatively high rate in order to provide health, education, and human services for its residents. According to the Tax Foundation (a nonpartisan nonprofit national think tank), California has the second-highest personal income tax in the country with a progressive tax system topping out at 13.3% for millionaires (2021). Second, California spends a lot, with a per capita state tax spending rate of \$12,714 (2021), ranking #5 among the fifty states (“Total State Expenditures Per Capita”). In short, the state meets the challenge of meeting the needs of its residents with high taxes. Because of the dependence on income and sales tax, the volatility of state revenue amounts has led to the state creating reserve funds and relying on bond funding for investment in infrastructure.
Is there public support for high taxes and plentiful state services? Surveys suggest the public supports the Governor’s budget. A June 2023 Public Policy Institute of California poll shows 59% favor the budget, including 79% of Democrats, 55% of Independents, but just 30% of Republicans. With about 70% of party registration consisting of Democratic or Independent voters, and with only 24% of the electorate registered as Republican (February 2023, Historical Voter Registration), a high tax, and high-spending budget enjoys the support of a majority of Californians.
We can readily see how dependent the state is on personal income and sales tax which will vary a great deal depending on economic conditions. Moreover, these two taxes have very different impacts. The personal income tax is a progressive tax with wealthier people paying a higher percentage. In fact, the top 3% of earners pay about 60% of total personal income tax, according to the California Legislative Analyst. Sales tax is highly regressive. The state rate is 7.5% with many local governments imposing additional amounts. As a percentage of income, the sales tax impacts the poor the hardest. Indeed, the consequence of these two taxes is that the income group that pays the highest portion of their income on taxes is the poorest 20% of the population followed by the wealthiest 20% (Kitson). It is no wonder then, that a 2023 survey of Californians by the Public Policy Institute of California, shows that 57% of all Californians see the tax system as unfair (“Most Californians…”)
Interest in tax reform waxes and wanes depending on if the state budget is under strain. In 2016, then State Controller Betty Yee convened a Council of Economic Advisers on Tax Reform to develop a systematic approach to tax reform. The Council identified three criteria to use when considering improvements in the system of tax revenues: predictability, sufficiency, and progressivity. They argued that the state’s heavy reliance on income and sales tax made it difficult to predict revenue amounts from year to year. Second, during times of increasing expectations of government, revenues may be simply insufficient to pay for everything that the people demand. Third, the issue of progressivity, or who bears the burden of taxes is of continuing concern. Let’s look at several reform proposals and their current status.
Table \(1\): Recent Tax Reform Proposals
Reform Proposal Description Efforts to implement
1. Raise Corporation Tax Proposed in California State Legislature Rejected by the governor (2023)
2. Increase Taxes on Wealthy Raise taxes on millionaires to fund electric cars and firefighting Proposition 30 (2022) rejected by electorate
3. Reform Proposition 13 by raising property tax on commercial real estate Allow local governments to reassess property at current values Proposition 15 (2020) rejected by voters
4. Sales Tax reforms Increase or decrease sales tax Sales tax on feminine products and diapers removed (2020)
Local districts raising revenues by increasing sales tax
5. Change sales tax to include services The economy is now much more service-oriented, tax labor rather than just tangible products No bill introduced
6. Reduce property taxes Safeguard and extend Proposition 13 property tax rates after selling a home Proposition 19 (2022), extending tax benefits to heirs and to purchase new homes, passes
Reviewing table \(1\), one can see that in the last few years, there have been multiple proposals to increase taxes on the wealthy and on corporations and that they have failed at the ballot box or been opposed by the governor (La).
Nevertheless, anti-tax sentiment remains strong. After property values rapidly rose in the 1970s leading to rapid increases in property taxes, a tax revolt swept across the state. Anti-tax advocates Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann successfully spearheaded the placement and passage of Proposition 13 on the 1978 ballot. Proposition 13 fixed property taxes at 1% of assessed market value at the time that the property was purchased with the rate allowed to increase for inflation, but only up to 2% a year.
One of the most effective interest groups in California is the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association. Jarvis formed this interest group after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, and, although he passed away in 1986, the organization continues to lobby state government and promote propositions to retain low property taxes. Efforts to allow market value assessment for commercial properties without transfer of title were opposed by the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association and voters rejected Proposition 15 in 2020. In fact, Proposition 13 was strengthened in 2022 with Proposition 19, allowing a homeowner who ius at least 55 to transfer their low property tax to a newly purchased home or pass on these low taxes to an heir if the home becomes their heir's residence (Christopher).
The decrease in local revenues following the passage of Proposition 13 forced local governments to turn to the state government to fully fund local expenditures, especially education. The result is that California’s property tax rates rank 33rd out of 50 states, although because of California’s high property values, with regards to property taxes as a percentage of income, California ranks 15th out of 50 (“California Property Taxes).
The issue of volatility in revenues remains a threat due to the state’s reliance on personal income and sales tax. So much of the personal income tax totals are dependent on the profitability of wealthy Californians’ stock portfolios, that a bear market on Wall Street means a slimmer year in Sacramento. One effort to address this problem is to enlarge reserves or “rainy day funds” to anticipate and be able to fund short-term deficits. For examples, in 2014, California voters passed Proposition 2 which amended the California Constitution to increase required reserves. For the 2023-24 fiscal year, the reserve funds add up to approximately \$38 billion (“California’s State Budget Reserves). Enlarging reserves is one way to address the volatility issue without dramatically changing tax policy.
In Sacramento, prior to 2011, a two-thirds vote was required to pass the budget. A committed minority of the legislature could stop a budget from passing, often resulting in budget delays. In 2010, Californians passed Proposition 25, reducing the fraction of the vote required to pass a bill to a simple majority (it also required that the legislature pass a budget on time or forfeit their pay). However, a two-thirds vote by the legislature is required to raise taxes. This, however, is no longer an impediment in Sacramento because the Democratic party enjoys a supermajority of more than two-thirds in both the State Assembly and the State Senate. Lastly, the state continues to elect Democratic governors, avoiding the threat of a conservative veto of the budget or a tax increase.
In short, because the numbers of Democrats and Independents (registered as no party preference) voters have increased while the number of Republicans has declined a majority in support of increased spending for a whole range of government services has emerged. This is funded with high personal income taxes that impact the wealthy disproportionately and high sales taxes that hit the poor disproportionately. In the meantime, strong post-Prop 13 support for maintaining low property taxes has helped long-time property owners such as senior citizens be able to afford their houses in the face of rapidly increasing home values.
In the long run, the question is whether the growing fiscal demands on the state can be satisfied with current tax policies. Health, education, and welfare spending plus the need for massive investments in infrastructure may push tax rates up even more. At some point, higher tax rates may spark a backlash like what occurred in the late 1970s that led to Proposition 13 limiting property taxes. Alternatively, high taxes may just be one more reason that Californians will feel forced to move to states with lower taxes but often with fewer services.
For Your Consideration
Each year, the governor and the legislators must make many tough decisions about expenditures balanced against projected revenues. According to the California Constitution, the budget must be balanced. Would you like to try your hand at the budget process? Go to the California Budget Challenge, a simulation in which you, the participant, formulate your own budget, learning about each category of spending as you go. Good luck! | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/12%3A_Public_Policy_Analysis/12.04%3A_The_State_Budget.txt |
Our first public policy analysis is regarding a historical issue that has great relevance today: abortion. Specifically, why did California liberalize abortion law prior to the 1973 US Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade?
The issue of abortion presents an excellent case study of how systems theory helps us study multiple factors to explain policy outcomes. The fundamental puzzle regarding abortion is what explains the dramatic changes in policy. In the 1850s, states banned abortion under most circumstances. Then, in 1973, the US Supreme Court, in the case of Roe v. Wade, declared that access to abortion, under most circumstances, is a constitutional right, protected by the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Almost fifty years later, the Court reversed itself in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022) stating, in so many words, that Roe was a mistake and directing states to develop their own abortion policies. Thirteen states promptly banned abortion almost entirely and many more have limited its use. Just a handful of states have continued to protect access to abortion using the previous standard of Roe v. Wade, which only restricted abortion in the third trimester (after twenty-four weeks). California is one of these more liberal states, even adding new laws to protect access to abortion.
What explains these dramatic variations in abortion policy? The history of abortion in the United States, and in California particular, raises many questions. What was abortion policy in California prior to Roe v. Wade? How did it come about that California reformed abortion policies before Roe? How can this history be useful for understanding current debates about abortion?
Consider the experiences of women when abortion was illegal. Tales of despair are far too common:
“I was seventeen years old. I was married. And ten months after I was married I had a baby girl. She was very ill, and the doctor told me, told me that if I ever had another child, I would die. Three months later, I was pregnant again, and I was absolutely terrified. I couldn't have that baby because if I did, and I died, who would take care of the little baby I had? And so I asked the young women where I worked if there was somebody who could help me do something. And they sent me to a woman, and she lived in a shack. And she put, I think it was a strip of slippery elm bark, and she inserted this up my uterus. And she said, “Now you go home, and that will swell up, and you will have pain, and you will probably have some temperature, but you will have a miscarriage.” Two days later I was in such pain...and so I went back out to see this woman. And she said, "I told you not to come back." And I said, "I have nowhere else to go.” And she just held me up to her chest for a minute and she said, "Honey, did you think it was so easy to be a woman?” (Lana, quoted in Fadiman)
From colonial times through the 1840s, termination of pregnancy was considered ethical prior to quickening; when the mother could feel the fetus move in the uterus, which occurs approximately after 16 to 20 weeks. Family members, herbalists, and midwives provided the instructions. Advertisements in magazines and newspapers such as that in the New York Herald in 1841 hawked “female monthly pills,” as “the very best medicine that ladies laboring under a suppression of their natural illness can take.” (“Capitalism by Gaslight”). In the nineteenth century, it is estimated that between 20 to 35 percent of pregnancies ended in this way (Martinelli-Fernandez 27).
As the practice of medicine developed, the newly formed American Medical Association (1847) sought to professionalize medical care. The AMA considered popular abortion practices dangerous and pressured state governments to ban the practice. In California, the 1850 Crimes and Punishment Act prohibited abortion. California Penal Code Section 274 (1872) also criminalized helping someone obtain an abortion:
“Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any pregnant woman, or procures, any such woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses or employees any instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment” (Gutierrez-Romine 11).
Similar laws were passed by states across the country. Doctors performed abortions when they were considered therapeutically necessary to save the life of the mother but the criteria for considering whether abortion was therapeutic varied a great deal. Terminating pregnancies by illegal means continued. It was estimated that, nationally, before 1973, somewhere between 200,000 to 1,200,000 abortions were performed annually (Calderone 950) with hundreds of women dying each year from illegal abortions. In 1930, abortion was blamed for the deaths of 2700 women (Benson).
The availability of abortion varied by one’s class. Wealthy women could go overseas to doctors in countries where abortion was legal (such as Japan) or obtain a therapeutic abortion from their doctors who ran the risk of arrest and loss of their medical licenses. The law simply stated that abortion is illegal “unless the same is necessary to preserve her life.” It was common practice for doctors to perform abortions when women were suffering from mental illness. Therapeutic abortion committees in hospitals authorized these abortions that went beyond the letter of the law (Pendleton 243).
In California, the proximity of the border with Mexico also provided an additional avenue for an abortion. Although abortion was illegal in Mexico, many American women traveled to border towns such as Tijuana for abortions. American doctors, who arranged, through intermediaries, for their patients to have abortions in Mexico were not violating US law. In 1953, the California Supreme Court ruled in People v. Buffum that Americans could not be charged with conspiracy to commit a crime because the abortion had occurred in a foreign country.
In the early 1960s, two public health tragedies prompted many doctors to break with the anti-abortion orthodoxy and push for reform of the law. The first was the thalidomide scandal. Today, thalidomide is an oral medication used to treat a number of conditions including cancer. However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was in clinical trials in the United States to treat a variety of ailments including nausea during pregnancy. Doctors did not realize that the drug would affect the growing fetus. Thousands of babies were born with phocomelia, or deformities of the limbs and it was banned in early 1962. Then in the 1963-65 period, twelve million Americans came down with rubella (also called, at the time, German measles). It was a relatively common virus to contract with mild symptoms for most people (the vaccine for it was invented in 1969). However, during early pregnancy, contracting rubella led to many neonatal deaths and disabilities. During this epidemic, nationally, 11,000 children were born deaf, 3500 blind, and 1800 intellectually disabled.
These two episodes prompted some hospitals to go beyond the letter of the law (which defined therapeutic abortion as only legal when the mother’s life was in danger) and approve of abortions for reasons regarding the health of the fetus (Gutierrez-Romine 15). The California State Medical Board threatened to remove the medical licenses of doctors who had been performing abortions on women exposed to rubella. In particular, a case against nine Bay Area doctors received significant publicity with 128 medical school deans signing a letter defending the doctor’s actions (Karol and Thurston 95).
Concerned that California law ought to be liberalized to help women facing these crises, the California Medical Association lobbied the state legislature to adopt American Law Institute (ALI) standards for abortion. The ALI is an organization of judges, lawyers, and scholars that work independently to improve the legal system by creating restatements of law for legal professionals and model codes of law for legislators. In 1962, the Model Penal Code recommended the liberalization of abortion law to allow abortion when:
1. "There is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother;
2. There is substantial risk that the child would be born with grave physical or mental defect;
3. The pregnancy resulted from rape or incest” (Gutierrez-Romine 12)
In 1967, the California state legislature passed the Therapeutic Abortion Act, and Governor Reagan signed the bill, liberalizing abortion law. However, this law’s impact was soon overshadowed by the case of People v. Belous (1969) which ended the enforcement of the 1872 California abortion law.
Dr. Leon Belous, who practiced obstetrics and gynecology at Los Angeles’ Cedars of Lebanon Hospital, was a well-respected physician and a prominent advocate of liberalizing abortion laws. In 1964, he was a guest on Louis E Lomax’s television show (an interview and debate show on KTTV in Los Angeles) where he was arguing for the ALI liberalization of abortion law. One of the listeners was a student named Cheryl Palmer who a few years later found herself with an unwanted pregnancy. Remembering the radio show, she contacted Dr. Belous who advised her that instead of going to Tijuana for an abortion, she should go to a doctor in Chula Vista, to Dr. Karl Lairtus, who would perform the abortion safely. Dr. Lairtus was a Mexican doctor who was seeing patients in California without a license.
Cheryl Palmer took his advice and went to Dr. Lairtus’s apartment for the abortion. However, the police had been tipped off, and while Cheryl was resting after the surgery, they raided the apartment, arresting Lairtus and found evidence of Belous’s referral. Belous was tried and convicted of conspiracy to commit an abortion. With the American Civil Liberties Union’s support, he appealed his conviction, ultimately to the California Supreme Court. Belous argued that by helping Palmer obtain a safe abortion, he was protecting her right to receive health care, specifically, Section 274 of the criminal code allowed abortion when “it was necessary to preserve the life of the mother.” The California Supreme Court ruled that this clause was simply too ambiguous to be enforced in a reasonable and consistent manner. Moreover, the Court, citing the US Supreme Court case of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), argued that women have a fundamental right to privacy regarding marriage, family, and sex. (People v. Belous). Effectively, with Belous, the Court had legalized abortion in California because the prohibition of abortion could no longer be enforced. Indeed, the argument used in Belous protecting the right to privacy was then used a year later by Jane Roe’s attorneys in Texas, in the case of Roe v. Wade
What explains the dramatic shift in California policy in the 1960s? There was not a groundswell of demand for liberalized abortion laws from the public. The first public opinion polls regarding abortion in the 1960s (Sauer) showed only 7% of Americans favored abortion for any reason, but majorities believed that it should be legal when the women’s life is in danger (87%), the child will suffer severe physical disabilities (50%), or the pregnancy was a result of rape (52%). Polls in California taken at this time show similar findings. A 1969 Field Poll showed only 15.4% of respondents approved of abortion for any reason. However, 77% favored abortion if the child would be born with a serious deformity. Only 29% approved if the family could not afford the child (California Field Poll).
Certainly, the liberalization of abortion laws occurred during a decade in which there was much social change. Civil rights movements for racial equality and gender equality made the issue of reproductive freedom a prominent goal. In 1962, Patricia Maginnis, a laboratory technician in San Francisco formed the interest group, Society for Humane Abortion, which sought to make elective abortions legal. Her group taught classes on the safe self-administration of abortion and helped 12,000 women get abortions by organizing a network of contacts with sympathetic doctors and other providers. Maginnis also founded ARAL, the Association to Repeal Abortion Laws, the predecessor to NARAL, the national interest group dedicated today to the promotion of pro-choice legislation (Loofbourow). Citizen support for abortion liberalization provided an important context for social change.
However, the key actors were doctors who supported the change and the California Medical Association lobbying for liberalization. Opposition to adopting the broader ALI standards came from Catholic clergy in California who mobilized their congregations to write letters to their state legislators (Karol and Thurston). In short, abortion politics in California before Roe were not partisan. Well-organized groups exerted the most amount of influence with both the lawmaking branches and the judicial branch as the arenas for conflict.
For Your Consideration
What lessons emerge from the study of abortion prior to Roe v. Wade that are relevant for today’s debates about abortion? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/12%3A_Public_Policy_Analysis/12.05%3A_Analyzing_Public_Policy_-_The_Case_of_Abortion_in_the_Pre-Roe_v._Wade_Era.txt |
Studying public policy has multiple purposes. First, we can pursue our interests in how California has addressed important historical and current issues. Second, as we study public policy formation and implementation, we are compelled to study all the different parts of the political system and how they interact with one another to respond to political demands. Policy analysis shows us the importance of considering multiple factors and dynamics to understand the nature of California politics.
There are so many fascinating topics that deserve our study as political scientists. Studying the budget provides one overview of what we are doing as a state for how we tax and how we spend reveals a great deal about our priorities. Policy analysis can be used to explain policy outcomes in the past, such as the liberalization of abortion law in the 1960s, or we can consider current challenges with the tools presented in this textbook.
You, the reader, are invited to continue this exploration.
12.07: Works Cited
Baldassare, Mark, et al. “PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government.” Public Policy Institute of California, 26 May 2021. www.ppic.org/publication/ppic-statewide-survey-californians-and-their-government-may-2021/
Benson, Rachel. “Lessons from Before Roe: Will Past be Prologue?” Guttmacher Institute, 1 March 2003. www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2003/03/lessons-roe-will-past-be-prologue
Berggruen, Nicolas. “California Proposition 2, Changes to State Budget Stabilization Fund Amendment (2014).” Ballotpediaballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_2,_Changes_to_State_Budget_Stabilization_Fund_Amendment_(2014)
Calderone, Mary Steichen. "Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem." American Journal of Public Health, vol. 50, no. 7, 1960, pp. 948-54.
California Department of Finance, “Chart B Historical Data Budget Expenditures,” Feb. 2023, www.dof.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/352/2023/03/CHART-B.pdf
California Field Poll. Berkeley D-Lab. Date of access 10 July 2023. dlab.berkeley.edu/data/California-public-opinion Polls
California Legislative Analyst’s Office, “California’s Tax System: A Visual Guide” 12 April 2018, lao.ca.gov/Publications/Detail/3805
“California Property Taxes By County - 2023.” Tax-Rates.org. Date of access 4 July 2023. www.tax-rates.org/california/property-tax
“California State Budget.” Date of access 5 July 2023. ebudget.ca.gov/FullBudgetSummary.pdf
“California State Budget Reserves.” California Budget and Policy Center. Date of access 3 July 2023. calbudgetcenter.org/resources/californias-state-budget-reserves-explained/
“Capitalism by Gaslight: The Shadow Economies of 19th-Century America (Selling Sex).” The Library Company of Philadelphia. Date of access 5 July 2023. www.librarycompany.org/shadoweconomy/section4_13.htm
Christopher, Ben. “Exploring the Prop. 13 Tax Revolt family tree.” CalMatters, 21 October 2020. calmatters.org/politics/2020/10/prop-13-family-tree/
Fadiman, Dorothy, director. Motherhood by Choice. 2023. www.concentric.org/films/motherhood_by_choice.html
Graves, Scott. “Guide to the California State Budget Process.” California Budget and Policy Center, calbudgetcenter.org/resources/a-guide-to-the-california-state-budget-process/
Gutierrez-Romine, Alicia. “Abortion and the Law in California: Lessons for Today.” California History, vol. 99, no. 1, pp. 10-29.
“Historical Voter Registration Statistics.” Elections and Voter Information: California Secretary of State, 10 February 2023. elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ror/ror-odd-year-2023/historical-reg-stats.pdf
Karol, David and Chloe N. Thurston: “From Personal to Partisan: Abortion, Party, and Religion Among State Legislators.” Studies in American Political Development, 34 (April 2020), 91-109.
Kitson Kayla, “5 Facts.” California Budget and Policy Center, 5 March 2022. calbudgetcenter.org/app/uploads/2022/03/5F-FP-Tax-Equity.pdf
La, Lynn. “California taxes: Newsom says no to hike.” CalMatters, 27 April 2023. calmatters.org/newsletters/whatmatters/2023/04/california-taxes-budget/
Loofbourow, Lili. “They Called Her “the Che Guevara of Abortion Reformers” Slate, 4 December 2018. slate.com/human-interest/2018/12/pat-maginnis-abortion-rights-pro-choice-activist.html
Martinelli-Fernandez, Susan A. and Lori Baker-Sperry, and Heather McIlvaine-Newsad, Interdisciplinary Views on Abortion: Essays from Philosophical, Sociological, Anthropological, Political, Health, and Other Perspectives. McFarland: 2014.
“Most Californians Believe They Are Overtaxed by an Unfair System.” Public Policy Institute of California, 18 April 2023, www.ppic.org/blog/most-californians-believe-they-are-overtaxed-by-an-unfair-system/
"Milkweed for Monarchs." The National Wildlife Federation. Date of access 1 August 2023. www.nwf.org/Garden-for-Wildlife/About/Native-Plants/Milkweed
People v. Belous: Supreme Court of California Decisions: California Case Law: US Law.” Justia Lawlaw.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2d/71/954.html
Pendleton, Brian. "The California Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Analysis.” Hastings Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 1, 1967, pp. 242-55. repository.uclawsf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1968&context=hastings_law_Journal
“PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government.” Public Policy Institute of California, 28 June 2023. www.ppic.org/publication/ppic-statewide-survey-californians-and-their-government-june-2023/
Reagan, Leslie J. When Abortion Was a Crime: Women, Medicine and Law in the United States, 1867-1973. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997.
Sauer, R. "Attitudes to Abortion in America, 1800-1973." Population Studies Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1974), pp. 53-67.
Simon, Herbert A. “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 79, no. 2, 1985, pp. 293–304. JSTOR. doi.org/10.2307/1956650
"Total State Expenditures per Capita" KFF, FY 2021. www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/per-capita-state-spending/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_California_Government_and_Politics_(Reti)/12%3A_Public_Policy_Analysis/12.06%3A_Summary.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Define key concepts within the discipline of comparative politics.
• Understand the scope of comparative politics and its place within the discipline of political science.
Introduction
Have you ever read the news and wondered,
• “Why is this country at war with another country?” or
• “Why did that world leader say or do that?” or
• “Why doesn’t this country trade with that country?” or maybe, very simply,
• “Why can’t all these countries just get along?”
If you have, you’ve already begun asking a few of the many questions scholars within the field of comparative politics ask when practicing their craft. Many of the questions and concerns within the realm of comparative politics are centered on a wide spectrum of social, political, cultural and economic circumstances and outcomes, which provide students and scholars alike with robust and diverse opportunities for inquiry and discussion. The field of comparative politics is broad enough to enable provocative conversations about the nature of violence, the future of democracy, why some democracies fail, and why vast disparities in wealth are able to persist both globally and within certain countries. Whether a student watches or reads the news, or expresses any outward concern for global and current events, many of the problems and issues within comparative politics inevitably affect every single person on the planet.
So, what exactly is comparative politics? What differentiates comparative politics from other subfields within political science? What can be gained from studying comparative politics? The following sections introduce the field, outlook, and topics within comparative politics that will be further explored in this book.
Overview
When defining and describing the scope of comparative politics, it is useful to back up and recall the purpose of political science from a broad perspective. Political science is a field of social and scientific inquiry which seeks to advance knowledge of political institutions, behavior, activities, and outcomes using systematic and logical research methods in order to test and refine theories about how the political world operates. Since the field of political science is so broad, it has a number of subfields within it that enable students and scholars to focus on various phenomena from different analytical lenses and perspectives. Although there are many topics that can be addressed within political science, there are eight subfields that tend to garner the most attention; these include: (1) Comparative Politics, (2) American Politics, (3) International Relations (sometimes referred to as World Politics, International affairs, or International Studies), (4) Political Philosophy, (5) Research Methods and Models, (6) Political Economy, (7) Public Policy, and (8) Political Psychology. All of these subfields, to varying degrees, are able to leverage findings and approaches from a diversity of disciplines, including sociology, history, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, economics, and law. Given the vast scope of political science, and in order to understand where comparative politics fits within the discipline, it is useful to briefly consider these subfields side-by-side.
Comparative Politics
This subfield of study within political science seeks to advance understanding of political structures from around the world in an organized, methodological, and clear way. Scholars can, for instance, analyze countries, in part or in whole, in order to consider similarities and differences between and among countries. While the name of the field itself suggests a methodology of comparing and contrasting, there is ample room for debate over the best way to analyze political units side-by-side. In this chapter, we show different ways to prepare a comparison, whether one focuses on area studies, cross-national studies, or subnational studies. Comparative politics involves looking first within countries and then across designated countries (this contrasts with International Relations, which is described below, but entails looking primarily across countries, with less attention given to within country analysis). Further on, we discuss many of the themes for analysis, whether the scholar is focusing on “the state” or statehood, political institutions, democracy and democratization, or backsliding democracies, and so forth. After briefly considering the other subfields within political science, we will revisit the question of the ultimate definition and scope of comparative politics today.
American Politics
This subfield of political science focuses on political institutions and behaviors within the United States. Those interested in American politics will focus on questions like: What is the role of elections in American democracy? How do interest groups affect legislation in the U.S.? What is the role of public opinion and the media in the U.S., and what are the implications for democracy? What is the future of the two-party system? Do political parties delay important political action? Those who decide to specialize in American politics could find themselves a variety of career opportunities, spanning from teaching, journalism, working for government think-tanks, working for federal, state or local governmental institutions, or even running for office.
International Relations
Sometimes called world politics, international affairs or international studies, international relations is a subfield of political science which focuses on how countries and/or international organizations or bodies interact with each other. Those interested in international relations consider questions like: What causes war between states? How does international trade affect relationships between states? How do international bodies, like non-governmental organizations, work with various states? What is globalization and how does it affect peace and conflict? What is the best balance of power for the global system? Individuals interested in this field of political science may be looking for careers with teaching, non-governmental organizations, the United Nations, and governmental think-tanks focused on U.S. foreign policy.
Political Philosophy
Sometimes called political theory, political philosophy is a subfield of political science which reflects on the philosophical origins of politics, the state, government, fairness, equality, equity, authority and legitimacy. This field can consider themes in broad or narrow terms, considering the origins of political principles, as well as implications for these principles as they relate to issues of political identity, culture, the environment, ethics, distribution of wealth, as well as other societal phenomena. Those interested in political philosophy may ask questions like: Where did the concept of “the state” arise? What were the different ancient beliefs regarding the formation of states and cooperation within societies? How is power derived within systems, and what are the best theories to explain power dynamics? Individuals who are interested in political philosophy may find careers in teaching, research, journalism as well as consulting.
Research Methods and Models
Research methods and models can sometimes be considered a subfield of political science in itself, as it seeks to consider the best practices for analyzing themes within political science through discussion, testing and critical analysis of how research is constructed and implemented. This subfield is concerned with finding techniques for testing theories and hypotheses related to political science. An ongoing and heated debate often arises out of the proper or applicable usage of quantitative versus qualitative research designs, though each inevitably can be appropriate for various research scenarios.
Quantitative research centers on testing a theory or hypothesis, usually through mathematical and statistical means, using data from a large sample size. Quantitative research can be beneficial in situations where a scholar or student is looking to test the validity of a theory, or general statement, while looking at a large sample size of data that is diverse and representative of the subjects being studied. International Relations, American Politics, Public Policy and Comparative politics can, depending on the subject they are considering, find practical applicable for quantitative research methods. Someone interested in International Relations may want to test, for instance, the influence of global trade on conflict between states. For this, the sample size of the study may be 172 states engaged in international trade over a period of 10, 20, or even 50 years. Perhaps the theory being tested would be this: trade improves relations between states, making conflict unlikely. The person testing this would need to find ways to quantify conflict over time, to measure alongside, perhaps, trade volume between states. Overall, some of the methods for quantitative research may involve conducting surveys, conducting bi- or multivariate regression analysis (time-series, cross-sectional), or carrying out observations to test a hypothesis.
Qualitative research centers on exploring ideas and phenomena, potentially with the goal of consolidating information or developing evidence to form a theory or hypothesis to test. Qualitative research involves categorizing, summarizing and analyzing cases more thoroughly, and possibly individually, to gain greater understanding. Often, given the need for more description, qualitative research will have a small sample size, perhaps only comparing a couple states at a time, or even a state individually based on the theme of interest. Some of the methods for qualitative research involve conducting interviews, constructing literature reviews, or preparing an ethnography. Regardless of a quantitative or qualitative approach, topics of interest within the subfield of Research Methods and Models focuses on advancing discussions of best practices in research design and methodology, understanding causal relationships between events or outcomes, identifying best practices in quantitative and qualitative research methods, consideration of how to measure social, economic, cultural and political trends (focusing on validity and reliability), and reducing errors or poor output due to selection bias, omitted variable bias, and other factors related to poor research design. In many ways, this subfield is critical to almost all others within political science, and this book will spend a chapter looking closer at appropriate research methods and models to provide students with a greater understanding in order to test or develop theories within political science. For those interested in pursuing Research Methods and Models as a subfield, there are a number of careers open not only for its relevance to political science, but also to fields within mathematics, the nature of inquiry, statistics and so forth.
Political Economy
This subfield of political science considers various economic theories (like capitalism, socialism, communism, fascism), practices and outcomes either within a state, or among and between states in the global system. Those interested in political economy will become versed with the theories brought forth by Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Max Weber to gain greater understanding into economic systems and their outputs and affect on society. Political economy can be studied from the standpoints of a few other subfields in political science, for instance, comparative politics may consider political economy when comparing and contrasting states. International relations could consider International Political Economy, wherein scholars attempt to understand international economics in the context of different state systems. International Political Economy will consider questions relating to global inequalities, relationships between poor and wealthy countries, the role and effect of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or multinational corporations (MNCs) on international trade and finance. Those who are interested in political economy find careers as economists, or analysts for the stock market, as well as in teaching and research.
Public Policy
This subfield of political science explores political policies and outcomes, and focuses on the strength, legitimacy and effectiveness of political institutions within a state or society. Relevant areas of inquiry in this field include: How is the agenda for public policies set? Which public policies issues get the most attention, and why? How do we evaluate the effectiveness of a public policy? To what extent can public policy hurt or help democracy? Individuals interested in public policy can seek careers relating to almost any item of the U.S. political agenda (the healthcare system, social security, military affairs, welfare, education, etc.), go into teaching and research, or serve as public policy consultants for federal, state or local governmental organizations.
Political Psychology
This relatively new subfield within political science weds together principles, themes and research from both political science and psychology, in order to understand the potential psychological roots for political behavior. Is there a psychological reason some world leaders behave in a certain way? Is a leader’s behavior strategic and, consciously or not, rooted in some psychological basis? Can theories of cognitive and social processes explain various political outcomes in states and societies? Those interested in the psychological origins of political behavior could find interesting careers in teaching, research, and consulting.
All of these subfields within political science can utilize each other to develop greater understanding of political institutions and activities to advance the field. Figure \(6\) provides a graphical representation of the subfields within political science, though it is important to point out that fields are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, there are, at times, overlap between fields. Public policy can be analyzed through the lens of American Politics, but it can also be the key point of consideration for comparative politics or international relations. Similarly, political economy can refer simply to domestic affairs, or be applied across a few or many countries or states. Political psychology can likewise be applied for single state analysis or comparative or global studies. Most all of these fields will need some level of specialization in research methods or models to enable the systematic analysis of their subjects of interest. Without a research method and model, these subfields would not be able to advance knowledge in the field in a substantive way.
Given the overall spectrum of subfields available within the field of political science, let’s take a closer look at comparative politics, its origin, expanded definition, its uniqueness among the subfields, and the terminology frequently used by comparativists.
A Brief History and Expanded Definition
In considering the other subfields within political science, it may not seem like a complicated process to define comparative politics. Comparative politics, further explained, seems to be a field of study wherein scholars compare and contrast various political systems, institutions, characteristics and outcomes on one, a few, or a group of countries. In actuality, there has been ample debate over the ideal definition and scope of comparative politics. To consider comparative politics more thoroughly, it is helpful to consider its historical origins.
Most often, comparative politics is considered to have ancient origins, going back to at least Aristotle. Aristotle has sometimes been credited with being the “father” of political science, and attributed with being one of the first to use comparative methodologies for analyzing competing Greek city-states. The word politics derives from the Greek word, politikos, meaning “of, or relating to, the polis,” with polis being translated as city-state. Aristotle envisioned the study of politics to be one of the three major forms of science individuals could engage in. The first form of science, according to Aristotle, was contemplative science, and in modern terms, this refers closest to the studies of both physics and metaphysics, which he considered to be concerned with truth, and the pursuit of truth and knowledge for intrinsic purposes. The second form of science that Aristotle identified was practical science, which was the study of what is ideal for individuals and society. Aristotle felt the practical sciences were the areas of philosophy, mathematics and science. The final area of science Aristotle identified was productive science, which he envisioned as the making of important or beautiful objects. To Aristotle, political science fell within the realm of practical sciences, and was of critical concern (he identified political science as “the most authoritative science”) when discussing what is best for society. To Aristotle, political science must concern itself with what is “good” or “right” or “just” for society, as the lives of citizens are at stake given political structures and institutions.
It is not difficult to appreciate why Aristotle found political science, and comparative politics, so important given his overall beliefs on the function of politics within a society. In Aristotle’s time, the units-of-analysis were the city-states in Greece, which, if stable, enabled people to live productive and possibly happy lives; if unstable, it could not produce any positive externalities. For Aristotle, it was critical to find ways to compare and contrast the various city-states, how they operated, and what their outcomes for the people were. To this end, Aristotle looked at the constitutions for various city-states, to understand which had the ideal configurations for both the people and political outputs. A city-state could have one ruler, who, depending on how the government is run, is either a rightful king, or a tyrant running an authoritarian regime. Or, a city-state may have a few rulers, which, at best, could be an aristocracy, or at worst, an oligarchy where only the elite are included in decision-making and rewards. Finally, a city-state could have multiple rulers, balanced by a “middle” class which attempts to rule on behalf of the people’s interests. The “middle” group is not tremendously wealthy, nor woefully poor, but being in the “middle” they can understand the needs of society at large. While Aristotle considered democracy to have the possibility of being “deviant,” he also entertained the possibility that having more people involved in government may be a way to edge out corruption. In some ways, perhaps Aristotle was hoping for “cooler heads to prevail,” or that there would be a “wisdom” of the majority which would limit corruption. In any/either case, Aristotle spent a lot of time comparing and contrasting the virtuous and deviant political regime types in order to determine what is best for society.
The work of Aristotle influenced a number of thinkers to continue the scientific tradition of scientifically approaching problems in political science and comparative politics. If considering political science broadly, Aristotle influenced Niccolo Machiavelli (author of The Prince), Charles Montesquieu, (author of The Spirit of the Laws), Max Weber (sociologist and author of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1905), to name a few.
If we consider the work of Gerardo Munck, we are currently in a period following the Second Scientific Revolution of 1989-2005. The current status of comparative politics is one where there is a greater reliance on methodology rather than theory, per se. In looking at Table \(1\), it can be observed that there are still variations in how significant scholars in the field define comparative politics, with some of these definitions leading to potentially different implications for research and inquiry.
Table \(1\): No, really… What is Comparative Politics?
Notable Comparativists Their Definition of Comparative Politics
(Lane, 1997, pg. 2) note his publications / contributions “What is comparative politics? It is two things, first a world, second, a discipline.” As a ‘world,’ comparative politics encompasses political behavior and institutions in all parts of the earth… The ‘discipline’ of comparative politics is a field of study that desperately tries to keep up with, to encompass, to understand, to explain, and perhaps to influence the fascinating and often riotous world of comparative politics.”
(O’Neill, Fields and Share, 2021) “Comparative Politics is the study and comparison of politics across countries.”.
(O’Neill, 2004 - pg 3) note his publications / contributions “Politics is . . . the struggle in any group for power that will give a person or people the ability to make decisions for the larger groups. . . . comparative politics is a subfield that compares this struggle across countries.”
(Wiarda, 2000, pg. 7) note his publications / contributions “Comparative politics involves the systematic study and comparison of the world’s political systems, It seeks to explain differences between as well as similarities among countries. In contrast to journalistic reporting on a single country, comparative politics is particularly interested in exploring patterns, processes, and regularities among political systems.”
Debate on the definition of comparative politics can arise in a few ways. One way would be this: Zahariadis (1997) argued that comparative politics needs to be a study of foreign countries. If this is true, does that mean someone who lives in a country, cannot study their own country and still call it comparative politics? If this is true, then was Aristotle’s study of city-states methodologically flawed since he occasionally lived in different city-states? Another area where comparativists disagree, which will be considered more in Chapter 2, is: what is the appropriate sample size for inquiry? Does the definition of comparative politics need to mandate a certain number of countries be studied at a time? When Alexis de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America, 1835, was this study flawed because it was only considered the political lives of Americans? If we take Zahariadis’ definition, de Tocqueville did focus on a foreign country, but since it is only one country, does that mean it does not fall into the realm of comparative politics? Already, the two issues of whether one can originate or reside in a country that is being compared, as well as the appropriate sample size, is already in question. As will be described in Chapter 2, this textbook provides a necessary overview of the scope of methods and models for the comparative politics field for the purpose of greater understanding, focusing less on arguing about a definitive answer to questions still argued within the field of comparative politics. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/01%3A_Why_Study_Comparative_Politics/1.01%3A_What_is_Comparative_Politics.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Describe the meaning and scope of area studies.
• Trace the origin and scope of cross-national studies.
• Identify the best application of subnational studies.
Introduction
If comparative politics involves ‘looking inside’ countries, regions, institutions or other entities and then comparing across them, then what we are comparing matters. For example, often that ‘what we compare’ involves countries. Yet can we just compare any two countries? Is it appropriate to compare two countries that are systematically different from one another? Is there a time when we would want to compare countries that are different? What are the ‘rules’ when it comes to being a comparativist? As we shall see in Chapter Two, case selection is an important process in comparative political science. Yet, over the years, a number of approaches have evolved when it comes to comparing.
Comparativists often study institutions when looking inside a country and then comparing across. Institutions are the beliefs, norms and organizations which structure social and political life. They encompass the rules, norms, and values of a society. March and Olsen (2011), define institutions as
a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individual and changing external circumstances.
Institutions come in many shapes and sizes. There are formal institutions, which are based on a clear set of rules that have been formalized. Formal institutions often have the authority to enforce the rules, usually through punitive measures. Examples include universities, sports leagues, and corporations. Formal institutions often have tangibility, often identified through a building or a location, such as a university campus, or the headquarters for a sports team or a corporation. However, physicality is not a requirement. Universities have had an online presence for years. Sports teams and corporations now engage with their fans and clients virtually.
There are also informal institutions, which are based on an unwritten set of rules that have not necessarily been formalized. Informal institutions are based on conventions on how one should behave. There is no authority that monitors behavior and people are expected to self-regulate. Examples could include societal expectations for waiting in line, or a cue. Of course, expectations for waiting in line will vary, depending on the location. Waiting in line for lunch at school is different than waiting in line to check in at a hospital, which is really different from waiting in line at the airport. In the first example, it’s more about who lined up first. In the second example, it is more about whose medical needs are more significant and not about when one checked in. In the latter example it is about the security of the facility. Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, these conventions have become formalized, with the Transportation Security Agency monitoring and enforcing behavior. This is a good example of how conventions can become codified into formal rules over time, of how informal institutions can become formal institutions.
According to Peters (2019), institutions “transcend individuals to involve groups of individuals in some sort of patterned interactions that are predictable” (23). Given this, the author writes that there are three defining features of institutions: predictability, stability, and that it must affect individual behavior. Given this, organizations can end up mattering more than the people. If institutions are self-enduring and long-lasting, then institutions can outlive the people that founded them. This allows us to talk about roles rather than individuals. This is why in political science we can talk about the judiciary instead of judges, or about the presidency instead of presidents. The institution transcends the individual or individuals that occupy that role.
Political institutions are “structures that lend the polity its integrity” (Orren & Skowronek, 1995). They are the space where the majority of politics and political decisions take place. Formal political institutions include written constitutions, executives, such as the US President, legislatures, such as the US Congress, and judiciaries, such as the US Supreme Court. They can also include the military, police forces, and other enforcement agencies. Examples of informal political institutions involve expectations during negotiations. For example, lawmakers may logroll, or exchange promises of support during when laws are written. This is the old saying, ‘you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’. Logrolling is an extremely important part of lawmaking. Without this practice, it is unlikely many laws would get through. Other examples of informal political institutions include levels of corruption, political ideology, such as identifying as liberal or conservative, and political culture. The latter example, political culture, is important for political science. Recent research suggests that political culture may strongly influence the formation and endurance of political institutions.
Area Studies
One of the more traditional ways of comparing is through the field of area studies, where scholarship is organized geographically. Area studies have their roots in the age of empires when European powers began expanding their borders beyond the continent of Europe. As imperial forces, such as the British and the French, began to occupy more territory, there was an attempt by ‘enlightened’ Europeans to understand the peoples and the indigenous languages, cultures and social of the regions they conquered. The peoples were seen as ‘exotic’ and Eurocentrism was the norm. Museums were filled with items from other civilizations that were often stolen or ‘bought’ by invading forces.
World War II transformed area studies from a colonial enterprise into a geopolitical imperative. Specialists were needed by the U.S. military for the war effort. Campaigns in Europe, Asia-Pacific and North Africa required understanding of the terrain they were fighting in. The Cold War solidified the need for area studies. The conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was fought through proxy wars across all continents and it pushed the U.S. military to extensively rely on the university system for expertise. For example, the 1958 National Defense Education Act provided the funding for training in critical language studies. And it was not just the defense establishment, other organizations engaged in the interdisciplinary pursuit. Entities such as the Ford Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the American Council of Learned Societies all contributed to the effort. Universities established various centers, programs, and initiatives, such as the Center for Latin American Studies at Stanford, Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and the Asian Studies Initiative at Boston University.
Yet despite the complicated origins of this research, area studies have become important segments of contemporary university curriculum in many countries. Area studies are by their definition multidisciplinary. They can include disciplines such as political science, history, economics, sociology, anthropology, geography, literature, linguistics, and for some area studies, religious studies and theology. They also now include geographical areas that were once not considered, such as European Studies.
List Area of Studies
This list provides a near comprehensive list of area studies and their fields of study.
• Asia
• Asian Studies
• Asian-Pacific Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Critical Asian Studies
• Southeast Asian Studies
• Modern Asian Studies
• South Asian Studies
• Latin America
• Latin American Studies
• Latino Studies
• Central American Studies
• Caribbean Studies
• Southern Cone Studies
• Amazonia Studies
• Iberian Studies*
• Africa
• African Studies
• Africana Studies
• East African Studies
• Southern African Studies
• West African Studies
• Middle East
• Middle East Studies
• Near Eastern Studies
• Oriental Studies
• Levantine Studies
• Maghrib Studies
• Gulf Studies
• Islamic Studies**
• Europe
• European Studies
• European Union/West European Studies
• East European Studies
• Eurasian Studies
• Post-Soviet/Communist Studies
• Mediterranean Studies
• Southeast European/Balkan Studies
*Iberian Studies involves Spain and Portugal, the two countries in the Iberian peninsula. Even though these two countries are geographically in Europe, they are often grouped under Latin American studies due to the strong associations of Latin America with Iberia.
**Historically, Islamic Studies is often grouped in the same department with Middle Eastern Studies and/or Near Eastern Studies. This is a reflection in Western societies of associating the Middle East with Islam, even though only 18% of the World’s Muslims live outside the Middle East.
Cross-national Studies
Cross-national studies can be broadly defined as “any research that transcends national boundaries” (Kohn, 1987). However as Kohn notes this definition is unclear. Thus he further refines his definition to “studies that are explicitly comparative, that is students that utilize systematically comparable data from two or more nations” (pg. 714). In this sense, area studies could also be labeled as cross-national studies, as it involves comparing two or more countries, yet in one defined geographical region. Yet we distinguish cross-national studies from area studies.
Cross-national research has its roots in the behavioral revolution of the 1950s. According to Franco, et al (2020), “behavioral political science, or behavioralism, is the study of political behavior and emphasizes the use of surveys and statistics''. During this era, social scientists moved away from studying institutions,which often involved in-depth contextual analyses, and more towards using quantitative measures to understand relationships between variables. The goal was to have external validity, or confidence in one’s conclusions across a larger number of observed cases. A good example includes the 1999 book by Arend Ljiphart, Patterns of Democracy. In this seminal study, the author examines thirty-six diverse democracies, comparing institutions ranging from their electoral systems to the role of their central banks to internal policy-making techniques.In comparative politics, cross-national studies often involve the comparisons of countries, or country institutions. Cross-national studies usually involve comparing countries across regions, and outside a specific geographical region. A good example includes cross-national analyses of countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD is an intergovernmental organization that facilitates dialogue on macroeconomic policies. There are 38 countries in the OECD. They include countries in Europe, North and South America, Asia and Australasia. OECD countries have harmonized their economic indicators, which allows for easier comparisons across countries.
Other examples of cross-national research includes the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, where scholars meet to design common post-election surveys. The researchers ask the same questions regarding the impact of elections in democratic countries. There have been five modules since 1996, with a new module released every five years. Not all countries participate in the Study and participation may vary from module to module. Another example of cross-national research is the Polity data series. Polity is one of the more prominent datasets that ranks countries from strongly democratic to strongly autocratic based on political regime characteristics. The most recent one is the Polity IV dataset that has analyzed democratic backsliding, state failure and current regime trends.
One of the major critiques of cross-national studies are the measurements themselves. Can we properly compare across large swaths of countries? Do our measurements have enough validity that allow us to make generalizations about certain political phenomena? These are excellent questions that have led some to reject cross-national research in comparative politics. Nevertheless, the attempt to systematize analyses across countries is important. Even if the variables we are looking at are slightly off in their measurements, which is a problem that all social scientists face, the deliberations on how to measure democracy, capitalism, and election integrity are important. It opens a much-needed discussion on what these concepts mean. They key according to Przeworski and Teune (1966) is to “identify ‘equivalent’ phenomena and analyze[ing] the relationships between them in an ‘equivalent’ fashion” (pg. 553).
Subnational Studies
Subnational studies can be defined as comparing subnational governments within countries. This comparison can be accomplished wholly within one country, or across countries. A subnational government is any lower level of government. In the United States this would consist of state governments, such as California, and even smaller governmental units, such as county and city governments. In other countries it could include provincial governments, regional governments, and other local governments often referred to as municipalities.
Subnational governments vary in regards to their level of sovereignty. Sovereignty is defined as fundamental governmental power. Fundamental governmental means the power to coerce those to do things they may not want to do, such as paying taxes, or not speeding on the California freeways. In countries, such as the United States, sovereignty is shared between the national government in Washington, DC and the fifty states. These are referred to as federal governments. Whereas in other countries, the power is concentrated at the national level. This is the case with France, where most power is in Paris and lies with the President and Parliament. These are referred to as unitary governments. And still there are other countries where most sovereignty is at the subnational levels. This is the case with countries like Switzerland and more recently Iraq. These are referred to as confederal governments.
Subnational research has its roots in the 1970s. Snyder (2001) points out that the Third Wave of democratization, where the world saw a surge in the number of democracies. At the same time, we saw significant decentralization trends, where subnational governments and domestic institutions were empowered, both in the newly created democracies and in some more established states. Recent scholarship has referred to this decentralization of power as devolution. Devolution occurs when the central government in a country deliberately transfers power to a government at a lower level. Devolution is almost always associated with autonomy, where subnational governments have a certain level of power independent of the central government. Good examples include the creation of parliaments in Scotland and Wales, and in Spain, with the Catalan, Basque and Galician regional governments.
Out of this two different approaches have developed in subnational studies. The first is what is referred to as within-nation comparisons. A within-nation is studying the subnational governments or institutions within a single country. For example, the subfield of American politics, mentioned earlier in this chapter, could be considered a within-nation comparison. If we were to analyze all fifty states’ policies towards COVID-19, and compare, we are engaging in this strategy. The second is between-nation comparisons, where subnational governments are compared across different countries. Between-nation comparisons of subnational units could include analyzing autonomous areas within countries. It also includes studying contiguous subnational governments. This is especially useful when looking at postcolonial Africa where tribal, ethnic or religious group boundaries overlap national borders. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/01%3A_Why_Study_Comparative_Politics/1.02%3A_Ways_Comparativists_Look_at_the_World.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Understand the range of substantive areas for inquiry within comparative politics
• Identify the relevance of substantive areas within comparative politics.
• Consider limitations to the field of comparative politics.
Approaching this Textbook
This book is divided into three major sections, following the initial discussion of methods and best practices for comparative politics outlined in Chapter 2 (which is about to be summarized below as well). Although students could, in theory, seek out chapters in the order of interest, it is likely most helpful to read this book from a linear perspective as foundational terminology presents itself as devised by the authors. Chapter 2 is the ultimate prerequisite for understanding how authors approach the case studies they have selected, and the chapter provides a solid foundation for methodologies used in the field. Chapter 2 of this book is concerned with how to scientifically approach many of the critical research questions in the field. The chapter addresses how the scientific method manifests for Comparative Politics, and provides a brief introduction and overview to how research questions are posed, how theories are developed and tested using best practices in the field. The chapter will go on to describe important terminology in the field, providing further insight on the differences between qualitative and quantitative research, as well as usage of the case study within comparative politics. Without a solid foundation for research methods and practices, the field of comparative politics would be unable to advance. Following Chapter 2, Part One: Institutions and Institutional Change, will delve into many of the most basic terms and questions within comparative politics itself. What is the state? How do we identify important institutions for analysis, and how do we as comparativists understand how and why institutions change? After addressing topics involving the state, and regime types and transitions between democracies and non-democracies, Part Two: Intersections and Boundaries, considers important internal structures and components which can provide students with yet another lens of analysis by which to consider differing states. The concept of political identity, which is quite large in scope, will introduce students to considering everything from race, ethnicity, and gender to nationalism, religion and class, all of which can have tremendous influence on collective political outcomes. Part Three: Comparative Political Behavior, will introduce additional levels of interest for inquiry, including the potential influence of social movements observed in various manifestations in different states, public opinion on political outcomes, as well as the circumstances surrounding different types of political violence. By reading this textbook in a linear way, students will be given a progressively wider understanding of the wide scope of topics and issues within political science, much of the content building upon the content of the previous chapter and section.
Organization of this Book
This textbook, Introduction to Comparative Politics, is an Open Education Resource (OER) and consists of the following 12 chapters. A team of eight political scientists at seven different community colleges in California co-authored this Open Education Resource.
Title and author(s) for each chapter
Chapter Chapter Title Authors
1 Introduction Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D & Julia Wendt, Ph.D.
2 How to Study Comparative Politics: Using Comparative Methods Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D., Julia Wendt, Ph.D., & Masahiro Omae, Ph.D.
3 States and Regimes Julia Wendt, Ph.D
4 Democracies and Democratization Julia Wendt, Ph.D, Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D. & Stefan Veldhuis
5 Non-Democracies and Democratic Backsliding Charlotte Lee, Ph.D.
6 Political Identity: Culture, Race & Ethnicity & Gender Julia Wendt, Ph.D
7 Political Identity: Nationalism, Religion, Class Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D & Jessica Scarffe, Ph.D.
8 Political Economy Jessica Scarffe, Ph.D. & Julia Wendt, Ph.D
9 Collective Action/Social Movements Charlotte Lee, Ph.D.
10 Public Opinion Bryan Martin, Ph.D. & Josh Franco, Ph.D.
11 Political Violence Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D & Masahiro Omae, Ph.D.
12 Conclusion: The Future of Comparative Politics Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D & Julia Wendt, Ph.D.
Each chapter is structured to include the following seven elements: Chapter Outline, Chapter Sections, Key Terms/Glossary, Summary of each Chapter Section, Review Questions, Critical Thinking Questions, and Suggestions for Further Study.
The Chapter Outline provides a list of the chapter’s sections. You can click on the name of the chapter section to move directly to that section. This outline is important because it quickly and concisely provides you an overview of the chapter and a clear sense of its contents.
The Chapter Sections can be considered the body of the chapter because they collectively include most of the substantive content. While each chapter author has endeavored to write Chapter Sections as stand-alone parts, there will naturally be a flow and integration of the chapters.
Key Terms/Glossary serves as a repository of definitions of key terms used throughout the chapter sections. The key terms are listed in alphabetical order. In some instances, key terms will be linked to external content, such as Dictionary.com or Wikipedia, for students and faculty to explore the term further. Additionally, key terms are linked within chapter sections, meaning you can click on the key term and be directed to the Key Terms/Glossary section.
Summary of the chapter provides a one paragraph synopsis of each section of the chapter. The goal is to distill each chapter section into a bite-sized chunk that can be quickly referenced. Each synopsis highlights a major concept of the section and serves as a reference. These should not be viewed as replacements for reading a specific chapter section.
Review Questions include at least 5 questions that could serve as a pop quiz, clicker questions, student self-check, or as part of a question bank used for a summative assessment, such as a traditional midterm or final. In future iterations of the textbook, we plan on creating a Learning Management System Course Shell that would convert these questions in both a Question Bank and Quiz. Similarly, Critical Thinking Questions include at least 3 questions that can serve as a short or long essay prompt for an in-class or at-home assessment.
Finally, Suggestions for Further Study includes links to websites, journal articles, and books related to the chapter topic. The goal is to build a robust repository of resources that can be explored by students and faculty. While we take effort to list OER or other open access content, there will be resources that are currently not freely available. As the textbook expands, this section will grow as well.
It is recommended that the chapters are followed for most coherent use. We recognize, and encourage that some faculty will want to assign specific chapters to complement an existing textbook adoption. We expect that after the textbook is adopted and utilized, feedback from faculty and students will help us refine the content of each chapter, and the ordering of the materials.
Part One: Institutions and Institutional Change
Beginning with Part One of this book, Institutions and Institutional Change, Chapter 3 introduces a critical focal point of comparative politics in addressing how “the state,” its formation and manifestation, can vary so greatly from place to place. Further, it discusses the historical foundations of “the state,” and differentiates important terms used in almost every study performed in comparative politics, e.g. state, regime, nation, and government. Chapter 3 also delves into concepts such as the social contract, sovereignty, power (hard and soft), authority and legitimacy. The chapter culminates with case study comparisons of two states within Africa, Botswana and Somalia. Botswana, sometimes considered one Africa’s longest standing and most stable democracy (with some level of debate here), juxtaposes itself from Somalia, a place which some have argued operated with more stability under, paradigmatically, stateless conditions. This chapter will help acquaint students with a number of the basic terms used in comparative politics, while also raising questions about why and how states can be so different, even when they share similarities in location, heritage, regime type, and more.
Chapter 4 introduces a foundational discussion in contemporary studies of comparative politics, the characteristics and nature of democracy and democratization. More than half of all countries currently in existence identify as democracies, and yet many questions remain over the quality, stability, and different types of democratic governments that exist. Is democracy the best form of government? Are there certain predictable characteristics that arise from states experiencing regime transitions to democracy? This chapter culminates with its study of Iraq and South Africa, considering movements towards democracy through the process of democratization.
Chapter 5 considers the occurrence of non-democratic regimes, as well as the potential for democracies to “backslide” into non-democratic regimes. While many democracies now exist globally, there have been ample occasions where previously democratic regimes, for various reasons and circumstances, engaged in political trajectories which took away the liberal aspects of their governance. There can be political, cultural, economic and social factors which contribute to democratic backsliding, and comparativists often consider cases of democratic backsliding in order to advance understanding of the phenomenon. The chapter concludes with a case study of Russia, which since the 17th century, has experienced multiple periods of non-democratic rule.
Part Two: Intersections and Boundaries
Chapter 6 is the first section of Part Two of this book, Intersections and Boundaries, which will look at other areas of concern for contemporary comparativists, everything from various aspects of political identity to different types of economic systems which have great internal influence on countries in the global system. Chapter 6 will introduce political socialization and the importance of political identity relating to key factors such as culture, race, ethnicity and gender. Political identity can be of critical importance when attempting to understand political behavior and decisions being made within a state. To this end, this chapter will consider the history of the caste systems in Japan and India in an attempt to understand how caste systems influenced, and continued to influence, the political systems within.
Chapter 7 continues the discussion of political identity by considering the concepts of nationalism, religion and class on the political behavior and outcomes within various countries. Nationalism and class are newer phenomena in politics, whereas religion is not. There were many instances of people in minority religions rising to prominence in the courts of empires, or of religious differences leading to conflict. However, their use as an identity and how one’s identity can shape one’s politics is even newer. As countries have democratized, these identities have taken on more meaning. This chapter considers the examples of political identities within Israel and Iran, where religion and nationalism both play a significant role in their societies.
Chapter 8 discusses political economy, which can be understood as a type of inquiry which explores the intersection and relationships between market systems and individuals, groups and political outcomes within a state. In some respects, considering the interconnected relationship between economic markets and politics can seem like a chicken and egg problem, that is, what comes first, does politics affect the economy, or does the economy affect politics? In many cases, politics and the economy are deeply synergistic and connected, and combinations of different political systems and economic systems create manifestly different political outcomes for various states. The end of this chapter will consider the cases of the highly government controlled economy of China versus the moderately controlled economy of Germany, considering their differences as well as their shared challenges for the future of their market systems on internal political outcomes.
Part Three: Comparative Political Behavior
Chapter 9 kicks off discussion of collective action and social movements. The chapter will discuss, in detail, how collective action, which is any activity in which coordination by and across individuals has the potential to lead to achievement of a common objective, has been observed in various places and with different outcomes. Additionally, the rise of social movements, which are organized activities not derived through established political institutions, is considered. This chapter considered the cases of labor movements within Poland and China to more closely consider the phenomenon of collective action.
Chapter 10 introduced the study of comparative public opinion, which is interested in how the public thinks and believes in particular policy and political issues across at least two different countries. Rather than focus on a single country, this chapter considers how public opinion is measured using different metrics, and how this can vary from place to place.
The final theme addressed in the textbook is the phenomenon of political violence. The concept of political violence can be difficult to define, but many scholars have considered various types of violence that can occur within states, whether the violence is sponsored or propagated by the state itself, or whether the violence stems from other groups not sponsored by state authority. In considering political violence, this chapter looks at Turkey and Bangladesh and how conflict, once started, can come to an end. An end to violence does not inherently lend itself to an end to instability or a peaceful outcome.
While the scope of this textbook is somewhat extensive, there remain many unanswered questions about the future of comparative politics as a discipline. Are the current scientific methodologies used in comparative politics sound? Are there advances that can be made in the way comparativists approach the problems within their field? The final chapter of this book will raise a number of the immediate issues pressing on the field today. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/01%3A_Why_Study_Comparative_Politics/1.03%3A_Things_that_Comparativists_Study_and_Say.txt |
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Key Terms/Glossary
• American politics - a subfield of political science which focuses on political institutions and behaviors within the United States.
• Area studies - a traditional method for comparing where scholarship is organized geographically.
• Between-nation comparisons - where subnational governments are compared across different countries.
• Comparative politics - a subfield of study within political science that seeks to advance understanding of political structures from around the world in an organized, methodological, and clear way.
• Confederal government - a system of government where sovereignty is held at subnational levels. (Example: Switzerland, Iraq).
• Cross-national studies - a method for comparison similar to area studies but often considered unique as comparison occurs involving two or more countries, not necessarily confined to a single similar region.
• Devolution - occurs when the central government in a country deliberately transfers power to a government at a lower level.
• Federal government - national or centralized authority differentiated from state and local governments. Federalism is a system where governmental power is shared between the federal, state and local governments. (Example: United States, Canada)
• Formal institutions - institutions are based on a clear set of rules that have been formalized. Formal institutions often have the authority to enforce the rules, usually through punitive measures
• Informal institutions - institutions are based on an unwritten set of rules that have not necessarily been formalized. Informal institutions are based on conventions on how one should behave.
• Institutions - the beliefs, norms and organizations which structure social and political life.
• International relations - (sometimes called World Politics, International Affairs or International Studies), a subfield of political science which focuses on how countries and/or international organizations or bodies interact with each other.
• Political economy - a subfield of political science that considers various economic theories (like capitalism, socialism, communism, fascism), practices and outcomes either within a state, or among and between states in the global system.
• Political institutions - they are the space where the majority of politics and political decisions take place.
• Political philosophy - (sometimes called political theory), a subfield of political science which reflects on the philosophical origins of politics, the state, government, fairness, equality, equity, authority and legitimacy.
• Political psychology - a subfield within political science, which weds together principles, themes and research from both political science and psychology, in order to understand the potential psychological roots for political behavior.
• Political science - a field of social and scientific inquiry which seeks to advance knowledge of political institutions, behavior, activities, and outcomes using systematic and logical research methods in order to test and refine theories about how the political world operates.
• Public policy - a subfield of political science that explores political policies and outcomes, and focuses on the strength, legitimacy and effectiveness of political institutions within a state or society.
• Qualitative research - type of research approach which centers on exploring ideas and phenomena, potentially with the goal of consolidating information or developing evidence to form a theory or hypothesis to test. Qualitative research involves categorizing, summarizing and analyzing cases more thoroughly, and possibly individually, to gain greater understanding.
• Quantitative research - type of research approach which centers on testing a theory or hypothesis, usually through mathematical and statistical means, using data from a large sample size.
• Research methods and models - a subfield of political science in itself, as it seeks to consider the best practices for analyzing themes within political science through discussion, testing and critical analysis of how research is constructed and implemented.
• Sovereignty - fundamental governmental power, where the government has the power to coerce those to do things they may not want to do.
• Subnational studies - a method for comparison where subnational governments are compared.
• Unitary government - a type of government where power is centralized at a national level, sometimes with a President/Prime Minister and a national Parliament. (Example: France, Britain).
• Within-nation comparisons - is studying the subnational governments or institutions within a single country.
Summary
Section #1.1: What is Comparative Politics?
Comparative politics is a subfield of study within political science that seeks to advance understanding of political structures from around the world in an organized, methodological, and clear way. There is still ample scholarly debate over the definition and scope of comparative politics, with scholars occasionally disagreeing about the ideal methodological approaches and methods for case selection. Beyond comparative politics, a number of other subfields exist within political science, including: American Politics, International Relations, Political Philosophy, Research Methods and Models, Political Economy, Public Policy, and Political Philosophy. Depending on the theme and the level-of-analysis, comparativists may use qualitative or quantitative research methods to advance the field.
Section #1.2: Ways Comparativists Look at the World
Understanding the necessity to compare and contrast countries, comparativists can begin to compare in three main ways: area studies, cross-national studies, and subnational studies. Area studies involve selecting countries from a similar geographic area, often in close proximity to each other, as a starting point for inquiry. Cross-national studies involve looking at at least two or more countries, but does not require that these countries be close in proximity or necessarily alike in basic ways. Finally, subnational studies enable comparativists to look within a country, possibly over time and considering a number of themes, to draw out conclusions and test theories.
Section #1.3: Things that Comparativists Study and Say
Comparative politics is a diverse field which can draw its focus to a number of different critical areas. One of the first areas of inquiry focuses on the origins of the state, considering the determinants of a strong versus a weak state in relation to political capacity, and developing understanding for the implications of relationships between strong and weak states. In considering strong and weak states, a comparativist may select two weak states with different political outcomes, or one weak state and one strong state with similar outcomes. (These methods for Most Similar Systems Design, MSSD, and Most Different Systems Design, MDSD, will be explained in Chapter 2). Another area of intense interest for comparativists is the study of institutions. The study of political institutions can lend greater understanding to different political outcomes among states, especially since the influence of strong and legitimate institutions within a state can contribute to the success or failure of prioritized public policy issues. Extending from the discussion of the state and its institutions, is the type of regime a state has. Some states have regimes characterized as democratic, while others may be authoritarian, and still others may be “stateless,” altogether. By understanding the implications of various regime types, students can begin to understand why political outcomes can vary, and consider the consequences for regime transitions. Other substantive areas of concern for comparativists can include conversations of political identity (relating to culture, race, ethnicity, gender, nationalism, religion, and class), collective action & social movements, and political opinion. Each of these areas can produce a robust and thorough picture of why and how states are so different. Finally, the study of political violence is often a focal point in comparative politics, as it can also be within international relations. Often, there is an intense desire to consider the determinants for political violence in hopes of presenting options or ways to deter this violence in the future. Other times, the study of political violence is an attempt to simply understand its causes and outcomes to provide scholars and policymakers alike with a greater understanding.
Review Questions
1. Which of the following is not a subfield of political science?
1. Comparative politics.
2. Comparative advantage.
3. American politics.
4. Research Methods and Models.
2. Which level-of-analysis focuses on state relations from similar geographic regions?
1. Area studies
2. Cross-national studies
3. Subnational studies
4. None of these is correct.
3. Who is considered the father of political science?
1. Socrates
2. Plato
3. Aristotle
4. Homer
4. According to Gerardo L. Munck, what is the most recent noted period in the evolution of the study of comparative politics?
1. The Second Scientific Revolution
2. The Behavioral Revolution
3. The Constitution of Political Science as a Discipline
4. The Post-Behavioral Revolution
5. Which of the following areas of inquiry falls outside the domain of comparative politics?
1. Voting behavior
2. Democracy and Regime transitions
3. Political Violence
4. Large sample size / Global trends
Answers: 1.b, 2.a, 3.c, 4.a, 5.d
Critical Thinking Questions
1. What are some of the key differences in studying Comparative Politics versus International Relations? What tends to be the research methodologies of choice in each of these fields?
2. Consider the approaches of area studies, cross-national studies and subnational studies. What can be the benefits or drawbacks of using these approaches? Which approach do you think would be most appropriate if considering the spread of COVID-19 or other pandemics? Similarly, which approach would be best if looking at climate change or environmental problems.
3. Considering how political science and comparative politics are defined, are these fields scientific? In what ways are these fields scientific, and how do they approach questions of politics in other countries?
4. What is the difference between quantitative and qualitative research? How can each of these methods be applied within comparative politics?
5. Some scholars have called for integration or merging of the subfields of comparative politics and international relations. What would be the pros and cons of doing this? Given the pros and cons, what is the preferable future for the study of comparative politics?
Suggestions for Further Study
Books
• Almond, G. (1990) A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
• Boix, C., & Stokes, S. [editors]. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
• Kesselman, M., Krieger, J., & Joseph, W. [editors]. Introduction to Comparative Politics. Boston, MA: Cengage.
• Kopstein, J., & Lichman, M. [editors]. Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in a Changing Global Order. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Lichbach, M. I., & Zuckerman, A. S. (2009). Comparative politics : rationality, culture, and structure (Second edition.). Cambridge University Press. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/01%3A_Why_Study_Comparative_Politics/1.05%3A_Student_Resources.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Consider the factors which make political science, and thereby comparative politics, a science.
• Identify and be able to describe the steps and key terms used in the scientific method.
Introduction
When many people consider the field of science, they may think of laboratories filled with clinicians in white lab coats, chemical experiments with bubbling vials, or vast chalkboards of mathematical equations. Many times, the word ‘science’ will conjure images of what are called the hard sciences. Hard sciences, such as chemistry, mathematics, and physics, work to advance scientific understanding in the natural or physical sciences. In contrast, soft sciences, like psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science, work to advance scientific understanding of human behavior, institutions, society, government, decision making, and power. Based on their interests and scope of inquiry, the soft sciences are interested in the social sciences, which are the fields of inquiry that scientifically study human society and relationships. Both hard and soft sciences provide significant contributions to the world of scientific inquiry, though soft sciences are often misunderstood and underappreciated for their contributions, largely based on lack of understanding of how these sciences engage the scientific method. In considering the different challenges facing hard and soft sciences, Physicist Heinz Pagels called the social sciences the “sciences of complexity,” and said further, “the nations and people who master the new sciences of complexity will become the economic, cultural, and political superpowers of the 21st century" (Pagels, 1988). To this end, the advancements made by the soft sciences, like political science, should not be undercut or diminished, but sought to be understood and further pursued. Indeed, as science is defined as the systematic and organized approach to any area of inquiry, and utilizes scientific methods to acquire and build a body of knowledge, political science, as well as comparative politics as a subfield of political science, embody the essence of the scientific method and possess deep foundations for the scientific tools and theory formation which align with their areas of inquiry.
Recall from Chapter One, “Comparative politics is a subfield of study within political science that seeks to advance understanding of political structures from around the world in an organized, methodological, and clear way”. The scholars of comparative politics are interested in understanding how particular incentives, patterns and institutions may prompt people to behave in certain ways. This understanding takes place in countries that are both similar in their outlook, but also different as well (Later, in relation to case selection, we will broach Mill’s approaches of Most Similar Systems Approach, and Most Different Systems Approach). In observing countries and their similarities and differences, we need to be able to distinguish between actions or decisions that are happening systematically from actions or decisions that may happen randomly. To this end, political scientists follow and rely on the rules of scientific inquiry to conduct their research. In the sections below, we introduce characteristics which affirm political science as a science, followed by the principles of scientific methods and the process of scientific inquiry as it is applicable to comparative politics.
Why is Political Science a Science?
The nature of human behavior within political relationships has been studied and considered for centuries, but has not always operated under a strictly scientific scope. Thucydides, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle all provided observations on their political worlds and ideas about why states and political actors may behave the way they do. The contributions of many famous philosophers and political thinkers over time has lent greatly to the field of politics, but the modern conception of Political Science is one that, like other social sciences, follows the scientific method and is based on a large depth of philosophy tradition regarding the nature of inquiry. Beginning in the late 1800s, scholars began attempting to treat political science, and indeed most of the social sciences, as a hard science that could utilize the scientific method. Through decades of debate, some level of consensus was met through scholastic political science communities as to defining the characteristics of research in political science and how research could best be conducted.
A seminal work in the field of Political Science that sought to describe the features of scientific research within the field came from Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, who wrote, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research in 1994. Although the book was discussing political science in relation to qualitative research methods, which will be discussed later in this chapter, they also spent a generous amount of time considering what scientific research in political science looks like.
According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), scientific research has four main characteristics. First, one of the primary purposes of scientific research is to make descriptive or causal inferences. An inference is a process of drawing a conclusion about an unobserved phenomenon, based on observed (empirical) information. It is important to note that accumulation of facts, by itself, does not make such an effort scientific. This is true no matter how systematically one is collecting the facts or the types of information being collected. In order for a study to be scientific, it requires the additional step of going beyond the immediately observable information in an effort to learn about something broader that is not directly observable. The process of making inferences can help us learn about the unobserved facts by describing it based on empirical information. For example, while we cannot directly observe democracy, political scientists have identified various tenets and characteristics of democratic nations, to the extent where we can describe such a concept. We can also learn the causal effects from the observed information. For example, political scientists have been studying and attempting to identify the cause of war and the process of a successful war termination.
Second, the procedures of scientific research must be public. Scientific research relies on 'explicit, codified, and public methods' so that the reliability of a study can be assessed effectively. It is critical that the process of gathering and analyzing information/data are reliable for the above described process of making inferences. As a condition for publication, it is often required for the authors of a published work to share data files or survey questionnaires to ensure that anyone could possibly replicate the work to assess its reliability as well as to evaluate the appropriateness of the method being used in such work.
Third, because of the fact that the process of making inferences is imperfect, the conclusions of scientific research are uncertain as well. Researchers must be aware of a reasonable estimate of uncertainty in their work to ensure that they can effectively interpret their conclusions. By definition, inferences without some level of uncertainty are not scientific. This idea relates to one of the most critical characteristics of a good theory, that is a theory must be falsifiable (discussed more in the sections below).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the content of scientific research is the method. It means that whether one’s research is scientific or not is determined by the way it is conducted as opposed to the subject matter of what is being studied. Scientific research must adhere to a set of rules of inference because its validity is dependent on how closely one follows such rules and procedures. Simply put, one can virtually study anything in a scientific manner as long as the researcher follows the rules of inference and scientific methods.
The Scientific Method
If you have ever enrolled in a science course, you have likely encountered the scientific method. The scientific method is a process by which knowledge is acquired through a sequence of steps, which generally include the following components: question, observation, hypothesis, testing of the hypothesis, analysis of the outcomes, and reporting of the findings. Ideally, use of the scientific method will build a body of knowledge and culminate in the formation of inferences and potentially theories for why/how phenomena exist or occur. It is useful to briefly consider each of these components in deconstructing how political scientists approach their areas of interest.
Broadly speaking the scientific method within political science will involve the following steps (each of these steps will be explored in-depth in this section):
1. The research question: Develop a clear, focused and relevant research question. Although this sounds like a simple step, the following section will lay out, in detail, the complexity of forming a sound research question.
2. Literature review: Research the context and background information and previous research regarding this research question. This part becomes the political scientist’s literature review. A literature review becomes a section of your research paper or research process which collects key sources and previous research on your research question and discusses the findings in synthesis with each other. From this work, you are able to have a full scope of understanding of all previous work performed on your topic, which will enhance knowledge in the field.
3. Theory and hypothesis development: Develop a theory that explains a potential answer to your research question. A theory is a statement that explains how the world works based on experience and observation. From the theory, you will construct hypotheses to test the theory. A hypothesis is a specific and testable prediction of what you think will happen; a hypothesis, or set of hypotheses, will describe, in very clear terms, what you expect will happen given the circumstances. Within the hypothesis, variables will be identified. A variable is a factor or object that can vary or change. As political scientists are concerned with cause-and-effect relationships, they will divide the variables into two categories: independent variables (explanatory variables) are the cause, and these variables are independent of other variables under consideration in a study. Dependent variables (outcome variables) are the assumed effect, their values will (presumably) depend on the changes in the independent variables.
4. Testing: A political scientist, at this stage, will test the hypothesis, or hypotheses, through observation of the relationship between the designated variables.
5. Analysis: When the testing is complete, political scientists will need to review their results and draw conclusions about the findings. Was the hypothesis correct? If so, they will be able to report the success of their findings. Was the hypothesis incorrect? That’s okay! A famous quip in this field is, 'no finding is still a finding.' If the hypothesis was not proven true, or fully true, then it is back to the drawing board to rethink a new hypothesis and do the testing again.
6. Reporting of findings: Reporting results, whether the hypothesis is true, partially true, or outright false, is critical to the advancement of the overall field. Typically, researchers will attempt to publish their findings so the findings are public and transparent, and so others may continue research in that area.
Step One: The Research Question
Most research, of any kind, begins with a question. Indeed, before a researcher can start thinking about describing or explaining a phenomenon, one must start with refining the question about one’s phenomenon of interest. After all, political science research is about solving an unsolved puzzle, so we must identify a question to be answered through rigorous research. So how do you determine what characteristics define a good political research question?
First, a substantive and quality political science question needs to be relevant to the real political world. It does not mean that the research questions must only address current political affairs. In fact, many political scientists study historical events and past political behaviors. However, the results of political science research are often relevant to the current political environment and may come with policy implications. A political research question that is highly hypothetical may be interesting and important on its own. Second, as an academic discipline, political science research is a means through which the discipline grows in terms of its knowledge about the political realm. As such, good political science research needs to contribute to the field. Overall, a political science research question must be a question, and this is an important point. A question in this context must be something that the answer to such a statement has a chance of being wrong. In other words, a research question has to be falsifiable. Falsifiability is a word coined by Karl Popper, a philosopher of science, and is defined as the ability for a statement to be logically contradicted through empirical testing. (Empirical analysis is defined as being based on experiment, experience or observation).
Importantly, some questions are inherently non-falsifiable, meaning the question cannot be proven true or false under present circumstances, particularly questions which are subjective (e.g. Are oranges better than lemons?) or technical limitations (Do angry ninja-robots live in Alpha Centauri?). Consider the subjective example in political science, a question like: Which one is better, North Dakota or South Dakota? This question is subjective and may ultimately, if not further described or delineated, result in nothing more than a matter of one’s taste. If the question was more refined and not simply a case of some abstract definition of ‘better than,’ perhaps the researcher is actually trying to ask something that can be proven: Which state is more economically productive, North or South Dakota? From here, the researcher could lay out metrics for what constitutes economically productive, and try to build from there. Consider now a technical limitations problem in political science, for instance, what if someone tried to ask: Does investing in a country’s education system always mean they will eventually become democratic? There’s two problems with this question. First, making a blanket statement that investing in education always leads to democracy can lend itself to problems. Will you be able to test every situation and circumstance where education systems are invested in and democracy happens? Second, there’s an issue with the word ‘eventually.’ A country that invests heavily in education could become democratic 700 years from now. If the time span ends up being 700 years, we cannot truly infer that it was the initial investment in education that was the cause of that county’s democratic transition.
Step Two: The Literature Review
Once you’ve found the research question, it’s important to consider how much you actually know about the topic, and to do a search about any relevant previous research that has ever been done on the topic. To this end, creating a literature review is vital to any research study. Recall, a literature review is a section of your research paper or research process which collects key sources and previous research on your research question and discusses the findings in synthesis with each other. The literature review can raise both previous research that has been done on a topic, as well as best practices regarding research methodologies given the question you’ve chosen. In most cases, the literature review itself will have its own introduction, body and conclusion. The introduction will explain the context of the research question and a thesis which will tie together the research you’ve collected. The body will summarize and synthesize all the research, ideally in either chronological, thematic, methodological or theoretical order.
For instance, maybe it makes the most sense to arrange the research you’ve looked at in chronological order, beginning with the early research and culminating in the most recent research on a topic. Or, maybe your research contains a number of interrelated themes, in which case, it may be ideal to introduce previous research as it is categorized based on its theme. Or, perhaps the most interesting part of your research will be the research methods previously employed to answer the research question. In this case, doing a survey of the previous research methods might be ideal. Finally, it’s possible that the literature review may be best organized by considering previous theories that have existed in relation to your research question. In this case, introducing the existing theories in order would be most helpful to your reader and to your understanding of the research context. In general, it’s important to consider the best way to showcase, summarize and synthesize previous research so it is clear to the readers and other scholars interested in the topic.
Step Three: Theory and Hypothesis Development
Given the research question and your exploration of previous research that has been organized in the literature review, it is now time to consider the theories and hypothesis that you will be using. Usually, the theory helps build your hypotheses for the study. Recall, a theory is a statement that explains how the world works based on experience as an observation.
A scientific theory consists of a set of assumptions, hypotheses, and independent (explanatory) and dependent (outcome) variables. First, assumptions are statements that are taken for granted. These statements are necessary for the researchers to proceed with their research so they are not usually challenged. For example, many international relations scholars assume that the world is anarchic, meaning that there is no meaningful central authority to enforce the rules of law. Also, scientific researchers are implicitly assuming that an objective truth exists. If we were to start a scientific inquiry by testing the assumption about the existence of an objective truth, we will never be able to proceed with the actual question of interest since such an assumption is not really testable. Again, we typically do not challenge a set of assumptions in scientific research.
Political science research involves both generating and testing hypotheses. Researchers may start with observing many cases that relate to a topic of inquiry. There are several methods. First, through inductive reasoning, scientists look at specific situations and attempt to form a hypothesis. Second, political scientists may also rely on deductive reasoning, which occurs when political scientists make an inference and then test its truth using evidence and observations. Recall, a hypothesis is a specific and testable prediction of what you think will happen; a hypothesis, or set of hypotheses, will describe, in very clear terms, what you expect will happen given the circumstances. Within the hypothesis, variables will be identified. Remember, a variable is a factor or object that can vary or change. Again, as political scientists are concerned with cause-and-effect relationships, they will divide the variables into two categories: independent variables (explanatory variables) are the cause, and these variables are independent of other variables under consideration in a study. Dependent variables (outcome variables) are the assumed effect, their values will (presumably) depend on the changes in the independent variables.
Steps Four and Five: Testing and Analysis
The testing of a theory and set of hypotheses will depend on the research method you decide to employ. This will be discussed in Section 2.2: Four Approaches to Research. For our purposes, the basic research approaches of interest will be: the experimental method, the statistical method, case study methods, and the comparative method. Each one of these methods involves research questions, use of theories to inform our understanding of the research problem, hypothesis testing and/or hypothesis generation.
Similarly, analysis of outcomes can be reliant on the research methodologies employed. As such, analysis is also considered in Section 2.2. Overall, analysis of the findings are critical to the advancement of the field of political science. It is important to interpret findings as accurately and objectively as possible in order to lay the foundations for further research to occur.
Step Six: Reporting of Findings
A critical feature of the scientific method is to report your research findings. Granted, not all research will result in publication, though publication is often the goal of research that hopes to extend the political science field. Sometimes research, if not published, is shared through research conferences, books, articles or digital media. Overall, the sharing of information helps lend others to further research into your topic, or helps spawn new and interesting directions of research. Interestingly, one can compare a world where research is shared versus where it was not shared. During the flu pandemic of 1918, many of the countries of the world did not have freedom of the press, including the United States, which had implemented Sedition Acts in the midst of World War I. In the midst of a hindered press and the lack of freedom of speech, many doctors around the world were not able to communicate their ideas or treatment plans for handling the flu pandemic at that time. Inundated with swarms of patients, flummoxed by the nature of a flu that was killing young, healthy adults, but largely sparing older individuals, doctors were trying all sorts of treatment methods, but were unable to broadly share their results of what worked and didn’t work well for treatment.
Contrast this with the COVID-19 pandemic, many doctors were working on treatment plans worldwide, and were able to share their ideas on how to best treat COVID. Initially, there was a heavy reliance on ventilators. In time, some doctors found that repositioning patients on their stomachs may be one way to avoid a ventilator and bide time for the patient to recover without having to resort to a ventilator right away. All told, the sharing of results is critical to learning about a research area or question. If scientists, as well as political scientists, are unable to share what they’ve learned, it can stall the advancement of knowledge altogether. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/02%3A_How_to_Study_Comparative_Politics-_Using_Comparative_Methods/2.01%3A_The_Scientific_Method_and_Comparative_Poli.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Identify, and distinguish between, the four different approaches to research.
• Consider the advantages and disadvantages of each research approach.
• Compare and contrast the four approaches to research.
• Identify best practices for when and how to use case studies.
Introduction
In empirical research, there are four basic approaches: the experimental method, the statistical method, case study methods, and the comparative method. Each one of these methods involves research questions, use of theories to inform our understanding of the research problem, hypothesis testing and/or hypothesis generation. Each method is an attempt to understand the relationship between two or more variables, whether that relation is correlational or causal, both of which will be discussed below.
The Experimental Method
What is an Experiment? An experiment is defined by McDermott (2002) as “laboratory studies in which investigators retain control over the recruitment, assignment to random conditions, treatment, and measurement of subjects” (pg. 32). Experimental methods are then the aspects of experimental designs. These methodological aspects involve “standardization, randomization, between-subjects versus within-subject design, and experimental bias” (McDermott, 2002, pg, 33). The experimental method assists in reducing bias in research, and for some scholars holds great promise for research in political science (Druckman, et. al. 2011). Experimental methods in political science almost always involve statistical tools to discern causality, which will be discussed in the next paragraph.
An experiment is used whenever the researcher seeks to answer causal questions or is looking for causal inference. A causal question involves discerning cause and effect, also referred to as a causal relationship. This is when a change in one variable verifiably causes an effect or change in another variable. This differs from a correlation, or when only a relationship or association can be established between two or more variables. Correlation does not equal causation! This is an often repeated motto in political science. Just because two variables, measures, constructs, actions, etc. are related, does not mean that one caused the other. Indeed, in some cases, the correlation may be spurious, or a false relationship. This can often occur in analyses, especially if particular variables are omitted or constructed improperly.
A good example involves capitalism and democracy. Political scientists assert that capitalism and democracy are correlated. That when we see capitalism, we see democracy, and vice versa. Notice, that nothing is said about which variable causes the other. It may well be that capitalism causes democracy. Or, it could be that democracy causes capitalism. So X could cause Y or Y could cause X. In addition, X and Y could cause each other, that is capitalism and democracy cause each other. Similarly, there could be an additional variable Z that could cause both X and Y. For example, it may not be that capitalism causes democracy or that democracy causes capitalism, but instead something completely unrelated, such as the absence of war. The stability that comes from an absence of war could be what allows both capitalism and democracy to flourish. Finally, there could be a(n) intervening variable(s), between X and Z. It is not capitalism per se that leads to democracy, or vice-versa, but the accumulation of wealth, often referred to as the middle class hypothesis. In this case, it would be X→A→Y. Using our example, capitalism produces wealth, which then leads to democracy.
Real world examples of the discussion above exist. Most wealthy countries are democratic. Examples include the United States and most of western Europe. However, this is not the case for all. The oil producing countries in the Persian Gulf are considered wealthy, but not democratic. Indeed, the wealth produced in natural resource rich countries may reinforce the lack of democracy as it mostly benefits the ruling classes. Also, there are countries, such as India, which are strong democracies, but are considered developing, or poorer nations. Finally, some authoritarian countries adopted capitalism and eventually became democratic, which would seem to confirm that middle class hypothesis discussed above. Examples include South Korea and Chile. However, we see plenty of other countries, such as Singapore, that are considered quite capitalistic have developed a strong middle class, but have yet to fully adopt democracy.
These potential contradictions are why we are careful in political science with making causal statements. Causality is difficult to establish, especially when the unit of analysis involves countries, which is often the case in comparative politics. Causality is a bit easier to establish when experimentation involves individuals. The inclusion of a treatment variable, or the manipulation of just one variable across a number of cases, can suggest causality. The reiteration of an experiment multiple times can confirm this. A good example includes interviewer effects among respondents in surveys. Experiments consistently show that the race, gender, and/or age of the interviewer can affect how an interviewee responds to a question. This is especially true if the interviewer is a person of color and the interviewee is white and the question that is asked is about race or race relations. In this case, we can make a strong argument that interviewer effects are causal. That X causes some kind of effect in Y.
Given this, are there any causal statements made by comparativists? The answer is a qualified yes. Often, the desire for causality is why comparative political scientists study a small number of cases or countries. One case/country, or small number of cases/countries, analyses lend itself well to searching for a causal mechanism, which will be discussed in further detail in Section 2.4 below. Are there any causal statements in comparative politics that involve lots of cases/countries? The answer is again a qualified yes. Democratic peace theory is explained in Section 4.2 of this textbook:
“Democracies per se do not go to war with each other because they have too much in common - they have too many shared organizational, political and socio-economic values to be willing to fight each other - therefore, the more democratic nations there are the more peaceful the world will become and remain.”
This is as close as it comes to empirical law in comparative politics. Yet even in democratic peace theory there are ‘exceptions’. Some cite the U.S. Civil War as a war between two democracies. However, an argument can be made that the Confederacy was a flawed or unconsolidated democracy and ultimately not a war between two real democracies. Others point to U.S. interventions in various countries during the Cold War. These countries, Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, British Guyana, Brazil, Chile, and Nicaragua, were all democracies. Yet, even these interventions are not convincing to some scholars as they were covert missions in countries that were not quite democratic (Rosato, 2003).
Statistical Methods
What are Statistical Methods? Statistical methods are the use of mathematical techniques to analyze collected data, usually in numerical form, such as interval or ratio-scale. In political science, statistical analyses of datasets are the preferred method. This mostly developed from the behavioral wave in political science where scholars became more focused on how individuals make political decisions, such as voting in a given election, or how they may express themselves ideologically. This often involves the use of surveys to collect evidence regarding human behavior. Potential respondents are sampled through the use of a questionnaire constructed to elicit information regarding a particular subject. For example, we may develop a survey that asks Americans regarding their intention on taking one of the approved COVID-19 vaccines, if they intend to get a booster in the future, and their thoughts on pandemic-related restrictions. Respondent choices are then coded, usually using a scale of measurement, and the data is then analyzed often with the use of a statistical software program. Researchers may also rely on the existing data from various sources (e.g., government agencies, think tanks, and other researchers) to conduct their statistical analyses. Scholars probe for correlations among the constructed variables for evidence in support of their hypotheses on the topic (Omae & Bozonelos, 2020).
Statistical methods are great for discerning correlations, or relationships between variables. Advanced mathematical techniques have been developed that permit understanding of complex relationships. Given that causation is difficult to prove in political science, many researchers default to the use of statistical analyses to understand how well certain things relate. This is particularly true when it comes to applied research. Applied research is defined as “research that attempts to explain social phenomena with immediate public policy implications'' (Knoke, et. al. 2002, pg. 7). Statistical methods are also the preferred approach when it comes to the analysis of survey data. Survey research involves the examination of a sample derived from a larger population. If the sample is representative of the population, then the findings of the sample will allow for the formation of inferences about some aspect of the population (Babbie, 1998).
At this point, we should review the discussion regarding one of the major partitions in political science, as noted in Chapter One, quantitative methods involve a type of research approach which centers on testing a theory or hypothesis, usually through mathematical and statistical means, using data from a large sample size. Qualitative methods are a type of research approach which centers on exploring ideas and phenomena, potentially with the goal of consolidating information or developing evidence to form a theory or hypothesis to test. Quantitative researchers collect data on known behavior or actions, or close-ended research where we already know what to look for, and then make mathematical statements about them. Qualitative researchers collect data on unknown actions, or open-ended research where we do not already know what to look for, and then make verbal statements about them. This divide has subsided somewhat, with concerted efforts to develop mixed methods research designs, however, researchers often segregate themselves into one of these two camps.
When looking at the three basic approaches, the first two methods - experimental and statistical - fall squarely into the quantitative camp, whereas comparative politics is mostly considered as qualitative. Experimental and statistical methods have their roots in the behavioral revolution of the 1950s, which shifted the focus of the inquiry from institutions to the individual. For example, the fields of behavioral economics and social psychology are well suited for experiments. Both studies focus on the behavior of individual people. For example, behavioral economists are interested in human judgment when it comes to financial and economic decisions. Social psychologists have been traditionally more interested in learning behavior and information processing. As political science has shifted more towards the study of individual political behavior, experimentation and statistical analysis of collected data, through experiments, surveys and other methods.
For more on the history of this divide and how it has affected political science, see Franco and Bozonelos’s (2020) chapter on the History and Development of the Empirical Study of Politics in Introduction to Political Science Research Methods.
The Comparative Method
What is the Comparative Method? The comparative method is often considered one of the oldest approaches in the study of politics. Ancient Greek philosophers, such as Plato, the author of The Republic, Aristotle, the author of Politics, and Thucydides, the author of the History of the Peloponnesian War wrote about politics in their times in a comparative manner. Indeed, as Laswell (1968) said, all science is 'unavoidably comparative'. Most scientific experiments or statistical analyses will have a control or reference group. The reason is so that we can compare the results of our current experiment and/or analysis to some baseline group. This is how knowledge develops; by grafting new insights through comparison.
Likewise, comparison is more than just description. We are not only analyzing the differences and/or similarities, we are conceptualizing. We cannot overstate the importance of concepts in political science. A concept is defined as “an abstract or generic idea generalized from particular instances” (Merriam-Webster). For political scientists, concepts are “generally seen as nonmathematical and deal with substantive issues” (Goertz, 2006). For example, if we want to compare democracies, we must first define what exactly constitutes a democracy.
Even in quantitative analyses, concepts are always understood in verbal terms. Given that there are quite a few ways to formulate quantitative measurements, conceptualization is key. Developing the right scales, indicators, or reliability measures is predicated on having one’s concepts right. A good example is the simple, yet complicated concept of democracy. Again, what exactly constitutes a democracy? We are sure that it must include elections, but not all elections are the same. An election in the U.S. is not the same as an election in North Korea. Clearly, if we want to determine how democratic a country is, and develop good indicators from which to measure, then concepts matter.
Comparative methods occupy an interesting space in methodology. Comparative methods involve “the analysis of a small number of cases, entailing at least two observations”. Yet it also involves “too few [cases] to permit the application of conventional statistical analysis” (Lijphart, 1971; Collier, 1993, pg 106). This means that the comparative method involves more than a case study, or single-N research (discussed in detail below), but less than a statistical analysis, or large-N study. It is for this reason that comparative politics is so closely intertwined with the comparative method. As we tend to compare countries in comparative politics, the numbers end up somewhere in between, anywhere from a few to sometimes over fifty. Cross-case analysis through the comparison of key characteristics, are the preferred methods in comparative politics scholarship.
Case Studies
Why would we want to use a case study? Case studies are one of major techniques used by comparativists to study phenomena. Cases provide for the in-depth traditional research. Many times there is a gap in knowledge, or a research question that necessitates a certain level of detail. Naumes and Naumes (2015) write that the case studies involve storytelling, and that there is power in the story’s message. Clearly, these are stories that are based in fact, rather than in fiction, but nevertheless, are important as they describe situations, characters, and the mechanisms for why things happen. For example, the exact cause of how the SARS-CoV-2 virus, more commonly referred to as COVID-19, will involve telling that story.
A case is defined as a “spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time, or over some period of time” (Gerring, 2007). Others define a case as “factual description of events that happened at some point in the past” (Naumes and Naumes, 2015). Therefore, a case can be broadly defined. A case could be a person, a family household, a group or community, or an institution, such as a hospital. The key question in any research study is to clarify the cases that belong and the cases that do not belong (Flick, 2009). If we are researching COVID-19, at what level should we research? This is referred to as case selection, which we discuss in detail in Section 2.4.
For many comparativists in political science, the unit (case) that is often observed is a country, or a nation-state. A case study then is an intensive look into that single case, often with the intent that this single case may help us better understand a particular variable of interest. For example, we could research a country that experienced lower levels of COVID-19 infections. This case study could consist of a single observation within the country, with each observation having several dimensions. For example, if we want to observe the country’s successful COVID-19 response, that observation could include the country’s level of health readiness, their government’s response, and the buy-in from their citizens. Each of these could be considered a dimension of the single observation - the successful response.
This description listed above is considered the traditional understanding of case study research - the in-depth analysis of one case, in our example of that one country, to find out how a particular phenomenon took place, a successful COVID-19 response. Once we research and discover the internal processes that led to the successful response, we naturally want to compare it to other countries (cases). When this happens, shifting the analysis from just one country (case) to other countries (cases), we refer to this as a comparative case study. A comparative case study is defined as a study that is structured on the comparison of two or more cases. Again, for comparative political scientists, we often compare countries and/or their actions.
Finally, as mentioned in Chapter One, there can also exist subnational case study research. This is when subnational governments, such provincial governments, regional governments, and other local governments often referred to as municipalities, are the cases that are compared. This can happen entirely within a country (case), such as comparing COVID-19 response rates among states in Mexico. Or it can happen between countries, where subnational governments are compared. This often occurs in studies of European and/or European Union policy. There are quite a few subnational governments with significant amounts of political power. Examples include fully autonomous regions, such as Catalonia in Spain, partially autonomous regions, such as Flanders and Walloons in Belgium, and regions where power was devolved, such as Scotland within the UK.
Use of Case Studies in Comparative Politics
As mentioned above, case studies are an important part of comparative politics, but they are not exclusive to political science. Case studies are used extensively in business studies for example. Ellet (2018) notes that case studies are “an analogue of reality”. They help readers understand particular business decision scenarios, or evaluation scenarios where some process, product, service, or policy is being evaluated on their performance. Business case studies also feature problem diagnosis scenarios, where the authors research when a business is not successful, and try to understand the actions, processes, or activities that led to failure. Case studies are also relevant in medical studies as well. Clinical case studies investigate how a diagnosis was made. Solomon (2006) notes that many of the case studies published by physicians are anecdotal reports, where they notate their procedures for diagnosis. These case studies are vitally important for the field of medicine as they allow researchers to form hypotheses on particular medical disorders and diseases.
Case studies are vital to theory development in political science. They are the cornerstones of different discourses in the discipline. Blatter and Haverland (2012) note that a number of case studies have reached ‘classic’ status in political science. These include Robert Dahl’s Who Governs? [1961], Graham T. Allison’s Essence of Decision [1971], Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions [1979], and Arend Ljiphart’s The Politics of Accommodation [1968]. Each of the classics is a seminal study into an important aspect in political science. Dahl’s work popularized the concept of pluralism, where different actors hold power. Allison studied the decision-making processes during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, whose work was influential for public policy analysis. Skocpol’s book laid out the conditions from which a revolution may take place. Skocpol’s work coincided with the rise of neo-institutionalism in the 1970s, where political scientists began to refocus their attention on the role of institutions in explaining political phenomena. Finally, Ljiphart gave us the concepts of “politics of accommodation” and “consensus democracy”. The terms are central to our understanding of comparative democracy.
As mentioned earlier, cases in comparative politics have historically focused on the nation-state. By this we mean that researchers compare countries. Comparisons often involve regime types, including both democratic and nondemocratic, political economies, political identities, social movements and political violence. All of these comparisons require scholars to look within countries and then compare. As stated in Chapter One, this “looking within” is what separates comparative politics from other fields of political science. Thus, as the nation-state is the most relevant and important political actor, this is where the emphasis tends to be.
Clearly, the nation-state is not the only actor in politics. Nor is the nation-state, the only level of analysis. Other actors exist in politics, from subnational actors, ranging from regional governments to labor unions, and all the way to insurgents and guerillas. There also exist transnational actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and also more sinister groups such as criminal and terrorist networks. In addition, we can analyze at different levels, including the international (systemic) level, the subnational level, and at the individual level. However, nation-states remain the primary unit and level of analysis in comparative politics. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/02%3A_How_to_Study_Comparative_Politics-_Using_Comparative_Methods/2.02%3A_Four_Approaches_to_Research.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Discuss the importance of case selection in case studies.
• Consider the implications of poor case selection.
Introduction
Case selection is an important part of any research design. Deciding how many cases, and which cases, to include, will clearly help determine the outcome of our results. If we decide to select a high number of cases, we often say that we are conducting large-N research. Large-N research is when the number of observations or cases is large enough where we would need mathematical, usually statistical, techniques to discover and interpret any correlations or causations. In order for a large-N analysis to yield any relevant findings, a number of conventions need to be observed. First, the sample needs to be representative of the studied population. Thus, if we wanted to understand the long-term effects of COVID, we would need to know the approximate details of those who contracted the virus. Once we know the parameters of the population, we can then determine a sample that represents the larger population. For example, women make up 55% of all long-term COVID survivors. Thus, any sample we generate needs to be at least 55% women.
Second, some kind of randomization technique needs to be involved in large-N research. So not only must your sample be representative, it must also randomly select people within that sample. In other words, we must have a large selection of people that fit within the population criteria, and then randomly select from those pools. Randomization would help to reduce bias in the study. Also, when cases (people with long-term COVID) are randomly chosen they tend to ensure a fairer representation of the studied population. Third, your sample needs to be large enough, hence the large-N designation for any conclusions to have any external validity. Generally speaking, the larger the number of observations/cases in the sample, the more validity we can have in the study. There is no magic number, but if using the above example, our sample of long-term COVID patients should be at least over 750 people, with an aim of around 1,200 to 1,500 people.
When it comes to comparative politics, we rarely ever reach the numbers typically used in large-N research. There are about 200 fully recognized countries, with about a dozen partially recognized countries, and even fewer areas or regions of study, such as Europe or Latin America. Given this, what is the strategy when one case, or a few cases, are being studied? What happens if we are only wanting to know the COVID-19 response in the United States, and not the rest of the world? How do we randomize this to ensure our results are not biased or are representative? These and other questions are legitimate issues that many comparativist scholars face when completing research. Does randomization work with case studies? Gerring suggests that it does not, as “any given sample may be widely representative” (pg. 87). Thus, random sampling is not a reliable approach when it comes to case studies. And even if the randomized sample is representative, there is no guarantee that the gathered evidence would be reliable.
One can make the argument that case selection may not be as important in large-N studies as they are in small-N studies. In large-N research, potential errors and/or biases may be ameliorated, especially if the sample is large enough. This is not always what happens, errors and biases most certainly can exist in large-N research. However, incorrect or biased inferences are less of a worry when we have 1,500 cases versus 15 cases. In small-N research, case selection simply matters much more.
This is why Blatter and Haverland (2012) write that, “case studies are ‘case-centered’, whereas large-N studies are ‘variable-centered’". In large-N studies we are more concerned with the conceptualization and operationalization of variables. Thus, we want to focus on which data to include in the analysis of long-term COVID patients. If we wanted to survey them, we would want to make sure we construct questions in appropriate ways. For almost all survey-based large-N research, the question responses themselves become the coded variables used in the statistical analysis.
Case selection can be driven by a number of factors in comparative politics, with the first two approaches being the more traditional. First, it can derive from the interests of the researcher(s). For example, if the researcher lives in Germany, they may want to research the spread of COVID-19 within the country, possibly using a subnational approach where the researcher may compare infection rates among German states. Second, case selection may be driven by area studies. This is still based on the interests of the researcher as generally speaking scholars pick areas of studies due to their personal interests. For example, the same researcher may research COVID-19 infection rates among European Union member-states. Finally, the selection of cases selected may be driven by the type of case study that is utilized. In this approach, cases are selected as they allow researchers to compare their similarities or their differences. Or, a case might be selected that is typical of most cases, or in contrast, a case or cases that deviate from the norm. We discuss types of case studies and their impact on case selection below.
Types of Case Studies: Descriptive vs. Causal
There are a number of different ways to categorize case studies. One of the most recent ways is through John Gerring. He wrote two editions on case study research (2017) where he posits that the central question posed by the researcher will dictate the aim of the case study. Is the study meant to be descriptive? If so, what is the researcher looking to describe? How many cases (countries, incidents, events) are there? Or is the study meant to be causal, where the researcher is looking for a cause and effect? Given this, Gerring categorizes case studies into two types: descriptive and causal.
Descriptive case studies are “not organized around a central, overarching causal hypothesis or theory” (pg. 56). Most case studies are descriptive in nature, where the researchers simply seek to describe what they observe. They are useful for transmitting information regarding the studied political phenomenon. For a descriptive case study, a scholar might choose a case that is considered typical of the population. An example could involve researching the effects of the pandemic on medium-sized cities in the US. This city would have to exhibit the tendencies of medium-sized cities throughout the entire country. First, we would have to conceptualize what we mean by ‘a medium-size city’. Second, we would then have to establish the characteristics of medium-sized US cities, so that our case selection is appropriate. Alternatively, cases could be chosen for their diversity. In keeping with our example, maybe we want to look at the effects of the pandemic on a range of US cities, from small, rural towns, to medium-sized suburban cities to large-sized urban areas.
Causal case studies are “organized around a central hypothesis about how X affects Y” (pg. 63). In causal case studies, the context around a specific political phenomenon or phenomena is important as it allows for researchers to identify the aspects that set up the conditions, the mechanisms, for that outcome to occur. Scholars refer to this as the causal mechanism, which is defined by Falleti & Lynch (2009) as “portable concepts that explain how and why a hypothesized cause, in a given context, contributes to a particular outcome”. Remember, causality is when a change in one variable verifiably causes an effect or change in another variable. For causal case studies that employ causal mechanisms, Gerring divides them into exploratory case-selection, estimating case-selection, and diagnostic case-selection. The differences revolve around how the central hypothesis is utilized in the study.
Exploratory case studies are used to identify a potential causal hypothesis. Researchers will single out the independent variables that seem to affect the outcome, or dependent variable, the most. The goal is to build up to what the causal mechanism might be by providing the context. This is also referred to as hypothesis generating as opposed to hypothesis testing. Case selection can vary widely depending on the goal of the researcher. For example, if the scholar is looking to develop an ‘ideal-type’, they might seek out an extreme case. An ideal-type is defined as a “conception or a standard of something in its highest perfection” (New Webster Dictionary). Thus, if we want to understand the ideal-type capitalist system, we want to investigate a country that practices a pure or ‘extreme’ form of the economic system.
Estimating case studies start with a hypothesis already in place. The goal is to test the hypothesis through collected data/evidence. Researchers seek to estimate the ‘causal effect’. This involves determining if the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is positive, negative, or ultimately if no relationship exists at all. Finally, diagnostic case studies are important as they help to “confirm, disconfirm, or refine a hypothesis” (Gerring 2017). Case selection can also vary in diagnostic case studies. For example, scholars can choose an least-likely case, or a case where the hypothesis is confirmed even though the context would suggest otherwise. A good example would be looking at Indian democracy, which has existed for over 70 years. India has a high level of ethnolinguistic diversity, is relatively underdeveloped economically, and a low level of modernization through large swaths of the country. All of these factors strongly suggest that India should not have democratized, or should have failed to stay a democracy in the long-term, or have disintegrated as a country.
Most Similar/Most Different Systems Approach
The discussion in the previous subsection tends to focus on case selection when it comes to a single case. Single case studies are valuable as they provide an opportunity for in-depth research on a topic that requires it. However, in comparative politics, our approach is to compare. Given this, we are required to select more than one case. This presents a different set of challenges. First, how many cases do we pick? This is a tricky question we addressed earlier. Second, how do we apply the previously mentioned case selection techniques, descriptive vs. causal? Do we pick two extreme cases if we used an exploratory approach, or two least-likely cases if choosing a diagnostic case approach?
Thankfully, an English scholar by the name of John Stuart Mill provided some insight on how we should proceed. He developed several approaches to comparison with the explicit goal of isolating a cause within a complex environment. Two of these methods, the 'method of agreement' and the 'method of difference' have influenced comparative politics. In the 'method of agreement' two or more cases are compared for their commonalities. The scholar looks to isolate the characteristic, or variable, they have in common, which is then established as the cause for their similarities. In the 'method of difference' two or more cases are compared for their differences. The scholar looks to isolate the characteristic, or variable, they do not have in common, which is then identified as the cause for their differences. From these two methods, comparativists have developed two approaches.
What Is the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD)?
This approach is derived from Mill’s ‘method of difference’. In a Most Similar Systems Design Design, the cases selected for comparison are similar to each other, but the outcomes differ in result. In this approach we are interested in keeping as many of the variables the same across the elected cases, which for comparative politics often involves countries. Remember, the independent variable is the factor that doesn’t depend on changes in other variables. It is potentially the ‘cause’ in the cause and effect model. The dependent variable is the variable that is affected by, or dependent on, the presence of the independent variable. It is the ‘effect’. In a most similar systems approach the variables of interest should remain the same.
A good example involves the lack of a national healthcare system in the US. Other countries, such as New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, UK and Canada, all have robust, publicly accessible national health systems. However, the US does not. These countries all have similar systems: English heritage and language use, liberal market economies, strong democratic institutions, and high levels of wealth and education. Yet, despite these similarities, the end results vary. The US does not look like its peer countries. In other words, why do we have similar systems producing different outcomes?
What Is the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD)?
This approach is derived from Mill’s ‘method of agreement’. In a Most Different System Design, the cases selected are different from each other, but result in the same outcome. In this approach, we are interested in selecting cases that are quite different from one another, yet arrive at the same outcome. Thus, the dependent variable is the same. Different independent variables exist between the cases, such as democratic v. authoritarian regime, liberal market economy v. non-liberal market economy. Or it could include other variables such as societal homogeneity (uniformity) vs. societal heterogeneity (diversity), where a country may find itself unified ethnically/religiously/racially, or fragmented along those same lines.
A good example involves the countries that are classified as economically liberal. The Heritage Foundation lists countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, Estonia, Australia, New Zealand, as well as Switzerland, Chile and Malaysia as either free or mostly free. These countries differ greatly from one another. Singapore and Malaysia are considered flawed or illiberal democracies (see chapter 5 for more discussion), whereas Estonia is still classified as a developing country. Australia and New Zealand are wealthy, Malaysia is not. Chile and Taiwan became economically free countries under the authoritarian military regimes, which is not the case for Switzerland. In other words, why do we have different systems producing the same outcome? | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/02%3A_How_to_Study_Comparative_Politics-_Using_Comparative_Methods/2.03%3A_Case_Selection_%28Or_How_to_Use_Cases_in_Y.txt |
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Key Terms/Glossary
• Applied research - defined as “research that attempts to explain social phenomena with immediate public policy implications.''
• Assumptions - statements that are taken to be true, or statements that are accepted as true, without proof.
• Case - is defined as a “spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time, or over some period of time."
• Case study - an intensive look into that single case, often with the intent that this single case may help us better understand a particular variable of interest.
• Causal case studies - case studies “organized around a central hypothesis about how X affects Y”.
• Causal mechanism - defined as “portable concepts that explain how and why a hypothesized cause, in a given context, contributes to a particular outcome.”
• Causal question - involves discerning cause and effect, also referred to as a causal relationship.
• Comparative case study - defined as a study that is structured on the comparison of two or more cases.
• Deductive reasoning - occurs when political scientists make an inference and then test its truth using evidence and observations.
• Dependent variables (outcome variables) - the assumed effect, their values will (presumably) depend on the changes in the independent variables.
• Descriptive case studies - case studies “not organized around a central, overarching causal hypothesis or theory”.
• Empirical Analysis - is defined as being based on experiment, experience or observation.
• Experiment - defined as “laboratory studies in which investigators retain control over the recruitment, assignment to random conditions, treatment, and measurement of subjects.”
• Falsifiability - is a word coined by Karl Popper, a philosopher of science, and is defined as the ability for a statement to be logically contradicted through empirical testing.
• Hard sciences - such as chemistry, mathematics, and physics, work to advance scientific understanding in the natural or physical sciences.
• Hypothesis - a specific and testable prediction of what you think will happen.
• Independent variables (explanatory variables) - the cause, and these variables are independent of other variables under consideration in a study.
• Inductive reasoning - occurs when scientists look at specific situations and attempt to form a hypothesis.
• Inference - is a process of drawing a conclusion about an unobserved phenomenon, based on observed (empirical) information.
• Large-N research - when the number of observations or cases is large enough where we would need mathematical, usually statistical, techniques to discover and interpret any correlations or causations.
• Literature review - a section of your research paper or research process which collects key sources and previous research on your research question and discusses the findings in synthesis with each other.
• Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) - the cases selected for comparison are different from each other, but outcomes are similar in results.
• Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) - the cases selected for comparison are similar to each other, but outcomes differ in results.
• Non-falsifiable - a question cannot be proven true or false under present circumstances, particularly when such questions are subjective.
• Science - is defined as the systematic and organized approach to any area of inquiry, and utilizes scientific methods to acquire and build a body of knowledge, political science, as well as comparative politics as a subfield of political science, embody the essence of the scientific method and possess deep foundations for the scientific tools and theory formation which align with their areas of inquiry.
• Scientific method - a process by which knowledge is acquired through a sequence of steps, which generally include the following components: question, observation, hypothesis, testing of the hypothesis, analysis of the outcomes, and reporting of the findings.
• Social sciences - which are the fields of inquiry that scientifically study human society and relationships.
• Soft sciences - like psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science, work to advance scientific understanding of human behavior, institutions, society, government, decision making, and power.
• Subnational case study research - when subnational governments, such provincial governments, regional governments, and other local governments often referred to as municipalities, are the cases that are compared.
• Theory - a statement that explains how the world works based on experiences and observation.
• Variable - is a factor or object that can vary or change.
Summary
Section #2.1: What Makes the Study of Comparative Politics a Science?
Comparative politics is a social science which follows the scientific method as a way to advance knowledge in the field. To this end, the scientific method is a process by which knowledge is acquired through a sequence of steps, which generally include the following components: question, observation, hypothesis, testing of the hypothesis, analysis of the outcomes, and reporting of the findings. Each of these steps is critical to exercising sound methodological practices to answer clear and substantive research questions.
Section #2.2: The Scientific Method and Comparative Politics
There are four basic approaches used in empirical research: the experimental method, the statistical method, case study methods, and the comparative method. Experimental methods are the result of experimental designs, and the methods involve standardization, randomization, between-subject versus within-subject design and experimental bias. Statistical methods are the use of mathematical techniques to analyze collected data, usually in numerical form, such as interval or ratio-scale. Statistical methods are great for discerning correlations, or relationships between variables. Advanced mathematical techniques have been developed that permit understanding of complex relationships. Comparative methods involve “the analysis of a small number of cases, entailing at least two observations”. As such, the comparative method involves more than a case study, or single-N research, but less than a statistical analysis, or large-N study. Case studies are one of major techniques used by comparativists to study phenomena, and cases provide for in-depth traditional research.
Section #2.3: What is a Case Study?
Case studies are one of major techniques used by comparativists to study various phenomena. A case study is an intensive look into a single case, often with the intent that this single case may help us better understand a particular variable of interest. The case study could consist of a single observation within the country, with each observation having several dimensions. There are also comparative case studies, when a scholar compares across an increasing number of cases, shifting the analysis from a single example to other cases in other countries. Finally, there are subnational case studies, where the area of interest involves subnational governments, such as provincial governments, regional governments or local governments. Overall, the option for using case studies as a means of research has been vital to theory development in the field of political science.
Section #2.4: Case Selection (Or, How to Use Cases in Your Comparative Analysis)
Case selection is a critical aspect of research design and relies on questions over how many cases, and which cases, to include in a study, to help determine the outcome of results. Some studies will have a large-N, where the number of observations or cases is large enough where we would need mathematical, usually statistical, techniques to discover and interpret any correlations or causations. For case selection, randomization is important to ensure bias is reduced. Case selection can be driven by a number of factors in comparative politics, including the interest of the researcher(s), as well as the type of case study being pursued. To this end, there are two types of case studies: descriptive and causal. Descriptive case studies are “not organized around a central, overarching causal hypothesis or theory” while causal case studies are “organized around a central hypothesis about how X affects Y.” A final method of considering which cases to select comes from John Stuart Mill’s approaches of Most Similar System Design (MSSD) and Most Different System Design (MDSD). In a Most Similar Systems Design Design, the cases selected for comparison are similar to each other, but the outcomes differ in result. Conversely, in a Most Different System Design, the cases selected are different from each other, but result in the same outcome.
Review Questions
1. The scientific method involves following certain steps. Which of these steps would come first?
1. Conduct an experiment
2. Form Hypotheses
3. Ask a question
4. Communicate findings
2. An inference is:
1. A process to acquire knowledge through a sequence of steps
2. An educated guess
3. A process of drawing a conclusion about an unobserved phenomenon based on observed information
4. The ability for a statement to be proven true or false
3. Who coined the term ‘falsifiable?’
1. Plato
2. Karl Popper
3. John Locke
4. Sidney Verba
4. “Is Chocolate ice cream better than Vanilla ice cream?” Why is this question not falsifiable?
1. It’s not specific enough.
2. It’s too technical.
3. It’s subjective.
4. It’s falsifiable.
5. Using a case study may be ideal if:
1. Using a large sample size of data from a number of countries
2. Comparing many countries at once
3. Considering a small number of countries
4. You want to make a sweeping statement about many countries
Answers: 1.c, 2.c, 3.b, 4.c., 5.c
Critical Thinking
1. Provide some examples of an inductive versus a deductive approach to hypothesis formation. Try to use examples conducive to political science and comparative politics specifically.
2. Construct a list of no less than five falsifiable questions you could use for political science research. What are the challenges in devising questions which are falsifiable?
3. Of the four approaches to research, which one do you find most appealing? What makes it most appealing? What challenges do you think you would face in your choice of research approach?
Suggestions for Further Study
Journals
• Achen, Chris. (2005). “Let’s Put Garbage Can Regressions and Garbage Can Probits Where They Belong.” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22(4), 327-339.
• Geddes, Barbara. (1990). “How the Cases you Choose Affect the Answers you Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis, 2, 131-50.
• Kalleberg, Arthur L., “The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems,” World Politics, 19 (October 1966), p. 72
Books
• Brady, Henry & Collier, David, eds. (2000). Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Berkeley, CA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
• Franco, J., Lee, C., Vue, K., Bozonelos, D., Omae, M., and Cauchon S. (2020). Introduction to Political Science Research Methods. First Edition. PDF Version ISBN: 978-1-7351980-0-2
• King, Gary, Keohane, Robert, & Verba, Sidney. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Contributors
2022 version: Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D., Masahiro Omae, Ph.D. and Julia Wendt, Ph.D. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/02%3A_How_to_Study_Comparative_Politics-_Using_Comparative_Methods/2.05%3A_Student_Resources.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Define, and distinguish between, key terms including state, regime, and nation.
• Recall the development of the state from its origins.
• Identify common characteristics of modern states.
• Consider the implications of political capacity in various states.
Introduction
What is government? Is government necessary? Why do governments exist?
At some point in your life, you may have asked some of these questions. Many times, the fact that people live under a government or in a country that has rules and societal norms, can be difficult to grasp. At the present moment, there are almost 8 billion people on the planet and almost 200 identified countries worldwide. There are 193 member countries in the United Nations. The fact stands that of the nearly 8 billion people currently on the planet, most live under some kind of government or are affiliated with one of 200 countries on the planet. This means that most human beings on this planet have found themselves in the situation of being ruled over or governed, and while daily life is filled with a myriad of basic to-do lists and activities, many of the activities of humans on the planet are, in small and big ways, dictated by political powers. To this end, this chapter considers important aspects of political power within countries, the important terminology we use in the field of comparative politics to understand the world around us, and important problems and issues related to states and regimes.
The Social Contract and Social Order
Let’s begin with some critical questions: Why does government exist? Is government necessary?
A society without government or central leadership is one that lives in anarchy. Anarchy is defined as a lack of societal structure and order where there is no established hierarchy of power. Many scholars and political scientists have considered, at great length, the phenomenon and applicability of anarchy, though anarchy has not been a norm within the communities of humans living over the past 15,000 years. Even prior to the establishment of formal governments and formalized institutions, human beings were organizing themselves for various reasons. One of the first things that compelled human beings to organize themselves was the pursuit of survival. Over the course of human history, humans began to understand that survival seemed more feasible when they cooperated with one another. While they didn’t have established, written laws, early humans did begin to have informal rules and norms for how they handled themselves in society. In some cases, informal leaders also existed and helped guide how humans were supposed to act in order to survive.
Early humans often existed as small groups composed mostly of family members. For example, think of your own family. Are there certain rules your family followed while you were growing up? Who was in charge? Who told you what to do and when to do it? Consider this, and consider how the existence or non-existence of rules in your family contributed to how your family worked and lived. Did rules help your family? Did you think the leaders, parental guardians, in your family were legitimate? Did you follow their rules? In time, families banded together into tribes, which in turn, formed their own rules and norms for how their group should act, usually with the common goal of surviving. Also, in time, circumstances changed for humans, particularly in terms of how they were able to survive. Initially, there was a hunter-gatherer approach, where humans hunted for their food and gathered fruits, berries and other available plant life in order to survive.
About twelve thousand years ago, society was able to shift its approach. Humans found a way to stay in one place for longer through the agricultural revolution. Humans were now able to till the land for crops and begin early irrigation methods to enable the watering of their crops. With the ability to stay in one place for longer, rather than moving around constantly to hunt and gather, human groups began to aggregate in common locations. The agricultural revolution also led to human population growth. This population growth, combined with more people living closer together, also led to the need for formal societal organization. Humans, now living closer to each other, were to forced to develop some sort of order to ensure survival. In looking back on this period of human history, the main takeaway is that humans chose not to live in anarchy instead of a living in a chaotic world without rules. Humans calculated that their status quo would be improved with a strong set of rules. In addition, both individual and societal goals could be accomplished through mutual cooperation in a rules-based society. Out of this, would come what Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Rousseau called the social contract.
A social contract is defined as either a formal or informal agreement between the rulers and those ruled in a society. Those who are ruled submit to the laws of the rulers in exchange for certain benefits. Sometimes, the benefits are as simple as military protection. In the United States, citizens are expected to obey the laws of the land, as expressed through the Constitution. This is in exchange for protection of their “life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” Social contracts can be voluntary or involuntary, and can be observed in almost every type of political system, democratic or otherwise. Sometimes, a social contract involves those who are ruled to pledge fealty, as well as their livelihoods and productivity, to the ruling class. There are two types of social contracts. The first is a voluntary social contract. This is where the people agree to submit to the ruling class. Keep in mind that even though this agreement is voluntary, it does not always mean that those who are ruled are entitled to certain privileges, such as freedom of speech. In this situation, the people may simply need protection from outside threats. An involuntary social contract is when the ruling class dominates in a given territory and demands obedience from the people. In this case, those being ruled are simply pushed into a social contract. In some instances, disagreement has led to banishment or death.
There are also implicit social contracts as well. For example, most US citizens are born into their social contract. This is why some Americans often take their social contract for granted. By being born into citizenship, Americans may never need to actualize, or act upon, their citizenship. They benefit from a system that protects their rights and liberties, even when they choose not to obey the law. In contrast, there are other US citizens that are born into this social contract, and instead go through a formal process to become US citizens. This process is referred to as naturalization. Naturalization is the process by which noncitizens formally become citizens of the country they reside in. Naturalization is a long process that requires multiple steps, including but not limited to background checks, oral examinations, paperwork, and finally pledging allegiance to your host country in a formal ceremony. The process of naturalization is a good example of a voluntary and formal social contract where a citizen pledges obedience and allegiance in exchange for the benefits of being a citizen.
Social contract theory is often credited to certain philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Hobbes was the earliest of these thinkers, living between 1588 and 1679. While Hobbes was known for many scholastic contributions to history, politics, math and physics, he contributed greatly to political science, most notably the concept of a social contract. Hobbes acknowledged that all people act within their own self-interest, and in acting in their own self-interest, will make calculations to ensure their survival. Hobbes inherently saw human beings as selfish. For him, the state of nature was unstable and dangerous. Hobbes wrote that life was, “nasty, brutish and short”.
Locke lived between 1632 to 1704 in the UK and is considered one of the primary Enlightenment thinkers of his time. Locke contributed to social contract theory in his masterpiece, Two Treatises of Government. Locke set out the principles of natural rights, where he believed that all people were born with “certain, unalienable” rights. These rights should be recognized by states. Governments are expected to protect these natural rights through their political institutions and structures. In contrast to Hobbes, Locke thought positively about humankind. But like Hobbes, he believed in the power of the state, which did a better job of protecting its citizens. Again, Hobbes favored a more authoritarian government, believing that the state needed to control the masses, for their own good. Whereas, Locke believed humans were perfectly capable of living peacefully with each other, with no need for an authoritarian state. Even though Locke’s work did not gain widespread attention during his lifetime, it heavily influenced the US founding fathers. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson borrowed heavily from Locke, with certain phrases in the US Constitution taken directly from Locke’s writings.
“Men are born free, yet everywhere are in chains,” remarked Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the opening lines of his 1762 work, Du Contrat social, or The Social Contract. In this publication, Rousseau continues the discourse on social contract theory and argues that society does not lend itself to equal and equitable treatment of those within society. Instead, society imprisons people with various “chains” and suppresses their natural born rights and liberties. To Rousseau, the only type of authority is only legitimate in society if it comes from the consent of all people. All people must agreed to a government in order to protect their interests, but in this contract, there must be a “unified will” which takes into consideration the interests of the people for the common good.
Taking this logic of the social contract back to the historical context, an early version of social contract can also be observed in ancient Greece, which is also credited with the first democratic state. In Ancient Greece, a system was established wherein elite men could participate in government and representatives could work on behalf of the people. Democracy comes from the Greek words, demo and kratos, meaning rule by the people. Broadly defined, democracy is a political system wherein government is dictated by the power of the people. A direct democracy is where every single citizen is able to be involved in the legal process and able to have some amount of power over the laws of society. A representative democracy is one where the people elect representatives to serve on their behalf to make the laws and rules of society. Ancient Greece did not have a perfect democracy as many members of the population were excluded from decision-making processes, like slaves (both male and female) and women were excluded from political processes. Nevertheless, the social contract here, in hindsight, was that the people of Ancient Greece submitted to the ruling class, through somewhat representative leadership, in order for protection from the political system.
Following the fall of the Roman Empire in 489 ACE, Western Europe fell into chaos. No longer were the citizens of these areas protected by the former social contract. Northern hordes came down and would attack territories, leaving most of the regions of the former Roman Empire in disarray. The circumstances were not ideal and most people during this time lived under constant duress with no protection of their person or property. Around 900 ACE, the system of feudalism arose. Feudalism was a system or social order that arose out of the middle ages, particularly in Europe, wherein peasants (sometimes called Serfs) were forced to provide members of the upper class with their crops, produce, goods as well as their services, fealty and loyalty. The upper class, usually Nobles, would provide some level of protection to the Serfs in exchange for their products and services. Consider feudalism in light of the social contract. Though not necessarily ideal, the Serfs were able to exchange their goods, services and fealty in exchange for some level of protection of their lives and property.
Overall, the story of government comes from this historical reckoning of the social contract and the drive for social order. From this, we can talk more directly about the formation of states, which is a common theme throughout political science and the comparative politics field.
Defining Terms
One of the most frequently used words in the study of comparative politics is the word state. At first glance, many students will see or hear the word state and think of, perhaps, subnational governments, like states in the United States like Montana, Wisconsin, New York, and so forth. This is not the way the word is interpreted within the field of comparative politics. Instead, a state is defined as a national-level group, organization or body which administers its own legal and governmental policies within a designated region or territory. Outside of the comparative discipline, many people tend to use the terms state, country, government, regime, and nation interchangeably. Within comparative politics, each of these terms is distinct, and have different implications when attempting to observe the political landscapes around the world. Since States tend to be the major political actors in the global arena, it is vital to have a firm grounding in understanding what states are, how the term state relates to other concepts and terms within comparative politics field, and how comparativists set out to study states and their actions. Using the correct terms in the right context will empower you to be able to interpret comparativist literature and research, and perhaps add your own contributions to the field someday.
If a state is a national-level organization which administers its own legal and governmental policies within a designated region or territory, what are nations and countries and how are they different or similar? State tends to have a narrower meaning than both a nation and a country, and relates more specifically to how a designated territory operates politically. A nation can be broadly defined as a population of people joined by common culture, history, language, ancestry within a designated region of territory. A country is similar, but tends to encompass aspects of both the nation and the state. A country is a nation, which may have one or more states within it, or may change state-type over time. For instance, consider the country, Russia. Russian history tends to be credited with its onset in the 9th century with the Rus’ people. The Rus’ state was established in 862 ACE, and encompassed much of modern day Russia as well as parts of Scandinavia. The Kievan Rus’ state followed the Rus’ state, but eventually fell apart during the Mongol invasions between 1237 and 1240. While Moscow grew to be a significant hub for business, politics, and society, the Russian region at this time was largely stateless and operated under the system of feudalism.
As mentioned above, feudalism was a system or social order that arose out of the middle ages, particularly in Europe, wherein peasants (sometimes called Serfs) were forced to provide members of the upper class with their crops, produce, goods as well as their services, fealty and loyalty. The upper class, usually Nobles, would provide some level of protection to the Serfs in exchange for their products and services. Eventually, Rus’ became a unified country Grand Duchy of Moscow, and became a major force within the region. (Briefly consider Tsardom, Imperial Russia…rise and fall of USSR…) Over time, the way Russia was ruled varied greatly, whether ruling came from a noble class, a royal bloodline, installment of a leader, or election of leadership. Let’s say a country, being a nation with shared values and heritage, is the hardware needed for a state within the world, then the regime is the software which tells the country or nation how to operate. The hardware, in this case, tends to last longer and be bound by similar history and values whereas a country or nation’s regime type can vary based on shifting values and challenges of the time period. Therefore, Russia has a common territory, history, language, ancestry, but has been led by different states over time.
One of the important characteristics of a state is its ability to independently organize its own policies and goals. As defined in Chapter One, sovereignty is fundamental governmental power, where the government has the power to coerce those to do things they may not want to do. Sovereignty also involves the ability to manage the country’s affairs independently from outside powers and internal resistance. If a state does not have the ability to manage its own affairs and issues, it will not be able to maintain its power over what happens. Power, broadly defined, is the ability to get others to do what you want them to do. Soft power means being able to get others to do what you want them to do using the methods of persuasion or manipulation. Hard power, in contrast, is the ability to get others to do what you want using physical and potentially aggressive measures, for instance, like fighting, attacking or through war. Both types of power hold critical places in the world of politics. It is critical to be able to convince others of a course of action from the perspective of a state, sometimes this ability to convince will come from simple persuasion or discussion of the merits of a certain course of action. Other times, there may be heavy resistance to an idea or plan, and some have chosen to use physical violence to get their policy goals achieved. Physical power is important in cases where a state must still defend itself from outside powers. If a state is unable to defend itself physically, even the most benevolent policy goals and objectives would be rendered meaningless because the state could cease to exist if attacked.
States must have both authority and legitimacy in order to operate effectively, or at the very least, to exist for some period of time. Legitimacy can be defined as the state’s ability to establish itself as a valid power over its citizens. Authority is another important piece of a state’s existence. Authority is defined as having the power to get things done. If we put these two terms together, a state is legitimate in its operations if it has the authority to make decisions and carry out its policy goals. Traditional legitimacy occurs when states have the authority to lead based on historical precedent. For instance, there are states in the political system where there is a legitimate authority to lead, but no defined or operationalized constitution, or set of rules and laws. A second type of legitimacy is called charismatic legitimacy, and it means that citizens follow the rules of a state based on the charisma and personality of the current leader. Legitimacy, in this scenario, also does not come from a written constitution accepted by the representatives or leaders of a country. This type of legitimacy can be flimsy as it is contingent on the charisma of a particular leader. When that leader dies or gets removed from office, will the state continue to stand, or will citizens no longer see legitimacy of authority from the government in the absence of that charismatic leader?
The last type of legitimacy is called rational-legal legitimacy, and it occurs when states derive their authority through firmly established, often written and adopted, laws, rules, regulations, procedures through a constitution. A constitution can be understood as a state’s described laws of the land. Authority and legitimacy can be consolidated and, if accepted by the people, it becomes the operating manual and handbook for how society should run. Each of these forms of legitimacy, especially when taken together, can enhance a state’s ability to function. If, for instance, there is a written and adopted constitution, and it has been transparently drafted and considered by representatives of a state, individuals will know what the rights and rules are of their given society. In time, as laws and norms are followed and accepted, there also becomes a historical precedent that individuals are more likely to accept (traditional legitimacy). Finally, if there does happen to be a charismatic leader, they may be able to garner further support from the people to deepen a state’s legitimacy and potentially grow the political agenda to meet further needs of society.
With these important terms considered, we can now more formally consider the many types of state and regimes that exist today, as well as the ways in which regimes may shift in form and function over time to either serve the needs or the people or the desires of the ruling classes. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/03%3A_States_and_Regimes/3.01%3A_Introduction_to_States.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Identify the differences between strong and weak states
• Compare and contrast examples of political capacity in different countries
• Define and identify different regime types
Introduction
The rise of the so-called modern state is usually attributed to the end of the European Middle Ages, wherein states were critical to the organization and survival of certain societies. Being a member of state brought benefits to those included. Having a recognized state meant there was a recognized authority by which states could trade and do business with each other. Trade prompted economic development, which further solidified trading relationships. With economic development, states were also able to pursue technological innovations. The advent of trade enabled states to improve the way ordinary day-to-day activities were run, and it enabled states to build further military power. Advances in technology helped European states invent, or improve, the use of gunpowder, weapons, mapmaking, as well as mathematics and engineering. A final benefit for European states coming out of the Middle Ages was some semblance of political stability for its inhabitants. When protected by a recognized, and somewhat unified, state, ordinary people had greater chances for survival.
As described earlier in this chapter, not all social contracts and state authority are created equal; in fact, there is great variation in the way states manifest in different regions and under different ideological perspectives. To this end, this chapter asks how we can compare states and state power. What is the scope of variation in the types of states we have seen? What are the implications of various state types?
Foundations & Strong and Weak States
How do Comparativists compare and contrast state types? How does this contribute to advancing our understanding of how states form, operate, and interact with each other? In looking at modern states, what are the main factors to consider in comparing states?
As seen previously in this chapter, states are alike in that they began forming when societies were able to stay in one place (thanks to the agricultural revolution), and some form of the social contract is observed between a state authority and those under the state authority. Regardless of the type of regime, government, and culture of the society, states tend to grapple with how much power a state can have to impede on the lives of its citizens. The balance over how much freedom to grant, versus how much authority the state can wield, contributes to a variety of different political outcomes; this is where the foundations of the social contract begin to end. Some states are powerful, strong, effective, and stable. Other states are disorganized, chaotic, weak and unstable. How can we tell the difference between strong and weak states?
Strong states are those which are able to work their political agendas effectively, to make sure basic political tasks are completed. Strong states are able to defend their territory and interests, collect taxes from the people, enforce laws, manage their economies, and promote civil and political stability within their domain. Regardless of where authority is derived, the state has legitimacy to act because the citizens have accepted the terms of the social contract.
Weak states are those which are unable to perform basic political tasks, and unable to work the political agenda of the authority in charge. Weak states are typically unable to defend their territories and interests. They do not have enough legitimacy, or related logistics, to collect taxes, enforce their laws, and manage their economy effectively. Weak states also struggle with ensuring domestic stability, likely because they lack the legitimacy and authority to act on their constituents. Considering strong and weak states side-by-side, we can begin to discuss the concept of state capacity. Political capacity is defined as the ability of a state to use its power, as derived through authority and legitimacy, to get things done and promote its own interests. A state with low capacity is a weak state whereas a state with high capacity is a strong state. Capacity will be one of the factors comparativists consider when comparing states.
An important factor to consider for comparativists considering states is a states’ regime type. A regime is the method by which the state has chosen to wield its power to enforce laws, rules and norms of political life. Regime type and the form of government are therefore synonymous.
Aside from political capacity and regime type, comparativists also consider many aspects of the political and cultural realities and institutions of a given state. Factors such as internal political stability and conflict, political conflict between competing states, culture and society within a state, geography, social demographics, political agendas and outcomes, and state economies and relationship to the global economy. Other chapters will focus on these latter factors, while this chapter is focused on the capacity of states and their regime types.
Regime Types - Dictatorships to Democracies
States can vary not only in their strength, legitimacy, and authority, but in the mechanisms they use to achieve political agendas. To this end, there are a number of different government types that states have chosen to achieve their political ends. Here, too, there can be much variation in how states choose to exercise their power. One way to look at regime types is to consider, broadly speaking, the range in types. Some of the main regime types and their characteristics are represented below in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Regime Types
Regime Type Number of People in Charge Examples
Anarchy No one
Monarchy One (Usually royal or bloodline) Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Medieval England
Dictatorship One Libya, North Korea, Cuba
Aristocracy A few (Usually an elite, small, ruling class) Ancient Sparta
Oligarchy A few (Usually wealthy elites) Renaissance Venice
Junta A few Military Officers (Usually high-ranking officers) Chad, Guinea
Democracy Many or All United States of America, Britain, Germany
In considering Table 3.1, we can first look at a type of regime called a monarchy. A monarchy is a form of government where a single person leads the country under the authority of royalty, bloodlines, or some other factor of symbolic significance. The word monarchy derives from ancient Greek word, μονάρχης (monárkhēs), where μόνος or mónos means “one” or “single” and ἄρχων or árkhōn means “ruler” or “chief.” Monarchies are thought to descend from more ancient forms of tribal leadership, where tribes appointed a special or sacred individual to lead their interests. Over time, modern monarchies evolved where leadership was generally vested with a King or Queen. Even within the regime type of monarchy, there is variation in how the leader may exercise their power. There are two primary types of Monarchy that have been identified throughout history. In an absolute monarchy, the monarch is wholly responsible for all decisions, and rules the state with absolute power over all political, economic and social matters. In a constitutional monarchy, a monarch must abide by a state-adopted constitution, which dictates the scope and depth of its power in all state-related activities.
A dictatorship is a form of government where one person, or sometimes a single group, has sole and absolute power over the state. While dictatorships can range in the extent to which the state intervenes in the private lives of citizens, most dictatorships do not permit free media, freedom of speech, or personal rights and freedoms. A common form of dictatorship in the 20th and 21st centuries have been personalist dictatorships, where power lies with a single, charismatic and all powerful person who drives all actions of the state. Current examples of these types of dictators could be Kim Jong-Un of North Korea and Xi Jinping of China. Kim Jong-Un is currently the Supreme Leader of North Korea, and has served since 2011 when his father, Kim Jong-il, who was Supreme Leader, passed away. Like his father, Kim Jong-Un has operated under a cult of personality. A cult of personality occurs when a state leverages all aspects of a leader’s real and exaggerated traits to solidify the leader’s power.
In the case of North Korea, the state uses its media to promote propaganda which endows its leaders with near or equal to God or Godly status. Xi Jinping of China also has been characterized as a dictator, as he controls all actions and activities of the state along with elites, whom he personally selects, who assist him in carrying out all state activities.
An aristocracy is a form of government where a group of social elites rule the state. Often, leaders of an aristocracy are nobles, wealthy, or somehow identified as superior to and/or above the class that is being ruled. Aristocracy tends to be associated with ancient Sparta because the form of government deliberately vested power with those who were seen as elite and capable of ruling. In modern terms, oligarchies seem to be a more present-day embodiment of aristocracy. Oligarchy is similarly defined as a form of government where elites rule, though there is not necessarily an assumption of nobility.
A junta is a regime type where there is a small, military group of elites who rule state activities. The term junta derives from its use during the Spanish resistance to Napoleon’s attempted invasion of Spain in 1808, wherein military groups within Spain assembled and attempted to stop Napoleon’s attack. Junta means “meeting” or “committee” in Spanish, though its current affiliations within political science characterize it as akin to a military oligarchy. Often, juntas tend to form as resistance or rebellion, and are used in coup d’etats. Coup d'etats are attempts by elites to overthrow the current government of a state through abrupt seizure of power and removal of the government’s leadership.
Regime Transitions
One key area of concern in comparative politics is the phenomenon of regime transition. Regime transitions occur when a formal government changes to a different government leadership, structure or system. Sometimes, a regime will change from a dictatorship to a democracy through the mobilization of citizens demanding change from their state operations. Other times, a democracy may backslide into a dictatorship. While democracies have become the most common and generally accepted form of government, there have been dozens of examples of a democracy backsliding into a dictatorship.
Consider the example of the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany during the 1920s. Following World War I, a weak democracy was installed in Germany. The Weimar Republic was Germany’s democracy following World War I, but it suffered a number of problems which eventually suppressed the regime and caused it to form into an oppressive dictatorship. The terms of the Treaty of Versaille, which ended World War I, put Germany into social and economic dire straits. The terms of the agreement forced Germany to pay high reparations to the Allies, which left the German people impoverished. High unemployment, high inflation, and general discontent caused the Weimar Republic difficulty in enforcing its political agenda. In the midst of dire circumstances, Adolf Hitler was able to use a Cult of Personality to rally many Germans against the Weimar Republic. Through his use of manipulation and incendiary speech, Hitler was able to get appointed as the Chancellor of Germany. He abolished the Constitution, and year after year, eroded the rights and liberties of the German people till Germany was a fully authoritarian regime led by a single dictator. At the end of World War II, Germany again experienced a regime transition back towards democracy.
Overall, observing cases of regime transition can be important to learning the causes and consequences of changing regimes. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/03%3A_States_and_Regimes/3.02%3A_The_Modern_State_and_Regime_Types.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Compare and contrast Botswana and Somalia’s historical context for political outcomes
• Apply understanding of political capacity in Botswana and Somalia
Introduction
Why compare and contrast Botswana and Somalia? Why select these two countries for consideration when discussing the main focal point of “the state?” The selection of Botswana and Somalia is interesting to consider when evaluating the relevance of the state, and in terms of methods for selecting case studies, this selection could be categorized as falling into Most Similar Systems Design. The Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) asks comparativists to consider at least two cases where the cases are similar, but the outcomes from these cases are different. Botswana and Somalia have a number of geographic and historical circumstances in common, and yet the resulting political outcomes have been very different. The primary difference between these two countries are their forms of legitimate authority.
Botswana
• Full Country Name: Botswana, Republic of Botswana
• Head(s) of State: President
• Government: Parliamentary Republic
• Official Languages: Setswana, English
• Economic System: Market-Oriented Economy
• Location: Southern Africa
• Capital: Gaborone
• Total land size: 224,610 sq. miles
• Population: 2,254,069
• GDP: \$18.726 billion
• GDP per capita: \$7,817
• Currency: Pula
The Republic of Botswana is located in southern Africa, and is a landlocked country. Botswana is bordered by South Africa to the south, Namibia to the northwest, and Zimbabwe to the northeast. Botswana has a long history, and is credited with perhaps being the “birthplace” of all modern humans dating back over 200,000 years ago. Much of what is known about the ancient Botswana region is derived from archeological and anthropological research, which has traced evidence of human civilization through ancient tools, cave drawings and evidence of farming practices that existed through the region over time. Although there is robust evidence of the region’s population adopting agricultural practices and having tribal norms and values that were followed, the first actual written records of life in Botswana were not noted until around the 1820s.
Botswana was one of many African countries affected by the Scramble for Africa, sometimes also called the conquest of Africa, wherein Western European powers attempted to control and colonize all parts of Africa. The Scramble for Africa occurred between the years of 1880 to 1914, with countries like Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Italy invading and colonizing much of Africa. Botswana was dominated by Britain. Under British rule, the region of Botswana was called the Bechuanaland Protectorate.
Part of the reason the region was called a protectorate was that Britain annexed, or took over, the region on the basis that they were “protecting” the main tribes from the Boers. The Boers were descendents of Dutch colonists in Southern Africa, and would frequently attempted to take over the territory of Botswana tribes.To protect their economic, military and moral interests in Botswana, Britain permitted the Bechuanaland Protectorate to operate under its own leadership and rules, but supplied resources to protect the region from the Boers. Beyond this, allowing for any encroachment of the Boers in the region may have compromised British interests in ensuring that German, Dutch and In some ways, some have emphasized the distinction that the Bechuanaland Protectorate was not a colony, but an area protected by the British government for various reasons. A protectorate is defined as an area or nation that is managed, possessed, controlled and protected by a different state. The area or nation is dependent in that it relies on the security provided by another state, but is still allowed, to some extent, to dictate its own local politics and activities.
At the beginning of the 20th century, more and more power had begun being shared with the various tribes and councils within Southern Africa. Various proclamations enabled tribal powers to have some level of power over how they conducted themselves. Nevertheless, it was not until 1964 that the United Kingdom allowed Botswana to declare its independence. Botswana was able to hold its first elections in 1966, following the creation of their own Constitution in 1965.
Today, Botswana is considered Africa’s oldest and most stable democracies, though it is not without some number of issues (which will be discussed below). Botswana’s constitution provides the supreme law of the law and basis for rule. There are components of Botswana’s constitution that seek to protect the citizens of Botswana and, like the U.S. the Constitution, provides for certain civil liberties. Civil liberties are defined as individual rights that are protected by law to ensure the government does not unreasonably interfere with certain specific individual rights (e.g. like freedom of speech, religion, assembly, etc.) Botswana is a parliamentary republic, which is a system of government where the executive branch is given its powers by the legislative branch, in this case, the parliament. In Botswana’s case, the president serves as both the head of state and head of government, and is elected by, and held accountable by, Botswana’s Parliament.
Although Botswana’s government has three branches of government with defined powers according to their constitution, and even though free elections do occur, there is some question as to how free Botswana actually is. The Freedom in the World Index categorizes Botswana’s democracy as free, but a number of global indexes for democracy, including the Democracy Index, have categorized Botswana as having a flawed democracy. (Chapter Four will discuss the variation manifestations of democracy worldwide, but it is worth noting that not all democracies are categorized as fully democratic. Instead, there are characteristics which are considered, and democracy is measured on more of a spectrum, with some characteristics being cause for caution. For instance, ideally, a democracy has more than one political power that is able to vie for power.) One area of concern is Botswana’s party system. Botswana has been dominated by single party rule since independence. In the case of Botswana, it tends to be a red flag of sorts that only one political party has held power time and time again. This could be an indication for a lack of fair competition. Another area of concern is Botswana’s freedom of speech. Botswana is said to not have full freedom of speech, and freedom of the media is constantly under threat. Another cautionary issue is how Botswana’s government treats migrants, refugees, and the LGBTQIA+ community; all of these groups face constant discrimination under the law.
Botswana’s current situation is a mixed bag. On the one hand, Botswana does have the oldest and one of the most stable democracies in Africa. According to most indexes, Botswana is also one of the least corrupt democracies in Africa. All this being acknowledged, it bears noting that many of the countries in Africa have struggled with government authority, the basis of legitimacy of leadership, and the practice of democracy. Compared to other countries in Africa, Botswana does seem to be a leader. In comparing Botswana globally, its flawed democracy does rank it lower in terms of democracies worldwide.
An interesting question to pose, considering the current state of Botswana’s democracy, is why has Botswana’s government been reasonably successful in light of the many failed or failing governments in Africa? Indeed, Botswana is often called the “African Exception.” One of the answers to this question is often attributed to culture, and to some extent, luck. At the time of Botswana’s independence in the mid-1960s, life for Botswanans was fairly traditional and undisturbed. There was a clear changing of the seasons, which led to predictable crops and management of agriculture. As agriculture was the dominant economic activity of the time, life in Botswana was pretty stable. In addition, prior to the move to formal independence vis-a-vis a government and the creation and adoption of a Constitution, the protectorates and the loose agreements with the United Kingdom for the region to operate with its own leaders within tribes, seemed to have prepared the people of Botswana for a hierarchical power dynamic where tribal decisions were based on the consensus and agreement of the tribes. From this, there was already sort of an informal democracy in place. The combined hierarchy of power, combined with the tradition of gathering consent of the people, may have made a difference for overall adoption of a democratic form of government. A saying in Setswana seems to capture this sentiment prior to the adoption of a Constitution: “Kgosi ke Kgosi ka batho”: A chief is a chief by the will of the people. (Lewis, Jr., 2020) Within this sentiment, the leadership that was in place at the time of independence was forward thinking. Many of the Chiefs that had been in place were open to modernization, and were open to progressive ideas and attitudes.
In some ways, one of the final issues that likely benefited Botswana’s political outcomes was the lack of British interests in their geographical resources. The United Kingdom had been interested in other locations within Africa, so many other countries in Africa became exploited. Interestingly, Botswana was largely left alone, and was not victims of exploitation on account of their geographical resources. Instead, many in Botswana actually felt abandoned by the government of the United Kingdom. It’s been said that a government official in Botswana quipped,”The British left us with nothing!” He then paused, thoughtfully, and added, “On the other hand, the British left us with nothing.” (Lewis, Jr. 2020) To this end, it may have been helpful that the British left Botswana alone instead of becoming heavily invested in trying to take from Botswana. In this way, Botswana was largely left to fend for itself, developing its own institutions and governmental practices, which were able to transition from previous practices with, relative to other countries, a level of ease.
Somalia
• Full Country Name: Somalia, Federal Republic of Somalia
• Head(s) of State: President, Prime Minister
• Government: Federal parliamentary republic
• Official Languages: Somali, Arabic
• Economic System: Informal
• Location: Eastern Africa
• Capital: Mogadishu
• Total land size: 246,201 sq miles
• Population: 15,893,219
• GDP: \$5.218 billion
• GDP per capita: \$348
• Currency: Somali Shilling
Somalia is a country located in Eastern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and bordered by Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Like Botswana, Somalia has a long history. In fact, Somalia is thought to be settled by the first human beings (homo sapiens) on the planet, who are thought to have emerged roughly 300,000 years ago. Archeological digs have unearthed pyramids, tombs, ancient cities as well as tools, burial grounds and homes and walls. Over time, the land that is now Somalia was affected by various civilizations and outside influences given its location for trade. Somalia was a stopping point that enabled profitable trade to occur between what is now the Middle East, connecting trading pathways with India and China. In the 9th century, Islam was introduced to the region of present-day Somalia. Muslims fleeing persecution came to Somalia and introduced the Islamic faith. Over time, Islam grew to be the main religion of Somalia.
Somalia, like Botswana, was a target within the Scramble for Africa, though the influence of colonial powers differed in Somalia. Botswana had been under British control, while Somalia was partially dominated by Britain, and partially dominated by Italy. The two colonial powers fought for control over Somali territory, to the detriment of the Somalians. In World War I, Italy, which had turned fascist under the rule of Benito Mussolini, sought to annex Ethiopia. Italian troops, along with some Somali troops, were able to take back parts of Somalia formerly dominated by the British. Years later, during World War II, Britain was able to successfully take back its former Somali territory, as well as those parts that were held by Italian forces. The battle between Britain and Italy to dominate Somalia often put the Somalians in difficult positions where they had to side with one or the other.
After years of dispute in the international community, including between Britain and Italy, Somalia formed the Somali Republic in 1961. A referendum was put forth for the people to accept a constitution, which would set the foundations for their own government. Unfortunately, most Somalians were not allowed to participate in the adoption and formal voting in for the new constitution. A president and prime Minister were put into place, but their positions were not the product of voting. In 1969, the President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated during a military coup d’etat. The leader of the military at that time, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, initiated the coup, became the leader of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and controlled the country. The country fell to an authoritarian dictatorship, and the SRC dissolved the legislature and the judiciary, and suspended the constitution. For a time under this control, the SRC renamed Somalia, the Somali Democratic Republic, though there was no constitution nor any democratic institutions. In 1976, Mohamed Siad Barre disbanded the SRC and formed the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. Barre’s administration was a communist regime that attempted to wed the Islamic traditions of the region with socialist ideas of equality.
Regardless of the lofty goals of Major General Barre, decades of military rule left the Somalian people restless and disillusioned. In 1991, in the face of increasingly authoritarian rules, Barre’s rule came to an end through the combined efforts of different clans who opposed Barre’s rule. Together, the clans were able to oust Barre from rule. The northern part of the country, previously occupied by Britain, declared independence from the rest of Somalia, though it has never been recognized as independent from the global community to this day. The rest of Somalia became a power vacuum and a civil war began where the clans which had ousted Barre now fought for dominance. At this time, many political scientists began calling Somalia a ‘failed state’. Somalia was seen as a failed state because there was no dominant authority able to reign supreme. Instead, the region was dominated by many groups vying for authority, but none of these powers were able to gain any long standing legitimacy or form any kind of durable government structures.
In 2000, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was established, and Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected to be the president. Ideally, this government was put in place to help Somalia transition to a formal and legitimate government authority, but this time period was not stable. For example, the prime minister’s office turned over four times within the first three years of the TNG’s establishment. Finally, in 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia was formed, which has been the most permanent central government authority in place since 1991. This government utilizes a federal parliamentary republic, though it is not a democracy and Freedom House categorizes Somalia as ‘not free’. The civil war that began in 1991 has not ended, and internal disputes still wreak disastrous consequences on the Somalian people. The federal government lacks widespread support, there is constant political infighting, massive corruption as well as continuing drought conditions and the displacement of millions of Somalians. The government is also inefficient, unable to collect taxes, unable to stimulate economic productivity, and operates on an insufficient government budget.
In the cases of Botswana and Somalia, it can be interesting to consider the similarities and differences that led to present-day outcomes. Although both countries were deeply affected by the Scramble for Africa, one of the key differences may have been the way in which the colonial governments left the respective regions. While the British largely left Botswana to its own devices, Somalia did not have the same luck. Instead, Somalia had been initially dominated partly by Italy and partly by Britain. In time, Somalia was also affected by World War I and World War II in ways Botswana was not. The persistence disruptions and foreign interventions faced by Somalia left it fragile and more difficult to breakaway. Lacking the pre-existing conditions that Botswana benefited from, i.e. its relatively seamless transition to democratic institutions and the benefit of Britain leaving without further exploitation, and having suffering from a number of internal and external issues (e.g. turbulent history, frequently disputed territories, climatic shows disrupting agriculture, disease, and poverty), Somalia is still struggling. In many ways, the latter half of the twentieth century was disastrous for Somalia because the area was considered to be of geo-political importance, particularly during the World Wars and the resulting cold War. The future of Somalia is uncertain, as the region is currently suffering from intense drought conditions in the midst of the ongoing civil war which began in the 1980s. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/03%3A_States_and_Regimes/3.03%3A_Comparative_Case_Study_-_Botswana_and_Somalia.txt |
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Key Terms/Glossary
• Anarchy - defined as a lack of societal structure and order, where there is no established hierarchy of power.
• Absolute monarchy - when the monarch is wholly responsible for all decisions, and rules the state with absolute power over all political, economic and social matters.
• Annex - to take over a region.
• Aristocracy - a form of government where a group of social elites rule the state.
• Authority - defined as having the power to get things done. If we put these two terms together, a state is legitimate in its operations if it has the authority to make decisions and carry out its policy goals.
• Charismatic legitimacy - means that citizens follow the rules of a state based on the charisma and personality of the current leader.
• Civil liberties - defined as individual rights that are protected by law to ensure the government does not unreasonably interfere with certain specific individual rights (e.g. like freedom of speech, religion, assembly, etc.).
• Constitution - a state’s described laws of the land.
• Constitutional monarchy - when a monarch must abide by a state-adopted Constitution, which dictates the scope and depth of its power in all state-related activities.
• Country - defined as a nation, which may have one or more states within it, or may change state-type over time.
• Coup d’etat - an attempt by elites to overthrow the current government of a state through abrupt seizure of power and removal of the government’s leadership.
• Cult of personality - occurs when a state leverages all aspects of a leader’s real and exaggerated traits to solidify the leader’s power.
• Democracy - a political system wherein government is dictated by the power of the people.
• Dictatorship - a form of government where one person has sole and absolute power over the state.
• Feudalism - was a system or social order that arose out of the middle ages, particularly in Europe, wherein peasants (sometimes called Serfs) were forced to provide members of the upper class with their crops, produce, goods as well as their services, fealty and loyalty.
• Hard power - the ability to get others to do what you want using physical and potentially aggressive measures, for instance, like fighting, attacking or through war.
• Junta - a regime type where there is a small, military group of elites who rule state activities.
• Legitimacy - defined as the state’s ability to establish itself as a valid power over its citizens.
• Nation - can be broadly defined as a population of people joined by common culture, history, language, ancestry within a designated region of territory.
• Naturalization - the process by which noncitizens formally become citizens of the country they reside in.
• Oligarchy - a form of government where elites rule, though there is not necessarily an assumption of nobility.
• Personalist dictatorship - where power lies with a single, charismatic and all powerful person who drives all actions of the state.
• Political capacity - the ability of a state to use its power, as derived through authority and legitimacy, to get things done and promote its own interests.
• Power - the ability to get others to do what you want them to do.
• Protectorate - an area or nation that is managed, possessed, controlled and protected by a different state.
• Rational-legal legitimacy - occurs when states derive their authority through firmly established, often written and adopted, laws, rules, regulations, procedures through a constitution.
• Regime transitions - occur when a formal government changes to a different government leadership, structure or system.
• Representative democracy - where the people elect representatives to serve on their behalf to make the laws and rules of society.
• Scramble for Africa - sometimes also called the Conquest of Africa, where Western European powers attempted to control and colonize all parts of Africa.
• Social contract - defined as either a formal or informal agreement between the rulers and those ruled in a society.
• Soft power - the ability to get others to do what you want them to do using the methods of persuasion or manipulation.
• State - defined as a national-level group, organization or body which administers its own legal and governmental policies within a designated region or territory.
• Strong states - are those which are able to work their political agendas effectively, to make sure basic political tasks are completed.
• Traditional legitimacy - occurs when states have the authority to lead based on historical precedent.
• Weak states - are those which are unable to perform basic political tasks, and unable to work the political agenda of the authority in charge. Weak states are typically unable to defend their territories and interests.
Summary
Section #3.1: Introduction to States
A state is defined as a national-level group, organization or body which administers its own legal and governmental policies within a designated region or territory. There has been ample research regarding the formation of states globally, and it is important to be able to distinguish between the terms ‘state,’ ‘country’ and ‘nation’ when discussing state regimes. Social Contract theory is a critical concept in considering state formation because it lays the foundations for why individuals might enter into a ‘social contract’ with government powers. Ideally, the social contract is the mechanism through which individuals surrender some of their individual rights for protections provided by the governmental powers.
Section #3.2: The Modern State and Regime Types
Social contracts and state authority are not the same everywhere. Modern states can fall into the categories of strong and weak states. Strong states are those which are able to work their political agendas effectively, to make sure basic political tasks are completed. Weak states are those which are unable to perform basic political tasks, and unable to work the political agenda of the authority in charge. The difference between strong and weak states can often be delineated through calculating a state’s political capacity. Political capacity is the ability of a state to use its power, as derived through authority and legitimacy, to get things done and promote its own interests.
Section #3.3: Comparative Case Study – States and the Stateless: Botswana and Somalia
using Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), which asks comparativists to consider at least two cases where the cases are similar, but the outcomes from these cases are different, Botswana and Somalia are considered. Overall, although Botswana and Somalia have a number of geographic and historical circumstances in common, the resulting political outcomes were very different. Botswana is considered to have one of the oldest and most stable democracies in Africa, while Somalia does not have a consolidated government authority that has widespread approval of the population. Botswana is recognized as a functional state, whereas Somalia has occasionally been considered stateless, a failed state, or a failing state. One of the features which may have been pivotal in the political outcomes of both Botswana and Somalia is the extent to which external powers interfered with their establishment of government authority. Botswana, though formally annexed by Britain, was able to establish its own government regime, whereas Somalia was considered to be of too much geopolitical importance to be supported in its pathway to eventual independence.
Review Questions
1. Which of the following influential thinkers was NOT a social contractarian?
1. Thomas Hobbes
2. John Locke
3. King George
4. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
2. Which influential thinker did the founding fathers rely heavily on when drafting the U.S. Constitution?
1. Thomas Hobbes
2. John Locke
3. John Stewart Mill
4. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
3. One way to gauge the difference between a strong and weak state is:
1. military strength
2. economic strength
3. political capacity
4. regime type
4. A regime only has a few military officers in charge is a
1. democracy
2. aristocracy
3. anarchy
4. junta
5. Events where a formal government changes to a different government leadership, structure or system is a:
1. Weak state
2. Strong state
3. regime transition
4. consolidated government
Answers: 1.c, 2.b, 3.c, 4.d., 5.c
Critical Thinking Questions
1. What is the “state” and what is its relationship to the social contract? Consider the various ways in which the social contract can manifest to contribute to varying “state” outcomes.
2. How is the strength of a “state” derived? Where does power and strength come from, and describe the difference between weak and strong states. Provide examples.
3. Are some societies better off without the state? Are there circumstances where the formation of a state would be detrimental to some societies? Describe these circumstances.
Suggestions for Further Study
Journal Articles
• Gabriel A. Almond. (September 1988) “The Return of the State,” and replies by Eric A. Nordlinger, Theodore J. Lowi and Sergio Fabbrini, American Political Science Review, vol. 82, pp. 875-901.
• Stephen D. Krasner. (January 1984) “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Comparative Politics, 16, pp. 223-246.
Books
• Martin Carnoy. (1984) Political Theory and the State.
• Mancur Olson. (2000). Power and Prosperity. New York: Basic Books.
• Robert Putnam. (1993). Making Democracy Work. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
• Hendrik Spruyt. (1994). The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton: Princeton University Press. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/03%3A_States_and_Regimes/3.05%3A_Student_Resources.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Define democracy.
• Recognize the origins and characteristics of democracies.
• Distinguish between (the) types of democracy.
Introduction
“Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.…”
— Winston Churchill, November 11th, 1947
More than half of the governments currently in existence operate under some variation of democracy. The global trends towards democratization worldwide during the twentieth century prompted some to conclude that democracy is simply the best, or most ideal, form of government. Indeed, near the end of the twentieth century, political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote a book entitled, The End of History and the Last Man, where he argued humanity had reached the end of history because many countries had adopted forms of liberal democracy. His book was a best-seller which energized many about the prospects of a world which embraces democracy and will not again suffer the likes of major World Wars and conflicts. Twenty years after this publication, however, and in light of events like the September 11th attacks on the United States, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of China, the backsliding of Russia, the COVID-19 pandemic and the eventual fall of Afghanistan back to authoritarian rule, Fukuyama mostly retracted his conclusion that the world had accepted democracy as the standard. Instead, he now asserts that issues related to political identity now threaten the security of geo-political stability. The many challenges facing democracy, democratization, and democratic backsliding (discussed in Chapter 5), prompts us to take a hard look at democracy, its types, its institutions and models, and various manifestations throughout the world. Is democracy the best form of government? What are its advantages and disadvantages?
Francis Fukuyama is an American Political Scientist, economist, and author of books and journal articles. From left to right, his 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, prompted discussion over whether the world had reached the end of history because so many countries had been adopting liberal democracy as their form of government. One of his more recent books, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, came out in 2018, and his conclusions began veering away from the belief that the world had accepted liberal democracy. Instead, political identity and the weight of historical disputes potentially impede global geopolitical potential for long-term peace.
Origins, Definitions and Characteristics of Democracy
Although there is evidence of what anthropologists have designated primitive democracy, wherein small communities have face-to-face discussions in order to make decisions, as far back as 2,500 years ago, the first formal application of democratic institutions and processes is generally attributed to ancient Greece. Athens, Greece is generally credited with being the birthplace of democracy. In its simplest terms, democracy is a government system in which the supreme power of government is vested in the people. Democracy comes from the Greek word, dēmokratiā, where “demos” means “people”, and “kratos” meaning “power” or “rule.” Prior to the formation of legal reforms, Athens had operated as an aristocracy.
An aristocracy is a form of government where power is held by nobility or those concerned to be of the highest classes within a society. Aristocracy proved troublesome for Athens, and the people eventually rallied under an Athenian leader named Solon (circa 640 - 560 B.C.E.). In trying to meet the demands of the people, Solon attempted to satisfy all classes of the Athenian population, rich and poor alike, to devise a form of government which satisfied all. To this end, in 594 B.C.E., Solon created legal reforms and a constitution, which provided the foundations for citizen participation in government affairs, and abolished slavery of Athenian citizens. Under this construct, adult males who had completed their military training were given the right to vote, and as much as 20% of the population was considered to be active in making laws. Eventually, democracy in Athens failed, due to both internal and external factors. Internally, there was heavy criticism that the aristocracy was still in force, and able to pervert and manipulate legal outcomes to their own benefit. Further, the works of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, all of whom were critical of the merits and feasibility of democracy, led to the erosion of trust in democracy in Athens. Generally, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, though they had their own unique critiques of democracy, tended to value political stability over the potential of “rule of the mob.” Externally, and tied to the prospect of political stability, Athens faced frequent challenges to its democracy from the outside. The Peloponnesian War, the changes in leadership from King Phillip II of Macedon and Alexander the Great, and finally, the rise of the Roman Empire, all are also attributed to the eventual decline of democracy in ancient Greece. After the fall of democracy in Greece, the prospect of democracy did not re-emerge as a feasible, or even desired, option until the early modern era in the 1600s.
Ancient concepts and manifestations of democracy differ greatly from modern conceptualization and application of democracy. One of the key differences is in the way power from the people is channeled; the difference becomes apparent in comparing a direct democracy versus an indirect democracy. A direct democracy enables citizens to vote directly, or participate directly, in the formation of laws, public policy and government decisions. In this system, citizens personally get involved in all aspects of politics, and are able to change constitutional laws, recommend referendums and make suggestions for laws, and mandate the activities and actions of government officials. To some extent, Athens exercised a direct democracy in that adult male citizens, who had completed their military training, could participate directly in the making of laws. It was not a 'perfect' democracy in that not all citizens, male and female, rich and poor, could participate, but it did have a mechanism for a certain class of citizen participating, i.e. males. In contrast, indirect democracy channels the power of the people through representation, where citizens elect representatives to make laws and government decisions on their behalf. In this scenario, citizens of the country are granted suffrage, which is the right to vote in political elections and propose referendums. In a healthy democracy, elections are both free and fair. Free elections are those where all citizens are able to vote for the candidate of their choice. The election is free if all citizens who meet the requirements to vote (e.g. are of lawful age and meet the citizenship requirements, if they exist), are not prevented from participating in the election process. Fair elections are those in which all votes carry equal weight, are counted accurately, and the election results are able to be accepted by parties. Ideally, the following standards are met to ensure elections are free and fair:
Before the Election
• Eligible citizens are able to register to vote;
• Voters are given access to reliable information about the ballot and the elections;
• Citizens are able to run for office.
During the Election
• All voters have access to a polling station or some method of casting their vote;
• Voters are able to vote free from intimidation;
• The voting process is free of fraud and tampering.
After the Election
• Ballots are accurately counted and the results are announced;
• The results of the election are accepted / respected / honored.
The integrity of the election is of paramount importance in democracies, for if the process is not found to be free or fair, it violates the core principles of what constitutes a democracy: by the people, for the people.
Indirect democracy is what most democratic countries today practice, partly because of logistics (In the U.S., how would every single adult citizen directly participate in the making of laws? Would requiring a vote for every decision be time efficient?), and to another extent, a question over whether voting is always the best option for determining just, equitable or ideal outcomes. In a representative democracy, citizens, to some extent, outsource the power of lawmaking to those who, ideally, either have expertise in making laws or who may be granted a greater depth of information in order to make decisions.In this sense, not every citizen necessarily wants to be involved in every government decision, but would prefer selecting a representative to getting political work done. Further, although most democratic countries do practice indirect democracy, there are often some mechanisms that align with some characteristics of a direct democracy. For instance, the U.S. has a representative democracy, but voters in some states have the ability to put forth initiatives and referendums, also referred to as Ballot Propositions. Overall, democracy’s definition, if practiced as indirect democracy, can be understood as: a government system in which the supreme power of the government is vested in the people, and exercised by the people through a system of representation which includes the continued practice of holding free and fair elections.
Importantly, democracy has a number of characteristics which can be central to understanding the variation in democracies that exist worldwide today. These differences also highlight the difference between concepts of ancient democracy versus contemporary democracy. Ancient democracy had no concept or foundations for widespread suffrage or the protection of civil liberties. Some of these modern accepted democratic themes include (but are not limited to): free, fair and regular elections (ideally, with the inclusion of more than one viable political party), respect for civil liberties (freedom of religion, speech, the press, peaceful assembly; freedom to criticize the government) as well as the protection of civil rights (freedom from discrimination based on various characteristics deemed important in society). Democracies which not only facilitate free and fair elections, but also ensure the protection of civil liberties are called liberal democracies. Although these are the general themes, there is still ample debate among scholars about the importance and weight of these characteristics. Larry Diamond, an American political sociologist and a scholar of democratic studies, put forth the following four characteristics which make a democracy, a democracy. A democracy must include:
1. A system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections;
2. Active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life;
3. The protection of human rights of all citizens;
4. A rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. (Diamond 2004)
Karl Popper, an Austrian-British academic and philosopher (whom you may recognize from Chapter 2 for his work on the nature of inquiry and the recognition of falsification theory), had a more blunt definition for democracy, “I personally call the type of government which can be removed without violence ‘democracy,’ and the other, ‘tyranny.’ (Popper 2002). Instead of citing specific characteristics of democracy, which Popper was hesitant to do given the wide variation in democracies that exist, he simply contrasted it with outright tyranny. In general, Popper emphasized the importance not in how the people could exercise authority, but that they have access, availability and opportunity, through some means, to control their leaders without violence, retribution or revolution.
Other scholars have noted more rigid qualifications for democracy. In looking at the world of Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro and Jose Antonio Cheibub, all political scientists, they assert that every vote in a representative democracy must carry equal weight, and that the rights of citizens must be equally protected by a well-defined and clear “law of the land;” in most cases, the “law of the land,” rests with a written constitution. The rights and liberties of citizens must be protected by the law of the land. (Dahl, Shapiro, Cheibub, 2003)
Overall, there are hundreds of critiques and frameworks for defining democracies and noting its characteristics, and scholars are generally not in full agreement on what constitutes a perfect democracy. Nevertheless, reaching some consensus on the characteristics is important if scholars want to advance the understanding of regime types like democracy. The difference in perception of democracy can be seen in how some organizations choose to measure democracy across countries. At present, there are at least eight organizations which attempt to quantify the existence and health of democracies worldwide. These eight include: Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit, V-Dem, the Human Freedom Index, Polity IV, World Governance Indicators, Democracy Barometer, and Vanhanen’s Polyarchy Index. In Table 4.1.1, a few of these are highlighted based on what they identify as main characteristics of democracy. This table shows the differences in components considered when trying to measure democracy. From left to right, Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit, and Varieties of Democracy; all are organizations which attempt to determine whether countries are democratic and assess the strength of their democratic institutions.
Table 4.1.1: Measuring Democracy
Index Freedom House Economist Intelligence Unit Varieties of Democracy
Components/ Characteristics Measured
-Elections
-Participation
-Functioning of Government
-Free Expression
-Organizational Rights
-Rule of Law
-Individual Rights
-Elections
-Participation
-Functioning of Government
-Political Culture
-Civil Liberties
-Elections
-Participation
-Deliberation
-Egalitarianism
-Individual Rights
The different organizations, choosing different areas of emphasis and weight for characteristics of democracy, yield different outcomes in terms of identifying whether a country is a democracy, as well as judging the healthiness of a democracy. For instance, as of 2018, the Varieties of Democracies Project finds there are currently 99 democracies, and 80 autocracies. Autocracies are forms of government where countries are ruled either by a single person or group, who/which holds total power and control. For this same time-period, the Polity IV Index disagrees, finding 57 full democracies, 28 mixed-regime types, and 13 autocratic regimes. Importantly, the Polity IV Index does not take suffrage into consideration as a meaningful indicator of democracy. Freedom House also arrives at different outcomes for this same time-period, asserting that 86 countries are democracies, with 109 non-democracies. Finally, the Economist Intelligence Unit found 20 countries to be fully democratic, and 55 countries have “flawed democracies.” Given that scholars and these organizations have acknowledged that different types of democracies exist, it is now useful to discuss these types, as well as the implications for these types on the institution of democracy.
The number of democracies has significantly grown worldwide since 1900. Political scientists have sometimes called jumps in the number of democracies ‘waves.’ In this way, there have been three major waves of democratization: World War I (First wave, 1828-1926), with subsequent “waves” of democratization coming following World War II (Second wave) and the democratic transitions in Portugal, Spain and Latin American in the 1970s (Third wave).
Types of Democracy
The different organizations, choosing different areas of emphasis and weight for characteristics of democracy, yield different outcomes in terms of identifying whether a country is a democracy, as well as judging the healthiness of a democracy. For instance, as of 2018, the Varieties of Democracies Project finds there are currently 99 democracies, and 80 autocracies. Recall, autocracies are forms of government where countries are ruled either by a single person or group, who/which holds total power and control. For this same time-period, the Polity IV Index disagrees, finding 57 full democracies, 28 mixed-regime types, and 13 autocratic regimes. Importantly, the Polity IV Index does not take suffrage into consideration as a meaningful indicator of democracy. Freedom House also arrives at different outcomes for this same time-period, asserting that 86 countries are democracies, with 109 non-democracies. Finally, the Economist Intelligence Unit found 20 countries to be fully democratic, and 55 countries have “flawed democracies.” Given that scholars and these organizations have acknowledged that different types of democracies exist, it is now useful to discuss these types, as well as the implications for these types on the institution of democracy. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/04%3A_Democracies_and_Democratization/4.01%3A_What_is_Democracy.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Distinguish the functions of legislative, executive and judicial branches.
• Define Electoral Systems and Political Parties.
• Determine the implications of political party composition and organization.
Introduction
Aside from considering the variety of ways democracy can manifest across different countries, we can also look at some of the institutions which tend to be common within democracies. In many ways, the institutions described in the first portion of this section (4.2.1) are akin to building blocks; each block has distinct functions, wielding distinct forms of power and operating within what political scientists would call a separation of powers with checks and balances. Separation of powers is a term that divides government functions into three areas: the legislature, tasked primarily with the making of laws; the executive, who carries out or enforces these laws; and the judiciary, tasked with interpreting the constitutionality of laws. These three institutions generally operate under a process of checks and balances, which is a system that attempts to ensure that no one branch can become too powerful.Traces of the historical underpinnings of separation of powers found in the writings of Harrington, Montesquieu among others. Other hallmark institutions of democracies are their electoral systems and the presence of political parties, which are both discussed in the second portion of this section (4.2.2). Electoral systems, simply put, are voting systems; an electoral system provides a set of rules that dictate how elections (and other voting initiatives) are conducted and how results are determined and communicated. Political parties are groups of people who are organized under shared values to get their candidates elected to office to exercise political authority. All of these institutions, taken together, contribute to the many unique democracies that exist today, and require, at the very least, a brief overview to consider their importance and implications to democracy today.
Executive, Legislative and Judicial
While some elements and characteristics of democracy vary, one constant commonality is the separation of powers among institutions within governments. As described above, this separation of powers promotes checks and balances because it provides for power to be spread throughout multiple branches of government with the intention of splitting up power between institutions so that no single branch has too much power but instead empowering all branches with their own institutionalized powers. The three branches of concern include: (1) the legislature; (2) the executive; and (3) the judiciary.
The legislative branch is tasked with performing three main functions:(1) making and revising laws; (2) providing administrative oversight to ensure laws are being properly executed; (3) and providing representation of the constituents to the government. The primary, and most important, function of the legislature is to make laws. Members of the legislature, elected by the people, represent their interests and make laws on their behalf.There are three main types of legislatures worth noting. First, the consultative legislature is one where the legislature advises the leader, or group of leaders, on issues relating to laws and their application. In the consultative legislature, members could either be elected or appointed. Second, the parliamentary legislature is one where members are elected by the people, enacts laws on their behalf, and also serves as the executive branch of government. Finally, the congressional legislature is one where groups of legislators, elected by the people, make laws and share powers with other branches within the government. This latter case is the one utilized in the U.S. In the U.S., Congress’ powers are substantial, especially relative to the other branches of government, when looking at its constitutional mandates. Congress can levy taxes, borrow money, spend money, regulate interstate commerce, establish a national currency, establish a post office, declare war, raise and support an army and navy; establish courts; and pass all laws “necessary and proper” to complete their work. Beyond this, Congress can propose amendments to the constitution and call for a constitutional convention. The Congress could also admit new states to the country. While legislatures can manifest in different ways, the U.S. Congress has two bodies, the House of Representatives, which contains 435 members (representation from states vary based on population size, determined every 10 years by the U.S. census), and the Senate, which contains 100 senators (two for each state). The two most popular types of legislatures are parliamentary and congressional. Interestingly, while most of the legislatures in North and South America are congressional legislatures (with the exception of Canada, which has a parliamentary legislature), European legislatures have tended to be parliamentary. The main difference between parliamentary and congressional systems is in how they structure their power. In the congressional system, power is divided for main functions, but shared for others. In the parliamentary system, the legislative body serves as both the legislative and the executive branches. In this system, the head of government, chosen by whoever the majority political party is at that time, attempts to build a majority group in the legislature to get laws made. If the leader is unable to build coalitions to reach agreements on legislation, laws cannot get made.
Within Democracies, the executive branch is typically made up of a singular leader, a leader with an assistant (vice-president) or a small group of leaders who have institutional powers, and serves as both the head of government and the head of state. In their capacity as head of government, chief executives must run and manage the day-to-day business of the state. As the head of state, the chief executive must represent the country in the global arena, for formal gatherings to dictate policies as well as for ceremonial responsibilities.
The final “building block” of government to identify is the judiciary, in some manifestations called the Judicial Branch, which refers to the part of government where laws can be interpreted and enforced. In some countries, the judiciary is a third branch of government, like in the U.S. In other countries, the judiciary, or its responsibilities of interpreting the constitutionality of laws, is shared with other branches of government. In authoritarian regimes, the judiciary tends to be subservient to the executive and legislative branches. In democracies, the judiciary is one of the divisions which functions to uphold the separation of powers, so that no one branch can become too powerful. In the U.S., the judicial branch is composed of the Supreme Court, the only court mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, and has the sole power of judicial review, which is the ability to interpret the constitutionality of laws, and in doing so, the ability to overturn decisions made by lesser courts when doing so. Interestingly, Thomas Jefferson was against forming a third branch of government tasked with this responsibility, and instead, he wanted the ability to interpret the constitutionality of laws to be held by the legislature. Through the process of debate, Jefferson lost the argument, and a third branch of government was created for this purpose.
Electoral Systems & Political Parties
As described previously, electoral systems, simply put, are voting systems; an electoral system provides a set of rules that dictate how elections (and other voting initiatives) are conducted and how results are determined and communicated. Elections are the mechanism through which leaders get chosen around the world. Rules that are relevant to an electoral system can include those that lay out when elections occur, who is allowed to vote, who is allowed to run as a candidate, how ballots are collected and can be cast, how ballots are counted, and what constitutes a victory. Usually, voting rules are set forth by constitutions, election laws, or other legal mandates / establishments. There are a number of different types of electoral systems. First, the plurality voting system is one where the candidate who gets the most votes, wins. In this system, there is no requirement to attain a majority, so this system can sometimes be called the first-past-the-post system. This system is the system used in the U.S., and it is the second most common election type for presidential elections and elections for legislative members around the world. Second, the majoritarian voting system is one where, as the name suggests, candidates must win a majority in order to win the election. If they do not win a majority, there needs to be a runoff election. Third, the proportional voting system is one where voting options reflect geographical or political divisions in the population to enable a proportional leadership when elected. For instance, if 10% of the population are members of Political Party A, then the country’s legislature will allow for 10% of its membership to reflect this. Finally, some countries employ mixed voting systems, which can combine use of any of the aforementioned election systems, using different systems for different types of elections, i.e. presidential versus legislative.
Political parties also play a very important role, not only in elections, but in how political agenda get accomplished in different countries. Recall, political parties are groups of people who are organized under shared values to get their candidates elected to office to exercise political authority. Political parties can exist as both a label and to indicate group leadership; as a label, individuals label themselves and their core values/priorities when voted and political parties can be used to indicate a group of leaders acting on behalf of the party. At this point, it is interesting to consider political parties in the context of U.S. democracy; American Founders didn’t plan for parties; in fact, they warned against them as deleterious. Edmund Burke’s Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770): parties are good. They protect the people from an abusive monarch or factions (with) in the government. Madison in Federalist 10: definition of faction: “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” Political parties are not altogether helpful in democracies, but can be mitigated by means of an extended political sphere. In other words, if factions must exist, it is better to have too many than too few. That way, as President George Washington stated in his farewell address, myriad factions, and by extension multiple political parties, make it “less likely…that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”
Political parties can lead to observably intense partisanship, measured quantitatively by the lack of compromise between, in the case of the United States, Republicans and Democrats. A prescient example of heavy partisanship now prevalent in US politics can be found in former President Ronald Reagan’s proverbial “11th Commandment” which posited “Republicans should never {publicly} criticize fellow Republicans”. Arguably, the impeachment of former president Bill Clinton and both impeachments of former president Donald Trump all ended with no political consequence. Specifically, while both Clinton and Trump were impeached in the House of Representatives along almost unanimous party lines, neither were convicted in the Senate in what were likewise near unanimous party-line votes. These examples illuminate both the extent to which the members of political parties are willing to pursue political consequences against the opposite party and the rarity of such consequences being applied on their own political party, regardless of the offense. One need to look no further than the aftermath of the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol building in Washington D.C. wherein the only 2 Republican members of the Congressional committee tasked with investigating 1/6/21, Liz Cheney and Adam Kitzinger were both officially censured by their own Republican Party.
There are three different ways in which Katz classifies political parties: number of parties competing; orientation -ideological/national vs. local/service; and internal unity. The number of parties depends upon the electoral formula and the number of deputies from each district. A large-district, proportional representation electoral system generally yields the greatest number of parties. The orientation depends upon the electoral formula. Generally, proportional representation systems yield parties with an ideological orientation. Internal unity also depends upon the given electoral formula. If there are intra-party preference votes (primaries), there is likely to be more internal disunity; particularly, there will be diffused leadership. If resources are so diffused that each candidate must build their own resources and following, then a fractionalized party is likely. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/04%3A_Democracies_and_Democratization/4.02%3A__Institutions_within_Democracy.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Identify the defining characteristics of Presidential, Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems.
• Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages to each of these systems.
Introduction
Within democracy, there are three types of systems which may be present, including: the presidential, the parliamentary and the semi-presidential systems. Each of these systems were designed to fit the context and cultures of their democratic systems, and each has their share of advantages and disadvantages, discussed below.
The presidential system of government, sometimes called a single executive system, is one where the head of government is a president who leads the executive branch of government. The executive branch of government, in this system, is separate and distinct from the legislative branch, to ensure a separation of powers.In countries with presidential systems, the president is the chief executive and is elected into their role. The president, in this system, is not dependent upon the legislature for attaining its position. Presidential Systems like the United States can encounter the problem of the “personalization of power” where vendibility, cronyism and even deinstitutionalization can occur. Parliamentary systems, on the other hand, typically have heads of government and heads of state that are not elected directly. Indeed, parliamentary systems - systems of government wherein the ministers of the executive branch are drawn from the legislature and are accountable to that body - are not so often held captive by personality-driven heads of state as are presidential systems. Thus, certain political personalities such as former president Trump are necessarily more reliant on the personalization of power per se.
In contrast to the presidential system, the parliamentary system, sometimes called parliamentary democracy, is one where the chief executive, usually a Prime Minister, attains their role through election by the legislature. Therefore, in this scenario, Prime Ministers must have the support of the legislature in order to take their office, and they can be pulled at any time by the legislature, should the legislature choose to change leadership. The legislature can vote “no confidence” in the Prime Minister. This model is dynamic and flexible and can respond quickly to lack of consensus. Parliamentary systems commonly have minimum winning coalitions, minimum sized cabinets, oversized minority coalitions that are fragmented requiring constant negotiation within their multiparty system in which there is typically a runoff election between the top two candidates.
Finally, the semi-presidential system, sometimes called the dual executive system, is one where a country has both a president and a prime minister and cabinet. The president, in this scenario, comprises the executive branch and needs to be elected by the population, whereas the Prime Minister is elected through the legislature and, with their cabinets, help perform the functions of the legislative branch.
Table 4.3.1: Advantages & Disadvantages of Presidential, Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems
Presidential System Parliamentary System Semi-Presidential System
Advantages
1. Fixed term
2. Popularly elected
3. Unipersonal leadership
1. Head of government is dependent on legislative approval
2. Easier to remove the head of government by legislative will
3. Collective leadership is present (with)in cabinet
1. For its parliamentary functions, Parliament has the ability to remove an unpopular prime minister, especially if the prime minister and the president are not working cooperatively
2. Division of work between prime minister and the president decreases the amount of bureaucracy.
Disadvantages
1. Deadlock within executive branch of government
2. Temporal rigidity, fixed term, can’t get them out easily (has never happened in US history)
3. Winner-take-all is an exclusive form of representative government, thus “third parties” are left with very little chance at victory
1. Instability in Head of Government
2. Head of Government is not elected directly by the people
3. No separation of powers per se between Head of government and Legislative body
1. Tends to favor the president, not the prime minister
2. Confusion over who is responsible for what
3. Potentially inefficient or ineffective legislative process
Each of these systems have potential pros and cons. The presidential system may be considered ideal in some circumstances because the chief executive has fixed terms of office. Fixed terms can produce stability and enable voters to understand the timelines of leadership. At the same time, the fixed term may be a disadvantage if there is an unpopular president, but no reasonable way to pull the president from their role. To remove a president from office, for instance, in the U.S., the legislature would have to follow the 25th Amendment to the Constitution, which describes and lays out the process for removing a president from power. This process is far more cumbersome than parliamentary systems which can remove a prime minister from power at any time, and for any reason, by getting majority consensus among the legislators. The nature of the prime minister role within a parliamentary system could also simultaneously be considered both a pro and a con. It can be to the advantage of the legislative branch to remove a prime minister if they are unpopular and/or not completing their political agenda. At the same time, changes in leadership can cause instability and uncertainty, which could be seen as a disadvantage. Finally, the semi-presidential system has some unique advantages and disadvantages. It could be seen as an advantage to have a president, in charge of head of government activities, and a prime minister, in charge of head of state activities. Here, there is a division of labor which can decrease the level of bureaucracy in both the executive and legislative branches. At the same time, semi-presidential systems can be non-ideal in that roles can be confused, and the president tends to have the advantage over a prime minister because the former has fixed terms while the latter can be pulled from office at any time. Overall, the system of government chosen is designed to fit the culture and context of the country’s democracy, and the characteristics of each of these systems can be seen as advantages or disadvantages depending on the unique circumstances. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/04%3A_Democracies_and_Democratization/4.03%3A_Systems_of_Democracy.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Define democratic consolidation.
• Identify characteristics of democratic consolidation.
• Recognize modern theories of democratic consolidation.
Introduction
Democratization, also referred to as democratic consolidation, is a type of regime transition whereby new democracies evolve from fledgling regimes to established democracies, making them less at risk to fall back into authoritarian regimes.When a democracy becomes consolidated, scholars expect that it will endure. Transitions of regimes from non-democratic, to democratic, to consolidated democracies are of major interest for scholars. A regime itself can be defined as a system in which a particular administration, system, or prevailing social system or pattern retains power and domestic (but not necessarily international) legitimacy. Regime transitions are not the same as government changes, but are instead broader political conversions, which mean that governmental changes can occur within a given regime without creating a true regime transition.
As defined in Chapter Three, a regime transition occurs when a formal government changes to a different government leadership, structure or system. According to comparative scholar Stephanie Lawson, it is a substantial change in the form of governance of countries, involving shifts from one type of regime to another, such as a shift from a socialist to a democratic form of rule (Lawson, 1993). Ronald Francisco (2000) argues that regime change is, at its core, a political event, meaning that the changes which occur center around political issues. The most important result of regime transitions for comparativists include the new constellation of rules, institutions, and authority that are established or develop(ed) over time. While there is certainly not unanimous consensus among scholars on how to pinpoint precisely when a regime transition has concluded, most agree that the establishment and legitimization of a national constitution is often indicative of such a change. Regime transitions have been studied at length, with attention paid to the quality of democracy that is established, and whether democratic institutions become stronger over time.
Many scholars assert that democratic consolidation occurs when the regime transition to democracy has ended, and further, that the qualities that led to the regime transition may not be the same qualities required to make a democracy endure.
Many scholars assert that democratic consolidation occurs when the regime transition to democracy has ended, and further, that the qualities that led to the regime transition may not be the same qualities required to make a democracy endure. At this point it is critical to ask, what are the indicators of a consolidated democracy? In other words, how do we know when a democracy is consolidated or not?
Two potential indicators of consolidation that have been put forth include the two-election test and the longevity test. On the former point, the two-election test, also known as the transfer of power test, is what it sounds like: democracy is consolidated when a government which had been freely and fairly elected is defeated in a subsequent election and the election outcome is accepted by both sides. The peaceful transition of power is critical in any democracy, so in a way, this test makes sense. At the same time, this test is not without its flaws. What if a country has a dominant party system wherein the same political party seems to be elected to power over and over again? Does that mean democracy is not consolidated? If that’s true, then a number of democracies in existence would be excluded from being considered consolidated. The second test to consider would be the longevity test. In this test, if a country has been able to hold free and fair elections for an extended period of time, perhaps over two decades, then perhaps the democracy is consolidated. Here too, there are problems. Maybe elections can be held over time, but the continued elections simply benefit one party. This is to say, the longevity of a regime may not translate into the quality of a democracy. Beyond this, longevity gives no indication, in and of itself, that democracy, if it exists, will continue to be high quality. We will have difficulty gauging whether democracy is in danger of backsliding into authoritarianism.
Since it can be difficult to solidify exact indicators for what constitutes a consolidated democracy, it may also be helpful to consider some theories of democratic consolidation. Below are a few of the theories that have been proposed regarding the likelihood of a democracy of becoming consolidated.Importantly, the below list of theories is not a complete one, there are dozens of theories about what circumstances or conditions best lend to a consolidated democracy.
Theory 1
The regime type that existed prior to the democracy will affect whether a country can experience a consolidated democracy.
While there have not been any extensive studies demarcating the types of preceding regimes that may lend towards democratic consolidation, this theory tends to be considered from time to time. The idea of this theory is that there will be some types of regimes that, prior to becoming democracies, may be better suited to eventually become consolidated democracies. In this vein, if the previous regime had any democratic characteristics, whether these were partially free or fair elections. If there were any institutions that were representative of the people, perhaps these regimes will eventually have a higher likelihood of consolidating. On another point, if there is a deeply embedded military dictatorship preceding a democracy, perhaps it will have more difficulty eventually becoming a democracy. Perhaps the people will be fearful of the regime backsliding into a military dictatorship. Perhaps this will limit the opportunities to fully democratize over time. Some authors have argued that it does not necessarily matter what the regime was prior to the transition, what is important is that there was an established state which had some form of legitimacy. To this end, Benthem wrote: “A 'state' which is incapable of enforcing any effective legal or administrative order across its territory is one in which the ideas of democratic citizenship and popular accountability can have little meaning.” (Beethem, 1994 pg. 163)
This theory is difficult to test, though not impossible. Case Studies, combined with the medium to large N, could add to the field. The main challenge in a quantitative study would be finding ways to quantify the various aspects of previous regimes.
Theory 2
The type of transition that occurs will affect whether a country can experience a consolidated democracy.
Does the circumstances under which the regime transitioned to democracy matter? Are there certain types of transition to democracy which may later inhibit its ability to consolidate? There has been a lot of consideration of this theory. Huntington and Linz put forward options for the circumstances that are most conductive and least conducive to democratic consolidation. For instance, if the transition to democracy was imposed by external forces, this may not be a positive indicator for eventual consolidation. There’s also the possibility of an authoritarian regime initiating a change to democracy, which may or may not lead to long term democratic processes. Finally, there’s the option of the regime transition being initiated by groups within the society. Some have argued that democracies have a better chance of success if it is the people who demand the change, and the change is not imposed from external or authoritarian forces.
Theory 3
The chances of democratic consolidation improve with economic development.
Some have argued that states need a free market system in order to experience democratic consolidation, and further, that economic growth is a catalyst for consolidation. This dovetails with modernization theory, which says a country will improve its processes towards modernizing because there could be economic and/or political benefits in doing so. Beethem described the general thoughts behind this theory when he wrote:
… a market economy disperses decisional and other forms of power from the state. This serves the cause of democracy in a number of ways: it facilitates the development of an autonomous sphere of 'civil society' which is not beholden to the state for resources, information or organisational capacities; it restricts the power and scope of a bureaucratic apparatus; it reduces what is at stake in the electoral process by separating the competition for economic and political power into different spheres. (Beethem, 1994 pg. 164-165)
Overall, if a state is willing/able to promote a free market with fair competition, it loosens its grasp on an institution which it may have the power to control, but chooses not to. In choosing not to control all market outcomes, the state is more likely to experience economic growth. There also tends to be a general argument that the more the economy improves, the more citizens within a state can experience prosperity and begin to engage in political life.
Theory 4
Some religions will deter or not support democratic consolidation.
This theory has been a controversial one, and has not aged well. Historically, there have been a number of political science articles which argued along the lines that sociologist Max Weber did, namely, arguing that countries which were primarily Protestant had better opportunity to democratize than, for instance, Catholic states. The reasoning here was that Protestants, according to Weber, were more accepting of individual responsibility, were focused on productive work, and were non-conformists. Later, this theory can sometimes be used to make it sound like certain religions are simply incapable of democratization, and this theory does not have solid grounding or support. While this theory has been largely revoked, it is still important to consider this theory as many authors, like Samuel Huntington, made arguments to this end.
Overall, new theories of democratic consolidation have emerged over the last few decades, and there is not yet consensus among scholars about what conditions and theories tend to have the greatest credence. That being said, regime transitions to democracy and the process of democratization likely rest on a variety of factors which need to be considered: historical context, political culture, identity politics, class structures, economic structures, institutions, types of government structure and constitution types. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/04%3A_Democracies_and_Democratization/4.04%3A_Democratic_Consolidation.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Compare and contrast South Africa and Iraq’s regime transitions.
• Identify internal and external factors which contributed to regime transition in South Africa and Iraq
Introduction
Samuel P. Huntington, a political scientist at Harvard University, popularized the concept of waves of democracy. Waves of democracy are moments in history when multiple countries transition to democracy during the same time period. Often, waves in democracy are attributed to the combination of internal and external factors facing countries. Internal factors can include societal rejection of authoritarian regimes resulting in decreased legitimacy, economic growth, which may help countries modernize and improve institutions which support education and the working class, and changes in how religion and religious traditions factor into political institutions. External factors can include regional and global pressures. Regional pressures, for instance, may occur if/when citizens observe other societies transitioning towards democracy and want the same governmental changes for their own countries. Global pressures could manifest because of globalization, as there is more global news and information available to citizens in different countries. With more information and exposure to new ideas, citizens may begin to question the legitimacy and basis for their own country’s government. Although the concept of waves of democracy helped political scientists to group and compare trends in democratization abroad, much remains to be understood about how and why countries decide to transition to democracy, as well as how successful these transitions are.
The movement from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes between the 1970s and 1990s, referred to as the Third Wave, initially garnered great hope worldwide. This hope was reflected in Fukuyama’s book arguing that humanity had reached the ‘end of history’ by beginning to universally accept democratic regimes, institutions, and ideas. Forty years later, however, a number of the countries which initially moved towards democratization have experienced disparate outcomes. It has been argued that most countries which attempted to democratize during and following the third wave simply became semi-authoritarian regimes or flawed democracies. It is in this context of global patterns of democratization that we look at the cases of South Africa and Iraq. Through the lens of Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), this case considers the similarities in South Africa and Iraq’s moves to democratize while also considering how their political outcomes have differed.
South Africa
Full Country Name: Republic of South Africa
Head(s) of State: President
Government: Parliamentary Republic (Unitary dominant-party / executive presidency)
Official Languages: 11 Official languages
(English, Zulu, Swazi, Afrikaans, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Xitsonga, Xhosa,
Tshivenda, isiNdebele)
Economic System: Mixed economy
Location: Southern Africa, at the southern tip of the continent of Africa
Capital: Pretoria
Total land size: 1,219,090 sq km
Population: 56.9 million
GDP: \$680.04 billion note
GDP per capita: \$11,500
Currency: Rand
Like Botswana and Somalia in Chapter 3, South Africa’s history is marked by frequent interventions and occupations by foreign powers through colonialism and imperialism. British and Dutch powers, attempting to expand their empires and grow their influence, colonized parts of South Africa at various points between the 1600s and 1800s. By the early 1900s, there was growing internal demand for South Africa to be independent from Britain. Multiple wars leading up to the 1900s, including the Boers Wars, contributed to deep racial divides between black and white citizens. White South Africans demanded independence from Britain, which eventually culminated in the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. The Union of South Africa modeled its government structure after the British system, but had a British leader installed as a ceremonial head of state. Full independence was achieved in 1931, giving South Africa’s government the ability to act outside of, and without permission from, the UK.
Although South Africa’s government had hallmarks of democratic government, like three branches of government operating with checks and balances, its legacy of colonialism and racial divide made democratization difficult. Under British rule, a number of laws promoted segregation and the disenfranchisement of nonwhite citizens. Following World War II, a political party called the National Party stoked fears within the country that significant growth in the nonwhite population of South Africa was a threat. The National Party won the majority votes in the 1948 election and implemented a system of apartheid. Apartheid is defined as a system of governance wherein racial oppression is institutionalized. In the case of South Africa, this meant laws were implemented to ensure that South Africa’s minority white population could dominate all political, social and economic factors within the country for their own benefit. Apartheid in South Africa resulted in, among other things, the segregation and displacement of nonwhites into segregated neighborhoods and the prohibition of interracial marriage and relationships.
Despite fierce criticism from the United Nations and global community, South Africa’s system of apartheid until 1991. In the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa experienced intense internal strife as clashes between those who supported the National Party, and those who opposed apartheid, deadly violence. The main opposition to the National Party, the African National Congress (ANC), worked to bring down South Africa’s system of apartheid. The ANC, having been forced into exile for many years, used a variety of tactics to force pressure upon the National Party, including using guerilla warfare and acts of sabotage. Eventually, the National Party and the ANC began meeting to negotiate a way forward. The outcomes of these negotiations was the abolishment of apartheid and, in the coming years, the election of the first democratically elected President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela.
Nelson Mandela was a member of the ANC who had been imprisoned for 27 years prior to his release in 1990. Under his leadership as President of South Africa, he oversaw the drafting of a new constitution which, in tandem with solidifying various democratic principles, heavily emphasized racial equality and the protection of human rights. Mandela saw it as his personal mission to heal the racial divides within the country, and formed a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was tasked with investigated crimes committed both by the government led by the National Party under apartheid, as well as the crimes committed by the ANC. Though it can be difficult to quantify, the commission was widely held as an important factor towards moving the country forward and focusing on improving the present challenges.
Mandela stepped down as the President of the ANC in 1998, and retired from politics in 1999. Although Mandela made strides in improving domestic conditions, including investing in education, welfare programs, and the protection of workers and prominent industries, a number of challenges remained that still challenge South Africa today. South Africa continues to struggle with racial tensions, as well as persistent xenophobia due to large influxes of legal and illegal migrants. One of the major criticisms of Mandela’s term in office is his failure to fully address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. For many years, the HIV/AIDS pandemic was so severe in South Africa that the average life expectancy was only 52 years. Failure to provide a strategic approach to combat the pandemic led to decades of poor health outcomes within South Africa.
For many years, South Africa’s transition to democracy was heralded as a victorious example of democratization. Nevertheless, current challenges to South Africa’s democracy include corruption, enduring racism, and increased rates of femicide and gender-based violence. Each of these realities has contributed to the Economist Intelligence Unit labeling South Africa as a flawed democracy. Recall, flawed democracies are those where elections are free and fair, and basic civil liberties are protected, but issues exist which may hamper the democratic process. It is worth briefly considering South Africa’s current challenges regarding corruption, racism and gender-based violence below.
Corruption is, at best, damaging to democracy and, at worst, fatal to democracy. Corruption can erode the public’s trust in the government and its institutions, exacerbate inequality and poverty, and hinder economic development. In 2021, high-ranking political officials in South Africa faced allegations of corruption for misusing billions of dollars of foreign aid targeted towards COVID-19 relief. The government officials charged with corruption are undergoing investigations for their misuse of funds, particularly in allowing various private companies to exorbitantly price gouge the government. There are additional allegations of government corruption, particularly in the favoring of some private companies over others. Corruption within a country can also yield skepticism and condemnation from the global community, as trading partners may lose trust in conducting business with corrupt regimes.
Racism, too, can present threats to democracy. Failure to protect civil liberties and civil rights within a country can create illiberal or flawed democracies. Ongoing structural racism can exacerbate societal tensions and perpetuate violence. Unfortunately, racism is still an ever present force in South Africa. The last two decades have seen ongoing allegations of police and military forces engaging in racist activities. During COVID-19, a number of Black South Africans were killed by police officers violently enforcing lockdowns. Frequent instances of violence against Black citizens has prompted recurrent conversations over the implementation of hate crime legislation as well as appropriate rules for conduct regarding the use of force on citizens.
Finally, data has shown continued increases in femicide and gender-based violence. Here again, democracies that are unable to protect civil liberties and civil rights of their citizens risk backsliding or inability to ever fully consolidate. To this end, equal protection of women under South Africa law is questionable. As of 2019, it was reported that 51% of women in South Africa experienced some kind of physical violence as a result of their gender. Violence towards women, which was already elevated prior to the pandemic, continued to increase during the COVID-19 lockdowns.
Iraq
Full Country Name: Republic of Iraq
Head(s) of State: Prime Minister
Government: Federal Parliamentary Republic
Official Languages: Arabic & Kurdish
Economic System: Mixed economy
Location: Middle East, bordering the Persian Gulf, between Iran and Kuwait
Capital: Baghdad
Total land size: 169,235 sq mi
Population: 40 million
GDP: \$250.070 billion
GDP per capita: \$4,474
Currency: Iraqi Dinar
Iraq formed in the wake of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The Arab people of the regions of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra fought with the British to gain their independence. However, this did not quite happen. While Iraq was nominally independent, the country had signed an agreement with the British that gave them power over major segments of the country. British imperial authorities controlled the newly formed kingdom’s military and foreign affairs and had major influence over its domestic political and economic affairs. In 1921, Britain established King Faysal Il as ruler of Mesopotamia and officially changed the name to Iraq, which means “well-rooted country” in Arabic. Many Arabs in the region saw Iraq as an artificially created country, established by British authorities to maintain power in the region. As a result, many people saw the country, and its newly installed royalty as illegitimate.
The British remained in Iraq for the next three decades, with military bases, transit rights for troops and eventually British control over the growing oil industry. Still, the question of illegitimacy never left. King Faysal and his family were able to stay in power until 1958, when the grandson, Faysal II was overthrown in a coup. The coup was led by a general that belonged to the Ba’athist Party. The Ba’athist Party was a transnational Arab political party that espouses pan-Arab nationalism and socialist economic policies. The party came to power in Iraq and Syria, but also exerted some power in Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya. After some turmoil between the Ba’athist party and the Iraqi military, the country eventually came under the command of Saddam Hussein. Hussein, who ruled until he was overthrown and executed during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, was from a mostly Sunni tribe in Tikrit, a city north of Baghdad. His reliance on members of his tribe and the city, which were a minority group in the country, contributed to the eventual violence that would follow the 1991 Gulf War.
After fighting Iran for 8 years to a stalemate in the Iran-Iraq War, the country found itself in debt to its neighbors, particularly Kuwait, located to the South. Kuwait itself had been a thriving autonomous trading community for centuries. Similar to Iraq, the British curried favor with the ruling as-Sabah family and eventually took control of their military and foreign affairs. Iraq historically claimed Kuwait as its 19th province, believing that the British had unfairly kept it from them. The debt burden and the geopolitical advantage of Kuwait’s geography led Hussein to invade and annex the country in 1990. The US and a coalition of allies invaded Kuwait and Southern Iraq the next year. Coalition forces routed Iraq forces and heavily bombed Iraq. In 1992, the US set up two ‘no-fly zones’ in the country to protect the Kurds in the north and the Shi’a in the south, who had rebelled against Hussein’s rule. A no-fly zone is when a foreign power intervenes to prevent that country or another country from gaining air superiority. The intervening power must be willing to use their military to prevent certain aircraft from flying over an established area.
The no-fly zones and ensuing UN embargo on Iraq greatly weakened the Hussein regime. However, the incoming US Bush administration strongly believed that Iraq was in the process of developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration pushed to invade Iraq a second time. The US invaded in 2003, without much world support. Coalition forces captured Hussein later that year. He was put on trial, found guilty of crimes against humanity and was executed in 2006. During this time, a fact-finding mission found that there was no identifiable WMD program. They were, in the words of the official Presidential Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, “dead wrong.”
The US invasion and Hussein’s fall had a dramatic effect on Iraq. Chaos ensued. The US was not ready to govern the country. Millions were displaced within Iraq and millions more fled the country as violence spiked. Long-simmering sectarian and ethnic disputes erupted in a full-fledged civil war and insurgency. Shi’a militias were unhappy about American military rule. Sunni tribes were fearful of reprisals. The Kurdish minority in the northern part of the country sought independence. Remnants of the Ba’athist party loyal to Hussein mostly folded into al-Qaeda in Iraq, which bitterly fought US forces in several major battles, including Fallujah. American soldiers were caught in the middle of a conflict where peace was elusive. Eventually, a surge of US troops in 2007 provided enough security to allow the country to stabilize and US forces finally withdrew from Iraq in 2011.
In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a successor terrorist group to al-Qaeda, rapidly grew into a massive presence in the region. Starting in Syria, ISIS took advantage of the security vacuum and moved into Iraq. ISIS surprisingly captured Mosul, considered the second largest city in the country. The terrorist organization used the revenues from the nearby oil fields to finance their violent activities. ISIS quickly expanded to other countries and committed a series of terrorist attacks in Europe. However, by the end of 2017, ISIS had lost 95% of its territory. A combination of Russian-led Syrian forces and US-led Kurdish forces, who sometimes worked together, defeated ISIS on the battlefield.
The majority Shi’a had always chafed under Hussein’s rule. His departure meant that the Shi’a would gain political power for the first time in centuries. A transitional Iraqi Governing Council led to democratic elections in 2005, where a religious Shi’a party won the plurality of seats under Nouri al-Maliki. al-Maliki remained as prime minister until 2014, where he governed a tenuous coalition and had been accused of protecting Shi’a militias. al-Maliki also forged closer ties with neighboring Iran, much to the chagrin of the American authorities. In addition, Iraq Kurdistan declared independence in 2017. The referendum results were rejected by the Iraqi parliament, and Turkey vehemently opposed the move. Kurdistan is still part of Iraq, though the region effectively functions as an independent country.
Today, Iraq is a tenuous confederation of three major groups, Sunni Arabs in the west, Kurds in the north and Shi’a Arabs in the central and southern parts of the country. The current prime minister is supported by the majority political bloc led by Moqtada al-Sadr. He comes from a powerful political family in Shi’a politics and is a major power broker in the country. Iraq also has a president, who is elected by the Iraqi parliament and has a largely ceremonial role. Mostly the country is run through a sectarian apportionment system, muhasasa taiifia in Arabic, where the country is structured amongst the three major sectarian identities. Initially, the US supported this sectarian approach to the country. US forces have had a close relationship with the Kurds since the early 1990s and Iraqi Kurdistan has become a relatively peaceful and prosperous region. However, sectarianism is what also led Iraqi Shi’a to look to Iran for leadership and what led Sunni Arab tribes to become receptive to first al-Qaeda and the ISIS overtures. How long will it take for Iraq to consolidate as a democracy? That question remains unanswered for now. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/04%3A_Democracies_and_Democratization/4.05%3A_Comparative_Case_Study__South_Africa_and_Iraq.txt |
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Key Terms/Glossary
• Apartheid - defined as a system of governance wherein racial oppression is institutionalized.
• Aristocracy - a form of government where power is held by nobility or those concerned to be of the highest classes within a society.
• Autocracies - forms of government where countries are ruled either by a single person or group, who/which holds total power and control.
• Ba’athist Party - a former transnational Arab political party that espouses pan-Arab nationalism and socialist economic policies.
• Checks and balances - a system that attempts to ensure that no one branch can become too powerful.
• Congressional legislature - one where groups of legislators, elected by the people, make laws and share powers with other branches within the government.
• Consultative legislature - where the legislature advises the leader, or group of leaders, on issues relating to laws and their application.
• Democracy - a government system in which the supreme power of government is vested in the people.
• Democratic consolidation - a type of regime transition whereby new democracies evolve from fledgling regimes to established democracies, making them less at risk to fall back into authoritarian regimes.
• Direct democracy - a government system that enables citizens to vote directly, or participate directly, in the formation of laws, public policy and government decisions.
• Elections - the mechanism through which leaders get chosen around the world.
• Electoral - an adjective which means relating to elections or electors.
• Electoral democracy - a form of representative democracy where political leaders are elected through an election (electoral) process to exercise political power and manage the basic tasks of government operations.
• Electoral systems - also known as a country's system of voting; an electoral system provides a set of rules that dictate how elections (and other voting initiatives) are conducted and how results are determined and communicated.
• Executive branch - typically made up of a singular leader, a leader with an assistant (vice-president) or a small group of leaders who have institutional powers.
• Fair elections - those in which all votes carry equal weight, are counted accurately, and the election results are able to be accepted by parties. Ideally, the following standards are met to ensure elections are free and fair.
• Free elections - those where all citizens are able to vote for the candidate of their choice. The election is free if all citizens who meet the requirements to vote (e.g. are of lawful age and meet the citizenship requirements, if they exist), are not prevented from participating in the election process.
• Flawed democracies - those where elections are free and fair, and basic civil liberties are protected, but issues exist which may hamper the democratic process.
• Head of government - refers to the chief executives who must run and manage the day-to-day business of the state.
• Head of state - refers to when the chief executive must represent the country in formal gatherings as well as for ceremonial responsibilities.
• Hybrid regimes - those where democracy is touted to exist, but elections may not be free or fair, and government functioning is poor.
• Illiberal democracies - those regimes where elections occur, but civil liberties are not protected.
• Indirect democracy - channels the power of the people through representation, where citizens elect representatives to make laws and government decisions on their behalf.
• Judicial review - is the ability to interpret the constitutionality of laws, and in doing so, the ability to overturn decisions made by lesser courts when doing so.
• Judiciary - refers to the part of government where laws can be interpreted and enforced.
• Legislative branch - tasked with performing three main functions: (1) making and revising laws; (2) providing administrative oversight to ensure laws are being properly executed; (3) and providing representation of the constituents to the government.
• Majoritarian voting system - an electoral system where candidates must win a majority in order to win the election. If they do not win a majority, there needs to be a runoff election.
• No-fly zone - when a foreign power intervenes to prevent that country or another country from gaining air superiority.
• Parliamentary legislature - where members are elected by the people, enacts laws on their behalf, and also serves as the executive branch of government.
• Parliamentary system - sometimes called parliamentary democracy, a system of government where the chief executive, usually a Prime Minister, attains their role through election by the legislature.
• Plurality voting system - an electoral system where the candidate who gets the most votes, wins. In this system, there is no requirement to attain a majority, so this system can sometimes be called the first-past-the-post system.
• Political parties - groups of people who are organized under shared values to get their candidates elected to office to exercise political authority.
• Presidential system - a system of government, sometimes called a single executive system, where the head of government is a president who leads the executive branch of government.
• Primitive democracy - small communities have face-to-face discussions in order to make decisions.
• Proportional voting system - an electoral system where voting options reflect geographical or political divisions in the population to enable a proportional leadership when elected.
• Semi-presidential system - sometimes called the dual executive system, a system of government where a country has both a president and a prime minister and cabinet.
• Separation of powers - a term that divides government functions into three areas: the legislature, tasked primarily with the making of laws; the executive, who carries out or enforces these laws; and the judiciary, tasked with interpreting the constitutionality of laws.
• Suffrage - the right to vote in political elections and propose referendums.
• Waves of democracy - moments in history when multiple countries transition to democracy during the same time period.
Summary
Section #4.1: What is Democracy?
Democracy is a government system in which the supreme power of government is vested in the people. Democracy has a number of characteristics which can be central to understanding the variation in democracies that exist worldwide today. These differences also highlight the difference between concepts of ancient democracy versus contemporary democracy. Ancient democracy had no concept or foundations for widespread suffrage or the protection of civil liberties. Some of these modern accepted democratic themes include (but are not limited to): free, fair and regular elections (ideally, with the inclusion of more than one viable political party), respect for civil liberties (freedom of religion, speech, the press, peaceful assembly; freedom to criticize the government) as well as the protection of civil rights (freedom from discrimination based on various characteristics deemed important in society). Democracies which not only facilitate free and fair elections, but also ensure the protection of civil liberties are called Liberal Democracies. Some of the different types of democracy include: Liberal Democracy, Electoral Democracy, Semi-Democratic Regimes, Flawed Democracies, Hybrid Regimes, and Illiberal Democracy.
Section #4.2: Institutions within Democracy
While some elements and characteristics of democracy vary, one constant commonality is the separation of powers among institutions within governments. This separation of powers promotes checks and balances because it provides for power to be spread throughout multiple branches of government with the intention of splitting up power between institutions so that no single branch has too much power but instead empowering all branches with their own institutionalized powers. The three branches of concern include: (1) the legislature; (2) the executive; and (3) the judiciary. Other hallmark institutions of democracies are their electoral systems and the presence of political parties.Electoral systems are voting systems; an electoral system provides a set of rules that dictate how elections (and other voting initiatives) are conducted and how results are determined and communicated. Political Parties are groups of people who are organized under shared values to get their candidates elected to office to exercise political authority. All of these institutions, taken together, contribute to the many unique democracies that exist today, and require, at the very least, a brief overview to consider their importance and implications to democracy today.
Section #4.3: Systems of Democracy
Within democracy, there are three types of systems which may be present, including: the presidential, the parliamentary and the semi-presidential systems. Each of these systems were designed to fit the context and cultures of their democratic systems, and each has their share of advantages and disadvantages. The Presidential System of government, sometimes called a single executive system, is one where the head of government is a president who leads the executive branch of government. the Parliamentary System, sometimes called parliamentary democracy, is one where the chief executive, usually a Prime Minister, attains their role through election by the legislature. Semi-Presidential System, sometimes called the dual executive system, is one where a country has both a president and a prime minister and cabinet.
Section #4.4: Democratic Consolidation
Democratization, also referred to as democratic consolidation, is a type of regime transition whereby new democracies evolve from fledgling regimes to established democracies, making them less at risk to fall back into authoritarian regimes.When a democracy becomes consolidated, scholars expect that it will endure. Two possible conditions of democratic consolidation have been considered, including the two-term test and the longevity test, though both of these lack substantial evidence. In the absence of confirmed conditions, a number of theories exist as to why some democracies are able to consolidate, and some are not.
Section #4.5: Comparative Case Study – Pathways to Democratization: South Africa & Iraq
Both South Africa and Iraq experienced journeys toward the destination of democracy, but with differing success in means and ends. While the countries of Iraq and South Africa differ in a multiplicity of ways, there remain viable similarities in the past and present of the two states which allow for a candid academic assessment of the reasons for and nature of the regime transitions.
Review Questions
1. In its most basic form, liberal democracy involves
1. Economic advantage
2. Social mobility
3. Free and fair elections & the protection of civil liberties
4. None of these
2. Which part of an election is important to look at when determining if an election is both free and fair?
1. Before the election
2. During the election
3. After the election
4. All of the above are correct
3. When a democracy becomes undemocratic, it is called:
1. A flawed democracy
2. A hybrid regime
3. Democratic backsliding
4. Autocracy
4. Groups of people who are organized under shared values to get their candidates elected to power are
1. Juntas
2. Electorates
3. Selectorates
4. Political Parties
5. The three branches of government are:
1. The electorate, the legislative and the judicial
2. The judicial, the executive and the political parties
3. The electoral system, separation of powers, and the legislative
4. Legislative, Executive and Judiciary
Answers: 1.c, 2.d, 3.c, 4.d., 5.d
Critical Thinking Questions
1. What are common characteristics of Democracy? What variations of democracy emerge out of these characteristics?
2. What are the differences between democracies, semi-democracies and authoritarian regimes? How can you recognize the difference between these regimes?
3. What is the relationship between voting and democracy? Is the characteristic of suffrage a critical component? (Consider, for instance, that the Polity IV measurement of democracy does not include a measurement for suffrage. What are the implications for democracy if suffrage is not included in its characteristics?)
Books
• Dahl, R. A. (1998) On Democracy. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
• Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Francisco, Ronald (2000) The Politics of Regime Transitions. Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/04%3A_Democracies_and_Democratization/4.07%3A_Student_Resources.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Recognize this subset of regimes in the world
• Understand differences between non-democracy and democracy
Introduction
There exists a rich vocabulary for referring to non-democracies, past and present. Scholars have employed terms such as dictatorship, tyranny, monarchy, oligarchy, and totalitarian regime, among others, to describe this kind of political system. All of these, and many more, fall under a broad umbrella of regimes that can be described as non-democratic. At its broadest, non-democracy refers to all forms of government which deny citizens meaningful institutional channels for making choices about their collective well-being. This can range from limited to no ability for public input in the selection of political leaders and limited to no decision-making power over the allocation of public resources.
Non-democracies are quite diverse, even more so than democracies, and this variety extends across time and space. While there are 'varieties of democracy' ranging from liberal to social democratic, with different institutional configurations such as presidential and parliamentary, across democracies there exist common principles such as divided government and accountability to the people. All democracies have electoral systems, an executive, legislature, and judiciary. Non-democracies, in contrast, do not have any common organizational features; instead, they run the gamut from rule by a single person with minimal institutionalization to complex bureaucratic systems under collective leadership. In this sense, non-democracies are a much broader and confounding collection of countries to study.
Empirically, non-democracies are also distinct from democracies in important ways. Non-democratic regimes are much more variable in their economic performance (Gandhi 2008). Many have swung from extreme levels of nationwide poverty to becoming economic dynamos, presenting sustained economic growth rates unseen in recorded human history. This would be the example set by China from 1978 to 2020. In a reversal of this pattern, the kingdom of Chad and post-independence state of Chad (1960-present) made the dramatic turn from a major trading empire during the ninth through nineteenth centuries to becoming one of the poorest sub-Saharan countries in Africa today. Non-democracies appear to experience deeper economic troughs and higher economic highs than their democratic counterparts.
While there exist many varieties of non-democracy, a subject taken up later in this chapter, all non-democracies share several overriding characteristics. These relate to accountability, competition, and freedom. Let’s take up each of these in turn.
Accountability
Political accountability has many dimensions. Most critically in democracies, it exists between public officials and the public via the institution of free and fair elections. Accountability exists via other channels, such as through the free flow of information about political decisions and developments in a society. A free and independent media can ensure this flow of information, along with monitors within government. Accountability also exists when different branches of government can check each other, for example through vetoes, court rulings, and divided authority.
In a non-democracy, some or all of these forms of accountability are compromised: elections are rigged or don’t exist; the media is muzzled or state-owned; government exists to carry out the will of an unchecked political elite. All non-democracies restrict channels for accountability of political authority(ies) to the governed. Take the example of Saudi Arabia. This kingdom is one of the few remaining absolutist monarchies in existence today, and all political authority lays with the Al Saud royal family. The Saudi king is the leader of this family, and he is also head of state and head of government of Saudi Arabia. There is no legislature to pass laws in Saudi Arabia, and Saudi citizens do not elect representatives or otherwise have institutional channels for providing input in the national policy-making process. In this polity, the ruling Al Saud family is not accountable to the Saudi people.
Competition
Separate but related, non-democracies have limited to no competition for political office. This may mean the absence of political parties, as in the case of Saudi Arabia. Some non-democracies allow limited competition for public office, which was the case in Mexico under PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional). PRI controlled Mexican political life for 71 years and was famously described by novelist Mario Vargas Llosa as “the perfect dictatorship” because it managed to remain the ruling party of Mexico for decades despite the existence of opposition parties. These opposition parties began to win elections in the 1980s and, in 2000, PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) presidential candidate Vicente Fox won national elections and overturned decades of single-party rule in modern Mexico. Political parties are one way to observe the degree of competition in a political system, and they are a proxy for a deeper and more meaningful competition of policy ideas. This competition of ideas is a critical marker of the debate, dissent, and diversity that characterizes a democratic system.
Freedom
Non-democracies lack a commitment to individual freedom, which is a hallmark of modern democracy. While democracies have many institutional channels for individual voice -- elections and independent media are key examples -- these are often manipulated or censored in a non-democracy. To justify the abrogation of individual freedoms, non-democracies may promote alternate values such as the importance of order and hierarchy over individual will or the need to subsume the individual to larger collective will (as mediated by those in power).
To capture these many aspects of non-democracy, across countries and within a country over time, there exist different measures. One measure can be found in the Polity Project (now in its fifth iteration), which examines aspects of a political system such as whether there is competition for executive positions and unconstrained participation in the political system. Polity scores for many countries around the world have been tracked from 1800 to the present; this data is publicly available and can be downloaded for analysis. Another popular measure of regime type is provided by Freedom House, a non-profit organization based in Washington, DC, that has tracked levels of political freedom and civil liberties in countries around the world since 1972. Freedom House scores, world maps, and reports are publicly available for download. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/05%3A_Non-Democracies_and_Democratic_Backsliding/5.01%3A_What_are_non-democracies.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Evaluate various institutional strategies by which non-democratic regimes remain in power
• Analyze cultural and ideological explanations for the persistence of non-democratic regimes
Introduction
All regimes possess a variety of means for staying in power. One common heuristic for thinking about these tools is through a simple “carrots versus sticks” breakdown of regime strategies. Carrots take the form of inducements or benefits that are doled out to gain the loyalty of constituents. Sticks are focused on meting out punishments as negative reinforcement of the rules.
One additional tool to add to the mix of carrots and sticks is propaganda. Governments may also expend resources to shore up their legitimacy in the minds of citizens, for example through sophisticated propaganda bureaucracies or control of information flows to the people. Here the term propaganda is used to refer to biased information communicated to convince audiences of a particular political view. Deploying propaganda is neither a carrot nor stick – or perhaps it is a bit of both – but rather a powerful means to control people’s perceptions and thoughts. Propaganda, as an ideational strategy, is in a category of its own, and especially powerful when it can draw on existing cultural foundations in a society.
All regimes utilize a mix of carrots, sticks, and ideas to stay in power. Many of the strategies reviewed in this section will have versions in democracies and non-democracies. For example, internal investigative bureaucracies, such as the Ministry of State Security in China, have counterparts in democracies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States. Similarly, virtually all countries in the world, regardless of regime type, have police for maintaining domestic order. It is not the case that non-democracies are repressive while democracies are not. But compared to democracies, non-democracies are relatively unconstrained in their ability to use force or manipulate information in order to ensure compliance with their rule. The lack of robust accountability mechanisms in non-democracies is a crucial difference in how public institutions are managed and the scope of their authority.
Institutional channels
Regimes are most likely to endure when they build and maintain institutions. Institutions here refers to shared practices, norms, and organizations which exist beyond any single individual. One shorthand way for thinking about institutions is that they are the “rules of the game” for all social life. Institutions structure the way we do things and organize our interactions with others. They are the source of a great deal of social and political power. This is in part because resources follow from beliefs. Take the institution of the state. The state is one of the most powerful institutions in the modern world today. The beliefs and norms surrounding states, which are shared globally, confer great power on states. States manage nuclear arsenals, squeeze taxes from billions of citizens, and manage the global flow of trade and finance.
Because of the power of institutions, regimes have an interest in institutionalizing their rule. This highlights another feature of institutions. Institutions relate to each other in many ways: they can reinforce each other, be nested in one another, and one institution can beget another. Regimes are institutions unto themselves. Supporting regimes, in turn, are many additional institutions. Regimes invest in institutions that enable them to stay in power, which means that these institutions both absorb and disperse resources.
Let’s start with institutional carrots. Nondemocracies have in place a variety of institutions that provide positive inducements for supporting the regime. We will define and examine three of these: institutions for co-opting opposition, patronage networks, and clientelism. Each of these is distinct but can overlap with the others.
Institutions for co-opting opposition
All non-democracies face the problem of an opposition which might oust them from power. To blunt the force of an opposition, or even vocal critics with a following, a regime might invest in institutions which have the appearance of democratic representation. These include rigged elections, legislatures, courts, and the like. These institutions are actually “window dressing” or façades for a tightly controlled political system. Judiciaries in these systems are not independent, nor do they provide a meaningful check on the authority of rulers. Many nondemocratic regimes have in place legislatures, but these legislatures lack authority to veto measures passed by those in power. Examples abound in the highly authoritarian Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea. North Korea has been ruled since the 1950s by a single Supreme Leader, yet formally it has a unicameral legislature. This Supreme People’s Assembly comprises nearly 700 deputies and in theory confers authority on the Supreme Leader. However, DPRK’s Supreme Leader makes all governance decisions for the country and does not face any threat of veto by this unicameral legislature.
Opposition parties or critics of the regime might agree to sit on such bodies as a means to have access to and possibly influence political leaders. They may also benefit materially from legislative or judicial seats, for example drawing a salary or receiving other perks of office such as a chauffeured car or swanky office. Note that co-opting opposition through such institutions can serve the ruling regime in multiple ways. They can boost the legitimacy of the rulers in the eyes of the public. They also allow rulers to more closely monitor the positions and ideas of opposition, which might then be countered or even adopted as appropriate.
Patronage networks
All politics hinge on relationships and the flow of resources. Patronage networks are relationships within political systems in which one party with access to resources distributes those resources to those within their network. Within a patronage network are reciprocal bonds that unite members of the network. A leader might take a portion of oil revenues and distribute those monies to their deputies scattered throughout the provinces; those deputies make sure that the leader’s posters are prominently displayed in every local government office.
Patronage networks may be organized via many different kinds of organizations or social groups. Political parties are one way to distribute public resources in exchange for political obedience. Other major state organizations, such as the military or state-owned businesses are also sites for building patronage networks. Non-state organizations may be part of patronage networks, such as businesses or business associations. Identity groups, including those bound by ethnicity or tribe, may be the basis of patronage networks. The latter is evident in Syria, where major institutions of the state are controlled by the Alawite minority, a Shia Muslim group that is less than one-fifth of Sunni Muslim-dominated Syria. Alawite networks support the ruling al-Assad family.
Broad-based clientelism
Related to but separate from patronage networks are institutions that promote clientelism on a broad scale. Clients are those who rely on a patron for resources; clientelism is a strategy whereby rulers seek to buy off the loyalties of broad swaths of the population. To do so, rulers may invest in social programs in which they mark clearly their sponsorship of these programs to the masses. Such broad-based distribution of resources has the effect of turning significant parts of a country’s population into clients, or dependents, of the regime.
One place where we see this kind of broad-based clientelism was in Mexico under the rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (or Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) during much of the twentieth century. PRI was in power in Mexico from 1929 to 2000. Under the PRI presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), social programs were consolidated under a new government organization called Pronasol. Pronasol distributed government funds to poor communities to build public works such as schools, health clinics, water treatment facilities, and electric grids. This organization reflected the national ambitions and reach of PRI: at its height, there were nearly 250,000 Pronasol committees at the grassroots level to carry out community projects in collaboration with community leaders. The results are impressive: renovations of 130,000 schools, creation of 1,000 rural medical units, and plumbing access for 16 million Mexican residents (Merrill and Miró eds. 1996). Looking back on this ambitious program, it represented a broad-based means to build support for PRI rule throughout the country and especially in the countryside.
Next, let’s turn to institutional sticks, or strategies of repression. There are a variety of repressive means by which nondemocratic regimes extract obedience from the population. These include the creation of domestic security bureaucracies and paramilitary groups.
Domestic security apparatuses
Nondemocracies are the creators of the modern secret police, beginning with the creation of the Cheka under Lenin, which became the NKVD – internal secret police – under Stalin. It is now the KGB in today’s Russia. The Cheka was the model for many other secret police that were created in Italy and Germany, to name some familiar examples. These institutions can serve critical purposes, from collecting intelligence on potential dissent within a country to terrorizing citizens.
One nondemocracy which has developed sophisticated means for surveilling its population is China. Since 2010, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has spent more on domestic security than external defense. A vast network of surveillance programs exist throughout the country, including “Sharp Eyes” (xueliang) a project announced in 2015 that mandated video surveillance of all public spaces in the country by 2020. Sharp Eyes included nonstop video feed of public squares, intersections of major roads, public areas in residential neighborhoods, and transit stations, to name a few. It also included monitoring of buildings such as the entry points of radio, TV, and newspaper offices. This video capability is combined with additional technologies such as facial recognition.
Paramilitaries
Another powerful instrument of repression are paramilitaries. These refer to groups with access to military-grade weapons and training, yet they are not part of the national military. They are “irregular armed organizations that carry out acts of violence against civilians on behalf of a state,” (Üngör 2020). Paramilities have been deployed by governments around the world, and they are an additional institutional layer of terror over citizens. Death squads are one kind of paramilitary employed by governments to carry out extrajudicial murders, usually of political enemies of the state. One tragic example of mass killing carried out by death squads can be found in Indonesia. During the height of the Cold War in the mid-1960s, Indonesian death squads were responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians believed to have leftist sympathies.
Taken together, nondemocratic leaders possess a variety of means, both persuasive and coercive, to enforce their rule. These include positive inducements that can be narrow or broad in scope. Coercive institutions, such as secret police and paramilitaries, offer an institutionalized means for nondemocratic leaders to maintain their monopoly on the use of violence over their societies.
Cultural and ideological controls
Another powerful way to maintain authority is to convince people to believe in the legitimacy of nondemocratic rule. This is in some ways the most efficient way to stay in power because it preempts resistance. Nondemocratic leaders thus invest in creating strong ideational foundations for their rule. These ideas may derive selectively from deeper cultural traditions in a society – including those linked to faith traditions – or from the dissemination of nondemocratic ideologies to the masses.
Undemocratic concepts such as hierarchy and unaccountable authority are embedded in many cultural traditions. Monarchies of Europe and empires of the Americas were supported by ideas focused on the divine right of rulers. Virtually all major religions of the world promote authoritarian and undemocratic systems of governance and social order, from the rigid patriarchy of the Roman Catholic church to the castes of Hinduism. Several East Asian societies – in China, Korea, and Japan, to name a few – have strong Confucian influences. Confucius, a scholar of antiquity, argued that the hierarchical relationship between ruler and ruled was one of several hierarchical relationships that constitute an orderly society. This supplemented the idea that Chinese emperors possessed the mandate to rule “all under heaven” (tian xia). To this day, Chinese leaders draw from Confucius’ writings to argue for a “harmonious society” in which dissent is culturally frowned upon.
One ongoing debate is whether “persistent authoritarianism” is an inevitable consequence of certain cultural traditions. The evidence on this count is that undemocratic cultural elements are not necessarily barriers to eventual democratization. Arguments were proffered for the incompatibility of democracy and Islam, or democracy and Confucianism, for example. Yet there are many examples of modern democracies that have emerged out of these anti-democratic cultural traditions. Turkey and Indonesia are examples of Muslim-majority democracies, while Korea and Japan demonstrate that societies with Confucian influences can become robust democracies.
Beyond cultural traditions, certain powerful political ideologies support nondemocratic rule. Two of these are communism and fascism. Countries organized according to these ideologies have been uniformly undemocratic and lack mechanisms of accountability between ruler and ruled in addition to basic freedoms for citizens. Communist countries have been led by a “dictatorship of the proletariat” in the process of dismantling capitalism and building the socialist society that is meant to precede transition to communism. Fascist countries are characterized by extreme social hierarchies and control of all aspects of society by the ruling party.
A more narrow tool employed by nondemocratic leaders to remain in power is the creation of a cult of personality. Remember from Chapter Three, a cult of personality occurs when a state leverages all aspects of a leader’s real and exaggerated traits to solidify the leader’s power. Drawing upon institutions such as propaganda bureaus and state control of media channels, a cult of personality creates the illusion of mass support for – even adulation of – the ruler. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was famous for creating such a cult around his personal rule, and this was taken to new heights by other twentieth century rulers such as China’s Mao Zedong and Romania’s Nicolae Ceaușescu. Fanning a cult of personality is a powerful way to create emotional links between citizens and ruler. A cult of personality also creates the appearance of invincibility on the part of the ruler, which can serve to stave off challenges to their rule. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/05%3A_Non-Democracies_and_Democratic_Backsliding/5.02%3A_Strategies_for_staying_in_power.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Identify different kinds of non-democratic regimes
• Recognize examples of different non-democracies in the world, past and present
Introduction
Given the diversity of regimes that are commonly labeled ‘non-democracy’, one first cut at analytical clarity is devising a typology to categorize different non-democracies by their essential characteristics. Typologies offer a powerful means for thinking analytically about a group, by dividing it into subgroups based on certain criteria. This section will explore a few of the major types of non-democracies that exist in the world, past and present.
A typology of non-democracies
Creating a typology is an important descriptive exercise. It helps to establish the “lay of the land” and distinguish key characteristics of items within a category. Typologies can be a helpful first step for further analysis. After dividing non-democracies into types A, B, C, and D, for example, a researcher can then ask deeper questions such as: Which type of non-democracy lasts longer, on average? Which type tends to fall into conflict or remain at peace for longer stretches of time? Which enjoys more economic stability? Do types tend to cluster in certain regions of the world?
Typologies of non-democracies are an example of a nominal measure of regime type. That is, the items in this typology are not ranked, or ordinal, in relationship to one another. Rather, this typology presents a nominal measure, where non-democracies are divided into sub-groups based on certain characteristics. These sub-groups are sorted based on the two characteristics identified below but there isn’t a hierarchy between groups.
Typologies present challenges. Since most things in the social world are dynamic, a typology may work for a certain period of time but then fail to capture changes such as the emergence of a new type or expiration of old types. The rise of modern fascist and communist regimes in the twentieth century prompted some scholars to argue that a new type of non-democracy, totalitarianism, had arisen. To this day scholars debate whether totalitarianism is a useful term.
A second challenge is one of fit. Some observations may not slot neatly into the types offered by a given typology but rather combine characteristics of two or even more types. This kind of combination is observable in the real world of non-democracies. It highlights how types within our typology of non-democracies are not mutually exclusive: one country may fit several types or change types over time.
In short, typologies are grounded in certain underlying characteristics that divide a group into subgroups. Typologies are dynamic and can shift with changes in those underlying characteristics of the category being observed. New types of non-democracies are identified over time, scholars argue that they have identified something distinct, and a new type may eventually become widely accepted by specialists and more casual observers. Illiberal or hybrid regimes, which will be discussed below, is one example of this phenomenon.
There exist many typologies for dividing up the diverse countries classified as non-democracies in the world. The typology presented here provides analytical leverage for thinking about variation within this regime type. Our typology of non-democracies depends on two qualitative factors, namely, leadership characteristics and sources of legitimacy. Leadership focuses on questions such as whether the core leadership comprises one or several people. Beyond how many people are in power, there are further questions about leadership characteristics: Are civilians or the military in power? Do the leaders all come from a certain institution, such as a political party or religious group? A second major consideration focuses on the foundations of regime authority: What are the animating ideas that lend legitimacy to the regime? Is the regime guided by a religion or a particular ideology?
When considering these two sets of factors, leadership characteristics and bases for regime legitimacy, we can focus on five major types of non-democracy in the world today. These are theocracies, personalist regimes or monarchies, single-party regimes or oligarchies, military regimes, and hybrid or illiberal regimes. Table 5.3.1 summarizes these types.
Table 5.3.1: Types of non-democracies based on leadership characteristics and sources of legitimacy
Type of non-democracy Leadership characteristics Sources of legitimacy
Theocracy Single leader or collective rule Religious texts
Personalist or monarchy Single leader Variable: Religion, charisma, tradition
Single-party rule or oligarchy Collective rule Variable: Religion, political ideology such as communism, fascism
Military rule Variable: Single leader or collective rule, all military Variable: Religion, political ideology, beliefs about military competence
Illiberal regime Variable Variable, but all have a veneer of liberal democracy
Theocracy
Theocracies are as old as organized religion. Many theocracies are non-democracies in which the authority of political leaders is grounded in a sacred text. These texts provide divine legitimacy to political leaders, who are not accountable to the public. Within theocracies, political institutions are organized in accordance with prescriptions in a sacred text, notably executive office, the legal code, legal system, and schools. Some current non-democratic theocracies are those organized around Islam, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Vatican, another non-democratic theocracy, is organized around Roman Catholicism.
Personalist rule and monarchy
Non-democracies characterized by personalist rule are led by a single leader. That leader may derive their legitimacy from a variety of sources. These include the personal charisma of that leader or their ability to serve as a convincing interpreter of a political ideology for all of society. An example of the former is Idi Amin of Uganda (r. 1971-1979), and an example of the latter is Fidel Castro of Cuba (r. 1959-2008). Some personalist leaders come to power through family dynasties, such as the al-Assad family in Syria. In all of these cases, personalist leaders are not subject to formal mechanisms of accountability.
Personalist rule is often combined with other types of non-democracy, for example a charismatic leader may rely upon the organizational heft of a ruling party or the military to remain in power. Idi Amin was a commander in the Ugandan army; Fidel Castro commanded the formidable organizational apparatus of the Communist Party of Cuba and Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces.
Personalist rule tends to be unstable due to problems of succession. A personalist ruler might be hesitant to designate a successor because that successor then has incentives to depose them from power. But if a successor is not designated, then instability is likely to set in upon the ruler’s death.
A monarchy is similar to personalist rule in that there is a single leader, but the bases of legitimacy tend to be grounded in tradition or sacred texts. The Vatican City, introduced previously as a theocracy, is also self-described as an “absolute monarchy” because it is led by a pope. The Kingdom of Bahrain is an example of a constitutional monarchy and has been led by the Al-Khalifa family since 1783.
Single-party rule and oligarchy
In contrast to personalist rule, single-party rule and oligarchies are shaped by collective leadership. Oligarchies are an older form of nondemocratic collective rule. In these systems, elites control political office and national resources and are not accountable to the public for their actions. The Roman Republic was a kind of oligarchy in that only the very wealthy could hold high political office. Political scientist Jeffrey Winters has theorized that there are two key dimensions to oligarchies. First, the wealth of oligarchs is difficult to seize and disperse. Second, their power extends systemically, across the entire regime (Winters 2011). In the contemporary world, some have pointed to Russia as subject to a great deal of political influence by oligarchs, though it is not formally an oligarchy.
The overriding characteristic of single-party rule is leadership by members of a political party. Prominent examples include the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1917-1991) and the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) of Mexico (1929-2000). The latter is especially interesting because PRI rule took place in an environment of multi-party competition, but the competition was so skewed in favor of the PRI that Mexico was subject to single-party rule for decades. A ruling party may have a clear guiding ideology, such as communist parties of the twentieth century, or instead be similar to the political parties that we see in the United States: organizations for selecting political talent and unifying political elites.
Single-party regimes can be quite stable. For this reason, single-party regimes have been on the rise worldwide since the 1970s (Figure 5.1). Over the period 1972 to 2005, non-democracies led by a ruling party increased from 60 percent of all non-democracies to 85 percent.
Today one of the most powerful countries in the world, the People’s Republic of China, is an example of single-party rule. Political leadership over the billion-plus people of China resides in the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, a body comprising around twenty individuals. Within the Politburo is the Politburo Standing Committee, a body typically comprising between seven and one dozen high officials; from this inner group emanate all major decisions guiding contemporary China.
Military rule
Military rule is characterized by military elites, rather than civilians, running the government. There are various reasons why militaries rise to political power in a society. One is that they possess the material means – the weapons and organizational capacity – to seize control over a society. On the demand side, a population might support military rule because of popular perceptions of the competence of the military, especially if there are charismatic or well-known generals leading the military. In some cases, the military might appear to be a particularly stable and orderly institution during a time of political turmoil. This in turn may appeal to certain segments of society (such as economic elites, who especially value stability) or entire war-weary societies.
There exists a continuum for thinking about the role of militaries within a polity. On one end of this continuum, developed democracies are grounded in civilian control of the military. In the example of Canada, the commander-in-chief of the Canadian military is the Canadian monarch.The reverse, total military control over the civilian population, falls on the opposite end of this continuum, and in these nondemocratic situations the military is not accountable to the public, even for gross human rights violations. Burma is a prominent example of a country which has been subject to repressive military rule for significant chunks of its post-colonial independence since 1948. The Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw, appeared to allow some liberalization and turn toward civilian leadership during the 2010s, but in the 2020s it has again asserted control over the country and its political apparatus.
Military rule rose and fell in frequency during the twentieth century. In the post-World War II period, military regimes peaked at 40 percent of all nondemocracies in the world, then fell to approximately 15 percent of nondemocracies worldwide by the turn of the twenty-first century (Gandhi 2008).
Illiberal and hybrid regimes
The idea of an illiberal regime – that is, one that mixes characteristics of liberal democracies but is decidedly illiberal in other respects – emerged in the twentieth century when it became clear that many aspiring democracies born immediately after the end of the Cold War (1989-1991), from Romania to Kazakhstan, were sliding into nondemocratic habits. Even more, this seemed to be a trend affecting many young democracies that had emerged even earlier in the twentieth century.
An illiberal regime might have multiple political parties, a partially free media, and partially free and fair elections. Institutions that are central to a liberal democracy are, in an illiberal context, weak and subject to manipulation by those with economic power and political influence. In an article exploring the rise of this form of government Fareed Zakaria observed that, “Far from being a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many countries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism,” (Zakaria, 1997, p. 24). In short, illiberal democracies exist in an in-between zone where there are nondemocratic institutions or practices in place, yet also some of the markers of democracy. One open-ended question is whether illiberal democracy will remain a distinct status for many countries for long stretches of time or whether they will trend more decisively toward either non-democracy or democracy.
Hybrid regimes are separate but related to illiberal regimes. The category of “hybrid regime” is an acknowledgement that many of the types of nondemocracies described previously are “ideal” types and many nondemocracies combine features of more than one type. North Korea is an example of a “triple hybrid” – a combination of a single-party system led by a personalist leader (from the Kim dynasty) with a politically powerful military. China under President Xi Jinping may be moving toward a hybrid of personalist rule and single-party rule.
Table 5.3.2 offers a summary of the different types of nondemocracies explored in this section, dominant characteristics, and some examples.
Table 5.3.2: Types of nondemocracies, distinguishing characteristics, and examples
Type of Nondemocracy Dominant Characteristics Examples
Theocracy Rule by religious elite in accordance with sacred texts Iran, 1979-present
Personalist rule and monarchy Rule by a single individual; in the case of a monarchy, the monarch derives legitimacy from tradition
Idi Amin of Uganda, 1971-79
Kingdom of Bahrain, 1971-present
Single-party rule and oligarchy Collective rule by a group of elites, in the case of single-party rule via the ruling party
Soviet Union under the CPSU, 1917/22-1991
Mexico under PRI, 1929-2000
China under the CCP, 1949-present
Military rule Rule by military elites
Burma, 1962-2011
Venezuela, 1899-1945, 1948-1958
Illiberal regime Veneer of liberal democratic institutions that are subverted by political elites Russia, 1991-present
Hybrid regime Some combination of the above types North Korea, 1948-present | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/05%3A_Non-Democracies_and_Democratic_Backsliding/5.03%3A_Varieties_of_non-democracy.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
• Evaluate indicators of democratic backsliding
Introduction
The twenty-first century has been marked by a weakening of democratic institutions in many once-robust democracies. This is not a new trend. The history of modern democracy is littered with examples of countries which adopted representative democracy or liberal republicanism, only to return to a non-democratic form of government. Democratic backsliding is when a country becomes more illiberal and undemocratic over time. This can take the form of weakening electoral systems and attenuation of the rule of law, repression or infringement of civil and political liberties, and corrupt governance that enjoys weakening accountability. Importantly, democratic backsliding is often gradual and protracted, which makes it difficult to identify. This also presents challenges for those who might wish to stop the backsliding because there are sometimes only smaller or subtle shifts that might not be cause for alarm by a critical mass of democrats within a society. While regime change from democracy to nondemocracy can happen via spectacular and sudden events such as a coup or revolution, democratic backsliding is more insidious and stymies those who might want to organize to combat it.
There are many reasons for democratic backsliding, and in this section we will explore three major explanations: institutional, cultural, and international factors.
Institutional Explanations
Certain institutions render a country more vulnerable to nondemocratic rule. Presidential systems are famously unstable (Linz, 1990). They tend to centralize power in a single individual, and there are fewer mechanisms in place to check that individual from abuse of office. Compared to a parliamentary system, where executives are appointed by the legislature and subject to no confidence votes, presidents are relatively difficult to dismiss before they complete their term of office. During this time, they may opt to abuse their power or degrade the democracy in significant ways.
Countries which lack strong institutions of accountability, such as independent judiciaries and independent anti-corruption bureaus, are also more susceptible to democratic backsliding. When courts do not check those in power, and there is only weak rule of law, then serious and flagrant abuse of public office is more likely. Significant and pervasive corruption – defined as misuse of public resources for private gain – can also degrade a democracy, both in practice and in the legitimacy of that regime. Well-resourced, robust anti-corruption bureaus or inspectors general are an important bulwark against this kind of internal decay.
Another major institution which can threaten a democracy is a politically motivated military. When a military is subject to weak or inadequate civilian oversight, it can become a politicized actor and even seize control, culminating in nondemocratic military rule. Building a professional military which is focused on its security responsibilities and ability to prevail in complex military operations, rather than be tempted by political power, is a deep ongoing challenge for many governments.
Cultural Explanations
Popular and elite beliefs in the appropriateness of democratic rule can shape political outcomes. When there are strong democratic norms in place, this takes on a self-perpetuating quality in which a society supports and reinforces democratic practices and institutions. Yet democratic “habits of the heart” can take long periods of time to mature and gain a taken-for-granted status in a society. Civic education can play a role in this endeavor, especially education that addresses liberal values such as liberty, fairness, representativeness, and accountability. When people in a society think critically about where authority and power should rest in their society, and believe that they are empowered to challenge nondemocratic rule, this can offer a deep societal buffer against democratic backsliding.
Charismatic, autocratic leaders can gain a national following and move a democracy toward non-democracy. Such leaders may call upon a variety of tactics to gain a mass following. Many of these strategies might appeal to cultural faultlines or vulnerabilities within a society. An aspiring autocrat might make populist appeals to in-group grievances and label an out-group as the culprit. They might appeal to nationalist ambitions or exploit ethnic divisions. They might present themselves as messengers with a holy message. They might offer promises of a return to a golden past or golden future. Such autocratic leaders take a variety of forms, but one common goal is a degrading of democratic institutions in order to consolidate power in non-democratic forms of governance.
One chilling example of this interplay between culture and political leadership can be found in the breakup of Yugoslavia during the 1990s. In the early years of the republics that formed after the collapse of communist Yugoslavia, one fiery Serb nationalist named Slobodan Milošević argued that a newly independent Serbia should reclaim territories once occupied by the Serb nation. His calls fell on fertile nationalist ground, which intersected with religious and ethnic faultlines in these Slavic territories. Milošević, who was elected president of Serbia during the 1990s, was a major political leader and instigator during a brutal civil war that ensued between former republics of Yugoslavia. He was eventually indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Bosnia Herzegovina.
International Factors
A country may be susceptible to democratic backsliding as a result of international factors. These can include “neighborhood effects”: if a country resides in a region where countries are trending non-democratic, or if there is a high regional concentration of non-democratic regimes, it is more likely to become a non-democracy. Conversely, a neighborhood which is pro-democracy, such as the European Union, can pull countries in the direction of embracing democracy.
International pressures for a democracy to backslide can be carried out via technological means. New information and communication technologies encourage countries to defy geographical constraints and reach into target countries to wage influence campaigns. These influence campaigns serve to undermine democratic governments around the world through the dissemination of misinformation via social media platforms and the internet. This kind of sharp power tactic is a means to destabilize democracies by sowing division within populations and undermining democratic institutions such as the free flow of information and electoral integrity. | textbooks/socialsci/Political_Science_and_Civics/Introduction_to_Comparative_Government_and_Politics_(Bozonelos_et_al.)/05%3A_Non-Democracies_and_Democratic_Backsliding/5.04%3A_Democratic_backsliding.txt |
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