chapter
stringlengths 1.97k
1.53M
| path
stringlengths 47
241
|
|---|---|
External Media:
HBO Films (2010), ‘Temple Grandin’
This film is available via HBOMax, Amazon Prime, or DVD purchase.
5.02: Activities
Discussion Prompt: ‘Temple Grandin’ Reflection
Watch the film ‘Temple Grandin’ (2010). Consider the experiences of Temple Grandin at school and through her diagnosis portrayed in the film. How would these things be different based on specific legislation that is now in place? Be sure to include specific examples from both the film and laws.
Discussion Prompt: Full Inclusion Discussion
There is a strong national debate regarding whether or not full inclusion, which refers to placing all students with disabilities in a general education classroom all the time, is appropriate or not. As a future teacher, where you do land on this issue? How do you feel about full inclusion? What concerns would you have about incorporating students with disabilities into your classrooms? What do you think is best for these students? Why do you think many in the Deaf community would oppose full inclusion?
Written Response: Reflection Paper Topics
1. It can be difficult for people without disabilities to fully understand the challenges many people with them face on a daily basis. To help you understand this, go to the following website (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/misunderstoodminds/attention.html) and complete the visual or auditory activity relating to attention problems. Then, respond to the following questions. Which activity did you complete? What were your impressions? How would having this type of disability make school challenging? How would this make social relationships challenging? Have you ever experienced a disability first-hand? If so, what was it and what are the major challenges you remember? If not, how do you think this activity changed your perception? Why is it important for teachers to understand the perspectives of students with disabilities?
2. Most of us take for granted our ability to come and go as we please and have access to any place we wish to go. As you go about your schedule the next couple of days consider the following: How accessible are the places you go to people in wheelchairs, blind, or hearing-impaired? What areas are not available to individuals with disabilities? How would accessibility limit their participation in activities that you regularly participate in? How could these areas be made more accessible to individuals with disabilities?
Accommodation or Modification?
Based on the information presented in class, read the following scenarios and decide whether the situation is describing an accommodation, modification, neither, or both.
1. Jack has been diagnosed with an auditory processing disorder and has an IEP. His case worker has recommended that his teacher have noise cancelling headphones available for him to wear while working on assignments and taking exams.
2. Rhonda was recently ill with the flu and missed two weeks of school. She has arranged for later due dates on class assignments with her teachers to give her additional time to complete her work.
3. Ramon has a visual impairment that makes it difficult for him to see written text at fonts smaller than 18 point. His teachers make copies of all class handouts and exams at the larger font so that he will be able read them.
4. Stephanie is a Type I diabetic. She needs to keep food with her in class in order to help control her varying blood-sugar levels. Her teachers need to assure she has the opportunity to eat or drink during class as needed.
5. Yang has a developmental delay and requires extra assistance on tests. In the past, his teachers have reduced the number of multiple choice options from four to three, and he has had the exams read aloud to him in a separate classroom.
6. Malika has historically struggled to keep up in her math classes. Her teacher has another student take notes for her to help give additional academic support as she works.
7. Joey has downs syndrome and his parents want him to be in as many regular education classes as possible. In his food and nutrition class, the teacher helps him to learn to make a peanut butter and jelly sandwich while other students practice baking cookies.
5.03: External Readings and Resources
Blanchett, W. J. (2006). Disproportionate Representation of African American Students in Special Education: Acknowledging the Role of White Privilege and Racism. Educational Researcher, (6). 24.
In this article, Wanda Blanchett describes the intersection of racial and class differences between teachers and students as it impacts special education referrals. Her findings about the disproportionate placement of African American, particularly male, students offer a challenge and call to action to reform current placement policies. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Exploring_Socio-Cultural_Perspectives_in_Diversity_(Cozart_et_al.)/05%3A_Special_Needs/5.01%3A_Media.txt |
External Media:
TED Talk, Jose Vargas, ‘Actions are illegal, never people’
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Independent Lens Film, ‘Precious Knowledge’Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Independent Lens Film, ‘Precious Knowledge’
6.02: Activities
Discussion Prompt: Impressions of Immigration
Using a photo compilation application (like Pic Stitch or Pic Jointer, which are free apps to download), create a photo collage of a minimum of three pictures that represent things that shape your views of immigration. These can be images that come to mind when you think of immigration or images that represent things that have helped form the way you consider immigration today. Upload your photo into a comment here, and then provide a three to four sentence description of the images you chose and why.
Discussion Prompt: Immigration Issues
You have read several articles discussing some of the challenges regarding immigration. Hopefully you noticed in ‘Let Them In’ the significant wait times facing many groups who would like to immigrate to the U.S. legally, as well as some of the challenges presented by Jose’ Vargas in his story, ‘My Life as an Undocumented Immigrant’.
Given all of this information, how do you think the U.S. sends mixed messages regarding the way we handle immigrants, and particularly students? Describe one way you think immigration policy or practice could be improved and the biggest barriers to you see to implementing your recommendation. Be sure to comment on your peers’ posts you think offer strong solutions.
Written Response: Reflection Paper Topic
Some activists have suggested that the languages of instruction should be in the dialect of students’ cultures. Others argue that Standard English should be the only acceptable language within the classroom. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each approach? Do you think teachers should at least be familiar with the dialects used by students in the classroom? Why or why not? How do you plan to respond to different dialects in your classroom?
Discussion Prompt: Accents and Dialects
Review the language and dialects case study, and then respond to the following questions. How does teacher evaluation based on language and pronunciation make you feel? Is this something that should be evaluated in teachers? How would you handle this situation?
Accents and Dialects Case Study
NEED THIS CASE STUDY
6.03: External Resources
Pedagogy of the Oppressed – Chapter 2
While not unique to language and immigration issues, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, does speak to the role of education in offering freedom to those whose lack of education is a type of oppression. In this specific excerpt, Friere contrasts the banking-concept of education with problem-posing education as means of empowering all students in more effective learning environments.
Freire, P. (2000). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York : Continuum, c2000.
‘What Should Teachers Do?’
Lisa Delpit asks the question, ‘What should teachers do?’ in the context of students speaking Ebonics in the classroom. She makes the case that there is a role for Ebonics and legitimizing the dialect, while simultaneously providing strategies for teachers working with students who speak in Ebonics but who need to learn standard English for testing and assessment requirements.
Lacey, M. (2011, September 14). In arizona, complaints of an accent. The New York Times.
Vargas, J. (2011, June 22). My life as an undocumented immigrant. The New York Times.
Jose Vargas gives an honest account of his life story in this biographical piece about his undocumented entry into the United States as a child and subsequent challenges to remain and make a home in the face of discrimination and restrictive policies in the United States today. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Exploring_Socio-Cultural_Perspectives_in_Diversity_(Cozart_et_al.)/06%3A_Language_Immigration_and_Geography/6.01%3A_Media.txt |
Discussion Prompt: Muslim Students at School
Watch the 20/20 News program, “Your Questions about Islam”. After watching this program and reading the information presented in this module regarding Islam, what are some challenges you see for Muslim students who attend school in the U.S.? What actions can you take as a teacher to make these students more comfortable at school?
Written Response: Reflection Paper Topic
Select a religious service or gathering to attend sometime in the next few weeks that is significantly different from your past religious experiences. (i.e. If you grew up Baptist, a Methodist church doesn’t count.) Reflect about your experience and answer the following questions.
What type of service did you choose to attend and why? How was this different from the type of religious experiences, or lack of experiences, you had growing up? What were your impressions of the service? Anything that surprised you or stood out to you? Why do you think it is important to be exposed to different types of religions and religious practices as a future teacher
Discussion Prompt: World Religions
Using the ‘World Religions Assignment’ below as your guide, post your responses.
World Religions Assignment
Objective
To individually investigate aspects of different religious minority groups in the United States, including major beliefs, population size, and religious holidays. Then, to consider how these details could impact students attending school in the United States.
Assignment
You will be randomly assignment to a group within eLC. In order to see your group number, go to the Tools menu on the course navigation bar. Then, select Groups from the dropdown menu. You will be able to see the group number to which you are assigned.
Here is the key to know which group is assigned to which major religion:
Group 1 = Catholicism
Group 2 = Judaism
Group 3 = Islam
Group 4 = Buddhism
Group 5 = Hinduism
Once you have discovered which religion you will be working with, you will need to determine which question you are responsible for answering. Here are the major questions for each religion.
1. Research the major religious holidays for your assigned religion, including looking at the specific dates of those holidays for the current school year. Then, look up the school calendar for your home public school district and compare the school holidays and testing schedule with the holidays of your religion. Provide a discussion post where you summarize the different religious holidays and their relationship to the school calendar. (A link to the calendar may be helpful as well.) Are there any conflicts? Describe any evidence you see that your district considered the major holidays of your assigned religion. What are some of the repercussions for students of this religion based on your findings?
2. Discuss the history of your religion in the United States, particularly as it relates to persecution, major historical milestones, and current numbers. Are there any geographic trends you notice for groups of people who practice this religion? What are the implications for schools based on your findings?
3. Describe your assigned religion in terms of the major belief systems and the practices of those that adhere to it.
For example, “In Protestantism, people believe that Jesus is the Son of God, and you can only gain access to heaven by believing in his death and resurrection. Common practices include baptism, by either sprinkling or immersion (dunking), and denominations vary in terms of whether or not they baptize infants.” Your response should include more depth than this example, but this should give you an idea of the content to include.
In order to determine which question you need to answer, follow this guide according to the first letter of your last name.
Question 1 = Last names beginning with A – I
Question 2 = Last names beginning with J – R
Question 3 = Last names beginning with S – Z
Response Expectations
Once you have determined your assigned religion and question, you will need to compose a two – three paragraph response. This should be posted to the appropriate religion discussion board. There is a forum for this activity, and each individual religion has its own board within that. Make sure you clearly identify your religion and question in your response, as well as including a reference list. Your textbook and reputable websites are encouraged. (As religion can be a contentious topic, make sure any site you reference is offering legitimate content.) You may also review the information included in my lecture notes for this module.
Once you have posted your response, be sure to go back and read the responses by others in the class.
8.01: Activities
Discussion Prompt: Applying Multiculturalism
Now that you have had a chance to work through all of the different modules and topics in the course, I would like for you to consider how you can apply these ideas to your own discipline. So, select one single lesson or idea from your content area, and consider one way you can apply a multicultural education approach. Then, below, post your lesson and how you have made it multicultural. I look forward to reading your ideas!
Written Response: Reflection Paper Topics
One of the goals of culturally responsive teaching is to validate the cultures of students as you teach. They should see themselves in the curriculum. How would you feel if you never saw yourself, your family, or your community in the curriculum except in a negative way? What groups are seldom seen in textbooks? How could you incorporate the cultures of your students into the subject you plan to teach? | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Exploring_Socio-Cultural_Perspectives_in_Diversity_(Cozart_et_al.)/07%3A_Religion/7.02%3A_Activities.txt |
• 1.1: Introduction to Minority Studies
I have designed this brief textbook for use in a Sociology survey course for Minority Studies; thus, it looks at minorities from a very broad but shallow Sociological perspective and includes discussion of race, ethnicity, sex, gender, sexual orientation, aging, and disability. The last section is devoted to expulsion and genocide.
01: Introduction to Minority Studies
Introduction to Minority Studies: A Brief Sociological Text
My name is Ruth Dunn and I have been teaching Sociology at Houston Community College (HCC) and the University of Houston-Clear Lake (UHCL) since 1998; both schools are in Houston, Texas, USA. My experiences in the classroom and online led me to develop a huge amount of course material above and beyond the ubiquitous, over-priced textbooks. This little volume, Minority Studies: A Brief Sociological Text, is based on the course material that I developed for Minority Studies Sociology courses at HCC (SOCI 2319/2320), and a Minorities in America Sociology course at UHCL (SOCI 4535).
HCC is a non-residential community college with six individual colleges located across seventeen campuses. We are one of the most diverse community colleges in the nation and we have the largest contingent of international students of any community college in the country. As of the fall semester 2009, we had an enrollment of over 60,000 students. Our size and diversity offers faculty a wide variety of experience on which to draw: it is a joy for a Sociologist to find so many different sociocultural perspectives that can then be used for those “teachable moments” that we crave.
In one class in 2009 I had four students from Nepal. During a discussion of race and ethnicity they questioned the racism in America and asked how and why it existed. These young men ranged in skin color from “white” to very dark, but they truly thought of each other as the same color; a fact that the American-born students simply could not grasp. This led to a spirited discussion of perception of difference and extrapolation of the theory that perception is reality.
I believe that most good college professors bring much more to the classroom than can be found in standard textbooks, and by offering our own style, knowledge, examples, and experience and drawing on the style, knowledge, and experience of the students, serious learning happens. This very brief, bare-bones, free textbook touches on the basics of minority studies leaving the bulk of the material to be fleshed-out by each individual instructor—something that most of us do anyway.
Since statistical data in most textbooks are more-or-less out of date by the time a textbook is published, I have used very few statistics; professors can supply links to the US Census Bureau, the CIA World Factbook, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and multiple other sources for their students to use. I have provided a fairly comprehensive list of websites for that purpose.
This textbook is divided into eleven different sections or modules: Introduction, Part I: Dominant and Minority Groups—there is a subsection of Part I that covers minorities by group (African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, Sexual Orientation, and Women) in more detail than the main text, Part II: Race and Ethnicity, Part III: Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation, Part IV: Aging, Part V: Disability, Part VI: The Consequences of Bigotry: Hate Kills!, The Three Sociological Paradigms/Perspectives: Conflict, Structural Functionalism, and Symbolic Interactionism, Reading Lists, Websites of Interest to Students of Sociology; and References. Each part of this textbook is arranged the same way so that it is easy for students and faculty alike to follow: Text, Course Objectives, Study Guide, Key Terms and Concepts, Lecture Outline, Assignments, and Reading Lists. Woven throughout the course material are a variety of links to various pertinent websites. There are also suggestions for books and social science journals in the Assignments section of each unit and because students should be reading and writing, I have compiled and included an extensive, but by no means complete, reading list for each unit.
I have designed this brief textbook for use in a Sociology survey course for Minority Studies; thus, it looks at minorities from a very broad but shallow Sociological perspective and includes discussion of race, ethnicity, sex, gender, sexual orientation, aging, and disability. The last section is devoted to expulsion and genocide.
I would like to thank my family, friends, colleagues, professors, and students from whom I have learned and continue to learn so much. It is my hope that this small textbook will be used either as a stand-alone text or as a supplement to a more detailed text. However it is used, I wish well you who do use it.
Ruth Dunn, B.S., M.A.
Professor of Sociology—Houston Community College
mailto:[email protected] | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/01%3A_Introduction_to_Minority_Studies/1.01%3A_Introduction_to_Minority_Studies.txt |
Part I—Dominant and Minority Groups
Dominant Group Defined
Minority Studies is a course that deals with the differential and negative treatment of groups (and of individuals as members of groups) who suffer from less wealth, power, (economic, political, social, coercive), and status and less access to wealth, power, and status than other groups in American society. There are racial/ethnic, sex/gender, age, religious, and disabled minorities as well as economic and educational minorities. Furthermore, minority group status may and often does encompass more than one category. Minorities are defined by the dominant group in society and are contrasted to the dominant group in both subtle and obvious ways. A dominant group is positively privileged (Weber) unstigmatized (Rosenblum and Travis)1 and generally favored by the institutions of society (Marger)2 particularly the social, economic, political, and educational systems. Classical Sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), recognizes several interlinked relational patterns that lead to stratification; whereas Marxists reduce all inequality to economics (the differences in access to and use of wealth—all of one’s financial assets—between the Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat), Weber expands stratification into three related yet distinct components: Class, Status, and Party. We may speak of a ‘class’ when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as, (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets.3
In other words one’s class situation is based solely on economics—one’s wealth or access to wealth, or, as Weber writes ‘property’ and ‘lack of property’ are therefore, the basic categories of all class situation, 4 however, class does not constitute a community or in Marxian terms a “Class for Self.” Weber argues that one’s economic position in society does not necessarily or even usually lead to class-consciousness. Status, however, and status groups are often class conscious. Status is related to social esteem, the honor in which one is held by others we wish to designate as ‘status situation’ every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor . . .Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity.5
In other words, status and class quite often, but not always, go hand-in-hand. Weber argues that when there is a stable economy there is greater stratification based on status or social honor, but when there is economic instability, the primary mode of stratification is based on class or wealth. Class and status are two components of stratification, but for Weber, all stratification is based on dimensions of power—the ability to influence over resistance. Class, status, and party, then are three separate dimensions of structures struggling for domination6.
Moreover, dominant group members have greater access to wealth, power, and status partly because dominant group membership automatically confers privilege. A minority group (and there is some controversy about whether we should even be using the term) is a group that is negatively privileged (Weber), stigmatized (Rosenblum and Travis),7 and generally less favored by the institutions of society (Marger).8 A dominant group is an ascribed, (unearned and socially defined), master status which is defined only in relationship to the minority groups in a society. Rosenblum and Travis have argued that
what one notices in the world depends in large part on the statuses one occupies . . . thus we are likely to be fairly unaware of the statuses we occupy that privilege us . . . [and] provide advantage and are acutely aware of those . . . that yield negative judgments and unfair treatment . . . one of the privileges of being white [in America is] being able to be oblivious to those privileges . . .majority status is unmarked or unstigmatized and grants a sense of entitlement . . .the unmarked category . . . tells us what a society takes for granted [such as being white and male in America.]9
Minority Group Defined
A minority group, which is defined by the dominant group, is also an ascribed master status. It is a category of people whose physical appearance or cultural characteristics are defined as being different from the traits of the dominant group and that result in their being set apart for different and unequal treatment. This definition of a minority group takes into account both race and ethnicity and can, indeed, subsume sex/gender, age, religion, disability, and SES! According to Dworkin and Dworkin there are four qualities of minority groups: 1) identifiability 2) differential power 3) differential and pejorative treatment 4) group awareness.10 Rosenblum and Travis have written that minority status is highly visible marked stigmatized and unprivileged or differentially (unequally) privileged, what Erving Goffman called tribal stigma.11 A minority group is not necessarily a minority because they are a smaller population than the dominant group. In fact, the South African system of apartheid (a system of de jure discrimination) was a major indicator that a minority group is socially and not numerically defined, (90% of the population of South Africa is black but until the very early 1990s they were the minority group and the 10% of the population who are white were the dominant group). The social differences between dominant and minority groups is called stratification, which, in sociological terms is the study of inequality. Stratification is a word that comes to us from geology and describes the layering or strata of rocks; therefore, stratification concerns the ways in which society is layered and how that layering effects the life chances of groups and the individuals within those groups. People in all societies experience some level of stratification—there is no society in the world that is completely egalitarian; even in the most equal societies, men usually have authority over women and the older have authority over the younger.
Stratification
In general, all societies are stratified along one or more lines comprised of race/ethnicity, sex/gender, age, religion, disability, and SES or socioeconomic status, which is a combination of one’s income, education, and occupation. Stratification is the unequal ways in which the goods of society are distributed. Sociologist Craig Oettinger defines stratification as who gets what and how much they get over time. My definition is: the unequal distribution of and unequal access to the goods of society: wealth power and status. According to Abercrombie et. al., social differences become social stratification when people are ranked hierarchically along some dimension of inequality whether this be income wealth power prestige age ethnicity or some other characteristic.12 Gerhard Lenski argues that stratification is based on distributive systems of who gets what and why? (p. viii) and that social stratification [is equated with] the distributive process in human societies—the process by which scarce resources are distributed (p. xxvi). 13 According to Marger14, there are four major conditions necessary for ethnic stratification to occur: contact. ethnocentrism, competition, and differential power.
An example of contact involves the indigenous peoples of North, Central, and South America who crossed the Bering Strait during the last great ice age approximately 35,000 years ago. It took these migrants another 12,000 to 15,000 years to populate both continents. Although exact population data is unknown it is believed that the indigenous population was about 75 million in the late 15th century, with somewhere between 1 million and 18 million residing in territories North of the Rio Grande. The Europeans who sailed to the Americas were in search of trade goods and treasure to enrich themselves individually and to bring greater wealth to their nation-states and monarchs. Thus, they arrived as conquerors. The Americas were rich in natural resources that had long since begun to be depleted in Europe and so, the “explorers” set about to establish mercantilistic colonies and to subdue the native populations. The Europeans with their superior weapons, horses, and statecraft overwhelmed the Indians within a few years in South America. Subjugation took longer in North America due to the widely divergent lifestyles of the North American Indians. In South America, the people were an agrarian population largely tied to large urban centers and a highly centralized form of government wherein authority was vested in a small, extremely wealthy, and extremely powerful ruling class. Conquest of people with a form of government and social organization not unlike the city-states and nation-states of Europe was much less problematic overall than the conquest of widely divergent, unorganized, tribal groups of hunter-gatherers who widely scattered across a large geographic area. As Marger15 makes clear, the Native Americans are the only minority group in the United States whose subjugation and subsequent minority group status was brought about solely through armed conflict and the use of coercive power.
Even after the North American tribes gained the use of horses and guns, they were, ultimately, no match for the superior forces of the United States military and armed mercenaries who hunted to near extinction the primary source of protein—the American bison or buffalo—and who also closed off through various (unkept) treaties many of the hunting and gathering grounds. The ideology called “Manifest Destiny” pushed white traders, treasure hunters, thrill seekers, and settlers further and further across North America until they had encroached on every part of the land, “we heard that creeks of [white people] were flowing into the [Black] Hills and becoming rivers”(Black Elk16 Speaks, John Neihardt, Bison Books, U of Nebraska Press, [1932] 1995), p.82).
Ethnocentrism
The ethnocentrism of the Europeans led to an ideology, based primarily on the low-technology hunter-gatherer lifestyle and animistic religion of the Native Americans, that the Native Americans were, as Marger17 states, inferior, savage humans. This ideology eventually led to “the only good Indian is a dead Indian” philosophy which began with such events as the “Trail of Tears” in the early 1800s and culminated in the massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. The “butchering” at Wounded Knee as Black Elk18describes it, marked the last battle between Native Americans and the military forces of the United States. However, there were still skirmishes between farmers and ranchers and Native Americans as late as the 1920s. In fact, the term “Redskin” comes from a bounty set aside by the United States government for any Indian found outside a reservation without papers. The policy was for Indians “dead or alive” and the bloody, red, skins of the Indians brought as much bounty as a body.
Competition
Competition for land and natural resources and conflict over ownership of land exacerbated the conditions imposed by armed conflict and ethnocentrism. Economic competition always ends in conflict whether armed or peacefully resolved, and when the competing group is a minority—and a despised minority at that—the competition often becomes bloody concluding with the complete subjugation or annihilation of the minority group.
Differential Power
Differential power is always a concomitant of stratification of any kind, as stated previously, the greater force of arms and the increasing white population linked to the susceptibility of the American Indians to disease, the collapse of their social structure, the loss of their hunting and gathering grounds created a state of affairs in which the indigenous peoples were virtually doomed. As Black Elk19 says:
and now when I look about me upon my people in despair, I feel like crying and I wish and wish my vision could have been given to a man more worthy. I wonder why it came to me, a pitiful old man who can do nothing. Men and women and children I have cured of sickness with the power [my] vision gave me; but my nation I could not help. If a man or woman or child dies, it does not matter long, for the nation lives on. It was the nation that was dying, and the vision was for the nation . . . the nation’s hoop [social structure/social solidarity/integrity as a people] is broken and scattered. There is no center any longer, and the sacred tree [the tree of life that nourishes the nation] is dead. (Black Elk Speaks, p. 180 and 270; italics added for emphasis)
Master Status
Oftentimes scarce but valued resources (wealth, power, and status) are distributed based on Master Status which includes race/ethnicity, sex/gender, age, religion, disability, and SES (socioeconomic status which is inclusive of the combined effects of income occupation and education). Master Status is a ranking that combines several factors to assess peoples’ positions in the stratification hierarchy (levels of social acceptance by the dominant group). Of all the statuses a person occupies it is the one that largely defines who that person is and what his or her goals and opportunities are. All people have Master Status.
For example, I occupy several statuses in society: white, married, female, middle-aged, upper middle class, professor of Sociology and my Master Status, (as is true with most people), is the way in which I define myself to myrself and to others.
Master Status includes those elements of ourselves that we are born with, (ascribed statuses), as well as those we accomplish or attain through our own efforts (achieved statuses). Ascribed statuses include those aspects of ourselves that we are born with and that we do not generally change such as our race/ethnicity, sex, eye color and shape, hair texture, and basic physical appearance (phenotype). Achieved statuses on the other hand are those aspects of ourselves that require us to do something to accomplish such as our adult income, education, and occupation (SES).20
One’s Master Status or the Master Status one chooses to present is often situationally dependent.
For instance, my Master Status as a professor of Sociology generally becomes evident only when performing the role of professor of Sociology. My Master Status as a white female, although always evident, is largely ignored unless whiteness or femaleness becomes a particular situational issue.
A social status (any status) is a social position which must be filled. However, any qualified person can fill any social position.
Those of you who are reading this are probably college students—a status which must be filled because it is necessary for people in our culture to be formally educated. Some of you are probably parents—another status that must be filled because it is critical for any culture to add to its population and socialize its young. Some of you are employees who have jobs and go to work everyday—also a necessary status in society because the economy must be supported and maintained and there are basic social services necessary for the smooth operation of an industrialized society.
Each status in society has certain obligations, expectations, duties, rights, and functions that go with them. College students are obligated to pay for their education, expected to do the reading and write the papers that have been assigned, required to come to class and complete the coursework satisfactorily in order to earn a passing grade, study hard, be treated with dignity and respect, and graduate. However, as we all know, some people fail to adequately fill their status.
Social Roles
A social role is the way we fill the various statuses we occupy. You have probably heard someone say that someone else is just taking up space, meaning that they are not doing their job or fulfilling the obligations, expectations, duties, rights, and functions that go with a specific status. They are not playing the role. We have all seen people in school plays who were wrong for a particular part, or who couldn’t remember their lines or their position on the stage, or who was simply bad at acting. That person (status=actor) is not playing satisfactorily the part (role=part). All of the various aspects of our Master Status, (the primary social positions we occupy), and sometimes the way we play our social roles, can and do effect our ranking on the stratification hierarchy.
Stratification Redux
Because every society has some level of stratification—even in the least complex hunter-gatherer cultures, men have authority over women and the old have authority over the young—our position in our society is based on our Master Statuses. The stratification hierarchy is the layers or levels of any social structure—it is the way people classify or categorize themselves and others. The American stratification hierarchy is evident to all even though we tend to be relatively oblivious to it.
For example, the majority of Americans think of themselves as middle class whether they make \$25,000 per year or \$250,000. Clearly, a vast difference in definitions of middle class is required in order for people with such disparate incomes to include themselves in this largest layer or social category. Even President George H. Bush, who comes from a very wealthy family and is worth several millions of dollars, spoke of himself as middle class during his abortive run for a second term in 1992. The media often referred to former President and Mrs. Bill Clinton as middle class even though they were worth nearly three million dollars in 2000. President George W. Bush and his wife Laura also referred to themselves as middle class and yet they are also worth several million dollars.
Our ability to enjoy such resources as personal autonomy—control of our own lives, health, physical comfort, creature comforts, education, employment opportunities in a high paying and satisfying job, the respect of others, and a long life span are all related to our position in the stratification hierarchy. How we live, where we live, the things with which we surround ourselves, the kind of food we eat, the style and quality of the clothes we wear and the other forms of body adornment we use, the music we listen to, the way we dance, our patterns of speech, virtually everything about us—is determined in greater or lesser extent by our social class, our position on the stratification hierarchy. The way we treat others and the way we classify others is also largely based on our perceptions of where they are located on the stratification hierarchy.
W.I. Thomas and Thomas’s Theorem
W. I. Thomas (1863-1947) is justly famous for his work with Florian Znaniecki (1882-1958) concerning the assimilation processes undergone by Polish peasant immigrants to the United States. Indeed they are responsible for our concepts of the social types they defined as “the Philistine, the Bohemian, and the creative man” that informed our social dialogue both in academia and in popular culture in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. However, Thomas is most widely know for what has come to be called Thomas’s Theorem which, which, according to Merton states that:
if men define situations as real they are real in their consequences. . . .Once meaning has been assigned, their consequent behavior is shaped by [that] meaning. If people believe in witches such beliefs have tangible consequences—they may for example kill those persons assumed to be witches. This then is the power the human mind has in transmuting raw sense data into a categorical apparatus that could make murderers of us all. Once a Vietnamese becomes a “gook,” or a Black a “nigger,” or a Jew a “kike,” that human being has been transmuted through the peculiar alchemy of social definition into something wholly other who is now a target of prejudice and discrimination, of violence and aggression, and even murder. 21
In other words we act on what we think is real regardless of its ontological reality. Our beliefs, our perceptions, guide our behavior. We treat people based on what we perceive to be their basic (essential) characteristics often based solely on our perception of their place in the stratification hierarchy. Stereotypes and discriminatory behavior are almost always based on such perceptions. Our own position in the stratification hierarchy is judged just as we judge that of others and based on the same generally superficial qualities. What are the first things you notice when you meet someone for the first time? Do the things you notice color your analysis of that person?
It seems to be both a biological as well as social trait that humans place everything in our environment into categories that help us determine what is safe and not safe. Anything that is different is immediately suspect and until we have analyzed the difference and determined whether that difference is or is not harmful we are apt to separate ourselves from that real or perceived danger. Seminal Social-Psychologist Gordon W. Allport wrote:
No one quite knows why related ideas in our minds tend to cohere and form categories. Since the time of Aristotle, various “laws of association” have been proposed to account for this important property of the mind. The clusters formed do not need to correspond to outer reality as found in nature. For example there are no such things as elves but I have a firm category in my mind concerning them. Similarly, I have firm categories concerning groups of mankind although there is no guarantee that my categories correspond to fact. To be rational, a category must be built primarily around the essential attributes of all objects that can be correctly included within the category. Thus all houses are structures marked by some degree of habitability (past or present). Each house will also have some nonessential attributes. Some are large, some small, some wooden, brick, cheap or expensive, old or new, painted white or gray. These are not the essential or defining attributes of a house.22
Essential Characteristics
Human beings create mental categories based on our current knowledge of our social and physical world. We may know full well that there is no such thing as a werewolf, but when we hear a wolf howl while we are camping our minds conjure up certain visions of what may be lurking just beyond our campfire.23Thus, we also use these categorical ideas to develop concepts of the essential characteristics of groups of people who differ in some way from ourselves; and yet, determining the essential qualities of any group is highly problematic: [p]robably in no case can it ever be said that a group difference marks off every single member of a group from every single nonmember. . . . There is probably not a single case where every member of a group has all the characteristics ascribed to his group nor is there a single characteristic that is typical of every single member of one group and of no other group.24
What are the essential characteristics of women? Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals? Blacks? Hispanics? Asians? American Indians? The disabled? The elderly? Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists? Or of any minority? What can be said that always applies to each and every member of the group without exception? According to Allport, (based on the J-curve theory of distribution), there are some (not necessarily essential) group traits that are exclusive to a particular group but are rare within that group. In statistical parlance, these are called rare-zero differentials. Unfortunately, we tend to generalize these rare-zero differentials and assume that they are widespread essential group characteristics.25 All women are __________. All men are ___________. All Muslims are __________. All Jews are ___________. All blacks are ___________. What words did you use to fill in the blanks? Were those words categorical rare-zero stereotypes based on your perception of reality? Are you sure? Why?
Various Sociological, Psychological, and Social-Psychological studies indicate that, based on first impressions of strangers, we think physically attractive people are smart; fat people are sloppy and not very bright; well-dressed people are smarter, richer, and more attractive than people who are less well-dressed; nonwhite males are dangerous and sinister; white people are smarter, richer, more attractive, more honest, and more trustworthy than ethnic or racial minorities (even in the eyes of racial and ethnic minorities). In other words the way we form our initial opinions of the intrinsic human value—the basic human worth—of a stranger is based largely on those external aspects of the person that society has determined are acceptable or not acceptable. We are a class-driven society, but those American core values of equality and independence for all also blind us to the class structure, the social structure, the stratification hierarchy, and the prejudice and discrimination that effects so profoundly and with such grave consequences our day-to-day interactions with our fellow human beings.
Footnotes
• 1 Rosenblum Karen E. and Toni-Michelle C. Travis. The Meaning of Difference: American Constructions of Race Sex and Gender Social Class and Sexual Orientation: Second Edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 2000.
• 2 Marger Martin. Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives: Fourth Edition. Wadsworth: Belmont CA: 1996.
• 3 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Edited and translated by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Oxford U.P., New York. 1946/1958. p. 151
• 4 Ibid. p. 152.
• 5 Ibid. p. 187.
• 6 Ibid. p. 185.
• 7 Rosenblum Karen E. and Toni-Michelle C. Travis. The Meaning of Difference: American Constructions of Race Sex and Gender Social Class and Sexual Orientation: Second Edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 2000.
• 8 Marger Martin. Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives: Fourth Edition. Wadsworth: Belmont CA: 1996.
• 9 Rosenblum Karen E. and Toni-Michelle C. Travis. The Meaning of Difference: American Constructions of Race Sex and Gender Social Class and Sexual Orientation: Second Edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 2000.
• 10 From Oettinger.
• 11 Rosenblum Karen E. and Toni-Michelle C. Travis. The Meaning of Difference: American Constructions of Race Sex and Gender Social Class and Sexual Orientation: Second Edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 2000.
• 12. 1 Dominant and Minority Groups2 The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology. Nicholas Abercrombie Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner. Penguin: London: 1994: pp. 413-414.
• 13 Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. Gerhard Lenski. UNC Press. Chapel Hill. 1984. Italics in original.
• 14 Martin Marger, Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives: 4th Edition, Wadsworth, Belmont, 1997. Chapter 5 “Foundations of the American Ethnic Hierarchy: Anglo-Americans and Native Americans, pp. 146-169.
• 15 Ibid.
• 16 Black Elk Speaks: Being the Life Story of a Holy Man of the Oglala Sioux, As Told through John G. Neihardt. John G. Neihardt. Bison Books, U. of Nebraska Press, [1932] 1995.
• 17 Marger, op. cit.
• 18 Black Elk, op. cit.
• 19 Black Elk, op. cit.
• 20 Whereas whiteness is the societal norm and therefore without negative connotations people of color (racial and ethnic minorities) do not enjoy the same high level of socioeconomic and normative privilege from their Master Status as do whites. In America, whiteness is the unstigmatized or unmarked category. In other words being white in America is being able to be oblivious to racial and ethnic prejudice and discrimination and to be oblivious to the harm that institutional racism still inflicts.
• 21 Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context. Lewis A. Coser. Harcourt. Fort Worth. 1977. p. 521.
• 22 Allport Gordon W. The Nature of Prejudice: 25th Anniversary Edition. Perseus: Reading. 1979. p. 171.
• 23 Ibid.
• 24 Allport Gordon W. The Nature of Prejudice: 25th Anniversary Edition. Perseus: Reading. 1979. p. 103; italics in original.
• 25 The J-curve theory states that the essential attributes of a group—these characteristics that define the group—tend to follow a J-curve type of distribution. Furthermore, a J-curve distribution, by definition, includes only group members—no non-group member can be fitted statistically into the distribution. Allport Gordon W. The Nature of Prejudice: 25th Anniversary Edition. Perseus: Reading. 1979. p. 97. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/02%3A_Dominant_and_Minority_Groups/2.01%3A_Dominant_and_Minority_Groups.txt |
2.2.1 African Americans
A Dream Deferred
What happens to a dream deferred? Does it dry up Like a raisin in the sun? Or fester like a sore— And then run? Does it stink like rotten meat? Or crust and sugar over— Like a syrupy sweet? Maybe it just sags like a heavy load Or does it explode? Langston Hughes 1944
The Middle Passage and the Triangle Trade
African Americans have lived on the North American continent for more than 350 years. They were our only completely involuntary immigrants. The Middle Passage was the route of the slave ships (called blackbirds) from Africa to the New World. It was the “middle” portion of the Triangular Trade (1500s-early 1800s) which was the movement of ships and goods from North America to the Caribbean to Africa and back. The Triangle Trade as it has also been called exchanged North American products and raw materials for Caribbean products and raw materials, including tobacco and rum, and then exchanged those for African slaves. Many people died during the Middle Passage from starvation, illness, and even murder. There are some reputable modern scholars who believe that as many as 250 million human beings died during the Middle Passage or were enslaved in the New World between 1500 and 1850 where black human beings were auctioned like cattle. (See Slavery in America: Historical Overview by Ronald L. F. Davis, Ph. D., California State University-Northridge; for a video lecture about the book Slavery by Another Name by Doulgas Blackmon, please go to the Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance, and Abolition.)
Free Blacks in Early America
However, not all blacks were enslaved in Colonial America. Fort Mose was the first free, all-black settlement in the US. Founded in 1604, it was Located a few miles from St. Augustine, Florida. Nonetheless, most blacks were not so lucky and were enslaved in the millions. In 1805 Toussaint the Liberator, with his revolutionary black soldiers, liberated Haiti and outlawed slavery. Their “inferior” status notwithstanding, African Americans served their country in the Revolutionary War. Crispus Attucks, a runaway slave and merchant seaman, was the first person to die in the Revolutionary War and Agrippa Hull was a free black and Revolutionary War veteran. Some northern religious institutions offered opportunities to African Americans. Absalom Jones was a free black and founder in 1810 of the First Free African Church of Philadelphia which was the first African American church in the United States. Lemuel Haynes was the first African American to be ordained in the United States by the Congregationalist Church in the early 19thcentury.
Pro-Slavery Movement
But the pro-slavery movement had powerful advocates. In 1850 Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act which required citizens to assist in the recovery of fugitive/runaway slaves. Click here for a timeline of the Fugitive Slave Act. The plethora of runaway slave posters attests to anti-black spirit alive in the land. (For some images of these posters see: New York Public Library Digital Gallery; \$200 Reward:Runaway slaves and the Underground Railroad in Kansas Territory; Keep a Sharp Eye Out for Kidnappers; Ran away from my farm and \$20 Reward; My Mulatto Boy George; Sophia Gordon; \$2,500 REWARD.)
John C. Calhoun was a powerful political force in the United States from 1808 until his death in 1850. He was twice Vice-President of the United States (in 1824 under John Quincy Adams and again in 1828 with Andrew Jackson) and had been a senator from South Carolina from 1832-1843 and again from 1845-1850. He was always a staunch defender of plantation system of slavery. In 1837, he delivered a speech “Slavery a Positive Good” in which argued that blacks are better off as slaves in the US than as “savages” in Africa. (See also: John C. Calhoun: A Brief Introduction.)
Compare [the slave’s] condition with the tenants of the poor houses . . . in Europe—look at the sick, and the old and infirm slave . . . in the midst of his family and friends, under the kind superintending care of his master and mistress, and compare it with the forlorn and wretched condition of the pauper in the poorhouse.
Anti-Slavery Movement and the Civil War
There were also powerful voices raised against slavery. Although unsuccessful, John Adams spent much of his life fighting against slavery; he urged that an anti-slavery clause be inserted into The Declaration of Independence. John Quincy Adams, also an abolitionist like his father, was the attorney for the defense in the La Amistad trial.
Frederick Douglass was the writer of one of the most famous “slave narratives” Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave. He was a runaway slave and anti-slavery lecturer in the North. On July 5, 1852 Frederick Douglass gave a famous speech titled “The Meaning of July Fourth to the Negro” which was given at an anti-slavery convention in Rochester, New York.
Blacks and whites banded together in the North to abolish slavery, and in 1845 they held an anti-slavery convention which was attended by Douglass. In December 1859, the fiery abolitionist John Brown executed a raid on the federal arsenal at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia in order to steal weapons and arm slaves for a revolt.
Many free and fugitive blacks along with some anti-slavery whites banded together to create the Underground Railroad. Harriet Tubman was the most famous “conductor” on the Underground Railroad. She made 19 trips into the slave-holding South and freed over 300 people from Southern slavery. (For more information about the Underground Railroad, please visit the following websites: The Underground Railroad; The Underground Railroad from PBS; The National Underground Railroad Freedom Center.)
The American Civil War (1861-1865) was largely the result of the clash between slavery and anti-slavery groups. (See American Civil War Summary for a brief view of this conflict.) Free and freed blacks were not allowed to serve in the Union Army until after the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, but many served with great distinction in the last years of the war. After the end of the Civil War three new constitutional amendments were ratified: the Thirteenth Amendment in December 1865 abolished slavery; the Fourteenth Amendment in July 1868 gave citizenship to former slaves and granted equal protection under the law to all citizens; the Fifteenth Amendment, ratified on February 3, 1870 gave former slave the right to vote. But freedom did not bring equality—segregation laws went into effect as soon as Reconstruction ended. The Jim Crowsegregation laws that were instituted after Reconstruction were named after British actor Charles Matthews who performed in blackface as a character named “Jim Crow.” Many African Americans tried to prove to fearful, racist whites that “Negroes” were deserving of social and economic equality; however, their early efforts were largely in vain. Henry Highland Garnet began a failed back-to-Africa movement toward the end of the 19th century. Booker T. Washington was an educator and leader of reform movement in the late 19th and early 20th century. He argued for vocational training as a method of bringing economic prosperity to African Americans. (See also: Booker T. Washington Delivers the 1895 Atlanta Compromise Speech; Up from Slavery: An Autobiography; “Cast Down Your Buckets;” “Of Mister Booker T. Washington and Others” from The Souls of Black Folk by W.E.B. DuBois.). Washington’s argument was in direct contradiction of the position of William Edward Burghardt (W.E.B.) DuBois who was a founder of the NAACP and a contemporary of Washington’s. DuBois argued for academic education to propel blacks into economic prosperity and into equality with whites. W.E.B. DuBois, decrying American racism, renounced his American citizenship when he was 90 and moved to Ghana in West Africa where he died in 1963 at the age of 95. In the 1910s and 1920s Marcus Garvey founded a failed back-to-Africa movement. (For more information about Garvey, please visit the following websites: The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers Project at UCLA;
Marcus Garvey.com; Historic Figures from the BBC.)
Eyes on the Prize—the Civil Rights Movement
The civil disobedience of Rosa Parks led to the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott which lasted for an entire year and generated the first significant change in the Jim Crow segregation laws by desegregating the Montgomery city busses. In 1957, Dr. King and a host of other black leaders in the American South banded together to form the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)which was dedicated to non-violent civil disobedience as practiced by Parks and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The Civil Rights movement largely began in the African American churches including Ebenezer Baptist Church where King served as the pastor beginning in 1960.
Freedom riders integrated lunch stands all across the American South but the sit ins began in 1960 with the Greensboro Four.
The Woolworth’s Lunch Counter at the Smithsonian National Museum of American History.
Figure 1. Photo by Ruth Dunn 2002
"The story of the Greensboro sit-ins " By JIM SCHLOSSER, News & Record Staff Writer Originally published in 1998 On Feb. 1, 1960, the Greensboro Four, as they would later be called, felt isolated and alone as they sat at that whites-only lunch counter at the Woolworth Store on South Elm Street. They were seeking more than what they ordered—sodas, coffee, doughnuts. They were attacking the social order of the time. The unwritten rules of society required black people to stay out of white-owned restaurants, to use only designated drinking fountains and restrooms, to sit in the rear of Greensboro city buses, in a separate balcony at the Center Theatre and in segregated bleachers during sports events at War Memorial Stadium. The four black youths—Franklin McCain, Joseph McNeil, Ezell Blair Jr. and David Richmond, all still teenagers and all freshmen on academic scholarships at N.C. A&T State University—had entered the unknown. McCain, who grew up in Washington and spent one year attending Greensboro's Dudley High School, says he expected to be arrested, beaten to a pulp or worse.
In 1963 Dr. King led a march on Washington D.C. where he delivered what is arguably his greatest speech: “I Have A Dream.” (For more information about this event, please visit the following websites: MLK Online; Congress of Racial Equality: March on Washington.)
The Declining Significance of Race
As with the end of slavery, the dissolution of the Jim Crow laws and greater equality did not lead to the kind of life that most African Americans envisioned. In many cases, greater equality has led to greater problems. African-American Sociologist William Julius Wilson1 2argues that the changing institutions and changing economic structures in the United States have changed race relations to the extent that the previous barriers [to integration and equality of opportunity] were usually designed to control and restrict the entire black population, the new barriers create hardships essentially for the black underclass; whereas the old barriers were based explicitly on racial motivations derived from intergroup contact, the new barriers have racial significance only in their consequences not in their origins.3 In other words, the patterns of pathology are a consequence of the new economic structure in which class subordination is of greater moment than “racial oppression in the economic sphere.4Wilson argues, class has become more important than race in determining black access to privilege and power which clearly supports the notion that the egregiously low numbers of black business ownership is indicative of lack of power and privilege in the black community.5
Wilson, in “The Declining Significance of Race” argues that the United States is in the last of three stages of race relations: 1) preindustrial—the plantation economy and racial-caste oppression; 2) industrial—industrial expansion, class conflict, and racial oppression; 3) modern industrial—progressive transition from racial inequalities to class inequalities.6 In other words, the United States has moved from direct institutional discrimination wherein skin color was almost completely determinant of a person’s life chances to indirect institutional discrimination which, although latent, is more insidious and has racism as a consequence rather than a goal.7 Wilson’s basic argument in this article is that the form of the economy determines the form of the structural relations between racial and class groups and which thereby produce different patterns of intergroup interaction.8
Wilson further argues, that the government must provide leadership and support for affirmative action in order for the economic inroads made by minorities to hold.9The problem for blacks today, in terms of government practices, is no longer one of legalized racial inequality. Rather the problem for blacks especially the black underclass, is that the government is not organized to deal with the new barriers imposed by structural changes in the economy.10 Government, Wilson argues, seems unable (unwilling?) to intervene among the at-risk lower-class blacks and the black underclass in order to prepare them to compete on a level playing field for those “good,” or first tier, jobs that their middle class black brothers and sisters are already accessing.11 The illusion that, when the needs of the black middle class were met, so were the needs of the entire black community is apparently still very much with us even though, the current problems of lower-class blacks are substantially related to fundamental structural changes in the economy. A history of discrimination and oppression created a huge black underclass, and the technological and economic revolutions have combined to insure it a permanent status.12 The data on unemployment in the black community, on poverty levels in the black community, and on the dearth of black business ownership support and are supported by Wilson’s theory that is the economy that drives inequality not just the color of one’s skin.
Harrison and Bennett maintain that residential segregation leads to distrust, fear, and animosity on both sides, planting the seeds of discriminatory and pejorative treatment.13
In “The Truly Disadvantaged” Wilson argues that, unlike the present period [1987], inner-city communities prior to 1960 exhibited the features of social organization—including a sense of community, positive neighborhood identification, and explicit norms and sanctions against aberrant behavior.14 Since 1960, Wilson argues, the inner-city has experienced severe social dislocation including: 1) the increase in the number of youth; 2) extreme unemployment; 3) very high school-dropout rates; 4) hyperghettoization15 5) a severe lack of social organization; 6) poverty; 7) welfare dependency; 8) criminal activity; 9) unemployability.16
Wilson discusses two factors , both of which are components of hyperghettoization, which may seen as causative agents in the pathology of the inner-city:
. . . concentration effects and social buffers. The former refers to the constraints and opportunities associated with living in a neighborhood in which the population is overwhelmingly socially disadvantaged—constraints and opportunities that include the kinds of ecological niches that the residents of these communities occupy in terms of access to jobs, availability of marriage partners, and exposure to conventional role models. The latter refers to the presence of a sufficient number of working- and middle-class professional families to absorb the shock or cushion the effect of uneven economic growth and periodic recessions on inner-city neighborhoods. . . . the removal of these families made it more difficult to sustain the basic institutions in the inner city (including churches, stores, schools, recreational facilities, etc.) in the face of prolonged joblessness.17
Wilson further contends that the extreme levels of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and single-mother headed families are a concomitant of that very joblessness. The black “male marriageable pool” has been reduced because young black women are confronting a shrinking pool of ‘marriageable’ (that is economically stable) men.18 It seems quite clear that another factor in the reduction of the black male marriageable pool is the high rate of incarceration of black men. Indeed, it is probable that the incarceration rates are also tightly tied to joblessness.
Wilson maintains that the government must intervene in order to raise the underclass out of its disadvantaged position. Like Tumin,19 Wilson believes that creaming is inhibited by stratification—the underclass and its potential talent remains hidden from and therefore unused by the wider society.
A Piece of the Pie
Stanley Lieberson’s article, “A Piece of the Pie” deals with the different paths taken (available?) to black Americans and white-ethnic immigrants since 1880. His primary thesis is that the new Europeans have ‘made it’ to a degree far in excess of that which would have been expected or predicted at the time of their arrival here. It is also equally apparent that blacks have not.20Lieberson argues that migrants from different sources will have different opportunities for jobs—emigrants from countries with high standards of living will have relatively higher skill levels and will be able to demand relatively higher wages overall, than their counterparts from countries with lower standards, or black Americans from the rural, low-standard-of-living, post-reconstruction South. Furthermore, Lieberson maintains that Bonacich’s split-labor market theory applies as a controlling factor in the kinds of jobs available for new immigrants and Southern blacks. However, Lieberson contends that, because there are no solid wage data for the groups in comparable work which also take into account the cost of living encountered in each [sending] nation and South21 from the late nineteenth century from which to make comparisons between black Americans and white-ethnic immigrants. Lieberson uses, instead, life expectancy to compare standards of living.22
In 1880 the life expectancy for male and female emigrants from South-Central-Eastern Europe (SCE) and for black male and female Americans was 27 and 29, and 22 and 26 years respectively. Lieberson’s life expectancy chart clearly shows that, from 1880-1920 the life expectancy of blacks is consistently shorter than that for white-ethnic immigrants. Current life expectancy rates strongly indicate that the consistent pattern shown by Lieberson is not only consistent but is persistent over time. Lieberson explains this persistent pattern by saying, if the European and black life table values represent differences in levels of living, then there is some reason to expect that the new Europeans might start off in a more favorable position that would blacks in the North even if there was no discrimination.23 However, Lieberson looks beyond these “intrinsic differences” in order to determine why more discrimination was directed at blacks as well as why other forces have maintained these gaps.24 A major reason for racial discrimination against black Americans may simply be, according to Lieberson, that “social events have a life of their own; once established, the customs persist long after causes vanish.25
Once again, however, economics is the governing factor in the persistent discrimination against blacks, as Lieberson states, the racial emphasis resulted from the use of the most obvious feature(s) of the group to support the intergroup conflict generated by a fear of blacks based on their threat as economic competitors.26 Moreover, as Lieberson compares the economic success and well-being of SCEs and American blacks, Lieberson makes it clear that American blacks’ playing field was inherently different and inherently worse.27 When one’s life chances are dictated by the color of one’s skin, and when those life chances are greatly lessened by the color of one’s skin, social pathologies, as Wilson argues, arise. We must never forget, Lieberson makes clear, that African Americans started out, in America, as involuntary immigrants—as slaves, chattel, property—and this simple fact, coupled with the de jure discrimination of Jim Crow and Plessy, must be kept in mind when comparing the economic successes of blacks and whites in America.28
“The Tangle of Pathology”
Almost contemporaneously with the Kerner Commission report (1968), Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1927-2003; U. S. Senator from New York 1977-2001) wrote an article that generated a fire-storm of controversy. In that article, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (1965) and in subsequent literature with co-author Nathan Glazer (Beyond the Melting Pot) Moynihan argued that the family structure of the American Negro29 community was non-mainstream and led to pathological behavior, the Negro community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out of line with the rest of the American society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on the Negro male . . . it is clearly a disadvantage for a minority group to be operating on one principle, while the great majority of the population, and the one with the most advantages is operating on another.30
Moynihan further argues that this structure engenders and perpetuates pathological behavior such as male unemployment, poverty, out-of-wedlock births, single-mother-headed households, and inadequate education. As a precursor to Wilson, Moynihan discusses the effects of hyperghettoization, the illegitimacy rate, the IQ levels of fatherless, poor Negro children, and the great strides made by the Negro middle class. Moreover, he, along with Wilson and Reich states, it might be estimated that as much as half of the Negro community falls into the middle class, however, the remaining half is in desperate and deteriorating circumstances.31 In 1993, thirty years after Moynihan’s article, the illegitimacy rate of black women was a staggering 68.7%! In fact roughly two-thirds of black children are born outside of marriage, and a minority of black children currently reside in two-parent families.32 33Moynihan also contends that joblessness, inadequate preparation for jobs, and lack of exposure to mainstream work ethics are mechanisms of a pathology that is almost exclusively relegated to poor, inner-city blacks who are more and more separated from white society.34
The More Things Change . . .
The more things change, the more they stay the same. The Southern Poverty Law Center has found a 75% increase in the number of hate-based groups and hate-based web sites in the past 5 years.
In 1903 W.E.B. DuBois wrote: The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line. Given the social pathologies entrenched in the African American community, what can be done to solve their problems? Who is responsible for “fixing” the problems of black poverty, drug abuse, criminality, out-of-wedlock pregnancy, male abandonment, single-female heads-of-household, drop-out rates, and lower-than-average college admissions test scores?
Many conservative African Americans argue that white liberal guilt, welfare programs, and social engineering have removed the prize from the grasp of African Americans and have created a society in which freedom is no longer possible. Such conservative apologists include such well known and highly respected academics and social theorists as Stanley Crouch, Thomas Sowell, and Shelby Steele. African American conservatives have argued that it is the responsibility of all blacks to take responsibility for the problems and social pathologies that exist in the black community and to stop making excuses for black poverty, drug abuse, criminality, out-of-wedlock pregnancy, male abandonment, single-female heads-of-household, drop-out rates, and lower-than-average college admissions test scores. Most recently, in 2009, President Barack Obama called on African Americans to be more involved in the lives of their children and to take responsibility for their families.
W.E.B. DuBois made a similar argument 100 years ago, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X (later Malcolm al Haj Shabazz), made the same argument 40 years ago, and we are still enmeshed in the same argument today
Perhaps the problem of the 21st century is: Who is right? Who is responsible for African American progress in the 21st century. “Eyes on the Prize” of freedom was the theme of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s. What is the prize now? How do we—all Americas—define “the prize” and “keep our eyes on the prize” in 21st century America?
The Black National Anthem
The Black National Anthem (Listen to this song by the Tennessee State University Choir)
By James Weldon Johnson (1900)
Lift every voice and sing Till earth and heaven ring, Ring with the harmonies of Liberty; Let our rejoicing rise High as the listening skies, Let it resound loud as the rolling sea. Sing a song full of the faith that the dark past has taught us, Sing a song full of the hope that the present has brought us, Facing the rising sun of our new day begun Let us march on till victory is won. * * * * * Stony the road we trod, Bitter the chastening rod, Felt in the days when hope unborn had died; Yet with a steady beat, Have not our weary feet Come to the place for which our fathers sighed? We have come over a way that with tears has been watered, We have come, treading our path through the blood of the slaughtered, Out from the gloomy past, Till now we stand at last Where the white gleam of our bright star is cast. * * * * * God of our weary years, God of our silent tears, Thou who has brought us thus far on the way; Thou who has by Thy might Led us into the light, Keep us forever in the path, we pray. Lest our feet stray from the places, Our God, where we met Thee, Lest, our hearts drunk with the wine of the world, we forget Thee; Shadowed beneath Thy hand, May we forever stand. True to our GOD, True to our native land.
Footnotes
• 1 Wilson, William Julius. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1987. Pp 520-529.
• 2 Wilson, William Julius. The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1980.
• 3 In David B. Grusky, Ed. Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Genderin Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Pp 520-529.
• 4 Ibid.
• 5 Ibid.
• 6 Ibid.
• 7 Oettinger, personal communication; 1997.
• 8 In David B. Grusky, Ed. Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Gender in Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Pp 520-529.
• 9 Ibid.
• 10 Ibid. Emphasis added.
• 11 Ibid.
• 12 Ibid.
• 13 Harrison, Roderick J. and Claudette E. Bennett. Racial and Ethnic Diversity.” In State of the Union: America in the 1990s, Volume Two: Social Trends. Reynolds Farley, Ed. New York: Russell Sage, 1995.
• 14 In David B. Grusky, Ed. Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Genderin Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press. 1994.
• 15 . Hyperghettoization is not a word that Wilson uses in either of the articles being reviewed here. The term however, is one that has come to be of some significance in sociological discussions of the inner-city. Basically the term means that “the exodus of black middle-class professionals from the inner-city has been increasingly accompanied by a movement of stable working-class blacks to higher-income neighborhoods in other parts of the city and to the suburbs . . .[leaving] today's ghetto residents [to] represent almost exclusively the most disadvantaged of the urban black community” thereby setting the scene for such pathologies as extremely high percentages of violent criminality, out-of-wedlock births, intractable joblessness, welfare dependency, and lack of job skills.
• 16 In David B. Grusky, Ed. Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Gender in Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Pp 520-529.
• 17 Ibid.
• 18 Ibid.
• 19 In David B. Grusky, Ed. Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Gender in Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Pp 22-24.
• 20 In David B. Grusky, Ed. Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Gender in Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Pp 541-553.
• 21 Ibid.
• 22 Ibid.
• 23 Ibid.
• 24 Ibid.
• 25 Ibid.
• 26 Ibid. Emphasis added.
• 27 Ibid.
• 28 Ibid.
• 29 . Even though, in today's culture, it is seen as a sign of ignorance, political incorrectness, or derogation to use the word “Negro” to refer to African Americans, since the word was used by Moynihan this writer uses it in the context of discussing his article.
• 30 In David B. Grusky, Ed. Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Gender in Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Pp 555-559.
• 31 Ibid.
• 32 Hogan and Lichter, In David B. Grusky, Ed. Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Gender in Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. P 103.
• 33 Births to Unmarried Women by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Age ofMother: 1990 to 2006.
• 34 In David B. Grusky, Ed. Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Gender in Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Pp 555-559.
2.2.2 American Indians
Background in America
American Indians have been on this continent much longer than any other racial or ethnic group. Sometime between 17,000 and 30,000 years ago, hunter-gatherers from Siberia came across the frozen Bering Strait, or across a land bridge formed during the Ice Age, in search of game. Over the millennia, they became the people we call Native Americans or American Indians. They are the indigenous people of the North and South American continents.
Languages and Geographical Location of North American Indians
American Indians speak: English, Spanish, French, and over 150 Native Languages and thousands of dialects. American Indians come from: North America, United States, Mexico, Canada, Central America, South America and may be of any race—black, white, brown.
People are American Indians by virtue of a legal concept developed by Congress called “blood quantum” which means the amount of Native American ancestry that can be proven (1/8th). American Indians are the slowest growing racial/ethnic group in the U.S.
The question of who's really an American Indian, what with the variation in blood quantum requirements from tribe to tribe, is confusing enough, and it's mostly because the Federal government has a long history of meddling, claiming the right to tell Indian people who they are and who they ought to be. Blood Quantum is the total percentage of your blood that is tribal native due to bloodline. All of the Nations use Blood Quantum as a requirement for membership. Usually this is detailed on a CDIB (Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood) Card issued by the United States Government. Additionally, many of the Nations have other requirements for Membership. As to how it affects you, that is a matter of some debate. Some Native Americans will never recognize you as "Indian" unless you are an enrolled member of a Federally Recognized Tribe, Band, or Nation. Others will recognize you as "Indian" if you are making an honest effort to reconnect with your own ancestral culture. Today over three hundred American Indian tribes (excluding Alaskan villages) in the United States are by treaty or executive order recognized by the federal government and receive services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. There are additionally some 125 to 150 groups seeking federal recognition, and dozens of others that might do so in the future.1
How many native peoples were in the Americas when the first white people came is a matter of conjecture.
The population of North America prior to the first sustained European contact in 1492 CE is a matter of active debate. Various estimates of the pre-contact Native population of the continental U.S. and Canada range from 1.8 to over 12 million. Over the next four centuries, their numbers were reduced to about 237,000 as Natives were almost wiped out. Author Carmen Bernand estimates that the Native population of what is now Mexico was reduced from 30 million to only 3 million over four decades. Peter Montague estimates that Europeans once ruled over 100 million Natives throughout the Americas. European extermination of Natives started with Christopher Columbus' arrival in San Salvador in 1492. Native population dropped dramatically over the next few decades. Some were directly murdered by Europeans. Others died indirectly as a result of contact with introduced diseases for which they had no resistance -- mainly smallpox, influenza, and measles. Later European Christian invaders systematically murdered additional Aboriginal people, from the Canadian Arctic to South America. They used warfare, death marches, forced relocation to barren lands, destruction of their main food supply -- the Buffalo -- and poisoning. Some Europeans actually shot at Indians for target practice.2
(For more information about the genocide of the native peoples of the Americas, please see the following websites: The American Indian Genocide Museum; Were American Indians the Victims of Genocide? by Guenter Lewy; American Indian Holocaust.)
Some of the first native people to be identified by archaeologists are the Clovis people; so called because many of their artifacts were originally found near present-day Clovis, New Mexico. According to Time Team America: “The Clovis people were Paleoindians who roamed the Americas around 13,000 years ago. Clovis people are thought to have made their way over the Bering land bridge, following large game down through the ice-free corridor into the unfrozen lands of North America. Named for a town in New Mexico where the distinctive tools were first found in the 1930s, the Clovis "tool bag" has now been found across the United States.”3
The so-called Clovis people, known for their distinctive spearheads, were not the first humans to set foot in the Americas after all, a new study says. The find supports growing archaeological evidence found in recent years that disputes the notion that the Americas were originally populated by a single migration of people from Asia about 13,000 years ago.4
One major archaeological American Indian site is located in Illinois.
According to archaeological finds, the city of Cahokia was inhabited from about A.D. 700 to 1400. At its peak, from A.D. 1050 to 1200, the city covered nearly six square miles and 10,000 to 20,000 people lived here. Over 120 mounds were built over time, and most of the mounds were enlarged several times. Houses were arranged in rows and around open plazas, and vast agricultural fields lay outside the city.
The site is named for the Cahokia subtribe of the Illiniwek (or Illinois tribe, a loose confederacy of related peoples), who moved into the area in the 1600s. They were living nearby when the French arrived about 1699. Sometime in the mid-1800s, local historians suggested the site be called "Cahokia" to honor these later arrivals.
Archaeological investigations and scientific tests, mostly since the 1920s and especially since the 1960s, have provided what is known of the once-thriving community. 5
Like the Clovis people, we know the Cahokia people only from their artifacts; we have no living representatives of these peoples to tell the tales of the North American mound builders.
In the Southwestern United States, in the area of Chaco Canyon, there was a tribal group that the Hopi people and the archaeologists who first excavated the area called the Anasazi.
The ancestral Puebloan homeland was centered in the Four Corners region of the Colorado Plateau-- southern Utah, northern Arizona, northwest New Mexico, and a lesser section of Colorado-- where their occupation lasted until 1280 or so. By 1300 AD the population centers had shifted south to the Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico and the Mogollon Rim in central Arizona, where related people had already been living for centuries. The Spanish who arrived in the 1500s named them the Pueblos, meaning "villagers," as distinct from nomadic people. Modern Pueblo people dislike the name "Anasazi" which they consider an ethnic slur. This Navajo word means ancient enemy (or “old-time” stranger, alien, foreigner, outsider) although it has been in common use for about about 70 years. 6
These cliff dwellers lived in “high rise” pueblos from circa 1500 BCE to circa 1300 CE and as with many ancient peoples, we know them from the ruins they left behind.
The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at Austin has a wide variety of historical maps of the United States. For the purposes of this discussion, the following maps are of particular interest because they show the location/territory of the early Indian tribes in the US. Early Inhabitants (From The National Atlas of the United States of America (Arch C. Gerlach, editor). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Geological Survey, 1970). Early Indian Tribes, Culture Areas, and Linguistic Stocks - Eastern U.S. (632K). Early Indian Tribes, Culture Areas, and Linguistic Stocks - Western U.S. (639K). Early Indian Tribes, Culture Areas, and Linguistic Stocks - Alaska (942K) Exploration and Settlement (Except as noted, from The National Atlas of the United States of America (Arch C. Gerlach, editor). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Geological Survey, 1970). Exploration and Settlement Before 1675 (1.13MB). The Coronado Expedition 1540-1542 (135K) U.S. National Park Service, 1974.
Exploration and Settlement 1675-1800 (1.17MB). Exploration and Settlement 1800-1820 (1.11MB). Westward Expansion and Exploration 1803-1807 From American Military History, United States Army Center of Military History, 1989 (194K). Lewis and Clark Expedition 1804-1806 "Lewis and Clark Expedition Historical Map" [poster] National Imagery and Mapping Agency, ca. 2003. Facsimile of "Lewis and Clark's Track Across the Western Portion of North America from the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean: by order of the executive of the United States in 1804, 5 & 6, copied by Samuel Lewis from the original drawing of Wm. Clark; Saml. Harrison, fct." 1814 (2.1MB).
The Library of Congress houses amazing collections of just about anything imaginable including many photographs. Edward S. Curtis's The North American Indian: Photographic Images is replete with photographs of native people from the early 20th century. The National Congress of American Indians lists 580 different tribal groups designated by the US government. On their website Native Languages of the Americas: List of Native American Indian Tribes and Languages there is an Alphabetical master list of American Indian tribes and languages and a Chart of Native American tribal names in their original language and their current version among other interesting features. The American Indian Resource Directory also has lists of tribal groups.
Indians Today
Concerning modern American Indians, Gary D. Sandefur, a professor of social work and sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and an affiliate of the Institute for Research on Poverty writes:
How American Indians came to be concentrated on reservations is a complicated story that most Americans know only very little about from their courses in American history in high school and college. The isolation and concentration of American Indians began very early, but it received its first legal justification in the Indian Removal Act of 1830. Subsequent to the passage of this legislation, most of the Indians who were located east of the Mississippi were relocated to areas west of the river. This relocation included groups such as the Seneca, who were forced to leave the state of New York and eventually ended up in a small area in what is now northeastern Oklahoma; the Sauk Indians, who were forced to leave the Midwest and now live in a small area in north-central Oklahoma; and the Cherokee, who were forced to leave the Southeast for eastern Oklahoma. Those Indians who did not move west of the Mississippi were compelled to give up large portions of land over which they had previously had control and were concentrated on increasingly small and geographically isolated areas. The Chippewa in Wisconsin, for example, gave up control of the northern third of the state and retained only a very small amount of land for their own use. As the population of European origin in the United States began to surge west of the Mississippi in the late 1800s, there was increasing pressure on the recently removed groups such as the Cherokee to give up some of their new land, and on the groups indigenous to the West, such as the Sioux, to give up large amounts of land traditionally under their control. Some of this further expulsion was accomplished in a relatively peaceful manner through treaties, and some was accomplished through violent military confrontation. The lands reserved for Indian use were generally regarded as the least desirable by whites and were almost always located far from major population centers, trails, and transportation routes that later became part of the modern system of metropolitan areas, highways, and railroads. In sum, for most of the nineteenth century the policy of the U.S. government was to isolate and concentrate Indians in places with few natural resources, far from contact with the developing U.S. economy and society. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the federal government revised its principal approach to the "Indian problem" to one of forced assimilation rather than forced isolation. This change in policy was in part motivated by awareness that the quality of life on the isolated reservations was very, very low. The concerns about the reservations resembled in many respects the current analyses of problems in the central city. The Eastern media and intellectuals viewed the conditions on the reservations as unacceptable and in need of immediate and drastic action. This assimilation was to be accomplished through allotment policy, and the first allotment legislation (the Dawes Act) was passed in 1887. The basic idea was to divide into smaller parcels (often 160 acres) the small areas of land that were at that time controlled by the various groups of Indians, and to allot one of these parcels to each Indian in the particular tribe. The goal of this policy was to enable Indians to become farmers or ranchers, the major occupations in the areas where Indians were located, and full members of American society. A side benefit was that "surplus" land was purchased from Indian groups at low prices and opened up for white settlement. Allotment did not have the desired healthy consequences for American Indians. The conclusion of most observers was that the Indian groups who experienced allotment were no better off, and in some cases worse off, than before. The enthusiasm for allotment as a solution to the Indian problem gradually subsided, and many reservations remained intact. The next major attack on the reservation system occurred in the early 1950s. Public opinion and political leaders were distressed by the miserable living conditions on Indian reservations, on the one hand, and the special legal relationship between American Indian groups and the federal government, on the other hand. In 1953, termination legislation was passed and signed into law. The intent of this legislation was to end the special relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government. Reservations would cease to exist as independent political entities. To accompany this program, The federal government also instituted an employment and relocation program which provided financial assistance and social services to Indians who wanted to leave reservations and isolated rural areas for urban areas with supposedly better employment prospects. Only a few tribes were terminated before this approach was abandoned, but a very limited relocation and employment assistance program is still in place. Since the 1950s the proportion of the American Indian population living on reservations has declined from over 50 percent to approximately 25 percent in 1980. This decline has been due to the migration of American Indians away from these impoverished, isolated areas. In 1980, 336,384 American Indians lived on reservations. Although some of these reservations are quite small, 250,379 Indians lived on 36 reservations with populations of 2,000 or more. Three-quarters of these Indians lived on the 18 reservations that had poverty rates of 40 percent or higher. In other words, approximately 14 percent of all American Indians in 1980 lived on large reservations with poverty rates of 40 percent or higher.7
The US Department of the Interior website states that:
The United States has a unique legal and political relationship with Indian tribes and Alaska Native entities as provided by the Constitution of the United States, treaties, court decisions and Federal statutes. Within the government-to-government relationship, Indian Affairs provides services directly or through contracts, grants, or compacts to 564 federally recognized tribes with a service population of about 1.9 million American Indian and Alaska Natives. While the role of Indian Affairs has changed significantly in the last three decades in response to a greater emphasis on Indian self-governance and self-determination, Tribes still look to Indian Affairs for a broad spectrum of services.” The Indian Affairs offers an extensive scope of programs that covers the entire range of Federal, State and local government services. Programs administered by either Tribes or Indian Affairs through the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) include an education system consisting of 183 schools and dormitories educating approximately 42,000 elementary and secondary students and 28 tribal colleges, universities, and post-secondary schools. Programs administered through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) include social services, natural resources management on trust lands representing 55 million surface acres and 57 million acres of subsurface minerals estates, economic development programs in some of the most isolated and economically depressed areas of the United States, law enforcement and detention services, administration of tribal courts, implementation of land and water claim settlements, housing improvement, disaster relief, replacement and repair of schools, repair and maintenance of roads and bridges, and the repair of structural deficiencies on high hazard dams, the BIA operates a series irrigation systems and provides electricity to a rural parts of Arizona.8
Indian Boarding Schools (Kill the Indian, Save the Man)
Quaker and missionary reformers explored new methods to 'civilize' the Indians. They were uncomfortable with extermination policies and began to formulate ideas of assimilation. These methods appealed to Richard Henry Pratt, who was already experimenting with his Ft. Marion charges. He agreed that to 'civilize' the Indian would be to turn him into a copy of his God-fearing, soil-tilling, white brother. By the end of their term of incarceration (1878), Pratt had convinced 17 prisoners to further their education by enrolling in the Hampton Institute in Virginia. Hampton was founded in 1868 by Samuel Chapman Armstrong. It was a government boarding school for African-American children designed to educate by training "the head, the hand, and the heart.” Its goal was to train and return them to their communities to become leaders and professionals among their people. This fit Pratt's developing philosophies about assimilation, with the exception of returning to community. He began to formulate a model similar to Hampton - but exclusively for Indians. In an address to a convention of Baptist ministers in 1883 Pratt wrote: "In Indian civilization I am a Baptist, because I believe in immersing the Indians in our civilization and when we get them under holding them there until they are thoroughly soaked." So Pratt began his aggressive and relentless quest for a school of his own to begin his work. He lobbied Washington; he contacted his wealthy supporters in the East and convinced the powers that be that his experiment would be a success. He would take Indian children from the reservations, remove them to a school far away from tribal influences, and transform them. Pratt lobbied politicians for support for the school. He often visited Washington or entertained dignitaries at Carlisle. One of his early supporters was Senator Henry Dawes, author of the General Allotment Act, the US government policy which resulted in the loss of more than 40% of tribal lands. Pratt's assimilationist policies for education for Indians coupled with Dawes' checkerboarding allotment legislation formed a perceived potential solution for the "Indian Problem" of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. [This person] evidently has the idea of Indians that Buffalo Bill and other [wild west] showmen keep alive, by hiring the reservation wild man to dress in his most hideous costume of feathers, paint, moccasins, blanket, leggins, and scalp lock, and to display his savagery, by hair lifting war-whoops make those who pay to see him, think he is a blood-thirsty creature ready to devour people alive. It is this nature in our red brother that is better dead than alive, and when we agree with the oft-repeated sentiment that the only good Indian is a dead one, we mean this characteristic of the Indian. Carlisle's mission is to kill THIS Indian, as we build up the better man.9
Demographics
There are about 3 million Native Americans currently living in the US. Their tribal affiliations (as of census 2000) are16% Cherokee, 12% Navajo, 6% Chippewa, 6% Sioux, 4% Choctaw, 46% all other tribes. Less than 2% of the US population is Native American with 22.3% living on reservations and trust lands; 10.2% living in tribal jurisdiction statistical areas; 2.7% in tribal designated statistical areas; 2.4% in Alaska native village statistical areas. However, the largest group of American Indians, 62.3%, do not live on traditional tribal lands or reservations. 6.25% of all American Indians live in the Northeast US, 17.93% of all American Indians live in the Midwest US, 30.21% of all American Indians live in the Southern US, and 45.59% of all American Indians live in the Western US.10
States with Largest Native American Population11 Ibid.
Figure 1.
Ten Largest Reservations (218,320 or 14%)12 Ibid.
Figure 2.
2.2.3 Asian Americans
Asian people have been in the US for hundreds of years and there is even some historical evidence that Chinese explorers reached the far Western coast of the US decades before Columbus; according to Gavin Menzies, a former submarine commanding officer who has spent 14 years charting the movements of a Chinese expeditionary fleet between 1421 and 1423, the eunuch admiral, Zheng He, was there first.1234 It can even be argued that the native American Indians are immigrants from Asia because thousands of years ago they crossed a land bridge from Asia into North America. Asia is the planet's largest continent, Asia covers about 30 percent of the world's landmass and includes (44) countries and assorted islands and/or dependencies. Significant features of the continent of Asia include the world's tallest mountain, Mt Everest in Nepal (and China), rising to 29,035 ft (8,850m). It also includes the world's lowest point, found in the Dead Sea, Israel/Jordan, at 1,286 ft (392m) below sea level. In addition, the continent includes the world's most populated countries, China and India; the world's longest coastline, the world's deepest lake; Lake Baykal, and some of the most important rivers on the planet.5
Figure 1.
Because of the size of Asia, the people from that continent speak too many languages to list, but among those languages are: Cantonese, English, French, Fukinese, Hindi, Hmong, Japanese, Korean, Tagalog, and Vietnamese. Asian Americans can trace their backgrounds to: Mongolia, China, Japan, Siberia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Borneo, Tibet, New Guinea, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Nepal, Polynesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Melanesia, Myanmar (Burma), Brunei, Micronesia, Melanesia, Malaysia, Korea. Asian Americans may be white, brown, or black and may or may not have epicanthic eye folds. Asian Americans are culturally, linguistically, religiously, politically, racially, and ethnically diverse. Because of their supposed educational and economic success, they have been called a “model minority.” However, in many ways this is a misnomer and creates problems for many Asian Americans. The term “model minority” presumes that all Asian Americans are high achievers and all Asian Americans are economically and educationally successful, but, as with any group, this is a stereotype and economic and educational success and failure are as equally divided among Asian Americans as they are among any other racial or ethnic group. Moreover, the idea of a “model minority” also makes the assumption that there is something wrong with all other minorities if they don’t “measure up” to Asian Americans. Therefore, “model minority” is a racist idea and a racist term. And, as with any other non-white minority, Asians have suffered from discrimination in the form of wide-spread, generalized anti-Asian sentiment as well as discriminatory laws that prevented Asians from becoming citizens, prohibited land ownership, inhibited immigration, and generally made the lives of Asian-Americans difficult at best. Nonetheless, Asians have come to the US in small but relatively constant numbers before the founding of the country. They have also prospered in spite of the limitations placed on them.
The early Chinese immigrants were begrudgingly accepted by Americans and were not the immediate targets of animosity or violence. However, taxes aimed at foreigners made earning wages difficult. California passed the foreign mine tax in the 1850s, which directly affected the majority of the Chinese immigrants who were working in the mines. In addition, they were required to pay an alien poll tax of \$2.50 per month until 1862, when it was declared unconstitutional. Additional discriminatory legislation the Chinese faced during the latter half of the 19th century pertained to segregated schools, lodging ordinances, laundry licensing fees, prohibition of intermarriage with whites, and bans from sections of cities. In 1854, a California judge's ruling barred Chinese immigrants from testifying in court after the testimonies of Chinese witnesses resulted in the murder conviction of a white man. The judge reversed the verdict citing the Criminal Act of 1850, which had previously prohibited blacks, mulattos, and Indians from testifying for or against a white man. By 1855 Chinese merchants began organizing to protest these and other discriminatory acts. Eventually this organization became known as the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, or the Chinese Six Companies. The Chinese Six Companies settled arguments within their own community, negotiated between the Chinese people and the federal and state governments, and hired lawyers to challenge unfair practices in court. The main sources of anti-Chinese sentiment during this time were workers' groups who described the influx of Asian workers to the United States as ‘yellow peril.’ In addition to widespread intolerance for people of color, many labor groups held that cheap immigrant labor would lower wages for American workers. In the 1870s, the Anti-Coolies Association and the Supreme Order of the Caucasians ran boycotts of Chinese businesses and laborers and caused riots in Chinatowns across the West. Many immigrants returned to China, while others fled to San Francisco, home to the largest Chinese community and Chinatown in the United States.7
Demographics
There Are 10.9 Million Asians Currently Living in the US. They come from all over Asia, but the largest countries of origin are shown in the figure below.
Countries of Origin
Figure 2.
About 4% of the US population is Asian with 18% living in the Northeast US, 10% living in the Midwest, 20% in the South, and 53% in the West. Nearly half of all Asians live in a central city within a major metropolitan area.
States with Largest Asian Populations
Figure 3.
Metropolitan Areas with Largest Asian Populations
Figure 4.
Asians are younger compared to white Americans: 29% of all Asians are under 18 (compared to 23.5% for non-Hispanic whites), 64.0% are between 18-64 (compared to 62.4% for non-Hispanic whites), and 7.0% are over 65 (compared to 14% for non-Hispanic whites). Asians have larger than average families: 23.0% have five or more members (as compared to 11.8% for non-Hispanic whites); also Asians are less likely to marry—34% have never married (compared to 24.5% of non-Hispanic whites)—but only half as likely to be divorced as non-Hispanic whites. Asians do receive more education: only 8% did not go past 9th grade as compared to 4.2% for non-Hispanic whites, while 15% went to high school but did not graduate as compared to 7.3% for non-Hispanic whites. And although only 45% are high school graduates as compared to 60.3% for non-Hispanic whites, 85% have at least a high school diploma as compared to 88.4% for non-Hispanic whites. When it comes to higher education however, the numbers shift dramatically—42% of all Asian Americans have a bachelors degree as compare to 28.1% for non-Hispanic whites. Asians are employed (and unemployed) at about the same rate as non-Hispanic whites but are more likely to work in managerial and professional occupations. However, Asians are more likely to be poor than non-Hispanic whites: 13% of all Asians live in poverty as compared to 8% of non-Hispanic whites, 11% of all poor in the US are Asian, 18% of all Asian children are poor as compared to 11% of all non-Hispanic whites. But, Asian Americans are slightly more likely to have high incomes: 59% of Asian Americans earn \$50,000-\$75,000 annually compared to 58% for non-Hispanic whites while 25% earn \$25,000-\$50,000 as compared to 28% for non-Hispanic whites.
Asian American Business Ownership
Figure 5.
A Chronology
Asians have been in the Americas permanently since the 1600s, and although they have never been a large segment of the American population they have still been an important addition to the American character. This chronology lists some of the most important events in the lives of Asians in America.
1600s—Chinese and Filipinos reach Mexico on ships of the Manila galleon.
1830s—Chinese "sugar masters" begin working in Hawaii, while Chinese sailors and peddlers arrive in New York.
1839-1844—US and China sign first treaty: the Treaty of Wangxia
1848—Gold discovered in California, Chinese begin to arrive.
1850—California imposes Foreign Miner's Tax and enforces it mainly against Chinese miners, who often had to pay more than once.
1852—First group of 195 Chinese contract laborers land in Hawaii. Over 20,000 Chinese enter California primarily due to the gold rush. Chinese first appear in court in California. Missionary William Speer opens Presbyterian mission for Chinese in San Francisco.
1854—Chinese in Hawaii establish a funeral society, their first community association in the islands. People v Hall rules that Chinese can't give testimony in court. US and Japan sign first treaty: The Treaty of Kanagawa
1857—San Francisco opens a school for Chinese children (changed to an evening school two years later). Missionary Augustus Loomis arrives to serve the Chinese in San Francisco.
1858—California passes a law to bar entry of Chinese and "Mongolians."
1860—Japan sends a diplomatic mission to US.
1862—Six Chinese district associations in San Francisco form loose federation. California imposes a "police tax" of \$250 a month on every Chinese, this was called the anti-coolie tax.
1865—Central Pacific Railroad Company recruits Chinese workers for the transcontinental railroad.8
1867—Two thousand Chinese railroad workers strike for a week.
1868—US and China sign Burlingame-Seward Treaty recognizing rights of their citizens to emigrate. Eugene Van Reed illegally ships 149 Japanese laborers to Hawaii.
Sam Damon9 opens Sunday school for Chinese in Hawaii.
1869—Completion of first transcontinental railroad.10 JH Schnell takes several dozen Japanese to California to establish the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony.11 Chinese Christian evangelist SP Aheong starts preaching in Hawaii.
1870—California passes a law against the importation of Chinese, Japanese, and "Mongolian" women for prostitution.12Chinese railroad workers in Texas sue company for failing to pay wages.
1872—California's Civil Procedure Code drops law barring Chinese court testimony.
1875—Page Law bars entry of Chinese, Japanese, and "Mongolian" prostitutes, felons, and contract laborers.
1877—Anti-Chinese violence in Chico, California. Japanese Christians set up the Gospel Society in San Francisco, the first immigrant association formed by the Japanese.
1878—In re Ah Yup rules Chinese not eligible for naturalized citizenship. (For more information about this issue, please see the following websites: The Racial Classification Cases; Google Timeline for In re Ah Yup; Unsuitable Suitors by Deenesh Sohoni.)
1879—California's second constitution prevents municipalities and corporations from employing Chinese. California state legislature passes law requiring all incorporated towns and cities to expel Chinese to outside of city limits, but US circuit court declares the law unconstitutional.
1880—US and China sign treaty giving the US the right to limit but "not absolutely prohibit" Chinese immigration. Section 69 of California's Civil Code prohibits issuing of licenses for marriages between whites and "Mongolians, Negroes, mulattoes and persons of mixed blood."
1881—Hawaiian King Kalakaua visits Japan during his world tour. Sit Moon becomes pastor of the first Chinese Christian church in Hawaii.
1882—Chinese Exclusion Law suspends immigration of laborers for ten years. Chinese community leaders form Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA or Chinese Six Companies) in San Francisco. US and Korea sign first treaty. Chinese Exclusion Law amended to require a certificate as the only permissible evidence for reentry.
1883—Chinese in New York establish CCBA.
1884—Joseph and Mary Tape sue San Francisco school board to enroll their daughter Mamie in a public school. Chinese Six Companies sets up Chinese language school in San Francisco. United Chinese Society established in Honolulu. CCBA established in Vancouver.
1885—San Francisco builds new segregated "Oriental School." Anti-Chinese violence at Rock Springs, Wyoming Territory. First group of Japanese contract laborers arrives in Hawaii under the Irwin Convention.
1886—Residents of Tacoma, Seattle, and many places in the American West forcibly expel the Chinese. End of Chinese immigration to Hawaii. Chinese laundrymen win case in Yick Wo v Hopkins, which declares that a law with unequal impact on different groups is discriminatory.
1888—Scott Act renders 20,000 Chinese reentry certificates null and void.
1889—First Nishi Hongwanji priest from Japan arrives in Hawaii. Chae Chan Ping v US upholds constitutionality of Chinese exclusion laws; for Chinese Americans, this law had the same effect as Plessy v. Ferguson in that made discrimination based on race the law of the land.
1892—Geary Law renews exclusion of Chinese laborers for another ten years and requires all Chinese to register. Fong Yue Ting v US upholds constitutionality of Geary Law.
1893—Japanese in San Francisco form first trade association, the Japanese Shoemakers' League. Attempts are made to expel Chinese from towns in Southern California.
1894—Sun Yat-sen founds the Xingzhonghui in Honolulu. US circuit court in Massachusetts declares in In re Saito that Japanese are ineligible for naturalization. Japanese immigration to Hawaii under Irwin Convention ends and emigration companies take over.
1895—Lem Moon Sing v US rules that district courts can no longer review Chinese habeas corpus petitions for landing in the US.
1896—Shinsei Kaneko, a Japanese Californian, is naturalized. Bubonic plague scare in Honolulu - Chinatown burned.
1897—Nishi Hongwanji includes Hawaii as a mission field.
1898—Wong Kim Ark v US decides that Chinese born in the US can't be stripped of their citizenship. Japanese in San Francisco set up Young Men's Buddhist Association. US annexes Hawaii and the Philippines.
1899—Chinese reformers Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao tour North America to recruit members for the Baohuanghui. First Nishi Hongwanji priests arrive in California and set up North American Buddhist Mission.
1900—Japanese Hawaiian plantation workers begin going to the mainland after the Organic Act ended contract labor. Bubonic plague scare in San Francisco - Chinatown cordoned and quarantined.
1902—Chinese exclusion extended for another ten years. Immigration officials and the police raid Boston's Chinatown and, without search warrants, arrest almost 250 Chinese who allegedly had no registration certificates on their persons.
1903—First group of Korean workers arrives in Hawaii. 1500 Japanese and Mexican sugar beet workers strike in Oxnard, California. Koreans in Hawaii form Korean Evangelical Society. Filipino students (pensionados) arrive in the US for higher education.
1904—Chinese exclusion made indefinite and applicable to US insular possessions. Japanese plantation workers engage in first organized strike in Hawaii. Punjabi Sikhs begin to enter British Columbia.
1905—Chinese in the US and Hawaii support boycott of American products in China. Koreans establish Korean Episcopal Church in Hawaii and Korean Methodist Church in California. San Francisco School Board attempts to segregate Japanese schoolchildren.
1905—Korean emigration ends. Koreans in San Francisco form Mutual Assistance Society. Asiatic Exclusion League formed in San Francisco. Section 60 of California's Civil Code amended to forbid marriage between whites and "Mongolians."
1906—Anti-Asian riot in Vancouver. Japanese nurserymen form California Flower Growers' Association. Koreans establish Korean Presbyterian Church in Los Angeles. Japanese scientists studying the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake are stoned.
1907—Japan and the US reach "Gentlemen's Agreement" whereby Japan stops issuing passports to laborers desiring to emigrate to the US. President Theodore Roosevelt signs Executive Order 589 prohibiting Japanese with passports for Hawaii, Mexico, or Canada to re-emigrate to the US. Koreans form United Korean Society in Hawaii
First group of Filipino laborers arrives in Hawaii. Asian Indians are driven out of Bellingham, Washington.
1908—Japanese form Japanese Association of America. Canada curbs Asian Indian immigrants by denying entry to immigrants who haven't come by "continuous journey" from their homelands (there is no direct shipping between Indian and Canadian ports). Asian Indians are driven out of Live Oak, California.
1909—Koreans form Korean Nationalist Association. 7000 Japanese plantation workers strike major plantations on Oahu for four months.
1910—Administrative measures used to restrict influx of Asian Indians into California.
1911—Pablo Manlapit forms Filipino Higher Wages Association in Hawaii. Japanese form Japanese Association of Oregon in Portland.
1912—Sikhs build gurdwara in Stockton and establish Khalsa Diwan. Japanese in California hold statewide conference on Nisei education
1913—California passes alien land law prohibiting "aliens ineligible to citizenship" from buying land or leasing it for longer than three years. Sikhs in Washington and Oregon establish Hindustani Association. Asian Indians in California found the revolutionary Ghadar Party and start publishing a newspaper. Pablo Manlapit forms Filipino Unemployed Association in Hawaii. Japanese form Northwest Japanese Association of America in Seattle. Korean farm workers are driven out of Hemet, California.
1914—Aspiring Asian Indian immigrants who had chartered a ship to come to Canada by continuous journey are denied landing in Vancouver.
1915—Japanese form Central Japanese Association of Southern California and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce.
1917—Arizona passes an Alien Land Law. 1917 Immigration Law defines a geographic "barred zone" (including India) from which no immigrants can come. Syngman Rhee founds the Korean Christian Church in Hawaii.
1918—Servicemen of Asian ancestry who had served in World War I receive right of naturalization. Asian Indians form the Hindustani Welfare Reform Association in the Imperial and Coachella valleys in southern California.
1919—Japanese form Federation of Japanese Labor in Hawaii.
1920—10,000 Japanese and Filipino plantation workers go on strike. Japan stops issuing passports to picture brides due to anti-Japanese sentiments. Initiative in California ballot plugs up loopholes in the 1913 alien land law.
1921—Japanese farm workers driven out of Turlock, California. Filipinos establish a branch of the Caballeros Dimas Alang in San Francisco and a branch of the Legionarios del Trabajo in Honolulu. Washington and Louisiana pass alien land laws.
1922—Takao Ozawa v US declares Japanese not eligible for naturalized citizenship. New Mexico passes an alien land law. Cable Act declares that any American female citizen who marries "an alien ineligible to citizenship" would lose her citizenship.
1923—US v Bhagat Singh Thind declares Asian Indians not eligible for naturalized citizenship. Idaho, Montana, and Oregon pass alien land laws. Terrace v Thompson upholds constitutionality of Washington's alien land law. Porterfield v Webb upholds constitutionality of California's alien land law. Webb v O'Brien rules that sharecropping is illegal because it is a ruse that allows Japanese to possess and use land. Frick v Webb forbids aliens "ineligible to citizenship" from owning stocks in corporations formed for farming.
1924—Immigration Act (also titled the Johnson-Reid Act) denies entry to virtually all Asians. 1600 Filipino plantation workers strike for eight months in Hawaii.
1925—Warring tongs in North America's Chinatowns declare truce Hilario Moncado founds Filipino Federation of America.
1928—Filipino farm workers are driven out of Yakima Valley, Washington. Filipinos in Los Angeles form Filipino American Christian Fellowship.
1930—Anti-Filipino riot in Watsonville, California.
1931—Amendment to Cable Act declares that no American-born woman who loses her citizenship (by marrying an alien ineligible to citizenship) can be denied the right of naturalization at a later date.
1934—Tydings - McDuffie Act spells out procedure for eventual Philippine independence and reduces Filipino immigration to 50 persons a year. Filipino lettuce pickers in the Salinas Valley, California, go on strike.
1936—American Federation of Labor grants charter to a Filipino - Mexican union of fieldworkers.
1937—Last ethnic strike in Hawaii.
1938—150 Chinese women garment workers strike for three months against the National Dollar Stores (owned by a Chinese).
1940—AFL charters the Filipino Federated Agricultural Laborers Association.
1941—After declaring war on Japan, 2000 Japanese community leaders along Pacific Coast states and Hawaii are rounded up and interned in Department of Justice camps.
1942—President Franklin D Roosevelt signs Executive Order 9066 authorizing the secretary of war to delegate a military commander to designate military areas "from which any and all persons may be excluded" - primarily enforced against Japanese. Congress passes Public Law 503 to impose penal sanctions on anyone disobeying orders to carry out Executive Order 9066. Protests at Poston and Manzanar relocation centers.
1943—Protest at Topaz Relocation Center Registration crisis leads to Tule Lake Relocation Center's designation as a segregation center. Hawaiian Nisei in the 100th Battalion sent to Africa. Congress repeals all Chinese exclusion laws, grants right of naturalization and a small immigration quota to Chinese.
1944—Tule Lake placed under martial law. Draft reinstated for Nisei. Draft resistance at Heart Mountain Relocation Center. 442nd Regimental Combat Team gains fame. Exclusion orders revoked.
1946—Luce-Celler bill grants right of naturalization and small immigration quotas to Asian Indians and Filipinos. Wing F. Ong 13 becomes first Asian American to be elected to state office in the Arizona House of Representatives.
1947—Amendment to 1945 War Brides Act allows Chinese American veterans to bring brides into the US.
1949—5000 highly educated Chinese in the US granted refugee status after China institutes a Communist government.
1952—One clause of the McCarran - Walter Act grants the right of naturalization and a small immigration quota to Japanese.
1956—California repeals its alien land laws. Dalip Singh Saund from the Imperial Valley, California, is elected to Congress.
1962—Daniel K Inouye becomes US senator and Spark Matsunaga becomes US congressman from Hawaii.
1964—Patsy Takemoto Mink becomes first Asian American woman to serve in Congress as representative from Hawaii.
1965—Immigration Law abolishes "national origins" as basis for allocating immigration quotas to various countries - Asian countries now on equal footing.
1968—Students on strike at San Francisco State University to demand establishment of ethnic studies programs.
1969—Students at the University of California, Berkeley, go on strike for establishment of ethnic studies programs.
1974—March Fong Eu elected California's secretary of state. Lau v Nichols rules that school districts with children who speak little English must provide them with bilingual education.
1975—More than 130,000 refugees enter the US from Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos as Communist governments are established there.
1976—President Gerald Ford rescinds Executive Order 9066.
1978—National convention of the Japanese American Citizens League adopts resolution calling for redress and reparations for the internment of Japanese Americans. Massive exodus of "boat people" from Vietnam.
1979—Resumption of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America reunites members of long-separated Chinese American families.
1980—The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees set up an Orderly Departure Program to enable Vietnamese to emigrate legally.
1981—Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (set up by Congress) holds hearings across the country and concludes the internment was a "grave injustice" and that Executive Order 9066 resulted from "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership."
1982—Vincent Chin, a Chinese American draftsman, is clubbed to death with a baseball bat by two Euro-American men.
1983—Fred Korematsu, Min Yasui, and Gordon Hirabayashi file petitions to overturn their World War II convictions for violating the curfew and evacuation orders.
1986—Immigration Reform and Control Act imposes civil and criminal penalties on employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens.
1987—The US House of Representatives votes 243 to 141 to make an official apology to Japanese Americans and to pay each surviving internee \$20,000 in reparations.
1988—The US Senate votes 69% to 27 to support redress for Japanese Americans. American Homecoming Act allows children in Vietnam born of American fathers to emigrate to the US.
1989—President George Bush signs into law an entitlement program to pay each surviving Japanese American internee \$20,000. US reaches agreement with Vietnam to allow political prisoners to emigrate to the US.
Asian Americans Today
Discrimination and prejudice do not cease to exist merely because there are laws that protect the rights of people in the US regardless of race or ethnicity. Minority groups often hold racist or at the very least prejudicial stereotypes about each other which can lead to violence. Even in the political arena, people are much more likely to vote for a candidate who is of the same race or ethnicity as themselves even when that candidate may not be the best choice for the office. We are less likely to vote for people who are different from ourselves and minorities often do not support other minorities.14 Moreover, thinking back to Thomas’s Theorem—that which is perceived to be real is real in its consequences—it would take a concerted, deliberate effort by every person every day to not notice the race or ethnicity of others. Thus, Asian Nation. Org states:
As many social scientists have noted, there are two primary stereotypes that continue to affect Asian Americans. One is that all Asian Americans are the same. That is, many people are either unable or unwilling to distinguish between different Asian ethnicities -- Korean American from a Japanese American, Filipino American from an Indonesian American, etc. This becomes a problem when people generalize certain beliefs or stereotypes about one or a few Asian Americans to the entire Asian American population. The result is that important differences between Asian ethnic groups are minimized or ignored altogether, sometimes leading to disastrous results. The second stereotype is that all Asian Americans are foreigners. Although more than half of all Asians in the U.S. were born outside the U.S., many non-Asians simply assume that every Asian they see, meet, or hear about is a foreigner. Many can't recognize that many Asian American families have been U.S. citizens for several generations. As a result, because all Asian Americans are perceived as foreigners, it becomes easier to think of us as not fully American and then to deny us the same rights that other Americans take for granted. Yes, that means prejudice and discrimination in its many forms.
In his article “Hate” by Patrick Walters The Associated Press January 21, 2010.
The blocks surrounding South Philadelphia High School are a melting pot of pizzerias fronted by Italian flags, African hair-braiding salons and a growing number of Chinese, Vietnamese and Indonesian restaurants. Inside is a cauldron of cultural discontent that erupted in violence last month - off-campus and lunchroom attacks on about 50 Asian students, injuring 30, primarily at the hands of blacks. The Asian students, who boycotted classes for more than a week afterward, say they've endured relentless bullying by black students while school officials turned a blind eye to their complaints. ‘We have suffered a lot to get to America and we didn't come here to fight,’ Wei Chen, president of the Chinese American Student Association, told the school board in one of several hearings on the violence. ‘We just want a safe environment to learn and make more friends. That's my dream.’Philadelphia school officials suspended 10 students, increased police patrols and installed dozens of new security cameras to watch the halls, where 70 percent of the students are black and 18 percent Asian. The Vietnamese embassy complained to the U.S. State Department about the attacks and numerous groups are investigating, including the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. The New York-based Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund joined the fray this week with a civil rights complaint to the U.S. Justice Department. 15
And in “Society” by James Glanz The New York Times July 16, 2000, the author argues that:
Asian and Asian-American scientists are staying away from jobs at national weapons laboratories, particularly Los Alamos, saying that researchers of Asian descent are systematically harassed and denied advancement because of their race. The issue has long simmered at the laboratories, but it came to a boil last year with the arrest of Dr. Wen Ho Lee, who is accused of mishandling nuclear secrets at Los Alamos. Though officials vehemently deny it, many Asian-Americans said Dr. Lee, a naturalized citizen born in Taiwan, was singled out because of his ethnicity.In any event, Asians and Asian-Americans said, security procedures implemented after Dr. Lee's arrest fall hardest on them. Since the arrest, some scholarly groups have even called for a boycott of the laboratories, urging Asian and Asian-American scientists not to apply for jobs with them.16
Clearly, anti-Asian attitudes are still alive and well in the United States as are so many of the prejudices that we harbor.
Footnotes
• 1http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1386655/Explorer-from-China-who-beat-Columbus-to-America.html
• 2 blogcritics.org/culture/artic...-the-globe-80/
• 3 http://www.pbs.org/previews/1421/
• 4 http://maritimeasia.ws/topic/1421bunkum.html
• 5http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/as.htm
• 6 CIA World Factbook.
• 7http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/chinese-boycott/
• 8 http://cprr.org/Museum/Chinese.html
• Samuel Chenery Damon was born in Massachusetts in 1815. After graduating from Amherst and Theological Seminary at Andover in Massachusetts, he was sent to Honolulu in 1842 by the American Seamen’s Friend Society in the company of his wife, Julia Mills Damon.www.hcucc.org/HawaiiConferenc...9/Default.aspx
• 10 Visit this site for early photos and maps of the transcontinental railroad. http://cprr.org/Museum/Archive/index.html
• In 1869, a group of Japanese people from Aizu Wakamatsu in modern Fukushima Prefecture in Japan, led by John Henry Schnell, arrived in California with the purpose of settling in California and to establish the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Farm Colony at Gold Hill. The Japanese people, who journeyed to San Francisco with John Schnell and his Japanese wife were in all likelihood the first group from Japan to arrive and settle in the United States. The Wakamatsu party arrived in Sacramento, then proceeded to Placerville and nearby Gold Hill where Schnell had arranged to purchase 160 acres from Charles M. Graner. They brought mulberry trees, silkworm cocoons, tea plants and bamboo shoots in the hopes of establishing an agricultural settlement. They also brought cooking utensils, swords and a large banner bearing the crest of the Aizu Wakamatsu clan.The Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Farm Colony struggled to survive for several years but was plagued by an insufficient water supply, lack of adequate funding, labor dispute and other economic problems. arconservancy.org/xoops/modul....php?itemid=71
• Chinese custom dictated that the wife of a prospective emigrant ought to stay behind to take care of her husband's parents, so the vast majority of Chinese immigrant men left for America on their own. Many came with the full intention of returning to their homeland after having made a sufficient profit; in fact, most sent money back to China to support their families throughout the course of their stay in the US. The Page Act of 1870 prohibited all ‘Chinese, Japanese, and Mongolian women’ from entering the US for the purpose of engaging in ‘immoral or licentious activities.’ This law mandated a series of humiliating character interrogations for women applying for visas, which, in any case, were rarely granted. The assumption was that Chinese women inherently wanted to become prostitutes. There were, in fact, as many as 900 Chinese prostitutes in San Francisco during the late 1870s, but most of these young girls were kidnapped, sold, captured, or lured from China by false promises of marriage. They would then be contracted to a brothel in one of America's emerging Chinatowns. The existence of these Chinese prostitutes was seen as a public health threat because they presumably carried strange and extraordinarily potent venereal diseases. The Page Act was an attempt to quell that threat. The reality was that, aside from on the West Coast, there were relatively few Chinese prostitutes in America. In New York’s Chinatown, for example, the vast majority of prostitutes were white. Nevertheless, the Page Act effectively prevented immigrants already in the US from bringing their wives over from China. To complicate matters, white working class men began to see Chinese laborers as dangerous competition-a threat to their own economic well-being. In response to these fears, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 cut off almost all Chinese immigration, exempting only merchants and students, who were, presumably, less likely to steal American jobs. Chinese wives of immigrant laborers now had no legal means to join their husbands in America. http://www.stg.brown.edu/projects/CreativeNonfiction/spring01/tsai.html
• Wing F. Ong was the first Chinese American to serve in a state legislature in the United States. Despite barriers to his education by language and statutes in the early 1900’s, Mr. Ong, as a young immigrant, enrolled in elementary school at the age of 15. He went on to high school and the University of Arizona. Financial difficulties interrupted his education, and Mr. Ong started a grocery business that helped sustain his family. He later enrolled in Phoenix College and went on to law school at the University of Arizona. He graduated in 1943 at the top of his law school class, and became one of eight Chinese American lawyers in the United States. He lost his first bid for elected office in 1941, but won a seat in the Arizona House of Representatives in 1946 where he served until 1950. After a period in private practice, Mr. Ong served a term in the Arizona State Senate in the 1960s. Mr. Ong was also appointed as the goodwill ambassador to the Republic of China by Governor Sam Goddard in 1965. www.napaba.org/napaba/showpag...lazers2005#Ong
• 14 Bloc Voting, Polarization, and the Panethnic Hypothesis: The Case of Little Saigon. Christian Collet. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Aug., 2005), pp. 907-933. Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association.
• 15 Hate by Patrick WaltersThe Associated Press January 21, 2010. www.modelminority.com/joomla/index.php.
• 16 Society by James Glanz The New York Times July 16, 2000. www.modelminority.com/joomla/index.php
2.2.4 Hispanic Americans
Background in America
The word Hispanic as a designation of ethnicity was created by Directive 15 (1977) of the US Office of Management and Budget which is the federal agency that defines standards for government publications. The categories are not based on biological or anthropological concepts. ‘Hispanic’ is considered a designation of ethnicity, not race, and people of Hispanic origin can be of any race. OMB developed these categories in response to the need for standardized data for record keeping and data collection and presentation by federal agencies (e.g., to conduct federal surveys, collect decennial census data, and monitor civil rights laws).1According to the US Census Bureau Persons of Hispanic origin were identified by a question that asked for self-identification of the person's origin or descent. Respondents were asked to select their origin (and the origin of other household members) from a ‘flash card’ listing ethnic origins. Persons of Hispanic origin, in particular, were those who indicated that their origin was Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or some other Hispanic origin. It should be noted that persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race.2 Consider this definition of Hispanic from The Free Dictionary.com.
His·pan·ic (hĭ-spăn-ĭk) adj. 1. Of or relating to Spain or Spanish-speaking Latin America.2. Of or relating to a Spanish-speaking people or culture. n. 1. A Spanish-speaking person. 2. A U.S. citizen or resident of Latin-American or Spanish descent. [Latin Hispānicus, from Hispānia, Spain.] Usage Note: Though often used interchangeably in American English, Hispanic and Latino are not identical terms, and in certain contexts the choice between them can be significant. Hispanic, from the Latin word for "Spain," has the broader reference, potentially encompassing all Spanish-speaking peoples in both hemispheres and emphasizing the common denominator of language among communities that sometimes have little else in common. Latino—which in Spanish means "Latin" but which as an English word is probably a shortening of the Spanish word latinoamericano—refers more exclusively to persons or communities of Latin American origin. Of the two, only Hispanic can be used in referring to Spain and its history and culture; a native of Spain residing in the United States is a Hispanic, not a Latino, and one cannot substitute Latino in the phrase the Hispanic influence on native Mexican cultures without garbling the meaning. In practice, however, this distinction is of little significance when referring to residents of the United States, most of whom are of Latin American origin and can theoretically be called by either word. A more important distinction concerns the sociopolitical rift that has opened between Latino and Hispanic in American usage. For a certain segment of the Spanish-speaking population, Latino is a term of ethnic pride and Hispanic a label that borders on the offensive. According to this view, Hispanic lacks the authenticity and cultural resonance of Latino, with its Spanish sound and its ability to show the feminine form Latina when used of women. Furthermore, Hispanic—the term used by the U.S. Census Bureau and other government agencies—is said to bear the stamp of an Anglo establishment far removed from the concerns of the Spanish-speaking community. While these views are strongly held by some, they are by no means universal, and the division in usage seems as related to geography as it is to politics, with Latino widely preferred in California and Hispanic the more usual term in Florida and Texas. Even in these regions, however, usage is often mixed, and it is not uncommon to find both terms used by the same writer or speaker.3
In other words, the term Hispanic is fraught with difficulties. If Hispanics can be of any race, then they are not “officially” considered a racial group; thus Hispanics are considered an ethnicity—they share a common culture, a common language, and a sense of peoplehood. But what common culture is shared by Argentinians, Spaniards, and Mexicans? What common culture is shared by Brazilians and Tierra del Fuegoans? Nonetheless, Hispanics or Latinos do see themselves as a separate and distinct “racial” group in the US regardless of the definitions of the government or the social sciences.
Demographics
Hispanic Americans speak many, many languages, but their major languages are Creole, English, Portuguese, and Spanish. Hispanic Americans come from the Caribbean, Central America, North America, Portugal, South America, and Spain.
As of 2008, there are 32.8 million Hispanics currently living in the US; 66.1% are of Mexican descent, 14.5 % are of Central and South American descent, 9.0% are originally from Puerto Rico, 4.0% are originally Cuban, and 6.4% come from unspecified locations.4 The United States is rapidly becoming a minority-majority country and the fastest growing segment of the population is Hispanic with a 33% increase over the eight years from 2000-2008.5 The current (2008) Hispanic population of the US is about 15% of the total. According to the 2000 census, 14.1% of all Hispanic Americans live in the Northeast US, 7.9% in the Midwest, 33.2% in the South, and 44.7% in the Western states. Nearly half of all Hispanics live in a central city within a major metropolitan area.6
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Hispanics are younger compared to white Americans: 35.7% of all Hispanics are under 18 compared to 23.5% for non-Hispanic whites, 59.0% are between 18 and 64 compared to 62.4% for non-Hispanic whites, and only 5.3% are over 65 compared to 14.0% for non-Hispanic whites. 39.1% (12.8 million) Hispanics are foreign born and 25% of all foreign born Hispanics are naturalized citizens. 43.0% of the foreign born entered the US in the 1990s, 29.7% came in the 1980s, 27.3% came prior to the 1980s. 74.2% of those entering the US before 1970 have become US citizens, 23.9% of those entering between 1980 and 1989 have become citizens, while only 6.7% of those entering between 1990 and 2000 have become US citizens. Hispanics have larger than average families. 30.6% have five or more members as compared to 11.8% for non-Hispanic whites. Hispanics are less likely to marry with 33.2% having never married compared to 24.5% of non-Hispanic whites. Cuban Americans are most likely to marry 79.6%. Hispanics receive less education; a staggering 27.3% did not go past 9th grade compared to 4.2% for non-Hispanic whites, while 15.7% went to high school but did not graduate more than double the 7.3% for non-Hispanic whites. Only 46.4% are high school graduates compared to 60.3% for non-Hispanic whites, and only 10.6% have a bachelors degree compared to 28.1% for non-Hispanic whites. Hispanics are two times more likely to be unemployed or to work in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. Hispanics are more likely also to be poor, 22.8% compared to 7.7% of non-Hispanic whites, 23.1% of all poor in the US are Hispanic and 30.3% of all Hispanic children are poor compared to 9.4% of all non-Hispanic whites, 29.0% of all poor children in the US are Hispanic. And while the entrepreneurial spirit is strong among Hispanic Americans, they own only 5.8% of all businesses in the US and earn a paltry 2.37% of all receipts.7
Figure 3.
A Chronology—1492-2001
During the period of exploration, in one generation approximately 300,000 Spaniards emigrated to the New World. They established over 200 cities and towns throughout the Americas. They explored and colonized from the southernmost tip of South America to the northernmost reaches of North America. They charted the oceans and the islands of the Caribbean; crisscrossed America by foot, raft, ship, horse; and in one generation Hispanics acquired more new territory than Rome conquered in five centuries! There have been Hispanics in the Americas since 1492. The Spanish and the Portuguese came to the New World in small ships such as those of Columbus.
1492—Columbus lands on Hispaniola.
1493—The Spanish Sovereigns grant the Admiral from Castile, Cristobal Colon (Christopher Columbus), the right to bear arms.
1499—the first Spanish Conquistadors arrive in the New World.
1499—Alonso de Ojeda explores Venezuelan coastline.
1500—João Fernandes explores Labrador.
1501—Rodrigo de Bastidas explores Central America Coast and Caribbean.
1508—Velasquez-Cortes-Ponce de Leon’s conquest of Cuba.
1510—Settlements in Jamaica.
1517—1518—First Spanish effort to colonize mainland Mexico.
1518—Juan de Grijalva sails along the Mexican coast, from Cozumel to Cabo Roxo, collecting the first European impression of Mesoamerica.
1519-1522—Ferdinand Magellan completes voyage of circumnavigation. Click here for a picture of the Coat of Arms of Christopher Columbus, the first modern European to “discover” the Americas, bringing Spanish conquest to the New World.
1521—May 1521 Spaniards begin the siege of Tenochtitlan which lasts 75 days.
1524—Franciscan Monks arrive.
1528—King Carlos V establishes the first Audiencia in Nueva Espana-Tierra Nueva, to handle judicial and executive matters.
1531—Pizaro conquers Peru which is colonized by Spain.
1539—The first press is introduced in the North American Continent by the Spanish.
1539-1542—Hernando de Soto explores the lower south of the present day United States of America, travels inland across ten states, “discovers” the Mississippi River.
1540—Francisco Vasquez de Coronado explores California, Kansas, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma. Click here for an image of Tenochtitlan.
1562—The Spanish conquerors and explorers created early maps. The Guiterrez Map is the earliest known map of California. Click here for a Spanish drawing of a hammock used by the natives of the Caribbean.
The Spanish and Portuguese found thriving civilizations in the New World. The Huejotizingo Codex documents the life of the Nahuatl (Aztec) people (mid-late 16th century). The Huejotizingo Codex showing the agricultural products of the Nahuatl. The Huejotizingo Codex showing a warehouse manifest or inventory. The Huejotizingo Codex may be a drawing of a textile embroidered with gold thread. The Huejotizingo Codex showing an inventory or possibly a tax list. An early drawing shows some of the various professions of the Tarascan people. Tarascan society was very similar to that of the Nahuatl although smaller. All complex civilizations in the New World were highly stratified. European conquest brought destruction and severe stratification to the civilizations of the Americas. The Inca civilization in Peru began to collapse soon after contact with Europeans.
1551—The First University on the North American continent established. The Real y Pontificia Universidad de Mexico, had the same privileges as the Universidad de Salamanca, had five facultades/schools. (The University of Salamanca, Spain, was the leading University in Europe of its time and is still a leading University).
1580-1640—Horses introduced to the American Southwest.
1602—Colony in New Mexico, San Gabriel del Yunque, soldiers and families abandoned the Colony in 1600, but some families remained, and a few additional colonizing families arrived in October 1602, some were the Bacas and the Montoyas. They resided at San Gabriel del Yunque prior to the founding of the Villa de Santa Fe in 1607.
1608—New Mexico made a Royal Province.
1610—Palace of the Governors built in Sante Fe8, New Mexico (still stands and is in use!)
1702—English from Carolina besieged Castillo de San Marcos unsuccessfully, but razed St. Augustine, Florida.
1738—The Spanish build Fort Mose, for the African born slaves who escaped from the British.
1763—Spanish Florida ceded to England by the Treaty of Paris.
1776—The American War of Independence. The American Continental Army (under George Washington) and its allies the Spanish Army ultimately defeat the British.
1914— On April 20, Colorado miners, state militiamen and company guards began shooting directly at striking Hispanic workers’ tents setting them on fire. Of the 18 people killed, half were Mexican-Americans and many were children who had been burned to death. This was called the Ludlow Massacre.
1915—Arizona, striking Hispanic workers were forced to walk to Bisbee, where they were loaded onto cattle cars and taken across the state line where they were abandoned in the New Mexico desert without food or water.
1921—Immigration Act restricts the entry of Southern and Eastern Europeans. Efforts to include Mexicans in the restrictions are blocked by supporters of the agriculture business in the Southwest. In response to growing public opinion against the flow of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe in the years following World War I, Congress passed first the Quota Act of 1921 then the even more restrictive Immigration Act of 1924 (the Johnson-Reed Act). Initially, the 1924 law imposed a total quota on immigration of 165,000—less than 20 percent of the pre-World War I average. It based ceilings on the number of immigrants from any particular nation on the percentage of each nationality recorded in the 1890 census—a blatant effort to limit immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, which mostly occurred after that date. In the first decade of the 20th century, an average of 200,000 Italians had entered the United States each year. With the 1924 Act, the annual quota for Italians was set at less than 4,000. This table shows the annual immigration quotas under the 1924 Immigration Act.
1929—The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) formed to fight for the Civil Rights of Hispanics.
1943—The “Zoot Suit” Riots in East Los Angeles. (For more information about this topic, please visit the following websites: PBS: American Experience: The Zoot Suit Riots; Los Angeles Zoot Suit Riots; The Zoot-Suit and Style Warfare).
1948—The American GI Forum (AGIF), a Hispanic veterans’ organization formed in order to help Hispanic WWII veterans who were being denied medical care by Veterans Hospitals.
1960s and 1970s—The Chicano Movement organized as Hispanics’ Civil Rights continue to be violated. (See also: Chicano! A History of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement; Latino Civil Rights Timeline, 1903 to present; National Council of La Raza.)
1968—Luis Alvarez won the Nobel Prize for his work with subatomic particles.
1995—Mario Molina, along with two other scientists, won the Nobel Prize in chemistry
The Bracero Program
The original agreement for the Bracero program was formalized the 23th of July, 1942. Months later, the agreement was modified. The final version was released on April 26, 1943. The original agreement was signed by representatives from both countries. From Mexico, Ernesto Hidalgo, representative of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Abraham J. Navas, Esq., representative of the Ministry of Labor. From United States: Joseph F. McGurk, Counsel of the American Embassy in Mexico, John Walker, Deputy Administrator of the Farm Security Administration, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and David Mecker, Deputy Director of War Farming Operations also from the USDA. Mexican migrant workers being recruited for the Bracero Program in the 1940s and 1950s. (For more information, please visit the following websites: Mexican Immigrant Labor History; Bracero History Archive; Bittersweet Harvest: The Bracero Program; Los Braceros: Mexican Labor Importation; Time Magazine: April 9, 1951: Immigration: The Wetbacks,)
Farmworkers and Migrant Labor
Cesar Chavez, was the founder of the http://www.ufw.org/(UFW) in1962. This labor union was begun in order to address many of the egregious practices of the farmers who hired migrant labor to pick their crops. Migrant labor keeps the prices of produce artificially low in the United States because they are seldom paid minimum wage and they aren’t protected by Federal Wage and Hour Laws because the government is officially unaware of their presence. Migrant laborers are overwhelmingly from Mexico, they are young, and they are undereducated. In New York State, farmworkers are excluded from New York State labor laws providing for: disability insurance, a day of rest, overtime pay, and collective bargaining.9 According to the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) farmworkers brave extreme weather conditions and exposure to chemicals in their work.·33% of farmworkers live in moderate to severely substandard housing. About 33% of farmworkers pay more than 1/3 of their income for housing. Areas in the US with the most serious farmworker housing problems are Florida and the Northwest. The 52% crowding rate for farmworkers is 10 times the national average. 88% of farmworkers are estimated to be Hispanic; 45% have children.10 Moreover, Recent estimates by the U.S. Department of Labor suggest that approximately 1.3 million U.S. citizens migrate between states, earning their living by working in the agricultural industry. The outlook for these workers is bleak. Their education rates are much lower than the national average. Their health is undermined by hard outdoor labor and exposure to pesticides — Department of Labor's Occupational Safety & Health Administration lists agriculture as the second most dangerous occupation in the United States. The Farmworker Health Services Program reports that the average life expectancy of a farmworker is substantially lower than the national life expectancy rate of the U.S. population. And, according to a 2000 survey by the Department of Labor, 61 percent of all farmworkers have incomes below the poverty level. For the past decade the median income of farmworker families has remained less than \$10,000.11 (For more information, please see the following websites: Trading on Migrant Labor; Imagining a United States without Immigrant Labor; Second Summit of the Americas: Migrant Workers; The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA); Migrant Farm Workers: Our Nation's Invisible Population; Farmworkers in the United States; Picture This: Depression Era: 1930s: Migrant Farm Workers.
Borders and Immigration
The Smithsonian’s “Migration in History” exhibit states, borders are artifacts of history and are subject to change over time. When borders shift, lands and peoples are subjected to different sets of rules; this creates opportunities for exploitation, conditions of hardship, and motivations for revolt.12 The old and common saying “we didn’t cross the border, the border crossed us” is true. For many northern Mexicans living on the now-American side of the Rio Grande, the border did indeed change. With the advent of a nation-based quota system in 1924, many immigrants found themselves found themselves on the wrong side of a new law. Because of the quota system, it became illegal for many Mexicans to cross a border which was less than 80 years old.13 For a timeline of a history of the US Mexico border, please visit The Border, a PBS online series.
Hispanics Today
In September 1996, ...Our Nation on the Fault Line . . . a report to the President of the United States, the Nation, and the Secretary of Education, United States Department of Education by the President's Advisory Commission on Educational Excellence for Hispanic Americans found that Educational attainment for most Hispanic Americans is in a state of crisis. In 2010, the state of education for Hispanics Americans is still as grim and . . . evidence exists that the isolation and segregation has had several detrimental effects. First, Hispanics have the highest dropout rate of any ethnic group in this country. One-half of all Mexican-American and Puerto Rican students do not graduate from high schools (National Council of La Raza, 1989).14 In a modern, post-industrial society where many jobs are in the so-called high tech sector, degrees beyond high school graduation are more important than ever. Thus, the huge dropout rate of Hispanic American children does not bode well for economic success in a nation where economic success is a core value. Furthermore, all of the scientific and demographic data consistently show that the less educated among us also do less well in terms of general health, and the less educated are more likely to engage in deviant behavior the consequences of which are often imprisonment or death at an early age. Therefore, our nation is still on the fault line in terms of our Hispanic American population.
Hispanic immigration is changing the face of America in profound and, for some, unexpected ways. Toombs County, Georgia—a little town about 200 miles southeast of Atlanta—made national news when its local high school sponsored three senior proms instead of its usual two. Principal Ralph Hardy, who is black, insisted that racism is not a serious problem at his school and that segregated proms are a matter of taste: ‘Latinos, blacks, and whites all prefer their own music and food.’ A prime example of communities, mostly in the South, that have experienced unprecedented Hispanic population growth, Toombs instantiates the growing complexity of the long-standing struggle for racial integration as newcomers from Mexico, Central America, and South America alter the ethno-racial landscape, forcing multiculturalism in places previously colored black and white. Whether the Hispanicization of metropolitan America redraws spatial color lines in urban places long divided into black and white into three-way splits is an empirical question with far-reaching implications for social integration and civic engagement.15The enormous influx of Hispanics into parts of mostly all-white or all black and white America is cause for concern among anti-immigration groups such as F.A.I.R.(Federation for Immigration Reform) in the US, but the racial/ethnic changes that are taking place are inevitable. Moreover, all data show that newcomers to American soil, while changing America are also changed by America and relatively rapidly assimilate into American society. According to a 2008 article in USA Today
Immigrants in the USA number almost 40 million. About half are Latin American, an issue at the center of the debate over immigration reform and border enforcement. Tracking how well immigrants blend in — from owning homes to moving up the economic ladder — is a key part of the controversy. The level of assimilation typically drops during times of high immigration because there are more newcomers who are different from native-born Americans. It happened between 1900 and 1920, when the immigrant population grew 40% — a much slower rate than the recent wave. Yet the rapid growth since 1990 has not caused as dramatic a decline in assimilation, [Jacob] Vigdor [of Duke University] says. Immigrants who arrived in the past 25 years have assimilated faster than their counterparts of a century ago, [Vigdor] says.
And although “Mexican immigrants experience very low rates of economic and civic assimilation they experience relatively normal rates of cultural assimilation.16
In “Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation along Five Dimensions” by Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, the authors argue that even though Hispanics are severely segregated, blacks are still the most segregated Americans. A high level of segregation . . . is problematic because it isolates a minority group from amenities, opportunities, and resources that affect social and economic well-being.17Hispanic segregation is lower on any given dimension . . . [so that] Hispanics are moderately but consistently segregated . . . [but] never display both multidimensional layering and high segregation.18In other words, although Hispanics do experience segregation it is not so egregious as that of African Americans.
Hispanics are rapidly transforming the social and economic fabric of many small towns, where they have come to work—often at low wages—in food processing plants, agriculture, and construction. But to what extent have these Hispanics been incorporated into their new communities and local housing markets? In other words, do they share the same neighborhoods or live apart from non-Hispanic whites?
Measuring Residential Segregation
Case studies of rural destination communities often provide a rather sketchy portrait of immigrant incorporation. Marshalltown, Iowa, a community of about 26,000 people, is a good example. Its Hispanic population grew from fewer than 300 to more than 3,500 between 1990 and 2000. But we understand little about how the local housing market has accommodated such an unprecedented influx of Hispanics or how they are incorporated into previously homogenous Anglo neighborhoods in Marshalltown, and other similarly affected communities. For rural immigrant communities working in the poultry industry in North Carolina, for example, employers sometimes provide temporary housing (trailers) to attract Hispanic immigrant workers. This practice effectively marginalizes new arrivals from the rest of the largely Anglo community.19
(For more information about Hispanic Americans, please visit The Pew Hispanic Center.)
Footnotes
• 1http://www.cdc.gov/DHDSP/library/maps/strokeatlas/methods/racedef.htm
• 2http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/95-test/appb.html#Hispanic_Origin
• 3 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Hispanic
• 4http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/files/Internet_Hispanic_in_US_2006.pdf
• 5http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0006.pdf
• 6http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/files/Internet_Hispanic_in_US_2006.pdf
• 7 Ibid.
• 8 http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5078
• 9 Migrant Farmworkers in the United States
• 10 Facts About Farmworkers
• 11 Now with Bill Moyers. “Migrant Labor in the United States.”
• 12 Migrations in History: United States-Mexico Borderlands/Frontera
• 13 The Border Crossed Us
• 14 ERIC Identifier: ED316616. Publication Date: 1989-00-00. Author: Wells, Amy Stuart. Source: ERIC Clearinghouse on Urban Education New York NY. Hispanic Education in America: Separate and Unequal. ERIC/CUE Digest No. 59.
• 15 Redrawing Spatial Color Lines: Hispanic Metropolitan Dispersal, Segregation, and Economic Opportunity. Mary J. Fischer and Marta Tienda.
• 16 Civic Report No. 53 May 2008. “Measuring Immigrant Assimilation in the United States.” by Jacob L. Vigdor. http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_53.htm.
• 17 Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation along Five Dimensions. Author(s): Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton. Demography, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 373-391. Stable URL: www.jstor.org/stable/2061599.
• 18 Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation along Five Dimensions. Author(s): Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton. Demography, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 373-391. Stable URL: www.jstor.org/stable/2061599.
• 19 Hispanic Segregation in America's New Rural Boomtowns by Domenico Parisi and Daniel T. Lichter. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/02%3A_Dominant_and_Minority_Groups/2.02%3A_Minorites_by_Group.txt |
Suggested Course Objectives for Part I—Dominant and Minority Groups
Upon completion of this unit, students will be able to:
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss dominant and minority groups and differentiate between them.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss prejudice and discrimination and the various forms they take.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss immigration, immigration theories, and the ongoing national debate concerning immigration.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical and historical information concerning race relations in the past and present in the US.
• Understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss popular media’s interpretation of stratification/inequality by race and ethnicity.
• Find, read, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss immigration law and immigration studies found in peer reviewed scientific journal articles.
• Find and interpret demographic data about immigration from the US Census and other valid and reliable sources.
• Understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss popular media’s interpretation of immigration and immigration policy.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss Congressional policies concerning immigration and immigrants in the US.
2.04: Study Guide for Part I
Study Guide for Part I
• Be able to define and discuss stratification/inequalityStratification
• The unequal distribution of the goods of society
• Wealth, power, status
• Social inequality
• A system in which people are denied access to the goods of society based on their group membership
• Define, discuss, and give examples of master statusReview master statusRace or ethnicity, sex or gender, age, religion, disability, and SESSES
• Socioeconomic Status= income+education+occupation
• Define and discuss SES
• What is SES and how does it impact peoples’ lives?
• The stratification hierarchy
• Where someone is placed in terms of access to wealth, power, and status
• Based on various aspects of their master status
• How does the stratification hierarchy affect
• Racial and ethnic minorities?
• Women?
• Sexual orientation minorities?
• Religious minorities?
• The disabled?
• Define Thomas’s Theorem and explain how it relates to issues of stratification/inequality
• How do our concepts of reality affect the way we judge others?
• Discuss the ways in which the human mind creates social categories
• Define and discuss stereotypes
• How many stereotypes about groups other than your own can you list?
• Are any of these stereotypes true?
• Why or why not?
• How many stereotypes about your own group can you list?
• Are any of these stereotypes true?
• Why or why not?
• Define and describe social differentiation
• Explain and give examples of social positions
• Rankings of roles and statuses
• Explain and give examples of social mobility
• What is the social mobility in your family?
• Define and discuss the various dimensions of and theories of stratification/inequality
• Marx
• Bourgeoisie and Proletariat
• Based on the economic system
• Weber
• The bureaucracy
• Wealth
• A person’s total economic access
• Give an example
• Power
• The ability to influence over resistance
• Give an example
• Status
• The esteem that society gives to social statuses and social roles
• Give an example
• Models of power
• C. Wright Mills: The Power Elite
• Power is held at the top of society by a handful of people
• Give an example
• Robert Dahl: Pluralistic model
• Power is relatively evenly distributed
• Give an example
• Which model is correct?
• Why?
• The Davis-Moore Debate
• What are the main points of Davis-Moore’s argument?
• Why do they say that stratification is functional for society?
• Do you agree?
• Why or why not?
• Melvin Tumin’s response to Davis-Moore
• What are the main points of Tumin’s argument?
• Why does he disagree with Davis-Moore?
• Do you agree with Tumin?
• Why or why not?
• Be able to discuss the following dimensions of and theories of stratification/inequality
• E. Digby Baltzell: WASP
• Who are the WASPs?
• Are they still “in charge”
• Thorstein Veblen
• Conspicuous Leisure
• Give three modern examples
• Look on Forbes
• Conspicuous Consumption
• Give three modern examples
• Look on Forbes
• Oscar LewisCulture of poverty
• What are the main characteristics of the culture of poverty?
• Is the culture of poverty real?
• Why or why not?
• Charles MurrayLosing Ground and The Bell Curve
• What are Murray’s primary arguments?
• Do you agree or disagree?
• Why?
• William Julius Wilson
• The Truly Disadvantaged
• When Work Disappears
• Hyperghettoization
• What are WJ Wilson’s major arguments?
• What data sources does he use?
• Do you agree with his conclusions?
• Why or why not?
• Herbert Gans
• The functionality of poverty
• The War against the Poor
• What are Gans’s primary points of argument?
• What are his data sources?
• Do you agree with his conclusions?
• Why or why not?
• Wealth
• The billionaire’s club
• Who are the richest people in the world and how rich are they?
• What are the most expensive consumer items in the world and who buys them?
• Use the Internet to look at Forbes Magazine’s lists
• Use the Internet to find census data
• What are the richest countries in the world and how does the US compare?Use the Internet to find data
• The CIA World Factbook
• The G8
• What are the richest companies in the world and how do they compare to the economies of countries?
• Forbes Magazine’s lists
• Use the Internet to find data
• Find and explain data about the demographics of poverty in the US
• Poverty thresholds
• Find and explain data about the feminization of poverty
• The Statistical Abstract of the United States
• Use the Internet to find data about women and poverty
• Find information about and explain public policies and poverty programs
• Find and explain data about poverty legislation
• Georgetown Law Library
• The Congressional Record
• Use these sites (The Statistical Abstract of the United States; ACORN Housing) to find and explain data about inequality in:
• Housing
• Health care
• Home ownership
• Business ownership
• Educational attainment
• Labor force participation
• Find data about the minimum wage vs. the living wage
• What is the minimum wage?
• What are the criteria used to determine what the minimum wage will be?
• Find information about the history of the minimum wage and explain how it relates to the cost of living
• Minimum wage historical chart
• Minimum wages by state
• US Department of Labor Minimum Wage Page
• Find information about the living wage; explain what it is and its ramifications for society
• The Living Wage Resource Center
• The Economic Policy Institute
• Living Wage Calculator
• What is a living wage?
• How would a living wage impact the US economy?
• Look at the World Demographic “Clock” and explain what it shows
• What did you learn from this that you did not know before?
• Explain the US and World Population “Clocks”
• Find data that break down world demographics into percentages.“If the World Were a Village of 100 People.”
• If the World Were a Village of 100 People
• If the World Were a Village of 100 People (2)
• If the World Were a Village of 100 People (YouTube video)
• Define, discuss, and give examples of Infant Mortality Rates, Literacy Rates, Life Expectancy, and GDP/GNP in the richest and poorest nations in the world
• The World Health Organization
• The United Nations
• How do most people perceive World Inequality?
• Why?
• What information is available about world inequality to most people?
• Identify the levels into which the world is stratified and what those levels mean in terms of life chances
• United Nations Summit on World Poverty
• First, Second, Third, and Fourth Worlds
• Define and give examples of:
• First World countries
• Second World countries
• Third World countries
• Fourth World countries
• Find data about and discuss carrying capacity and world hunger
• Define carrying capacity
• In the late spring of 2008, there have been food riots in some parts of the world and food prices in some parts of the world have reached an all-time high
• Find data that explain this
• United Nations Summit on World Hunger
• Discuss the health concerns of First, Second, and Third World countries
• What are their health concerns?
• Who does and does not have access to health care?
• Where does the US rank in terms of access to and quality of health care in the world?
• United Nations: Economic and Social Development
• The World Health Organization
• Find and explain data about the HIV/AIDS epidemic and how it impacts world poverty
• UNAIDS: Joint United Programme on HIV/AIDS
• Human Rights Watch: AIDS
• World Health Organization: AIDS Day Message
• The World Bank: HIV/AIDS in Africa
• Identify and differentiate among the various theories of inequality in the world
• Conquest
• Migration
• Colonialism and Empire
• Neo-Colonialism
• World Systems Theory
• Modernization Theory
• Globalization and Glocalization
• George Ritzer’s McDonaldization theory.
• Thomas Friedman’s “Flat World” theory.
• Find and explain statistical information concerning world stratification/inequality including such statistical referents as Infant Mortality Rates, Literacy Rates, Life Expectancy, and GDP or GNP.
• The CIA World Factbook
• Find and explain data about the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the ways in which their policies impact global inequality.
• The World Bank
• The International Monetary Fund | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/02%3A_Dominant_and_Minority_Groups/2.03%3A_Course_Objectives_for_Part_I.txt |
Suggested Key Terms and Concepts for Part I—Dominant and Minority Groups
“The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line”
“You’ve Got To Be Carefully Taught”
Apartheid
Ascribed master status
Assimilation
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
Categorical ideas
Civil Rights Act
Cognitive dissonance
Consequences of racism
Cultural assimilation
De facto discrimination
De jure discrimination…
Direct personal discrimination
Discrimination
Discrimination is a behavior
Dominant group
Dred Scott Decision
Dworkin and Dworkin
Erving Goffman
Essential characteristics of groups
Ethnicity
Ethnocentrism
Ethnophaulisms
Expulsion
Fair Housing Act
First generation Americans
Genocide
Gordon W. Allport
Hispanics/Latinos
Immigrants
Immigration
Immigration Act
Indirect institutional discrimination
Japanese-American relocation
Jim Crow laws
Korematsu Decision
Laws of association
Literacy tests
Majority status is unmarked or unstigmatized
Mccarran-Walter Act
Mental categories
Minority group
Minority status
Minority-Majority
Patterns of primary and secondary structural assimilation
Plessy v. Ferguson
Pogroms
Poll taxes
Power
Prejudice
Primary structural assimilation
Race
Racism
Robert Merton’s Typology of Bigotry (Prejudice and Discrimination)
Rosenblum and Travis
Second generation Americans
Secondary structural assimilation
Social construct
Species
Stereotypes
Stigmatized
Structural discrimination
Third generation Americans
Thomas’s Theorem
Traditional American assimilation pattern
Trail of Tears
Tribal stigma
Voting Rights Act
W.E.B. DuBois
White ethnics
2.06: Lecture Outline for Part I
Suggested Lecture Material for Part I—Dominant and Minority Groups
• Review Master Status.
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of dominant group and dominant group status.
• Discuss and give examples of white privilege.
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of minority groups and minority group status.
• Discuss and give examples of bigotry against minority groups.
• Use the Internet to display population data about racial and ethnic groups in the US.
• Historical and current.
• Immigration
• Define immigration.
• Define emigration.
• Define and discuss push factors.
• Define and discuss pull factors.
• Assimilation.
• Define and discuss cultural assimilation.
• Define and discuss structural assimilation.
• Primary
• Secondary
• Identify and discuss models of assimilation.
• Standard Model.
• Pluralistic Model.
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning immigration into the US.
• Historical data.
• Current data.
• Future data.
• What is the projected population of each racial and ethnic group?
• Identify and differentiate among the various theories of race and ethnicity.
• Conquest
• Migration
• Colonialism and Empire
• Middle-man minorities
• Merton’s Typology of Bigotry
2.07: Assignments for Part I
Suggested Assignments for Part I—Dominant and Minority Groups
Find on the Internet: Immigration laws past and present.
Find on the Internet: Information about naturalization laws and procedures.
Find on the Internet: Population data about the various racial and ethnic groups identified by the US Census Bureau.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about race and ethnicity and the law.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about undocumented immigrants.
Find on the Internet: US Census Bureau data about housing, health care, home ownership, business ownership, educational attainment, and labor force participation of each of the racial and ethnic groups in the US.
Find on the Internet: US Census Bureau data about the number of immigrants who come to the US each year and their countries of origin.
In-Class Discussion: Discuss the “rightness” of the way race and ethnicity were addressed in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.
In-Class Discussion: How do we account for the racial and ethnic differences in housing, health care, home ownership, business ownership, educational attainment, labor force participation of each of the racial and ethnic groups in the US.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of bigotry and prejudice against immigrants.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of bigotry and prejudice.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of prejudice and discrimination in the Constitution and in the Declaration of Independence.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of white privilege.
In-Class Discussion: Is the US a melting pot, a lumpy stew, a tossed salad? Are we an assimilationist/assimilated society or a pluralistic society? What should we be?
In-Class Discussion: Read aloud from WPA slave narratives and discuss the similarities and differences among them.
In-Class Discussion: Should English be the “official” language of the United States?
In-Class Discussion: Should the United States change its immigration policies?
Read: The Constitution of the United States of America.
Read: The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen United States of America.
Read: The Declining Significance of Race by William Julius Wilson.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about illegal immigration.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about immigration by Alejandro Portes.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about legal immigration.
Read: Three to five popular media articles about illegal immigration.
Read: Three to five popular media articles about legal immigration. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/02%3A_Dominant_and_Minority_Groups/2.05%3A_Key_Terms_and_Concepts_for_Part_I.txt |
Reading List for Part I—Dominant and Minority Groups
A Suggestion on the Negro Problem. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Jul., 1908), pp. 78-85.
The Religious Context of Prejudice (in Psychological Studies). Gordon W. Allport. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 5, No. 3. (Autumn, 1966), pp. 447-457.
The Functional Autonomy of Motives. Gordon W. Allport, The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 50, No. 1/4, Golden Jubilee Volume 1887-1937. (Nov., 1937), pp. 141-156.
An Analysis of Rumor. Gordon W. Allport; Leo Postman. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4. (Winter, 1946-1947), pp. 501-517.
Attitudes and the Social Act. Herbert Blumer. Social Problems, Vol. 3, No. 2. (Oct., 1955), pp. 59-65.
Social Problems as Collective Behavior . Herbert Blumer. Social Problems, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Winter, 1971), pp. 298-306.
Social Science and the Desegregation Process (in Principles for Planning). Herbert Blumer. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 304, Racial Desegregation and Integration. (Mar., 1956), pp. 137-143.
Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. Herbert Blumer. The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Spring, 1958), pp. 3-7.
Phylon: Science or Propaganda. W. E. B. DuBois. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 5, No. 1 (1st Qtr., 1944), pp. 5-9.
The Rural South. W. E. B. DuBois. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 13, No. 97 (Mar., 1912), pp. 80-84.
How the Public Received The Journal of Negro History. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Apr., 1916), pp. 225-232.
Africa and World Freedom. W. E. B. DuBois, Ira De A. Reid. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 4, Supplement: Freedom in the Modern World: Four Broadcasts by the People's College of Atlanta University (2nd Qtr., 1943), pp. 8-12.
The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places. Joe R. Feagin. American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Feb., 1991), pp. 101-116.
How Black Students Cope with Racism on White Campuses. Joe R. Feagin; Melvin P. Sikes. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 8. (Summer, 1995), pp. 91-97.
Discrimination: Motivation, Action, Effects, and Context. Joe R. Feagin; Douglas Lee Eckberg. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 6. (1980), pp. 1-20.
Superior Intellect?: Sincere Fictions of the White Self. Hernan Vera; Joe R. Feagin; Andrew Gordon. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 64, No. 3, Myths and Realities: African Americans and the Measurement of Human Abilities. (Summer, 1995), pp. 295-306.
Prejudice, Orthodoxy and the Social Situation. Joe R. Feagin. Social Forces, Vol. 44, No. 1. (Sep., 1965), pp. 46-56.
Racial Barriers to African American Entrepreneurship: An Exploratory Study. Joe R. Feagin; Nikitah Imani. Social Problems, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 562-584.
The Continuing Significance of Racism: Discrimination Against Black Students in White Colleges. Joe R. Feagin. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Jun., 1992), pp. 546-578.
White Separatists and Black Separatists: A Comparative Analysis. Joe R. Feagin. Social Problems, Vol. 19, No. 2. (Autumn, 1971), pp. 167-180.
Herbert J. Gans. The Uses of Poverty: The Poor Pay All. Social Policy July/August 1971: pp. 20-24. Retrieved (1 of 6) 4/9/2007 2:28:32 PM.
The Positive Functions of Poverty. Herbert J. Gans. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 2. (Sep., 1972), pp. 275-289.
The Ghetto Rebellions and Urban Class Conflict. Herbert J. Gans. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 1, Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change. (1968), pp. 42-51.
“Underclass”: Problems with the Term. Herbert J. Gans; Ronald B. Mincy; Isabel V. Sawhill; Douglas A. Wolf. Science, New Series, Vol. 248, No. 4962. (Jun. 22, 1990), pp. 1472-1473.
A Suggestion on the Negro Problem. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Jul., 1908), pp. 78-85.
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. U.S. Department of Labor; Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy. The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. Office of Policy Planning and Research. United States Department of Labor, March 1965.
Urban Conditions: General. Daniel P. Moynihan. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 371, Social Goals and Indicators for American Society, Volume 1. (May, 1967), pp. 159-177.
Have the Poor Been “Losing Ground”? Charles Murray. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Autumn, 1985), pp. 427-445.
Welfare and the Family: The U.S. Experience. Charles Murray. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, Part 2: U.S. and Canadian Income Maintenance Programs. (Jan., 1993), pp. S224-S262.
Bad News for Charles Murray: Uneducated White Women Give Birth to More Babies Than Do Uneducated Black Women. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 19. (Spring, 1998), pp. 68-69.
IQ and Income Inequality in a Sample of Sibling Pairs from Advantaged Family Backgrounds. Charles Murray. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 2002), pp. 339-343.
A Conversation with Charles Murray. Think Tank Transcripts: A Conversation With Charles Murray. http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/show_129.html
Social Trends in America and Strategic Approaches to the Negro Problem. Gunnar Myrdal. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 9, No. 3. (3rd Qtr., 1948), pp. 196-214.
Population Problems and Policies. Gunnar Myrdal. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 197, Social Problems and Policies in Sweden. (May, 1938), pp. 200-215. Stable URL: links.jstor.org/sici?sici=000...3E2.0.CO%3B2-7
Gunnar Myrdal on Population Policy in the Underdeveloped World (in Archives). Gunnar Myrdal. Population and Development Review, Vol. 13, No. 3. (Sep., 1987), pp. 531-540.
The Equality Issue in World Development. Gunnar Myrdal. The American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 6, Nobel Lectures and 1989 Survey of Members. (Dec., 1989), pp. 8-17.
Negro Home Life and Standards of Living (in Social Conditions and Problems). Robert E. Park. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 49, The Negro’s Progress in Fifty Years. (Sep., 1913), pp. 147-163.
The Bases of Race Prejudice (in Race Relations). Robert E. Park, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 140, The American Negro. (Nov., 1928), pp. 11-20.
The Conflict and Fusion of Cultures with Special Reference to the Negro. Robert E. Park. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 4, No. 2. (Apr., 1919), pp. 111-133.
Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups With Particular Reference to the Negro. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 5. (Mar., 1914), pp. 606-623.
Human Nature and Collective Behavior. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 5. (Mar., 1927), pp. 733-741.
The Social Function of War Observations and Notes. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4. (Jan., 1941), pp. 551-570.
Caribbean Diasporas: Migration and Ethnic Communities. Alejandro Portes; Ramón Grosfoguel. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 533, Trends in U.S.-Caribbean Relations. (May, 1994), pp. 48-69.
Disproving the Enclave Hypothesis: Reply. Alejandro Portes; Leif Jensen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 418-420.
TAP: Vol. 7, Iss. 25. Global Villagers. Alejandro Portes. Global Villagers: The Rise of Transnational Communities. http://www.prospect.org/ file:///F|/Portes Ethnic Enclaves 5.htm. (1 of 6) 3/21/2007 3:25:12 PM
Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities. Alejandro Portes. International Migration Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, Special Issue: Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans. (Winter, 1997), pp. 799-825.
Making Sense of Diversity: Recent Research on Hispanic Minorities in the United States. Alejandro Portes; Cynthia Truelove. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 13. (1987), pp. 359-385.
Revisiting the Enclave Hypothesis: Miami Twenty-Five Years Later. Alejandro Portes and Steven Shafer. Princeton University, May 2006. CMD Working Paper #06-10 The Center for Migration and Immigration and Development Working Paper Series • Princeton University.
No Margin for Error: Educational and Occupational Achievement among Disadvantaged Children of Immigrants.
Unwelcome Immigrants: The Labor Market Experiences of 1980 (Mariel) Cuban and Haitian Refugees in South Florida. Alejandro Portes; Alex Stepick. American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Aug., 1985), pp. 493-514.
The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami. Alejandro Portes. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 4, The Ethnic Economy. (Oct., 1987), pp. 340-372.
The Rise of Ethnicity: Determinants of Ethnic Perceptions Among Cuban Exiles in Miami. Alejandro Portes. American Sociological Review, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Jun., 1984), pp. 383-397.
Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action. Alejandro Portes; Julia Sensenbrenner. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 98, No. 6. (May, 1993), pp. 1320-1350.
Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis of the Labor Market Experiences of Cubans in Miami. Kenneth L. Wilson; Alejandro Portes. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 2. (Sep., 1980), pp. 295-319.
Introduction: Immigration and Its Aftermath. Alejandro Portes. International Migration Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, Special Issue: The New Second Generation. (Winter, 1994), pp. 632-639.
Self-Employment and the Earnings of Immigrants. Alejandro Portes; Min Zhou. American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 219-230.
The Enclave and the Entrants: Patterns of Ethnic Enterprise in Miami before and after Mariel. Alejandro Portes; Leif Jensen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 6. (Dec., 1989), pp. 929-949.
The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants. Alejandro Portes; Min Zhou. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 530, Interminority Affairs in the U.S.: Pluralism at the Crossroads. (Nov., 1993), pp. 74-96.
The Poor. Georg Simmel; Claire Jacobson. Social Problems, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Autumn, 1965), pp. 118-140.
Race Psychology: Standpoint and Questionnaire, With Particular Reference to the Immigrant and the Negro. W. I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 17, No. 6. (May, 1912), pp. 725-775.
The Psychology of Race-Prejudice. William I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 5. (Mar., 1904), pp. 593-611.
The Mind of Woman and the Lower Races. William I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Jan., 1907), pp. 435-469.
Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis. Melvin M. Tumin. American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No. 4. (Aug., 1953), pp. 387-394.
Superior Intellect?: Sincere Fictions of the White Self (in The Politics of Race and Science). Hernan Vera; Joe R. Feagin; Andrew Gordon. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 64, No. 3, Myths and Realities: African Americans and the Measurement of Human Abilities. (Summer, 1995), pp. 295-306.
Race Conflicts in the North End of Boston. William Foote Whyte. The New England Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Dec., 1939), pp. 623-642.
Social Organization in the Slums. William Foote Whyte. American Sociological Review, Vol. 8, No. 1. (Feb., 1943), pp. 34-39.
Corner Boys: A Study of Clique Behavior. William Foote Whyte. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 5. (Mar., 1941), pp. 647-664.
The Plight of the Inner-City Black Male (in Symposium on the Underclass). William Julius Wilson. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 136, No. 3. (Sep., 1992), pp. 320-325.
The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy. William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 182-192.
Rising Inequality and the Case for Coalition Politics. William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 568, The Study of African American Problems: W. E. B. Du Bois’s Agenda, Then and Now. (Mar., 2000), pp. 78-99.
Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations: The Challenge of Public Agenda Research: 1990 Presidential Address. William Julius Wilson. American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Feb., 1991), pp. 1-14.
Another Look at The Truly Disadvantaged. William Julius Wilson. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 4. (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 639-656.
When Work Disappears. William Julius Wilson. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 4. (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 567-595.
Urban Poverty. William Julius Wilson; Robert Aponte. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11. (1985), pp. 231-258.
The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City. Loïc J. D. Wacquant; William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 8-25.
The New Economy and Racial Inequality (in Stated Meeting Report). William Julius Wilson; James O. Freedman. Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 54, No. 4. (Summer, 2001), pp. 41-48.
Chicago Hope (in Conversations). William Julius Wilson; Eric Bryant Rhodes. Transition, No. 68. (1995), pp. 162-172.
Ethnic Enclaves, Middleman Minorities and Immigration
A Comprehensive Immigration Policy and Program. Sidney L. Gulick. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 6, No. 3. (Mar., 1918), pp. 214-223.
A Decomposition of Trends in Poverty among Children of Immigrants. Jennifer Van Hook; Susan L. Brown; Maxwell Ndigume Kwenda. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 2004), pp. 649-670.
A New Test and Extension of Propositions from the Bonacich Synthesis. Jose A. Cobas. Social Forces, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Dec., 1985), pp. 432-441.
An Act to Limit the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, and for Other Purposes. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents. (Oct., 1924), pp. 208-227.
Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California’s Illegal Immigration Initiative. Caroline J. Tolbert; Rodney E. Hero. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, No. 3. (Aug., 1996), pp. 806-818.
Beyond the Ethnic Enclave Economy. Ivan Light; Georges Sabagh; Mehdi Bozorgmehr; Claudia Der-Martirosian. Social Problems, Vol. 41, No. 1, Special Issue on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America. (Feb., 1994), pp. 65-80.
E Pluribus Unum: Bilingualism and Loss of Language in the Second Generation. Alejandro Portes; Lingxin Hao. Sociology of Education, Vol. 71, No. 4. (Oct., 1998), pp. 269-294.
A Theory of Middleman Minorities. Edna Bonacich. American Sociological Review, Vol. 38, No. 5. (Oct., 1973), pp. 583-594.
Coming to Stay: An Analysis of the U.S. Census Question on Immigrants’ Year of Arrival. Ilana Redstone; Douglas S. Massey. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 2004), pp. 721-738.
Criminality and Immigration. Ervin Hacker. Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Nov., 1929), pp. 429-438.
Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA. Pia M. Orrenius; Madeline Zavodny. Demography, Vol. 40, No. 3. (Aug., 2003), pp. 437-450.
“Don’t Let Them Make You Feel You Did a Crime”: Immigration Law, Labor Rights, and Farmworker Testimony. Anne Shea. MELUS, Vol. 28, No. 1, Multi-Ethnic Literatures and the Idea of Social Justice. (Spring, 2003), pp. 123-144.
Economic and Labor Market Trends. Demetra Smith Nightingale; Michael Fix. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 48-59.
Economic Segmentation and Worker Earnings in a U.S.-Mexico Border Enclave. Scarlett G. Hardesty; Malcolm D. Holmes; James D. Williams. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Oct., 1988), pp. 466-489.
Ethnic Economies in Metropolitan Regions: Miami and Beyond. John R. Logan; Richard D. Alba; Thomas L. McNulty. Social Forces, Vol. 72, No. 3. (Mar., 1994), pp. 691-724.
Ethnic Enclaves and Middleman Minorities: Alternative Strategies of Immigrant Adaptation? José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Apr., 1987), pp. 143-161.
Ethnic Hegemony and the Japanese of California. Robert M. Jiobu. American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, No. 3. (Jun., 1988), pp. 353-367.
Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship. Howard E. Aldrich; Roger Waldinger. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 16. (1990), pp. 111-135.
Facts About Mexican Immigration Before and Since the Quota Restriction Laws. Louis Bloch. Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 24, No. 165. (Mar., 1929), pp. 50-60.
Illegal Immigrants, Health Care, and Social Responsibility. James Dwyer. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 34, No. 1. (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 34-41.
Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare Participation: Do Immigrants Assimilate into or out of Welfare? Jorgen Hansen; Magnus Lofstrom. The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Winter, 2003), pp. 74-98.
Structural Opportunity or Ethnic Advantage? Immigrant Business Development in New York. Roger Waldinger. International Migration Review, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Spring, 1989), pp. 48-72.
Immigrant Enterprise: A Critique and Reformulation. Roger Waldinger. Theory and Society, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, Special Double Issue: Structures of Capital. (Jan., 1986), pp. 249-285.
Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Business Patterns: A Comparison of Koreans and Iranians in Los Angeles. Pyong Gap Min; Mehdi Bozorgmehr. International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 707-738.
Immigrant Small Business and International Economic Linkage: A Case of the Korean Wig Business in Los Angeles, 1968-1977. Ku-Sup Chin; In-Jin Yoon; David Smith. International Migration Review, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 485-510.
Immigration an International Problem. Donald R. Taft. Social Forces, Vol. 6, No. 2. (Dec., 1927), pp. 264-270.
Immigration and Population Trends in the United States, 1900-1940. Ernest Rubin. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 3. (Apr., 1947), pp. 345-362.
Immigration and the Declining Birthrate. Maurice R. Davie. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Jul., 1924), pp. 68-76.
Immigration as a Source of Urban Increase. F. Stuart Chapin. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 14, No. 107. (Sep., 1914), pp. 223-227.
Immigrants’ Growing Role in U.S. Poverty Cited. By Michael A. Fletcher, Washington Post Staff Writer. Thursday, September 2, 1999; Page A2. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv...mmig/immig.htm. Retrieved (1 of 3) 3/20/2007 6:03:38 PM
Immigration Policy Since World War I. Edward P. Hutchinson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 262, Reappraising Our Immigration Policy. (Mar., 1949), pp. 15-21.
Is the New Immigration More Unskilled than the Old? Paul H. Douglas. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 16, No. 126. (Jun., 1919), pp. 393-403.
Japanese Americans: The Development of a Middleman Minority. Harry H. L. Kitano
The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 43, No. 4. (Nov., 1974), pp. 500-519.
Job Transitions in an Immigrant Metropolis: Ethnic Boundaries and the Mixed Economy. Victor Nee; Jimy M. Sanders; Scott Sernau. American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Dec., 1994), pp. 849-872.
Korean Businesses in Black and Hispanic Neighborhoods: A Study of Intergroup Relations. Lucie Cheng; Yen Espiritu. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 4. (Winter, 1989), pp. 521-534.
Limits of Ethnic Solidarity in the Enclave Economy. Jimy M. Sanders; Victor Nee. American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, No. 6. (Dec., 1987), pp. 745-773.
Middleman Minority Concept: Its Explanatory Value in the Case of the Japanese in California Agriculture. David J. O’Brien; Stephen S. Fugita. The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 1982), pp. 185-204.
The Washington Post: Myth of the Melting Pot: America’s Racial and Ethnic Divides. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv...t/melt0222.htm. Retrieved (1 of 10) 3/20/2007 6:00:09 PM
On the Study of Ethnic Enterprise: Unresolved Issues. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 4, The Ethnic Economy. (Oct., 1987), pp. 467-472.
Our Oldest National Problem. Alcott W. Stockwell. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 5. (Mar., 1927), pp. 742-755.
Paths to Self-Employment among Immigrants: An Analysis of Four Interpretations. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Jan., 1986), pp. 101-120.
Politics without Borders or Postmodern Nationality: Mexican Immigration to the United States. Arturo Santamaría Gómez; James Zackrison. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 2, Citizenship in Latin America. (Mar., 2003), pp. 66-86.
Problems in Resolving the Enclave Economy Debate. Jimy M. Sanders; Victor Nee. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 415-418.
Problems of Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurs. Pyong Gap Min. International Migration Review, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Autumn, 1990), pp. 436-455.
Returns on Human Capital in Ethnic Enclaves: New York City’s Chinatown. Min Zhou; John R. Logan. American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 5. (Oct., 1989), pp. 809-820.
Selective Immigration and the Needs of American Basic Industries. Magnus W. Alexander. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Vol. 10, No. 4, American Economic Policies Since the Armistice. (Jan., 1924), pp. 102-115.
Six Problems in the Sociology of the Ethnic Economy. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 2. (Summer, 1989), pp. 201-214.
Social Capital and the Education of Immigrant Students: Categories and Generalizations. Pedro A. Noguera. Sociology of Education, Vol. 77, No. 2. (Apr., 2004), pp. 180-183.
Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant Population. George J. Borjas. The Future of Children, Vol. 16, No. 2, Opportunity in America. (Autumn, 2006), pp. 55-71.
Social Structure and Prejudice. Sheldon Stryker. Social Problems, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Spring, 1959), pp. 340-354.
Some Aspects of the Immigration Problem. Roland P. Falkner. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Mar., 1904), pp. 32-49.
The Antecedents of Mexican Immigration to the United States. Robert Redfield. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 3. (Nov., 1929), pp. 433-438.
The Changing Significance of Ethnic and Class Resources in Immigrant Businesses: The Case of Korean Immigrant Businesses in Chicago. In-Jin Yoon. International Migration Review, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Summer, 1991), pp. 303-332.
The Control of Immigration as an Administrative Problem. Paul S. Peirce. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 4, No. 3. (Aug., 1910), pp. 374-389.
The Fertility Contribution of Mexican Immigration to the United States. Stefan Hrafn Jonsson; Michael S. Rendall. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 1. (Feb., 2004), pp. 129-150.
The Industrial Significance of Immigration. W. Jett Lauck. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 93, Present-Day Immigration with Special Reference to the Japanese. (Jan., 1921), pp. 185-190.
The New American Immigration Policy and the Labor Market. Niles Carpenter. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Aug., 1931), pp. 720-723.
The Origins and Persistence of Ethnic Identity among the “New Immigrant” Groups. David O. Sears; Mingying Fu; P. J. Henry; Kerra Bui. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 4, Special Issue: Race, Racism, and Discrimination. (Dec., 2003), pp. 419-437.
The Present Status of Our Immigration Laws and Policies. E. P. Hutchinson. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 1947), pp. 161-173.
The Relation of Oriental Immigration to the General Immigration Problem. J. Allen Smith. The American Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, Papers and Discussions of the Twenty-third Annual Meeting. (Apr., 1911), pp. 237-242.
The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965. Mae M. Ngai. Law and History Review, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Spring, 2003), pp. 69-107.
The War and Immigration. Frank Julian Warne. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 61, America’s Interests after the European War. (Sep., 1915), pp. 30-39.
Toward a Unified Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: A Preliminary Synthesis of Three Macro Models. Jonathan H. Turner. Sociological Forum, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Summer, 1986), pp. 403-427. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/02%3A_Dominant_and_Minority_Groups/2.08%3A_Reading_List_for_Part_I.txt |
Dimensions, Forms, and Systems of Stratification
Max Weber delineated the major dimensions of stratification, which are wealth, status or prestige, and power. Wealth is a person’s total economic assets, power is the ability to influence over resistance, and status/prestige is the respect and admiration people attach to various social positions. There are three other, different kinds of power: personal power, which is the ability to affect one’s own life (also called autonomy); social power, which is the ability to affect the lives of others; and coercive power, which is the use or threat of force or violence by persons or groups against others—this is the power of the state or the thug with a gun. There are also two forms of stratification: the closed form, in which the boundaries between/among the layers are impermeable, statuses are ascribed, and social mobility is limited by custom, tradition, ideology, and law; and the open form in which the layers between/among the boundaries are permeable, statuses are achieved, and social mobility is aided by custom, tradition, ideology, and law.
Within these two forms of stratification there are four systems of stratification: the slave system the caste system the estate system and the class system. The slave system includes two distinct strata: a category of people who are free and a category of people who are legally the property of others. Slave systems are a closed form of society characterized by differential power, lack of complete social mobility, and few, if any, legal rights. Slavery is maintained by custom, ideology, and law. In a caste system, membership in ranked categories of people is hereditary and permanent and marriage between members of different categories is prohibited. Caste systems are totally closed societies where status is ascribed; there no social mobility, and they are maintained by custom ideology and law. The estate system is a concomitant of feudalism, which is a social hierarchy centered on the monopoly of power and ownership of land by a group of victorious warriors (lords) who were entitled to labor goods and military service from peasants who were the vast majority of the agrarian population. Feudalism endured from the 11th to the 20th century. Estate systems are relatively closed societies where there is extreme inequality with virtually no middle class—only the very rich and the very poor—and although there was some social mobility, this system was also maintained by custom, ideology, and law. The class system is a product of modern, industrial capitalism.
In a class system, the economic factor is the most important in determining differences, and achieved statuses, (gained by ability and merit), are the principal means of determining a person’s rank. This is a relatively open society and the boundaries between/among the layers are based on master status. There is greater economic equality but greater relative deprivation in the class system and although there is little social mobility at the extremes, there is great mobility at the center. The class system is characterized by a small, very wealthy, upper class, a large diverse middle class, and a mobile working class. Unfortunately, a relatively large and growing underclass has been characteristic in the US for the past 40 years.1
Race
In 1903, when W.E.B. DuBois wrote, The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line, he was writing about race relations in the United States and in the world system.2 Racism is woven into the fabric of American society. A race is a population that differs from others in the frequency of certain hereditary traits, which is also the definition of a species. However, all human beings are members of the same species, we all share the same DNA, and we share many physiological characteristics that cross the boundaries of skin color, hair texture, eye shape, and all of the other physical characteristics that we believe to define race. Biologically, there is no such things as race when it comes to human beings with the exception that we all members of the same species: Homo Sapiens Sapiens. Race, as we use the term on a day-to-day basis, is a social construct; it is categories of people who are set apart from others because of socially defined physical characteristics.
For example, in the U.S., people of Chinese and Southern European heritage have been categorized as both black and white, dependent upon the time period.
Since earliest times, for hundreds of thousands of years, human beings have been moving across the face of the planet. From more than 75,000 years ago until the present, people have been meeting others different in physical appearance from themselves. Oftentimes these travelers have interbred with those whom they have encountered, creating a worldwide situation in which there are no pure races among human beings: we are all related, even if distantly, to one another, notwithstanding our superficial physical differences (phenotype)—the differences in phenotype are accounted for by 1 /10th of 1% (.1%=.0001) of our genotype (DNA). Sadly, many socially defined racial characteristics have become significant symbols of character and Thomas’s Theorem which states that “things perceived to be real are real in their consequences” explains to us that race and the way we define it matters significantly in American society. When W.E.B. DuBois wrote about this double consciousness this seeing one’s self through the eyes of the other world he was emphasizing the idea that race is defined by others, by the dominant group in any given society.3
In about 2001, in a class discussion of race, one of my students who is from Venezuela told the class about her experience emigrating to the US. On her application there was a space for race: she wrote “human.” The immigration officials at the airport where she entered the US were not amused and changed her response to “white.”
Ethnicity
Ethnicity is a status based on cultural heritage and shared feelings of peoplehood, so that an ethnic group is a category of people that is set apart from others because of its distinctive social and cultural characteristics such as ancestry, language, religion, customs, and lifestyle. And although ethnicity is self-defined, it is more than possible for race and ethnic group membership to be combined in one person. Those who do the defining of race are referred to as the dominant group (the dominant group is always the ultimate in-group in a society).
In the US we consider Hispanic or Latino to be an ethnicity, but it is a problematic designation because the culture of Mexico is not the same as the culture of Venezuela and the culture of El Salvador is not the same as the culture of Argentina. In fact, even though most of Latin America shares a common language and a common history of conquest by the Spanish, their cultures are distinct as are their histories.
Racism and Bigotry
Unfortunately, there has been a long and terrible history of racism in the United States—racism that is woven into the fabric of America. (Racism is the belief that one racial category is inherently inferior to another.) With that racism has come egregious levels of prejudice and discrimination which we learn as part of the socialization process. Bigotry includes racism but also includes hatred and discrimination against people based on sex, sexual orientation, religion, age, disability, and socioeconomic status; thus bigotry is more all-encompassing than racism.
Prejudice and Discrimination
Prejudice and discrimination are learned as part of the socialization process; our stereotypes are part of our culture and are omnipresent. Even our language is filled with prejudicial and discriminatory stereotypes concerning others.
Shortly after the end of WWII, James Michener wrote a novel entitled Tales of the South Pacific which was made into a Broadway musical and later a motion picture. There is a scene in the movie where a character sings a song about prejudice and discrimination which is titled “You’ve Got To Be Carefully Taught.” Part of the lyrics to that song are: “You’ve go to be taught, before it’s too late, Before you are six or seven or eight, To hate all the people your relatives hate. You’ve got to be carefully taught.”4
Prejudice is an attitude based on irrational attitudes and preconceived judgments (either favorable or unfavorable) toward a category of people. It is based on stereotypes concerning the essential qualities of a group different form our own. (See Thomas’s Theorem.) Discrimination is a behavior which includes such behaviors as: direct personal discrimination which includes slurs social slights threats and even murder; ethnophaulisms which are derogatory expressions jokes folk sayings or generalized negative remarks such as white men can’t jump, black people have rhythm, the Washington Redskins.
Robert Merton developed a Typology of Prejudice and Discrimination (Bigotry) in which he wrote that, when it comes to bigotry, there are four kinds of people. The All-weather Liberal is not prejudiced does not discriminate and tends to remain firm in her/his convictions over time. The Fair-weather Liberal, although not prejudiced, does engage in discriminatory behavior; perhaps because the sociocultural milieu demands it, perhaps because of fear or cowardice. Since prejudice is an attitude and discrimination is a behavior, the Fair-weather Liberal is dangerous, because in order to overcome the cognitive dissonance which exists due to the incompatibility of behavior and attitude, some change must take place, and this change is almost always in the direction of becoming deeply prejudiced, because our behavior changes our attitudes!5 The Fair-weather Bigot is prejudiced but does not discriminate, perhaps because it would be considered Socioculturally inappropriate or may be illegal, and the All-weather Bigot who is prejudiced, does discriminate, and probably supports or joins hate groups.
De Jure Discrimination
There are many types of discrimination, two of them are: de jure, which is legal discrimination or discrimination by law in which minority group members lawfully are denied access to public institutions, jobs, housing, and social rewards; and de facto, which is discrimination in fact even when it is illegal to engage in acts of discrimination. Harrison and Bennett conducted an historical analysis of types of legal discrimination by racial/ethnic group. For African Americans: slavery and Jim Crow laws; Asians: prevention of immigration, denial of citizenship, concentration camps,6 and seizing of property; American Indians: conquest, usurpation, seizing of property, the Trail of Tears; Mexicans and Hawaiians: conquest, usurpation, and seizing of property.7
De Facto Discrimination
De facto discrimination is practical factual discrimination. It is a situation in which minority group members are discriminated against as a day-to-day occurrence even when laws exist that prohibit such behavior. Such behaviors include indirect institutional discrimination, which is the differential and unequal treatment of a group that is deeply embedded in social, economic, and political institutions; and structural discrimination, which is built into the very structure of the society. Structural discrimination is the most insidious form because, although racism is not the intent, it is the result.
Overcoming Discrimination
Even with such horrific legal atrocities as those discussed by Harrison and Bennett, the United States, since the early 1950s and particularly in the mid 1960s to mid 1970s, has worked very hard at overcoming, if not our racism, at least our discriminatory behavior toward minorities. Once again we turn to Harrison and Bennett: 1952 the McCarran-Walter Act overturned all of the Asian exclusionary acts and permitted Asians to emigrate to the U.S. and to become US citizens; 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka overturned the Plessy decision and declared that segregation was inherently discriminatory and unconstitutional; the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited any race/ethnicity-based discrimination in hiring and employment practices; the 1965 Voting Rights Act prohibited any race/ethnicity-based discrimination in allowing minorities to vote; in 1965 Congress passed the Immigration Act which removed national quota systems permitting an influx of immigrants from Mexico Latin American and Asia; and in 1968 the Fair Housing Act was passed prohibiting any race/ethnicity-based discrimination in housing. These signaled a change in the way in which the U.S. saw itself, and although this decision and these acts did not overcome all forms of discrimination, they were nonetheless an indication that America would no longer think of itself as a racist society. 8
There are a great many theories concerning the causes of racism and attempting to explain prejudice and discrimination. In general, they all boil down to a very few concepts: ethnocentrism which is the tendency to evaluate the customs and practices of other groups through the prism of one’s own culture; we tend to like people who are most like us; we judge people based on our own values; and stereotypes, which are exaggerated claims of what are believed to be the essential characteristics of a group. Whatever the causes, Thomas’s Theorem—“that which is perceived to be real is real in its consequences”—is a screaming indictment of letting our belief patterns run away with our critical thinking skills. What stereotypes do you have? What are some of the stereotypes about your own racial/ethnic group? How do you feel about those stereotypes? Why do stereotypes last over time? Why doesn’t reality change our perceptions? America is the most racially and religiously diverse nation in the world. And yet, we tend to build instant stereotypes about new immigrant groups and hold on to those about older groups.
Assimilation
Is America a melting pot or a lumpy stew/tossed salad? America is a nation of immigrants. With the exception of Native Americans, we all have immigrant ancestors or are ourselves immigrants. Assimilation is the process by which a racial or ethnic minority loses its distinctive identity and lifeways and conforms to the cultural patterns of the dominant group. Cultural assimilation is assimilation of values, behaviors, beliefs, language, clothing styles, religious practices, and foods while structural assimilation is about social interaction. Primary structural assimilation occurs when different racial/ethnic groups belong to the same clubs, live in the same neighborhoods, form friendships, and intermarry. Secondary structural assimilation concerns parity in access to and accumulation of the goods of society, (wealth, power, and status), which is measured by SES and political power—it is becoming middle class or above. The traditional American assimilation pattern is that white ethnics, Asians, Cubans, and non-Mexican Hispanics, by the third generation (third generation Americans are those people whose grandparents were foreign-born), have assimilated both culturally and structurally. However, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and African Americans do not follow this traditional pattern which differs due to propinquity, coercion, and lack of socioeconomic opportunity. 9
Push and Pull Factors in Emmigration/Immigration
Emmigration is the movement of people from one country to another while immigration is the movement of people into a country other than their land of birth. Emmigration and immigration are ubiquitous among human beings: we have been moving ever since we were born in Africa tens of thousands of years ago. There are various reasons why people move from one country to another and we call those motivating forces push and pull factors. The table, below, shows some of the push and pull factors for sending and receiving countries.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Immigration
One’s position in the stratification hierarchy, as stated previously, often depends on one’s master status—a social position which may be influenced by one’s ancestry. The United States is a land of immigrants. Even the American Indians are not truly indigenous to this continent but came as hunters in search of prey across the Bering Strait some 17,000 or more years ago. However, embedded in America’s historic past, immigration and the role of immigrants have played a significant part in determining our national character. Since our earliest history, the North American continent has consisted of indigenous Indians, white Northwestern Europeans, African peoples, and Jews. This continent had its earliest historical beginnings in the journeys of conquest of Europeans. It is to them that the United States owes some of its heritage as a nation; however, the vast influx of an extraordinarily broad array of people from across the globe has given America a uniqueness in the world. America is the most racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse nation on Planet Earth. In one of the largest and busiest harbors in the world stands the gift of a foreign nation holding aloft a torch and cradling a book in which is written the Bill of Rights. At the base of the Statue of Liberty is a plaque on which is written a poem by Emma Lazarus:
THE NEW COLOSSUS Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame, With conquering limbs astride from land to land, Here at our sea-washed, sunset-gates shall stand A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand Glows world-wide welcome, her mild eyes command The air-bridged harbor that twin-cities frame. ‘Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!’ cries she, With silent lips. ‘Give me your tired, your poor,Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore; Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!’ 10
an invitation to all the peoples of all nations to come to America and to take part in her great promise. Unfortunately, that promise has not materialized for millions of immigrants.
There have been, throughout our history, many times when one’s ancestry, country of origin, method of migration, or religion marked one as being so different from “real” Americans that discrimination, both de jure11and de facto,12 was the order of the day. How well people fit into whatever the dominant culture values as normative is often a key to their position in the stratification hierarchy. When immigrant populations are taken into account the dominant culture attempts to force new immigrants to assimilate—become thoroughly Americanized—as quickly as possible. Assimilation is the process by which a racial or ethnic minority loses its distinctive identity and lifeways and conforms to the cultural patterns of the dominant group. It is submerging one’s self into the melting pot of American society. There are two kinds of assimilation cultural and structural. Cultural assimilation concerns values, behaviors, beliefs, language, clothing styles, religious practices, and foods; whereas structural assimilation concerns social interaction in clubs, neighborhoods, friendship, marriage (primary structural assimilation), and parity in access to and accumulation of the goods of society (wealth power and status) measured by SES and political power (secondary structural assimilation).
Dr. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., is the Alphonse Fletcher University Professor and the Director of the W. E. B. Du Bois Institute for African and African American Research at Harvard University.Professor Gates is Editor-in-Chief of the Oxford African American Studies Center, the first comprehensive scholarly online resource in the field of African American Studies and Africana Studies, and of The Root, an online news magazine dedicated to coverage of African American news, culture, and genealogy.13. Dr. Gates is also the producer of Faces of America, a 2010 series about geneology and the interconnectedness of the American people. In this series Dr. Gates explores the history of immigration and assimilation by following the lives and migration patterns of a handful of celebrities’ families According to the show’s website, the series explores the interaction between the country and its immigrants.
What made America? What makes us? These two questions are at the heart of the new PBS series Faces of America with Henry Louis Gates, Jr. The Harvard scholar turns to the latest tools of genealogy and genetics to explore the family histories of 12 renowned Americans — professor and poet Elizabeth Alexander, chef Mario Batali, comedian Stephen Colbert, novelist Louise Erdrich, journalist Malcolm Gladwell, actress Eva Longoria, musician Yo-Yo Ma, director Mike Nichols, Her Majesty Queen Noor, television host/heart surgeon Dr. Mehmet Oz, actress Meryl Streep, and figure skater Kristi Yamaguchi.14
There are certain patterns of primary and secondary structural assimilation (hereinafter referred to by the term assimilation) into American culture that differ based on race and ethnicity but before discussing those patterns an explanation of terminology is necessary. First generation Americans are those people who are foreign-born; second generation Americans are the children of foreign-born parents; and third generation Americans are the grandchildren of the foreign-born. For white ethnics—primarily Southern and Eastern Europeans, although arguably anyone who is not one of the primary racial or ethnic minority groups such as Arabs, Asians, blacks, Hispanics, American Indians could be considered a white ethnic—Asians, Cubans, South American, and other, non-Mexican Hispanics, assimilation follows a fairly traditional pattern even though some prejudice and discrimination may continue to exist. First generation white ethnic Americans, although the vast majority learn and speak English, tend to maintain their native language in their own homes, to keep many of their traditional religious and holiday customs, retain native styles of dress and food preferences, marry among themselves (endogamous marriage), and live near others from their homeland. Second generation white ethnic Americans generally lose much of the language of their parents, drift away from traditional religious and holiday customs, let go of native styles of dress and food preferences in favor of more American-style clothing and food, marry outside their parents’ ethnic group, and move into neighborhoods that are ethnically mixed. By the third generation, most white ethnics have become thoroughly Americanized and have failed to learn all but a very few words of their grandparents language, found meaningless many of the traditional religious and holiday customs, and have adopted American customs (turkey instead of lasagna for Christmas dinner) instead, wear American-style clothing exclusively, eat fast food, marry outside their ethnic group (in fact third generation white ethnic Americans usually do not even consider the ethnic background of those they marry) and live in such ethnically-mixed communities that, except for the generalized whiteness, there is no consideration of the ethnic backgrounds of their neighbors. Moreover, by the third generation, most white ethnics enjoy relatively high levels of structural assimilation.15
Some of this ease of both cultural and structural assimilation is based on the migration patterns of white ethnics. Although many white ethnics have come to America because they perceive it to be a land of economic and political freedom and opportunity, many have been driven from their homelands by border wars, internal ethnic conflict, economic uncertainty or collapse lack of educational opportunities, less political freedom, and myriad other reasons. The primary push factors—those conditions which impel people to emigrate from their native lands and immigrate to a new and unknown country—are political and economic, and, as one might guess, the primary pull factors—those real or perceived conditions in the new country which beckon to those on foreign shores moving people to emigrate from the countries of their birth—are also political and economic. Regardless of the push or pull factors, white ethnics are voluntary migrants to America choosing to migrate, sometimes at great personal risk, because they choose to migrate; a migration pattern that Sociologists call voluntary migration. Although many white ethnic groups—Jews, Irish, and Italians16 particularly—have experienced greater or lesser degrees of discrimination, complete assimilation by the third generation is the rule. However, that assimilation was often accomplished with the help of others.
Many white ethnic groups (and as will be shown many nonwhite migrants) formed neighborhoods where first, second, and third generation white ethnics lived and worked together in ethnic enclaves. An ethnic enclave is a neighborhood or an area or region of a larger city in which people of a particular ethnic group: 1) live in close proximity; 2) support the traditional values customs and ways of life of that ethnic group; 3) maintain social services such as employment networks political clubs civic organizations and houses of worship; 4) establish retail stores where traditional foods clothing household goods and utensils are sold; 5) develop and sustain native language newspapers and sometimes radio and TV stations; 6) provide employment and social and sometimes financial support for new immigrants; 7) permit new immigrants to adapt to a new country without experiencing serious levels of culture shock and homesickness. In general, ethnic enclaves provide a safe haven with a variety of social supports for new immigrants that serve to ease their transition into a new and different culture.
The Little Italys in New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia; the Chinatowns of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York; the Little Saigons of Houston, Los Angeles, and Atlanta; the Calle Ocho Little Havana district of Miami and the Little Mexico Barrios in Houston, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Dallas, and Phoenix; the Crown Heights area of Brooklyn New York which is home to nearly 100,000 Lubavitsch-sect, ultra-Orthodox Jews; the Amish and other Old Order religious groups of Iowa, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and far Northwestern Minnesota are all primary exemplars of ethnic enclaves.
Sociologist Alejandro Portes has long studied ethnic enclaves and has argued that for an ethnic enclave to survive it requires early immigrants to arrive with business skills and funds or access to funds. Ethnic enclaves survive over more than two generations only when there is a constant migration stream from the country of origin that lasts over more than two generations. Ethnic enclaves, once they have served their purpose of socializing new immigrants into American culture, tend to disappear as later generations follow the traditional assimilation pattern and move further and further out into the wider society.17
Middleman Minorities
Some minority immigrants, most notably Jews and Asians, have found themselves in the unique position of being middleman minorities.
Certain ethnic groups in multiethnic societies sometimes occupy a middle status between the dominant group at the top of the ethnic hierarchy and subordinate groups in lower positions. These have been referred to as middleman minorities . . . Middleman minorities often act as mediators between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups. They ordinarily occupy an intermediate niche in the economic system being neither capitalists (mainly members of the dominant group) at the top nor working masses (mainly those of the subordinate group) at the bottom. They play such occupational roles as traders, shopkeepers, moneylenders, and independent professionals. . . . They perform economic duties that those at the top find distasteful or lacking in prestige and they frequently supply business and professional services to members of ethnic minorities who lack such skills and resources. . . . In times of stress they are . . . natural scapegoats. . . . Subordinate groups will view middleman minorities with disdain because they often encounter them as providers of necessary business and professional services [that members of their own group do not or cannot provide in sufficient numbers to supply the demand]. Such entrepreneurs therefore come to be seen as exploiters. . . . Because they stand in a kind of social no-man’s-land middleman minorities tend to develop an unusually strong in-group solidarity and are often seen by other groups as clannish. (Marger p. 51) 18
Assimilation Patterns
While white ethnics, Cubans, Asians, non-Mexican Hispanics, and Middle Easterners follow the traditional assimilation pattern, three significantly large minorities do not: Mexican Americans (about 50%), Puerto Ricans, and African Americans. The assimilation patterns for these groups differ due to propinquity, method of immigration, and let us not mince words, racism. Approximately 50% of all Mexican immigrants to the United States do not follow the traditional assimilation pattern. This is partly due to the propinquity of the mother country, the nearly continuous new migration stream, a relatively high rate of return migration, racism, and in some cases, involuntary immigration in that parts of Mexico have been annexed by the United States so that some people’s native land quite literally changed overnight—they went to bed Mexican and woke up American.1920
Puerto Ricans, following the treaty that concluded the Spanish American War, became citizens of the United States, albeit citizens without suffrage. Therefore, Puerto Ricans, who are already citizens, have little incentive to assimilate and, like their Mexican counterparts, are physically close to their homeland, maintain a nearly continuous migration stream onto the mainland, and have a relatively high rate of return migration. Puerto Rico is a desperately poor colony of the United States populated primarily by Spanish-speaking, Hispanic-surnamed descendants of African slaves. Thus, entrenched intergenerational poverty, coupled with language difficulties and racism, have prevented assimilation. Most Puerto Ricans who live on the mainland live in poor, inner city neighborhoods in New York and Chicago. Neighborhoods that are not ethnic enclaves but are rather huge concentrations of the poor, poorly educated, and black underclass.21
African Americans differ dramatically from all other migrants. Many, probably most, African Americans have been Americans far longer than most whites. Many African Americans can trace their ancestry back more than seven generations. Those ancestors however were involuntary immigrants who were stolen from their homes, thrown into the bellies of slave ships, and brought to these shores as pieces of property—chattel—to work for the rest of their lives and for the rest of the lives of all their descendants in involuntary servitude as the slaves of white masters. No other people have involuntarily migrated to America in such vast numbers. No other people have been treated as property. No other people have suffered 350 years of slavery. No other people have been so vilely used, abused, mistreated, maltreated, and battered physically, emotionally, intellectually, and spiritually. It was not until the late 1860s that blacks were granted Constitutional rights in the United States and it was not until 1953, and then again in the middle 1960s through the mid 1970s, that real civil rights were finally established for African Americans. Until that time African Americans were second-class people who were often denied their political citizenship by being denied suffrage. Therefore, the opportunity for traditional assimilation for African Americans has not existed until very recently. Given the traditional assimilation pattern, African Americans for all practical purposes, are only second generation Americans regardless of how far back they can trace their actual ancestry in America.22
For many nonwhite minorities in America there has been denial of political citizenship through denial of suffrage, denial of economic citizenship through de jure and de facto discrimination that prevented competition for jobs and small business loans, denial of social citizenship through de jure and de facto residential segregation and educational segregation, denial of human citizenship through racist public policies.
There has often been the assumption that America is the land of opportunity for everyone, and indeed it can be, however, there are those who also make the assumption that America is a melting pot in which immigrants either do or should assimilate quickly and readily. If assimilation is the process by which a racial or ethnic minority loses its distinctive identity and lifeways and conforms to the cultural patterns of the dominant group then submerging one’s self into the melting pot of American society means trying to be as white as possible. The dominant culture in America is white even though it has many aspects of great diversity and even though it has taken many elements from many other cultures and incorporated them into its culture, it has in most cases stamped diversity with the imprimatur of white acceptance. While America is a melting pot for white ethnics, for people of color it has become a kind of tossed salad or lumpy stew where all share the same seasoning, (the sociocultural structure), while each still retains its separate identity. This societal pattern is called pluralism—cooperation among racial and ethnic groups in areas deemed essential to their well being (e.g. the economy the national political arena), while retaining their distinctive identities and lifestyles. In pluralistic societies, citizens share what they can and maintain what they can. With the notable exception of Switzerland with its four distinct ethnic/language groups, most pluralistic societies have destroyed themselves with bloody ethnic strife.23 Whether America can balance the melting pot with semi-pluralism is yet to be seen. The great experiment that is America may be the only nation on earth where the possibility of unity through diversity may actually come to fruition.
For more information about immigration, please visit the following websites: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; History of Migration and Immigration Laws in the United Statesfrom ACLAnet; A History of Immigration Law Regarding People of Color by Diana Vellos; United States Citizenship and Immigration Services: Laws; An Immigration Law Timeline and Links
Racial/Ethnic Discrimination In America 1776-1998
1776—Sally Hemings—was the slave and mistress of Thomas Jefferson. DNA evidence indicates that most of Hemings’s children were sired by Jefferson; however, the white descendents of Jefferson dispute this. On February 28, 2010, the New York Times ran several articles about this issue.
1845—Native American Party—An anti-immigration group held convention in Philadelphia; attempted to stop immigration to U.S.
1852—Know-Nothings formed the American Party—Gained control of some legislature. Wanted to: Ban Catholics and other immigrants (mostly Southern Europeans) from holding offices; Create literacy tests; Restrict immigration based on national origin. For more about the Know-Nothings click here.
1854—Commodore Matthew Perry opens trade between US and Japan—this led to the explosive modernization of Japan which went from a feudal society to an industrial society in less than fifty years.
1857—Dred Scott Decision—established the legal doctrine of slaves as property.
1864-1877—Reconstruction—a time of martial law in the South. Reconstruction ended due to a political deal made to settle the disputed election of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877.
1877—Jim Crow Laws established—the Jim Crow laws were laws that segregated white and non-white people and denied the civil rights of non-white people. This led to the “separate but equal” doctrine which was later amended to “separate and unequal.” For more information about the Jim Crow laws, see: Jim Crow History.Org; Remembering Jim Crow; The Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia
1882—First Chinese Exclusionary Act passed—this legislation prevented the families of railroad construction workers and agricultural laborers from entering the United States. It created a deviant community of bachelor men on the west coast. For more information about the Asian Exclusion Act see: The Chinese Exclusion Act: A Black Legacy; An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese; Chinese Exclusion Act (1882).
1887—American Protective Association founded to stop immigration.
1887—The Dawes Act eliminated tribal ownership of Indian lands.
1894—Immigration Restriction League founded; proposed literacy tests and special standards for immigrants
1896—Plessy v. Ferguson decided by the Supreme Court; established separate but equal; affirmed the constitutionality of the Jim Crow laws. For more information see: Plessy v. Ferguson; The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow; Landmark Cases: Plessy v. Ferguson.
1899—Cumming v. County Board of Education established separate but unequal status; progeny of Plessy; upheld constitutionality of Jim Crow laws.
1911—Chinese Exclusionary Act expanded to include other East Asians and Japanese.
1924—National Origins Act passed by Congress—Banned all east Asians, strictly limited immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe
1924—Ku Klux Klan marched down Pennsylvania Avenue in D.C.; the KKK had 4 million members out of a national population of about 114 million. See also: “1924: Hatred Wore a Hood in Jersey
1942—Korematsu Decision determined that denying the civil rights of a certain group of citizens in times of war is constitutional. See also: Korematsu v. United States: The U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Internment; Landmark Cases: Korematsu.
1943—The “Zoot Suit Riots” in LA; 200 Navy personnel rioted for 4 days over the July 4th Holiday in East L.A.; many Hispanics killed; no arrests; newspapers anti-Hispanic articles exacerbated the situation.
1953—Emmett Till murdered.For more information, see: The History of Jim Crow: The Lynching of Emmett Till; The Lynching of Emmett Till; A Timeline of the Emmett Till Case.
1962—South Carolina begins to fly Confederate Flag over capitol dome
1998—James Byrd Jr. dragged to death in Jasper TX. For more information see: Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act; Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act.
1998—Matthew Shephard murdered because he was gay.24 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act; Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act.
W.E.B. (William Edward Burghardt) DuBois
W.E.B. (William Edward Burghardt) DuBois (pronounced dooboyz) lived from 1868 to 1963. He was the first African American to get a PhD in Sociology from Harvard. He wrote The Souls of Black Folk in 1903. He edited The Crisis during the Harlem Renaissance, and was an early member of the Niagara Movement which later became the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People). DuBois was the first African American president of the American Sociological Society. As a young man, he believed in the promise of the United States as a country where all people could be equal and free. He spent his life as a sociologist, social critic, and civil rights activist. His 1903 book, The Souls of Black Folk was about the socioeconomic and sociopolitical circumstances of African Americans following the Civil War and in the first years of the 20th century. He wrote:
The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line.
How does it feel to be a problem?
. . . the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil and gifted with second sight in this American world—a world that yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self . . . He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed in his face. 25
Sally Hemings
Thomas Jefferson, slave owner, primary author of the Declaration of Independence, third President of the United States, founder of the University of Virginia, polymath, rapist, and father of Sally Hemings’s children, wrote about his social conflict over the issue of slavery: . . . I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep forever . .26. In other words, white America has a great deal to answer for.
Sally Hemings was a slave who was originally owned by a Virginia planter named John Wayles. Wayles owned Sally Hemings’s mother, raped her, and the result of that rape was Sally Hemings. John Wayles’s legitimate, white daughter Martha married Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence and later, the third President of the United States. Upon her marriage to Jefferson, Martha was given Sally Hemings as her personal-maid/slave; Hemings was between 12 and 14 at the time. The marriage between Martha Wayles Jefferson and Thomas Jefferson was relatively short and ended with her death after which, Jefferson began a life-long relationship with Sally Hemings, siring several children, all of whom remained slaves for the duration of Jefferson’s life.27 The relationship between Jefferson and Hemings was undoubtedly complicated, but one thing is clear: Hemings could not prevent Jefferson from coming into her bed and having sex with her because she was his property! Slaves had no personal rights and slave women were often the repeated victims of their owner’s rapine behavior. Jefferson never acknowledged his children and they (and Sally Hemings, herself) remained slaves until after Jefferson’s death.
Anti-Immigrant Groups
The Statue of Liberty notwithstanding, (“give me your tired, your poor”), the United States has a long history of preventing immigration and attempting to block persons based on national origin and/or religion. There have been many anti-immigration groups and political parties in the United States beginning in the early 19th century and continuing until the present day. Many of our immigration laws have been discriminatory and have stultified migration rather than encouraging it. The Native American Party, the American Party, the American Protective Association, the Immigration Restriction League, and the Ku Klux Klan, among many other groups, were all founded based on their opposition to the immigration of anyone they considered unworthy—Italians, Jews, Greeks, Poles, Irish Catholics, Catholics or non-Protestants in general, and all non-whites which included, among people traditionally classified as non-white, Italians, Greeks, Turks, and other residents of the southern European, Mediterranean coast, and eastern European, mostly Catholic or Muslim, peoples. Congress vacillates between restricting and encouraging migration from various regions of the planet. Nevertheless, we were a nation of immigrants at our inception and remain a nation of immigrants to this day.
In 2010 there are still anti-immigration groups. PublicEye.org publishes a list of about a dozen anti-immigrant groups that ranges from think tanks to the Christian right as does the Southern Poverty Law Center. In February 2010, former US House of Representatives member Tom Tancredo (R-CO), gave the keynote address to the first Tea Party convention arguing that we need “a civics literacy test” before anyone in this country can vote. He also stated that if John McCain had been elected president in 2009, President Calderon and President McCain would be toasting the elimination of those pesky things called borders and major steps taken toward creation of a North American Union.28In other words, there are those today who would block all immigration into this country legal and illegal because they are afraid of the changes that immigrants make to the culture of the United States. The question then becomes, how have other immigrants changed America and has America changed them more than they have changed it? Most of the literature on this question would suggest that it is a reciprocal process but that the American ideology and the American constitution remain strong.
The Dred Scott Decision
In 1857, a slave named Dred Scott was owned by a physician (Dr. Scott) who was a civilian contractor to the United States Army. Dr. Scott accepted a contract in territory that would enter the union as a free, non-slave state. The abolitionist movement filed suit on behalf of Dred Scott claiming that, because he was residing in free territory, he should no longer be a slave. The Supreme Court of the United States determined that slaves are not human, but are property and thus may be treated like property, meaning that ownership existed regardless of the location of the property.
After the Civil War, a period of marital law existed in the South in the states that had seceded from the Union and joined the Confederate States of America. There were approximately ten million slaves who were freed by the Civil War, most of whom were illiterate—it was illegal to teach a slave to read or write, and a slave caught reading or writing could be killed at once—trained only for work in the fields, had never been more than ten miles from where they were born, and had no concept of money management. Ten million in a nation of 35 million! Ten million people, one-third of the population of the country without the most basic economic skills! Reconstruction was a political process meant to bring the freed slaves up to the same socioeconomic condition of poor whites in order to make them economically self-sufficient. However, Reconstruction became a way to crush the South, grind it down, and pillage what remained after the war. The government did very little to help the newly freed blacks, but Northern abolitionists and religious organizations began to send people into the South to provide an academic education, (reading, writing, arithmetic), and job skill training. A series of schools were established across the South and when the “white, Quaker, school marms,” as W.E.B. DuBois called them, left, they had trained young African Americans to teach the basic skills so that the schools continued long after Reconstruction ended. Unfortunately, the death of Reconstruction gave birth to the segregation laws that later came to be called Jim Crow laws.29 These segregation laws remained in effect until the mid-to-late 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, in 1896, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a ground-breaking case titled Plessy v. Ferguson, declared that segregation was Constitutional establishing the legal separation and unequal treatment of people based on race! It wasn’t until 1955, nearly sixty years later and ninety years after the end of the Civil War, in another ground-breaking case titled Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas that the Supreme Court decided, unanimously, that segregation was inherently discriminatory and thus unConstitutional.
Chinese/Asian Exclusion
Many Chinese men had been recruited by the railroad companies to work on the Transcontinental Railroad—a vast, complex, engineering feat to span the continent and link the entire expanse of the middle of North America, from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean. By 1887, the project was complete and many of the Chinese workers, having saved the majority of their pay, returned home, or, conversely, began to send for their families—parents, siblings, wives and children, sweethearts, cousins—beginning a steady migration stream from China to the United States. Many of these former railroad workers settled along the West Coast and began to compete, economically, with the white population of the region. Feeling serious economic pressure from the Chinese immigrants, whites on the West Coast petitioned Congress to stop migration from China. Congress complied and passed a bill titled the “Asian Exclusionary Act.”
The Dawes Act
That same year, Congress also passed the “Dawes Act” which deprived American Indians of the ownership of their ancestral land and established the reservation system that exists even now. As an aside, Congress has never, in its entire history, kept any treaty it has made with any American Indian tribe. The current treaties are so bent that they are about to break and there is a law suit in federal court concerning the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which is part of the Department of the Interior, and is responsible for the management of reservation land and the people living on reservations. The suit alleges that the BIA has misallocated, misappropriated, or simply lost, over ten million dollars that was earmarked for social services on a reservation. This suit has been languishing in the federal court system since 1995! 30
It is also important to know that, in the mid 1970s, medical doctors from the United States Public Health Service’s Indian Health Services branch, whose mandate is to provide health care on Indian reservations, often forcibly, sterilized, without their knowledge or consent, more than 25,000 American Indian women on several reservations.31 This practice of forced sterilizations continued into the 1990s. The rationale was that the women were too poor to manage children and that the doctors and nurses were providing indispensable help to these women by limiting their child bearing. A further argument was that sterilization is a preventative for fetal alcohol syndrome in alcoholic American Indian women. How far should government go in protecting us from ourselves? Does the government have a legitimate concern regarding what we do with our bodies? Should the poor be prevented from having children? Should alcoholic or drug addicted women be allowed to get pregnant?
Expansion of Asian Exclusion
From the 15th century through the 19th century, Japan was a xenophobic, feudal society, ostensibly governed by a God-Emperor, but in reality ruled by ruthless, powerful Shoguns. Japan’s society changed little during the four centuries of samurai culture, and it was cut off from the rest of the world in self-imposed isolation, trading only with the Portuguese, Spanish, English, and Chinese, and then not with all of them at once, often using one group as middlemen to another group. In the mid-19th century, (1854), the United States government became interested in trading directly with Japan in order to open up new export markets and to import Japanese goods at low prices uninflated by middleman add-ons. Commodore Matthew Perry was assigned to open trade between the United States and Japan. With a flotilla of war ships, Perry crossed the Pacific and berthed his ships off the coast of the Japanese capital. Perry sent letters to the emperor that were diplomatic but insistent. Perry had been ordered not to take no for an answer, and when the emperor sent Perry a negative response to the letters, Perry maneuvered his warships into positions that would allow them to fire upon the major cities of Japan. The Japanese had no armaments or ships that could compete with the Americans, and so, capitulated to Perry. Within thirty years, Japan was almost as modernized as its European counterparts. They went from feudalism to industrialism almost over night.
Within a few years of the trade treaty between the United States and Japan, a small but steady trickle of Japanese immigrants flowed across the Pacific Ocean. This migration to the West Coast of the United States meant that Japanese immigrants were in economic competition with the resident population, most of whom were white. Fears of economic loss led the whites to petition Congress to stop the flow of immigrants from Japan, and in 1911 Congress expanded the Asian Exclusionary Act to include Japanese thereby stopping all migration from Japan into the United States. In 1914, Congress passed the National Origins Act which cut off all migration from East Asia.32
In 1924, anti-minority sentiment in the United States was so strong that the Ku Klux Klan had four million, proud, openly racist members thousands of whom were involved in a parade down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC, that was watched by thousands of Klan supporters, and other Americans.
On December 7, 1941, at 7:55 A.M. local time the Japanese fleet in the South Pacific launched 600 hundred aircraft in a surprise attack against U.S. Naval forces at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Within four hours, 2, 400 people, mostly military personnel had been killed, including the 1,100 men who will be entombed forever in the wreckage of the U.S.S. Arizona when it capsized during the attack. Although this was a military target, the United States was not at war when the attack occurred. In less than six months after the attack, Congress passed the Japanese Relocation Act. Below, is reproduced the order that was posted in San Francisco.
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN RELOCATION ORDER
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN RELOCATION ORDER
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Presidio of San Francisco, California
May 3, 1942
INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY
Living in the Following Area:
All of that portion of the City of Los Angeles, State of California, within that boundary beginning at the point at which North Figueroa Street meets a line following the middle of the Los Angeles River; thence southerly and following the said line to East First Street; thence westerly on East First Street to Alameda Street; thence southerly on Alameda Street to East Third Street; thence northwesterly on East Third Street to Main Street; thence northerly on Main Street to First Street; thence north-westerly on First Street to Figueroa Street; thence northeasterly on Figueroa Street to the point of beginning.
Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 33, this Headquarters, dated May 3, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., Saturday, May 9, 1942.
No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., Sunday, May 3, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding General, Southern California Sector, at the Civil Control Station located at
Japanese Union Church,
120 North San Pedro Street,
Los Angeles, California
SEE CIVILIAN EXCLUSION ORDER NO. 33
Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a family, or in cases of grave emergency.
The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:
1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.
2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real estate, business and professional equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock.
3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.
4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.
The Following Instructions Must Be Observed:
1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further instructions. This must be done between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Monday, May 4, 1942, or between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Tuesday, May 5, 1942.
2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Assembly Center, the following property:
(a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family;
(b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
(c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;
(d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each member of the family;
(e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.
All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.
3. No pets of any kind will be permitted.
4. No personal items and no household goods will be shipped to the Assembly Center.
5. The United States Government through its agencies will provide for the storage, at the sole risk of the owner, of the more substantial household items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.
6. Each family, and individual living alone will be furnished transportation to the Assembly Center or will be authorized to travel by private automobile in a supervised group. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.
Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Monday, May 4, 1942, or between the hours of
8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M.,
Tuesday, May 5, 1942, to receive further instructions.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding
This map shows the location of the American concentration camps where Japanese Americans were interned during WWII.
Figure 5.
In 1943, Fred Korematsu, with the assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit in federal court arguing that it was unconstitutional to deprive American citizens of the their civil rights without due process of law. The Supreme Court of the United States decided that, in times of great national strife, it was Constitutional to deprive one specific segment of the population of their civil rights because of the potential for harm by that specific group. You might be interested to know that this decision has never been overturned, which means that it is still the law of the land.
The Zoot Suit Riots
During the “Zoot Suit Riots,” 200 United States Navy personnel rioted for four days over the July 4th, 1943 holiday in East L.A.; many Hispanics killed; no military personnel were arrested. The Los Angeles newspapers had published a series of anti-Hispanic articles which exacerbated the situation. (For more information, please visit the following websites: The “Zoot Suit” Riots; Los Angeles Zoot Suit Riots; World War Two and the Zoot Suit Riots.)
The Murder of Emmett Till
In 1953, a fourteen year old boy from Chicago convinced his reluctant mother to send him to Mississippi during his summer vacation to visit his uncle and cousins; the boy’s name was Emmett Till. His uncle had a farm a few miles from a very small town, population 300-500. One day Emmett and his cousins decided to go into the town where they visited a small grocery store/meat market. While in the store, Emmett told his cousins that the woman behind the counter was pretty, and then he whistled at her. Emmett Till was black, the woman was white, and this was the American South of Jim Crow segregation.
The woman reached for a shotgun as Till’s cousins grabbed him and ran home as fast as their legs could move. Late that night, three adult, white men came to Till’s uncle’s house and demanded that the boy be brought out, Till’s uncle refused. The men went into the house, found Till, still asleep, picked him up and dragged him, kicking and screaming, out the house. The men took Till to a remote, semi-abandoned barn where perhaps twenty white, adult men, took turns, for the next seven days, beating and torturing the fourteen year old, whose crime was whistling at a white woman.
When Till’s mother was asked to identify her son’s body, she couldn’t recognize her son whose face looked more like a large piece of hamburger meat than a human being. The three men who took Till from his uncle’s house were arrested, tried by an all-white, all-male jury, and acquitted. In 2005, the FBI exhumed Emmett Till’s body, looking for evidence that would allow them to bring federal charges of civil rights abuses against the handful of living men who were involved in the torture and murder of Till. Unfortunately, they failed to find sufficient evidence to present to a grand jury. Thus, the case is closed, and the guilty have either died or gone free since 1953!. (For more information, please visit the following websites: The Murder of Emmett Till; The History of Jim Crow: The Lynching of Emmett Till; The Lynching of Emmett Till; A Timeline of the Emmett Till Case.)
The Murder of James Byrd, Jr.
James Byrd, Jr. was murdered by being dragged to death, down an asphalt road, late at night, in the small East Texas town of Jasper. Byrd was black, his killers are white. Two of them have been sentenced to death and one to life imprisonment. (For more information, please visit the following websites: The Murder of James Byrd Jr. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act; Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act.)
Hate kills, and the United States, born in racism, is a nation where hate has been nurtured. Unfortunately, racism is part of the fabric of American society. It is part of our social structure. Thus, we must learn to deal with both the legacy and the ongoing problems of racism. A difficult, but necessary task. In order to fully overcome the racism inherent in American society, we must heed the words of W.E.B. DuBois and remember, that for minorities “One ever feels his twoness—an American, a [minority]; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one . . . body whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.” The promise of this country is great, but the reality has not yet met the promise even though there have been movements to overcome our inherent racism.
Overcoming Racial/Ethnic Discrimination
1808—Importation of slaves banned in the U.S.
1863—Emancipation Proclamation signed.
1865—13th Amendment ratified; abolished slavery.
1868—14th Amendment ratified; established due process and equal protection to all citizens including former slaves.
1870—15th Amendment ratified; voting rights for former slaves established.
1905—The Niagara Movement the beginnings of the NAACP.
1952—McCarran-Walter Act permitted Asians to become US citizens; overturned Asian exclusionary acts.
1954—Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka declared that segregation was inherently discriminatory and unconstitutional.
1964—Civil Rights Act prohibited any race/ethnicity-based discrimination in hiring and employment practices.
1964—24th Amendment ratified; outlawed poll taxes.
1965—Voting Rights Act prohibited any race/ethnicity-based discrimination in allowing minorities to vote.
1965—Immigration Act removed national quota systems permitting an influx of immigrants from Mexico Latin American and Asia.
1968—Fair Housing Act prohibited any race/ethnicity-based discrimination in housing.
1980s—Congress issues an apology and grants reparations to those effected by Korematsu.
1990s—President Clinton offers apologies and reparations to victims of the Tuskegee experiment. (For more information, please see the following websites: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment; U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee; TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY; Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Study; Remembering Tuskegee; TUSKEGEE EXPERIMENT ON BLACK MALES!)
1995—Mississippi ratifies constitutional amendment abolishing slavery
2000—South Carolina removes the Confederate Flag from flying over the capitol dome33
See also: Civil Rights: A Chronology; Slavery Timeline; Slavery and our Founding Fathers; Statutes of the United States Concerning Slavery.
Historical Race/Ethnic Population Demographics in America: A Brief Statistical Overview
• 1790—Population 4 million
• 1 person in 30 urban=3.33
• 1820—Population 10 million
• 1 black to 4 whites=25% Black population
• 14000 immigrants per year for decade
• Almost all from England and N. Ireland (Protestants)
• 1 in 20 urban=5%
• 1830—Population 13 million
• 1 black to 5 whites=20 Black population
• 60,000 immigrants in 1832
• 80,000 immigrants in 1837
• Irish Catholics added to mix
• 1840—Population 17 million
• 1 in 12 urban=8.33
• 84,000 immigrants
• 1840-1850—immigration1.5 million Europeans
• 1850—Population 23 million
• Irish 45% of foreign-born
• Germans20% of foreign-born
• 1850s—immigration2.5 million Europeans
• 2% of the population of NYC were immigrants
• In St. Louis, Chicago, Milwaukee the foreign-born outnumbered the native-born
• 1860—Population 31.5 million
• 26% of the population of free states were urban
• 10 of the population in the South were urban
• Irish immigrant population in America=1.5 million
• German immigrant population in America=1 million
• 1900—Population=76.1 million
• 2002—Population=280 million
• 2010—Population=309 million34
Although Europe has been the traditional sending region for immigrants to the U.S., the post WWII era (after 1946) shows a significant increase in migration from Mexico, South and Central America, and Asia. The latest migration trend involves people from Africa. Please visit the following websites for more information: TheStatistical Abstract of the United States: Population: Migration; The Statistical Abstract of the United States: Population: Ancestry, Language Spoken At Home; The Statistical Abstract of the United States Population: Native and Foreign-born Populations.
Footnotes
• 1 The United States is inarguably the richest nation in the world with an economy in 2002 over \$12 trillion (12,000,000,000,000). England (population 59.6 million, economy \$1.36 trillion); France (population 56 million, economy \$1.45 trillion); Germany (population 83 million, economy \$1.94 trillion); Italy (population 58 million, economy \$1.3 trillion); Spain (population 40 million, economy \$720 billion); Sweden (population 9 million, economy \$197 billion); Austria (population 8 million, economy \$203 billion), Switzerland (72. million, \$207 billion), Denmark (population 5 million, \$136 billion); Norway (4.5 million, \$124 billion); Netherlands (16 million, \$308 billion); Belgium (population 10 million, \$259 billion). England France Italy and Spain have a combined population of about 300 million (approximately 20 million fewer people than the United States, their combined economies are valued at slightly less than \$7 trillion or about 23 % that of the United States! In other words, the United States is richer than the 4 largest countries in Western Europe combined! CIA World Factbook On-Line, January 2, 2002. HYPERLINK www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.And yet, even with this vast ability to generate wealth, at the end of 2000, eighteen percent of all American children lived in poverty and nearly 35 of children in Houston in 2000 lived in poverty. The government-determined poverty line is set so that an individual who makes less than \$8,000 and a family four making less than \$17,000 is considered poor. Poverty levels are based on subsistence levels for food, clothing, and shelter. The feminization of poverty is a social condition that has existed since WWII, in which women, particularly teenage mothers, elderly widows, divorced women, and female heads of single-parent households constitute a disproportionate share of the poor. In fact, single women with children are many times more likely to be poor than any other group in American society.
• 2 DuBois, W. E. B. The Souls of Black Folk. Signet. 1995. p. 41.
• 3 Ibid. p. 45.
• 4 The source for this line from South Pacific is my own memory.
• 5 According to Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, an individual cannot hold two incompatible ideas in their mind at one time without suffering extreme psychic distress. In order to relieve such distress or dissonance, it is necessary for the individual to remove in some way the cause of the dissonance. This is sometimes accomplished by rationalizing the ideas so that they become compatible. The Fair-weather Liberal must attempt to make sense out of his/her behavior which is at odds with his/her attitude by rationalizing that behavior which eventually will result in the cognitive dissonance being relieved by making the attitude compatible with the behavior—in other words, the Fair-weather Liberal becomes an All-weather Bigot because he/she has accommodated the incompatibility between attitude and behavior by excusing the behavior and changing the attitude.
• 6 The following is the actual text of the original order that forced 110,000-120,00 people of Japanese ancestry, more than 75% of them American citizens, to relocate into concentration camps in the United States for the duration of World War II. The Korematsu Decision by the United States Supreme Court held that the relocation was Constitutional.The Japanese American Relocation OrderWESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMYWARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIONPresidio of San Francisco CaliforniaMay 3 1942INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRYLiving in the Following Area:All of that portion of the City of Los Angeles State of California within that boundary beginning at the point at which North Figueroa Street meets a line following the middle of the Los Angeles River; thence southerly and following the said line to East First Street; thence westerly on East First Street to Alameda Street; thence southerly on Alameda Street to East Third Street; thence northwesterly on East Third Street to Main Street; thence northerly on Main Street to First Street; thence northwesterly on First Street to Figueroa Street; thence northeasterly on Figueroa Street to the point of beginning.Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 33 this Headquarters dated May 3 1942 all persons of Japanese ancestry both alien and non-alien will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock noon P. W. T. Saturday May 9 1942.No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o'clock noon P. W. T. Sunday May 3 1942 without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding General Southern California Sector at the Civil Control Station located atJapanese Union Church120 North San Pedro StreetLos Angeles CaliforniaSEE CIVILIAN EXCLUSION ORDER NO. 33Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a family or in cases of grave emergency.The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.2. Provide services with respect to the management leasing sale storage or other disposition of most kinds of property such as real estate business and professional equipment household goods boats automobiles and livestock.3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.The Following Instructions Must Be Observed1. A responsible member of each family preferably the head of the family or the person in whose name most of the property is held and each individual living alone will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further instructions. This must be done between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Monday May 4 1942 or between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Tuesday May 5 1942.2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Assembly Center the following property:(a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family;(b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;(c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;(d) Sufficient knives forks spoons plates bowls and cups for each member of the family;(e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.All items carried will be securely packaged tied and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.3. No pets of any kind will be permitted.4. No personal items and no household goods will be shipped to the Assembly Center.5. The United States Government through its agencies will provide for the storage at the sole risk of the owner of the more substantial household items such as iceboxes washing machines pianos and other heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.6. Each family and individual living alone will be furnished transportation to the Assembly Center or will be authorized to travel by private automobile in a supervised group. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. Monday May 4 1942 or between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M.Tuesday May 5 1942 to receive further instructions.Lieutenant General U. S. ArmyCommanding http://ipr.ues.gseis.ucla.edu/images/Evacuation_Poster.pdf
• 7 Harrison and Bennett, “Racial and EthniDiversity” in Farley, State of the Union: America in the 1990s Volume Two: Social Trends.Reynolds Farley, Ed. New York: Russell Sage 1995. pp. 157-164, & pp. 141-210. Farley, Reynolds. The New American Reality: Who We Are How, We Got There, Where We Are Going. New York: Russell Sage 1996.
• 8 Harrison and Bennett, “Racial and Ethnic Diversity” in Farley, State of the Union: America in the 1990s Volume Two: Social Trends.Reynolds Farley, Ed. New York: Russell Sage 1995. pp. 157-164, & pp. 141-210. Farley, Reynolds. The New American Reality: Who We Are How, We Got There, Where We Are Going. New York: Russell Sage 1996.
• 9 Marger Martin. Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives: Fourth Edition. Wadsworth: Belmont CA: 1996.
• 10 www.nps.gov/stli/historycultu...splaypage2.pdf
• 11 De jure discrimination is discrimination that is supported by laws. It is legal and legally enforced discrimination.
• 12 De facto discrimination is discrimination that exists in fact even when that discrimination is illegal. The kind of structural discrimination—discrimination based on the racism inherent in the American social structure—that is so prevalent in America today.
• 13 www.fas.harvard.edu/~amciv/faculty/gates.shtml
• 14 http://www.pbs.org/wnet/facesofamerica/
• 15 Harrison, Roderick J. and Claudette E. Bennett. “Racial and Ethnic Diversity” in State of the Union: America in the 1990s Volume Two: Social Trends. Reynolds Farley, Ed. New York: Russell Sage 1995. 141-210. Current, Richard N. and T. Harry Williams, Frank Freidel, Alan Brinkley. American History: A Survey Sixth Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1987. Marger Martin, Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives: Fourth Edition. Wadsworth: Belmont CA. 1996.
• 16 Jews have been prevented from joining various clubs living in certain neighborhoods enrolling in certain schools and kept out of certain professions. In some areas of New York during the great white ethnic immigration (circa 1880-1915), signs reading “No dogs or Irish (or Italians) allowed!” were ubiquitous.
• 17 Harrison, Roderick J. and Claudette E. Bennett. “Racial and Ethnic Diversity” in State of the Union: America in the 1990s Volume Two: Social Trends. Reynolds Farley, Ed. New York: Russell Sage 1995. 141-210. Current, Richard N. and T. Harry Williams, Frank Freidel, Alan Brinkley. American History: A Survey Sixth Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1987. Marger Martin, Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives: Fourth Edition. Wadsworth: Belmont CA. 1996.
• 18 Ibid.
• 19 Ibid.
• 20 Parts of Mexico have been annexed through war—Texas, Arizona, New Mexico—and parts through treaty—most of California and the Southernmost borders of Arizona and New Mexico through the Gadsden Purchase. The history of Mexico since the coming of the European conqueror/explorers has been fraught with internal strife and external pressure.
• 21 Harrison, Roderick J. and Claudette E. Bennett. “Racial and Ethnic Diversity” in State of the Union: America in the 1990s Volume Two: Social Trends. Reynolds Farley, Ed. New York: Russell Sage 1995. 141-210. Current, Richard N. and T. Harry Williams, Frank Freidel, Alan Brinkley. American History: A Survey Sixth Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1987. Marger Martin, Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives: Fourth Edition. Wadsworth: Belmont CA. 1996.
• 22 Ibid.
• 23 Ibid.
• 24 Current, Richard N. and T. Harry Williams, Frank Freidel, Alan Brinkley. American History: A Survey Sixth Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1987. U. S. Census Bureau. HYPERLINK http://:www.census.gov/prod/; www.statisticalabstractus.html./; The Official Statistics: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1998.
• 25 etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toc...&division=div1
• 26 etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toc...ublic&part=all; number 289/
• 27 DNA evidence, oral tradition in the Hemings family, and written documents maintained by the Hemings family solidly confirm that Jefferson was the father of all but the first of Sally Hemings’s children. The white descendants of Thomas Jefferson refuse to accept the evidence and argue that it was Jefferson’s brother who was responsible for siring Hemings’s children.
• 28 www.therockymountainfoundatio...osjournal.html
• 29 Jim Crow was a racist, enormously troped, portrayal of American Blacks by a British music hall performer.
• 30 See: http://archive.gao.gov/d43t14/149286.pdf
• 31 “A study by the Government Accounting Office during the 1970s found widespread sterilization abuse in four areas served by the IHS. In 1975 alone, some 25,000 Native American women were permanently sterilized--many after being coerced, misinformed, or threatened. One former IHS nurse reported the use of tubal ligation on “uncooperative” or “alcoholic” women into the 1990s.” Women of Color Partnership
• 32 Migration from Philippines in limited numbers was still permitted largely because the United States owned Philippines.
• 33 Current, Richard N. and T. Harry Williams, Frank Freidel, Alan Brinkley. American History: A Survey Sixth Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1987. U. S. Census Bureau. HYPERLINK http://:www.census.gov/prod/; www.statisticalabstractus.html./; The Official Statistics: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1998.
• 34 Current, Richard N. and T. Harry Williams, Frank Freidel, Alan Brinkley. American History: A Survey Sixth Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1987. U. S. Census Bureau. HYPERLINK http://:www.census.gov/prod/; www.statisticalabstractus.html./; The Official Statistics: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1998; www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/03%3A_Race_and_Ethnicity/3.01%3A_Race_and_Ethnicity.txt |
Suggested Course Objectives for Part II—Race, Ethnicity
Upon completion of this unit, students will be able to:
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss race and ethnicity from a sociologically scientific perspective.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss race and ethnicity and be able to differentiate between them.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss the various aspects of race and ethnicity.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss dominant and minority groups and differentiate between them.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss prejudice and discrimination and the various forms they take.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss immigration, immigration theories, and the ongoing national debate concerning immigration.
• Explain the impact of politics, the political process, as well as economic and social policies on the lives of people in the US based on their race or ethnicity.
• Identify the levels into which the US is stratified and how race and ethnicity impact peoples’ life chances.
• Upper Class
• Middle Class
• Working or Lower Class
• Underclass
• Identify and differentiate among various theories of race.
• 16th century
• Enlightenment
• Victorian era
• Colonialism and empire
• Early 20th century
• Late 20th century
• Early 21st century
• Know and analyze the various aspects of master status and the general impact of master status on the life chances of various racial and ethnic groups in the US.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical information concerning stratification/inequality by race and ethnicity.
• Find and interpret demographic data about racial and ethnic groups from the US Census and other valid and reliable sources.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical and historical information concerning race relations in the past and present in the US.
• Understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss popular media’s interpretation of stratification/inequality by race and ethnicity.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss Congressional policies concerning race and ethnicity in the US.
• Find, read, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss immigration law and immigration studies found in peer reviewed scientific journal articles.
• Find and interpret demographic data about immigration from the US Census and other valid and reliable sources.
• Understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss popular media’s interpretation of immigration and immigration policy.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss Congressional policies concerning immigration and immigrants in the US.
3.03: Study Guide for Part II
Study Guide for Part II
• Review Master Status.
• What is it?
• How do the various aspects of Master Status affect peoples’ life chances in the US?
• Identify and discuss the history of race and race relations in the US since the 16th century
• Race: Are We So Different (American Anthropological Association)
• American Memory: The Library of Congress
• An African American Timeline of racism
• Asian American History, Demographics & Issues
• Las Culturas: A historical gallery of Latino contribution to the United States culture
• American Indians.com
• The Library of Congress Experience
• Define, discuss, and give examples of race
• Why do we say the race is socially defined?
• What does socially defined mean?
• Why is race a social construct?
• What does social construct mean?
• Define, discuss, and give examples of ethnicityHow do race and ethnicity differ?
• Why?
• Identify the various racial and ethnic groups in the US Find information from the US Census Bureau
• Alaska Native
• American Indian
• Asian American
• Black or African American
• Latino(a)/Hispanic American
• Pacific Islander
• White or Anglo American
• How are these divisions determined?
• Why do we make these divisions?
• Discuss the various designations of racial and ethnic groups.
• What do people want to be called?
• Why?
• How do racial/ethnic designations occur and change?
• Define, discuss, and give examples of dominant group and dominant group status discuss and give examples of white privilege read: “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack”
• Do you agree with the premise of this article?
• Why or why not?
• Define, discuss, and give examples of minority groups and minority group status
• Discuss and give examples of bigotry against minority groups
• What are stereotypes
• List five stereotypes about racial/ethnic groups other than your own
• Are they accurate?
• Why or why not?
• Are they true
• Why or why not?
• List five stereotypes about your own racial/ethic group
• Are they accurate?
• Why or why not?
• Are they true?
• Why or why not?
• Use the Internet to display population data about racial and ethnic groups in the US
• Historical and current (US Census Bureau)
• Immigration
• Find data and information about immigration
• Immigration and Customs Enforcement
• US Citizenship and Immigration Services
• The Yearbook of Immigration Statistics
• America’s History: A History of US Immigration: A Traveling Exhibit
• Immigration: The Changing Face of America
• Internet Modern History Sourcebook: US Immigration
• Define immigration
• Define emigration
• Define and discuss push factors
• Define and discuss pull factors
• Assimilation
• Define and discuss cultural assimilation
• Define and discuss structural assimilation
• Primary
• Secondary
• Identify and discuss models of assimilation
• Standard Model
• Pluralistic Model
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning immigration into the US (see item 11, above for Internet links)
• Historical data
• Current data
• Future data
• What is the projected population of each racial and ethnic group? (US Census Bureau)
• Identify and differentiate among the various theories of race and ethnicity
• Conquest
• Migration
• Colonialism and Empire
• Middle-man minorities
• Merton’s Typology of Bigotry
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning race and ethnicity including such statistical referents as housing, health care, home ownership, business ownership, educational attainment, and labor force participation of each of the racial and ethnic groups in the US Census Bureau
• Compare and contrast the data found
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning the relationship between race and ethnicity and the criminal justice system in the United States | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/03%3A_Race_and_Ethnicity/3.02%3A_Course_Objectives_for_Part_II.txt |
Suggested Key Terms and Concepts for Part II—Race and Ethnicity
“The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line”
“You’ve Got To Be Carefully Taught”
Apartheid
Ascribed master status
Assimilation
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
Categorical ideas
Civil Rights Act
Cognitive dissonance
Consequences of racism
Cultural assimilation
De facto discrimination
De jure discrimination…
Direct personal discrimination
Discrimination
Discrimination is a behavior
Dominant group
Dred Scott Decision
Dworkin and Dworkin
Erving Goffman
Essential characteristics of groups
Ethnicity
Ethnocentrism
Ethnophaulisms
Expulsion
Fair Housing Act
First generation Americans
Genocide
Gordon W. Allport
Hispanics/Latinos
Immigrants
Immigration
Immigration Act
Indirect institutional discrimination
Japanese-American relocation
Jim Crow laws
Korematsu Decision
Laws of association
Literacy tests
Majority status is unmarked or unstigmatized
Mccarran-Walter Act
Mental categories
Minority group
Minority status
Minority-Majority
Patterns of primary and secondary structural assimilation
Plessy v. Ferguson
Pogroms
Poll taxes
Power
Prejudice
Primary structural assimilation
Race
Racism
Robert Merton’s Typology of Bigotry (Prejudice and Discrimination)
Rosenblum and Travis
Second generation Americans
Secondary structural assimilation
Social construct
Species
Stereotypes
Stigmatized
Structural discrimination
Third generation Americans
Thomas’s Theorem
Traditional American assimilation pattern
Trail of Tears
Tribal stigma
Voting Rights Act
W.E.B. DuBois
White ethnics
3.05: Lecture Outline for Part II
Suggested Lecture Material for Part II—Race and Ethnicity
• Review Master Status.
• Identify and discuss the history of race and race relations in the US since the 16th century.
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of race.
• Socially defined.
• A social construct.
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of ethnicity.
• Identify the various racial and ethnic groups in the US.
• Alaska Native
• American Indian
• Asian American
• Black or African American
• Latino(a)/Hispanic American
• Pacific Islander
• White or Anglo American
• How are these divisions determined?
• Why do we make these divisions?
• Discuss the various designations of racial and ethnic groups.
• What do people want to be called?
• How do racial/ethnic designations occur and change?
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of dominant group and dominant group status.
• Discuss and give examples of white privilege.
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of minority groups and minority group status.
• Discuss and give examples of bigotry against minority groups.
• Use the Internet to display population data about racial and ethnic groups in the US.
• Historical and current.
• Immigration
• Define immigration.
• Define emigration.
• Define and discuss push factors.
• Define and discuss pull factors.
• Assimilation.
• Define and discuss cultural assimilation.
• Define and discuss structural assimilation.
• Primary
• Secondary
• Identify and discuss models of assimilation.
• Standard Model.
• Pluralistic Model.
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning immigration into the US.
• Historical data.
• Current data.
• Future data.
• What is the projected population of each racial and ethnic group?
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning race and ethnicity including such statistical referents as housing, health care, home ownership, business ownership, educational attainment, and labor force participation of each of the racial and ethnic groups in the US.
• Compare and contrast the data found.
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning the relationship between race and ethnicity and the criminal justice system in the United States. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/03%3A_Race_and_Ethnicity/3.04%3A_Key_Terms_and_Concepts_for_Part_II.txt |
Suggested Assignments for Part II—Race and Ethnicity
Essay: Discuss race and ethnic relations in terms of information from peer reviewed journals.
Essay: Discuss race and ethnic relations in terms of information from popular media articles.
Essay: Discuss the differences and similarities in the findings of peer reviewed articles and popular media articles concerning the racial disparities in arrest, convictions, and sentencing based on race and ethnicity.
Essay: Find information about each racial and ethnic group and compare and contrast them demographically.
Essay: Identify and discuss the racial disparities in arrest, convictions, and sentencing based on race and ethnicity.
Find on the Internet: Immigration laws past and present.
Find on the Internet: Information about naturalization laws and procedures.
Find on the Internet: Population data about the various racial and ethnic groups identified by the US Census Bureau.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about race and ethnicity and the law.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about undocumented immigrants.
Find on the Internet: US Census Bureau data about housing, health care, home ownership, business ownership, educational attainment, and labor force participation of each of the racial and ethnic groups in the US.
Find on the Internet: US Census Bureau data about the number of immigrants who come to the US each year and their countries of origin.
Find on the Internet: WPA slave narratives.
In-Class Discussion: Discuss the “rightness” of the way race and ethnicity were addressed in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.
In-Class Discussion: How do we account for the racial and ethnic differences in housing, health care, home ownership, business ownership, educational attainment, labor force participation of each of the racial and ethnic groups in the US.
In-Class Discussion: Identify and discuss the racial disparities in arrest, convictions, and sentencing based on race and ethnicity.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of bigotry and prejudice against immigrants.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of bigotry and prejudice.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of prejudice and discrimination in the Constitution and in the Declaration of Independence.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of white privilege.
In-Class Discussion: Is the US a melting pot, a lumpy stew, a tossed salad? Are we an assimilationist/assimilated society or a pluralistic society? What should we be?
In-Class Discussion: Read aloud from WPA slave narratives and discuss the similarities and differences among them.
In-Class Discussion: Should English be the “official” language of the United States?
In-Class Discussion: Should the different racial and ethnic groups be “as the fingers on the hand” as Booker T. Washington argued?
In-Class Discussion: Should the United States change its immigration policies?
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Black Elk Speaks by John G. Niehardt.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Bless Me Ultima by Rudolfo Anaya.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Brown by Richard Rodriguez.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Like Water for Chocolate: A Novel in Monthly Installments with Recipes, Romances, and Home Remedies by Laura Esquivel.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave by Frederick Douglass.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: The Declining Significance of Race by William Julius Wilson.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: The House on Mango Street by Sandra Cisneros.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: The Souls of Black Folk by W.E.B. DuBois.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: The Spirit Catches You and Then You Fall Down by Anne Fadiman.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Up from Slavery by Booker T. Washington.
Present to the Class: A timeline of bigotry in the form of a chart covering all racial and ethnic groups.
Present to the Class: Demographic data about housing, health care, home ownership, business ownership, educational attainment, and labor force participation of legal and illegal immigrants in the US in the US in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: Information about the legal immigration and naturalization process in the United States in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: Past, present, and future data about the demographic changes in the United States in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: Population data about the various racial and ethnic groups in the US in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: Statistical data about the racial disparities in arrest, convictions, and sentencing based on race and ethnicity in the form of a chart.
Read: Black Elk Speaks by John G. Niehardt.
Read: Bless Me Ultima by Rudolfo Anaya.
Read: Brown by Richard Rodriguez.
Read: Like Water for Chocolate: A Novel in Monthly Installments with Recipes, Romances, and Home Remedies by Laura Esquivel.
Read: Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave by Frederick Douglass.
Read:The “Atlanta Compromise” speech by Booker T. Washington.
Read: The Constitution of the United States of America.
Read: The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen United States of America.
Read: The Declining Significance of Race by William Julius Wilson.
Read: The House on Mango Street by Sandra Cisneros.
Read: The Souls of Black Folk by W.E.B. DuBois.
Read: The Spirit Catches You and Then You Fall Down by Anne Fadiman.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about ethnicity and minority group relations.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about illegal immigration.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about immigration by Alejandro Portes.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about legal immigration.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about race and ethnicity and the criminal justice system.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about race and race relations.
Read: Three to five popular media articles about ethnicity and ethnic group relations.
Read: Three to five popular media articles about illegal immigration.
Read: Three to five popular media articles about legal immigration.
Read: Three to five popular media articles about race and ethnicity and the criminal justice system.
Read: Three to five popular media articles about race and race relations.
Read: Up From Slavery by Booker T. Washington. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/03%3A_Race_and_Ethnicity/3.06%3A_Assignments_for_Part_II.txt |
Reading List for Part II—Race and Ethnicity
A Suggestion on the Negro Problem. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Jul., 1908), pp. 78-85.
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. U.S. Department of Labor; Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy. The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. Office of Policy Planning and Research. United States Department of Labor, March 1965.
Urban Conditions: General. Daniel P. Moynihan. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 371, Social Goals and Indicators for American Society, Volume 1. (May, 1967), pp. 159-177.
Have the Poor Been “Losing Ground”? Charles Murray. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Autumn, 1985), pp. 427-445.
Welfare and the Family: The U.S. Experience. Charles Murray. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, Part 2: U.S. and Canadian Income Maintenance Programs. (Jan., 1993), pp. S224-S262.
Bad News for Charles Murray: Uneducated White Women Give Birth to More Babies Than Do Uneducated Black Women. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 19. (Spring, 1998), pp. 68-69.
IQ and Income Inequality in a Sample of Sibling Pairs from Advantaged Family Backgrounds. Charles Murray. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 2002), pp. 339-343.
A Conversation with Charles Murray. Think Tank Transcripts: A Conversation With Charles Murray. http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/show_129.html
Social Trends in America and Strategic Approaches to the Negro Problem. Gunnar Myrdal. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 9, No. 3. (3rd Qtr., 1948), pp. 196-214.
Population Problems and Policies. Gunnar Myrdal. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 197, Social Problems and Policies in Sweden. (May, 1938), pp. 200-215. Stable URL: links.jstor.org/sici?sici=000...3E2.0.CO%3B2-7
Gunnar Myrdal on Population Policy in the Underdeveloped World (in Archives). Gunnar Myrdal. Population and Development Review, Vol. 13, No. 3. (Sep., 1987), pp. 531-540.
The Equality Issue in World Development. Gunnar Myrdal. The American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 6, Nobel Lectures and 1989 Survey of Members. (Dec., 1989), pp. 8-17.
Negro Home Life and Standards of Living (in Social Conditions and Problems). Robert E. Park. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 49, The Negro’s Progress in Fifty Years. (Sep., 1913), pp. 147-163.
The Bases of Race Prejudice (in Race Relations). Robert E. Park, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 140, The American Negro. (Nov., 1928), pp. 11-20.
The Conflict and Fusion of Cultures with Special Reference to the Negro. Robert E. Park. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 4, No. 2. (Apr., 1919), pp. 111-133.
Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups With Particular Reference to the Negro. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 5. (Mar., 1914), pp. 606-623.
Human Nature and Collective Behavior. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 5. (Mar., 1927), pp. 733-741.
The Social Function of War Observations and Notes. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4. (Jan., 1941), pp. 551-570.
Caribbean Diasporas: Migration and Ethnic Communities. Alejandro Portes; Ramón Grosfoguel. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 533, Trends in U.S.-Caribbean Relations. (May, 1994), pp. 48-69.
Disproving the Enclave Hypothesis: Reply. Alejandro Portes; Leif Jensen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 418-420.
TAP: Vol. 7, Iss. 25. Global Villagers. Alejandro Portes. Global Villagers: The Rise of Transnational Communities. (1 of 6) 3/21/2007 3:25:12 PM
Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities. Alejandro Portes. International Migration Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, Special Issue: Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans. (Winter, 1997), pp. 799-825.
Making Sense of Diversity: Recent Research on Hispanic Minorities in the United States. Alejandro Portes; Cynthia Truelove. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 13. (1987), pp. 359-385.
Revisiting the Enclave Hypothesis: Miami Twenty-Five Years Later. Alejandro Portes and Steven Shafer. Princeton University, May 2006. CMD Working Paper #06-10 The Center for Migration and Immigration and Development Working Paper Series • Princeton University.
No Margin for Error: Educational and Occupational Achievement among Disadvantaged Children of Immigrants.
Unwelcome Immigrants: The Labor Market Experiences of 1980 (Mariel) Cuban and Haitian Refugees in South Florida. Alejandro Portes; Alex Stepick. American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Aug., 1985), pp. 493-514.
The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami. Alejandro Portes. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 4, The Ethnic Economy. (Oct., 1987), pp. 340-372.
The Rise of Ethnicity: Determinants of Ethnic Perceptions Among Cuban Exiles in Miami. Alejandro Portes. American Sociological Review, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Jun., 1984), pp. 383-397.
Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action. Alejandro Portes; Julia Sensenbrenner. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 98, No. 6. (May, 1993), pp. 1320-1350.
Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis of the Labor Market Experiences of Cubans in Miami. Kenneth L. Wilson; Alejandro Portes. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 2. (Sep., 1980), pp. 295-319.
Introduction: Immigration and Its Aftermath. Alejandro Portes. International Migration Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, Special Issue: The New Second Generation. (Winter, 1994), pp. 632-639.
Self-Employment and the Earnings of Immigrants. Alejandro Portes; Min Zhou. American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 219-230.
The Enclave and the Entrants: Patterns of Ethnic Enterprise in Miami before and after Mariel. Alejandro Portes; Leif Jensen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 6. (Dec., 1989), pp. 929-949.
The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants. Alejandro Portes; Min Zhou. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 530, Interminority Affairs in the U.S.: Pluralism at the Crossroads. (Nov., 1993), pp. 74-96.
The Poor. Georg Simmel; Claire Jacobson. Social Problems, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Autumn, 1965), pp. 118-140.
Race Psychology: Standpoint and Questionnaire, With Particular Reference to the Immigrant and the Negro. W. I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 17, No. 6. (May, 1912), pp. 725-775.
The Psychology of Race-Prejudice. William I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 5. (Mar., 1904), pp. 593-611.
The Mind of Woman and the Lower Races. William I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Jan., 1907), pp. 435-469.
Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis. Melvin M. Tumin. American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No. 4. (Aug., 1953), pp. 387-394.
Superior Intellect?: Sincere Fictions of the White Self (in The Politics of Race and Science). Hernan Vera; Joe R. Feagin; Andrew Gordon. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 64, No. 3, Myths and Realities: African Americans and the Measurement of Human Abilities. (Summer, 1995), pp. 295-306.
Race Conflicts in the North End of Boston. William Foote Whyte. The New England Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Dec., 1939), pp. 623-642.
Social Organization in the Slums. William Foote Whyte. American Sociological Review, Vol. 8, No. 1. (Feb., 1943), pp. 34-39.
Corner Boys: A Study of Clique Behavior. William Foote Whyte. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 5. (Mar., 1941), pp. 647-664.
The Plight of the Inner-City Black Male (in Symposium on the Underclass). William Julius Wilson. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 136, No. 3. (Sep., 1992), pp. 320-325.
The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy. William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 182-192.
Rising Inequality and the Case for Coalition Politics. William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 568, The Study of African American Problems: W. E. B. Du Bois’s Agenda, Then and Now. (Mar., 2000), pp. 78-99.
Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations: The Challenge of Public Agenda Research: 1990 Presidential Address. William Julius Wilson. American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Feb., 1991), pp. 1-14.
Another Look at The Truly Disadvantaged. William Julius Wilson. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 4. (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 639-656.
When Work Disappears. William Julius Wilson. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 4. (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 567-595.
Urban Poverty. William Julius Wilson; Robert Aponte. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11. (1985), pp. 231-258.
The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City. Loïc J. D. Wacquant; William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 8-25.
The New Economy and Racial Inequality (in Stated Meeting Report). William Julius Wilson; James O. Freedman. Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 54, No. 4. (Summer, 2001), pp. 41-48.
Chicago Hope (in Conversations). William Julius Wilson; Eric Bryant Rhodes. Transition, No. 68. (1995), pp. 162-172.
Ethnic Enclaves, Middleman Minorities and Immigration
A Comprehensive Immigration Policy and Program. Sidney L. Gulick. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 6, No. 3. (Mar., 1918), pp. 214-223.
A Decomposition of Trends in Poverty among Children of Immigrants. Jennifer Van Hook; Susan L. Brown; Maxwell Ndigume Kwenda. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 2004), pp. 649-670.
A New Test and Extension of Propositions from the Bonacich Synthesis. Jose A. Cobas. Social Forces, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Dec., 1985), pp. 432-441.
An Act to Limit the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, and for Other Purposes. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents. (Oct., 1924), pp. 208-227.
Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California’s Illegal Immigration Initiative. Caroline J. Tolbert; Rodney E. Hero. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, No. 3. (Aug., 1996), pp. 806-818.
Beyond the Ethnic Enclave Economy. Ivan Light; Georges Sabagh; Mehdi Bozorgmehr; Claudia Der-Martirosian. Social Problems, Vol. 41, No. 1, Special Issue on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America. (Feb., 1994), pp. 65-80.
E Pluribus Unum: Bilingualism and Loss of Language in the Second Generation. Alejandro Portes; Lingxin Hao. Sociology of Education, Vol. 71, No. 4. (Oct., 1998), pp. 269-294.
A Theory of Middleman Minorities. Edna Bonacich. American Sociological Review, Vol. 38, No. 5. (Oct., 1973), pp. 583-594.
Coming to Stay: An Analysis of the U.S. Census Question on Immigrants’ Year of Arrival. Ilana Redstone; Douglas S. Massey. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 2004), pp. 721-738.
Criminality and Immigration. Ervin Hacker. Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Nov., 1929), pp. 429-438.
Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA. Pia M. Orrenius; Madeline Zavodny. Demography, Vol. 40, No. 3. (Aug., 2003), pp. 437-450.
“Don’t Let Them Make You Feel You Did a Crime”: Immigration Law, Labor Rights, and Farmworker Testimony. Anne Shea. MELUS, Vol. 28, No. 1, Multi-Ethnic Literatures and the Idea of Social Justice. (Spring, 2003), pp. 123-144.
Economic and Labor Market Trends. Demetra Smith Nightingale; Michael Fix. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 48-59.
Economic Segmentation and Worker Earnings in a U.S.-Mexico Border Enclave. Scarlett G. Hardesty; Malcolm D. Holmes; James D. Williams. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Oct., 1988), pp. 466-489.
Ethnic Economies in Metropolitan Regions: Miami and Beyond. John R. Logan; Richard D. Alba; Thomas L. McNulty. Social Forces, Vol. 72, No. 3. (Mar., 1994), pp. 691-724.
Ethnic Enclaves and Middleman Minorities: Alternative Strategies of Immigrant Adaptation? José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Apr., 1987), pp. 143-161.
Ethnic Hegemony and the Japanese of California. Robert M. Jiobu. American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, No. 3. (Jun., 1988), pp. 353-367.
Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship. Howard E. Aldrich; Roger Waldinger. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 16. (1990), pp. 111-135.
Facts About Mexican Immigration Before and Since the Quota Restriction Laws. Louis Bloch. Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 24, No. 165. (Mar., 1929), pp. 50-60.
Illegal Immigrants, Health Care, and Social Responsibility. James Dwyer. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 34, No. 1. (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 34-41.
Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare Participation: Do Immigrants Assimilate into or out of Welfare? Jorgen Hansen; Magnus Lofstrom. The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Winter, 2003), pp. 74-98.
Structural Opportunity or Ethnic Advantage? Immigrant Business Development in New York. Roger Waldinger. International Migration Review, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Spring, 1989), pp. 48-72.
Immigrant Enterprise: A Critique and Reformulation. Roger Waldinger. Theory and Society, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, Special Double Issue: Structures of Capital. (Jan., 1986), pp. 249-285.
Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Business Patterns: A Comparison of Koreans and Iranians in Los Angeles. Pyong Gap Min; Mehdi Bozorgmehr. International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 707-738.
Immigrant Small Business and International Economic Linkage: A Case of the Korean Wig Business in Los Angeles, 1968-1977. Ku-Sup Chin; In-Jin Yoon; David Smith. International Migration Review, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 485-510.
Immigration an International Problem. Donald R. Taft. Social Forces, Vol. 6, No. 2. (Dec., 1927), pp. 264-270.
Immigration and Population Trends in the United States, 1900-1940. Ernest Rubin. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 3. (Apr., 1947), pp. 345-362.
Immigration and the Declining Birthrate. Maurice R. Davie. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Jul., 1924), pp. 68-76.
Immigration as a Source of Urban Increase. F. Stuart Chapin. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 14, No. 107. (Sep., 1914), pp. 223-227.
Immigrants’ Growing Role in U.S. Poverty Cited. By Michael A. Fletcher, Washington Post Staff Writer. Thursday, September 2, 1999; Page A2. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv...mmig/immig.htm. Retrieved (1 of 3) 3/20/2007 6:03:38 PM
Immigration Policy Since World War I. Edward P. Hutchinson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 262, Reappraising Our Immigration Policy. (Mar., 1949), pp. 15-21.
Is the New Immigration More Unskilled than the Old? Paul H. Douglas. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 16, No. 126. (Jun., 1919), pp. 393-403.
Japanese Americans: The Development of a Middleman Minority. Harry H. L. Kitano
The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 43, No. 4. (Nov., 1974), pp. 500-519.
Job Transitions in an Immigrant Metropolis: Ethnic Boundaries and the Mixed Economy. Victor Nee; Jimy M. Sanders; Scott Sernau. American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Dec., 1994), pp. 849-872.
Korean Businesses in Black and Hispanic Neighborhoods: A Study of Intergroup Relations. Lucie Cheng; Yen Espiritu. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 4. (Winter, 1989), pp. 521-534.
Limits of Ethnic Solidarity in the Enclave Economy. Jimy M. Sanders; Victor Nee. American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, No. 6. (Dec., 1987), pp. 745-773.
Middleman Minority Concept: Its Explanatory Value in the Case of the Japanese in California Agriculture. David J. O’Brien; Stephen S. Fugita. The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 1982), pp. 185-204.
The Washington Post: Myth of the Melting Pot: America’s Racial and Ethnic Divides. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv...t/melt0222.htm. Retrieved (1 of 10) 3/20/2007 6:00:09 PM
On the Study of Ethnic Enterprise: Unresolved Issues. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 4, The Ethnic Economy. (Oct., 1987), pp. 467-472.
Our Oldest National Problem. Alcott W. Stockwell. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 5. (Mar., 1927), pp. 742-755.
Paths to Self-Employment among Immigrants: An Analysis of Four Interpretations. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Jan., 1986), pp. 101-120.
Politics without Borders or Postmodern Nationality: Mexican Immigration to the United States. Arturo Santamaría Gómez; James Zackrison. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 2, Citizenship in Latin America. (Mar., 2003), pp. 66-86.
Problems in Resolving the Enclave Economy Debate. Jimy M. Sanders; Victor Nee. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 415-418.
Problems of Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurs. Pyong Gap Min. International Migration Review, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Autumn, 1990), pp. 436-455.
Returns on Human Capital in Ethnic Enclaves: New York City’s Chinatown. Min Zhou; John R. Logan. American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 5. (Oct., 1989), pp. 809-820.
Selective Immigration and the Needs of American Basic Industries. Magnus W. Alexander. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Vol. 10, No. 4, American Economic Policies Since the Armistice. (Jan., 1924), pp. 102-115.
Six Problems in the Sociology of the Ethnic Economy. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 2. (Summer, 1989), pp. 201-214.
Social Capital and the Education of Immigrant Students: Categories and Generalizations. Pedro A. Noguera. Sociology of Education, Vol. 77, No. 2. (Apr., 2004), pp. 180-183.
Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant Population. George J. Borjas. The Future of Children, Vol. 16, No. 2, Opportunity in America. (Autumn, 2006), pp. 55-71.
Social Structure and Prejudice. Sheldon Stryker. Social Problems, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Spring, 1959), pp. 340-354.
Some Aspects of the Immigration Problem. Roland P. Falkner. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Mar., 1904), pp. 32-49.
The Antecedents of Mexican Immigration to the United States. Robert Redfield. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 3. (Nov., 1929), pp. 433-438.
The Changing Significance of Ethnic and Class Resources in Immigrant Businesses: The Case of Korean Immigrant Businesses in Chicago. In-Jin Yoon. International Migration Review, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Summer, 1991), pp. 303-332.
The Control of Immigration as an Administrative Problem. Paul S. Peirce. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 4, No. 3. (Aug., 1910), pp. 374-389.
The Fertility Contribution of Mexican Immigration to the United States. Stefan Hrafn Jonsson; Michael S. Rendall. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 1. (Feb., 2004), pp. 129-150.
The Industrial Significance of Immigration. W. Jett Lauck. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 93, Present-Day Immigration with Special Reference to the Japanese. (Jan., 1921), pp. 185-190.
The New American Immigration Policy and the Labor Market. Niles Carpenter. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Aug., 1931), pp. 720-723.
The Origins and Persistence of Ethnic Identity among the “New Immigrant” Groups. David O. Sears; Mingying Fu; P. J. Henry; Kerra Bui. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 4, Special Issue: Race, Racism, and Discrimination. (Dec., 2003), pp. 419-437.
The Present Status of Our Immigration Laws and Policies. E. P. Hutchinson. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 1947), pp. 161-173.
The Relation of Oriental Immigration to the General Immigration Problem. J. Allen Smith. The American Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, Papers and Discussions of the Twenty-third Annual Meeting. (Apr., 1911), pp. 237-242.
The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965. Mae M. Ngai. Law and History Review, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Spring, 2003), pp. 69-107.
The War and Immigration. Frank Julian Warne. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 61, America’s Interests after the European War. (Sep., 1915), pp. 30-39.
Toward a Unified Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: A Preliminary Synthesis of Three Macro Models. Jonathan H. Turner. Sociological Forum, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Summer, 1986), pp. 403-427.
Race and Ethnicity
Science and the Race Problem. Charles I. Glicksberg. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 12, No. 4. (4th Qtr., 1951), pp. 319-327.
Science and the Race Problem. AAAS Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare. Science, New Series, Vol. 142, No. 3592. (Nov. 1, 1963), pp. 558-561.
Science and the Race Problem. Carleton Putnam; W. W. Baker. Science, New Series, Vol. 142, No. 3598. (Dec. 13, 1963), pp. 1419-1420.
The Race Problem and Science. Freeman H. Quimby; H. S. Dudley; William T. Powers; Robert W. Shortridge; Clifford A. Kaye; Louis S. Kassel; Duncan MacRae, Jr. Science, New Series, Vol. 143, No. 3604. (Jan. 24, 1964), pp. 306-308.
Science and the Race Problem. Henry E. Garrett; Wesley C. George; Barry Commoner; Robert B. Brode; T. C. Byerly; Ansley J. Coale; John T. Edsall; Lawrence K. Frank; Margaret Mead; Walter Orr Roberts; Dael Wolfle. Science, New Series, Vol. 143, No. 3609. (Feb. 28, 1964), pp. 913-915.
The Individual, Society, or Both? A Comparison of Black, Latino, and White Beliefs about the Causes of Poverty. Matthew O. Hunt. Social Forces, Vol. 75, No. 1. (Sep., 1996), pp. 293-322.
A Theory of Immigration and Racial Stratification. Vilna Bashi; Antonio McDaniel. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 27, No. 5. (May, 1997), pp. 668-682.
America’s Melting Pot Reconsidered. Charles Hirschman. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9. (1983), pp. 397-423.
Does Ethnic Concentration Influence Employees’ Access to Authority? An Examination of Contemporary Urban Labor Markets. Ryan A. Smith; James R. Elliott. Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 1. (Sep., 2002), pp. 255-279.
Black Ethnicity and the Persistence of Ethnogenesis. Ronald L. Taylor. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84, No. 6. (May, 1979), pp. 1401-1423.
AP: Cherokee Votes Rescind Freedmen Membership - Race & Ethnicity - MSNBC.com, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17597902...playmode/1098/. Retrieved 8/24/2007. URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17597902/
Chicanas in White-Collar Jobs: “You Have to Prove Yourself More.” Denise A. Segura. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 35, No. 1, Women in the Workplace: Toward True Integration. (Spring, 1992), pp. 163-182.
Color-Blind: The Treatment of Race and Ethnicity in Social Psychology. Matthew O. Hunt; Pamela Braboy Jackson; Brian Powell; Lala Carr Steelman. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4, Special Millenium Issue on the State of Sociological Social Psychology. (Dec., 2000), pp. 352-364.
Vindicating Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Road to a Color-Blind Society. Mary Frances Berry. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 81, No. 1/4, Vindicating the Race: Contributions to African-American Intellectual History. (Winter - Autumn, 1996), pp. 137-144.
A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind.” Neil Gotanda. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1-68.
America’s Moral Dilemma: Will It Be Color Blindness or Racial Equality? Glenn C. Loury. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 27. (Spring, 2000), pp. 90-94.
Reflections on Race Relations and Organizations. Clayton P. Alderfer. Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 11, No. 6, Special Issue: The Career and Life Experiences of Black Professionals. (Nov., 1990), pp. 493-495.
The Profession of the Color Blind: Sociocultural Anthropology and Racism in the 21st Century (in Contemporary Issues Forum. Race and Racism). Eugenia Shanklin. American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Sep., 1998), pp. 669-679.
Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies. J. Skelly Wright. The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2. (Winter, 1980), pp. 213-245.
Color Blind? The Influence of Race on Perception of Crime Severity (in Prize-Winning Student Paper). Stacy E. Benjamin. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 58, No. 3, Shaping the Urban Future: People and Places, Problems and Potentials. (Summer, 1989), pp. 442-448.
“What Group?” Studying Whites and Whiteness in the Era of “Color-Blindness.” Amanda E. Lewis. Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 623-646.
Race, Color Blindness, and the Democratic Public: Albion W. Tourgée’s Radical Principles in Plessy v. Ferguson. Mark Elliott. The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 67, No. 2. (May, 2001), pp. 287-330.
“Interracial” Sex and Racial Democracy in Brazil: Twin Concepts? Donna Goldstein. American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 101, No. 3. (Sep., 1999), pp. 563-578.
Racism in U. S. Nursing. Evelyn L. Barbee. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 7, No. 4, Racism, Gender, Class, and Health. (Dec., 1993), pp. 346-362.
Incentive Effects of Affirmative Action (in Historical and Legal Background). Glenn C. Loury. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 523, Affirmative Action Revisited. (Sep., 1992), pp. 19-29.
Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed-Race People (in Comment). Kenneth E. Payson. California Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 4. (Jul., 1996), pp. 1233-1291.
Hopwood in Doubt: The Folly of Setting a Grand Theory Requiring Race Neutrality in All Programs of Higher Education. Theodore Cross. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 29. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 60-84.
A Rational Basis for Affirmative Action: A Shaky but Classical Liberal Defense (in Symposium: Centennial Celebration). Richard A. Epstein. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 8. (Aug., 2002), pp. 2036-2061.
Ethnicity Matters. Barbara Eckstein. American Literary History, Vol. 7, No. 3, Imagining a National Culture. (Autumn, 1995), pp. 572-581.
Alleged Cures of Color Blindness (in Notes and Discussions). Elsie Murray. The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 58, No. 2. (Apr., 1945), pp. 253-261.
Ameliorative Racial Preference and the Fourteenth Amendment: Some Constitutional Problems (in Articles). Ralph A. Rossum. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2. (May, 1976), pp. 346-366.
Legal Foundations of Civil Rights and Pluralism in America. Charles M. Lamb. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 454, America as a Multicultural Society. (Mar., 1981), pp. 13-25.
Racial Classifications and Reconstruction Legislation. Paul Moreno. The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 61, No. 2. (May, 1995), pp. 271-304.
Affirmative Action and Its Negative Repercussions (in Historical and Legal Background). Wm. Bradford Reynolds. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 523, Affirmative Action Revisited. (Sep., 1992), pp. 38-49.
Empowerment Hazards: Affirmative Action, Recovery Psychology, and Identity Politics. Michel Feher. Representations, No. 55, Special Issue: Race and Representation: Affirmative Action. (Summer, 1996), pp. 84-91.
Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and Implications (in Race and Education). William F. Tate IV. Review of Research in Education, Vol. 22. (1997), pp. 195-247.
Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture. Joane Nagel. Social Problems, Vol. 41, No. 1, Special Issue on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America. (Feb., 1994), pp. 152-176.
Data on Race and Ethnicity: Revising the Federal Standard. Katherine K. Wallman.
The American Statistician, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Feb., 1998), pp. 31-33.
Dominican-American Ethnic/Racial Identities and United States Social Categories. Benjamin Bailey. International Migration Review, Vol. 35, No. 3. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 677-708.
Effects of Ethnicity and Sex on Teachers’ Expectations of Junior High School Students. Rodney A. Clifton; Raymond P. Perry; Karen Parsonson; Stella Hryniuk. Sociology of Education, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Jan., 1986), pp. 58-67.
Ethnic and Environmental Influences on Mental Abilities. Kevin Marjoribanks. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 2. (Sep., 1972), pp. 323-337.
Ethnic Euphemisms and Racial Echoes. Saul Dubow. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, Special Issue: Ethnicity and Identity in Southern Africa. (Sep., 1994), pp. 355-370.
Ethnicity. J. Milton Yinger. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11. (1985), pp. 151-180.
Ethnicity: A Neglected Dimension of American History (in Documentation). Dean Cinel
International Migration Review, Vol. 3, No. 3. (Summer, 1969), pp. 58-63.
Ethnicity: An Analysis of Its Dynamism and Variability Focusing on the Mexican/Anglo/Mexican American Interface (in Pluralism and Ethnicity). Margarita B. Melville. American Ethnologist, Vol. 10, No. 2. (May, 1983), pp. 272-289.
Ethnicity and Practice. G. Carter Bentley. Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Jan., 1987), pp. 24-55.
Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly? Darrell Steffensmeier; Stephen Demuth. American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, No. 5. (Oct., 2000), pp. 705-729.
Ethnicity and Sexuality. Joane Nagel. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26. (2000), pp. 107-133.
Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status as Sources of Participation: The Case for Ethnic Political Culture. Dale C. Nelson. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. (Dec., 1979), pp. 1024-1038.
Ethnicity as Practice? A Comment on Bentley. Kevin A. Yelvington. Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Jan., 1991), pp. 158-168.
Ethnicity in 25 Years of Published Sexuality Research: 1971-1995. Michael W. Wiederman; Carri Maynard; Amelia Fretz. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 33, No. 4. (1996), pp. 339-342.
Hispanic Turnout: Estimates from Validated Voting Data. Carol A. Cassel. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Jun., 2002), pp. 391-408.
Kids Forced into Domestic Servitude in Haiti - Americas - MSNBC.com. URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20293963/. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20293963...playmode/1098/. Retrieved 8/24/2007
Reputed Klansman gets life for killings - Race & Ethnicity - MSNBC.com. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20424056/?GT1=10252. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20424056...splaymode=1098. Retrieved 8/24/2007
Marriage among Unwed Mothers: Whites, Blacks and Hispanics Compared. Deborah Roempke Graefe; Daniel T. Lichter. Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, Vol. 34, No. 6. (Nov. - Dec., 2002), pp. 286-293.
Measuring Race and Ethnicity: Meeting Public Policy Goals. Thomas C. Sawyer. The American Statistician, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Feb., 1998), pp. 34-35.
Minority Identity and Self-Esteem. J. R. Porter; R. E. Washington. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19. (1993), pp. 139-161.
Neo-Ethnicity as Defensive Political Protest. Albert James Bergesen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 42, No. 5. (Oct., 1977), pp. 823-825.
Disciplines Unbound: Notes on Sociology and Ethnic Studies. Yen Le Espiritu. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 5. (Sep., 1999), pp. 510-514.
On Perilous Ideas (in Discussion and Criticism). Jonathan Friedman; Aidan Southall. Current Anthropology, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Apr., 1994), pp. 173-175.
On the Borderland of Ethnicity and Race: An Introduction (in On the Borderland of Ethnicity and Race). David Paul Nord. The Journal of American History, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Mar., 2000), pp. 1630-1631.
Pacific Islander Americans and Multiethnicity: A Vision of America’s Future? Paul R. Spickard; Rowena Fong. Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 4. (Jun., 1995), pp. 1365-1383.
The Persistent Power of “Race” in the Cultural and Political Economy of Racism. Faye V. Harrison. Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 24. (1995), pp. 47-74.
Race and Class Consciousness Among Lower- and Middle-Class Blacks. Thomas J. Durant, Jr.; Kathleen H. Sparrow. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Jan., 1997), pp. 334-351.
The Black Middle Class in America: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Thomas J. Durant, Jr.; Joyce S. Louden. Phylon(1960-), Vol. 47, No. 4. (4th Qtr., 1986), pp. 253-263.
Race and Race Theory. Howard Winant. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26. (2000), pp. 169-185.
Restructuring for Whom? Race, Class, Gender, and the Ideology of Invisibility. Margaret L. Andersen. Sociological Forum, Vol. 16, No. 2. (Jun., 2001), pp. 181-201.
Race, Ethnicity and Nativity, Family Structure, Socioeconomic Status and Welfare Dependency. Hiromi Ono; Rosina M. Becerra. International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 739-765.
Categorical Usages and Complex Realities: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion in the United States. Richard F. Hamilton; William H. Form. Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 3. (Mar., 2003), pp. 693-714.
“Your Blues Ain’t Like My Blues”: Race, Ethnicity, and Social Inequality in America. Walter R. Allen; Angie Y. Chung. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 6. (Nov., 2000), pp. 796-805.
Race/Ethnicity, Nativity, and Infant Mortality in the United States. Robert A. Hummer; Monique Biegler; Peter B. De Turk; Douglas Forbes; W. Parker Frisbie; Ying Hong; Starling G. Pullum. Social Forces, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Mar., 1999), pp. 1083-1117.
Race in International Relations. R. J. Vincent. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 58, No. 4. (Autumn, 1982), pp. 658-670.
Race, Public Opinion, and the Social Sphere. Lawrence Bobo. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 1, Special Issue on Race. (Spring, 1997), pp. 1-15.
Racial and Ethnic Differences in U.S. Census Omission Rates. David J. Fein. Demography, Vol. 27, No. 2. (May, 1990), pp. 285-302.
Racial and Ethnic Variations in Gender-Related Attitudes. Emily W. Kane. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26. (2000), pp. 419-439.
Racial Matching among African-American and Hispanic Physicians and Patients. Martha Harrison Stinson; Norman K Thurston. The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 2. (Spring, 2002), pp. 410-428.
Racial Policy and Racial Conflict in the Urban United States, 1869-1924. Susan Olzak; Suzanne Shanahan. Social Forces, Vol. 82, No. 2. (Dec., 2003), pp. 481-517.
White, Black, or Puerto Rican? Racial Self-Identification among Mainland and Island Puerto Ricans. Nancy S. Landale; R.S. Oropesa. Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 1. (Sep., 2002), pp. 231-254.
Racial Theorizing: Is Sociology Ready to Replace Polemic Causation Theory with a New Polemic Model? Leonard Gordon. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Spring, 1989), pp. 129-136.
Reconstructing Racial Identity: Ethnicity, Color, and Class among Dominicans in the United States and Puerto Rico. Jorge Duany. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 25, No. 3, Race and National Identity in the Americas. (May, 1998), pp. 147-172.
Reflections on Race: The Debate Continues. William L. Smith. Teaching Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Jul., 1992), pp. 254-257.
Social Class, Ethnicity, and Racial Prejudice. Thomas J. Pavlak. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2. (Summer, 1973), pp. 225-231.
Symbolic Ethnicity or Religion among Jews in the United States: A Test of Gansian Hypotheses. J. Alan Winter. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Mar., 1996), pp. 233-247.
Political Opinion and Distinctiveness: The Case of Hispanic Ethnicity. Ryan L. Claassen. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 609-620.
The Composition of Political Attitudes. Gordon W. Allport. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Sep., 1929), pp. 220-238.
The Continuing Significance of Race in Minority Male Joblessness. Ronald D’Amico; Nan L. Maxwell. Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 3. (Mar., 1995), pp. 969-991.
The Creation and Re-Creation of Ethnicity: Lessons from the Zapotec and Mixtec of Oaxaca. Lynn Stephen. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 2, Ethnicity and Class in Latin America. (Spring, 1996), pp. 17-37.
Investment, Obsession, and Denial: The Ideology of Race in the American Mind. Dirk Philipsen. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 72, No. 2. (Spring, 2003), pp. 193-207.
The Impact of Ethnicity and Socialization on Definitions of Democracy: The Case of Mexican Americans and Mexicans. Rodolfo O. de la Garza; Muserref Yetim. Mexican Studies / Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Winter, 2003), pp. 81-104.
The Importance of Racial-Ethnic Identity and Social Setting for Blacks, Whites, and Multiracials. Charles Jaret; Donald C. Reitzes. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 42, No. 4. (Winter, 1999), pp. 711-737.
The Meaning and Measurement of Race in the U.S. Census: Glimpses into the Future. Charles Hirschman; Richard Alba; Reynolds Farley. Demography, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Aug., 2000), pp. 381-393.
The Origins and Demise of the Concept of Race. Charles Hirschman. Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Sep., 2004), pp. 385-415.
The Portuguese and Haoles of Hawaii: Implications for the Origin of Ethnicity. James A. Geschwender; Rita Carroll-Seguin; Howard Brill. American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Aug., 1988), pp. 515-527.
The Religious Context of Prejudice. Gordon W. Allport. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 5, No. 3. (Autumn, 1966), pp. 447-457.
Color-Blind: The Treatment of Race and Ethnicity in Social Psychology. Matthew O. Hunt; Pamela Braboy Jackson; Brian Powell; Lala Carr Steelman. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4, Special Millenium Issue on the State of Sociological Social Psychology. (Dec., 2000), pp. 352-364.
Trends in the Race and Ethnicity of Eminent Americans. Monica McDermott. Sociological Forum, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Mar., 2002), pp. 137-160.
Black Candidates, White Voters: Understanding Racial Bias in Political Perceptions. Carol K. Sigelman; Lee Sigelman; Barbara J. Walkosz; Michael Nitz. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 1. (Feb., 1995), pp. 243-265.
“White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.” Peggy McIntosh.
Who Is Multiracial? Assessing the Complexity of Lived Race. David R. Harris; Jeremiah Joseph Sim. American Sociological Review, Vol. 67, No. 4. (Aug., 2002), pp. 614-627.
Race and Justice
Crime and Punishment: The Politics of Federal Criminal Justice Sanctions. Sean Nicholson-Crotty; Kenneth J. Meier. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2. (Jun., 2003), pp. 119-126.
Gender, Race, and Sentencing. Kathleen Daly; Michael Tonry. Crime and Justice, Vol. 22. (1997), pp. 201-252.
Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, and the Law. Valerie P. Hans; Ramiro Martinez, Jr. Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 18, No. 3, Race, Ethnicity, and the Law. (Jun., 1994), pp. 211-221.
Supreme Court of The United States . Panetti v. Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division . Certiorari to The United States Court of Appeals For the Fifth Circuit. No. 06–6407. Argued April 18, 2007—Decided June 28, 2007 . No URL.
Perceptions of Justice: Race and Gender Differences in Judgments of Appropriate Prison Sentences. J. L. Miller; Peter H. Rossi; Jon E. Simpson. Law & Society Review, Vol. 20, No. 3. (1986), pp. 313-334.
Race and Plea Bargained Outcomes: A Research Note. John A. Humphrey; Timothy J. Fogarty. Social Forces, Vol. 66, No. 1. (Sep., 1987), pp. 176-182.
Race and Sentence Severity: The Case of American Justice. Jim Sidanius. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Mar., 1988), pp. 273-281.
Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Injustice in America. John Hagan; Celesta Albonetti. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 88, No. 2. (Sep., 1982), pp. 329-355.
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States. Robert J. Sampson; Janet L. Lauritsen. Crime and Justice, Vol. 21, Ethnicity, Crime and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives. (1997), pp. 311-374.
Study Finds Racial Disparity in Executions - Newsweek Health - MSNBC.com. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20072722...playmode/1098/ . Retrieved 8/1/2007
Racial Classification in Criminology: The Reproduction of Racialized Crime. Jeanette Covington. Sociological Forum, Vol. 10, No. 4, Special Issue: African Americans and Sociology: A Critical Analysis. (Dec., 1995), pp. 547-568.
Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty. Gary Kleck. American Sociological Review, Vol. 46, No. 6. (Dec., 1981), pp. 783-805.
Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Explain the Racial Composition of Prisons in the United States. Patrick A. Langan. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-), Vol. 76, No. 3. (Autumn, 1985), pp. 666-683.
Retrying Race. Anthony V. Alfieri. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 5, Colloquium: Retrying Race. (Mar., 2003), pp. 1141-1200.
The Color of Crime: The Case against Race-Based Suspect Descriptions. Bela August Walker. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 103, No. 3. (Apr., 2003), pp. 662-688.
The Limits of Justice: Finding Fault in the Criminal Law. Alan Norrie. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Jul., 1996), pp. 540-556.
African Americans
A Comparison of European and African-Based Psychologies and Their Implications for African American College Student Development. Vanessa D. Johnson. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 33, No. 6. (Jul., 2003), pp. 817-829.
African American Diversity and the Study of Folklore. John W. Roberts. Western Folklore, Vol. 52, No. 2/4, Theorizing Folklore: Toward New Perspectives on the Politics of Culture. (Apr. - Oct., 1993), pp. 157-171.
American Experience | The Murder of Emmett Till. 6/22/2005 2:03:54 PM
African American Males in Dance, Music, Theater, and Film. I. Peter Ukpokodu. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 569, The African American Male in American Life and Thought. (May, 2000), pp. 71-85.
African Americans’ Congressional Careers and the Democratic House Delegation. Alan Gerber. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, No. 3. (Aug., 1996), pp. 831-845.
Langston Hughes—”A Dream Deferred” . This is a video clip from the Langston Hughes program in the Voices & Visions video series from the Annenberg Media Multimedia Collection.. www.learner.org/catalog/extra...eo/hughes.html. Retrieved 12/09/2007, 1:41:30 PM
African Art and African-American Identity. Eric Robertson. African Arts, Vol. 27, No. 2. (Apr., 1994), pp. 1+6+8+10.
African (Black) Psychology: Issues and Synthesis. Joseph A. Baldwin. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3. (Mar., 1986), pp. 235-249.
African Immigrants in the United States are the Nation’s Most Highly Educated Group. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 26. (Winter, 1999-2000), pp. 60-61..
African-American Odyssey. The Library of Congress. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/aaohtml/ . Retrieved (1 of 5) 5/21/2007 5:46:25 PM
African-American Parents: Pay Attention!. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 34. (Winter, 2001-2002), p. 9..
African-American Women in Higher Education: Struggling to Gain Identity. Michelle R. Howard-Vital. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, The African-American Woman: Complexities in the Midst of a Simplistic World View. (Dec., 1989), pp. 180-191.
African-American Women in the Economic Marketplace: A Continuing Struggle. Delores P. Aldridge. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, The African-American Woman: Complexities in the Midst of a Simplistic World View. (Dec., 1989), pp. 129-154.
African-Americans and the Selective Service Act of 1917. James Mennell. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 84, No. 3. (Summer, 1999), pp. 275-287.
Alexander Crummell. Priest, Missionary, Educator (10 Sep 1898). http://satucket.com/lectionary/Alex_Crummell.htm. Retrieved 12/08/2007, 02:15:17 PM
American Experience | Reconstruction: The Second Civil War | Forty Acres and a Mule | PBS. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reconst...res/index.html. Retrieved (1 of 2) 9/15/2007 12:44:38 PM.
American Experience | Reconstruction: The Second Civil War | PBS. www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reconst...ion/index.html. Retrieved 9/15/2007 12:58:02 PM.
American Experience | The Murder of Emmett Till. www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/till/index.html. Retrieved 6/22/2005 2:03:54 PM.
An Investigation of Sex-Role Stereotypes in African Americans. Lennell R. Dade; Lloyd R. Sloan. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 30, No. 5. (May, 2000), pp. 676-690.
Black versus Black: The Relationships among African, African American, and African Caribbean Persons. Jennifer V. Jackson; Mary E. Cothran. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 33, No. 5. (May, 2003), pp. 576-604.
Introduction: Challenges to the Homogenization of “African American.” Richard Williams. Sociological Forum, Vol. 10, No. 4, Special Issue: African Americans and Sociology: A Critical Analysis. (Dec., 1995), pp. 535-546.
Civil Rights Movement Veterans - CORE, NAACP, SCLC, SNCC. http://www.crmvet.org/. Retrieved 5/23/2007 3:14:06 PM
Comments on African American Contributions to American Material Life. Theodore C. Landsmark. Winterthur Portfolio, Vol. 33, No. 4, Race and Ethnicity in American Material Life. (Winter, 1998), pp. 261-282.
Disproportionate Representation of African Americans in Emotionally Handicapped Classes. Thomas S. Serwatka; Sharian Deering; Patrick Grant. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4. (Mar., 1995), pp. 492-506.
Effects of Television Advertising on African American Teenagers. E. Bun Lee; Louis A. Browne. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 25, No. 5. (May, 1995), pp. 523-536.
The Nguzo Saba as a Foundation for African American College Student Development Theory. Vanessa D. Johnson. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Mar., 2001), pp. 406-422.
The Story of the Greensboro Four. Independent Lens . FEBRUARY ONE . The Sit-In | PBS. http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/februaryone/sitin.html . Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/23/2007 3:03:22 PM.
The Greensboro Sit-In Timeline of Events. www.sitins.com/timeline.shtml .
Henry Mcneal Turner Versus the Tuskegee Machine: Black Leadership in the Nineteenth Century. Gregory Mixon. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 79, No. 4. (Autumn, 1994), pp. 363-380.
In Quest of African American Political Woman. Jewel L. Prestage. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 515, American Feminism: New Issues for a Mature Movement. (May, 1991), pp. 88-103.
International Civil Rights Center & Museum :: History. www.sitinmovement.org/history/default.asp . Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/23/2007 3:02:00 PM
Introduction: The African-American Mosaic (Library of Congress Exhibition). www.loc.gov/exhibits/african/introduction.html . Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/21/2007 5:45:50 PM
Moving up, but How Far? African American Women and Economic Restructuring in Los Angeles, 1970-1990. Angela D. James; David M. Grant; Cynthia Cranford. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 43, No. 3. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 399-420.
Mutations of Eurocentric Domination and Their Implications for African American Resistance. Jerome H. Schiele. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4. (Mar., 2002), pp. 439-463.
Preschool Children’s Selection of Race-Related Personal Names. Jerlean E. Daniel; Jack L. Daniel. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4. (Mar., 1998), pp. 471-490.
Guiding Philosophical Principles for a DuBoisian-Based African American Educational Model. Derrick P. Alridge. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 68, No. 2. (Spring, 1999), pp. 182-199.
Race and Class in America’s Elite Preparatory Boarding Schools: African Americans as the “Outsiders Within.” Peter W. Cookson, Jr.; Caroline Hodges Persell. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 60, No. 2. (Spring, 1991), pp. 219-228.
Soul in the Culture of African Americans. Phillip L. Mason. Music Educators Journal, Vol. 79, No. 3. (Nov., 1992), pp. 49-52.
Studying African American Artifacts: Some Background for the Winterthur Conference, “Race and Ethnicity in American Material Life.” John Michael Vlach. Winterthur Portfolio, Vol. 33, No. 4, Race and Ethnicity in American Material Life. (Winter, 1998), pp. 211-214.
Gender Roles Revisited: The Development of the “Woman’s Place” Among African American Women in the United States. Norma J. Burgess. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4. (Jun., 1994), pp. 391-401.
The Dilemmas of the African American Male. Wayne M. Blake; Carol A. Darling. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4. (Jun., 1994), pp. 402-415.
Introduction and Overview: The Education of African American Students: The Struggle Continues. Ralph Gardner, III; Donna Y. Ford; Antoinette Halsell Miranda. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 70, No. 4, African American Children with Special Needs. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 241-242.
The Ties That Bind: The Historic African Diaspora and Africa. Cassandra R. Veney. African Issues, Vol. 30, No. 1, The African “BRAIN DRAIN” to the North: Pitfalls and Possibilities. (2002), pp. 3-8.
The Impact of Perceptions on Interpersonal Interactions in an African American/Asian American Housing Project. Patricia Guthrie; Janis Hutchinson. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3. (Jan., 1995), pp. 377-395.
The Limited Presence of African-American Teachers. Sabrina Hope King. Review of Educational Research, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Summer, 1993), pp. 115-149.
Understanding the Strengths of African American Families. Sheila M. Littlejohn-Blake; Carol Anderson Darling. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Jun., 1993), pp. 460-471.
Understanding Violence Among Young African American Males: An Afrocentric Perspective. Anthony E. O. King. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Sep., 1997), pp. 79-96.
Voices of Civil Rights (A Library of Congress Exhibition). http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civilrights/. Retrieved 5/21/2007 5:47:53 PM
Whose Tangle is it Anyway? The African-American Family, Poverty and United States Kinship. Anthony Marcus. International Development, SAGES, University of Melbourne. The Australian Journal of Anthropology: The Official Journal of The Australian Anthropological Society ISSN: 1035-8811. Volume 16, Number 1, April 2004, Special Issue 16. www.aas.asn.au/TAJA/Contents_16_1.htm
Why “Black” and Not “African American”?. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 3. (Spring, 1994), pp. 18-19..
“What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?”. University of Rochester: Frederick Douglass Project. Oration Delivered July 5, 1852.. http://www.library.rochester.edu/index.cfm?PAGE=2945.
American Indians
The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women . Jane Lawrence . American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Summer, 2000), pp. 400-419.
Tubal Sterilization in the United States, 1994-1996 . Andrea P. MacKay; Burney A. Kieke, Jr.; Lisa M. Koonin; Karen Beattie . Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 2001), pp. 161-165.
Revision and Resistance: The Politics of Native Women’s Motherwork . Lisa J. Udel . Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2. (2001), pp. 43-62.
Native American Women (in The New Scholarship: Review Essays) . Rayna Green . Signs, Vol. 6, No. 2, Studies in Change. (Winter, 1980), pp. 248-267.
Ethics and Compulsory Population Control . Drew Christiansen . The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Feb., 1977), pp. 30-33.
Aboriginal North American Population and Rates of Decline, ca. A.D. 1500-1900. Russell Thornton. Current Anthropology, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Apr., 1997), pp. 310-315.
“African and Cherokee by Choice”: Race and Resistance under Legalized. Segregation. Laura L. Lovett. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1/2. (Winter - Spring, 1998), pp. 203-229.
AIDS: The New Smallpox among Native Americans. Irene S. Vernon. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, Indigenous Resistance and Persistence. (Spring, 1999), pp.. 235-249.
Alcatraz, Wounded Knee, and beyond: The Nixon and Ford Administrations Respond to Native American Protest. Dean J. Kotlowski. The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 72, No. 2. (May, 2003), pp. 201-227.
American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity. Joane Nagel. American Sociological Review, Vol. 60, No. 6. (Dec., 1995), pp. 947-965.
American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity. Joane Nagel. American Sociological Review, Vol. 60, No. 6. (Dec., 1995), pp. 947-965.
American Indian Persistence and Resurgence. Karl Kroeber. boundary 2, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1492-1992: American Indian Persistence and Resurgence. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 1-25.
Amerindians. John Collier. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3. (Mar., 1929), pp. 116-122.
Antecedents of Self-Reported Arrest for Indian Americans in Seattle. Larry E. Williams; Bruce A. Chadwick; Howard M. Bahr. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 40, No. 3. (3rd Qtr., 1979), pp. 243-252.
At the Boundaries of Religious Identity: Native American Religions and American Legal Culture. Susan Staiger Gooding. Numen, Vol. 43, No. 2, Religion, Law and the Construction of Identities. (May, 1996), pp. 157-183.
Before and beyond the Sioux Ghost Dance: Native American Prophetic Movements and the Study of Religion. Joel W. Martin. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Winter, 1991), pp. 677-701.
Changing Identification among American Indians and Alaska Natives. Karl Eschbach. Demography, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Nov., 1993), pp. 635-652.
Confrontation with the Law: The Case of the American Indians in Seattle. Bruce A. Chadwick; Joseph Stauss; Howard M. Bahr; Lowell K. Halverson. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 37, No. 2. (2nd Qtr., 1976), pp. 163-171.
Do Reservation Native Americans Vote with Their Feet?: A Re-Examination of Native American Migration, 1985-1990. Elizabeth Zahrt Geib. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 60, No. 4. (Oct., 2001), pp. 815-827.
Empowering the World War II Native American Veteran: Postwar Civil Rights. Jeré Franco. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Spring, 1993), pp. 32-37.
Engaging Students with Native American Community Resources. James Treat. American Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Dec., 1993), pp. 621-630.
Environmental Genocide: Native Americans and Toxic Waste. Daniel Brook. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 57, No. 1. (Jan., 1998), pp. 105-113.
Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians. Stuart Minor Benjamin. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, No. 3. (Dec., 1996), pp. 537-612.
Fear and Contempt: A European Concept of Property. Sidner Larson. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 567-577.
Sioux ghost dance / Thomas A. Edison, Inc. ; producer, W.K.L. Dickson. http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/...nd(edmp+4024)) . Retrieved (1 of 3) 7/3/2007 1:20:56 PM
The Ghost Dance. Lakota Dakota Home Page: History. http://puffin.creighton.edu/lakota/index_history.html. Retrieved (2 of 7)7/3/2007 1:27:00 PM
PBS - THE WEST - Mrs. Z. A. Parker, the Ghost Dance at Pine Ridge Reservation (1890). http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/reso...t/gddescrp.htm . Retrieved (1 of 3) 7/3/2007 1:19:42 PM.
Ghost Dance Religion. www.bgsu.edu/departments/acs/...e/WKghost.html . Retrieved (1 of 4) 7/3/2007 1:16:50 PM.
The Religious Movements Homepage: Ghost Dance. The Religious Movements Project @The University of Virginia: Ghost Dance. religiousmovements.lib.virgin...ghostdance.htm . Retrieved (1 of 6) 7/3/2007 1:24:29 PM.
Time & Again - Wounded Knee - Ghost Dance. http://www.msnbc.com/onair/msnbc/tim...host.asp?cp1=1 . Retrieved (1 of 2) 7/3/2007 1:18:18 PM.
Including Native American Perspectives in the Political Science Curriculum. Franke Wilmer; Michael E. Melody; Margaret Maier Murdock. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2. (Jun., 1994), pp. 269-276.
Indian Nations at Risk: An Educational Strategy for Action. Final Report of the Indian Nations at Risk Task Force. US Department of Education, 1991. www.ed.gov/rschstat/research/...isk/report.pdf
Indian Removal: The Trail of Tears. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2959.html . Retrieved (1 of 8) 9/15/2007 2:23:20 PM.
Intermarriage and Assimilation: The Beginning or the End?. Sandy Gonzalez. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 8, No. 2. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 48-52.
Ishi: Hearst Museum of Anthropology. hearstmuseum.berkeley.edu/exh...cc_4_ishi.html. Retrieved 3/18/2007 4:15:28 PM.
ISHI: A Real-Life Last of the Mohicans. http://www.mohicanpress.com/mo08019.html . Retrieved (1 of 12) 3/18/2007 4:12:02 PM.
Masculine/Indian. Elizabeth Cromley. Winterthur Portfolio, Vol. 31, No. 4, Gendered Spaces and Aesthetics. (Winter, 1996), pp. 265-280.
Mobilizing the Unrepresented: Indian Voting Patterns and the Implications for Tribal Sovereignty. Eileen M. Luna. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, The Secular Past, the Mythic Past, and the Impending Future. (Spring, 2000), pp. 91-115.
Native American: Evidence of an Earlier Use. Sidney I. Landau. American Speech, Vol. 69, No. 2. (Summer, 1994), pp. 202-206.
Native American Population Patterns. J. Matthew Shumway; Richard H. Jackson. Geographical Review, Vol. 85, No. 2. (Apr., 1995), pp. 185-201.
Native American Turnout in the 1990 and 1992 Elections. Geoff Peterson. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Spring, 1997), pp. 321-331.
Native Americans and the Environment: A Survey of Twentieth-Century Issues. David Rich Lewis. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Summer, 1995), pp. 423-450.
Native Americans, New Voices: American Indian History, 1895-1995. R. David Edmunds. The American Historical Review, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Jun., 1995), pp. 717-740.
New Frontiers in Native American History. Clara Sue Kidwell. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3. (1996), pp. 29-30.
Cowboys and Indians: Perceptions of Western Films Among American Indians and Anglos. JoEllen Shively. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 6. (Dec., 1992), pp. 725-734.
Plastic Shamans and Astroturf Sun Dances: New Age Commercialization of Native American Spirituality. Lisa Aldred. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Summer, 2000), pp. 329-352.
Identity and the Politics of American Indian and Hispanic Women Leaders. Diane-Michele Prindeville. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Aug., 2003), pp. 591-608.
“Poor Indians” and the “Poor in Spirit”: The Indian Impact on David BRAINerd. Richard W. Pointer. The New England Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 3. (Sep., 1994), pp. 403-426.
Reservation Wages: An Analysis of the Effects of Reservations on Employment of American Indian Men. Robert J. Gitter; Patricia B. Reagan. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4. (Sep., 2002), pp. 1160-1168.
Rethinking Native American Ecological Assumptions and Myths. Florence C. Shipek. Ethnohistory, Vol. 28, No. 4. (Autumn, 1981), pp. 293-294.
Roots of the Native American Urban Experience: Relocation Policy in the 1950s. Larry W. Burt. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2. (Spring, 1986), pp. 85-99.
Smoke or Signals? American Popular Culture and the Challenge to Hegemonic Images of American Indians in Native American Film. John Mihelich. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, Film and Video. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 129-137.
Sociological Perspectives on American Indians. C. Matthew Snipp. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 18. (1992), pp. 351-371.
Stride toward Freedom: The Relocation of Indians to Cities, 1952-1960. Kenneth R. Philp. The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2. (Apr., 1985), pp. 175-190.
Superficiality and Bias: The (Mis)Treatment of Native Americans in U. S. Government Textbooks. Jeffrey S. Ashley; Karen Jarratt-Ziemski. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3/4. (Summer - Autumn, 1999), pp. 49-62.
Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration and the American Indians. Oliver La Farge. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 311, American Indians and American Life. (May, 1957), pp. 41-46.
The Changing Political and Economic Status of the American Indians: From Captive Nations to Internal Colonies. C. Matthew Snipp. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 45, No. 2. (Apr., 1986), pp. 145-157.
The Commodification of Indian Identity. George Pierre Castile. American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 98, No. 4. (Dec., 1996), pp. 743-749.
The Correlation between Societal Attitudes and Those of American Authors in the Depiction of American Indians, 1607-1860. Wynette L. Hamilton. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Spring, 1974), pp. 1-26.
The Ghost-Dance Religion: Sioux Outbreak of 1890 by James Mooney. Bureau of Ethnology: Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1892-93. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896. www.archive.org/details/ghost...ioux00moonrich.
The Integration of Americans of Indian Descent. J. Milton Yinger; George Eaton Simpson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 436, American Indians. Today. (Mar., 1978), pp. 137-151.
The Role of AIM Leaders in Indian Nationalism. Rachel A. Bonney. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3. (Autumn, 1977), pp. 209-224.
Still Native: The Significance of Native Americans in the History of the Twentieth-Century American West. David Rich Lewis. The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2. (May, 1993), pp. 203-227.
The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978. Robert S. Michaelsen. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Mar., 1984), pp. 93-115.
The Use of Racial and Ethnic Terms in America: Management by Manipulation. Jack D. Forbes. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 11, No. 2. (Autumn, 1995), pp. 53-65.
The Wounded Knee Massacre - December 1890. http://www.lastoftheindependents.com/wounded.htm . Retrieved (1 of 4) 7/3/2007 1:25:18 PM
Undercounting Native Americans: The 1980 Census and the Manipulation of Racial Identity in the United States. Jack D. Forbes. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 6, No. 1. (Spring, 1990), pp. 2-26.
What We Want to Be Called: Indigenous Peoples’ Perspectives on Racial and Ethnic Identity Labels. Michael Yellow Bird. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2. (Spring, 1999), pp. 1-21.
What’s in a Name?: A Historical Look at Native American-Related Nicknames and Symbols at Three U.S. Universities. Mark R. Connolly. The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 71, No. 5. (Sep. - Oct., 2000), pp. 515-547.
Who and What Is an American Indian?. Frell M. Owl. Ethnohistory, Vol. 9, No. 3. (Summer, 1962), pp. 265-284.
Asian Americans
A ‘Model Minority’ Speaks Out on Cultural Shyness. Ronald R. Hoy. Science, New Series, Vol. 262, No. 5136. (Nov. 12, 1993), pp. 1117-1118.
Additional Complexities: Social Class, Ethnicity, Generation, and Gender in Asian American Student Experiences. Stacey J. Lee. Race Ethnicity and Education,Vol. 9, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 17–28. University of Wisconsin—Madison, USA. ISSN 1361-3324 (print)/ISSN 1470-109X (online)/06/010017–12. © 2006 Taylor & Francis. No URL.
Are Asian-Americans ‘Underrepresented’?. Constance Holden. Science, New Series, Vol. 262, No. 5136. (Nov. 12, 1993), p. 1096.
Significant Lives: Asia and Asian Americans in the History of the U. S. West. Gail M. Nomura. The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1. (Spring, 1994), pp. 69-88.
Asian American Interracial and Interethnic Marriages: Differences by Education and Nativity. Zhenchao Qian; Sampson Lee Blair; Stacey D. Ruf. International Migration Review, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Summer, 2001), pp. 557-586.
Asian American Women and Racialized Femininities: “Doing” Gender across Cultural Worlds. Karen D. Pyke; Denise L. Johnson. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Feb., 2003), pp. 33-53.
Situating Asian Americans in the Political Discourse on Affirmative Action. Michael Omi; Dana Y. Takagi. Representations, No. 55, Special Issue: Race and Representation: Affirmative Action. (Summer, 1996), pp. 155-162.
Asian Americans and Higher Education. Russell Endo. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 41, No. 4. (4th Qtr., 1980), pp. 367-378.
Asian Americans as a Model Minority: Self-Perceptions and Perceptions by Other Racial Groups. Paul Wong; Chienping Faith Lai; Richard Nagasawa; Tieming Lin. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 41, No. 1. (1998), pp. 95-118.
“What Is Indian about You?”: A Gendered, Transnational Approach to Ethnicity. Monisha Das Gupta. Gender and Society, Vol. 11, No. 5. (Oct., 1997), pp. 572-596.
Asian Americans as Model Minorities? A Look at Their Academic Performance. Grace Kao. American Journal of Education, Vol. 103, No. 2. (Feb., 1995), pp. 121-159.
Asian-Americans Bump Against Glass Ceilings. Susan Katz Miller. Science, New Series, Vol. 258, No. 5085. (Nov. 13, 1992), pp. 1224-1225+1228.
Asian Indian Immigration Patterns: The Origins of the Sikh Community in California. Juan L. Gonzales Jr.. International Migration Review, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Spring, 1986), pp. 40-54.
Asian Indians as a Minority in the United States: The Effect of Education, Occupations and Gender on Income. Herbert Barringer; Gene Kassebaum. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 4. (Winter, 1989), pp. 501-520.
Diversity’s Missing Minority: Asian Pacific American Undergraduates’ Attitudes toward Affirmative Action. Karen Kurotsuchi Inkelas. The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 74, No. 6. (Nov. - Dec., 2003), pp. 601-639.
Asian Pacific Americans and the New Minority Politics. Andrew L. Aoki; Don T. Nakanishi. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 605-610.
Asian Pacific Americans’ Social Movements and Interest Groups. Kim Geron; Enrique de la Cruz; Leland T. Saito; Jaideep Singh. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 618-624.
Asian/Pacific American Heritage Month (Library of Congress). http://www.loc.gov/topics/asianpacific/ . Retrieved (1 of 4) 5/21/2007 5:35:12 PM.
Behind the Model-Minority Stereotype: Voices of High- and Low-Achieving Asian American Students. Stacey J. Lee. Anthropology & Education Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4. (Dec., 1994), pp. 413-429.
Differences in Family of Origin Perceptions among African American, Asian American, and Hispanic American College Students. Connie M. Kane. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Sep., 1998), pp. 93-105.
The Concept of Differentiated Oneness and Implications for Asian American Families. Auris Huang Hung, Dallas Theological Seminary. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 2006, Vol. 25, No. 3, 226-239. ISSN 0733-4273. No URL.
Disrupting Asian America: South Asian American Histories as Strategic Sites of Narration. Sridevi Menon. Department of Ethnic Studies, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43620, USA. E-mail: [email protected]. NO URL.
Ethnic Residential Concentration and the Protected Market Hypothesis. Howard Aldrich; John Cater; Trevor Jones; David Mc Evoy; Paul Velleman. Social Forces, Vol. 63, No. 4. (Jun., 1985), pp. 996-1009.
From Discrimination to Affirmative Action: Facts in the Asian American. Admissions Controversy. Dana Y. Takagi. Social Problems, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Nov., 1990), pp. 578-592.
Global Forces, Foreign Policy, and Asian Pacific Americans. Paul Y. Watanabe. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 639-644.
“I Love Asian Women”. Rana Chang. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1/2, Asian American Women. (2000), pp.. 157-158.
Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry - 1942. http://www.sfmuseum.org/hist9/evacorder.html . Retrieved (1 of 3) 6/11/2005 2:51:39 PM. This is the full text of Gen. John L. DeWitt’s first order to force the Japanese — citizens and aliens alike — out of San Francisco. A map of the zone designated for evacuation by Gen. DeWitt was published in the San Francisco News April 2, 1942. The newspaper said those evacuated from San Francisco would be sent to a remote place known as Manzanar.
Intergenerational Relationships among Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Americans. Masako Ishii-Kuntz. Family Relations, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Jan., 1997), pp. 23-32.
Interracial Politics: Asian Americans and Other Communities of Color. Claire Jean Kim; Taeku Lee. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 631-637.
Japanese Americans, Pluralism, and the Model Minority Myth. George T. Endo; Connie Kubo Della-Piana. Theory into Practice, Vol. 20, No. 1, Cultural Pluralism: Can It Work?. (Winter, 1981), pp. 45-51.
Southeast Asian American Children: Not the “Model Minority.” KaYing Yang. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 127-133.
“You Can Never Be Too Rich or Too Thin”: Popular and Consumer Culture and the Americanization of Asian American Girls and Young Women. Stacey J. Lee; Sabina Vaught. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 72, No. 4, Commercialism in the Lives of Children and Youth of Color: Education and Other Socialization Contexts. (Autumn, 2003), pp. 457-466.
Race, Ethnic Options, and Ethnic Binds: Identity Negotiations of Second-Generation Chinese and Korean Americans. Nazli Kibria. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 43, No. 1. (Spring, 2000), pp. 77-95.
Race, Ethnicity, and Deviance: A Study of Asian and Non-Asian Adolescents in America. Sung Joon Jang. Sociological Forum, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Dec., 2002), pp. 647-680.
Racial Violence against Asian Americans. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 106, No. 8. (Jun., 1993), pp. 1926-1943.
Silent No Longer: ‘Model Minority’ Mobilizes. Andrew Lawler. Science, New Series, Vol. 290, No. 5494. (Nov. 10, 2000), pp. 1072-1077.
The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism. Daina C. Chiu. California Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 4, Symposium: Critical Race Theory. (Jul., 1994), pp. 1053-1125.
The Development of Feminist Consciousness among Asian American Women. Esther Ngan-Ling Chow. Gender and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Sep., 1987), pp. 284-299.
The Impact of Perceptions on Interpersonal Interactions in an African American/Asian American Housing Project. Patricia Guthrie; Janis Hutchinson. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3. (Jan., 1995), pp. 377-395.
The Role of Reflected Appraisals in Racial Identity: The Case of Multiracial Asians. Nikki Khanna. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 2. (Jun., 2004), pp. 115-131.
To Stay or Not to Stay: Dimensions of Ethnic Assimilation. Minako K. Maykovich. International Migration Review, Vol. 10, No. 3. (Autumn, 1976), pp. 377-387.
Toward a Theory of Panethnicity: Explaining Asian American Collective Action. Dina G. Okamoto. American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, No. 6. (Dec., 2003), pp. 811-842.
Transcript of Executive Order 9066: Japanese Relocation Order (1942). www.ourdocuments.gov/print_fr...der+%281942%29. Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/11/2005 2:53:34 PM.
Hispanic/Latino Americans
Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for Latino and African-American Political Coalitions. Karen M. Kaufmann. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2. (Jun., 2003), pp. 199-210.
Changing politics of race and region: Latino migration to the US South. Jamie Winders. Progress in Human Geography 29, 6 (2005) pp. 683–699.
Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA. © 2005 Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd 10.1191/0309132505ph577oa. No URL.
Dual Sources Of Influence On Latino Political Identity: Mexico’s Dual Nationality Policy And The Dream Act. René Galindo, Christina Medina& Xóchitl Chávez, Texas Hispanic Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 11:75] Pp 74-98. No URL.
History on the Move . . . Revisiting the Suffering of the Immigrants from the Latino/a Perspective. Suzanne Oboler. Qualitative Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 1, Spring 2006 (© 2006) DOI: 10.1007/s11133-005-9007-4. Published online: 29 March 2006. 0162-0436/06/0100-0117/1 C_ 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. No URL.
Homeland Security, Militarism, and the Future of Latinos and Latinas in the United States. Jorge Mariscal. Radical History Review. Issue 93 (Fall 2005): 39–52, pp. 39-52. Copyright 2005 by MARHO: The Radical Historians’ Organization, Inc. No URL.
Ideologies of Diversity and Inequality: Predicting Collective Action in Groups Varying in Ethnicity and Immigrant Status. Kay Deaux, Anne Reid, Daniela Martin, Nida Bikmen. Political Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2006. pp. 123-146. 0162-895X © 2006 International Society of Political Psychology. Published by Blackwell Publishing. Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria Australia. No URL
Immigration Panel: Commentary. Andrew Smith. Harvard Latino Law Review [Vol. 9 2006. pp. 112-118]. No URL.
Immigration Policy and Employment Conditions of US Immigrants from Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. Katharine M. Donato, Michael Aguilera, and Chizuko Wakabayashi. International Migration Vol. 43 (5) 2005. pp. 2-29. ISSN 0020-7985. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.© 2005 IOM. No URL.
Introduction to 1492: An Ongoing Voyage. http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/1492/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/21/2007 5:44:53 PM
Identity and the Politics of American Indian and Hispanic Women Leaders. Diane-Michele Prindeville. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Aug., 2003), pp. 591-608.
Las Culturas – Home. www.lasculturas.com/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/21/2007 5:13:07 PM
Latino Elected Officials in the 1990s. Harry Pachon; Louis DeSipio. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Jun., 1992), pp. 212-217.
Eighth Annual Harvard Latino Law and Policy Conference and Commentary: Connecting Today, Impacting Tomorrow. April 22-23, 2005. Harvard Latino Law Review [Vol. 9 2006]. Pp. 92-111. No URL.
Latinos and Lethal Violence: The Impact of Poverty and Inequality. Ramiro Martinez, Jr. Social Problems, Vol. 43, No. 2. (May, 1996), pp. 131-146.
Latinos in America’s Cultural Laboratory: Immigrating for Diverse Reasons, Latinos Complicate U.S. Policy Choices. The Futurist, January-February 2007. pp 18-19. www.wfs.org. No URL.
Nuestra Palabra: Latino Writers Having Their Say: Houston, TX. http://www.nuestrapalabra.org/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/21/2007 5:01:58 PM
Occupational Attainment of Latino Immigrants in the United States. Bohon, Stephanie A. Geographical Review; Apr2005, Vol. 95 Issue 2, p. 249-266. EBSCOhost. http://0-web.ebscohost.com.librus.hc...0sessionmgr107. Retrieved (1 of 25) 4/26/2007 2:45:34 PM
On Immigrant Street: Newcomers Are Making A Big Impact on Built Environment. James B. Goodno. Planning November 2005; pp. 4-9. American Planning Association. No URL.
A Note on The Political Idea of in American Life. Niccolo Caldararo & James Quesada. Social Thought and Commentary, No Date. pp. 731-736. No URL.
Welcome to the Front Seat: Racial Identity and Mesoamerican Immigrants. Gilberto Arriaza. Journal of Latinos and Education, 3{4), 251-265, Copyright © 2004, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. No URL.
Dropping the Hyphen? Becoming Latino(a)-American through Racialized Assimilation. Tanya Golash-Boza. Social Forces, Volume 85, Number 1, September 2006. pp 27-55. No URL.
Sense of Community in Community Organizations: Structure and Evidence of Validity. Joseph Hughey, Paul W. Speer and N. Andrew Peterson. Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 1, 97–113 (1999). © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0090-4392/99/010097-16. No URL.
Su Voto Es Su Voz: Latino Political Empowerment and the Immigration Challenge. Susan Gonzaléz Baker. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3. (Sep., 1996), pp. 465-468.
The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation. Francine J. Lipman. Harvard Latino Law Review [Vol. 9 2006] pp. 1-58. No URL.
The Cultures and History of America: The Jay I. Kislak Collection at the Library of Congress (Exhibition). http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/kislak/. Retrieved 5/21/2007 5:43:04 PM.
The Racialization of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans: 1890s-1930s. Víctor M. Rodríguez Domínguez. Centro Journal, Volume XVII Number I, Spring 2005. pp 71-106. No URL.
The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity And Perceptions of Discrimination. Deborah J. Schildkraut. Political Behavior, Vol. 27, No. 3, September 2005 (© 2005) pp. 285-312. DOI: 10.1007/s11109-005-4803-9. 0190-9320/05/0900-0285/0 _ 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. No URL.
Shaping New Possibilities for Latino Children and the Nation’s Future. Sonia M. Pérez. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 122-126.
Latino Immigrants at the Polls: Foreign-Born Voter Turnout in the 2002 Election. Matt A. Barreto. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 1. (Mar., 2005), pp. 79-86.
Studying Latino Politics: The Development of the Latino National Political Survey. F. Chris Garcia; John A. Garcia; Angelo Falcon; Rodolfo O. de la Garza. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Dec., 1989), pp. 848-852.
All Segregation Is Not Equal: The Impact of Latino and Black School Composition. Pat António Goldsmith. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Spring, 2003), pp. 83-105.
Becoming Latinos: Mexican Americans, Chicanos, and the Spanish Myth in the Urban Southwest. Joseph A. Rodríguez. The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2. (Summer, 1998), pp. 165-185.
Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition. Paula D. McClain; Albert K. Karnig. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 2. (Jun., 1990), pp. 535-545.
Bracero Timeline. The Dallas Morning News, January 27, 2002. http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/immigration/bracero-timeline.htm. Retrieved (1 of 3) 6/11/2005 3:08:28 PM.
Fear and Loathing in California: Contextual Threat and Political Sophistication among Latino Voters. Adrian D. Pantoja; Gary M. Segura. Political Behavior, Vol. 25, No. 3. (Sep., 2003), pp. 265-286.
Conventional Politics Takes Center Stage: The Latino Struggle against English-Only Laws. Wayne A. Santoro. Social Forces, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Mar., 1999), pp. 887-909.
Cooperation and Conflict in Multiracial School Districts. Kenneth J. Meier; Joseph Stewart, Jr. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1123-1133.
Differential Influences on Latino Electoral Participation. Robert A. Jackson. Political Behavior, Vol. 25, No. 4. (Dec., 2003), pp. 339-366.
Divided or Together? Conflict and Cooperation between African Americans and Latinos. Kenneth J. Meier; Paula D. McClain; J. L. Polinard; Robert D. Wrinkle. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Sep., 2004), pp. 399-409.
Examining Latino Turnout in 1996: A Three-State, Validated Survey Approach. Daron Shaw; Rodolfo O. de la Garza; Jongho Lee. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Apr., 2000), pp. 338-346.
Gender, Culture, and Power: Barriers to HIV-Prevention Strategies for Women. Cynthia A. Gómez; Barbara VanOss Marín. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 33, No. 4. (1996), pp. 355-362.
“Hispanic” and “Latino:” The Viability of Categories for Panethnic Unity. Jose Calderon. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 4, The Politics of Ethnic Construction: Hispanic, Chicano, Latino...? (Autumn, 1992), pp. 37-44.
Hispanic Turnout: Estimates from Validated Voting Data. Carol A. Cassel. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Jun., 2002), pp. 391-408.
Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Workers: Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination? Cynthia Bansak; Steven Raphael. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 54, No. 2. (Jan., 2001), pp. 275-295.
“Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”? Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience. Kevin R. Johnson. California Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 5, LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law: A Joint Symposium by “California Law Review” and “La Raza Law Journal.” (Oct., 1997), pp. 1259-1313.
Mixed-Race School-Age Children: A Summary of Census 2000 Data. Alejandra M. Lopez. Educational Researcher, Vol. 32, No. 6. (Aug. - Sep., 2003), pp. 25-37.
Our Nation on the Fault Line: Hispanic American Education, September 1996. President’s Advisory Commission on Educational Excellence for Hispanic Americans. Ana Margarita “Cha” Guzmán, Chair. www.ed.gov/pubs/FaultLine/index.html.
Parental Work, Family Structure, and Poverty among Latino Children. Daniel T. Lichter; Nancy S. Landale. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 57, No. 2. (May, 1995), pp. 346-354.
Political Opinion and Distinctiveness: The Case of Hispanic Ethnicity. Ryan L. Claassen. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 609-620.
Preparing Diverse Adolescents for the Transition to Adulthood. Andrew J. Fuligni; Christina Hardway. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 98-119.
Private Schools and “Latino Flight” from Black Schoolchildren. Robert W. Fairlie. Demography, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Nov., 2002), pp. 655-674.
Residential Segregation and Links to Minority Poverty: The Case of Latinos in the United States. Anne M. Santiago; Margaret G. Wilder. Social Problems, Vol. 38, No. 4, Special Issue on the Underclass in the United States. (Nov,1991), pp. 492-515.
The Health of Latino Children in the United States. Fernando S. Mendoza. The Future of Children, Vol. 4, No. 3, Critical Health Issues for Children and Youth. (Winter, 1994), pp. 43-72.
The Impact of Brown on the Education of Latinos. A. Reynaldo Contreras; Leonard A. Valverde. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 63, No. 3, Brown v. Board of Education at 40: A Commemorative Issue Dedicated to the Late Thurgood Marshall. (Summer, 1994), pp. 470-481.
The New Face of School Desegregation. Kristi L. Bowman. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 6. (Apr., 2001), pp. 1751-1808.
The Politics of Labeling: Latino/Cultural Identities of Self and Others. Suzanne Oboler. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 4, The Politics of Ethnic Construction: Hispanic, Chicano, Latino...?. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 18-36.
White, Black, or Puerto Rican? Racial Self-Identification among Mainland and Island Puerto Ricans. Nancy S. Landale; R.S. Oropesa. Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 1. (Sep., 2002), pp. 231-254.
Working with Co-Ethnics: Earnings Penalties for Latino Immigrants at Latino Jobsites. Lisa Catanzarite; Michael Bernabé Aguilera. Social Problems, Vol. 49, No. 1. (Feb., 2002), pp. 101-127.
The Official Bracero Agreement. www.farmworkers.org/bpaccord.html. Retrieved (1 of 6) 6/11/2005 3:07:40 PM
Latino Representation, It’s Direct and Indirect. Brinck Kerr; Will Miller. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3. (Jul., 1997), pp. 1066-1071.
The Border | 1942 Mexican Immigrant Labor History. http://www.pbs.org/kpbs/theborder/hi...meline/17.html. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/28/2007 12:55:51 PM
The Bracero Program. www.farmworkers.org/bracerop.html. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/28/2007 12:55:20 PM
The Bracero Program: Was It a Failure? Philip Martin; 7-03-06. http://hnn.us/articles/27336.html
Jewish Americans
American Jewish Communists and Jewish Culture in the 1930s. Bat-Ami Zucker. Modern Judaism, Vol. 14, No. 2. (May, 1994), pp. 175-185.
American Jewish Historiography (A Survey of Some of the Literature on the History of the Jews in America). Joshua Bloch. The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Ser., Vol. 45, No. 4, Tercentenary Issue. (Apr., 1955), pp. 434-450.
ADL: Fighting Anti-Semitism, Bigotry and Extremism. http://www.adl.org/.
Characteristics of 1,107 Petitioners for Change of Name. Leonard Broom; Helen P. Beem; Virginia Harris. American Sociological Review, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Feb., 1955), pp. 33-39.
Fraternities, Social Distance, and Anti-Semitism Among Jewish and Non-Jewish Undergraduates. Bernard E. Segal. Sociology of Education, Vol. 38, No. 3. (Spring, 1965), pp. 251-264.
Jewish American Entrepreneurs. Bernard Sarachek. The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 40, No. 2. (Jun., 1980), pp. 359-372.
Jewish Education in the Postwar World. Samuel M. Blumenfield. Journal of Educational Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 5, The Jew in the Postwar World. (Jan., 1945), pp. 262-267.
Jewish American Heritage Month. URL: http://www.jewishheritagemonth.gov/. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/21/2007 5:36:13 PM
Jewish Identity in America: Structural Analyses of Attitudes and Behaviors. Uzi Rebhun. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Sep., 2004), pp. 43-63.
Jewish Political Studies. Daniel J. Elazar. Modern Judaism, Vol. 11, No. 1, Review of Developments in Modern Jewish Studies, Part 2. (Feb., 1991), pp. 67-90.
Jewish-Christian Marriages and Conversions, 1971 and 1990. Bernard Lazerwitz. Sociology of Religion, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Winter, 1995), pp. 433-443.
Juvenile Delinquency among the Jews in New York. Julius B. Maller. Social Forces, Vol. 10, No. 4. (May, 1932), pp. 542-549.
Labor Supply and Investment in Child Quality: A Study of Jewish and Non- Jewish Women: A Reply. Barry R. Chiswick. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 74, No. 4. (Nov., 1992), pp. 726-727.
Latin America’s Jews: A Review of Sources. Judith Laikin Elkin. Sociology of Religion Latin American Research Review, Vol. 20, No. 2. (1985), pp. 124-141.
Marginality and Liberalism Among Jewish Elites. Robert Lerner; Althea K. Nagai; Stanley Rothman. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3. (Autumn, 1989), pp. 330-352.
Religion’s Subsystem: Toward a Sociology of Jewish Education. Norman L. Friedman. Sociology of Education, Vol. 42, No. 1. (Winter, 1969), pp. 104-113.
Religious Education and Ethnic Identification: Implications for Ethnic Pluralism. Howard M. Shapiro; Arnold Dashefsky. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 15, No. 2, Religious Identification and Involvement. (Winter, 1974), pp. 93-102.
Sampling by Ethnic Surnames: The Case of American Jews. Harold S. Himmelfarb; R. Michael Loar; Susan H. Mott. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2. (Summer, 1983), pp. 247-260.
Socioeconomic Attainment and Expressions of Jewish Identification, 1970 and 1990. Esther I. Wilder. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Jun., 1996), pp. 109-127.
From Noblesse Oblige to Personal Redemption: The Changing Profile and Agenda of American Jewish Leaders. Deborah E. Lipstadt. Modern Judaism, Vol. 4, No. 3. (Oct., 1984), pp. 295-309.
The Effect of Demographic Dynamics on Jewish Communal Participation in the United States. Jonathan Rabinowitz. Sociological Analysis, Vol. 53, No. 3, Monopolism and Pluralism in American Religion and Society. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 287-297.
The Jewish Synagogue in the United States. Uriah Zevi Engelman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 41, No. 1. (Jul., 1935), pp. 44-51.
The Study of American Jewish Identification: How It Is Defined, Measured, Obtained, Sustained and Lost. Harold S. Himmelfarb. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Mar., 1980), pp. 48-60.
The Transformation of Community Integration among American Jewry: Religion or Ethnoreligion? A National Replication. J. Alan Winter. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Jun., 1992), pp. 349-363.
Muslim Americans
“So That You May Know One Another”: A Muslim American Reflects on Pluralism and Islam. Ali S. Asani. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and Changing Realities. (Jul., 2003), pp. 40-51.
A Part of US or Apart from US?: Post-September 11 Attitudes toward Muslims and Civil Liberties. Kathleen Moore. Middle East Report, No. 224. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 32-35.
American Muslim Women and U. S. Society. Aminah B. McCloud. Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 12, No. 1. (1995 - 1996), pp. 51-59.
Between the Crescent and the Star-Spangled Banner: American Muslims and US Foreign Policy. Ali A. Mazrui. International Affairs(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 72, No. 3, Ethnicity and International Relations. (Jul., 1996), pp. 493-506.
No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion after September 11. Louise Cainkar. Middle East Report, No. 224. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 22-29.
Cracking Down on Diaspora: Arab Detroit and America’s “War on Terror.” Sally Howell; Andrew Shryock. Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 76, No. 3. (Summer, 2003), pp. 443-462.
Black Muslims and the Development of Prisoners’ Rights. Christopher E. Smith. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2. (Dec., 1993), pp. 131-146.
Black Muslims and the Police. Lee P. Brown. The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Mar., 1965), pp. 119-126.
Christian Elements in Negro American Muslim Religious Beliefs. Abbie Whyte. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 25, No. 4. (4th Qtr., 1964), pp. 382-388.
Interpreting Islam in American Schools. Susan L. Douglass; Ross E. Dunn. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and Changing Realities. (Jul., 2003), pp. 52-72.
Islam and Affirmative Action. S. A. Jackson. Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 14, No. 2. (1999 - 2000), pp. 405-431.
Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America. Fawaz A. Gerges. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and Changing Realities. (Jul., 2003), pp. 73-89.
Islam, Archaeology and Slavery in Africa. J. Alexander. World Archaeology, Vol. 33, No. 1, The Archaeology of Slavery. (Jun., 2001), pp. 44-60.
Justifiable Homicide, Police Brutality, or Governmental Repression? The 1962 Los Angeles Police Shooting of Seven Members of the Nation of Islam. Frederick Knight. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 79, No. 2. (Spring, 1994), pp. 182-196.
Muslims in Early America. Michael A. Gomez. The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 60, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 671-710.
Muslims in the United States: Settlers and Visitors. M. Arif Ghayur. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 454, America as a Multicultural Society. (Mar., 1981), pp. 150-163.
Mediating Discrimination: Resisting Oppression among African-American Muslim Women. Michelle D. Byng. Social Problems, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Nov., 1998), pp. 473-487.
Some Neglected Aspects of Medieval Muslim Polemics against Christianity. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh. The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Jan., 1996), pp. 61-84.
A Contemporary Revitalization Movement in American Race Relations: The ‘Black Muslims.’ James H. Laue. Social Forces, Vol. 42, No. 3. (Mar., 1964), pp. 315-323.
The Sister Clara Muhammad Schools: Pioneers in the Development of Islamic Education in America. Hakim M. Rashid; Zakiyyah Muhammad. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 61, No. 2, African Americans and Independent Schools: Status, Attainment, and Issues. (Spring, 1992), pp. 178-185. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/03%3A_Race_and_Ethnicity/3.07%3A_Reading_List_for_Part_II.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Part III—Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
Sex and Gender
Besides racial and ethnic minorities, there are sex/gender minorities, age minorities (the very young and the very old), religious minorities, and minority status based on disability. Most ascribed aspects of master status, then, can lead to social differentiation (being set aside for differential and often negative treatment) for many Americans. Since at least half of the population of the United States is female (actually it is about 52% female), the minority status of women must be addressed.
Although much has changed for women since the 1960s, much remains the same—women still receive less pay than men, are less likely to be promoted to upper-level management positions than men, are less likely to be hired for typically “male” jobs, are more likely to live in poverty, are more likely to be fired or to work part time or second jobs—they still have fewer socioeconomic opportunities, over all, than men. In the corporate world the glass ceiling still exists. However, a 2009 study by the Pew Research Center found that a larger share of men in 2007, compared with their 1970 counterparts, are married to women whose education and income exceed their own, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of demographic and economic trend data. A larger share of women are married to men with less education and income.1
Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s Men and Women of the Corporation
According to Sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter, sex polarization and segregation of occupations are ubiquitous—there is men's work and there is women’s work. And, although that is changing, the glass ceiling is firmly in place for women and racial minorities in 2010, Barack Obama’s election to the presidency of the United States notwithstanding. Factory-bureaucracy gained ascendancy because it was a way to gain control over activities that would otherwise have a high quotient of uncertainty, and coping with uncertainty was a principal aim of the new forms of organization.2The managerial viewpoint stressed rationality and efficiency as the raison d’être for managerial control. Taylorism and deskilling are addressed as dehumanizing—the very design of organizations was oriented toward and assumed to be capable of suppressing irrationality, personality, and emotionality.3 Mayo’s human relations model is seen to stress the inherent social-psychological differences between managers and workers and women are the antithesis of the rational manager.4 Concerning women’s entrance into the work force, it is argued that the growth of modern administration brought women into domination in the office but left them absent in management.5
In order to “get ahead” in corporate America, it is necessary to have a wife who is also bound to the company. Status differences among categories of employees are formalized by the location of one’s office, where and with whom one eats lunch, the type of office furniture one has, whether one was exempt (salaried) or non-exempt (hourly), unofficially prescribed dress codes dependent upon one’s position. Companies have their own vocabulary or corporate jargon containing hundreds of specialized words and phrases. Impersonality, emotional distance, rationality, team membership, collaboration, consensus, and cooperation are highly prized personal qualities.6
Conformity in appearance—not merely the way one dresses but the complete look—matters because leaders in a variety of situations are likely to show preference for socially similar subordinates and help them get ahead.7 Homosexual/Homosocial reproduction—managers and others in power overwhelmingly hire and promote those who are like themselves because [in] conditions of uncertainty . . . people fall back on social bases for [determining whom to] trust. Difference of any kind—gender, race, education, social class of family of origin—is seen as unpredictable, the greater the uncertainty, the greater the pressures for those who have to trust each other to form a homogeneous group.8 Social conformity is a prerequisite for promotions, and although salary increases reward productivity, promotions reward sameness which ultimately closes the door to women, minorities, and other socially unorthodox, idiosyncratic, or unconventional employees. Uncertainty creates a particular problematic regarding very large companies, and the higher one progresses up the corporate ladder and the more authority, responsibility, and accountability one has, the more uncertain one becomes, we don't know how to manage these giant structures; and I suspect no one does. They are like dinosaurs, lumbering on of their own accord, even if they are no longer functional, said one major executive.9 Companies demand that their employees, particularly at the upper levels, look upon the company as an all-absorbing part of their lives, those on management ladders . . . planned their career . . . though all of life could be encapsulated within the corporation.10 Furthermore, corporations . . . create organizational loyalty by ensuring that for its most highly paid members the corporation represents the only enduring set of social bonds other than the immediate family. And the family, too—at least the wife—can be drawn in.11
The glass ceiling for women and minorities is a structural problem created by the corporate culture, the wider socioeconomic environment, and the lack of complete bureaucratization and routinization—laws and rules are required in order to overcome the problem—because the more closed the circle, the more difficult it is for ‘outsiders’ to break in. . . . The more closed the circle, the more difficult it is to share power when the time comes, as it inevitably must . . . corporations must grapple with the problem of how to reduce pressures for social conformity in their top jobs;12if [women] were evaluated on non-utilitarian grounds, they were also expected to accept non-utilitarian rewards. . . . Theorists have pointed out that the interstitial position occupied by some white-collar workers makes them manipulable by esteem and prestige symbols, by normative rather than material rewards. 13[female employees are] locked into self-perpetuating, self-defeating cycles in which job and opportunity structure encourage personal orientations that reinforce low pay and low mobility, and perpetuate the original job structure. The fact that such jobs [are] held almost entirely by women also reinforces limited and stereotyped views of the ‘nature’ of women at work.1415
In other words, the sociocultural and sociostructural environment of our society and the structure and culture of our corporations creates scenarios in which women and people of color are not on a level playing field in terms of jobs. Even though Kanter wrote her seminal book Men and Women of the Corporation in 1977, things have not changed as dramatically as we would like to think.
Modern Feminism
Modern feminism, which is an attempt to overcome the worst aspects of male domination, has a hundred year history in the United States beginning with such women as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Susan B. Anthony. In 1898, Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935) wrote Women and Economics in which she reasoned that women are the only creatures who are totally economically dependent upon the male of the species, and that so long as this condition continued to exist, our American society would stagnate. Gilman also wrote the famous short story “The Yellow Wallpaper” about a woman treated like an object who becomes an object. “She Walketh Veiled and Sleeping,” her best-loved poem, is an indictment of the condition of woman who have been kept emotionally, intellectually, and economically “asleep” by the male-dominated patriarchy.
She walketh veiled and sleeping
For she knoweth not her power;
She obeyeth but the pleading
Of her heart, and the high leading
of her soul, unto this hour.
Slow advancing, halting, creeping
Comes the Woman to the hour!—
She walketh veiled and sleeping,
For she knoweth not her power.16
Mary Daly and Radical Feminism
Feminism, which is an ideology aimed at eliminating patriarchy in support of equality between the sexes has been highly controversial in recent years. It has been linked to the destruction of the family, and there are some conservative social critics who believe that traditional roles for women are necessary in order to maintain social stability. Traditional mainstream feminism, however, is concerned with equality in all aspects of life such as equal pay for equal work; affordable, safe, competent day care; elimination of sexual harassment; tougher rape laws; tougher child abuse laws; tougher domestic violence laws; medical coverage for families; the family leave act; abortion rights; single parent adoption; and increased funding for shelters, among other things. However, when most people think of feminism today, they tend to think of the kind of radical lesbian feminism propounded by activist-writers such as Mary Daly (1928-2010) who taught Feminist Ethics at conservative, Roman Catholic Boston College from 1966 until 2001 when she resigned her tenured professorship rather than allow men into her classes.
One of Daly’s most well known book is Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism. In this 1978 volume, Daly discusses in detail the sexism that has caused women to be second-class citizens or even non-citizens in many parts of the world today (women in Kuwait, in 2010, many years after the Gulf War of the early 1990s, are still not allowed to vote). The Table of Contents of Daly’s book is a striking example of historical sexism around the world. Topics such as Indian sutee or the immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their dead husbands; Chinese footbinding which actually broke the bones and rotted the flesh of little girls for hundreds of years; and the European witch burnings of the 15th through 17th centuries which resulted in the deaths of between two and nine million people, mostly women, are all egregious examples of the consequences of patriarchal sexism. Radical feminists believe that traditional gender roles do not address the needs of society.
Gender
Gender refers to a cultural understanding of what constitutes masculinity and femininity in any society. Gender roles are the social and cultural expectations that are associated with a person’s sex and are learned during the socialization process. Gender is social differentiation based on sex. Masculinity, as a gender differentiation, refers to attributes traditionally considered appropriate for males such as aggression, athleticism, high levels of physical activity, logical thinking, dominance in interpersonal relationships; whereas femininity as a gender differentiation, refers to attributes traditionally associated with behavior appropriate for females such as passivity, docility, fragility, emotionality, and subordination in interpersonal relationships. Although many consider gender to be biological, it is not. Gender traits are socially determined, they are not innate. Margaret Mead’s classic studies of sexual practices and gender roles among various ethnic groups in New Guinea demonstrated that among the Arapesh both sexes display what Americans would think of as feminine characteristics; among the Mundugumor both sexes display what Americans would think of as masculine characteristics, and among the Tchambuli Mead documented women engaging in gender roles that most Americans would consider masculine, while men engaged in gender roles that most Americans would consider feminine. As with racial and ethnic stereotypes there are also gender stereotypes: men are instrumental or goal oriented while women are expressive or emotional.
Consider the following story. One night a man and his young son are driving in the car in a terrible rainstorm. It is extremely dark; the father cannot see well enough to drive the car because the rainstorm is so severe. Suddenly, the car stalls on a railroad track just as a freight train is coming. The freight train hits the car and instantly kills the father. The little boy is thrown from the car. The train engineer radios for Life-Flight who transports the child to the nearest trauma center. At the hospital, the little boy is rushed immediately into emergency surgery. The surgeon enters the operating room, looks at the child and says, “I can’t possibly operate on that child, that child is my son.” What, if anything, is wrong with this story? Why? What was your first reaction? Why?
Until they are about 4 or 5, small children believe that they can be a boy one day and a girl the next day. By the time they are 5 or 6, however, children understand and accept their gender identity, which means acknowledging one’s sex and internalizing the norms, values, and behaviors of the accompanying gender expectations. Charles Horton Cooley’s Looking-Glass Self theory explains to us that our recognition of societally acceptable gender role behavior is an important aspect of socialization. In Western industrial societies, both males and females tend not to exhibit traditional gender role behavior but rather express androgynous characteristics—androgyny is a blending of both masculine and feminine attributes based on emotions and behaviors.
Look at the example above. There is nothing wrong with the scenario as stated—what many of us fail to recognize is that the surgeon is the child’s mother. A small but telling indication of sexism in our society.
Sexual Orientation
Sexual orientation refers to who one desires or is attracted to as a sex partner. Heterosexuality, an ascribed status, is attraction to partners of the opposite sex and is encouraged by most, but not all, societies in order to insure procreation.17 Homosexuality, an ascribed status, is attraction to partners of the same sex: the word “gay” traditionally refers to homosexual males, and the term “lesbian” traditionally refers to homosexual females. For our purposes, when referring to both sexes we will use the term homosexual, when referring to homosexual males we will use the term gay, and when referring to homosexual females we will use the term lesbian. Although there are many socio-religious, and sociocultural ideas and ideologies concerning homosexuality, consider the following information: about 10% of the population OF THE WORLD is gay; children raised by gay or lesbian parents are no more or less likely than children raised by straight parents to become gay or lesbian; all of our studies show that children raised by gay or lesbian parents are as psychologically normal as children raised by straight parents; studies indicate that there is NO CHOICE—some people are born homosexual just as others are born heterosexual; animals, as well as humans, engage in homosexual activity; homosexuals are less likely than the straight population to be child molesters (over 98% of all child molesters are straight because child sexual molestation is about age fetishes and uncontrolled age-inappropriate sexual desires); gay teenagers are 5 times more likely to commit suicide than straight teenagers.
Could you change your sexual orientation? If you are heterosexual, how did you “get that way”? What caused you to become straight? How many sexes are there? What is the scientific basis for your answer?
Homophobia
Some of our religious and cultural attitudes are so homophobic—homophobia is hatred and discrimination directed against homosexuals, based on an exaggerated fear of homosexuality—that they cause gay bashing and murders such as the 1998 murder of gay college student Matthew Shephard who was virtually crucified on a barbed-wire fence. The Reverend Pat Robertson of the Christian Coalition urged people to call on their Congress members to vote against the Hate Crimes Bill which was finally passed in 2009. Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority, as well as the Christian Coalition, and the Southern Baptist Convention instituted a boycott of Disney because Disney provides healthcare, insurance, and retirement benefits to domestic partners. Beginning in 2005, a fanatical, fundamentalist, religious, so-called Christian group out of Kansas called the Westboro Baptist Church has been harassing the funerals of Iraqi war dead saying that the soldier/sailor/marine died because “God hates fags,” and the Iraq war and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are ways in which God is punishing the United States because of our acceptance of homosexuality.
Gender Roles
Although America is not as seriously sexist as many countries in the world, there are still certain expectations concerning sex-appropriate behavior. Some argue that gender roles are based on tradition and that the divisions of labor between male and female marriage partners are necessary because dividing household tasks into women’s work and men’s work is functional for society. Others argue that traditional gender roles prevent women from competing economically with men because men attempt to maintain their sociocultural and socioeconomic power. And some believe gender roles begin in the family setting where children, through the socialization process, learn what roles are appropriate for girls and boys.
The Second Shift
Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung, in their 1989 book The Second Shift wrote: women [working outside the home] averaged three hours a day on housework while men averaged 17 minutes; women spent fifty minutes a day of time exclusively with their children; men spent twelve minutes. On the other side of the coin, fathers who work outside the home watched television an hour longer than their wives, and slept a half hour longer each night.18
In other words, women who work outside the home have two jobs; an eight-hour shift at their place of employment and then another –6-hour shift at home, and this has not changed since the book was written!
Rosie the Riveter
For the United States of America, World War II began on December 7, 1941, which was a Sunday. By 8:00am the next day, tens of thousands of men and boys were lined up at their draft boards to enlist and fight the enemy. As the number of men entering the military grew, the number of industrial and factory workers was rapidly depleted. At a time when very high levels of industrial production were required, there was a dearth of men to fill those crucial jobs. The answer to the dwindling industrial workforce was to hire women to do men’s jobs. Tens of thousands of women heeded America’s call, took off their skirts and aprons, put on blue jeans and work shirts and went to work building ships, planes, jeeps, tanks, weapons, and a variety of other industrial products needed by the war effort and by the civilian population. The name given these women was “Rosie the Riveter.” Rosie the Riveter became the symbol of women working in jobs that had traditionally gone to men, but in 1945, when the war ended, the Rosies laid down their rivet guns and welding torches, replaced their blue jeans with skirts and aprons and went home to welcome their men and have babies. By the mid-1960s, these women were beginning to get restless. The most recent modern women’s movement, which largely coincided with the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, had begun and women began to enroll in college, and to enter the workplace in unprecedented numbers. Although these women led the way for all the rest of us, their struggle is not complete. Earnings for the same work or level of work still differ for men and women.
Discrepancies in Earnings
Minorities, which for the purpose of this discussion, includes white women and all people of color, earn significantly less for the same work than white men. White women earn about 76 cents for every dollar earned by a white man. Hispanic women, who are the lowest paid of any minority group, earn about 57 cents for every dollar earned by a white man. When adjusting for educational attainment and professional job categories the percentage of difference between the earnings of minorities and white men shrinks but the differences still remain. (For more information about this topic, please visit the following website: Table 633. Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers—Number and Earnings: 2000 to2008 in the Statistical Abstract of the United States)
According to Rosabeth Moss Kanter, separate career ladders for minorities and men create glass walls; while the glass ceiling is created largely due to homosocial reproduction. Minorities (white women and people of color) are severely underrepresented in upper-level corporate positions and the glass-ceiling blocks minorities from being able to climb the corporate ladder to the top—one can see through it, but can’t get through it. Rosabeth Moss Kanter in her classic study of women’s work and men’s work in one large multinational corporation, Men and Women of the Corporation coined the term homosocial reproduction which means that, since most management level personnel are white and male and since most people want to be around people who are similar to themselves, white males are hired and promoted in greater numbers than white women or people of color. Some of the consequences of sexism, therefore, are economic. But Mary Daly writes of one of the most egregious consequences of sexism.
Female Genital Mutilation
Between two and five million girls in parts of Africa and Southeast Asia are subjected annually to a pre-pubescent rite of passage called female circumcision or, more properly called by the World Health Organization female genital mutilation or FGM. There are various forms of this “procedure” as Daly writes.
1) Sunna Circumcision: removal of the prepuce and /or tip of the clitoris.
2) Excision or Clitoridectomy: excision of the entire clitoris with the labia minora and some or most of the external genitalia.
3) Excision and Infibulation: This means excision of the entire clitoris, labia minora and parts of the labia majora. The two sides of the vulva are then fastened together in some way either by thorns . . . [sic] or sewing with catgut, Alternatively the vulva are scraped raw and the child’s limbs are tied together for several weeks until the wound heals (or she dies). The purpose is to close the vaginal orifice. Only a small opening is left (usually by inserting a slither [sic] of wood) so the urine or later menstrual blood can be passed.
It should not be imagined that the horror of the life of an infibulated child/woman ends with this operation. Her legs are tied together, immobilizing her for weeks, during which time excrement remains within the bandage. Sometimes accidents occur during the operation: the bladder may be pierced or the rectum cut open. Sometimes in a spasm of agony the child bites off her tongue. [This “operation” usually occurs in the child’s home, without anesthetic or sterile instruments—sometimes kitchen knives or pieces of broken glass are used are used by the child’s female relatives who perform this torture.] Infections are, needless to say, common. . . . What is certain is that the infibulated girl is mutilated and that she can look forward to a life of repeated encounters with “the little knife”—the instrument of her perpetual torture. For women who are infibulated have to be cut open—either by the husband or by another woman—to permit intercourse. They have to be cut open further for delivery of a child. Often they are sewn up again after delivery, depending upon the decision of the husband. The cutting (defibulation) and re-sewing goes on throughout a woman’s living death of reproductive “life.” Immediate medical results of excision and infibulation include ‘hemorrhage, infections, shock, retention of urine, damage to adjacent tissues, dermoid cysts, abscesses, keloid scarring, coital difficulties [!!!], and infertility cause by chronic pelvic infections. 19
For more information about Female Genital Mutilation see the following websites:
Female genital mutilation; Female Genital Cutting Education and Networking Project; Female Genital Mutilation: A Fact Sheet from Amnesty International; Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting from Unicef; Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) Debates about FGM in Africa, the Middle East & Far East from Religious Tolerance.org.
Footnotes
• 1 http://pewsocialtrends.org/pubs/750/...cs-of-marriage
• 2 Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books, 1977. p. 19.
• 3 Ibid. pp. 19-25.
• 4 Ibid. p. 25.
• 5 Ibid. p. 26.
• 6 Ibid. p. 41.
• 7 Ibid. p. 48.
• 8 Ibid. p. 48.
• 9 Ibid. p. 52.
• 10 Ibid. p. 65.
• 11 Ibid. p. 66.
• 12 Ibid. p. 68.
• 13 Ibid. p. 86; italics in original.
• 14 Ibid. p. 103.
• 15 Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books, 1977; Weber, Max. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Trans., Eds., and Intro. Hans. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mill. New York: Oxford UP, 1946; Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Ed. and trans. Talcott Parsons, Intro. Anthony Giddens. New York: Scribner's, 1958.
• 16 Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. Herland, The Yellow Wall-Paper, and Selected Writings. Penguin: New York. 1999. p. 320.
• 17 In Melanesia, there are male rite-of-passage rituals in which homosexual behavior is normative. Among the Etoro of New Guinea, homosexual activity is part of the belief system, and heterosexual activity is engaged in sparingly and only for procreation. Bisexuality is sexual attraction to people of both sexes and is normative in parts of Mombassa, Kenya where the activity is based on extreme social differentiation between males and females.
• 18 Hochschild, Arlie Russell, and Anne Machung. The Second Shift. Avon: New York. 1989. p. 3.
• 19 Daly, Mary. Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism. Beacon: Boston. 1990. pp. 156-157. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/04%3A_Sex_Gender_and_Sexual_Orientation/4.01%3A_Sex_Gender_and_Sexual_Orientation.txt |
Suggested Course Objectives for Part III—Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss sex, gender, human sexuality, and sexual orientation from a sociologically scientific perspective.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss sex, gender, human sexuality, and sexual orientation and be able to differentiate among them.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss the various aspects of sex, gender, human sexuality, and sexual orientation.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss prejudice and discrimination based on sex, gender, and sexual orientation and the various forms they take.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss theories of sex, gender, and human sexuality, and the ongoing national debate concerning gay marriage.
• Explain the impact of politics, the political process, as well as economic and social policies on the lives of people in the US based on their sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
• Identify the levels into which the US is stratified based on sex, gender, and sexual orientation and how sex, gender, and sexual orientation (GLBT—gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered) impact peoples’ life chances.
• Straight Males
• Straight Females
• Gay (Males)
• Lesbian (Females)
• Bisexual
• Transgendered (Male to Female)
• Transgendered (Female to Male)
• Intersexed
• Identify and differentiate among various theories of sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
• Feminist Theory
• Queer Theory
• Know and analyze the various aspects of master status and the general impact of master status on the life chances of women and GLBTs in the US.
• The glass ceiling.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical information concerning stratification/inequality by sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
• Find and interpret demographic data about women and GLBTs from the US Census and other valid and reliable sources.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical and historical information concerning sex, gender, and sexual orientation in the past and present in the US.
• Understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss popular media’s interpretation of stratification/inequality by sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss legal policies concerning sex, gender, and sexual orientation in the US.
• Find, read, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss sex, gender, and sexual orientation studies found in peer reviewed scientific journal articles.
4.03: Study Guide for Part III
Study Guide for Part III
• Identify and differentiate among sex, gender, and sexual orientation
• Sex
• Males
• Females
• Gender
• Roles
• Sex-appropriate behavior
• The Looking Glass Self
• The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
• Sexual Orientation-GLBT
• Straight Males
• Straight Females
• Gay (Males)
• Lesbian (Females)
• Bisexual
• Transgendered (Male to Female)
• Transgendered (Female to Male)
• Intersexed
• Use the Internet to display statistical information and historical legal status concerning sex, gender, and sexual orientation
• Compare and contrast the data found
• Discuss the GLBT movement
• Historically
• Presently
• GLBT Historical Society
• GLBT National Help Center
• The Civil Rights Coalition for the 21st Century
• LGBT Research Guide
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning the historical legal status of women in the United States
• Human Rights Watch: Women’s Rights (Global)
• Global Issues: Women’s Rights
• One Hundred Years toward Suffrage (A Timeline)
• Amnesty International: Women’s Human Rights
• Define and give examples for:
• Gender identity
• Sex roles
• Masculinity
• Femininity
• Discuss the various forms that inequality based on sex takes around the world
• Discuss the status of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
• Discuss the status of women in Japan
• Discuss the differences among religious strictures, legal doctrine, and cultural practices concerning women in various societies
• Discuss the various forms that inequality based sexual orientation takes around the world
• Discuss the differences among religious strictures, legal doctrine, and cultural practices concerning sexual orientation in various societies
• Discuss female genital mutilation
• WHO: Female Genital Mutilation
• Controversial Religious Topics: Female Genital Mutilation
• CIRP: Female Genital Mutilation (contains links)
• UNICEF: Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting
• Discuss the status of women in Third World countries
• WHO: Women’s Health
• United Nations: Women Watch
• United Nations Development Fund for Women
• United Nations: “World’s Women 2005: Progress in Statistics”
• Discuss rape as an act of war
• Rape of Women during Wartime
• Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity
• BBC: “Rape in War a Growing Problem”
• BBC: “How Did Rape become a Weapon of War?”
• Amnesty International: Sudan: Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Consequences
• CBS News: 60 Minutes: War against Women: The Use of Rape as a Weapon in Congo’s Civil War
• WILPF: War and Rape: Analytical Approaches
• Discuss the women’s movement
• Historically
• One Hundred Years toward Suffrage (A Timeline)
• Presently
• Women’s International Center
• Feminist Resources.com
• Feminist Majority Foundation
• National Organization for Women
• Association for Women’s Rights in Development | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/04%3A_Sex_Gender_and_Sexual_Orientation/4.02%3A_Course_Objectives_for_Part_III.txt |
Suggested Key Terms and Concepts for Part III—Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
“She Walketh Veiled and Sleeping”
Androgyny
Ascribed status
Biological differences
Bisexuality
Charlotte Perkins Gilman
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s
Conflict Perspective
Female genital mutilation (FGM)
Femininity
Feminism
Feminist Theory
FGM
Functionalism
Gay
Gender
Gender identity
Gender roles
Glass walls
Glass-ceiling
GLBT
Heterosexuality
Hochschild and Anne Machung
Homophobia
Homosexuality
Homosocial reproduction
Intersexed
Lesbian
Looking-Glass Self
Mainstream feminism
Margaret Mead
Mary Daly
Masculinity
Minorities
Modern feminism
Queer Theory
Radical lesbian feminism
Rosabeth Moss Kanter
Rosie the Riveter
Sex
Sex-appropriate behavior
Sexism
Social expectations
Stereotypes
Symbolic Interactionism
The Second Shift
Transgendered
Women’s Movement
4.05: Lecture Outline for Part III
Suggested Lecture Material for Part III—Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
• Identify and differentiate among sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
• Sex
• Males
• Females
• Gender
• Roles
• Sex-appropriate behavior
• The Looking Glass Self
• The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
• Sexual Orientation-GLBT
• Straight Males
• Straight Females
• Gay (Males)
• Lesbian (Females)
• Bisexual
• Transgendered (Male to Female)
• Transgendered (Female to Male)
• Intersexed
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning sex, gender, and sexual orientation..
• Compare and contrast the data found.
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning the historical legal status of women in the United States.
• Use the Internet to display statistical information concerning the historical legal status of GLBTs in the United States.
• Define and give examples for:
• Gender identity
• Sex roles
• Masculinity
• Femininity
• Discuss the various forms that inequality based on sex takes around the world.
• Discuss the status of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
• Discuss the status of women in Japan.
• Discuss the differences among religious strictures, legal doctrine, and cultural practices concerning women in various societies.
• Discuss the various forms that inequality based sexual orientation takes around the world.
• Discuss the differences among religious strictures, legal doctrine, and cultural practices concerning sexual orientation in various societies.
• Discuss female genital mutilation.
• Discuss the status of women in Third World countries.
• Discuss the rape as an act of war.
• Discuss the women’s movement
• Historically
• Presently
• Discuss the GLBT movement
• Historically
• Presently
4.06: Assignments for Part III
Suggested Assignments for Part III—Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
Essay: Discuss the differences and similarities in the findings of peer reviewed articles and popular media articles concerning sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
Essay: Discuss the history of the GLBT movement in the US.
Essay: Discuss the history of the GLBT movement in the world.
Essay: Discuss the history of the women’s movement in the US.
Essay: Discuss the history of the women’s movement in the world.
Essay: Identify and discuss the disparities in earnings based on sex.
Essay: Identify the countries that permit gay and discuss their legal process.
Find on the Internet: Information about female genital mutilation.
Find on the Internet: Information about rape as an act of war.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about sex, gender, sexual orientation, and the law.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about the GLBT movement in the US.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about the GLBT movement in the world.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about the women’s movement in the US.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about the women’s movement in the world.
Find on the Internet: US Census Bureau data about housing, health care, home ownership, business ownership, educational attainment, and labor force participation of women in the US.
In-Class Discussion: Do we need to “defend marriage” in the United States?
In-Class Discussion: How do we account for the disparities in earnings between men and women?
In-Class Discussion: How do we account for the sex differences in housing, health care, home ownership, business ownership, educational attainment, labor force participation of men and women in the US?
In-Class Discussion: In 2007, the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said that there are no homosexuals in Iran. Why would he say this?
In-Class Discussion: Is sexual orientation a choice?
In-Class Discussion: Should the United States allow gay marriage?
In-Class Discussion: What is marriage from a cross-cultural and historical perspective?
In-Class Discussion: Why are women in some Muslim countries treated like possessions, or like non-persons?
In-Class Discussion: Why do we use the word “gender” when we really mean “sex”?
In-Class Discussion: Why is rape considered an act of war in some countries?
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Families Like Mine: Children of Gay Parents Tell It Like It Is by Abigail Garner
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Gyn-Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism by Mary Daly.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Herland by Charlotte Perkins Gilman.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Love Makes a Family: Portraits of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Parents and Their Families by Peggy Gillespie, Kath Weston, Gigi Kaeser, and April Martin
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Men and Women of the Corporation by Rosabeth Moss Kanter.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: The Second Shift by Arlie Hochschild and Ann Machung.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Women and Economics by Charlotte Perkins Gilman.
Oral Film Review and Discussion: A Doll’s House.
Oral Film Review and Discussion: Torch Song Trilogy.
Present to the Class: A timeline of historical discrimination against women in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: A timeline of historical discrimination against GLBTs in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: A timeline of overcoming discrimination against women in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: A timeline of overcoming discrimination against GLBTs in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: Statistical data about sexual orientation in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: Statistical data about the earning disparities between men and women in the form of a chart.
Read: Families Like Mine: Children of Gay Parents Tell It Like It Is by Abigail Garner
Read: Gyn-Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism by Mary Daly.
Read: Herland by Charlotte Perkins Gilman.
Read: Love Makes a Family: Portraits of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Parents and Their Families by Peggy Gillespie, Kath Weston, Gigi Kaeser, and April Martin
Read: Men and Women of the Corporation by Rosabeth Moss Kanter.
Read: The Defense of Marriage Act.
Read: The Second Shift by Arlie Hochschild and Ann Machung.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles each about sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles each about the GLBT movement.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles each about women and the women’s movement.
Read: Three to five popular media articles each about sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
Read: Three to five popular media articles each about the GLBT movement.
Read: Three to five popular media articles each about women and the women’s movement.
Read: United Nations and WHO information about female genital mutilation.
Read: Women and Economics by Charlotte Perkins Gilman.
Watch: A Doll’s House. Film, directed by Patrick Garland. Elkins Productions International Corporation, 1973. 105 minutes.
Watch: Torch Song Trilogy. Film, directed by Paul Bogart. New Line Cinema, 1988. 120 minutes.
Quizzes: Definitions, Matching, Multiple Choice, True/False, Short Answer, Brief Essay | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/04%3A_Sex_Gender_and_Sexual_Orientation/4.04%3A_Key_Terms_and_Concepts_for_Part_III.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Reading List for Part III—Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
An Obstacle. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Nursing, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Jan., 1929), p. 59.
At What Cost a Room of Her Own? Factors Contributing to the Feminization of Poverty Among Prime-Age Women, 1939-1959. Linda Barrington; Cecilia A. Conrad. The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 54, No. 2, Papers Presented at the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association. (Jun., 1994), pp. 342-357.
Black Americans and the Feminization of Poverty: The Intervening Effects of Unemployment. Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Jun., 1987), pp. 402-417.
Black Women in Poverty: Some Comments on Female-Headed Families. Rose M. Brewer. Signs, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Winter, 1988), pp. 331-339.
Black Women on AFDC and the Struggle for Higher Education. George Junne. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Women and Worth. (1988), pp. 39-44.
Child Support Awards: Differentials and Trends by Race and Marital Status. Andrea H. Beller; John W. Graham. Demography, Vol. 23, No. 2. (May, 1986), pp. 231-245.
Child Support Payments: Evidence from Repeated Cross Sections. Andrea H. Beller; John W. Graham. The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1988), pp. 81-85.
Cleaning Up/Kept down: A Historical Perspective on Racial Inequality in “Women’s Work.” Evelyn Nakano Glenn. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 6. (Jul., 1991), pp. 1333-1356.
Economic and Labor Market Trends. Demetra Smith Nightingale; Michael Fix. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp.48-59.
Estimating Earnings Poverty in 1939: A Comparison of Orshansky-Method and Price-Indexed Definitions of Poverty. Linda Barrington. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 79, No. 3. (Aug., 1997), pp. 406-414.
Family, Race, and Poverty in the Eighties. Maxine Baca Zinn. Signs, Vol. 14, No. 4, Common Grounds and Crossroads: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in Women’s
Female Headship, Feminization of Poverty and Welfare. Mwangi S. Kimenyi; John Mukum Mbaku. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 62, No. 1. (Jul., 1995), pp. 44-52.
Feminist Political Discourses: Radical versus Liberal Approaches to the Feminization of Poverty and Comparable Worth. Johanna Brenner. Gender and Society, Vol. 1, No. 4. (Dec., 1987), pp. 447-465.
Feminization and Juvenilization of Poverty: Trends, Relative Risks, Causes, and Consequences. Suzanne M. Bianchi. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 25. (1999), pp. 307-333.
Gender Differentials in Poverty-Mortality Well-Being. Arthur Sakamoto. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Winter, 1990), pp. 429-445.
Gender in the Welfare State. Ann Orloff. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 22. (1996), pp. 51-78.
Getting into Poverty Without a Husband, and Getting Out, With or Without. Thomas J. Kniesner; Marjorie B. McElroy; Steven P. Wilcox. The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1988), pp. 86-90.
How Home Conditions React Upon the Family. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 5. (Mar., 1909), pp. 592-605.
In Search of a New Economic Order: Women’s Agenda for the Next Millennium. Barbara Hopkins. Feminist Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 529-536.
Lives. (Summer, 1989), pp. 856-874.
Poverty Among Women and Children: What Accounts for the Change? Laurie J. Bassi. The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1988), pp. 91-95.
Putting Women and Children First; Priorities for the Future of America. Ruth Sidel. Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 12, No. 1. (Spring, 1991), pp. 37-49.
Racial Disparities in Income Security for a Cohort of Aging American Women. Andrea E. Willson; Melissa A. Hardy. Social Forces, Vol. 80, No. 4. (Jun., 2002), pp. 1283-1306.
Racial Equality in the United States: From Institutionalized Racism to “Respectable” Racism. Monte Piliawsky. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 45, No. 2. (2nd Qtr., 1984), pp. 135-143.
Restructured Regions and Families: The Feminization of Poverty in the U.S. John Paul Jones III; Janet E. Kodras. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 80, No. 2. (Jun., 1990), pp. 163-183.
Sex Differences in Poverty, 1950-1980. Sara S. Mc Lanahan; Annemette Sørensen; Dorothy Watson. Signs, Vol. 15, No. 1. (Autumn, 1989), pp. 102-122.
The Changing Nature of Poverty. Martha S. Hill. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 479, The Welfare State in America: Trends and Prospects. (May, 1985), pp. 31-47.
The Construction of Poverty and Homelessness in US Cities. I. Susser. Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 25. (1996), pp. 411-435.
The Effectiveness of Child-Care Subsidies in Encouraging the Welfare-to-Work Transition of Low-Income Single Mothers. Jean Kimmel. The American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundredth and Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association Washington, DC, January 6-8, 1995. (May, 1995), pp. 271-275.
The Feminization of Poverty: Claims, Facts, and Data Needs. Alain Marcoux. Population and Development Review, Vol. 24, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp. 131-139.
The Gender Gap in Poverty in Modern Nations: Single Motherhood, the Market, and the State. Karen Christopher; Paula England; Timothy M. Smeeding; Katherin Ross Phillips. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 45, No. 3. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 219-242.
The Housekeeper and the Food Problem (in Food Utilization and Conservation; Food Conservation and Utilization). Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 74, The World’s Food. (Nov., 1917), pp. 123-130.
The Impact of Income Issues and Social Status on Post-Divorce Adjustment of Custodial Parents. Marjorie A. Pett; Beth Vaughan-Cole. Family Relations, Vol. 35, No. 1, The Single Parent Family. (Jan., 1986), pp. 103-111.
The Larger Aspects of the Woman’s Movement. Jane Addams. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 56, Women in Public Life. (Nov., 1914), pp. 1-8.
The Nairobi Conference: The Powerless Majority. Margaret E. Galey. PS, Vol. 19, No. 2. (Spring, 1986), pp. 255-265.
The Precarious Survival and Hard-Won Satisfactions of White Single-Parent Families. Leslie N. Richards. Family Relations, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Oct., 1989), pp. 396-403.
Time on Welfare: Why Do People Enter and Leave the System? Peter J. Leahy; Terry F. Buss; James M. Quane. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 54, No. 1. (Jan., 1995), pp. 33-46.
Trends in Women’s Economic Status. Paula England; Irene Browne. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 35, No. 1, Women in the Workplace: Toward True Integration. (Spring, 1992), pp. 17-51.
Wealth Inequality in the United States. Lisa A. Keister; Stephanie Moller. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26. (2000), pp. 63-81.
Welfare Reform: Revolution or Retrenchment? Samuel H. Beer. Publius, Vol. 28, No. 3, Welfare Reform in the United States: A Race to the Bottom?. (Summer, 1998), pp. 9-15.
Women and Children Last: The Poverty and Marginalization of One-Parent Families. Hilary P. M. Winchester. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 15, No. 1. (1990), pp. 70-86.
Women and the Economics of Divorce in the Contemporary United States. Terry J. Arendell. Signs, Vol. 13, No. 1, Women and the Political Process in the United States. (Autumn, 1987), pp. 121-135.
Women in Poverty: A New Global Underclass. Mayra Buvini. Foreign Policy, No. 108. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 38-53.
Women in the Labor Market and in the Family. James P. Smith; Michael Ward. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 1. (Winter, 1989), pp. 9-23.
Women. Sarah J. Stage. American Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1/2, Special Issue: Contemporary America. (Spring - Summer, 1983), pp. 169-190.
Women’s Poverty and Women’s Citizenship: Some Political Consequences of Economic Marginality. Barbara J. Nelson. Signs, Vol. 10, No. 2, Women and Poverty. (Winter, 1984), pp. 209-231.
Work, Welfare, and Poverty among Black Female-Headed Families. John Paul Jones, III. Economic Geography, Vol. 63, No. 1. (Jan., 1987), pp. 20-34.
Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
Contradictions and Coherence in Feminist Responses to Law. Emily Jackson. Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Winter, 1993), pp. 398-411.
Ethics in the Women’s Movement. Jean Bethke Elshtain. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 515, American Feminism: New Issues for a Mature Movement. (May, 1991), pp. 126-139.
Feminism in Psychology: Revolution or Evolution? Judith Worell. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 571, Feminist Views of the Social Sciences. (Sep., 2000), pp. 183-196.
How Media Frames Move Public Opinion: An Analysis of the Women’s Movement. Nayda Terkildsen; Frauke Schnell. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 879-900.
A Historical Perspective on Gender. Elizabeth A. St. Pierre. The English Journal, Vol. 88, No. 3, Genderizing the Curriculum. (Jan., 1999), pp. 29-34.
A Vindication of the Rights of Women. Mary Woolstonecraft: Modern History Sourcebook: Wollstonecraft, Vindication. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/mw-vind.html. Retrieved (1 of 151) 10/9/2007 2:20:24 PM
Beyond the Difference versus Equality Policy Debate: Postsuffrage Feminism, Citizenship, and the Quest for a Feminist Welfare State. Wendy Sarvasy. Signs, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Winter, 1992), pp. 329-362.
Black Women, Sexism and Racism: Black or Antiracist Feminism? Gemma Tang Nain. Feminist Review, No. 37. (Spring, 1991), pp. 1-22.
Does the Sex of Your Children Matter? Support for Feminism among Women and Men in the United States and Canada. Rebecca L. Warner. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1051-1056.
Feminism 2000: One Step beyond? Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Feminist Review, No. 64, Feminism 2000: One Step beyond?. (Spring, 2000), pp. 113-116.
Feminism and Liberalism Reconsidered: The Case of Catharine MacKinnon. Denise Schaeffer. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 699-708.
Feminism and Motherhood: An American Reading. Ann Snitow. Feminist Review, No. 40. (Spring, 1992), pp. 32-51.
Feminism and the Gender Gap—A Second Look. Elizabeth Adell Cook; Clyde Wilcox. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1111-1122.
Feminism versus Multiculturalism. Leti Volpp. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 5. (Jun., 2001), pp. 1181-1218.
Feminist Fairy Tales for Black and American Indian Girls: A Working-Class Vision. France Winddance Twine. Signs, Vol. 25, No. 4, Feminisms at a Millennium. (Summer, 2000), pp. 1227-1230.
Feminists or “Postfeminists”?: Young Women’s Attitudes toward Feminism and Gender Relations. Pamela Aronson. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 6. (Dec., 2003), pp. 903-922.
Forging Feminist Identity in an International Movement: A Collective Identity Approach to Twentieth-Century Feminism. Leila J. Rupp; Verta Taylor. Signs, Vol. 24, No. 2. (Winter, 1999), pp. 363-386.
Form Follows Function: The Evolution of Feminist Strategies. Janet K. Boles. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 515, American Feminism: New Issues for a Mature Movement. (May, 1991), pp. 38-49.
Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism in Comparative Perspective. Bernadette C. Hayes; Ian McAllister; Donley T. Studlar. International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 21, No. 4, Women, Citizenship, and Representation. Femmes, citoyenneté et représentation#. (Oct., 2000), pp. 425-439.
Gender, Social Reproduction, and Women’s Self-Organization: Considering the U.S. Welfare State. Johanna Brenner; Barbara Laslett. Gender and Society, Vol. 5, No. 3, Special Issue: Marxist Feminist Theory. (Sep., 1991), pp. 311-333.
Has Feminism Changed Science? Londa Schiebinger. Signs, Vol. 25, No. 4, Feminisms at a Millennium. (Summer, 2000), pp. 1171-1175.
“I Am Not a Feminist, but...” College Women, Feminism, and Negative Experiences. Joan K. Buschman; Silvo Lenart. Political Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Mar., 1996), pp. 59-75.
Identity Politics and the Hierarchy of Oppression: A Comment. Linda Briskin. Feminist Review, No. 35. (Summer, 1990), pp. 102-108.
International Feminism of the Future. Tani Barlow. Signs, Vol. 25, No. 4, Feminisms at a Millennium. (Summer, 2000), pp. 1099-1105.
Men and Women Really Do Think Differently | LiveScience. http://www.livescience.com/health/05...brain_sex.html. Retrieved (1 of 4) 6/27/2007 11:24:32 AM
National Organization for Women Website. http://www.now.org/.
Queer Black Feminism: The Pleasure Principle. Laura Alexandra Harris. Feminist Review, No. 54, Contesting Feminine Orthodoxies. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 3-30.
Race, Gender Role Attitudes and Support for Feminism. Clyde Wilcox. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1. (Mar., 1990), pp. 113-121.
Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law. Joanne Conaghan. Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Sep., 2000), pp. 351-385.
The Attitudinal Structure of African American Women Party Activists: The Impact of Race, Gender, and Religion. Rosalee A. Clawson; John A. Clark. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2. (Jun., 2003), pp. 211-221.
The Coming of Age of Feminist Sociology: Some Issues of Practice and Theory for the Next Twenty Years. Sasha Roseneil. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 2. (Jun., 1995), pp. 191-205.
Natural Governance and the Governance of Nature: The Hazards of Natural Law Feminism. Lealle Ruhl. Feminist Review, No. 66, Political Currents. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 4-24.
The Historical Evolution of Black Feminist Theory and Praxis. Ula Taylor. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2. (Nov., 1998), pp. 234-253.
Feminism and Students of the ‘80s and ‘90s: The Lady and the Raging Bitch; Or, How Feminism Got a Bad Name. Jackie Brookner. Art Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, Feminist Art Criticism. (Summer, 1991), pp. 11-13.
The Myth of Postfeminism. Elaine J. Hall; Marnie Salupo Rodriguez. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 6. (Dec., 2003), pp. 878-902.
The Rights of Man and Woman in Post-Revolutionary America. Rosemarie Zagarri. The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 55, No. 2. (Apr., 1998), pp. 203-230.
The Structure of Men’s and Women’s Feminist Orientations: Feminist Identity and Feminist Opinion. Laurie A. Rhodebeck. Gender and Society, Vol. 10, No. 4. (Aug., 1996), pp. 386-403.
Third Wave Black Feminism? Kimberly Springer. Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Summer, 2002), pp. 1059-1082.
Response from a “Second Waver” to Kimberly Springer’s “Third Wave Black. Feminism?” Beverly Guy-Sheftall. Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Summer, 2002), pp. 1091-1094.
What’s Love Got to Do with It? White Women, Black Women, and Feminism in the Movement Years. Wini Breines. Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Summer, 2002), pp. 1095-1133.
Who Are Feminists and What Do They Believe? The Role of Generations. Jason Schnittker; Jeremy Freese; Brian Powell. American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, No. 4. (Aug., 2003), pp. 607-622.
Women, Differences, and Rights as Practices: An Interpretive Essay and a Proposal. Adelaide H. Villmoare. Law & Society Review, Vol. 25, No. 2, Special Issue on Gender and Sociolegal Studies. (1991), pp. 385-410.
Women’s Culture and Lesbian Feminist Activism: A Reconsideration of Cultural Feminism. Verta Taylor; Leila J. Rupp. Signs, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Autumn, 1993), pp. 32-61.
Women’s International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward. Rebecca J. Cook. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2. (May, 1993), pp. 230-261.
Women’s Movements and Nonviolence. Anne N. Costain. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 33, No. 2. (Jun., 2000), pp. 175-180.
Women’s Movements around the World: Cross-Cultural Comparisons. Diane Rothbard Margolis. Gender and Society, Vol. 7, No. 3. (Sep., 1993), pp. 379-399.
Women’s Publics and the Search for New Democracies. Zillah Eisenstein. Feminist Review, No. 57, Citizenship: Pushing the Boundaries. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 140-167.
Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights. Charlotte Bunch. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Nov., 1990), pp. 486-498.
An Ethos of Lesbian and Gay Existence. Mark Blasius. Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Nov., 1992), pp. 642-671.
Birth Order and Sexual Orientation in a National Probability Sample. Anthony F. Bogaert. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Nov., 2000), pp. 361-368.
Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents. Charlotte J. Patterson. Child Development, Vol. 63, No. 5. (Oct., 1992), pp. 1025-1042.
“Coming out” in the Age of Social Constructionism: Sexual Identity Formation among Lesbian and Bisexual Women. Paula C. Rust. Gender and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Mar., 1993), pp. 50-77.
Constructing Lesbian and Gay Rights and Liberation. Morris B. Kaplan. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 7, Symposium on Sexual Orientation and the Law. (Oct., 1993), pp. 1877-1902.
Denaturalizing and Desexualizing Lesbian and Gay Identity. Cheshire Calhoun. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 7, Symposium on Sexual Orientation and the Law. (Oct., 1993), pp. 1859-1875.
Family Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men. Charlotte J. Patterson. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 62, No. 4. (Nov., 2000), pp. 1052-1069.
Gay and Lesbian Language. Don Kulick. Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 29. (2000), pp. 243-285.
Gay and Lesbian Politics. Ronald J. Hunt. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Jun., 1992), pp. 220-224.
Gay but Not Queer: Toward a Post-Queer Study of Sexuality. Adam Isaiah Green. Theory and Society, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Aug., 2002), pp. 521-545.
Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America’s Children. William Meezan; Jonathan Rauch. The Future of Children, Vol. 15, No. 2, Marriage and Child Wellbeing. (Autumn, 2005), pp. 97-115.
GLAAD: Fair, Accurate and Inclusive Representation. Web Address: http://glaad.org/
(How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter? Judith Stacey; Timothy J. Biblarz. American Sociological Review, Vol. 66, No. 2. (Apr., 2001), pp. 159-183.
“I Can’t Even Think Straight” “Queer” Theory and the Missing Sexual Revolution in Sociology. Arlene Stein; Ken Plummer. Sociological Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2. (Jul., 1994), pp. 178-187.
Lesbian and Gay Kinship: Kath Weston’s “Families We Choose” and Contemporary Anthropology. Ellen Lewin. Signs, Vol. 18, No. 4, Theorizing Lesbian Experience. (Summer, 1993), pp. 974-979.
Men’s and Women’s Beliefs about Gender and Sexuality. Emily W. Kane; Mimi Schippers. Gender and Society, Vol. 10, No. 5. (Oct., 1996), pp. 650-665.
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force | Building LGBT Political Power from the Ground Up. Web Address: http://www.thetaskforce.org/
Predictors of Movement toward Homosexuality: A Longitudinal Study of Bisexual Men. Joseph P. Stokes; Will Damon; David J. McKirnan. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 34, No. 3. (1997), pp. 304-312.
Queer-Ing Sociology, Sociologizing Queer Theory: An Introduction. Steven Seidman. Sociological Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2. (Jul., 1994), pp. 166-177.
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society. Francisco Valdes. California Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 1. (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-377.
Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes. Robert Wintemute. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 3. (May, 1997), pp. 334-359.
Relationship Quality in a Sample of Lesbian Couples with Children and Child-Free Lesbian Couples. Leslie Koepke; Jan Hare; Patricia B. Moran. Family Relations, Vol. 41, No. 2. (Apr., 1992), pp. 224-229.
Sex Differences in Attitudes toward Gay Men and Lesbians: A Multidimensional Perspective. Lisa LaMar; Mary Kite. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 35, No. 2. (May, 1998), pp. 189-196.
Sex Differences in How Heterosexuals Think about Lesbians and Gay Men: Evidence from Survey Context Effects. Gregory M. Herek; John P. Capitanio. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 36, No. 4. (Nov., 1999), pp. 348-360.
Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability. Janet E. Halley. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3. (Feb., 1994), pp. 503-568.
Sex (ual Orientation) and Title VII. I. Bennett Capers. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 5. (Jun., 1991), pp. 1158-1187.
Sexual Orientation Identities, Attractions, and Practices of Female-to-Male Transsexuals. Holly Devor. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Nov., 1993), pp. 303-315.
The Earnings Effects of Sexual Orientation. Dan A. Black; Hoda R. Makar; Seth G. Sanders; Lowell J. Taylor. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 56, No. 3. (Apr., 2003), pp. 449-469.
The Ethics of Genetic Research on Sexual Orientation. Udo Schüklenk; Edward Stein; Jacinta Kerin; William Byne. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 1997), pp. 6-13.
The Families of Lesbians and Gay Men: A New Frontier in Family Research. Katherine R. Allen; David H. Demo. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 57, No. 1. (Feb., 1995), pp. 111-127.
The Gender Closet: Lesbian Disappearance under the Sign “Women.” Cheshire Calhoun. Feminist Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Spring, 1995), pp. 7-34.
The Individualization of Society and the Liberalization of State Policies on Same-Sex Sexual Relations, 1984-1995. David John Frank; Elizabeth H. Mceneaney. Social Forces, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Mar., 1999), pp. 911-943.
The Nexus of Sexual Orientation and Gender in the Determination of Earnings. John M. Blandford. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul., 2003), pp. 622-642.
The Politics of Sexual Identity: Sexual Attraction and Behavior among Lesbian and Bisexual Women. Paula C. Rust. Social Problems, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Nov., 1992), pp. 366-386.
The Psychosexual Development of Urban Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths. Margaret Rosario; Heino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg; Joyce Hunter; Theresa M. Exner; Marya Gwadz, Arden M. Keller. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 33, No. 2. (1996), pp. 113-126.
The Silent Minority: Rethinking Our Commitment to Gay and Lesbian Youth. Virginia Uribe. Theory into Practice, Vol. 33, No. 3, Rethinking Middle Grades. (Summer, 1994), pp. 167-172.
The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination. M. V. Lee Badgett. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 48, No. 4. (Jul., 1995), pp. 726-739.
Understanding Sexual Orientation: A Plea for Clarity. Juliet Richters. Reproductive Health Matters, Vol. 6, No. 12, Sexuality. (Nov., 1998), pp. 144-149.
We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage.” Nancy D. Polikoff. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 7, Symposium on Sexual Orientation and the Law. (Oct., 1993), pp. 1535-1550.
From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace (Or, Why Can’t a Woman Be More like a Fag?) Suzanna Danuta Walters. Signs, Vol. 21, No. 4, Feminist Theory and Practice. (Summer, 1996), pp. 830-869.
“Transforming” the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality. Taylor Flynn. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 2. (Mar., 2001), pp. 392-420.
The Sources of Gender Role Attitudes among Christian and Muslim Arab-American Women. Jen’nan Ghazal Read. Sociology of Religion, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Summer, 2003), pp. 207-222.
To Veil or Not to Veil? A Case Study of Identity Negotiation among Muslim Women in Austin, Texas. Jen’Nan Ghazal Read; John P. Bartkowski. Gender and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Jun., 2000), pp. 395-417.
Western Ethnocentrism and Perceptions of the Harem. Leila Ahmed. Feminist Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3. (Autumn, 1982), pp. 521-534. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/04%3A_Sex_Gender_and_Sexual_Orientation/4.07%3A_Reading_List_for_Part_III.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Part IV—Aging
In the mid-19th century, British poet Robert Browning wrote Grow old along with me / The best is yet to be / The last of time for which the first was made. Between 1996 and 2015, over 5,000 Americans PER DAY will have turned 50 years of age—these are Americans who were born between 1946 and 1965, otherwise called the Baby Boom Generation
Old age begins at age 65 years. The young-old are those from 65 to 75 years old; the old-old are between 76 and 84 years old while the oldest-old are 85 years of age or more. The oldest-old are a fast growing segment of the American population. We have more elderly people now, than ever before in our history. In 1900, only 4% of the American population was over 65, in 1990 12% of Americans were over 65. In 2010 38.9 million Ameidoricans were 65 or older: about 13% of the total population. In 2010, 2.0% of Americans are over 85! Each of these major age groups represents a cohort—a group of people born close to the same time period who have similar life experiences and similar remembrances
For example the Depression Kids who are people who were adolescents or young adults in 1929; Baby Boomers, people born between after World War II (between 1946 and 1965); and Gen X who are the children of the Baby Boomers, each have their own distinct memories of memories of war, musical forms, technological change, medical breakthroughs, epidemics, changing social norms and mores, etc. The shared understanding of a particular sociocultural milieu is called the cohort effect. In thirty years, when the majority of you are middle-aged, and you are hanging out with your friends, you will probably be listening to the same music you listen to now, and you will occasionally reminisce about what life was like when you were young, and the changes you have seen.1
Cohorts: Memories and Technology
Depression Kids are people who were adolescents or young adults in 1929. Their shared memories include: Pearl Harbor. WWII. Korean Conflict, the GI Bill, swing music and big bands, (Duke Ellington, Count Basie, Glenn Miller, etc.), jazz, and flappers. Their technology was: radio, telephones, flivvers and jalopies (specialized cars), and talking pictures (movies).
Baby Boomers are people born after World War II (between 1946 and 1965). Their shared memories are: the assassinations of John Kennedy, Bobby Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, rock ’n’ roll, the Sixties (hippies and yippies, Woodstock, drugs, birth control pill and the sexual revolution, the Civil Righs Movement, the Vietnam War, the moon landing, and the resignation of Richard Nixon. Their technology included: transistor radios and color TV.
Gen X are the children of the Baby Boomers. Their shared memories include: the Challenger disaster, heavy metal rock music, Michael Jackson, drugs, abortion on demand, the Gulf War. Their technology included: PCs and Macs, Donkey Kong, pagers, 8-track tapes, tape players and CB radios in cars.
Gen Y are people born in the mid-to-late 1980s. They are the children and grandchildren of the Baby Boomers. Their shared memories include: Hip Hop and Rap music, September 11, 2001, the Iraq and Afghan Wars, Harry Potter, and CNN. Their technology included: the Internet, Cell Phones, Video Games (online, game players such as the Playstation, hand-held game player platforms such as the Gameboy), and 24/7 cable/satellite/fiber-optic TV.
The Millienials are people born in the 1990s. They are the grandchildren of early Gen Xers, and late Baby Boomers. Their shared memories include Hip Hop and Rap music, Beyonce, Kanye West, September 11, 2001, the Iraq and Afghan wars, the Toyota recall, the election of Barack Obama, the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2010, the earthquake in Haiti. Their technology includes: I-Pods™ and MP3 players, I-Phones™, smart phones, Blackberries™, Wii™, social networking media (Twitter, Facebook, My Space), and online education.
Changes Due to Aging
Although there are many scientists who today are working to overcome the most deleterious effects of aging, and some who are even attempting to stop aging and expand the life span, for most of us now, aging is an entirely normal process. As we age, our bodies begin to change and many of us believe, incorrectly, that aging is closely related to virtually complete physical and mental deterioration. Our cells and organs do indeed change over time, but a healthy life style and engaging in interesting and challenging activities as well as interacting with other people helps the elderly to remain physically and mentally healthy into very old age. Some things that do occur however are that skin texture and resiliency changes, hair turns gray or falls out, spinal disks compress; joints stiffen; and many women suffer from osteoporosis. Generally speaking however, these changes do not necessarily mean that the older person is falling apart or that they are losing their ability to care for themselves. Many healthy elderly people are quite capable of living very active lives, in their own homes, into very old age. 2
We tend to believe, again wrongly, that as people age they experience changes in personality. In actuality, unless there is illness or brain damage such as dementia or Alzheimer’s disease, changes in personality, perceptions, and attitudes do not occur. Cranky, ill-tempered, unpleasant older people, in general, were cranky, ill-tempered, unpleasant young people, just as pleasant, enjoyable, fun old people were pleasant, enjoyable, fun young people. The differences that we think we see often are related to the conditions in which the elderly live. Elderly people who are alone, or who are in nursing homes (a form of total institution) often suffer from severe levels of clinical depression.3 The old people depicted on the television show The Simpsons who sit in wheelchairs and stare out the window all day are clearly chronically depressed. Elderly people who have nothing to do, who feel purposeless and useless, tend toward severe depression. Alcoholism and suicide are at nearly epidemic proportions. However, according to Havighurst different personality types adjust differently to aging; while Russell argues that aging is a normal process and healthy older people can do most of the same things as younger people.4
Social roles do change over time as do the norms and folkways concerning “proper” behavior for the elderly, such as appropriate clothing styles, activity levels, and sexual activity. Healthy oldsters however, should be allowed and encouraged to engage in physical activity including sex. Most elderly people enjoy normal relationships with spouses and families, and when their own families are not present they tend to form family-like relationships with others. Contrary to popular wisdom, most elderly people care for themselves, with spouses caring for each other in times of illness or distress, rather than relying on adult children to become caregivers. 5
Stratification by Age
There is indeed inequality that is based on age, although gender and race or ethnicity are more significant indicators of stratification than age alone. Throughout the years there have been laws that prevented the elderly from working past the age of 65. However, the Age-Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 made such policies and laws illegal. The AARP (American Association of Retired Persons) is the largest lobbying group in the United States. (A lobbying group petitions Congress to pass laws favorable to the specific agenda of the group.) The AARP’s membership is composed of people over the age of 49 who, along with their younger spouses, pay ten dollars each year and in turn receive discounts on car rentals, vacations, hotels and motels, resorts, cruises, and insurance, among other things. Most members of the AARP are employed, and are not officially elderly. Along with Maggie Kuhn of the Grey Panthers—an organization whose goal is to eliminate all aspects of ageism, which is the belief or ideology that people in a particular age category are inferior to people in other age categories—the AARP was responsible for the passage of many laws favorable to the elderly.6
Regardless of any specific theoretical paradigm, it is clear that the elderly have heard the voices from the past, and in the grandest legacy of the American republic, have assembled in multivariate ways to petition the government, initiating a new era in the politics of aging 7 It is also clear that the elderly gain significant benefits by engaging in various forms of social interaction.8. Pamela Hubbard, et al. (1992), in a study of political activism among a relatively small sample of institutionalized (i.e. nursing home residents) seniors found that participation in an active and effective political action group helped seniors fulfill their needs to be responsible and contributing community members, gain a sense of empowerment, and enhance their control over their environment. Residents are able to shed nursing home stereotypes . . . [and] enjoy the social benefits of participating . . . [in a group in which] the residents are not as sheltered as other institutionalized elderly.9
Political and Social Activism
However, political activism among the elderly, regardless of the social benefits that accrue to members, is seldom seen as benign, and, as with most lobbying groups, the elderly must justify their positions vis á vis the positions of other lobbying organizations and the preeminent social, economic, and political interests of the polity as an aggregate. The largest, most financially secure, and arguably most politically powerful elderly advocacy group, AARP, has been criticized for its undemocratic methodology because most members join for [the social and financial] benefits, [and] in doing so they automatically become part of a political army, fighting battles which they may or may not believe in.10
The AARP
According to the AARP (quoting Bureau of the Census statistics), there were, as of 1993, 32.8 million elderly representing 12.7% of the entire population of the United Sates and that number is expanding: the number of elderly has increased by 5% since 1990 compared to a 3% increase in the size of the population under 65, and by 2030 the number of those over 65 is projected by the Census Bureau to be 70.2 million or 20% of the entire population (A Profile 1-2 [1994]), moreover, the fastest growing segment of this older population is the age group 85 years and older; this segment is projected to double to 4.2 million persons by the year 2000 (INFO-PAK n. page. [1995]). Robert N. Binstock’s (1995) figure of 33 million members of the AARP (Binstock 71 [1995]) leads one to conclude that all people who are over 65 are members and indeed, the AARP (1995) lists its membership at more than 33 million . . . [making it] the largest non-profit organization serving the needs of older persons in the United States (AAARP News 1 [1995]), however, membership in AARP is not restricted to those who are considered elderly but is open to anyone age 50 or older, both working and retired, and, in fact, over one-third of the Association’s membership is in the work force” (AAARP News 1 [1995]) which accounts for the seemingly disparately large numbers of participants.1112
The sheer size of the AARP makes it appear formidable, therefore, in order to respond to charges being levied by some advocates of generational equity that [old age interest groups] are concerned with the special interests of the elderly population to the exclusion of the legitimate interests of any others. Eric R. Kingson (1988) suggests that the resources . . . at the disposal of elderly interest groups are more important to the success of their lobbying and other efforts than the perception that they are not selfish. After all, why should elder interest groups, or any other interest groups for that matter, be expected to be unselfish?Furthermore, the elderly have enormous political clout at the polls—they vote in vast numbers. The AARP’s, members, who are mainly middle class, can be counted on to turn out at election time. In 1980, 71% of Americans aged 55-64 went to the polls, compared with 36% of those aged 18-20.1314
Walter A. Rosenbaum (1993) and James W. Button contest Kingson’s (1988) view that there is a deterioration in the public image upon which the political privilege of the aging is grounded [and which] is a bellwether of generational tension and argue that most studies of political preferences among the elderly generally highlight only those issues and policies that directly impact the elderly rather than issues and policies that effect all Americans. Indeed, they found that studies of candidate and party preference among the aging, like policy studies, seldom reveal significant associations between age and voting choice that cannot be explained by other socioeconomic factors.15 Furthermore, it is clear that the vast majority of all money given to political parties is given to the party in power1617 so that access gained through financial means is largely based on pocketbook issues that effect most citizens. Moreover, Laurie A. Rhodebeck (1993) maintains that while older Americans share common age-related concerns . . . they are hardly subject to the solidifying experiences typical of [other minorities]. She further argues that:
several conditions seem likely to enhance cohesion among older people. The development of retirement communities may encourage interactions that foster an awareness of common political interests. The availability of senior citizen perquisites may promote a sense of group entitlement that extends to the policy arena. Finally, recent deficit reduction measures that have threatened the viability of public assistance for the elderly may serve as effective mobilizers of group interests and powerful inducements to the maintenance of group unity. 18
With the sea change in the American political scene from a largely liberal Democratic majority in the Congress to a predominately conservative Republican majority, lobbying and other special interest groups will find it necessary to modify their approaches. Indeed, as the political climate is transformed so must special interest and lobbying groups adjust their tactics if they are to be successful petitioners. Binstock (1995) offers a brief analysis of the changes that must take place if old-age activist groups are to maintain their ability to influence public policies:
Starting in the late 1970s and continuing into the mid-1990s, new stereotypes emerged in popular culture depicting older people as prosperous, hedonistic, selfish, and politically powerful, greedy geezers. . . . In this era the activities of old-age interest groups were aimed at protecting existing programs and their specific features. These defensive efforts were somewhat successful in the broad sense that cutbacks in old-age programs during this period were generally less than in other social programs.19
Moreover, Binstock (1995) argues that, as the Congress, if not the country as a whole, becomes more partisan and more ideologically conservative this new era in the policies of aging [will pose] difficult challenges for old-age interest groups. 20
Considering that largest of the age-related special interest groups Binstock (1995) says:
The most difficult and politically important choices will be those made by AARP . . . [which] is by far the most important [of all old-age advocacy groups] because of its huge membership . . . [of] 33 million members. (Binstock 71 [1995]) The enormous financial and personnel resources which AARP can muster is a classic example of RM that is evident in Binstock’s (1995) figures: “in 1994 AARP’s total revenue was \$469 million . . . [and they had] 1,700 employees” not including a host of unpaid local community volunteers.21
Nonetheless, Binstock (1995) finds that the AARP and other old-age organizations will be forced to make changes if they are to survive as viable and vigorous political forces. Indeed, as the political mood changes the social dynamic and the cultural milieu:
Proposals for major changes in programs on aging are being generated by conservative political principles and to balance the federal budget, without much attention to the implications for older people themselves . . . Consequently the old-age lobby is unlikely to have much impact unless its efforts are coincidentally fortified by more powerful political forces.22
Robert N. Butler [1994], in 1993, also argued that the persuasive power of the AARP has declined:
Our form of special interest politics and government is reflected in organizations of older persons. These organizations are considered influential . . . the American media treat the AARP as if it were a very powerful special interest group. However, this is exaggerated. It has been weakened in recent years because of the Medicare Catastrophic Act and its repeal. In any case, compared to powerful interest groups within Washington, the AARP is not as strong an influence.23
But Kingson (1988) argues that:
By broadening their agenda, aging advocacy organizations may increase their legitimacy and reduce the likelihood that the advocates of various groups (the old, the disabled, the young) will expend resources engaging in divisive competition. And coalitions may provide an important means of expanding needed programs and services to all groups while simultaneously protecting existing services and programs against erosion.24
Whether such coalition building will occur and be politically successful is purely speculative but further study on coalition politics would be worth pursuing. Although the causal factors involved in political participation and activism among the general populace are problematic due to the various theoretical paradigms employed to explain such behavior, little specific research has been conducted on the involvement of the elderly. Furthermore, as the “Baby Boomer” generation reaches retirement age such research might prove to be an important addition to the literature. As this more affluent and activist cohort ages, and discovers that, as Alan Neustadtl (1990) argues, money purchases access at declining rates will they engage in higher levels of political and social activism as they find that highly visible (and often emotionally charged) issues require a greater adherence [by elected officials and decision makers] to party and constituent desires?25 Arguments used to exist over proper implementation of social welfare programs for the elderly, not over the existence of such programs but as the political situation reverses liberal legislation will the AARP join with other lobbying groups for the disadvantaged to preserve the status quo? The entire field of gerontology is ripe for study and theory development and so is the field of political activism among the elderly; the changes that will ensue as one cohort of the newly elderly slowly replaces the previous generation of elderly will be a fecund ground for social science research. 26
Societal Attitudes toward Aging
Societal attitudes toward aging are generally highly stereotyped so that Jennifer McLerran, in apparent agreement with Kirkland, warns that, although those attitudes have been largely negative stereotypes, there is an equal danger in the trend toward positive stereotyping which may serve as evidence of a form of ageism which threatens to propagate public policies and institutional practices which ignore the specific needs of the elderly (McLerran 82).27 John Bell argues that societal attitudes and stereotypes of old age are rampant on television and although most programming does not encourage rational discourse on such important issues as health care for the elderly, they do participate in our society’s overall discourse on aging by providing compelling, often unexaminedly accepted images of aging and the elderly, thereby fueling stereotypes about elderly persons and their lives (Bell 92). Bell further states that many portrayals of the elderly on television are sexist and, as McLerran has cautioned, other images of the aged are in the categories of either highly negative or highly positive stereotypes which furnish to the viewers significantly unrealistic perspectives of older Americans (Bell 93). However, Bell does say that, due to a handful of programs featuring elderly individuals in leading roles, [t]he picture of the elderly on television . . . appears to be far more positive than it was [in 1981] . . . the elderly are still an incomplete presence, and significant problems of role presentation, especially in terms of gender, persist (Bell 93), furthermore, society would be better served if all members of society, including the elderly, were depicted in realistic terms on television (Bell 98).28
Societal attitudes toward the elderly are often displayed as ageism, the term coined in the late 1960’s by Robert Butler (Kirkland 28) which is inherent in all stereotypes of the elderly and, as Patricia Moore found in her highly publicized and now-famous experiment, is ubiquitous in American society and includes: rudeness, assault, invisibility, patronizing behaviors, false assumptions about physical and/or social competence, victimization, and verbal abuse (Ryan 34-35). Among other ageist stereotypes are the myths of the asexual and uninterested elder (Mayo Clinic 45) which are addressed by Richard Cross who states the following facts: all older people are sexual (Cross 101) . . . many older people have a need for a good sexual relationship (Cross 101) . . . sexual physiology changes with age (Cross 102) . . . social attitudes [toward sexuality between older adults] are often frustrating (Cross 102) . . . [sexuality must be] used or lost (Cross 103). . older folks do it better (Cross 103). Ageism, as with any negative attitudes toward any members of a minority group is detrimental to society creating obstacles to the development of competent public policy and general human understanding.29
Sociological Explanations of the Aging Process
There are various Sociological explanations of the aging process which are based on the three major Sociological paradigms. Within the rubric of the Functionalist paradigm is social disengagement theory which argues that as people age, they gradually withdraw from social participation and simultaneously are relieved of social responsibilities (Cumming and Henry). This theory has very little support and according to Nelson and Dannefur, the healthy, non-poor elderly are highly active. Subculture theory, which comes from the Symbolic Interactionist paradigm, states that older persons form subcultures in order to interact with others with similar backgrounds, experiences, attitudes, values, beliefs, and lifestyles (Rose), but this theory, also, ahs very little support because the elderly have been shown to highly heterogeneous. The most highly supported Symbolic Interactionist theory is called Activity Theory which has shown that the extent to which an individual remains engaged in meaningful social activity determines the quality of life because desired activity with realistic goals help to determine life satisfaction. Various theories from the Conflict perspective have some support for the idea that the elderly compete with younger members of society for the same resources and social rewards and suffer a variety of disadvantages because of their relative lack of power, however, as stated above, race and ethnicity are more important variables than age in stratification. Furthermore, the elderly today are more and more likely to be comfortable, healthy, vigorous, and engage.30
Stratification among the elderly is more a matter of gender and race than age. According to the 1990 census 31% of the elderly live comfortable, active lives in their own homes (Treas and Torrecilha);31 only 13% are in poverty with an average 1989 income of less than \$7,495; and an average social security income of only \$488/month. Minority elderly are more likely to be poor than white elderly and white women live longer than any other group. Five percent of the elderly are institutionalized, 16% have limited mobility; 25% are rural and thus more likely to be poor; fully 60% are married and living with a spouse; 20% live with adult children. The vast majority of the elderly are in good health and 50% of those between 75 and 84 are free from serious medical problems. According to Rogers, healthy lifestyles among the elderly increase their longevity. Feminist writer and activist Betty Friedan wrote a book titled The Fountain of Age in which she maintained that aging brings with it wisdom and understanding, and that aging is a time for joy and activity, not deterioration and death. But, of course, death is a part of life, particularly for the elderly.32
Sex and Gender
Due to the traditional sex-typed roles practiced by women and men who are currently among the old-old (85+), gender differences in role continuity tend to exist with women much more likely than men to maintain close family connections (Barer 74). Women also tend to socialize with peers and be more actively engaged in close interpersonal relationships than men (Barer 74). However, white women outlive white men into old-old age so that Amore men than women, aged eighty-five and over are still married, 48.7 percent of white men in comparison to only 10.3 percent of white women. . . . As a consequence, more women live alone in late-late life, two-thirds compared to one-third of men.”33
To compound the difficulties inherent in widowhood and living alone, the socioeconomic status of women is relatively poor. . . . Twenty-three percent of women aged eighty-five and over live in poverty, compared to 16 percent of men (Barer 74). Furthermore, women tend to have greater physical disability because of chronic health conditions [which makes women] less able to independently manage their activities of daily living (Barer 78). Men, however, due to traditional sex-typed roles, although physically better off than women, are more likely to experience problems with domestic chores and tend to face a greater likelihood of social isolation (Barer 79). Clearly, both sexes in old-old age may be faced with serious problems which have sociopolitical and socioeconomic ramifications for young and old alike (Tauber 65-67), but, as Cynthia M. Tauber argues, all of American society face[s] the challenge of anticipating and preparing for the changing needs and desires of a diverse, aging U.S.(Tauber 67).34
Even though the gender related age gap will continue to exist among the elderly and particularly the old-old, that gap may be closing as Americans become more aware of health issues and practice preventive maintenance (Kirkland 22; Tauber 65). According to Richard I. Kirkland, the advances that will make us live longer and healthier . . . range from the marvelous to the mundane (Kirkland 23) and include: [m]ore targeted medical weaponry (Kirkland 23); cures for Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias (Kirkland 24); more powerful antibiotics and immune system strengtheners (Kirkland 24-25); hormone replacement and enhancement (Kirkland 25); healthier life-styles (Kirkland 25); and genetic engineering to retard the aging process at the molecular level (Kirkland 25-26). However, echoing Tauber, because [t]he culture still too often patronizes and stigmatizes its elderly citizens(Kirkland 28), there are serious socioeconomic and sociopolitical problems that must be addressed as the population of the United States ages (Kirkland 28).35
The late thanatologist Elizabeth Kübler-Ross, was a physician who took on only patients were all terminally developed a stage theory of dying. Dying, assuming one lives long enough to complete it, is for the terminally ill, a process. According to Kübler-Ross the stages of dying are: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. As the Baby Boomers age, euthanasia, which is helping the terminally ill to die free of pain and with as much dignity as possible, may become a major social issue. There are two forms of euthanasia—passive euthanasia which is allowing someone to die and active euthanasia which is helping someone to die36. On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling that said that there is no constitutional right to die, and states may make their own laws covering euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. How will we deal with this? What are your feelings about this issue?
As with all other forms of stratification there are serious consequences of ageism which includes elder abuse which is the mistreatment of older persons and takes several forms: physical abuse is hitting, pushing, shoving, starvation, and rape; psychological abuse includes threats, intimidation, verbal assaults; and exploitation which is the misuse or theft of financial assets.37 How do you want to be treated when you are old? How can you change the way elders are cared for today?
For more information, please visit the following websites: National Council on Aging: Improving the Lives of Older Americans; Aging in America: The New World of Growing Older from MSNBC News; American Society on Aging; The State of Aging and Health in America from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related Statistics.
Footnotes
• 1 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 2 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 3 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 4 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 5 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 6 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 7 Binstock, Robert H. “A New Era in the Politics of Aging: How Will the Old-Age Interest Groups Respond?” Generations: Journal of the American Society on Aging. 19.3 (1995): 68-74.
• 8 Hubbard, Pamela, Perla Werner, Jiska Cohen-Mansfield, and Rochelle Shusterman. “Seniors for Justice: A Political and Social Action Group for Nursing Home Residents.” The Gerontologist. 32.6 (1992) 856-858.
• 9 Hubbard, Pamela, Perla Werner, Jiska Cohen-Mansfield, and Rochelle Shusterman. “Seniors for Justice: A Political and Social Action Group for Nursing Home Residents.” The Gerontologist. 32.6 (1992) 856-858.
• 10 “Old, But Far From Feeble,” The Economist 12 Mar. 1988: 30.
• 11 A Profile of Older Americans. (Washington: AARP, Program Resources Department, 1994) 1-9. Rhodebeck, Laurie A. “The Politics of Greed? Political Preferences among the Elderly.” The Journal of Politics. 55.2 (1993): 342-364.
• 12 INFO-PAK (Washington: American Association of Retired Persons, National Gerontology Research Center, 1995) N. page. “AARP News: Fact Sheet.” (Washington: American Association of Retired Persons, Communications Division, 1995) 1-10.
• 13 Kingson, Eric R. “Generational Equity: An Unexpected Opportunity to Broaden the Politics of Aging.” The Gerontologist. 28.6 (1988): 765-772.
• 14 “Old, But Far From Feeble,” The Economist 12 Mar. 1988: 30.
• 15 Rosenbaum, Walter A., and James W. Button. “The Unquiet Future of Intergenerational Politics.” The Gerontologist. 33.4 (1993): 481-490.
• 16 Rosenbaum, Walter A., and James W. Button. “The Unquiet Future of Intergenerational Politics.” The Gerontologist. 33.4 (1993): 481-490.
• 17 Salant, Jonathan D. “Where the PAC Money Goes.” Congressional Quarterly 15 Apr 1995: 1058-1059.
• 18 Rhodebeck, Laurie A. “The Politics of Greed? Political Preferences among the Elderly.” The Journal of Politics. 55.2 (1993): 342-364.
• 19 Binstock, Robert H. “A New Era in the Politics of Aging: How Will the Old-Age Interest Groups Respond?” Generations: Journal of the American Society on Aging. 19.3 (1995): 68-74.
• 20 Binstock, Robert H. “A New Era in the Politics of Aging: How Will the Old-Age Interest Groups Respond?” Generations: Journal of the American Society on Aging. 19.3 (1995): 68-74.
• 21 Binstock, Robert H. “A New Era in the Politics of Aging: How Will the Old-Age Interest Groups Respond?” Generations: Journal of the American Society on Aging. 19.3 (1995): 68-74.
• 22 Binstock, Robert H. “A New Era in the Politics of Aging: How Will the Old-Age Interest Groups Respond?” Generations: Journal of the American Society on Aging. 19.3 (1995): 68-74.
• 23 Butler, Robert N. “Politics versus Policy in the Health Care Debate.” The Gerontologist. 14.5 (1994) 614-615.
• 24 Kingson, Eric R. “Generational Equity: An Unexpected Opportunity to Broaden the Politics of Aging.” The Gerontologist. 28.6 (1988): 765-772.
• 25 Neustadtl, Alan. “Interest-Group PACsmanship: An Analysis of Campaign Contributions, Issue, Visibility, and Legislative Impact.” Social Forces. 69.2 (1990): 549-564.
• 26 Rovner, Julie. “‘Pepper Bill’ Pits Politics Against Process.” Congressional Quarterly 4 Jun 1988: 1491-1493.
• 27 McClaren in Annual Editions: Aging. Ed. Harold Cox. Dushkin: Guilford. 1995.
• 28 Bell in Annual Editions: Aging. Ed. Harold Cox. Dushkin: Guilford. 1995.
• 29 Ryan, Cross, Butler, Kirkland, Mayo Clinic in Annual Editions: Aging. Ed. Harold Cox. Dushkin: Guilford. 1995.
• 30 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 31 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 32 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 33 Barer in Annual Editions: Aging. Ed. Harold Cox. Dushkin: Guilford. 1995.
• 34 Barer, Tauber in Annual Editions: Aging. Ed. Harold Cox. Dushkin: Guilford. 1995.
• 35 Kirkland, Tauber in Annual Editions: Aging. Ed. Harold Cox. Dushkin: Guilford. 1995.
• 36 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000.
• 37 Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Edition. Thompson, William E. and Joseph V. Hickey. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Sociology: Sixth Edition. Schaefer, Richard T. and Robert P. Lamm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society. Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2000. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/05%3A_Aging/5.01%3A_Aging.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Course Objectives: Part IV—Aging
Upon completion of this unit, you will be able to:
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss aging from a sociologically scientific perspective.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss the various aspects of aging.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss prejudice and discrimination based on age and the various forms they take.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss theories of aging and the ongoing national debate concerning Social Security, health care, and euthanasia.
• Explain the impact of politics, the political process, as well as economic and social policies on the lives of people in the US based on their age.
• Identify the levels into which the US is stratified based on age and how aging impacts peoples’ life chances.
• Identify and differentiate among various theories of aging.
• Conflict theories
• Functionalist theories
• Symbolic Interactionist theories
• Know and analyze the various aspects of ageism and the way it effects families and society.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical information concerning stratification/inequality by age.
• Find and interpret demographic data about the elderly from the US Census and other valid and reliable sources.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical and historical information concerning the elderly in the past and present in the US.
• Understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss popular media’s depiction of the elderly and end of life issues.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss legal policies concerning the elderly and end of life issues in the US.
• Find, read, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss aging studies found in peer reviewed scientific journal articles.
5.03: Study Guide for Part IV
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Study Guide for Part IV—Aging
1. Identify and differentiate among various groups of the elderly
1. Young-old
2. Old
3. Old-old
4. Oldest-old
2. Discuss the aging process
1. Biological aging
2. Social aging
3. Identify and discuss social attitudes toward the elderly
1. Age-appropriate roles
2. Age-appropriate behavior
1. Clothing
2. Activity levels
3. Sexuality
1. STDs and the elderly
3. Health and illness
1. Ability of the elderly to care for themselves and others
2. Drug abuse and alcoholism
3. Alzheimer’s disease and dementia
4. Nursing homes
4. The portrayal of the elderly in popular media
4. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning aging and the elderly
5. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning the current legal status of the elderly in the United States
6. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning the historical legal status of the elderly in the United States
7. Discuss ageism and the forms that it takes in the US
8. Use the Internet to find and display information about anti-ageist political and social groups
1. The AARP
2. The Grey Panthers
3. Others
9. Identify and discuss theories of aging
1. Conflict theories of aging
2. Functionalist theories of aging
3. Symbolic interactionist theories of aging
10. Discuss Social Security and Medicare
11. Discuss theories of death and dying
12. Discuss euthanasia from social, political, and legal perspectives
1. Use the Internet to find and display information about euthanasia
5.04: Key Terms and Concepts for Part IV
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Key Terms and Concepts for Part IV—Aging
AARP
Active euthanasia
Activity theory
Ageism
Ageist stereotypes
Aging
Alcoholism
Baby boomers
Betty Friedan
Changes in personality
Clinical depression
Cohort
Cohort effect
Conflict perspective
Consequences of ageism
Depression kids
Elizabeth Kübler-Ross
Euthanasia
Family-like relationships
Folkways concerning aging
Functionalist paradigm
Gen X
Gender differences in role continuity
Grey Panthers
Indicators of stratification
Maggie Kuhn
Millennial Generation
Myths about aging
Norms
Nursing homes
Old age
Oldest-old
Old-old
Passive euthanasia
Political activism
Portrayals of the elderly on television
Sexual activity among the elderly
Social disengagement theory
Social roles
Societal attitudes toward aging
Socioeconomic status of women
Sociological explanations of the aging process
Spouses caring for each other
Stages of dying
Stereotypes
Stratification by age
Subculture theory
Suicide
Symbolic interactionist paradigm
The Fountain of Age
Total institution
Young-old
5.05: Lecture Outline for Part IV
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Lecture Material for Part IV—Aging
1. Identify and differentiate among various groups of the elderly.
1. Young-old
2. Old
3. Old-old
4. Oldest-old
2. Identify and discuss the cohort effect
1. Have students discuss the various shared memories, technologies, music, clothing styles, etc. from the Depression Kids through the Millennial Generation
3. Discuss the aging process.
1. Biological aging
2. Social aging
4. Identify and discuss social attitudes toward the elderly.
1. Age-appropriate roles
2. Age-appropriate behavior
1. Clothing
2. Activity levels
3. Sexuality
1. STDs and the elderly
3. Health and illness
1. Ability of the elderly to care for themselves and others
2. Drug abuse and alcoholism
3. Alzheimer’s disease and dementia
4. Nursing homes
4. The portrayal of the elderly in popular media
5. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning aging and the elderly.
6. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning the current legal status of the elderly in the United States.
7. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning the historical legal status of the elderly in the United States.
8. Discuss ageism and the forms that it takes in the US.
9. Use the Internet to find and display information about anti-ageist political and social groups
1. The AARP
2. The Grey Panthers
3. Others
10. Identify and discuss theories of aging.
1. Conflict theories of aging
2. Functionalist theories of aging
3. Symbolic interactionist theories of aging
11. Discuss Social Security and Medicare
12. Discuss theories of death and dying
13. Discuss euthanasia from social, political, and legal perspectives.
1. Use the Internet to find and display information about euthanasia
5.06: Assignments for Part IV
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Assignments for Part IV—Aging
Essay: Discuss Social Security and Medicare.
Essay: Discuss the elderly in your family and your culture.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about the elderly and the law.
Find on the Internet: US Census Bureau data about aging.
In-Class Discussion: How do we account for our attitudes about the elderly in the US?
In-Class Discussion: How do you treat the elderly in your family?
In-Class Discussion: How do you want to be treated when you are old?
In-Class Discussion: Should euthanasia be legal?
Oral Book Review and Discussion: The Fountain of Age by Betty Friedan.
Present to the Class: Statistical data about aging and the elderly in the form of a chart.
Read: The Fountain of Age by Betty Friedan.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about aging and the elderly.
Read: Three to five popular media articles each about aging and the elderly.
Quiz: Definitions, Matching, Multiple Choice, True/False, Short Answer, Brief Essay | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/05%3A_Aging/5.02%3A_Course_Objectives_for_Part_IV.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Reading List for Part IV—Aging
Dispelling Ageism: The Cross-Cutting Intervention. Robert N. Butler. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 503, The Quality of Aging: Strategies for Interventions. (May, 1989), pp. 138-147.
An Overview of Research on Aging and the Status of Gerontology Today. Robert N. Butler. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No. 3, Special Issue: Aging: Demographic, Health, and Social Prospects. (Summer, 1983), pp. 351-361.
The Relation of Extended Life to Extended Employment since the Passage of Social Security in 1935 . Robert N. Butler. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No. 3, Special Issue: Aging: Demographic, Health, and Social Prospects. (Summer, 1983), pp. 420-429.
What’s Best for the Elderly Research Subject? (in Correspondence). Robert N. Butler; Robert E. Vestal; Richard Ratzan. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 11, No. 4. (Aug., 1981), pp. 45-46.
Successful Aging and Quality of Life. Yuchi Young; Ming-Yu Fan; Elizabeth A. Skinner; Albert Wu. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 11, No. 7, Abstracts: 9th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Nov., 2002), p. 645.
Antiaging Technology and Pseudoscience (in Science’s Compass; Letters). Aubrey D. N. J. de Grey; Leonid Gavrilov; S. Jay Olshansky; L. Stephen Coles; Richard G. Cutler; Michael Fossel; S. Mitchell Harman. Science, New Series, Vol. 296, No. 5568. (Apr. 26, 2002), p. 656.
Aging Mechanisms (in From the Academy: Japanese-American Frontiers of Science Symposium). Yoshiko Takahashi; Makoto Kuro-o; Fuyuki Ishikawa. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 97, No. 23. (Nov. 7, 2000), pp. 12407-12408.
Aging and the Satisfaction of Psychological Needs (in Commentaries). Peter G. Coleman. Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 11, No. 4. (2000), pp. 291-293.
Expectations regarding Aging among Older Adults and Physicians Who Care for Older Adults. Catherine A. Sarkisian; Ron D. Hays; Sandra H. Berry; Carol M. Mangione. Medical Care, Vol. 39, No. 9. (Sep., 2001), pp. 1025-1036.
The Quest to Reverse Time’s Toll (in Bodybuilding: The Bionic Human). Constance Holden. Science, New Series, Vol. 295, No. 5557. (Feb. 8, 2002), pp. 1032-1033.
A Gray Zone? Meetings between Sociology and Gerontology (in Symposia; Sociology and Border Disciplines: Opportunities and Barriers to Intellectua). Gunhild O. Hagestad. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 5. (Sep., 1999), pp. 514-517.
Successful Adaptation in the Later Years: A Life Course Approach to Aging. Robert Crosnoe; Glen H. Elder Jr. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 4. (Dec., 2002), pp. 309-328.
Act Your Age. Cheryl Laz. Sociological Forum, Vol. 13, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp. 85-113.
Aging versus Cohort Interpretations of Intercohort Differences in GSS Vocabulary Scores (in Decline in Vocabulary Scores: An Exchange). Duane F. Alwin; Ryan J. McCammon. American Sociological Review, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 272-286.
Epilogue: Research on Population Aging at NIA: Retrospect and Prospect. Richard Suzman. Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, Supplement: Aging, Health, and Public Policy. (2004), pp. 239-264.
Linking Social Gerontology with Quantitative Skills: A Class Project Using U.S. Census Data (in Notes). Christine L. Himes; Christine Caffrey. Teaching Sociology, Vol. 31, No. 1. (Jan., 2003), pp. 85-94.
Gender and Aging in the Developing World: Where Are the Men? (in Notes and Commentary). John Knodel; Mary Beth Ofstedal. Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Dec., 2003), pp. 677-698.
Age Structure and Social Structure (in Symposia; Charting Futures for Sociology: Structure and Action). Charles C. Gordon; Charles F. Longino, Jr. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 5. (Sep., 2000), pp. 699-703.
The Biodemography of Aging (in History, Biology, and Disease). James W. Vaupel. Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, Supplement: Aging, Health, and Public Policy. (2004), pp. 48-62.
The Transition to Adulthood in Aging Societies. Elizabeth Fussell. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 580, Early Adulthood in Cross-National Perspective. (Mar., 2002), pp. 16-39.
The Micropolitics of Care in Relationships between Aging Parents and Adult Children: Individualism, Collectivism, and Power (in Intergenerational Relations). Karen Pyke. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 61, No. 3. (Aug., 1999), pp. 661-672.
Feminism, Eros, and the Coming of Age. Roberta Rubenstein. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2. (2001), pp. 1-19.
Families in the Middle and Later Years: A Review and Critique of Research in the 1990s (in Families across the Life-Span). Katherine R. Allen; Rosemary Blieszner; Karen A. Roberto. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 62, No. 4. (Nov., 2000), pp. 911-926.
Economy and Society: The Future (in Pryor’s Millennium Survey). Dennis Wrong. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Jan., 2000), pp. 57-60.
Against Wisdom: The Social Politics of Anger and Aging. Kathleen Woodward. Cultural Critique, No. 51. (Spring, 2002), pp. 186-218.
The Intercohort Decline in Verbal Ability: Does It Exist? (in Decline in Vocabulary Scores: An Exchange). James A. Wilson; Walter R. Gove. American Sociological Review, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 253-266.
Race Differences in Filial Responsibility Expectations among Older Parents (in Intergenerational Relations). Gary R. Lee; Chuck W. Peek; Raymond T. Coward. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 60, No. 2. (May, 1998), pp. 404-412.
Family Experiences and the Erosion of Support for Intergenerational Coresidence (in Intergenerational Relations). Frances K. Goldscheider; Leora Lawton. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 60, No. 3. (Aug., 1998), pp. 623-632.
Rewriting Menopause: Challenging the Medical Paradigm to Reflect Menopausal Women’s Experiences . Susan J. Ferguson; Carla Parry. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, Identity, the Body, and the Menopause. (1998), pp. 20-41.
Rethinking Age Dependence in Organizational Mortality: Logical Formalizations. Michael T. Hannan. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 104, No. 1. (Jul., 1998), pp. 126-164.
Financial Strain and Health among Elderly Mexican-Origin Individuals (in Health and Health Behavior). Ronald J. Angel; Michelle Frisco; Jacqueline L. Angel; David A. Chiriboga. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 44, No. 4. (Dec., 2003), pp. 536-551.
The Burgess Award Lecture: Beyond the Nuclear Family: The Increasing Importance of Multigenerational Bonds. Vern L. Bengtson. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 63, No. 1. (Feb., 2001), pp. 1-16.
The Personal and Social Links between Age and Self-Reported Empathy. Scott Schieman; Karen Van Gundy. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Jun., 2000), pp. 152-174.
Status, Role, and Resource Explanations for Age Patterns in Psychological Distress (in Mental Health and Mental Illness). Scott Schieman; Karen van Gundy; John Taylor. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 42, No. 1. (Mar., 2001), pp. 80-96.
Perspectives on American Kinship in the Later 1990s (in Reviews). Colleen L. Johnson. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 62, No. 3. (Aug., 2000), pp. 623-639.
Religious Attendance and Subjective Well-Being among Older Americans: Evidence from the General Social Survey (in Religion and Mental Health). Steven E. Barkan; Susan F. Greenwood. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 45, No. 2. (Dec., 2003), pp. 116-129.
Biogerontology, “Anti-Aging Medicine,” and the Challenges of Human Enhancement. Eric T. Juengst; Robert H. Binstock; Maxwell Mehlman; Stephen G. Post; Peter Whitehouse. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 2003), pp. 21-30.
Staying Alive with Attitude (in Science News This Week). Bruce Bower. Science News, Vol. 162, No. 4. (Jul. 27, 2002), p. 53.
How and Why Do Aging and Life Span Evolve? Steven Hecht Orzack. Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, Supplement: Life Span: Evolutionary, Ecological, and Demographic Perspectives. (2003), pp. 19-38.
More about More Life (in Letters). Felicia Nimue Ackerman; Gems. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 33, No. 6. (Nov. - Dec., 2003), pp. 5-6.
Extending Life: Scientific Prospects and Political Obstacles. Richard A. Miller. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 1. (2002), pp. 155-174.
Life Course, Environmental Change, and Life Span. Jean-Marie Robine. Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, Supplement: Life Span: Evolutionary, Ecological, and Demographic Perspectives. (2003), pp. 229-238.
Aging and the Environment: A Research Framework (in Research; Mini-Monograph). Andrew M. Geller; Harold Zenick. Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 113, No. 9. (Sep., 2005), pp. 1257-1262.
The IMF on Policies Responding to Demographic Change (in Documents). Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 783-789.
The National Institute on Aging (in Views from Funding Agencies). Sidney M. Stahl. Medical Care, Vol. 36, No. 8. (Aug., 1998), pp. 1123-1125.
Aging in the Third Millennium (in Science’s Compass; Policy Forum). Edward L. Schneider. Science, New Series, Vol. 283, No. 5403. (Feb. 5, 1999), pp. 796-797.
Aging Parents Helping Adult Children: The Experience of the Sandwiched Generation. Berit Ingersoll-Dayton; Margaret B. Neal; Leslie B. Hammer. Family Relations, Vol. 50, No. 3. (Jul., 2001), pp. 262-271.
Aging Research: The Future Face of Environmental Health (in Environews; Focus). Tina Adler. Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 111, No. 14. (Nov., 2003), pp. A760-A765.
Patients’ Voices: The Powerful Sound in the Stem Cell Debate (in Stem Cell Research and Ethics; Viewpoints). Daniel Perry. Science, New Series, Vol. 287, No. 5457. (Feb. 25, 2000), p. 1423.
New Gene Therapy Fights Frailty (in Science News of the Week). Janet Raloff. Science News, Vol. 154, No. 25/26. (Dec. 19-26, 1998), p. 388.
Is More Life Always Better? The New Biology of Aging and the Meaning of Life. David Gems. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 2003), pp. 31-39.
Unproven Elixir. Ben Harder. Science News, Vol. 163, No. 19. (May 10, 2003), pp. 296-297+301.
Should America Save for Its Old Age? Fiscal Policy, Population Aging, and National Saving (in Symposium: Fiscal Policy). Douglas W. Elmendorf; Louise M. Sheiner. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Summer, 2000), pp. 57-74.
The Aging Baboon: Comparative Demography in a Non-Human Primate (in Biological Sciences). Anne M. Bronikowski; Susan C. Alberts; Jeanne Altmann; Craig Packer; K. Dee Carey; Marc Tatar. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 99, No. 14. (Jul. 9, 2002), pp. 9591-9595.
Alan Greenspan on the Economic Implications of Population Aging (in Documents). Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 779-783.
Neural Teamwork May Compensate for Aging (in Science News of the Week). Laura Helmuth. Science News, Vol. 155, No. 16. (Apr. 17, 1999), p. 247.
Calorie Restriction and Aging: A Life-History Analysis. Daryl P. Shanley; Thomas B. L. Kirkwood. Evolution, Vol. 54, No. 3. (Jun., 2000), pp. 740-750.
The Role of Parental Age Effects on the Evolution of Aging. Nicholas K. Priest; Benjamin Mackowiak; Daniel E. L. Promislow. Evolution, Vol. 56, No. 5. (May, 2002), pp. 927-935.
Intimations of Immortality (in Science’s Compass; Essays on Science and Society). John Harris. Science, New Series, Vol. 288, No. 5463. (Apr. 7, 2000), p. 59.
Wedding of Calm and Wedding of Noise: Aging Performed and Aging Misquoted in Tuareg Rites of Passage. Susan J. Rasmussen. Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 277-303.
Integrating Biology into the Study of Health Disparities (in Health and Socioeconomic Status). Eileen M. Crimmins; Teresa E. Seeman.
Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, Supplement: Aging, Health, and Public Policy. (2004), pp. 89-107.
Sex and Death (in Science’s Compass; Perspectives). David N. Reznick; Cameron Ghalambor. Science, New Series, Vol. 286, No. 5449. (Dec. 24, 1999), pp. 2458-2459.
The Embodiment of Old Women: Silences. Barbara Hillyer. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, Identity, the Body, and the Menopause. (1998), pp. 48-60.
Health Behaviors, Social Networks, and Healthy Aging: Cross-Sectional Evidence from the Nurses’ Health Study. Yvonne L. Michael; Graham A. Colditz; Eugenie Coakley; Ichiro Kawachi. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 8, No. 8. (Dec., 1999), pp. 711-722.
A Biodemographic Interpretation of Life Span (in Notes and Commentary). S. Jay Olshansky; Bruce A. Carnes; Jacob Brody. Population and Development Review, Vol. 28, No. 3. (Sep., 2002), pp. 501-513.
“It Just Isn’t Fair”: Helping Older Families Balance Their Ledgers before the Note Comes Due (in An Essay for Practitioners). Jonathan G. Sandberg. Family Relations, Vol. 48, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 177-179.
Population Aging and the Rising Cost of Public Pensions. John Bongaarts. Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, No. 1. (Mar., 2004), pp. 1-23. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/05%3A_Aging/5.07%3A_Reading_List_for_Part_IV.txt |
Note:
This module/section is an unpublished paper by a student at the University of Houston-Clear Lake who was in Ruth Dunn’s Minorities in America class in the fall of 2007. Ruth Dunn has the student’s permission to use the paper, but not to use the student’s name. Ruth Dunn has made some changes to the style, but not to the substance other than to remove some charts and graphs that are unnecessary for this discussion.
There are many different types of disabilities and disabled persons in the United States as well as throughout the world. While no one definition can adequately describe all disabilities, the universally-accepted definition describes a disability as any physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. (U.S. Department of Justice, ADA, 2007.) Determining whether a condition is recognized as a disability is decided on a case-by-case basis. (U.S. Department of Justice, ADA, 2007.) The term disability includes cognitive, developmental, intellectual, physical, and learning impairments. Some disabilities are congenital (present at birth), or the result of an accident or illness, or age-related. A person may be mildly or severely affected by their disability. Some examples of disabilities include attention deficit disorder, Down's syndrome, mental retardation, autism, deafness, blindness, dyslexia, paralysis, difficulty with memory, and brain injuries caused by trauma.
Disability Does Not Mean Inability
The term disability does not mean inability and it is not a sickness. (US National Library of Medicine, 2007.) Although many disabilities limit a person’s mobility and functionality, thousands of disabled individuals in the United States lead relatively normal lives which include working, playing, and socializing in a world designed for non-disabled persons. Many individuals in the public spotlight are, or were, disabled, including Helen Keller, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Senator Bob Dole, and entertainers Ray Charles and Stevie Wonder. The purpose of this research paper is to focus on employment of disabled persons in the United States, what the government has done over the past thirty years to assist and protect disabled individuals in the workplace, and what difference (if any) these changes have made for disabled persons.
Employment
Employment provides individuals with social integration as well as many different, positive feelings about themselves. Pride, independence, security, self confidence, and self worth are just a few examples of what having a job can mean and how it can affect one’s perception of self. For a person with a disability however, securing and retaining employment has not always been an easy endeavor. Statistics reported in the 2006 Disability Status Report published by Cornell University in Ithaca, New York revealed that in the United States, approximately 37.7 percent of working-age people had a disability. In Texas, this percentage was 12.7. The percentage of people with a disability who did not have jobs, but were actively looking for one was 8.7 percent. The poverty rate was listed at 25.3 percent for working-aged disabled individuals. (Rehabilitation Research and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics, 2006 Disability Status Report. Ithaca, NY; Cornell University.)
This study also revealed that the employment percentage of working-age individuals who are disabled but not institutionalized is only 19.3. The research found that the median annual household income for disabled persons was \$36,300 compared to \$60,000 for persons who were not disabled. In addition, in 2002, five hundred random interviews conducted with businesses across America revealed that most companies do not employ anyone with a disability. Specifically, only 26 percent of US business in 2002 had one employee with a disability. Twenty percent of employers interviewed admitted their own discrimination as the main reason for not hiring disabled individuals. Employers also stated they did not know how to find people with disabilities to hire; they did not know how to interview them; and they did not know how to address needed accommodations and assistive technology (i.e. TTY phone system; voice-activated computers and telephones). Other reasons were the assumptions that a disabled person could not perform to the standards of the business and it would be too costly to provide the necessary accommodations for the disabled person. (Rehabilitation Research and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics, 2006 Disability Status Report. Ithaca, NY; Cornell University.)
Discrimination
In an attempt to eliminate discrimination in the workplace against people with disabilities, the US Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was passed by the United States government. The provisions of the Act state that any government-funded organization must provide accessibility programs and services to disabled people. In 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was created and became effective in 1992. The ADA is a significant civil rights law designed to eliminate the obstacles of employment, stop discrimination, and guarantee education for disabled individuals. Its purpose is to protect qualified individuals with disabilities from being discriminated against in the employment areas of hiring; firing; job training and placement, and advancement; compensation; and any privileges of employment. The ADA applies to labor unions, employment agencies, private companies, restaurants, retails stores, movie theaters, and state and local governments which employ fifteen or more people. The ADA offers protection to persons with a physical or mental impairment which limits one or more of their life activities, and requires employers to extend reasonable accommodations to these persons. It also prohibits discrimination based solely on the opinion that the disabled person is a potential risk to the company (i.e. extensive illness). In the years since the ADA became a law, it has increased public awareness of disabled persons in the United States, assisted in improving the environment to accommodate disabilities, and advanced technological communications. (U.S. Department of Justice, ADA, 2007.)
Moreover, advocacy groups across the country continue striving to increase the percentage of employed disabled persons through programs which promote employer awareness and dispel myths surrounding the disabled community. The progress is slow, and data collected through research is the most effective tool to change skepticism in hiring into enthusiasm in hiring. These awareness programs highlight the abilities of the disabled person rather than their disability. Many employers are finally beginning to recognize the value a person has to offer rather than focusing on that person’s disability. The changing culture of today’s business world also makes it easier for a disabled person to get hired. Businesses are not as rigid as they were in the past and turnover is more rapid. New concepts put into place such as flexible work hours, working from home, and teleworking (videoconferences, net meetings, etc.) can all have a positive impact in the hiring of disabled persons.
Other resources that provide valuable information and assistance to employers and disabled persons are the internet and the advancement of technology. Government websites, as well as state-based websites now exist and offer instructions and assistance to disabled persons in the areas of employment, health care, education, taxes, job training, housing, transportation, emergency preparedness, benefits, technology, community life, and civil rights. Businesses can find websites that guide them through the process of locating, interviewing, and hiring disabled individuals. Several informative and useful websites are: DisabilityInfo.gov, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice/ADA home page, and the City of Houston eGovernment Center. Cutting edge technological advancements such as voice-recognition systems, voice synthesizers, computer screen readers, telecaptioners (closed captioning), and telephone TTY devices make it much easier for the disabled world to function and assimilate into the non-disabled world. Additionally, as more and more of these devices become commonplace, the stigmas associated with the disabled person will dissolve, and they will not be seen as different, unusual, unable individuals. Two excellent websites are the U.S. Department of Justice, ADA, and ABLEDATA. Both provide valuable information regarding these devices and how to purchase them which can aid in eliminating the stress, guesswork, dread, and overwhelmed feeling a person may face when he/she must deal with these issues.
Positive Images
Another positive stride in the employment of disabled persons over the past few years is their visibility in newspaper ads and television commercials. The national retail chains Home Depot, Walgreens Pharmacy, and CVS Pharmacy all promote hiring disabled individuals and encourage other businesses to do the same. Home Depot is one retailer who features disabled employees in many of their newspaper ads and television commercials. This marketing tool is encouraging to other disabled individuals because it illustrates success stories. It also demonstrates to other employers that disabled persons are competent, valuable employees who are easily integrated into the work environment. Randall’s and Kroger grocery stores also endorse hiring disabled persons to perform jobs such as stocking shelves, sacking groceries, and loading groceries into customer vehicles.
As visibility of competent, qualified, dependable disabled persons in the working environment increases, more business owners will have confidence in selecting future employees from the disabled community, thus creating social change and dissolving old stereotypes. Disabled individuals will be seen as valuable employees and will be afforded improved education, housing, and transportation opportunities. The disabled community will no longer be dependent on others to take care of them or speak for them. They will be independent members of society who have equality, autonomy, and confidence in knowing they are viable members of the world in which they live.
Almost one in five people has a disability. An estimated 19.4% of non-institutionalized civilians in the United States, totaling 8.9 million people, have a disability. Almost half of these people (an estimated 24.1 million people) can be considered to have a severe disability. Activities considered to be major are: children under age 5: playing; persons 5-17: attending school; persons 18-69: working or keeping house; People age 70 and over: ability to care for oneself (bathing, eating, dressing, or getting around the home) and one's home (doing household chores, doing necessary business, shopping, or getting around for other purposes) without another person's assistance. Almost one out of every seven people has an activity limitation. Activity limitation: In the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), each person is classified into one of four categories: (a) unable to perform the major activity, (b) able to perform the major activity but limited in the kind or amount of this activity, (c) not limited in the major activity but limited in the kind or amount of other activities, and (d) not limited in any way. The NHIS classifies people as limited (groups a-c) or not limited (group d). Persons are not classified as limited in activity unless one or more chronic health conditions are reported as the cause of the activity limitation (see also chronic health condition and major activity). An estimated 4.0% (9.2 million) of the non-institutionalized population age 5 and over in the United States need personal assistance with one or more activities. Over 5.8 million people need assistance in "instrumental activities of daily living" (IADL), while 3.4 million need assistance in "activities of daily living" (ADL). ADL includes bathing, dressing, eating, walking, and other personal functioning activities. IADL covers preparing meals, shopping, using the phone, doing laundry, and other measures of living independently. If someone has a need for assistance in ADL, it is assumed that they will have a need for assistance in IADL also. One in 25 people age 5 and over needs assistance in daily activities. The number of non-institutionalized people in the United States with a work disability is estimated to be 16.9 million, which represents 10.1% of the working age population (16 to 64 years old). Higher percentages of blacks are work disabled than whites or Hispanics: 15.4% of blacks have a work disability (3.2 million people) compared to 9.6% for people of Hispanic origin (1.6 million), 9.4% of whites (13 million) and 8.5% of other races (700,000). Work disability increases in frequency with age. At 16-24 years, 4.2% are work disabled; for 25-34 years, the proportion rises to 6.4%; for 35-44 years, 9.4%; from 45-54 years, 13.3%; and for 55-64 years, 22.9% are work disabled. Technical Note: The Hispanic category can include people of any race. Blacks report the highest rates of work disability.
Works Cited
1. ABLEDATA www.abledata.com/abledata.cfm...eep=2&trail=22
2. Disability Info. 2007.www.disabilityinfo.gov/digov-...rentFolderId=9
3. The Disability Rights Movement. 2000. http://americanhistory.si.edu/disabi...s/exhibit.html
4. Medline Plus http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/d...abilities.html
5. US National Library of Medicine and the National Institutes of Health. 2007.
6. Rehabilitation Research and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics. 2007. 2006 Disability Status Report. Ithaca, New York. Cornell University. www.ilr.cornell.edu/edi/disab...N=51397315#top
7. The U.S. Department of Justice, ADA Home Page. 2007. www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/adahom1.htm | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/06%3A_Disability/6.01%3A_Disability.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Course Objectives for Part V—Disability
Upon completion of this unit, you will be able to:
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss disability from a sociologically scientific perspective.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss the various aspects of disability.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss prejudice and discrimination based on disability and the various forms they take.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss theories of disability and the ongoing national debate concerning health care and job creation.
• Explain the impact of politics, the political process, as well as economic and social policies on the lives of people in the US based on their disability.
• Identify how disabilities impact peoples’ life chances in the United States.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical information concerning stratification/inequality by disability in the United States.
• Find and interpret demographic data about disability from valid and reliable sources.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical and historical information concerning treatment of the disabled in the workplace and in society at large in the US
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss statistical and historical information concerning treatment of the disabled in the political arena in the past and present in the US.
• Understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss popular media’s depiction of the disabled.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss legal policies concerning the disabled in the US.
• Find, read, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss the disabled found in peer reviewed scientific journal articles.
• Find, interpret, understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss common stereotypes concerning the disabled.
6.03: Study Guide for Part V
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Study Guide for Part IV—Aging
1. Identify and differentiate among various groups of the elderly
1. Young-old
2. Old
3. Old-old
4. Oldest-old
2. Discuss the aging process
1. Biological aging
2. Social aging
3. Identify and discuss social attitudes toward the elderly
1. Age-appropriate roles
2. Age-appropriate behavior
1. Clothing
2. Activity levels
3. Sexuality
1. STDs and the elderly
3. Health and illness
1. Ability of the elderly to care for themselves and others
2. Drug abuse and alcoholism
3. Alzheimer’s disease and dementia
4. Nursing homes
4. The portrayal of the elderly in popular media
4. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning aging and the elderly
5. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning the current legal status of the elderly in the United States
6. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning the historical legal status of the elderly in the United States
7. Discuss ageism and the forms that it takes in the US
8. Use the Internet to find and display information about anti-ageist political and social groups
1. The AARP
2. The Grey Panthers
3. Others
9. Identify and discuss theories of aging
1. Conflict theories of aging
2. Functionalist theories of aging
3. Symbolic interactionist theories of aging
10. Discuss Social Security and Medicare
11. Discuss theories of death and dying
12. Discuss euthanasia from social, political, and legal perspectives
1. Use the Internet to find and display information about euthanasia
6.04: Key Terms and Concepts for Part V
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Key Terms and Concepts for Part V—Disability
Accident or illness, or age-related
Activity limitation
ADA
Americans with Disabilities Act
Cognitive disability
Congenital disability
Degree of affectedness
Developmental disability
Disability
Disability and work
Erving Goffman’s stigma
Instrumental activities of daily living (IADL)
Intellectual disability
Learning impairments
Physical disability
Reasonable accommodations
Severe disability
TTY
US Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Work disability
6.05: Lecture Outline for Part V
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Lecture Material for Part V—Disability
1. Define disability and discuss the major forms it takes.
1. Physical versus cognitive disability
2. Disability in everyday life tasks
3. Disability of mobility
4. Instrumental activities of daily living (IADL)
2. Discuss stereotypes concerning the disabled.Discuss Irving Goffman’s Stigma
1. Discuss the historical time period and background of the theory
2. Discuss Goffman’s abominations of the body
3. Discuss the Americans with Disabilities Act.
4. Use the Internet to find and display statistical socioeconomic data concerning disabilities and the disabled in the United States.
5. Use the Internet to find and display statistical information concerning the current legal status of the disabled in the United States.
6. Use the Internet to find and display information about US Supreme Court decisions concerning the disabled.
6.06: Assignments for Part V
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Assignments for Part V—Disability
Essay: Discuss the Americans with Disabilities Act and the ways it impacts our everyday lives.
Essay: Discuss the various forms of stigma against the disabled.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about the disabled and the law in the United States.
Find on the Internet: Statistical data about the socioeconomic status of the disabled in the US.
In-Class Discussion: Do you know someone who is disabled? If so, what is there life like compared to yours?
In-Class Discussion: What are your stereotypes about the disabled?
In-Class Discussion: What is the Americans with Disabilities Act and how does it apply to our daily lives?
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Stigma by Erving Goffman.
Present to the Class: Statistical data about disabilities in the form of a chart.
Present to the Class: Statistical data about the disabled in the form of a chart.
Read: Stigma by Erving Goffman.
Read: The Americans with Disabilities Act.
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about the disabled.
Read: Three to five popular media articles each about the disabled.
Quiz: Definitions, Matching, Multiple Choice, True/False, Short Answer, Brief Essay | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/06%3A_Disability/6.02%3A_Course_Objectives_for_Part_V.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Reading List for Part V—Disability
Disability Studies: The Old and the New. Tanya Titchkosky. Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Spring, 2000), pp. 197-224.
Crips Strike Back: The Rise of Disability Studies. Lennard J. Davis. American Literary History, Vol. 11, No. 3. (Autumn, 1999), pp. 500-512.
Policy Watch: U.S. Disability Policy in a Changing Environment (in Features). Richard V. Burkhauser; Mary C. Daly. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1. (Winter, 2002), pp. 213-224.
“Space: The Final Frontier”: The Invisibility of Disability on the Landscape of Women Studies (in Frontiers Reconsidered). Karen P. DePauw. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3. (1996), pp. 19-23.
Toward a Theory of Disability and Gender. Thomas J. Gerschick. Signs, Vol. 25, No. 4, Feminisms at a Millennium. (Summer, 2000), pp. 1263-1268.
Spires, Wheelchairs and Committees: Organizing for Disability Advocacy at the Judicatory Level (in On Denominational Outreach Programs). Albert A. Herzog, Jr. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Jun., 2004), pp. 349-367.
Disability as Human Variation: Implications for Policy. Richard K. Scotch; Kay Schriner. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege? (Jan., 1997), pp. 148-159.
Geography for Disabled People? (in Commentary). B. J. Gleeson. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 2. (1996), pp. 387-396.
HIV/AIDS and Individuals with Disability (in Commentary). Nora Ellen Groce. Health and Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 2, Emerging Issues in HIV/AIDS. (2005), pp. 215-224.
Measurement Properties of the World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule (WHODAS II) in Stroke Survivors. Patrick J. Doyle; Luis Prieto; JoAnne Epping-Jordan; Somnath Chatterji; Bedirhan Ustun. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 9, No. 3, Abstracts: 7th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Mar., 2000), p. 321.
Governing Embodiment: Technologies of Constituting Citizens with Disabilities. Tanya Titchkosky. Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 28, No. 4. (Autumn, 2003), pp. 517-542.
Child Disability and Mothers’ Tubal Sterilization. Jennifer M. Park; Dennis P. Hogan; Frances K. Goldscheider. Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, Vol. 35, No. 3. (May - Jun., 2003), pp. 138-143.
Identifying the Population with Disability: The Approach of an INSEE Survey on Daily Life and Health (in Issues of Terminology, Data Collection, and Measurement). Jean-François Ravaud; Alain Letourmy; Isabelle Ville; Zoé Andreyev. Population (English Edition, 2002-), Vol. 57, No. 3. (May - Jun., 2002), pp. 529-552.
Generational Cohorts, Group Membership, and Political Participation by People with Disabilities. Lisa Schur; Todd Shields; Kay Schriner. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 3. (Sep., 2005), pp. 487-496.
The Reduction in Disability among the Elderly (in Commentaries). David M. Cutler. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 98, No. 12. (Jun. 5, 2001), pp. 6546-6547.
‘Women and Disability Don’t Mix!’: Double Discrimination and Disabled Women’s Rights. Lina Abu Habib. Gender and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, [Rights]. (Jun., 1995), pp. 49-53.
The Relationship between Self-Perception of a Learning Disability and Achievement, Self-Concept and Social Support. Howard R. Rothman; Merith Cosden. Learning Disability Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Summer, 1995), pp. 203-212.
Sexuality and Disability (in In Brief). Shanaaz Majiet. Agenda, No. 28, Women’s Sexuality. (1996), pp. 77-80.
# 1408/I Feel Good about Things: Positive Quality of Life Outcomes Following a Stroke. Deborah Buck; Ann Jacoby. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 12, No. 7, Abstracts: 10th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Nov., 2003), p. 766.
Who Is Protected by the ADA? Evidence from the German Experience. Mary C. Daly. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 101-116.
Ideology and Independent Living: Will Conservatism Harm People with Disabilities? Andrew I. Batavia. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 10-23.
A Selected Bibliography of Human Rights and Disability (in Bibliography). Aart Hendriks; Aldred H. Neufeldt; Ruth Mathieson. Health and Human Rights, Vol. 1, No. 2. (1995), pp. 212-225.
Self-Reported Work-Limitation Data: What They Can and Cannot Tell Us. Richard V. Burkhauser; Mary C. Daly; Andrew J. Houtenville; Nigar Nargis. Demography, Vol. 39, No. 3. (Aug., 2002), pp. 541-555.
Effects of Alcohol Consumption on Disability among the Near Elderly: A Longitudinal Analysis. Jan Ostermann; Frank A. Sloan. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 4. (2001), pp. 487-515.
Active Life Expectancy Estimates for the U.S. Elderly Population: A Multidimensional Continuous-Mixture Model of Functional Change Applied to Completed Cohorts, 1982-1996 (in Mortality and Morbidity among America’s Youngest and Oldest). Kenneth G. Manton; Kenneth C. Land. Demography, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Aug., 2000), pp. 253-265.
Mobility Problems and Perceptions of Disability by Self-Respondents and Proxy Respondents (in Brief Report). Lisa I. Iezzoni; Ellen P. McCarthy; Roger B. Davis; Hiliary Siebens. Medical Care, Vol. 38, No. 10. (Oct., 2000), pp. 1051-1057.
Is the ADA Successful? Indicators for Tracking Gains. Frederick C. Collignon. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 129-147.
Disability Identity and Attitudes toward Cure in a Sample of Disabled Activists. Harlan D. Hahn; Todd L. Belt. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 453-464.
Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work? Richard V. Burkhauser. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 71-83.
Meeting the Health Care Needs of Persons with Disabilities (in Commentary). Carolyn M. Clancy; Elena M. Andresen. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2. (2002), pp. 381-391.
Enabling Citizenship: Gender, Disability and Citizenship in Australia. Helen Meekosha; Leanne Dowse. Feminist Review, No. 57, Citizenship: Pushing the Boundaries. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 49-72.
Enabling Democracy: Disability and Voter Turnout. Lisa Schur; Todd Shields; Douglas Kruse; Kay Schriner. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 1. (Mar., 2002), pp. 167-190.
Becoming Visible: Lessons in Disability. Brenda Jo Brueggemann; Linda Feldmeier White; Patricia A. Dunn; Barbara A. Heifferon; Johnson Cheu. College Composition and Communication, Vol. 52, No. 3. (Feb., 2001), pp. 368-398.
“The (Im)Perfect Human Being” and the Beginning of Disability Studies in Germany: A Report. Carol Poore. New German Critique, No. 86. (Spring - Summer, 2002), pp. 179-190.
Special Supplement: The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing Reflections and Recommendations. Erik Parens; Adrienne Asch. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 29, No. 5. (Sep. - Oct., 1999), pp. S1-S22.
Disability in Theory: From Social Constructionism to the New Realism of the Body. Tobin Siebers. American Literary History, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 737-754.
Trends in Disability-Free Life Expectancy in the United States, 1970-90. Eileen M. Crimmins; Yasuhiko Saito; Dominique Ingegneri. Population and Development Review, Vol. 23, No. 3. (Sep., 1997), pp. 555-572.
State Bureaucratic Discretion and the Administration of Social Welfare Programs: The Case of Social Security Disability. Lael R. Keiser. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1999), pp. 87-106.
Employment Discrimination Laws for Disability: Utilization and Outcome. Nancy R. Mudrick. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege? (Jan., 1997), pp. 53-70.
Can I Make a Difference? Efficacy, Employment, and Disability. Lisa Schur; Todd Shields; Kay Schriner. Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1. (Mar., 2003), pp. 119-149.
In Sickness and in Health: An Annuity Approach to Financing Long-Term Care and Retirement Income. Christopher M. Murtaugh; Brenda C. Spillman; Mark J. Warshawsky. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 68, No. 2. (Jun., 2001), pp. 225-253.
Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability.” Samuel R. Bagenstos. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 3. (Apr., 2000), pp. 397-534.
Social Inequalities in Disability-Free Life Expectancy in the French Male Population, 1980-1991 (in Elderly Health Status and Mortality in Developed Countries). Emmanuelle Cambois; Jean-Marie Robine; Mark D. Hayward. Demography, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Nov., 2001), pp. 513-524.
The Future of Disability Policy: Benefit Payments or Civil Rights? William G. Johnson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 160-172.
Weighting Life Expectancy for Quality: Whose Values Count? P. Kind. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 4, No. 5, Second Annual Meeting of the International Society for Quality of Life Research: Abstracts of the Contributed Papers. (Oct., 1995), pp. 447-448.
Parasites, Pawns and Partners: Disability Research and the Role of Non-Disabled Researchers. Emma Stone; Mark Priestley. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 47, No. 4. (Dec., 1996), pp. 699-716.
The Factor Structure of the World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule (WHODAS II). Luis Prieto; Joanne E. Epping-Jordan; Patrick Doyle; Somnath Chatterji; Bedirhan T. Ustun. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 9, No. 3, Abstracts: 7th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Mar., 2000), p. 320.
Strong Regional Links between Socio-Economic Background Factors and Disability and Mortality in Oslo, Norway. Marit Aase Rognerud; Øystein Krüger; Finn Gjertsen; Dag Steinar Thelle. European Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 14, No. 5. (Jul., 1998), pp. 457-463.
Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Daron Acemoglu; Joshua D. Angrist. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, No. 5. (Oct., 2001), pp. 915-957.
Ableist Geographies, Disablist Spaces: Towards a Reconstruction of Golledge’s ‘Geography and the Disabled’ (in Commentary). Rob Imrie. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 2. (1996), pp. 397-403.
The Case of Disability in the Family: Impact on Health Care Utilization and Expenditures for Nondisabled Members. Barbara M. Altman; Philip F. Cooper; Peter J. Cunningham. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 1. (1999), pp. 39-75.
The League of the Physically Handicapped and the Great Depression: A Case Study in the New Disability History. Paul K. Longmore; David Goldberger. The Journal of American History, Vol. 87, No. 3. (Dec., 2000), pp. 888-922.
Canadians with Disabilities and the Labour Market. Derek Hum; Wayne Simpson. Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Sep., 1996), pp. 285-299.
Age, Disability, and the Sense of Mastery. Scott Schieman; Heather A. Turner. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 39, No. 3. (Sep., 1998), pp. 169-186.
The Labor Productivity Effects of Chronic Backache in the United States. John A. Rizzo; Thomas A. Abbott, III; Marc L. Berger. Medical Care, Vol. 36, No. 10. (Oct., 1998), pp. 1471-1488.
The Effect of Disabilities on Exits from AFDC (in Disabilities and AFDC). Gregory Acs; Pamela Loprest. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 1. (Winter, 1999), pp. 28-49.
The Employment of People with and without Disabilities in an Age of Insecurity. Edward H. Yelin. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 117-128.
Disability as a Public Health Issue: Findings and Reflections from the Massachusetts Survey of Secondary Conditions. Nancy Wilber; Monika Mitra; Deborah Klein Walker; Deborah Allen; Allan R. Meyers; Paul Tupper. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2. (2002), pp. 393-421.
Epidemiological Aspects of Ageing. Kay-Tee Khaw. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, Vol. 352, No. 1363, Ageing: Science, Medicine, and Society. (Dec. 29, 1997), pp. 1829-1835.
Enabling Legislation or Dissembling Law? The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (in Legislation). Brian Doyle. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 1. (Jan., 1997), pp. 64-78.
Conscientization and the Cultural Politics of Education: A Radical Minority Perspective. Susan Peters; Robert Chimedza. Comparative Education Review, Vol. 44, No. 3. (Aug., 2000), pp. 245-271.
Not Disabled Enough: The ADA’s “Major Life Activity” Definition of Disability (in Notes). Michelle T. Friedland. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Nov., 1999), pp. 171-203.
Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?. Marjorie L. Baldwin. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 37-52.
Pathways to Disability Income among Persons with Severe, Persistent Psychiatric Disorders. Sue E. Estroff; Donald L. Patrick; Catherine R. Zimmer; William S. Lachicotte, Jr. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 4. (1997), pp. 495-532.
Canadian Federalism and Disability Policy Making. Michael J. Prince. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 34, No. 4, Citizenship and National Identity / Citoyennete et identité nationale. (Dec., 2001), pp. 791-817.
Visible Disability in the College Classroom. Mark Mossman. College English, Vol. 64, No. 6. (Jul., 2002), pp. 645-659.
Cumulative Disadvantage and Health: Long-Term Consequences of Obesity? Kenneth F. Ferraro; Jessica A. Kelley-Moore. American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, No. 5. (Oct., 2003), pp. 707-729.
Falling Through the Gap: Women with Mild Learning Disabilities and Self-Harm (in Dialogue). Samantha Downie. Feminist Review, No. 68, Women and Mental Health. (Summer, 2001), pp. 177-180.
Benefits, Bodily Functions and Living with Disability (in Cases). Nick Wikeley. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 4. (Jul., 1998), pp. 551-560.
The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation (in Essay). Samuel R. Bagenstos. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 6. (Oct., 2001), pp. 1479-1514.
Long Term Consequences of Neuromuscular Diseases: Sustaining Quality of Life with Severe Disability. Luc P. de Witte; Dominique J. Tilli. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 9, No. 3, Abstracts: 7th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Mar., 2000), p. 283.
What Happens after the High School Years among Young Persons with Disabilities? Thomas Wells; Gary D. Sandefur; Dennis P. Hogan. Social Forces, Vol. 82, No. 2. (Dec., 2003), pp. 803-832.
The Long-Run Consumption Effects of Earnings Shocks. Melvin Stephens Jr. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 83, No. 1. (Feb., 2001), pp. 28-36.
Health Trajectories: Long-Term Dynamics Among Black and White Adults . Kenneth F. Ferraro; Melissa M. Farmer; John A. Wybraniec. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Mar., 1997), pp. 38-54.
Empirical Dimensions of Discrimination against Disabled People. Aldred H. Neufeldt. Health and Human Rights, Vol. 1, No. 2. (1995), pp. 174-189.
Case Study: Society’s Diseases. Diana Puñales Moréjon; Marsha Saxton. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 26, No. 3. (May - Jun., 1996), pp. 21-22.
What Can Disability Studies Learn from the Culture Wars? Tobin Siebers, Cultural Critique, No. 55. (Autumn, 2003), pp. 182-216.
Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Psychiatric Disability (in Comments). Stephanie Proctor Miller. California Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 3. (May, 1997), pp. 701-747.
Siblings of Adults with Mental Retardation or Mental Illness: Effects on Lifestyle and Psychological Well-Being (in Type of Disability). Marsha Mailick Seltzer; Jan S. Greenberg; Marty Wyngaarden Krauss; Rachel M. Gordon; Katherine Judge. Family Relations, Vol. 46, No. 4, Family Caregiving for Persons with Disabilities. (Oct., 1997), pp. 395-405.
Factor Structure of the Disability and Impact Profile in Patients with Multiple Sclerosis. L. Cohen; F. Pouwer; L. E. M. A. Pfennings; G. J. Lankhorst; H. M. van der Ploeg; C. H. Polman; H. J. Adèr; A. Jønnson; L. Vleugels. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 8, No. 1/2. (Mar., 1999), pp. 141-150.
Statutory Interpretation. Americans with Disabilities Act. Fourth Circuit Holds That Asymptomatic HIV Cannot Constitute a Disability. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N. A., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (En banc) (in Recent Cases). Harvard Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 3. (Jan., 1998), pp. 843-848. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/06%3A_Disability/6.07%3A_Reading_List_for_Part_V.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Course Objectives for Part VI—Hate Kills! The Consequences of Bigotry
Upon completion of this unit, students will be able to:
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss expulsion and genocide from a sociologically scientific perspective.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss expulsion and genocide and be able to differentiate between them.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss the various aspects of expulsion and genocide.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss dominant and minority groups and differentiate between them.
• Read about, find, identify, interpret, understand, explain, critique, define, present factually and persuasively, and write about and/or discuss prejudice and discrimination and the various forms they take.
• Understand, analyze, critique, and write about and/or discuss popular media’s interpretation of expulsion and genocide.
7.02: Study Guide for Part VI
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Study Guide for Part VI—Hate Kills! The Consequences of Bigotry
• Be able to define and discuss stratification/inequality stratification
• The unequal distribution of the goods of society
• Wealth, power, status
• Social inequality
• A system in which people are denied access to the goods of society based on their group membership
• Define, discuss, and give examples of master status
• Review master statusRace or ethnicity, sex or gender, age, religion, disability, and SESSES
• Socioeconomic Status= income+education+occupation
• Define and discuss SES
• What is SES and how does it impact peoples’ lives?
• The stratification hierarchy
• Where someone is placed in terms of access to wealth, power, and status
• Based on various aspects of their master status
• How does the stratification hierarchy affect
• Racial and ethnic minorities?
• Women?
• Sexual orientation minorities?
• Religious minorities?
• The disabled?
• Define Thomas’s Theorem and explain how it relates to issues of stratification/inequality
• How do our concepts of reality affect the way we judge others?
• Discuss the ways in which the human mind creates social categories
• Define and discuss stereotypes
• How many stereotypes about groups other than your own can you list?
• Are any of these stereotypes true?
• Why or why not?
• How many stereotypes about your own group can you list?
• Are any of these stereotypes true?
• Why or why not?
• Look at the World Demographic “Clock” and explain what it shows
• What did you learn from this that you did not know before?
• Find data that break down world demographics into percentages.“If the World Were a Village of 100 People.”
• If the World Were a Village of 100 People
• If the World Were a Village of 100 People (2)
• If the World Were a Village of 100 People (YouTube video)
• Define, discuss, and give examples of Infant Mortality Rates, Literacy Rates, Life Expectancy, and GDP/GNP in the richest and poorest nations in the world
• The World Health Organization
• The United Nations
• Define, discuss, and give examples of expulsion
• The Trail of Tears
• Japanese-American internment
• Define, dicusss, and give examples of genocide
• UN Convention on Genocide
• The Crime of Genocide
• Genocide: Meaning and Definition | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/07%3A_Hate_Kills_-_The_Consequences_of_Bigotry/7.01%3A_Course_Objectives_for_Part_VI.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Key Terms and Concepts for Part VI—Hate Kills! The Consequences of Bigotry
“The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line”
“You’ve Got To Be Carefully Taught”
Apartheid
Ascribed master status
Ascribed status
Assimilation
Bigotry
Categorical ideas
Conflict Perspective
Consequences of racism
Direct personal discrimination
Discrimination
Dominant group
Essential characteristics of groups
Ethnicity
Ethnocentrism
Expulsion
Functionalist Perspective
Genocide
Gordon W. Allport
Japanese-American relocation
Korematsu Decision
Laws of association
Majority status is unmarked or unstigmatized
Mental categories
Minority group
Minority status
Minority-Majority country
Patterns of primary and secondary structural assimilation
Pogroms
Power
Prejudice
Primary structural assimilation
Race
Racism
Secondary structural assimilation
Social construct
Stereotypes
Structural discrimination
Symbolic Interactionism
Thomas’s Theorem
Trail of Tears
Tribal stigma
7.04: Lecture Outline for Part VI
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Lecture Material for Part IV—Hate Kills! The Consequences of Bigotry
• Review Master Status.
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of race.
• Socially defined.
• A social construct.
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of ethnicity.
• How are these divisions determined?
• Why do we make these divisions?
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of dominant group and dominant group status.
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of minority groups and minority group status.
• Discuss and give examples of bigotry against minority groups.
• Assimilation.
• Define and discuss cultural assimilation.
• Define and discuss structural assimilation.
• Primary
• Secondary
• Definitions, discussion, and examples of expulsion and genocide.
• Use the Internet to display data about expulsion and genocide.
• Historical and current.
7.05: Assignments for Part VI
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Suggested Assignments for Part VI—Hate Kills! The Consequences of Bigotry
Essay: Discuss expulsion and genocide in terms of information from peer reviewed journals.
Essay: Discuss expulsion and genocide in terms of information from popular media articles.
Essay: Discuss the differences and similarities in the findings of peer reviewed articles and popular media articles concerning the racial/ethnic disparities involved in expulsion and genocide.
Find on the Internet: examples of expulsion and genocide throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of bigotry and prejudice.
In-Class Discussion: Identify examples of expulsion and genocide.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: A Problem from Hell by Samantha Power.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: A Problem from Hell by Samantha Power.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Hiroshima by John Hersey.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Night by Elie Weisel.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: When Justice Failed by Steven A, Chin
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Farewell to Manzanar by Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston, James D. Houston
Oral Book Review and Discussion: Trail of Tears: The Rise and Fall of the Cherokee Nation by John Ehle.
Oral Book Review and Discussion: We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories From Rwanda by Philip Gourevitch
Present to the Class: A timeline of expulsion and genocide in the form of a chart.
Read: A Problem from Hell by Samantha Power.
Read: Hiroshima by John Hersey.
Read: Night by Elie Weisel.
Read: When Justice Failed by Steven A, Chin
Read: Farewell to Manzanar by Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston, James D. Houston
Read: Trail of Tears: The Rise and Fall of the Cherokee Nation by John Ehle.
Read: We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories From Rwanda by Philip Gourevitch
Read: Three to five peer reviewed articles about expulsion and genocide.
Quizzes: Definitions, Matching, Multiple Choice, True/False, Short Answer, Brief Essay | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/07%3A_Hate_Kills_-_The_Consequences_of_Bigotry/7.03%3A_Key_Terms_and_Concepts_for_Part_VI.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Reading List for Part VI—Hate Kills! The Consequences of Bigotry
DOUGLASS : British Historical Doc., “Proclamation of Rebellion,” 23 August 1775. http://douglassarchives.org/proc_a52.htm. Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/11/2005 2:58:23 PM
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Women’s Rights are Human Rights,” 5 September 1995. Occasion: Remarks to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women Plenary Session in Beijing, China. http://douglassarchives.org/clin_a64.htm. Retrieved (1 of 6) 6/11/2005 2:57:08 PM
Martin Luther King, “I Have a Dream,” 28 August 1963. http://douglassarchives.org/king_b12.htm. Retrieved (1 of 5) 6/25/2005 5:03:28 PM
W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, “The Evolution of Negro Leadership,” 16 July 1901. http://douglassarchives.org/dubo_a09.htm. Retrieved (1 of 4) 6/11/2005 3:00:08 PM
American Experience: Scottsboro: An American Tragedy. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/scottsboro. Retrieved 5/27/2007 4:27:40 PM
American Experience: Zoot Suit Riots. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/zoot/. Retrieved 5/27/2007 4:23:57 PM
Dare to Compare: Americanizing the Holocaust. Lilian Friedberg. American Indian Quarterly/ Summer 2000/vol. 24, no. 3.
Darfur Eyewitness: Brian Steidle, www.ushmm.org/conscience/aler...FRaHgQodsyXAJA . Retrieved (1 of 4)5/27/2007 4:31:28 PM
Darfur: A Genocide We Can Stop. www.darfurgenocide.org/. Retrieved (1 of 2)5/27/2007 4:33:03 PM
Exploring Japanese American Internment. http://www.asianamericanmedia.org/jainternment/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/27/2007 4:29:38 PM
FGC Education and Networking Project. http://www.fgmnetwork.org/index.php. Retrieved (1 of 8) 5/27/2007 4:35:34 PM
Promising Democracy, Imposing Theocracy: Gender-Based Violence and the US War on Iraq. Yifat Susskind, MADRE Communications Director. http://www.madre.org/articles/me/iraqreport.html
20th Century Genocides. www.unitedhumanrights.org/Gen...e_massacre.htm. Retrieved 5/27/2007 5:18:55 PM
History of the Holocaust, Jewish Holocaust, the Nazi Holocaust, Human Rights Violations. www.unitedhumanrights.org/Gen..._holocaust.htm. Retrieved (1 of 9) 5/27/2007 5:17:44 PM
Holocaust Encyclopedia. http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/?gclid=C...FRsYIwodYCJRNQ. Retrieved 5/28/2007 1:37:39 PM
A Dream Denied: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities. A Report by The National Coalition For The Homeless And The National Law Center On Homelessness & Poverty. http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publ...ort/index.html
Human Rights 50th Anniversary / Universal Declaration. www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm. Retrieved (1 of 8) 6/11/2005 3:10:38 PM
Internet Archive: Details: USA on Trial. http://www.archive.org/details/ddtv_131_usa_on_trial. Retrieved 7/8/2007 1:21:51 PM
Last Year (2006) One of Worst Ever for Refugees-UNHCR Chief | Reuters. uk.reuters.com/article/homepa..._.242020070620. Retrieved (1 of 4)6/20/2007 3:34:30 PM
Massacre At Wounded Knee, 1890. http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/knee.htm. Retrieved (1 of 6) 5/27/2007 5:13:04 PM
Power, Samantha. “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide. Perennial, New York: 2003. ISBN: 0-06-054164-4.
Campaign To End Racial Profiling 07: Smarter Policing Practices—Creating a Safer, More Unified Texas: Racial Profiling in Texas. criminaljusticecoalition.org/...texas_2007.pdf
2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons. www.rms.org.nz/document/UNHCR...nds%202006.pdf.
NPR : Remembering the Tuskegee Experiment. www.npr.org/programs/morning/.../jul/tuskegee/. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/27/2007 5:28:47 PM
The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women. Jane Lawrence. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Summer, 2000), pp. 400-419.
The Rights of Man by Thomas Paine. http://www.ushistory.org/paine/rights/index.htm. Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/12/2005 4:12:43 PM
The Seneca Falls Declaration on Women’s Rights. http://search.eb.com/women/pri/Q00172.html. Retrieved (1 of 5) 6/11/2005 3:11:47 PM
Trafficking in Human Beings. www.unodc.org/unodc/en/traffi...an_beings.html. Retrieved (1 of 4) 5/27/2007 4:37:57 PM
Trafficking In Persons Home Page. http://www.traffickinginpersons.com/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/27/2007 4:36:41 PM
Trail of Tears Commemorative Park. http://www.trailoftears.org/. Retrieved (1 of 6) 5/27/2007 5:09:26 PM
Trail of Tears National Historic Trail - Trail of Tears National Historic Trail (U.S. National Park Service). http://www.nps.gov/trte/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/27/2007 5:10:25 PM
UNHCR - The UN Refugee Agency. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home. Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/20/2007 3:32:52 PM
UNHCR - UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2005. http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STAT...464478a72.html. Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/20/2007 3:40:05 PM
WHO | Female Genital Mutilation. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/27/2007 4:34:48 PM
Wounded Knee: The Museum. www.woundedkneemuseum.org/index.htm. Retrieved 5/27/2007 5:11:16 PM | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/07%3A_Hate_Kills_-_The_Consequences_of_Bigotry/7.06%3A_Reading_List_for_Part_VI.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Part VI—Hate Kills!
Consequences of Bigotry
As with many aspects of society, there are consequences of racism. One consequence is expulsion which is the removal of a minority group from inside national boundaries to outside national boundaries. Some examples of expulsion are the “Trail of Tears” and the pogroms carried out against the Jews by Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish Cossacks, and the “alien” relocation of more than 120,000 Japanese-Americans during WW II.
The Trail of Tears
In 1838 and 1839 the native American people called the Cherokee were forcibly removed by military force from their traditional lands east of the Mississippi River and along the Blue Ridge Mountains of Georgia. By the time of their expulsion from the United States and resettlement in Indian Territory in Oklahoma the Cherokee were a highly assimiliated/Europeanized group. They had stable agricultural settlements, bilingual schools where children learned both Cherokee and English, and their own written language and newspaper.
According to the New Georgia Encylopedia1:
In the 1820s and 1830s Georgia conducted a relentless campaign to remove the Cherokees. Between 1827 and 1831 the Georgia legislature extended the state's jurisdiction over Cherokee territory and set in motion a process to seize the Cherokee land, divide it into parcels, and offer the parcels in a lottery to white Georgians. The discovery of gold on Cherokee territory in 1829 further fueled the desire of Georgians to possess their land. The following year Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, which authorized U.S. president Andrew Jackson to negotiate removal treaties with Native American tribes. Ross and other leaders fought government efforts to separate the Cherokees from their land and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. In Worcester v. Georgia (1832) the Court held that the Cherokee Indians constituted a nation holding distinct sovereign powers, but the decision would not protect the Cherokees from removal.
The Cherokee called this illegal, forcible removal The Trail of Tears because they were force-marched in the winter without sufficient clothing, shelter, or food. More than 4,000 people died along the way.2
Japanese Exclusion and Expulsion
From the 15th century through the 19th century, Japan was a xenophobic, feudal society, ostensibly governed by a God-Emperor, but in reality ruled by ruthless, powerful Shoguns. Japan’s society changed little during the four centuries of samurai culture, and it was cut off from the rest of the world in self-imposed isolation, trading only with the Portuguese, Spanish, English, and Chinese, and then not with all of them at once, often using one group as middlemen to another group. In the mid-19th century, (1854), the United States government became interested in trading directly with Japan in order to open up new export markets and to import Japanese goods at low prices uninflated by middleman add-ons. Commodore Matthew Perry was assigned to open trade between the United States and Japan. With a flotilla of war ships, Perry crossed the Pacific and berthed his ships off the coast of the Japanese capital. Perry sent letters to the emperor that were diplomatic but insistent. Perry had been ordered not to take no for an answer, and when the emperor sent Perry a negative response to the letters, Perry maneuvered his warships into positions that would allow them to fire upon the major cities of Japan. The Japanese had no armaments or ships that could compete with the Americans, and so, capitulated to Perry. Within thirty years, Japan was almost as modernized as its European counterparts. They went from feudalism to industrialism almost over night.
Within a few years of the trade treaty between the United States and Japan, a small but steady trickle of Japanese immigrants flowed across the Pacific Ocean. This migration to the West Coast of the United States meant that Japanese immigrants were in economic competition with the resident population, most of whom were white. Fears of economic loss led the whites to petition Congress to stop the flow of immigrants from Japan, and in 1911 Congress expanded the Asian Exclusionary Act to include Japanese thereby stopping all migration from Japan into the United States. In 1914, Congress passed the National Origins Act which cut off all migration from East Asia.3
On December 7, 1941, at 7:55 A.M. local time the Japanese fleet in the South Pacific launched 600 hundred aircraft in a surprise attack against U.S. Naval forces at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Within four hours, 2, 400 people, mostly military personnel had been killed, including the 1,100 men who will be entombed forever in the wreckage of the U.S.S. Arizona when it capsized during the attack. Although this was a military target, the United States was not at war when the attack occurred. In less than six months after the attack, Congress passed the Japanese Relocation Act. Below, is reproduced the order that was posted in San Francisco.
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN RELOCATION ORDER
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN RELOCATION ORDER
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Presidio of San Francisco, California
May 3, 1942
INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY
Living in the Following Area:
All of that portion of the City of Los Angeles, State of California, within that boundary beginning at the point at which North Figueroa Street meets a line following the middle of the Los Angeles River; thence southerly and following the said line to East First Street; thence westerly on East First Street to Alameda Street; thence southerly on Alameda Street to East Third Street; thence northwesterly on East Third Street to Main Street; thence northerly on Main Street to First Street; thence north-westerly on First Street to Figueroa Street; thence northeasterly on Figueroa Street to the point of beginning.
Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 33, this Headquarters, dated May 3, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., Saturday, May 9, 1942.
No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., Sunday, May 3, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding General, Southern California Sector, at the Civil Control Station located at
Japanese Union Church,
120 North San Pedro Street,
Los Angeles, California
SEE CIVILIAN EXCLUSION ORDER NO. 33
Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a family, or in cases of grave emergency.
The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:
1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.
2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real estate, business and professional equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock.
3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.
4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.
The Following Instructions Must Be Observed:
1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further instructions. This must be done between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Monday, May 4, 1942, or between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Tuesday, May 5, 1942.
2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Assembly Center, the following property:
(a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family;
(b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
(c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;
(d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each member of the family;
(e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.
All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.
3. No pets of any kind will be permitted.
4. No personal items and no household goods will be shipped to the Assembly Center.
5. The United States Government through its agencies will provide for the storage, at the sole risk of the owner, of the more substantial household items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.
6. Each family, and individual living alone will be furnished transportation to the Assembly Center or will be authorized to travel by private automobile in a supervised group. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.
Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Monday, May 4, 1942, or between the hours of
8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M.,
Tuesday, May 5, 1942, to receive further instructions.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding
This map shows the location of the American concentration camps where Japanese Americans were interned during WWII.
Figure 1.
In 1943, Fred Korematsu, with the assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit in federal court arguing that it was unConstitutional to deprive American citizens of the their civil rights without due process of law. The Supreme Court of the United States decided that, in times of great national strife, it was Constitutional to deprive one specific segment of the population of their civil rights because of the potential for harm by that specific group. You might be interested to know that this decision has never been overturned, which means that it is still the law of the land.
Genocide
Genocide, however, is the most egregious and monstrous example of bigotry. According to “The United Nations 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Genocide [is defined] as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: A. Killing members of the group; B. Causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group; C. Deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or in part; D. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; E. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group45
Social critic, author, philosopher, and Nobel Peace Prize winner Elie Wiesel, has argued that the 20th century was the most genocidal century in the history of humankind, with 174 million non-combatants dead.67
Many estimates give the number of 20th century victims of genocidal violence at 174 million dead.8 This would be as if the entire population of the 15 most populous states in the US were to be killed. So that California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Georgia, New Jersey, Virginia, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Minnesota would cease to exist. “The 174 million murdered by government [between] 1900 and 1990 would, [if laid head to toe] circle the earth four times.9
King Leopold of Belgium
Perhaps the genocide of the 20th century really had its beginnings in the 19th century when King Leopold II of Belgium personally owned all of Central Africa—the Congo! From 1880 until 1920, more than 20 million Congolese natives had been murdered by the Belgian soldiers loyal to Leopold. It is unknown how many millions were maimed in a deliberate terror campaign that left entire villages—every man, woman, and child—without hands, or arms, or legs. All this wanton destruction of human life and human productivity occurred because Leopold believed the native slave labor was not sufficiently productive and was not making him rich enough. In 40 years, half of the population of the Congo was murdered!101112
The Armenian Genocide
In 1915, under the orders of Mehmed Talaat the Turkish Minister of the Interior, the Muslim Turkish army crossed the borders it shares with Christian Armenia. Within a year, 1.5 million Armenians who had been forced out of their homes were dead, many of starvation. While the Armenian refugees were forced to flee in vast numbers, the Turkish government sanctioned hanging in order to engender terror. The Turkish government also stole or destroyed crops and food stuffs so that starvation became the primary way of death.131415
The Soviet Gulags
In the Soviet Union Gulags, between 1917and 1977, 62 million people are thought to have been murdered. The Gulags were prison camps for political dissidents in the Soviet Union. Under Stalin’s rule, the Gulags were filled to capacity and new ones had to be built continuously to accommodate the vast numbers of people who were purged from the body politic. The vast majority of those sent to the Gulags were political prisoners. The barracks were large but poorly made—even though winters in Siberia are brutally cold, many buildings had no sides. Prisoners were used as slave labor which included digging post holes in almost-frozen ground in early winter, and building new rail lines for more prisoners. Prisoners often built their own barracks, often being forced to use extremely shoddy material. If the bad food or starvation diet, lack of medical care, dangerous work, and brutal beatings didn’t kill the prisoners, sometimes the weather did: many prisoners froze to death. The only headstones for the graveyards where most prisoners ended up were rough wooden posts made by the friends of those who had died.1617
The Burning of “Little Africa”
In 1923, a large white mob invaded and burned to the ground the large African American suburb in Tulsa, Oklahoma. No white perpetrator was arrested, although millions of dollars in property was destroyed and an unknown number of lives were lost. The local newspapers blamed the blacks for provoking the violence. In fact, many blacks were arrested or held during the conflagration. The smoke rising into the air from the fires covered a huge geographical area: in one photograph from the time, the caption reads “Little Africa burns.” African Americans were rounded up and arrested or held while their neighborhoods burned. Even the elderly were not spared, one photo in a Tulsa newspaper of the time shows an elderly man standing in the midst of a pile of burnt rubble in what used to be his house. Where homes once stood, there is only devastation. African Americans who gathered to try to stop the fires were arrested and marched down the streets. Many of the photographs bear an eerie resemblance to scenes of bombed towns and villages in World Wars I and II. Even God wasn’t immune from the violence and destruction; there is a photograph that shows a large African American church burning. The mob carried, and used, weapons in order to make sure that no one would interfere and forcibly removed African Americans from their homes. 181920
The Destruction of Rosewood, Florida
In January 1923, a white mob in east-central Florida, enraged by unfounded rumors of the attack on a white woman by a black man, assaulted the small, all-African American community of Rosewood, killed 8, and, as in Tulsa, burned the entire town to the ground. The night before the raid on Rosewood a Ku Klux Klan rally was held just outside of the nearby white town. The neighborhoods of Rosewood lay in smoldering ruins and the white mob spared nothing, not even the shacks of poor sharecroppers. 21222324
The Nazi Holocaust
When we think of genocide in the 20th century, the Holocaust is our model of its evil. In the 12 years of Nazi rule from 1933-1945, nearly 20 million non-combatants were killed—14 million in the camps, where six to seven million Jews were murdered, and six to seven million others including Muslims, Latvians, Estonians, Gypsies, Homosexuals, Communists, and Poles were also among the slaughtered. The gate to Auschwitz, one of the most heinous of all the death camps, had a sign that “greeted” new arrivals—the sign read, Arbeit Macht Frei, “Work will make you free!” As many as 100,000 prisoners a day met their deaths in the showers that were filled with Zyklon B, a deadly gas. The ovens were used to burn the remains. After D-Day however, the ovens were sometimes used to burn people alive. Many of the ovens used to cremate both the living and the dead were manufactured by firms who made ovens for commercial bakeries. 2526272829
Kristallnacht
The Warsaw Ghetto, home to Polish Jews for centuries, was a battle ground where Jews tried to hide, to protect each other, and to resist Nazi domination. Even though not all the Jews had been removed, the ghetto was eventually burned to the ground. One night in November 1938, military men, SS officers, and mobs of thugs attacked the Jewish sections of many Eastern European cities. For hours they walked through the streets breaking all the glass in every building they passed. Jews all over the world remember that night as Kristallnacht—the Night of Broken Glass—and on the anniversary of that event, Jews gather together to pledge their eternal vigilance and resistance to such terror ever again occurring. On Kristallnacht, a synagogue burned to the ground, while firefighters and neighbors stood by and watched. German-Jewish children were singled out for humiliation in their schools. 303132
Children were also victims of the Nazi “medical experiments” at Auschwitz and other death camps and there are photographs that show children who have been burned deliberately. The so-called medical experiments of the Nazis, such as the amputations and mutilations shown in some photos, were thinly veiled torture conducted without anesthetic. The Nazis didn’t confine their murders only to those they had imprisoned in the camps. There is one photograph that shows Russian civilians who were forced to dig the trench into which their bodies fell when shot by German soldiers. There were thousands of bodies found in mass graves all over Europe after the war, but one of the sites of such atrocities was Babi Yar in the Soviet Union where 30,000 non-combatants were slain in two terrible days, September 28-29, 1941.333435
Many bodies of the dead at places like Dachau death camp were thrown into a heap like badly stacked cord wood. Hundreds of starving prisoners were found by the Allied forces at the liberation of the concentration and death camps. So that they could maintain order and efficiency, the Nazis tattooed on the arm everyone in the camps. These tattoo numbers were entered into the extensive files that the Nazis kept. Holocaust victims were often forced to dig their own graves. Sometimes, however, there was no one left alive to bury the dead who were thrown by their murderers into the pits that the victims themselves had dug. The photo shows bodies thrown into an open pit at Auschwitz shortly before the allied troops arrived.363738
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
I am not arguing here that the American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were genocide or that they were in any way meant by anyone to be genocide. What I am arguing here is that the US is, as of early 2010, the only nation on earth to use nuclear weapons against human beings. Currently (February 2010) Iran is claiming to have fissionable material as is North Korea. It is clear that the use of a nuclear weapon would result in massive loss of human life and the destruction of huge amounts of property as well as a crisis of confidence: anomie would ensue, and the repercussions could be horrendous. What used to be the unthinkable (MAD—mutual assured destruction) during the Cold War has now become a possible scenario because of terrorism and what the world calls “loose nukes”—those nuclear weapons that are not under the strict control of a powerful nation-state. 39404142 How this will play out, no one knows. How this will play out, know one wants to find out.
Although there is still a great deal of controversy surrounding the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, what remains an incontrovertible truth is that the United States of America is the only nation on the face of the earth to ever use nuclear weapons against human beings. The Enola Gay, named after the mother of the pilot, dropped the first of only two nuclear weapons ever used against human beings. It was the first time in human history that such a weapon of mass destruction was used. The United States government argued that it was necessary to use such a weapon in order to end WW II. Many historians agree with that assessment. However, many, including Albert Einstein whose work led to the creation of the A-Bomb, and J. Robert Oppenheimer, who was responsible for building the A-Bomb, did not agree and spent the remainder of their lives after Hiroshima trying to halt nuclear proliferation.
On August 6, 1945, the B-29 Enola Gay, dropped an A-Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. Three days later, on August 9, 1945, Commander Bock, in his B-29 nicknamed “Bock’s Car” dropped the second A-Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan. The living fell dead in their tracks. Four square miles of the city of Hiroshima were virtually obliterated in a matter of minutes. The eerie shell of one large, domed structure was the only thing to remain standing after the bomb fell on Hiroshima. The center of Hiroshima, which was the target, was populated by non-combatant civilians. Those who survived the blast were horribly burned and maimed. Makeshift hospitals were set up in the outskirts of the city in order to care for the survivors, many of whom died from their burns or from radiation sickness within days or weeks of the bombing. There was no reconstructive surgery and the burn victims were often hideously scarred for life. The medical, emergency, and educational infrastructure was destroyed in the bombing. One photo from after the bombing shows a badly scarred and deformed child getting lessons in the ruins of a school. The last survivor of the bombings, Tsutomu Yamaguchi, died in January 2010 at the age of 93. 434445464748
The Killing Fields of Cambodia
Cambodia is still known as the killing fields, which is a reference to the murder of two million Cambodians (25% of the population) by the Communist insurgent paramilitary group known as the Khmer Rouge, which was led by Pol Pot, from 1975-1979. Mass graves scarred the earth over all of Cambodia. The massacred men, women and children were tossed in pits that were covered only loosely with soil. Within months, erosion due to monsoonal rains and winds caused the bones of the dead to rise to the surface littering the ground with the skeletal remains of the victims. The bones were gathered up and stored in sheds and warehouses. Children often gather the bones that litter the earth, the bones of their ancestors—sometimes the bones of their parents, grandparents or siblings.495051
South African Apartheid
Throughout its more than 400 year history, South Africa has been a nation separated by color. The dominant white group, descended from Dutch and later British settlers, comprised only 10 % of the population but controlled the economy, the government, the military and police, the educational system, and all internal and external commerce. Although it had existed in fact for more than two hundred years, the rigid, caste-like system of racial segregation known as Apartheid was begun officially in the late 19th century. It gained strength and popular support in the 1920s and 1930s when internal passports were required of all non-whites who were forced to live in “black” or “colored” townships such as Soweto which were called ironically, “homelands,” but were, in fact, little more than shanty towns populated by poor blacks. An unknown number of black South Africans were murdered by their government between 1930 and the early 1990s. Garbage dumps are seldom, if ever, built in affluent communities. Environmental racism exists all over the world. The waste of the world, toxic and non-toxic, is dumped near the neighborhoods of the poor. Soweto was no exception, it dumped its own refuse and the refuse of all-white Johannesburg in its own back yard.
Metal and wood scraps are usually scrounged to build houses. A typical Soweto house was a makeshift shanty. Some “affluent” blacks, physicians, lawyers, educators, and merchants who managed, against all odds, to attend universities in Europe, lived in brick houses. However, affluence is relative and the bricks and mortar for their houses was usually scrounged also. Open cooking fires often led to large portions of Soweto erupting in flames. Because there was no fire department, bucket brigades were used to try to contain the conflagration. Sometimes, however, the fires were set deliberately by dissidents or by white soldiers acting on official orders. The vast majority of houses in Soweto had no electricity, running water, plumbing, natural gas, telephones or any of the utilities that white South Africans not only took for granted but felt entitled to—much as we do in America. However, children, even in places liked Soweto, exhibit an enormous exuberance and joy of living even though the perimeter of Soweto and all the other homelands was fenced and gated. Traditional celebrations, with people dressed in traditional, ethnic/tribal clothing, are a method of identity maintenance and social cohesion in the midst of anomie—conditions of social chaos. Maintaining traditions is also a social critique that indicates resistance toward oppression. Maintenance of peoplehood is helpful in overcoming depression and alienation. 52535455
Idi Amin’s Uganda
In a military coup in 1979, dictator Idi Amin became the ruler of the central African nation of Uganda. Rich in minerals, timber, oil, and other natural resources, Uganda had been systematically exploited by foreign governments and multi-national corporations for most of the 20th century. Because many Ugandans protested against the coup and the dictatorship of Amin, soldiers loyal to Amin, at Amin’s behest, began a systematic slaughter of dissidents resulting in 300,000 deaths. There are few internet-based photographs available of the horrors that took place in Uganda under the vicious, dictatorial rule of Idi Amin, which lasted until he was forcibly removed from power in 1987. As in Cambodia, piles of human skulls and bones are the only physical indications of the slaughter. The sheer ubiquity of the bones of the dead is shockingly evident in a photo of a toddler and a human skull.56575859
The Rwandan Genocide
In a terrible ethnic war in the central African nation of Rwanda (1994-1996), more than 800,000 were killed in only the first three months; many hacked to death by machetes. Besides those slaughtered, nearly a million people were forced from their homes and into enormous, unsanitary refugee camps across the border. These camps had no running water, no toilets, no cooking facilities, and little to no food. Many people starved to death, many others succumbed during a particularly virulent outbreak of cholera, an already virulent disease in which the victim vomits and defecates blood for several days until they die of dehydration and shock. Sometimes cholera evidences symptoms similar to hemorrhagic fevers in which the victims bleed from every orifice in the body. Cholera epidemics have killed untold millions during the history of the world. Fleeing refugees pass bodies of their fellow citizens along the roadside. During times of great fear, people often seek solace, sanctuary, and community in houses of worship, but evil respects no boundaries—more than one massacre took place in Christian churches during worship services. Children orphaned because of the mass murder often did not survive and the majority of parentless children starved to death.6061626364
Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo
“Ethnic Cleansing” can mean nothing less than genocide. From 1997 to 1998, the Christians of Bosnia and Kosovo engaged in a struggle to annihilate the Muslim population of this remnant of the former country of Yugoslavia. United Nations and American military forces are still in the Balkans attempting to prevent any further bloodshed. Half a million people were killed, tens of thousands of women were raped, and the leader of the Serbian government who authorized the slaughter awaited for years an oft-postponed trial in The Hague for crimes against humanity. Meanwhile, other Serbian leaders are still at large as recently as 2010. 656667
Refugees
Refugees have been reduced to an uncertain future. Refugees often find themselves living in conditions that would have seemed normal to a 13th or 14th century peasant. Where would you go if forced from your home with only what you could carry? What would you take with you? How would you live? How would you feed and shelter your family? Refugees are not welcome by other nations—they suck up resources while putting nothing back into the economy. In the 20th century, the United Nations has often had to persuade governments to accept refugees and has had to control the refugee camps. Non-governmental organizations (called NGOs) like the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and Doctors without Borders supply needed aid to both refugees and host nations in times of crisis. It is easier in some ways for modern day peasants to survive as refugees, because they are more accustomed to certain levels of privation than technologically sophisticated, highly educated, urbanites. Refugees often walk for tens if not hundreds or thousands of miles to reach safety, crowding roads with masses of fleeing humanity.68697071727374
The Iraqi Kurds
The more than ten million Kurds in the Middle East, are the largest ethnic group in the world without a country to call their own. Many Kurds resided for many years in Northern Iraq. During and shortly after the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein turned his biological weapons on Kurdish villages, so that, between 1987 and 1999 he had succeeded in killing half a million and sending one million into exile. What will become of the Kurds in the aftermath of the 2003 war against Iraq still remains to be seen in 2010. Where do one million homeless, unwanted, forcibly exiled people go? They have only as much food, fuel, medicine, shelter, and clothing as they can carry. Photos show Iraqi Kurds trying to cross the border into Iran. The young, the old, the healthy, the sick, the rich, the poor—everyone must flee, on foot, from the threat of torture and death. Some will die along the way, some will starve, but some will survive. Is this a recipe for rage? Will these refugees one day come back as guerilla insurgents or as an army of revolution, doing to their persecutors what had been done to them? Does mass violence create more mass violence? It is always the most vulnerable members of any society that suffer the most during times of social upheaval. Children, the elderly, and the sick are the least likely to survive as refugees. The dead must be buried along the way, but how do you find the grave later? Where do bury a child who dies while you are escaping from the monsters who want to kill all of you?75767778
The American Slave Trade
From 1500 to 1850, a period of 350 years, between ten and fifteen million Africans were landed in chains in the New World, and four to six million more are thought to have died during their capture or the Atlantic crossing—a total of between 14 and 21 million people. Some scholars think the Slave Trade may have cost as many as 200 million lives and there are many scholars today in both the United States, South America, the Caribbean, and East Africa who are attempting to unearth centuries old data concerning the slave trade. Whatever they find, it is all too clear that the consequences of racism is death! 7980818283
Genocidal Monsters and Their Crimes 84http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/welcome.html. Power, Samantha. “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide. Perennial, New York: 2003. ISBN: 0-06-054164-4.
Figure 2.
However, acts of monstrous evil are sometimes offset by a few of the heroic human beings who resisted and stood up to evil in their own lands in their own times—people who had the courage to speak truth to power! Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent civil disobedience against the British Raj in India fueled the fires of human rights campaigns across the world. More than fifty years after his assassination, Gandhi is still revered for his intellectual strength, moral courage, and indomitable will. From Oskar Schindler’s heroic attempt to save Jews from the death camps, Steven Spielberg made the award winning film, Schindler’s List. When the Nazis decreed that all Swedish Jews were to wear yellow stars on their clothes, King Gustav V of Sweden, the next day, appeared in full dress regalia, mounted on a horse and riding through the streets of the capital with a yellow star on his uniform. Cesar Chavez founded the United Farm Workers Union in order to address the egregious exploitation of migrant laborers. Bishop Desmond Tutu, a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, spent much of his life in segregated South Africa calling for the dismantling of the Apartheid system. Nelson Mandela, the South African anti-Apartheid activist became the first black to be freely elected to the Presidency in the country where he had spent most of his adult life as a political prisoner on Robbyn Island. The courageous Rosa Parks was not solely responsible for the Civil Rights Movement, but she was the catalyst for the events that followed her 1953 refusal to “move to the back of the bus.” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., one of the best known leaders of the American Civil Rights Movement because of his non-violent civil disobedience, gave a famous speech in Washington, D.C. in which he said “I have a dream . . . that someday, my little children will be judged not by the color of their skin, but the content of their character.” Perhaps the courage of these people and others like them will give us all the bravery needed to stop such horrors from happening again in this, our world.84
Minority-Majority Country
By 2050, the United States will be a Minority-Majority country—California is already a minority-majority state, and Houston is a minority-majority city which means that there are numerically more minority group members than dominant group members. Since Hispanics are the fastest growing minority group in the U.S., who will have the POWER (political, social, economic) when there are numerically more minorities than whites? Why? What is the basis of POWER?
Conclusion
Regardless of the theories, minorities in America do less well by any statistical measure than the dominant group. (See: The Statistical Abstract of the United States: Income, Expenditures, Poverty, & Wealth: Income and Poverty--State and Local Data; The Statistical Abstract of the United States—Labor Force, Employment, and Earrnings. The Statistical Abstract of the United States—Law Enforcement, Courts, and Prisons.) It is not enough to be reminded of the oppression, the inequality, indeed the hatred that has been heaped on minorities since the dawn of American history. Rather, it is for us, as individuals, day-by-day to stop the racism, sexism, and ageism by refusing to be a party to it. Perhaps if we analyze our stereotypes, our ideas of the essential characteristics of a group other than our own, then we can discover that our prejudices and pre-conceived ideas are inaccurate.
During the summer semester of 2001, a student in my Minorities class at the University of Houston-Clear Lake decided to conduct a study based on her stereotypes. She was a server in a restaurant, and had been in that job for several years. She and her fellow servers were of the opinion that African Americans did not tip well. Using this stereotype, she conducted a semi-scientific study with the help of her co-workers. To her amazement, she found that whites (after adjusting for raw numbers) were the worst tippers, and that the level of service determined how well African Americans tipped. In other words, she tested her theory (her stereotype) and found it to have no basis in fact. She told me that she had always thought of herself as a non-racist person, and was truly shocked to learn that she had been carrying some level of racism in her mind and heart for years.
Testing our beliefs may be painful, but the tests may show us the error of what we have learned. To rid the world of prejudice and discrimination toward minorities we must begin in our own hearts and minds, and in our behaviors. Perhaps if we refuse to listen to the jokes, refuse to accept negative comments, reject the stereotypes that daily bombard us in the media and in society in general, others will begin to question their own behavior and perhaps make changes that will eventually ripple throughout all of America. In other words, “let there be peace on earth, and let it begin with me! | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/07%3A_Hate_Kills_-_The_Consequences_of_Bigotry/7.07%3A_Hate_Kills_-_The_Consequences_of_Bigotry.txt |
A paradigm is a description of the world of human behavior; it is a description of society. A paradigm is a description of the interactions of human beings within any society. Paradigms are broad viewpoints or perspectives that permit social scientists to have a wide range of tools to describe society, and then to build hypotheses and theories. Paradigms don't do anything but DESCRIBE! They analyze based on their descriptions. That is all they do. They are scientific tools. Paradigms cannot occur or happen! Societies are not Conflictualist, Functionalist, or Symbolic Interactionist. People and social events are not based on paradigms: a paradigm is a viewpoint, a perspective, a guiding principal, a belief system. Paradigms cannot be proven or disproven, but they lead to the development of theories which are provable.
The Conflict Paradigm
The Conflict paradigm does a very good job of explaining racism, sexism, ageism, socioeconomic inequality (wealth and poverty), etc.
The Conflict paradigm describes the inequalities that exist in all societies around the globe. Conflict is particularly interested in the inequalities that exist based on all of the various aspects of master status—race or ethnicity, sex or gender, age, religion, ability or disability, and SES. SES is an abbreviation of socioeconomic status and is comprised of the combined effects of income, education, and occupation. Every society is plagued by inequality based on social differences among the dominant group and all of the other groups in society, according to the Conflict paradigm. When we are analyzing any element of society from this perspective, we need to look at the structures of wealth, power, and status and the ways in which those structures maintain the social, economic, political, and coercive power of one group at the expense of all other groups.
The war in Iraq which began in 2003, according to the Conflict paradigm, was being fought in order to extend the power and control of the United States, and to create an American empire in the non-white, non-Christian world.
TheSeptember 11, 2001 terrorist attack was caused by American foreign policy vis á vis the Middle East as a whole, the first Gulf War, American support of the Israeli government and Israel’s treatment of its Palestinian population. The Bourgeoisie (the United States and most of Western Europe) has exploited for decades the people and natural resources of the Middle East without offering economic and educational support to the people. The U.S. and Western Europe have supported dictatorial regimes, ignored human rights abuses, and generally turned their backs on the plight of the majority of Middle Easterners and Muslims in general throughout the world. Thus, the terrorists (as representatives of the Proletariat), attacked, or attempted to attack, the centers of American power: the World Trade Center (economic power), the Pentagon (military power), and the U.S. Capital (political power).
The Conflict Paradigm’s Explanation of Socialization
The socialization process is coercive, forcing us to accept the values and norms of society.
The values and norms of society are dictated and enforced by the Bourgeoisie.
The Proletariat follow and accept the values and norms of the Bourgeoisie because all of the institutions of society, particularly education, religion, and the economy are shaped to serve the exploitative purposes of the Bourgeoisie.
The Conflict Paradigm’s Explanation of the Social Structure
The social structure exists in time and space, is objective/external, concrete, coercive, and relatively static.
The group is the basic unit of society and of analysis
Roles, statuses, groups, and institutions exist for the protection and maintenance of the elite; the social structure is based on relations of exploitation often based on master status.
There is no consensus among groups or individual members of society, there is only conflict over wealth, power, and status.
The social structure is exploitative.
The Conflict Paradigm’s Explanation of Bureaucracies
The bureaucracy exists to serve the needs of the Bourgeoisie
The bureaucracy is exploitive, and creates an “iron cage” which traps the average worker.
The bureaucracy is the primary characteristic of large-scale industrial societies.
The bureaucracy is the rationalized, and exploitive form of human interaction in large-scale formal organization.
The Conflict Paradigm’s Explanation of Deviance
Deviance is defined by those in power; therefore, what is deviant, is whatever offends the powerful, or whatever causes them to believe that they are losing power and control over the masses.
Deviance is conditional, situational, and relative to time, place, situation, and culture.
By declaring that certain groups are deviant, or treating certain groups as if they are, in some way, outside the boundaries of mainstream society, the ultimate in-group is able to maintain its power.
Deviance exists in all societies, and all societies create institutionalized methods of preventing and punishing de
The Conflict Paradigm’s Explanation of Inequality
Inequality is generated and maintained by those in power in order to maintain their power.
Various groups in society are delineated by those in power and then are pitted against each other in a struggle for wealth, power, and status.
The powerful exploit everyone in order to engender false consciousness—the belief that the non-elites have the potential to become rich and powerful.
The elites will do anything in order to maintain their power.
The Conflict Paradigm’s Explanation of the Family
The family works toward the continuance of social inequality within a society by maintaining and reinforcing the status quo.
Through inheritance, the wealthy families are able to keep their privileged social position for their members.
The traditional family form which is Patriarchal, also contributes to the inequality of the sexes. Males have a lot of power and females tend to have less. Traditional roles of husbands and wives are differential valued in favor of husbands. The roles they do are more valued than the traditional housekeeping/child raising roles done by their wives. The traditional family is also a structure of inequality for both women and children.
The Conflict Paradigm’s Explanation of Education
Schools routinely provide learning according to students’ social background, thereby perpetuating social HUinequalityUH.
Wealthy School districts have better buildings, state of the art technology, higher teacher salaries, more ancillary programs such as Art and Music and better sports equipment.
Schools serve as a screening device to fill positions of unequal status.
Tracking is a basic screening device - placing of students perceived to have similar intelligence and academic abilities in the same classroom.
Credentialism is the overemphasis on educational credentials for job placement. The result is that many individuals are placed in jobs for which they are overeducated.
The Conflict Paradigm’s Explanation of Religion
Religion is “the opiate of the masses.”
Religion acts as a drug, which keeps the proletariat from rising up against their oppressors.
Religion serves to legitimate the social structure and serves the needs of the elite to oppress the workers.
Religion lulls the workers into a false sense of security.
The Functionalist Paradigm (Structural Functionalism)
The Functionalist paradigm describes society as stable and describes all of the various mechanisms that maintain social stability. Functionalism argues that the social structure is responsible for all stability and instability, and that that the social structure is continuously attempting to maintain social equilibrium (balance) among all of the components of society. Functionalism argues that a stable society is the best possible society and any element that helps to maintain that stability must add to the adaptability (functionality) of society. This is a macro-level paradigm that describes large-scale processes and large- scale social systems; it is uninterested in individual behavior.
The Functionalist paradigm does a very good job of explaining the ways in which the institutions of society (the family, education, religion, law/politics/government, the economy, medicine, media) work together to create social solidarity (a social contract in which society as a whole agrees upon the rules of social behavior and agrees, more or less, to abide by those rules) and to maintain balance in society.
Functionalism, or Structural Functionalism, or the Functionalist paradigm describes the elements in society that create social stability FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE. This paradigm, like the Conflict paradigm, is very interested in the structure of society and how it impacts people's lives. However, Functionalism sees the social structure as creating equilibrium or balance. It also describes the various elements of society that maintain that balance. One of its basic premises is that society is structured to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Unfortunately, this perspective ignores minorities and is unable to explain inequality except to say that it must have a social function—it must make society more adaptable—simply because inequality has always existed. Functionalism describes, analyzes, and is interested in any social element that maintains the status quo—keeps things as they are—and maintains social balance between and among all of the institutions of society (the family, education, religion, law/politics/government, the economy, medicine, and media).
The war in Iraqwhich began in 2003, according to the Functionalist paradigm, is being fought in order to maintain security and stability in the US by keeping terrorism at bay thousands of miles away.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack was an act of extreme deviance caused by anomic conditions (conditions of social chaos when the rules for normative behavior seem to have disappeared) in the Middle East and among Muslim people throughout the world. Because of the cultural influence of the American media throughout the world, and because of the rapidity of social change taking place due to that cultural influence, the terrorists engaged in an act of deviance based on their belief that they were acting at the behest of God, and for the good of their own people, that took their own lives as well as the lives of thousands of others.
The Structural Functionalist Paradigm’s Explanation of Socialization
The socialization process is coercive, forcing us to accept to the values and norms of society.
The values and norms of society are agreed upon by all members of society because there is a “social contract” in effect which protects us from one another and keeps society stable and balanced.
People follow and accept the values and norms of society in order to maintain their own safety as well as maintaining the social order.
The Structural Functionalist Paradigm’s Paradigm’s Explanation of the Social Structure
The social structure exists in time and space, is objective/external, concrete, coercive. and relatively static.
Members of society see the social structure as legitimate (acceptable and working properly) and therefore strive to maintain that social structure. Legitimation (acceptability) maintains social equilibrium or balance which maintains the status quo.
The structure itself creates consensus.
The social structure is stable
The Structural Functionalist Paradigm’s Explanation of Bureaucracies
The bureaucracy exists to serve the needs of society.
The bureaucracy provides for the economic and social needs of a society and helps to maintain social stability.
The bureaucracy is a major characteristic of large-scale industrial societies.
The bureaucracy is the response to large-scale formal organizations.
The Structural Functionalist Paradigm’s Explanation of Deviance
Behaviors are not offensive because they are deviant; they are deviant because they offend.
Deviance is usually dysfunctional for society and arises from conditions of anomie.
Deviance may be functional for society because it may bring about necessary social change.
Deviance is integral to human societies. Deviance exists in all societies, and all societies create institutionalized methods of preventing and punishing deviance.
The Structural Functionalist Paradigm’s Explanation of Inequality
Inequality is less widespread than the Conflictualists believe.
Inequality, in general, is functional for society because it engenders competition which serves as an incentive for people to attempt to rise to the top.
Inequality, overall, is highly dysfunctional for society because it fails to permit large groups of people from competing for the goods of society.
Inequality is always functional (adaptive) for some segments of society and dysfunctional (non-adaptive) for others.
The Structural Functionalist Paradigm’s Explanation of the Family
The family creates well-integrated members of society and teaches culture to the new members of society.
The family provides important ascribed statuses such as social class and ethnicity to new members.
The family regulates sexual activity.
Family is responsible for social replacement by reproducing new members, to replace its dying members.
Family gives individuals property rights and also affords the assignment and maintenance of kinship order.
Families offer material and emotional security and provides care and support for the individuals who need to be taken care of.
The Structural Functionalist Paradigm’s Explanation of Education
Enhances the operation and stability of society by systematically teaching certain cognitive skills and knowledge, and transmitting these skills and knowledge from one generation to the next generation.
Education has several manifest and latent functions for society.
Cultural transmission passes culture from one generation to the next and established social values are taught thoroughly.
EducationUH also serves to enhance social and cultural integration in society by bringing together people from diverse social backgrounds so that they share widespread social experiences and thus acquire commonly held societal HUnormsUH, attitudes and beliefs.
The Structural Functionalist Paradigm’s Explanation of Religion
Religion (along with the family and law) serves to legitimate (make acceptable) the social structure of any given society.
Religion (along with the family and law) helps to maintain social stability and balance by binding people to the normative aspects of their society.
Religion (along with law) provides a system of behavioral guidelines for society.
The Symbolic Interactionist Paradigm
Symbolic Interactionism describes society as small groups of individuals interacting based on the various ways that people interpret their various cultural symbols such as spoken, written, and non-verbal language. Our behavior with and among other people (our interaction) is the result of our shared understanding of cultural symbols. This is a micro-level paradigm that describes small-scale processes and small-scale social systems; it is interested in individual behavior.
The most important aspect of the Symbolic Interactionist paradigm is not so much that it is interested in small groups—although that is of great importance—as its interest in the interpretation of cultural symbols. For Symbolic Interactionism, everything in society is based on how we interpret our cultural symbols—media images, language, stereotypes, perceptions, and belief systems. In the US, we have a long history of creating a social mythology that leads many of us to believe that the poor, the minorities, women, non-white, non-Christian people are somehow not as American as White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs), and are somehow not as deserving of social approval as White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs). This social mythology is reinforced by the media's portrayal of non-white, non-middle class, non-Christian, etc. Americans as being disease-ridden, criminally-inclined, dangerous, and altogether unacceptable or barely acceptable in American society. This social mythology creates negative symbols that impact the actual, daily lives of the not-well-off, not Christian, not white, not female, etc. citizens and residents in our country. These negative symbols engender fear, hatred, neglect, and deliberate ignorance concerning the lives of those people in our country who are, in some socially defined way, out of the "mainstream" of American society.
Symbolic Interactionism does a very good job of explaining how various forms of language (including the images and the messages in the media) shape our interactions with one another and reinforce stereotypes.
The war in Iraq which began in 2003, according to the Symbolic Interactionist paradigm, is being fought to send a message to Islamic terrorists that the US cannot be attacked with impunity, and to support the image of non-white, non-Christian people as dangerous to our way of life.
The September 11, 2001 terrorists used the symbols of American power—the World Trade Center, New York City, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.—in order to deliver a message to the world concerning their perception that the United States is the cause of the misery of Muslims in the Middle East as well as throughout the world. The perception of reality is often more real than the concrete reality itself, because sometimes we act based on what we think or believe more strongly than on what is really real. The actions of the terrorists were a form of language, a method of communication that was extreme, because the message was extreme.
The Symbolic Interactionist Paradigm’s Explanation of Socialization
The socialization process is voluntary, and we can accept or reject the values and norms of society at will.
The values and norms of society change moment by moment based on our mutual, day-to-day interactions with one another.
People follow and accept the values and norms of society only if those values and norms serve their own needs and permit them to be more comfortable in their society.
The Symbolic Interactionist Paradigm’s Explanation of the Social Structure
The social structure exists only in the minds of individuals and small groups and has no objective reality; it is subjective/internal, abstract, voluntary, and in constant flux.
The social structure is based on social interaction, statuses, roles, groups, social networks, social institutions, and societies in which small groups and individuals create consensus.
The social structure is subjective, abstract, and constantly changing.
The social structure exists within every individual and it is through our everyday interactions with one another that the abstract social structure is created, and continuously re-created, every moment of every day.
The Symbolic Interactionist Paradigm’s Explanation of Bureaucracies
The bureaucracy consists of groups of people interacting with one another in patterned ways, on a day-today basis.
The bureaucracy provides a mechanism for social intercourse among disparate groups and individuals.
The bureaucracy is a major characteristic of large-scale industrial societies.
The bureaucracy is the method by which large-scale formal organizations create interaction.
The Symbolic Interactionist Paradigm’s Explanation of Deviance
Deviance is conditional, situational, and relative to time, place, situation, and culture.
Deviance is based on the perceptions of individuals.
The language used to label groups or individuals as deviant, is highly symbolic and “coded.”
Individuals have the capacity to accept or reject the labels that society creates in the mirror.
The Symbolic Interactionist Paradigm’s Explanation of Inequality
Inequality is based on individual reactions to their own perceptions of the social structure.
Because the social structure is subjective, inequality is also subjective and based on individual interpretations.
The Symbolic Interactionist Paradigm’s Explanation of the Family
Emphasizes exploring the changing meanings attached to family.
Shared activities help build emotional bonds.
Marriage and family relationships are based on negotiated meanings.
Social resources are brought to the marriage by each partner including education, physical attractiveness, intelligence and family status.
The Symbolic Interactionist Paradigm’s Explanation of Education
Note
Schools play a vital role in shaping the way students see reality and themselves.
Authoritarianism prevalent in schools impedes learning and encourages undemocratic behavior later in life.
Schools create serious difficulties for students who are “labeled” as learning disabled or less academically competent than their peers; these students may never be able to see themselves as good students and move beyond these labels.
Teacher expectations play a huge role in student achievement. If students are made to feel like high achievers, they will act like high achievers, and vice versa.1
The Symbolic Interactionist Paradigm’s Explanation of Religion
Note
Religion is a set of symbols that identify and join adherents.
Religion is shared among groups and between individuals.
Religion provides meaning.
Footnotes
• 1 http://74.125.95.132/search q=cache:Yi8QaV3ml88J:www.unc.edu/~kbm/SOCI10Spring2004/Symbolic_Interactionism.doc+symbolic+interactionism+and+education&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/08%3A_The_Three_Sociological_Paradigms/8.01%3A_The_Three_Sociological_Paradigms_and_Perspectives.txt |
Dominant and Minority Groups
A Suggestion on the Negro Problem. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Jul., 1908), pp. 78-85.
The Religious Context of Prejudice (in Psychological Studies). Gordon W. Allport. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 5, No. 3. (Autumn, 1966), pp. 447-457.
The Functional Autonomy of Motives. Gordon W. Allport, The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 50, No. 1/4, Golden Jubilee Volume 1887-1937. (Nov., 1937), pp. 141-156.
An Analysis of Rumor. Gordon W. Allport; Leo Postman. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4. (Winter, 1946-1947), pp. 501-517.
Attitudes and the Social Act. Herbert Blumer. Social Problems, Vol. 3, No. 2. (Oct., 1955), pp. 59-65.
Social Problems as Collective Behavior . Herbert Blumer. Social Problems, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Winter, 1971), pp. 298-306.
Social Science and the Desegregation Process (in Principles for Planning). Herbert Blumer. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 304, Racial Desegregation and Integration. (Mar., 1956), pp. 137-143.
Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. Herbert Blumer. The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Spring, 1958), pp. 3-7.
Phylon: Science or Propaganda. W. E. B. DuBois. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 5, No. 1 (1st Qtr., 1944), pp. 5-9.
The Rural South. W. E. B. DuBois. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 13, No. 97 (Mar., 1912), pp. 80-84.
How the Public Received The Journal of Negro History. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Apr., 1916), pp. 225-232.
Africa and World Freedom. W. E. B. DuBois, Ira De A. Reid. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 4, Supplement: Freedom in the Modern World: Four Broadcasts by the People's College of Atlanta University (2nd Qtr., 1943), pp. 8-12.
The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places. Joe R. Feagin. American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Feb., 1991), pp. 101-116.
How Black Students Cope with Racism on White Campuses. Joe R. Feagin; Melvin P. Sikes. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 8. (Summer, 1995), pp. 91-97.
Discrimination: Motivation, Action, Effects, and Context. Joe R. Feagin; Douglas Lee Eckberg. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 6. (1980), pp. 1-20.
Superior Intellect?: Sincere Fictions of the White Self. Hernan Vera; Joe R. Feagin; Andrew Gordon. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 64, No. 3, Myths and Realities: African Americans and the Measurement of Human Abilities. (Summer, 1995), pp. 295-306.
Prejudice, Orthodoxy and the Social Situation. Joe R. Feagin. Social Forces, Vol. 44, No. 1. (Sep., 1965), pp. 46-56.
Racial Barriers to African American Entrepreneurship: An Exploratory Study. Joe R. Feagin; Nikitah Imani. Social Problems, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 562-584.
The Continuing Significance of Racism: Discrimination Against Black Students in White Colleges. Joe R. Feagin. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Jun., 1992), pp. 546-578.
White Separatists and Black Separatists: A Comparative Analysis. Joe R. Feagin. Social Problems, Vol. 19, No. 2. (Autumn, 1971), pp. 167-180.
Herbert J. Gans. The Uses of Poverty: The Poor Pay All. Social Policy July/August 1971: pp. 20-24. www.soc.duke.edu/~jcook/gans.html. Retrieved (1 of 6) 4/9/2007 2:28:32 PM.
The Positive Functions of Poverty. Herbert J. Gans. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 2. (Sep., 1972), pp. 275-289.
The Ghetto Rebellions and Urban Class Conflict. Herbert J. Gans. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 1, Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change. (1968), pp. 42-51.
“Underclass”: Problems with the Term. Herbert J. Gans; Ronald B. Mincy; Isabel V. Sawhill; Douglas A. Wolf. Science, New Series, Vol. 248, No. 4962. (Jun. 22, 1990), pp. 1472-1473.
A Suggestion on the Negro Problem. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Jul., 1908), pp. 78-85.
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. U.S. Department of Labor; Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy. The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. Office of Policy Planning and Research. United States Department of Labor, March 1965. www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/hi...d-meynihan.htm
Urban Conditions: General. Daniel P. Moynihan. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 371, Social Goals and Indicators for American Society, Volume 1. (May, 1967), pp. 159-177.
Have the Poor Been “Losing Ground”? Charles Murray. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Autumn, 1985), pp. 427-445.
Welfare and the Family: The U.S. Experience. Charles Murray. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, Part 2: U.S. and Canadian Income Maintenance Programs. (Jan., 1993), pp. S224-S262.
Bad News for Charles Murray: Uneducated White Women Give Birth to More Babies Than Do Uneducated Black Women. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 19. (Spring, 1998), pp. 68-69.
IQ and Income Inequality in a Sample of Sibling Pairs from Advantaged Family Backgrounds. Charles Murray. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 2002), pp. 339-343.
A Conversation with Charles Murray. Think Tank Transcripts: A Conversation With Charles Murray. http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/show_129.html
Social Trends in America and Strategic Approaches to the Negro Problem. Gunnar Myrdal. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 9, No. 3. (3rd Qtr., 1948), pp. 196-214.
Population Problems and Policies. Gunnar Myrdal. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 197, Social Problems and Policies in Sweden. (May, 1938), pp. 200-215. Stable URL: links.jstor.org/sici?sici=000...3E2.0.CO%3B2-7
Gunnar Myrdal on Population Policy in the Underdeveloped World (in Archives). Gunnar Myrdal. Population and Development Review, Vol. 13, No. 3. (Sep., 1987), pp. 531-540.
The Equality Issue in World Development. Gunnar Myrdal. The American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 6, Nobel Lectures and 1989 Survey of Members. (Dec., 1989), pp. 8-17.
Negro Home Life and Standards of Living (in Social Conditions and Problems). Robert E. Park. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 49, The Negro’s Progress in Fifty Years. (Sep., 1913), pp. 147-163.
The Bases of Race Prejudice (in Race Relations). Robert E. Park, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 140, The American Negro. (Nov., 1928), pp. 11-20.
The Conflict and Fusion of Cultures with Special Reference to the Negro. Robert E. Park. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 4, No. 2. (Apr., 1919), pp. 111-133.
Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups With Particular Reference to the Negro. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 5. (Mar., 1914), pp. 606-623.
Human Nature and Collective Behavior. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 5. (Mar., 1927), pp. 733-741.
The Social Function of War Observations and Notes. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4. (Jan., 1941), pp. 551-570.
Caribbean Diasporas: Migration and Ethnic Communities. Alejandro Portes; Ramón Grosfoguel. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 533, Trends in U.S.-Caribbean Relations. (May, 1994), pp. 48-69.
Disproving the Enclave Hypothesis: Reply. Alejandro Portes; Leif Jensen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 418-420.
TAP: Vol. 7, Iss. 25. Global Villagers. Alejandro Portes. Global Villagers: The Rise of Transnational Communities. http://www.prospect.org/ file:///F|/Portes Ethnic Enclaves 5.htm. (1 of 6) 3/21/2007 3:25:12 PM
Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities. Alejandro Portes. International Migration Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, Special Issue: Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans. (Winter, 1997), pp. 799-825.
Making Sense of Diversity: Recent Research on Hispanic Minorities in the United States. Alejandro Portes; Cynthia Truelove. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 13. (1987), pp. 359-385.
Revisiting the Enclave Hypothesis: Miami Twenty-Five Years Later. Alejandro Portes and Steven Shafer. Princeton University, May 2006. CMD Working Paper #06-10 The Center for Migration and Immigration and Development Working Paper Series • Princeton University. cmd.princeton.edu/papers/wp0610.pdf. cmd.princeton.edu/papers.shtml
No Margin for Error: Educational and Occupational Achievement among Disadvantaged Children of Immigrants . cmd.princeton.edu/papers/wp0703.pdf
Unwelcome Immigrants: The Labor Market Experiences of 1980 (Mariel) Cuban and Haitian Refugees in South Florida. Alejandro Portes; Alex Stepick. American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Aug., 1985), pp. 493-514.
The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami. Alejandro Portes. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 4, The Ethnic Economy. (Oct., 1987), pp. 340-372.
The Rise of Ethnicity: Determinants of Ethnic Perceptions Among Cuban Exiles in Miami. Alejandro Portes. American Sociological Review, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Jun., 1984), pp. 383-397.
Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action. Alejandro Portes; Julia Sensenbrenner. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 98, No. 6. (May, 1993), pp. 1320-1350.
Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis of the Labor Market Experiences of Cubans in Miami. Kenneth L. Wilson; Alejandro Portes. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 2. (Sep., 1980), pp. 295-319.
Introduction: Immigration and Its Aftermath. Alejandro Portes. International Migration Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, Special Issue: The New Second Generation. (Winter, 1994), pp. 632-639.
Self-Employment and the Earnings of Immigrants. Alejandro Portes; Min Zhou. American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 219-230.
The Enclave and the Entrants: Patterns of Ethnic Enterprise in Miami before and after Mariel. Alejandro Portes; Leif Jensen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 6. (Dec., 1989), pp. 929-949.
The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants. Alejandro Portes; Min Zhou. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 530, Interminority Affairs in the U.S.: Pluralism at the Crossroads. (Nov., 1993), pp. 74-96.
The Poor. Georg Simmel; Claire Jacobson. Social Problems, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Autumn, 1965), pp. 118-140.
Race Psychology: Standpoint and Questionnaire, With Particular Reference to the Immigrant and the Negro. W. I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 17, No. 6. (May, 1912), pp. 725-775.
The Psychology of Race-Prejudice. William I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 5. (Mar., 1904), pp. 593-611.
The Mind of Woman and the Lower Races. William I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Jan., 1907), pp. 435-469.
Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis. Melvin M. Tumin. American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No. 4. (Aug., 1953), pp. 387-394.
Superior Intellect?: Sincere Fictions of the White Self (in The Politics of Race and Science). Hernan Vera; Joe R. Feagin; Andrew Gordon. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 64, No. 3, Myths and Realities: African Americans and the Measurement of Human Abilities. (Summer, 1995), pp. 295-306.
Race Conflicts in the North End of Boston. William Foote Whyte. The New England Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Dec., 1939), pp. 623-642.
Social Organization in the Slums. William Foote Whyte. American Sociological Review, Vol. 8, No. 1. (Feb., 1943), pp. 34-39.
Corner Boys: A Study of Clique Behavior. William Foote Whyte. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 5. (Mar., 1941), pp. 647-664.
The Plight of the Inner-City Black Male (in Symposium on the Underclass). William Julius Wilson. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 136, No. 3. (Sep., 1992), pp. 320-325.
The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy. William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 182-192.
Rising Inequality and the Case for Coalition Politics. William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 568, The Study of African American Problems: W. E. B. Du Bois’s Agenda, Then and Now. (Mar., 2000), pp. 78-99.
Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations: The Challenge of Public Agenda Research: 1990 Presidential Address. William Julius Wilson. American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Feb., 1991), pp. 1-14.
Another Look at The Truly Disadvantaged. William Julius Wilson. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 4. (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 639-656.
When Work Disappears. William Julius Wilson. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 4. (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 567-595.
Urban Poverty. William Julius Wilson; Robert Aponte. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11. (1985), pp. 231-258.
The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City. Loïc J. D. Wacquant; William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 8-25.
The New Economy and Racial Inequality (in Stated Meeting Report). William Julius Wilson; James O. Freedman. Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 54, No. 4. (Summer, 2001), pp. 41-48.
Chicago Hope (in Conversations). William Julius Wilson; Eric Bryant Rhodes. Transition, No. 68. (1995), pp. 162-172.
Ethnic Enclaves, Middleman Minorities and Immigration
A Comprehensive Immigration Policy and Program. Sidney L. Gulick. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 6, No. 3. (Mar., 1918), pp. 214-223.
A Decomposition of Trends in Poverty among Children of Immigrants. Jennifer Van Hook; Susan L. Brown; Maxwell Ndigume Kwenda. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 2004), pp. 649-670.
A New Test and Extension of Propositions from the Bonacich Synthesis. Jose A. Cobas. Social Forces, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Dec., 1985), pp. 432-441.
An Act to Limit the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, and for Other Purposes. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents. (Oct., 1924), pp. 208-227.
Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California’s Illegal Immigration Initiative. Caroline J. Tolbert; Rodney E. Hero. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, No. 3. (Aug., 1996), pp. 806-818.
Beyond the Ethnic Enclave Economy. Ivan Light; Georges Sabagh; Mehdi Bozorgmehr; Claudia Der-Martirosian. Social Problems, Vol. 41, No. 1, Special Issue on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America. (Feb., 1994), pp. 65-80.
E Pluribus Unum: Bilingualism and Loss of Language in the Second Generation. Alejandro Portes; Lingxin Hao. Sociology of Education, Vol. 71, No. 4. (Oct., 1998), pp. 269-294.
A Theory of Middleman Minorities. Edna Bonacich. American Sociological Review, Vol. 38, No. 5. (Oct., 1973), pp. 583-594.
Coming to Stay: An Analysis of the U.S. Census Question on Immigrants’ Year of Arrival. Ilana Redstone; Douglas S. Massey. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 2004), pp. 721-738.
Criminality and Immigration. Ervin Hacker. Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Nov., 1929), pp. 429-438.
Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA. Pia M. Orrenius; Madeline Zavodny. Demography, Vol. 40, No. 3. (Aug., 2003), pp. 437-450.
“Don’t Let Them Make You Feel You Did a Crime”: Immigration Law, Labor Rights, and Farmworker Testimony. Anne Shea. MELUS, Vol. 28, No. 1, Multi-Ethnic Literatures and the Idea of Social Justice. (Spring, 2003), pp. 123-144.
Economic and Labor Market Trends. Demetra Smith Nightingale; Michael Fix. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 48-59.
Economic Segmentation and Worker Earnings in a U.S.-Mexico Border Enclave. Scarlett G. Hardesty; Malcolm D. Holmes; James D. Williams. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Oct., 1988), pp. 466-489.
Ethnic Economies in Metropolitan Regions: Miami and Beyond. John R. Logan; Richard D. Alba; Thomas L. McNulty. Social Forces, Vol. 72, No. 3. (Mar., 1994), pp. 691-724.
Ethnic Enclaves and Middleman Minorities: Alternative Strategies of Immigrant Adaptation? José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Apr., 1987), pp. 143-161.
Ethnic Hegemony and the Japanese of California. Robert M. Jiobu. American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, No. 3. (Jun., 1988), pp. 353-367.
Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship. Howard E. Aldrich; Roger Waldinger. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 16. (1990), pp. 111-135.
Facts About Mexican Immigration Before and Since the Quota Restriction Laws. Louis Bloch. Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 24, No. 165. (Mar., 1929), pp. 50-60.
Illegal Immigrants, Health Care, and Social Responsibility. James Dwyer. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 34, No. 1. (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 34-41.
Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare Participation: Do Immigrants Assimilate into or out of Welfare? Jorgen Hansen; Magnus Lofstrom. The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Winter, 2003), pp. 74-98.
Structural Opportunity or Ethnic Advantage? Immigrant Business Development in New York. Roger Waldinger. International Migration Review, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Spring, 1989), pp. 48-72.
Immigrant Enterprise: A Critique and Reformulation. Roger Waldinger. Theory and Society, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, Special Double Issue: Structures of Capital. (Jan., 1986), pp. 249-285.
Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Business Patterns: A Comparison of Koreans and Iranians in Los Angeles. Pyong Gap Min; Mehdi Bozorgmehr. International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 707-738.
Immigrant Small Business and International Economic Linkage: A Case of the Korean Wig Business in Los Angeles, 1968-1977. Ku-Sup Chin; In-Jin Yoon; David Smith. International Migration Review, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 485-510.
Immigration an International Problem. Donald R. Taft. Social Forces, Vol. 6, No. 2. (Dec., 1927), pp. 264-270.
Immigration and Population Trends in the United States, 1900-1940. Ernest Rubin. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 3. (Apr., 1947), pp. 345-362.
Immigration and the Declining Birthrate. Maurice R. Davie. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Jul., 1924), pp. 68-76.
Immigration as a Source of Urban Increase. F. Stuart Chapin. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 14, No. 107. (Sep., 1914), pp. 223-227.
Immigrants’ Growing Role in U.S. Poverty Cited. By Michael A. Fletcher, Washington Post Staff Writer. Thursday, September 2, 1999; Page A2. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv...mmig/immig.htm. Retrieved (1 of 3) 3/20/2007 6:03:38 PM
Immigration Policy Since World War I. Edward P. Hutchinson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 262, Reappraising Our Immigration Policy. (Mar., 1949), pp. 15-21.
Is the New Immigration More Unskilled than the Old? Paul H. Douglas. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 16, No. 126. (Jun., 1919), pp. 393-403.
Japanese Americans: The Development of a Middleman Minority. Harry H. L. Kitano
The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 43, No. 4. (Nov., 1974), pp. 500-519.
Job Transitions in an Immigrant Metropolis: Ethnic Boundaries and the Mixed Economy. Victor Nee; Jimy M. Sanders; Scott Sernau. American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Dec., 1994), pp. 849-872.
Korean Businesses in Black and Hispanic Neighborhoods: A Study of Intergroup Relations. Lucie Cheng; Yen Espiritu. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 4. (Winter, 1989), pp. 521-534.
Limits of Ethnic Solidarity in the Enclave Economy. Jimy M. Sanders; Victor Nee. American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, No. 6. (Dec., 1987), pp. 745-773.
Middleman Minority Concept: Its Explanatory Value in the Case of the Japanese in California Agriculture. David J. O’Brien; Stephen S. Fugita. The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 1982), pp. 185-204.
The Washington Post: Myth of the Melting Pot: America’s Racial and Ethnic Divides. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv...t/melt0222.htm. Retrieved (1 of 10) 3/20/2007 6:00:09 PM
On the Study of Ethnic Enterprise: Unresolved Issues. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 4, The Ethnic Economy. (Oct., 1987), pp. 467-472.
Our Oldest National Problem. Alcott W. Stockwell. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 5. (Mar., 1927), pp. 742-755.
Paths to Self-Employment among Immigrants: An Analysis of Four Interpretations. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Jan., 1986), pp. 101-120.
Politics without Borders or Postmodern Nationality: Mexican Immigration to the United States. Arturo Santamaría Gómez; James Zackrison. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 2, Citizenship in Latin America. (Mar., 2003), pp. 66-86.
Problems in Resolving the Enclave Economy Debate. Jimy M. Sanders; Victor Nee. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 415-418.
Problems of Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurs. Pyong Gap Min. International Migration Review, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Autumn, 1990), pp. 436-455.
Returns on Human Capital in Ethnic Enclaves: New York City’s Chinatown. Min Zhou; John R. Logan. American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 5. (Oct., 1989), pp. 809-820.
Selective Immigration and the Needs of American Basic Industries. Magnus W. Alexander. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Vol. 10, No. 4, American Economic Policies Since the Armistice. (Jan., 1924), pp. 102-115.
Six Problems in the Sociology of the Ethnic Economy. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 2. (Summer, 1989), pp. 201-214.
Social Capital and the Education of Immigrant Students: Categories and Generalizations. Pedro A. Noguera. Sociology of Education, Vol. 77, No. 2. (Apr., 2004), pp. 180-183.
Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant Population. George J. Borjas. The Future of Children, Vol. 16, No. 2, Opportunity in America. (Autumn, 2006), pp. 55-71.
Social Structure and Prejudice. Sheldon Stryker. Social Problems, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Spring, 1959), pp. 340-354.
Some Aspects of the Immigration Problem. Roland P. Falkner. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Mar., 1904), pp. 32-49.
The Antecedents of Mexican Immigration to the United States. Robert Redfield. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 3. (Nov., 1929), pp. 433-438.
The Changing Significance of Ethnic and Class Resources in Immigrant Businesses: The Case of Korean Immigrant Businesses in Chicago. In-Jin Yoon. International Migration Review, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Summer, 1991), pp. 303-332.
The Control of Immigration as an Administrative Problem. Paul S. Peirce. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 4, No. 3. (Aug., 1910), pp. 374-389.
The Fertility Contribution of Mexican Immigration to the United States. Stefan Hrafn Jonsson; Michael S. Rendall. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 1. (Feb., 2004), pp. 129-150.
The Industrial Significance of Immigration. W. Jett Lauck. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 93, Present-Day Immigration with Special Reference to the Japanese. (Jan., 1921), pp. 185-190.
The New American Immigration Policy and the Labor Market. Niles Carpenter. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Aug., 1931), pp. 720-723.
The Origins and Persistence of Ethnic Identity among the “New Immigrant” Groups. David O. Sears; Mingying Fu; P. J. Henry; Kerra Bui. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 4, Special Issue: Race, Racism, and Discrimination. (Dec., 2003), pp. 419-437.
The Present Status of Our Immigration Laws and Policies. E. P. Hutchinson. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 1947), pp. 161-173.
The Relation of Oriental Immigration to the General Immigration Problem. J. Allen Smith. The American Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, Papers and Discussions of the Twenty-third Annual Meeting. (Apr., 1911), pp. 237-242.
The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965. Mae M. Ngai. Law and History Review, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Spring, 2003), pp. 69-107.
The War and Immigration. Frank Julian Warne. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 61, America’s Interests after the European War. (Sep., 1915), pp. 30-39.
Toward a Unified Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: A Preliminary Synthesis of Three Macro Models. Jonathan H. Turner. Sociological Forum, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Summer, 1986), pp. 403-427. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/09%3A_Reading_Lists/9.01%3A_Readings_for_Part_I%E2%80%94Dominant_and_Minority_Groups.txt |
Reading List for Part II—Race and Ethnicity
A Suggestion on the Negro Problem. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Jul., 1908), pp. 78-85.
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. U.S. Department of Labor; Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy. The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. Office of Policy Planning and Research. United States Department of Labor, March 1965. www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/hi...d-meynihan.htm
Urban Conditions: General. Daniel P. Moynihan. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 371, Social Goals and Indicators for American Society, Volume 1. (May, 1967), pp. 159-177.
Have the Poor Been “Losing Ground”? Charles Murray. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Autumn, 1985), pp. 427-445.
Welfare and the Family: The U.S. Experience. Charles Murray. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, Part 2: U.S. and Canadian Income Maintenance Programs. (Jan., 1993), pp. S224-S262.
Bad News for Charles Murray: Uneducated White Women Give Birth to More Babies Than Do Uneducated Black Women. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 19. (Spring, 1998), pp. 68-69.
IQ and Income Inequality in a Sample of Sibling Pairs from Advantaged Family Backgrounds. Charles Murray. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 2002), pp. 339-343.
A Conversation with Charles Murray. Think Tank Transcripts: A Conversation With Charles Murray. http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/show_129.html
Social Trends in America and Strategic Approaches to the Negro Problem. Gunnar Myrdal. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 9, No. 3. (3rd Qtr., 1948), pp. 196-214.
Population Problems and Policies. Gunnar Myrdal. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 197, Social Problems and Policies in Sweden. (May, 1938), pp. 200-215. Stable URL: links.jstor.org/sici?sici=000...3E2.0.CO%3B2-7
Gunnar Myrdal on Population Policy in the Underdeveloped World (in Archives). Gunnar Myrdal. Population and Development Review, Vol. 13, No. 3. (Sep., 1987), pp. 531-540.
The Equality Issue in World Development. Gunnar Myrdal. The American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 6, Nobel Lectures and 1989 Survey of Members. (Dec., 1989), pp. 8-17.
Negro Home Life and Standards of Living (in Social Conditions and Problems). Robert E. Park. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 49, The Negro’s Progress in Fifty Years. (Sep., 1913), pp. 147-163.
The Bases of Race Prejudice (in Race Relations). Robert E. Park, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 140, The American Negro. (Nov., 1928), pp. 11-20.
The Conflict and Fusion of Cultures with Special Reference to the Negro. Robert E. Park. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 4, No. 2. (Apr., 1919), pp. 111-133.
Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups With Particular Reference to the Negro. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 5. (Mar., 1914), pp. 606-623.
Human Nature and Collective Behavior. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 5. (Mar., 1927), pp. 733-741.
The Social Function of War Observations and Notes. Robert E. Park. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4. (Jan., 1941), pp. 551-570.
Caribbean Diasporas: Migration and Ethnic Communities. Alejandro Portes; Ramón Grosfoguel. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 533, Trends in U.S.-Caribbean Relations. (May, 1994), pp. 48-69.
Disproving the Enclave Hypothesis: Reply. Alejandro Portes; Leif Jensen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 418-420.
TAP: Vol. 7, Iss. 25. Global Villagers. Alejandro Portes. Global Villagers: The Rise of Transnational Communities. http://www.prospect.org/ file:///F|/Portes Ethnic Enclaves 5.htm. (1 of 6) 3/21/2007 3:25:12 PM
Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities. Alejandro Portes. International Migration Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, Special Issue: Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans. (Winter, 1997), pp. 799-825.
Making Sense of Diversity: Recent Research on Hispanic Minorities in the United States. Alejandro Portes; Cynthia Truelove. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 13. (1987), pp. 359-385.
Revisiting the Enclave Hypothesis: Miami Twenty-Five Years Later. Alejandro Portes and Steven Shafer. Princeton University, May 2006. CMD Working Paper #06-10 The Center for Migration and Immigration and Development Working Paper Series • Princeton University. cmd.princeton.edu/papers/wp0610.pdf. cmd.princeton.edu/papers.shtml
No Margin for Error: Educational and Occupational Achievement among Disadvantaged Children of Immigrants . cmd.princeton.edu/papers/wp0703.pdf
Unwelcome Immigrants: The Labor Market Experiences of 1980 (Mariel) Cuban and Haitian Refugees in South Florida. Alejandro Portes; Alex Stepick. American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Aug., 1985), pp. 493-514.
The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami. Alejandro Portes. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 4, The Ethnic Economy. (Oct., 1987), pp. 340-372.
The Rise of Ethnicity: Determinants of Ethnic Perceptions Among Cuban Exiles in Miami. Alejandro Portes. American Sociological Review, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Jun., 1984), pp. 383-397.
Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action. Alejandro Portes; Julia Sensenbrenner. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 98, No. 6. (May, 1993), pp. 1320-1350.
Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis of the Labor Market Experiences of Cubans in Miami. Kenneth L. Wilson; Alejandro Portes. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 2. (Sep., 1980), pp. 295-319.
Introduction: Immigration and Its Aftermath. Alejandro Portes. International Migration Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, Special Issue: The New Second Generation. (Winter, 1994), pp. 632-639.
Self-Employment and the Earnings of Immigrants. Alejandro Portes; Min Zhou. American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 219-230.
The Enclave and the Entrants: Patterns of Ethnic Enterprise in Miami before and after Mariel. Alejandro Portes; Leif Jensen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 6. (Dec., 1989), pp. 929-949.
The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants. Alejandro Portes; Min Zhou. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 530, Interminority Affairs in the U.S.: Pluralism at the Crossroads. (Nov., 1993), pp. 74-96.
The Poor. Georg Simmel; Claire Jacobson. Social Problems, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Autumn, 1965), pp. 118-140.
Race Psychology: Standpoint and Questionnaire, With Particular Reference to the Immigrant and the Negro. W. I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 17, No. 6. (May, 1912), pp. 725-775.
The Psychology of Race-Prejudice. William I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 5. (Mar., 1904), pp. 593-611.
The Mind of Woman and the Lower Races. William I. Thomas. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Jan., 1907), pp. 435-469.
Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis. Melvin M. Tumin. American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No. 4. (Aug., 1953), pp. 387-394.
Superior Intellect?: Sincere Fictions of the White Self (in The Politics of Race and Science). Hernan Vera; Joe R. Feagin; Andrew Gordon. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 64, No. 3, Myths and Realities: African Americans and the Measurement of Human Abilities. (Summer, 1995), pp. 295-306.
Race Conflicts in the North End of Boston. William Foote Whyte. The New England Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Dec., 1939), pp. 623-642.
Social Organization in the Slums. William Foote Whyte. American Sociological Review, Vol. 8, No. 1. (Feb., 1943), pp. 34-39.
Corner Boys: A Study of Clique Behavior. William Foote Whyte. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 5. (Mar., 1941), pp. 647-664.
The Plight of the Inner-City Black Male (in Symposium on the Underclass). William Julius Wilson. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 136, No. 3. (Sep., 1992), pp. 320-325.
The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy. William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 182-192.
Rising Inequality and the Case for Coalition Politics. William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 568, The Study of African American Problems: W. E. B. Du Bois’s Agenda, Then and Now. (Mar., 2000), pp. 78-99.
Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations: The Challenge of Public Agenda Research: 1990 Presidential Address. William Julius Wilson. American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Feb., 1991), pp. 1-14.
Another Look at The Truly Disadvantaged. William Julius Wilson. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 4. (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 639-656.
When Work Disappears. William Julius Wilson. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 4. (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 567-595.
Urban Poverty. William Julius Wilson; Robert Aponte. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11. (1985), pp. 231-258.
The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City. Loïc J. D. Wacquant; William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 8-25.
The New Economy and Racial Inequality (in Stated Meeting Report). William Julius Wilson; James O. Freedman. Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 54, No. 4. (Summer, 2001), pp. 41-48.
Chicago Hope (in Conversations). William Julius Wilson; Eric Bryant Rhodes. Transition, No. 68. (1995), pp. 162-172.
Ethnic Enclaves, Middleman Minorities and Immigration
A Comprehensive Immigration Policy and Program. Sidney L. Gulick. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 6, No. 3. (Mar., 1918), pp. 214-223.
A Decomposition of Trends in Poverty among Children of Immigrants. Jennifer Van Hook; Susan L. Brown; Maxwell Ndigume Kwenda. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 2004), pp. 649-670.
A New Test and Extension of Propositions from the Bonacich Synthesis. Jose A. Cobas. Social Forces, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Dec., 1985), pp. 432-441.
An Act to Limit the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, and for Other Purposes. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents. (Oct., 1924), pp. 208-227.
Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California’s Illegal Immigration Initiative. Caroline J. Tolbert; Rodney E. Hero. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, No. 3. (Aug., 1996), pp. 806-818.
Beyond the Ethnic Enclave Economy. Ivan Light; Georges Sabagh; Mehdi Bozorgmehr; Claudia Der-Martirosian. Social Problems, Vol. 41, No. 1, Special Issue on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America. (Feb., 1994), pp. 65-80.
E Pluribus Unum: Bilingualism and Loss of Language in the Second Generation. Alejandro Portes; Lingxin Hao. Sociology of Education, Vol. 71, No. 4. (Oct., 1998), pp. 269-294.
A Theory of Middleman Minorities. Edna Bonacich. American Sociological Review, Vol. 38, No. 5. (Oct., 1973), pp. 583-594.
Coming to Stay: An Analysis of the U.S. Census Question on Immigrants’ Year of Arrival. Ilana Redstone; Douglas S. Massey. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 4. (Nov., 2004), pp. 721-738.
Criminality and Immigration. Ervin Hacker. Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Nov., 1929), pp. 429-438.
Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA. Pia M. Orrenius; Madeline Zavodny. Demography, Vol. 40, No. 3. (Aug., 2003), pp. 437-450.
“Don’t Let Them Make You Feel You Did a Crime”: Immigration Law, Labor Rights, and Farmworker Testimony. Anne Shea. MELUS, Vol. 28, No. 1, Multi-Ethnic Literatures and the Idea of Social Justice. (Spring, 2003), pp. 123-144.
Economic and Labor Market Trends. Demetra Smith Nightingale; Michael Fix. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 48-59.
Economic Segmentation and Worker Earnings in a U.S.-Mexico Border Enclave. Scarlett G. Hardesty; Malcolm D. Holmes; James D. Williams. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Oct., 1988), pp. 466-489.
Ethnic Economies in Metropolitan Regions: Miami and Beyond. John R. Logan; Richard D. Alba; Thomas L. McNulty. Social Forces, Vol. 72, No. 3. (Mar., 1994), pp. 691-724.
Ethnic Enclaves and Middleman Minorities: Alternative Strategies of Immigrant Adaptation? José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Apr., 1987), pp. 143-161.
Ethnic Hegemony and the Japanese of California. Robert M. Jiobu. American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, No. 3. (Jun., 1988), pp. 353-367.
Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship. Howard E. Aldrich; Roger Waldinger. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 16. (1990), pp. 111-135.
Facts About Mexican Immigration Before and Since the Quota Restriction Laws. Louis Bloch. Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 24, No. 165. (Mar., 1929), pp. 50-60.
Illegal Immigrants, Health Care, and Social Responsibility. James Dwyer. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 34, No. 1. (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 34-41.
Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare Participation: Do Immigrants Assimilate into or out of Welfare? Jorgen Hansen; Magnus Lofstrom. The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Winter, 2003), pp. 74-98.
Structural Opportunity or Ethnic Advantage? Immigrant Business Development in New York. Roger Waldinger. International Migration Review, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Spring, 1989), pp. 48-72.
Immigrant Enterprise: A Critique and Reformulation. Roger Waldinger. Theory and Society, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, Special Double Issue: Structures of Capital. (Jan., 1986), pp. 249-285.
Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Business Patterns: A Comparison of Koreans and Iranians in Los Angeles. Pyong Gap Min; Mehdi Bozorgmehr. International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 707-738.
Immigrant Small Business and International Economic Linkage: A Case of the Korean Wig Business in Los Angeles, 1968-1977. Ku-Sup Chin; In-Jin Yoon; David Smith. International Migration Review, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 485-510.
Immigration an International Problem. Donald R. Taft. Social Forces, Vol. 6, No. 2. (Dec., 1927), pp. 264-270.
Immigration and Population Trends in the United States, 1900-1940. Ernest Rubin. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 3. (Apr., 1947), pp. 345-362.
Immigration and the Declining Birthrate. Maurice R. Davie. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Jul., 1924), pp. 68-76.
Immigration as a Source of Urban Increase. F. Stuart Chapin. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 14, No. 107. (Sep., 1914), pp. 223-227.
Immigrants’ Growing Role in U.S. Poverty Cited. By Michael A. Fletcher, Washington Post Staff Writer. Thursday, September 2, 1999; Page A2. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv...mmig/immig.htm. Retrieved (1 of 3) 3/20/2007 6:03:38 PM
Immigration Policy Since World War I. Edward P. Hutchinson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 262, Reappraising Our Immigration Policy. (Mar., 1949), pp. 15-21.
Is the New Immigration More Unskilled than the Old? Paul H. Douglas. Publications of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 16, No. 126. (Jun., 1919), pp. 393-403.
Japanese Americans: The Development of a Middleman Minority. Harry H. L. Kitano
The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 43, No. 4. (Nov., 1974), pp. 500-519.
Job Transitions in an Immigrant Metropolis: Ethnic Boundaries and the Mixed Economy. Victor Nee; Jimy M. Sanders; Scott Sernau. American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Dec., 1994), pp. 849-872.
Korean Businesses in Black and Hispanic Neighborhoods: A Study of Intergroup Relations. Lucie Cheng; Yen Espiritu. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 4. (Winter, 1989), pp. 521-534.
Limits of Ethnic Solidarity in the Enclave Economy. Jimy M. Sanders; Victor Nee. American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, No. 6. (Dec., 1987), pp. 745-773.
Middleman Minority Concept: Its Explanatory Value in the Case of the Japanese in California Agriculture. David J. O’Brien; Stephen S. Fugita. The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 1982), pp. 185-204.
The Washington Post: Myth of the Melting Pot: America’s Racial and Ethnic Divides. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv...t/melt0222.htm. Retrieved (1 of 10) 3/20/2007 6:00:09 PM
On the Study of Ethnic Enterprise: Unresolved Issues. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 4, The Ethnic Economy. (Oct., 1987), pp. 467-472.
Our Oldest National Problem. Alcott W. Stockwell. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 5. (Mar., 1927), pp. 742-755.
Paths to Self-Employment among Immigrants: An Analysis of Four Interpretations. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Jan., 1986), pp. 101-120.
Politics without Borders or Postmodern Nationality: Mexican Immigration to the United States. Arturo Santamaría Gómez; James Zackrison. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 2, Citizenship in Latin America. (Mar., 2003), pp. 66-86.
Problems in Resolving the Enclave Economy Debate. Jimy M. Sanders; Victor Nee. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 415-418.
Problems of Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurs. Pyong Gap Min. International Migration Review, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Autumn, 1990), pp. 436-455.
Returns on Human Capital in Ethnic Enclaves: New York City’s Chinatown. Min Zhou; John R. Logan. American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 5. (Oct., 1989), pp. 809-820.
Selective Immigration and the Needs of American Basic Industries. Magnus W. Alexander. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Vol. 10, No. 4, American Economic Policies Since the Armistice. (Jan., 1924), pp. 102-115.
Six Problems in the Sociology of the Ethnic Economy. José A. Cobas. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 2. (Summer, 1989), pp. 201-214.
Social Capital and the Education of Immigrant Students: Categories and Generalizations. Pedro A. Noguera. Sociology of Education, Vol. 77, No. 2. (Apr., 2004), pp. 180-183.
Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant Population. George J. Borjas. The Future of Children, Vol. 16, No. 2, Opportunity in America. (Autumn, 2006), pp. 55-71.
Social Structure and Prejudice. Sheldon Stryker. Social Problems, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Spring, 1959), pp. 340-354.
Some Aspects of the Immigration Problem. Roland P. Falkner. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Mar., 1904), pp. 32-49.
The Antecedents of Mexican Immigration to the United States. Robert Redfield. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 3. (Nov., 1929), pp. 433-438.
The Changing Significance of Ethnic and Class Resources in Immigrant Businesses: The Case of Korean Immigrant Businesses in Chicago. In-Jin Yoon. International Migration Review, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Summer, 1991), pp. 303-332.
The Control of Immigration as an Administrative Problem. Paul S. Peirce. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 4, No. 3. (Aug., 1910), pp. 374-389.
The Fertility Contribution of Mexican Immigration to the United States. Stefan Hrafn Jonsson; Michael S. Rendall. Demography, Vol. 41, No. 1. (Feb., 2004), pp. 129-150.
The Industrial Significance of Immigration. W. Jett Lauck. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 93, Present-Day Immigration with Special Reference to the Japanese. (Jan., 1921), pp. 185-190.
The New American Immigration Policy and the Labor Market. Niles Carpenter. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Aug., 1931), pp. 720-723.
The Origins and Persistence of Ethnic Identity among the “New Immigrant” Groups. David O. Sears; Mingying Fu; P. J. Henry; Kerra Bui. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 4, Special Issue: Race, Racism, and Discrimination. (Dec., 2003), pp. 419-437.
The Present Status of Our Immigration Laws and Policies. E. P. Hutchinson. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 1947), pp. 161-173.
The Relation of Oriental Immigration to the General Immigration Problem. J. Allen Smith. The American Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, Papers and Discussions of the Twenty-third Annual Meeting. (Apr., 1911), pp. 237-242.
The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965. Mae M. Ngai. Law and History Review, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Spring, 2003), pp. 69-107.
The War and Immigration. Frank Julian Warne. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 61, America’s Interests after the European War. (Sep., 1915), pp. 30-39.
Toward a Unified Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: A Preliminary Synthesis of Three Macro Models. Jonathan H. Turner. Sociological Forum, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Summer, 1986), pp. 403-427.
Race and Ethnicity
Science and the Race Problem. Charles I. Glicksberg. Phylon (1940-1956), Vol. 12, No. 4. (4th Qtr., 1951), pp. 319-327.
Science and the Race Problem. AAAS Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare. Science, New Series, Vol. 142, No. 3592. (Nov. 1, 1963), pp. 558-561.
Science and the Race Problem. Carleton Putnam; W. W. Baker. Science, New Series, Vol. 142, No. 3598. (Dec. 13, 1963), pp. 1419-1420.
The Race Problem and Science. Freeman H. Quimby; H. S. Dudley; William T. Powers; Robert W. Shortridge; Clifford A. Kaye; Louis S. Kassel; Duncan MacRae, Jr. Science, New Series, Vol. 143, No. 3604. (Jan. 24, 1964), pp. 306-308.
Science and the Race Problem. Henry E. Garrett; Wesley C. George; Barry Commoner; Robert B. Brode; T. C. Byerly; Ansley J. Coale; John T. Edsall; Lawrence K. Frank; Margaret Mead; Walter Orr Roberts; Dael Wolfle. Science, New Series, Vol. 143, No. 3609. (Feb. 28, 1964), pp. 913-915.
The Individual, Society, or Both? A Comparison of Black, Latino, and White Beliefs about the Causes of Poverty. Matthew O. Hunt. Social Forces, Vol. 75, No. 1. (Sep., 1996), pp. 293-322.
A Theory of Immigration and Racial Stratification. Vilna Bashi; Antonio McDaniel. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 27, No. 5. (May, 1997), pp. 668-682.
America’s Melting Pot Reconsidered. Charles Hirschman. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9. (1983), pp. 397-423.
Does Ethnic Concentration Influence Employees’ Access to Authority? An Examination of Contemporary Urban Labor Markets. Ryan A. Smith; James R. Elliott. Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 1. (Sep., 2002), pp. 255-279.
Black Ethnicity and the Persistence of Ethnogenesis. Ronald L. Taylor. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84, No. 6. (May, 1979), pp. 1401-1423.
AP: Cherokee Votes Rescind Freedmen Membership - Race & Ethnicity - MSNBC.com, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17597902...playmode/1098/. Retrieved 8/24/2007. URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17597902/
Chicanas in White-Collar Jobs: “You Have to Prove Yourself More.” Denise A. Segura. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 35, No. 1, Women in the Workplace: Toward True Integration. (Spring, 1992), pp. 163-182.
Color-Blind: The Treatment of Race and Ethnicity in Social Psychology. Matthew O. Hunt; Pamela Braboy Jackson; Brian Powell; Lala Carr Steelman. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4, Special Millenium Issue on the State of Sociological Social Psychology. (Dec., 2000), pp. 352-364.
Vindicating Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Road to a Color-Blind Society. Mary Frances Berry. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 81, No. 1/4, Vindicating the Race: Contributions to African-American Intellectual History. (Winter - Autumn, 1996), pp. 137-144.
A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind.” Neil Gotanda. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1-68.
America’s Moral Dilemma: Will It Be Color Blindness or Racial Equality? Glenn C. Loury. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 27. (Spring, 2000), pp. 90-94.
Reflections on Race Relations and Organizations. Clayton P. Alderfer. Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 11, No. 6, Special Issue: The Career and Life Experiences of Black Professionals. (Nov., 1990), pp. 493-495.
The Profession of the Color Blind: Sociocultural Anthropology and Racism in the 21st Century (in Contemporary Issues Forum. Race and Racism). Eugenia Shanklin. American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Sep., 1998), pp. 669-679.
Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies. J. Skelly Wright. The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2. (Winter, 1980), pp. 213-245.
Color Blind? The Influence of Race on Perception of Crime Severity (in Prize-Winning Student Paper). Stacy E. Benjamin. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 58, No. 3, Shaping the Urban Future: People and Places, Problems and Potentials. (Summer, 1989), pp. 442-448.
“What Group?” Studying Whites and Whiteness in the Era of “Color-Blindness.” Amanda E. Lewis. Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 623-646.
Race, Color Blindness, and the Democratic Public: Albion W. Tourgée’s Radical Principles in Plessy v. Ferguson. Mark Elliott. The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 67, No. 2. (May, 2001), pp. 287-330.
“Interracial” Sex and Racial Democracy in Brazil: Twin Concepts? Donna Goldstein. American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 101, No. 3. (Sep., 1999), pp. 563-578.
Racism in U. S. Nursing. Evelyn L. Barbee. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 7, No. 4, Racism, Gender, Class, and Health. (Dec., 1993), pp. 346-362.
Incentive Effects of Affirmative Action (in Historical and Legal Background). Glenn C. Loury. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 523, Affirmative Action Revisited. (Sep., 1992), pp. 19-29.
Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed-Race People (in Comment). Kenneth E. Payson. California Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 4. (Jul., 1996), pp. 1233-1291.
Hopwood in Doubt: The Folly of Setting a Grand Theory Requiring Race Neutrality in All Programs of Higher Education. Theodore Cross. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 29. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 60-84.
A Rational Basis for Affirmative Action: A Shaky but Classical Liberal Defense (in Symposium: Centennial Celebration). Richard A. Epstein. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 8. (Aug., 2002), pp. 2036-2061.
Ethnicity Matters. Barbara Eckstein. American Literary History, Vol. 7, No. 3, Imagining a National Culture. (Autumn, 1995), pp. 572-581.
Alleged Cures of Color Blindness (in Notes and Discussions). Elsie Murray. The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 58, No. 2. (Apr., 1945), pp. 253-261.
Ameliorative Racial Preference and the Fourteenth Amendment: Some Constitutional Problems (in Articles). Ralph A. Rossum. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2. (May, 1976), pp. 346-366.
Legal Foundations of Civil Rights and Pluralism in America. Charles M. Lamb. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 454, America as a Multicultural Society. (Mar., 1981), pp. 13-25.
Racial Classifications and Reconstruction Legislation. Paul Moreno. The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 61, No. 2. (May, 1995), pp. 271-304.
Affirmative Action and Its Negative Repercussions (in Historical and Legal Background). Wm. Bradford Reynolds. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 523, Affirmative Action Revisited. (Sep., 1992), pp. 38-49.
Empowerment Hazards: Affirmative Action, Recovery Psychology, and Identity Politics. Michel Feher. Representations, No. 55, Special Issue: Race and Representation: Affirmative Action. (Summer, 1996), pp. 84-91.
Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and Implications (in Race and Education). William F. Tate IV. Review of Research in Education, Vol. 22. (1997), pp. 195-247.
Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture. Joane Nagel. Social Problems, Vol. 41, No. 1, Special Issue on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America. (Feb., 1994), pp. 152-176.
Data on Race and Ethnicity: Revising the Federal Standard. Katherine K. Wallman.
The American Statistician, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Feb., 1998), pp. 31-33.
Dominican-American Ethnic/Racial Identities and United States Social Categories. Benjamin Bailey. International Migration Review, Vol. 35, No. 3. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 677-708.
Effects of Ethnicity and Sex on Teachers’ Expectations of Junior High School Students. Rodney A. Clifton; Raymond P. Perry; Karen Parsonson; Stella Hryniuk. Sociology of Education, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Jan., 1986), pp. 58-67.
Ethnic and Environmental Influences on Mental Abilities. Kevin Marjoribanks. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 2. (Sep., 1972), pp. 323-337.
Ethnic Euphemisms and Racial Echoes. Saul Dubow. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, Special Issue: Ethnicity and Identity in Southern Africa. (Sep., 1994), pp. 355-370.
Ethnicity. J. Milton Yinger. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11. (1985), pp. 151-180.
Ethnicity: A Neglected Dimension of American History (in Documentation). Dean Cinel
International Migration Review, Vol. 3, No. 3. (Summer, 1969), pp. 58-63.
Ethnicity: An Analysis of Its Dynamism and Variability Focusing on the Mexican/Anglo/Mexican American Interface (in Pluralism and Ethnicity). Margarita B. Melville. American Ethnologist, Vol. 10, No. 2. (May, 1983), pp. 272-289.
Ethnicity and Practice. G. Carter Bentley. Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Jan., 1987), pp. 24-55.
Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly? Darrell Steffensmeier; Stephen Demuth. American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, No. 5. (Oct., 2000), pp. 705-729.
Ethnicity and Sexuality. Joane Nagel. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26. (2000), pp. 107-133.
Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status as Sources of Participation: The Case for Ethnic Political Culture. Dale C. Nelson. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. (Dec., 1979), pp. 1024-1038.
Ethnicity as Practice? A Comment on Bentley. Kevin A. Yelvington. Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Jan., 1991), pp. 158-168.
Ethnicity in 25 Years of Published Sexuality Research: 1971-1995. Michael W. Wiederman; Carri Maynard; Amelia Fretz. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 33, No. 4. (1996), pp. 339-342.
Hispanic Turnout: Estimates from Validated Voting Data. Carol A. Cassel. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Jun., 2002), pp. 391-408.
Kids Forced into Domestic Servitude in Haiti - Americas - MSNBC.com. URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20293963/. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20293963...playmode/1098/. Retrieved 8/24/2007
Reputed Klansman gets life for killings - Race & Ethnicity - MSNBC.com. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20424056/?GT1=10252. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20424056...splaymode=1098. Retrieved 8/24/2007
Marriage among Unwed Mothers: Whites, Blacks and Hispanics Compared. Deborah Roempke Graefe; Daniel T. Lichter. Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, Vol. 34, No. 6. (Nov. - Dec., 2002), pp. 286-293.
Measuring Race and Ethnicity: Meeting Public Policy Goals. Thomas C. Sawyer. The American Statistician, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Feb., 1998), pp. 34-35.
Minority Identity and Self-Esteem. J. R. Porter; R. E. Washington. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19. (1993), pp. 139-161.
Neo-Ethnicity as Defensive Political Protest. Albert James Bergesen. American Sociological Review, Vol. 42, No. 5. (Oct., 1977), pp. 823-825.
Disciplines Unbound: Notes on Sociology and Ethnic Studies. Yen Le Espiritu. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 5. (Sep., 1999), pp. 510-514.
On Perilous Ideas (in Discussion and Criticism). Jonathan Friedman; Aidan Southall. Current Anthropology, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Apr., 1994), pp. 173-175.
On the Borderland of Ethnicity and Race: An Introduction (in On the Borderland of Ethnicity and Race). David Paul Nord. The Journal of American History, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Mar., 2000), pp. 1630-1631.
Pacific Islander Americans and Multiethnicity: A Vision of America’s Future? Paul R. Spickard; Rowena Fong. Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 4. (Jun., 1995), pp. 1365-1383.
The Persistent Power of “Race” in the Cultural and Political Economy of Racism. Faye V. Harrison. Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 24. (1995), pp. 47-74.
Race and Class Consciousness Among Lower- and Middle-Class Blacks. Thomas J. Durant, Jr.; Kathleen H. Sparrow. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Jan., 1997), pp. 334-351.
The Black Middle Class in America: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Thomas J. Durant, Jr.; Joyce S. Louden. Phylon(1960-), Vol. 47, No. 4. (4th Qtr., 1986), pp. 253-263.
Race and Race Theory. Howard Winant. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26. (2000), pp. 169-185.
Restructuring for Whom? Race, Class, Gender, and the Ideology of Invisibility. Margaret L. Andersen. Sociological Forum, Vol. 16, No. 2. (Jun., 2001), pp. 181-201.
Race, Ethnicity and Nativity, Family Structure, Socioeconomic Status and Welfare Dependency. Hiromi Ono; Rosina M. Becerra. International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 739-765.
Categorical Usages and Complex Realities: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion in the United States. Richard F. Hamilton; William H. Form. Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 3. (Mar., 2003), pp. 693-714.
“Your Blues Ain’t Like My Blues”: Race, Ethnicity, and Social Inequality in America. Walter R. Allen; Angie Y. Chung. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 6. (Nov., 2000), pp. 796-805.
Race/Ethnicity, Nativity, and Infant Mortality in the United States. Robert A. Hummer; Monique Biegler; Peter B. De Turk; Douglas Forbes; W. Parker Frisbie; Ying Hong; Starling G. Pullum. Social Forces, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Mar., 1999), pp. 1083-1117.
Race in International Relations. R. J. Vincent. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 58, No. 4. (Autumn, 1982), pp. 658-670.
Race, Public Opinion, and the Social Sphere. Lawrence Bobo. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 1, Special Issue on Race. (Spring, 1997), pp. 1-15.
Racial and Ethnic Differences in U.S. Census Omission Rates. David J. Fein. Demography, Vol. 27, No. 2. (May, 1990), pp. 285-302.
Racial and Ethnic Variations in Gender-Related Attitudes. Emily W. Kane. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26. (2000), pp. 419-439.
Racial Matching among African-American and Hispanic Physicians and Patients. Martha Harrison Stinson; Norman K Thurston. The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 2. (Spring, 2002), pp. 410-428.
Racial Policy and Racial Conflict in the Urban United States, 1869-1924. Susan Olzak; Suzanne Shanahan. Social Forces, Vol. 82, No. 2. (Dec., 2003), pp. 481-517.
White, Black, or Puerto Rican? Racial Self-Identification among Mainland and Island Puerto Ricans. Nancy S. Landale; R.S. Oropesa. Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 1. (Sep., 2002), pp. 231-254.
Racial Theorizing: Is Sociology Ready to Replace Polemic Causation Theory with a New Polemic Model? Leonard Gordon. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Spring, 1989), pp. 129-136.
Reconstructing Racial Identity: Ethnicity, Color, and Class among Dominicans in the United States and Puerto Rico. Jorge Duany. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 25, No. 3, Race and National Identity in the Americas. (May, 1998), pp. 147-172.
Reflections on Race: The Debate Continues. William L. Smith. Teaching Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Jul., 1992), pp. 254-257.
Social Class, Ethnicity, and Racial Prejudice. Thomas J. Pavlak. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2. (Summer, 1973), pp. 225-231.
Symbolic Ethnicity or Religion among Jews in the United States: A Test of Gansian Hypotheses. J. Alan Winter. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Mar., 1996), pp. 233-247.
Political Opinion and Distinctiveness: The Case of Hispanic Ethnicity. Ryan L. Claassen. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 609-620.
The Composition of Political Attitudes. Gordon W. Allport. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Sep., 1929), pp. 220-238.
The Continuing Significance of Race in Minority Male Joblessness. Ronald D’Amico; Nan L. Maxwell. Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 3. (Mar., 1995), pp. 969-991.
The Creation and Re-Creation of Ethnicity: Lessons from the Zapotec and Mixtec of Oaxaca. Lynn Stephen. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 2, Ethnicity and Class in Latin America. (Spring, 1996), pp. 17-37.
Investment, Obsession, and Denial: The Ideology of Race in the American Mind. Dirk Philipsen. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 72, No. 2. (Spring, 2003), pp. 193-207.
The Impact of Ethnicity and Socialization on Definitions of Democracy: The Case of Mexican Americans and Mexicans. Rodolfo O. de la Garza; Muserref Yetim. Mexican Studies / Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Winter, 2003), pp. 81-104.
The Importance of Racial-Ethnic Identity and Social Setting for Blacks, Whites, and Multiracials. Charles Jaret; Donald C. Reitzes. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 42, No. 4. (Winter, 1999), pp. 711-737.
The Meaning and Measurement of Race in the U.S. Census: Glimpses into the Future. Charles Hirschman; Richard Alba; Reynolds Farley. Demography, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Aug., 2000), pp. 381-393.
The Origins and Demise of the Concept of Race. Charles Hirschman. Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Sep., 2004), pp. 385-415.
The Portuguese and Haoles of Hawaii: Implications for the Origin of Ethnicity. James A. Geschwender; Rita Carroll-Seguin; Howard Brill. American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Aug., 1988), pp. 515-527.
The Religious Context of Prejudice. Gordon W. Allport. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 5, No. 3. (Autumn, 1966), pp. 447-457.
Color-Blind: The Treatment of Race and Ethnicity in Social Psychology. Matthew O. Hunt; Pamela Braboy Jackson; Brian Powell; Lala Carr Steelman. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4, Special Millenium Issue on the State of Sociological Social Psychology. (Dec., 2000), pp. 352-364.
Trends in the Race and Ethnicity of Eminent Americans. Monica McDermott. Sociological Forum, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Mar., 2002), pp. 137-160.
Black Candidates, White Voters: Understanding Racial Bias in Political Perceptions. Carol K. Sigelman; Lee Sigelman; Barbara J. Walkosz; Michael Nitz. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 1. (Feb., 1995), pp. 243-265.
“White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.” Peggy McIntosh. www.case.edu/president/aactio...heKnapsack.pdf
Who Is Multiracial? Assessing the Complexity of Lived Race. David R. Harris; Jeremiah Joseph Sim. American Sociological Review, Vol. 67, No. 4. (Aug., 2002), pp. 614-627.
Race and Justice
Crime and Punishment: The Politics of Federal Criminal Justice Sanctions. Sean Nicholson-Crotty; Kenneth J. Meier. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2. (Jun., 2003), pp. 119-126.
Gender, Race, and Sentencing. Kathleen Daly; Michael Tonry. Crime and Justice, Vol. 22. (1997), pp. 201-252.
Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, and the Law. Valerie P. Hans; Ramiro Martinez, Jr. Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 18, No. 3, Race, Ethnicity, and the Law. (Jun., 1994), pp. 211-221.
Supreme Court of The United States . Panetti v. Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division . Certiorari to The United States Court of Appeals For the Fifth Circuit. No. 06–6407. Argued April 18, 2007—Decided June 28, 2007 . No URL.
Perceptions of Justice: Race and Gender Differences in Judgments of Appropriate Prison Sentences. J. L. Miller; Peter H. Rossi; Jon E. Simpson. Law & Society Review, Vol. 20, No. 3. (1986), pp. 313-334.
Race and Plea Bargained Outcomes: A Research Note. John A. Humphrey; Timothy J. Fogarty. Social Forces, Vol. 66, No. 1. (Sep., 1987), pp. 176-182.
Race and Sentence Severity: The Case of American Justice. Jim Sidanius. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Mar., 1988), pp. 273-281.
Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Injustice in America. John Hagan; Celesta Albonetti. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 88, No. 2. (Sep., 1982), pp. 329-355.
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States. Robert J. Sampson; Janet L. Lauritsen. Crime and Justice, Vol. 21, Ethnicity, Crime and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives. (1997), pp. 311-374.
Study Finds Racial Disparity in Executions - Newsweek Health - MSNBC.com. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20072722...playmode/1098/ . Retrieved 8/1/2007
Racial Classification in Criminology: The Reproduction of Racialized Crime. Jeanette Covington. Sociological Forum, Vol. 10, No. 4, Special Issue: African Americans and Sociology: A Critical Analysis. (Dec., 1995), pp. 547-568.
Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty. Gary Kleck. American Sociological Review, Vol. 46, No. 6. (Dec., 1981), pp. 783-805.
Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Explain the Racial Composition of Prisons in the United States. Patrick A. Langan. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-), Vol. 76, No. 3. (Autumn, 1985), pp. 666-683.
Retrying Race. Anthony V. Alfieri. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 5, Colloquium: Retrying Race. (Mar., 2003), pp. 1141-1200.
The Color of Crime: The Case against Race-Based Suspect Descriptions. Bela August Walker. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 103, No. 3. (Apr., 2003), pp. 662-688.
The Limits of Justice: Finding Fault in the Criminal Law. Alan Norrie. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Jul., 1996), pp. 540-556.
African Americans
A Comparison of European and African-Based Psychologies and Their Implications for African American College Student Development. Vanessa D. Johnson. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 33, No. 6. (Jul., 2003), pp. 817-829.
African American Diversity and the Study of Folklore. John W. Roberts. Western Folklore, Vol. 52, No. 2/4, Theorizing Folklore: Toward New Perspectives on the Politics of Culture. (Apr. - Oct., 1993), pp. 157-171.
American Experience | The Murder of Emmett Till. www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/till/index.html. 6/22/2005 2:03:54 PM
African American Males in Dance, Music, Theater, and Film. I. Peter Ukpokodu. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 569, The African American Male in American Life and Thought. (May, 2000), pp. 71-85.
African Americans’ Congressional Careers and the Democratic House Delegation. Alan Gerber. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, No. 3. (Aug., 1996), pp. 831-845.
Langston Hughes—”A Dream Deferred” . This is a video clip from the Langston Hughes program in the Voices & Visions video series from the Annenberg Media Multimedia Collection.. www.learner.org/catalog/extra...eo/hughes.html. Retrieved 12/09/2007, 1:41:30 PM
African Art and African-American Identity. Eric Robertson. African Arts, Vol. 27, No. 2. (Apr., 1994), pp. 1+6+8+10.
African (Black) Psychology: Issues and Synthesis. Joseph A. Baldwin. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3. (Mar., 1986), pp. 235-249.
African Immigrants in the United States are the Nation’s Most Highly Educated Group. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 26. (Winter, 1999-2000), pp. 60-61..
African-American Odyssey. The Library of Congress. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/aaohtml/ . Retrieved (1 of 5) 5/21/2007 5:46:25 PM
African-American Parents: Pay Attention!. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 34. (Winter, 2001-2002), p. 9..
African-American Women in Higher Education: Struggling to Gain Identity. Michelle R. Howard-Vital. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, The African-American Woman: Complexities in the Midst of a Simplistic World View. (Dec., 1989), pp. 180-191.
African-American Women in the Economic Marketplace: A Continuing Struggle. Delores P. Aldridge. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, The African-American Woman: Complexities in the Midst of a Simplistic World View. (Dec., 1989), pp. 129-154.
African-Americans and the Selective Service Act of 1917. James Mennell. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 84, No. 3. (Summer, 1999), pp. 275-287.
Alexander Crummell. Priest, Missionary, Educator (10 Sep 1898). http://satucket.com/lectionary/Alex_Crummell.htm. Retrieved 12/08/2007, 02:15:17 PM
American Experience | Reconstruction: The Second Civil War | Forty Acres and a Mule | PBS. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reconst...res/index.html . Retrieved (1 of 2) 9/15/2007 12:44:38 PM.
American Experience | Reconstruction: The Second Civil War | PBS. www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reconst...ion/index.html. Retrieved 9/15/2007 12:58:02 PM.
American Experience | The Murder of Emmett Till. www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/till/index.html. Retrieved 6/22/2005 2:03:54 PM.
An Investigation of Sex-Role Stereotypes in African Americans. Lennell R. Dade; Lloyd R. Sloan. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 30, No. 5. (May, 2000), pp. 676-690.
Black versus Black: The Relationships among African, African American, and African Caribbean Persons. Jennifer V. Jackson; Mary E. Cothran. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 33, No. 5. (May, 2003), pp. 576-604.
Introduction: Challenges to the Homogenization of “African American.” Richard Williams. Sociological Forum, Vol. 10, No. 4, Special Issue: African Americans and Sociology: A Critical Analysis. (Dec., 1995), pp. 535-546.
Civil Rights Movement Veterans - CORE, NAACP, SCLC, SNCC. http://www.crmvet.org/. Retrieved 5/23/2007 3:14:06 PM
Comments on African American Contributions to American Material Life. Theodore C. Landsmark. Winterthur Portfolio, Vol. 33, No. 4, Race and Ethnicity in American Material Life. (Winter, 1998), pp. 261-282.
Disproportionate Representation of African Americans in Emotionally Handicapped Classes. Thomas S. Serwatka; Sharian Deering; Patrick Grant. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4. (Mar., 1995), pp. 492-506.
Effects of Television Advertising on African American Teenagers. E. Bun Lee; Louis A. Browne. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 25, No. 5. (May, 1995), pp. 523-536.
The Nguzo Saba as a Foundation for African American College Student Development Theory. Vanessa D. Johnson. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Mar., 2001), pp. 406-422.
The Story of the Greensboro Four. Independent Lens . FEBRUARY ONE . The Sit-In | PBS. http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/f...one/sitin.html . Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/23/2007 3:03:22 PM.
The Greensboro Sit-In Timeline of Events. www.sitins.com/timeline.shtml .
Henry Mcneal Turner Versus the Tuskegee Machine: Black Leadership in the Nineteenth Century. Gregory Mixon. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 79, No. 4. (Autumn, 1994), pp. 363-380.
In Quest of African American Political Woman. Jewel L. Prestage. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 515, American Feminism: New Issues for a Mature Movement. (May, 1991), pp. 88-103.
International Civil Rights Center & Museum :: History. www.sitinmovement.org/history/default.asp . Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/23/2007 3:02:00 PM
Introduction: The African-American Mosaic (Library of Congress Exhibition). www.loc.gov/exhibits/african/introduction.html . Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/21/2007 5:45:50 PM
Moving up, but How Far? African American Women and Economic Restructuring in Los Angeles, 1970-1990. Angela D. James; David M. Grant; Cynthia Cranford. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 43, No. 3. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 399-420.
Mutations of Eurocentric Domination and Their Implications for African American Resistance. Jerome H. Schiele. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4. (Mar., 2002), pp. 439-463.
Preschool Children’s Selection of Race-Related Personal Names. Jerlean E. Daniel; Jack L. Daniel. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4. (Mar., 1998), pp. 471-490.
Guiding Philosophical Principles for a DuBoisian-Based African American Educational Model. Derrick P. Alridge. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 68, No. 2. (Spring, 1999), pp. 182-199.
Race and Class in America’s Elite Preparatory Boarding Schools: African Americans as the “Outsiders Within.” Peter W. Cookson, Jr.; Caroline Hodges Persell. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 60, No. 2. (Spring, 1991), pp. 219-228.
Soul in the Culture of African Americans. Phillip L. Mason. Music Educators Journal, Vol. 79, No. 3. (Nov., 1992), pp. 49-52.
Studying African American Artifacts: Some Background for the Winterthur Conference, “Race and Ethnicity in American Material Life.” John Michael Vlach. Winterthur Portfolio, Vol. 33, No. 4, Race and Ethnicity in American Material Life. (Winter, 1998), pp. 211-214.
Gender Roles Revisited: The Development of the “Woman’s Place” Among African American Women in the United States. Norma J. Burgess. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4. (Jun., 1994), pp. 391-401.
The Dilemmas of the African American Male. Wayne M. Blake; Carol A. Darling. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4. (Jun., 1994), pp. 402-415.
Introduction and Overview: The Education of African American Students: The Struggle Continues. Ralph Gardner, III; Donna Y. Ford; Antoinette Halsell Miranda. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 70, No. 4, African American Children with Special Needs. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 241-242.
The Ties That Bind: The Historic African Diaspora and Africa. Cassandra R. Veney. African Issues, Vol. 30, No. 1, The African “BRAIN DRAIN” to the North: Pitfalls and Possibilities. (2002), pp. 3-8.
The Impact of Perceptions on Interpersonal Interactions in an African American/Asian American Housing Project. Patricia Guthrie; Janis Hutchinson. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3. (Jan., 1995), pp. 377-395.
The Limited Presence of African-American Teachers. Sabrina Hope King. Review of Educational Research, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Summer, 1993), pp. 115-149.
Understanding the Strengths of African American Families. Sheila M. Littlejohn-Blake; Carol Anderson Darling. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Jun., 1993), pp. 460-471.
Understanding Violence Among Young African American Males: An Afrocentric Perspective. Anthony E. O. King. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Sep., 1997), pp. 79-96.
Voices of Civil Rights (A Library of Congress Exhibition). http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civilrights/. Retrieved 5/21/2007 5:47:53 PM
Whose Tangle is it Anyway? The African-American Family, Poverty and United States Kinship. Anthony Marcus. International Development, SAGES, University of Melbourne. The Australian Journal of Anthropology: The Official Journal of The Australian Anthropological Society ISSN: 1035-8811. Volume 16, Number 1, April 2004, Special Issue 16. www.aas.asn.au/TAJA/Contents_16_1.htm
Why “Black” and Not “African American”?. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 3. (Spring, 1994), pp. 18-19..
“What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?”. University of Rochester: Frederick Douglass Project. Oration Delivered July 5, 1852.. http://www.library.rochester.edu/index.cfm?PAGE=2945.
American Indians
The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women . Jane Lawrence . American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Summer, 2000), pp. 400-419.
Tubal Sterilization in the United States, 1994-1996 . Andrea P. MacKay; Burney A. Kieke, Jr.; Lisa M. Koonin; Karen Beattie . Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 2001), pp. 161-165.
Revision and Resistance: The Politics of Native Women’s Motherwork . Lisa J. Udel . Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2. (2001), pp. 43-62.
Native American Women (in The New Scholarship: Review Essays) . Rayna Green . Signs, Vol. 6, No. 2, Studies in Change. (Winter, 1980), pp. 248-267.
Ethics and Compulsory Population Control . Drew Christiansen . The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Feb., 1977), pp. 30-33.
Aboriginal North American Population and Rates of Decline, ca. A.D. 1500-1900. Russell Thornton. Current Anthropology, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Apr., 1997), pp. 310-315.
“African and Cherokee by Choice”: Race and Resistance under Legalized. Segregation. Laura L. Lovett. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1/2. (Winter - Spring, 1998), pp. 203-229.
AIDS: The New Smallpox among Native Americans. Irene S. Vernon. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, Indigenous Resistance and Persistence. (Spring, 1999), pp.. 235-249.
Alcatraz, Wounded Knee, and beyond: The Nixon and Ford Administrations Respond to Native American Protest. Dean J. Kotlowski. The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 72, No. 2. (May, 2003), pp. 201-227.
American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity. Joane Nagel. American Sociological Review, Vol. 60, No. 6. (Dec., 1995), pp. 947-965.
American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity. Joane Nagel. American Sociological Review, Vol. 60, No. 6. (Dec., 1995), pp. 947-965.
American Indian Persistence and Resurgence. Karl Kroeber. boundary 2, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1492-1992: American Indian Persistence and Resurgence. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 1-25.
Amerindians. John Collier. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3. (Mar., 1929), pp. 116-122.
Antecedents of Self-Reported Arrest for Indian Americans in Seattle. Larry E. Williams; Bruce A. Chadwick; Howard M. Bahr. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 40, No. 3. (3rd Qtr., 1979), pp. 243-252.
At the Boundaries of Religious Identity: Native American Religions and American Legal Culture. Susan Staiger Gooding. Numen, Vol. 43, No. 2, Religion, Law and the Construction of Identities. (May, 1996), pp. 157-183.
Before and beyond the Sioux Ghost Dance: Native American Prophetic Movements and the Study of Religion. Joel W. Martin. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Winter, 1991), pp. 677-701.
Changing Identification among American Indians and Alaska Natives. Karl Eschbach. Demography, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Nov., 1993), pp. 635-652.
Confrontation with the Law: The Case of the American Indians in Seattle. Bruce A. Chadwick; Joseph Stauss; Howard M. Bahr; Lowell K. Halverson. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 37, No. 2. (2nd Qtr., 1976), pp. 163-171.
Do Reservation Native Americans Vote with Their Feet?: A Re-Examination of Native American Migration, 1985-1990. Elizabeth Zahrt Geib. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 60, No. 4. (Oct., 2001), pp. 815-827.
Empowering the World War II Native American Veteran: Postwar Civil Rights. Jeré Franco. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Spring, 1993), pp. 32-37.
Engaging Students with Native American Community Resources. James Treat. American Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Dec., 1993), pp. 621-630.
Environmental Genocide: Native Americans and Toxic Waste. Daniel Brook. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 57, No. 1. (Jan., 1998), pp. 105-113.
Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians. Stuart Minor Benjamin. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, No. 3. (Dec., 1996), pp. 537-612.
Fear and Contempt: A European Concept of Property. Sidner Larson. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 567-577.
Sioux ghost dance / Thomas A. Edison, Inc. ; producer, W.K.L. Dickson.. http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/...nd(edmp+4024)) . Retrieved (1 of 3) 7/3/2007 1:20:56 PM
The Ghost Dance. Lakota Dakota Home Page: History. http://puffin.creighton.edu/lakota/index_history.html . Retrieved (2 of 7)7/3/2007 1:27:00 PM
PBS - THE WEST - Mrs. Z. A. Parker, the Ghost Dance at Pine Ridge Reservation (1890). http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/reso...t/gddescrp.htm . Retrieved (1 of 3) 7/3/2007 1:19:42 PM.
Ghost Dance Religion. www.bgsu.edu/departments/acs/...e/WKghost.html . Retrieved (1 of 4) 7/3/2007 1:16:50 PM.
The Religious Movements Homepage: Ghost Dance. The Religious Movements Project @The University of Virginia: Ghost Dance. religiousmovements.lib.virgin...ghostdance.htm . Retrieved (1 of 6) 7/3/2007 1:24:29 PM.
Time & Again - Wounded Knee - Ghost Dance. http://www.msnbc.com/onair/msnbc/tim...host.asp?cp1=1 . Retrieved (1 of 2) 7/3/2007 1:18:18 PM.
Including Native American Perspectives in the Political Science Curriculum. Franke Wilmer; Michael E. Melody; Margaret Maier Murdock. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2. (Jun., 1994), pp. 269-276.
Indian Nations at Risk: An Educational Strategy for Action. Final Report of the Indian Nations at Risk Task Force. US Department of Education, 1991. www.ed.gov/rschstat/research/...isk/report.pdf
Indian Removal: The Trail of Tears. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2959.html . Retrieved (1 of 8) 9/15/2007 2:23:20 PM.
Intermarriage and Assimilation: The Beginning or the End?. Sandy Gonzalez. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 8, No. 2. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 48-52.
Ishi: Hearst Museum of Anthropology. hearstmuseum.berkeley.edu/exh...cc_4_ishi.html. Retrieved 3/18/2007 4:15:28 PM.
ISHI: A Real-Life Last of the Mohicans. http://www.mohicanpress.com/mo08019.html . Retrieved (1 of 12) 3/18/2007 4:12:02 PM.
Masculine/Indian. Elizabeth Cromley. Winterthur Portfolio, Vol. 31, No. 4, Gendered Spaces and Aesthetics. (Winter, 1996), pp. 265-280.
Mobilizing the Unrepresented: Indian Voting Patterns and the Implications for Tribal Sovereignty. Eileen M. Luna. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, The Secular Past, the Mythic Past, and the Impending Future. (Spring, 2000), pp. 91-115.
Native American: Evidence of an Earlier Use. Sidney I. Landau. American Speech, Vol. 69, No. 2. (Summer, 1994), pp. 202-206.
Native American Population Patterns. J. Matthew Shumway; Richard H. Jackson. Geographical Review, Vol. 85, No. 2. (Apr., 1995), pp. 185-201.
Native American Turnout in the 1990 and 1992 Elections. Geoff Peterson. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Spring, 1997), pp. 321-331.
Native Americans and the Environment: A Survey of Twentieth-Century Issues. David Rich Lewis. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Summer, 1995), pp. 423-450.
Native Americans, New Voices: American Indian History, 1895-1995. R. David Edmunds. The American Historical Review, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Jun., 1995), pp. 717-740.
New Frontiers in Native American History. Clara Sue Kidwell. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3. (1996), pp. 29-30.
Cowboys and Indians: Perceptions of Western Films Among American Indians and Anglos. JoEllen Shively. American Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 6. (Dec., 1992), pp. 725-734.
Plastic Shamans and Astroturf Sun Dances: New Age Commercialization of Native American Spirituality. Lisa Aldred. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Summer, 2000), pp. 329-352.
Identity and the Politics of American Indian and Hispanic Women Leaders. Diane-Michele Prindeville. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Aug., 2003), pp. 591-608.
“Poor Indians” and the “Poor in Spirit”: The Indian Impact on David BRAINerd. Richard W. Pointer. The New England Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 3. (Sep., 1994), pp. 403-426.
Reservation Wages: An Analysis of the Effects of Reservations on Employment of American Indian Men. Robert J. Gitter; Patricia B. Reagan. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4. (Sep., 2002), pp. 1160-1168.
Rethinking Native American Ecological Assumptions and Myths. Florence C. Shipek. Ethnohistory, Vol. 28, No. 4. (Autumn, 1981), pp. 293-294.
Roots of the Native American Urban Experience: Relocation Policy in the 1950s. Larry W. Burt. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2. (Spring, 1986), pp. 85-99.
Smoke or Signals? American Popular Culture and the Challenge to Hegemonic Images of American Indians in Native American Film. John Mihelich. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, Film and Video. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 129-137.
Sociological Perspectives on American Indians. C. Matthew Snipp. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 18. (1992), pp. 351-371.
Stride toward Freedom: The Relocation of Indians to Cities, 1952-1960. Kenneth R. Philp. The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2. (Apr., 1985), pp. 175-190.
Superficiality and Bias: The (Mis)Treatment of Native Americans in U. S. Government Textbooks. Jeffrey S. Ashley; Karen Jarratt-Ziemski. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3/4. (Summer - Autumn, 1999), pp. 49-62.
Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration and the American Indians. Oliver La Farge. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 311, American Indians and American Life. (May, 1957), pp. 41-46.
The Changing Political and Economic Status of the American Indians: From Captive Nations to Internal Colonies. C. Matthew Snipp. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 45, No. 2. (Apr., 1986), pp. 145-157.
The Commodification of Indian Identity. George Pierre Castile. American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 98, No. 4. (Dec., 1996), pp. 743-749.
The Correlation between Societal Attitudes and Those of American Authors in the Depiction of American Indians, 1607-1860. Wynette L. Hamilton. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Spring, 1974), pp. 1-26.
The Ghost-Dance Religion: Sioux Outbreak of 1890 by James Mooney. Bureau of Ethnology: Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1892-93. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896. www.archive.org/details/ghost...ioux00moonrich.
The Integration of Americans of Indian Descent. J. Milton Yinger; George Eaton Simpson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 436, American Indians. Today. (Mar., 1978), pp. 137-151.
The Role of AIM Leaders in Indian Nationalism. Rachel A. Bonney. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3. (Autumn, 1977), pp. 209-224.
Still Native: The Significance of Native Americans in the History of the Twentieth-Century American West. David Rich Lewis. The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2. (May, 1993), pp. 203-227.
The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978. Robert S. Michaelsen. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Mar., 1984), pp. 93-115.
The Use of Racial and Ethnic Terms in America: Management by Manipulation. Jack D. Forbes. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 11, No. 2. (Autumn, 1995), pp. 53-65.
The Wounded Knee Massacre - December 1890. http://www.lastoftheindependents.com/wounded.htm . Retrieved (1 of 4) 7/3/2007 1:25:18 PM
Undercounting Native Americans: The 1980 Census and the Manipulation of Racial Identity in the United States. Jack D. Forbes. Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 6, No. 1. (Spring, 1990), pp. 2-26.
What We Want to Be Called: Indigenous Peoples’ Perspectives on Racial and Ethnic Identity Labels. Michael Yellow Bird. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2. (Spring, 1999), pp. 1-21.
What’s in a Name?: A Historical Look at Native American-Related Nicknames and Symbols at Three U.S. Universities. Mark R. Connolly. The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 71, No. 5. (Sep. - Oct., 2000), pp. 515-547.
Who and What Is an American Indian?. Frell M. Owl. Ethnohistory, Vol. 9, No. 3. (Summer, 1962), pp. 265-284.
Asian Americans
A ‘Model Minority’ Speaks Out on Cultural Shyness. Ronald R. Hoy. Science, New Series, Vol. 262, No. 5136. (Nov. 12, 1993), pp. 1117-1118.
Additional Complexities: Social Class, Ethnicity, Generation, and Gender in Asian American Student Experiences. Stacey J. Lee. Race Ethnicity and Education,Vol. 9, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 17–28. University of Wisconsin—Madison, USA. ISSN 1361-3324 (print)/ISSN 1470-109X (online)/06/010017–12. © 2006 Taylor & Francis. No URL.
Are Asian-Americans ‘Underrepresented’?. Constance Holden. Science, New Series, Vol. 262, No. 5136. (Nov. 12, 1993), p. 1096.
Significant Lives: Asia and Asian Americans in the History of the U. S. West. Gail M. Nomura. The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1. (Spring, 1994), pp. 69-88.
Asian American Interracial and Interethnic Marriages: Differences by Education and Nativity. Zhenchao Qian; Sampson Lee Blair; Stacey D. Ruf. International Migration Review, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Summer, 2001), pp. 557-586.
Asian American Women and Racialized Femininities: “Doing” Gender across Cultural Worlds. Karen D. Pyke; Denise L. Johnson. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Feb., 2003), pp. 33-53.
Situating Asian Americans in the Political Discourse on Affirmative Action. Michael Omi; Dana Y. Takagi. Representations, No. 55, Special Issue: Race and Representation: Affirmative Action. (Summer, 1996), pp. 155-162.
Asian Americans and Higher Education. Russell Endo. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 41, No. 4. (4th Qtr., 1980), pp. 367-378.
Asian Americans as a Model Minority: Self-Perceptions and Perceptions by Other Racial Groups. Paul Wong; Chienping Faith Lai; Richard Nagasawa; Tieming Lin. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 41, No. 1. (1998), pp. 95-118.
“What Is Indian about You?”: A Gendered, Transnational Approach to Ethnicity. Monisha Das Gupta. Gender and Society, Vol. 11, No. 5. (Oct., 1997), pp. 572-596.
Asian Americans as Model Minorities? A Look at Their Academic Performance. Grace Kao. American Journal of Education, Vol. 103, No. 2. (Feb., 1995), pp. 121-159.
Asian-Americans Bump Against Glass Ceilings. Susan Katz Miller. Science, New Series, Vol. 258, No. 5085. (Nov. 13, 1992), pp. 1224-1225+1228.
Asian Indian Immigration Patterns: The Origins of the Sikh Community in California. Juan L. Gonzales Jr.. International Migration Review, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Spring, 1986), pp. 40-54.
Asian Indians as a Minority in the United States: The Effect of Education, Occupations and Gender on Income. Herbert Barringer; Gene Kassebaum. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 4. (Winter, 1989), pp. 501-520.
Diversity’s Missing Minority: Asian Pacific American Undergraduates’ Attitudes toward Affirmative Action. Karen Kurotsuchi Inkelas. The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 74, No. 6. (Nov. - Dec., 2003), pp. 601-639.
Asian Pacific Americans and the New Minority Politics. Andrew L. Aoki; Don T. Nakanishi. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 605-610.
Asian Pacific Americans’ Social Movements and Interest Groups. Kim Geron; Enrique de la Cruz; Leland T. Saito; Jaideep Singh. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 618-624.
Asian/Pacific American Heritage Month (Library of Congress). http://www.loc.gov/topics/asianpacific/ . Retrieved (1 of 4) 5/21/2007 5:35:12 PM.
Behind the Model-Minority Stereotype: Voices of High- and Low-Achieving Asian American Students. Stacey J. Lee. Anthropology & Education Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4. (Dec., 1994), pp. 413-429.
Differences in Family of Origin Perceptions among African American, Asian American, and Hispanic American College Students. Connie M. Kane. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Sep., 1998), pp. 93-105.
The Concept of Differentiated Oneness and Implications for Asian American Families. Auris Huang Hung, Dallas Theological Seminary. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 2006, Vol. 25, No. 3, 226-239. ISSN 0733-4273. No URL.
Disrupting Asian America: South Asian American Histories as Strategic Sites of Narration. Sridevi Menon. Department of Ethnic Studies, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43620, USA. E-mail: [email protected]. NO URL.
Ethnic Residential Concentration and the Protected Market Hypothesis. Howard Aldrich; John Cater; Trevor Jones; David Mc Evoy; Paul Velleman. Social Forces, Vol. 63, No. 4. (Jun., 1985), pp. 996-1009.
From Discrimination to Affirmative Action: Facts in the Asian American. Admissions Controversy. Dana Y. Takagi. Social Problems, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Nov., 1990), pp. 578-592.
Global Forces, Foreign Policy, and Asian Pacific Americans. Paul Y. Watanabe. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 639-644.
“I Love Asian Women”. Rana Chang. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1/2, Asian American Women. (2000), pp.. 157-158.
Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry - 1942. http://www.sfmuseum.org/hist9/evacorder.html . Retrieved (1 of 3) 6/11/2005 2:51:39 PM. This is the full text of Gen. John L. DeWitt’s first order to force the Japanese — citizens and aliens alike — out of San Francisco. A map of the zone designated for evacuation by Gen. DeWitt was published in the San Francisco News April 2, 1942. The newspaper said those evacuated from San Francisco would be sent to a remote place known as Manzanar.
Intergenerational Relationships among Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Americans. Masako Ishii-Kuntz. Family Relations, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Jan., 1997), pp. 23-32.
Interracial Politics: Asian Americans and Other Communities of Color. Claire Jean Kim; Taeku Lee. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 631-637.
Japanese Americans, Pluralism, and the Model Minority Myth. George T. Endo; Connie Kubo Della-Piana. Theory into Practice, Vol. 20, No. 1, Cultural Pluralism: Can It Work?. (Winter, 1981), pp. 45-51.
Southeast Asian American Children: Not the “Model Minority.” KaYing Yang. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 127-133.
“You Can Never Be Too Rich or Too Thin”: Popular and Consumer Culture and the Americanization of Asian American Girls and Young Women. Stacey J. Lee; Sabina Vaught. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 72, No. 4, Commercialism in the Lives of Children and Youth of Color: Education and Other Socialization Contexts. (Autumn, 2003), pp. 457-466.
Race, Ethnic Options, and Ethnic Binds: Identity Negotiations of Second-Generation Chinese and Korean Americans. Nazli Kibria. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 43, No. 1. (Spring, 2000), pp. 77-95.
Race, Ethnicity, and Deviance: A Study of Asian and Non-Asian Adolescents in America. Sung Joon Jang. Sociological Forum, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Dec., 2002), pp. 647-680.
Racial Violence against Asian Americans. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 106, No. 8. (Jun., 1993), pp. 1926-1943.
Silent No Longer: ‘Model Minority’ Mobilizes. Andrew Lawler. Science, New Series, Vol. 290, No. 5494. (Nov. 10, 2000), pp. 1072-1077.
The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism. Daina C. Chiu. California Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 4, Symposium: Critical Race Theory. (Jul., 1994), pp. 1053-1125.
The Development of Feminist Consciousness among Asian American Women. Esther Ngan-Ling Chow. Gender and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Sep., 1987), pp. 284-299.
The Impact of Perceptions on Interpersonal Interactions in an African American/Asian American Housing Project. Patricia Guthrie; Janis Hutchinson. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3. (Jan., 1995), pp. 377-395.
The Role of Reflected Appraisals in Racial Identity: The Case of Multiracial Asians. Nikki Khanna. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 2. (Jun., 2004), pp. 115-131.
To Stay or Not to Stay: Dimensions of Ethnic Assimilation. Minako K. Maykovich. International Migration Review, Vol. 10, No. 3. (Autumn, 1976), pp. 377-387.
Toward a Theory of Panethnicity: Explaining Asian American Collective Action. Dina G. Okamoto. American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, No. 6. (Dec., 2003), pp. 811-842.
Transcript of Executive Order 9066: Japanese Relocation Order (1942). www.ourdocuments.gov/print_fr...der+%281942%29 . Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/11/2005 2:53:34 PM.
Hispanic/Latino Americans
Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for Latino and African-American Political Coalitions. Karen M. Kaufmann. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2. (Jun., 2003), pp. 199-210.
Changing politics of race and region: Latino migration to the US South. Jamie Winders. Progress in Human Geography 29, 6 (2005) pp. 683–699.
Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA. © 2005 Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd 10.1191/0309132505ph577oa. No URL.
Dual Sources Of Influence On Latino Political Identity: Mexico’s Dual Nationality Policy And The Dream Act. René Galindo, Christina Medina& Xóchitl Chávez, Texas Hispanic Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 11:75] Pp 74-98. No URL.
History on the Move . . . Revisiting the Suffering of the Immigrants from the Latino/a Perspective. Suzanne Oboler. Qualitative Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 1, Spring 2006 (© 2006) DOI: 10.1007/s11133-005-9007-4. Published online: 29 March 2006. 0162-0436/06/0100-0117/1 C_ 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. No URL.
Homeland Security, Militarism, and the Future of Latinos and Latinas in the United States. Jorge Mariscal. Radical History Review. Issue 93 (Fall 2005): 39–52, pp. 39-52. Copyright 2005 by MARHO: The Radical Historians’ Organization, Inc. No URL.
Ideologies of Diversity and Inequality: Predicting Collective Action in Groups Varying in Ethnicity and Immigrant Status. Kay Deaux, Anne Reid, Daniela Martin, Nida Bikmen. Political Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2006. pp. 123-146. 0162-895X © 2006 International Society of Political Psychology. Published by Blackwell Publishing. Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria Australia. No URL
Immigration Panel: Commentary. Andrew Smith. Harvard Latino Law Review [Vol. 9 2006. pp. 112-118]. No URL.
Immigration Policy and Employment Conditions of US Immigrants from Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. Katharine M. Donato, Michael Aguilera, and Chizuko Wakabayashi. International Migration Vol. 43 (5) 2005. pp. 2-29. ISSN 0020-7985. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.© 2005 IOM. No URL.
Introduction to 1492: An Ongoing Voyage. http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/1492/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/21/2007 5:44:53 PM
Identity and the Politics of American Indian and Hispanic Women Leaders. Diane-Michele Prindeville. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Aug., 2003), pp. 591-608.
Las Culturas – Home. www.lasculturas.com/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/21/2007 5:13:07 PM
Latino Elected Officials in the 1990s. Harry Pachon; Louis DeSipio. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Jun., 1992), pp. 212-217.
Eighth Annual Harvard Latino Law and Policy Conference and Commentary: Connecting Today, Impacting Tomorrow. April 22-23, 2005. Harvard Latino Law Review [Vol. 9 2006]. Pp. 92-111. No URL.
Latinos and Lethal Violence: The Impact of Poverty and Inequality. Ramiro Martinez, Jr. Social Problems, Vol. 43, No. 2. (May, 1996), pp. 131-146.
Latinos in America’s Cultural Laboratory: Immigrating for Diverse Reasons, Latinos Complicate U.S. Policy Choices. The Futurist, January-February 2007. pp 18-19. www.wfs.org. No URL.
Nuestra Palabra: Latino Writers Having Their Say: Houston, TX. http://www.nuestrapalabra.org/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/21/2007 5:01:58 PM
Occupational Attainment of Latino Immigrants in the United States. Bohon, Stephanie A. Geographical Review; Apr2005, Vol. 95 Issue 2, p. 249-266. EBSCOhost. http://0-web.ebscohost.com.librus.hc...0sessionmgr107. Retrieved (1 of 25) 4/26/2007 2:45:34 PM
On Immigrant Street: Newcomers Are Making A Big Impact on Built Environment. James B. Goodno. Planning November 2005; pp. 4-9. American Planning Association. No URL.
A Note on The Political Idea of in American Life. Niccolo Caldararo & James Quesada. Social Thought and Commentary, No Date. pp. 731-736. No URL.
Welcome to the Front Seat: Racial Identity and Mesoamerican Immigrants. Gilberto Arriaza. Journal of Latinos and Education, 3{4), 251-265, Copyright © 2004, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. No URL.
Dropping the Hyphen? Becoming Latino(a)-American through Racialized Assimilation. Tanya Golash-Boza. Social Forces, Volume 85, Number 1, September 2006. pp 27-55. No URL.
Sense of Community in Community Organizations: Structure and Evidence of Validity. Joseph Hughey, Paul W. Speer and N. Andrew Peterson. Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 1, 97–113 (1999). © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0090-4392/99/010097-16. No URL.
Su Voto Es Su Voz: Latino Political Empowerment and the Immigration Challenge. Susan Gonzaléz Baker. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3. (Sep., 1996), pp. 465-468.
The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation. Francine J. Lipman. Harvard Latino Law Review [Vol. 9 2006] pp. 1-58. No URL.
The Cultures and History of America: The Jay I. Kislak Collection at the Library of Congress (Exhibition). http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/kislak/. Retrieved 5/21/2007 5:43:04 PM.
The Racialization of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans: 1890s-1930s. Víctor M. Rodríguez Domínguez. Centro Journal, Volume XVII Number I, Spring 2005. pp 71-106. No URL.
The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity And Perceptions of Discrimination. Deborah J. Schildkraut. Political Behavior, Vol. 27, No. 3, September 2005 (© 2005) pp. 285-312. DOI: 10.1007/s11109-005-4803-9. 0190-9320/05/0900-0285/0 _ 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. No URL.
Shaping New Possibilities for Latino Children and the Nation’s Future. Sonia M. Pérez. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 122-126.
Latino Immigrants at the Polls: Foreign-Born Voter Turnout in the 2002 Election. Matt A. Barreto. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 1. (Mar., 2005), pp. 79-86.
Studying Latino Politics: The Development of the Latino National Political Survey. F. Chris Garcia; John A. Garcia; Angelo Falcon; Rodolfo O. de la Garza. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Dec., 1989), pp. 848-852.
All Segregation Is Not Equal: The Impact of Latino and Black School Composition. Pat António Goldsmith. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Spring, 2003), pp. 83-105.
Becoming Latinos: Mexican Americans, Chicanos, and the Spanish Myth in the Urban Southwest. Joseph A. Rodríguez. The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2. (Summer, 1998), pp. 165-185.
Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition. Paula D. McClain; Albert K. Karnig. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 2. (Jun., 1990), pp. 535-545.
Bracero Timeline. The Dallas Morning News, January 27, 2002. http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/immigration/bracero-timeline.htm. Retrieved (1 of 3) 6/11/2005 3:08:28 PM.
Fear and Loathing in California: Contextual Threat and Political Sophistication among Latino Voters. Adrian D. Pantoja; Gary M. Segura. Political Behavior, Vol. 25, No. 3. (Sep., 2003), pp. 265-286.
Conventional Politics Takes Center Stage: The Latino Struggle against English-Only Laws. Wayne A. Santoro. Social Forces, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Mar., 1999), pp. 887-909.
Cooperation and Conflict in Multiracial School Districts. Kenneth J. Meier; Joseph Stewart, Jr. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1123-1133.
Differential Influences on Latino Electoral Participation. Robert A. Jackson. Political Behavior, Vol. 25, No. 4. (Dec., 2003), pp. 339-366.
Divided or Together? Conflict and Cooperation between African Americans and Latinos. Kenneth J. Meier; Paula D. McClain; J. L. Polinard; Robert D. Wrinkle. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Sep., 2004), pp. 399-409.
Examining Latino Turnout in 1996: A Three-State, Validated Survey Approach. Daron Shaw; Rodolfo O. de la Garza; Jongho Lee. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Apr., 2000), pp. 338-346.
Gender, Culture, and Power: Barriers to HIV-Prevention Strategies for Women. Cynthia A. Gómez; Barbara VanOss Marín. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 33, No. 4. (1996), pp. 355-362.
“Hispanic” and “Latino:” The Viability of Categories for Panethnic Unity. Jose Calderon. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 4, The Politics of Ethnic Construction: Hispanic, Chicano, Latino...? (Autumn, 1992), pp. 37-44.
Hispanic Turnout: Estimates from Validated Voting Data. Carol A. Cassel. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Jun., 2002), pp. 391-408.
Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Workers: Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination? Cynthia Bansak; Steven Raphael. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 54, No. 2. (Jan., 2001), pp. 275-295.
“Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”? Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience. Kevin R. Johnson. California Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 5, LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law: A Joint Symposium by “California Law Review” and “La Raza Law Journal.” (Oct., 1997), pp. 1259-1313.
Mixed-Race School-Age Children: A Summary of Census 2000 Data. Alejandra M. Lopez. Educational Researcher, Vol. 32, No. 6. (Aug. - Sep., 2003), pp. 25-37.
Our Nation on the Fault Line: Hispanic American Education, September 1996. President’s Advisory Commission on Educational Excellence for Hispanic Americans. Ana Margarita “Cha” Guzmán, Chair. www.ed.gov/pubs/FaultLine/index.html.
Parental Work, Family Structure, and Poverty among Latino Children. Daniel T. Lichter; Nancy S. Landale. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 57, No. 2. (May, 1995), pp. 346-354.
Political Opinion and Distinctiveness: The Case of Hispanic Ethnicity. Ryan L. Claassen. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 609-620.
Preparing Diverse Adolescents for the Transition to Adulthood. Andrew J. Fuligni; Christina Hardway. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp. 98-119.
Private Schools and “Latino Flight” from Black Schoolchildren. Robert W. Fairlie. Demography, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Nov., 2002), pp. 655-674.
Residential Segregation and Links to Minority Poverty: The Case of Latinos in the United States. Anne M. Santiago; Margaret G. Wilder. Social Problems, Vol. 38, No. 4, Special Issue on the Underclass in the United States. (Nov,1991), pp. 492-515.
The Health of Latino Children in the United States. Fernando S. Mendoza. The Future of Children, Vol. 4, No. 3, Critical Health Issues for Children and Youth. (Winter, 1994), pp. 43-72.
The Impact of Brown on the Education of Latinos. A. Reynaldo Contreras; Leonard A. Valverde. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 63, No. 3, Brown v. Board of Education at 40: A Commemorative Issue Dedicated to the Late Thurgood Marshall. (Summer, 1994), pp. 470-481.
The New Face of School Desegregation. Kristi L. Bowman. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 6. (Apr., 2001), pp. 1751-1808.
The Politics of Labeling: Latino/Cultural Identities of Self and Others. Suzanne Oboler. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 4, The Politics of Ethnic Construction: Hispanic, Chicano, Latino...?. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 18-36.
White, Black, or Puerto Rican? Racial Self-Identification among Mainland and Island Puerto Ricans. Nancy S. Landale; R.S. Oropesa. Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 1. (Sep., 2002), pp. 231-254.
Working with Co-Ethnics: Earnings Penalties for Latino Immigrants at Latino Jobsites. Lisa Catanzarite; Michael Bernabé Aguilera. Social Problems, Vol. 49, No. 1. (Feb., 2002), pp. 101-127.
The Official Bracero Agreement. www.farmworkers.org/bpaccord.html. Retrieved (1 of 6) 6/11/2005 3:07:40 PM
Latino Representation, It’s Direct and Indirect. Brinck Kerr; Will Miller. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3. (Jul., 1997), pp. 1066-1071.
The Border | 1942 Mexican Immigrant Labor History. http://www.pbs.org/kpbs/theborder/hi...meline/17.html. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/28/2007 12:55:51 PM
The Bracero Program. www.farmworkers.org/bracerop.html. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/28/2007 12:55:20 PM
The Bracero Program: Was It a Failure? Philip Martin; 7-03-06. http://hnn.us/articles/27336.html
Jewish Americans
American Jewish Communists and Jewish Culture in the 1930s. Bat-Ami Zucker. Modern Judaism, Vol. 14, No. 2. (May, 1994), pp. 175-185.
American Jewish Historiography (A Survey of Some of the Literature on the History of the Jews in America). Joshua Bloch. The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Ser., Vol. 45, No. 4, Tercentenary Issue. (Apr., 1955), pp. 434-450.
ADL: Fighting Anti-Semitism, Bigotry and Extremism. http://www.adl.org/.
Characteristics of 1,107 Petitioners for Change of Name. Leonard Broom; Helen P. Beem; Virginia Harris. American Sociological Review, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Feb., 1955), pp. 33-39.
Fraternities, Social Distance, and Anti-Semitism Among Jewish and Non-Jewish Undergraduates. Bernard E. Segal. Sociology of Education, Vol. 38, No. 3. (Spring, 1965), pp. 251-264.
Jewish American Entrepreneurs. Bernard Sarachek. The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 40, No. 2. (Jun., 1980), pp. 359-372.
Jewish Education in the Postwar World. Samuel M. Blumenfield. Journal of Educational Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 5, The Jew in the Postwar World. (Jan., 1945), pp. 262-267.
Jewish American Heritage Month. URL: http://www.jewishheritagemonth.gov/. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/21/2007 5:36:13 PM
Jewish Identity in America: Structural Analyses of Attitudes and Behaviors. Uzi Rebhun. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Sep., 2004), pp. 43-63.
Jewish Political Studies. Daniel J. Elazar. Modern Judaism, Vol. 11, No. 1, Review of Developments in Modern Jewish Studies, Part 2. (Feb., 1991), pp. 67-90.
Jewish-Christian Marriages and Conversions, 1971 and 1990. Bernard Lazerwitz. Sociology of Religion, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Winter, 1995), pp. 433-443.
Juvenile Delinquency among the Jews in New York. Julius B. Maller. Social Forces, Vol. 10, No. 4. (May, 1932), pp. 542-549.
Labor Supply and Investment in Child Quality: A Study of Jewish and Non- Jewish Women: A Reply. Barry R. Chiswick. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 74, No. 4. (Nov., 1992), pp. 726-727.
Latin America’s Jews: A Review of Sources. Judith Laikin Elkin. Sociology of Religion Latin American Research Review, Vol. 20, No. 2. (1985), pp. 124-141.
Marginality and Liberalism Among Jewish Elites. Robert Lerner; Althea K. Nagai; Stanley Rothman. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3. (Autumn, 1989), pp. 330-352.
Religion’s Subsystem: Toward a Sociology of Jewish Education. Norman L. Friedman. Sociology of Education, Vol. 42, No. 1. (Winter, 1969), pp. 104-113.
Religious Education and Ethnic Identification: Implications for Ethnic Pluralism. Howard M. Shapiro; Arnold Dashefsky. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 15, No. 2, Religious Identification and Involvement. (Winter, 1974), pp. 93-102.
Sampling by Ethnic Surnames: The Case of American Jews. Harold S. Himmelfarb; R. Michael Loar; Susan H. Mott. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2. (Summer, 1983), pp. 247-260.
Socioeconomic Attainment and Expressions of Jewish Identification, 1970 and 1990. Esther I. Wilder. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Jun., 1996), pp. 109-127.
From Noblesse Oblige to Personal Redemption: The Changing Profile and Agenda of American Jewish Leaders. Deborah E. Lipstadt. Modern Judaism, Vol. 4, No. 3. (Oct., 1984), pp. 295-309.
The Effect of Demographic Dynamics on Jewish Communal Participation in the United States. Jonathan Rabinowitz. Sociological Analysis, Vol. 53, No. 3, Monopolism and Pluralism in American Religion and Society. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 287-297.
The Jewish Synagogue in the United States. Uriah Zevi Engelman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 41, No. 1. (Jul., 1935), pp. 44-51.
The Study of American Jewish Identification: How It Is Defined, Measured, Obtained, Sustained and Lost. Harold S. Himmelfarb. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Mar., 1980), pp. 48-60.
The Transformation of Community Integration among American Jewry: Religion or Ethnoreligion? A National Replication. J. Alan Winter. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Jun., 1992), pp. 349-363.
Muslim Americans
“So That You May Know One Another”: A Muslim American Reflects on Pluralism and Islam. Ali S. Asani. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and Changing Realities. (Jul., 2003), pp. 40-51.
A Part of US or Apart from US?: Post-September 11 Attitudes toward Muslims and Civil Liberties. Kathleen Moore. Middle East Report, No. 224. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 32-35.
American Muslim Women and U. S. Society. Aminah B. McCloud. Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 12, No. 1. (1995 - 1996), pp. 51-59.
Between the Crescent and the Star-Spangled Banner: American Muslims and US Foreign Policy. Ali A. Mazrui. International Affairs(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 72, No. 3, Ethnicity and International Relations. (Jul., 1996), pp. 493-506.
No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion after September 11. Louise Cainkar. Middle East Report, No. 224. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 22-29.
Cracking Down on Diaspora: Arab Detroit and America’s “War on Terror.” Sally Howell; Andrew Shryock. Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 76, No. 3. (Summer, 2003), pp. 443-462.
Black Muslims and the Development of Prisoners’ Rights. Christopher E. Smith. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2. (Dec., 1993), pp. 131-146.
Black Muslims and the Police. Lee P. Brown. The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Mar., 1965), pp. 119-126.
Christian Elements in Negro American Muslim Religious Beliefs. Abbie Whyte. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 25, No. 4. (4th Qtr., 1964), pp. 382-388.
Interpreting Islam in American Schools. Susan L. Douglass; Ross E. Dunn. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and Changing Realities. (Jul., 2003), pp. 52-72.
Islam and Affirmative Action. S. A. Jackson. Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 14, No. 2. (1999 - 2000), pp. 405-431.
Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America. Fawaz A. Gerges. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and Changing Realities. (Jul., 2003), pp. 73-89.
Islam, Archaeology and Slavery in Africa. J. Alexander. World Archaeology, Vol. 33, No. 1, The Archaeology of Slavery. (Jun., 2001), pp. 44-60.
Justifiable Homicide, Police Brutality, or Governmental Repression? The 1962 Los Angeles Police Shooting of Seven Members of the Nation of Islam. Frederick Knight. The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 79, No. 2. (Spring, 1994), pp. 182-196.
Muslims in Early America. Michael A. Gomez. The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 60, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 671-710.
Muslims in the United States: Settlers and Visitors. M. Arif Ghayur. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 454, America as a Multicultural Society. (Mar., 1981), pp. 150-163.
Mediating Discrimination: Resisting Oppression among African-American Muslim Women. Michelle D. Byng. Social Problems, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Nov., 1998), pp. 473-487.
Some Neglected Aspects of Medieval Muslim Polemics against Christianity. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh. The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Jan., 1996), pp. 61-84.
A Contemporary Revitalization Movement in American Race Relations: The ‘Black Muslims.’ James H. Laue. Social Forces, Vol. 42, No. 3. (Mar., 1964), pp. 315-323.
The Sister Clara Muhammad Schools: Pioneers in the Development of Islamic Education in America. Hakim M. Rashid; Zakiyyah Muhammad. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 61, No. 2, African Americans and Independent Schools: Status, Attainment, and Issues. (Spring, 1992), pp. 178-185. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/09%3A_Reading_Lists/9.02%3A_Readings_for_Part_II%E2%80%94Race_and_Ethnicity.txt |
An Obstacle. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Nursing, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Jan., 1929), p. 59.
At What Cost a Room of Her Own? Factors Contributing to the Feminization of Poverty Among Prime-Age Women, 1939-1959. Linda Barrington; Cecilia A. Conrad. The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 54, No. 2, Papers Presented at the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association. (Jun., 1994), pp. 342-357.
Black Americans and the Feminization of Poverty: The Intervening Effects of Unemployment. Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Jun., 1987), pp. 402-417.
Black Women in Poverty: Some Comments on Female-Headed Families. Rose M. Brewer. Signs, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Winter, 1988), pp. 331-339.
Black Women on AFDC and the Struggle for Higher Education. George Junne. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Women and Worth. (1988), pp. 39-44.
Child Support Awards: Differentials and Trends by Race and Marital Status. Andrea H. Beller; John W. Graham. Demography, Vol. 23, No. 2. (May, 1986), pp. 231-245.
Child Support Payments: Evidence from Repeated Cross Sections. Andrea H. Beller; John W. Graham. The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1988), pp. 81-85.
Cleaning Up/Kept down: A Historical Perspective on Racial Inequality in “Women’s Work.” Evelyn Nakano Glenn. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 6. (Jul., 1991), pp. 1333-1356.
Economic and Labor Market Trends. Demetra Smith Nightingale; Michael Fix. The Future of Children, Vol. 14, No. 2, Children of Immigrant Families. (Summer, 2004), pp.48-59.
Estimating Earnings Poverty in 1939: A Comparison of Orshansky-Method and Price-Indexed Definitions of Poverty. Linda Barrington. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 79, No. 3. (Aug., 1997), pp. 406-414.
Family, Race, and Poverty in the Eighties. Maxine Baca Zinn. Signs, Vol. 14, No. 4, Common Grounds and Crossroads: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in Women’s
Female Headship, Feminization of Poverty and Welfare. Mwangi S. Kimenyi; John Mukum Mbaku. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 62, No. 1. (Jul., 1995), pp. 44-52.
Feminist Political Discourses: Radical versus Liberal Approaches to the Feminization of Poverty and Comparable Worth. Johanna Brenner. Gender and Society, Vol. 1, No. 4. (Dec., 1987), pp. 447-465.
Feminization and Juvenilization of Poverty: Trends, Relative Risks, Causes, and Consequences. Suzanne M. Bianchi. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 25. (1999), pp. 307-333.
Gender Differentials in Poverty-Mortality Well-Being. Arthur Sakamoto. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Winter, 1990), pp. 429-445.
Gender in the Welfare State. Ann Orloff. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 22. (1996), pp. 51-78.
Getting into Poverty Without a Husband, and Getting Out, With or Without. Thomas J. Kniesner; Marjorie B. McElroy; Steven P. Wilcox. The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1988), pp. 86-90.
How Home Conditions React Upon the Family. Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 5. (Mar., 1909), pp. 592-605.
In Search of a New Economic Order: Women’s Agenda for the Next Millennium. Barbara Hopkins. Feminist Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 529-536.
Lives. (Summer, 1989), pp. 856-874.
Poverty Among Women and Children: What Accounts for the Change? Laurie J. Bassi. The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1988), pp. 91-95.
Putting Women and Children First; Priorities for the Future of America. Ruth Sidel. Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 12, No. 1. (Spring, 1991), pp. 37-49.
Racial Disparities in Income Security for a Cohort of Aging American Women. Andrea E. Willson; Melissa A. Hardy. Social Forces, Vol. 80, No. 4. (Jun., 2002), pp. 1283-1306.
Racial Equality in the United States: From Institutionalized Racism to “Respectable” Racism. Monte Piliawsky. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 45, No. 2. (2nd Qtr., 1984), pp. 135-143.
Restructured Regions and Families: The Feminization of Poverty in the U.S. John Paul Jones III; Janet E. Kodras. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 80, No. 2. (Jun., 1990), pp. 163-183.
Sex Differences in Poverty, 1950-1980. Sara S. Mc Lanahan; Annemette Sørensen; Dorothy Watson. Signs, Vol. 15, No. 1. (Autumn, 1989), pp. 102-122.
The Changing Nature of Poverty. Martha S. Hill. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 479, The Welfare State in America: Trends and Prospects. (May, 1985), pp. 31-47.
The Construction of Poverty and Homelessness in US Cities. I. Susser. Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 25. (1996), pp. 411-435.
The Effectiveness of Child-Care Subsidies in Encouraging the Welfare-to-Work Transition of Low-Income Single Mothers. Jean Kimmel. The American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundredth and Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association Washington, DC, January 6-8, 1995. (May, 1995), pp. 271-275.
The Feminization of Poverty: Claims, Facts, and Data Needs. Alain Marcoux. Population and Development Review, Vol. 24, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp. 131-139.
The Gender Gap in Poverty in Modern Nations: Single Motherhood, the Market, and the State. Karen Christopher; Paula England; Timothy M. Smeeding; Katherin Ross Phillips. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 45, No. 3. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 219-242.
The Housekeeper and the Food Problem (in Food Utilization and Conservation; Food Conservation and Utilization). Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 74, The World’s Food. (Nov., 1917), pp. 123-130.
The Impact of Income Issues and Social Status on Post-Divorce Adjustment of Custodial Parents. Marjorie A. Pett; Beth Vaughan-Cole. Family Relations, Vol. 35, No. 1, The Single Parent Family. (Jan., 1986), pp. 103-111.
The Larger Aspects of the Woman’s Movement. Jane Addams. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 56, Women in Public Life. (Nov., 1914), pp. 1-8.
The Nairobi Conference: The Powerless Majority. Margaret E. Galey. PS, Vol. 19, No. 2. (Spring, 1986), pp. 255-265.
The Precarious Survival and Hard-Won Satisfactions of White Single-Parent Families. Leslie N. Richards. Family Relations, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Oct., 1989), pp. 396-403.
Time on Welfare: Why Do People Enter and Leave the System? Peter J. Leahy; Terry F. Buss; James M. Quane. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 54, No. 1. (Jan., 1995), pp. 33-46.
Trends in Women’s Economic Status. Paula England; Irene Browne. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 35, No. 1, Women in the Workplace: Toward True Integration. (Spring, 1992), pp. 17-51.
Wealth Inequality in the United States. Lisa A. Keister; Stephanie Moller. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26. (2000), pp. 63-81.
Welfare Reform: Revolution or Retrenchment? Samuel H. Beer. Publius, Vol. 28, No. 3, Welfare Reform in the United States: A Race to the Bottom?. (Summer, 1998), pp. 9-15.
Women and Children Last: The Poverty and Marginalization of One-Parent Families. Hilary P. M. Winchester. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 15, No. 1. (1990), pp. 70-86.
Women and the Economics of Divorce in the Contemporary United States. Terry J. Arendell. Signs, Vol. 13, No. 1, Women and the Political Process in the United States. (Autumn, 1987), pp. 121-135.
Women in Poverty: A New Global Underclass. Mayra Buvini. Foreign Policy, No. 108. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 38-53.
Women in the Labor Market and in the Family. James P. Smith; Michael Ward. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 1. (Winter, 1989), pp. 9-23.
Women. Sarah J. Stage. American Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1/2, Special Issue: Contemporary America. (Spring - Summer, 1983), pp. 169-190.
Women’s Poverty and Women’s Citizenship: Some Political Consequences of Economic Marginality. Barbara J. Nelson. Signs, Vol. 10, No. 2, Women and Poverty. (Winter, 1984), pp. 209-231.
Work, Welfare, and Poverty among Black Female-Headed Families. John Paul Jones, III. Economic Geography, Vol. 63, No. 1. (Jan., 1987), pp. 20-34.
Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
Contradictions and Coherence in Feminist Responses to Law. Emily Jackson. Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Winter, 1993), pp. 398-411.
Ethics in the Women’s Movement. Jean Bethke Elshtain. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 515, American Feminism: New Issues for a Mature Movement. (May, 1991), pp. 126-139.
Feminism in Psychology: Revolution or Evolution? Judith Worell. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 571, Feminist Views of the Social Sciences. (Sep., 2000), pp. 183-196.
How Media Frames Move Public Opinion: An Analysis of the Women’s Movement. Nayda Terkildsen; Frauke Schnell. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 879-900.
A Historical Perspective on Gender. Elizabeth A. St. Pierre. The English Journal, Vol. 88, No. 3, Genderizing the Curriculum. (Jan., 1999), pp. 29-34.
A Vindication of the Rights of Women. Mary Woolstonecraft: Modern History Sourcebook: Wollstonecraft, Vindication. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/mw-vind.html. Retrieved (1 of 151) 10/9/2007 2:20:24 PM
Beyond the Difference versus Equality Policy Debate: Postsuffrage Feminism, Citizenship, and the Quest for a Feminist Welfare State. Wendy Sarvasy. Signs, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Winter, 1992), pp. 329-362.
Black Women, Sexism and Racism: Black or Antiracist Feminism? Gemma Tang Nain. Feminist Review, No. 37. (Spring, 1991), pp. 1-22.
Does the Sex of Your Children Matter? Support for Feminism among Women and Men in the United States and Canada. Rebecca L. Warner. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1051-1056.
Feminism 2000: One Step beyond? Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Feminist Review, No. 64, Feminism 2000: One Step beyond?. (Spring, 2000), pp. 113-116.
Feminism and Liberalism Reconsidered: The Case of Catharine MacKinnon. Denise Schaeffer. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3. (Sep., 2001), pp. 699-708.
Feminism and Motherhood: An American Reading. Ann Snitow. Feminist Review, No. 40. (Spring, 1992), pp. 32-51.
Feminism and the Gender Gap—A Second Look. Elizabeth Adell Cook; Clyde Wilcox. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1111-1122.
Feminism versus Multiculturalism. Leti Volpp. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 5. (Jun., 2001), pp. 1181-1218.
Feminist Fairy Tales for Black and American Indian Girls: A Working-Class Vision. France Winddance Twine. Signs, Vol. 25, No. 4, Feminisms at a Millennium. (Summer, 2000), pp. 1227-1230.
Feminists or “Postfeminists”?: Young Women’s Attitudes toward Feminism and Gender Relations. Pamela Aronson. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 6. (Dec., 2003), pp. 903-922.
Forging Feminist Identity in an International Movement: A Collective Identity Approach to Twentieth-Century Feminism. Leila J. Rupp; Verta Taylor. Signs, Vol. 24, No. 2. (Winter, 1999), pp. 363-386.
Form Follows Function: The Evolution of Feminist Strategies. Janet K. Boles. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 515, American Feminism: New Issues for a Mature Movement. (May, 1991), pp. 38-49.
Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism in Comparative Perspective. Bernadette C. Hayes; Ian McAllister; Donley T. Studlar. International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 21, No. 4, Women, Citizenship, and Representation. Femmes, citoyenneté et représentation#. (Oct., 2000), pp. 425-439.
Gender, Social Reproduction, and Women’s Self-Organization: Considering the U.S. Welfare State. Johanna Brenner; Barbara Laslett. Gender and Society, Vol. 5, No. 3, Special Issue: Marxist Feminist Theory. (Sep., 1991), pp. 311-333.
Has Feminism Changed Science? Londa Schiebinger. Signs, Vol. 25, No. 4, Feminisms at a Millennium. (Summer, 2000), pp. 1171-1175.
“I Am Not a Feminist, but...” College Women, Feminism, and Negative Experiences. Joan K. Buschman; Silvo Lenart. Political Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Mar., 1996), pp. 59-75.
Identity Politics and the Hierarchy of Oppression: A Comment. Linda Briskin. Feminist Review, No. 35. (Summer, 1990), pp. 102-108.
International Feminism of the Future. Tani Barlow. Signs, Vol. 25, No. 4, Feminisms at a Millennium. (Summer, 2000), pp. 1099-1105.
Men and Women Really Do Think Differently | LiveScience. http://www.livescience.com/health/05...brain_sex.html. Retrieved (1 of 4) 6/27/2007 11:24:32 AM
National Organization for Women Website. http://www.now.org/.
Queer Black Feminism: The Pleasure Principle. Laura Alexandra Harris. Feminist Review, No. 54, Contesting Feminine Orthodoxies. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 3-30.
Race, Gender Role Attitudes and Support for Feminism. Clyde Wilcox. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1. (Mar., 1990), pp. 113-121.
Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law. Joanne Conaghan. Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Sep., 2000), pp. 351-385.
The Attitudinal Structure of African American Women Party Activists: The Impact of Race, Gender, and Religion. Rosalee A. Clawson; John A. Clark. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2. (Jun., 2003), pp. 211-221.
The Coming of Age of Feminist Sociology: Some Issues of Practice and Theory for the Next Twenty Years. Sasha Roseneil. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 2. (Jun., 1995), pp. 191-205.
Natural Governance and the Governance of Nature: The Hazards of Natural Law Feminism. Lealle Ruhl. Feminist Review, No. 66, Political Currents. (Autumn, 2000), pp. 4-24.
The Historical Evolution of Black Feminist Theory and Praxis. Ula Taylor. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2. (Nov., 1998), pp. 234-253.
Feminism and Students of the ‘80s and ‘90s: The Lady and the Raging Bitch; Or, How Feminism Got a Bad Name. Jackie Brookner. Art Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, Feminist Art Criticism. (Summer, 1991), pp. 11-13.
The Myth of Postfeminism. Elaine J. Hall; Marnie Salupo Rodriguez. Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 6. (Dec., 2003), pp. 878-902.
The Rights of Man and Woman in Post-Revolutionary America. Rosemarie Zagarri. The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 55, No. 2. (Apr., 1998), pp. 203-230.
The Structure of Men’s and Women’s Feminist Orientations: Feminist Identity and Feminist Opinion. Laurie A. Rhodebeck. Gender and Society, Vol. 10, No. 4. (Aug., 1996), pp. 386-403.
Third Wave Black Feminism? Kimberly Springer. Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Summer, 2002), pp. 1059-1082.
Response from a “Second Waver” to Kimberly Springer’s “Third Wave Black. Feminism?” Beverly Guy-Sheftall. Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Summer, 2002), pp. 1091-1094.
What’s Love Got to Do with It? White Women, Black Women, and Feminism in the Movement Years. Wini Breines. Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Summer, 2002), pp. 1095-1133.
Who Are Feminists and What Do They Believe? The Role of Generations. Jason Schnittker; Jeremy Freese; Brian Powell. American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, No. 4. (Aug., 2003), pp. 607-622.
Women, Differences, and Rights as Practices: An Interpretive Essay and a Proposal. Adelaide H. Villmoare. Law & Society Review, Vol. 25, No. 2, Special Issue on Gender and Sociolegal Studies. (1991), pp. 385-410.
Women’s Culture and Lesbian Feminist Activism: A Reconsideration of Cultural Feminism. Verta Taylor; Leila J. Rupp. Signs, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Autumn, 1993), pp. 32-61.
Women’s International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward. Rebecca J. Cook. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2. (May, 1993), pp. 230-261.
Women’s Movements and Nonviolence. Anne N. Costain. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 33, No. 2. (Jun., 2000), pp. 175-180.
Women’s Movements around the World: Cross-Cultural Comparisons. Diane Rothbard Margolis. Gender and Society, Vol. 7, No. 3. (Sep., 1993), pp. 379-399.
Women’s Publics and the Search for New Democracies. Zillah Eisenstein. Feminist Review, No. 57, Citizenship: Pushing the Boundaries. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 140-167.
Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights. Charlotte Bunch. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Nov., 1990), pp. 486-498.
An Ethos of Lesbian and Gay Existence. Mark Blasius. Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Nov., 1992), pp. 642-671.
Birth Order and Sexual Orientation in a National Probability Sample. Anthony F. Bogaert. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Nov., 2000), pp. 361-368.
Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents. Charlotte J. Patterson. Child Development, Vol. 63, No. 5. (Oct., 1992), pp. 1025-1042.
“Coming out” in the Age of Social Constructionism: Sexual Identity Formation among Lesbian and Bisexual Women. Paula C. Rust. Gender and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Mar., 1993), pp. 50-77.
Constructing Lesbian and Gay Rights and Liberation. Morris B. Kaplan. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 7, Symposium on Sexual Orientation and the Law. (Oct., 1993), pp. 1877-1902.
Denaturalizing and Desexualizing Lesbian and Gay Identity. Cheshire Calhoun. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 7, Symposium on Sexual Orientation and the Law. (Oct., 1993), pp. 1859-1875.
Family Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men. Charlotte J. Patterson. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 62, No. 4. (Nov., 2000), pp. 1052-1069.
Gay and Lesbian Language. Don Kulick. Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 29. (2000), pp. 243-285.
Gay and Lesbian Politics. Ronald J. Hunt. PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Jun., 1992), pp. 220-224.
Gay but Not Queer: Toward a Post-Queer Study of Sexuality. Adam Isaiah Green. Theory and Society, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Aug., 2002), pp. 521-545.
Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America’s Children. William Meezan; Jonathan Rauch. The Future of Children, Vol. 15, No. 2, Marriage and Child Wellbeing. (Autumn, 2005), pp. 97-115.
GLAAD: Fair, Accurate and Inclusive Representation. Web Address: http://glaad.org/
(How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter? Judith Stacey; Timothy J. Biblarz. American Sociological Review, Vol. 66, No. 2. (Apr., 2001), pp. 159-183.
“I Can’t Even Think Straight” “Queer” Theory and the Missing Sexual Revolution in Sociology. Arlene Stein; Ken Plummer. Sociological Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2. (Jul., 1994), pp. 178-187.
Lesbian and Gay Kinship: Kath Weston’s “Families We Choose” and Contemporary Anthropology. Ellen Lewin. Signs, Vol. 18, No. 4, Theorizing Lesbian Experience. (Summer, 1993), pp. 974-979.
Men’s and Women’s Beliefs about Gender and Sexuality. Emily W. Kane; Mimi Schippers. Gender and Society, Vol. 10, No. 5. (Oct., 1996), pp. 650-665.
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force | Building LGBT Political Power from the Ground Up. Web Address: http://www.thetaskforce.org/
Predictors of Movement toward Homosexuality: A Longitudinal Study of Bisexual Men. Joseph P. Stokes; Will Damon; David J. McKirnan. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 34, No. 3. (1997), pp. 304-312.
Queer-Ing Sociology, Sociologizing Queer Theory: An Introduction. Steven Seidman. Sociological Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2. (Jul., 1994), pp. 166-177.
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society. Francisco Valdes. California Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 1. (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-377.
Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes. Robert Wintemute. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 3. (May, 1997), pp. 334-359.
Relationship Quality in a Sample of Lesbian Couples with Children and Child-Free Lesbian Couples. Leslie Koepke; Jan Hare; Patricia B. Moran. Family Relations, Vol. 41, No. 2. (Apr., 1992), pp. 224-229.
Sex Differences in Attitudes toward Gay Men and Lesbians: A Multidimensional Perspective. Lisa LaMar; Mary Kite. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 35, No. 2. (May, 1998), pp. 189-196.
Sex Differences in How Heterosexuals Think about Lesbians and Gay Men: Evidence from Survey Context Effects. Gregory M. Herek; John P. Capitanio. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 36, No. 4. (Nov., 1999), pp. 348-360.
Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability. Janet E. Halley. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3. (Feb., 1994), pp. 503-568.
Sex (ual Orientation) and Title VII. I. Bennett Capers. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 5. (Jun., 1991), pp. 1158-1187.
Sexual Orientation Identities, Attractions, and Practices of Female-to-Male Transsexuals. Holly Devor. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Nov., 1993), pp. 303-315.
The Earnings Effects of Sexual Orientation. Dan A. Black; Hoda R. Makar; Seth G. Sanders; Lowell J. Taylor. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 56, No. 3. (Apr., 2003), pp. 449-469.
The Ethics of Genetic Research on Sexual Orientation. Udo Schüklenk; Edward Stein; Jacinta Kerin; William Byne. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 1997), pp. 6-13.
The Families of Lesbians and Gay Men: A New Frontier in Family Research. Katherine R. Allen; David H. Demo. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 57, No. 1. (Feb., 1995), pp. 111-127.
The Gender Closet: Lesbian Disappearance under the Sign “Women.” Cheshire Calhoun. Feminist Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Spring, 1995), pp. 7-34.
The Individualization of Society and the Liberalization of State Policies on Same-Sex Sexual Relations, 1984-1995. David John Frank; Elizabeth H. Mceneaney. Social Forces, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Mar., 1999), pp. 911-943.
The Nexus of Sexual Orientation and Gender in the Determination of Earnings. John M. Blandford. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul., 2003), pp. 622-642.
The Politics of Sexual Identity: Sexual Attraction and Behavior among Lesbian and Bisexual Women. Paula C. Rust. Social Problems, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Nov., 1992), pp. 366-386.
The Psychosexual Development of Urban Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths. Margaret Rosario; Heino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg; Joyce Hunter; Theresa M. Exner; Marya Gwadz, Arden M. Keller. The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 33, No. 2. (1996), pp. 113-126.
The Silent Minority: Rethinking Our Commitment to Gay and Lesbian Youth. Virginia Uribe. Theory into Practice, Vol. 33, No. 3, Rethinking Middle Grades. (Summer, 1994), pp. 167-172.
The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination. M. V. Lee Badgett. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 48, No. 4. (Jul., 1995), pp. 726-739.
Understanding Sexual Orientation: A Plea for Clarity. Juliet Richters. Reproductive Health Matters, Vol. 6, No. 12, Sexuality. (Nov., 1998), pp. 144-149.
We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage.” Nancy D. Polikoff. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 7, Symposium on Sexual Orientation and the Law. (Oct., 1993), pp. 1535-1550.
From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace (Or, Why Can’t a Woman Be More like a Fag?) Suzanna Danuta Walters. Signs, Vol. 21, No. 4, Feminist Theory and Practice. (Summer, 1996), pp. 830-869.
“Transforming” the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality. Taylor Flynn. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 2. (Mar., 2001), pp. 392-420.
The Sources of Gender Role Attitudes among Christian and Muslim Arab-American Women. Jen’nan Ghazal Read. Sociology of Religion, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Summer, 2003), pp. 207-222.
To Veil or Not to Veil? A Case Study of Identity Negotiation among Muslim Women in Austin, Texas. Jen’Nan Ghazal Read; John P. Bartkowski. Gender and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Jun., 2000), pp. 395-417.
Western Ethnocentrism and Perceptions of the Harem. Leila Ahmed. Feminist Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3. (Autumn, 1982), pp. 521-534. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/09%3A_Reading_Lists/9.03%3A_Readings_for_Part_III%E2%80%94Sex%2C_Gender%2C_and_Sexual_Orientation.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Reading List for Part IV—Aging
Dispelling Ageism: The Cross-Cutting Intervention. Robert N. Butler. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 503, The Quality of Aging: Strategies for Interventions. (May, 1989), pp. 138-147.
An Overview of Research on Aging and the Status of Gerontology Today. Robert N. Butler. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No. 3, Special Issue: Aging: Demographic, Health, and Social Prospects. (Summer, 1983), pp. 351-361.
The Relation of Extended Life to Extended Employment since the Passage of Social Security in 1935 . Robert N. Butler. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No. 3, Special Issue: Aging: Demographic, Health, and Social Prospects. (Summer, 1983), pp. 420-429.
What’s Best for the Elderly Research Subject? (in Correspondence). Robert N. Butler; Robert E. Vestal; Richard Ratzan. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 11, No. 4. (Aug., 1981), pp. 45-46.
Successful Aging and Quality of Life. Yuchi Young; Ming-Yu Fan; Elizabeth A. Skinner; Albert Wu. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 11, No. 7, Abstracts: 9th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Nov., 2002), p. 645.
Antiaging Technology and Pseudoscience (in Science’s Compass; Letters). Aubrey D. N. J. de Grey; Leonid Gavrilov; S. Jay Olshansky; L. Stephen Coles; Richard G. Cutler; Michael Fossel; S. Mitchell Harman. Science, New Series, Vol. 296, No. 5568. (Apr. 26, 2002), p. 656.
Aging Mechanisms (in From the Academy: Japanese-American Frontiers of Science Symposium). Yoshiko Takahashi; Makoto Kuro-o; Fuyuki Ishikawa. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 97, No. 23. (Nov. 7, 2000), pp. 12407-12408.
Aging and the Satisfaction of Psychological Needs (in Commentaries). Peter G. Coleman. Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 11, No. 4. (2000), pp. 291-293.
Expectations regarding Aging among Older Adults and Physicians Who Care for Older Adults. Catherine A. Sarkisian; Ron D. Hays; Sandra H. Berry; Carol M. Mangione. Medical Care, Vol. 39, No. 9. (Sep., 2001), pp. 1025-1036.
The Quest to Reverse Time’s Toll (in Bodybuilding: The Bionic Human). Constance Holden. Science, New Series, Vol. 295, No. 5557. (Feb. 8, 2002), pp. 1032-1033.
A Gray Zone? Meetings between Sociology and Gerontology (in Symposia; Sociology and Border Disciplines: Opportunities and Barriers to Intellectua). Gunhild O. Hagestad. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 5. (Sep., 1999), pp. 514-517.
Successful Adaptation in the Later Years: A Life Course Approach to Aging. Robert Crosnoe; Glen H. Elder Jr. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 4. (Dec., 2002), pp. 309-328.
Act Your Age. Cheryl Laz. Sociological Forum, Vol. 13, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp. 85-113.
Aging versus Cohort Interpretations of Intercohort Differences in GSS Vocabulary Scores (in Decline in Vocabulary Scores: An Exchange). Duane F. Alwin; Ryan J. McCammon. American Sociological Review, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 272-286.
Epilogue: Research on Population Aging at NIA: Retrospect and Prospect. Richard Suzman. Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, Supplement: Aging, Health, and Public Policy. (2004), pp. 239-264.
Linking Social Gerontology with Quantitative Skills: A Class Project Using U.S. Census Data (in Notes). Christine L. Himes; Christine Caffrey. Teaching Sociology, Vol. 31, No. 1. (Jan., 2003), pp. 85-94.
Gender and Aging in the Developing World: Where Are the Men? (in Notes and Commentary). John Knodel; Mary Beth Ofstedal. Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Dec., 2003), pp. 677-698.
Age Structure and Social Structure (in Symposia; Charting Futures for Sociology: Structure and Action). Charles C. Gordon; Charles F. Longino, Jr. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 5. (Sep., 2000), pp. 699-703.
The Biodemography of Aging (in History, Biology, and Disease). James W. Vaupel. Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, Supplement: Aging, Health, and Public Policy. (2004), pp. 48-62.
The Transition to Adulthood in Aging Societies. Elizabeth Fussell. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 580, Early Adulthood in Cross-National Perspective. (Mar., 2002), pp. 16-39.
The Micropolitics of Care in Relationships between Aging Parents and Adult Children: Individualism, Collectivism, and Power (in Intergenerational Relations). Karen Pyke. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 61, No. 3. (Aug., 1999), pp. 661-672.
Feminism, Eros, and the Coming of Age. Roberta Rubenstein. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2. (2001), pp. 1-19.
Families in the Middle and Later Years: A Review and Critique of Research in the 1990s (in Families across the Life-Span). Katherine R. Allen; Rosemary Blieszner; Karen A. Roberto. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 62, No. 4. (Nov., 2000), pp. 911-926.
Economy and Society: The Future (in Pryor’s Millennium Survey). Dennis Wrong. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Jan., 2000), pp. 57-60.
Against Wisdom: The Social Politics of Anger and Aging. Kathleen Woodward. Cultural Critique, No. 51. (Spring, 2002), pp. 186-218.
The Intercohort Decline in Verbal Ability: Does It Exist? (in Decline in Vocabulary Scores: An Exchange). James A. Wilson; Walter R. Gove. American Sociological Review, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 253-266.
Race Differences in Filial Responsibility Expectations among Older Parents (in Intergenerational Relations). Gary R. Lee; Chuck W. Peek; Raymond T. Coward. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 60, No. 2. (May, 1998), pp. 404-412.
Family Experiences and the Erosion of Support for Intergenerational Coresidence (in Intergenerational Relations). Frances K. Goldscheider; Leora Lawton. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 60, No. 3. (Aug., 1998), pp. 623-632.
Rewriting Menopause: Challenging the Medical Paradigm to Reflect Menopausal Women’s Experiences . Susan J. Ferguson; Carla Parry. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, Identity, the Body, and the Menopause. (1998), pp. 20-41.
Rethinking Age Dependence in Organizational Mortality: Logical Formalizations. Michael T. Hannan. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 104, No. 1. (Jul., 1998), pp. 126-164.
Financial Strain and Health among Elderly Mexican-Origin Individuals (in Health and Health Behavior). Ronald J. Angel; Michelle Frisco; Jacqueline L. Angel; David A. Chiriboga. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 44, No. 4. (Dec., 2003), pp. 536-551.
The Burgess Award Lecture: Beyond the Nuclear Family: The Increasing Importance of Multigenerational Bonds. Vern L. Bengtson. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 63, No. 1. (Feb., 2001), pp. 1-16.
The Personal and Social Links between Age and Self-Reported Empathy. Scott Schieman; Karen Van Gundy. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Jun., 2000), pp. 152-174.
Status, Role, and Resource Explanations for Age Patterns in Psychological Distress (in Mental Health and Mental Illness). Scott Schieman; Karen van Gundy; John Taylor. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 42, No. 1. (Mar., 2001), pp. 80-96.
Perspectives on American Kinship in the Later 1990s (in Reviews). Colleen L. Johnson. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 62, No. 3. (Aug., 2000), pp. 623-639.
Religious Attendance and Subjective Well-Being among Older Americans: Evidence from the General Social Survey (in Religion and Mental Health). Steven E. Barkan; Susan F. Greenwood. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 45, No. 2. (Dec., 2003), pp. 116-129.
Biogerontology, “Anti-Aging Medicine,” and the Challenges of Human Enhancement. Eric T. Juengst; Robert H. Binstock; Maxwell Mehlman; Stephen G. Post; Peter Whitehouse. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 2003), pp. 21-30.
Staying Alive with Attitude (in Science News This Week). Bruce Bower. Science News, Vol. 162, No. 4. (Jul. 27, 2002), p. 53.
How and Why Do Aging and Life Span Evolve? Steven Hecht Orzack. Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, Supplement: Life Span: Evolutionary, Ecological, and Demographic Perspectives. (2003), pp. 19-38.
More about More Life (in Letters). Felicia Nimue Ackerman; Gems. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 33, No. 6. (Nov. - Dec., 2003), pp. 5-6.
Extending Life: Scientific Prospects and Political Obstacles. Richard A. Miller. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 1. (2002), pp. 155-174.
Life Course, Environmental Change, and Life Span. Jean-Marie Robine. Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, Supplement: Life Span: Evolutionary, Ecological, and Demographic Perspectives. (2003), pp. 229-238.
Aging and the Environment: A Research Framework (in Research; Mini-Monograph). Andrew M. Geller; Harold Zenick. Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 113, No. 9. (Sep., 2005), pp. 1257-1262.
The IMF on Policies Responding to Demographic Change (in Documents). Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 783-789.
The National Institute on Aging (in Views from Funding Agencies). Sidney M. Stahl. Medical Care, Vol. 36, No. 8. (Aug., 1998), pp. 1123-1125.
Aging in the Third Millennium (in Science’s Compass; Policy Forum). Edward L. Schneider. Science, New Series, Vol. 283, No. 5403. (Feb. 5, 1999), pp. 796-797.
Aging Parents Helping Adult Children: The Experience of the Sandwiched Generation. Berit Ingersoll-Dayton; Margaret B. Neal; Leslie B. Hammer. Family Relations, Vol. 50, No. 3. (Jul., 2001), pp. 262-271.
Aging Research: The Future Face of Environmental Health (in Environews; Focus). Tina Adler. Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 111, No. 14. (Nov., 2003), pp. A760-A765.
Patients’ Voices: The Powerful Sound in the Stem Cell Debate (in Stem Cell Research and Ethics; Viewpoints). Daniel Perry. Science, New Series, Vol. 287, No. 5457. (Feb. 25, 2000), p. 1423.
New Gene Therapy Fights Frailty (in Science News of the Week). Janet Raloff. Science News, Vol. 154, No. 25/26. (Dec. 19-26, 1998), p. 388.
Is More Life Always Better? The New Biology of Aging and the Meaning of Life. David Gems. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 2003), pp. 31-39.
Unproven Elixir. Ben Harder. Science News, Vol. 163, No. 19. (May 10, 2003), pp. 296-297+301.
Should America Save for Its Old Age? Fiscal Policy, Population Aging, and National Saving (in Symposium: Fiscal Policy). Douglas W. Elmendorf; Louise M. Sheiner. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Summer, 2000), pp. 57-74.
The Aging Baboon: Comparative Demography in a Non-Human Primate (in Biological Sciences). Anne M. Bronikowski; Susan C. Alberts; Jeanne Altmann; Craig Packer; K. Dee Carey; Marc Tatar. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 99, No. 14. (Jul. 9, 2002), pp. 9591-9595.
Alan Greenspan on the Economic Implications of Population Aging (in Documents). Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 779-783.
Neural Teamwork May Compensate for Aging (in Science News of the Week). Laura Helmuth. Science News, Vol. 155, No. 16. (Apr. 17, 1999), p. 247.
Calorie Restriction and Aging: A Life-History Analysis. Daryl P. Shanley; Thomas B. L. Kirkwood. Evolution, Vol. 54, No. 3. (Jun., 2000), pp. 740-750.
The Role of Parental Age Effects on the Evolution of Aging. Nicholas K. Priest; Benjamin Mackowiak; Daniel E. L. Promislow. Evolution, Vol. 56, No. 5. (May, 2002), pp. 927-935.
Intimations of Immortality (in Science’s Compass; Essays on Science and Society). John Harris. Science, New Series, Vol. 288, No. 5463. (Apr. 7, 2000), p. 59.
Wedding of Calm and Wedding of Noise: Aging Performed and Aging Misquoted in Tuareg Rites of Passage. Susan J. Rasmussen. Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Autumn, 2001), pp. 277-303.
Integrating Biology into the Study of Health Disparities (in Health and Socioeconomic Status). Eileen M. Crimmins; Teresa E. Seeman.
Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, Supplement: Aging, Health, and Public Policy. (2004), pp. 89-107.
Sex and Death (in Science’s Compass; Perspectives). David N. Reznick; Cameron Ghalambor. Science, New Series, Vol. 286, No. 5449. (Dec. 24, 1999), pp. 2458-2459.
The Embodiment of Old Women: Silences. Barbara Hillyer. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, Identity, the Body, and the Menopause. (1998), pp. 48-60.
Health Behaviors, Social Networks, and Healthy Aging: Cross-Sectional Evidence from the Nurses’ Health Study. Yvonne L. Michael; Graham A. Colditz; Eugenie Coakley; Ichiro Kawachi. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 8, No. 8. (Dec., 1999), pp. 711-722.
A Biodemographic Interpretation of Life Span (in Notes and Commentary). S. Jay Olshansky; Bruce A. Carnes; Jacob Brody. Population and Development Review, Vol. 28, No. 3. (Sep., 2002), pp. 501-513.
“It Just Isn’t Fair”: Helping Older Families Balance Their Ledgers before the Note Comes Due (in An Essay for Practitioners). Jonathan G. Sandberg. Family Relations, Vol. 48, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 177-179.
Population Aging and the Rising Cost of Public Pensions. John Bongaarts. Population and Development Review, Vol. 30, No. 1. (Mar., 2004), pp. 1-23. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/09%3A_Reading_Lists/9.04%3A_Readings_for_Part_IV%E2%80%94Aging.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Reading List for Part V—Disability
Disability Studies: The Old and the New. Tanya Titchkosky. Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Spring, 2000), pp. 197-224.
Crips Strike Back: The Rise of Disability Studies. Lennard J. Davis. American Literary History, Vol. 11, No. 3. (Autumn, 1999), pp. 500-512.
Policy Watch: U.S. Disability Policy in a Changing Environment (in Features). Richard V. Burkhauser; Mary C. Daly. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1. (Winter, 2002), pp. 213-224.
“Space: The Final Frontier”: The Invisibility of Disability on the Landscape of Women Studies (in Frontiers Reconsidered). Karen P. DePauw. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3. (1996), pp. 19-23.
Toward a Theory of Disability and Gender. Thomas J. Gerschick. Signs, Vol. 25, No. 4, Feminisms at a Millennium. (Summer, 2000), pp. 1263-1268.
Spires, Wheelchairs and Committees: Organizing for Disability Advocacy at the Judicatory Level (in On Denominational Outreach Programs). Albert A. Herzog, Jr. Review of Religious Research, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Jun., 2004), pp. 349-367.
Disability as Human Variation: Implications for Policy. Richard K. Scotch; Kay Schriner. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege? (Jan., 1997), pp. 148-159.
Geography for Disabled People? (in Commentary). B. J. Gleeson. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 2. (1996), pp. 387-396.
HIV/AIDS and Individuals with Disability (in Commentary). Nora Ellen Groce. Health and Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 2, Emerging Issues in HIV/AIDS. (2005), pp. 215-224.
Measurement Properties of the World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule (WHODAS II) in Stroke Survivors. Patrick J. Doyle; Luis Prieto; JoAnne Epping-Jordan; Somnath Chatterji; Bedirhan Ustun. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 9, No. 3, Abstracts: 7th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Mar., 2000), p. 321.
Governing Embodiment: Technologies of Constituting Citizens with Disabilities. Tanya Titchkosky. Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 28, No. 4. (Autumn, 2003), pp. 517-542.
Child Disability and Mothers’ Tubal Sterilization. Jennifer M. Park; Dennis P. Hogan; Frances K. Goldscheider. Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, Vol. 35, No. 3. (May - Jun., 2003), pp. 138-143.
Identifying the Population with Disability: The Approach of an INSEE Survey on Daily Life and Health (in Issues of Terminology, Data Collection, and Measurement). Jean-François Ravaud; Alain Letourmy; Isabelle Ville; Zoé Andreyev. Population (English Edition, 2002-), Vol. 57, No. 3. (May - Jun., 2002), pp. 529-552.
Generational Cohorts, Group Membership, and Political Participation by People with Disabilities. Lisa Schur; Todd Shields; Kay Schriner. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 3. (Sep., 2005), pp. 487-496.
The Reduction in Disability among the Elderly (in Commentaries). David M. Cutler. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 98, No. 12. (Jun. 5, 2001), pp. 6546-6547.
‘Women and Disability Don’t Mix!’: Double Discrimination and Disabled Women’s Rights. Lina Abu Habib. Gender and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, [Rights]. (Jun., 1995), pp. 49-53.
The Relationship between Self-Perception of a Learning Disability and Achievement, Self-Concept and Social Support. Howard R. Rothman; Merith Cosden. Learning Disability Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Summer, 1995), pp. 203-212.
Sexuality and Disability (in In Brief). Shanaaz Majiet. Agenda, No. 28, Women’s Sexuality. (1996), pp. 77-80.
# 1408/I Feel Good about Things: Positive Quality of Life Outcomes Following a Stroke. Deborah Buck; Ann Jacoby. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 12, No. 7, Abstracts: 10th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Nov., 2003), p. 766.
Who Is Protected by the ADA? Evidence from the German Experience. Mary C. Daly. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 101-116.
Ideology and Independent Living: Will Conservatism Harm People with Disabilities? Andrew I. Batavia. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 10-23.
A Selected Bibliography of Human Rights and Disability (in Bibliography). Aart Hendriks; Aldred H. Neufeldt; Ruth Mathieson. Health and Human Rights, Vol. 1, No. 2. (1995), pp. 212-225.
Self-Reported Work-Limitation Data: What They Can and Cannot Tell Us. Richard V. Burkhauser; Mary C. Daly; Andrew J. Houtenville; Nigar Nargis. Demography, Vol. 39, No. 3. (Aug., 2002), pp. 541-555.
Effects of Alcohol Consumption on Disability among the Near Elderly: A Longitudinal Analysis. Jan Ostermann; Frank A. Sloan. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 4. (2001), pp. 487-515.
Active Life Expectancy Estimates for the U.S. Elderly Population: A Multidimensional Continuous-Mixture Model of Functional Change Applied to Completed Cohorts, 1982-1996 (in Mortality and Morbidity among America’s Youngest and Oldest). Kenneth G. Manton; Kenneth C. Land. Demography, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Aug., 2000), pp. 253-265.
Mobility Problems and Perceptions of Disability by Self-Respondents and Proxy Respondents (in Brief Report). Lisa I. Iezzoni; Ellen P. McCarthy; Roger B. Davis; Hiliary Siebens. Medical Care, Vol. 38, No. 10. (Oct., 2000), pp. 1051-1057.
Is the ADA Successful? Indicators for Tracking Gains. Frederick C. Collignon. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 129-147.
Disability Identity and Attitudes toward Cure in a Sample of Disabled Activists. Harlan D. Hahn; Todd L. Belt. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 453-464.
Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work? Richard V. Burkhauser. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 71-83.
Meeting the Health Care Needs of Persons with Disabilities (in Commentary). Carolyn M. Clancy; Elena M. Andresen. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2. (2002), pp. 381-391.
Enabling Citizenship: Gender, Disability and Citizenship in Australia. Helen Meekosha; Leanne Dowse. Feminist Review, No. 57, Citizenship: Pushing the Boundaries. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 49-72.
Enabling Democracy: Disability and Voter Turnout. Lisa Schur; Todd Shields; Douglas Kruse; Kay Schriner. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 1. (Mar., 2002), pp. 167-190.
Becoming Visible: Lessons in Disability. Brenda Jo Brueggemann; Linda Feldmeier White; Patricia A. Dunn; Barbara A. Heifferon; Johnson Cheu. College Composition and Communication, Vol. 52, No. 3. (Feb., 2001), pp. 368-398.
“The (Im)Perfect Human Being” and the Beginning of Disability Studies in Germany: A Report. Carol Poore. New German Critique, No. 86. (Spring - Summer, 2002), pp. 179-190.
Special Supplement: The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing Reflections and Recommendations. Erik Parens; Adrienne Asch. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 29, No. 5. (Sep. - Oct., 1999), pp. S1-S22.
Disability in Theory: From Social Constructionism to the New Realism of the Body. Tobin Siebers. American Literary History, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 737-754.
Trends in Disability-Free Life Expectancy in the United States, 1970-90. Eileen M. Crimmins; Yasuhiko Saito; Dominique Ingegneri. Population and Development Review, Vol. 23, No. 3. (Sep., 1997), pp. 555-572.
State Bureaucratic Discretion and the Administration of Social Welfare Programs: The Case of Social Security Disability. Lael R. Keiser. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1999), pp. 87-106.
Employment Discrimination Laws for Disability: Utilization and Outcome. Nancy R. Mudrick. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege? (Jan., 1997), pp. 53-70.
Can I Make a Difference? Efficacy, Employment, and Disability. Lisa Schur; Todd Shields; Kay Schriner. Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1. (Mar., 2003), pp. 119-149.
In Sickness and in Health: An Annuity Approach to Financing Long-Term Care and Retirement Income. Christopher M. Murtaugh; Brenda C. Spillman; Mark J. Warshawsky. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 68, No. 2. (Jun., 2001), pp. 225-253.
Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability.” Samuel R. Bagenstos. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 3. (Apr., 2000), pp. 397-534.
Social Inequalities in Disability-Free Life Expectancy in the French Male Population, 1980-1991 (in Elderly Health Status and Mortality in Developed Countries). Emmanuelle Cambois; Jean-Marie Robine; Mark D. Hayward. Demography, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Nov., 2001), pp. 513-524.
The Future of Disability Policy: Benefit Payments or Civil Rights? William G. Johnson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 160-172.
Weighting Life Expectancy for Quality: Whose Values Count? P. Kind. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 4, No. 5, Second Annual Meeting of the International Society for Quality of Life Research: Abstracts of the Contributed Papers. (Oct., 1995), pp. 447-448.
Parasites, Pawns and Partners: Disability Research and the Role of Non-Disabled Researchers. Emma Stone; Mark Priestley. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 47, No. 4. (Dec., 1996), pp. 699-716.
The Factor Structure of the World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule (WHODAS II). Luis Prieto; Joanne E. Epping-Jordan; Patrick Doyle; Somnath Chatterji; Bedirhan T. Ustun. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 9, No. 3, Abstracts: 7th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Mar., 2000), p. 320.
Strong Regional Links between Socio-Economic Background Factors and Disability and Mortality in Oslo, Norway. Marit Aase Rognerud; Øystein Krüger; Finn Gjertsen; Dag Steinar Thelle. European Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 14, No. 5. (Jul., 1998), pp. 457-463.
Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Daron Acemoglu; Joshua D. Angrist. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, No. 5. (Oct., 2001), pp. 915-957.
Ableist Geographies, Disablist Spaces: Towards a Reconstruction of Golledge’s ‘Geography and the Disabled’ (in Commentary). Rob Imrie. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 2. (1996), pp. 397-403.
The Case of Disability in the Family: Impact on Health Care Utilization and Expenditures for Nondisabled Members. Barbara M. Altman; Philip F. Cooper; Peter J. Cunningham. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 1. (1999), pp. 39-75.
The League of the Physically Handicapped and the Great Depression: A Case Study in the New Disability History. Paul K. Longmore; David Goldberger. The Journal of American History, Vol. 87, No. 3. (Dec., 2000), pp. 888-922.
Canadians with Disabilities and the Labour Market. Derek Hum; Wayne Simpson. Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Sep., 1996), pp. 285-299.
Age, Disability, and the Sense of Mastery. Scott Schieman; Heather A. Turner. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 39, No. 3. (Sep., 1998), pp. 169-186.
The Labor Productivity Effects of Chronic Backache in the United States. John A. Rizzo; Thomas A. Abbott, III; Marc L. Berger. Medical Care, Vol. 36, No. 10. (Oct., 1998), pp. 1471-1488.
The Effect of Disabilities on Exits from AFDC (in Disabilities and AFDC). Gregory Acs; Pamela Loprest. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 1. (Winter, 1999), pp. 28-49.
The Employment of People with and without Disabilities in an Age of Insecurity. Edward H. Yelin. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 117-128.
Disability as a Public Health Issue: Findings and Reflections from the Massachusetts Survey of Secondary Conditions. Nancy Wilber; Monika Mitra; Deborah Klein Walker; Deborah Allen; Allan R. Meyers; Paul Tupper. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2. (2002), pp. 393-421.
Epidemiological Aspects of Ageing. Kay-Tee Khaw. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, Vol. 352, No. 1363, Ageing: Science, Medicine, and Society. (Dec. 29, 1997), pp. 1829-1835.
Enabling Legislation or Dissembling Law? The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (in Legislation). Brian Doyle. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 1. (Jan., 1997), pp. 64-78.
Conscientization and the Cultural Politics of Education: A Radical Minority Perspective. Susan Peters; Robert Chimedza. Comparative Education Review, Vol. 44, No. 3. (Aug., 2000), pp. 245-271.
Not Disabled Enough: The ADA’s “Major Life Activity” Definition of Disability (in Notes). Michelle T. Friedland. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Nov., 1999), pp. 171-203.
Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?. Marjorie L. Baldwin. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 549, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege?. (Jan., 1997), pp. 37-52.
Pathways to Disability Income among Persons with Severe, Persistent Psychiatric Disorders. Sue E. Estroff; Donald L. Patrick; Catherine R. Zimmer; William S. Lachicotte, Jr. The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 4. (1997), pp. 495-532.
Canadian Federalism and Disability Policy Making. Michael J. Prince. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 34, No. 4, Citizenship and National Identity / Citoyennete et identité nationale. (Dec., 2001), pp. 791-817.
Visible Disability in the College Classroom. Mark Mossman. College English, Vol. 64, No. 6. (Jul., 2002), pp. 645-659.
Cumulative Disadvantage and Health: Long-Term Consequences of Obesity? Kenneth F. Ferraro; Jessica A. Kelley-Moore. American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, No. 5. (Oct., 2003), pp. 707-729.
Falling Through the Gap: Women with Mild Learning Disabilities and Self-Harm (in Dialogue). Samantha Downie. Feminist Review, No. 68, Women and Mental Health. (Summer, 2001), pp. 177-180.
Benefits, Bodily Functions and Living with Disability (in Cases). Nick Wikeley. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 4. (Jul., 1998), pp. 551-560.
The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation (in Essay). Samuel R. Bagenstos. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 6. (Oct., 2001), pp. 1479-1514.
Long Term Consequences of Neuromuscular Diseases: Sustaining Quality of Life with Severe Disability. Luc P. de Witte; Dominique J. Tilli. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 9, No. 3, Abstracts: 7th Annual Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Research (ISOQOL). (Mar., 2000), p. 283.
What Happens after the High School Years among Young Persons with Disabilities? Thomas Wells; Gary D. Sandefur; Dennis P. Hogan. Social Forces, Vol. 82, No. 2. (Dec., 2003), pp. 803-832.
The Long-Run Consumption Effects of Earnings Shocks. Melvin Stephens Jr. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 83, No. 1. (Feb., 2001), pp. 28-36.
Health Trajectories: Long-Term Dynamics Among Black and White Adults . Kenneth F. Ferraro; Melissa M. Farmer; John A. Wybraniec. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Mar., 1997), pp. 38-54.
Empirical Dimensions of Discrimination against Disabled People. Aldred H. Neufeldt. Health and Human Rights, Vol. 1, No. 2. (1995), pp. 174-189.
Case Study: Society’s Diseases. Diana Puñales Moréjon; Marsha Saxton. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 26, No. 3. (May - Jun., 1996), pp. 21-22.
What Can Disability Studies Learn from the Culture Wars? Tobin Siebers, Cultural Critique, No. 55. (Autumn, 2003), pp. 182-216.
Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Psychiatric Disability (in Comments). Stephanie Proctor Miller. California Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 3. (May, 1997), pp. 701-747.
Siblings of Adults with Mental Retardation or Mental Illness: Effects on Lifestyle and Psychological Well-Being (in Type of Disability). Marsha Mailick Seltzer; Jan S. Greenberg; Marty Wyngaarden Krauss; Rachel M. Gordon; Katherine Judge. Family Relations, Vol. 46, No. 4, Family Caregiving for Persons with Disabilities. (Oct., 1997), pp. 395-405.
Factor Structure of the Disability and Impact Profile in Patients with Multiple Sclerosis. L. Cohen; F. Pouwer; L. E. M. A. Pfennings; G. J. Lankhorst; H. M. van der Ploeg; C. H. Polman; H. J. Adèr; A. Jønnson; L. Vleugels. Quality of Life Research, Vol. 8, No. 1/2. (Mar., 1999), pp. 141-150.
Statutory Interpretation. Americans with Disabilities Act. Fourth Circuit Holds That Asymptomatic HIV Cannot Constitute a Disability. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N. A., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (En banc) (in Recent Cases). Harvard Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 3. (Jan., 1998), pp. 843-848. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/09%3A_Reading_Lists/9.05%3A_Readings_for_Part_V%E2%80%94Disability.txt |
Minority Studies: A Brief Text: Reading List for Part VI—Hate Kills! The Consequences of Bigotry
DOUGLASS : British Historical Doc., “Proclamation of Rebellion,” 23 August 1775. http://douglassarchives.org/proc_a52.htm. Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/11/2005 2:58:23 PM
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Women’s Rights are Human Rights,” 5 September 1995. Occasion: Remarks to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women Plenary Session in Beijing, China. http://douglassarchives.org/clin_a64.htm. Retrieved (1 of 6) 6/11/2005 2:57:08 PM
Martin Luther King, “I Have a Dream,” 28 August 1963. http://douglassarchives.org/king_b12.htm. Retrieved (1 of 5) 6/25/2005 5:03:28 PM
W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, “The Evolution of Negro Leadership,” 16 July 1901. http://douglassarchives.org/dubo_a09.htm. Retrieved (1 of 4) 6/11/2005 3:00:08 PM
American Experience: Scottsboro: An American Tragedy. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/scottsboro. Retrieved 5/27/2007 4:27:40 PM
American Experience: Zoot Suit Riots. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/zoot/. Retrieved 5/27/2007 4:23:57 PM
Dare to Compare: Americanizing the Holocaust. Lilian Friedberg. American Indian Quarterly/ Summer 2000/vol. 24, no. 3.
Darfur Eyewitness: Brian Steidle, www.ushmm.org/conscience/aler...FRaHgQodsyXAJA . Retrieved (1 of 4)5/27/2007 4:31:28 PM
Darfur: A Genocide We Can Stop. www.darfurgenocide.org/. Retrieved (1 of 2)5/27/2007 4:33:03 PM
Exploring Japanese American Internment. http://www.asianamericanmedia.org/jainternment/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/27/2007 4:29:38 PM
FGC Education and Networking Project. http://www.fgmnetwork.org/index.php. Retrieved (1 of 8) 5/27/2007 4:35:34 PM
Power, Samantha. “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide. Perennial, New York: 2003. ISBN: 0-06-054164-4.
Promising Democracy, Imposing Theocracy: Gender-Based Violence and the US War on Iraq. Yifat Susskind, MADRE Communications Director. http://www.madre.org/articles/me/iraqreport.html
20th Century Genocides. www.unitedhumanrights.org/Gen...e_massacre.htm. Retrieved 5/27/2007 5:18:55 PM
History of the Holocaust, Jewish Holocaust, the Nazi Holocaust, Human Rights Violations. www.unitedhumanrights.org/Gen..._holocaust.htm. Retrieved (1 of 9) 5/27/2007 5:17:44 PM
Holocaust Encyclopedia. http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/?gclid=C...FRsYIwodYCJRNQ. Retrieved 5/28/2007 1:37:39 PM
A Dream Denied: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities. A Report by The National Coalition For The Homeless And The National Law Center On Homelessness & Poverty. http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publ...ort/index.html
Human Rights 50th Anniversary / Universal Declaration. www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm. Retrieved (1 of 8) 6/11/2005 3:10:38 PM
Internet Archive: Details: USA on Trial. http://www.archive.org/details/ddtv_131_usa_on_trial. Retrieved 7/8/2007 1:21:51 PM
Last Year (2006) One of Worst Ever for Refugees-UNHCR Chief | Reuters. uk.reuters.com/article/homepa..._.242020070620. Retrieved (1 of 4)6/20/2007 3:34:30 PM
Massacre At Wounded Knee, 1890. http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/knee.htm. Retrieved (1 of 6) 5/27/2007 5:13:04 PM
Campaign To End Racial Profiling 07: Smarter Policing Practices—Creating a Safer, More Unified Texas: Racial Profiling in Texas. criminaljusticecoalition.org/...texas_2007.pdf
2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons. www.rms.org.nz/document/UNHCR...nds%202006.pdf.
NPR : Remembering the Tuskegee Experiment. www.npr.org/programs/morning/.../jul/tuskegee/. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/27/2007 5:28:47 PM
The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women. Jane Lawrence. American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Summer, 2000), pp. 400-419.
The Rights of Man by Thomas Paine. http://www.ushistory.org/paine/rights/index.htm. Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/12/2005 4:12:43 PM
The Seneca Falls Declaration on Women’s Rights. http://search.eb.com/women/pri/Q00172.html. Retrieved (1 of 5) 6/11/2005 3:11:47 PM
Trafficking in Human Beings. www.unodc.org/unodc/en/traffi...an_beings.html. Retrieved (1 of 4) 5/27/2007 4:37:57 PM
Trafficking In Persons Home Page. http://www.traffickinginpersons.com/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/27/2007 4:36:41 PM
Trail of Tears Commemorative Park. http://www.trailoftears.org/. Retrieved (1 of 6) 5/27/2007 5:09:26 PM
Trail of Tears National Historic Trail - Trail of Tears National Historic Trail (U.S. National Park Service). http://www.nps.gov/trte/. Retrieved (1 of 2) 5/27/2007 5:10:25 PM
UNHCR - The UN Refugee Agency. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home. Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/20/2007 3:32:52 PM
UNHCR - UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2005. http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STAT...464478a72.html. Retrieved (1 of 2) 6/20/2007 3:40:05 PM
WHO | Female Genital Mutilation. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/. Retrieved (1 of 3) 5/27/2007 4:34:48 PM
Wounded Knee: The Museum. www.woundedkneemuseum.org/index.htm. Retrieved 5/27/2007 5:11:16 PM | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/09%3A_Reading_Lists/9.06%3A_Readings_for_Part_VI%E2%80%94The_Consequences_of_Bigotry-_Hate_Kills.txt |
Affirmative Action
E. B. Hook. Science, New Series, Vol. 272, No. 5260. (Apr. 19, 1996), pp. 338-339.
Affirmative Action and City Managers: Attitudes toward Recruitment of Women. James D. Slack. Public Administration Review, Vol. 47, No. 2. (Mar. - Apr., 1987), pp. 199-206.
Affirmative Action Beneficiaries Performing at Levels Equal to Their White Peers. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 13. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 20-21.
Affirmative Action in the 1990s: Staying the Course. William L. Taylor; Susan M. Liss
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 523, Affirmative Action Revisited. (Sep., 1992), pp. 30-37.
Attitudes toward Affirmative Action as a Function of Racial Identity among African American College Students. Anke Schmermund; Robert Sellers; Birgit Mueller; Faye Crosby. Political Psychology, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Dec., 2001), pp. 759-774.
Jefferson - Enlightenment: Brown v. Board of Education - Racial Segregation in Public Schools. Brown v. Board of Education. Issue: Racial Segregation in Public Schools. http://www.pbs.org/jefferson/enlight/brown.htm. Retrieved (1 of 4) 6/28/2007 4:23:00 PM
Divided Court Rejects School Diversity Plans. http://cnn.law.printthis.clickabilit...urt+rejects+sc... 6/28/2007.
Only the Onset of Affirmative Action Explains the Explosive Growth in Black Enrollments in Higher Education. Theodore Cross; Robert Bruce Slater. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 23. (Spring, 1999), pp. 110-115.
Supreme Court of the United States. Parents Involved in Community Schools V. Seattle School District No. 1 Et Al. Certiorari to the United States Court Of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No. 05–908. Argued December 4, 2006—Decided June 28, 2007
Plessy v. Ferguson. Docket: 210. Citation: 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Petitioner: Plessy
Respondent: Ferguson. Oral Argument: Monday, April 13, 1896. Decision: Monday, May 18, 1896. The Oyez Project, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Available at: <http://www.oyez.org/cases/1851-1900/1895/1895_210/>.
Transcript of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). Judgement of the Court | Opinion of the Court. (Transcription of the Judgement of the Supreme Court of the United States in Plessy v. Ferguson.). Supreme Court of the United States, No. 210, October Term, 1895. Homer Adolph Plessy, Plaintiff in Error, vs. J.H. Ferguson, Judge of Section “A” Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/print_fr...son+%281896%29 . Retrieved (1 of 17) 6/28/2007 4:28:59 PM
Racial Conservatives Are Still Replaying the Myth That Racial Preferences Cause High Black Student College Dropout Rates. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 32. (Summer, 2001), pp. 12-13.
The Affirmative Action Conversion of Nathan Glazer. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 20. (Summer, 1998), p. 32.
The Continuing Evolution of Affirmative Action under Title VII: New Directions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Don Munro. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 2. (Mar., 1995), pp. 565-610.
Rethinking “Weber”: The Business Response to Affirmative Action. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 102, No. 3. (Jan., 1989), pp. 658-671.
Transcript of Brown v. Board of Education (1954). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (USSC+). Argued December 9, 1952. Reargued December 8, 1953. Decided May 17, 1954.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS*http://www.ourdocuments.gov/print_fr...ion+%281954%29. Retrieved (1 of 5) /28/2007 4:21:26 PM
What Does Affirmative Action Do? Harry J. Holzer; David Neumark. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 53, No. 2. (Jan., 2000), pp. 240-271.
Women and Affirmative Action. Jonathan S. Leonard. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 1. (Winter, 1989), pp. 61-75.
Affirmative Action: A Surprise Attack From the Political Left. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 9. (Autumn, 1995), p. 38.
Affirmative Action and Economics: A Framework for Analysis. Alma M. Joseph; Henry A. Coleman. Public Productivity & Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Mar., 1997), pp. 258-271.
Affirmative Action in American Politics: Strength or Weakness? Rupert W. Nacoste. Political Behavior, Vol. 9, No. 4. (1987), pp. 291-304.
Are Affirmative Action Hires Less Qualified? Evidence from Employer- Employee Data on New Hires. Harry Holzer; David Neumark. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 17, No. 3. (Jul., 1999), pp. 534-569.
Black Support for Affirmative Action Programs. Cardell K. Jacobson. Phylon (1960-), Vol. 44, No. 4. (4th Qtr., 1983), pp. 299-311.
Class or Caste Model: Which Road for Affirmative Action? Lenora Greenbaum. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 4, No. 2. (Winter, 1985), pp. 271-275.
Major Conservative Scholar Concedes Affirmative Action is Here to Stay. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 10. (Winter, 1995-1996), p. 37.
Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate. Randall Kennedy. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 6. (Apr., 1986), pp. 1327-1346.
Pluralistic Ignorance and Political Correctness: The Case of Affirmative Action. Leaf Van Boven. Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Jun., 2000), pp. 267-276.
Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections on a Decade of Federal Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace. John Cocchi Day. California Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Jan., 2001), pp. 59-127.
Sex, Race, and Affirmative Action: An Uneasy Alliance. Meredith A. Newman. Public Productivity & Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Mar., 1997), pp. 295-307.
The Affirmative Action Stigma of Incompetence: Effects of Performance Information Ambiguity. Madeline E. Heilman; Caryn J. Block; Peter Stathatos. The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 40, No. 3. (Jun., 1997), pp. 603-625.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. www.eeoc.gov/policy/vii.html
Retrieved (1 of 30) 5/25/2007 4:14:21 PM.
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). http://www.eeoc.gov/.
What Was Affirmative Action? Jonathan S. Leonard. The American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1986), pp. 359-363.
Culture of Poverty
A Behavioral-Economics View of Poverty. Marianne Bertrand; Sendhil Mullainathan; Eldar Shafir. The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association San Diego, CA, January 3-5, 2004. (May, 2004), pp. 419-423.
A Partial Test of Oscar Lewis’s Culture of Poverty in Rural America. David B. Miller. Current Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Dec., 1976), pp. 720-723.
Alternative Conceptions of Poverty and Their Implications for Income Maintenance. Seymour Spilerman; David Elesh. Social Problems, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Winter, 1971), pp. 358-373.
Another Look at The Truly Disadvantaged. William Julius Wilson. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 4. (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 639-656.
“Are the Poor Different?” A Comparison of Work Behavior and Attitudes among the Urban Poor and Nonpoor. Chandler Davidson; Charles M. Gaitz. Social Problems, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Dec., 1974), pp. 229-245.
Black Women in Poverty: Some Comments on Female-Headed Families. Rose M. Brewer. Signs, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Winter, 1988), pp. 331-339.
Culture and Poverty in Appalachia: A Theoretical Discussion and Empirical Analysis. Dwight Billings. Social Forces, Vol. 53, No. 2, Special Issue. (Dec., 1974), pp. 315-323.
Ethnicity, Poverty, and Selected Attitudes: A Test of the “Culture of Poverty” Hypothesis. Lola M. Irelan; Oliver C. Moles; Robert M. O’Shea. Social Forces, Vol. 47, No. 4. (Jun., 1969), pp. 405-413.
Family and Social Pathology in the Ghetto. Hyman Rodman. Science, New Series, Vol. 161, No. 3843. (Aug. 23, 1968), pp. 756-762.
Family Stability in the Context of Economic Deprivation. Florence C. Odita; Mary Ann Janssens. The Family Coordinator, Vol. 26, No. 3. (Jul., 1977), pp. 252-258.
Female Headship, Feminization of Poverty and Welfare. Mwangi S. Kimenyi; John Mukum Mbaku. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 62, No. 1. (Jul., 1995), pp. 44-52.
Immigration: Issues of Ethnicity, Class, and Public Policy in the United States. Robert L. Bach. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 485, From Foreign Workers to Settlers? Transnational Migration and the Emergence of New Minorities. (May, 1986), pp. 139-152.
Misspeaking Truth to Power: A Geographical Perspective on the “Underclass” Fallacy. Mark Alan Hughes. Economic Geography, Vol. 65, No. 3. (Jul., 1989), pp. 187-207.
Patterns of Childhood Poverty: New Challenges for Policy. Karl Ashworth; Martha Hill; Robert Walker. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn, 1994), pp. 658-680.
Public Transfers: Safety Net or Inducement into Poverty? Jimy M. Sanders. Social Forces, Vol. 68, No. 3. (Mar., 1990), pp. 813-834.
Race and Theory: Culture, Poverty, and Adaptation to Discrimination in Wilson and Ogbu. Mark Gould. Sociological Theory, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Jul., 1999), pp. 171-200.
Rags to Rags: Poverty and Mobility in the United States. M. Corcoran. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 21. (1995), pp. 237-267.
Robert Coles Reconsidered: A Critique of the Portrayal of Blacks as Culturally Deprived. Alan Wieder. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Autumn, 1981), pp. 381-388.
Social Research and the Underclass Debate. William Julius Wilson. Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 43, No. 2. (Nov., 1989), pp. 30-44.
Studying Social Class: The Case of Embourgeoisement and the Culture of Poverty. Garth Massey. Social Problems, Vol. 22, No. 5. (Jun., 1975), pp. 595-608.
The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City. Loïc J. D. Wacquant; William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 8-25.
The Culture of Poverty: An Ideological Analysis. David L. Harvey; Michael H. Reed. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Winter, 1996), pp. 465-495.
The Culture of Poverty Debate: Some Additional Data. Barbara E. Coward; Joe R. Feagin; J. Allen Williams, Jr. Social Problems, Vol. 21, No. 5. (Jun., 1974), pp. 621-634.
The Effect of Income on Use of Preventive Care: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations. Thomas G. Rundall; John R. C. Wheeler. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 4, Health Professions: Socialization, Organization, Utilization. (Dec., 1979), pp. 397-406.
The Measurement and Meaning of Poverty. John B. Williamson; Kathryn M. Hyer. Social Problems, Vol. 22, No. 5. (Jun., 1975), pp. 652-663.
The Myths of Oppositional Culture. Garvey F. Lundy. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Mar., 2003), pp. 450-467.
The Relationship Between Racial Identity Attitudes and Social Class. Robert T. Carter; Janet E. Helms. The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 57, No. 1. (Winter, 1988), pp. 22-30.
The Urban Child. Neil Sutherland. History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3. (Autumn, 1969), pp. 305-311.
“They Think You Ain’t Much of Nothing”: The Social Construction of the Welfare Mother. Karen Seccombe; Delores James; Kimberly Battle Walters. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 60, No. 4. (Nov., 1998), pp. 849-865.
Urban Hispanic Poverty: Disaggregations and Explanations. Robert Aponte. Social Problems, Vol. 38, No. 4, Special Issue on the Underclass in the United States. (Nov. 1991), pp. 516-528.
Values as Social Indicators of Poverty and Race Relations in America. Milton Rokeach; Seymour Parker. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 388, Political Intelligence for America’s Future. (Mar., 1970), pp. 97-111.
Will Public Service Jobs Cure Unemployment? Thomas F. Hady. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 57, No. 5, Proceedings Issue. (Dec., 1975), pp. 949-952.
Work Response to Income Maintenance: Economic, Sociological, and Cultural Perspectives. Sonia Wright. Social Forces, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Jun., 1975), pp. 553-562.
A Culture of Poverty? The St. Martin in the Fields Workhouse, 1817. Lynn MacKay. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Autumn, 1995), pp. 209-231.
Absent Fathers in the Inner City. Mercer L. Sullivan. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 48-58.
An Evaluation of the Concept “Culture of Poverty.” Jack L. Roach; Orville R. Gursslin. Social Forces, Vol. 45, No. 3. (Mar., 1967), pp. 383-392.
Antecedents of Pregnancy among Unmarried Adolescents. Cynthia Robbins; Howard B. Kaplan; Steven S. Martin. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 47, No. 3. (Aug., 1985), pp. 567-583.
Beating the Barrio: Piri Thomas and “Down These Mean Streets.” James B. Lane. The English Journal, Vol. 61, No. 6. (Sep., 1972), pp. 814-823.
Concentrated Deviance and the “Underclass” Hypothesis. Mark Alan Hughes. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 8, No. 2. (Spring, 1989), pp. 274-281.
Do the Differences Make a Difference? An Empirical Evaluation of the Culture of Poverty in the United States. Troy Abell; Larry Lyon. American Ethnologist, Vol. 6, No. 3, Interdisciplinary Anthropology. (Aug., 1979), pp. 602-621.
Factors Affecting the Mobility-Orientation of the Poor. Lawrence E. Sneden II. The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Jan., 1974), pp. 60-82.
Family Planning and Public Policy: Is the “Culture of Poverty” the New Cop-Out? Frederick S. Jaffe; Steven Polgar. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 30, No. 2, Family Planning and Fertility Control. (May, 1968), pp. 228-235.
Family, Race, and Poverty in the Eighties. Maxine Baca Zinn. Signs, Vol. 14, No. 4, Common Grounds and Crossroads: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in Women’s Lives. (Summer, 1989), pp. 856-874.
Ideology in the Study of American Racism, Ethnicity, and Poverty. Howard F. Stein. American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 76, No. 4. (Oct., 1974), pp. 840-845.
Low-Income Families and the Schools for Their Children. Theodore R. Sizer. Public Administration Review, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 1970), pp. 340-346.
Myth and Reality: The Causes and Persistence of Poverty. Mary Corcoran; Greg J. Duncan; Gerald Gurin; Patricia Gurin. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 4, No. 4. (Summer, 1985), pp. 516-536.
Poverty and Culture: Empirical Evidence and Implications for Public Policy. Naomi Carmon. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 28, No. 4. (Oct., 1985), pp. 403-417.
Puerto Ricans in Perspective: The Meaning of Migration to the Mainland. Joseph P. Fitzpatrick. International Migration Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, The Puerto Rican Experience on the United States Mainland. (Spring, 1968), pp. 7-20.
Race, Family Structure, and Changing Poverty Among American Children. David J. Eggebeen; Daniel T. Lichter. American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, No. 6. (Dec., 1991), pp. 801-817.
Rational Choice, Culture of Poverty, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Welfare Dependency. Mwangi S. Kimenyi. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 57, No. 4. (Apr., 1991), pp. 947-960.
Social Background, Not Race, Conditions Black Premarital Childbearing. Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 5. (Sep. - Oct., 1987), pp. 219-220.
Structural Conditions of Achievement among Whites and Blacks in the Rural South. Jonathan H. Turner. Social Problems, Vol. 19, No. 4. (Spring, 1972), pp. 496-508.
The Changing Nature of Poverty. Martha S. Hill. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 479, The Welfare State in America: Trends and Prospects. (May, 1985), pp. 31-47.
The Culture of Poverty: An Adjustive Dimension. Seymour Parker; Robert J. Kleiner. American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 72, No. 3. (Jun., 1970), pp. 516-527.
The Culture of Poverty and African-American Culture: An Empirical Assessment. Rachel K. Jones; Ye Luo. Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 42, No. 3. (Autumn, 1999), pp. 439-458.
The Culture of Poverty Revisited: A Strategy for Research. L. Richard Della Fave. Social Problems, Vol. 21, No. 5. (Jun., 1974), pp. 609-621.
The Family, The Culture of Poverty and Welfare Provision. Patricia Owens. RAIN, No. 63. (Aug., 1984), pp. 6-9.
The Moynihan Controversy: Letter to Seymour Parker from Daniel P. Moynihan. Seymour Parker. American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 73, No. 4. (Aug., 1971), pp. 985-986.
The Problem of Poverty. George A. Shipman. Public Administration Review, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Jan. - Feb., 1968), pp. 62-64.
The Role of Racism in the Inequality Studies of William Julius Wilson. Stephen Steinberg. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 15. (Spring, 1997), pp. 109-117.
The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy. William Julius Wilson. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 501, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. (Jan., 1989), pp. 182-192.
The Urban Underclass. Carole Marks. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 17. (1991), pp. 445-466.
Toward a Constructive Theory for Anti-Poverty Policy. Brian J. Jones. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 2. (Apr., 1984), pp. 247-256.
Urban Indian Personality and the ‘Culture of Poverty.’ Theodore D. Graves. American Ethnologist, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Feb., 1974), pp. 65-86.
Welfare Use Across Generations: How Important Are the Ties That Bind? Mark R. Rank; Li-Chen Cheng. Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Aug., 1995), pp. 673-684.
Wilson on the Truly Disadvantaged. Bernard R. Boxill. Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 3. (Apr., 1991), pp. 579-592.
9.08: General Reading List- Free, Online Books
General Reading List: Free, Online Books
Jane Addams: My Twenty Years at Hull House http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/ADDAMS/title.html
Edward Bellamy: Looking Backwards http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/BELLAMY/front.html
Charles Horton Cooley: Human Nature and the Social Order http://ia340917.us.archive.org/0/ite...00cooluoft.pdf
W.E.B. DuBois: The Negro http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15359...-h/15359-h.htm
W.E.B. DuBois: The Souls of Black Folk http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng...c/DubSoul.html
W.E.B. DuBois: Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15210...-h/15210-h.htm
Charlotte Perkins Gilman: Women and Economics http://digital.library.upenn.edu/wom...economics.html
Charlotte Perkins Gilman: The Yellow Wallpaper www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext99/ylwlp10.txt
Emma Goldman: Anarchism and Other Essays http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/Goldman/front.html
Karl Marx http://www.marxists.org/
Upton Sinclair: The Jungle http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/SINCLAIR/front.html
W.I. Thomas: Sex and Society http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15015...-h/15015-h.htm
Sojourner Truth: The Narrative of Sojourner Truth http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/TRUTH/cover.html
Thorstein Veblen: The Theory of the Leisure Class http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/ve.../veblenhp.html
Booker T. Washington: Up From Slavery http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/WA...TON/cover.html
Max Weber: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/weber/header.html
WPA: American Slave Narratives: An OnLine Anthology http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/wpa/wpahome.html
10.01: Web Sites of Interest to Students of Sociology
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
Figure 8.
Figure 9.
Figure 10.
Figure 11.
Figure 12.
Figure 13.
Figure 14.
Figure 15.
Figure 16.
Figure 17.
Figure 18.
Figure 19.
Figure 20.
Figure 21.
Figure 22.
Figure 23. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Minority_Studies_(Dunn)/09%3A_Reading_Lists/9.07%3A_Minority_Studies-_A_Brief_Sociological_Text-_General_Reading_List.txt |
Many people who encounter the capability approach for the first time find the ideas embedded within it intuitively attractive. The basic claim of the capability approach is that, when asking normative questions, we should ask what people are able to do and what lives they are able to lead. That claim resonates with widespread ideas among citizens, academics, and politicians about how to make policies, views about what social justice requires, or bottom-up views about development and social progress. Perhaps the most important contribution the capability approach makes is to prompt us to ask alternative questions, and to focus on different dimensions when we make observations or when we gather the relevant data for making evaluations or judgements.
What is the capability approach? This book will answer that question in detail. But let us start with a first, preliminary description, taken from a quote by Amartya Sen, who introduced the theoretical idea of the capability approach in his 1979 Tanner Lecture (Sen 1980a) and soon after in empirical work (Sen and Sengupta 1983; Sen 1985a). According to Sen, the capability approach “is an intellectual discipline that gives a central role to the evaluation of a person’s achievements and freedoms in terms of his or her actual ability to do the different things a person has reason to value doing or being” (Sen 2009a, 16). As we will see later in this book, I will propose a definition and an account of the capability approach that does not exactly equal Sen’s but rather can be interpreted as a generalisation of Sen’s definition.1 Yet Sen’s definition is a good way to start, since it highlights that the capability approach is concerned with aspects of people’s lives such as their health, the education they can enjoy and the support they enjoy from their social networks; it is also concerned with what people can do, such as being able to work, raise a family, travel, or be politically active. The capability approach cares about people’s real freedoms to do these things, and the level of wellbeing that they will reach when choosing from the options open to them. It is a rich, multidimensional approach.
Here’s an example illustrating the difference the capability approach makes. Everyone agrees that poverty needs to be combatted — but who are the people that suffer from poverty? Which conceptual and normative framework do we use when we identify the poor? Which definition of poverty do we use when we analyse the incidence of poverty in a country? As empirical research has shown, it does matter whether one uses the widespread income-based metric, or whether one takes a capability perspective and focuses on a set of thresholds of basic functionings, the lack of which indicates a dimension of poverty. Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi (1997) used data from a Chilean household survey to investigate the extent to which an income-based measure is able to capture some basic functionings that could arguably be seen as central to poverty analysis: basic education, health and nutrition. She found that the income variable in itself is insignificant as a determinant of the shortfall in health, schooling and child nutrition and that the role that income plays is highly non-linear and depends on a number of other personal, household and regional characteristics. In other words, looking at the income level in a household to determine whether the members of that household are poor may be an unreliable indicator for the prevalence of poverty. The difference between, on the one hand, the income-based measurements and, on the other hand, measurements based on a selection of basic indicators that reflect how people are doing has also been confirmed by a large number of other studies in the last twenty-five years.2 It is for that income-based approach that the capability approach offers an alternative — but, as will be explained in this book, it is also an alternative to many other approaches and theories, such as the happiness approach or resources-based theories of justice.
While the capability approach has been used to identify the poor, it has also been used for many other purposes. Over the last twenty-five years, the range of fields in which the capability approach has been applied and developed has expanded dramatically, and now includes global public health, development ethics, environmental protection and ecological sustainability, education, technological design, welfare state policies and many, many more.3 Nor has the use of the capability approach been restricted to empirical research only. Some of its purposes have been theoretical, such as the construction of theories of justice (Anderson 1999; Nussbaum 2000; Nussbaum 2006b; Claassen 2016), or the development of a riches-line, which allows us to identify the rich (Robeyns 2017b). Other uses of the capability approach have combined theoretical and empirical research, such as Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit’s (2007) study of disadvantage.
For all these endeavours, the capability approach asks: What are people really able to do and what kind of person are they able to be? It asks what people can do and be (their capabilities) and what they are actually achieving in terms of beings and doings (their functionings). Do the envisioned institutions, practices and policies focus on people’s capabilities, that is, their opportunities to do what they value and be the kind of person they want to be? Do people have the same capabilities in life?4 Or do global economic structures, domestic policies or brute bad luck make people’s capabilities unequal, and if so, is that unfair and should we do something about that? Do development projects focus on expanding people’s capabilities, or do they have another public policy goal (such as economic growth), or are they merely serving the interests of a dominant group? The capability approach thus offers a different perspective than alternative approaches that focus on the accumulation of material resources, or the mental states of people, such as their overall satisfaction with their lives.
1 The exact definition and description of the capability approach that I will develop in this book is broader than Sen’s own. The reason, as will become clear in due course, is that the “having reason to value” clause in Sen’s definition is, in my view, a special case of the general definition of the capability approach.
2 See, among others, Klasen 2000; Laderchi, Saith and Stewart 2003; Qizilbash 2002; Reddy, Visaria and Asali 2009; Alkire et al. 2015.
3 See section 1.4 for a more detailed discussion of the scope of the capability approach, and some references to the various fields in which it is now applied and developed.
4 Some capability scholars, in particular Martha Nussbaum, have extended the capability approach to include the functionings of non-human animals. In this book, I restrict the discussion to human functionings and human capabilities. This is not to deny that the functionings of non-human animals are important, nor that for some ethical questions we need to consider both humans and non-human animals. There is a literature that analyses whether the capability approach can plausibly be extended to include non-human animals, which will not be discussed here, given the focus on humans (e.g. Nussbaum 2006b; Schinkel 2008; Cripps 2010; Wissenburg 2011; Holland and Linch 2016). Note that there is also a large literature on ‘the capabilities of firms’, which is not related to how the term ‘capabilities’ is used in the capability approach. In this book, the term ‘capabilities’ refers only to the capabilities of members of the human species. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/01%3A_Introduction/1.01%3A_Why_the_capability_approach.txt |
Although the capability approach appeals to many readers, others have wondered whether this theory is really any different from other more established theories, or whether the capability approach is promising as a theory with sufficient bite. For example John Rawls (1999, 13), while acknowledging that the idea of basic capabilities is important, calls it “an unworkable idea” for a liberal conception of justice. John Roemer (1996, 191–93) has criticized the capability approach for being insufficiently specified — a complaint that is also echoed in the critique made by Pratab Bhanu Mehta (2009). Others have questioned the practical significance of the capability approach for policy making and empirical assessment. For instance, Robert Sugden (1993, 1953) has questioned the usefulness of the capability approach for welfare economics — a critique to which we will return in section 4.10. In addition, at seminars and other scholarly gatherings, an often-heard criticism is that the capability approach is old wine in new bottles — it aims to do what the non-economic social sciences have been doing all along. If that is the case, then why should we bother?5
There are two types of answer to the sceptics. The first is conceptual or theoretical and that answer will be given in the remainder of this book. In a nutshell, the reason the capability approach is worth our time and attention is that it gives us a new way of evaluating the lives of individuals and the societies in which these people live their lives. The attention is shifted to public values currently not always considered most important — such as wellbeing, freedom and justice. It is an alternative discourse or paradigm, perhaps even a ‘counter-theory’ to a range of more mainstream discourses on society, poverty and prosperity. Moreover, it brings insights from several disciplines together, and gives scholars a common interdisciplinary language. Nevertheless, it doesn’t follow that the capability approach will always offer a framework that is to be preferred over other frameworks: as this book will show, the capability approach can contribute something, but we should be careful not to overplay our hand and believe that it can do a better job for all ethical questions.
The second answer to the sceptic is empirical — to show the sceptic what difference the capability approach makes. The earlier mentioned study by Ruggeri Laderchi (1997) and dozens of similar studies do exactly that. In 2006, I provided a survey of the studies in which the capability approach had been put into practice (Robeyns 2006b) — a task that I think is no longer feasible today in a single paper or chapter, given that the empirical literature of applications of the capability approach has grown dramatically. But in order to illustrate in somewhat greater depth this kind of answer to the sceptic, let us focus on one type of empirical application of the capability approach: namely how we perceive and evaluate our lives at a macro level, and how we evaluate the social arrangements in which we live those lives.
5 Several more specific critiques on the capability approach will be discussed in chapter 4. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/01%3A_Introduction/1.02%3A_The_worries_of_the_sceptics.txt |
For many decades, the dominant way to measure prosperity and social progress has been to focus on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Product (GNP) per capita. The more we produce, the more developed our country has been taken to be. Yet a large literature has emerged showing that GDP per capita is limited and often flawed as a measure of social and economic progress (Fleurbaey 2009; Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2010; Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013; Coyle 2015).
In one of the very first empirical applications of the capability approach, Amartya Sen (1985a) used some very simple statistics to illustrate how deceiving GDP per capita can be as a measure of prosperity and progress.6 Sen showed that, in the early 1980s, the (roughly equivalent) GNP per capita of Brazil and Mexico was more than seven times the (roughly equivalent) GNP per capita of India, China and Sri Lanka — yet performances in life expectancy, infant mortality and child death rates were best in Sri Lanka, better in China compared to India and better in Mexico compared to Brazil. Important social indicators related to life, premature death and health, can thus not be read from the average national income statistic. Another finding was that India performs badly regarding basic education but has considerably higher tertiary education rates than China and Sri Lanka. Thus, Sen concluded that the public policy of China and especially Sri Lanka towards distributing food, public health measures, medical services and school education have led to their remarkable achievements in the capabilities of survival and education. What can this application teach us about the capability approach? First, the ranking of countries based on GNP per capita can be quite different from a ranking based on the selected functionings. Second, growth in GNP per capita should not be equated with growth in living standards.
Sen has often made use of the power of comparing the differences in the ranking of countries based on GDP per capita with indicators of some essential functionings. Recently Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (2013, 46–50) used the capability approach to develop an analysis of India’s development policies. For example, as table 1.1 shows, they compared India with the fifteen other poorest countries outside sub-Saharan Africa in terms of development indicators.7
Of those sixteen countries, India ranks on top in terms of GDP per capita, but ranks very low for a range of functionings, such as life expectancy at birth, infant mortality, undernourishment, schooling and literacy. Other countries, with fewer financial means, were able to achieve better outcomes in terms of those functionings. Once again, the point is made that focussing on income-based metrics such as disposable income at the household level, or GDP per capita at the national level, gives limited information on the lives people can lead.
Table 1.1 Selected Indicators for the World’s Sixteen Poorest Countries Outside Sub-Saharan Africa
India Average for other poorest countries India's rank among 16 poorest countries
GDP per capita, 2011 (PPP Constant 2005 international \$) 3,203 2,112 1
Life expectancy at birth, 2011 (years) 65 67 9
Infant mortality rate, 2011 (per 1,000 live births) 47 45 10
Under-5 mortality rate, 2011
(per 1,000 live births)
61 56 10
Total fertility rate, 2011
(children per woman)
2.6 2.9 7
Access to improved sanitation, 2010 (%) 34 57 13
Mean years of schooling, 25+, 2011 4.4 5.0 11
Literacy rate, age 14–15 years, 2010 (%)
Female 74 79 11
Male 88 85 9
Proportion of children below 5 years who are undernourished, 2006–2010 (%)
Underweight 43 30 15
Stunted 48 41 13
Child immunization rates, 2011 (%)
DPT 72 88 13
Measles 74 87 11
Source: Drèze and Sen (2013, 47).
This type of illustration of the power of the capability approach, whereby at the macro level the quality of life in a country is compared with GDP per capita, is not restricted to poor countries only. For example, the capability approach has recently also been taken up by the ‘Better Life Initiative’ of the OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The aim of this initiative is to track wellbeing, both in the present day and historically, by looking at ten dimensions of wellbeing: per capita GDP, real wages, educational attainment, life expectancy, height, personal security, the quality of political institutions, environmental quality, income inequality and gender inequality. Several of these dimensions can be conceptualized through a capability lens and others (such as per capita GDP or real wages) are needed for a comparison between capability dimensions and income dimensions, or can be seen as core capability determinants or capability inputs. In a recent report, which reconstructed the outcomes on those dimensions between 1820 and 2000, it was found that some dimensions, such as education and health outcomes, are strongly correlated with per capita GDP, but others are not — such as the quality of political institutions, homicide rates and exposure to conflicts (Van Zanden et al. 2014).
Another example that illustrates the difference the capability approach can make is the analysis of gender inequality, for which it is clear that we are missing out the most important dimensions if we only focus on how income is distributed. There are two main problems with an income-based approach to gender inequalities. The first is that it is often assumed that income within households will be shared. Yet that assumption makes most of the economic inequalities between women and men invisible (Woolley and Marshall 1994; Phipps and Burton 1995; Robeyns 2006a). Moreover, gender scholars across the disciplines have argued that one of the most important dimensions of gender inequality is the distribution of burdens between men and women (paid work, household work and care work); the fact that women are expected to do the lion’s share of unpaid household work and care work makes them financially vulnerable and restricts their options. Any account of gender inequality that wants to focus on what really matters should talk about the gender division of paid and unpaid work, and the capability approach allows us to do that, since both paid and unpaid work can be conceptualized as important capabilities of human beings (e.g. Lewis and Giullari 2005; Robeyns 2003, 2010; Addabbo, Lanzi and Picchio 2010).
Moreover, for millions of girls and women worldwide, the most important capability that is denied to them is extremely basic — the capability to live in the first place. As Sen showed in an early study and as has been repeatedly confirmed since, millions of women are ‘missing’ from the surface of the Earth (and from the population statistics), since newborn girls have been killed or fatally neglected, or female foetuses have been aborted, because they were females in a society in which daughters are more likely to be seen as a burden, especially when compared to sons (Sen 1990b, 2003b, 1992b; Klasen 1994; Klasen and Wink 2003). In sum, tracking the gap between women’s achievements in income and wealth or labour market outcomes will not reveal some crucial dimensions of gender inequality, whereas the capability approach draws attention to these non-income-based dimensions.
Using the capability approach when thinking about prosperity and social progress has another advantage: it will impede policy makers from using mistaken assumptions about human beings in their policies, including how we live together and interact in society and communities, what is valuable in our lives and what kind of governmental and societal support is needed in order for people (and in particular the disadvantaged) to flourish. For example, in their study of disadvantage in affluent societies, in particular the UK and Israel, Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit discuss the effects of a government policy of clearing a slum by moving the inhabitants to newly built tower blocks. While there may be clear material advantages to this policy — in particular, improving the hygiene conditions in which people live — a capabilitarian analysis will point out that this policy damages the social aspects of people’s wellbeing, since social networks and communities are broken up and cannot simply be assumed to be rebuilt in the new tower blocks (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 168, 178–79). Since social relationships among people are key to their wellbeing, this may well have additional derivative effects on other dimensions of people’s lives, such as their mental health. Understanding people as beings whose nature consists of a plurality of dimensions can help governments to think carefully through all the relevant effects of their policies.
6 An even earlier empirical study, in which the capability approach is referred to as the right evaluative framework, was done by Amartya Sen and Sunil Sengupta (1983).
7 Those other countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Moldova, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/01%3A_Introduction/1.03%3A_A_yardstick_for_the_evaluation_of_prosperity_and_progre.txt |
The previous section provides one type of answer to those who are sceptical about the capability approach, namely by showing what difference it makes in practice. The other strand in answering the sceptic who asks “Why bother?” is to explain in detail how one should understand the capability approach as a conceptual and theoretical frame and how it differs from other theoretical frameworks. After all, a proper understanding of what the capability approach precisely is (and is not) should also help in making clear what difference it can make. While this book is not framed as a reply to the sceptic, implicitly such an argument is made in the chapters to come.
Nevertheless, we should not simply assume that the added value of the capability approach is equal across cases, fields and disciplines. In some areas, the difference between the capability approach and the dominant ways of thinking and evaluating are so significant that we can rightly speak of a ‘counter-theory’. In other debates and discussions, the difference that the capability approach makes to the prevailing modes of analysis has been more limited. Moreover, the development of the capability approach itself is uneven within different disciplines.
In some debates, the capability approach has been so much studied, developed or applied that we should no longer speak of “the potential of the capability approach” or “the promises of the capability approach”, since the work that has been done has made quite clear what difference the capability approach actually makes. The prime example is the literature and debate on the very idea of what development is. The capability approach has made a crucial foundational contribution to the growth of the human development paradigm which is now well-known, especially through the work of the Human Development Reports, which are annually published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In addition, the most well-known of Sen’s books among the wider public is Development as Freedom, which uses the capability approach as a key element of his alternative vision on development (Sen 1999a). In economics, Sabina Alkire, James Foster and their collaborators have made major contributions to the development of poverty measures based on the capability approach, with the development of the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Alkire and Foster 2011; Alkire et al. 2015). In the area of development studies, the capability approach is no longer a new and emerging alternative (as it was twenty to thirty years ago), but rather one of the major established frameworks.8
Another area is philosophical thinking about the metric of distributive justice (that is: what we ought to compare between individuals when we make statements about whether certain inequalities between people are unjust). In this literature too, the capability approach has by now established itself as an important alternative.9 And while work on development and on justice perhaps stands out, there are now significant bodies of literature on the capability approach in many fields, such as health economics and public health,10 technology,11 sustainability analysis and environmental policy studies,12 disability studies,13 and the vast amount of literature in educational studies that works with the capability approach.14
However, in other academic fields it is more disputed to what extent the capability approach has been shown to make a real difference. For example, in ethical theories within the systematic/analytical strand of philosophy, the capability approach hasn’t yet been much developed. Similarly, one can doubt whether the capability approach has contributed to a significant change in mainstream economic thinking. The development of the capability approach within different academic disciplines and discussions thus differs significantly, and the effect the capability approach has had on developing new policies also differs drastically between different policy fields.
In the debates where the capability approach is now well-established, the development of that literature has often raised new questions. For example, in philosophical theories of justice there are now enough convincing arguments that the capability approach makes a difference, but the very possibility of a capability theory of justice has also allowed us to be much more explicit about which questions remain unaddressed in case one wants to make a substantive theory of (distributive) justice (Freeman 2006; Robeyns 2016d). This is a ‘normal’ way in which a paradigm develops. It therefore shouldn’t be surprising that we have just as many questions about the capability approach as we had a few years ago. We may even have more, but they are different to those that were raised a decade or two ago.
Whatever the unevenness in its uptake and development between disciplines, and independently of the new questions that the capability approach has raised, the current state of the literature which I will present in this book confirms that the capability approach is here to stay. It makes a difference in many debates. It is one of those rare theories that strongly connects disciplines and offers a truly interdisciplinary language. And it leads to recommendations on how to organise society and choose policies that are often genuine alternatives for prevailing views.
8 For some examples from the huge body of literature in development economics, development studies and development ethics that builds on the capability approach, see Alkire (2002); Clark (2002, 2005); Conradie (2013); Crocker (2008); Deneulin (2006a, 2006b, 2014); Drydyk (2011, 2013); Gasper (2004); Ibrahim (2011); Klasen (2000); Qizilbash (1996) and Qizilbash and Clark (2005).
9 See e.g. Anderson (1999, 2010); Nussbaum (1988); Nussbaum (2000; 2006b); Richardson (2000); Kaufman (2007); Wolff and De-Shalit (2007); Brighouse and Robeyns (2010); Arneson (2010, 2013); Claassen (2014, 2016); Nielsen and Axelsen (2017). See also section 3.13.
10 E.g. Grewal et al. (2006); Ruger (2006, 2010); Coast et al. (2008); Coast, Smith and Lorgelly (2008); Venkatapuram (2009, 2011, 2013); Bleichrodt and Quiggin (2013); Entwistle and Watt (2013); Mitchell et al. (2016, 2017).
11 E.g. Oosterlaken (2009, 2011, 2015); Zheng (2009); Zheng and Stahl (2011); Kleine (2010, 2011, 2013); Fernández-Baldor et al. (2014).
12 E.g. Anand and Sen (1994, 2000); Robeyns and Van der Veen (2007); Scholtes (2010); Schlosberg and Carruthers (2010); Rauschmayer, Omann and Frühmann (2012); Schlosberg (2012); Crabtree (2013); Voget-Kleschin (2013, 2015); Schultz et al. (2013); Holland (2014).
13 E.g. Nussbaum (2002a); Burchardt (2004); Zaidi and Burchardt (2005); Terzi (2005, 2007, 2008); Wasserman (2005); Mitra (2006); Qizilbash (2011); Harnacke (2013); Robeyns (2016c).
14 E.g. Terzi (2008); Walker and Unterhalter (2007); Lozano et al. (2012); Boni and Walker (2013); Apsan Frediani, Boni and Gasper (2014); Unterhalter (2003a, b, 2009, 2013); Hart (2009, 2012); Peppin Vaughan (2011, 2016); Peppin Vaughan and Walker (2012); Saito (2003); Nussbaum (2002b, 2006a); Walker (2003, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012a, 2012b), Loots and Walker (2015, 2016); Mutanga and Walker (2015); Wilson-Strydom and Walker (2015).
1.05: A guide for the reader
This book has an extremely simple structure. There are five chapters — an introduction (this chapter), a short concluding chapter (chapter 5) and three very long chapters in the middle. In chapter 2 we start with a rather simple explanation of the capability approach, and then present a more detailed account of capability theories, focusing in particular on their structure and properties. I will present the capability approach by describing it as having a modular structure — whereby each specific capability theory combines the core elements of the non-optional module with a range of non-core modules. This way of looking at the capability approach helps those who want to apply the capability approach to a particular question or problem to see clearly which elements are needed for such an application; it also makes it very clear that the capability approach can be specified in diverse ways. One could see chapter 2 as trying to provide the anatomy of the capability approach — to try to see behind its skin, to detect what its various organs are, how they interact and which ones are essential, whereas others may be more tangential.
In chapter 3 we discuss further details and try to clear up some misunderstandings. The capability approach is a field that is notoriously prone to misunderstandings, in part because of its interdisciplinary nature, but also because the terminology differs somewhat between different authors. Chapter 3 tries to present the literature as neutrally as possible and describes how it has been evolving.
Chapter 4 then zooms in on a range of critiques that have been made of the capability approach, such as the argument that it is too individualistic, or that it cannot properly account for power. In this chapter, my own voice will be more prominent, as I will engage with these claims, agreeing with some of them (and, as philosophers do, giving reasons why I agree), but also arguing against some other critiques. Here, it will become clear what the value is of the distinction between the general capability approach and more specific capability theories, which I introduced elsewhere (Robeyns 2016b) and explain again in section 2.3. As it turns out, some of the critiques are valid against particular capability theories, but make no sense against the capability approach in general. I hope that the adoption of this distinction between capability theories or applications on the one hand, and capability approach on the other, will clear the capability literature of many confusing and unnecessary criticisms, so that we can devote our energy to those that are powerful and with which we need to engage. Moreover, let us not forget that the capability approach is a tool and not an end in itself; we should master it as well as we can, perhaps also as efficiently as we can, and then move on to use it in the work that really matters. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/01%3A_Introduction/1.04%3A_Scope_and_development_of_the_capability_approach.txt |
The previous chapter listed a range of fields in which the capability approach has been taken up, and in chapters 3 and 4 we focus in more detail on how the capability approach can (or cannot) make a difference for thinking about wellbeing, social and distributive justice, human rights, welfare economics and other topics. This broad uptake of the capability approach across disciplines and across different types of knowledge production (from theoretical and abstract to applied or policy oriented) is testimony to its success. But how is the capability approach understood in these different fields, and is it possible to give a coherent and clarifying account of how we can understand the capability approach across those fields?1 In other words, how should we understand the capability approach as an overarching framework, that unites its more specific uses in different fields and disciplines?
This chapter gives an account of that general framework. It provides explanations and insights into what the capability approach is, what its core claims are, and what additional claims we should pay attention to. This chapter will also answer the question: what do we mean exactly when we say that the capability approach is a framework or an approach?
In other words, in this chapter, I will give an account (or a description) of the capability approach at the most general level. I will bracket additional details and questions about which disagreement or confusion exists; chapter 3 will offer more detailed clarifications and chapter 4 will discuss issues of debate and dispute. Taken together, these three chapters provide my understanding of the capability approach.
Chapter 2 is structured as follows. In the next section, we look at a preliminary definition of the capability approach. Section 2.3 proposes to make a distinction between ‘the capability approach’ and ‘a capability theory’. This distinction is crucial — it will help us to clarify various issues that we will look at in this book, and it also provides some answers to the sceptics of the capability approach whom we encountered in the previous chapter. Section 2.4 describes, from a bottom-up perspective, the many ways in which the capability approach has been developed within particular theories, and argues why it is important to acknowledge the great diversity within capabilitarian scholarship. Sections 2.5 to 2.11 present an analytic account of the capability approach, and show what is needed to develop a particular capability theory, application or analysis. In 2.5, I propose the modular view of the capability approach, which allows us to distinguish between three different types of modules that make up a capability theory. The first, the A-module, consists of those properties that each capability theory must have (section 2.6). This is the non-optional core of each capability theory. The B-modules are a set of modules in which the module itself is non-optional, but there are different possible choices regarding the content of the module (section 2.7). For example, we cannot have a capability theory or application without having chosen a purpose for that theory or application — yet there are many different purposes among which we can choose. The third group of modules, the C-modules, are either non-optional but dependent on a choice made in the B-modules, or else are completely optional. For example, if the purpose you choose is to measure poverty, then you need to decide on some empirical methods in the C-modules; but if your aim is to make a theory of justice, you don’t need to choose empirical methods and hence the C-module for empirical methods (module C3) is not relevant for your capability application (section 2.8).2 In the next section, 2.9, I discuss the possibility of hybrid theories — theories that give a central role to functionings and capabilities yet violate some other core proposition(s). Section 2.11 rounds up the discussion of the modular view by discussing the relevance and advantages of seeing the capability approach from this perspective.
Section 2.12 summarises the conceptual aspects that have been explained by presenting a visualisation of the conceptual framework of the capability approach. Section 2.13 uses the modular view to illuminate the observation, which has been made by several capability scholars, that the capability approach has been used in a narrow and in a broad sense, and explains what difference lies behind this distinction. In the broader use of the capability approach, supporting or complementary theories or additional normative principles are added to the core of the approach — yet none of them is itself essential to the capability approach. These are choices made in B-modules or the C-modules. The modular view of the capability approach that will be central to this chapter can thus help to formulate in a sharper manner some observations that have already been made in the capability literature. The chapter closes by looking ahead to the next chapter.
1 In developing the account of the capability approach as presented in this book, I have started in an inductive way by trying to generalize from how the capability approach has been used in the literature. However, that literature has been critically scrutinized, and in some cases I have come to the conclusion that some ideas in this broad ‘capabilities literature’ do not survive careful analysis, and should be rejected. Put differently, my methodology has been to be as inclusive as possible, but not at the cost of endorsing (what I believe to be) confusions or errors.
2 To the reader who finds this ultra-brief summary of the modular account of the capability approach here unclear: please bear with me until we have reached the end of this chapter, when the different modules will have been unpacked and explained in detail. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
The capability approach has in recent decades emerged as a new theoretical framework about wellbeing, freedom to achieve wellbeing, and all the public values in which either of these can play a role, such as development and social justice. Although there is some scholarly disagreement on the best description of the capability approach (which will be addressed in this chapter), it is generally understood as a conceptual framework for a range of evaluative exercises, including most prominently the following: (1) the assessment of individual levels of achieved wellbeing and wellbeing freedom; (2) the evaluation and assessment of social arrangements or institutions;3 and (3) the design of policies and other forms of social change in society.
We can trace some aspects of the capability approach back to, among others, Aristotle, Adam Smith, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill,4 yet it is Sen who pioneered the approach and a growing number of other scholars across the humanities and the social sciences who have significantly developed it — most significantly Martha Nussbaum, who has developed the capability approach into a partial theory of social justice.5 Nussbaum also understands her own capabilities account as a version of a theory of human rights.6 The capability approach purports that freedom to achieve wellbeing is a matter of what people are able to do and to be, and thus the kind of life they are effectively able to lead. The capability approach is generally conceived as a flexible and multipurpose framework, rather than a precise theory (Sen 1992a, 48; Alkire 2005; Robeyns 2005b, 2016b; Qizilbash 2012; Hick and Burchardt 2016, 78). The open-ended and underspecified nature of the capability approach is crucial, but it has not made it easier for its students to understand what kind of theoretical endeavour the capability approach exactly is. How should we understand it? Isn’t there a better account possible than the somewhat limited description of the capability approach as ‘an open, flexible and multi-purpose framework’? Answering these questions will be the task of this chapter.7
The open and underspecified nature of the capability approach also explains why the term ‘capability approach’ was adopted and is now widely used rather than ‘capability theory’. Yet as I will argue in section 2.3, we could use the terms ‘capability theory’ and ‘capability approach’ in a more illuminating way to signify a more substantive difference, which will help us to get a better grip on the capability literature.
It may be helpful to introduce the term ‘advantage’ here, which is a technical term used in academic debates about interpersonal comparisons and in debates about distributive justice.8 A person’s advantage is those aspects of that person’s interests that matter (generally, or in a specific context). Hence ‘advantage’ could refer to a person’s achieved wellbeing, or it could refer to her opportunity to achieve wellbeing, or it could refer to her negative freedoms, or to her positive freedoms, or to some other aspect of her interests. By using the very general term ‘advantage’, we allow ourselves to remain agnostic between the more particular specifications of that term;9 our analysis will apply to all the different ways in which ‘advantage’ could be used. This technical term ‘advantage’ thus allows us to move the arguments to a higher level of generality or abstraction, since we can focus, for example, on which conditions interpersonal comparisons of advantage need to meet, without having to decide on the exact content of ‘advantage’.
Within the capability approach, there are two different specifications of ‘advantage’: achieved wellbeing, and the freedom to achieve wellbeing. The notions of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ — which will be explained in detail in section 2.6.1 — are used to flesh out the account of achieved wellbeing and the freedom to achieve wellbeing.10 Whether the capability approach is used to analyse distributive injustice, or measure poverty, or develop curriculum design — in all these projects the capability approach prioritises certain people’s beings and doings and their opportunities to realize those beings and doings (such as their genuine opportunities to be educated, their ability to move around or to enjoy supportive social relationships). This stands in contrast to other accounts of advantage, which focus exclusively on mental categories (such as happiness) or on the material means to wellbeing (such as resources like income or wealth).11
Thus, the capability approach is a conceptual framework, which is in most cases used as a normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual wellbeing and that of institutions, in addition to its much more infrequent use for non-normative purposes.12 It can be used to evaluate a range of values that draw on an assessment of people’s wellbeing, such as inequality, poverty, changes in the wellbeing of persons or the average wellbeing of the members of a group. It can also be used as an evaluative tool providing an alternative for social cost-benefit analysis, or as a framework within which to design and evaluate policies and institutions, such as welfare state design in affluent societies, or poverty reduction strategies by governments and non-governmental organisations in developing countries.
What does it mean, exactly, if we say that something is a normative analysis? Unfortunately, social scientists and philosophers use these terms slightly differently. My estimate is that, given their numerical dominance, the terminology that social scientists use is dominant within the capability literature. Yet the terminology of philosophers is more refined and hence I will start by explaining the philosophers’ use of those terms, and then lay out how social scientists use them.
What might a rough typology of research in this area look like? By drawing on some discussions on methods in ethics and political philosophy (O. O’Neill 2009; List and Valentini 2016), I would like to propose the following typology for use within the capability literature. There are (at least) five types of research that are relevant for the capability approach. The first type of scholarship is conceptual research, which conducts conceptual analysis — the investigation of how we should use and understand certain concepts such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘wellbeing’, and so forth. An example of such conceptual analysis is provided in section 3.3, where I offer a (relatively simple) conceptual analysis of the question of what kind of freedoms (if any) capabilities could be. The second strand of research is descriptive. Here, research and analyses provide us with an empirical understanding of a phenomenon by describing it. This could be done with different methods, from the thick descriptions provided by ethnographic methods to the quantitative methods that are widely used in mainstream social sciences. The third type of research is explanatory analysis. This research provides an explanation of a phenomenon — what the mechanisms are that cause a phenomenon, or what the determinants of a phenomenon are. For example, the social determinants of health: the parameters or factors that determine the distribution of health outcomes over the population. A fourth type of research is evaluative, and consists of analyses in which values are used to evaluate a state of affairs. A claim is evaluative if it relies on evaluative terms, such as good or bad, better or worse, or desirable or undesirable. Finally, an analysis is normative if it is prescriptive — it entails a moral norm that tells us what we ought to do.13 Evaluative analyses and prescriptive analyses are closely intertwined, and often we first conduct an evaluative analysis, which is followed by a prescriptive analysis, e.g. by policy recommendations, as is done, for example, in the evaluative analysis of India’s development conducted by Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (2013). However, one could also make an evaluative analysis while leaving the prescriptive analysis for someone else to make, perhaps leaving it to the agents who need to make the change themselves. For example, one can use the capability approach to make an evaluation or assessment of inequalities between men and women, without drawing prescriptive conclusions (Robeyns 2003, 2006a). Or one can make a prescriptive analysis that is not based on an evaluation, because it is based on universal moral rules. Examples are the capability theories of justice by Nussbaum (2000; 2006b) and Claassen (2016).
The difference with the dominant terminology used by economists (and other social scientists) is that they only distinguish between two types of analysis: ‘positive’ versus ‘normative’ economics, whereby ‘positive’ economics is seen as relying only on ‘facts’, whereas ‘normative economics’ also relies on values (e.g. Reiss 2013, 3). Hence economists do not distinguish between what philosophers call ‘evaluative analysis’ and ‘normative analysis’ but rather lump them both together under the heading ‘normative analysis’. The main take-home message is that the capability approach is used predominantly in the field of ethical analysis (philosophers’ terminology) or normative analysis (economists’ terminology), somewhat less often in the fields of descriptive analysis and conceptual analysis, and least in the field of explanatory analysis. We will revisit this in section 3.10, where we address whether the capability approach can be an explanatory theory.
3 Amartya Sen often uses the term “social arrangement”, which is widely used in the social choice literature and in some other parts of the literature on the capability approach. Yet this term is not very widely used in other disciplines, and many have wondered what “social arrangement” exactly means (e.g. Béteille 1993). Other scholars tend to use the term “institutions”, using a broad definition — understood as the formal and informal rules in society that structure, facilitate and delineate actions and interactions. “Institutions” are thus not merely laws and formal rules such as those related to the system of property rights or the social security system, but also informal rules and social norms, such as social norms that expect women to be responsible for raising the children and caring for the ill and elderly, or forbid members of different castes to work together or interact on an equal footing.
4 See Nussbaum (1988, 1992), Sen (1993a, 1999a, 14, 24); Walsh (2000); Qizilbash (2016); Basu and López-Calva (2011, 156–59).
5 A partial theory of justice is a theory that gives us an account of some aspects of what justice requires, but does not comment on what justice requires in other instances or areas.
6 On the relationship between capabilities and human rights, see section 3.14.
7 For earlier attempts to describe the capability approach, see amongst others Deneulin (2014); Gasper (2007, 1997); Alkire, Qizilbash and Comim (2008); Qizilbash (2012); Robeyns (2005b, 2016b).
8 A ‘technical term’ is a term which is used in a specialist debate, and has a meaning that is defined within that debate. In many cases, the term refers to something other than its referent in common-sense language (that is, a layperson’s use of language).
9 To ‘remain agnostic’ means that, for the purpose of that analysis, one does not make a choice between different options, and hence proceeds with an analysis that should be valid for all those options. This does not mean that one cannot make a choice, or really believes that all available options are equally good, but rather that one wants to present an analysis that is applicable to as wide a range of choices as possible.
10 Following Amartya Sen (1985c), some would say there are four different ideas of advantage in the capability approach: achieved wellbeing, freedom to achieve wellbeing, achieved agency, and freedom to achieve agency. Yet whether the capability approach should always and for all purposes consider agency freedom to be an end in itself is disputed, and depends in large measure on what one wants to use the capability approach for.
11 Of course, it doesn’t follow that mental categories or the material means play no role at all; but the normative priority lies with functionings and capabilities, and hence happiness or material resources play a more limited role (and, in the case of resources, a purely instrumental role). The relations between functionings/capabilities and resources will be elaborated in 3.12; the relationship between functionings/capabilities and happiness will be elaborated in more detail in section 3.8.
12 On whether the capability approach can be used for explanatory purposes, see section 3.10.
12 Alkire (2008) calls these normative applications “prospective analysis”, and argues that we need to distinguish the evaluative applications of the capability approach from the “prospective applications” of the capability approach. I agree, but since we should avoid introducing new terms when the terms needed are already available, it would be better to use the term ‘prescriptive applications’ or, as philosophers do, ‘normative analysis’, rather than introducing ‘prospective applications’ as a new term. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.02%3A_A_preliminary_definition_of_the_capabil.txt |
The above preliminary definition highlights that the capability approach is an open-ended and underspecified framework, which can be used for multiple purposes. It is open-ended because the general capability approach can be developed in a range of different directions, with different purposes, and it is underspecified because additional specifications are needed before the capability approach can become effective for a particular purpose — especially if we want it to be normative (whether evaluative or prescriptive). As a consequence, ‘the capability approach’ itself is an open, general idea, but there are many different ways to ‘close’ or ‘specify’ this notion. What is needed for this specifying or closing of the capability approach will depend on the aim of using the approach, e.g. whether we want to develop it into a (partial) theory of justice, or use it to assess inequality, or conceptualise development, or use it for some other purpose.
This distinction between the general, open, underspecified capability approach, and its particular use for specific purposes is absolutely crucial if we want to understand it properly. In order to highlight that distinction, but also to make it easier for us to be clear when we are talking about the general, open, underspecified capability approach, and when we are talking about a particular use for specific purposes, I propose that we use two different terms (Robeyns 2016b, 398). Let us use the term ‘the capability approach’ for the general, open, underspecified approach, and let us employ the term ‘a capability theory’ or ‘a capability analysis, capability account or capability application’ for a specific use of the capability approach, that is, for a use that has a specific goal, such as measuring poverty and deriving some policy prescriptions, or developing a capabilitarian cost-benefit analysis, or theorising about human rights, or developing a theory of social justice. In order to improve readability, I will speak in what follows of ‘a capability theory’ as a short-hand for ‘a capability account, or capability application, or capability theory’.14
One reason why this distinction between ‘capability approach’ and ‘capability theory’ is so important, is that many theories with which the capability approach has been compared over time are specific theories, not general open frameworks. For example, John Rawls’s famous theory of justice is not a general approach but rather a specific theory of institutional justice (Rawls 2009), and this has made the comparison with the capability approach at best difficult (Robeyns 2008b). The appropriate comparison would be Rawls’s theory of justice with a properly developed capability theory of justice, such as Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice (Nussbaum 2006b), but not Rawls’s theory of justice with the (general) capability approach.
Another reason why the distinction between ‘capability approach’ and ‘capability theory’ is important, is that it can help provide an answer to the “number of authors [who] ‘complain’ that the capability approach does not address questions they put to it” (Alkire 2005, 123). That complaint is misguided, since the capability approach cannot, by its very nature, answer all the questions that should instead be put to particular capability theories. For example, it is a mistake to criticise Amartya Sen because he has not drawn up a specific list of relevant functionings in his capability approach; that critique would only have bite if Sen were to develop a particular capability theory or capability application where the selection of functionings is a requirement.15
In short, there is one capability approach and there are many capability theories, and keeping that distinction sharply in mind should clear up many misunderstandings in the literature.
However, if we accept the distinction between capability theories and the capability approach, it raises the question of what these different capability theories have in common. Before addressing that issue, I first want to present a bottom-up description of the many modes in which capability analyses have been conducted. This will give us a better sense of what the capability approach has been used for, and what it can do for us.
14 I kindly request readers who are primarily interested in the capability approach for policy design and (empirical) applications to read ‘capability application’ every time the term ‘capability theory’ is used.
15 Yet even for capability theories, it is unlikely that Sen would agree that he has to draw up a list of capabilities, since he is a proponent of a procedural method for selecting capabilities. At the beginning of this century, there was a fierce discussion in the capability literature about whether it was a valid critique of Sen’s work that it lacked a specific list (Nussbaum 2003a; Robeyns 2003; Sen 2004a; Qizilbash 2005). Luckily that debate seems to be settled now. For an overview of the different ways in which dimensions can be selected in the capability approach, see section 2.7.2. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.03%3A_The_capability_approach_versus_capabili.txt |
If the capability approach is an open framework, then what are the ways in which it has been closed to form more specific and powerful analyses? Scholars use the capability approach for different types of analysis, with different goals, relying on different methodologies, with different corresponding roles for functionings and capabilities. Not all of these are capability theories; some are capability applications, both empirical as well as theoretical. We can observe that there is a rich diversity of ways in which the capability approach has been used. Table 2.1 gives an overview of these different usages, by listing the different types of capability analyses.
Normative theorising within the capability approach is often done by moral and political philosophers. The capability approach is then used as one element of a normative theory, such as a theory of justice or a theory of disadvantage. For example, Elizabeth Anderson (1999) has proposed the outlines of a theory of social justice (which she calls “democratic equality”) in which certain basic levels of capabilities that are needed to function as equal citizens should be guaranteed to all. Martha Nussbaum (2006b) has developed a minimal theory of social justice in which she defends a list of basic capabilities that everyone should be entitled to, as a matter of human dignity.
While most normative theorising within the capability approach has related to justice, other values have also been developed and analysed using the capability approach. Some theorists of freedom have developed accounts of freedom or rights using the capability approach (van Hees 2013). Another important value that has been studied from the perspective of the capability approach is ecological sustainability (e.g. Anand and Sen 1994, 2000; Robeyns and Van der Veen 2007; Lessmann and Rauschmayer 2013; Crabtree 2013; Sen 2013). Efficiency is a value about which very limited conceptual work is done, but which nevertheless is inescapably normative, and it can be theorised in many different ways (Le Grand 1990; Heath 2006). If we ask what efficiency is, we could answer by referring to Pareto optimality or x-efficiency, but we could also develop a notion of efficiency from a capability perspective (Sen 1993b). Such a notion would answer the question ‘efficiency of what?’ with ‘efficiency in the space of capabilities (or functionings, or a mixture)’.
Table 2.1 The main modes of capability analysis
Epistemic goal Methodology/discipline Role of functionings and capabilities Examples
Normative theories (of particular values), e.g. theories of justice, human rights, wellbeing, sustainability, efficiency, etc. Philosophy, in particular ethics and normative political philosophy. The metric/currency in the interpersonal comparisons of advantage that are entailed in the value that is being analysed. Sen 1993b; Anand and Sen 1994; Crabtree 2012, 2013; Lessmann and Rauschmayer 2013; Robeyns 2016c; Nussbaum 1992, 1997; Nussbaum 2000; Nussbaum 2006b; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007.
Normative applied analysis, including policy design. Applied ethics (e.g. medical ethics, bio-ethics, economic ethics, development ethics etc.) and normative strands in the social sciences. A metric of individual advantage that is part of the applied normative analysis. Alkire 2002; Robeyns 2003; Canoy, Lerais and Schokkaert 2010; Holland 2014; Ibrahim 2017.
Welfare/quality of life measurement. Quantitative empirical strands within various social sciences. Social indicators. Kynch and Sen 1983; Sen 1985a; Kuklys 2005; Alkire and Foster 2011; Alkire et al. 2015; Chiappero-Martinetti 2000.
Thick description/descriptive analysis. Quantitative empirical strands within various social sciences. Elements of a narrative. Unterhalter 2003b; Conradie 2013.
Understanding the nature of certain ideas, practices, notions (other than the values in the normative theories). Conceptual analysis. Used as part of the conceptualisation of the idea or notion. Sen 1993b; Robeyns 2006c; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2006; van Hees 2013.
[Other goals?] [Other methods?] [Other roles?] [Other studies may be available/are needed.]
Source: Robeyns (2005a), expanded and updated.
Quantitative social scientists, especially economists, are mostly interested in measurement. This quantitative work could serve different purposes, e.g. the measurement of multidimensional poverty analysis (Alkire and Foster 2011; Alkire et al. 2015), or the measurement of the disadvantages faced by disabled people (Kuklys 2005; Zaidi and Burchardt 2005). Moreover, some quantitative social scientists, mathematicians, and econometricians have been working on investigating the methods that could be used for quantitative capability analyses (Kuklys 2005; Di Tommaso 2007; Krishnakumar 2007; Krishnakumar and Ballon 2008; Krishnakumar and Nagar 2008).
Thick description or descriptive analysis is another mode of capability analysis. For example, it can be used to describe the realities of schoolgirls in countries that may have formal access to school for both girls and boys, but where other hurdles (such as high risk of rape on the way to school, or the lack of sanitary provisions at school) mean that this formal right is not enough to guarantee these girls the corresponding capability (Unterhalter 2003b).
Finally, the capability approach can be used for conceptual work beyond the conceptualisation of values, as is done within normative philosophy. Sometimes the capability approach lends itself well to providing a better understanding of a certain phenomenon. For example, we could understand education as a legal right or as an investment in human capital, but we could also conceptualise it as the expansion of a capability, or develop an account of education that draws on both the capability approach and human rights theory. This would not only help us to look differently at what education is; a different conceptualisation would also have normative implications, for example related to the curriculum design, or to answer the question of what is needed to ensure that capability, or of how much education should be guaranteed to children with low potential market-related human capital (McCowan 2011; Nussbaum 2012; Robeyns 2006c; Walker 2012a; Walker and Unterhalter 2007; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2006).
Of course, texts and research projects often have multiple goals, and therefore particular studies often mix these different goals and methods. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen’s (1996, 2002, 2013) comprehensive analyses of India’s human development achievements are in part an evaluative analysis based on various social indicators, but also in part a prescriptive analysis. Similarly, Nussbaum’s (2000) book Women and Human Development is primarily normative and philosophical, but also includes thick descriptions of how institutions enable or hamper people’s capabilities, by focussing on the lives of particular women.
What is the value of distinguishing between different uses of the capability approach? It is important because functionings and capabilities — the core concepts in the capability approach — play different roles in each type of analysis. In quality of life measurement, the functionings and capabilities are the social indicators that reflect a person’s quality of life. In thick descriptions and descriptive analysis, the functionings and capabilities form part of the narrative. This narrative can aim to reflect the quality of life, but it can also aim to understand some other aspect of people’s lives, such as by explaining behaviour that might appear irrational according to traditional economic analysis, or revealing layers of complexities that a quantitative analysis can rarely capture. In philosophical reasoning, the functionings and capabilities play yet another role, as they are often part of the foundations of a utopian account of a just society or of the goals that morally sound policies should pursue.
The flexibility of functionings and capabilities, which can be applied in different ways within different types of capability analysis, means that there are no hard and fast rules that govern how to select the relevant capabilities. Each type of analysis, with its particular goals, will require its own answer to this question. The different roles that functionings and capabilities can play in different types of capability analyses have important implications for the question of how to select the relevant capabilities: each type of analysis, with its particular goals, will require its own answer to this question. The selection of capabilities as social indicators of the quality of life is a very different undertaking from the selection of capabilities for a utopian theory of justice: the quality standards for research and scholarship are different, the epistemic constraints of the research are different, the best available practices in the field are different. Moral philosophers, quantitative social scientists, and qualitative social scientists have each signed up to a different set of meta-theoretical assumptions, and find different academic practices acceptable and unacceptable. For example, many ethnographers tend to reject normative theorising and also often object to what they consider the reductionist nature of quantitative empirical analysis, whereas many economists tend to discard the thick descriptions by ethnographers, claiming they are merely anecdotal and hence not scientific.
Two remarks before closing this section. First, providing a typology of the work on the capability approach, as this section attempts to do, remains work in progress. In 2004, I could only discern three main modes of capability analysis: quality of life analysis; thick description/descriptive analysis; and normative theories — though I left open the possibility that the capability approach could be used for other goals too (Robeyns 2005a). In her book Creating Capabilities, Nussbaum (2011) writes that the capability approach comes in only two modes: comparative qualify of life assessment, and as a theory of justice. I don’t think that is correct: not all modes of capability analysis can be reduced to these two modes, as I have argued elsewhere in detail (Robeyns 2011, 2016b). The different modes of capability analysis described in table 2.1 provide a more comprehensive overview, but we should not assume that this overview is complete. It is quite likely that table 2.1 will, in due course, have to be updated to reflect new types of work that uses the capability approach. Moreover, one may also prefer another way to categorise the different types of work done within the capability literature, and hence other typologies are possible and may be more illuminating.
Second, it is important that we fully acknowledge the diversity of disciplines, the diversity of goals we have for the creation of knowledge, and the diversity of methods used within the capability approach. At the same time, we need not forget that some aspects of its development might need to be discipline-specific, or specific for one’s goals. As a result, the capability approach is at the same time multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, but also forms part of developments within disciplines and methods. These different ‘faces’ of the capability approach all need to be fully acknowledged if we want to understand it in a nuanced and complete way. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.04%3A_The_many_modes_of_capability_analysis.txt |
It is time to take stock. What do we already know about the capability approach, and what questions are raised by the analysis so far? The capability approach is an open approach, and depending on its purpose can be developed into a range of capability theories or capabilitarian applications. It is focused on what people can do and be (their capabilities) and on what they are actually achieving in terms of beings and doings (their functionings). However, this still does not answer the question of what kind of framework the capability approach is. Can we give an account of a capability theory that is more enlightening regarding what exactly makes a theory a capabilitarian theory, and what doesn’t?
In this book, I present an account of the capability approach that, on the one hand, makes clear what all capability theories share, yet on the other hand allows us to better understand the many forms that a capability theory or capability account can take — hence to appreciate the diversity within the capability approach more fully. The modular view that I present here is a modified (and, I hope, improved) version of the cartwheel model that I have developed elsewhere (Robeyns 2016b). The modular view shifts the focus a little bit from the question of how to understand the capability approach in general, to the question of how the various capability accounts, applications and theories should be understood and how they should be constructed. After all, students, scholars, policy makers and activists are often not concerned with the capability approach in general, but rather want to know whether it would be a smart idea to use the capability approach to construct a particular capability theory, application or account for the problem or question they are trying to analyse. In order to answer the question of whether, for their purposes, the capability approach is a helpful framework to consider, they need to know what is needed for a capability theory, application or account. The modular view that will follow will give those who want to develop a capability theory, application or analysis a list of properties their theory has to meet, a list of choices that need to be made but in which several options regarding content are possible, and a list of modules that they could take into account, but which will not always be necessary.
Recall that in order to improve readability, I use the term ‘a capability theory’ as a short-hand for ‘a capability account, or capability analysis, or capability application, or capability theory’. A capability theory is constructed based on three different types of module, which (in order to facilitate discussion) will be called the A-module, B-modules and C-modules. The A-module is a single module which is compulsory for all capability theories. The A-module consists of a number of propositions (definitions and claims) which a capability theory should not violate. This is the core of the capability approach, and hence entails those properties that all capability theories share. The B-modules consist of a range of non-optional modules with optional content. That is, if we construct a capability theory, we have to consider the issue that the module addresses, but there are several different options to choose from in considering that particular issue. For example, module B1 concerns the ‘purpose’ of the theory: do we want to make a theory of justice, or a more comprehensive evaluative framework for societal institutions, or do we want to measure poverty or inequality, or design a curriculum, or do we want to use the capability approach to conceptualise ‘social progress’ or ‘efficiency’ or to rethink the role of universities in the twenty-first century? All these purposes are possible within the capability approach. The point of seeing these as B-modules is that one has to be clear about one’s purpose, but there are many different purposes possible. The C-modules are either contingent on a particular choice made in a B-module, or they can be fully optional. For example, one can offer a comprehensive evaluation of a country’s development path, and decide that as part of this evaluation, one wants to include particular accounts of the history and culture of that country, since this may make more comprehensible the reasons why that country has taken this particular development path rather than another. The particular historical account that would be part of one’s capability theory would then be optional.16
Given this three-fold structure of the modular view of capability theories, let us now investigate what the content of the compulsory module A is, as well as what the options are within the B-modules and C-modules.
16 To say that the insertion of those theories is fully optional is not the same as saying that capability theories that will be developed with different types of additional complementary theories will all be equally good. For example, historians are very likely to think that most theories, even normative theories, have to be historically informed, and hence the relevant historical knowledge will need to be added to a capability theory. But these are matters of dispute that have to be debated, and cannot be settled by narrowing down the definition of a capability theory. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.05%3A_The_modular_view_of_the_capability_appr.txt |
What, then, is the content of the A-module, which all capability theories should share? Table 2.2 presents the keywords for the eight elements of the A-module.
Table 2.2 The content of the compulsory module A
A1: Functionings and capabilities as core concepts
A2: Functionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories
A3: Conversion factors
A4: The distinction between means and ends
A5: Functionings and/or capabilities form the evaluative space
A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value
A7: Value pluralism
A8: Valuing each person as an end
2.6.1 A1: Functionings and capabilities
Functionings and capabilities are the core concepts in the capability approach. They are also the dimensions in which interpersonal comparisons of ‘advantage’ are made (this is what property A5 entails).17 They are the most important distinctive features of all capabilitarian theories. There are some differences in the usage of these notions between different capability theorists,18 but these differences do not affect the essence of these notions: capabilities are what people are able to be and to do, and functionings point to the corresponding achievements.
Capabilities are real freedoms or real opportunities, which do not refer to access to resources or opportunities for certain levels of satisfaction. Examples of ‘beings’ are being well-nourished, being undernourished, being sheltered and housed in a decent house, being educated, being illiterate, being part of a supportive social network; these also include very different beings such as being part of a criminal network and being depressed. Examples of the ‘doings’ are travelling, caring for a child, voting in an election, taking part in a debate, taking drugs, killing animals, eating animals, consuming great amounts of fuel in order to heat one’s house, and donating money to charity.
Capabilities are a person’s real freedoms or opportunities to achieve functionings.19 Thus, while travelling is a functioning, the real opportunity to travel is the corresponding capability. A person who does not travel may or may not be free and able to travel; the notion of capability seeks to capture precisely the fact of whether the person could travel if she wanted to. The distinction between functionings and capabilities is between the realized and the effectively possible, in other words, between achievements, on the one hand, and freedoms or opportunities from which one can choose, on the other.
Functionings are constitutive of human life. At least, this is a widespread view, certainly in the social sciences, policy studies, and in a significant part of philosophy — and I think it is a view that is helpful for the interdisciplinary, practical orientation that the vast majority of capability research has.20 That means one cannot be a human being without having at least a range of functionings; they make the lives of human beings both lives (as opposed to the existence of innate objects) and human (in contrast to the lives of trees or animals). Human functionings are those beings and doings that constitute human life and that are central to our understandings of ourselves as human beings. It is hard to think of any phenomenological account of the lives of humans — either an account given by a human being herself, or an account from a third-person perspective — which does not include a description of a range of human functionings. Yet, not all beings and doings are functionings; for example, flying like a bird or living for two hundred years like an oak tree are not human functionings.
In addition, some human beings or doings may not be constitutive but rather contingent upon our social institutions; these, arguably, should not qualify as ‘universal functionings’ — that is, functionings no matter the social circumstances in which one lives — but are rather ‘context-dependent functionings’, functionings that are to a significant extent dependent on the existing social structures. For example, ‘owning a house’ is not a universal functioning, yet ‘being sheltered in a safe way and protected from the elements’ is a universal functioning. One can also include the capability of being sheltered in government-funded housing or by a rental market for family houses, which is regulated in such a way that it does not endanger important aspects of that capability.
Note that many features of a person could be described either as a being or as a doing: we can say that a person is housed in a pleasantly warm dwelling, or that this person does consume lots of energy to keep her house warm. Yet other functionings are much more straightforwardly described as either a being or a doing, for example ‘being healthy’ (a being) or ‘killing animals’ (a doing).
A final remark. Acknowledging that functionings and capabilities are the core concepts of the capability approach generates some further conceptual questions, which have not all been sufficiently addressed in the literature. An important question is whether additional structural requirements that apply to the relations between various capabilities should be imposed on the capability approach in general (not merely as a particular choice for a specific capability theory). Relatively little work has been done on the question of the conceptual properties of capabilities understood as freedoms or opportunities and on the question of the minimum requirements of the opportunity set that make up these various capabilities. But it is clear that more needs to be said about which properties we want functionings, capabilities, and capability sets to meet. One important property has been pointed out by Kaushik Basu (1987), who argued that the moral relevance lies not in the various capabilities each taken by themselves and only considering the choices made by one person. Rather, the moral relevance lies in whether capabilities are truly available to us given the choices made by others, since that is the real freedom to live our lives in various ways, as it is truly open to us. For example, if a teenager lives in a family in which there are only enough resources for one of the children to pursue higher education, then he only truly has the capability to pursue higher education if none of his older siblings has made that choice before him.21
2.6.2 A2: Functionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories
Functionings and capabilities are defined in a value-neutral way. Many functionings are valuable, but not all functionings necessarily have a positive value. Instead, some functionings have no value or even have a negative value, e.g. the functioning of being affected by a painful, debilitating and ultimately incurable illness, suffering from excessive levels of stress, or engaging in acts of unjustifiable violence. In those latter cases, we are better off without that functionings outcome, and the functionings outcome has a negative value. Functionings are constitutive elements of human life, which consist of both wellbeing and ill-being. The notion of functionings should, therefore, be value-neutral in the sense that we should conceptually allow for the idea of ‘bad functionings’ or functionings with a negative value (Deneulin and Stewart 2002, 67; Nussbaum 2003a, 45; Stewart 2005, 190; Carter 2014, 79–81).
There are many beings and doings that have negative value, but they are still ‘a being’ or ‘a doing’ and, hence, a functioning. Nussbaum made that point forcefully when she argued that the capability to rape should not be a capability that we have reason to protect (Nussbaum 2003: 44–45). A country could effectively enable people to rape, for example, either when rape is not illegal (as it is not between husband and wife in many countries), or when rape is illegal, but de facto never leads to any punishment of the aggressor. If there is a set of social norms justifying rape, and would-be rapists help each other to be able to rape, then would-be rapists in that country effectively enjoy the capability to rape. But clearly, rape is a moral bad, and a huge harm to its victims; it is thus not a capability that a country should want to protect. This example illustrates that functionings as well as capabilities can be harmful or have a negative value, as well as be positive or valuable. At an abstract and general level, ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ are thus in themselves neutral concepts, and hence we cannot escape the imperative to decide which ones we want to support and enable, and which ones we want to fight or eliminate. Frances Stewart and Séverine Deneulin (2002, 67) put it as follows:
[…] some capabilities have negative values (e.g. committing murder), while others may be trivial (riding a one-wheeled bicycle). Hence there is a need to differentiate between ‘valuable’ and non-valuable capabilities, and indeed, within the latter, between those that are positive but of lesser importance and those that actually have negative value.
The above examples show that some functionings can be unequivocally good (e.g. being in good health) or unequivocally bad (e.g. being raped or being murdered). In those cases, there will be unanimity on whether the functionings outcome is bad or good. But now we need to add a layer of complexity. Sometimes, it will be a matter of doubt, or of dispute, whether a functioning will be good or bad — or the goodness or badness may depend on the context and/or the normative theory we endorse. An interesting example is giving care, or ‘care work’.22 Clearly being able to care for someone could be considered a valuable capability. For example, in the case of child care, there is much joy to be gained, and many parents would like to work less so as to spend more time with their children. But care work has a very ambiguous character if we try to answer whether it should be considered to be a valuable functioning from the perspective of the person who does the care. Lots of care is performed primarily because there is familial or social pressure put on someone (generally women) to do so, or because no-one else is doing it (Lewis and Giullari 2005). There is also the hypothesis that care work can be a positive functioning if done for a limited amount of time, but becomes a negative functioning if it is done for many hours. Hence, from the functionings outcome in itself, we cannot conclude whether this is a positive element of that person’s quality of life, or rather a negative element; in fact, sometimes it will be an ambiguous situation, which cannot easily be judged (Robeyns 2003).
One could wonder, though, whether this ambiguity cannot simply be resolved by reformulating the corresponding capability slightly differently. In theory, this may be true. If there are no empirical constraints related to the observations we can make, then one could in many cases rephrase such functionings that are ambiguously valued into another capability where its valuation is clearly positive. For example, one could say that the functioning of providing care in itself can be ambiguous (since some people do too much, thereby harming their own longer-term wellbeing, or do it because no-one else is providing the care and social norms require them to do it). Yet there is a closely related capability that is clearly valuable: the capability to provide hands-on care, which takes into account that one has a robust choice not to care if one does not want to, and that one does not find oneself in a situation in which the care is of insufficient quantity and/or quality if one does not deliver the care oneself. If such a robust capability to care is available, it would be genuinely valuable, since one would have a real option not to choose the functioning without paying an unacceptable price (e.g. that the person in need of care is not properly cared for). However, the problem with this solution, of reformulating functionings that are ambiguously valuable into capabilities that are unequivocally valuable, is the constraints it places on empirical information. We may be able to use these layers of filters and conditions in first-person analyses, or in ethnographic analyses, but in most cases not in large-scale empirical analyses.
Many specific capability theories make the mistake of defining functionings as those beings and doings that one has reason to value. But the problem with this value-laden definition is that it collapses two aspects of the development of a capability theory into one: the definition of the relevant space (e.g. income, or happiness, or functionings) and, once we have chosen our functionings and capabilities, the normative decision regarding which of those capabilities will be the focus of our theory. We may agree on the first issue and not on the second and still both rightly believe that we endorse a capability theory — yet this is only possible if we analytically separate the normative choice for functionings and capabilities from the additional normative decision of which functionings we will regard as valuable and which we will not regard as valuable. Collapsing these two normative moments into one is not a good idea; instead, we need to acknowledge that there are two normative moves being made when we use functionings and capabilities as our evaluative space, and we need to justify each of those two normative moves separately.
Note that the value-laden definition of functionings and capabilities, which defines them as always good and valuable, may be less problematic when one develops a capability theory of severe poverty or destitution. We all agree that poor health, poor housing, poor sanitation, poor nutrition and social exclusion are dimensions of destitution. So, for example, the dimensions chosen for the Multidimensional Poverty Index developed by Sabina Alkire and her colleagues — health, education and living standard — may not elicit much disagreement.23 But for many other capability theories, it is disputed whether a particular functionings outcome is valuable or not. The entire field of applied ethics is filled with questions and cases in which these disputes are debated. Is sex work bad for adult sex workers, or should it be seen as a valuable capability? Is the capability of parents not to vaccinate their children against polio or measles a valuable freedom? If employees in highly competitive organisations are not allowed to read their emails after working hours, is that then a valuable capability that is taken away from them, or are we protecting them from becoming workaholics and protecting them from the pressure to work all the time, including at evenings and weekends? As these examples show, we need to allow for the conceptual possibility that there are functionings that are always valuable, never valuable, valuable or non-valuable in some contexts but not in others, or where we simply are not sure. This requires that functionings and capabilities are conceptualised in a value-neutral way, and hence this should be a core requirement of the capability approach.
2.6.3 A3: Conversion factors
A third core idea of the capability approach is that persons have different abilities to convert resources into functionings. These are called conversion factors: the factors which determine the degree to which a person can transform a resource into a functioning. This has been an important idea in Amartya Sen’s version of the capability approach (Sen 1992a, 19–21, 26–30, 37–38) and for those scholars influenced by his writings. Resources, such as marketable goods and services, but also goods and services emerging from the non-market economy (including household production) have certain characteristics that make them of interest to people. In Sen’s work in welfare economics, the notion of ‘resources’ was limited to material and/or measurable resources (in particular: money or consumer goods) but one could also apply the notion of conversion factors to a broader understanding of resources, including, for example, the educational degrees that one has.
The example of a bike is often used to illustrate the idea of conversion factors. We are interested in a bike not primarily because it is an object made from certain materials with a specific shape and colour, but because it can take us to places where we want to go, and in a faster way than if we were walking. These characteristics of a good or commodity enable or contribute to a functioning. A bike enables the functioning of mobility, to be able to move oneself freely and more rapidly than walking. But a person might be able to turn that resource into a valuable functioning to a different degree than other persons, depending on the relevant conversion factors. For example, an able-bodied person who was taught to ride a bicycle when he was a child has a high conversion factor enabling him to turn the bicycle into the ability to move around efficiently, whereas a person with a physical impairment or someone who never learnt to ride a bike has a very low conversion factor. The conversion factors thus represent how much functioning one can get out of a resource; in our example, how much mobility the person can get out of a bicycle.
There are several different types of conversion factors, and the conversion factors discussed are often categorized into three groups (Robeyns 2005b, 99; Crocker and Robeyns 2009, 68). All conversion factors influence how a person can be or is free to convert the characteristics of the resources into a functioning, yet the sources of these factors may differ. Personal conversion factors are internal to the person, such as metabolism, physical condition, sex, reading skills, or intelligence. If a person is disabled, or if she is in a bad physical condition, or has never learned to cycle, then the bike will be of limited help in enabling the functioning of mobility. Social conversion factors are factors stemming from the society in which one lives, such as public policies, social norms, practices that unfairly discriminate, societal hierarchies, or power relations related to class, gender, race, or caste. Environmental conversion factors emerge from the physical or built environment in which a person lives. Among aspects of one’s geographical location are climate, pollution, the likelihood of earthquakes, and the presence or absence of seas and oceans. Among aspects of the built environment are the stability of buildings, roads, and bridges, and the means of transportation and communication. Take again the example of the bicycle. How much a bicycle contributes to a person’s mobility depends on that person’s physical condition (a personal conversion factor), the social mores including whether women are generally allowed to ride a bicycle (a social conversion factor), and the availability of decent roads or bike paths (an environmental conversion factor). Once we start to be aware of the existence of conversion factors, it becomes clear that they are a very pervasive phenomenon. For example, a pregnant or lactating woman needs more of the same food than another woman in order to be well-nourished. Or people living in delta regions need protection from flooding if they want to enjoy the same capability of being safely sheltered as people living in the mountains. There are an infinite number of other examples illustrating the importance of conversion factors. The three types of conversion factor all push us to acknowledge that it is not sufficient to know the resources a person owns or can use in order to be able to assess the wellbeing that he or she has achieved or could achieve; rather, we need to know much more about the person and the circumstances in which he or she is living. Differences in conversion factors are one important source of human diversity, which is a central concern in the capability approach, and will be discussed in more detail in section 3.5.
Note that many conversion factors are not fixed or given, but can be altered by policies and choices that we make. And the effects of a particular conversion factor can also depend on the social and personal resources that a person has, as well as on the other conversion factors. For example, having a physical impairment that doesn’t allow one to walk severely restricts one’s capability to be mobile if one finds oneself in a situation in which one doesn’t have access to a wheelchair, and in which the state of the roads is bad and vehicles used for public transport are not wheelchair-accessible. But suppose now the built environment is different: all walking-impaired people have a right to a wheelchair, roads are wheelchair-friendly, public transport is wheelchair-accessible and society is characterised by a set of social norms whereby people consider it nothing but self-evident to provide help to fellow travellers who can’t walk. In such an alternative social state, with a different set of resources and social and environmental conversion factors, the same personal conversion factor (not being able to walk) plays out very differently. In sum, in order to know what people are able to do and be, we need to analyse the full picture of their resources, and the various conversion factors, or else analyse the functionings and capabilities directly. The advantage of having a clear picture of the resources needed, and the particular conversion factors needed, is that it also gives those aiming to expand capability sets information on where interventions can be made.
2.6.4 A4: The means-ends distinction
The fourth core characteristic of the capability approach is the means-ends distinction. The approach stresses that we should always be clear, when valuing something, whether we value it as an end in itself, or as a means to a valuable end. For the capability approach, when considering interpersonal comparisons of advantage, the ultimate ends are people’s valuable capabilities (there could be other ends as well; see 2.6.6). This implies that the capability approach requires us to evaluate policies and other changes according to their impact on people’s capabilities as well as their actual functionings; yet at the same time we need to ask whether the preconditions — the means and the enabling circumstances — for those capabilities are in place. We must ask whether people are able to be healthy, and whether the means or resources necessary for this capability, such as clean water, adequate sanitation, access to doctors, protection from infections and diseases and basic knowledge on health issues are present. We must ask whether people are well-nourished, and whether the means or conditions for the realization of this capability, such as having sufficient food supplies and food entitlements, are being met. We must ask whether people have access to a high-quality education system, to real political participation, and to community activities that support them, that enable them to cope with struggles in daily life, and that foster caring friendships. Hence we do need to take the means into account, but we can only do so if we first know what the ends are.
Many of the arguments that capability theorists have advanced against alternative normative frameworks can be traced back to the objection that alternative approaches focus on particular means to wellbeing rather than the ends.24 There are two important reasons why the capability approach dictates that we have to start our analysis from the ends rather than the means. Firstly, people differ in their ability to convert means into valuable opportunities (capabilities) or outcomes (functionings) (Sen 1992a, 26–28, 36–38). Since ends are what ultimately matter when thinking about wellbeing and the quality of life, means can only work as fully reliable proxies of people’s opportunities to achieve those ends if all people have the same capacities or powers to convert those means into equal capability sets. This is an assumption that goes against a core characteristic of the capability approach, namely claim A3 — the inter-individual differences in the conversion of resources into functionings and capabilities. Capability scholars believe that these inter-individual differences are far-reaching and significant, and hence this also explains why the idea of conversion factors is a compulsory option in the capability approach (see 2.6.3). Theories that focus on means run the risk of downplaying the normative relevance of not only these conversion factors, but also the differences in structural constraints that people face (see 2.7.5).
The second reason why the capability approach requires us to start from ends rather than means is that there are some vitally important ends that do not depend very much on material means, and hence would not be picked up in our analysis if we were to focus on means only. For example, self-respect, supportive relationships in school or in the workplace, or friendship are all very important ends that people may want; yet there are no crucial means to those ends that one could use as a readily measurable proxy. We need to focus on ends directly if we want to capture what is important.
One could argue, however, that the capability approach does not focus entirely on ends, but rather on the question of whether a person is being put in the conditions in which she can pursue her ultimate ends. For example, being able to read could be seen as a means rather than an end in itself, since people’s ultimate ends will be more specific, such as reading street signs, the newspaper, or the Bible or Koran. It is therefore somewhat more precise to say that the capability approach focuses on people’s ends in terms of beings and doings expressed in general terms: being literate, being mobile, being able to hold a decent job. Whether a particular person then decides to translate these general capabilities into the more specific capabilities A, B or C (e.g. reading street signs, reading the newspaper or reading the Bible) is up to them. Whether that person decides to stay put, travel to the US or rather to China, is in principle not important for a capability analysis: the question is rather whether a person has these capabilities in more general terms.25 Another way of framing this is to say that the end of policy making and institutional design is to provide people with general capabilities, whereas the ends of persons are more specific capabilities.26
Of course, the normative focus on ends does not imply that the capability approach does not at all value means such as material or financial resources. Instead, a capability analysis will typically focus on resources and other means. For example, in their evaluation of development in India, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (2002, 3) have stressed that working within the capability approach in no way excludes the integration of an analysis of resources such as food. In sum, all the means of wellbeing, like the availability of commodities, legal entitlements to them, other social institutions, and so forth, are important, but the capability approach presses the point that they are not the ends of wellbeing, only their means. Food may be abundant in the village, but a starving person may have nothing to exchange for it, no legal claim on it, or no way of preventing intestinal parasites from consuming it before he or she does. In all these cases, at least some resources will be available, but that person will remain hungry and, after a while, undernourished.27
Nevertheless, one could wonder: wouldn’t it be better to focus on means only, rather than making the normative analysis more complicated and more informationally demanding by also focusing on functionings and capabilities? Capability scholars would respond that starting a normative analysis from the ends rather than means has at least two advantages, in addition to the fundamental reason mentioned earlier that a focus on ends is needed to appropriately capture inter-individual differences.
First, if we start from being explicit about our ends, the valuation of means will retain the status of an instrumental valuation rather than risk taking on the nature of a valuation of ends. For example, money or economic growth will not be valued for their own sake, but only in so far as they contribute to an expansion of people’s capabilities. For those who have been working within the capability framework, this has become a deeply ingrained practice — but one only needs to read the newspapers for a few days to see how often policies are justified or discussed without a clear distinction being made between means and ends.
Second, by starting from ends, we do not a priori assume that there is only one overriding important means to those ends (such as income), but rather explicitly ask the question: which types of means are important for the fostering and nurturing of a particular capability, or set of capabilities? For some capabilities, the most important means will indeed be financial resources and economic production, but for others it may be a change in political practices and institutions, such as effective guarantees and protections of freedom of thought, political participation, social or cultural practices, social structures, social institutions, public goods, social norms, and traditions and habits. As a consequence, an effective capability-enhancing policy may not be increasing disposable income, but rather fighting a homophobic, ethnophobic, racist or sexist social climate.
2.6.5 A5: Functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space
If a capability theory is a normative theory (as is often the case), then functionings and capabilities form the entire evaluative space, or are part of the evaluative space.28 A normative theory is a theory that entails a value judgement: something is better than or worse than something else. This value judgement can be used to compare the position of different persons or states of affairs (as in inequality analysis) or it can be used to judge one course of action as ‘better’ than another course of action (as in policy design). For all these types of normative theories, we need normative claims, since concepts alone cannot ground normativity.
The first normative claim which each capability theory should respect is thus that functionings and capabilities form the ‘evaluative space’. According to the capability approach, the ends of wellbeing freedom, justice, and development should be conceptualized in terms of people’s functionings and/or capabilities. This claim is not contested among scholars of the capability approach; for example, Sabina Alkire (2005, 122) described the capability approach as the proposition “that social arrangements should be evaluated according to the extent of freedom people have to promote or achieve functionings they value”. However, if we fully take into account that functionings can be positive but also negative (see 2.6.2), we should also acknowledge that our lives are better if they contain fewer of the functionings that are negative, such as physical violence or stress. Alkire’s proposition should therefore minimally be extended by adding “and to promote the weakening of those functionings that have a negative value”.29
However, what is relevant is not only which opportunities are open to us individually, hence in a piecemeal way, but rather which combinations or sets of potential functionings are open to us. For example, suppose you are a low-skilled poor single parent who lives in a society without decent social provisions. Take the following functionings: (1) to hold a job, which will require you to spend many hours on working and commuting, but will generate the income needed to properly feed yourself and your family; (2) to care for your children at home and give them all the attention, care and supervision they need. In a piecemeal analysis, both (1) and (2) are opportunities open to that parent, but they are not both together open to her. The point about the capability approach is precisely that it is comprehensive; we must ask which sets of capabilities are open to us, that is: can you simultaneously provide for your family and properly care for and supervise your children? Or are you rather forced to make some hard, perhaps even tragic choices between two functionings which are both central and valuable?
Note that while most types of capability analysis require interpersonal comparisons, one could also use the capability approach to evaluate the wellbeing or wellbeing freedom of one person at one point in time (e.g. evaluate her situation against a capability yardstick) or to evaluate the changes in her wellbeing or wellbeing freedom over time. The capability approach could thus also be used by a single person in her deliberate decision-making or evaluation processes, but these uses of the capability approach are much less prevalent in the scholarly literature. Yet all these normative exercises share the property that they use functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space — the space in which personal evaluations or interpersonal comparisons are made.
2.6.6 A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value
However, this brings us straight to another core property of module A, namely that functionings and/or capabilities are not necessarily the only elements of ultimate value. Capabilitarian theories might endorse functionings and/or capabilities as their account of ultimate value but may add other elements of ultimate value, such as procedural fairness. Other factors may also matter normatively, and in most capability theories these other principles or objects of evaluation will play a role. This implies that the capability approach is, in itself, incomplete as an account of the good since it may have to be supplemented with other values or principles.30 Sen has been a strong defender of this claim, for example, in his argument that capabilities capture the opportunity aspect of freedom but not the process aspect of freedom, which is also important (e.g. Sen 2002a, 583–622).31
At this point, it may be useful to reflect on a suggestion made by Henry Richardson (2015) to drop the use of the word ‘intrinsic’ when describing the value of functionings and capabilities — as is often done in the capability literature. For non-philosophers, saying that something has ‘intrinsic value’ is a way to say that something is much more important than something else, or it is used to say that we don’t need to investigate what the effects of this object are on another object. If we think that something doesn’t have intrinsic value, we would hold that it is desirable if it expands functionings and capabilities; economic growth is a prominent example in both the capability literature and in the human development literature. Yet in philosophy, there is a long-standing debate about what it means to say of something that it has intrinsic value, and it has increasingly been contested that it is helpful to speak of ‘intrinsic values’ given what philosophers generally would like to say when they use that word (Kagan 1998; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000).
In philosophy, the term ‘intrinsic’ refers to a metaphysical claim; something we claim to be intrinsically valuable only derives its value from some internal properties. Yet in the capability approach, this is not really what we want to say about functionings (or capabilities). Rather, as Richardson rightly argues, we should be thinking about what we take to be worth seeking for its own sake. Richardson prefers to call this ‘thinking in terms of final ends’; in addition, one could also use the terminology ‘that which has ultimate value’ (see also Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000, 48).32 This has the advantage that we do not need to drop the widely used, and in my view very useful, distinction between instrumental value and ultimate value. Those things that have ultimate value are the things we seek because they are an end (of policy making, decision making, evaluations); those things that do not have ultimate value, hence that are not ends, will be valued to the extent that they have instrumental value for those ends.
Of course, non-philosophers may object and argue they are using ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘ultimate value’ as synonyms. But if we want to develop the capability approach in a way that draws on the insights from all disciplines, we should try to accommodate this insight from philosophy into the interdisciplinary language of the capability approach, especially if there is a very easy-to-use alternative available to us. We can either, as Richardson proposes, speak of the selected functionings and capabilities as final ends, or we can say that the selected functionings and capabilities have ultimate value — that is, they have value as ends in themselves and not because they are useful for some further end. It is of course possible for a capability to have ultimate value and for the corresponding functioning to have instrumental value. For example, being knowledgeable and educated can very plausibly be seen as of ultimate value, but is also of instrumental value for various other capabilities, such as the capability of being healthy, being able to pursue projects, being able to hold a job, and so forth.
However, the question is whether it is possible to change the use of a term that is so widespread in some disciplines yet regarded as wrong from the point of view of another discipline. It may be that the best we can hope for is to become aware of the different usages of the term ‘intrinsic value’, which in the social sciences is used in a much looser way than in philosophy, and doesn’t have the metaphysical implications that philosophers attribute to it.
2.6.7 A7: Value pluralism
There are at least two types of value pluralism within the capability approach. One type is the other objects of ultimate value, which was briefly addressed in the previous section. This is what Sen called in his Dewey lectures principle pluralism (Sen 1985c, 176). Expanding capabilities and functionings is not all that matters; there are other moral principles and goals with ultimate value that are also important when evaluating social states, or when deciding what we ought to do (whether as individuals or policy makers). Examples are deontic norms and principles that apply to the processes that lead to the expansion of capability sets. This value pluralism plays a very important role in understanding the need to have the C-module C4, which will be discussed in section 2.8.4.
It is interesting to note that at some stage in Sen’s development of the capability approach, his readers lost this principle-pluralism and thought that the capability approach could stand on its own. But a reading of Sen’s earlier work on the capability approach shows that all along, Sen felt that capabilities can and need to be supplemented with other principles and values. For example, in his 1982 article ‘Rights and Agency’, Sen argues that “goal rights, including capability rights, and other goals, can be combined with deontological values […], along with other agent-relative considerations, in an integrated system” (Sen 1982, 4). Luckily, the more recent publications in the secondary literature on the capability approach increasingly acknowledge this principle pluralism; the modules A7 and C4 of the modular view presented in this book suggest that it is no longer possible not to acknowledge this possibility.
The second type of value-pluralism relates to what is often called the multidimensional nature of the capability approach. Functionings and capabilities are not ‘values’ in the sense of ‘public values’ (justice, efficiency, solidarity, ecological sustainability, etc.) but they are objects of ultimate value — things that we value as ends in themselves. Given some very minimal assumptions about human nature, it is obvious that these dimensions are multiple: human beings value the opportunity to be in good health, to engage in social interactions, to have meaningful activities, to be sheltered and safe, not be subjected to excessive levels of stress, and so forth. Of course, it is logically conceivable to say that for a particular normative exercise, we only look at one dimension. But while it may be consistent and logical, it nevertheless makes no sense — for at least two reasons.
First, the very reason why the capability approach has been offered as an alternative to other normative approaches is to add informational riches — to show which dimensions have been left out of the other types of analysis, and why adding them matters. It also makes many evaluations much more nuanced, allowing them to reflect the complexities of life as it is. For example, an African-American lawyer may be successful in her professional life in terms of her professional achievements and the material rewards she receives for her work, but she may also encounter disrespect and humiliation in a society that is sexist and racist. Being materially well-off doesn’t mean that one is living a life with all the capabilities to which one should be entitled in a just society. Only multi-dimensional metrics of evaluation can capture those ambiguities and informational riches.
Second, without value pluralism, it would follow that the happiness approach is a special case of the capability approach — namely a capability theory in which only one functioning matters, namely being happy. Again, while this is strictly speaking a consistent and logical possibility, it makes no sense given that the capability approach was conceived to form an alternative to both the income metric and other resourcist approaches on the one hand, and the happiness approach and other mental metric approaches on the other. Thus, in order to make the capability approach a genuine alternative to other approaches, we need to acknowledge several functionings and capabilities, rather than just one.
2.6.8 A8: The principle of each person as an end
A final core property of each capability theory or application is that each person counts as a moral equal. Martha Nussbaum calls this principle “the principle of each person as an end”. Throughout her work she has offered strong arguments in defence of this principle (Nussbaum 2000, 56):
The account we strive for [i.e. the capability approach] should preserve liberties and opportunities for each and every person, taken one by one, respecting each of them as an end, rather than simply as the agent or supporter of the ends of others. […] We need only notice that there is a type of focus on the individual person as such that requires no particular metaphysical position, and no bias against love or care. It arises naturally from the recognition that each person has just one life to live, not more than one. […] If we combine this observation with the thought […] that each person is valuable and worthy of respect as an end, we must conclude that we should look not just to the total or the average, but to the functioning of each and every person.
Nussbaum’s principle of each person as an end is the same as what is also known as ethical or normative individualism in debates in philosophy of science. Ethical individualism, or normative individualism, makes a claim about who or what should count in our evaluative exercises and decisions. It postulates that individual persons, and only individual persons are the units of ultimate moral concern. In other words, when evaluating different social arrangements, we are only interested in the (direct and indirect) effects of those arrangements on individuals.
As will be explained in more detail in section 4.6, the idea of ethical individualism is often conflated with other notions of individualism, such as the ontological idea that human beings are individuals who can live and flourish independently of others. However, there is no such claim in the principle of ethical individualism. The claim is rather one about whose interests should count. And ethical individualism claims that only the interests of persons should count. Ultimately, we care about each individual person. Ethical individualism forces us to make sure we ask questions about how the interests of each and every person are served or protected, rather than assuming that because, for example, all the other family members are doing fine, the daughter-in-law will be doing fine too. If, as all defensible moral theories do, we argue that every human being has equal moral worth, then we must attach value to the interests of each and every one of the affected persons. Thus, my first conclusion is that ethical individualism is a desirable property, since it is necessary to treat people as moral equals.
But ethical individualism is not only a desirable property, it is also an unavoidable property. By its very nature the evaluation of functionings and capabilities is an evaluation of the wellbeing and freedom to achieve wellbeing of individual persons. Functionings are ‘beings’ and ‘doings’: these are dimensions of a human being, which is an embodied being, not merely a mind or a soul. And with the exception of the conjoined twins, and the case of the unborn child and the pregnant mother, bodies are physically separated from each other.33 We are born as a human being with a body and future of her own, and we will die as a human being with a body and a past life narrative that is unique. This human being, that lives her life in an embodied way, thus has functionings that are related to her person, which is embodied. It is with the functionings and capabilities of these persons that the capability approach is concerned with.34 However, as I will explain in detail in section 4.6, from this it does not follow that the capability approach conceptualises people in an atomistic fashion, and thus that the capability approach is ‘individualistic’ — meant in a negative, pejorative way. And it also does not imply that a capabilitarian evaluation could not also evaluate the means (including social institutions, structures, and norms) as well as conversion factors, as well as non-capabilitarian elements of value — as long as we are clear what the role or status of each of those elements is.35
Note that the use of the term ‘normative individualism’ is deeply disputed. Some scholars see no problem at all in using that term, since they use it in a technical sense that they believe should not be conflated with any pejorative use of the term ‘individualism’ in daily life. Other scholars resist the term ‘ethical individualism’, since they cannot separate it from (a) the notions of ontological and explanatory individualism, and/or (b) from the pejorative meaning that the term ‘individualism’ has in daily life, which is probably close to a term such as ‘egoism’. While the first group is, in my view, right, the second group conveys important information about how the capability approach will be perceived in a broader setting, including outside academia. It may therefore be recommendable to replace the term ‘ethical or normative individualism’ with the term ‘the principle of each person as an end’ whenever possible.
17 See section 2.2 for an explanation of the technical term ‘advantage’.
18 For some core differences in the way Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen use the terms ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’, see section 3.2.
19 See also section 3.3 which discusses in more depth the kind of freedoms or opportunities that capabilities are.
20 The exceptions are those philosophers who want to develop normative theories while steering away from any metaphysical claims (that is, claims about how things are when we try to uncover their essential nature). I agree that the description of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ in this section makes metaphysical claims, but I think they are very ‘minimal’ (in the sense that they are not wildly implausible, and still leave open a wide variety of theories to be developed) and hence we should not be troubled by these metaphysical assumptions.
21 Arguably, some of that work is being done by social choice theorists and others working with axiomatic methods, but unfortunately almost none of the insights of that work have spread among the disciplines within the capability literature where axiomatic and other formal methods are not used (and, presumably, not well understood). See, for example, Pattanaik (2006); Xu (2002); Gotoh, Suzumura and Yoshihara (2005); Gaertner and Xu (2006, 2008).
22 On the complex nature of ‘care’, and what the need to care and be cared for requires from a just society, see e.g. Tronto (1987); Kittay (1999); Nussbaum (2006b); Folbre (1994); Folbre and Bittman (2004); Engster (2007); Gheaus (2011); Gheaus and Robeyns (2011).
23 The Multidimensional Poverty Index is developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), under the leadership of Sabina Alkire. See http://www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/ for a clear introduction of the Multidimensional Poverty Index. For scholarly papers on the Index, as well as other work done by the scholars in OPHI, see http://www.ophi.org.uk/resources/ophi-working-papers/
24 This is a critique that the capability approach shares with the happiness approach, which also focusses on what it considers to be an end in itself — happiness. Still, capability scholars have reasons why they do not endorse the singular focus on happiness, as the happiness approach proposes. See section 3.8.
25 However, while a focus on available options rather than realised choices is the default normative focus of capability theories, there are some capability applications where, for good reasons, the focus is on achieved functionings rather than capabilities. This will be elaborated in the next section.
26 On the distinction between general capabilities and specific capabilities, see 3.2.4.
27 The relationship between means and capabilities is analysed in more depth in section 3.12.
28 I am using the term ‘normative’ here in the way it is used by social scientists, hence encompassing what philosophers call both ‘normative’ and ‘evaluative’. For these different uses of terminology, see section 2.2. It is also possible to use the notions of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ for non-normative purposes (see section 3.10). In that case, the basic notions from the core are all that one takes from the capability approach; one does not need this normative part of the core. I will suggest in the concluding chapter 5 that explanatory applications of the capability approach are part of how it could be fruitfully developed in the future.
29 Moreover, further extensions of this proposition may be needed. One issue is that we should not only focus on capabilities that people value, but also on capabilities that they do not, but should, value (see section 2.7.2). Another issue is that the evaluative space should not necessarily be restricted to capabilities only, but could also be functionings, or a combination of functionings and capabilities (see section 2.6.5).
30 For example, if Henry Richardson (2007) is right in arguing that the idea of capabilities cannot capture basic liberties, then one need not reject the capability approach, but instead could add an insistence on basic liberties to one’s capability theory, as Richardson (2007, 394) rightly points out.
31 This distinction, and its relevance, will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.
32 “[…] the relevant values can be said to be ‘end-point values’, insofar as they are not simply conducive to or necessary for something else that is of value. They are ‘final’, then, in this sense of being ‘ultimate’” (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000, 48).
33 As Richardson (2016, 5) puts it, “all capabilities […] are dependent on the body. Without relying on one’s body there is nothing one can do or be”.
34 Some have argued in favour of what they call ‘collective capabilities’, which I will discuss in section 3.6.
35 However, the question remains whether the capability approach is fully compatible with indigenous world views and normative frameworks, as well as thick forms of communitarianism. This is a question that doesn’t allow for a straightforward answer, and requires more analysis. For some first explorations of the compatibility of indigenous world views with the capability approach, see Binder and Binder (2016); Bockstael and Watene (2016); Watene (2016). | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.06%3A_The_A-module-_the_non-optional_core_of_.txt |
I believe that the best way to understand the capability approach is by taking the content of the A-module as non-optional. All capability theories need to endorse the content of the A-module (ideally in an explicit way) or at a very minimum should not have properties that violate the content of the A-module. But there are also properties of a capability theory where the module is non-optional, yet there is choice involved in the content of the module. This doesn’t mean that ‘anything goes’ in terms of the choice of the content, but it does mean that within each module, there is a range of options to choose from. These are the B-modules, each of which contains a range of possible content, from which the capability theorist can decide what content to adopt. However, the range of content of the B-modules must not contradict the A-module. The following table lists the non-optional B-modules with optional content.
Table 2.3 The B-modules: non-optional modules with optional content
B1: The purpose of the capability theory
B2: The selection of dimensions
B3: An account of human diversity
B4: An account of agency
B5: An account of structural constraints
B6: The choice between functionings, capabilities, or both
B7: Meta-theoretical commitments
2.7.1 B1: The purpose of the capability theory
The first module, which is itself non-optional, but where the content can be chosen, is the purpose of the theory. For example, one could use the capability approach to construct a theory of justice, to develop an international empirical comparison, to reform an educational curriculum, to develop alternative welfare economics, or to evaluate the effects of laws on people’s capabilities. Questions of scope and reach also need to be addressed in this module. For example, is a theory of justice a political or a comprehensive theory? Is such a theory domestic or global? Other questions that need to be addressed involve the intended audience. Is one constructing an academic theory where great attention is given to detail and even the smallest distinctions are taken as relevant, or is one addressing policy makers or societal organisations for whom every detail does not matter and the time to think and read may be much more constrained, while the accessibility of the ideas is much more important?
Of course, one could argue that B1 is not specific to capability theories, and also holds for, say, deontological theories, or utilitarian theories, or theories that use care ethics as their basic normative foundation. While that is true, there are two reasons to highlight B1, the purpose of the capability theory, in the account that I am developing. The first is that it will help us to be explicit about the purpose. There are plenty of pieces published in the capability literature in which the purpose of the application or theory is not made explicit, and as a consequence it leads to people based in different disciplines or fields talking alongside each other. Second, it seems that the need to be explicit about the purpose (including the audience) of one’s capability theory or application is stronger in the capability literature than in other approaches, because in comparison to those other approaches it has a much more radically multidisciplinary uptake.
2.7.2 B2: The selection of dimensions
The second B-module is the selection of capabilities and/or functionings. We need to specify which capabilities matter for our particular capability theory. This is a deeply normative question, and touches the core of the difference that the capability approach can make. After all, the dimensions that one selects to analyse will determine what we will observe — and also, equally importantly, what we will not observe since the dimensions are not selected.
There is, by now, a large body of literature discussing the various ways in which one can make that selection, including some overview articles that survey the different methods for particular purposes (e.g. Alkire 2002; Robeyns 2005a; Byskov forthcoming). These methods explicitly include various participatory, deliberative and/or democratic approaches, which are widely used in capability applications.
There are two crucial factors determining which selection procedure is suitable. The first is the purpose of the capability theory (hence the choice made in B1). If we develop an account of wellbeing for thinking about how our lives are going, we are not constrained by questions such as the legitimate scope of government intervention, whereas a theory of political justice would need to take that element into account. Another example is if we would like to use the capability approach to think about what is universally demanded by moral principles, hence to develop the capability approach into a theory of morality: there the selection may be constrained by a method of moral justification for categorically binding principles, which is much more demanding than a method that justifies principles we offer to each other as rationally defensible proposals in the public realm. At the empirical and policy level, similar questions arise. For example, one could take the international human rights treaties as reflecting a given political consensus, and use those to select capabilities (Vizard 2007). Or, one’s main goal may be to analyse what difference the capability approach makes for poverty or inequality analysis in comparison with income metrics, in which case one may opt for a method that makes the normativity explicit but nevertheless stays close to existing practices in the social sciences, assuming the epistemic validity of those practices (Robeyns 2003).
The second factor determining which selection procedure is suitable is the set of constraints one takes as given in the normative analysis one is making. In an ideal world, there would always be cooperation between scholars with different disciplinary expertise, who would understand each other well, and who would be able to speak the language of the other disciplines involved in developing the capability theory. In an ideal world, there would also be no time constraints on the amount of time one has to develop a capability theory, and no financial constraints on the data gathering, or social, psychological or political constraints on the types of question one can ask when conducting a survey. One would be able always to conduct one’s own fieldwork if one wanted, one would have access to all the empirical knowledge one needed, and one would not be constrained in gathering the information one wanted to gather. Clearly, the methods for such an ideal world would be very different from the methods that are used in practice — where database-driven selection may be the best one can do.
Still, whichever method one uses, what always remains important, and very much in the spirit of the capability approach, is not to act in a mechanical way, or to see the question of the selection of dimensions as a technocratic exercise. Even if one cannot, for example, collect certain data, one could nevertheless still mention the dimensions that one would have wanted to include if it had been possible, and perhaps provide some reasonable informed guess of what difference the inclusion of that dimension would have made.
2.7.3 B3: Human diversity
Within the capability approach human diversity is a core characteristic, and indeed a core motivation for developing the capability approach in the first place. Yet the account of human diversity that one endorses can differ. For example, scholars with a background in structuralist sociology or Marxism often believe that the social class to which one belongs is a very important factor in human diversity, which has great influence on which options lie open to a person, but also on how a person’s character and aspirations are formed. For those scholars, class interacts with, and in some cases even outweighs, all other identity aspects. For others, such as libertarians, these differences are not so important.36 They would not attach much (normative or explanatory) importance to one’s gender, ethnicity, race, social class, and so forth: everyone is, first and foremost, an individual whose personal ambitions and projects matter. Yet, whether one is a Marxist or a libertarian or one of the many other positions one can take, one always, either implicitly or explicitly, endorses a view on human nature and on human diversity. That choice should be made in capability theories, since the capability approach rejects the use of an implicit, unacknowledged account of human diversity. Hence such an account belongs to the B-modules: one has to have an account of human diversity, but, as long as one is willing to defend one’s account and it survives critical analysis, there are several accounts that one can opt for.
Note that if one puts all the modules A, B and C together, a picture will emerge about the great importance attached to human diversity in the capability approach; this will be analysed in more detail in section 3.5.
2.7.4 B4: Agency
Another B-module is the acknowledgement of agency. As a working definition, we can use Sen’s definition of an agent as “someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well” (Sen 1999a, 19).
Applications of the capability approach should endorse some account of agency, except if there are good reasons why agency should be taken to be absent, or why in a particular capability application agency is simply not relevant (for example, when one wants to investigate the correlation between an income metric and some achieved functionings).
But clearly, as with other key ethical concepts such as ‘wellbeing’ or ‘freedom’, the concept of ‘agency’ can be fleshed out in many different ways. The capability approach is not committed to one particular account of agency. Similar to the acknowledgement of structural constraints, there is no agreed-upon or standard claim about how much agency, or what particular type, should be assumed; the claim is minimalistic in the sense that, as with the structural constraints which will be discussed in the next section, agency cannot simply be ignored and must be accounted for. One can give agency a key role in a capability theory (e.g. Crocker 2008; Claassen 2016) or a more restricted role, perhaps also using different terminology. One can also develop the account of agency by spelling out some of its preconditions, which may include capabilities. For example, Tom de Herdt (2008) analysed the capability of not having to be subjected to public shame as a precondition of agency, and showed how this may be relevant for social policymaking by illustrating its importance in a food relief programme in Kinshasa. For empirical scholars and policy scholars, an empirically sound account of agency will be crucial; for moral philosophers, a more theoretical account of what conceptualisation of agency is morally relevant will be needed. Thus, the precise content of this B-module will differ significantly between different capability theories and applications — but, in all cases, some acknowledgement of agency will be needed.37
2.7.5 B5: Structural constraints
The fifth B-module is the account of structural constraints: the institutions, policies, laws, social norms and so forth, that people in different social positions face. Those differences in the structural constraints that people face can have a great influence on their conversion factors, and hence on their capability sets. For example, if relationships between people of the same sex are criminalised, then gay people may have all the means and resources they would wish, but they will still not be able to enjoy a happy family life. Or if people of colour face explicit or implicit discrimination on the labour market, then they will not be able to use the same labour-market resources (their degrees, training, experience) to generate the same levels of capabilities in the professional sphere of life, compared with groups that face no (or less) discrimination.
In addition, structural constraints also play a role in the shaping of people’s capabilities that are not heavily dependent on material resources. If one group of people is, for cultural, historical or religious reasons, stigmatized as outcasts, then they will be treated with disrespect by other groups in society. The same holds for all groups that suffer from stigma, such as, for example, people with psychiatric disorders or other mental health issues. These structural constraints will also affect the capabilities that do not rely on resources directly, such as opportunities for friendships or for a healthy sense of self-confidence.
Which of those structural constraints will be important for a particular capability analysis will depend on the context. For example, in her study of the living standards of waste pickers, scavengers, and plastic recycling and scrap trading entrepreneurs in Delhi, Kaveri Gill (2010) showed that caste plays a very important role in the capability sets of different castes. For example, those at the very bottom of the hierarchical ladder of waste workers — the waste pickers — have no opportunities for upward mobility due to social norms and societal discrimination related to their caste. In this study, social norms related to caste are key as a structural constraint; in other studies, it may be the anatomy of twenty-first century capitalism, or gender norms in gender-stratified societies, or some other set of structural constraints.
In sum, structural constraints can have a very important role in shaping people’s capability sets, and therefore have to be part of capability theories. Structural constraints vary depending on one’s caste, class, ethnicity, age, gender, sexual orientation, (dis)abilities, and the economic system in which one lives. These structural constraints are very likely to have an influence on a person’s capability set (and in most cases also do have that influence). Having an account of structural constraints is therefore non-optional: every capability theory has one, although sometimes this account will be very implicit. For example, I will argue in section 4.10 that part of the critique of mainstream welfare economics is that it has a very weak or minimal account of structural constraints. Heterodox welfare economists who are embracing the capability approach are not only doing so because they think the endorsement of the capability account of wellbeing is better than the preferences-based accounts that are dominant in mainstream economics, but often also because they hope that the minimal account of structural constraints in welfare economics can be replaced by a richer account that is better informed by insights from the other social sciences and from the humanities.
2.7.6 B6: The choice between functionings, capabilities, or both
In developing a capability theory, we need to decide whether we think that what matters are capabilities, functionings, or a combination of both. The core proposition that functionings and capabilities form the evaluative space (A5), was not decisive regarding the question of whether it is only functionings, or only capabilities, or a mixture of both, that form this space.
There are various arguments given in the literature defending a range of views that only capabilities matter; or that primarily secured functionings matter; or that for particular capability theories it is impossible only to focus on capabilities; or that we sometimes have good reasons to focus on functionings. These various claims and arguments will be reviewed in section 3.4; as will be argued in that section, there are good reasons why people could reasonably disagree on whether the capability analysis they are conducting should focus on functionings or capabilities or a mixture. It follows that a choice must be made, but that there are various options to choose from.
2.7.7 B7: Meta-theoretical commitments
Finally, each capability theory will embrace some meta-theoretical commitments. Yet often, these meta-theoretical commitments are shared commitments within one’s discipline or one’s school within that discipline, and as a graduate student one has become socialised in accepting these meta-theoretical commitments as given. As a consequence, it often happens that scholars are not even aware that there are such things as meta-theoretical commitments. For example, if one wants to conduct a measurement exercise (a choice made in the module B1) then one may be committed to the methodological principle of parsimony (to build a model with as few assumptions and as elegantly as possible) or, instead, to providing a measurement that is embedded into a rich narrative description aimed at a better understanding. Or, if one wants to construct a theory of justice (again, a choice made in the module B1), then one may aim for an ideal or non-ideal theory of justice, or for a partial or a comprehensive account of justice. Or one may espouse certain views about the status of theories of justice or meta-ethical claims related to, for example, the role that intuitions are permitted to play as a source of normativity. Some debates within the capability approach, but also between capability scholars and those working in other paradigms, would be truly enlightened if we made the meta-theoretical commitments of our theories, accounts and applications more explicit.
36 For an introduction to libertarianism, see Vallentyne and Van der Vossen (2014).
37 Martha Nussbaum explicitly refrains from integrating the notion of ‘agency’ in her capability theory (Nussbaum 2000, 14). However, this does not mean that there isn’t an account of agency in her theory, since the inclusion of the capability of practical reason on her list of central human capabilities can be understood as corresponding to one particular conceptualisation of agency. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.07%3A_The_B-modules-_non-optional_modules_wit.txt |
In addition to the compulsory content of the core A-module, and the optional content of the non-optional B-modules, a capability theory could also add a third type of module, which I will call the contingent modules. These are either modules that need to be taken on board due to some choices that have been made in a B-module, or else they are entirely optional, independent of what one has chosen in the B-modules. The following table gives an overview of the contingent modules.
Table 2.4 The C-modules: contingent modules
C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories
C2: Weighing dimensions
C3: Methods for empirical analysis
C4: Additional normative principles and concerns
2.8.1 C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories
Two capabilitarian thinkers could each aspire to make a theory of justice, yet embrace very different views on human nature and on the degree to which certain outcomes can be explained solely by people’s choices or are also affected by structural constraints. This can matter a lot for the particular capability theories that one develops.
For example, in earlier work, I showed that the capability approach’s answer to whether there is anything wrong with the traditional gender division of labour depends a lot on the social ontological claims related to gender that are (implicitly) endorsed as well as the explanatory views of how that division of labour came about (Robeyns 2008c). If one believes that the fact that women end up doing most of the unpaid and care work, while men end up doing most of the paid labour market work, is a result of differences in talents, dispositions and preferences, then one would judge that the different functionings outcomes that result for men and women within households provide them with maximal levels of wellbeing given the formal institutional background that they face. But if one endorses a feminist explanation of this division of labour between men and women within households, then one is likely to stress power differences, the role of societal expectations and social norms in decision making, and so forth (e.g. Okin 1989; Folbre 1994). The same observed functionings outcomes in households with a traditional gender division of labour would then be evaluated differently.
Similarly, Miriam Teschl and Laurent Derobert argue that a range of different accounts of social and personal identity are possible, and this may also impact on how we interpret a person forfeiting a capability that we would all deem valuable (Teschl and Derobert 2008). If we believe that our religious identities are a matter of rational deliberation and decision-making, then we will judge the choice to physically self-harm because of one’s religion differently than if we have an account of identity where there is much less scope for choice and rational deliberation regarding our religious affiliation or other group memberships.
In short, different ontological and explanatory options are available in module C1, and they may have effects on various other elements or dimensions of the capability theory that are being constructed. However, we should be careful and not mistakenly conclude that ‘anything goes’ when we add additional ontological theories, since there should not be any conflicts with the propositions of the A-module — and, in addition, some ontological and explanatory accounts are much better supported by critical analysis and empirical knowledge.
2.8.2 C2: Weighing dimensions
For some capability theories, the prioritising, weighing or aggregating of dimensions (functionings and capabilities) may not be needed. For example, one may simply want to describe how a country has developed over time in terms of a number of important functionings, as a way of giving information about the evolution of the quality of life that may give different insights than the evolution of GDP (e.g. Van Zanden et al. 2014). Weighing dimensions is therefore not required for each capability theory or capability application, in contrast to the selection of dimensions, which is inevitable.
However, for some other choices that one can make in B1, the capabilitarian scholar or practitioner needs to make choices related to the weighing of the different dimensions. If that is the case, then there are different methods for how one could weigh. When considering which weighing method to use, the same factors are relevant as in the case of selecting the dimensions: the purposes of one’s capability theory, and the constraints one has to take into account when choosing a method.
In contrast to the overview works that have been written on how to select dimensions (e.g. Alkire 2002; Robeyns 2005a; Byskov forthcoming), capability scholars have written much less about which methods one could use to decide on the weights given to each dimension, specifically focussing on functionings or capabilities as the dimensions. What lessons and insights can we learn from what has so far been argued in this literature on the weighing of dimensions? (Alkire 2016; Alkire et al. 2015, chapter 6; Robeyns 2006b, 356–58)
First, the selection of weights for the capability approach is structurally similar to other multidimensional metrics (in the case of evaluations) or decision-making procedures (in case one needs to decide to which capabilities to give priority in policies or collective decision making). Hence one should consult existing discussions in other debates where multidimensionality plays an important role. Let us first look at the group of applications in which the capability approach is used to make decisions about what we, collectively, ought to do. That may be in an organisation; or at the level of a community that needs to decide whether to spend tax revenues on investing more in public green spaces, or in social services for particular groups, or in taking measures to prevent crime, or in anything else that can likely be understood as leading to positive effects on our capabilities. In those cases, we can learn from social choice theory, and from theories of democratic decision making, how we could proceed.38 Decisions could be made by voting, or by deliberation, or by deliberation and/or voting among those who are the representatives of the relevant population.
Second, the applications of the capability approach that involve a multidimensional metric of wellbeing or wellbeing freedom could use (most of) the weighing methods that have been discussed for multidimensional metrics in general. Koen Decancq and María Ana Lugo (2013) have reviewed eight different approaches to set weights for multidimensional metrics, which they categorize in three classes: data-driven weights in which the weights are a function of the distribution of the various dimensions in the population surveyed; normative approaches in which either experts decide on the weights, or the weights are equal or arbitrary; and hybrid weights that are in part data-driven but in addition depend on some normative decision. Note that in the data-driven and hybrid approaches, the selection of dimensions and the weights tends to be done through a process in which the selection of dimensions and the determination of the weights go hand in hand. One example is the proposal by Erik Schokkaert (2007) of using happiness as the master-value by which we weigh the various capabilities that together form the multidimensional account of wellbeing. In this proposal, if the functionings do not contribute to one’s happiness, they are given a zero weight and hence no longer count in the wellbeing index. In methods such as this one, there are two rounds of the selections of the dimensions: the first before one collects the data, and the second when one uses econometric techniques to determine the contribution that the various functionings make to the master-value (here: life-satisfaction) and uses those as weights; those functionings that will make no contribution will receive a weight of zero, which is the same as being deleted as a dimension in the wellbeing index.
Third, for non-empirical applications, we can categorize methods to determine weights in the same way as we could categorise methods for the selection of dimensions. Morten Fibieger Byskov (forthcoming) distinguishes between ad-hoc methods (such as the data-driven methods discussed by Decancq and Lugo), procedural methods, or foundational methods. A theoretical capability application could include answers to all B-modules (including the selection of dimensions) yet decide that the weighing of those dimensions should be done in a procedural way, e.g. via a democratic decision-making process. Alternatively, one could introduce one master-value that will determine which capabilities are relevant, and also what weights they should be given. One example is the empirical work done by Erik Schokkaert (2007), which was discussed above. Another example, which is theoretical, is Rutger Claassen’s capabilitarian theory of justice, in which the selection and weighing of capabilities is done based on their contribution to that person’s “navigational agency” (Claassen 2016).
Note that in the case in which one has essentially a monistic theory in which there is a master-value, one may doubt whether this doesn’t violate property A7 from the A-module. At first value, it seems that it does. But proponents of a monistic theory may respond that all theories or measures ultimately must choose one principle or value that tells us something about the relative weight of the different dimensions. In Nussbaum’s work, they argue, there is also an implicit master-value, namely human dignity. It seems to me that this issue is not sufficiently analysed and the dispute not settled. One question one could raise is whether all master-values have the same function. It seems to be different whether the capabilities constitute the dimensions of a good life (as in the case of flourishing), or whether they contribute to the master-value. For the time being, we should in any case flag this as an issue to which more attention should be paid in the further development of our understanding of the capability approach.
2.8.3 C3: Methods for empirical analysis.
If in B1 one chooses an empirical study, one needs to know which methods to use. This is the task of the module C3. For example, the study could contain choices about which multivariate analysis tools to use or whether certain existing data sets are capturing functionings, capabilities, or merely rough indicators. In C3, we also make methodological choices related to empirical analysis: does a particular capability issue require quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis, or a combination? In part, the contours of the empirical analysis will be influenced by one’s ambitions and goals: is one trying to measure functionings and/or capabilities directly, or is one measuring resources and conversion factors in order to infer the capability set?
For empirical capability applications, these are of course huge methodological questions that need to be answered. These empirical methods questions may be particularly challenging for the capability approach for two reasons. First, because it is a radically multidimensional approach, and multidimensional analysis is by its very nature more complicated than a one-dimensional analysis. Second, in many cases, the relevant dimensions will include dimensions on which the collection of data is difficult, or on which no data are available — such as the quality of our social networks, the degree to which we do not suffer from excessive levels of stress, or our mental health. Nevertheless, as Alkire (2005, 129) rightly points out in her discussion on what is needed for the empirical operationalisation of the capability approach, one has to adopt the best existing empirical research (and its methods) that exists, and either master those new techniques that have been developed in other fields, or else engage in collaborations. Hick and Burchardt (2016, 88) raise the related point that there is a need for capability scholars to reach out and engage with related fields where similar themes and problems are faced. Only after that route has been travelled can we know the limits of empirical analyses of the capability approach.
2.8.4 C4: Additional normative principles and concerns
Finally, module C4 provides room for additional normative concerns or moral principles that capability scholars aim to add to their capability theory. For example, in a particular capability theory, a principle of non-discrimination may play a role or, alternatively, one may want to work out a capabilitarian theory that subscribes to the non-domination principle as it has been defended by Republican political theory (Pettit 2001, 2009). Or, if one ascribes to a rich account of empowerment that stresses the relevance of ‘power’ and hence strongly incorporates relational aspects (e.g. Drydyk 2013; Koggel 2013), then one may add a principle related to enhancing people’s empowerment, or prioritising the empowerment of the worst-off, as an additional normative principle to be added in module C4. Again, there are several elements belonging to module C4 that could be added to a capability theory.
38 In the case of democratic theory, the discussion is often about which laws to implement, but the same insights apply to policy making. Both the literature on democratic theory (e.g. Dryzek 2000; Gutmann and Thompson 2004) and social choice theory (e.g. Arrow, Sen and Suzumura 2002, 2010; Sen 1999c, 2017; Gaertner 2009) are vast and will not be further discussed here. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.08%3A_The_C-modules-_contingent_modules.txt |
In the previous sections, we have looked at the different elements of the modular account of the capability approach, consisting of the core A-module, the compulsory B-modules with optional content, and the contingent C-modules. For an easily accessible overview, the different elements of the modular view of the capability approach are summarised in table 2.5.
Table 2.5 The modular view of the capability approach
The A-module: the non-optional core
A1: Functionings and capabilities as core concepts
A2: Functionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories
A3: Conversion factors
A4: The distinction between means and ends
A5: Functionings and/or capabilities form the evaluative space
A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value
A7: Value pluralism
A8: Valuing each person as an end
The B-modules: non-optional modules with optional content
B1: The purpose of the capability theory
B2: The selection of dimensions
B3: An account of human diversity
B4: An account of agency
B5: An account of structural constraints
B6: The choice between functionings, capabilities, or both
B7: Meta-theoretical commitments
The C-modules: contingent modules
C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories
C2: Weighing dimensions
C3: Methods for empirical analysis
C4: Additional normative principles and concerns
What, exactly, is the status of this characterisation of the capability approach? Is this list of modules and the core properties exhaustive, and is this a proposal to change the current definitions on offer in the literature?
The answers have been given throughout the sections so far, but now that we have gone through the different modules and know their content, it is worthwhile to repeat and summarize this in a very explicit manner. The modular view is an attempt at understanding the plurality of capability theories on offer in the literature, doing justice to this plurality, yet at the same time avoiding the idea that ‘anything goes’. By distinguishing between three types of modules — the A-module, the content of which one must adopt, the B-modules, which are non-optional but have optional content, and the C-modules, which are contingent — we can get a better grasp of the peculiar nature of the capability approach: not exactly a precise theory, but also not something that can be anything one likes it to be. I hope that this way of looking at the anatomy of the capability approach will help us to understand what the approach is, but also provide more guidance to those who want to use the general capability approach as a guiding theoretical framework to work on particular theoretical or empirical issues and problems.
The content of the A-module, the B-modules and C-modules is, as with everything in scholarship, a proposal that can be modified to accommodate new insights. If someone has convincing arguments why one element or module should be deleted, modified, or added, then that should be done. Given what we know from the history of scholarship, it is rather unlikely that no further modifications will be proposed in the future.
2.10: Hybrid theories
In the previous sections, we have seen which modules are core in a capability theory, which ones need to be addressed but have optional content, and which ones may or may not be necessary to add to a particular capability theory. One question that this modular view raises is what we should think of a theory or an application that uses the addition of normative principles that are in contradiction with a property of the A-module. For example, suppose one would want to add the normative principle that institutions and personal behaviour should honour the traditions of one’s local community. There may be aspects of those traditions that are in tension with the principle of treating each person as an end, for example, because women are not given the same moral status in those traditions as men. What should we then say? Would such a theory no longer be a capability theory, even if the bulk of the theory is trying to think about the quality of life and desirable institutions in terms of the enhancement of functionings and capabilities?
I propose that we introduce the notion of a hybrid theory — theories or applications that use the notions of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ yet do not endorse all propositions in the A-module. Let me stress that categorizing these theories as ‘hybrid’ entails no value judgement, whether positive or negative; rather, it is only a matter of clarifying the possibilities of having capability theories but in addition also hybrid theories which use part of the A-module yet also insert elements from other ethical frameworks that go against some propositions in the A-module. Thus, appreciating the possibility of hybrid views enlarges the diversity of theories that are possible.
Can we give an example of such a hybrid theory? Perhaps surprisingly, an example may be Amartya Sen’s theorising about justice. According to the interpretation by Antoinette Baujard and Muriel Gilardone (2017), Sen’s (2006, 2009c) recent work on justice does not endorse functionings and/or capabilities as the metric of justice, but should rather be seen as a procedural or democratic account of justice, in which the idea of having functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space is merely a suggestion, which should be put to the public who eventually, in a process of public reasoning, have to decide what justice is about. If that interpretation is correct, then Sen is unwilling to commit to proposition A5 (‘functionings and capabilities form the evaluative space’) when theorising about justice, since that is something to be decided by a process of public reasoning.39 Clearly, when Sen theorises about justice, he has certain meta-theoretical commitments (module B7) that make it inconsistent for him to endorse A5, namely the meta-theoretical commitment that the nature of justice will be decided by a democratic process. Whether that is a plausible meta-theoretical position, has been subject of debate in the capability literature (e.g. Claassen 2011; Byskov 2017) but need not concern us here. The point that is relevant for us is that Sen’s theorizing about justice could be seen as a public reasoning-capability theory of justice.
Other potential candidates for hybrid theories are the theories that we discussed in section 2.8.2, in which functionings and capabilities play an important role, yet in the theory or measurement construction those functionings and capabilities turn out not to be of ultimate value, but rather to be instrumental for some further end that is normatively prior to the functionings and capabilities themselves. There is, in those cases, a master-value that determines how important (if at all) those capabilities are: capabilities that we could value, but which do not contribute to the master-value, will then not be given any ultimate value. As we discussed there, it is unclear whether those theories that endorse a master-value violate module A7 (value pluralism) or not. If we conclude they do, then the best way to understand these views is to regard them as hybrid theories too.
39 Note that for other capability applications or capability theories, such as making quality of life assessment studies, Sen has no problem endorsing proposition A5. Moreover, one could also ask whether regarding his earlier publications on justice it would be implausible to interpret Sen’s writings as an endorsement of A5. In my view (and pace Baujard and Gilardone’s interpretation), Sen has made several statements in earlier work that could be seen as an endorsement of all propositions of module A for the case of theorizing about justice (e.g. Sen 1980, 1990a, 2000). | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.09%3A_The_modular_view_of_the_capability_acco.txt |
Understanding the capability approach as having a modular structure leads to a number of insights. Let me highlight three important ones: countering the risk of inflation, whereby we have no criteria for deciding when a theory is or is not a capability theory; appreciating the diversity of capability theories that are possible; and getting a better sense of how Sen’s and Nussbaum’s writings relate to each other.
First, the modular view can help us to contain the risk of inflation: too many things being labelled as belonging to the ‘capability approach’, whereas they do not meet the essential characteristics of the A-module. The modular view of the capability approach which I presented gives us a description that includes all the work in the capability approach that should legitimately be included. There are, of course, other descriptions of the capability approach available in the literature. Yet to my mind most of these descriptions (including my own previous attempts at describing the approach) were insufficiently detailed and illuminating. If a description is too vague, we run the risk of inflation.
For example, one could aim to work on multi-dimensional poverty analysis and highlight the fact that we should be interested in the combination of achievements that people are able to have. This would point at two important insights in the capability approach — namely its multidimensional character, as well as focussing on opportunity sets rather than on outcomes. But if the opportunities one focusses on are not capabilities, but rather opportunities to access certain bundles of commodities, then it would be an unjustified inflation to call this a capability application; rather, it would be another type of opportunity-based multidimensional inequality measure.
Second, to understand that capability theories have a modular structure is crucial in understanding the diversity of capability theories that are possible. Let me try to illustrate this. Module C4 states that additional normative principles may be part of a capability theory, and property A6 that functionings and capabilities are not necessarily all that matters in a capability theory. From this it does not follow that all capability scholars have to endorse each and every capability theory. Surely there will be capability theorists who will take issue with the normative principles that are added in module C4 by other capability theorists when they design their theory. That is perfectly fine, as long as both theorists recognise that (a) the capability approach entails the possibility to add such additional normative principles in module C4, and (b) the normative principles they have added in module C4 are not thereby required for each and every other capability theory.40
Take the following example. One may defend a political theory of disadvantage which states that no-one should live in poverty, no matter whether people are partly causally responsible for having ended up in that situation. Such a theory would endorse a principle (in module C4) that there should be, at the level of outcomes (and hence not at the level of opportunities) institutionally enforced solidarity via redistribution. Let us call those who endorse this principle the S-theorists (S for solidarity). This is a strong normative claim: many other normative political theories rather defend that everyone should have a genuine opportunity to live a decent life, but still attribute some responsibility to all persons for realising that life. Let us call these theorists the O-theorists (O for opportunity). Both the S-theorists and the O-theorists can agree that we should understand people’s wellbeing in terms of functionings and capabilities. The S-theorists and the O-theorists are both capabilitarians. They have to acknowledge that the other group’s theory is a capability theory, without having to endorse the other theory. In other words, a capability theorist can agree that the normative position or theory that someone else is defending is a capability theory, without having to endorse that specific theory. There is absolutely no inconsistency in this situation.
Thirdly, the modular view of the capability approach endorses the view that Martha Nussbaum’s work on the capability approach should be understood as a capability theory, that is, a theory in which specific choices are made regarding the modules. It is not, as Nussbaum (2011) suggests in her Creating Capabilities, a version of the capability approach structurally on a par with Sen’s more general capability approach. What Sen has tried to do in his work on the capability approach, is to carve out the general capability approach, as well as to give some more specific capability applications. Admittedly, Sen’s work on the capability approach (rather than his work on a variety of capability applications) would have benefited from a more systematic description of how he saw the anatomy of the capability approach. To my mind, that has been missing from his work, and that is what I have tried to develop here and in an earlier paper (Robeyns 2016b). Yet everything put together, I agree with the understanding of Mozaffar Qizilbash, who concludes an analysis of the difference between Nussbaum’s and Sen’s work on the capability approach by saying that “On this reading […] Nussbaum’s capabilities approach emerges as one particular application or development of Sen’s original formulation of the approach” (Qizilbash 2013, 38).
It is a mistake to understand the capability literature as a field with two major thinkers who have each proposed one version of the capability approach, which have then inspired the work by many other scholars. Rather, there is only one capability approach which is a generalisation of the work by Sen together with further developments by many others. In addition, there are many dozens capability theories — about justice, human rights, social choice theory, welfare economics, poverty measurement, relational egalitarianism, curriculum design, development project assessment, technological design, and so forth. Clearly, Nussbaum has been one of the most prolific and important contributors; she has pushed the boundaries of capabilitarian theories and has rightly advanced the agenda to achieve more clarity on the essential characteristics that any capability theory should meet. However, she has offered us a more specific capability theory, rather than another version of the approach, even if it is the capability theory that is by far the most influential capability theory among philosophers. Establishing the anatomy of the capability approach and its relation to particular capability theories is very important, because it vastly expands the scope of the capability approach, and increases the potential types of capability applications and capabilitarian theories.
In sum, there is much pluralism within the capability approach. Someone who considers herself a capabilitarian or capability thinker does not need to endorse all capability theories. In fact, it is impossible to endorse all capability theories, since different choices made in module C1 (ontological and explanatory theories that are endorsed) and module C4 (additional normative principles) can be in conflict with each other. It is presumably coherent to be a Marxist capabilitarian, and it is presumably also coherent to be a libertarian capabilitarian, but it is not coherent to endorse the views taken by those two positions, since they are incompatible.
40 I believe that Martha Nussbaum makes a mistake when she argues that a commitment to the normative principle of political liberalism is essential to the capability approach, hence to each and every capability theory. For my arguments why this is a mistake, see Robeyns (2016b). Political liberalism is an additional normative commitment that is not a property of the A-module, but rather a choice in module C4. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.11%3A_The_relevance_and_implications_of_the_m.txt |
We have now covered enough ground in understanding the core concepts of the capability approach to construct a visualisation of these concepts. Figure 2.1 below gives a graphical representation of the different elements of the capability approach, and how they relate. Note that the arrows do not indicate normative importance but rather indicate which parts of this conceptual system are determinants of, or have an influence on, other parts.
Let us start our description where economists generally start (and often also end): with resources. In the capability approach, the term ‘resources’ is interpreted in a broader sense than the understanding of that term elsewhere in the social sciences. Economics and the quantitative empirical social sciences have traditionally focussed on material resources only: either income and wealth, or else on the consumption that these financial means (or unpaid production) generated. One important lesson learnt from feminist economics is that about half of economic production happens outside the market and the formal economy, which is the reason why the box at the far left in Figure 2.1 also includes resources created by non-market production (Folbre 2008; Folbre and Bittman 2004).
Both the resources and the consumption could be conceptualised as capability inputs: they are the means to the opportunities to be the person one wants to be, and do what one has reason to value doing. The means do not all have the same power to generate capabilities; this depends on a person’s conversion factors, as well as the structural constraints that she faces. Those structural constraints can have a great influence on the conversion factors as well as on the capability sets directly.
From this visualisation, we can also see the difference between the social conversion factors and the structural constraints. The structural constraints affect a person’s set of conversion factors, including the social conversion factors she faces. But recall that those conversion factors tell us something about the degree to which people can turn resources into capabilities. Conversion factors are thus, conceptually and empirically, closely related to the capability inputs — that is, the resources that are needed to generate capabilities. Structural constraints affect conversion factors, but can also affect a person’s capability set without impacting on the conversion of resources in capabilities. For example, if a certain set of social norms characterizes a group in society as not having the same moral status as others, then this affects the capabilities of the members of that group directly, not merely in terms of what they can get out of their resources. A good example is gay people, a significant percentage of whom are not worse off in financial terms than straight people, but they often cannot express their sexual orientation in public, at the risk of humiliation, aggression, or even risking their jobs or their lives.
Another part of the visualisation to pay attention to is the choice that people make given the capability set they have. These choices are always constrained in some sense, and the question is which types of constraints a particular capability theory will take into account. Also, the term ‘choice’ is used here in a very thin (or, as philosophers say, ‘weak’) sense: it is not assumed that elaborate thinking and weighing is done before we decide which capabilities to use and realise into functionings. In fact, we have ample evidence from psychology that there are many other factors that influence the decisions we make, including how hungry or tired we are, the people in our company, or the amount of time we have to make a decision (Ariely 2010; Kahneman 2011). Most capability theories will have an (implicit) theory of choice: they will have views on the extent to which people’s past history (which includes the structural constraints they faced in their personal past) as well as societal processes, such as preference formation mechanisms, influence the choices that we make from the opportunities that are available to us.
The last element of the visualisation is the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one’s functionings and capability levels each person will have. Of course, this does not mean that we need to attribute ethical significance to those levels of satisfaction; rather, the point in the visualisation is that satisfaction with one’s functionings and capability levels is not the same thing as those capability sets and combination of functionings achievements themselves. For now, we will concentrate on deepening our understanding of the capability approach itself, but in section 3.8, we will engage in more depth with the question whether we should look at functionings and capabilities, rather than satisfaction, or some other mental metrics, such as happiness.
Figure 2.1 A stylised visualisation of the core concepts of capability theories
Source: Based on Robeyns (2005b), updated and expanded.
Two remarks are important. First, this is a stylized visualisation, and also a simplification. It is meant to help us see the different elements of the capability approach and how they relate; it is not a fine-grained and exhaustive picture of all the elements that determine a person’s capability set. One important limitation is that this is not a dynamic visualisation and that many arrows, indicating relationships between various parts, are not present.41 In addition, the choices we make from our capability set at one point in time, will be determinants of our resources and our capability set in the future. Another important limitation of this visualisation is that it gives us only the resources, capabilities, functionings and satisfaction of one person, but, as was mentioned before, capability sets are interdependent; hence choices made from one person’s capability set will lead to changes in another person’s capability set.
41 In reality, almost everything is related to almost everything else in one way or another, but putting all those arrows on a visualisation would make it completely uninformative. After all, the task of scholarship is to abstract away from distracting details to see more clearly. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.12%3A_A_visualisation_of_the_core_conceptual_.txt |
We have now reached the end of the discussion of the modular view of the capability approach. Yet before closing this chapter, let us pause to use this modular view to clarify something that has been noted by several capability scholars, namely that the capability approach has been used and can be used in narrower or more limited ways on the one hand, and broader or richer ways on the other (e.g. Alkire, Qizilbash and Comim 2008, 4–5; Crocker and Robeyns 2009; Qizilbash 2012).42 The distinction has been slightly differently presented by different authors, but the general gist of their analyses has been that the capability approach can either be seen as offering something limited, or else much more ambitious and wide-reaching:
[…] several interpretations of the scope of the capability approach are used in the wider literature […]. These can be charted between two poles: one narrow and broad, with the broad subsuming the narrow. […] The narrow interpretation sees the approach primarily as identifying capability and functionings as the primary informational space for certain exercises. The broad interpretation views the capability approach as providing a more extensive and demanding evaluative framework, for example by introducing human rights or plural principles beyond the expansion of capabilities — principles which embody other values of concerns such as equity, sustainability or responsibility. (Alkire, Qizilbash and Comim 2008, 4–5)
In the narrow way, the capability approach tells us what information we should look at if we are to judge how well someone’s life is going or has gone; this kind of information is needed in any account of wellbeing or human development, or for any kind of interpersonal comparisons. Since the capability approach contends that the relevant kind of information concerns human functionings and capabilities, the approach provides part of what is needed for interpersonal comparisons of advantage.
The modular view presented in this chapter can help to make sense of this observation that there is both a narrower and a wider use of the capability approach. In the narrow use of the capability approach, the focus is often strictly on the evaluation of individual functioning levels or on both functionings and capabilities. If we look at the narrow use of the capability approach through the lens of the modular understanding of the approach, we can see that the narrow view chooses interpersonal comparisons as the purpose of the capability theory (module B1); and that it will have to make a selection of dimensions (module B2) and make a choice between functionings or capabilities (module B6); its choice for human diversity (module B3) will be reflected in the choices it makes in B2, but also in which groups (if any) it will compare. Its meta-theoretical commitments (B7) are likely related to limiting research to those things that can be measured. The narrow use of the capability approach will most likely not have much to say about agency (B4) and structural constraints (B5) but adopt the implicit theories of agency and structural constraints that are used in the empirical literatures on interpersonal comparisons. Finally, the narrower view must decide on how to weigh the dimensions (module C2) and which methods for empirical analysis (module C3) to make.
In its broad uses, the capability approach not only evaluates the lives of individuals (as in the narrow use), but also includes other considerations in its evaluations, which are ‘borrowed’ from other approaches or theories. For example, the broader use of the capability approach often pays attention to other normative considerations and other values than only wellbeing, such as efficiency, agency, or procedural fairness.
The broad view would, in most cases, have a more ambitious purpose for its use of the capability approach, such as societal evaluation or policy design. It would also have (either implicit or explicit) richer theories of human diversity, agency and structural constraints, and — most importantly — add several additional ontological and explanatory theories (module C1) and additional normative principles (module C4). The narrow view does not include modules C1 and C4, and this can make a huge difference to the kind of capability theory that emerges.
An example of the broad view is David Crocker’s (2008) book on development ethics, in which he has extended the capability approach with accounts of agency, democratic deliberation and participation into a more detailed account of development ethics. Yet Crocker acknowledges that not all versions of the capability approach embrace agency so explicitly. The capability approach proper need not endorse a strong account of agency, but there are several scholars who have developed particular capability theories and applications in which agency plays a central role (e.g. Claassen and Düwell 2013; Claassen 2016; Trommlerová, Klasen and Leßmann 2015).
Why is this difference between the narrow and the broad uses of the capability approach relevant and important? There are several important reasons. First, to assess a critique of the capability approach, we need to know whether the critique addresses the capability approach in its narrow use, or rather a specific version of its broad use. Second, we need to be clear that many of the additional normative commitments in the broad use of the capability approach are not essential to the capability approach: rather, they are optional choices made in modules B and, especially, module C1 (additional ontological and explanatory theories) and module C4 (additional normative principles and concerns). This insight will also be important when we address the question, in section 4.9, of whether we can simply talk about ‘the capability approach’ and ‘the human development paradigm’ as the same thing.
42 Readers who have never come across that distinction between the narrow and broad use of the capability approach may simply ignore this section and move on, since the anatomy of the capability approach that has been presented in this book covers the same terrain. In essence, this section is written for those who came across this terminology in the literature, and wonder how it relates to what has been said so far in this book.
2.14: Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to give a comprehensive explanation of the capability approach: what is it trying to do, what are the many ways in which it has been used, what are the properties that all capability theories share, and what is the structure that we can detect in the construction of capability theories and applications? In order to get a helicopter view, I have deliberately put aside a number of additional distinctions and details. They will be the focus of the next chapter, whereas critiques and areas of contestation and debate will be discussed in chapter 4. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/02%3A_Core_Ideas_and_the_Framework/2.13%3A_The_narrow_and_broad_uses_of_the_capabi.txt |
This chapter aims to deepen our understanding of the capability approach, by analysing and clarifying a range of questions that a student of the capability approach may have. My aim has been to include the most frequently asked questions raised by students of the capability approach, as well as a few cases which, in my view, currently lead to confusion in the literature. The questions and issues which are much more a matter of debate or contestation have been collected in chapter 4. Admittedly, the distinction between questions that require clarification on the one hand, and issues of debate on the other, is not a neat one. But that should not bother us: nothing much hangs on whether a topic is included in chapter 3 or rather in chapter 4; what matters is that students of the capability approach are able to find answers to the questions they have.
In this chapter, the following topics are clarified and analysed: How do the terminologies used by Sen and Nussbaum differ, and which additional terminological refinements have been proposed in the literature? (Section 3.2) Can ‘capabilities’ properly be described as freedom, and if so, which types of freedom are capabilities? And is it always a good idea to speak of capabilities in terms of freedom? (Section 3.3) Which considerations should play a role in making the relevant choices in module B6 — the choice between functionings or capabilities (or both) — for one’s capability theory? (Section 3.4) How exactly does the capability approach account for human diversity, and why is human diversity given so much importance in the capability literature? (Section 3.5) What does the notion ‘collective capability’ refer to? (Section 3.6) Which notion of wellbeing does the capability approach give us? (Section 3.7) How does the capability approach differ from the happiness approach, and what are the reasons that capability scholars do not adopt the happiness approach? (Section3.8) To what extent — and how — can the capability approach deal with adaptive preferences? (Section 3.9) Can a capability theory also be an explanatory theory, or is that not possible? (Section 3.10) Can the capability approach be used to study all normative questions, or is it not a suitable framework for some normative questions? (Section 3.11) The capability approach is often positioned as an alternative for resourcist theories — but what exactly is the role of resources in the capability approach? (Section 3.12) Finally, we consider how the capability approach relates to two established literatures: theories of justice and theories of human rights. Which choices in module B and module C are needed in order to construct a capability theory of justice? (Section 3.13) And how do capabilities and human rights relate to each other? (Section 3.14)
3.02: Refining the notions of capability' and functioning
While at a very introductory level, the terms ‘functionings’ and ‘capability’ seem to be easy and straightforward, the terminology used in the literature is, alas, not always clear. There has been quite considerable confusion in the use of the terminology, although — if one takes a meta-disciplinary helicopter view — it is possible to discern that particular uses of certain terms are more dominant than others. The confusion has several sources. First, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have used the same terminology somewhat differently to each other, and since most capability scholars are more influenced either by Sen or by Nussbaum, its use in the wider literature is not standardised. Moreover, both Sen and Nussbaum have changed their use over time, without always making this explicit. Thirdly, there are differences in terminological choices that can be traced back to established differences in different disciplines, which are having their effect on the different disciplinary streams in the capability literature.
There are at least four terminological issues that need to be noted: (1) ‘capability’ understood as a single opportunity versus ‘capability’ understood as an opportunity set; (2) Nussbaum’s more complex terminology; (3) the quite different meanings given in the literature to the term ‘basic capabilities’; and (4) additional refinements — both some that have been proposed in the literature, as well as a proposal that I will put on the table, namely to take the robustness of a capability into account. Let’s look at these four issues in turn.
3.2.1 Capability as an opportunity versus capability as an opportunity set
Let us first look at Sen’s original terminology. The major constituents of the capability approach are functionings and capabilities. Functionings are the ‘beings and doings’ of a person, whereas a person’s capability is “the various combinations of functionings that a person can achieve. Capability is thus a set of combinations of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another” (Sen 1992a, 40). According to Sen, a person has only one capability (or capability set), which consists of a combination of possible, reachable functionings.
A person’s functionings and her capability are closely related but distinct, as the following quote illustrates:
A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to achieve. Functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to living conditions, since they are different aspects of living conditions. Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: what real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead. (Sen 1987, 36)
Sen thus used the term ‘a capability’ for what we could also call ‘a capability set’. The advantage of each person corresponds to one capability (hence ‘a person’s overall freedom to do the things they want to do and be the person they want to be’). In the original terminology, each person had one capability, and the use of the word ‘capabilities’ therefore had to refer to the capabilities of various persons.
In Sen’s original terminology, a person’s capability consisted of a range of potential functionings, out of which a particular combination of functionings could be chosen. Functionings could therefore be either potential or achieved. This kind of language is most familiar to social choice scholars and scholars in formal welfare economics, where the focus of much of the analysis is on the opportunity set.
However, many other scholars working on the capability paradigm, including Martha Nussbaum, have labelled these potential functionings ‘capabilities’, and only use the term ‘functioning’ for an outcome. In that terminology, the capability set consists of a number of capabilities, in the same way as a person’s overall freedom is made up of a number of more specific freedoms. One does not find this usage of ‘capabilities’ (meaning the separate elements of one person’s capability set) in Sen’s earlier writings, and in his later writings he (perhaps reluctantly) uses the word ‘capability’ in both senses interchangeably.
What, then, is the terminology that is now predominantly used? As was explained in chapter 2, a functioning is a state of one’s being (such as being healthy or ill), or something one is doing (such as going on a trip or raising children). The real opportunity to accomplish such a functioning, is the corresponding capability. Hence if my sister goes on a trip and invites me along, but I decide to stay at home because I want to do something else, then I have the capability to go on a trip, but I chose not to have the corresponding outcome — the functioning. Each functioning corresponds exactly to one capability.
This plural use of capabilities is widespread in the contemporary literature on the capability approach — with the exception of those working in social choice theory, formal welfare economics and related fields. The terminology as used by the broader group of scholars working on the capability approach seems to be more straightforward and less technical, but when reading Sen’s (earlier) work it is important to know that the term ‘capability’ started with a different definition.1
3.2.2 Nussbaum’s terminology
In Women and Human Development, her first book-length work on her capabilities theory, Martha Nussbaum used the following terminology, which she still uses in her recent book on the capability approach (Nussbaum 2011, 20–25). Human capabilities are “what people are actually able to do and to be” (Nussbaum 2000, 5). From those human capabilities, Nussbaum identifies a list of ten “central capabilities” which have the status of rights: they “may not be infringed upon to pursue other types of social advantage” (Nussbaum 2000, 14). According to Nussbaum’s minimal account of social justice, these central capabilities have to be protected up to a certain threshold level.
Nussbaum helpfully distinguishes between three further notions to unpack the concept of ‘human capabilities’: basic capabilities, internal capabilities, and combined capabilities (Nussbaum 2000, 84–85). The term basic capabilities refers to “the innate equipment of individuals that is necessary for developing the more advanced capabilities”, such as the capability of speech and language, which is present in a new-born but needs to be fostered before it can develop into a true capability. Internal capabilities are “the matured conditions of readiness” — the internal aspect of the capability. If I have the skill and meet the physical preconditions of walking, then I may or may not be able to go for a walk — depending, for example, on whether as a woman I am legally allowed to leave the house without a male relative, or whether there is not currently a hurricane posing a real danger if I were to leave my house. If those suitable external conditions are in place, we can speak of combined capabilities.
Finally, a functioning is an “active realisation of one or more capabilities. […] Functionings are beings and doings that are the outgrowths or realizations of capabilities” (Nussbaum 2011, 25). Hence, in Nussbaum’s terminology, a functioning stands in relation to a capability as an outcome stands in relation to an opportunity.
While the substantive distinctions to which Nussbaum’s terminology refers are very helpful, the specific words chosen may be not ideal. There are two problems. First, for many capability scholars, the reference to the term ‘capability’ refers to the real opportunity to do something or be the person one wants to be; ‘internal capabilities’ do not fit that category. They are, starting from that perspective, simply not a capability, but rather necessary elements of a capability, or a precondition for a capability. It would have been better to call ‘internal capabilities’ simply ‘internal characteristics’ or else ‘skills, talents, character traits and abilities’. Such terminology would also make the link with various other behavioural and social disciplines much easier. What Nussbaum calls ‘combined capabilities’ could then simply be called ‘human capabilities’, which consist of the presence of those skills, talents, character traits and abilities, together with suitable external conditions and circumstances. Second, Nussbaum uses the term ‘basic capability’ after it had already been used in two other different ways, as the next section will show. Why not simply call these ‘innate human characteristics’?
3.2.3 What are ‘basic capabilities’?
The way readers from different disciplines use terminology in particular ways is clearly exemplified by the various interpretations of the term ‘basic capabilities’.
One interpretation is Nussbaum’s. As was mentioned before, Nussbaum (2000, 84) uses the term ‘basic capabilities’ to refer to “the innate equipment of individuals that is necessary for developing the more advanced capabilities”, such as the capability of speech and language, which is present in a new-born but needs to be fostered. Yet of the four ways in which the term ‘basic capabilities’ is used in the literature, this one may be the least prevalent.
Sen (1980) mentioned the term ‘basic capability’ as his first rough attempt to answer the ‘equality of what?’ question, but changed his terminology in subsequent work (what he called ‘basic capability’ would later become ‘capability’).2 In his later writings, Sen reserved the term ‘basic capabilities’ to refer to a threshold level for the relevant capabilities. A basic capability is “the ability to satisfy certain elementary and crucially important functionings up to certain levels” (Sen 1992a, 45 fn 19). Basic capabilities refer to the freedom to do some basic things considered necessary for survival and to avoid or escape poverty or other serious deprivations. The relevance of basic capabilities is “not so much in ranking living standards, but in deciding on a cut-off point for the purpose of assessing poverty and deprivation” (Sen 1987, 109).
A third way in which the term ‘basic capabilities’ can be used is, as in analytical political philosophy, to refer to essential (moral and/or political) entitlements that signify a higher level of moral urgency, according to the philosopher’s own normative commitments. For example, Rutger Claassen, who has been developing an agency-based capability theory of justice, has been using the term ‘basic’ in that sense (Claassen 2016).
A fourth way to use the term ‘basic capability’ has been proposed by Bernard Williams. Yet this has, to the best of my knowledge, not been taken up by anyone. Williams has argued that it is important to distinguish between the capability to choose yet another new brand of washing powder from, say, Adam Smith’s often-cited capability to appear in public without shame. Williams rightly notes that “what you need, in order to appear without shame in public, differs depending on where you are, but there is an invariant capability here, namely that of appearing in public without shame. This underlying capability is more basic” (Williams 1987, 101). I agree with the need for the distinction that Williams makes, but I would rather call these underlying capabilities the general capabilities, so as to avoid confusion with Sen’s use of basic capabilities. I will turn to the discussion of general versus specific capabilities in section 3.2.4, but first I want to ask the question: how should we interpret the term ‘basic capability’?
My reading is that, within the capability literature, the most widespread (and hence dominant) use of ‘basic capabilities’ is Sen’s use, referring to poverty or deprivation. Hence, while the notion of capabilities refers to a very broad range of opportunities, ‘basic capabilities’ refers to the real opportunity to avoid poverty or to meet or exceed a threshold of wellbeing. By focusing on ‘basic’ capabilities, we are limiting the set of all capabilities in two ways: first, by having a selection of capabilities (i.e. those that are key to capturing wellbeing, and those that are centrally important), and second, by imposing a threshold at which those capabilities will be evaluated (i.e. at a low or poverty-like level).
Basic capabilities are thus crucial for poverty analysis and in general for studying the wellbeing of large sections of the population in poor countries, or for theories of justice that endorse sufficiency as their distributive rule. In affluent countries, by contrast, wellbeing analysis often focuses on capabilities that are less necessary both for survival and the avoidance of poverty. It is important to acknowledge that the capability approach is not restricted to poverty and deprivation analysis but can also serve as a framework for, say, project or policy evaluations or inequality measurement in non-poor communities. Sen’s and Nussbaum’s extensive writings on the capability approach in the context of poverty alleviation and development questions have misled some of their readers into thinking that the capability approach is about poverty and development issues only. Yet as has been absolutely clear from the description and account of the capability approach presented in chapters 1 and 2, there is conceptually or normatively no reason to restrict its scope in this way. The term ‘basic capabilities’ is helpful since it can signal to the reader when the capability approach is specifically used in this context.
3.2.4 Conceptual and terminological refinements
Over the years, several proposals have been made to refine the notions of ‘functioning’ and ‘capability’, or to add additional qualifications which may be helpful in capability analyses.
The first refinement — which is straightforward but still very helpful — is the distinction between general and specific functionings and capabilities (Alkire 2002, 31). Suppose we are concerned with questions about what is needed for people not to be socially excluded. Sen has repeatedly referred to Adam Smith’s example that, in order to be able to appear in public without shame, one needed (in the time and place Smith lived) a linen shirt. Yet in other countries one would need a sari, or a suit, or something else. We all know that in every specific time and place, there are certain types of clothes one shouldn’t wear if one doesn’t want to be frowned upon or be seen as inappropriately dressed. We could say that, for women in place A, being able to wear a sari is important, and for men in another place, being able to wear a suit is important, in order not to be excluded. ‘Being able to wear a sari’ and ‘being able to wear a suit’ are specific capabilities; ‘being able to wear the clothes that are considered appropriate’ is the more general capability. Thus, if we formulate the relevant capabilities at a higher level of generality, it will be easier to reach agreement on what those are, than if we focus on more specific capabilities (Sen 1992a, 108–09). General capabilities are thus the more generic and more abstract capabilities. The idea of general versus more specific functionings and capabilities is also entailed by Nussbaum’s idea of the multiple realisability of capabilities that are under scrutiny: the selected capabilities “can be more concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and circumstances” (Nussbaum 2000, 77).
A second conceptual refinement to consider is the concept of ‘refined functioning’. Sen (1987, 36–37) has proposed the concept of ‘refined functioning’ to designate functioning that takes note of the available alternatives. Sen (1992a, 52) notes: “‘fasting’ as a functioning is not just starving; it is choosing to starve when one does have other options”. The aim of this proposal is to try to bridge the choice between functionings and capabilities by a conceptual move. That is, one could focus on achieved functionings levels but — where appropriate — include the exercise of choice as one of the relevant functionings (Fleurbaey 2002). This allows us to stay within the realm of (observable) achievements, but because the act of choosing is included, one can derive from that functioning relevant information about whether one had options or not.
A third conceptual refinement — this time a qualification or property that we can attribute to a functioning or a capability — has been proposed by Avner De-Shalit and Jonathan Wolff. They have argued that what is relevant for the most disadvantaged persons is not so much whether they have any functionings, but rather whether those functionings are secure (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 2013). The idea here is that we are not only interested in the functionings that people can achieve, but also in the prospects that a person has to sustain that level — that is, the risk and vulnerability of losing that functionings achievement should be taken into account, even if the risk never materialises. The objective fact of risk and vulnerability itself should be seen as having an influence on how we normatively judge a functionings achievement (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 63–73).
Another qualification that we could add to capabilities is their robustness — referring to the probability of a capability being realisable. The standard definition of a capability is that it is a genuine option: if we have the capability and we choose this opportunity, then we should also enjoy the outcome — the functioning. But this presents us with a very dichotomous view of our options: either we have an option with a 100% probability, or else, if the probability is significantly less, it is implied that we do not have the capability. That is, arguably, a rather unhelpful way of thinking about real life processes. For example, the problem with women’s opportunities in advanced economies is definitely not that women have no capabilities to achieve professional success; rather, the problem is that, given a variety of mechanisms that are biased against female professionals, the robustness of the capabilities they are given is weaker. If an equally talented man and woman both want to succeed professionally, they may, in a liberal society, both have that capability — but the probability that the man will be able to succeed will be higher than the woman’s. She does have some opportunity, but that opportunity is less robust. Probabilities of success if one were to want to exercise that capability would be a way to express this. In the above gender case, the source of the different probabilities lies in the social and environmental conversion factors. But the source of the difference in robustness could also lie in internal factors. For example, a person with a psychiatric condition may have some opportunities for finding a job, but those opportunities may be much more precarious then they would be if she didn’t have those psychiatric challenges.
1 For a seminal analysis of the differences between Nussbaum’s and Sen’s conceptual and terminological apparatus, see the twin papers by David A. Crocker (1992, 1995).
2 The ‘equality of what?’ debate was prompted by Sen’s Tanner lecture with the same title (Sen 1980a), in which he argued that almost any theory of distributive justice is egalitarian, in the sense that they all advocate equality of something. The question to pose to a theory of distributive justice is therefore not whether it is egalitarian or not, but what is its answer to the ‘equality of what?’ question. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
Amartya Sen (1990c, 460) has described capabilities as
the freedom[s] to achieve valuable human functionings, which can vary from such elementary things as being well-nourished and avoiding escapable morbidity and mortality, to such complex achievements as having self-respect, being well-integrated in society, and so on. Capabilities thus reflect the actual freedoms that people respectively enjoy in being able to lead the kind of lives they have reason to value.
But several philosophers and social scientists have questioned the understanding (or, for philosophers: ‘conceptualisation’) of capabilities in terms of freedoms, asking whether capabilities could plausibly be understood as freedoms, whether Sen was not overextending the use of freedom, whether freedom is all there is to the capability approach, and whether it is wise to use the terminology of freedom for the goals of the capability approach (e.g. Cohen 1993; Gasper and Van Staveren 2003; Hill 2003; Okin 2003, 291–92). Let us therefore clarify and analyse the conceptualisation of capabilities as freedom by answering three questions. First, capabilities have been described as positive freedoms, but how should we understand that notion, and is that the best way to describe what kind of freedoms capabilities are? (Section 3.3.1) Secondly, is there a better conceptualisation of freedom that captures what capabilities are? (Section 3.3.2) Thirdly, if it is the case that capabilities can coherently be conceptualised as freedoms, are capabilities then best understood as freedoms, or is it better to avoid that terminology? (Section 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Capabilities as positive freedoms?
Sen has often used the distinction between positive and negative freedoms, thereby describing capabilities as positive freedoms. For example, Sen (1984b, 315) has stated that he is trying “to outline a characterization of positive freedoms in the form of capabilities of persons”.3 In some discourses, especially in the social sciences, the term ‘positive freedoms’ is used to refer to access to certain valuable goods, such as the freedom to affordable high quality health care or education. Positive freedoms are contrasted with negative freedoms, which refer to the absence of interference by others, such as the freedom to own a gun.4 Yet these are by no means standard understandings of positive and negative freedom.
In making the claim that capabilities are positive freedoms, Sen often approvingly refers to Isaiah Berlin’s canonical distinction between positive and negative freedom, but unfortunately doesn’t explain in detail how we should read Berlin. This is potentially confusing, since Berlin’s use of the term ‘positive freedom’ is far from crystal clear.
Let us start from the clearest concept in Berlin — his notion of negative freedom — which Berlin (1969, 122) defines as follows: “I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity”. The opposite of having negative freedom is being coerced — the deliberate interference of other persons in an area of my life in which I could, without the interference, act freely. Negative freedom thus corresponds to freedom as non-interference, and Berlin speaks approvingly of this kind of freedom: “[…] non-interference, which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not the only good. This is the ‘negative’ conception of liberty in its classical form” (1969, 128).
On positive freedom, there is much less clarity in Berlin’s work. Berlin first introduces positive freedom as the freedom to be one’s own master:
I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be a somebody, not nobody, a doer — deciding, not being decided for; self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. (Berlin 1969, 131)
Berlin argues that the metaphor of self-mastery historically developed into the idea that a person has two selves, a dominant self which is identified with reason and a ‘higher nature’, and a ‘heteronomous self’ which follows desires and passions and needs to be disciplined. Berlin continues that the first self, the ‘real self’, may become seen as wider than the individual,
as a social whole of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a church, a state, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn. This entity is then identified as being the ‘true’ self which, by imposing its collective, or ‘organic’ single will upon its recalcitrant ‘members’ achieves its own, and therefore their ‘higher freedom’. (Berlin 1969, 132)
Put differently, men are “coerced in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt” (132–133). Berlin acknowledges that one could, in principle, develop the same justification of tyranny starting from the definition of negative freedom, but continues to argue that this is easier with the positive conception of freedom. The reason is that the idea of positive freedom as self-mastery entails a distinction between my ‘true’ self and an ‘untrue self’. It is therefore possible that someone else other than you knows better what your true self is, which opens up a space for another person to coerce you in the name of your ‘true self’. Berlin believes that this has historically been the case with tyrannical regimes that propagated an ideology entailing a notion of positive freedom as self-mastery, whereby everything can be justified in the name of some true or higher self that needs to master other impulses and desires.
It is not difficult to see that positive freedom in Berlin’s sense is not the kind of freedom that capabilities represent, especially not when understood against the historically tyrannical shape that this ideal (according to Berlin) took. Capabilities are not about people’s internal attitudes towards what they should do with their lives. At the political level, the capability approach would advocate that we should organise our political life in such a way as to expand people’s capabilities, whereby the capability approach will judge that two persons had the same initial equal freedom if both of them had the same initial set of valuable options from which to choose. The capability approach, therefore, is not strongly perfectionist and teleological, as is the positive freedom doctrine in Berlin’s sense. In sum, capabilities are very different from Berlin’s notion of positive freedom, and Berlin’s understanding of positive freedom is not the best way to capture the kinds of freedom that capabilities are.
In later work, Sen acknowledged the potential for confusion that his equation of capabilities with positive freedom and his references to Berlin’s work had made, and provided a clearer description of his own understanding of positive freedom. In his Arrow lectures, Sen (2002a, 586) wrote:
positive freedom has also been variously defined, varying on one side from the general freedom to achieve in general, to the particular aspect, on the other side, of freedom to achieve insofar as it relates to influences working within oneself (a use that is close to Berlin’s conceptualization of positive freedom). In my own attempts in this field, I have found it more useful to see ‘positive freedom’ as the person’s ability to do the things in question taking everything into account (including external restraints as well as internal limitations). In this interpretation, a violation of negative freedom must also be — unless compensated by some other factor — a violation of positive freedom, but not vice versa. This way of seeing positive freedom is not the one preferred by Isaiah Berlin.
This quote also draws attention to another drawback of defining capabilities in terms of positive freedom. Violations of negative freedoms will, according to Sen, always lead to violations of positive freedoms; yet for Berlin this need not be the case. In a totalitarian state which espouses a doctrine of positive freedom, in which the state will help the citizens to ‘liberate their true selves’, a violation of a range of negative freedoms, such as the freedom of expression or of the freedom to hold property, will not violate positive freedom; on the contrary, within the parameters of that doctrine, violations of such negative freedoms may even enhance the state-aspired positive freedom.
So where does all this terminological exegesis lead us? It has often been remarked that there are many available definitions of negative and positive freedom. Berlin’s conceptualisations are canonical, but his definition of positive freedom is very different from Sen’s. Moreover, as Charles Taylor (1979, 175) rightly pointed out, the debate on negative and positive freedoms has been prone to polemical attacks that caricature the views of both sides. One therefore wonders what is to be gained by describing capabilities in terms of positive freedoms — at least, if one is aware of the philosophical background to this term. Perhaps it may be wiser to look further for an alternative conceptualisation that is less prone to creating misunderstandings?
3.3.2 Capabilities as opportunity or option freedoms?
Luckily, in other parts of Amartya Sen’s writings we can find the answer to the question of what kind of freedoms capabilities are (if any at all). Although Sen’s first descriptions of capabilities were couched exclusively in terms of positive freedoms, he soon offered an alternative description in terms of opportunities.5 In his 1984 Dewey Lectures, Sen (1985c, 201) defended a conceptualisation of wellbeing freedom in terms of capabilities, and defined wellbeing freedom as:
whether one person did have the opportunity of achieving the functioning vector that another actually achieved. This involves comparisons of actual opportunities that different persons have.
Similarly, in Inequality Reexamined, Sen (1992a, 31) writes:
A person’s position in a social arrangement can be judged in two different perspectives, viz. (1) the actual achievement, and (2) the freedom to achieve. Achievement is concerned with what we manage to accomplish, and freedom with the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value.
Given Sen’s descriptions of the freedoms that the capability approach is concerned with in terms of opportunities, it seems a natural suggestion to investigate whether the concept of ‘opportunity freedom’ better captures the nature of capabilities.
Charles Taylor, in his discussion of Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive freedom, has argued that beneath the distinction between positive and negative freedom lies another set of distinctions, namely between an exercise concept of freedom and an opportunity concept of freedom. The exercise concept of freedom refers to an agent being free “only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one’s life”, whereas according to the opportunity concept of freedom “being free is a matter of what we can do, of what is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise these options” (Taylor 1979, 177). According to Taylor, theories of negative freedom can be grounded on either an exercise or an opportunity concept, but theories of positive freedom can never be grounded merely on an opportunity concept. Taylor’s goal is arguing in favour of the exercise concept of freedom, and shows that the crude view of negative freedom (which, he argues, Berlin is defending) is untenable. Taylor (1979, 177) describes the opportunity concept of freedom thus: “being free is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise these options. […] Freedom consists just in there being no obstacle. It is a sufficient condition of one’s being free that nothing stand in the way”.
Is Taylor’s opportunity concept of freedom the kind of freedom we are searching for in our attempt to understand the nature of capabilities? His concept comes close, but it is narrower than the conception of freedom contained in the idea of capabilities. For Taylor, only external obstacles count in the definition of negative freedom (Taylor 1979, 176, 193; Kukathas 2007, 688). He holds that the acknowledgement of internal obstacles to action, including the action to choose between different opportunities, merges an element of the exercise concept of freedom into the opportunity concept. The notion of opportunity in Taylor’s concept of opportunity freedom thus resembles a formal notion of opportunity more closely than a substantive notion.
Here’s an example to illustrate the difference between Taylor’s opportunity concept of freedom and the notion of ‘capabilities’. If, in a patriarchal community, men have all the power, and in a verbally aggressive manner they teach girls and remind women that their place is inside the house, then surely these women do not have the same opportunity freedom to find employment in the nearest city where women from more liberal communities are holding jobs. In formal terms, the women from both communities may be able to work outside the home since there are jobs available to women in the city, they are able-bodied and are able to commute to the city. Yet the women from the patriarchal community would face much bigger costs and would need to gather much more courage, and resist the subtle working of social norms, before they could effectively access this formal opportunity. Put in capability terms, we would say that the first group of women has a much smaller capability to work outside the home than the women living in less patriarchal communities. If the costs and burdens borne by the women from strongly patriarchal communities are excessive, we could even conclude that the capability to work in the city is virtually nonexistent.
Luckily, more recent debates in political philosophy have further developed this discussion, in a way that is helpful in answering the question of how capabilities should be understood. Philip Pettit (2003) has argued that the philosophical debate on social freedom could benefit from being clear on the distinction between option-freedom and agency-freedom. While option-freedom is a property of options, agency-freedom is a property of agents. Agency-freedom relates to the long tradition in philosophy of seeing the slave as the prime example of someone who is not free: he is subjugated to the will of others. Agency-freedom focusses on the question of how a person relates to their fellows, and is a matter of social standing or status, not of the options that they enjoy (Pettit 2003, 394–95).
Options are the alternatives that an agent is in a position to realize. Pettit argues that option freedom is a function of two aspects: the character of access to options, and the character of options themselves. First, option freedom is a function of the character of the agent’s access to the options. Some philosophers would hold that the physical possibility of carrying out an option is sufficient for access, and thus would conclude that the agent has option freedom. Alternatively, one could defend the position that access to an option does not only depend on the physical possibility of carrying out the option, but that non-physical barriers are relevant too. Pettit distinguishes two possibilities: either an agent is objectively more burdened than another agent when trying to access an option, whether by difficulty or by penalty, or an agent is subjectively burdened in the sense that he believes that access to an option is not possible. The second aspect of option freedom is the character of the options. Here a wide range of views exist, such as the number of options that are accessible, their diversity, and whether they are objectively significant or subjectively significant (Pettit 2003, 389–92).
Capabilities are precisely this kind of option freedom. What counts in the capability approach is indeed the access that a person has to a wide range of valuable alternative options. In sum, capabilities can be understood as opportunity or option freedoms, but are broader than Taylor’s rather narrow opportunity concept of freedom. We can therefore conclude that it is conceptually sound to understand capabilities as freedoms of this sort.6
3.3.3 Are capabilities best understood as freedoms?
The detailed analysis in the previous section doesn’t settle all questions, though. It may well be the case that it is coherent to see capabilities as freedoms, but that there is another notion, such as human rights, basic needs, or something similar, that much better captures what capabilities are.
The answer to that question has to be contextual in the following sense. The capability approach is a deeply interdisciplinary approach, yet scholars from different disciplines will have different associations with certain terms. Philosophers may well have very different associations with the word ‘freedom’ than, say, anthropologists or development sociologists. Similar remarks can be made when the capability approach is being applied for policy and political purposes, since the term ‘freedom’ has in some countries a particular historical connotation, or is being claimed by extreme right or extreme left political parties, in the sense that if they were to come to power, they would use that power to drastically curtail the capabilities of (some sections of) the population. However, one should also not forget that the word ‘capabilities’ is non-existent in many languages, and may itself also lead to mistaken connotations, for example with skills or capacities in its French translation (capacité).
When developing a particular capability theory or capability application, should we frame the capability approach in terms of freedoms? My suggestion would be to answer this question in a pragmatic fashion. If the context in which the capability approach is applied makes it likely that the use of the term freedom will lead to the application being misunderstood, then I would suggest that one defines, describes and illustrates the word ‘capabilities’ and introduces that term. Yet for moral philosophers and political theorists who are eager to further develop the capability approach into a coherent political theory, a clear understanding of capabilities as option freedoms may pave the way for work that lies ahead. Pettit’s analysis of option freedoms, and the established literature to which he is referring in his analysis, give the capability scholar a neat overview of the choices that need to be made if one wants to turn the underspecified capability approach into a well-specified moral or political capability theory. For the political philosopher, there is therefore less reason to be worried about being misunderstood when referring to capabilities as option freedoms, or as opportunity freedoms.
3 Other statements equating capabilities with positive freedoms can be found in Sen (1982, 6, 38–39; 1984c, 78, 86; 1985c, 201; 2008, 18 among other places). In his 1979 Tanner lecture in which Sen coined the term ‘capability’, he did not refer to freedoms, but did use other terms such as ‘ability’ and ‘power’.
4 According to Sen (2009c, 282) this is the understanding of positive and negative freedom in welfare economics.
5 In fact, even this is not entirely correct, since in his earlier work and especially in his work written for economists, Sen did not speak of ‘capabilities’, but rather of ‘capability sets’ and thus also of ‘opportunity sets’ (see section 3.2.1).
6 It doesn’t follow, of course, that capability theories would not be able to pay attention to agency freedom. They do — for example by including relational capabilities in the selection of relevant dimensions, or by having some ideal of agency freedom as an additional moral principle included in module C4. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.03%3A_Are_capabilities_freedoms_and_if_so_which_ones.txt |
We now move to examine the issue that is central to module B6: should we, when developing a capability analysis or capability theory, focus on functionings, capabilities, or a mixture of both? After all, this question is not settled. It is one of the core features of the capability approach that it uses ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ as core notions (property A1, as discussed in 2.6.1) and that every capability analysis endorses the claim that functionings and/or capabilities form the evaluative space (property A5, as discussed in 2.6.5). But this still leaves the question unanswered whether we should focus on functionings, or on capabilities or on a combination of functionings and capabilities. Perhaps we have good reasons sometimes to focus on functionings, and sometimes on capabilities, for example for different types of applications, or for different groups of people?
Luckily, this question is not new to the capability literature, and there is by now a lively debate with many different types of arguments about whether the appropriate wellbeing metric should be capabilities or functionings, hence opportunities or achievements. What reasons or considerations have been argued to be relevant for this choice?7
The first consideration concerns anti-paternalism. It is a normative consideration: by focusing on capabilities rather than functionings, we do not force people into a particular account of good lives but instead aim at a range of possible ways of life from which each person can choose. Thus, it is the liberal nature of the capability approach, or an anti-paternalist commitment, that motivates a principled choice of capabilities rather than functionings. Obviously, the strength of this argument depends on how bad one takes paternalism to be. There may be good reasons to believe that some paternalism is unavoidable, or even desired (Nussbaum 2000, 51–56; Robeyns 2016b). Moreover, some scholars have argued that some element of paternalism in the capability approach may well be unavoidable. One reason is that the protection of the capacity to choose from one’s capability set requires certain functionings, such as mental health and education, to be promoted as achievements, rather than merely as freedoms (Gandjour 2008). Another reason is that the protection of certain specific capabilities requires either previously certain functionings-levels, or else requires certain levels of achievement of other capabilities, or requires that enough other people have functionings achievements within those capabilities (e.g. Robeyns and Van der Veen 2007; Claassen 2014; Robeyns 2016b). Rutger Claassen has identified five different types of mechanisms in which capability protection leads to the promotion of functionings, and has concluded that “any capability theory will have to confront the issue of paternalism” (Claassen 2014, 72).
As this literature shows, there are many reasons why one can reasonably decide sometimes to promote functionings, rather than capabilities. Here, I will only give one example, namely limits to our capacities to make informed choices in a voluntary, autonomous way. Let us start with an uncontested case: infants and the severely cognitively disabled. The concept of functioning has particular relevance for our relations to those human beings who are not yet able to choose (infants), who will never be able to make complex choices (severely mentally disabled individuals), or who have lost this ability through advanced dementia or serious brain damage. Whether or not these persons can decide to be well nourished and healthy, it is generally held that we (through families, governments, or other institutions) have the moral obligation to promote or protect their nutritional and healthy functioning. All capability theorists agree that in these cases, we should focus on functionings rather than capabilities. The implicit underlying assumption in the claim that capabilities have normative priority over functionings is that we assume the presence of a sufficient level of agency in the individuals who will be given the power to make their own choices from their capability sets. If we have strong reason to believe that such agency cannot be attributed to a person, we should not let the person herself decide on which options to choose; however, we should find ways of compensating for that lack of agency — either by having a steward make the choices for her or by guiding her in the choice-making process. Thus, we will shift our normative concern from capabilities to functionings for those who are incapable of deciding for themselves. In empirical research, this implies, for example, that it is fine to study the quality of life of small children by focussing on a range of functionings (e.g. Phipps 2002).
But the paternalism claim is not limited to the case of infants and the severely cognitively disabled: one could also apply this argument — at least to some extent and in some areas — to all adults. Adults, too, often make systematically irrational or mistaken choices. We are often not able to choose what is best for us simply because of our psychological makeup; many of our choices are the result of the impulsive, unreflective, habit-driven part of our brain rather than the deliberative and reflective part. There is mounting empirical evidence of our systematic failures in choice-making, that we are influenced by a large number of arbitrary factors in making choices and that we often harm our own interests in non-deliberate and non-intentional ways (e.g. Ariely 2010; Kahneman 2011). It is entirely consistent for a capability theory to argue that we have strong reasons to protect people against their own systematic irrationalities, just as it is consistent for the capability approach to argue that there are stronger reasons why we should allow people to make the errors that follow from their own systematic irrationalities: both positions follow from choices made in the B-modules.
Summing up, we have here a first normative consideration that can help us to decide whether some (limited or fuller) focus on functionings rather than capabilities is acceptable, namely the question of whether there are mechanisms that justify paternalism.
A second normative consideration in the choice between capabilities and functionings stems from the importance given to personal responsibility in contemporary political philosophy. If one believes that the moral aim should be to establish equality of opportunity, then it follows that one should, at least as an ideal, favour equality of capability over equality of functionings. If equality of capability becomes the ideal, then each person should have the same real opportunity (capability), but once that is in place, each individual should be held responsible for his or her own choices. It is important to stress, however, that philosophers and social scientists working on issues of social justice do not at all agree on whether equality of opportunity (capabilities) should be the goal, rather than equality of outcome (functionings). On the one hand, the responsibility-sensitivity principle is widely endorsed not only in political philosophy but also in the mathematical models being developed in normative welfare economics. If one wants to endorse and implement this principle of responsibility-sensitivity, then specifications and applications of the capability approach should focus on capabilities, rather than functionings. On the other hand, scholars have objected to the weight given to personal responsibility, both within the highly abstract theorising about ideals and when considering more applied and practical issues. At a highly abstract theoretical level, philosophers disagree on whether we should endorse responsibility-sensitivity in developing the capability approach (Fleurbaey 2002; Vallentyne 2005; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Moreover, for applied work, serious epistemological hurdles may ultimately lead us to drop the responsibility-sensitivity principle for practical reasoning about the actual world: in practice, it is often impossible to know what the causal factors were that led someone to make decisions that lowered her achieved wellbeing, and hence it is difficult or even impossible to know whether the causal factors are those for which one could be held morally responsible or not.
Thirdly, there may be institutional considerations that have an influence on whether we choose functionings, capabilities, or a mixture (Robeyns 2016b). Take the example of a government that has, with the broad support of the population, set up a welfare state arrangement, which includes certain welfare rights. Then this government may demand from citizens who want to be part of this societal arrangement that they proactively aim to master, secure, or maintain certain functionings, such as being able to read and write, or to speak a language that does not exclude one from holding a job. A welfare state arrangement that offers citizens relatively generous welfare rights can legitimately induce or perhaps even force citizens and legal residents to choose certain functionings that are needed in order to justly participate in that welfare state arrangement. But here, again, one has to pay attention to detail and be careful, since we would want to distinguish between those who didn’t exercise a functioning but had the capability versus those who didn’t exercise a functioning but due to inability didn’t have the capability in the first place. For example, if the political community believes that it is a fair requirement in order to enjoy the benefits of the welfare state that one learns the major dominant local language, then we have to make a distinction between those who do, those who don’t but could, and those who don’t but are unable. In practice, that distinction may sometimes be very hard to make. Nevertheless, the general point to take home is that an outcome-oriented theory of justice needs to be bolstered with an account of what justice requires from the institutional design for a state or coalition of states. Reasons of reciprocity, feasibility, and stability may justify a focus on functionings rather than merely on capabilities.
Fourthly, there are pervasive cases of interdependence between people’s capabilities that may prompt us to look beyond the capability of a single person. One important type of case is that in which a capability is available to a person but only if other people do not also want to realize that capability (Basu 1987, 74). For example, two spouses may each have the capability of holding demanding jobs which are each incompatible with large caring responsibilities. However, if these spouses also have infants or relatives with extensive care needs, then at best only one of them may effectively realize that capability. Another type of case is that in which the capability of one person is only possible if enough other people have chosen to realise the corresponding functioning (Claassen 2014, 67–68). Take the example of being protected against dangerous infectious diseases such as polio or measles by way of a vaccine. In order genuinely to have that capability, one does not only need access to a vaccination, but enough other people need to choose to be vaccinated, since protection requires that a certain minimal number of people are vaccinated. In other words, my child’s capability to be protected from the debilitating effects of polio or the measles depends on your choice to exercise that capability and opt for the functioning — that is, to vaccinate your children.
Since capability sets may thus include freedoms that are conditional (because they depend on the choices of other people), it might be better to focus both on the individual’s capability set and also on what people have been able to realize from their own capability sets, that is, their functionings or wellbeing achievements. The question of who decides or should decide this sort of question highlights the importance of agency and procedural fairness, which are often additional normative commitments included in the capability theory that is developed.
Finally, note that in many empirical applications, an analysis of functionings is used as a proxy for an analysis of the capability set. In the case of comparison of inequalities between groups, it has been argued that group-inequalities in functionings should be taken to reflect group-inequalities in capabilities, except if a plausible reason can be offered for why the members of those groups would systematically choose differently (Robeyns 2003; Kuklys and Robeyns 2005). Tania Burchardt and Rod Hicks have stressed that if inferences about capabilities based on information about functionings are made, one should be explicit about the underlying assumptions, and that three different situations could occur, namely:
(1) situations in which all difference in outcomes might reasonably be attributed to differences in capabilities (such as where a person is assaulted); (2) situations where differences in preferences may result in differences in outcomes, but where for the purposes of public policy it may be possible to assume that any differences are a result of differing levels of capabilities; and (3) situations in which additional evidence may be needed in order to determine whether differences in outcomes are genuinely a result of differences in capability. (Hick and Burchardt 2016, 80)
What is the upshot of all these considerations? In my view, there are sound reasons why one would limit oneself to capabilities, there are sound reasons why one would rather focus only on functionings, and there are sound reasons why one would prefer a mixture. The choice depends on the purpose of the capability theory, but also on the additional ontological choices one endorses (e.g. one’s idea of human nature — are we fully rational or not, and what, if anything, should be the consequences for policy making and institutional design), on the normative principles one adds to the core of the capability approach when developing a capability theory (e.g. endorsement of neutrality or not), and on practical constraints one is facing. We cannot say in general that the capability approach should focus exclusively on capabilities, or exclusively on functionings. It all depends on additional theoretical choices and normative commitments, which can be made in modules B and C, when developing a capability analysis.8
7 General discussions surveying different reasons to choose for functionings, capabilities or both, can also be found in Robeyns and Van der Veen (2007, 45–99, 76–78), Hick and Burchardt (2016, 79–82) and Robeyns (2016b).
8 I therefore think that Nussbaum’s (2011c) claim that it is a core property of the capability approach that it focusses on capabilities rather than functionings is mistaken (Robeyns 2011, 2016b; see also Claassen 2014). | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.04%3A_Functionings_or_capabilities.txt |
In the previous chapter, it was already highlighted that diversity among human beings is a key motivation as well as a conceptual characteristic of the capability approach (module B3). Given how central human diversity is to the approach, it is worth saying a few more words on this topic. There are two important points to make: first, the mechanisms that the capability approach has at its disposal to account for diversity, and second, the attention given to diversity within the existing capability literature.
The capability approach takes account of human diversity in at least two ways. First, by its focus on the plurality of functionings and capabilities as important evaluative spaces. By including a wide range of dimensions in the conceptualization of wellbeing and wellbeing outcomes, the approach broadens the so-called ‘informational basis’ of assessments, and thereby includes some dimensions that may be particularly important for some groups but less so for others. For example, in standard outcome assessments, women as a group virtually always end up being worse off than men. But if the selection of outcome dimensions is shifted to also include the quality and quantity of social relations and support, and being able to engage in hands-on care, then the normative assessment of gender inequality becomes less univocal and requires much further argument and normative analysis, including being explicit about how to aggregate different dimensions (Robeyns 2003, 2006a).
Secondly, human diversity is stressed in the capability approach by the explicit focus on personal and socio-environmental conversion factors that make possible the conversion of commodities and other resources into functionings, and on the social, institutional, and environmental contexts that affect the conversion factors and the capability set directly. Each individual has a unique profile of conversion factors, some of which are body-related, while others are shared with all people from her community, and still others are shared with people with the same social characteristics (e.g. same gender, class, caste, age, or race characteristics). In the account of the capability approach presented in chapter 2, this is made very explicit by having module A3 focus on the conversion factors, which is an important source of interpersonal variations (the other source is how structural constraints affect people differently). As Sen (1992a, xi) has argued, interpersonal variations should be of central importance to inequality analysis:
Investigations of equality — theoretical as well as practical — that proceed with the assumption of antecedent uniformity (including the presumption that ‘all men are created equal’) thus miss out on a major aspect of the problem. Human diversity is no secondary complication (to be ignored, or to be introduced ‘later on’); it is a fundamental aspect of our interest in equality.
Indeed, if human beings were not diverse, then inequality in one space, say income, would more or less be identical with inequality in another space, like capabilities. The entire question of what the appropriate evaluative space should be would become obsolete if there weren’t any interpersonal difference in the mapping of outcomes in one space onto another. If people were all the same and had the same needs and abilities, then the capability approach would lose much of its force and significance, since resources would be excellent proxies for our wellbeing and wellbeing freedom. But as it happens, human beings are very diverse.
However, we also need to acknowledge that there is significant scholarly dispute about the question of which dimensions and parameters of human diversity are salient, and which are not. Scholars embrace very different accounts of human diversity, which is why we have module B3 in the capability approach. One’s account of human diversity can often be traced back to the ontological accounts one accepts of diversity-related factors, as well as the role of groups in explanatory accounts. An example of the former is the account of gender and race that one embraces. If one holds a theory of gender and race that regards these as rather superficial phenomena that do not have an important impact on people’s behaviour and opportunities in life, then the attention given to diversity in a capability application or capability theory will be rather minimal. This is logically consistent with the structure of capability theories (as laid out in chapter 2), but it is also a view that has not been widely embraced in the capability literature. Instead, the capability approach attracts scholars who endorse accounts of dimensions of gender, race, and other dimensions of human diversity that are much richer. Presumably, these scholars recognise the ways in which the capability approach can account for human diversity, hence this may explain why most capability scholars endorse rich accounts of such diversity.
A strong acknowledgement of human diversity has therefore become a hallmark of the capability approach as that literature has developed. Its criticism of other normative approaches is often fuelled by, and based on, the claim that human diversity is insufficiently acknowledged in many normative frameworks and theories. This also explains why the capability approach is often favourably regarded by feminist scholars, and by academics concerned with global justice, race or class relations, or care and disability issues. One of the main complaints of these scholars about mainstream philosophy and economics has been precisely this issue: the relative invisibility of the fate of those people whose lives do not correspond to that of an able-bodied, non-dependent, caregiving-free individual who belongs to the dominant ethnic, racial and religious groups. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.05%3A_Human_diversity_in_the_capability_approach.txt |
Several scholars have proposed the introduction of a category of ‘collective capabilities’ or ‘community capabilities’ (Evans 2002; Ibrahim 2006, 2009, 2017; Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010; Murphy 2014). The idea of ‘collective capabilities’ is used in different ways in the literature, and not always spelled out very carefully. I will try to reconstruct what ‘collective capabilities’ could mean, and then discuss to what extent these are different from human capabilities tout court.
It is instructive, first, to see in which contexts different authors introduce the idea of ‘collective capability’. Here are a few typical examples from the literature. Solava Ibrahim (2006, 2009, 2017) argues for the importance of collective capabilities from the perspective of the work done by self-help groups of poor people fighting to overcome their poverty, which is an issue also discussed by Stewart (2005).9 David Schlosberg and David Carruthers (2010) argue for the importance of the idea of collective capabilities to understand the struggles of indigenous peoples for ecological justice. And Michael Murphy (2014) argues that political self-determination (of an indigenous group) should be considered to be a collective capability which should be a central aim for development.
What is shared in those cases, and what makes the idea of ‘collective capability’ plausible, is that a group or collective is needed to engage in collective action in order to reach the capability that the members of that group find valuable.
Sen (2002b) points out that we should be careful not to confuse this with a capability that he calls “socially dependent individual capability” — a person’s capability, which that person enjoys, but for which the person is dependent on others to have that capability realised. Perhaps we should not use the term ‘individual capability’ but rather ‘personal capability’, since for many defenders of ‘collective capabilities’ the word ‘individual’ evokes pejorative images of persons living by themselves on an island. There are no such human creatures; we all live interdependently, and none of us could grow up without prolonged care from others, or, as adults, have a decent chance of surviving and living a minimally adequate life. Human beings are, just as other mammals, animals who live in groups. Although philosophers are used to working with terms outside their everyday use, and most philosophers (especially those with an analytical background) will not have these pejorative connotations when they hear the term ‘individual capabilities’, I will proceed with the term ‘personal capabilities’ in order to facilitate the discussion in this section.
Now, if we are very strict in our terminological distinctions, then collective capabilities are also personal capabilities, since it is individual persons who enjoy the capabilities that are thus secured. Still, there are two justifications to proceed with the term ‘collective capability’ — one fundamental one, and one additional one which is especially weighty from a practical point of view.
The fundamental reason to keep and use the term ‘collective capability’ is that we may want to make a distinction between capabilities that are only realisable with the help of others, versus capabilities that require a group or collective to act in order to secure a capability for the members of that group. An example of the former would be learning a foreign language. It is impossible to do that without the help of others; one needs a teacher, or at the very least books and audio-tapes or internet lessons that help one with self-study. Still, that doesn’t suffice to say that learning a language is a collective capability. There is no group involved, and no collective action of that group is necessary in order to achieve the functioning. A different case is acquiring the capability to vote in elections for groups that are not yet given suffrage. Fighting for that capability is not possible on one’s own. One needs collective action — e.g. the first wave women’s movement, or the civil rights movement in the US, or the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa — to act collectively so that the group is granted the capability, and all persons who belong to that group can enjoy the newly won freedom.
The second reason to accept the notion of ‘collective capability’ is because it is already present in the practice of certain justice movements, whose demands fit very well with the capability approach, for example because they embody claims of diversity or because they fight for a notion of the good life or of justice that goes beyond a narrow materialist or economistic view of what is valuable. Examples include the disability movement, the women’s movement and indigenous struggles.
So the idea of a collective capability can be understood and can be justified. Nevertheless, two warnings are in order, which may be needed to avoid conceptual confusion as well as an overuse or inflation of the notion. The first comment is that all that has been said so far does not permit one to conclude that one has personal (individual) capabilities and collective capabilities as two mutually exclusive categories. Rather, collective capabilities are a subset of personal capabilities, namely those personal capabilities that require for their realisation action by a group or a collectivity. Secondly, we should be very careful to be clear to keep our concepts distinct and correct when developing a capability theory. The modular account of the capability approach has ample conceptual and theoretical space to account for collective processes, the social embedding of persons, the influence of social structures on our choices and opportunities, a proper acknowledgement of social processes of preference formation as well as the crucial role of social institutions and norms in shaping a person’s capability set. But if we want to account for a social process, we shouldn’t just jump to the claim that we have now found a collective capability. Rather, we should use the quite complex and multi-layered framework that was presented in figure 2.1, and be clear when something is a social structure that is shaping our capabilities, rather than a capability itself. Means to ends (capabilities) and the ‘capability determinants’ (the social structures, social norms, institutions, etc.) can all be part of our evaluation — we just need to keep in mind which parts of what we evaluate are the means, which are the ends and why we evaluate a certain dimension. In the case of the evaluation of the means, one important reason could be to see how those means have changed over time, as well as whether there is any scope to improve the contribution that those particular means can make to the increase of capability sets.
9 Self-help groups are “any informal income-generating or social activity initiated by a poor community to achieve permanent improvements in their individual and communal wellbeings” (Ibrahim 2006, 398–399). | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.06%3A_Collective_capabilities.txt |
The capability approach is closely related to notions of wellbeing and the quality of life. Sometimes it is assumed that the capability approach is a theory of wellbeing, which cannot be quite right since the capability approach can be used for many purposes, such as the construction of a theory of justice, poverty measurement or policy evaluation. Yet on the other hand, with its proposition that interpersonal comparisons be made in terms of functionings and/or capabilities, the capability approach is clearly also involved in offering us an account of wellbeing (Sen 1984c, 1985c, 2009a; Alkire 2016; Qizilbash 2013). But what, exactly, is the nature of the account of wellbeing in the capability approach? I will argue in this chapter that the more precise formulation is that the capability approach entails several slightly different accounts of wellbeing, which can be used for different purposes. Different capability theories have different purposes (module B1) and different meta-theoretical commitments (module B7), and the choices made in those modules will require different accounts of wellbeing for such capability theories.
When one looks at the accounts of wellbeing in the various disciplines in which the notion of ‘wellbeing’ plays a central role, one quickly notices that there are a range of quite different accounts proposed in different paradigms or disciplines, and that there is very limited discussion between those fields (Gasper 2010). In particular, there is surprisingly little interaction between the very large philosophical literature on wellbeing (Crisp 2013; Fletcher 2015) and the (theoretical and empirical) literature in psychology and economics, or the uses of the term wellbeing in particular fields, such as development studies or medical care. There are a few scholars who have tried to grasp this discrepancy, as well as explain why the philosophical and theoretical literatures, as well as the debates in different disciplines, are so little connected (e.g. Alexandrova 2013; Rodogno 2015b, 2015a). This is the background against which we must try to understand the place of the capability approach in thinking about wellbeing, and try to understand the accounts of wellbeing used in capability theories. I therefore believe that it is helpful first to try to grasp that scholarly context in somewhat more detail (section 3.7.1). Then we will briefly look at the standard typology of wellbeing theories (section 3.7.2), before analysing the question of which account (or rather, accounts) of wellbeing are entailed in the capability approach (section 3.7.3).
Before we start, one further clarification may be helpful. Recall that the capability approach includes a notion of achieved wellbeing (focussing on functionings) as well as a notion of wellbeing freedom, represented by one’s capability set (Sen 1985c, 1993a). The distinction between achieved wellbeing and wellbeing freedom is virtually absent from the wellbeing literature. In contemporary philosophy, most philosophical accounts focus on how well life is going for a person, hence on achieved wellbeing. But clearly, for policy purposes, we will often focus on wellbeing freedom, since other values, such as respect for personal autonomy or even human dignity, may prevent us from having a specific wellbeing outcome as a legitimate policy goal. When in the capability approach the term ‘wellbeing freedom’ is used, it refers to what philosophers elsewhere would call ‘opportunities for wellbeing’. This notion is especially relevant in moral theories where we try to balance a concern for wellbeing with a concern for individual freedom to choose: the term ‘wellbeing freedom’ tries to bring together and integrate those two values.
3.7.1 The aim and context of accounts of wellbeing
Philosophical discussions of wellbeing typically start out from a rather general definition of wellbeing, stating that wellbeing is about how well the life of a person is going for that person. The addition ‘for that person’ is important, since it means that in the philosophical literature wellbeing is generally conceived as what we could call a personal value, or a first-person value, rather than an institutional value — a value that we have to consider when we think about how to organise our collective life. While this demarcates ‘wellbeing’ from other public values such as ‘justice’ or ‘efficiency’, this is still a very general notion that can be elaborated in many different ways. Moreover, as was already mentioned, if we look at the debates in contemporary philosophy of wellbeing, we notice that they hardly relate at all to the empirical discussions in policy studies and the social sciences (with the exception of the relatively recent boom in subjective wellbeing analysis, which will be discussed in section 3.8).
Anna Alexandrova (2013) argues that the diversity in scholarship on wellbeing can be explained by the fact that the meaning of the use of the term ‘wellbeing’ differs depending on the context in which it is used. If the word ‘wellbeing’ is used by a medical doctor, or a policy maker, or a sociologist, or an adolescent reflecting on her options for her future life, they all use the term ‘wellbeing’ for different purposes and in a different context. I would like to add that, in particular, the aim or the purpose of our use of the term ‘wellbeing’ is crucial. That is, the term ‘wellbeing’ is never used in a vacuum; each use of that term plays a role in either explanatory or else normative projects. Normative projects always have a purpose, that is, something to judge, evaluate or recommend, which is precisely the choice that has to be made in module B1 in the account of the capability approach presented in chapter 2. Depending on whether we use the term ‘wellbeing’ for policy making, or for purely descriptive work, or for deciding what we owe to each other as fellow citizens, the term wellbeing will play a different function.
Most work on wellbeing in contemporary analytical philosophy is concerned with answering the question “What would be the best for someone, or would be most in this person’s interests, or would make this person’s life go, for him, as well as possible?” (Parfit 1984, 493). This is especially the case for the literature since the publication of Derek Parfit’s typology of theories of wellbeing. While Parfit’s typology is arguably crude, it has been very influential, and still serves an important function as an influential attempt that a philosopher has made to classify accounts of wellbeing.
In the next section, we will consider how (if at all) the capability approach fits into Parfit’s typology. But it is important to note that this highly abstract, very detailed and analytical strand in philosophy is only to a very limited degree concerned with (a) empirical applicability and measurement or (b) practical consequences, in the sense of action-guidance such as the establishment of normatively sound policy making or the question of which social arrangements we should want. The dominant contemporary philosophical literature on wellbeing is concerned with philosophical investigation in the sense of finding truths, and typically focussed on the entire lives of people from their own, first-person, perspective. That literature is much less concerned with wellbeing as an institutional value, with asking which account of wellbeing would be best when deciding what institutions we should implement — a question that can only be answered after taking feasibility considerations into account, or considering what would be best from the point of view of ethically sound policy making. However, as Alexandrova (2013, 311) rightly points out, “the context of an all-things-considered evaluation of life as a whole privileged by philosophers is just that: one of the many contexts in which wellbeing is in question”. Since most uses of the term ‘wellbeing’ in other debates, e.g. in applied philosophy or other disciplines, are concerned with overall evaluations of states of affairs and/or policy making, it shouldn’t surprise us that there is very little cross-fertilisation between those philosophical debates and the policy oriented and empirical literatures in other disciplines. This will have an influence on how we will, in the next section, answer the question how the capability approach fits into the standard typology of theories of wellbeing used in philosophy.
3.7.2 The standard taxonomy of philosophical wellbeing accounts
In Appendix I of his influential book Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984, 493) suggests that we should make a distinction between three types of philosophical wellbeing theories.
On Hedonistic Theories, what would be best for someone is what would make his life happiest. On Desire-Fulfilment Theories, what would be best for someone is what, throughout this life, would best fulfil his desires. On Objective List Theories, certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.
In interdisciplinary conversations, hedonistic theories are today better known under the label ‘happiness theories’. Interpreted from the perspective of the capability approach, hedonistic theories (or the happiness approach) entail that the only functioning that matters is happiness. The capability approach stresses what people can do and be (module A1) and ‘happiness’ or one’s hedonic state at best refers to one aspect of one’s being, not the various aspects of what we can do. The capability approach and the happiness approach do share some common characteristics, such as the fact that both focus on what they take to be of ultimate value. Yet the two approaches have very different ideas of what that ‘ultimate value’ should be, with the happiness approach defending an exclusive choice for a mental state versus the capability approach defending the focus on a plurality of aspects of our lives. It is therefore not plausible to see the happiness approach, or hedonism, as a specific case of the capability approach. However, more can be said about the precise relation between the capability approach and hedonistic or happiness approaches, which will be done in section 3.8.
How about the desire-fulfilment theories, or the objective list theories? Can the notion of wellbeing embedded in the capability approach plausibly be understood as either of those? Let us first very briefly describe the two types of theories, and then ask how the capability approach fits in.
Desire-fulfilment theories of wellbeing claim, essentially, that wellbeing is the extent to which our desires are satisfied. These desires could be our current, unquestioned desires. In philosophy, that is a view that cannot count on many defenders, since it is very easy to think of examples of current desires that will harm us in the near future, or else desires for something that is, arguably, not good for us, such as a desire for excessive amounts of food or alcohol. Philosophers have therefore proposed more sophisticated views of desires, called ‘informed desires’ (e.g. Sumner 1996). Those are desires that meet additional conditions, and different proposals have been made for what those conditions should be. Examples of such additional constraints include not being ignorant of facts, but also not being deceived, or not suffering from mental adaptation — which ranges from having adapted one’s aspirations to one’s dire circumstances, to having adapted one’s desires to one’s extremely affluent circumstances, to a more general ‘preference adaptation’ which applies to all of us in societies with social norms and the widespread use of advertisements.
For a philosophical theory of wellbeing, which merely asks the metaphysical question what is wellbeing for the person who is living that life, and which has no consequences for the choice of social arrangements or policy making, the informed desire theory has a very important attraction: it gives the authority to decide what would make life better to the person whose wellbeing we are investigating. We also see this account of wellbeing being helpfully put to work in various other contexts. For example, if the daughter of a family-owned business has no interest at all in continuing that business, and argues that her strongest desire in life is to become a medical doctor, then her parents may, regretfully, decide that it is indeed better for her to study medicine, since that is what she really wants. They may perhaps urge her to talk to a friend who is a medical doctor to get a better understanding of what that profession entails (that is, to ‘test’ whether her preferences are properly informed). Yet in such a context, the desire-fulfilment theory of wellbeing seems apt and appropriate.
The problems with the informed desire-fulfilment theory of wellbeing are especially relevant in other contexts where an account of wellbeing is needed for policy making or social change. The most significant is that our desires are moulded, not fully informed, and subject to social norms and other forms of societal pressures and expectations. For example, critics of capitalism argue that advertisement by profit-seeking companies form our preferences, and make us want things we would be better off without. There are many subtle forms of manipulation possible. Students of marketing learn that the products put at eye-height are more often taken by customers shopping in a supermarket. At the macro-level, the culture of late-modern capitalism tells us to find happiness in material success and in trying to achieve higher status in the dominant social order. We are socialised into these patterns, often not even aware of their existence. But why would those desires give us the highest level of wellbeing? Another interesting case is the standards of beauty that women are expected to meet, which will make them more attractive and ultimately happier. Dominant norms of beauty put a huge pressure on women (and increasingly also on men), leading to anxieties, low self-esteem, and even unhealthy conditions and illnesses such as anorexia (Lavaque‐Manty 2001). What if we could ‘reset’ our cultural and social norms, which would lead to less pressure, stress and fewer anxieties? Some alternative views of living, such as those advanced by deep ecology thinkers (e.g. Naess 1973, 1984), are based on the view that with a different set of desires, and a different appreciation of certain experiences and values, we would be able to live not only in an ecologically sustainable way, but also have higher levels of wellbeing. In sum, the desire-fulfilment theory is interesting and arguably plausible at the individual level, and also at the general level as a theoretical approach to wellbeing, which can make ample use of counterfactual and hypothetical thinking and conditions. But it is much trickier to think about wellbeing from a macro or third-person perspective in the world as it is, in which we don’t have information on how each person’s preferences have been formed and influenced.
How does the objective list theory fare? Objective list theories are accounts of wellbeing that list items that make our lives better, independent of our own view on this. The claim of objective list theories is that there is an irreducible plurality of issues that make up wellbeing; wellbeing is plural and cannot be reduced to a single thing. Secondly, those items are objectively good for us, whether or not we attach any value to (or desire) those items. Hence items such as being healthy, or having friends, or feeling well, are all good for us, whether we personally value them or not.
What are some of the main strengths and weaknesses of the objective list theories? Objective list theories are generally criticised for not respecting people’s views about their own lives, and hence taking away the authority to decide the quality of those lives from the agents leading them: in other words, for being paternalistic. Who is to decide that, say, social relationships are good for us? Now, this seems a very valid critique if we use an objective list theory for purely descriptive and first-person truth-seeking purposes, as the vast literature in philosophy does. But if one uses accounts of wellbeing for policy or political purposes, the public nature of the dimensions of wellbeing is rather important. This relates to what political philosophers have called ‘the publicity criterion’: if wellbeing is used for purposes of institutional design or policy making, those principles used need to be capable of being known by all to be satisfied in society (Rawls 2009; Anderson 2010, 85).
Indeed, this directly relates to an advantage of objective list theories: many of the items that have been proposed by such theories have been translated into specific indicators such as health or social policy, or else overall assessments have been made that can be used for an entire population. The long-standing literature on social indicators can be situated in this tradition (Boelhouwer and Stoop 1999; Boelhouwer 2002; Hagerty et al. 2001).
3.7.3 The accounts of wellbeing in the capability approach
So how does the capability approach fit in this standard taxonomy? The capability approach is often categorised as being an objective list theory, since functionings and capabilities are plural and the selection of dimensions gives us a list of items which are judged to be valuable for persons. However, in my view there is not merely one wellbeing account in the capability approach, but several wellbeing accounts.
So why is there not one, but several accounts of wellbeing in the capability literature? As was mentioned in the introduction to this section, the reason is that there are a variety of capability theories in the general capability literature, and those theories need different accounts of wellbeing. If a capability theory is used for a first-person perspective, for example by an adolescent contemplating what to do with her life, she may ask herself what she really wants: to study hard and work hard and become a medical doctor? Or does she have a stronger desire to build a family and search for a job that makes it possible to spend enough time with her children? Does she want to devote her life to fighting for a good cause? In this personal deliberation, the account of wellbeing she then uses can be seen as a desire-fulfilment account in which the desires all refer to functionings.
In the design of institutions, there is also often implicitly a desire-fulfilment account, by trying to create valuable options (capabilities) for citizens, but by not forcing them into those outcomes (functionings). But policy making can’t be done by trying to enlarge a non-specific general account of freedom to realise one’s desires: what would that look like? In policy making, we often assume that what we owe to each other are specific freedoms, not a general vague notion of overall freedom (Anderson 2000b). Therefore, at the policy level we can often see that the implicit account of wellbeing is desire-fulfilment, whereby it is assumed that the desires refer to particular functionings (such as being able to enjoy higher education or leisure activities in green spaces in cities), or, alternatively, policies provide the resources (money, and sometimes time) that are inputs for a wide range of desires that people may have.
If a capability theory is made for macro-level poverty analysis, then the researchers will select a number of functionings that they have reason to believe are good for people, such as their health, educational outcomes, and the kind of shelter in which they can live. The notion of achieved wellbeing entailed in this normative exercise is an objectively good account, although one could also argue that one has reason to assume that these are dimensions of the quality of life that people would want for themselves (hence their desires) and that, given that one is working with very large numbers, it is a safe assumption to proceed this way.
There are at least two interesting things to notice. First, for policy making we often have to choose either an approach that uses resources as a proxy for wellbeing (although this cannot account for differences in conversion factors between people) or else policy makers will try to provide a range of options to us, where ideally the policy maker assumes that these options are things that many people want. Second, the often-heard view that the account of wellbeing given by the capability approach is an objective list theory doesn’t seem to be true. Rather, depending on the kind of capability theory one is pursuing (in particular, the choice in B1) it is more accurate to see this as a desire-fulfilment or an objective list account. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.07%3A_Which_notion_of_wellbeing_is_used_in_the_capability_a.txt |
In section 3.7.2, we encountered hedonist theories of wellbeing as an important subgroup of theories of wellbeing. The debates about hedonism and the happiness approach are closely related. Hedonism is the philosophical view that wellbeing can be captured by the balance of pleasures over pains. The core aspect is the exclusive focus on mental states, and on a person’s subjective assessments of their own mental state. In recent decades, this approach has been revitalised in ‘the happiness approach’, although empirical scholars prefer the term ‘subjective wellbeing’ (SWB). The happiness and SWB literatures have in recent years gone through a revival.
On the empirical front, significant progress has been made in the last few decades by an international network of economists and psychologists, such as Andrew Clark, Ed Diener, Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Bruno Frey, Richard Layard, Andrew Oswald, David Schkade, Bernard van Praag and Ruut Veenhoven.10 Many of these scholars have concluded that sufficient scientific progress has been made for public policies to focus on subjective wellbeing. The measures of subjective wellbeing have been tested and refined, and much is supposedly known about the determinants of happiness that the government can influence. The happiness and SWB approaches are strongly focussed on empirical analysis and policy design, and this is also, therefore, the main lens that will be used in the comparison with the capability approach, although we will very briefly discuss the comparison between the theoretical happiness approach and the capability approach.
From the perspective of the capability approach, the happiness approach raises three questions: First, what is the happiness approach, exactly? Second, what are its strengths and weaknesses? Third, what role can happiness play in the capability approach?11
3.8.1 What is the happiness approach?
The happiness approach is based on the assumption that wellbeing (or quality of life) is constituted by the subjective experiences of a person, expressed in terms of utility, happiness, or satisfaction. Satisfaction can be expressed in terms of overall satisfaction with life, or satisfaction within particular domains, such as income, health, family relationships, labour, and so forth.
In the happiness approach, life satisfaction is understood as a concept that combines two components: how we normally feel in everyday life — the affective or ‘hedonistic’ component — and how we judge the degree to which our preferences and aspirations in life have been realised — the cognitive component. In order to find out how ‘happy’ a person is, respondents are asked, for example, to rate how satisfied they are with their life on a scale from 1 to 10 (to measure the cognitive component) and to report their mood at particular moments of the day, sometimes even with the aid of a buzzer set to go off at random times (to measure the affective component). In another method, the respondents are asked to imagine the worst possible life and to give that life a value of 0, to imagine the best possible life and give that a value of 10, and then to rate their own life on a scale from 0 to 10.
The view in the happiness literature is that overall life satisfaction should be adopted as the official ‘policy guide’, and the task of the government is to aim for the highest possible average level of life satisfaction (Hagerty et al. 2001; Layard 2011). For comparisons in the long term, Ruut Veenhoven also proposes to measure the quality of life based on ‘happy life expectancy’. This is an index obtained from multiplying life expectancy in a country with average overall life satisfaction (Veenhoven 1996).
Is the happiness approach, or the SWB approach, the best basis for thinking about wellbeing and the quality of life, especially against the background of policy design? The happiness approach certainly has a number of attractive features. Firstly, it puts the human being centre stage, rather than focusing on the means that human beings use to improve their quality of life. Hence the approach satisfies the core criterion from module A that means and ends should not be conceptually confused. Secondly, in considering the means to happiness, the subjective approach is not limited to material means, which is the major shortcoming of the dominant economic empirical methods. Income has only a limited (but not unimportant) role to play in generating happiness.
In conclusion, the happiness approach does have some significant strengths, but it also gives rise to some concerns. We will briefly discuss the main theoretical problem, and then look in more detail at the worries raised for empirical research and policy making.
3.8.2 The ontological objection
The theoretical worry is an ontological worry, that is, it asks what wellbeing is, and questions whether this can be captured by mental states only. This objection was forcefully made by Robert Nozick (1974, 42–45) when he introduced the ‘experience machine’ thought experiment. Nozick ask us to imagine that we are invited to be plugged into a machine, which would stimulate our brain and make us feel as if we were having a range of experiences that we could choose beforehand; all the time, we would be floating in a tank with electrodes attached to our brain. Would we choose such a life? Nozick claims we would not, and interestingly enough the arguments he gives to justify this claim refer to our functionings and capabilities.12 According to Nozick, three things matter to us in addition to our experiences. First, we do not only want to have the experience of doing certain things (which we could have by sitting and taking drugs) but we also want to do certain things. Second, “we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person” (Nozick 1974, 43). Third, we don’t want to limit our experiences to a man-made reality (the experience machine) but also to have the opportunity to be in contact with deeper significance. The insight from Nozick’s thought experiment is thus that a good life cannot be reduced to mental states, but must also contain some genuine activities and states of being. According to Nozick (1974, 43), “someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob”, not a human being to whom we can describe human wellbeing. There is thus more to human wellbeing then merely feeling happy. If decent labour, knowledge, appreciating art and culture, and intimate relationships are to be valued only, or even primarily, because of their contribution to overall or specific life satisfaction, then we could say this is a misrecognition of the contribution they make to how well our lives progress. Phenomenologically speaking, this is an implausible account of wellbeing.
3.8.3 Mental adaptation and social comparisons
How about the worries related to empirical research and policy making? The first worry at this level is raised by processes of mental adaptation and social comparisons. Our satisfaction is to some extent influenced by mental adaptation issues that emerge from comparisons with the situations of others. This can have problematic implications for public policies aiming at the highest happiness for the greatest number. Take the mental adaptation processes first. How do these emerge? First of all, there can be shocks in our lives that have a major effect on our wellbeing, such as immobility after an accident. People confronted with a major setback in health and mobility through such an impairment will first experience a strong deterioration of their subjective wellbeing, but after a while this effect will weaken. Obviously, this adaptation to circumstances is good, since a disabled person will not remain deeply unhappy for the rest of her life due to her limited abilities to move around without pain. However, the question is what this implies for policy. A utilitarian will say that the government has to limit itself to creating provisions such that a disabled person can return to an acceptable level of life satisfaction, taking into account the corresponding welfare costs for others.13 A utilitarian would even say that there is no reason to invest in prevention if this is more expensive than rehabilitation. But one could also argue that a cost-sensitive policy has to try to reach an acceptable level of functioning for a disabled person, even if this makes little difference to her subjective judgement about her wellbeing after adapting to the accident. Subjective indicators focus automatically on the first goal, but this may imply that the quality aspects that relate to the things a person still can do after the accident remain out of sight.
Secondly, people can adapt to an objective disadvantage that is not caused by an external shock, but that shows a more stable pattern. This is the problem of ‘adaptive preferences’, which is particularly relevant for the happiness approach.14 Amartya Sen has pointed out repeatedly that people living at the very bottom of the social ladder (such as ‘exploited labourers’ or ‘oppressed housewives’) adapt to their situation and come to suffer less intensely. Another example is the effect of racism. If a society becomes gradually less tolerant towards cultural minorities and increasingly accepts racist practices, then cultural minorities might get used to a racist social climate. Perhaps they will change their behaviour, in order to avoid contact with openly racist people. By changing their behaviour and mentally preparing for racist practices, it is possible that after a while the negative wellbeing effect of racism on minority groups will be partially wiped out. However, a policy that anticipates such adaptation processes is morally and politically problematic: racism should not be tolerated in society, even if it were not to have a significant impact on the subjective wellbeing of its victims. In order to judge that racism is not morally permissible and hence that policies should try to minimize racism, we don’t first need to investigate whether racism makes its victims less happy: that’s simply beside the point. Even if the victims of racism acted stoically and didn’t let racism affect their happiness levels, that wouldn’t make racism any less undesirable.
Another form of mental adaptation which is relevant for the government is the adjustment response to income changes. Subjective wellbeing judgements about income have been shown to adapt asymmetrically to income changes. Income increases go together with higher aspirations for the future, with only one third of the increase being reflected by improvements of subjective wellbeing (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Panel-analysis over a period of ten years shows that we adapt strongly to an increase in income, but much less so to a drop in income (Burchardt 2005). Thus, if people change positions in an income distribution which itself remains unchanged, then aggregate satisfaction of the population will decrease. The people who move up the ladder will be more satisfied for a short time, but quickly adapt to the new situation, whereas people who move downwards experience a larger drop in satisfaction — and this effect lasts longer as well. Tania Burchardt (2006) argues that due to similar phenomena of adaptation, people’s positions in the distribution of income, health and marital status should preferably remain immobile, according to utilitarianism. Clearly this is a policy conclusion that goes against the principle that people should receive equal opportunities, even if the effect of one person’s upward social mobility is not compensated by the effect of another person’s downward social mobility.
How serious are these problems of mental adaptation for the subjective approach? In part, the response to this question depends on our normative judgements about the counter-intuitive and sometimes perverse implications of a policy that single-mindedly aims to promote maximal average utility. It also depends, however, on the empirical question of how strong these mental adaptation processes are in reality. According to Veenhoven, overall life satisfaction is primarily determined by the affective component, and therefore it is much less vulnerable to the effects of mental adaptation than satisfaction in particular domains, which he judges to be much more vulnerable to adaptation. However, the work of Kahneman and Krueger (2006, 17–18) shows that mental adaptation processes are clearly present even when predominantly affective measures of overall happiness experiences are adopted.
There are additional concerns related to the subjective wellbeing findings in particular domains, such as income or education. Recall the literature reporting on the findings that subjective wellbeing is also strongly influenced by social comparisons with reference groups. In particular, the wellbeing effect of income, but also of education, is affected by the levels reached by members of the reference groups to which individuals compare their own situation. As a consequence, increases in income, or additional educational credentials, contribute less to satisfaction in these domains, the more income or educational progress is achieved within the reference groups. Apparently, these resources have a stronger positional component than other resources do, in particular leisure time, where the comparison effect appears to have a much weaker impact on wellbeing obtained from an additional unit of free time.
In conclusion, there seems to be little consensus in the subjective wellbeing literature on the question of whether, and to what extent, phenomena of mental adaptation and reference groups cause problems for the measurement of overall life satisfaction. However, all researchers do acknowledge that satisfaction in some domains is susceptible to these phenomena, and this may result in the counter-intuitive policy implications we mentioned earlier.
3.8.4 Comparing groups
The second worry about the happiness or SWB approach concerns the effect of group differences, which will be a problem if we need an account of wellbeing to compare wellbeing levels between groups. The subjective wellbeing approach focuses on the affective and cognitive responses of people to their lives overall, or in particular domains. If groups differ on average in their responses to a situation, then this may cause problems for policies, if those differences correlate with the objective circumstances that one would intuitively judge as important. There are two symmetric possibilities: (1) groups who are in the same objective situation have different levels of life satisfaction, or (2) groups with the same level of life satisfaction are in different situations, whereby it is clear that one situation is worse than the other independently of subjective wellbeing.
Research has indeed shown that the average level of life satisfaction between demographic groups differs systematically. In other words, if we control for the relevant factors, then some groups are significantly less satisfied with their lives than others. For example, recent Australian research (Cummins et al. 2003) shows that women report a higher level of overall life satisfaction than men, after taking a number of control-variables into account.15 The researchers cannot pinpoint the exact causes of this finding, but they do not exclude the possibility that women are ‘constitutionally’ more satisfied than men. This may have a biological explanation, but it may also be the consequence of processes of adaptation that men and women experience differently over their lifetimes.
If the aim of the account of wellbeing is to inform public policy, then the question is how government should deal with these findings. From a utilitarian perspective, it would be efficient to develop a policy that is advantageous to men. For example, if due to unemployment men experience a larger drop in happiness than women, as reported by Frey and Stutzer (2002, 419), then a policy that gives men priority on the labour market will minimise the average wellbeing damage in terms of happiness. But the fact that one demographic group (women, the worst off, the elderly, and so forth) are made less unhappy due to a certain event than other groups can cause perverse policy implications if life satisfaction is declared to be the guideline for policies. Fundamental political principles such as non-discrimination and equality of opportunities for all citizens are thereby put into jeopardy. This would also be true in the symmetric case where the average level of life satisfaction of discriminated or marginalised groups does not differ significantly from the average level of a group that is not faced with these disadvantages. I do not want to claim here that the subjective wellbeing approach will always lead to such injustices. But I do think that a central focus on subjective wellbeing will make policies less sensitive to signalling and combating these injustices. Hence Burchardt (2005, 94) is right in pointing out that “satisfaction — the best proxy we have for the concept of utility — is unsuitable for assessing current wellbeing, justice or equality”.
3.8.5 Macro analysis
A third worry concerns the applicability of the subjective wellbeing approach at the national or regional levels of policy making. One may agree that the happiness approach can be very helpful when it can offer persons with low affect (negative moods and feelings) concrete strategies to change that, such as engaging in mindfulness training and practice. Yet what about policy making? Are the happiness indicators sufficiently refined and sensitive for policy at lower levels of aggregation than the level of a country? In their discussion of the criteria that an index of the quality of life should meet, Hagerty and his co-authors (2001, 2) include the criterion that the index must help policy makers to develop and evaluate policies at all levels of aggregation. Thus, the index should not only be useful for the national government, but also for governments in cities, communities, and regions. As Robert van der Veen and I argued in earlier work, overall life satisfaction does not satisfactorily meet this criterion (Robeyns and Van der Veen 2007); it is too crude for these purposes. It is even less suitable for the evaluation of specific policy interventions (Cummins et al. 2003). The effect of one policy measure such as improved child care facilities will be reflected hardly or not at all in reported overall life satisfaction, even if such policies have significant effects on the real opportunities of parents to organise their lives as they think best — hence on their capabilities. Overall ‘happy life expectancy’ is, by contrast, well-suited for comparing the effects of fundamental political and economic institutions on subjective wellbeing. This emerges clearly from the work of Veenhoven (1996), which concentrates on studies whereby the unit of analysis is the country. In other words, Veenhoven mainly uses happy life expectancy as an indicator for macro-analysis. The variables that emerge as the determinants of happy life expectancy are therefore typically system variables such as the degree of political freedom, or the presence of rule of law. But the quality of life in a micro-situation (say, living in a particular community or neighbourhood) is also influenced by many other variables.
3.8.6 The place of happiness in the capability approach
The previous sections argued that happiness can’t be taken to represent a person’s wellbeing for many purposes, including policy purposes. Yet it would also be deeply counter-intuitive to say that happiness doesn’t matter at all. It may be the right concept of wellbeing for other aims. How, then, can happiness be given a proper place within the capability approach?
The first possibility is to see happiness, or some more specific capabilities that are closely related to the affective component of subjective wellbeing, as one important dimension to be selected. In fact, Amartya Sen has for many years argued that we could take ‘feeling happy’ as one of the functionings to be selected. For example, Sen (2008, 26) wrote:
happiness, however, is extremely important, since being happy is a momentous achievement in itself. Happiness cannot be the only thing that we have reason to value, nor the only metric for measuring other things that we value, but on its own, happiness is an important human functioning. The capability to be happy is, similarly, a major aspect of the freedom that we have good reason to treasure. The perspective of happiness illuminates one critically important element of human living.
Indicators of happiness are already included, for example, by incorporating dimensions of mental health into capability applications. Certain specific functionings, which make up an overall ‘mental health’ functioning, already contain such affective items: whether, over the last week, the respondent has felt down or worthless, for example, or whether one is free from worry.
Second, we can try to capture the cognitive aspect of happiness, that is, a person’s satisfaction with her capability set, or with particular options from that set. We can then compare that person’s level of satisfaction with her capabilities, which should allow us to compare the objective situation with a person’s satisfaction with that situation. For example, the absence of criminality is a valuable functioning.16 But there is a long-standing finding in criminology that there are discrepancies between the objective incidence of being safe versus the subjective feeling of being in danger of becoming a victim of crime. For example, even if the incidence and impact of criminality goes down, it can still be the case that the population is more worried about crime than before and feels less safe. The discrepancy between objective outcomes and subjective perception is instructive here; it may imply, for example, that the government should communicate more effectively about its success in reducing crime, so as to make the subjective perception more in line with the objective reality, or it should work directly on factors that impact on the subjective experience of safety feelings.
Third, capability scholars would, of course, hope that an enlarging of people’s functionings and capabilities would, as a further effect, increase their feelings of happiness and satisfaction, and serve as a (sometimes rough) indicator of people’s satisfaction with their functionings and capabilities (Sen 2008, 26–27). Not all functionings will lead to people becoming happier, yet their lives may still be better: more flourishing, or more meaningful, or with a higher quality of life, or with a greater degree of freedom that could be realised. An interesting example is the case of writing a PhD dissertation. Very few PhD students would say that this is what makes them happy in the sense outlined above. So why, then, do so many graduates want to earn a doctoral degree, and give some of the best years of their lives to what often becomes a stressful time? It is hard to understand this, if one doesn’t take into account the meaning it brings to their lives. The capability approach can capture this — taking on a difficult and challenging project such as writing a PhD dissertation can plausibly be conceptualised as a general functioning (consisting of a set of more specific functionings) that we may want to include in our capability analyses, including in our capabilitarian theories of wellbeing for public policies.
I would thus defend the position that various roles for happiness are potentially possible within capability theories, and that it depends on the exact purpose and scope of the capability theory or application, as well as the aim that wellbeing plays in that capability theory, what the best role (if any) for both the affective and cognitive aspects of happiness would be.
11 This section draws on, yet also modifies and expands, the analysis presented in Robeyns and Van der Veen (2007, 33–42).
12 Obviously, Nozick didn’t use the terminology of the capability approach, but his account of what is valuable in life could nevertheless be seen as capabilitarian.
13 A more fine-grained analysis than that presented in this section would need to make the distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism, and ask whether both are vulnerable to these critiques to the same extent. I am assuming here that the critiques apply to both types of utilitarianism to such a degree that it leads to worrying consequences.
14 Yet the phenomenon of ‘adaptive preferences’ can also potentially create problems for some capability theories, as we will analyse in section 3.9.
15 A similar strong and significant gender effect has been found by Eriksson, Rice and Goodin (2007).
16 Perhaps criminals would disagree. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.08%3A_Happiness_and_the_capability_approach.txt |
As we saw in the previous section, a widely-voiced reason offered for rejecting the happiness approach as an account of wellbeing is the phenomenon of adaptive preferences, which has been widely discussed in the literature (e.g. Elster 1983; Sen 1985c, 3, 1992a; Nussbaum 2000; Teschl and Comim 2005; Burchardt 2009; Khader 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013; Conradie and Robeyns 2013). Phenomena of mental adaption are a problem if we take happiness or desire-satisfaction to be our account of wellbeing. Yet we also concluded in section 3.7.3 that the capability approach sometimes boils down to a desire-fulfilment account of wellbeing. Hence we need to ask: how do processes of adaptation affect the desire-fulfilment view of wellbeing, and what are the implications for the capability approach?
In the most general terms, preferences formation or adaptation is the phenomenon whereby the subjective assessment of one’s wellbeing is out of line with the objective situation. Two persons who find themselves in the same objective situation will have a very different subjective assessment, because one is happy with small amounts of ‘objective goods’, whereas the other is much more demanding. In the capability literature, the general concern is with deprived persons who, over time, adapt to their objectively poor circumstances, and report a level of subjective wellbeing which is higher than the objective circumstances warrant.
The idea of adaptation can take different forms. Jon Elster (1983) referred to one particular type of adaptation, in which being unable to fulfil a preference or realise an aspiration leads one to reject that preference or aspiration. This phenomenon is known as ‘sour grapes’: the fox who cannot pick the grapes, because they are hanging too high for him, starts telling himself that they are sour anyway, and no longer desires to eat them. On Elster’s account, adaptation occurs at a non-conscious level, as a reaction to the painful process of cognitive dissonance that a person who can’t fulfil her unreachable desires or aspirations feels. Elster’s notion of adaptive preferences only refers to a process, and makes no reference to an objective notion of wellbeing. These psychological aspects of adaptation are echoed in Sen’s reference to this phenomenon, when he writes that “considerations of ‘feasibility’ and of ‘practical possibility’ enter into what we dare to desire and what we are pained not to get” (Sen 1985a, 15). Adaptive preferences are a reason for Sen to reject a focus on mental metrics, such as utility or happiness, as the metric of wellbeing. After all, someone who is in an objectively dire situation may have adapted to that situation and learnt to be pleased with little. As Sen (1985c, 21) puts it, “A person who is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulfilment if he or she has learned to have ‘realistic’ desires and to take pleasure in small mercies”.
Serene Khader (2011) has argued that not all cases that we tend to consider as cases of adaptive preferences fit Elster’s conceptualisation. Khader believes that an account of adaptive preferences must make reference to an objective notion of flourishing, even if that notion remains vague and only focusses on basic flourishing (since there is more intercultural agreement on what basic flourishing entails). She develops the following definition:
An adaptive preference is a preference that (1) is inconsistent with a person’s basic flourishing, (2) was formed under conditions nonconducive to her basic flourishing, and (3) that we do not think a person would have formed under conditions conductive to basic flourishing. (Khader 2011, 51)
A similarly perfectionist, but much less systematically developed account of adaptive preferences can be found in Martha Nussbaum’s work. She understands adaptive preferences as the preferences of people who do not want to have items of her list of capabilities, whereby these preferences are deformed due to injustices, oppression, ignorance and unreflective habit (Nussbaum 2000, 114).
What questions do adaptive preferences raise for the capability approach? At the very minimum, they raise the following questions: first, why would adaptive preferences pose a problem for capability theories? Second, do we have any evidence about the prevalence of adaptive preferences? And third, how can capability scholars deal with adaptive preferences in their capability theories and applications?
Let us start with the first of these questions: why would adaptive preferences pose a problem for capability theories? There are at least two reasons. The first lies in module B2, the selection of dimensions. If that selection is done in a participatory or democratic way, then it may be vulnerable to adaptive preferences. A group that is systematically socialised to have low aspirations and ambitions will perhaps not put certain capabilities on its list, thereby telling themselves that they are unachievable, whereas objectively speaking they are achievable, albeit perhaps only after some social changes have taken place. The second reason is that a person with adaptive preferences may objectively have access to a certain capability, but may believe that either this capability is not available to her, or else that she should not choose it, and hence she may pick from her capabilities set a suboptimal combination of functionings. If we then assume that this person (or group) has non-adaptive preferences, then we will wrongly interpret the choice not to exercise certain capabilities as a matter of personal agency, which a capability theory that focusses on capabilities rather than functionings, should respect. The capability approach by default regards adults as agents rather than patients, but this may be problematic in the case of adaptive preferences.
So we can conclude that adaptive preferences can pose a problem for capability theories in which the choice of dimensions is made democratic, or in which we focus on capabilities rather than functionings. But a critic may raise the question: do we have any evidence about the prevalence of adaptive preferences? Is this not a theoretical problem invented by philosophers who like complex puzzles, or by western scholars who pity the lives of poor people in the Global South?
There are at least two answers to be given to this question. The first is that there are indeed good reasons to be very careful with the conclusions we draw when studying adaptive preferences, especially in a context with which one is not familiar. Serene Khader (2011, 55–60) provides a nuanced and convincing discussion of the various mistakes that can be made when we try to identify whether a person or group of persons living under unjust conditions expresses adaptive preferences. There are at least three ‘occupational hazards’ that those trying to identify adaptive preferences may make: we run the risk of psychologizing structural constraints, of misidentifying possible trade-offs between various dimensions of wellbeing that a person makes, or we may be unable to recognise forms of flourishing in very different culture or class settings. All this shows that thinking about adaptive preferences needs to be done with great attention to contextual details and in a very careful manner; it is not an analysis that can easily be done by applying a rigid formula. Scholars should therefore be very cautious before concluding that someone or a group shows adaptive preferences, and carefully investigate alternative interpretations of what they observe, since otherwise they run the risk of seeing adaptive preferences where there are none.
Having said this, it is clear from the literature that adaptive preferences are a genuine phenomenon. For example, Serene Khader (2011) discusses real cases of groups of women who had adaptive preferences. Tania Burchardt analysed the 1970 British Cohort Study and found that “among those able to formulate agency goals, the aspirations expressed are conditioned by their socio-economic background and experience” (Burchardt 2009, 13). She also found evidence that adaptation may play a role in the selection of functionings from one’s capability set, since among the sixteen-year-olds who have the capability to continue full-time education, the choice whether or not to do so is highly influenced by past deprivation and experiences of inequality. Burchardt rightly concludes that if the influence on people’s choices is so systematically related to previous experiences of disadvantage, that this is a case of injustice. Hence the need, for capability theorists and not just for those endorsing the happiness approach or the desire-fulfilment theory of wellbeing, to take processes of adapted preferences and adapted aspirations seriously. On the other hand, as David Clark (2009, 32) argued in the context of development studies, adaptive preferences may not be as widespread as some capability theorists make it out to be: “the available evidence only provides limited support for the adaptation argument and is not always easy to interpret”. Given the “occupational hazards” that those trying to identify adaptive preferences face (Khader 2011, 55–60), it is important not to ‘see’ adaptive preferences where there are none. In conclusion, the capability scholar will have to balance the tricky tasks of neither ignoring processes of adaption, nor making the adaptation problem bigger than it really is.
This brings us to the last question: can the capability approach deal with these issues? Given that capability theories and applications can be very diverse, we will need different methods to handle the issue of adaptive preferences for different capability theories and applications.
In the context of action-research, small-scale projects and grassroots strategies, what is required above all is deliberation and interaction with people of whom one may be worried that their preferences may show signs of adaption, as exemplified by Ina Conradie in her project with women in a South African township (Conradie 2013; Conradie and Robeyns 2013). Khader (2011) has developed ‘a deliberative perfectionist approach to adaptive preference intervention’, in which a practitioner who suspects that a group of people has adaptive preferences will first attempt to understand how the suspected preferences affect their basic flourishing. This must be done via deliberative processes — a strategy that we also see in Conradie’s research. If the practitioner has good reasons to suspect that some of the preferences are adapted, she can involve those with the alleged adaptive preference in a discussion and together search for a strategy for change. Note that there is an interesting parallel here with the grassroots-based development model that has been proposed by Solava Ibrahim (2017), in which ‘a conscientization process’ is an integral part of the development process. In this process, a person reflects critically on her life, develops aspirations for better living conditions, and makes a plan of action to bring about the desired change (Ibrahim 2017, 206). While, as Ibrahim rightly notes, adaptive preferences and aspirations may provide a challenge for this conscientization process, they are also very likely to be challenged and hence changed via such a process.
What about capability applications that involve the empirical analysis of large-scale datasets? How can adaptation be dealt with in those applications? Here, the capability approach needs to use insights from the disciplines that have built most expertise in large-scale adaptation processes, such as sociology and social policy studies. Based on the insights from those disciplines, we know the likely candidates to be dimensions of adaptation — such as social class, caste or gender. We can then use indicators of those dimensions to study whether preferences and aspirations systematically differ, as in the earlier mentioned study by Tania Burchardt (2009). But it is clear that this can only help us to identify adapted preferences or adapted aspirations; it will not always tell us whether for each application it is possible to ‘launder’ the data so as to clean them from processes of unjust adaptations. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.09%3A_The_capability_approach_and_adaptive_preferences.txt |
In almost all capability applications and theories, the capability approach is developed for conceptual and normative purposes, rather than for explanations. If it is used for conceptual work, then capability theories do not explain poverty, inequality, or wellbeing, but rather help us to conceptualize these notions. If capability analyses are used for normative work, then they help to evaluate states of affairs and prescribe recommendations for intervention and change.
Nevertheless, the notions of functionings and capabilities in themselves can be employed as elements in explanations of social phenomena, or one can use these notions in descriptions of poverty, inequality, quality of life and social change. In those cases, the properties A1 to A4 from module A would still hold, but characteristics A5 (functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space), A6 (other dimensions of intrinsic values can be important for normative analyses) and A7 (normative individualism) are not applicable.
To the best of my knowledge, few scholars use the capability approach in this way. Probably this should not be surprising, since the capability approach may not make a significant difference to this type of work. Still, there are parallels with existing studies. For example, there is a large literature on the social determinants of health (e.g. Marmot 2005; Wilkinson and Marmot 2003; Marmot et al. 2008). The goal here is to establish a set of functionings related to the general functioning of being healthy, and the determinants are investigated so that social interventions are possible. The same is done for other functionings — not surprisingly, since explaining the determinants of valuable social states is one of the main aims of social scientists.
This raises the question of whether the capability approach should aspire to do this kind of explanatory capabilitarian analysis. The answer depends on a further question: whether the capability approach would have any added value in conducting explanatory capability analyses. If not, then it is unclear why this should be part of the capability approach, since there seems to be very little value in doing what others are already doing successfully.
But this pessimistic dismissal of the potential of explanatory capability analyses may be too quick. Perhaps the capability approach has a role to play in synthesising and connecting these field-specific lines of explanatory research; since it is a strongly interdisciplinary approach, it may perhaps also have a role to play in bringing different disciplines within the social and behavioural sciences together. Another very important task of the capability approach is to reach out to those disciplines in order to make bridges between the normative and the explanatory analyses — one valuable element of the truly post-disciplinary agenda to which the capability approach aims to contribute.
3.11: A suitable theory for all normative questions
The capability approach is primarily a normative theory, but are there also restrictions on which normative questions it can help to address? Or is it suitable for all normative questions?
In order to answer this, it is helpful to remind us of the key distinction in philosophical ethics between the right and the good. Questions about the good focus on what makes life valuable and include discussions about wellbeing, autonomy, freedom, and love. Questions about the right focus on how we should act in order for that action to be morally sound, as well as discussions about how institutions and policies should be designed so as not to violate universal moral rules. Here, the central issues concern fairness, respect and the avoidance of harm. Different moral theories give different answers to the question of how the good and the right relate to each other.
In philosophical ethics, if we say that an issue is a moral issue, this implies that we have duties to comply with the moral norm, no matter how we feel about it. These are very stringent and universal duties. An example is: do not kill an innocent person; or: respect the human dignity of all persons. Normative questions are much broader, and can also entail other values, such as prudential value (wellbeing). Questions about the right are questions about morality, whereas for most ethical frameworks questions about the good are questions about other areas of normativity, but not morality straight.17
The modular view that has been presented in chapter 2 has in the core module A only normative properties related to the good. Properties A1 and A2 define functionings and capabilities, and property A5 claims that a person’s advantage should focus on functionings and capabilities: this gives the capability approach the core of its theory of the good. The complete theory of the good may be extended by additional choices made in module C4.
What does the core of the capability approach (module A) have to say about the right? The only property related to the right is normative individualism. There are no additional claims related to the right included in module A. Hence, the only conclusion we can draw is that the capability approach would claim that, if and whenever rightness involves a notion of the good, one should use the theory of the good as entailed by the core characteristics of the capability approach. Hence, if we believe that the right thing to do is to prioritise the lives of the worst-off, then a capabilitarian version of this claim would say that we should prioritise the functionings and/or capabilities of the worst-off rather than their happiness or their command over resources.
Yet many claims concerning the right make no reference to an account of the good. The core of the capabilities approach is, thus, orthogonal to other aspects of the theory of the right, except for ethical individualism, which is only a very small part of a theory of the right. The fact that the capability approach has, at its very core, more to offer in terms of the theory of the good than in terms of the theory of the right has an important implication, namely that the capability approach is not very suitable for ethical issues that only concern questions about the right. For example, the capability approach is not a very helpful theory when analysing the morality of abortion since so much of that ethical debate is about issues of the right rather than about issues of the good. That is, most of the philosophical debates on the ethics of abortion concern the moral status of the foetus, notions of personhood, or questions about the autonomy and self-ownership of the pregnant woman — issues on which the capability approach remains mute.18 It is therefore not surprising that the capability approach is more useful and more widely used as a theory analysing socio-economic policies where there is a consensus on those aspects that are questions about the right or where the questions about the right are much less weighty than those about the good. Examples include debates about poverty alleviation, distributive justice, environmental ethics and disability ethics. In sum, the capability approach is not a very helpful (or the most illuminating) framework for normative analyses in which elements regarding deontological duties and rights, which are not conceptually closely related to notions of wellbeing, play the most important role — that is, where aspects of the right are crucial in addressing the normative questions.
17 An influential exception are utilitarians and other consequentialists, who define the morally right as that which maximizes the (non-moral) good (Driver 2014; Sinnott-Armstrong 2015).
18 Philosophical arguments on the moral permissibility of abortion come to widely divergent conclusions (e.g. Thomson 1971; Tooley 1972; English 1975; Marquis 1989). | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.10%3A_Can_the_capability_approach_be_an_explanatory_theory.txt |
In section 2.6.4 we discussed property A4, which stresses the importance of the difference between means and ends in the capabilities approach. In section 2.6.5, we discussed property A5, which claims that in the capability approach functionings and capabilities form the evaluative space. From these two core properties from module A, some may draw the conclusion that resources are no longer important in the capability approach. This is a mistake. Resources are important, although in an instrumental manner.
Firstly, a focus on functionings and capabilities does not necessarily imply that a capability analysis would not pay any attention to resources, or to the evaluation of social institutions, economic growth, technical advancement, and so forth. While functionings and capabilities are of ultimate concern, other dimensions can be important as well, but in an instrumental way, or as indicators for what ultimately matters. For example, in their evaluation of development in India, Drèze and Sen have stressed that working within the capability approach in no way excludes the integration of an analysis of resources:
It should be clear that we have tended to judge development by the expansion of substantive human freedoms — not just by economic growth (for example, of the gross national product), or technical progress, or social modernization. This is not to deny, in any way, that advances in the latter fields can be very important, depending on circumstances, as ‘instruments’ for the enhancement of human freedom. But they have to be appraised precisely in that light — in terms of their actual effectiveness in enriching the lives and liberties of people — rather than taking them to be valuable in themselves. (Drèze and Sen 2002, 3)
Second, once we have decided which capabilities are relevant, we need to investigate the determinants of those capabilities — the factors which affect their emergence, size and robustness. As figure 2.1 illustrates, these determinants include resources, a person’s set of conversion factors and structural constraints. Hence if we want to expand the capabilities of a person or a group, these are the levels at which we could intervene. Resources are not the only things that matter, and for some capabilities that we try to expand or try to equalise, resources may not be the most effective factor of intervention. At the same time, it is also clear that resources are very important for most capabilities and there are hardly any capabilities where resources play no role at all. Being able to buy presents enhances the capability of affiliation and social interaction; being able to get the best medical care enhances the capability of health; and being able to afford time off and time to travel enhances the capability to enjoy nature. Hence even those capabilities that could be seen as non-material dimensions of advantage are nevertheless also aided by the availability of resources, albeit probably not in a linear way, and perhaps only up to a certain threshold level. If a capability analysis is aimed at making an intervention, then the exact relationship between resources and functionings needs to be studied for each capability analysis, rather than being assumed to have a certain shape.
Third, in empirical research there are often data constraints that force scholars to work with resources as proxies for valuable functionings. There is nothing inconsistent in taking that path, as long as one is careful in the conclusions that one draws from an analysis of resources. Moreover, if one uses multiple resources, such as a combination of income, time, and human and social capital (e.g. Burchardt 2010), then the informational riches of the analysis increases, compared to a one-dimensional monetary analysis. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.12%3A_The_role_of_resources_in_the_capability_approach.txt |
Discussions about inequality and justice are very important within the capability literature. In fact, they are so important that many philosophers studying the capability approach have made the mistake of believing that it is a theory of equality, or a theory of justice. But as the descriptions of the capability approach in chapter 2 have shown, that is not the case. Here, too, we need to make use of the distinction between the general capability approach and more specific capability theories: theorizing justice is only one among many different purposes that capability theories can have, that is, one of the possible choices we can make in module B1.19 Still, given that the capability approach offers a distinct view on interpersonal comparisons of advantage, it should not surprise us that the capability approach has been widely used in thinking about inequality and justice.
The literature that develops the relevance of the capability approach in theories of justice falls primarily within the domain of normative political philosophy, but there is some overlap with the work done by welfare economists and other scholars. In order to get a grip on what the capability approach does in the literature on distributive justice, or, vice versa, what thinking goes on about theories of distributive justice within the capability literature, let us start with a brief primer on the theoretical literature on justice in the next section. Then, in section 3.13.2, I pose the question of what is required for the construction of a complete capability theory of justice. The final section, 3.13.3, explores the implications of a capability-based approach to justice in practice.
3.13.1 A brief description of the literature on theories of justice
Justice is an essentially contested concept: there is no generally accepted definition of justice, and thus no consensus on what the appropriate subject matter of theories of justice is or should be. Of course, it does not follow that nothing at all can be said about the notion of justice. David Miller’s description of social justice is a good starting point. He claims that when arguing about justice, we are discussing:
how the good and bad things in life should be distributed among the members of a human society. When, more concretely, we attack some policy or some state of affairs as socially unjust, we are claiming that a person, or more usually a category of persons, enjoys fewer advantages than that person or group of persons ought to enjoy (or bears more of the burdens than they ought to bear), given how other members of the society in question are faring. (Miller 1999, 1)
Theories of justice do not cover the entire spectrum of moral issues. Social justice theorists generally agree that parts of morality fall outside the scope of justice. Charity is such a case: you may not have a duty of justice to help a frail, elderly neighbour, but you may nevertheless decide to help that person as an act of charity and compassion. Another example is morally laudable behaviour, such as being a volunteer for social activities in your neighbourhood. Such behaviour may be morally praiseworthy, but it may at the same time not be required as a matter of justice. Hence, justice is not all that matters, if we consider how to make the world morally better.
Can we describe justice, and theories of justice, by their properties, as philosophers often do? First, justice is a property that has been ascribed to both individuals and institutions: justice is a virtue of individuals in their interactions with others, and justice is also a virtue of social institutions (Barry and Matravers 2011). Thus, we can say that a certain society is more or less just, or we can say that the behaviour of some persons is just or unjust. Theorists of justice tend primarily to discuss the justice of social arrangements, that is, of social institutions broadly defined; justice as an individual virtue is sometimes regarded as a matter of ethics rather than of political philosophy (although not every political philosopher would agree with this way of demarcating justice from ethics). Moreover, an increasing number of theorists define social institutions more broadly so as to include societal structures related to class or caste, as well as social norms; under such broad definitions, conceptualising justice as a virtue of institutions touches upon many of the same aspects we would discuss if we were to see justice as a virtue of persons. For example, if a society has widely shared racist social norms, such as the disapproval of interracial love relationships, then a person who shows her disapproval of an interracial love relationship is acting upon an unjust social norm, but also showing non-virtuous behaviour.
Second, while sometimes the terms ‘social justice’ and ‘distributive justice’ are used as synonyms, it makes sense to understand ‘social justice’ as somewhat broader than ‘distributive justice’. Distributive justice always deals with an analysis of who gets what, whereas social justice may also relate to questions of respect or recognition, or the attitudes that a certain institution expresses. The capability approach is mainly discussed in theories of distributive justice, although it is to some extent able to integrate the concerns of theorists of recognition about what they conceive to be the narrow or mistaken focus of theories of distributive justice.20
A third point to note about the literature on justice is that there are several different schools within social justice theories. According to Brian Barry and Matt Matravers, it is helpful to classify theories of social justice according to four types: conventionalism, teleology, justice as mutual advantage and egalitarian justice. Conventionalism is the view that issues of justice can be resolved by examining how local conventions, institutions, traditions and systems of law determine the divisions of burdens and benefits. Barry and Matravers rightly point out that this approach, which has been defended by Michael Walzer (1983), can lead to the acceptance of grossly unjust practices because they are generally endorsed by certain communities, even if they may be seen as unjust if judged on the basis of values and ideas not currently present (or dominant) in that society. Teleology is the view that social arrangements should be justified by referring to some good they are aiming for. Some examples are utilitarianism, natural law theory or Aquinas’ Christian philosophy. For teleological theories, what justice is follows from an account of the good, and thus the account of justice depends on the account of the social good itself. A criticism of teleological theories is that they necessarily rely on an external source (to specify what ‘the good’ is), such as utility, the natural law or God’s authority. Teleological accounts of justice therefore necessarily depend on notions of the ultimate good. However, in pluralistic societies characterised by a variety of religious and non-religious worldviews, it is hard to see how justice can be derived from notions of the good that are not endorsed by all. Many contemporary political philosophers therefore argue that teleological theories cannot be defended since people have competing ideas of the good, and we cannot call upon a generally-accepted external source that will tell us which idea of the good should be imposed on all.
The third and fourth schools of social justice, in comparison, share a commitment to some form of liberalism that recognizes the diversity of views of the good life, which a just society should respect. These schools experienced a major revival after the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971, which is generally regarded as the single most important work on social justice written in the last century.21 Rawls turned to the social contract tradition, in which justice is understood as the fair distribution of benefits of social cooperation. The core idea is that rules of justice are ultimately more beneficial to everyone than if each were to pursue their own advantage by themselves. Some of these theories (though not Rawls’s!) take the relative power or bargaining strength of every individual in society as given, and one may therefore question whether in situations of unequal bargaining power, justice will be done (Nussbaum 2006b). The other liberal school of justice is egalitarian justice, which is premised on the idea that people should be treated with equal respect and concern (Dworkin 2000). The most basic claim of those theories is that people are morally equal: each person should be treated as a being of equal moral worth. However, that general and abstract claim can be further developed in many different ways, and it is in specifying these further details that philosophers disagree. Distributive justice requires equality of something, but not necessarily equality of outcome in material terms (in fact, plain equality of resources is a claim very few theorists of justice would be willing to defend, since people have different needs, are confronted with different circumstances and, if given the same opportunities, are likely to make different use of them). Hence, Rawls’s theory of justice can be seen as an egalitarian theory of justice, but so are theories that come to very different substantive conclusions, such as Robert Nozick’s (1974) entitlement theory. Other major contemporary theorists of justice who can be labelled ‘liberal egalitarian’ are Brian Barry (1995), Philippe Van Parijs (1995), and Ronald Dworkin (2000), among many others.
Of those four schools, it is primarily liberal egalitarian theories that are discussed in relation to the capability approach. While there is internal diversity within this group of liberal egalitarian theories, these theories share the commitment to the principle that there should be considerable (although by no means absolute) scope for individuals to determine their own life plan and notion of the good, as well as a commitment to a notion of equal moral consideration, which is another way to put the principle of each person as an end, or normative individualism (see section 2.6.8).
Of the four schools of social justice, only the last two regard justice and equality as being closely related values. Under conventionalism, justice is guided by existing traditions, conventions and institutions, even if those existing practices do not treat people as equals in a plausible sense. Teleological theories also do not understand justice as entailing some notion of equality; instead, the idea of the good is more important, even if it implies that people are not treated as moral equals. In some theories of conventionalism and teleology, social justice could be consistent with a notion of equality, but this is not necessarily the case for all these theories. The social contract tradition and liberal egalitarianism, in contrast, derive their principles of social justice from a fundamental idea of people as moral equals. However, the notion of equal moral worth does not necessarily lead to the notion of equality of resources or another type of equality of outcome, as will be explained in what follows. Social justice and equality are related in these theories, but not always at the level of material inequality, but rather at a more fundamental level of treating people as moral equals or with equal respect and concern.
For a proper understanding of mainstream philosophical literature on theories of justice, it is helpful to know that the literature itself is highly abstract, and often rather detached from questions about policy design or political feasibility. Sen (2006, 2009c) has recently criticised such theories, and in particular Rawls’s work, for being overly “transcendental”. Such ideal theories give an account of the perfectly just society, but do not tell us what needs to be done to get closer to that very ideal, how we can make the world less unjust and which of two situations might be more unjust than the other. Another critique of contemporary theories of justice is that they are often based on so-called idealisations or strong assumptions, which may introduce significant biases or exclude certain groups of people from the theory. For example, Dworkin (2000) sets his egalitarian theory against a set of background assumptions that rule out racist and sexist attitudes and behaviours, as well as the adaptation of preferences to unfair circumstances (Pierik and Robeyns 2007). Certain assumptions and meta-theoretical as well as methodological choices also put philosophical theories of justice at risk of being too far removed from practical applicability. When we try to apply contemporary theories of justice to the actual reality of our chaotic and often messy world, there are all sorts of complications that need to be taken into account, such as trade-offs between different values, power imbalances between different social groups, unintended consequences of justice-enhancing interventions and policies, or interests of individuals and groups that may conflict with concerns for justice (e.g. a desire for re-election on the part of government administrations).
Debates about the practical relevance of contemporary philosophical theories of justice have gained momentum in the last decade. It remains unclear whether the outcome will change the way theories of justice are constructed in the future. It may well be that we will see a turn towards more non-ideal, empirically-informed, ‘directly useful’ theories that are easier to translate into practice. In any case, it is fair to say that most capability theorists working on justice are among those who strongly advocate this turn to make theories of justice more relevant to practice.
3.13.2 What do we need for a capability theory of justice?
In the previous section I gave a very brief account of the philosophical literature on theories of justice. What contribution can the capability approach make to this field? The first thing to note is that Martha Nussbaum has written at great length developing a capabilities theory of justice (e.g. Nussbaum 1988, 1992, Nussbaum 2000, 2002a; Nussbaum 2006b). Her capabilities theory is the most detailed capability theory of justice that has been developed up till now. Her theory is comprehensive, in the sense that it is not limited to an account of political justice, or to liberal democracies. Her account holds for all human beings on earth, independently of whether they are living in a liberal democratic regime, or of whether they are severely disabled. However, Nussbaum’s theory of social justice doesn’t amount to a full theory of social justice. The main demarcation of Nussbaum’s account is that it provides only “a partial and minimal account of social justice” (Nussbaum 2006b, 71) by specifying thresholds of a list of capabilities that governments in all nations should guarantee to their citizens. Nussbaum’s theory focuses on thresholds, but this does not imply that reaching these thresholds is all that matters for social justice; rather, her theory is partial and simply doesn’t discuss the question of what social justice requires once those thresholds are met. Not discussing certain things is not necessarily a flaw of a theory: this may be theoretical work that Nussbaum will do in the future, or it may be work that will be done by other scholars. Moreover, it is quite possible that Nussbaum’s account of partial justice is consistent with several accounts of what justice requires above the thresholds.
Yet, while Nussbaum’s theory of justice has been worked out in great detail and has received a lot of attention, it would be a grave mistake to think that there can be only one capability theory of justice. On the contrary, the open nature of the capability framework allows for the development of a family of capability theories of justice. This then prompts the question: what is needed if we want to create such a capability theory of justice?22
First, a theory of justice needs to explain on what basis it justifies its principles or claims of justice. For example, Rawls uses the method of reflective equilibrium, including the thought experiment of the original position.23 Dworkin’s egalitarian justice theory starts from the meta-principle of equal respect and concern, which he then develops in the principles that the distribution of burdens and benefits should be sensitive to the ambitions that people have but should not reflect the unequal natural endowments with which individuals are born (Dworkin 1981, 2000). One could also develop a capability theory of justice arguing that the ultimate driving force is a concern with agency (Claassen and Düwell 2013; Claassen 2016) or with human dignity (Nussbaum 2000; Nussbaum 2006b). If capability scholars want to develop a full theory of justice, they will also need to explain on what bases they justify their principles or claims. As mentioned earlier, Nussbaum starts from a notion of human dignity, whereas the Senian strand in the capability approach stresses the importance of what people have reason to value, hence an account of public reasoning. However, little work has been done so far to flesh out this embryonic idea of ‘having reason to value’, and it therefore remains unclear whether the capability approach has a solid unified rationale on the basis of which a full account of justice could be developed.
Second, as indicated above, in developing a capability theory of justice we must decide whether we want it to be an outcome or an opportunity theory; that is, whether we think that we should assess injustices in terms of functionings, or rather in terms of capabilities, or a mixture. At the level of theory and principles, most theorists of justice endorse the view that justice is done if all have equal genuine opportunities, or if all reach a minimal threshold of capability levels. Translated to the capability language, this would imply that at the level of theory and principles, capabilities are the relevant metric of justice, and not functionings. However, among theorists of justice, not everyone subscribes to this view. Anne Phillips (2004) has been a prominent voice arguing for equality of outcome, rather than opportunities. In the capability literature, Marc Fleurbaey (2002) has argued against an approach that takes only capabilities into account and has defended a focus on ‘refined functionings’ (being the combination of functionings and capabilities).
A third issue which needs to be solved if one hopes to develop a capability theory of justice is to decide and justify which capabilities matter the most. There are at least two ways of answering this question: either through procedural approaches, such as using criteria from which the relevant capabilities are derived, or by defending a specific list of capabilities. This selection of relevant capabilities for the purpose of justice can be done at the level of ideal theory (without taking issues of practical feasibility and implementation into account), at the level of abstract principles (Anderson 1999; Nussbaum 2006b; Claassen 2016) or at an applied theoretical level, which is useful for practical assessments of unjust inequalities (e.g. Robeyns 2003; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007).
Fourth, a capability theory of justice may need to engage in a comparison with other ‘metrics of justice’. In the literature on social justice there are several terms used to indicate what precisely we are assessing or measuring: the metric of advantage, the currency of justice, or the informational basis for the interpersonal comparisons for the purpose of justice. Within theories of justice, the main arguments are with Rawlsian24 resourcists and with defenders of Dworkinian resourcism.25 Other possible metrics are basic needs or the many different types of subjective welfare or preference satisfaction. A full capability theory of justice would need to show why it serves better as a metric of justice than these other metrics.
Fifth, a capability theory of justice needs to take a position on the “distributive rule” (Anderson 2010, 81) that it will endorse: will it argue for plain equality, or for sufficiency, or for prioritarianism, or for some other (mixed) distributive rule? Both Martha Nussbaum’s and Elizabeth Anderson’s theories are sufficiency accounts, but from this it does not follow, as one sometimes reads in the secondary literature, that the capability approach entails a sufficiency rule. Sen may have given the (wrong) impression of defending straight equality as a distributive rule, by asking the question “Equality of what?” (Sen 1980), though a careful reading shows that he was merely asking the question “If we want to be defending equality of something, then what would that be?” In fact, Sen has remained uncommitted to one single distributive rule, which probably can be explained by the fact that he is averse to building a well-defined theory of justice but rather prefers to investigate how real-life unjust situations can be turned into more just situations, even if perfect justice is unattainable (Sen 2006, 2009c). The capability approach clearly plays a role in Sen’s work on justice, since when assessing a situation, he will investigate inequalities in people’s capabilities and analyse the processes that led to those inequalities. Yet Sen has an eclectic approach to theorizing, and hence other notions and theories (such as human rights or more formal discussions on freedoms from social choice theory) also play a role in his work on justice. The presence and importance of the capability approach in Sen’s work is thus undeniable, but should not be seen as the only defining feature.
Sixth, a capability theory of justice needs to specify where the line between individual and collective responsibility is drawn, or how this will be decided, and by whom. There is a remarkable absence of any discussion about issues of responsibility in the capability literature, in sharp contrast to political philosophy and welfare economics where this is one of the most important lines of debate, certainly since the publication of Dworkin’s (1981, 2000) work on justice and equality which led to what Anderson (1999) has called “luck-egalitarianism”. Nevertheless, whether one wants to discuss it explicitly or not, any concrete capability policy proposal can be analysed in terms of the division between personal and collective responsibility, but this terminology is largely absent from the capability literature. In part, this might be explained by the fact that much of the work on capabilities deals with global poverty, where issues of individual responsibility seem to be less relevant since it would seem outrageous to suggest that the world’s most destitute people are personally responsible for the situation they are in. That doesn’t mean that the responsibility question is not important: it is indeed of utmost importance to ask who is responsible for global poverty reduction or the fulfilling of international development targets, such as the Sustainable Development Goals on which political philosophers have written a great deal (Singer 2004, 2010; Pogge 2008). The point is rather that philosophical puzzles, such as the issue of expensive tastes (for expensive wine, caviar, fast cars, or you name it), are simply beyond the radar of the child labourer or the poor peasant. However, while this may perhaps justify the absence of any discussion about personal responsibility among capability scholars concerned with poverty, it does not absolve theorists of justice who deal with justice in affluent societies (or affluent sections of poor societies) from discussing the just division between personal and collective responsibility (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, 148–49).
This brings us to a related issue: a theory of justice generally specifies rights, but also duties. However, capability theorists have remained largely silent on the question of whose duty it is to expand the selected capabilities. Nussbaum passionately advocates that all people all over the world should be entitled, as a matter of justice, to threshold levels of all the capabilities on her list, but apart from mentioning that it is the governments’ duty to guarantee these entitlements (Nussbaum 2006b, 70), she remains silent on the question of who precisely should bear the burdens and responsibilities for realizing these capabilities. Yet as Onora O’Neill (1996, 122–53) has argued, questions of obligations and responsibilities should be central to any account of justice.
This section makes clear that a capability theory of justice is theoretically much more demanding than the basic presupposition of the capability approach that ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ are the best metric for most kinds of interpersonal evaluations. While much has been written on the capability approach in recent years by an increasing number of scholars, including philosophers, much of the philosophical work needed for turning the open-ended capability approach into a specific theory of justice remains to be done.
Note, however, that not all capability theorists working on issues of justice believe that such a fully worked-out theory is required. Sen (2009c) himself has argued at length that we don’t need a theory that describes a utopian ideal, but rather we need theorising to help us with making comparisons of injustice, and to guide us towards a less unjust society. Similarly, Jay Drydyk (2012) has argued that the capability approach to justice should focus on reducing capability shortfalls, for which a utopian account of perfect justice is not needed. Some capability theorists may want to work out a full theory of justice by addressing the various specifications outlined above, while others may want to change the very nature of theorising about justice, moving it more to applied, non-ideal or grounded theories (Watene and Drydyk 2016).
3.13.3 From theories of justice to just practices and policies
Before closing this section on capabilitarian theorizing about justice, let us briefly shift from theory to practice. Since theories of justice are mainly developed at a highly abstract level, often entailing ideals of perfect justice, we may wonder whether the capability approach to social justice and equality is of any use in telling us what justice-enhancing strategies and policies to develop. Indeed, this has sometimes been phrased as a serious concern, namely, that theories of justice are too abstract and do not help us with social justice struggles on the ground. One may well argue that we roughly know what is going wrong and we need political action rather than more and more detailed theorising. Moreover, some think that in the real world the subtleties of theories of justice are easily abused in order to justify gross inequalities, as may have been the case with philosophical discussions on individual responsibility. For example, Brian Barry’s (2005) later work exemplified this concern with the direct application of theories of justice to political change and the reform of the welfare state, rather than with further philosophical refinements of theories of justice. Related charges have been aimed at the capability approach as well. For instance, it has been argued that not enough attention has been paid to issues of social power in the capability writings on justice, and Feldman and Gellert (2006) have underscored the importance of recognising the struggles and negotiations by dominated and disadvantaged groups if social justice is ever to be realised. Such questions of power politics, effective social criticism, successful collective action, historical and cultural sensitivities, and the negotiation of competing interests are indeed largely absent from the philosophical literature on theories of justice. These ideal theories develop standards of a just society, but often do not tell us what institutions or policies are necessary if just societies are to be constructed, nor do they tell us what social and political processes will help advocates implement these social changes in concrete ways.
But the capability approach can be linked to more concrete justice-enhancing policy proposals that have been developed. For one thing, the Millennium Development Goals could be understood as being a practical (albeit specific and also limited) translation of the capability approach in practice, and their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals, can also be seen as influenced by the capability approach.26 In fact, at the level of severe global poverty, any concrete poverty-reduction strategy which conceptualises poverty in a capability sense is, for most accounts of justice, a concrete justice-enhancing strategy, since these theories would include the absence of severe poverty as a principle of justice.
If we move from the area of poverty-reduction strategies to the question of just social policies in countries or regions with higher levels of affluence, we observe that there are much fewer actual examples of justice-enhancing policies that have been explicitly grounded in, or associated with, the capability approach. Yet many concrete policies and interventions could be interpreted as such, or are consistent with the capability perspective itself. One example relates to a policy of providing, regulating and/or subsidising child-care facilities. This can arguably be justified as a prerequisite for gender justice in capabilities since, due to gender norms, women will in effect not be able to develop themselves professionally if they are not supported in their need for decent quality-regulated (and possibly subsidised) child-care facilities. Mothers at home may be materially well-off if their husbands earn a good income but, if they do not have the genuine opportunity to hold jobs, then their capability sets are severely constrained and gender justice in capabilities cannot be achieved. An income metric which assumes equal sharing in the household may not detect any moral problem, but a capability metric will claim that women have more limited freedoms than men, since the provisions are not there to ensure that both parents can hold jobs, and gender norms and other gendered social mechanisms make it highly unlikely that men will volunteer to stay at home with their children. At the same time, men are also losing out since they have a very limited capability to spend time with their newborn babies.
A slightly different example concerns a justice-enhancing intervention that can be found in the form of adult volunteers who visit disadvantaged families to read to the children in order to enhance their language skills.27 It is well-known that many children of immigrants are disadvantaged at school since they are very likely to enter school with weaker knowledge of the language of instruction than non-immigrant children. For this reason, in several cities there are networks of volunteers to read books to small immigrant children in their own homes. In this way, they effectively reduce the gap in educational opportunity between immigrant children and non-immigrant children. This example also illustrates that justice-enhancing strategies are not confined to public policy, but can also be initiated by persons and groups at the grassroots. The government is not the only agent of justice; we can all do our part.
19 In particular, see the overview of different types of capability study in section 2.4.
20 It doesn’t follow that all concerns of theorists of recognition are best expressed by using the capability approach. I doubt that this is the case, but will not pursue this issue here further.
21 There is a large literature on the differences and complementarities between the capability approach to justice (that is, capabilitarian theories of justice) and Rawls’s theory of justice (see e.g. Sen 1980, 195–200; Rawls 1988; Sen 1992a, 82–83; Pogge 2002; Nussbaum 2006b; Robeyns 2008b, 2009; and the contributions to Brighouse and Robeyns 2010).
22 I have presented this overview of steps that need to be taken in earlier publications (e.g. Robeyns 2016d).
23 An accessible explanation of the method of reflective equilibrium can be found in Knight (2017).
24 An analysis of this comparison between social primary goods and capabilities was made by the various contributions to the volume edited by Brighouse and Robeyns (2010).
25 For comparisons of the capability view with Dworkin’s egalitarian theory, see Sen (1984b, 321–23, 2009c, 264–68); Dworkin (2000, 299–303); Williams (2002); Browne and Stears (2005); Kaufman (2006); Pierik and Robeyns (2007).
27 In the Netherlands, this volunteer organisation is called De Voorleesexpress (https://voorleesexpress.nl) but similar initiatives must exist around the world. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.13%3A_The_capability_approach_and_theories_of_justice.txt |
Several capability theories are closely related to accounts of human rights. Within the capability literature, some scholars have developed capability theories that they regard as a human rights theory. In the human rights literature, scholars have examined to what extent the capability approach can help to develop stronger theories of human rights. The same topics (e.g. provision of or right to basic health or basic education) are defended based on both approaches, or are defended appealing both to human rights and capabilities (e.g. Osmani 2000). Amartya Sen has in several of his publications analysed the relationship between human rights and capabilities (e.g. Sen 2004b, 2005). In addition, Martha Nussbaum has claimed that her capabilities theory is a version of human rights theory, which has drawn much attention to the question about the relationship between capabilities and human rights.
It should not be surprising that there are so many scholars and practitioners interested in both the human rights framework and the capability approach, since they share some important aspects. First, they are both widely endorsed ethical frameworks. Second, they seem to share an underlying motivation, namely to protect and enhance people’s freedoms. Third, they are both used for global as well as domestic questions. Fourth, both frameworks want to build strong links between theory and practice: they are studied and used by scholars but also used by practitioners (political parties, activists, policy makers, etc.). Finally, both discourses are strongly interdisciplinary in nature.
All this raises some questions. What is the relationship between human rights and capabilities? Can we say that capabilities are the objects of human rights? If so, do human rights theories and analyses have something to gain by developing capabilities-based human rights theories? Can the capability approach deliver all that is important in human rights theories? And what should we make of the alleged disadvantages of using the capability approach in thinking about human rights?
3.14.1 What are human rights?
Human rights are rights each human being is entitled to in order to protect her from severe harms that could be inflicted by others — either by deliberate actions, or else by the failure to protect human rights caused by institutional design. They are norms aimed at protecting people from severe social, political and legal abuse (Nickel 2014, 1). Examples of human rights are the right to life, the right to food, the right to freedom of assembly, the right to freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial when charged with a crime, the right not to be tortured, and the right to privacy.
Human rights are not all the rights that people have. As Sen (2004b, 329) writes, “there have to be some ‘threshold conditions’ of (i) importance and (ii) social influenceability for a freedom to figure within the interpersonal and interactive spectrum of human rights”. Take the ‘importance threshold’ first. Here is an example of a right that is not a human right, because it does not meet the threshold condition of importance: the right to parental leave. In many European countries, parents who are employed have a right to paid parental leave upon the birth of their child or when they adopt a child. While many have argued that such a right would help meet our duties towards children and parents as well as advance gender justice (e.g. Gheaus and Robeyns 2011), it is not at all plausible to argue that this should be seen as a human right. It has a much weaker moral urgency than the right to a fair trial, let alone the right to life. Human rights thus correspond to a subset of the domain of justice, and focus on those questions that are of utter importance, the protection of which should have a greater urgency than the support of other normative claims. The second threshold — social influenceability — implies that even if something valuable is hugely important, as long as there is no or very limited social influenceability, its protection cannot be a human right. For example, it makes no sense to speak of a human right to be protected from volcano eruptions, or a human right to be protected from cancer. However, one can say that there is a human right to be warned about volcano eruptions if the government has the relevant information. To the extent that there is more social influenceability, the scope to speak coherently of human rights increases.
Human rights have corresponding duties. But on whom do those duties fall and what kind of duties are they? A broad, inclusive account of duties is given by Pablo Gilabert (2009, 673) who writes:
[Human rights impose] a duty of the highest priority for individuals and governments to identify ways to protect certain important interests through (a) specific rights and entitlements, but also, when these are insufficient or not presently feasible, through (b) urgent goals of institution-building.
Note that this definition does not limit the duty to protect human rights to governments only, and that it does include institution-building as an important path towards protecting human rights.28
3.14.2 The interdisciplinary scholarship on human rights
The human rights literature is, just like the capability approach, deeply multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary. The philosophy of human rights “addresses questions about the existence, content, nature, universality, justification, and legal status of human rights” (Nickel 2014, 1). How can human rights exist in the first place? What should be the content of human rights, that is, what kinds of harms or abuses should they protect us from? What kind of rights are human rights — are they moral claims, or legal claims, or political claims, or something else? The question of justification asks: on what grounds can we say that people have human rights? Is it because humans have rational capacities or agency? If so, does that mean that newborn babies do not have human rights? All these questions are studied in the vast philosophical literature on human rights.
Note that while the relationship between normative political philosophy, justice and human rights is not entirely disputed, the dominant view in the contemporary literature is that the domain of human rights is a subset of the domain of justice, which in turn is a subset of the domain of morality. The reason is that “[n]ot everything that is desirable to be realized in politics is a matter of human rights, and not everything that is a matter of justice is a matter of human rights. Human rights constitute the most urgent demand of basic global justice” (Gilabert 2009, 676).
Legal scholars are interested in questions related to the treaties and constitutions in which human rights are codified. The idea of human rights gained momentum with the 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which over time received a canonical status in legal and political debates. The UDHR subsequently served as a template for human rights instruments that are legally binding, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights. One question this raises is to what extent national constitutions are consistent with those legally binding treaties, or with the UDHR. Another question frequently asked by legal scholars is to what extent national jurisprudence can be in tension with — and violate — a human right that is part of an international treaty to which that particular nation signed up. For example, in the famous ‘Lautsi case’, the question emerged whether the Italian state’s policy to have a compulsory crucifix in the classroom of public schools was in violation of the human right to the freedom of religion as codified in the European Convention on Human Rights (Weiler 2010; Pierik 2012; Pierik and van der Burg 2011).
In the social sciences and international relations, questions are asked about what role human rights play in politics. How do countries differ in the degree in which they protect human rights? What are the effective instruments that support human rights in countries in which they are not violated? Is it effective to condemn human rights violations in other countries, or is silent support for grassroots human rights activists a more effective strategy?
Of course, human rights are hugely important for human right activists, who are working on actual human rights protections. Other activists, such as those focusing on the empowerment of disadvantaged groups, often take a more instrumental attitude towards human rights, and ask whether such rights are effective instruments to reach their goals of inclusion, development and combatting forms of injustice and oppression.
3.14.3 Why a capability-based account of human rights?
After this brief sketch of the huge literature on human rights, we can now explore the relation between human rights and capabilities. The first question that needs to be asked is: why would we be at all interested in a capabilities-based theory of human rights? What could be gained by theorizing human rights, or trying to protect human rights, by referring to capabilities?
The first reason is philosophical, and concerns the justification of human rights. Human rights are norms or instruments to protect certain valuable things (which are called ‘the objects of human rights’). But every time we claim an object is so important its protection must be enshrined as a human right, we must argue why that object has this special importance. Part of the philosophical literature on capabilities does precisely that — to justify why we need to protect certain valuable personal states. Both Sen (2004b, 2005) and Nussbaum (1997, 2011a) have argued that human rights can be seen as entitlements to certain capabilities. However, Sen’s views are more qualified, since he has argued that the object of some but not necessarily all human rights can be viewed as capabilities. There are plausibly also other objects of human rights, such as process freedoms and liberties.
The second reason builds on the first. If some human rights can be understood in terms of capabilities, and poverty can also be conceptualized in terms of the denial of capabilities, then poverty can be conceptualized as a human rights violation (Osmani 2005). This is important for various reasons, including the strong rhetorical force that a human rights violation has in comparison with other claims, and also because socio-economic human rights have sometimes been regarded as more in need of conceptual foundations, in comparison with the civic and political human rights whose status as human rights has been less contested.
This relates to the third reason why it can be helpful to conceptualise human rights in terms of capabilities, which is the often-stated worry that the protection of human rights, especially social and economic rights, is infeasible (Gilabert 2009). To counter that pessimism, we need greater clarity on the chain of steps that are involved in socio-economic human rights protection. Capabilities are the objects of our rights, and we know, from our understanding of how capabilities relate to resources and social structures, which parameters can influence the capabilities that people enjoy (see the figure in section 2.12). Hence, if we want to protect human rights, in particular socio-economic rights, which sceptics believe cannot effectively be protected, the capability approach helps us see that “promoting socioeconomic rights may require attention to specific parameters that affect the capabilities of people” (Gilabert 2009, 666). In sum, the language of the capability approach helps us to respond and address the feasibility worry of socio-economic rights.
Fourthly, we are unsure whether some things we want to protect meet the threshold condition of importance that human rights should meet. If one is unsure about whether a certain freedom should be a right, let alone a human right, one could already start to protect or enhance it if one sees it as a capability. One does not need to wait until the discussion about the threshold is settled before one starts to protect something that everyone agrees is in any case important.
A final reason is more practical or political. In some countries, the terminology of ‘human rights’ is regarded with suspicion, as it is seen as stemming from a colonial era, and, as a consequence, is regarded as an instrument of western domination. This makes it hard for both local and global advocates of human rights to advance their cause. By using the terminology of capabilities, which is not linked to a particular colonial era or western power, instead of the language of human rights, these same valuable rights can be argued for.
3.14.4 Are capabilities sufficientto construct a theory of human rights?
There is quite a lot of interest among capability scholars and those working in the human development paradigm to try to bring the best of the capability approach and the human rights approach together (e.g. Vizard 2006, 2007; Vizard, Fukuda‐Parr and Elson 2011; Fukuda-Parr 2011; Gilabert 2009, 2013). One important question, though, is how much the capability approach can offer if one is interested in constructing a powerful human rights theory. Is the notion of capabilities sufficient for such a theory?
The answer clearly must be negative. A theory of human rights needs other elements, such as a discussion of the scope of, and, importantly, the justification for, human rights. Yet, by making use of the distinction between the capability approach and capability theories that was introduced in section 2.3, we can see that it is not at all an embarrassment for the capability approach that, by itself, it cannot deliver a theory of human rights. Instead, that should be the task of a specific capability theory, for which, in the various modules, additional elements that are needed for a human rights theory can be added.
This raises the next question: what would have to be added, then? One important thing that may need to be added (in A6 — other dimensions of ultimate value) are process freedoms. Sen (2004b) argues that we should make a distinction between freedoms as substantive opportunities and the process aspect of freedom (procedural aspects). Both are, in his view, relevant when thinking about human rights, but only the opportunity aspect of freedom is captured by the notion of ‘capabilities’. Linda Barclay (2016) makes a similar point, by saying that rights that concern equitable processes are very important for human rights, and cannot be captured by the notion of capabilities. Clearly, procedural characteristics, for example those that guarantee a free trial, may not necessarily best be understood as capabilities, but perhaps rather more as elements of institutional design. Yet as proposition A6 emphasizes, not everything that is of crucial importance is a capability. Recall that proposition A6 allows us to include other elements of ultimate value, and this could incorporate what Sen calls process freedoms.29 In short, by seeing a capability-based human rights theory as a capability theory, for which various theoretical additions and choices are possible, it becomes clear that more is needed than the mere reference to ‘capabilities’.
Note also that we can, of course, ask the question the other way around — what is needed to make a capability theory? — and use the human rights framework as the theory of value that is used to make the selection of capabilities. This route has been developed by Polly Vizard, and has led to the “human rights based capability set” (Vizard 2006, 2007).
3.14.5 The disadvantages
Finally, we need to ask whether there are any disadvantages in using the capability approach to further our thinking, policy making and activism on human rights, and — ultimately — in letting a capabilities-based human rights theory compete with the existing human rights accounts.
The first thing to note is that there is a long-standing human rights discourse that is used by activists all over the world, and often very effectively so. Clearly there are costs involved for these activists to become familiarized with the capability language. If the human rights discourse delivers to them what they need, why would we change it?
Second, there is a worry about legitimacy. The current human rights declarations and treaties have been the result of actual political processes, and the treaties were drafted by a large number of people, drawn from all over the world. For the capability approach, this is different. Given the prominence of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and also the many publications that (wrongly) reduce the capability approach to the work by, primarily, Sen and Nussbaum,30 the capability approach is much more associated with specific individuals. A capability-based human rights theory that is the work of one thinker can never have the political leverage that the existing human rights framework has. For the various practices in which human rights are used (creating laws, making policy and activism) a capability-based human rights framework can therefore never replace the existing human rights framework.
However, there is, of course, a more fruitful relationship possible, and that is to see the two frameworks as complementary rather than competitive (Nussbaum 2011a). Note, however, that any merging of the two frameworks has to be between a particular capability theory and human rights thinking, rather than between the general capability approach and human rights thinking.31 A good example of such practical work is the UK’s Equality and Human Rights Framework. Tania Burchardt and Polly Vizard (2011) used insights from both the capability approach and the existing work on human rights to create a framework that is used for the monitoring undertaken by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in order to meet its legal mandate.32
28 This relates to a complex discussion in legal and political philosophy on whether human rights can be protected by so-called ‘imperfect duties’ or ‘imperfect obligations’ which is beyond the scope of this book. See, amongst others, Polly Vizard (2006, 84–91) and Frances Kamm (2011) for further discussion.
29 The example that Barclay gives is the right not to be discriminated against. Barclay believes that “to be protected from discrimination” is a very important human right, but cannot plausibly be conceptualized as a capability, since one does not have a choice to be discriminated against or not. However, not being discriminated against is a functioning, and it is a mistake to think that the capability approach holds that we should only focus on capabilities and never on functionings, as was argued in section 3.4.
30 Unfortunately, Nussbaum’s (2011c) account of the capability approach only adds to that reductive and misleading portrayal of the capability literature (Robeyns 2011, 2016b; Unterhalter 2013).
31 Hence, when Nussbaum (2011a, 24) writes “the CA is a type of human rights approach”, we should read this as “Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory is a type of human rights approach”. Many other capability theories are, evidently, not human rights approaches, and hence the capability approach, as the overarching framework, cannot be either.
3.15: Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to deepen our understanding of the capability approach, by analysing some questions of clarification that are often posed, and by reconstructing and synthesizing some developments that have taken place in the capability literature over time.
The next chapter will focus on a range of critiques that have been put to the capability approach. Of course, it is not always entirely clear whether a certain question or debate is purely a matter of clarification, or rather a matter of debate and dispute; put differently, there is no neat demarcation between the main focus of this chapter and that of the next. Still, in this chapter I have tried to be as neutral and even-handed as possible in describing the literature, whereas in the next chapter I will take a more active role in arguing for or against certain views or claims. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/03%3A_Clarifications/3.14%3A_Capabilities_and_human_rights.txt |
In chapter 2 I gave an account of the capability approach that gave us a better sense of its necessary core and its scope, as well as describing the structure of a capability theory or capability analysis. While that account has aimed to be precise and comprehensive, it nevertheless raises some further issues.
Hence, this chapter is focussed on investigating those further questions and debates. We will look into the following issues. Section 4.2 asks whether everything that has been called a capability in the literature is genuinely so. Section 4.3 addresses a dispute that has kept capability theorists busy for quite a while over the last two decades, namely whether a capability theorist should endorse a specific list of capabilities. For many years, this was debated under the banner ‘the question of the list’ and was seen as the major criticism that Martha Nussbaum had of Amartya Sen’s work on the capability approach. Section 4.4 investigates the relationship between the basic needs approach and philosophical theories of needs, and argues that the capability scholars may be able to engage more fruitfully with theories of needs. Section 4.5 asks whether, as Nussbaum suggests, we should understand the capability approach as a theory that addresses the government; I will argue that we should reject that suggestion and also take other ‘agents of change’ into account. Section 4.6 analyses a debate that has generated much controversy, namely whether the capability approach can be said to be too individualistic. The next section, 4.7, focuses on a closely related issue: the scope for the inclusion of ‘power’ into the capability approach. Should the capability approach pay much more attention to political economy? Section 4.8 asks whether the capability approach is a liberal theory, and whether it can be anything other than a liberal theory. Section 4.9 argues that, despite the many references to ‘the human development and capability approaches’, these are not the same thing. Finally, section 4.10 discusses the potential and problems of a capabilitarian welfare economics.
4.02: Is everything that's called a capability gen
Since this chapter is the place to collect critiques and debates, let me start with a very basic point of criticism: not everything that is called ‘a capability’ in the capability literature is, upon closer examination, genuinely a capability. The main criticism that I want to offer in this brief section is that we should be very careful in our choices of terms and concepts: not everything that is important is a capability, and it is conceptually confusing (and hence wrong) to call everything that is important a capability. As an interdisciplinary language used in many different disciplines, the capability approach already suffers from sloppy use of terms because of interdisciplinary differences in their usage, and we should avoid contributing to this conceptual confusion. Let me give one example to illustrate the critique.
In her book Allocating the Earth as well as in earlier work, Breena Holland (2008, 2014) argues that the role of the environment in making capabilities possible is so important and central that we should conceptualize environmental ecological functioning (that is, the ecosystem services that the environment offers to human beings) as a meta-capability that underlies all other capabilities. As Holland puts it, “the environment’s ecological functioning is a meta-capability in the sense that it is a precondition of all the capabilities that Nussbaum defines as necessary for living a good human life” (2014, 112). By using this terminology, Holland wants to stress that protecting the ecosystem is not just one way among many equally good ways to contribute to human wellbeing — rather, it is a crucial and non-substitutable precondition for living. Yet one could question whether conceptualizing it as a “meta-capability” is correct. As I have argued elsewhere (Robeyns 2016a), the environment is not a capability, since capabilities are real opportunities for beings and doings. The environment and the services that its ecosystems give to human beings are absolutely necessary for human life to be possible in the first place, but that doesn’t warrant giving it the conceptual status of a ‘capability’. It would have been better, in my view, to introduce a term showing that there are substitutable and non-substitutable preconditions for each capability, and that there are absolutely necessary (or crucial) versus less central preconditions. An environment that is able to deliver a minimal level of ecosystem services to life on our planet is both a non-substitutable as well as an absolutely necessary precondition for human wellbeing understood in terms of capabilities. There are many other preconditions for human wellbeing, but a minimum level of sustainable ecosystem services is one of the very few — perhaps even the only one — that is both non-substitutable and absolutely necessary. That makes it hugely important — perhaps even more important than some capabilities (which could be accommodated by including it in proposition A6), but the absolute priority it should receive does not warrant us to call it a capability. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/04%3A_Critiques_and_Debates/4.01%3A_Introduction.txt |
At an earlier stage of the development of the capability approach, a rather heated debate took place on whether or not it was necessary for Sen to list the capabilities he felt were relevant for the issue under consideration. This ‘question of the list’ debate wasn’t always very helpful, since participants were not making the distinction between capability theories and the capability approach, which, as I will show in this section, is crucial to answer this question. Several scholars have criticized Sen for not having specified which capabilities matter or for not giving us some guidelines on how the selection of capabilities could be conducted (e.g. Sugden 1993; Roemer 1996; Nussbaum 2003a). As is well known, Sen has explicitly refrained from committing himself to one particular list of capabilities. But should Sen (or anyone else) do so?
In order to answer that question, it is important to keep the distinction in mind between the general capability approach, and particular capability theories. As Mozaffar Qizilbash (2012) rightly points out, Sen has written on the capability approach in general and he has developed particular capability applications, critiques, and theories. When asking whether Sen (or anyone else) should commit to a particular list of capabilities, we have to keep that distinction firmly in mind — since it is relevant to our answer.
It is obvious that there cannot be one list that applies to all the different purposes for which the capability approach can be used — that is, one list that applies to more specific capability theories and applications. Hence insofar as it is argued that Sen (or any other capability scholar) should endorse a particular list of capabilities when discussing the capability approach, rather than more specific capability theories, this critique misfires. This is part of the answer that Sen has given to his critics. Each application or theory based on the capability approach will always require a selection of valuable functionings that fits the purpose of the theory or application. Hence the capability approach as such is deliberately too underspecified to endorse just one single list that could be used for all capability analyses (Sen 1993, 2004). It is quite likely that those who have criticised Sen, or the capability approach in general, for not entailing a specific list of capabilities, have not sufficiently appreciated the distinction between the capability approach in general and more specific capability theories.
But what then about specific capability theories, applications and analyses? Should these always commit to a particular list of capabilities? It is possible to distinguish between two types of critique addressing capability theories, which I labelled the weak and strong critiques (Robeyns 2005a). The strong critique entails that there must be a clear list of capabilities that we can use for all capability theories and their application.
The strong critique is most clearly voiced by Nussbaum, who has proposed a list of ten “central human capabilities” that specify the political principles that every person should be entitled to as a matter of justice.1 Nussbaum’s capabilities theory differs in a number of ways from Sen’s version. Nussbaum (1988, 2003) not only argues that these ten capabilities are the relevant ones, but in addition claims that if Sen wants his version of the capability approach to have any bite for addressing issues of social justice, he has to endorse one specific and well-defined list of capabilities.
Sen does not accept the stronger critique as it applies to particular capability theories. The reason is the importance he attaches to agency, the process of choice, and the freedom to reason with respect to the selection of relevant capabilities. He argues that theory on its own is not capable of making such a final list of capabilities (Sen 2004). Instead, Sen argues that we must leave it to democratic processes and social choice procedures to define the distributive policies. In other words, when the capability approach is used for policy work, it is the people who will be affected by the policies who should decide on what will count as valuable capabilities for the policy in question. This immediately makes clear that in order to be operational for (small-scale) policy implementation, the capability approach needs to engage with theories of deliberative democracy and public deliberation and participation.
Sen’s response to the strong critique can be better understood by highlighting his meta-theoretical views on the construction of theories, and theories of justice in particular. One should not forget that Sen is predominantly a prominent scholar in social choice theory, which is the discipline that studies how individual preferences and interests can be combined to reach collective decisions, and how these processes affect the distribution and levels of welfare and freedom. Sen published ground-breaking work in social choice theory before he started working on the capability approach, and he has never ceased to be interested in and to contribute to social choice theory.2 Sen’s passion for social choice theory is also a very likely explanation for his critique of the dominant forms of contemporary theories of justice, which, he argues, focus on describing a utopian situation of perfect justice, rather than giving us tools to detect injustices and decide how to move forward to a less unjust society (Sen 2006, 2009c).
According to my reading of Sen’s work on capability theories and applications, he is not against the selection of dimensions in general, but rather (a) against one list that would apply to all capability theories and applications, and (b) as far as those capability theories and applications are concerned, in favour of seriously considering procedural methods to decide which capabilities matter.
However, even if we all accept that view, it doesn’t settle all disputes. Even if we agree that a selection of capabilities for, say, a poverty evaluation should differ from the selection of capabilities for a theory of justice, this still allows for different views on how that selection should be made. Some scholars have argued that it should be based on normative grounds, in other words based on philosophical reasoning and argumentation (Nussbaum 2000; 2006b; Claassen 2016). Others have argued for a selection based on a procedural method (Byskov 2017). For empirical applications, it has been argued that the selection of dimensions should be made in a way that minimises biases in the selection (Robeyns 2003). For policy-relevant applications, it has been argued that the freedoms listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could provide a good starting point, and should plausibly be playing a larger role in the selection of capabilities (Vizard 2007; Burchardt and Vizard 2011). There are by now various overviews published on how to select functionings and capabilities but, interestingly, they almost always are limited to a certain type of capability theory, such as wellbeing for policy making (Hick and Burchardt 2016; Alkire 2016), multidimensional poverty measurement (Alkire 2016; Alkire et al. 2015), human development projects and policies (Alkire 2002; Byskov forthcoming) and theories of justice (Robeyns 2016d). Thus, there are a range of arguments pointing out that the selection of capabilities for particular capability theories needs to be sensitive to the purpose of the theory in question, hence selection is a matter to be decided at the level of the individual capability theories, rather than at the more general and abstract level of the capability approach (see also Sen 2004a).
1 These ten capabilities are: Life; Bodily health; Bodily integrity; Senses, imagination and thought; Emotions; Practical reason; Affiliation; Other species; Play; and Control over one’s environment. For more details, see Nussbaum (2006b, 76–78).
2 Sen was also awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize for his contributions to social choice theory and welfare economics. For some of his work on social choice theory, see Sen (1970a, 1970b, 1976, 1977b, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1992c, 1999c, 2017). | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/04%3A_Critiques_and_Debates/4.03%3A_Should_we_commit_to_a_specific_list_of_capabil.txt |
By introducing the concepts of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’, the capability approach offers some specific notions of ‘advantage’ and provides an ethical framework to guide our actions and institutional design. It is also a theoretical framework with clear commitments to practice and policy making in the world as it is, not just in some hypothetical world or in a stylized model. However, the same can be said of the (basic) needs approach, which was introduced and developed much earlier in the landscape of ethical approaches related to wellbeing and poverty. Hence, the obvious question to ask is: why not use the notion of needs for our theoretical work, and the basic needs approach for work on development?
To answer that question, it makes sense to make a distinction between the basic needs approach as it has been used by development scholars and policy makers, and the philosophical theories of basic needs. Let us look at the basic needs approach first. This is a practice and policy oriented approach “that gives priority to meeting people’s basic needs — to ensuring that there are sufficiently, appropriately distributed basic need goods and services to sustain all human lives at a minimally decent level” (Stewart 2006, 14). The basic needs approach was a reaction to the development policies that many countries in the Global South pursued after independence from colonial rule, and that led to a dualistic pattern of development, with a small modern sector that allowed some people to flourish while at the same time leaving many other people in poverty and unemployment. The fundamental claim of the basic needs approach was that the poor not only need a monetary income but also some very basic goods and services such as clean water, enough food, health services, and education. Given the urgency of these needs, the hope was that the requirement to supply them would be more readily accepted by governments in both the Global South and North than theoretical arguments about inequality (Stewart 2006, 15).
In the 1980s, the basic needs approach lost support because development donors shifted their attention to the goals of stability and adjustment, but when they again started to pay attention to the poor, adopting the capability approach, and especially the more policy oriented human development paradigm, seemed more attractive. However, according to Frances Stewart (2006, 18), when applied to the concern of reducing poverty in the Global South, the capability approach and the basic needs approach are very similar in terms of the actions they recommend.
Why, then, would anyone consider the capability approach over the basic needs approach? The first reason is that the capability approach seems to have a more elegant philosophical foundation (Stewart 2006, 18). However, while its seeming elegance might have been perceived by the basic needs practitioners as a reason for its adoption, the question is whether this is true, given that there have always been the philosophical theories of needs, to which we turn below. Perhaps the answer is pragmatic and points to an advantage of the interdisciplinary nature of the capability approach: Sen did not only lay out its theoretical foundations, but also, via his empirical work and his contributions to the Human Development Reports, translated those philosophical ideas into practice. Perhaps it is the case that a philosophical theory needs some charismatic thinker who translates it into practice, since otherwise it is not picked up by policy makers. In the case of the capability approach, Sen did both the philosophical work and the policy translation.
Another reason mentioned by Stewart is that the capability approach focuses more on the situation of individuals than the basic needs approach (Stewart 2006, 18). The capability approach doesn’t recommend the delivery of the same basic goods to everyone, but rather that we take human diversity as much as possible into account. The basic needs approach was more broad-brush than the capability approach, which stresses the additional resources needed by some people, such as the disabled. A third reason is that the capability approach applies to all human beings, hence also to the rich, whereas the basic needs approach has generally been perceived as focused on poor people in poor countries (Streeten 1995, ix). The more inclusive scope of the capability approach, which applies to all human beings, resonates with an increasing acknowledgement that countries in the Global North also include people with low levels of wellbeing, and that ideas of development, social progress and prosperity apply to all countries. This is very well captured in the case of the Sustainable Development Goals, which are goals applicable to all countries.
Many of the earlier key advocates of the basic need approach are pursuing their goals now under the umbrella of the human development paradigm. Hence the pragmatic and policy oriented basic needs approach has joined the human development paradigm, which has become much stronger politically. For policy making, the influence of frameworks at a particular point in time is one of the relevant considerations whether one should adopt one framework rather than another, and hence there is a good reason why, given their pragmatic goals, the basic needs advocates have contributed to a joint endeavour with capability scholars to set up the human development paradigm.
But what about the philosophical theories of basic needs? Are there reasons why we should favour them rather than the capability approach? The arguments that were given for the pragmatic basic needs approach apply also to some extent to the questions of the complementarities and differences between the theories. There are, theoretically, close similarities between theories of needs and capabilities, and Soran Reader (2006) has argued that many of the objections that capability scholars have to theories of needs are unwarranted and based on implausibly reductionist readings of theories of needs. According to Reader, theories of needs and capability theories have much more in common than capability scholars have been willing to see.
Still, Sen has been notorious in arguing that the capability approach is superior to the basic needs approach, a critique he has reaffirmed in his latest book (Sen 2017, 25). In his paper ‘Goods and people’, Sen (1984a, 513–15) criticised the basic needs approach for being too focussed on commodities, and seeing human beings as passive and needy. Those criticisms were rebutted by Alkire (2002, 166–74), who believed they were based on misinterpretations. However, Alkire did argue that the other two claims by Sen were correct. First, that the basic needs approach confines our attention to the most desperate situations, and is therefore only useful to developing countries. Alkire, however, sees this as potentially a strength of the basic needs approach; one could argue that it helps us to focus our attention on the worst off. Sen’s final criticism was, according to Alkire, the one with most theoretical bite: that the basic needs approach does not have solid philosophical foundations.
However, the question is whether that is true. A set of recent papers by basic needs scholars (Brock and Reader 2002; Reader and Brock 2004; Reader 2006) make clear that the philosophical theory of basic needs is sophisticated; moreover, several philosophically highly sophisticated theories of needs have been proposed in the past, both in the Aristotelian tradition but also more recently by contemporary philosophers (e.g. Doyal and Gough 1991; Wiggins 1998). Instead, a more plausible explanation for the basic needs approach losing ground in comparison to the capability approach seems to me that in the case of the basic needs approach, there was less interaction between empirical scholars and policy makers on the one hand, and philosophers on the other. It is hard to find evidence of a clear synergy between basic needs philosophers and basic needs development scholars and policy advisors — an interaction that is very present in the capability literature. This may explain why the basic needs approach has been seen as lacking solid conceptual foundations.
Yet despite these hypotheses, which may help us understand why the capability approach to a large extent replaced the focus on needs in the practical field and in empirical research, some genuine differences remain. The first difference requires the capability approach to adopt some basic distinctions that are fundamental to philosophical needs theory, and for which the capability approach in itself does not have the resources: the distinction between non-contingent needs on the one hand, and contingent needs, desires, wants, etc. on the other hand. Non-contingent needs are cases in which “the needing being simply cannot go on unless its need is met” (Reader and Brock 2004, 252). This relates to a more common-sense distinction between ‘needs’ and ‘wants’, that has an important relevance to our everyday ethical life and to policy making, but that has no equivalent in the capability approach. For some applications of the capability approach, such as those related to prioritising in conditions of extreme scarcity of resources (whether these resources are money, food, water, the right to emit greenhouse gasses, etc.) theories of needs can provide tools to guide our moral priorities that are lacking in the capability approach. Right now, preferences dominate in public decision making, but the concept of preferences cannot make a distinction between a preference for minimal amounts of water, food, safety, and social interaction, versus a preference for wine and a jacuzzi. The preferences-based approach, which has become very dominant in ethical theory as well as policy analysis by economists, doesn’t have the theoretical resources to make such a distinction, whereas it is central to some of our intuitions of how to prioritise our actions in cases of scarcity (e.g. J. O’Neill 2011; Robeyns 2017a).
The second difference follows from the first. The distinction in theories of needs between the morally required (meeting non-contingent or basic needs) and the morally laudable but not required (the other needs, wants, desires, etc.) implies that the needs approach may have a smaller scope than the capability approach. The modular view of the capability approach presented in chapter 2 makes clear that the capability approach can be used for a wide variety of capabilitarian theories and applications. The basic needs approach is more focussed on situations in which we need to prioritise — but the domain of ethical questions is broader than that.
In conclusion, the basic needs approach in practice is, for pragmatic and political reasons, now part of the human development paradigm. At the theoretical level, though, capability scholars neglect to take the philosophy of needs seriously or to draw on the theoretical resources of those theories to strengthen particular capabilitarian theories and applications. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/04%3A_Critiques_and_Debates/4.04%3A_Why_not_use_the_notion_of_needs.txt |
Some capability scholars believe that the capability approach is a theory about public policy or state action. For example, Nussbaum (2011, 19) writes that it is an essential element of the (general) capability approach that it ascribes an urgent task to government and public policy. In her own capabilities theory of justice, Nussbaum makes very clear that she sees the government as the actor of change. But is it right to see the government as the only agent of change or of justice in the capability approach? I think the literature offers ample evidence that this is not the case.
The first thing to note is that, while the dominant view is that the capability approach is related to public policy and assumes the government as the main or only agent of change, and while Nussbaum highlights the government as the actor of change in her account of the capability approach in Creating Capabilities, not all capability scholars endorse this focus on the government. For example, as Frances Stewart (2005, 189) writes:
Given that improvements in the position of the poor rarely happen solely through the benevolence of governments, and are more likely to occur because of political and economic pressures, organisation of groups among the poor is important — even essential — to achieve significant improvements.
The view that the capability approach is government-focussed may thus be reinforced by the fact that Nussbaum makes this claim, but other capability scholars are developing theories or applications that address other agents of change. A prominent example is the work of Solava Ibrahim (2006, 2009) who has shown how self-help initiatives can play a crucial role in promoting the capabilities of the poor, by enhancing their ownership of development projects, and “overcoming their helplessness by changing their perceptions of their own capabilities” (Ibrahim 2009, 236). Similar research has been conducted in more informal settings in Khayelitsha, a South African township, by Ina Conradie (2013). These are just two studies that have been published in widely read scholarly journals — but there is a broad range of capability theories and capability applications that do not, or do not primarily, address the government. In conclusion, the first observation is that some of the capability literature does not address the government. But can we in addition also find reasons for not restricting the agents of change in the capability approach to the government?
The first reason relates to the distinction between the capability approach and capability theories and applications, which was introduced in section 2.3. As far as we are looking at the capability approach, rather than particular capability theories or applications, an exclusive focus on the government is clearly unwarranted. There is nothing in module A that forces us to see the government as the addressee of our capability theory, and module B1 (the purpose of the capability theory) gives us the choice between any addressee we would like to pick. One could also use the capability approach to analyse what neighbours, in a particular street or neighbourhood in a well-functioning democratic state, could do for each other and in their common interests, in order to improve the quality of life in their neighbourhood. The neighbours may prefer to keep the initiative for themselves, and not ask the government to solve their local problems.
Another example of a capability application in which the government is not involved at all is the case of parents deciding to which school to send their child (assuming they have options to choose from, which globally is not the case for many parents). Suppose that parents have the choice between two schools. The first school focusses more on making pupils ready to excel in their future professional life, endorsing a human capital understanding of education. In the other school, there is more attention paid to creative expression, learning the virtues of cooperating, taking responsibility for oneself, for others and for the environment, and a concern with the flourishing of the child as he or she is now, not just as a future adult. Clearly there is a different ideal of education in these two school. The parents may sit down and write two lists of the pros and cons of the different schools — and many items on that list will be functionings or capabilities. Parents choosing between these two schools will choose different future capability sets for their children. Although the terminology may not be used, capabilities are at work in this decision; yet very few people would argue that it is a task for the government to decide whether children should be sent to schools focussing on human capital training, or rather on human flourishing. The scholarship focussing on curriculum design using the capability approach, or on making us understand the difference between human capital and human capabilities is doing precisely all of this (Brighouse 2006; Robeyns 2006c; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2006; Walker 2008, 2010, 2012b).
Of course, one could respond to these examples by saying that there may be capability applications or theories that belong to the private sphere and that therefore the government is not the (only) agent of change — yet that capabilitarian political theories, such as theories of justice, should address the government.
But this response will not do either. As several political theorists have argued, the question of who should be the agents of justice is one that needs to be properly discussed and analysed, and it is not at all obvious that the primary or only agents of justice should be the government (O. O’Neill 2001; Weinberg 2009; Deveaux 2015). There are at least three reasons one could give for not giving the government the main role as agent of change, or indeed any role at all. The first reason is one’s general ideological commitment as regards political systems. Anarchism and (right-)libertarian political theories would either give the government no agency at all, or else only insofar as property rights need to be protected (Nozick 1974). There is nothing in the structure of anarchist or libertarian political theories that rules out their adoption of functionings and capabilities as (part of) the metric of quality of life that should guide the social and economic institutions that we choose for our societies. People have very different views on the question of what can realistically be expected from a government. Just as we need to take people as they are, we should not work with an unrealistic utopian account of government. It may be that the capabilitarian ideal society is better reached by a coordinated commitment to individual action or by relying on market mechanisms. Adherents of public choice theory would stress that giving the government the power to deliver those goods will have many unintended but foreseeable negative consequences, which are much more important than the positive contributions the government could make.3
A second reason why capabilitarian political theories may not see the government as the only, or primary, agent of justice, relates to the distinction between ideal theories of justice (which describe those normative principles that would be met in a just world, and the institutions that would meet those principles) versus non-ideal theory (which describes what is needed to reduce injustices in the world in which we live).4 In several areas of the world, governmental agents are involved in the creation of (severe) economic and social injustice, either internationally or against some of its own minorities, or — in highly repressive states — against the vast majority of the population (e.g. Hochschild 1999; Roy 2014). The government is then more part of the problem than part of the solution, and some would argue that it is very naive to construct capabilitarian political theories that simply assume that the government will be a force for the good (Menon 2002). Similarly, some political philosophers have argued that in cases of injustice in which the government doesn’t take sufficient action, as in the case of harms done by climate change, duties fall on others who are in a position to ‘take up the slack’ or make a difference (Karnein 2014; Caney 2016).
The third reason why capabilitarian political theories may not see the government as the only, or primary, agent of justice, relates to the question of how we decide to allocate the responsibility for being the agent of change.5 As Monique Devaux points out, we can attribute moral and political agency derived from our responsibility in creating the injustice (a position advocated by Thomas Pogge (2008) in his work on global poverty) or because of the greater capacities and powers that agents have, as Onora O’Neill (2001) has advocated. Devaux (2015, 127–28) argues that in the case of justice related to global poverty, the moral agency of the poor stems from their experience of living in poverty. This may not only make them more effective as political agents in some contexts, but it might also lead to the poor endorsing a different political agenda, often focussing on empowerment, rather than merely reducing poverty understood in material terms. This is in tune with the earlier-mentioned research by Ibrahim (2006, 2009) and Conradie (2013) on self-organisation by the poor.
It has not been my aim in this section to defend a particular way to answer the question of who should be the agent(s) of justice. Rather, my goal has been much more limited — namely, to show that it is not at all self-evident that a capabilitarian political theory, let alone another type of capabilitarian theory or application, would always posit the government as the only agent of change, or the primary agent of change. Pace what Nussbaum (2011) claims on this issue, there is no reason why this should be the case, and there are many good reasons why we should regard our answer to this question as one that requires careful reasoning and consideration — and ultimately a choice that is made in module B and module C, rather than a fixed given in module A.
3 For an introduction to the public choice literature, see Mueller (2003).
4 On the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theories of justice, see e.g. Swift (2008); Stemplowska (2008); Robeyns (2008a); Valentini (2012).
5 The second and third reasons may sometimes both be at work in an argument to attribute agency to a particular group or institutions. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/04%3A_Critiques_and_Debates/4.05%3A_Does_the_capability_approach_only_address_the_.txt |
At the beginning of this century, an often-heard critique at academic meetings on the capability approach was that “the capability approach is too individualistic”. This critique has been especially widespread among those who endorse communitarian philosophies, or social scientists who argue that neoclassical economics is too individualistic, and believe that the same applies to the capability approach (e.g. Gore 1997; Evans 2002; Deneulin and Stewart 2002; Stewart 2005). The main claim would be that any theory should regard individuals as part of their social environment, and hence agents should be recognised as socially embedded and connected to others, and not as atomised individuals. Very few scholars have directly argued that the capability approach is too individualistic, but a few have stated it explicitly. Séverine Deneulin and Frances Stewart (2002, 66) write that “the [capability] approach is an example of methodological individualism” and also add “the individualism of the [capability] approach leads us […] to a belief that there are autonomous individuals whose choices are somehow independent of the society in which they live”. But is this critique correct? What are we to make of the argument that the capability approach is “too individualistic”?6
4.6.1 Different forms of individualism
To scrutinise the allegedly individualistic character of the capability approach, we should distinguish between ethical or normative individualism on the one hand and methodological and ontological individualism on the other. As we already saw in section 2.6.8, ethical individualism, or normative individualism, makes a claim about who or what should count in our evaluative exercises and decisions. It postulates that individuals, and only individuals, are the units of ultimate moral concern. In other words, when evaluating different states of affairs, we are only interested in the (direct and indirect) effects of those states on individuals. Methodological and ontological individualism are somewhat more difficult to describe, as the debate on methodological individualism has suffered from confusion and much obscurity. Nevertheless, at its core is the claim that “all social phenomena are to be explained wholly and exclusively in terms of individuals and their properties” (Bhargava 1992, 19). It is a doctrine that includes semantic, ontological and explanatory individualism. The last is probably the most important of these doctrines, and this can also explain why many people reduce methodological individualism to explanatory individualism. Ontological individualism states that only individuals and their properties exist, and that all social entities and properties can be identified by reducing them to individuals and their properties. Ontological individualism hence makes a claim about the nature of human beings, about the way they live their lives and about their relation to society. In this view, society is built up from individuals only, and hence is nothing more than the sum of individuals and their properties. Similarly, explanatory individualism is the doctrine that all social phenomena can in principle be explained in terms of individuals and their properties.
The crucial issue here is that a commitment to normative individualism is not incompatible with an ontology that recognises the connections between people, their social relations, and their social embedment. Similarly, a social policy focussing on and targeting certain groups or communities can be perfectly compatible with normative individualism.
As I argued in section 2.6.8, the capability approach embraces normative individualism — and this is, for reasons given there, a desirable property. However, it also follows from the discussion on the importance of structural constraints (section 2.7.5) that the capability approach does not rely on ontological individualism.
Clearly, scholars have divergent (implicit) social theories, and hence some attach more importance to social structures than others do. Nevertheless, I fail to see how the capability approach can be understood to be methodologically or ontologically individualistic, especially since Sen himself has analysed some processes that are profoundly collective, such as his analysis of households as sites of cooperative conflict (1990a). In later work too, he acknowledged persons as socially embedded, as the following quote from his joint work illustrates:
The [capability] approach used in this study is much concerned with the opportunities that people have to improve the quality of their lives. It is essentially a ‘people-centered’ approach, which puts human agency (rather than organizations such as markets or governments) at the centre of the stage. The crucial role of social opportunities is to expand the realm of human agency and freedom, both as an end in itself and as a means of further expansion of freedom. The word ‘social’ in the expression ‘social opportunity’ […] is a useful reminder not to view individuals and their opportunities in isolated terms. The options that a person has depend greatly on relations with others and on what the state and other institutions do. We shall be particularly concerned with those opportunities that are strongly influenced by social circumstances and public policy […]. (Drèze and Sen 2002: 6)
Of course, the critique is not only (and also not primarily) about Sen’s work, but about the capability approach in general, or about capability theories. But the work done by other scholars similarly doesn’t meet the criteria for being plausibly considered to be methodologically or ontologically individualistic. In general, we can say that the capability approach acknowledges some non-individual structures, and for the various more specific capability theories, the degree to which they move away from methodological or ontological individualism depends on the choices made in modules B and C. But whatever those choices are, there are already some features in module A that prevent capability theories from being methodologically or ontologically individualistic.
4.6.2 Does the capability approach pay sufficient attention to groups?
The critique that the capability approach should focus more on groups is often related to the critique that the focus of the capability approach is too individualistic, but it is nevertheless a distinct critique. A clear example can be found in the work of Frances Stewart (2005), who argues that in order to understand processes that affect the lives of people, such as violent conflict, one has to look at group capabilities — which she defines as the average of the individual capabilities of all the individuals in the selected group. The reason we need to focus on these ‘group capabilities’ is because they are a central source of group conflict. They are thus crucial to understand processes such as violent conflict.
We will return to Stewart’s specific complaint below, but first unpack the general critique that the capability approach doesn’t pay enough attention to groups. To properly judge the critique that the capability approach does not pay sufficient attention to groups, we need to distinguish between a weaker and a stronger version of that claim.
A stronger version of that claim would be that the capability approach cannot pay sufficient attention to groups — that there is something in the conceptual apparatus of the capability approach that makes it impossible for the capability approach to pay attention to groups. But that claim is obviously false, because there exists a large literature of research analysing the average capabilities of one group compared to another, e.g. women and men (Kynch and Sen 1983; Nussbaum 2000; Robeyns 2003, 2006a) or the disabled versus those without disabilities (Kuklys 2005; Zaidi and Burchardt 2005). Capability theorists have also written on the importance of groups for people’s wellbeing, like Nussbaum’s discussion of women’s collectives in India. Several lists of capabilities that have been proposed in the literature include capabilities related to community membership: Nussbaum stresses affiliation as an architectonic capability, Alkire (2002) discusses relationships and participation, and in earlier work I have included social relationships (Robeyns 2003). The UNDP (1995, 2004) has produced Human Development Reports on both gender and culture, thus policy reports based on the capability approach focus on groups.
The weaker claim states that the present state of the literature on the capability approach does not pay sufficient attention to groups. I agree that contemporary mainstream economics is very badly equipped to account for group membership on people’s wellbeing. But is this also the case for the capability approach? While some capability theorists have a great faith in people’s abilities to be rational and to resist social and moral pressure stemming from groups (e.g. Sen 1999b, 2009b), other writers on the capability approach pay much more attention to the influence of social norms and other group-based processes on our choices and, ultimately, on our wellbeing (e.g. Alkire 2002; Nussbaum 2000; Iversen 2003; Robeyns 2003a). There is thus no reason why the capability approach would not be able to take the normative and constitutive importance of groups fully into account. Admittedly, however, this is a theoretical choice that needs to be made when making scholarly decisions in modules B3, B5 and C1, hence we may not agree with the assumptions about groups in each and every capability theory.
If we return to the reasons Stewart gave for a focus on group capabilities, we notice that the main reason stated is that analysis of group capabilities is needed to understand outcomes. Yet that is precisely what the just mentioned capability applications do (since they do not only measure group inequalities in capabilities but also try to understand them). Those applications also investigate how group identities constrain groups to different degrees, or which privileges they ensure for certain groups. In my reading of the literature, many capability scholars do precisely this kind of work, and to the extent that they do not do so, one important reason is that they are engaging in documenting and measuring inequalities, rather than in explaining them. The complaint should then be that capability analysis should be less concerned with documenting and measuring inequalities, and should spend more time on understanding how inequalities emerge, are sustained, and can be decreased — but that is another complaint.
Still, I do think that a consideration of the role of groups in the capability approach gives us a warning. To fully understand the importance of groups, capability theories should engage more intensively in a dialogue with disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, history, and gender and cultural studies. This will make the choices of the account of human diversity (module B3), the account of structural constraints (module B5), and of ontological and explanatory theories (module C1) more accurate. Disciplinary boundaries and structures make these kinds of dialogues difficult, but there is no inherent reason why this could not be done.
4.6.3 Social structures, norms and institutions in the capability approach
The critique that the capability approach is too individualistic is sometimes also put in another way, namely that the capability approach should pay more attention to collective features, such as social structures, social norms, and institutions. How can the capability approach account for such collective aspects of human living?
At the theoretical level, the capability approach does account for social relations and the constraints and opportunities of societal structures and institutions on individuals in two ways. First, by recognising the social and environmental factors which influence the conversions of commodities into functionings. For example, suppose that Jaap and Joseph both have the same individual conversion factors and possess the same commodities. But Jaap is living in a town with cycle lanes and low criminality rates, whereas Joseph is living in a city with poor infrastructure for cyclists, and with high levels of criminality and theft. Whereas Jaap can use his bike to cycle anywhere he wants, at any moment of the day, Joseph will be faced with a much higher chance that his bike will be stolen. Hence, the same commodity (a bike) leads to different levels of the functioning ‘to transport oneself safely’, due to characteristics of the society in which one lives (its public infrastructure, crime levels etc).
The second way in which the capability approach accounts for societal structures and constraints is by theoretically distinguishing functionings from capabilities. More precisely, moving from capabilities to achieved functionings requires an act of choice. Now, it is perfectly possible to take into account the influence of societal structures and constraints on those choices, by choosing a nuanced and rich account of agency (module B4 — account of agency) and of societal structures (module B5 — account of structural constraints). For example, suppose Sarah and Sigal both have the same intellectual capacities and human capital at the age of six, and live in a country where education is free and children from poorer families receive scholarships. Sarah was born in a class in which little attention was paid to intellectual achievement and studying, whereas Sigal’s parents are both graduates pursuing intellectual careers. The social environment in which Sarah and Sigal live will greatly influence and shape their preferences for studying. In other words, while initially Sarah and Sigal have the same capability set, the social structures and constraints that influence and shape their preferences will influence the choice they will make to pick one bundle of functionings. The capability approach allows us to take those structures and constraints on choices into account, but whether a particular capability theory will take that into account depends on the choices made in the various modules, especially modules B4 and B5. Yet it is clear that the choices made in modules B and C will have ultimately far reaching consequences for our capabilitarian evaluations.
Summing up, one could, plausibly, complain that a certain capability theory doesn’t pay sufficient attention to social structures or collective features of human life. This may well be a very valid critique of a particular capability theory in which the additional theories of human diversity, social structures, and other social theories more generally, are very minimal (that is, the explanatory and ontological theories added in C1 do not properly account for many collective features of life). But I have argued that it is not a valid critique against the capability approach in general.
6 Amartya Sen has responded to their critique by stating that “I fear I do not see at all the basis of their diagnosis” (Sen 2002b, 80). As my arguments in this section will show, I think Sen is right, because Deneulin’s and Stewart’s critique fails to distinguish properly between different types of individualism, including methodological individualism (which the capability approach is not) and normative individualism (which the capability approach meets, and, as I have argued in section 2.6.8, should meet). | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/04%3A_Critiques_and_Debates/4.06%3A_Is_the_capability_approach_too_individualistic.txt |
In section 4.6, I analysed the critique that the capability approach is too individualistic, and argued that this charge is based on a misunderstanding of different distinct types of individualism, as well as a flawed (and unduly limited) understanding of the potential for capability theories to include social structures as factors that explain varying levels of advantage between different people. However, there are two closely related critiques that must be addressed briefly: first, that the capability approach downplays power and social structures, and second, that capability theories divert our attention from the political economy of poverty and inequality, which is much more important than the measurement and evaluation of poverty and inequality. Let us analyse these two critiques in turn.
4.7.1 Which account of power and choice?
The first worry is that the capability approach is insufficiently critical of social constraints on people’s actions, and does not pay due attention to “global forces of power and local systems of oppression” (Koggel 2003). Put differently, the worry is that the capability approach does not pay sufficient attention to inequalities in power (Hill 2003). Similarly, there is also a worry that the capability approach could be used in combination with a stripped-down version of human choice. For example, despite Sen’s repeated criticism of choice as revealed preference, one could in principle make interpersonal comparisons of functionings that assume revealed preference theory: a person will choose from their option set what is best for them. But this ignores the fact that our choices are heavily influenced by patterns of expectations and social norms,7 as well as commitments we have to certain interests that do not necessarily affect our own advantage.8 Depending on the choice theory one adopts, the capability approach could lead to widely divergent normative conclusions (Robeyns 2000; 2001). Standard economics pays very little attention to the social and cultural constraints that impinge on people’s choices, in contrast to sociology, gender studies and cultural studies, among other disciplines. In political philosophy, one sees a similar split between the core of Anglo-American political philosophy, in which the concept of the self that is endorsed is that of a rational, autonomous agent whose own plans take precedence over things he finds as ‘given’ in his life, versus other traditions in philosophy that pay more attention to relations and the social embedding of individuals, including unjust structures in which one finds oneself, as well as mechanisms that reproduce power differences. The consequence is that it is possible to use functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space in combination with many different normative accounts of choice, with a widely divergent critical content.
Take as an example the choices made by men versus women between paid (labour market) or unpaid (care and household) work. In all societies women do much more household and care work, whereas men do much more paid work. Both kinds of work can generate a number of different functionings so that the largest capability set might perhaps be reached only by giving everyone the opportunity to combine both types of work. However, I would argue that in the world today, in which hardly any society allows people to combine market work and non-market work without having to make significant compromises when it comes to the quality of at least one of them, the labour market enables more (and more important) functionings than care work. These include psychological functionings like increased self-esteem; social functionings like having a social network; material functionings like being financially independent and securing one’s financial needs for one’s old age or in the event of divorce.9 Many schools in political philosophy and normative welfare economics have typically seen the gender division of labour as ethically unproblematic, in the sense that this division is seen as the result of men’s and women’s voluntary choices, which reflect their preferences. However, this is an inadequate way of explaining and evaluating this division, because gender-related structures and constraints convert this choice from an individual choice under perfect information into a collective decision under socially constructed constraints with imperfect information and asymmetrical risks. Moreover, evaluating the gender division of labour can only be done if we scrutinise the constraints on choice, and these may turn out to be very different for men and women.10 What is crucial for the discussion here is that both positive theories of the gender division of labour (which are choices made in modules B3, B4, and B5) bear different normative implications. If a housewife is held fully responsible for the fact that she works at home then the logical consequence would be that she had the capability to work in the labour market. However, if we embrace a theory of choice that focuses on gender specific constraints, then we will not hold the housewife fully responsible for her choice but acknowledge that her capability set was smaller and did not contain the possibility for a genuine choice to work in the labour market. It seems, thus, that it is perfectly possible to apply the capability approach in combination with different accounts of gender-specific constraints on choices.
By giving choice such a central position and making its place in wellbeing and social justice evaluations more explicit, the capability approach opens up a space for discussions of how certain choices are constrained by gender-related societal mechanisms and expectations. But again, the capability approach provides no guarantee for this: it depends on the choices made in modules B and C. For example, conservatives will want to integrate a conservative theory of gender relations within the capability approach, whereas for critical scholars it will be crucial to integrate a feminist account of gender relations, which includes an account of power. No doubt the two exercises will reach very different normative conclusions. In short, for scholars who defend a theory of human agency and social reality that challenges the status quo, one of the important tasks will be to negotiate which additional theories will be integrated in further specifications of the capability approach, especially the choices made in module C1.
The conclusion is that the core characteristics of the capability approach (as listed in module A) do not necessarily have significant implications for the role of power in capability theories and applications, which can include widely divergent views on social realities and interpersonal relations. Indeed, the fact that the capability approach interests both scholars who work in the libertarian tradition, as well as scholars who work in more critical traditions, illustrate this conclusion. My own personal conviction is that there is ample reason why we should not adopt a stripped-down view of the roles of social categories and social structures, and hence include a rich account of power that is supported by research in anthropology, sociology and other social sciences. But for everyone advancing a capability theory or application, it holds that they should defend their implicit social theories, and be willing to scrutinize them critically.
4.7.2 Should we prioritise analysing the political economy?
Capability scholars have been criticised for having the wrong priorities: by focusing so much on the metric of justice and on human diversity in the conversion of resources into capabilities, their approach draws attention away from huge inequalities in terms of resources (income, wealth) and therefore helps to preserve the (unjust) status quo. Thomas Pogge (2002) has specifically argued that the capability approach — Sen’s work in particular — overemphasises the role of national and local governments, thereby neglecting the huge injustices created by the global economic system and its institutional structures, such as global trade rules. Similarly, Alison Jaggar (2002, 2006) has argued that western philosophers, and Martha Nussbaum’s work on the capability approach in particular, should not prioritise the analysis of cultural factors constraining poor women’s lives, or listing what an ideal account of flourishing and justice would look like, but rather focus on the global economic order and other processes by which the rich countries are responsible for global poverty.
Pogge and Jaggar may have a point in their charge that capability theorists have paid insufficient attention to these issues, which have been discussed at length in the philosophical literature on global justice. But one might also argue that this is orthogonal to the issues about which the capability approach to social justice is most concerned, namely, how to make interpersonal comparisons of advantage for the purposes of social justice. One could, quite plausibly, hold the view that, since most capability theorists are concerned with human wellbeing, they should invest their energies in addressing the most urgent cases of injustice, investigate their underlying causal processes and mechanisms, and concentrate on the development of solutions. Using the modular view of the capability approach, this critique boils down to the view that we should concentrate on modules outside the core, namely those that explain certain unjust structures.
This is not, however, a valid critique of the capability approach as a general framework, nor does it recognise the role that capability theories can play in substantive debates about global justice and inequality. Rather, the critique should be reformulated to say that the most urgent issues of justice do not require theories of justice, but rather a political and economic analysis of unjust structures. But then we are no longer facing a critique of the capability approach, but rather a critique of our research priorities, which goes beyond the scope of this book.11 It is clear that the capability approach will not solve all the world’s problems, and that we should regard it as a tool to help us in analysing cases that need our attention, rather than an intellectual project that has become an end in itself for academics. However, it doesn’t follow therefore that all scholars developing the capability approach should become political economists — or malaria researchers, for that matter.
7 On the importance of social norms in explaining a person’s choice and behaviour, see e.g. Elster (1989); Anderson (2000a).
8 On commitment, see e.g. Sen (1977a, 1985b); Cudd (2014).
9 As is also suggested by the empirical findings of Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti (2000) who measured achieved functioning levels for Italy.
10 The seminal work in this area is Susan Okin’s book Justice, Gender and the Family (Okin 1989). On the gendered nature of the constraints on choice, see also Nancy Folbre (1994).
11 Serene Khader (2011, 24–30) faces similar critiques in her study of adaptive preferences (rather than the global economic order), and provides a sensible response to those worries. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/04%3A_Critiques_and_Debates/4.07%3A_What_about_power_and_political_economy.txt |
Students of the capability approach often ask whether it is a liberal theory — something those who ask that question seem to think is a bad thing. Given the various audiences and disciplines that engage with the capability approach, there is a very high risk of misunderstandings of discipline-specific terms, such as ‘liberal’. Hence, let us answer the question: is the capability approach a liberal theory, and if so, in what sense?
In many capability theories and applications, including the work by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, there is a great stress on capabilities rather than functionings, as well as on agency and the power of people to shape their own destinies.12 What is ultimately important is that people have the freedoms (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to lead, to do what they want to do and be the person they want to be. Once they have these freedoms, they can choose to act on them in line with their own ideas of the kind of life they want to live. For example, every person should have the opportunity to be part of a community and to practice a religion, but if someone prefers to be a hermit or an atheist, they should also have this option. Now, it is certainly true that individual freedoms and agency are a hallmark of liberalism. But is this enough to conclude that the capability approach, in contrast to specific capability theories, is a liberal framework?13
First, given the interdisciplinary context in which the capability approach is operating, it is very important that the word ‘liberal’ is not confused with the word ‘liberal’ in daily life. In ordinary language, ‘liberal’ has different political meanings in different countries, and can cover both the political right or left. In addition it is often used to refer to (neo)liberal economic policies that prioritise free markets and the privatization of public companies such as water suppliers or the railways. In contrast, philosophical liberalism is neither necessarily left or right, nor does it a priori advocate any social or economic policies.
The first misunderstanding to get out the way is that capabilities as freedoms refer exclusively to the ‘free market’ and thus that the capability approach would always lead to an endorsement of (unfettered) markets as the institutions that are capabilities-enhancing. Sen does argue that people have reason to value the freedom or liberty to produce, buy, and sell in markets. This point, however, is part of his more general work on development, and it is very different to the highly disputed question in economics and politics regarding the benefits and limits of the market as a system of economic production and distribution. Functionings and capabilities are conceptualizations of wellbeing achievements and wellbeing freedoms, and the question of which economic institutions are the best institutional means to foster functionings and capabilities is both analytically and politically a question that can only be settled after we first agree what economic outcomes we should be aiming for: a question to which the capability approach gives a (partial) answer.
The question of what are the appropriate institutions to lead to capability expansions is a separate one, which cannot be answered by the capability approach in itself; it must be coupled with a political economy analysis. However, there is nothing in the (limited) literature that has undertaken this task so far to suggest that a capability analysis would recommend unfettered markets — quite the contrary, as the work by Rutger Claassen (2009, 2015) shows: capabilities theories give reasons for regulating markets, and for constraining property rights. In sum, if the word ‘liberal’ is used to refer to ‘neoliberalism’ or to ‘economic liberalization policies’, then neither the capability approach in general, nor Sen and Nussbaum’s more specific theories, are liberal in that sense.
Yet I believe it is correct to say that Sen and Nussbaum’s writings on the capability approach are liberal in the philosophical sense, which refers to a philosophical tradition that values individual autonomy and freedom.14 However, even philosophical liberalism is a very broad church, and Sen and Nussbaum’s theories arguably participate in a critical strand within it, since the explanatory theories that they use in their capability theories (that is, the choices they make in module C1), are in various ways aware of social structures.
Third, while the particular capability theories advocated by Sen and Nussbaum aspire to be liberal, it is possible to construct capability theories that are much less so. Take a capability theory that opts in module C1 for (1) a highly structuralist account of social conditions, and (2) theories of bounded rationality, that place great emphasis on people’s structural irrationalities in decision-making. In module C4, the theory accepts some degree of paternalism due to the acknowledgement of bounded rationality in decision-making. Similarly, one could have a capability theory of social justice that argues that the guiding principle in institutional design should be the protection of the vulnerable, rather than the maximal accommodation of the development of people’s agency. Such theories would already be much less liberal.
Is it possible for capability theories to be non-liberal? This would probably depend on where exactly one draws the line between a liberal and a non-liberal theory, or, formulated differently, which properties we take to be necessary properties of a theory in order for that theory to qualify as ‘liberal’. The capability approach draws a clear line at the principle of each person as an end, that is, in the endorsement of normative individualism. The principle of normative individualism is clearly a core principle of liberal theories. Yet it is also a core principle of some non-liberal theories that do not give higher priority to agency or autonomy (e.g. capability theories that merge insights from care ethics, and which give moral priority to protecting the vulnerable over enhancing and protecting agency). However, if a theory endorses functionings and/or capabilities as the relevant normative metric, yet violates the principle of each person as an end, it would not only not qualify as a liberal theory, but it would also not qualify as a capability theory. At best, it would qualify as e.g. a hybrid capabilitarian-communitarian theory.
12 Sen’s work on identity testifies to the great faith he puts in people’s power to choose whether or not to adopt certain group memberships and identities. See e.g. Sen (2009b).
13 In earlier work, I argued that on those grounds we could conclude that the capability approach is a liberal theory. I now think this conclusion was premature.
14 Nussbaum (2011b, 2014) has written explicitly on the type of liberalism that her capabilities approach endorses: political liberalism. For arguments that Nussbaum’s capability approach is, upon closer scrutiny, not politically liberal but rather perfectionist liberal, see Barclay (2003), and Nussbaum (2003b) for a response. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/04%3A_Critiques_and_Debates/4.08%3A_Is_the_capability_approach_a_liberal_theory.txt |
Some believe that the terms ‘human development approach’ and ‘the capability approach’ are synonymous, or else scholars talk about the ‘capability and human development approach’. Although I will argue that this usage is misleading, the equation of ‘human development’ with ‘capability approach’ is often made. Why is this the case? And is that equation a good thing?
First, the Human Development Reports and their best-known index, the Human Development Index, have been vastly influential in making the case for the capability approach, and in spreading the idea of ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ both inside and outside academia (UNDP 1990). In other words, one of the main series of publications within the human development approach, and the corresponding analyses and indexes, is arguably one of the most politically successful applications of the capability approach. However, it doesn’t follow from this that they are the same thing.
A second possible explanation for this misleading equation is that both the international association and the current name of the main journal in the field have merged both terms: the Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) and the Journal of Human Development and Capabilities. This seems to suggest that ‘human development’ and ‘capabilities’ necessarily go together. But this need not be the case: the use of a particular title doesn’t make the two things the same (and in a moment, I will give a few examples in which this isn’t the case).
Thirdly and most importantly, the equation of ‘human development approach’ and ‘capability approach’ shouldn’t be surprising because human development aims to shift the focus of our evaluation of the quality of life and the desirability of social arrangements, from material resources or mental states to people’s functionings and capabilities. The capability approach is thus a central and indispensable element of the human development paradigm.
Finally, one may believe that the two terms are equivalent given that some influential authors in the capability literature equate the two terms, or merge them into one idea (Alkire and Deneulin 2009a, 2009b; Fukuda-Parr 2009; Nussbaum 2011). Let me highlight two examples. Sabina Alkire and Séverine Deneulin (2009a, 2009b) do not distinguish between the reach of the capability approach and the human development approach; instead, they merge them into one term, “the human development and capability approach”. More recently, Martha Nussbaum (2011) has written on the distinction in her Creating Capabilities. Nussbaum has suggested that ‘human development approach’ is mainly associated, historically, with the Human Development Reports, and that the term ‘capability approach’ is more commonly used in academia. Nussbaum prefers the term ‘capabilities approach’ since she also likes to include non-human animals in her account. However, for those of us, like me, who are using the capability approach to analyse and evaluate the quality of life as well as the living arrangements of human beings, this is not a valid reason to make the distinction between ‘the human development approach’, and ‘the capability approach’.
So, should we use ‘human development approach’ and ‘capability approach’ as synonyms, and merge them together into ‘the human development and capability approach’? I believe we shouldn’t. I think there are at least four valid reasons why we should make a distinction between the two ideas.
The first reason is historical: while the capability approach has been very important in the development of the human development paradigm, the human development paradigm has derived insights and concepts from several other theories and frameworks. Human development has been defined as “an expansion of human capabilities, a widening of choices, an enhancement of freedoms and a fulfilment of human rights” (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar 2003, xxi). There are important historical ideas in the human development paradigm that are to a significant extent based on Sen’s capability approach. And Sen was closely involved in the development of the Human Development Reports that have been key in the maturing of the human development paradigm. Yet as some key contributors to this paradigm have rightly pointed out, it had other intellectual roots too, such as the basic needs approach (Streeten 1995; Fukuda-Parr 2003; Sen 2003a).
The second reason is intellectual. The capability approach is used for a very wide range of purposes, as the account I presented in chapter 2 makes amply clear. These include purposes that are only tangentially, or very indirectly, related to human development concerns. For example, the philosopher Martin van Hees (2013) is interested in the structural properties of capabilities, especially how the formal analysis of rights fits into the capability concept. This research allows us to see how capabilities, as a concept, would fit in, and relate to, the existing literature on the structure of rights. But it would be a big stretch to say that this is also a contribution to the human development literature; in fact, I would find such a statement an implausible inflation of what we understand by ‘human development’. Rather, it is much more plausible to say that the study by Van Hees is a contribution to the capability literature, but not to the human development literature. If we were wrongly to equate the capability approach with the human development paradigm, this would create problems for understanding such a study as part of the capability approach.
The third reason is practical. Those who have written about the human development paradigm stress that ‘development’ is about all people and all countries, and not only about countries which are often called ‘developing countries’, that is, countries with a much higher incidence of absolute poverty, and often with a less developed economic infrastructure. For example, Paul Streeten (1995, viii) writes:
We defined human development as widening the range of people’s choices. Human development is a concern not only for poor countries and poor people, but everywhere. In the high-income countries, indicators of shortfalls in human development should be looked for in homelessness, drug addiction, crime, unemployment, urban squalor; environmental degradation, personal insecurity and social disintegration.
The inclusion of all human beings within the scope of ‘human development thinking’ is widely endorsed within human development scholarship and policy reports. However, it is also a matter of fact that most people, including policy makers, associate the term ‘development’ not with improvements to the lives of people living in high-income countries. This is unfortunate, but it is a fact one needs to reckon with. In high-income countries, some of the terms often used for what could also be called ‘human development interventions’ are ‘policies’, ‘institutional design’, or ‘social transformations’. While it is laudable to deconstruct the term ‘development’, at the same time we should be careful about using words that would lead to scholars and policy makers in high-income countries to neglect the capability approach if they (mistakenly) believe that it is a framework only suitable for ‘developing countries’ (as they would use the term).
The final reason is political. There are many capability scholars who would like to develop an alternative to neoliberalism, or, more specifically when it concerns development policies, to the ‘Washington consensus’. While more sophisticated analyses of both doctrines have been put forward, both doctrines focus on private property rights; the primacy of markets as an allocation mechanism; the focus in macro-economic policies on controlling inflation and reducing fiscal deficits; economic liberalisation with regard to free trade and capital flows; and, overall, restricted and reduced involvement of governments in the domestic economy, such as markets in labour, land and capital (the so-called ‘factor markets’) (Gore 2000; Fukuda-Parr 2003; McCleery and De Paolis 2008). The ‘Washington consensus’ refers to the development policy views propagated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (two international institutions based in Washington, D.C., hence its name). The ideas of the Washington consensus spread in the 1980s and were endorsed as the consensus view by the IMF and the World Bank by 1990, and they dominated for at least two decades. Over the last decade, neoliberalism and the Washington consensus have been heavily criticised from many different corners, and there is a renewed recognition of the importance of considering the historical, cultural and institutional specificity of countries when deciding what good development policies look like; but it seems too early to conclude that any of those alternative views is now more influential then neoliberalism and the Washington consensus. Many citizens, scholars, policy makers and politicians are searching for alternatives, and some hope that the capability approach can offer such an alternative.
My suggestion would be that if one’s goal is to develop a powerful alternative to neoliberalism and the Washington consensus, one has to look at the human development paradigm, rather than the capability approach. The human development paradigm includes many specific explanatory theories that stress the importance of historical paths and local cultural and social norms in understanding development outcomes and options in a particular country. The human development paradigm is, therefore, much more powerful than the capability approach for this specific purpose.
Recall the modular view of the capability approach that I presented in chapter 2. The human development paradigm is a capabilitarian theory or capability application, because it endorses all the elements from module A. In addition, it has made particular choices in modules B, such as a strong notion of agency (B3) as well as an elaborate account of social structures (B4), and, importantly, it has chosen anti-neoliberal ontological accounts of human nature and explanatory theories about how the economy and societies work (C1), as well as the endorsement of additional normative principle and social ideals (C4) such as human rights and ecological sustainability. Hence the human development paradigm is much more powerful as a policy paradigm than the capability approach, since it is much more comprehensive (taking many more aspects into account then merely people’s functionings and capabilities) and it is much more powerful in policy or political terms (being informed about what works and what doesn’t).
In sum, I think it is not correct to equate the capability approach and the human development approach. The two are theoretically and historically related, but they are not exactly the same. For those who work within development studies and are endorsing a critical assessment of the development policies that have been pursued as part of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’, it is understandable that the two may seem to be the same, or at least so close that they can be merged. But that is only if one looks at the two notions from a specific perspective. Merging the two would do injustice to the work of other thinkers using the capability approach, and it would also ultimately hamper the development of the capability approach over its full scope. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/04%3A_Critiques_and_Debates/4.09%3A_Why_human_development%27_is_not_the_same_idea.txt |
Of all the (sub)disciplines where the capability approach is relevant, welfare economics may well be the one where it is most difficult to describe its impact. The reason is that the capability approach could be seen in two very different lights, depending on one’s own position towards the current state of economics: either as an improved modification of mainstream welfare economics, or else as a path that could lead us to a very different type of welfare economics, which would radically break with some mainstream assumptions and practices. One could say that the welfare economists interested in the capability approach have two very different agendas: the first group only wants some changes in the normative focus, and possibly in some of the ontological and behavioural assumptions in the theory development, but no methodological or meta-theoretical changes, whereas the second group wants a paradigm change or a scientific revolution, in which there would be meta-theoretical and methodological pluralism (module B7) and much richer or thicker accounts of human agency (module B3) and structural constraints (module B5). In addition, it makes a difference whether we analyse the possibilities for a capabilitarian theoretical welfare economics or for a capabilitarian empirical welfare economics.
4.10.1 Welfare economics and the economics discipline
Before analysing the reach and limit of the capability approach in these various endeavours, a few general comments are in order about economics in general, and welfare economics in particular. Let us first ask: what is welfare economics? As Sen (1996, 50) writes, “Welfare economics deals with the basis of normative judgements, the foundations of evaluative measurement, and the conceptual underpinnings of policy-making in economics”. While, in practice, much of the economics discipline is concerned with policy advice, welfare economics is nevertheless a small subfield of economics, and is by some prominent welfare economists seen as unduly neglected or marginalised by mainstream economics (Atkinson 2001). One important reason is that welfare economics makes explicit the inevitable normative dimensions of economic policy analysis and evaluations, and most economists have been socialised to believe that ‘modern economics’ is value-free, and that anything to do with normativity can be outsourced to ethics or to a democratic vote. In reality, however, the imaginary science-value split that mainstream economists would wish for is, for many economic questions, impossible (Reiss 2013; Hausman, McPherson and Satz 2016). It would therefore be much better to face this inevitability upfront, and understand economics as a moral science (Boulding 1969; Atkinson 2009; Shiller and Shiller 2011) rather than as applied mathematics or a form of value-free modelling. But in economics, as in any other discipline, there are complicated sociological processes conveying views about authority and status, as well as unexamined beliefs about what ‘good science’ is and which type of objectivity is most desirable: one is not born an economist, but becomes one through one’s training, which is in part also a socialisation process (Colander and Klamer 1987; McCloskey 1998; Nelson 2002). Unfortunately, there is empirical evidence that many economists are unwilling to engage with these fundamental questions and hold on to the belief that economics is superior to other social sciences and has little to learn from other disciplines (Fourcade, Ollion and Algan 2015). Many economists who are interested in economic questions but are not endorsing the myth of value-free social science, or who crave more methodological and meta-theoretical freedom, have left for another discipline that offers them those liberties.15 After all, economists do not have a monopoly on economic topics, and there are many questions about such topics that are analysed by economic sociologists, economic historians, political economists, economic geographers, and economic philosophers. In my view, one cannot analyse the reach and limits of the capability approach in welfare economics if one does not acknowledge the high levels of discontent and methodological conservatism within economics, which cannot be found in any other discipline that engages with the capability approach.
With this background in mind, we can now proceed to ask whether the capability approach can make a difference to welfare economics. First, in section 4.10.2, we will look at the main theoretical contribution of the capability approach to welfare economics: its contribution to the development of non-welfarist welfare economics. In section 4.10.3 we will analyse what kind of empirical analyses a capabilitarian welfare economics could make, and what its challenges and possibilities are. Finally, in section 4.10.3, we analyse what challenges the development of a heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics would face.
4.10.2 Non-welfarism
The main theoretical contribution of the capability approach is that it contributes to the development of post-welfarism or non-welfarism in welfare economics. Welfarism is the position that social welfare depends exclusively on individual utilities, which are either understood in a hedonic or in a desire-satisfaction sense, and this has been the dominant position in economics for a long time. Post-welfarism broadens the informational basis of interpersonal comparison with non-utility information, such as deontic rights, or objective information such as people’s functionings and capabilities. In a series of publications, Sen has offered strong theoretical arguments to move from welfarism to non-welfarism (sometimes also called ‘post-welfarism’) and has inspired other welfare economists to work on a post-welfarist welfare economics (e.g. Gaertner and Xu 2006, 2008; Gotoh and Yoshihara 2003; Gotoh, Suzumura and Yoshihara 2005; Pattanaik 2006; Pattanaik and Xu 1990; Suzumura 2016; Xu 2002). Some reasons for this move are the same as the arguments against desire-satisfaction theories or the happiness approach that we reviewed earlier in sections 3.7 and 3.8. Another argument is that relevant information is left out of the informational basis. If two social states have exactly the same utility levels, but social state A has also a set of legal and social norms that discriminate against one group of people, whereas in social state B, the principles of moral equality and non-discrimination are protected, then surely, we should prefer social state B over social state A. But welfarism, because of its exclusive focus on utilities, is unable to take any type of non-utility information into account, whether it is the violation of deontic principles, information on rights, liberties and justice, or information on inefficient or unsustainable use of common resources. Many of the welfare economists who have embarked on the development of a post-welfarist welfare economics have focussed on the importance of freedom as an important part of the widening of the informational basis.
Non-welfarist welfare economics requires some changes to our approach to welfare economics. As Sen (1996, 58) noted in his discussion of the contribution of the capability approach to non-welfarist welfare economics, if we move to an informational basis with multiple dimensions of different types (as in the capability approach) then this requires explicit evaluations of the different weights to be given to the contributions of the different functionings and capabilities to overall (aggregate) social welfare. For Sen, the way to proceed is by public reasoning about those weights. This should probably not be seen as the only and exclusive way to determine them, since not all work in welfare economics is suited for public discussion — for example, it often entails desk-studies of inequalities or the analysis of the welfare effects of certain policy measures, and it is practically impossible to organise an exercise of public reasoning for every desk study that welfare economists make. Luckily, as the survey by Decancq and Lugo (2013) shows, there are various weighting systems possible that can give us the weights that are needed if one wants to aggregate the changes in different functionings and capabilities. For example, Erik Schokkaert (2007) has suggested that we derive the weights of the functionings from the contribution they make to the life-satisfaction of people, after those weights are cleaned of ethically suspicious information.
However, as we saw in section 4.10.1, many (possibly most) economists are unwilling to engage in explicit evaluations, since they believe in the science/value split and believe that economics can be value-free. This makes it harder for welfare economics to engage in such normative work, since they run the risk that their peers will no longer accept their approach as ‘economics research’. But it is inconsistent to reject all explicit evaluative exercises. Economists are happy working with GNP per capita and real income metrics as proxies of welfare, which uses market prices as the weights. But this is equally normative: it is assumed that the welfare-value of a certain good for a person is reflected by the price that the good commands on the market. This is problematic, for reasons that have been explained repeatedly in the literature. For one thing, market prices reflect demand and supply (and thus relative scarcity of a good) — diamonds are expensive and water (in non-drought-affected places) is cheap — but this doesn’t say anything about their importance for our wellbeing. Moreover, market prices do not take into account negative or positive welfare effects on third parties, the so-called externalities, despite their omnipresence (Hausman 1992).
Of course, it may be that, upon reflection of the various weights available, some capability theorists will conclude that the set of market prices, possibly combined with shadow prices for non-market goods, is the best way to proceed. That is quite possible, and would not be inconsistent with the general claim in the capability approach that weights need to be chosen. The point is rather that the choice of weights needs to be done in a reflective way, rather than simply using the weighing scheme that is dominant or customary. I take it that this is the point Sen is trying to make when he argues that “Welfare economics is a major branch of ‘practical reason’” (Sen 1996, 61).16
4.10.3 Empirical possibilities and challenges
When Amartya Sen introduced the capability approach in economics, there was some scepticism about its potential for empirical research. For example, Robert Sugden (1993, 1953) famously wrote:
Given the rich array of functionings that Sen takes to be relevant, given the extent of disagreement among reasonable people about the nature of the good life, and given the unresolved problem of how to value sets, it is natural to ask how far Sen’s framework is operational. Is it a realistic alternative to the methods on which economists typically rely — measurement of real income, and the kind of practical cost-benefit analysis which is grounded in Marshallian consumer theory?
What Sugden and other early welfare economic critics of the capability approach, such as John Roemer (1996, 191–93) were looking for, is a theory that is fully formalised and provides a neat algorithm to address questions of evaluation and/or (re-)distribution, resulting in a complete ranking of options. That requires two things: first, to be able to put the capability approach in a fully formalized model which can be econometrically estimated. This requires us to move beyond the welfare economic models as we know them, and may also require the collection of new data (Kuklys 2005). In addition, it requires us to accept that the different dimensions (functionings and/or capabilities) are commensurable, that is, have a common currency that allows us to express the value of one unit of one dimension in relation to the value of one unit of another dimension. One-dimensional or aggregated evaluative spaces are, ultimately, a necessary condition for conducting empirical work in contemporary mainstream welfare economics. Yet there may well be a trade-off between the number of dimensions and the informational richness of the evaluative space on the one hand, and the degree to which the theory can be formalised and can provide complete orderings of interpersonal comparisons on the other hand. Some welfare economists are working on the question of how to aggregate the many dimensions such that one has, in the end, one composite dimension to work with, but it should be obvious that this is not the only way to develop capabilitarian welfare economics. The alternative is to stick to the view that wellbeing is inherently multidimensional, which requires other methods and techniques that allow for fuzziness, vagueness and complexity (Chiappero-Martinetti 2008, 2000, 1994, 2006; Clark and Qizilbash 2005; Qizilbash and Clark 2005). One could also advance work on dominance rankings or incomplete rankings, which Sen has been defending in his social choice work for several decades (e.g. Sen 2017). As a consequence, there are several ways to develop a capabilitarian welfare economics, and to make the capability approach “operational” (Atkinson 1999, 185).
Sugden’s objection can be best answered by looking at the applications that have already been developed, and which have been listed in several overviews of the empirical literature (e.g. Kuklys and Robeyns 2005; Robeyns 2006b; Chiappero-Martinetti and Roche 2009; Lessmann 2012).17 However, whether the applications discussed in those surveys satisfy the critics depends on what one expects from empirical work in capabilitarian welfare economics. As was already shown in chapter 1, empirical applications of the capability approach do make a substantive difference to research using other normative frameworks, such as income-based metrics. But from that it doesn’t follow that capabilitarian welfare economics will be able to deliver alternatives for each and every existing welfarist study in economics. It may well be that sometimes the informational riches of the capability approach clash with requirements regarding measurability that certain empirical applications put upon the scholar.
4.10.4 Towards a heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics?
In the last two sections, we discussed how the capability approach can make a difference to contemporary welfare economics both theoretically and empirically. Those debates by and large stay within the mainstream of contemporary welfare economics, even though as Amartya Sen (1996, 61) notes, they require us “to go more and more in these pluralist and heterodox directions, taking note of a variety of information in making the wide-ranging judgements that have to be made”. The reference to ‘heterodoxy’ that Sen makes here is limited to the informational basis of evaluations, yet in other work he has challenged some of the behavioural assumptions underlying mainstream welfare economics (e.g. Sen 1977a, 1985b). However, other economists believe that we need a much more radical heterodox and pluralist turn in economics, which would also affect meta-theoretical views, the range of methods that can be used (e.g. including qualitative methods), giving up on the belief that economics can be value-free, and engaging much more — and much more respectfully — with the other social sciences, and indeed also with the humanities. What can these heterodox economists expect from the capability approach?
The answer to that question flows from the description of the state of economics that was given in section 4.10.1. The unwillingness of mainstream welfare economics to genuinely engage with other disciplines (Fourcade, Ollion and Algan 2015; Nussbaum 2016) clashes with the deeply interdisciplinary nature of the capability approach. The modular view of the capability approach that was presented in chapter 2 makes it possible to see that a heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics is certainly possible. It could not only, as all non-welfarist welfare economics does, include functionings and/or capabilities as ends in the evaluations (A1) and possibly include other aspects of ultimate value too (A6), but it could also include a rich account of human diversity (B3), a richly informed account of agency and structural constraints (B4 and B5) and it could widen its meta-theoretical commitments (B7) to become a discipline that is broader and more open to genuine interdisciplinary learning. Yet the modular account also makes it very clear that mainstream welfare economists can make a range of choices in those modules that are more in line with the status quo in current welfare economics, which would result in a very different type of capabilitarian welfare economics.
In short, while both types of capabilitarian welfare economics will depart in some sense from welfarist welfare economics, we are seeing the emergence of both mainstream capabilitarian welfare economics and heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics. The problem for the first is that it will have few means of communication with other capability theories, since it does not adopt many of the interdisciplinary choices that most other capability theories make. The problem for the latter is that it will not be taken seriously by mainstream economics, since it does not meet the narrow requirements of what counts as economics according to the vast majority of mainstream economists. Taking everything together, a capabilitarian welfare economics is possible, but (a) it will be harder to develop the capability approach in welfare economics than in some other disciplines because of the methodological and meta-theoretical clashes and restrictions, and (b) the difficult position that welfare economics occupies within mainstream economics will become even more challenging, since moving in the direction of the capability approach conflicts with the criteria that the gatekeepers in mainstream economists impose on anyone who wants to do something considered ‘economics’. This may also explain why there is much less work done in welfare economics on the capability approach, compared to some other disciplines or fields in which the capability approach has made a much bigger impact.
15 There are plenty of academic economists who have moved to history, development studies or philosophy in order to enjoy the greater methodological and paradigmatic freedoms in those disciplines.
16 Note also that for welfare economists, an important concern in examining and developing a capabilitarian welfare economics will be the question of how it can be formalized. On formalizations of the capability approach, see Sen (1985a); Kuklys and Robeyns (2005); Basu and López-Calva (2011); Bleichrodt and Quiggin (2013).
17 In addition to the first, rather rough empirical application in the Appendix of Sen’s (1985a) Commodities and Capabilities, the literature on empirical applications in welfare economics that used individual-level data started off with the paper by Schokkaert and Van Ootegem (1990), in which they showed that unemployment benefits may restore an unemployed person’s income level, but do not restore all of her functionings to the level they were at before she become unemployed.
4.11: Taking stock
In this chapter, we have engaged with a range of critiques that have been voiced about the capability approach, or debates that have developed in the capability literature. While I hope that I have been fair in representing all viewpoints, I have in many cases argued for a particular way of looking at the problem, and in a significant number of cases argued that critiques must be reformulated in order to be sound, or did not sufficiently appreciate the modular structure of the general capability approach or the distinction between the capability approach and capability theories. Several of the critiques presented in this chapter had bite as a critique of a particular type of capability theory, but not of the capability approach in general.
The next and final (and very short!) chapter will not provide a summary of the previous chapters, but rather offer some thoughts and speculations on what the future of the capability approach could look like, which issues will need to be addressed to unlock its full potential, and which limitations will always need to be reckoned with. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/04%3A_Critiques_and_Debates/4.10%3A_Can_the_capability_approach_change_welfare_eco.txt |
In the last two decades, much time and intellectual energy has been spent on trying to answer some basic questions about the capability approach. What difference does it make to existing normative frameworks? Can it really make a difference to welfare economics as we know it? How should we select capabilities, and how should these dimensions be aggregated? Is the capability approach not too individualistic? Can it properly account for power? And can it properly account for the importance of groups and the collective nature of many processes that are crucial for people’s capabilities?
I believe that many of the debates that kept capability scholars busy in the last two decades have been settled, and we can move to another phase in developing the capability approach and using it to study the problems that need addressing. As many capability scholars have acknowledged (sometimes implicitly) for a very long time, and as this book has illustrated in detail, there are a variety of capability theories possible. As a consequence, one capability theory does not need to be a direct rival of another capability theory: we do not necessarily need to choose between them, and it will often be a mistake to see them as rivals. Many different capability theories can coexist. This theory-pluralism should be embraced, rather than attacked by trying to put the capability approach into a straightjacket. There is, of course, the real risk that any theory that is somehow ‘broadening’ the informational basis of evaluations and comparisons is seen as a capability theory — hence a real risk of inflation. However, the modular understanding of the capability approach clearly lays out the properties that every capability theory, application or analysis should meet, and thereby provides a powerful response to the risk of the inflation of the term ‘capability theory’.
Having sorted all of this out, we are free to put the capability approach to good use. It is impossible for one person to know all the interesting paths that the capability approach should take (even if that one person benefited from comments and many helpful discussions with others). But as a start, let me just mention some lines of further thinking, research and interventions that would be interesting to explore.
First, within the disciplines in which the capability has been discussed and developed, there are plenty of opportunities to see what difference it can make if pushed all the way to its limits. In some fields, such as educational studies, the capability approach is well-developed and widely applied. But there are others in which the capability approach has so far merely been introduced, rather than being used to develop mature and complete theories. One question, which remains unanswered after our discussion in section 4.10, is whether the capability approach can provide an equally powerful alternative to utility-based welfare economics. In the literature on theories of justice, which we discussed in section 3.13, the capability approach is widely debated, but there are hardly any fully developed capabilitarian theories of justice, apart from Nussbaum’s (2006b) and the theory of disadvantage by Wolff and De-Shalit (2007). We need book-length accounts of capabilitarian theories of justice, capabilitarian theories of institutional evaluation, capabilitarian theories of welfare economics, and so forth.
Second, the capability approach is, so far, almost exclusively used for evaluative and normative purposes — such as studies evaluating whether certain people are better off than others, studies trying to propose a certain policy or institution (for the effect it has on people’s functionings and capabilities) rather than others, or studies arguing for justice in terms of people’s capabilities. But one could also use the capability approach for explanatory studies, e.g. to examine which institutions or policies foster certain capabilities, or using the notions of functionings and capabilities in the analysis of people’s behaviour and decision making. For example, labour economists model the decision about a person’s labour supply — how many hours she would be willing to work — by looking at the costs and benefits of working more or fewer hours, but wouldn’t it make much more sense to also ask how the capabilities of different options compare? For example, many adults are happy to work an equal number of hours for less pay if the work is more intrinsically rewarding or if it contributes to the creation of a public good. Another example is how we explain a parent’s decision not to use formal child care, or to use it only for a very limited number of hours. If we explain this exclusively in terms of financial costs and benefits (as some policy analysts do) we don’t capture the fact that the capabilities of affiliation and social relations are very different in the two scenarios. A general model of people’s behaviour and decision-making should therefore not only look at the pecuniary costs and benefits of different options, but also at the different levels of valuable functionings, and the absence of functionings with a negative value, that the different options offer. The challenge of this approach is, of course, that capabilities are often merely qualitative variables, and this hampers the explanatory models that many social scientists use. But if our decision-making and behaviour is largely influenced by the capabilities that characterize different options, then surely, we should prefer (i) a more muddy and vaguer explanatory model that takes all important aspects into account above (ii) a more elegant and neat model that gives us a distorted picture of how persons act and live.1 Some of this is already done, of course, since there is a large literature about certain functionings taken individually, e.g. in explanatory research on people’s health. The suggestion I’m making here is to look at those functionings in a more systematic way, and to integrate functionings and capabilities as general categories in theories of behaviour and decision making, next to other categories such as resources and preference-satisfaction.
Third, the capability approach may well have a very important role to play in the current quest for a truly interdisciplinary conceptual framework for the social sciences and humanities. Despite the fact that universities are still to a large extent organized along disciplinary lines, there is an increasing recognition that many important questions cannot be studied properly without a unified framework or conceptual language in which all the social sciences and humanities can find their place. The capability approach may well form the nexus connecting existing disciplinary frameworks, precisely because its concepts bring together people’s wellbeing and the material resources they have, the legal rules and social norms that constrain their capability sets, and so forth. The approach thereby offers important conceptual and theoretical bridges between disciplines. And it could also link evaluative and normative frameworks to descriptive and explanatory frameworks, rather than leaving the normative frameworks implicit, as is now too often done in the social sciences.
Fourth, the capability approach should be more extensively used in designing new policy tools. Citizens who endorse a broad understanding of the quality of life that gives non-material aspects a central place have been annoyed for many years by the constant assessment of economic growth as an end in itself, rather than as a means to human flourishing and the meeting of human needs. They have been saying, rightly in my view, that whether economic growth is a good thing depends, among other things, on how it affects the overall quality of life of people, as well as how other public values fare, such as ecological sustainability, and that we have very good reasons to take seriously the limits to economic growth (Jackson 2016). But those who want to put the ends of policies at the centre of the debate, and focus policy discussions more on these ultimate ends rather than on means, need to move from mere critique to developing tools that can fashion constructive proposals. The alternatives to GDP, which I briefly discussed in chapter 1, are one element that can help, but other tools are also needed.
Fifth, we have to investigate which capability theories are logically possible, but empirically implausible. The argument in this book has been that the capability approach can be developed in a wide range of capability theories and applications, and is not committed to a particular set of political or ideological commitments. But that is as far as its logical structures go, and it doesn’t take a stance on empirical soundness. We need to investigate which capability theories may be logically possible, but nevertheless should be ruled out, given what we know about the plausibility of our empirical assumptions regarding conversion factors, human diversity, and structural constraints. It is highly likely that there are capability theories that are logically conceivable, yet inconsistent with some ‘basic facts’ about human nature and societies. This is especially important since we want to avoid the hijacking of the capability approach by powerful societal actors or organisations who will start to propagate a very uncritical and reductionist version of the approach, and push that as the only right interpretation of it. The general account of the capability approach that I have defended in this book tries to be as politically and ideologically neutral as possible; but that doesn’t mean that I personally, as a scholar who has written a lot on questions of injustice, believe that all possible capability theories are equally plausible. In fact, my own substantive work in which I have used the capability approach confirms that I do not, and that I think that a critical account of social structures and power is needed (e.g. Robeyns 2003, 2010, 2017b, 2017a). But I think we should then argue directly about the unjust nature of social structures, economic institutions, or social norms. I hope that the modular view presented in this book makes clear that many of the intellectual and ideological battles actually take place in arguing about the B-modules and the C-modules.
Sixth and finally, the capability approach should be used in guiding existing practices on the ground, in many different segments of society, and in many different societies of the world. This is not easy, since there are quite significant challenges for theorists to bridge the gap between their work and practices on the ground, as several theorists who engaged in such theory-practice collaborations have pointed out (e.g. Koggel 2008; Wolff 2011). Yet if the capability approach aspires to make a difference in practice — which many capability scholars do — then thinking carefully about how to move to practice without diluting the essence of the framework is crucial. Luckily, there are signs that more of these ‘on-the-ground applications’ are being developed, and that the capability approach is not only of interest to scholars and policy makers, but also for practitioners and citizens. One example is Solava Ibrahim’s (2017) recent model for grassroots-led development, which is primarily a conceptual and theoretical framework, yet is also based on ten years of fieldwork. Another example is the practical field of social work in the Netherlands, where social work professionals have recently argued that the field is in need of a new moral compass, in order to counter the technocratic developments that, it is argued, have dominated changes in social work in recent decades. Some social workers argue that the human rights framework could provide a useful theory (Hartman, Knevel and Reynaert 2016), while others believe that capabilities could be helpful in restoring ethical and political dimensions to the practice of social work (Braber 2013). As the discussion in section 3.14 has shown, there need not be a conflict between those two frameworks. Yet it remains to be seen in the years to come if and how the capability approach is able to guide the effective change of the entire sector of social work in countries where the traditional welfare state is under pressure.
However, with all these future extensions of the capability approach, it remains important to explicitly acknowledge its limitations. This book has shown what the capability approach has to offer, but also what needs to be added before the vague and underspecified capability framework can be developed into a more powerful capability theory or capability application. Especially the choices made in the B-modules, but also the additions made in the C-modules C1 (additional explanatory and ontological theories) and C4 (additional normative claims and principles) will be crucial for many capabilitarian theories and applications to become powerful.
There is no point in pretending that the capability approach can do more than it is able to do, since this would blind us to the necessary collaborations with other theories and insights that are needed. It is in those collaborations with complementary powerful theories and frameworks that the success of the future of the capability approach lies.
1 This is a methodological point that Amartya Sen has been pressing for a very long time. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/05%3A_Which_Future_for_the_Capability_Approach/5.01%3A_Which_Future_for_the_Capabi.txt |
Addabbo, Tindara, Diego Lanzi and Antonella Picchio. 2010. ‘Gender Budgets: A Capability Approach’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 11 (4), 479–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2010.520900
Alexandrova, Anna. 2013. ‘Doing Well in the Circumstances’. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3), 307–28. https://doi.org/10.1163/174552412X628814
Alkire, Sabina. 2002. Valuing Freedoms. Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199245797.001.0001
Alkire, Sabina. 2005. ‘Why the Capability Approach?’ Journal of Human Development 6 (1), 115–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/146498805200034275
Alkire, Sabina. 2008. ‘Using the Capability Approach: Prospective and Evaluative Analyses’. In The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures, Applications, edited by Flavio Comim, Mozaffar Qizilbash and Sabina Alkire, pp. 26–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492587.002
Alkire, Sabina. 2016. ‘The Capability Approach and Wellbeing Measurement for Public Policy’. In The Oxford Handbook of Wellbeing and Public Policy, edited by Matthew D. Adler and Marc Fleurbaey, pp. 615–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199325818.013.18
Alkire, Sabina and Séverine Deneulin. 2009a. ‘A Normative Framework for Development’. In An Introduction to the Human Development and Capability Approach, edited by Séverine Deneulin and Lila Shahani, pp. 3–21. London: Earthscan.
Alkire, Sabina and Séverine Deneulin. 2009b. ‘The Human Development and Capability Approach’. In An Introduction to the Human Development and Capability Approach, edited by Séverine Deneulin and Lila Shahani, pp. 22–48. London: Earthscan.
Alkire, Sabina and James Foster. 2011. ‘Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement’. Journal of Public Economics 95 (7), 476–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.006
Alkire, Sabina, James Foster, Suman Seth, Maria Emma Santos, José Manuel Roche and Paola Ballon. 2015. Multidimensional Poverty Measurement and Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199689491.001.0001
Alkire, Sabina, Mozaffar Qizilbash and Flavio Comim. 2008. ‘Introduction’. In The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures, Applications, edited by Flavio Comim, Mozaffar Qizilbash and Sabina Alkire, pp. 1–25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492587.001
Anand, Sudhir and Amartya Sen. 1994. ‘Sustainable Human Development’. Unpublished paper written in preparation for the 1994 Human Development Report. New York: United Nations Human Development Report Office.
Anand, Sudhir and Amartya Sen. 2000. ‘Human Development and Economic Sustainability’. World Development 28 (12), 2029–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0305-750x(00)00071-1
Anderson, Elizabeth. 1999. ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 109 (2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2000a. ‘Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (2), 170–200. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2000.00170.x
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2000b. ‘Optional Freedoms’. In What’s Wrong with a Free Lunch?, edited by Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, pp. 70–74. Boston: Beacon Press. http://bostonreview.net/forum/basic-income-all/elizabeth-anderson-optional-freedoms
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2010. ‘Justifying the Capability Approach to Justice’. In Measuring Justice, edited by Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns, pp. 81–100. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511810916.004
Apsan Frediani, Alexandre, Alejandra Boni and Des Gasper. 2014. ‘Approaching Development Projects from a Human Development and Capability Perspective’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 15 (1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2013.879014
Ariely, Dan. 2010. Perfectly Irrational: The Unexpected Ways We Defy Logic at Work and at Home. London: Harper.
Arneson, Richard. 2010. ‘Two Cheers for the Capabilities Approach’. In Measuring Justice, edited by Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns, pp. 101–27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511810916.005
Arneson, Richard. 2013. ‘From Primary Goods to Capabilities to Wellbeing’. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (2), 179–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2012.757910
Arrow, Kenneth J., Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura. 2002. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Arrow, Kenneth J., Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura. 2010. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Atkinson, Anthony B. 1999. ‘The Contributions of Amartya Sen to Welfare Economics’. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101 (2), 173–90. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00151
Atkinson, Anthony B. 2001. ‘The Strange Disappearance of Welfare Economics’. Kyklos 54 (2‐3), 193–206. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00148
Atkinson, Anthony B. 2009. ‘Economics as a Moral Science’. Economica 76, 791–804. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00788.x
Barclay, Linda. 2003. ‘What Kind of Liberal Is Martha Nussbaum?’ SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2), 5–24.
Barclay, Linda. 2016. ‘The Importance of Equal Respect: What the Capabilities Approach Can and Should Learn from Human Rights Law’. Political Studies 64 (2), 385–400. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12175
Barry, Brian. 1995. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barry, Brian. 2005. Why Social Justice Matters. Cambridge: Polity.
Barry, Brian and Matt Matravers. 2011. ‘Justice’. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/justice/v-1
Basu, Kaushik. 1987. ‘Achievements, Capabilities and the Concept of Wellbeing’. Social Choice and Welfare 4 (1), 69–76.
Basu, Kaushik and Luis López-Calva. 2011. ‘Functionings and Capabilities’. In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edited by Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura, 2, pp. 153–87. Amsterdam: Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00016-x
Baujard, Antoinette and Muriel Gilardone. 2017. ‘Sen Is Not a Capability Theorist’. Journal of Economic Methodology 24 (1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178x.2016.1257821
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Béteille, André. 1993. ‘Amartya Sen’s Utopia’. Economic and Political Weekly 28 (16), 753–56.
Bhanu Mehta, Pratap. 2009. ‘“Doing” Justice’. Outlook India, 17 August 2009. http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/doing-justice/261172
Bhargava, Rajeev. 1992. Individualism in Social Science. Forms and Limits of a Methodology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Binder, Christina and Constanze Binder. 2016. ‘A Capability Perspective on Indigenous Autonomy’. Oxford Development Studies, 44 (3), 297–314. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2016.1167178
Bleichrodt, Han and John Quiggin. 2013. ‘Capabilities as Menus: A Non-Welfarist Basis for QALY Evaluation’. Journal of Health Economics 32 (1), 128–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.10.004
Bockstael, Erika and Krushil Watene. 2016. ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Capability Approach: Taking Stock’. Oxford Development Studies 44 (3), 265–70. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2016.1204435
Boelhouwer, Jeroen. 2002. ‘Quality of Life and Living Conditions in the Netherlands’. Social Indicators Research 58 (1–3), 113–38.
Boelhouwer, Jeroen and Ineke Stoop. 1999. ‘Measuring Wellbeing in the Netherlands: The SCP Index from 1974 to 1997’. Social Indicators Research 48 (1), 51–75.
Boni, Alejandra and Melanie Walker. 2013. Human Development and Capabilities: Re-Imagining the University of the Twenty-First Century. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203075081
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1969. ‘Economics as a Moral Science’. The American Economic Review 59 (1), 1–12.
Braber, Collin den. 2013. ‘The Introduction of the Capability Approach in Social Work across a Neoliberal Europe’. Journal of Social Intervention: Theory and Practice 22 (4), 61–77. https://doi.org/10.18352/jsi.380
Brighouse, Harry. 2006. On Education. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203390740
Brighouse, Harry and Ingrid Robeyns. 2010. Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511810916
Brock, Gillian and Soran Reader. 2002. ‘Needs-Centered Ethical Theory’. The Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4), 425–34. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021910832459
Browne, Jude and Marc Stears. 2005. ‘Capabilities, Resources, and Systematic Injustice: A Case of Gender Inequality’. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 4 (3), 355–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594x05056608
Burchardt, Tania. 2004. ‘Capabilities and Disability: The Capabilities Framework and the Social Model of Disability’. Disability & Society 19 (7), 735–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/0968759042000284213
Burchardt, Tania. 2005. ‘Are One Man’s Rags Another Man’s Riches? Identifying Adaptive Expectations Using Panel Data’. Social Indicators Research 74 (1), 57–102. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-005-6519-y
Burchardt, Tania. 2006. ‘Happiness and Social Policy: Barking up the Right Tree in the Wrong Neck of the Woods’. In Social Policy Review 18: Analysis and Debate in Social Policy, 2006, edited by Linda Bauld, Karen Clarke and Tony Maltby, pp. 144–59. Bristol: Policy Press. https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781861348449.003.0008
Burchardt, Tania. 2009. ‘Agency Goals, Adaptation and Capability Sets’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 10 (1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880802675044
Burchardt, Tania. 2010. ‘Time, Income and Substantive Freedom: A Capability Approach’. Time & Society 19 (3), 318–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463x10369754
Burchardt, Tania and Polly Vizard. 2011. ‘“Operationalizing” the Capability Approach as a Basis for Equality and Human Rights Monitoring in Twenty‐first‐century Britain’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12 (1), 91–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2011.541790
Byskov, Morten Fibieger. Forthcoming. ‘Methods for the Selection of Capabilities and Functionings’. In New Frontiers of the Capability Approach, edited by Flavio Comim, Shailaja Fennel and P. B. Anand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Byskov, Morten Fibieger. 2017. ‘Democracy, Philosophy, and the Selection of Capabilities’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 18 (1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2015.1091809
Caney, Simon. 2016. ‘The Struggle for Climate Justice in a Non‐Ideal World’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 40 (1), 9–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12044
Canoy, Marcel, Frédéric Lerais and Erik Schokkaert. 2010. ‘Applying the Capability Approach to Policy-Making: The Impact Assessment of the EU-Proposal on Organ Donation’. The Journal of Socio-Economics 39 (3), 391–99.
Carter, Ian. 2014. ‘Is the Capability Approach Paternalist?’ Economics and Philosophy 30 (1), 75–98. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000054
Chiappero-Martinetti, Enrica. 1994. ‘A New Approach to Evaluation of Wellbeing and Poverty by Fuzzy Set Theory’. Giornale Degli Economisti E Annali Di Economia 7 (9), 367–88.
Chiappero-Martinetti, Enrica. 2000. ‘A Multidimensional Assessment of Wellbeing Based on Sen’s Functioning Approach’. Rivista Internazionale Di Scienze Sociali 108 (2), 207–39.
Chiappero-Martinetti, Enrica. 2006. ‘Capability Approach and Fuzzy Set Theory: Description, Aggregation and Inference Issues’. In Fuzzy Set Approach to Multidimensional Poverty Measurement, edited by Chille Lemmi and Gianni Betti, pp. 93–113. New York: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34251-1_6
Chiappero-Martinetti, Enrica. 2008. ‘Complexity and Vagueness in the Capability Approach: Strength or Weakness?’ In The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures, Applications, edited by Flavio Comim, Mozaffar Qizilbash and Sabina Alkire, pp. 268–309. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492587.010
Chiappero-Martinetti, Enrica and José Manuel Roche. 2009. ‘Operationalization of the Capability Approach, from Theory to Practice: A Review of Techniques and Empirical Applications’. In Debating Global Society. Reach and Limit of the Capability Approach, edited by Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti, pp. 157–201. Milan: Feltrinelli.
Claassen, Rutger. 2009. ‘Institutional Pluralism and the Limits of the Market’. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 8 (4), 420–47. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594x09345479
Claassen, Rutger. 2011. ‘Making Capability Lists: Philosophy versus Democracy’. Political Studies 59 (3), 491–508. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00862.x
Claassen, Rutger. 2014. ‘Capability Paternalism’. Economics and Philosophy 30 (1), 57–73. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267114000042
Claassen, Rutger. 2015. ‘The Capability to Hold Property’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 16 (2), 220–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2014.939061
Claassen, Rutger. 2016. ‘An Agency‐Based Capability Theory of Justice’. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3), Early View. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12195
Claassen, Rutger and Marcus Düwell. 2013. ‘The Foundations of Capability Theory: Comparing Nussbaum and Gewirth’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3), 493–510. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9361-8
Clark, David A. 2002. Visions of Development: A Study of Human Values. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Clark, David A. 2005. ‘Sen’s Capability Approach and the Many Spaces of Human Wellbeing’. The Journal of Development Studies 41 (8), 1339–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380500186853
Clark, David A. 2009. ‘Adaptation, Poverty and Well‐being: Some Issues and Observations with Special Reference to the Capability Approach and Development Studies’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 10 (1), 21–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880802675051
Clark, David A. and Mozaffar Qizilbash. 2005. ‘Core Poverty, Basic Capabilities and Vagueness: An Application to the South African Context’, Global Poverty Research Group Working Paper Series, 26. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3d2942da-fdce-47a0-880c-80591fe85d8c
Coast, Joanna, Terry N. Flynn, Lucy Natarajan, Kerry Sproston, Jane Lewis, Jordan J. Louviere and Tim J. Peters. 2008. ‘Valuing the ICECAP Capability Index for Older People’. Social Science & Medicine 67 (5), 874–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2008.05.015
Coast, Joanna, Richard D Smith and Paula Lorgelly. 2008. ‘Welfarism, Extra-Welfarism and Capability: The Spread of Ideas in Health Economics’. Social Science & Medicine 67 (7), 1190–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2008.06.027
Cohen, G. A. 1993. ‘Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities’. In The Quality of Life, edited by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, pp. 9–29. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198287976.003.0002
Colander, David and Arjo Klamer. 1987. ‘The Making of an Economist’. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 1 (2), 95–111. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.1.2.95
Conradie, Ina. 2013. ‘Can Deliberate Efforts to Realise Aspirations Increase Capabilities? A South African Case Study’. Oxford Development Studies 41 (2), 189–219. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2013.790949
Conradie, Ina and Ingrid Robeyns. 2013. ‘Aspirations and Human Development Interventions’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14 (4), 559–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2013.827637
Coyle, Diane. 2015. GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873630
Crabtree, Andrew. 2012. ‘A Legitimate Freedom Approach to Sustainability: Sen, Scanlon and the Inadequacy of the Human Development Index’. International Journal of Social Quality 2 (1), 24–40. https://doi.org/10.3167/ijsq.2012.020103
Crabtree, Andrew. 2013. ‘Sustainable Development: Does the Capability Approach Have Anything to Offer? Outlining a Legitimate Freedom Approach’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14 (1), 40–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2012.748721
Cripps, Elizabeth. 2010. ‘Saving the Polar Bear, Saving the World: Can the Capabilities Approach Do Justice to Humans, Animals and Ecosystems?’ Res Publica 16, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-010-9106-2
Crisp, Roger. 2017. ‘Wellbeing’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/wellbeing/
Crocker, David A. 1992. ‘Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s Development Ethic’. Political Theory 20 (4), 584–612. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591792020004003
Crocker, David A. 1995. ‘Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s Development Ethic. Part 2’. In Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, edited by Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, pp. 153–98. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198289642.003.0007
Crocker, David A. 2008. Ethics of Global Development. Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492594
Crocker, David A. and Ingrid Robeyns. 2009. ‘Capability and Agency’. In Amartya Sen, edited by Christopher W. Morris, pp. 60–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511800511.005
Cudd, Ann E. 2014. ‘Commitment as Motivation: Amartya Sen’s Theory of Agency and the Explanation of Behaviour’. Economics and Philosophy 30 (1), 35–56. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267114000030
Cummins, Robert A., Richard Eckersley, Julie Pallant, Jackie Van Vugt and Roseanne Misajon. 2003. ‘Developing a National Index of Subjective Wellbeing: The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index’. Social Indicators Research 64 (2), 159–90. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024704320683
De Herdt, Tom. 2008. ‘Social Policy and the Ability to Appear in Public without Shame: Some Lessons from a Food Relief Programme in Kinshasa’. In The Capability Approach. Concepts, Measures, and Applications, edited by Flavio Comim, Mozaffar Qizilbash and Sabina Alkire, pp. 458–88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492587.016
Decancq, Koen and María Ana Lugo. 2013. ‘Weights in Multidimensional Indices of Wellbeing: An Overview’. Econometric Reviews 32 (1), 7–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/07474938.2012.690641
Deneulin, Séverine. 2006a. ‘Individual Wellbeing, Migration Remittances and the Common Good’. The European Journal of Development Research 18 (1), 45–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/09578810600572353
Deneulin, Séverine. 2006b. The Capability Approach and the Praxis of Development. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230627253
Deneulin, Séverine. 2014. Wellbeing, Justice and Development Ethics. London: Earthscan. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315867090
Deneulin, Séverine and Frances Stewart. 2002. ‘Amartya Sen’s Contribution to Development Thinking’. Studies in Comparative International Development 37 (2), 61–70. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02686262
Deveaux, Monique. 2015. ‘The Global Poor as Agents of Justice’. Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (2), 125–50. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681029
Di Tommaso, Maria Laura. 2007. ‘Children Capabilities: A Structural Equation Model for India’. The Journal of Socio-Economics 36 (3), 436–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.006
Diener, Ed and Martin E. P. Seligman. 2004. ‘Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Wellbeing’. Psychological Science in the Public Interest 5 (1), 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00501001.x
Doyal, Len and Ian Gough. 1991. A Theory of Human Need. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21500-3
Drèze, Jean and Amartya Sen. 1996. India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Drèze, Jean and Amartya Sen. 2002. India: Development and Participation. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199257492.001.0001
Drèze, Jean and Amartya Sen. 2013. An Uncertain Glory. India and Its Contradictions. London: Alan Lane.
Driver, Julia. 2014. ‘The History of Utilitarianism’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history/
Drydyk, Jay. 2011. ‘Responsible Pluralism, Capabilities, and Human Rights’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12 (1), 39–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2011.541734
Drydyk, Jay. 2012. ‘A Capability Approach to Justice as a Virtue’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1), 23–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9327-2
Drydyk, Jay. 2013. ‘Empowerment, Agency, and Power’. Journal of Global Ethics 9 (3), 249–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2013.818374
Dryzek, John S. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/019925043x.001.0001
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981. ‘What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 10 (4), 283–345.
Dworkin, Ronald. 2000. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139171694
Elster, Jon. 1989. The Cement of Society: A Survey of Social Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511624995
English, Jane. 1975. ‘Abortion and the Concept of a Person’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2), 233–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1975.10716109
Engster, Daniel. 2007. The Heart of Justice. Care Ethics and Political Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214358.001.0001
Entwistle, Vikki A. and Ian S. Watt. 2013. ‘Treating Patients as Persons: A Capabilities Approach to Support Delivery of Person-Centered Care’. The American Journal of Bioethics 13 (8), 29–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2013.802060
Eriksson, Lina, James Mahmud Rice and Robert E. Goodin. 2007. ‘Temporal Aspects of Life Satisfaction’. Social Indicators Research 80 (3), 511–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-006-0005-z
Evans, Peter. 2002. ‘Collective Capabilities, Culture, and Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom’. Studies in Comparative International Development 37 (2), 54–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02686261
Feldman, Shelley and Paul Gellert. 2006. ‘The Seductive Quality of Central Human Capabilities: Sociological Insights into Nussbaum and Sen’s Disagreement’. Economy and Society 35 (3), 423–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140600845008
Fernández-Baldor, Álvaro, Alejandra Boni, Pau Lillo and Andrés Hueso. 2014. ‘Are Technological Projects Reducing Social Inequalities and Improving People’s Wellbeing? A Capability Approach Analysis of Renewable Energy-Based Electrification Projects in Cajamarca, Peru’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 15 (1), 13–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2013.837035
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada. 2005. ‘Income and Wellbeing: An Empirical Analysis of the Comparison Income Effect’. Journal of Public Economics 89 (5), 997–1019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.003
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada and John M. Gowdy. 2007. ‘Environmental Degradation and Happiness’. Ecological Economics 60 (3), 509–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.12.005
Fletcher, Guy. 2015. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Wellbeing. London and New York: Routledge.
Fleurbaey, Marc. 2002. ‘Development, Capabilities and Freedom’. Studies in Comparative International Development 37 (2), 71–77. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02686263
Fleurbaey, Marc. 2009. ‘Beyond GDP: The Quest for a Measure of Social Welfare’. Journal of Economic Literature 47 (4), 1029–75. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.4.1029
Fleurbaey, Marc and Didier Blanchet. 2013. Beyond GDP: Measuring Welfare and Assessing Sustainability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199767199.001.0001
Folbre, Nancy. 1994. Who Pays for the Kids?: Gender and the Structures of Constraint. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203168295
Folbre, Nancy. 2008. Valuing Children. Harvard University Press.
Folbre, Nancy and Michael Bittman. 2004. Family Time: The Social Organization of Care. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203411650
Fourcade, Marion, Etienne Ollion and Yann Algan. 2015. ‘The Superiority of Economists’. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 29 (1), 89–113. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.29.1.89
Freeman, Samuel. 2006. ‘Bookreview: Frontiers of Justice’. Texas Law Review 85, 385–430.
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer. 2002. ‘What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?’ Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2), 402–35. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.40.2.402
Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko. 2003. ‘The Human Development Paradigm: Operationalizing Sen’s Ideas on Capabilities’. Feminist Economics 9 (2–3), 301–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354570022000077980
Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko. 2009. ‘Human Rights and Human Development’. In Arguments for a Better World. Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen. Volume II: Society, Institutions, and Development, edited by Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur, pp. 76–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239979.003.0006
Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko. 2011. ‘The Metrics of Human Rights: Complementarities of the Human Development and Capabilities Approach’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12 (1), 73–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2011.541750
Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko and A. K. Shiva Kumar. 2003. ‘Introduction’. In Readings in Human Development, edited by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and A. K. Shiva Kumar, pp. xxi–xxxi. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Gaertner, Wulf. 2009. A Primer in Social Choice Theory: Revised Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gaertner, Wulf and Yongsheng Xu. 2006. ‘Capability Sets as the Basis of a New Measure of Human Development’. Journal of Human Development 7 (3), 311–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880600815891
Gaertner, Wulf and Yongsheng Xu. 2008. ‘A New Class of Measures of the Standard of Living Based on Functionings’. Economic Theory 35 (2), 201–15. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0229-4
Gandjour, Afschin. 2008. ‘Mutual Dependency between Capabilities and Functionings in Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach’. Social Choice and Welfare 31 (2), 345–50. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0283-7
Gasper, Des. 1997. ‘Sen’s Capability Approach and Nussbaum’s Capabilities Ethic’. Journal of International Development 9 (2), 281–302. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-1328(199703)9:2%3C281::aid-jid438%3E3.0.co;2-k
Gasper, Des. 2004. The Ethics of Development. From Economism to Human Development. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Gasper, Des. 2007. ‘What Is the Capability Approach? Its Core, Rationale, Partners and Dangers’. The Journal of Socio-Economics 36, 335–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.001
Gasper, Des. 2010. ‘Understanding the Diversity of Conceptions of Wellbeing and Quality of Life’. The Journal of Socio-Economics 39 (3), 351–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2009.11.006
Gasper, Des and Irene Van Staveren. 2003. ‘Development as Freedom — and as What Else?’ Feminist Economics 9 (2–3), 137–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354570032000078663
Gheaus, Anca. 2011. ‘Arguments for Nonparental Care for Children’. Social Theory and Practice 37 (3), 483–509. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201137328
Gheaus, Anca and Ingrid Robeyns. 2011. ‘Equality-Promoting Parental Leave’. Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (2), 173–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2011.01525.x
Gilabert, Pablo. 2009. ‘The Feasibility of Basic Socioeconomic Human Rights: A Conceptual Exploration’. The Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237), 659–81. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.590.x
Gilabert, Pablo. 2013. ‘The Capability Approach and the Debate between Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human Rights. A Critical Survey’. Human Rights Review 14 (4), 299–325. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-013-0269-z
Gill, Kaveri. 2010. Of Poverty and Plastic. Scavenging and Scrap Trading Entrepreneurs in India’s Urban Informal Economy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198060864.001.0001
Gore, Charles. 1997. ‘Irreducibly Social Goods and the Informational Basis of Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach’. Journal of International Development 9 (2), 235–50. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-1328(199703)9:2%3C235::aid-jid436%3E3.0.co;2-j
Gore, Charles. 2000. ‘The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries’. World Development 28 (5), 789–804. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0305-750x(99)00160-6
Gotoh, Reiko, Kotaro Suzumura and Naoki Yoshihara. 2005. ‘Extended Social Ordering Functions for Rationalizing Fair Allocation Rules as Game Forms in the Sense of Rawls and Sen’. International Journal of Economic Theory 1 (1), 21–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2005.00003.x
Gotoh, Reiko and Naoki Yoshihara. 2003. ‘A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen’. Economic Theory 22 (1), 63–88. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0280-0
Grewal, Ini, Jane Lewis, Terry Flynn, Jackie Brown, John Bond and Joanna Coast. 2006. ‘Developing Attributes for a Generic Quality of Life Measure for Older People: Preferences or Capabilities?’ Social Science & Medicine 62 (8), 1891–901. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2005.08.023
Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. 2004. Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400826339
Hagerty, Michael R., Robert A. Cummins, Abbott L. Ferriss, Kenneth Land, Alex C. Michalos, Mark Peterson, Andrew Sharpe, Joseph Sirgy and Joachim Vogel. 2001. ‘Quality of Life Indexes for National Policy: Review and Agenda for Research’. Social Indicators Research 55 (1), 1–96. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1010811312332
Harnacke, Caroline. 2013. ‘Disability and Capability: Exploring the Usefulness of Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach for the UN Disability Rights Convention’. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 41 (4), 768–80. https://doi.org/10.1111/jlme.12088
Hart, Caroline S. 2009. ‘Quo Vadis? The Capability Approach and New Directions for the Philosophy of Educational Research’. Studies in Philosophy of Education 28 (5), 391–402. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-009-9128-4.
Hart, Caroline S. 2012. ‘The Capability Approach and Education’. Cambridge Journal of Education 42 (3), 275–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0305764X.2012.706393
Hartman, Jeannette, Jeroen Knevel and Didier Reynaert. 2016. ‘Manifest: Stel Mensenrechten Centraal in Sociaal Werk’. Sociale Vraagstukken, 26 May 2016. http://www.socialevraagstukken.nl/stel-mensenrechten-centraal-in-het-sociaal-werk
Hausman, Daniel. 1992. ‘When Jack and Jill Make a Deal’. Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (1), 95–113. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003617
Hausman, Daniel, Michael McPherson and Debra Satz. 2017. Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511754289
Heath, Joseph. 2006. ‘The Benefits of Cooperation’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 34 (4), 313–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2006.00073.x
Hees, M. van. 2013. ‘Rights, Goals, and Capabilities’. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (3), 247–59. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594x12447787
Hick, Rod and Tania Burchardt. 2016. ‘Capability Deprivation’. In The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty, edited by David Brady and Linda M. Burton, pp. 75–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199914050.013.5
Hill, Marianne. 2003. ‘Development as Empowerment’. Feminist Economics 9 (2–3), 117–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354570022000077962
Hochschild, Adam. 1999. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa. Boston: Mariner Books.
Holland, Breena. 2008. ‘Justice and the Environment in Nussbaum’s “Capabilities Approach”: Why Sustainable Ecological Capacity Is a Meta-Capability’. Political Research Quarterly 61 (2), 319–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907306471
Holland, Breena. 2014. Allocating the Earth. A Distributive Framework for Protecting Capabilities in Environmental Law and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692071.001.0001
Holland, Breena and Amy Linch. 2016. ‘Cultivating Human and Non-Human Capabilities’. In The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory, edited by Teena Gabrielson, Cheryl Hall, John M. Meyer and David Schlosberg, pp. 413–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199685271.013.9
Ibrahim, Solava. 2006. ‘From Individual to Collective Capabilities: The Capability Approach as a Conceptual Framework for Self‐help’. Journal of Human Development 7 (3), 397–416. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880600815982
Ibrahim, Solava. 2009. ‘Self-Help: A Catalyst for Human Agency and Collective Capabilities’. In Debating Global Society. Reach and Limit of the Capability Approach, edited by Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti, pp. 233–65. Milan: Feltrinelli.
Ibrahim, Solava. 2011. ‘A Tale of Two Egypts: Contrasting State-Reported Macro-Trends with Micro-Voices of the Poor’. Third World Quarterly 32 (7), 1347–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.600108
Ibrahim, Solava. 2017. ‘How to Build Collective Capabilities: The 3C-Model for Grassroots-Led Development’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 18 (2), 197–222. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2016.1270918
Jackson, Tim. 2016. Prosperity without Growth. Economics for a Finite Planet. Second edition. London: Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849774338
Jaggar, Alison M. 2002. ‘Challenging Women’s Global Inequalities: Some Priorities for Western Philosophers’. Philosophical Topics 30 (2), 229–52. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20023022
Jaggar, Alison M. 2006. ‘Reasoning about Well‐being: Nussbaum’s Methods of Justifying the Capabilities’. Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (3), 301–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00253.x
Kagan, Shelly. 1998. ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’. The Journal of Ethics 2 (4), 277–97. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1009782403793
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking Fast and Slow. London: Penguin Books.
Kahneman, Daniel and Alan B. Krueger. 2006. ‘Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Wellbeing’. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (1), 3–24. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533006776526030
Kahneman, Daniel, Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz and Arthur A. Stone. 2006. ‘Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion’. Science 312 (5782), 1908–10. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1129688
Kamm, F. M. 2011. ‘Sen on Justice and Rights: A Review Essay’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 39 (1), 82–104. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2011.01199.x
Karnein, Anja. 2014. ‘Putting Fairness in Its Place: Why There Is a Duty to Take up the Slack’. The Journal of Philosophy 111 (11), 593–607. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20141111138
Kaufman, Alexander. 2005. ‘What Goods Do to (and for) People’. In Capabilities Equality. Basic Issues and Problems, edited by Alexander Kaufman, pp. 117–29. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203799444
Kaufman, Alexander. 2005 Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203799444
Khader, Serene J. 2009. ‘Adaptive Preferences and Procedural Autonomy’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 10 (2), 169–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452820902940851
Khader, Serene J. 2011. Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777884.001.0001
Khader, Serene J. 2012. ‘Must Theorising about Adaptive Preferences Deny Women’s Agency?’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (4), 302–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2012.00575.x
Khader, Serene J. 2013. ‘Identifying Adaptive Preferences in Practice: Lessons from Postcolonial Feminisms’. Journal of Global Ethics 9 (3), 311–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2013.818379
Kittay, Eva Feder. 1999. Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315021218
Klasen, Stephan. 1994. ‘“Missing Women” Reconsidered’. World Development 22 (7), 1061–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750x(94)90148-1
Klasen, Stephan. 2000. ‘Measuring Poverty and Deprivation in South Africa’. Review of Income and Wealth 46 (1), 33–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.2000.tb00390.x
Klasen, Stephan and Claudia Wink. 2003. ‘“Missing Women”: Revisiting the Debate’. Feminist Economics 9 (2/3), 263–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354570022000077999
Kleine, Dorothea. 2010. ‘ICT4WHAT? — Using the Choice Framework to Operationalise the Capability Approach to Development’. Journal of International Development 22 (5), 674–92. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1719
Kleine, Dorothea. 2011. ‘The Capability Approach and the “Medium of Choice”: Steps Towards Conceptualising Information and Communication Technologies for Development’. Ethics and Information Technology 13 (2), 119–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-010-9251-5
Kleine, Dorothea. 2013. Technologies of Choice?: ICTs, Development, and the Capabilities Approach. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Knight, Carl. 2017. ‘Reflective Equilibrium’. In Methods in Analytical Political Theory, edited by Adrian Blau, pp. 46–64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316162576.005
Koggel, Christine. 2003. ‘Globalization and Women’s Paid Work: Expanding Freedom?’ Feminist Economics 9 (2–3), 163–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354570022000077935
Koggel, Christine. 2008. ‘Theory to Practice and Practice to Theory? Lessons from Local NGO Empowerment Projects in Indonesia’. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (S1), 111–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00158.x
Koggel, Christine. 2013. ‘A Critical Analysis of Recent Work on Empowerment: Implications for Gender’. Journal of Global Ethics 9 (3), 263–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2013.818383
Krishnakumar, Jaya. 2007. ‘Going Beyond Functionings to Capabilities: An Econometric Model to Explain and Estimate Capabilities’. Journal of Human Development 8 (1), 39–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880601101408
Krishnakumar, Jaya and Paola Ballon. 2008. ‘Estimating Basic Capabilities: A Structural Equation Model Applied to Bolivia’. World Development 36 (6), 992–1010. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.10.006
Krishnakumar, Jaya and Anirudh Lal Nagar. 2008. ‘On Exact Statistical Properties of Multidimensional Indices Based on Principal Components, Factor Analysis, MIMIC and Structural Equation Models’. Social Indicators Research 86 (3), 481–96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-007-9181-8
Kukathas, Chandran. 2007. ‘Liberty’. In A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, edited by Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, Second edition, Volume II, pp. 685–98. Oxford: Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1111/b.9781405136532.2007.00040.x
Kuklys, Wiebke. 2005. Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach: Theoretical Insights and Empirical Applications. Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28083-9
Kuklys, Wiebke and Ingrid Robeyns. 2005. ‘Sen’s Capability Approach to Welfare Economics’. In Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach: Theoretical Insights and Empirical Applications, by Wiebke Kuklys, pp. 9–30. Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28083-9_2
Kynch, Jocelyn and Amartya Sen. 1983. ‘Indian Women: Wellbeing and Survival’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 7 (3/4), 363–80. https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/7.3-4.363
Laderchi, Caterina Ruggeri. 1997. ‘Poverty and Its Many Dimensions: The Role of Income as an Indicator’. Oxford Development Studies 25 (3), 345–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600819708424139
Laderchi, Caterina Ruggeri, Ruhi Saith and Frances Stewart. 2003. ‘Does It Matter That We Do Not Agree on the Definition of Poverty? A Comparison of Four Approaches’. Oxford Development Studies 31 (3), 243–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/1360081032000111698
Lavaque‐Manty, Mika. 2001. ‘Food, Functioning and Justice: From Famines to Eating Disorders’. Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2), 150–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00122
Layard, Richard. 2011. Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. London: Penguin UK.
Le Grand, Julian. 1990. ‘Equity versus Efficiency: The Elusive Trade-Off’. Ethics 100 (3), 554–68. https://doi.org/10.1086/293210
Lessmann, Ortrud. 2012. ‘Applying the Capability Approach Empirically: An Overview with Special Attention to Labor’. Management Revue 23 (2), 98–118.
Lessmann, Ortrud and Felix Rauschmayer. 2013. ‘Re-Conceptualizing Sustainable Development on the Basis of the Capability Approach: A Model and Its Difficulties’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14 (1), 95–114. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2012.747487
Lewis, Jane and Susanna Giullari. 2005. ‘The Adult Worker Model Family, Gender Equality and Care: The Search for New Policy Principles and the Possibilities and Problems of a Capabilities Approach’. Economy and Society 34 (1), 76–104. https://doi.org/10.1080/0308514042000329342
List, Christian and Laura Valentini. 2016. ‘The Methodology of Political Theory’. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne, pp. 525–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.10
Loots, Sonja and Melanie Walker. 2015. ‘Shaping a Gender Equality Policy in Higher Education: Which Human Capabilities Matter?’ Gender and Education 27 (4), 361–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540253.2015.1045458
Loots, Sonja and Melanie Walker. 2016. ‘A Capabilities-Based Gender Equality Policy for Higher Education: Conceptual and Methodological Considerations’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 17 (2), 260–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2015.1076777
Lozano, J. Felix, Alejandra Boni, Jordi Peris and Andrés Hueso. 2012. ‘Competencies in Higher Education: A Critical Analysis from the Capabilities Approach’. Journal of Philosophy of Education 46 (1), 132–47. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00839.x
Marmot, Michael. 2005. ‘Social Determinants of Health Inequalities’. The Lancet 365 (9464), 1099–104. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(05)71146-6
Marmot, Michael, Sharon Friel, Ruth Bell, Tanja A. J. Houweling, Sebastian Taylor and Commission on Social Determinants of Health. 2008. ‘Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through Action on the Social Determinants of Health’. The Lancet 372 (9650), 1661–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(08)61690-6
Marquis, Don. 1989. ‘Why Abortion Is Immoral’. The Journal of Philosophy 86 (4), 183–202. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026961
McCleery, Robert K. and Fernando De Paolis. 2008. ‘The Washington Consensus: A Post-Mortem’. Journal of Asian Economics 19 (5), 438–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2008.09.004
McCloskey, Deirdre N. 1998. The Rhetoric of Economics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
McCowan, Tristan. 2011. ‘Human Rights, Capabilities and the Normative Basis of “Education for All”’. Theory and Research in Education 9 (3), 283–98. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878511419566
Menon, Nivedita. 2002. ‘Universalism without Foundations?’ Economy and Society 31 (1), 152–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140120109295
Miller, David. 1999. Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mitchell, Paul Mark, Hareth Al-Janabi, Sarah Byford, Willem Kuyken, Jeff Richardson, Angelo Iezzi and Joanna Coast. 2017. ‘Assessing the Validity of the ICECAP-A Capability Measure for Adults with Depression’. BMC Psychiatry 17 (1), 46. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-017-1211-8
Mitchell, Paul Mark, Tracy E. Roberts, Pelham M. Barton and Joanna Coast. 2016. ‘Applications of the Capability Approach in the Health Field: A Literature Review’. Social Indicators Research 133(1), 1–27.
Mitra, Sophie. 2006. ‘The Capability Approach and Disability’. Journal of Disability Policy Studies 16 (4), 236–47. https://doi.org/10.1177/10442073060160040501
Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511813771
Murphy, Michael. 2014. ‘Self-Determination as a Collective Capability: The Case of Indigenous Peoples’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 15 (4), 320–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2013.878320
Mutanga, Oliver and Melanie Walker. 2015. ‘Towards a Disability-Inclusive Higher Education Policy through the Capabilities Approach’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 16 (4), 501–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2015.1101410
Naess, Arne. 1973. ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-range Ecology Movement. A Summary’. Inquiry 16 (1–4), 95–100. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747308601682
Naess, Arne. 1984. ‘A Defence of the Deep Ecology Movement’. Environmental Ethics 6 (3), 265–70. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19846330
Nelson, Julie. 1995. Feminism, Objectivity and Economics. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203435915
Nickel, James. 2014. ‘Human Rights’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rights-human/
Nielsen, Lasse and David V. Axelsen. 2017. ‘Capabilitarian Sufficiency: Capabilities and Social Justice’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 18 (1), 46–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2016.1145632
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 1988. ‘Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume I, pp. 145–84.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 1992. ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defence of Aristotelian Essentialism’. Political Theory 20 (2), 202–46. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591792020002002
Nussbaum, Martha C. 1997. ‘Capabilities and Human Rights’. Fordham Law Review 66, 273.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511841286
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2002a. ‘Capabilities and Disabilities’. Philosophical Topics 30 (2), 133–65. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics200230218
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2002b. ‘Education for Citizenship in an Era of Global Connection’. Studies in Philosophy and Education 21 (4/5), 289–303. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1019837105053
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2003a. ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice’. Feminist Economics 9 (2–3), 33–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354570022000077926
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2003b. ‘Political Liberalism and Respect: A Response to Linda Barclay’. SATS 4 (2), 25–44. https://doi.org/10.1515/sats.2003.25
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006a. ‘Education and Democratic Citizenship: Capabilities and Quality Education’. Journal of Human Development 7 (3), 385–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880600815974
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006b. Frontiers of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2011a. ‘Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights: Supplementation and Critique’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12 (1), 23–37. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2011.541731
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2011b. ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (1), 3–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2011.01200.x
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2011c. Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674061200
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2012. Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities. Princeton: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400883509
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2014. ‘Introduction: Capabilities, Challenges, and the Omnipresence of Political Liberalism’. In Capabilities, Gender, Equality, edited by Flavio Comim and Martha Nussbaum, pp. 1–16. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139059138.002
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2016. ‘Economics Still Needs Philosophy’. Review of Social Economy 74 (3), 229–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/00346764.2015.1044843
Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and The Family. New York: Basic Books.
Okin, Susan Moller. 2003. ‘Poverty, Well‐being, and Gender: What Counts, Who’s Heard?’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 (3), 280–316. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2003.00280.x
O’Neill, John. 2011. ‘The Overshadowing of Needs’. In Sustainable Development: Capabilities, Needs, Wellbeing, edited by Felix Rauschmayer, Ines Omann and Johannes Frühmann, pp. 25–42. London: Routledge.
O’Neill, Onora. 1996. Towards Justice and Virtue. A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511621239
O’Neill, Onora. 2001. ‘Agents of Justice’. Metaphilosophy 32 (1‐2), 180–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00181
O’Neill, Onora. 2009. ‘Applied Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public Policy’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (3), 219–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00446.x
Oosterlaken, Ilse. 2009. ‘Design for Development: A Capability Approach’. Design Issues 25 (4), 91–102. https://doi.org/10.1162/desi.2009.25.4.91
Oosterlaken, Ilse. 2011. ‘Inserting Technology in the Relational Ontology of Sen’s Capability Approach’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12 (3), 425–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2011.576661
Oosterlaken, Ilse. 2015. Technology and Human Development. London: Routledge.
Osmani, Siddiqur Rahman. 2000. ‘Human Rights to Food, Health, and Education’. Journal of Human Development 1 (2), 273–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/713678042
Osmani, Siddiqur Rahman. 2005. ‘Poverty and Human Rights: Building on the Capability Approach’. Journal of Human Development 6 (2), 205–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880500120541
Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/019824908x.001.0001
Pattanaik, Prasanta K. 2006. ‘On Comparing Functioning Bundles and Capability Sets’. In Human Development in the Era of Globalization: Essays in Honor of Keith B. Griffin, edited by James K. Boyce, Stephen Cullenberg, Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Robert Pollin, pp. 181–98. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781845429867.00018
Pattanaik, Prasanta K. and Yongsheng Xu. 1990. ‘On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Terms of Freedom of Choice’. Recherches Économiques de Louvain 56 (3–4), 383–90.
Peppin Vaughan, Rosie. 2016. ‘Education, Social Justice and School Diversity: Insights from the Capability Approach’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 17 (2), 206–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2015.1076775
Peppin Vaughan, Rosie and Melanie Walker. 2012. ‘Capabilities, Values and Education Policy’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 13 (3), 495–512. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2012.679648
Pettit, Philip. 2001. ‘Capability and Freedom: A Defence of Sen’. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267101000116
Pettit, Philip. 2003. ‘Agency-Freedom and Option-Freedom’. Journal of Theoretical Politics 15 (4), 387–403. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692803154003
Pettit, Philip. 2009. ‘Freedom in the Spirit of Sen’. In Amartya Sen, edited by Christopher W. Morris, pp. 91–114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511800511.006
Phillips, Anne. 2004. ‘Defending Equality of Outcome’. Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00188.x
Phipps, Shelley. 2002. ‘The Well-Being of Young Canadian Children in International Perspective: A Functionings Approach’. Review of Income and Wealth 48 (4), 493–515. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4991.00065
Phipps, Shelley and Peter Burton. 1995. ‘Sharing within Families: Implications for the Measurement of Poverty among Individuals in Canada’. Canadian Journal of Economics 28(1), 177–204. https://doi.org/10.2307/136028
Pierik, Roland. 2012. ‘State Neutrality and the Limits of Religious Symbolism’. In The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom, edited by Jeroen Temperman, pp. 201–18. Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijhoff. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004222519_010
Pierik, Roland and Wibren van der Burg. 2011. ‘The Neutral State and the Mandatory Crucifix’. Religion & Human Rights 6 (3), 267–72. https://doi.org/10.1163/187103211x599427
Pierik, Roland and Ingrid Robeyns. 2007. ‘Resources versus Capabilities: Social Endowments in Egalitarian Theory’. Political Studies 55 (1), 133–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00646.x
Pogge, Thomas W. 2002. ‘Can the Capability Approach Be Justified?’ Philosophical Topics 30 (2), 167–228. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics200230216
Pogge, Thomas W. 2008. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity.
Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 1996. ‘Capabilities, Well‐being and Human Development: A Survey’. The Journal of Development Studies 33 (2), 143–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220389608422460
Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 2002. ‘A Note on the Measurement of Poverty and Vulnerability in the South African Context’. Journal of International Development 14 (6), 757–72. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.922
Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 2005. ‘Sen on Freedom and Gender Justice’. Feminist Economics 11 (3), 151–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/13545700500301551
Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 2011. ‘Disability and Human Development’. In Arguing about the World: The Work and Legacy of Meghnad Desai, edited by Mary Kaldor and Polly Vizard, pp. 99–118. London: Bloomsbury Academic. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781849665469
Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 2012. ‘The Capability Approach: Its Interpretations and Limitations’. In The Capability Approach. Development Practice and Public Policy in the Asian-Pacific Region, edited by Francesca Panzironi and Katharine Gelber, pp. 9–22. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203116159
Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 2013. ‘On Capability and the Good Life: Theoretical Debates and Their Practical Implications’. Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 31 (2), 35–42.
Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 2016. ‘Capability, Objectivity and “False Consciousness”: On Sen, Marx and JS Mill’. International Journal of Social Economics 43 (12), 1207–18. https://doi.org/10.1108/ijse-04-2016-0127
Qizilbash, Mozaffar and David A. Clark. 2005. ‘The Capability Approach and Fuzzy Poverty Measures: An Application to the South African Context’. Social Indicators Research 74 (1), 103–39. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-005-6527-y
Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. 2000. ‘A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100, 33–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9264.00064
Rauschmayer, Felix, Ines Omann and Johannes Frühmann. 2012. Sustainable Development: Capabilities, Needs, and Wellbeing. London: Routledge.
Rawls, John. 1988. ‘The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 17(4), 251–76.
Rawls, John. 1999. Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 2009. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reader, Soran. 2006. ‘Does a Basic Needs Approach Need Capabilities?’ Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (3), 337–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00259.x
Reader, Soran and Gillian Brock. 2004. ‘Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory’. Utilitas 16 (3), 251–66. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820804001165
Reddy, Sanjay G., Sujata Visaria and Muhammad Asali. 2009. ‘Inter-Country Comparisons of Income Poverty Based on a Capability Approach’. In Arguments for a Better World. Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen, edited by Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur, Volume I, pp. 7–29. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239979.003.0002
Reiss, Julian. 2013. Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203559062
Richardson, Henry S. 2000. ‘Some Limitations of Nussbaum’s Capabilities’. Quinnipiac Law Review 19, 309–32.
Richardson, Henry S. 2007. ‘The Social Background of Capabilities for Freedoms’. Journal of Human Development 8 (3), 389–414. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880701462213
Richardson, Henry S. 2015. ‘Using Final Ends for the Sake of Better Policy-Making’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 16 (2), 161–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2015.1036846
Richardson, Henry S. 2016. ‘Capabilities and the Definition of Health: Comments on Venkatapuram’. Bioethics 30 (1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12219
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2003. ‘Sen’s Capability Approach and Gender Inequality: Selecting Relevant Capabilities’. Feminist Economics 9 (2–3), 61–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354570022000078024
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2005a. ‘Selecting Capabilities for Quality of Life Measurement’. Social Indicators Research 74, 191–215. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-005-6524-1
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2005b. ‘The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey’. Journal of Human Development 6 (1), 93–117. https://doi.org/10.1080/146498805200034266
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2006a. ‘Measuring Gender Inequality in Functionings and Capabilities: Findings from the British Household Panel Survey’. In Gender Disparity: Manifestations, Causes and Implication, edited by Premananda Bharati and Manoranjan Pal, pp. 236–77. New Delhi: Anmol.
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2006b. ‘The Capability Approach in Practice’. Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (3), 351–76. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00263.x
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2006c. ‘Three Models of Education Rights, Capabilities and Human Capital’. Theory and Research in Education 4 (1), 69–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878506060683
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2008a. ‘Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice’. Social Theory and Practice 34 (3), 341–62. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200834321
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2008b. ‘Justice as Fairness and the Capability Approach’. In Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen, edited by Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur, Volume II, pp. 397–413. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239115.003.0022
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2008c. ‘Sen’s Capability Approach and Feminist Concerns’. In The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures, Applications, edited by Sabina Alkire, Flavio Comin and Mozaffar Qizilbash, pp. 82–104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492587.004
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2009. ‘Capabilities and Theories of Social Justice’. In Debating Global Society. Reach and Limit of the Capability Approach, edited by Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti, pp. 61–89. Milan: Feltrinelli.
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2010. ‘Social Justice and the Gendered Division of Labour: Possibilities and Limits of the Capability Approach’. In Gender Inequalities, Households and the Production of Wellbeing in Modern Europe, edited by Tindara Addabbo, Marie-Pierre Arrizabalaga, Cristina Borderías and Alastair Owens, pp. 25–40. Farnham: Ashgate. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315584058
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2011. ‘Review of Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities’. Notre Dame Philosophy Reviews 2011.09.23 http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/creating-capabilities-the-human-development-approach-2/
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2016a. ‘Book Review of B. Holland (2014), Allocating the Earth’. Ethics 126 (4), 1100–04. https://doi.org/10.1086/686060
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2016b. ‘Capabilitarianism’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 17 (3), 397–414. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2016.1145631
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2016c. ‘Conceptualising Wellbeing for Autistic Persons’. Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (6), 383–90. https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2016-103508
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2016d. ‘The Capability Approach’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/capability-approach/
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2017a. ‘Freedom and Responsibility — Sustainable Prosperity through a Capabilities Lens’. Center for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity. https://www.cusp.ac.uk/essay/m1-4
Robeyns, Ingrid. 2017b. ‘Having Too Much’. In NOMOS LVIII: Wealth, edited by Jack Knight and Melissa Schwartzberg, pp. 1–45. Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. New York: New York University Press.
Robeyns, Ingrid and Robert-Jan Van der Veen. 2007. Sustainable Quality of Life. Conceptual Analysis for a Policy-Relevant Empirical Specification. Bilthoven: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. http://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/publicaties/550031006.pdf
Rodogno, Raffaele. 2015a. ‘Prudential Value or Wellbeing’. In Handbook of Value: Perspectives from Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology, edited by Tobias Brosch and David Sander, pp. 287–312. Oxford: Oxford University press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716600.003.0014
Rodogno, Raffaele. 2015b. ‘Wellbeing, Science, and Philosophy’. In Wellbeing in Contemporary Society, edited by Johnny H. Søraker, Jan-Willem van der Reijt, Jelle de Boer, Pak-Hang Wong, and Philip Brey, pp. 39–57. Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06459-8_3
Roemer, John E. 1996. Theories of Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roy, Arundhati. 2014. Capitalism: A Ghost Story. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
Ruger, Jennifer Prah. 2006. ‘Toward a Theory of a Right to Health: Capability and Incompletely Theorized Agreements’. Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 18 (2), article 3. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1313&context=yjlh
Ruger, Jennifer Prah. 2010. ‘Health Capability: Conceptualization and Operationalization’. American Journal of Public Health 100 (1), 41–49. https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2008.143651
Saito, Madoka. 2003. ‘Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to Education: A Critical Exploration’. Journal of the Philosophy of Education 37, 17–33. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.3701002
Schinkel, Anders. 2008. ‘Martha Nussbaum on Animal Rights’. Ethics & the Environment 13 (1), 41–69. https://doi.org/10.2979/ete.2008.13.1.41
Schkade, David A. and Daniel Kahneman. 1998. ‘Does Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction’. Psychological Science 9 (5), 340–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00066
Schlosberg, David. 2012. ‘Climate Justice and Capabilities: A Framework for Adaptation Policy’. Ethics & International Affairs 26 (4), 445–61. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0892679412000615
Schlosberg, David and David Carruthers. 2010. ‘Indigenous Struggles, Environmental Justice, and Community Capabilities’. Global Environmental Politics 10 (4), 12–35. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00029
Schokkaert, Erik. 2007. ‘Capabilities and Satisfaction with Life’. Journal of Human Development 8 (3), 415–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880701462239
Schokkaert, Erik and Luc Van Ootegem. 1990. ‘Sen’s Concept of the Living Standard Applied to the Belgian Unemployed’. Recherches Économiques de Louvain/Louvain Economic Review 45 (3–4), 429–50.
Scholtes, Fabian. 2010. ‘Whose Sustainability? Environmental Domination and Sen’s Capability Approach’. Oxford Development Studies 38 (3), 289–307. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2010.505683
Schultz, Emily, Marius Christen, Lieske Voget-Kleschin and Paul Burger. 2013. ‘A Sustainability-Fitting Interpretation of the Capability Approach: Integrating the Natural Dimension by Employing Feedback Loops’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14 (1), 115–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2012.747489
Sen, Amartya. 1970a. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Fransisco: Holden-Day.
Sen, Amartya. 1970b. ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’. Journal of Political Economy 78 (1), 152–57. https://doi.org/10.1086/259614
Sen, Amartya. 1976. ‘Liberty, Unanimity and Rights’. Economica 43 (171), 217–45. https://doi.org/10.2307/2553122
Sen, Amartya. 1977a. ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 6 (4), 317–44.
Sen, Amartya. 1977b. ‘Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination’. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 45(1), 53–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913287
Sen, Amartya. 1979. ‘Utilitarianism and Welfarism’. Journal of Philosophy 76 (9), 463–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025934
Sen, Amartya. 1980. ‘Equality of What?’ In The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, edited by S. McMurrin, pp. 196–220. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
Sen, Amartya. 1982. ‘Rights and Agency’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1), 3–39.
Sen, Amartya. 1983. ‘Liberty and Social Choice’. The Journal of Philosophy 80 (1), 5–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026284
Sen, Amartya. 1984a. Resources, Values, and Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Sen, Amartya. 1984b. ‘Rights and Capabilities’. In Resources, Values and Development, pp. 307–24. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sen, Amartya. 1984c. ‘The Living Standard’. Oxford Economic Papers 36, 74–90. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041662
Sen, Amartya. 1985a. Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, Amartya. 1985b. ‘Goals, Commitment, and Identity’. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 1 (2), 341–56. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036895
Sen, Amartya. 1985c. ‘Wellbeing, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984’. The Journal of Philosophy 82 (4), 169–221. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026184
Sen, Amartya. 1986. ‘Social Choice Theory’. Handbook of Mathematical Economics 3, 1073–181. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4382(86)03004-7
Sen, Amartya. 1987. The Standard of Living. Edited by Geoffrey Hawthorn. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511570742
Sen, Amartya. 1990a. ‘Justice: Means versus Freedoms’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (2), 111–21.
Sen, Amartya. 1990b. ‘More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing’. The New York Review of Books, 20 December 1990.
Sen, Amartya. 1990c. ‘Welfare, Freedom and Social Choice: A Reply’. Recherches Économiques de Louvain/Louvain Economic Review 56 (3–4), 451–85.
Sen, Amartya. 1992a. Inequality Reexamined. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198289286.001.0001
Sen, Amartya. 1992b. ‘Missing Women’. British Medical Journal 304, 587–88. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.304.6827.587
Sen, Amartya. 1992c. ‘Minimal Liberty’. Economica 59 (234), 139–59. https://doi.org/10.2307/2554743
Sen, Amartya. 1993a. ‘Capability and Wellbeing’. In The Quality of Life, edited by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, pp. 30–53. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198287976.003.0003
Sen, Amartya. 1993b. ‘Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms’. Oxford Economic Papers, 45 (4), 519–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042106
Sen, Amartya. 1996. ‘On the Foundations of Welfare Economics: Utility, Capability, and Practical Reason’. In Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour, edited by Francesco Farina, Frank Hahn and Stefano Vannucci, pp. 50–65. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sen, Amartya. 1999a. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf.
Sen, Amartya. 1999b. Reason Before Identity: The Romanes Lecture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, Amartya. 1999c. ‘The Possibility of Social Choice’. The American Economic Review 89 (3), 349–78. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.3.349
Sen, Amartya. 2000. ‘Social Justice and the Distribution of Income’. In Handbook of Income Distribution, edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and Francois Bourguinon, pp. 59–85. Amsterdam: Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0056(00)80004-4
Sen, Amartya. 2002a. Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press.
Sen, Amartya. 2002b. ‘Response to Commentaries’. Studies in Comparative International Development 37 (2), 78–86. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02686264
Sen, Amartya. 2003a. ‘Foreword’. In Readings in Human Development, edited by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and A. K. Shiva Kumar, pp. vii–xiii. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Sen, Amartya. 2003b. ‘Missing Women — revisited’. BMJ: British Medical Journal 327 (7427), 1297–98. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.327.7427.1297
Sen, Amartya. 2004a. ‘Capabilities, Lists, and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversation’. Feminist Economics 10 (3), 77–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354570042000315163
Sen, Amartya. 2004b. ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (4), 315–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2004.00017.x
Sen, Amartya. 2005. ‘Human Rights and Capabilities’. Journal of Human Development 6 (2), 151–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880500120491
Sen, Amartya. 2006. ‘What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?’ Journal of Philosophy 103 (5), 215–38. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2006103517
Sen, Amartya. 2008. ‘The Economics of Happiness and Capability’. In Capabilities and Happiness, edited by Luigino Bruni, Flavio Comim and Maurizio Pugno, pp. 16–27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, Amartya. 2009a. ‘Capability: Reach and Limit’. In Debating Global Society: Reach and Limits of the Capability Approach, pp. 15–28. Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli.
Sen, Amartya. 2009b. ‘The Fog of Identity’. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (3), 285–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594x09105388
Sen, Amartya. 2009c. The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane.
Sen, Amartya. 2013. ‘The Ends and Means of Sustainability’ Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14 (1), 6–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2012.747492
Sen, Amartya. 2017. Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition. London: Penguin.
Sen, Amartya and Sunil Sengupta. 1983. ‘Malnutrition of Rural Children and the Sex Bias’. Economic and Political Weekly 18, 855–64.
Shiller, Robert J. and Virginia M. Shiller. 2011. ‘Economists as Worldly Philosophers’. The American Economic Review 101 (3), 171–75. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.3.171
Singer, Peter. 2004. One World. The Ethics of Globalization. Second edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Singer, Peter. 2010. The Life You Can Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty. New York: Random House.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2015. ‘Consequentialism’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism
Stemplowska, Zofia. 2008. ‘What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?’ Social Theory and Practice 34 (3), 319–40. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200834320
Stewart, Frances. 2005. ‘Groups and Capabilities’. Journal of Human Development 6 (2), 185–204. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880500120517
Stewart, Frances. 2006. ‘Basic Needs Approach’. In The Elgar Companion to Development Studies, edited by David A. Clark, pp. 14–18. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781847202864.00014
Stiglitz, Joseph E., Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi. 2010. Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add up. New York: The New Press.
Streeten, Paul. 1995. ‘Foreword’. In Reflections on Human Development, edited by Mahbub ul Haq, pp. vii–xvi. New York: Oxford.
Sugden, Robert. 1993. ‘Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities: A Review [Inequality Reexamined]’. Journal of Economic Literature 31 (4), 1947–62.
Sumner, Leonard Wayne. 1996. Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238782.001.0001
Suzumura, Kotaro. 2016. Choice, Preferences, and Procedures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674726307
Swift, Adam. 2008. ‘The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances’. Social Theory and Practice 34 (3), 363–87. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200834322
Taylor, Alan. 1979. ‘What’s Wrong with Negatlive Liberty?’ In The Idea of Freedom, edited by Alan Ryan, pp. 175–93. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Terzi, Lorella. 2005. ‘Beyond the Dilemma of Difference: The Capability Approach to Disability and Special Educational Needs’. Journal of Philosophy of Education 39 (3), 443–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2005.00447.x
Terzi, Lorella. 2007. ‘Capability and Educational Equality: The Just Distribution of Resources to Students with Disabilities and Special Educational Needs’. Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (4), 757–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2007.00589.x
Terzi, Lorella. 2010. Justice and Equality in Education: A Capability Perspective on Disability and Special Educational Needs. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472541178
Teschl, Miriam and Flavio Comim. 2005. ‘Adaptive Preferences and Capabilities: Some Preliminary Conceptual Explorations’. Review of Social Economy 63 (2), 229–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/00346760500130374
Teschl, Miriam and Laurent Derobert. 2008. ‘Does Identity Matter? On the Relevance of Identity and Interaction for Capabilities’. In The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures, Applications, edited by Flavio Comim, Mozaffar Qizilbash and Sabina Alkire, pp. 125–56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492587.006
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1971. ‘A Defense of Abortion’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1), 47–66.
Tooley, Michael. 1972. ‘Abortion and Infanticide’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 2 (1), 37–65.
Trommlerová, Sofia Karina, Stephan Klasen and Ortrud Leßmann. 2015. ‘Determinants of Empowerment in a Capability-Based Poverty Approach: Evidence from the Gambia’. World Development 66, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.07.008
Tronto, Joan C. 1987. ‘Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care’. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 12 (4), 644–63. https://doi.org/10.1086/494360
United Nations Development Program. 1990–2017. Human Development Reports. New York: UNDP.
Unterhalter, Elaine. 2003a. ‘Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries: The Potential of Sen’s Capability Approach for Sociologists of Education’. British Journal of Sociology of Education 24 (5), 665–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/0142569032000148708
Unterhalter, Elaine. 2003b. ‘The Capabilities Approach and Gendered Education An Examination of South African Complexities’. Theory and Research in Education 1 (1), 7–22. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878503001001660
Unterhalter, Elaine. 2009. ‘What Is Equity in Education? Reflections from the Capability Approach’. Studies in Philosophy and Education 28 (5), 415–24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-009-9125-7
Unterhalter, Elaine. 2013. ‘Educating Capabilities’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14 (1), 185–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2013.762183
Valentini, Laura. 2012. ‘Ideal vs. Non‐ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map’. Philosophy Compass 7 (9), 654–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00500.x
Vallentyne, Peter. 2005. ‘Debate: Capabilities versus Opportunities for Well‐being’. Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (3), 359–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2005.00227.x
Vallentyne, Peter and Bas Van der Vossen. 2014. ‘Libertarianism’. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism
Van Parijs, Philippe. 1995. Real Freedom for All. What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198293577.001.0001
Van Praag, Bernard M. S. and Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell. 2004. Happiness Quantified: A Satisfaction Calculus Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198286546.001.0001
Van Zanden, Jan Luiten, Joerg Baten, Marco Mira d’Ercole, Auke Rijpma, Conal Smith and Marcel Timmer. 2014. How Was Life? Global Wellbeing since 1820. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264214262-en
Vaughan, Donna. 2011. ‘The Importance of Capabilities in the Sustainability of Information and Communications Technology Programs: The Case of Remote Indigenous Australian Communities’. Ethics and Information Technology 13 (2), 131–50. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-011-9269-3
Veenhoven, Ruut. 1996. ‘Happy Life-Expectancy’. Social Indicators Research 39 (1), 1–58. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00300831
Venkatapuram, Sridhar. 2009. ‘A Bird’s Eye View. Two Topics at the Intersection of Social Determinants of Health and Social Justice Philosophy’. Public Health Ethics 2 (3), 224–34. https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/php031
Venkatapuram, Sridhar. 2011. Health Justice. An Argument from the Capability Approach. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Venkatapuram, Sridhar. 2013. ‘Health, Vital Goals, and Central Human Capabilities’. Bioethics 27 (5), 271–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01953.x
Vizard, Polly. 2006. Poverty and Human Rights. Sen’s ‘Capability Perspective’ Explored. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273874.001.0001
Vizard, Polly. 2007. ‘Specifying and Justifying a Basic Capability Set: Should the International Human Rights Framework Be given a More Direct Role?’ Oxford Development Studies 35 (3), 225–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600810701514787
Vizard, Polly, Sakiko Fukuda‐Parr and Diane Elson. 2011. ‘Introduction: The Capability Approach and Human Rights’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12 (1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2010.541728
Voget-Kleschin, Lieske. 2013. ‘Employing the Capability Approach in Conceptualizing Sustainable Development’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14 (4), 483–502. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2013.827635
Voget-Kleschin, Lieske. 2015. ‘Reasoning Claims for More Sustainable Food Consumption: A Capabilities Perspective’. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 (3), 455–77. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-014-9503-1
Walker, Melanie. 2003. ‘Framing Social Justice in Education: What Does the Capabilities Approach Offer?’ British Journal of Educational Studies 51 (2), 168–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8527.t01-2-00232
Walker, Melanie. 2005. ‘Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach and Education’. Educational Action Research 13 (1), 103–10. https://doi.org/10.1080/09650790500200279
Walker, Melanie. 2008. ‘A Human Capabilities Framework for Evaluating Student Learning’. Teaching in Higher Education 13 (4), 477–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/13562510802169764
Walker, Melanie. 2010. ‘Critical Capability Pedagogies and University Education’. Educational Philosophy and Theory 42 (8), 898–917. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00379.x
Walker, Melanie. 2012a. ‘A Capital or Capabilities Education Narrative in a World of Staggering Inequalities?’ International Journal of Educational Development 32 (3), 384–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2011.09.003
Walker, Melanie. 2012b. ‘Universities and a Human Development Ethics: A Capabilities Approach to Curriculum’. European Journal of Education 47 (3), 448–61. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-3435.2012.01537.x
Walker, Melanie and Elaine Unterhalter. 2007. Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach and Social Justice in Education. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230604810
Walsh, Vivian. 2000. ‘Smith after Sen’. Review of Political Economy 12 (1), 5–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/095382500106795
Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books.
Wasserman, David. 2005. ‘Disability, Capability, and Thresholds for Distributive Justice’. In Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems, edited by Alexander Kaufman, pp. 214–34. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203799444
Watene, Krushil. 2016. ‘Valuing Nature: Māori Philosophy and the Capability Approach’. Oxford Development Studies 44 (3), 287–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2015.1124077
Watene, Krushil and Jay Drydyk, eds. 2016. Theorizing Justice. Critical Insights and Future Directions. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
Weiler, Joseph H. H. 2010. ‘Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux’. The European Journal of International Law 21, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chq032
Weinberg, Justin. 2009. ‘Norms and the Agency of Justice’. Analyse & Kritik 31 (2), 319–38. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2009-0207
Wiggins, David. 1998. Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wigley, Simon and Arzu Akkoyunlu-Wigley. 2006. ‘Human Capabilities versus Human Capital: Gauging the Value of Education in Developing Countries’. Social Indicators Research 78 (2), 287–304. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-005-0209-7
Wilkinson, Richard G. and Michael Marmot. 2003. Social Determinants of Health: The Solid Facts. Geneva: World Health Organization.
Williams, Andrew. 2002. ‘Dworkin on Capability’. Ethics 113 (1), 23–39. https://doi.org/10.1086/341323
Wilson-Strydom, Merridy and Melanie Walker. 2015. ‘A Capabilities-Friendly Conceptualisation of Flourishing in and through Education’. Journal of Moral Education 44 (3), 310–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2015.1043878
Wissenburg, Marcel. 2011. ‘The Lion and the Lamb: Ecological Implications of Martha Nussbaum’s Animal Ethics’. Environmental Politics 20 (3), 391–409. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2011.573361
Wolff, Jonathan. 2011. Ethics and Public Policy. A Philosophical Inquiry. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203816387
Wolff, Jonathan and Avner De-Shalit. 2007. Disadvantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278268.001.0001
Wolff, Jonathan and Avner De-Shalit. 2013. ‘On Fertile Functionings: A Response to Martha Nussbaum’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14 (1), 161–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2013.762177
Woolley, Frances R. and Judith Marshall. 1994. ‘Measuring Inequality within the Household’. Review of Income and Wealth 40 (4), 415–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.1994.tb00084.x
Xu, Yongsheng. 2002. ‘Functioning, Capability and the Standard of Living: An Axiomatic Approach’. Economic Theory 20 (2), 387–99. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100221
Zaidi, Asghar and Tania Burchardt. 2005. ‘Comparing Incomes When Needs Differ: Equivalization for the Extra Costs of Disability in the UK’. Review of Income and Wealth 51 (1), 89–114. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.2005.00146.x
Zheng, Yingqin. 2009. ‘Different Spaces for E‐development: What Can We Learn from the Capability Approach?’ Information Technology for Development 15 (2), 66–82. https://doi.org/10.1002/itdj.20115
Zheng, Yingqin and Bernd Carsten Stahl. 2011. ‘Technology, Capabilities and Critical Perspectives: What Can Critical Theory Contribute to Sen’s Capability Approach?’ Ethics and Information Technology 13 (2), 69–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-011-9264-8 | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/Cultural_Sociology_and_Social_Problems/Wellbeing_Freedom_and_Social_Justice%3A_The_Capability_Approach_Re-Examined_(Robeyns)/05%3A_Which_Future_for_the_Capability_Approach/5.02%3A_References.txt |
Learning Objectives
• To develop a critical awareness of the multi-dimensional, nuanced nature of culture, and cultural difference.
vimeo.com/250718736
01: Culture
The ability to recognise and understand your own cultural context is seen as an essential prerequisite for understanding and interacting with people from different
cultural backgrounds. Let’s begin by grappling with the idea of culture itself.
This module examines the highly nuanced, multi-dimensional, and dynamic nature of the concept of culture. The concept of culture is contested1, as it can mean different things to different people and in different contexts. Part of the difficulty in arriving at a comprehensive definition stems from the fact that when talking about culture we are usually referring to a rather limited ‘visible’ dimension (such as language, works of art, dress, etc.), and not necessarily considering the rather large ‘invisible’ area of concepts and ideas (such as values, attitudes, and worldviews).
An iceberg is often used as a metaphor for culture; on the surface we are able to see the more obvious aspects of culture, however, there are many aspects that lie deeper
and require time and critical thinking to comprehend.
vimeo.com/250718899
Common misconceptions of culture can be created by using definitions that limit understandings of culture to discrete and readily identifiable categories.1
Consider these three different ways of defining culture:
… the eight major factors which set groups apart from one another, and which give individuals and groups elements of identity: age, class, race, ethnicity, levels of ability, language, spiritual belief systems, educational achievement, and gender differences.3
… an abstract concept that refers to learned and shared patterns of perceiving and adapting to the world. Culture is reflected in its products: the learned, shared beliefs,
values, attitudes, and behaviors that are characteristic of a society or population. Culture is not a static phenomenon; it is dynamic and ever-changing, but it maintains a sense of coherence.4
Culture in its widest sense can be understood as a specific way of thinking, acting and feeling about one’s own actions and the actions of others. This includes conscious or underlying explanations of the world and one’s own and other people’s place within it. It also encompasses beliefs, faiths, ideologies and worldviews, which we call upon to assert reality, truths, values and ideas of good and bad. Culture as a group phenomenon develops further and changes according to changes in society. Culture as the property of an individual is open to further development depending on knowledge and experience.5
What do you notice about these three definitions of culture?
What are the differences and similarities in the definitions?
Which definitions capture the visible aspects of culture and which capture the invisible?
These definitions highlight differences between narrow and broad conceptualizations of culture. The first definition captures the factors that most people probably recognize and take into consideration when thinking about culture. By contrast, the second definition suggests a more expansive and inclusive view of culture. Similarly, the final definition emphasizes culture’s existence as a variable and fluid construct, both on a group and individual level.
In the last two definitions, culture is understood as dynamic and relational, multi-dimensional, and expansive. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) stresses (as UNESCO is one organization) the importance of understanding cultures not as ‘self-enclosed or static entities’; rather:
Cultures are like clouds, their confines ever changing, coming together or moving apart … and sometimes merging to produce new forms arising from those that
preceded them, yet differing from them entirely …
Culture is the very substratum of all human activities, which derive their meaning and value from it.6
Which definitions align with your ideas of culture? Has your idea of culture shifted? If so, in what way?
Key point
Avoid falling into a very limited and narrow understanding of what we mean when we talk about culture. Dynamic and fluid approaches to defining culture have a much better chance of capturing a sense of the complex, changing and multi-dimensional nature of this concept.
1 Culture is relational and fluid, providing frames of reference for negotiating the world.
2 Culture is systemic, occurring within, between, and across individuals, families, communities, and regions.
3 Each individual carries culture – culture is not simply a construct applied to ‘others’ apart from ‘us’.
4 Culture embodies heterogeneity, carries temporal qualities, and cannot be singularised.2
1.03: Section 3-
While we have now developed some understanding of culture and cultural difference, we need to be aware of the limitations to fully understand other cultures. We need to recognise the plurality of cultures and be aware of any tendencies towards essentialism, or generalisations that reduce complex and dynamic cultures to some key definitive factors.7 Essentialism of culture minimises the internal differences within that culture. The challenge is to recognise and embrace diversity through respect and inclusion rather than a process of exclusion.8
http://www.ted.com/talks/wade_davis_...ief_and_ritual
For an inspired and impassioned insight into some of the ‘exquisite’ manifestations of these elements of culture, watch this short video by Canadian anthropologist, Wade Davis.
Given culture is dynamic, complex and prone to generalisation, the notion of intercultural competence is critiqued by a number of authors. Competence “refers to the ability to do something successful or efficiently. The focus remains on what people do rather than on the knowledge they have”.8 Practitioners should question the idea of the ‘cultural expert’ and challenge top-down, outsider, or etic approaches to understanding culture. Alternatively, an emic approach, or from within, entails collaborative processes where both outsiders and insiders are changed by cultural interactions. This requires developing greater awareness of self, sharing knowledge, creating partnerships and acknowledging issues of power, racism and the dynamic nature of culture.
In other words, when we begin to recognise the complexity of culture, it becomes apparent that ways of thinking about culture which tend to oversimplify, reduce
and homogenise cultures are inadequate. If we are interested in understanding our own culture, and in learning about the cultures of other people, an approach
that recognises and values this complexity is a valuable starting point.
vimeo.com/250724018
4.01: Section 1-
Learning Objectives
• To un derstand the role of critical reflection in making explicit aspects of an individual’s cultural self, and to articulate how culture shapes values, beliefs and worldviews.
04: Critical Reflection and Culture
You can’t really know the ‘self’ fully until you have engaged in critical reflection.41
The previous unit suggested that an understanding of racism and privilege required going beyond abstract, conceptual knowledge about these issues. A critical understanding involves reflection on our own situations and experiences, connecting these to the broader concepts and dynamics under consideration. This is also true for our broader goal of intercultural learning. Intercultural awareness “is not about a passive absorption of cultural knowledge” which one then applies in intercultural interactions; rather, it requires ongoing self-examination and critical reflection about key aspects of one’s cultural self.42 A critically reflective framework helps to make explicit the ways in which culture shapes our values, beliefs, and worldviews. We’ll explore this further in this module.
Click here to watch the video: vimeo.com/250727434
Why is critical reflection important?
intercultural awareness ‘is not about a passive absorption of cultural knowledge’ which one then applies in intercultural interactions; rather, it requires ongoing self-examination and critical reflection about key aspects of one’s cultural ‘self.’
05: Intercultural Practice
Learning Objectives
• To develop an understanding of some of the knowledge, values, and skills required when working across cultures. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_Intercultural_Learning_-_Critical_Preparation_for_International_Student_Travel_(Jones_Miles_and_Gopalkrishnan)/1.01%3A_UNDERSTANDING_CULTURE_and_CULTURAL_DIFFERE.txt |
International relations, as it is presented in the flow of daily news, concerns a large number of disparate events: leaders are meeting, negotiations are concluded, wars are started, acts of terror committed, and so on. In order to make sense of all this information we need to know a lot about the contemporary world and its history; we need to understand how all the disparate events hang together. At university, we study these topics, but it is a basic tenet of the academic study of international politics that this rather messy picture can be radically simplified. Instead of focusing on the flow of daily news, we focus on the basic principles underlying it. This is what we will try to do in this chapter. So, let us begin by thinking big: what is international relations, how was it made, and how did it come to be that way?
The state is a good place to start. There are a lot of states in the world – in fact, according to the latest count, there are no fewer than 195 of them. States are obviously very different from each other, but they are also similar to each other in important respects. All states are located somewhere, they have a territorial extension; they are surrounded by borders which tell us where one state ends and another begins. In fact, with the exception of Antarctica, there is virtually no piece of land anywhere on earth’s surface that is not claimed by one state or another and there is no piece of land that belongs to more than one state (although, admittedly, the ownership of some pieces of land is disputed). Moreover, all states have their own capitals, armies, foreign ministries, flags and national anthems. All states call themselves ‘sovereign’, meaning that they claim the exclusive right to govern their respective territories in their own fashion. But states are also sovereign in relation to each other: they act in relation to other states, declaring war, concluding a peace, negotiating a treaty, and many other things. In fact, we often talk about states as though they were persons with interests to defend and plans to carry out. According to a time-honoured metaphor, we can talk about international politics as a ‘world stage’ on which the states are the leading actors.
Over the course of the years there have been many different kinds of states, yet this chapter is mainly concerned with the European state and with European developments. There are good reasons for this. For much of its history, Europe was of no particular relevance to the rest of the world. Europe had few connections to other continents and European states were not more powerful, and certainly no richer, than those elsewhere. But this began to change from around the year 1500. This was when the Europeans first developed extensive trading links with the rest of the world. That trade helped to spur both economic development and social change. As a result, the Europeans began to assert themselves. Eventually, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, European states occupied and colonised the bulk of the world, dramatically transforming the course of world history. Yet, as we will see, it was only when the colonised countries became independent in the twentieth century that the European state and the European way of organising international relations finally became the universal norm. Today’s international system is, for good and for bad, made by Europeans and by non-Europeans copying European examples.
01: The Making of the Modern World
In medieval Europe international politics consisted of a complicated pattern of overlapping jurisdictions and loyalties. Most of life was local and most political power was local too. At the local level there was an enormous diversity of political entities: feudal lords who ruled their respective estates much as they saw fit, cities made up of independent merchants, states ruled by clerics and smaller political entities such as principalities and duchies. There were even brotherhoods – such as the Knights Hospitaller, a military order – who laid claims to a political role. There were also, especially in northern Europe, many peasant communities that were more or less self-governing. There were kings too of course, such as the kings of France and England, but their power was limited and their poverty looked like wealth only in comparison with the conditions of the near-destitute members of the peasant class underneath them.
In medieval Europe there were two institutions with pretensions to power over the continent as a whole – the (Catholic) Church and the Empire. The Church was the spiritual authority, with its centre in Rome. Apart from a small Jewish minority, all Europeans were Christian and the influence of the Church spread far and penetrated deeply into people’s lives. As the custodian, from Roman times, of institutions like the legal system and the Latin language, the Church occupied a crucial role in the cultural and intellectual life of the Middle Ages. The Empire – known as the Holy Roman Empire – was established in the tenth century in central, predominantly German-speaking, Europe. It also included parts of Italy, France and today’s Netherlands and Belgium. It too derived legitimacy from the Roman Empire, but had none of its political power. The Holy Roman Empire is best compared to a loosely structured federation of many hundreds of separate political units.
The political system of medieval Europe was thus a curious combination of the local and the universal. Yet, from the fourteenth century onward this system was greatly simplified as the state emerged as a political entity located at an intermediate level between the local and the universal. The new states simultaneously set themselves in opposition to popes and emperors on the universal level, and to feudal lords, peasants and assorted other rulers on the local level. This is how the state came to make itself independent and self-governing. The process started in Italy where northern city-states such as Florence, Venice, Ravenna and Milan began playing the pope against the emperor, eventually making themselves independent of both. Meanwhile, in Germany, the pope struggled with the emperor over the issue of who of the two should have the right to appoint bishops. While the two were fighting it out, the constituent members of the Holy Roman Empire took the opportunity to assert their independence. This was also when the kings of France and England began acting more independently, defying the pope’s orders. Between 1309 and 1377, the French even forced the pope to move to Avignon, in southern France. In England, meanwhile, the king repealed the pope’s right to levy taxes on the people.
With the Reformation in the sixteenth century the notion of a unified Europe broke down completely as the Church began to split apart. Before long the followers of Martin Luther, 1483–1546, and John Calvin, 1509–1564, had formed their own religious denominations which did not take orders from Rome. Instead the new churches aligned themselves with the new states. Or rather, various kings, such as Henry VIII in England or Gustav Vasa in Sweden, took advantage of the religious strife in order to further their own political agendas. By supporting the Reformation, they could free themselves from the power of Rome. All over northern Europe, the new ‘Protestant’ churches became state-run and church lands became property of the state. Yet, the new divisions were cultural and intellectual too. With the invention of the printing press, power over the written word moved away from the monasteries and into the hands of private publishers who sought markets for their books. The biggest markets were found in books published not in Latin but in various local languages. From the early eighteenth century onwards Latin was no longer the dominant language of learning. As a result, it was suddenly far more difficult for Europeans to understand each other.
In this climate, the increasingly self-assertive states were not only picking fights with universal institutions but also with local ones. In order to establish themselves securely in their new positions of power, the kings rejected the traditional claims of all local authorities. This led to extended wars in next to all European countries. Peasants rose up in protest against taxes and the burdens imposed by repeated wars. There were massive peasant revolts in Germany in the 1520s with hundreds of thousands of participants and almost as many victims. In the latter part of the sixteenth century, there were major peasant uprisings in Sweden, Croatia, England and Switzerland. In France, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the nobility rose up in defence of its traditional rights and in rebellion against the encroachments of the king.
Medieval kings were really quite powerless. They had no proper bureaucracies at their disposal, no standing armies and few ways of raising money. In fact, there were few good roads, ports and not many large cities. These, however, soon came to be constructed. From the sixteenth century onwards the states established the rudiments of an administrative system and raised armies, both in order to fight their own peasants and in order to defend themselves against other states. Since such state-building was expensive, the search for money became a constant concern. The early modern state was more than anything an institutional machinery designed to develop and extract resources from society. In return for their taxes, the state provided ordinary people with defense and a rudimentary system of justice. If they refused to pay up, state officials had various unpleasant ways to make them suffer.
Early modern Europe was the golden age of political economy. During this period, the economy was not thought of as a distinct sphere separated from politics but instead as a tool of statecraft which the state could manipulate to serve its own ends. Economic development meant higher revenues from taxes and gave the kings access to more resources which they could use in their wars. The state was keen to encourage trade, not least since taxes on trade were a lot easier to collect than taxes on land. It was now that a search began for natural resources – agricultural land, forests, iron and copper ore, but also manpower – which the state might make use of. Maps were drawn up which located these resources within the country’s borders, and lists were made of births, marriages and deaths in order to better keep track of the population. Domestic industries were set up and given state subsidies, above all in militarily significant sectors such as metal works and in sectors that were easy for the state to tax. In addition, various ‘useful sciences’ were encouraged, by the newly established scientific academies, and prizes were given to innovations and discoveries. In state-sponsored universities, future members of the emerging administrative class were taught how best to regulate society and assure peace and social order. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/01%3A_The_Making_of_the_Modern_World/1.01%3A_The_Rise_of_the_Sovereign_State.txt |
The European states emerged in the midst of struggle and strife, and struggle and strife have continued to characterise their existence. Yet, in early modern Europe it was no longer the competing claims of local and universal authorities that had to be combated but instead the competing claims of other states. The Thirty Years’ War, 1618–1648, was the bloodiest and most protracted military confrontation of the era. As a result of the war Germany’s population was reduced by around a third. What the Swiss or the Scottish mercenaries did not steal, the Swedish troops destroyed. Many of the people who did not die on the battlefield died of the plague. The Thirty Years’ War is often called a religious conflict since Catholic states confronted Protestants. Yet, Protestant and Catholic countries sometimes fought on the same side and religious dogma was clearly not the first thing on the minds of the combatants. Instead the war concerned which state should have hegemony (or dominance) over Europe. That is, which state, if any, would take over from the universal institutions of the Middle Ages. The main protagonists were two Catholic states, France and Austria, but Sweden – a Protestant country – intervened on France’s side and in the end no dominant power emerged.
The Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, which concluded the 30 years of warfare, has come to symbolise the new way of organising international politics. From this point onwards, international politics was a matter of relations between states and no other political units. All states were sovereign, meaning that they laid claims to the exclusive right to rule their own territories and to act, in relation to other states, as they themselves saw fit. All states were formally equal and they had the same rights and obligations. Taken together, the states interacted with each other in a system in which there was no overarching power. Sovereignty and formal equality led to the problem of anarchy. Within a country ‘anarchy’ refers to a breakdown of law and order, but in relations between states it refers to a system where power is decentralised and there are no shared institutions with the right to enforce common rules. An anarchical world is a world where everyone looks after themselves and no one looks after the system as a whole. Instead, states had to rely on their own resources or to form alliances through which the power of one alliance of states could be balanced against the power of another alliance. Yet, as soon became clear, such power balances were precarious, easily subverted, and given the value attached to territorial acquisitions, states had an incentive to engage in aggressive wars. As a result, the new international system was characterised by constant tensions and threats of war – which often enough turned into actual cases of warfare.
At the same time various practices developed which helped regulate common affairs. The foremost example was the practice of diplomacy as exemplified by the way peace treaties were negotiated. From the seventeenth century onward, European states met after each major war in order to reach a settlement and lay down the terms of their future interaction. These diplomatic practices had their origin in relations between the city-states of northern Italy. Once these states had made themselves independent both of the pope and the emperor, they soon discovered that their relations had become vastly more complicated. In order to avoid misunderstandings and unnecessary conflicts, the different rulers began dispatching ambassadors to each other’s courts. This diplomatic network provided a means of gathering information, of spying, but also a way of keeping in touch with one another, of carrying out negotiations and concluding deals. The practices of diplomacy soon expanded to include a number of mutually advantageous provisions: the embassies were given extraterritorial rights and legal immunity, diplomatic dispatches were regarded as inviolable and ambassadors had the right to worship the god of their choice. These originally north Italian practices gradually expanded to embrace more states and by the middle of the seventeenth century the system included France, Spain, Austria, England, Russia, Poland, Denmark, Sweden and the Ottoman Empire. Diplomatic practices were never powerful enough to prevent war, indeed wars continued to be common, but they did provide Europeans with a sense of a common identity. A European state was, more than anything, a state that participated in the system of shared diplomatic practices. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/01%3A_The_Making_of_the_Modern_World/1.02%3A_The_Westphalian_System.txt |
The early modern state was a coercive machinery designed to make war and to extract resources from society. Yet at the end of the eighteenth century, this machinery came to be radically transformed. Or rather, the ‘state’ was combined with a ‘nation’ forming a compound noun – the ‘nation-state’ – which was organised differently and pursued different goals. A nation, in contrast to a state, constitutes a community of people joined by a shared identity and by common social practices. Communities of various kinds have always existed but they now became, for the first time, a political concern. As a new breed of nationalist leaders came to argue, the nation should take over the state and make use of its institutional structures to further the nation’s ends. In one country after another the nationalists were successful in these aims. The nation added an interior life to the state, we might perhaps say; the nation was a soul added to the body of the early modern state machinery.
The revolutions that took place in Britain’s North American colonies in 1776, and in France in 1789, provided models for other nationalists to follow. ‘We the People of the United States’ – the first words of the Preamble to the US Constitution – was a phrase which itself would have been literally unthinkable in an earlier era. In France, the king was officially the only legitimate political actor and the people as a whole were excluded from politics. In addition, the power of the aristocracy and the church remained strong, above all in the countryside where they were the largest landowners. In the revolution of 1789, the old regime was overthrown and with it the entire social order. The French nation was from now on to be governed by the people, the nation, and in accordance with the principles of liberté, égalité et fraternité – liberty, equality and brotherhood.
Already in 1792, confrontation began between the revolutionary French nation and the kings of the rest of Europe. The wars were to go on for close to 25 years, most ferociously during the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century named after the French general, Napoleon Bonaparte, who made himself emperor of France. In contrast to the kings of the old regimes, the revolutionary French government could rely on the whole people to make contributions to the war due to the power of patriotism. This allowed first the revolutionaries, and later Napoleon, to create a formidable fighting machine which set about conquering Europe. Germany was quickly overrun and its sudden and complete defeat was a source of considerable embarrassment to all Germans. The Holy Roman Empire, by now in tatters, was finally dissolved in 1806 in the wake of Napoleon’s conquest. Yet, since there was no German state around which prospective nationalists could rally, the initial response was formulated in cultural rather than in military terms. Nationalist sentiment focused on the German language, German traditions and a shared sense of history. Before long a strong German nation began looking around for a unified German state. The goal was eventually achieved in 1871, after Germany – appropriately enough, perhaps – had defeated France in a war.
The Congress of Vienna of 1815, where a settlement was reached at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, was supposed to have returned Europe to its prerevolutionary ways. Yet, nationalist sentiments were growing across the continent and they constantly threatened to undermine the settlement. All over Europe national communities demanded to be included into the politics of their respective countries. Nationalism in the first part of the nineteenth century was a liberal sentiment concerning self-determination – the right of a people to determine its own fate. This programme had far-reaching implications for the way politics was organised domestically, but it also had profound ramifications for international politics. Most obviously, the idea of self-determination undermined the political legitimacy of Europe’s empires. If all the different peoples that these empires contained gained the right to determine their own fates, the map of Europe would have to be radically redrawn. In 1848 this prospect seemed to become a reality as nationalist uprisings quickly spread across the continent. Everywhere the people demanded the right to rule themselves.
Although the nationalist revolutions of 1848 were defeated by the political establishment, the sentiments themselves were impossible to control. Across Europe an increasingly prosperous middle-class demanded inclusion in the political system and their demands were increasingly expressed through the language of nationalism. The Finns wanted an independent Finland; the Bulgarians an independent Bulgaria; the Serbs an independent Serbia, and so on. In 1861 Italy too – long divided into separate city-states and dominated by the Church – became a unified country and an independent nation. Yet it was only with the conclusion of the First World War in 1918 that selfdetermination was acknowledged as a right. After the First World War most people in Europe formed their own nation-states.
As a result of the nationalist revolutions, the European international system became for the first time truly ‘inter-national’. That is, while the Westphalian system concerned relations between states, world affairs in the nineteenth century increasingly came to concern relations between nation-states. In fact, the word ‘international’ itself was coined only in 1783, by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham. In most respects, however, the inter-national system continued to operate in much the same fashion as the Westphalian inter-state system. Nation-states claimed the same right to sovereignty which meant that they were formally equal to each other. Together, they interacted in an anarchical system in which power was decentralised and wars were a constant threat. Yet, the addition of the nation changed the nature of the interaction in crucial ways. For one thing, leaders who ruled their countries without at least the tacit support of their national communities were increasingly seen as illegitimate. This also meant that newly created nationstates such as Italy and Germany were automatically regarded as legitimate members of the European community of nations. They were legitimate since the people, in theory at least, were in charge.
There were also new hopes for world peace. While kings wage war for the sake of glory or personal gain, a people is believed to be more attuned to the aspirations of another people. Inspired by such hopes, liberal philosophers devised plans for how a ‘perpetual peace’ could be established. For some considerable time, these assumptions seemed quite feasible. The nineteenth century – or, more accurately, the period from 1815 to 1914 – was indeed an uncharacteristically peaceful period in European history. At the time, great hopes were associated with the increase in trade. As Adam Smith pointed out in The Wealth of Nations (1776), a nation is rich not because it has a lot of natural resources but because it has the capacity to manufacture things that others want. In order to capitalise on this capacity, you need to trade and the more you trade the wealthier you are likely to become. Once the quest for profits and market shares has become more important than the quest for a neighbouring state’s territory, world peace would naturally follow. In a world in which everyone is busy trading with each other, no one can afford to go to war.
By the twentieth century most of these liberal hopes were dashed. As the First World War demonstrated, nation-states could be as violent as the earlymodern states. In fact, nation-states were far more lethal, not least since they were able to involve their entire population in the war effort together with the entirety of its shared resources. The peaceful quest for profits and market shares had not replaced the anxious quest for security or the aggressive quest for pre-eminence. In the Second World War, the industrial might of the world’s most developed nations was employed for military ends with aerial bombardments of civilian populations, including the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan. Between 1939 and 1945 over 60 million people were killed – around 2.5 per cent of the world’s population. This figure included the six million Jews exterminated by Germany in the Holocaust, which was one of the worst genocides in recorded history. After the Second World War, the military competition continued between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was known as a ‘cold war’ since the two superpowers never engaged each other in direct warfare, but they fought several wars by proxy such as those in Korea and Vietnam. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/01%3A_The_Making_of_the_Modern_World/1.03%3A_An_Inter-national_System.txt |
Most of what happened in Europe before the nineteenth century was of great concern to the Europeans but of only marginal relevance to people elsewhere. Europe certainly had a significant impact on the Americas, North and South. However, it had far less impact on Asia and relations with Africa were largely restricted to a few trading ports. The large, rich and powerful empires of East Asia were organised quite differently than the European states, and international politics followed different principles. The same can be said for other parts of the world such as the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world. And yet, it was the European model of statehood and the European way of organising international relations that eventually came to organise all of world politics.
As previously mentioned, trade was an important source of revenue for states in early modern Europe, and no trade was more lucrative than the trade with East Asia. Europeans had developed a taste for East Asian goods already in the Middle Ages – for spices above all, but also for silk and other exotic commodities. During the Mongol Empire, 1206–1368, much of the vast stretch of the Eurasian landmass was unified under one set of rulers and it was easy to obtain goods via the great caravan routes which criss-crossed Asia. When the Mongol Empire fell, overland trade became more insecure and the Europeans began looking for ways to get to East Asia by sea. It was when Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope, at the southernmost tip of Africa, in 1497 that the Europeans for the first time discovered a direct way to travel by sea to East Asia. The Portuguese took the lead in this trade, but they were soon replaced by the Dutch, and above all, by the Dutch East India Company, founded in 1602. All over Europe similar trading companies were soon established and they were all granted monopolies on the highly profitable East Asian trade. These monopolies were sold to the highest bidder, and for European kings this was an easy and quick way to raise revenue.
The Europeans who came back from travels in East Asia were amazed at the wondrous things they had seen. East Asian kings, they reported, were far richer and more powerful than European rulers. Europe seemed a provincial backwater compared to the centres of civilisation they had stumbled upon. From an East Asian point of view, however, the Europeans were nothing but a small contingent of traders who docked at a few ports, conducted their trade, and then left. Yet, the increase in trade which the opening of new trade routes produced was nevertheless important to the countries of East Asia. The Europeans paid for their goods in silver – often mined at Potosí, an enormous mine in today’s Bolivia – and this inflow of precious metal helped spur interAsian trade. In order to facilitate commerce, various European trading companies were given the right to establish small trading posts. The Portuguese established outposts in Goa in India, Macau in China, East Timor and Malacca in today’s Malaysia; while the Dutch founded Batavia, a trading post on the island of Java in today’s Indonesia.
In the Americas, the Europeans were far more ruthless. The Spanish conquered the Aztecs in Mexico and the Incas in Peru and gradually took over the bulk of the continent. In North America the English established themselves, together with the Dutch and the French. The European invasion was associated with widespread genocide. In South America many natives died as a result of being overworked in mines and plantations and in North America the European settlers made outright war on the natives. Yet in both North and South America the largest number of natives died through exposure to European diseases such as the measles. Africa, meanwhile, remained largely unknown to the Europeans.
It was only in the nineteenth century that relations between Europe and the rest of the world were irrevocably transformed. The reason is above all to be found in economic changes taking place in Europe itself. At the end of the eighteenth century, new ways of manufacturing goods were invented which made use of machines powered by steam, and later by electricity, which made it possible to engage in large-scale factory production. As a result of this so called ‘industrial revolution’, the Europeans could produce many more things and do it far more efficiently. As cheap, mass-produced goods flooded European markets, the Europeans began looking for new markets overseas. They also needed raw material for their factories, which in many cases only could be found outside of Europe. These economic imperatives meant that the Europeans took a renewed interest in world trade. This time it was the British who took the lead. It was in Britain that the industrial revolution had started and the British, an island nation with a long history of international commerce, had a navy second to none. Before long they had established commercial outposts from Canada to South Africa and Australia, but it was India that became the most important colony. The commercial outposts and colonial settlements soon grew in size as the British sought to protect their economic investments by means of military force.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, other European countries joined in this scramble for colonies, not least in Africa. Colonial possessions became a symbol of ‘great power’ status, and the new European nation-states often proved themselves to be very aggressive colonisers. France added West Africa and Indochina to its growing empire, and the Germans and Italians also joined the race once their respective countries were unified. This explains how, by the time of the First World War in 1914, most parts of the world were in European hands. There were some exceptions to this rule – China, Japan, Siam, Persia, Ethiopia and Nepal, among others – but even in these ostensibly independent countries the Europeans had a strong presence.
But this was not how the European state and the European way of organising international relations came to spread to the rest of the world, at least not directly. After all, a colonised country is the very opposite of a sovereign state; the colonised peoples had no nation-states and enjoyed no selfdetermination. It was instead through the process of liberating themselves from the colonisers that the European models were copied. Since the Europeans only would grant sovereignty to states that were similar to their own, the only way to become independent was to become independent on European terms. To create such Europe-like states was thus the project in which all non-European political leaders engaged. Once they finally made themselves independent in the decades after the Second World War, as an international climate of decolonisation took hold, all new states had a familiar form. They had their respective territories and fortified borders; their own capitals, armies, foreign ministries, flags, national anthems and all the other paraphernalia of European statehood. Whether there were alternative, nonEuropean, ways of organising a state and its foreign relations was never discussed. Whether it made sense for the newly independent states to try to live up to European ideals was never discussed either. This, briefly, is how the modern world was made.
1.05: Conclusion
In this chapter we focused on Europe since contemporary international politics, for good and for bad, was shaped by Europeans and by nonEuropeans copying European examples. This is a story of how the state emerged as a sovereign actor in the late Middle Ages by simultaneously rejecting the traditional claims made by universal and local institutions. It is a story of how the state went on to strengthen its power by means of bureaucracies and armies. European states were always competing with each other, and while the military competition had disastrous effects in terms of human suffering, the economic competition that took place was a spur to development and social change. In the course of the nineteenth century, the state was transformed into a nation-state in which, in theory at least, the people as a whole were in charge. There were great hopes that nation-states would be more peaceful in their relations with one another, but these hopes were soon dashed. Nation-states were ferocious colonisers and in the twentieth century the world as a whole suffered through two devastating world wars and came to the brink of nuclear Armageddon during the Cold War. In the twenty-first century there are once again hopes for a better future, but as long as the European state-system (now the international system) lasts a more enduring peace is unlikely. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/01%3A_The_Making_of_the_Modern_World/1.04%3A_The_Europeans_and_the_Rest_of_the_World.txt |
As the previous chapter showed, war compels and focuses public attention, leaves a clear mark on human life, and is responsible for shaping our world. On the other hand, despite its importance, diplomacy rarely gains much attention. When military theorist Carl von Clausewitz remarked in the early 1800s that war was the continuation of policy by other means, he sought to normalise the idea of war in modern politics. But, his words also indicated that actions short of war are available to help states achieve their objectives. These are typically the actions of diplomats. And, their work is often far less expensive, far more effective and much more predictable a strategy than war. In fact, unlike in centuries gone by when war was common, diplomacy is what we understand today as the normal state of affairs governing international relations. And, in the modern era, diplomacy is conducted not only between nation-states, but also by a range of non-state actors such as the European Union and the United Nations.
02: Diplomacy
Diplomacy has probably existed for as long as civilisation has. The easiest way to understand it is to start by seeing it as a system of structured communication between two or more parties. Records of regular contact via envoys travelling between neighbouring civilisations date back at least 2500 years. They lacked many of the characteristics and commonalities of modern diplomacy such as embassies, international law and professional diplomatic services. Yet, it should be underlined that political communities, however they may have been organised, have usually found ways to communicate during peacetime, and have established a wide range of practices for doing so. The benefits are clear when you consider that diplomacy can promote exchanges that enhance trade, culture, wealth and knowledge.
For those looking for a quick definition, diplomacy can be defined as a process between actors (diplomats, usually representing a state) who exist within a system (international relations) and engage in private and public dialogue (diplomacy) to pursue their objectives in a peaceful manner.
Diplomacy is not foreign policy and must be distinguished from it. It may be helpful to perceive diplomacy as part of foreign policy. When a nation-state makes foreign policy it does so for its own national interests. And, these interests are shaped by a wide range of factors. In basic terms, a state’s foreign policy has two key ingredients; its actions and its strategies for achieving its goals. The interaction one state has with another is considered the act of its foreign policy. This act typically takes place via interactions between government personnel through diplomacy. To interact without diplomacy would typically limit a state’s foreign policy actions to conflict (usually war, but also via economic sanctions) or espionage. In that sense, diplomacy is an essential tool required to operate successfully in today’s international system.
In the modern context then, a system dominated by states, we can reasonably regard diplomacy as something being conducted for the most part between states. In fact, the applicable international law that governs diplomacy – the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) – only references states as diplomatic actors. Yet, the modern international system also involves powerful actors that are not states. These tend to be international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and international governmental organisations (IGOs). These actors regularly partake in areas of diplomacy and often materially shape outcomes. For example, the United Nations and the European Union (two IGOs) materially shaped diplomacy in the case studies highlighted later in this chapter. And, a range of INGOs – such as Greenpeace – have meaningfully advanced progress toward treaties and agreements in important areas tied to the health and progress of humankind such as international environmental negotiations.
While readers of this book will be familiar with the concept of war to some extent due to its ubiquity in modern life, diplomacy may present itself as something alien or distant. On the one hand this is a consequence of what diplomacy is and how it is carried out. Diplomacy is most often an act carried out by representatives of a state, or a non-state actor, usually behind closed doors. In these instances, diplomacy is a silent process working along in its routine (and often highly complex) form, carried out by rank-and-file diplomats and representatives. This is perhaps not the best place to shine a light on diplomacy for beginners. On the other hand, sometimes the public are presented with briefings, statements, or – more rarely – full disclosures of a diplomatic matter. These usually drift into the public consciousness when they involve critical international issues and draw in high-ranking officials. Because they do get headlines and work their way into the history books, examples drawn from this type of diplomacy are used in this chapter to offer a more palatable access point.
To enable the reader to get a sense of what diplomacy is and why it is important, this chapter will use two interrelated case studies. The first case study involves the quest to manage the spread of nuclear weapons. The second half of the twentieth century came to be dominated by conflict between two nuclear-armed superpowers, the United States of America (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – often called the Soviet Union. In this tense climate, diplomacy ensured that few other nation-states developed nuclear weapons. Hence, the diplomatic success in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a major one, and one that involved nonstate as well as nation-state actors. US-Iran relations form the second case study. This case spans several important decades from the end of the Second World War, to the present day. As times changed, the structure of international relations also changed, often causing material shifts in the patterns of diplomacy between both nations. By visiting that relationship, it is possible to not just show the importance of high-level diplomacy between two pivotal states but also to consider the importance of an international governmental organisation – the European Union. The case studies were chosen as they offer a glimpse of diplomacy between states that were sworn enemies and had had little in common due to incompatible economic, political, or even religious, systems. Yet, through diplomacy, they were able to avoid war and find ways to achieve progress in the most critical of areas. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/02%3A_Diplomacy/2.01%3A_What_Is_Diplomacy%3F.txt |
After the first use of an atomic bomb by the US on Japan in August 1945, the world was transformed. Reports and pictures of the total devastation caused by the two bombs that the US dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima confirmed that the nature of warfare had changed forever. As one reporter described the scene:
There is no way of comparing the Atom Bomb damage with anything we’ve ever seen before. Whereas bombs leave gutted buildings and framework standing, the Atom bomb leaves nothing. (Hoffman 1945)
Although the US was the first state to successfully detonate a nuclear bomb, other nations were also researching the technology. The second state to successfully detonate a bomb was the Soviet Union (1949). The United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964) followed. As the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons increased from one to five, there were genuine fears that these dangerous weapons would proliferate uncontrollably to many other nations.
Proliferation was not only a numbers issue. As the weapons developed in sophistication from those dropped in Japan they became many orders of magnitude more destructive, representing a grave threat to humankind as a whole. By the early 1960s, nuclear weapons had been built that could cause devastation for hundreds of kilometres beyond the impact zone. The United States and the Soviet Union, who were locked into a system of rivalry known as the Cold War, seemed to be in a race to outdo each other in terms of the quantity and quality of bombs each possessed. The Cold War was known as such because the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides made a traditional war between the two almost unfathomable. If somehow they were to end up engaged in a direct conflict they each had the power to destroy the other entirely and in doing so jeopardise human civilisation as a whole.
It may seem strange but, despite their offensive power, nuclear weapons are primarily held as defensive tools – unlikely to be ever used. This is due to a concept known as deterrence. By holding a weapon that can wipe out an opponent, such an opponent is unlikely to attack you. Especially if your weapons can survive that attack and allow you to retaliate. In an environment as insecure as the Cold War, gaining a nuclear arsenal was a way to achieve deterrence and a measure of security that was not otherwise attainable. This was obviously an attractive option for states. For this reason, any hope of creating an international regime of moderation over nuclear weapons seemed doomed during the Cold War.
To the brink and back
The United Nations (UN), which was created in 1945 in part to give international diplomacy a focal point and create a more secure world, attempted in vain to outlaw nuclear weapons in the late 1940s. Following that failure, a series of less absolute goals were advanced, most notably to regulate the testing of nuclear weapons. Weapons that were being developed required test detonations, and each test released large amounts of radiation into the atmosphere, endangering ecosystems and human health.
By the late 1950s, high-level diplomacy under a United Nations framework had managed to establish a moratorium (or suspension) on nuclear testing by the United States and the Soviet Union. However, by 1961 a climate of mistrust and heightened tensions between the two nations caused testing to resume. One year later, in 1962, the world came to the brink of nuclear war in what is now known as the Cuban Missile Crisis when the Soviet Union sought to place nuclear warheads in Cuba, a small island nation in the Caribbean less than 150 kilometres off the southern coast of the United States. Cuban leader Fidel Castro had requested the weapons to deter the United States from meddling in Cuban politics following a failed US-sponsored invasion by anti-Castro forces in 1961. As Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev (1962) put it, ‘the two most powerful nations had been squared off against each other, each with its finger on the button.’ After pushing each other to the brink, US president John F. Kennedy and Khrushchev found that via diplomacy, they could agree to a compromise that satisfied the basic security needs of the other. Over a series of negotiations Soviet missiles were removed from Cuba in return for the United States removing missiles they had deployed in Turkey and Italy. As the two sides could not fully trust each other due to their rivalry, the diplomacy was based (and succeeded) on the principle of verification by the United Nations, which independently checked for compliance.
Once the immediate crisis over Cuba was resolved, high-level diplomacy continued. Neither nation desired such a dramatic break down in communications to occur again, so a direct hot line was established linking the Kremlin in Moscow and the Pentagon in Washington. Building further on the momentum, in July 1963 the Partial Test Ban Treaty was agreed, confining nuclear testing to underground sites only. It was not a perfect solution, but it was progress. And, in this case it was driven by the leaders of two superpowers who wanted to de-escalate a tense state of affairs.
Although early moves to regulate nuclear weapons were a mixed affair, the faith that Kennedy and Khrushchev put in building diplomacy was pivotal in the course of the Cold War and facilitated further progress in finding areas of agreement. In the years that followed the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cold War diplomacy entered a high watermark phase in what became known as a period of ‘détente’ between the superpowers as they sought to engage diplomatically with each other on a variety of issues, including a major arms limitation treaty. In that climate, progress was also made on nuclear proliferation.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty
Building on earlier progress, the 1970s opened with the entering into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970) – often known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Treaty sought to channel nuclear technology into civilian uses and to recognise the destabilising effect of further nuclear weapons proliferation on the international community. It was a triumph of diplomacy. The genius of the treaty was that it was aware of the realities of the international politics of the time. It was not a disarmament treaty as great powers would simply not give up their nuclear weapons, fearful their security would be diminished. So, instead of pursuing an impossible goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the Non-Proliferation Treaty sought to freeze the number of nations that had nuclear weapons at the five nations which already possessed them: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. Simultaneously, those five nations were encouraged to share non-military nuclear technology with other nations – such as civilian nuclear energy – so that those nations would not feel tempted to pursue nuclear weapons. In short, those who had nuclear weapons could keep them. Those who didn’t have them would be allowed to benefit from the non-military research and innovation of the existing nuclear powers.
Due to the well-considered design of the treaty and its enforcement, it has been deemed highly successful. Following the end of the Cold War, the NonProliferation Treaty was permanently extended in 1995. Granted, it has not kept the number of nuclear nations to five, but there are still fewer than ten – which is far from the twenty or more projected by diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic before the treaty entered into force in 1970. States with nascent nuclear weapons programmes, such as Brazil and South Africa, gave them up due to international pressure to join the treaty. Today, only a small number of states are outside its bounds. India, Pakistan and Israel never joined as they (controversially in each case) had nuclear ambitions that they were not prepared to give up due to national security priorities. Underlining the weight of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in 2003, when North Korea decided to rekindle earlier plans to develop nuclear weapons, they withdrew from the treaty rather than violate it. To date, North Korea remains the only nation to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The non-proliferation regime is not perfect of course – a situation best underlined by North Korea’s quest to proliferate despite international will. It is also a system with an inherent bias, since a number of nations are allowed to have nuclear weapons simply because they were first to develop them – and this continues to be the case regardless of their behaviour. Yet, while humankind has developed the ultimate weapon in the nuclear bomb, diplomacy has managed to prevail in moderating its spread. When a nation is rumoured to be developing a nuclear bomb, as in the case of Iran, the reaction of the international community is always one of common alarm. In IR we call ideas that have become commonplace ‘norms’. Due to skilful diplomacy in decades gone by, non-proliferation is one of the central norms underpinning our international system. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/02%3A_Diplomacy/2.02%3A_Regulating_Nuclear_Weapons.txt |
Following the end of the Second World War, Iran found itself placed in a geostrategic hotspot. It shared a long border to its north with the Soviet Union and as a result acted as a geographical buffer to any Soviet moves into the Middle East. Iran’s wider location, known as the Persian Gulf, was a region that contained the world’s largest-known pool of oil – the steady supply of which was vital for the fuelling of Western-orientated economies. So, a coincidence of time, place, politics and economics judged Iran – in most ways a weak and underdeveloped state – important. When Iran’s king, known as the Shah, found himself side-lined by a powerful left-leaning government, the United States, in league with the British, conspired to restore him to power via a covert coup in 1953. During the Cold War the United States feared that leftward political developments in nations would result in a domestic communist revolution and/or an alliance with the communist Soviet Union. In certain cases, therefore, the United States took interventionist action to contain communism from spreading. The coup was a watermark in US-Iranian history. It set up a pattern of close relations that would last 25 years, as the Shah became a loyal ally of the United States in a volatile region. This volatility was not just due to Cold War geostrategic rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. The wider region was embroiled in a series of crises caused by decolonisation and the resulting phenomenon of Arab nationalism, regional opposition to the creation of Israel, and a major ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan. Then, as now, this was a highly unstable area of the world to live in.
Iran has always been a nation that, despite different manifestations of its internal shape and character, has aspired to greater stature internationally, or at the very least regional predominance. For example, the Shah, whose autocratic rule was brought to an end by the 1979 revolution that erased his regime and created the Islamic Republic of Iran, harboured grand designs for Iran as the premier nation of the Middle East. This vision was shared by the United States, which armed Iran with advanced weaponry, of the non-nuclear kind, during the Shah’s rule. The United States hoped its support of the Shah would allow him to widen and deepen Iranian power in order to help stabilise the region. Iran today is not much different to the Shah’s Iran in the sense that it exists within the same borders and is a nation of the same peoples. However, a significant caveat is that the regional and global role Iran was to play under the Shah was largely in line with American desires, while the role envisioned by the Islamic Republic of Iran is deeply antagonistic to just about every facet of American politics. Hence, US-Iran relations are packed with insight and intrigue due to the history and divergent paths both nations have experienced.
The Iran hostage crisis
To connect our US-Iran case study to the issue of diplomacy, we do not need to look far beyond the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran to an episode known as the Iran hostage crisis. In November 1979 a gang of Iranian students invaded the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran’s capital city, and captured the personnel they found there. This occurred after the Shah, who was in exile, had taken residence in New York for cancer treatment. The protesters demanded his return to stand trial for various crimes committed by his regime, such as torturing political dissidents. So the prisoners, most of them US diplomatic personnel, were taken hostage as a bargaining chip, their freedom offered in exchange for the return of the Shah. The United States and Iran found themselves in uncharted waters when Iran’s new government, led by the once-exiled anti-Shah cleric Ruhollah Khomeini, officially sanctioned the hostage-taking.
Due to established diplomatic customs, an embassy – although hosted on foreign soil – is forbidden from being entered by the host state unless permission is given. So, when the Iranian protesters invaded the US Embassy in Tehran they violated a key feature of diplomacy developed over centuries to allow diplomats the freedom to do their work. This is why, to use a more contemporary example, WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange was able to avoid arrest by British police by taking up residence in an innocuous-looking terraced house in London – the house is the Embassy of Ecuador and police were refused entry. Strange as it may sound, police officers were then stationed outside the door waiting to arrest Assange should he decide to leave – an operation that has cost the British taxpayer millions of pounds. It is evident from the Assange example how highly such diplomatic customs are regarded by nations and how little this changes over time – even when those nations are in conflict.
In Iran’s case, its disregard for established diplomatic principles was both shocking and extreme. Not only did it violate established diplomatic principles, but hostage-taking by a state is defined as a war crime under the Geneva Conventions. Predictably, the United States rejected Iran’s demands and the hostage crisis became a tense diplomatic stand-off lasting 444 days. It turned Iran into an international pariah: there was worldwide outrage at its disregard not only for the rules of the international system but also for human decency as it paraded the hostages – bound and gagged – in front of news cameras. It also marked a new anti-Western political path for Iran, one in stark opposition to its pro-US stance during the time of the Shah. Despite the eventual freeing of the hostages in January 1981, the once-friendly nations had become foes. Following the crisis, all direct diplomatic links between the United States and Iran were severed until an issue of nuclear proliferation brought them to the same table over thirty years later.
Nuclear Iran
The idea of Iran possessing nuclear weapons is understandably controversial. Iran’s known disregard for international laws and customs, as evidenced by the hostage crisis and reinforced by the regular accusation that it supports terrorist and radical groups, creates an atmosphere of mistrust in the international community. News of Iran’s nuclear ambitions has been a point of major international diplomatic focus since 2002, when news leaked out that Iran had begun the development of a modern nuclear programme that showed signs of weaponisation (see Sinha and Beachy 2015 and Patrikarakos 2012). This was in spite of the fact that Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore bound to neither receive nor develop nuclear arms. Iran protested that its programme was for civilian and peaceful purposes only. However, due to Iran’s international profile, few believed this. Given that the United States had just declared its ‘Global War on Terrorism’ following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it was a tense period.
In 2002 the United States had no appetite for diplomacy with Iran over the nuclear issue. The US had already invaded Afghanistan in late 2001 and was preparing to invade Iraq in early 2003 as part of its campaign to rid the Middle East of regimes which might provide safe harbour to transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda – the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. The United States also had a larger goal: to secure regime change in Iran, which it considered the world’s leading state-sponsor of terrorism. Seen through that logic, a war on terror was meaningless if it did not target the world’s chief terrorist. This would be done by demonstrating the might of the United States through its invasion of Iran’s neighbours – note that Afghanistan borders Iran to the east and Iraq borders Iran to the west. This would then create internal pressure on Iran’s leadership to reform of its own accord; it might even incite another revolution. If that failed, the United States was prepared to engage with Iran in some fashion in order to destroy its nuclear research facilities and possibly engineer regime change via military means, as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is best encapsulated by president George W. Bush’s oftrepeated phrase that ‘all options are on the table’ regarding dealing with Iran – outlined in more complete terms by the following passage from an official government document:
The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom. The nuclear issue and our other concerns can ultimately be resolved only if the Iranian regime makes the strategic decision to change these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. This is the ultimate goal of U.S. policy. In the interim, we will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct. (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006, 20)
In that climate, diplomacy seemed a non-starter. However, an unlikely candidate entered the fray – the European Union (EU). In 2003, three EU nations, the UK, Germany and France, initiated high-level diplomacy with Iran in an attempt to prevent a war and introduce mediation to the situation. The talks were rejected by the United States, which refused to take part, given its above-mentioned objectives. For the European nations, diplomacy was worth pursuing. Despite the UK, France and Germany being traditional allies of the United States, there was no appetite in Europe for more war in the Middle East. The war in Iraq was controversial, as many – including the United Nations, which refused to mandate the war – did not accept its rationale. The 2003 invasion of Iraq also divided Europe politically and caused mass popular protests. In this context, engaging Iran was a bold move of diplomacy – effectively stepping in the way of the world’s sole superpower when it was at its most belligerent. The talks were initially inconclusive, but they at least succeeded in engaging Iran in diplomacy, stalling its nuclear programme and offering a path to resolution other than confrontation.
In the years that followed invasion, military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan became deeply troubled as both nations (for different reasons) descended into instability. This required a longer-term, and more substantial, military presence by the United States than had been planned. As a result, the US became bogged down and was not in a position to realistically pursue a military strategy against Iran. Thus, it joined the EU-Iran talks, albeit reluctantly, in 2006. China and Russia also joined, making it a truly international diplomatic affair. It took almost a decade, but the parties finally reached agreement in July 2015. That agreement is a marvel of diplomacy. What were once mutually opposing positions characterised by decades of mistrust between the United States and Iran were painstakingly worked on by diplomats at all levels over many rounds of diplomacy until compromises acceptable to both sides were found.
Personal relationships between the diplomats were also built during the years of the negotiations, and these helped transcend state rivalries. Wendy Sherman, the US lead negotiator, recalled how she and her Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, both became grandparents during their negotiations and shared videos of their grandchildren with each other. Personal relationships like this do not dissolve or change pre-set national interests on either side, but they were instrumental in both sides developing the resolve to work tirelessly and not give up until they were able to agree on key parameters. Similar personal relations were developed between officials at the highest level when they spent 17 days locked in intense discussions in Vienna during the concluding phase of the negotiations. Sherman later described the scene on the final day, with all the diplomatic personnel gathered together, as US Secretary of State John Kerry addressed the parties:
Secretary Kerry was the last person to speak. He recounted that when he was 21 he went off to war in Vietnam. He made a commitment that he would do whatever he could in his life to make sure that there was never war, ever again. The room was absolutely still. There was quiet. And then everyone, including the Iranians, applauded. Because, I think for all of us we understood that what we had done was to try to ensure peace, not war. (Sherman 2016)
Much like the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the key to the success of the diplomatic strategy underlining the agreement was to focus on verification rather than the seemingly impossible goal of establishing trust. The diplomats laboured in the one area where a resolution was possible and found a way to make it acceptable for both sides. For Iran this overtly involved the phased removal of punitive economic sanctions that had been sponsored by the United States and also the tacit removal of any direct military threat. For the Americans, the deal placed Iran under a strict regime of verification to ensure that it cannot easily develop nuclear weapons, and if they appeared to be doing so there would be time for the international community to react before those weapons became useable. This is known as a ‘breakout’ period (see Broad and Peçanha 2015). Such a thing is only possible via an unprecedented system of strict international inspection of Iran’s facilities, which Iran agreed to.
The resolution of the US-Iran nuclear standoff would not have been possible without the bold move of three European Union nations to start a diplomatic process during the tense year of 2003. Not only was a serious confrontation between Iran and the United States avoided, but the important nonproliferation principle that has become central to international relations was upheld by securing Iran’s commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Iran nuclear deal, although a clear example of a diplomatic success in the face of tall odds, is contentious and fragile. It will need to weather multiple political shifts in the United States and Iran that might unseat it in years to come – and it does not remove the enmity between the states, which continue to mistrust each other. However, it may be seen in retrospect as the opening act on a path of rapprochement between the two nations that may gradually replace the toxic pattern of relations begun in 1979 with the hostage crisis. Even if the United States and Iran resume a path of confrontation, it does not take away from the triumph of diplomacy in this case, with nuclear weapons in the Middle East prevented from proliferating during a critical period and an alternative offered to what might have been a major war.
2.04: Conclusion
Diplomacy in the modern era, an era sometimes called the ‘long peace’ (Gaddis 1989) due to the absence of major war since 1945, has deepened and widened in complexity. Nowadays, it would be ill advised to base a description of diplomacy on actions short of, or in response to, war between states. Diplomacy today is integral to ensuring that our period of long peace gets longer and that the world we live in is as conducive as possible to the progress of the individual, as well as the state. As today’s world is more linked and interdependent than ever before, effective and skilful diplomacy is vital to ensure that humankind can navigate an ever-growing list of shared challenges such as climate change, pandemics, transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation that may be our undoing if left unresolved. So, while you may not know the names of many of those engaged in diplomatic endeavours, nor see much of their hard work credited in the media, their work is more important than ever to all of us. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/02%3A_Diplomacy/2.03%3A_The_US_and_Iran.txt |
The previous two chapters have set the foundations for understanding our world as one determined by centuries of warfare. At the same time, we have developed mechanisms for ‘getting along’ via diplomacy. With that context in mind, we must turn to unpacking how International Relations as an academic discipline analyses our world. International Relations (IR) traditionally focused on interactions between states. However, this conventional view has been broadened over the years to include relationships between all sorts of political entities (‘polities’), including international organisations, multinational corporations, societies and citizens. IR captures a vast array of themes ranging from the growing interconnectedness of people to old and new forms of security, dialogue and conflict between visions, beliefs and ideologies, the environment, space, the global economy, poverty and climate change. The sheer number of actors and issues that are relevant to IR can be overwhelming. This can make it seem like a daunting task to not just study various aspects of IR but to try to grasp the bigger picture.
All the more important are the analytical tools that scholars have developed in an attempt to make the field more manageable – not just for newcomers to the discipline but also for themselves. Social scientists in general spend quite a lot of time thinking about effective ways of structuring their thinking and of processing the complexity of the reality they endeavour to study, analyse and understand. A lot of this kind of analytical sense-making in IR happens in the form of theories. Scholars use theories to explain and capture the meaning of real-life events in the form of abstract interpretations and generalised assumptions. On the one hand, theories can be ‘empirical’ – based on measurable experiences, usually through observation or experimentation. Empirical theories generally seek to try to explain the world as it is. On the other hand, theories can be ‘normative’ – meaning that they build on principles and assumptions about how social interactions should occur. In other words, normative theories generally seek to present a version of world that ought to be.
Before scholars develop or adopt any specific theories, however, they take what is often a subconscious decision in selecting the focus of their analysis. Following this, they normally stick with their choice without reflecting very much on alternative approaches to the issue. As students of IR it can be helpful to equip ourselves with a basic overview of the perspectives one can adopt when analysing just about any topic. This chapter will do this by looking at different ‘levels of analysis’ as one of the most common ways of structuring scholarly debates in IR.
03: One World Many Actors
Thinking of different levels of analysis in IR means that the observer and analyst may choose to focus on the international system as a whole, parts of the system in interaction with each other, or some of its parts in particular. What forms the parts or components of this system is again a matter of perspective. The international system can be conceived of as made up of states, groups of states, organisations, societies or individuals within and across those societies. IR generally distinguishes between three levels of analysis: the system, the state, and the individual – but the group level is also important to consider as a fourth. To be able to use the level of analysis as an analytical device, we need to be clear about what we are most interested in. We have to clarify for ourselves what it is exactly that we want to look at when discussing a particular theme or issue concerning the ‘international’ sphere. If we were to study and understand the 2008 global financial crisis and its consequences, for example, there would be various ways of approaching, discussing and presenting the issue. To determine the level of analysis we would need to determine what those levels are and ask ourselves some questions, which we can explore below.
The individual level
Would we look at the actions of individuals responding to the financial crisis according to their own position or responsibilities? For example, a prime minister encountering the leader of another state to negotiate an important financial agreement, the head of a large corporation adopting a policy to rescue their business or even the situation of individual citizens and their attitude towards austerity measures?
The group level
Would we be more interested in the actions of groups of individuals, such as all voters of a country and the way they express their views in the general election, political parties picking up on the issue in their campaigns or social movements forming to counter the effects of the crisis on society?
Would we be interested in activist/pressure groups like ‘Anonymous’ that seek to influence the global debate about the winners and losers of globalisation and capitalism?
The state level
Would we look at states as actors in their own right as if they were clearly defined entities that have certain preferences, and accordingly, look at their actions and decisions to find an answer to our analytical questions?
Would we then be looking at how states interact with each other to deal with the crisis – in other words, their foreign policy? How they build off each other’s suggestions and react to international developments and trends? How they cooperate, say, in the framework of international organisations?
Or would we be looking at them as competitors and antagonists, each of them pushing for a stronger position in what makes up the world economy?
The system level
Finally, might we try to look at the global level, the big picture, and try to grasp wider ranging dynamics that emerge from the global economic ‘system’ to affect its various components, states, national economies, societies, individuals?
A much-debated example of this kind of system perspective has been presented by Daniel W. Drezner (2014), who argued controversially that the international system of financial governance did well at coping with the 2008 global financial crisis. He looked at how various parts of the system worked together to mitigate wider repercussions. After all, while we call it the global financial crisis, the world has really not changed much since then and you might argue it has been business as usual for the system. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/03%3A_One_World_Many_Actors/3.01%3A_Levels_of_Analysis.txt |
Being aware of various possible perspectives helps us to develop an understanding of where we stand as analysts and observers. It also guides us through the process of investigation and analysis. First of all, the particular perspective we assume determines the kind of information we would need to gather and look at in order to be able to answer our questions and draw meaningful conclusions.
A system-level (‘systemic’) study would need to consider global linkages that go beyond single interactions between states. It would need to look at such things as the balance of power between states and how that determines what happens in global politics. This could include developments that are even outside the immediate control of any particular state or group of states, such as the global economy, transnational terrorism or the internet.
A state-level study would require careful consideration of what kinds of states we are looking at (how they are ordered politically), their geographical position, their historical ties and experiences and their economic standing. It would likely also look at the foreign policy of states, meaning their approach to and practice of interacting with other states. Key indicators of the foreign policy of states would be the policies proposed and decided by governments, statements of top-level politicians but also the role and behaviour of diplomats and their adjoining bureaucratic structures.
A group level analysis would again need to try and break the analysis down into certain kinds of groups, how they relate to the state level and where they position themselves with respect to the global dimension of the issues they are dealing with. An example of this can be seen in the work of Engelen et al. (2012), who discuss the global financial crisis as the ‘misrule of experts’, pointing at the politicised role of technocratic circles and the relative lack of democratic control over the boards of large banks and corporations. A grouplevel analysis focusing on foreign policy would look, for example, at the role of lobbying groups and the way they influence national decision-making on an issue.
If looking at the actions of individuals, we would likely also need to engage with the implications of human nature. This can be seen in the psychology and emotions behind people’s actions and decisions, their fears and their visions as well as their access to information and capacity to make a difference. Psychological factors do not only matter at the level of individual members of society or of a group. They are also an important factor in the analysis of foreign policy, whenever particular mindsets and perceptions of political leaders and key actors might influence their decisions and behaviour.
Which one of these specific perspectives we choose would greatly influence our findings. In other words, the focus or level of analysis determines the outcome of our scholarly investigations. Meanwhile, the real-life events we are analysing remain the same, of course. That is a particularly important consideration if we aim at developing generalised conclusions from our observations. Strictly speaking, our conclusions would only be valid within the scope of the level of analysis we chose to focus on. Insights provided by other perspectives would remain outside the remit of our analysis. To illustrate this, let’s stick with the above example of the global financial crisis as it is one of the more debated issues in contemporary politics.
From the system level
If we studied the global financial crisis from a system-level perspective, for instance, we would expect to gain an insight into the global dynamics that make up the international financial system. Focusing on the big picture would enable us to develop a comprehensive model of explanation that could potentially capture the states and national economies within that global system. The explanations we derive from this systemic model, however, might exaggerate the system-level factors that have conditioned the global financial crisis. As a consequence, we might overlook a lot of psychological and sociological issues that would be the subject of a group-level or individual level-analysis.
From the state level
If we studied the same theme from a state perspective, we would develop a greater level of detail about specific circumstances in particular states as well as in their interaction with each other. The distinction here, as will be discussed further below, is not quite this rigid in practice as the state level is rarely looked at in isolation but more in its wider systemic context. For our example this would mean that the world financial system is taken as the framework in which state actors operate, so state action is often conditioned by factors beyond the state’s control.
From the group level
If we studied the issue from a group-level perspective, we would yet again reach a different result in our findings. We would potentially emphasise aspects of the global financial crisis that would escape a more comprehensive global level analysis. This includes analysing the impact of the crisis on society and the livelihoods of individuals as exemplified in the UN Report ‘The Global Social Crisis’ (2011).
From the individual level
Finally, focusing on the individual level and, say, particular actions of specific personalities in the public realm – be they politicians, diplomats or bankers – would lead to us drawing different conclusions again about the causes and consequences of the financial crisis.
The bigger picture
In short, being aware and acknowledging the potential gaps in our observation – that is to say, all of what is not directly captured by our perspective or level of analysis – is important. Applying rigour in our analysis is also important. These guidelines for scholarly investigation are applied in many academic disciplines, including the natural sciences. What German theoretical physicist Werner K. Heisenberg (1962, 58) said in respect to research in his field very much also applies to IR; ‘we have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.’ Scholarly writings are nevertheless not always explicit about their particular perspective or level of analysis. So, as a reader, it is important to stay critical and to look closely and enquire whenever an argument presented to us appears to straddle potentially conflicting analytical lenses.
As you start to read deeper on particular IR issues, always remind yourself of the importance of analytical clarity. Do not hesitate to expect and demand it even from renowned authors and established publications outlets. Note that clarity concerning one’s level of analysis does not necessarily mean that different perspectives could not be used in conjunction with each other – on the contrary. As will be argued further below, many of today’s political challenges are so complex that they require our analyses to span across various levels.
Foreign policy
A crucial area where the need to broaden our levels of analysis is particularly important is the analysis of the foreign policy of states. Hopefully, we can see this immediately due to the fact that any state activity that crosses their national borders, such as a foreign policy, will have implications for other states. We can look at foreign policy at the state level by analysing government policies and diplomatic decisions in isolation. However, governments are also actors on the world stage and their foreign policies contribute to what we call international relations. As highlighted above, foreign policy can also be explained by looking at the individual level, for example, the psychological and political factors that guide leaders and their advisers in their foreign policy decisions. Those decisions in turn then feed into national decisions that matter at the state level and in relation to other states.
It can be helpful to think of foreign policy behaviour as something that is influenced by a range of factors. Some of them can be found within a state, in its political traditions, its socio-economic profile, its political party system or in the minds of leading politicians. Others come from outside, from the global system that builds the context within which states operate. This does not mean that every meaningful discussion of foreign policy needs to look at all these aspects: investigations at one particular level should be used very carefully to draw conclusions about a different level. Where the levels overlap, we need to be aware that each one will require us to look at different kinds of evidence.
To help lock in the foreign policy example, we can draw on the case of British prime minister Tony Blair. Blair is often remembered for his decision to take the UK to war with Iraq in 2003, in coalition with the United States. To examine this important foreign policy decision from the individual level, we might draw on Blair’s personal convictions as a committed anti-terrorist with a strong moral sense based on his Christianity, something that helped him forge a common personal bond with the US president, George W. Bush. If we move our focus to the state level, we can judge equally as fairly that Blair might have been acting to preserve the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ that was vital to British national security. The Iraq war period was a contentious one in Europe, with many European nations rejecting American plans for war. If Blair had followed some of his European colleagues and not supported the war, then he may have put a vital bilateral relationship in danger. Finally, we move to the international, or systemic, level. Here, we are not so much focused on Blair himself since the systemic level often supposes that it is forces operating at the international level that shape behaviour. By this reading, Blair may have felt compelled to participate in what he saw as a shift in world order that was defined by the existence of dangerous transnational terrorism on one hand, and a coalition led by the United States on the other hand who were waging a war on terrorism. Of course, as has been noted already, you would also be able to argue that Blair’s motives might have been drawn from more than one of these levels – perhaps even all of them. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/03%3A_One_World_Many_Actors/3.02%3A_How_the_Level_of_Analysis_Determines_Our_Findings.txt |
Apart from making us more critical and discerning readers, being aware of the issue of different levels of analysis can also help us understand the way in which the academic discipline of IR has developed over time. To begin with, in the early days of IR – say, from 1919 until the after the Second World War – a lot of what could be called traditional or conventional IR was not concerned with any potential distinctions between different levels of analysis or theoretical perspectives. J. David Singer (1961, 78) lamented that scholars would simply roam up and down the ladder of organizational complexity with remarkable abandon, focusing upon the total system, international organizations, regions, coalitions, extra-national associations, nations, domestic pressure groups, social classes, elites, and individuals as the needs of the moment required.
Singer’s criticism of this ‘general sluggishness’ (Singer 1961, 78) highlights another value in thinking of IR as something that can be studied from different and distinctive perspectives. Being clear about our level of analysis can prevent us from indulging in analytical ‘cherry-picking’, that is to say, from randomly gathering evidence across different levels in pursuit of an answer to our research questions. This ‘vertical drift’, as Singer calls it, can compromise the accuracy of our observations and undermine the validity of our findings. That in turn can obscure some of the detail that might have otherwise turned out to be the key to a conclusive explanation. This does not mean that any one piece of scholarly work must not consider aspects from different levels of analysis. However, when moving between different levels of analysis, we need to do so openly and explicitly. We also need to acknowledge the analytical consequences of drifting between levels: that our search for evidence will need to be comprehensive and that we might have to look at a different set of data or material for each additional aspect. For example, if you were to explain Germany’s decision to open its borders to hundreds of thousands of refugees in 2015 you might want to look at the external pressures as much as the personal motivations of German chancellor Angela Merkel. You would investigate factors at the system level (such as economic indicators, refugee flows, the attitude of key partners) and at the individual level (such as Merkel’s ideological background, her interests and perceptions of the problem as it emerges from statements and key decisions throughout her career). Each would contribute to an overall explanation, but you would need to be prepared to look at different sets of information.
From the 1950s onwards, more and more IR scholars endeavoured to specify the focus of their analysis more clearly. The most prominent example was Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (1959) which introduced an analytical framework for the study of IR that distinguished between what he referred to as different ‘images’ of an issue: the individual, the state and the international system. Waltz’s contributions to the discipline generated interest in analysing the international system as a place of interactions between states. From this perspective, the global system is conceived of as the structure or context within which states cooperate, compete and confront each other over issues of national interest. You might visualise it as a level above the state. Particularly important in that context is the distribution of power amongst states, meaning, whether there is one main concentration of power (‘unipolarity’), two (‘bipolarity’) or several (‘multipolarity’). Global circumstances are seen to condition the ability and opportunity of individual states and groups of states to pursue their interests in cooperative or competitive ways. The view of states being embedded in a global context traditionally comes with the assumption that our international system is ‘anarchic’. An anarchic system is one that lacks a central government (or international sovereign) that regulates and controls what happens to states in their dealings with each other.
Although this idea of the global or system level as a context of anarchy features in many contributions to the IR literature, the main focus remains on the state as the dominant unit of analysis. This enduring focus on the state, and therefore, on the state level of analysis, is referred to as the relative ‘state-centrism’ of the discipline. This means that IR scholars would generally not only regard states as the central unit of analysis as such, they also conceive of the state as a point of reference for other types of actors. From this perspective, the state acts as the arena in which state officials, politicians and decision-makers operate. The state is seen as the framework that encapsulates society and as the main point of reference for the individual. This predominant focus on the state is strongly related to an assumption IR scholars have made about the state also being the main location of power within the international sphere. This idea that the state is where power is primarily concentrated and located has to be seen against the historical context within which some of the most prominent IR scholars operated – the Cold War. It was an era in which much of international affairs appeared to be run via state channels and in line with particular state interests. Other actors that we would consider important from today’s perspective, such as those explored in later chapters in this book, seem to have had little leverage during the Cold War. This was because the period was dominated by great power confrontation and overwhelming military might on each side of the systemic conflict.
Although the Cold War has long since passed, a lot of today’s political life remains managed in the state framework, based on issues like national security, domestic cohesion or internal stability. States form the primary kind of actor in major international organisations such as the United Nations, they feature prominently in the global discourse on most of the major challenges of our time, and states still hold what famous German sociologist Max Weber called the monopoly on violence – the exclusive right to the legitimate use of physical force. States continue to matter and thus have to be part of our considerations about what happens in the world and why. The state as a unit of analysis and frame of reference will certainly not go away any time soon, nor will the interactions of states as a key level of analysis in IR. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/03%3A_One_World_Many_Actors/3.03%3A_Levels_of_Analysis_and_the_Changing_Ambitions_of_a_Discipline.txt |
It is important to highlight that thinking from the point of view of different – and to a degree, separate – levels of analysis as discussed up to this point has been contested by some. Leftwich (2004), for instance, has argued that thinking of international politics as something that takes place in a certain site or location is just one possible way of looking at things. He calls this the ‘arena’ approach given the way in which it focuses on the location, or ‘locus’ of interactions, on different platforms that provide the stage to particular events and instances of international relations. He distinguishes this ‘arena’ approach from what he calls the ‘processual’ approach, which assumes that international relations should not primarily be looked at as something that happens in a particular location or at a particular level of analysis but that it can instead be thought of as a complex web of processes that takes place between people.
Some theoretical approaches have what is often an implicit preference for a conception of IR as a process rather than an arena with various distinctive levels. This is because they aim to highlight the meaning of interactions as opposed to the meaning of physical structures and locations, such as the state or particular institutions within states. An example of such a perspective can be found in environmentalism or so-called ‘Green Politics’, which traditionally refuses to think of the practice of international relations as something that can be studied at different ‘levels’ of analysis. This is mainly because analysts pertaining to this approach perceive any proposed division of political reality into arenas or any attempts at physically locating a problem in a particular context as arbitrary and misleading. They would also argue that thinking in those divisions conveys a false sense of structure, when all aspects of any societal challenge are fundamentally interconnected and should thus be studied in a ‘holistic’ way – meaning, in conjunction with each other.
Another example of such a theoretical approach is feminism, which would argue that politics does not exclusively occur in public places such as state institutions and international organisations. Feminists would instead argue that ‘the personal is the political’, meaning that all human interactions carry and reproduce political meaning, and are therefore part of the intricate process of global affairs. Other thinkers would even go as far as to suggest that politics as a process is not even confined to the human species. Frans de Waal (1982) argues that even the interactions between animals, such as chimpanzees, can carry political meaning and should thus not be excluded from any intellectual accounts of politics including its international and global dimensions.
We will not develop these kinds of perspectives further at this point, but it is nevertheless useful to note how such contentions challenge any assumption of there being any kind of clear cut structure or specific levels of analysis that we can rely on as students and analysts of IR. Regardless of perspective, it is important to be aware of the multiplicity of actors and processes that make up the global system. Reminding ourselves of the complexity of international relations equips us with the ability to recognise any overgeneralisations as they are being presented to us by the media, by political leaders, activists, pressure groups and through our social networks, making us more informed, nuanced and rounded in our thinking. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/03%3A_One_World_Many_Actors/3.04%3A_IR_as_Arena_or_Process%3F.txt |
While the legacy of conventional Cold War-style thinking still looms large in contemporary analyses, researchers have been interested in developing nonstate-centric and more fluid perspectives. We already mentioned environmentalism and feminism as examples of analytical perspectives that acknowledge the importance of actors other than the state, and the role of individuals in particular. Some analysts have not completely abandoned the state perspective but suggest looking into what exactly it is inside states that might be contributing to what happens in the global sphere. This could be related to their internal characteristics, such as their form of government, their economic profile, their cultural and ideological composition or their demography. This perspective includes a distinctive focus on the societies that make up a specific state as much as particular groups and individuals within those societies. Many analysts invite their readers to open the ‘black box’ that way. In other words, to break up the conventional IR habit of treating states as secluded units and containers of power, politics and societies. They also openly challenge the assumption that there is such a thing as ‘unitary’ state action. They would dispute, for instance, that ‘Germany’ – as a nationstate – would push for austerity measures in Greece. Rather, they would insist that related policies are initiated by specific German politicians that advocate such measures out of a particular sentiment, out of an individual interpretation of current developments, or for reasons that might be linked to their own political future or specific preferences of their electorate.
Apart from a focus on the individual and group level of official decisionmaking, this ‘sub-state’ (meaning, ‘below the state’) level of analysis also attempts to expand the scope of scholarly investigation beyond formal interactions of the state, its official representatives and of its constituent parts to include informal relationships and non-official exchanges, such as flows and transfers of goods, information, communications, services and people – above and below the purview of the state.
Contemporary IR is interested in looking at actors that operate across state borders instead of being specifically confined by them – for instance, citizens of a particular state or proponents of a particular ethnic or cultural minority within that state. The study of IR has gradually widened to include all kinds of interactions between a variety of actors, including the general public and individual members of it, people like you and me.
Such an analytical move seems welcome if we think of how potent the influence of individual actors can be that do not officially represent or act on behalf of states or any of their constituent parts. An example of this is the activist Julian Assange, who spearheaded a widely publicised whistleblowing campaign leaking government secrets via the website WikiLeaks. Another example is Osama Bin Laden, who built a global terrorist network (Al Qaeda) based on his own religious and political visions. Both Assange and Bin Laden, although very different in nature, have had lasting impact on top-level global politics from the position of a private persona with no official political status or role.
What is significant in this context is that the traditional conception of the state as the main framework of political interaction and the main point of reference for both society and the individuals within it has lost a lot of its meaning and importance. If we look at the world around us, state borders do not seem to accurately delimitate global affairs. The majority of global interactions – be they related to global finance, production, education, personal and professional travel, labour migration or terrorism – no longer occur via state channels the way they once did. We could say that the increased focus on non-state actors and cross-border issues has marked a close-to-revolutionary turn in IR; something that could be interpreted as a shift away from the international (‘between-states’) to the ‘trans-national’ (‘across/beyond-states’ and their borders). Robert Keohane, one of the leading scholars in the field, recently stated that ‘International Relations’ is no longer a suitable label and that we should instead refer to the discipline as ‘Global Studies’ or ‘World Politics’ (Keohane 2016). In today’s world, few societal and political issues, challenges and problems are neatly confined by the borders of individual states or even groups of states. Thinking about world affairs in ‘trans-national’ rather than in purely ‘inter-national’ terms therefore seems more of an analytical necessity than just a choice.
Individuals and groups interact across borders and thus relativise the meaning of space and territory as conventional IR knew it. International commercial aviation and the rapid spread of information technologies has further increased people’s mobility and the rate at which interactions occur across and beyond state borders. The ability for common people to store, transfer and distribute large amounts of information, the possibility for data to travel across the world in virtually no time, and the increasing availability of high-speed internet have not only changed lives at personal and community levels but also dramatically altered the general dynamics in politics and global affairs.
Social media provide accessible platforms of communication that allow for the projection and promotion of ideas across borders at virtually no cost to the individual or group generating and advocating them. Various political agendas – be they progressive, revolutionary or outright dangerous – can unfold in a relatively uncontrolled and unregulated way, posing real challenges to governmental agencies and the political leaders that try to improve and direct them. Random individuals can potentially start a revolution from their homes, bypassing any conventional conceptions of power and transcending spatial and material boundaries to the point where political activity and even confrontation become weightless and immaterial altogether. A powerful illustration of this can be found in Thomas Neuwirth, an Austrian singer, who is most commonly known by the stage persona ‘Conchita Wurst’. The political messages displayed during a show at the Sydney Opera House in March 2016 multiplied and spread through social media. This eventually urged various representatives of the Australian government to take a stance on gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) issues and also gave momentum to the global LGBT movement. A national politician from, say, Austria, would likely not have been able to influence the domestic debate in Australia to that extent, let alone spark a worldwide debate that way.
3.06: IR and You
This chapter has introduced you to the idea of levels of analysis as an analytical device that makes the variety of issues in IR more manageable and structured. More specifically, we distinguished between the system level, the state level, the group and the individual level, highlighting differences as well as connections between them. We have shown that the academic discipline of IR has gradually moved away from a dominant focus on the state and the system to deal more with the role and perspective of groups and individuals. As you are reading this book it should be an inspirational thought that never in the history of humanity has it been easier for individuals like you to become directly involved in the practice of international relations, or should we say transnational relations. As an individual you are not just a passive subject of international relations as directed by political elites and official state actors; you have the means of being an actor in your own right – or at the very least being counted as more scholars focus beyond the narrow confines of the state level of analysis. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/03%3A_One_World_Many_Actors/3.05%3A_Beyond_the_State.txt |
Theories of International Relations allow us to understand and try to make sense of the world around us through various lenses, each of which represents a different theoretical perspective. In order to consider the field as a whole for beginners it is necessary to simplify IR theory. This chapter does so by situating IR theory on a three-part spectrum of traditional theories, middle-ground theories and critical theories. Examples are used throughout to help bring meaning and perspective to these positions. Readers are also encouraged to consult this book’s companion text, International Relations Theory (2017), which expands greatly on the subject matter of this chapter.
Before we get started, one very important note. You may notice that some of the theories you are introduced to here are referred to by names that also occur in other disciplines. Sometimes this can be confusing as, for example, realism in IR is not the same as realism in art. Similarly, you may hear the word ‘liberal’ being used to describe someone’s personal views, but in IR liberalism means something quite distinct. To avoid any confusion, this note will serve as a caveat that in this chapter we only refer to the theories concerned as they have been developed within the discipline of International Relations.
04: International Relations Theory
Theories are constantly emerging and competing with one another. For that reason it can be disorientating to learn about theoretical approaches. As soon as you think you have found your feet with one approach, you realise there are many others. Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) set the stage for understanding how and why certain theories are legitimised and widely accepted. He also identified the process that takes place when theories are no longer relevant and new theories emerge. For example, human beings were once convinced the earth was flat and accepted this as fact. With the advancement of science and technology, humans discarded this previously accepted belief. Once such a discovery takes place, a ‘paradigm shift’ results and the former way of thinking is replaced with a new one. Although changes in IR theory are not as dramatic as the example above, there have been significant evolutions in the discipline. This is important to keep in mind when we consider how theories of IR play a role in explaining the world and how, based upon different time periods and our personal contexts, one approach may speak to us more than another. Traditionally there have been two central theories of IR: liberalism and realism. Although they have come under great challenge from other theories, they remain central to the discipline.
At its height, liberalism in IR was referred to as a ‘utopian’ theory and is still recognised as such to some degree today. Its proponents view human beings as innately good and believe peace and harmony between nations is not only achievable, but desirable. Immanuel Kant developed the idea in the late eighteenth century that states that shared liberal values should have no reason for going to war against one another. In Kant’s eyes, the more liberal states there were in the world, the more peaceful it would become, since liberal states are ruled by their citizens and citizens are rarely disposed to desire war. This is in contrast to the rule of kings and other non-elected rulers who frequently have selfish desires out of step with citizens. His ideas have resonated and continue to be developed by modern liberals, most notably in the democratic peace theory, which posits that democracies do not go to war with each other, for the very reasons Kant outlined.
Further, liberals have faith in the idea that the permanent cessation of war is an attainable goal. Taking liberal ideas into practice, US President Woodrow Wilson addressed his famous ‘Fourteen Points’ to the US Congress in January 1918 during the final year of the First World War. As he presented his ideas for a rebuilt world beyond the war, the last of his points was to create a general association of nations, which became the League of Nations. Dating back to 1920, the League of Nations was created largely for the purpose of overseeing affairs between states and implementing, as well as maintaining, international peace. However, when the League collapsed due to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, its failure became difficult for liberals to comprehend, as events seemed to contradict their theories. Therefore, despite the efforts of prominent liberal scholars and politicians such as Kant and Wilson, liberalism failed to retain a strong hold and a new theory emerged to explain the continuing presence of war. That theory became known as realism.
Realism gained momentum during the Second World War when it appeared to offer a convincing account for how and why the worst conflict in known history originated after a period of supposed peace and optimism. Although it originated in named form in the twentieth century, many realists have traced its origins in earlier writings. Indeed, realists have looked as far back as to the ancient world where they detected similar patterns of human behaviour as those evident in our modern world. As its name suggests, advocates of realism purport it reflects the ‘reality’ of the world and more effectively accounts for change in international politics. Thomas Hobbes is often mentioned in discussions of realism due to his description of the brutality of life during the English Civil War of 1642–1651. Hobbes described human beings as living in an orderless ‘state of nature’ that he perceived as a war of all against all. To remedy this, he proposed that a ‘social contract’ was required between a ruler and the people of a state to maintain relative order. Today, we take such ideas for granted as it is usually clear who rules our states. Each leader, or ‘sovereign’ (a monarch, or a parliament for example) sets the rules and establishes a system of punishments for those who break them. We accept this in our respective states so that our lives can function with a sense of security and order. It may not be ideal, but it is better than a state of nature. As no such contract exists internationally and there is no sovereign in charge of the world, disorder and fear rules international relations. That is why war seems more common than peace to realists, indeed they see war as inevitable. When they examine history they see a world that may change in shape, but is always characterised by a system of what they call ‘international anarchy’ as the world has no sovereign to give it order.
One central area that sets realism and liberalism apart is how they view human nature. Realists do not typically believe that human beings are inherently good, or have the potential for good, as liberals do. Instead, they claim individuals act in their own self-interests. For realists, people are selfish and behave according to their own needs without necessarily taking into account the needs of others. Realists believe conflict is unavoidable and perpetual and so war is common and inherent to humankind. Hans Morgenthau, a prominent realist, is known for his famous statement ‘all politics is a struggle for power’ (Morgenthau 1948). This demonstrates the typical realist view that politics is primarily about domination as opposed to cooperation between states. Here, it is useful to briefly recall the idea of theories being lenses. Realists and liberals look at the very same world. But when viewing that world through the realist lens, the world appears to be one of domination. The realist lens magnifies instances of war and conflict and then uses those to paint a certain picture of the world. Liberals, when looking at the same world, adjust their lenses to blur out areas of domination and instead bring areas of cooperation into focus. Then, they can paint a slightly different picture of the same world.
It is important to understand that there is no single liberal or realist theory. Scholars in the two groups rarely fully agree with each other, even those who share the same approach. Each scholar has a particular interpretation of the world, which includes ideas of peace, war and the role of the state in relation to individuals. And, both realism and liberalism have been updated to more modern versions (neoliberalism and neorealism) that represent a shift in emphasis from their traditional roots. Nevertheless, these perspectives can still be grouped into theory ‘families’ (or traditions). In your studies, you will need to unpack the various differences but, for now, understanding the core assumptions of each approach is the best way to get your bearings.
For example, if we think of the simple contrast of optimism and pessimism we can see a familial relationship in all branches of realism and liberalism. Liberals share an optimistic view of IR, believing that world order can be improved, with peace and progress gradually replacing war. They may not agree on the details, but this optimistic view generally unites them. Conversely, realists tend to dismiss optimism as a form of misplaced idealism and instead they arrive at a more pessimistic view. This is due to their focus on the centrality of the state and its need for security and survival in an anarchical system where it can only truly rely on itself. As a result, realists reach an array of accounts that describe IR as a system where war and conflict is common and periods of peace are merely times when states are preparing for future conflict.
Another point to keep in mind is that each of the overarching approaches in IR possesses a different perspective on the nature of the state. Both liberalism and realism consider the state to be the dominant actor in IR, although liberalism does add a role for non-state actors such as international organisations. Nevertheless, within both theories states themselves are typically regarded as possessing ultimate power. This includes the capacity to enforce decisions, such as declaring war on another nation, or conversely treaties that may bind states to certain agreements. In terms of liberalism, its proponents argue that organisations are valuable in assisting states in formulating decisions and helping to formalise cooperation that leads to peaceful outcomes. Realists on the other hand believe states partake in international organisations only when it is in their self-interest to do so. Many scholars have begun to reject these traditional theories over the past several decades because of their obsession with the state and the status quo. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/04%3A_International_Relations_Theory/4.01%3A_Traditional_Theories.txt |
The thinking of the English school is often viewed as a middle ground between liberal and realist theories. Its theory involves the idea of a society of states existing at the international level. Hedley Bull, one of the core figures of the English school, agreed with the traditional theories that the international system was anarchic. However, he insisted that this does not imply there are no norms (expected behaviours), thus claiming there is a societal aspect to international politics. In this sense, states form an ‘Anarchical Society’ (Bull 1977) where a type of order does exist, based on shared norms and behaviours. Due to its central premise, the English school is often characterised as having an international society approach to IR. This describes a world that is not quite realist and not quite liberal – but rather a world that has elements of both.
Constructivism is another theory commonly viewed as a middle ground, but this time between mainstream theories and the critical theories that we will explore later. It also has some familial links with the English school. Unlike scholars from other perspectives, constructivists highlight the importance of values and shared interests between individuals who interact on the global stage. Alexander Wendt, a prominent constructivist, described the relationship between agents (individuals) and structures (such as the state) as one in which structures not only constrain agents but also construct their identities and interests. His famous phrase ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992) sums this up well. Another way to explain this, and to explain the core of constructivism, is that the essence of international relations exists in the interactions between people. After all, states do not interact; it is agents of those states, such as politicians and diplomats, who interact. As those interacting on the world stage have accepted international anarchy as the defining principle, it has become part of our reality. However, if anarchy is what we make of it, then different states can perceive anarchy differently and the qualities of anarchy can even change over time. International anarchy could even be replaced with a different system if a critical mass of other individuals (and by proxy the states they represent) accepted the idea. To understand constructivism is to understand that ideas, or ‘norms’ as they are often called, have power. IR is, then, a never-ending journey of change chronicling the accumulation of the accepted norms of the past and the emerging norms of the future. As such, constructivists seek to study this process.
4.03: Critical Theories
Critical approaches refer to a wide spectrum of theories that have been established in response to mainstream approaches in the field, mainly liberalism and realism. In a nutshell, critical theorists share one particular trait – they oppose commonly held assumptions in the field of IR that have been central since its establishment. Thus, altered circumstances call for new approaches that are better suited to understand, as well as question, the world we find ourselves in. Critical theories are valuable because they identify positions that have typically been ignored or overlooked within IR. They also provide a voice to individuals who have frequently been marginalised, particularly women and those from the Global South.
Marxism is a good place to start with critical theories. This approach is based upon the ideas of Karl Marx, who lived in the nineteenth century at the height of the industrial revolution. The term ‘Marxist’ refers to individuals who have adopted Marx’s views and believe that society is divided into two classes – the business class (the bourgeoisie) and the working class (the proletariat). The proletariat are at the mercy of the bourgeoisie who control their wages and therefore their standard of living. Marx hoped for an eventual end to the class society and overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. Critical theorists who take a Marxist angle often argue that the internationalisation of the state as the standard operating principle of international relations has led to ordinary people around the globe becoming divided and alienated, instead of recognising what they all have in common as a global proletariat. For this to change, the legitimacy of the state must be questioned and ultimately dissolved. In that sense, emancipation from the state in some form is often part of the wider critical agenda.
Postcolonialism differs from Marxism by focusing on the inequality between nations or regions, as opposed to classes. The effects of colonialism are still felt in many regions of the world today as local populations continue to deal with the challenges created and left behind by the former colonial powers. Postcolonialism’s origins can be traced to the Cold War period when much activity in international relations centred around decolonisation and the ambition to undo the legacies of European imperialism. This approach acknowledges that politics is not limited to one area or region and that it is vital to include the voices of individuals from other parts of the world. Edward Said (1978) developed the prominent ‘Orientalist’ critique, describing how the Middle East and Asia were inaccurately depicted in the West. As a result, more focus within the discipline was placed on including the viewpoints of those from the Global South to ensure that Western scholars no longer spoke on their behalf. This created a deeper understanding of the political and social challenges faced by people living within these regions as well as an acknowledgement of how their issues could be better addressed. Postcolonial scholars are, therefore, important contributors to the field as they widen the focus of enquiry beyond IR’s traditionally ‘Western’ mindset.
Another theory that exposes the inequality inherent in international relations is feminism. Feminism entered the field in the 1980s as part of the emerging critical movement. It focused on explaining why so few women seemed to be in positions of power and examining the implications of this on how global politics was structured. You only need look at a visual of any meeting of world leaders to see how it appears to be a man’s world. Recognising this introduces a ‘gendered’ reading of IR, where we place an issue such as gender as the prime object in focus. If it is a man’s world, what does that mean? What exactly is masculinity as a gender and how has it imposed itself on international relations? As V. Spike Peterson (1992) argues, as long as gender remains ‘invisible’ it may be unclear what ‘taking gender seriously’ means. Once it is recognised that gender is essentially a social construction permeating all aspects of society, the challenges it presents can be better confronted in a way that benefits all individuals. Here, you might be beginning to see some overlaps – with constructivism for example. We are doing our best to present each approach separately so that you have a clearer starting point, but it is wise to caution you that IR theory is a dense and complex web and not always clearly defined. Keep this in mind as you read on, and as your studies develop.
The most controversial of the critical theories is poststructuralism. It is an approach that questions the very beliefs we have all come to know and feel as being ‘real’. Poststructuralism questions the dominant narratives that have been widely accepted by mainstream theories. For instance, liberals and realists both accept the idea of the state and for the most part take it for granted. Such assumptions are foundational ‘truths’ on which those traditional theories rest – becoming ‘structures’ that they build their account of reality around. So, although these two theoretical perspectives may differ in some respect in regards to their overall worldviews, they share a general understanding of the world. Neither theory seeks to challenge the existence of the state. They simply count it as part of their reality. Poststructuralism seeks to question these commonly held assumptions of reality that are taken for granted, such as the state – but also more widely the nature of power. Jacques Derrida’s contribution in this area was in how he showed that you could deconstruct language to identify deeper, or alternative, meanings behind texts. If you can deconstruct language (expose its hidden meanings and the power it has), then you can do the same with fundamental ideas that shape international relations – such as the state. By introducing doubt over why the state exists – and who it exists for – poststructuralists can ask questions about central components of our political world that traditional theories would rather avoid. If you can shake the foundations of a structure, be that a word or an idea, you can move beyond it in your thinking and become free of the power it has over you. This approach introduces doubt to the reality we assume to share and exposes the often thin foundations that some commonly held ‘truths’ stand upon. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/04%3A_International_Relations_Theory/4.02%3A_The_Middle_Ground.txt |
The United Nations (UN) is a highly respected international organisation created at the conclusion of the Second World War from the ashes of the League of Nations. Although it continues to exist, many doubt its claims to success. The United Nations General Assembly is an organ that provides every country with a seat at the table. However, the United Nations Security Council is where power ultimately resides. The Security Council has ten elected non-permanent members, each with their own vote. More importantly, the Security Council also contains five permanent members – the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom – reflecting the victors of the Second World War who stood dominant in 1945 as the United Nations was created. Any of those five permanent members can, through the use of a veto, stop any major resolution.
The United Nations does not possess complete power over states. In other words, it has limited authority to interfere in domestic concerns since one of its main purposes has generally been to mediate diplomatically when issues between countries arise. To better understand this last point, one can point to the challenges faced by the UN’s peacekeepers, who comprise civilian, police and military personnel positioned in areas of conflict to create conditions for lasting peace. Irrespective of any actual desire to maintain peace in a certain area, peacekeepers are typically only permitted to apply force in matters of self-defence. This draws on the common (though not always accurate) description of the United Nations as ‘peacekeeper’ rather than ‘peacemaker’. For these reasons, among others, it is possible to argue that the United Nations as an organisation is merely symbolic. At the same time, despite its limited ability to influence heads of state or prevent violence, it is also possible to argue that many nations have benefitted from its work. Aside from its mission to maintain peace and security, the United Nations is also committed to promoting sustainable development, protecting human rights, upholding international law, and delivering humanitarian aid around the world.
From a theoretical point of view, the effectiveness and utility of the United Nations differs depending on which perspective we choose to adopt. Liberals tend to have faith in the capacity of international organisations, primarily the United Nations, along with others organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization and the World Bank, to uphold the framework of global governance. International organisations may not be perfect, but they help the world find alternatives to war through trade and diplomacy (among other things), which are staples of the liberal account of IR. On the other hand, middle-ground theories such as constructivism focus on ideas and interests. As constructivists focus often on the interactions of elite individuals, they see large organisations like the United Nations as places where they can study the emergence of new norms and examine the activities of those who are spreading new ideas.
Realists, although they do not reject the United Nations completely, argue that the world is anarchic and states will eventually resort to war despite the efforts of international organisations, which have little real authority. Generally, realists believe that international organisations appear to be successful when they are working in the interests of powerful states. But, if that condition is reversed and an organisation becomes an obstacle to national interests, then the equation may change. This line of enquiry is often used by realists to help explain why the League of Nations was unsuccessful – failing to allow for Germany and Japan’s expansionist desires in the 1930s. A contemporary example would be the United States invading Iraq in 2003 despite the Security Council declining to authorise it. The United States simply ignored the United Nations and went ahead, despite opposition. On the other hand, liberals would argue that without the United Nations, international relations would likely be even more chaotic – devoid of a respectable institution to oversee relations between states and hold bad behaviour to account. A constructivist would look at the very same example and say that while it is true that the United States ignored the United Nations and invaded Iraq, by doing so it violated the standard practices of international relations. The United States disregarded a ‘norm’ and even though there was no direct punishment, its behaviour was irregular and so would not be without consequence. Examining the difficulties the United States faced in its international relations following 2003 gives considerable weight to the constructivist and liberal viewpoints.
In contrast to liberals and constructivists, who value the United Nations to an extent, critical theories offer different perspectives. Marxists would argue that any international body, including the United Nations, works to promote the interests of the business class. After all, the United Nations is composed of (and was built by) states who are the chief protagonists in global capitalism – the very thing that Marxism is opposed to. Likewise, the United Nations can be said to be dominated by imperial (or neo-imperial) powers. Imperialism, according to Marxist doctrine, is the highest stage of capitalism. The United Nations, then, is not an organisation that offers any hope of real emancipation for citizens. Even though it may appear humanitarian, these actions are merely band-aids over a system of perpetual state-led exploitation that the United Nations legitimises.
Poststructuralists would seek to question the meanings behind the role of the United Nations and the arbitrary power structure of the Security Council. They would also look at how key terms are used by the United Nations and what they mean. For example, examining the wording of concepts like ‘peacekeepers’ and ‘peacekeeping’ as opposed to ‘peace-making’ and ‘peace-enforcing’. Or similarly, ‘collective security’ versus ‘international security’: poststructuralists would be sceptical as to whether these terms really differ in meaning and would point to the power of language in advancing the agenda of the United Nations – or perhaps that of the powerful states controlling it. Even the name of the dominant organ of the United Nations – the ‘Security’ Council – begs the question, security for whom? A critique here would point out that at its core, the United Nations is primarily concerned with facilitating the national security of powerful states rather than human security. In instances like these, the tools that poststructuralism provides to deconstruct and analyse wording have real value.
Feminists would look to how those in positions of power, whether politicians or those working for the United Nations such as officials and delegates, perpetuate a discourse of masculinity. Alternative feminine perspectives are still not adequately recognised and those in decision-making positions of power continue to be disproportionately male. Many countries that make up the United Nations marginalise the feminine voice domestically and thus perpetuate this at the international level. This is especially true of states where women hold more traditional roles in society and are therefore less likely to be considered suitable for what may be traditionally viewed as masculine roles, such as a delegate or ambassador.
Finally, postcolonialists would argue that the discourse perpetuated by the United Nations is one based on cultural, national or religious privilege. They would suggest, for instance, that, as it has no African or Latin American permanent members, the Security Council fails to represent the current state of the world. Postcolonialists would also point to the presence of former colonial powers on the Security Council and how their ability to veto proposals put forward by other countries perpetuates a form of continued indirect colonial exploitation of the Global South.
Hopefully, this brief reading of the United Nations from these varied perspectives has opened your eyes to the potential of IR theory as an analytical tool. We have barely scratched the surface, but it should be clear why so many divergent views are needed in IR and how, in a basic sense, they may be applied.
4.05: Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed the main approaches in IR theory, each of which possesses a legitimate, yet different, view of the world. It is important to note that the theories listed in this chapter are not exhaustive and there are many more that could be examined. However, this is a good starting point for achieving an overall understanding of the field and where the most common approaches are situated. Hopefully this has helped you consider your own theoretical inclination – or at least piqued your interest in determining where you might stand. It is not necessary to adopt one theory as your own. But it is important to understand the various theories as tools of analysis that you can apply in your studies. Using a theory to critique an issue, as this chapter did with the United Nations, is to understand the reason why these theories exist. Simply, they offer a means by which to attempt to understand a complex world. As international relations has grown in complexity, the family of theories that IR offers has grown in number. Due to its complexity and diversity, it is common for newcomers to have some difficulty in grasping IR theory, but this chapter should give you the confidence to get started. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/04%3A_International_Relations_Theory/4.04%3A_Theory_in_Practice-_Examining_the_United_Nations.txt |
International law is an important area to understand and much of it is theoretical or historical in nature – building on themes explored in the previous chapters. You have seen in the preceding chapter that some of the discussed theories regard ‘norms’ as a regulatory force in international relations, although the theories differ in their understanding of the relevance and function of these norms. This chapter takes up this notion and introduces you to the role of international legal norms as a particular means for the social regulation of international affairs.
Imagine a small settlement with a number of properties on each of which stands one house in which lives one family. This settlement has no common government, parliament, court system or police force. The internal affairs of each family as much as the borders of each property are respected as inviolable. The families have predominantly bilateral relations with each other and engage in commercial exchanges of goods and services. It is commonly accepted that if the head of a family dies, the established promises to other families and agreed exchanges are respected by the heirs. When children decide to delineate a new property or when a new family from elsewhere wants to settle in, the other families must agree first and recognise this new property. When disputes between families arise, they may result in violence, especially if someone challenges an established border or intervenes with a family’s interests. It is commonly accepted that one may have recourse to force to defend one’s interest in family and property. Other families do not intervene in these disputes as long as their interests are not affected or they have formed a special alliance with another family.
Ask yourself now whether you would call this settlement a ‘legal system’? Would you even speak of ‘laws’? Perhaps intuitively you would say no. Yet, consider for a moment which kind of rules and principles must exist even in such a setting. How does any form of regulation work? Why does it work? If you delve a little on these questions, you will encounter some of the foundational legal institutions that exist in most legal systems. The concept of property, title, territory and border are there; a principle of autonomy and supreme authority seems to apply to the families; and the institution of contract certainly exists. You will also detect rules of some sort in the form of established customs and you might even identify a principle that says that ‘agreements need to be kept’. Lawyers make use of the Latin phrase ‘pacta sunt servanda’ to express this basic principle. Thus, even in such a rudimentary setting, some customary rules and principles exist even if they are not called ‘law’ or written down in any form.
You will also note that some characteristics of what you may intuitively regard as essential to a legal order are missing: There is no authority ‘above’ the families which makes laws for all, adjudicates conflicts or enforces laws and judgements. There is no government, parliament, court or police system. The rules and principles seem to stem from established practices motivated by the functional needs of cohabitation, pragmatism or mere common sense. Whatever rules exist in this settlement, their validity and effectiveness are routed exclusively in the will of the families and their members.
This settlement resembles many peculiarities of the international legal order. In fact, the settlement resembles a certain depiction of the international legal order that most international lawyers today would call outdated, even though it is precisely this depiction of a primitive legal order that haunts international law even today. If you translate the situation of the settlement to the international plane and substitute the families with states, you will get a picture of international law characterised by states as the principal actors. In this depiction, states hold the supreme and exclusive authority over their polities and follow predominantly customary and contractual rules in the relations between them but have no world government above them.
The principle of sovereignty expressed this supreme and exclusive authority of states over their territory, and it confirmed the equal status of all states. It developed its current meaning through the writings of legal and political philosophers between the sixteenth and eighteenth century. Sovereignty continues to be the foundational pillar of the international legal order. For many decades this foundational pillar of international law read: sovereign states are the masters of international law with no world government above them. This meant that the validity of any legal rule depended on the will of states or, conversely, that states are only bound by authoritative legal precepts (norms) that they have consented to. In a famous judgement in the Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague – the principal judicial organ of the League of Nations, the predecessors to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of the United Nations (UN) – stated in 1927 (The Case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’, judgement of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 7 September 1927, 18):
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.
05: International Law
It is this depiction of international law that often culminated in the question of whether international law was really law. How could international legal norms be effective if their validity depended on the will of states, the very subjects international law should govern? This doubt in the validity and effectiveness of international law ultimately led to a rupture between the two disciplines of international law and international relations theory after the Second World War. Two scholars, Edward Hallett Carr and Hans Morgenthau, suggested around this time that international law was particularly inept for understanding the behaviour of nations. They were disappointed by what they identified as an idealistic belief in international law which, after all, had not prevented – for the second time – a world war. They proposed instead a more ‘realistic’ assessment of international relations based on power and interest. The founding realist school of international relations theory thus questioned the effectiveness and relevance of international law as a decisive influencing factor for the behaviour of states and for the assurance of international peace and security.
Much has changed since then. The international legal order has diversified in every possible way. There are countless bilateral and multilateral contracts between states (called treaties or conventions in international law), and more than 5,000 intergovernmental organisations and their different organs engage in the regulation and administration of nearly all aspects of international life.
International legal norms pervade global affairs. Every time you travel internationally, send an email, or update your social media profiles, there are not only domestic but supranational legal norms at play, including regional norms as in the European Union. Be it border control, diplomatic and consular relations between countries, the determination of flight and navigation routes, internet regulation, privacy, the use of postal and telecommunication services, industrial standards or cross-border environmental hazards – international law permeates these areas as much as the better-known fields of the protection of human rights, humanitarian interventions and the fight against transnational terrorism.
It is important to understand, then, that the question of whether and how international law matters depends not least on one’s conceptual outlook on international life. This chapter introduces you foremost to the (traditional ‘occidental’ or ‘Western’) normative understanding of international law in order to show you how international lawyers think and how they use international law. This implies a focus on valid legal rules that authoritatively regulate international life. Yet the understanding of international law as a system of legal norms is not the only possible approach, nor is it the solely valid one. In fact, there are numerous other approaches that complement the normative outlook on global law (Walker 2014). It is also important that the occidental depiction of international law is not the only one existing in the world. Scholars from outside the West have shown, for example, how the dominant view of international law neglects important and often earlier contributions to international law by other cultures. Asian, African and Latin American countries should form part of our understanding of international law. For example, international treaties existed already in Africa and Asia over three thousand years ago. Islamic legal thought, present in Persia, India, South Asia and Europe, also had legal regulations of how to conduct hostilities at least since the seventh century. There is not one single conception of international law or international politics.
By focusing on the normative understanding of international law, the chapter takes a modest approach and steers a middle ground. There are also conceptualisations that portray international law as a cosmopolitan order securing solidarity and peace in a ‘post-Westphalian’ world in which states have largely lost their status as sole sovereigns. On the other hand, there are theories that continue to question the social effectiveness and relevance of international legal norms to shape the behaviour of international actors. In addition, one can also analyse international law through empirical research that uses collected data about the social behaviour of actors as it is done, for example, to scrutinise the effectiveness of human rights norms. Yet, a purely empirical analysis has difficulty in conveying the idiosyncrasy of normative thinking and argumentation in international law. Even if collected data shows instances of non-compliance with human rights norms, it would be wrong to draw conclusions from this about the binding character or range of social effects of these norms.
International lawyers as a particular group of professionals learn techniques to determine which legal norms exist and which are applicable to the relevant actors in a certain situation. Lawyers speak of the sources and subjects of law. They learn how to apply these norms using specific techniques, such as interpretation or the balancing of conflicting rights. These professional techniques are not value-neutral or objective but involve subjective choices and politics. An approximation to objectivity and ideals of justice is achieved only through specific procedures that need to be followed, recognised modes of argumentation and particular processes of decision-making. In a nutshell, international law consists of certain conventions on argumentation and modes of conflict resolution that some regard as a craft, others as an art. Most likely it is both. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/05%3A_International_Law/5.01%3A_What_Law_Is_International_Law.txt |
One distinguishes broadly between domestic, regional and (public and private) international law. Domestic law stems from domestic lawmakers and regulates the life of the citizens of a particular state. Regional law, such as European Union law or the law of regional human rights mechanisms, stems from regional intergovernmental institutions and addresses the governments and individuals of a particular geographical region or legal regime. Public international law is the subject of this chapter and addresses – in most general terms – relations involving states, intergovernmental organisations and non-state actors, which include today individuals, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private corporations. Private international law concerns conflicts of laws that may arise in cases where the domestic laws of different states could apply, for example in cases of cross-border e-commerce, marriages or liabilities.
Within public international law, a distinction is traditionally drawn between the law of peace and the law of war (humanitarian law). The law of peace regulates peaceful relations and includes such subject matters as international treaty law, the law of diplomatic and consular relations, international organisation law, the law of state responsibility, the law of the sea, the environment and outer space or international economic law.
International humanitarian law (IHL) is the law of armed conflicts (jus in bellum – the law applicable in war) and regulates the conduct of international and non-international hostilities. In times of war, the use of force, including the killing of human beings, is not prohibited. The legal regulation of armed conflicts goes back to the mid-nineteenth century and comprises a large body of customary rules and a series of important conventions and additional protocols to these conventions adopted primarily in The Hague and Geneva.
International humanitarian law regulates, among other things, the methods and means of warfare and the protection of certain categories of persons – for example, the sick and wounded, prisoners of war and civilians. More specific treaties prohibit the use of certain types of weapons (such as chemical or biological weapons, mines or cluster munitions) or the protection of cultural property during armed conflict. Much of the development and codification of this body of law is the merit of the International Committee of the Red Cross, founded in 1863 by Henry Dunant, which is a private humanitarian institution based in Geneva and forms part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
At the transitional points between the law of peace and the law of armed conflict lies the legal regulation of the resort to force (jus ad bellum – the law to engage in war) which concerns the conditions that need to be met to use force legally as, for example, in instances of self-defence (Article 51, UN Charter). More recently, scholars also speak of the regulation of the transition to peace after the end of armed conflicts (jus post-bellum – the law after war) which includes questions over how to end armed conflicts, transitional justice and post-war reconstruction.
The strict distinction between the law of peace and the law of armed conflict has been somewhat blurred with the rise of international human rights law and international criminal law. Human rights law builds on and develops fundamental principles of humanitarian law for the protection of individuals. On the other hand, human rights have considerably influenced the refinement of humanitarian rules for the protection of combatants and civilians. International criminal law has seen a rapid development after the end of the Cold War first with the establishment of the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and then with the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/05%3A_International_Law/5.02%3A_The_Contents_of_International_Law.txt |
Consider now what it meant to establish, for example, an international legal prohibition of torture. Torture was a common and legal method of interrogation before the seventeenth century. A legal prohibition of torture would mean that governments are obliged by international law not to allow their officials to use torture. How did an international legal norm prohibiting torture develop? What were its effects?
Subjects: Who makes international law and to whom does it apply?
You have seen already that traditionally only states (for historical reasons also the Holy See/Vatican and the Maltese Order) were subjects of international law and bearers of privileges and obligations. Privileges included sovereign status, immunities, jurisdiction or membership in international organisations, for example. Obligations towards other states arose from voluntary contracts, from the principle of non-intervention or from responsibilities for wrongful acts.
The status of a sovereign state implied full membership in the international society of states. It is a contentious issue in international law whether a territorial entity gains the legal status of a sovereign state depending only on a number of factual criteria (such as the existence of a population, territory, effective government and capacity to enter into international relations) or whether this requires also a formal recognition by other states. Already the criteria of statehood are contentious, and in practice it is not always easy to determine whether all conditions are met. In addition, for political reasons states have sometimes recognised other states that did not fulfil one or more criteria of statehood, or they have not recognised states despite them fulfilling all criteria. After the break-up of the former state of Yugoslavia, for example, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008. Serbia has not formally recognised Kosovo as an independent sovereign state. Neither have a number of other states such as Russia, China and Spain, which all try to control movements for regional independence or autonomy in their own territory.
Coming back now to the example of the prohibition of torture, which options did individuals have under international law to seek redress for acts of torture? If a foreigner was tortured by officials of another state, the home state could complain to the latter. The individuals themselves, however, could do very little under international law, for individuals were not subjects of this body of law. Even worse, if a state tortured its own citizens, this was an internal matter in which other states could not intervene.
Sources: How is international law made?
The most important and most concrete sources of international law are bilateral and multilateral treaties. Multilateral treaties are usually prepared during long negotiations at diplomatic state conferences where a final treaty text is adopted and then opened for signature and ratification by states. When an agreed number of states have ratified the treaty, it enters into force and becomes binding on the member states.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists as sources of international law on which the court may rely in its decisions: treaties, customary international law, general principles of law that exist in most domestic legal systems (such as behaving in ‘good faith’) and, as a subsidiary means, also judicial decisions and scholarly writings.
Customary practices are even today still a common and highly contentious source of law. Customary law refers to the established practices of states that are supported by a subjective belief to be required by law. If a customary rule exists, it is binding on all states except where a state has persistently objected to this rule. You can imagine already that the deduction of legal rules from social practices and subjective beliefs poses many difficulties and bears many insecurities regarding proof and actual content. Also during diplomatic conferences that prepare a treaty text, many difficult compromises are brokered. To paraphrase a saying that is often attributed to Otto von Bismarck, laws are like sausages. It is better not to see them being made.
In the context of our example of the prohibition of torture, imagine the following scenario: state A has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which contains a prohibition of torture in Article 7, and is also party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This country fights terrorism and brings suspected terrorists to secret prisons in countries which are not party to any of the above conventions. In these prisons, the suspects endure intense interrogations which include sleep deprivation, waterboarding (causing the sensation of drowning) and other measures.
As an international lawyer faced with this case your starting point would be the aforementioned international treaties that contain a prohibition of torture. You would need to determine whether the interrogation measures amount to torture. Here, the codified definition in international treaties and the interpretation of this definition in previous cases can give you important guidance. You would also need to determine whether the particular state in question has ratified the pertinent treaty or treaties. In our example, the situation is complicated by the fact that both treaties limit the territorial applicability of the treaty to all individuals within a state’s territory and subject to its jurisdiction. Hence one could argue that instances of torture on the territory of non-state parties do not fall within the ambit of the treaties. Also a counterargument is possible. One could make a case for the extraterritorial application of the treaty if the acts of torture on foreign soil were effectively controlled by a state that is a member to the treaty.
You would then proceed to see whether a customary rule exists that prohibits the use of torture. Even if the treaties prohibiting torture have not been ratified by a state, you could argue that the treaty has codified an already existing customary rule or, if a large majority of states has ratified the treaties, that this is evidence that a customary rule has been formed. In light of horrendous historical experiences, you may also argue that the prohibition of torture is of such fundamental importance that today no derogation from this rule is permitted. In other words, you would argue that the prohibition of torture is a peremptory rule of international law (ius cogens – peremptory law) that does not permit any exception.
You can see now how the early idea of state consent as a necessary requirement for an international rule still permeates these argumentations. The main difficulty often consists in establishing state consent or, at times, in constructing alternatives for it.
Global organisation: The United Nations era
The end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War are probably the most significant historical watersheds in the development of recent public international law. The end of the Second World War in 1945 led to the establishment of the United Nations and the rapid development of several areas of international law, including human rights law, international criminal law and international economic law.
The United Nations is the most important global intergovernmental organisation with major offices in New York, Geneva, Nairobi and Vienna. It was established with the principal aim to ensure peace and security through international co-operation and collective measures. As of 2017, it has 193 member states. Article 2 of the UN Charter, the founding treaty of the United Nations, confirms as guiding principles the sovereign equality of the member states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention.
Delegates of all member states meet once a year during the General Assembly to discuss pertinent issues of world politics and vote on nonbinding resolutions. The Security Council is the highest executive organ of the United Nations in which the representatives of ten selected member states and five states with permanent seats decide on issues of peace and security through binding resolutions, which may result in economic sanctions or even military actions. The ‘permanent five’ (the People’s Republic of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) hold the privilege of a veto right allowing them to prevent the adoption of resolutions of the Security Council on any substantial (as opposed to procedural) issues. Major reform initiatives of the composition or voting procedures of the Security Council have been unsuccessful so far. This taints the effectiveness and the democratic legitimacy of the Security Council and, especially during the Cold War, it severely constrained the Security Council as two of its key members (the United States and the Soviet Union) were engaged in an ideological conflict. Politically, however, the right to veto was a necessary concession to ensure the participation of the most powerful nations in a world organisation.
Numerous principal and subsidiary UN organs and specialised agencies engage in the application, enforcement and development of international law. This work comprises, for example, classical legal work in the International Law Commission and special committees of the General Assembly, practical work in the field and diplomatic efforts by Offices of High Commissioners and their staff, or actions taken by the Security Council. All of these bodies, and many more, promote and shape international law in various ways. In the International Law Commission, for example, a group of experts create reports and drafts on specific topics that are then submitted to a committee of the General Assembly and can provide an important basis for later treaty negotiations. The Offices of the High Commissioners for Human Rights and Refugees do important work in the field where their staff endeavour to uphold international law often in crisis situations. Their experiences influence also subsequent interpretations of international law, for example, regarding who qualifies as a refugee. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) fulfils a crucial function in disseminating knowledge about international law by promoting education and research on human rights, justice and the rule of law.
Community and governance: The changing structure of international law
The existence of a world organisation, the legal prohibition of the use of force, the establishment of a system of collective security and the protection of human rights have caused fundamental changes in the international legal order. International lawyers and politicians speak frequently of the ‘international community’ that co-operates to pursue community interests which cannot be achieved by single states alone. These community interests may range from environmental challenges and cultural heritage to issues of human security.
How much the meaning of sovereignty has changed, one can see, for example, in the principle of a shared ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). According to this principle, states have an obligation to prevent gross human rights violations not only at home but also abroad, if necessary through forceful United Nations measures. The protection of the individual from severe atrocities has thus become a matter of national, regional and international concern. This means that states can no longer claim that gross human rights violations are internal matters and that they are protected by their sovereignty.
Today there are countless actors that engage in the making, interpretation, use and enforcement of international norms. States still are the major international actors and the principal makers and addressees of international norms. Yet the bureaucracies of intergovernmental organisations and their organs, numerous international, regional and domestic courts and tribunals, non-governmental organisations and even groups or single persons (socalled ‘norm entrepreneurs’) engage in the pronunciation, interpretation and dissemination of international legal norms, standards and other types of ‘soft law’. And, they often do this without, or even against, the will of states. For example, a NATO-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was executed without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is a collective security organisation, effectively a military alliance, of Western states. It was originally created to help contain the spread of communism in Europe during the Cold War but has endured in the years since. Its actions in Kosovo contributed to the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which was a private expert group under the auspices of the Canadian Government to respond to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s challenge on how to respond to large-scale violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The commission produced a report on ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ to which both the UN Security Council and the General Assembly have repeatedly referred to and which is used as an argumentative tool by civil society actors, including many non-governmental organisations. You can thus see how a private initiative has transformed into public normative authority.
This multitude of norms, legal regimes, actors and normative processes is reflected in more recent approaches to international law that focus more on pluralistic governance processes than on a unified legal system, and more on informal law-making than on formal sources. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/05%3A_International_Law/5.03%3A_From_No_World_Government_to_Global_Governance.txt |
In order to understand how different actors make normative claims and how they use international law, the aforementioned broader perspectives offer valuable insights. The emergence of a norm like the prohibition of torture and its influence start long before such a norm is codified in an international treaty. Political scientists and legal scholars have described a normative ‘life cycle’ that relies on a (transnational) social process which is characterised by an initial norm emergence, followed by early adoption of this new norm, spreading of this acceptance and ultimately by widespread internalisation of the norm and compliance with it.
For the first stage of norm emergence, the influence of so-called ‘normentrepreneurs’ (such as private individuals, lobbying groups, nongovernmental organisations) is essential. Through a combination of means (e.g. framing of issues, campaigning, empathy appeal, persuasion, shaming, claiming, declaring, etc.) and on different organisational platforms, the normentrepreneurs try to enunciate norms and persuade governments to embrace them. In the case of torture, this meant that even literary novels and political pamphlets contributed to a change in social perception and an increase of empathy with victims which in turn led to the social unacceptability of torture.
Once a ‘critical mass’ of actors have adopted a new norm prohibiting torture or of a responsibility to protect, a threshold or tipping point is reached. At this second stage, the norm starts to spread through international society. Here an active process of transnational – domestic, regional and international – socialisation takes place which, primarily, states, international organisations and networks of norm entrepreneurs carry forward. Those state and non-state actors that have endorsed the norm engage in a process of redefining what qualifies as appropriate behaviour within international society. Social movement theory, which studies mobilisations in society to make collective claims about social changes, provides valuable insights on the conditions and effects of this process.
A third phase of internalisation or obedience is reached when norms ‘achieve a “taken-for-granted” quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 904). If this process succeeds, norms such as the prohibition of torture become truly transnational in the course of this process. They exert normative force domestically through constitutional guarantees and through the work of civil society groups. In addition, the norms are invoked in regional and in international human rights fora such as regional and international courts or human rights bodies. Thus, these norms acquire a transnational character through interactions between a variety of actors – both state and non-state – across issues areas and across historic public/private and domestic/international dichotomies (Koh 1997, 2612).
This, however, does not mean that international law is a guarantor for a just global order. Much rests on the will and interests of the actors involved. International law itself cannot solve injustices and cannot manufacture solutions. Ultimately, many of the politically charged issues simply reflect in the language of international law. For example, we have seen already that international law prohibits the use of force by states in peace times except when the forceful measures have been authorised by the UN Security Council or when a state acts in self-defence (Article 51, UN Charter). In this scenario, not only politicians but also international lawyers will argue in legal terms whether the use of force against an (allegedly) imminent terrorist attack that has not yet occurred can be justified as a form of ‘pre-emptive’ self-defence. Similarly, since it is not illegal to kill enemy combatants during an armed conflict, international lawyers will exchange legal arguments about whether terrorists qualify as combatants and whether the killing of terrorist suspects in a foreign country is permissible under international law because of a continuing global war on terror that amounts to a state of armed conflict. Finally, also in the ambit of our example on the prohibition of torture, lawyers will argue about whether the situation of a hidden ticking bomb might exceptionally permit torturing the apprehended attacker if this could save innocent lives.
This is not to say, however, that international law is inherently indeterminate or arbitrary. The normative force of international law lies in the creation of new argumentative needs, in the possibility to challenge established positions, in the specific required modes of argumentation, in the institutionalised fora for conflict resolution and in the justificatory potential that rests in law.
5.05: Conclusion
Although questions about the relevance and effectiveness of international law persist, especially when powerful nations use their political power to ‘bend’ international law, today hardly anyone declares international law as irrelevant. Accordingly, the discussion has shifted from ‘whether international law is really law’ to ‘how do international norms matter’. Also the divide between international law and IR theory has been closing for some time now. Liberal approaches to IR acknowledge that norms have an important role to play for the shaping of state preferences and in international co-operation to attain common aims by setting common normative frameworks. The English school argues for an international society in which states through interaction naturally create rules and institutions, as exemplified in the example of the families at the beginning of this chapter. The constructivist school focuses on social processes, including legal norms that shape the self-understanding, role, identity and behaviour of actors. Social movement theory analyses the creation and effects of group organisation in civil society and how campaigning, for example for human rights, gains social force and translates into political results.
International lawyers, on the other hand, have been opening up towards empirical, sociological and political approaches to understand how norms develop and how actors exert normative authority. This goes beyond understanding international law exclusively as a coherent legal system with recognised sources of law and specific techniques of legal practice. International lawyers increasingly adopt a more pluralistic and holistic outlook and an understanding of international law as a social process. This social process results in normative regulations that function as standards of conduct to guide and evaluate the behaviour of international actors. That the individual has acquired such a prominent role in international law as a central subject beyond state confines is truly remarkable. Today, each individual has rights that permeate the international and that are fundamentally embedded in an – albeit imperfect – global law which in turn permeates each of our lives. This law is not static but in a constant process of development. It requires to be made effective, challenged, defended and reformulated in order to fulfil its emancipatory potential. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/05%3A_International_Law/5.04%3A_The_Functioning_of_International_Law.txt |
As you may have picked up in the previous chapter, we live in a world of laws. While sovereign states are the principal legal actors, international organisations are increasingly important in helping us govern our world. Today’s international system is made up of a cacophony of different voices and interests. In addition to states there are also non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations and hybrid organisations which are a mix of all the different categories.
Imagine stepping off a plane into a foreign country. As you disembark you switch on your phone to check the messages that may have come through while you were in transit. You follow the sign that directs you to the airport’s exit, clear immigration, and then pick up your luggage at the designated carousel. You then head straight for the ‘nothing to declare’ green lane to exit the airport. Those routine actions would have already brought you into contact with the work of at least four different international organisations. The aircraft that you arrived in would have been one of the many planes under the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and regulated by standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); that you were able to use your phone to check messages would have been courtesy of the work of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU); and your customs clearance would have been facilitated by the Kyoto Convention set by the World Customs Organization (WCO) to simplify the customs process.
These are just some of the ways in which international organisations form an integral part of our everyday lives. Whether these organisations are working to build houses for the impoverished like UN-Habitat does, or working to ensure a standard of health for everyone like the World Health Organization (WHO) does, there is no running away from international organisations. Today, it is increasingly difficult to imagine an international system in which the only voices that matter are those of states.
06: International Organizations
An international governmental organisation (IGO), also referred to as an intergovernmental organisation, is an organisation with a membership of only states. The organisation is usually founded upon a treaty, or a multilateral agreement, and consists of more than two states. Member states determine the way in which the organisation is run, vote within the organisation and provide its funding.
Established in 1945 following the end of the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) is a prime example of an international governmental organisation with almost universal membership. Only states can be members of the United Nations and membership is valued because it confers upon the member state international recognition of its sovereignty. As of 2017 there are 193 UN member states – but it is important to note that a small number of states are not members. Taiwan, for example, has repeatedly requested membership but has had its request blocked by China. This is because China regards Taiwan as a part of its sovereign territory and does not recognise it as an independent nation. Taiwan, of course, wants United Nations membership because this will mean that the international community fully accepts its sovereignty. The Taiwan example has gone unresolved for decades due to the major role that China plays within the United Nations as one of its most powerful members.
There are six main organs of the United Nations. Once a state is a member, it is automatically a member of the General Assembly. This is the most democratic organ where each state gets one vote, no matter how big or small, rich or poor the country. It is also the place where, every September, world leaders give their address to the international community from behind a dark green podium with the UN crest clearly visible. The other organs are the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat and the International Court of Justice. By far the most powerful organ is the Security Council, which has 15 members. Five states – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – are permanent members of the Security Council. The other ten are voted in by the General Assembly for two-year tenures. The Security Council is the only organ that can impose sanctions on states or deploy military forces on behalf of the international community to keep the peace in a certain area, region or country. The United Nations itself does not have its own military force, but it can muster military and police personnel through contributions by its members. These UN peacekeepers are distinguished by their trademark blue helmets, giving rise to the nickname ‘Blue Berets’.
In order to be inclusive the United Nations has welcomed the participation (note participation, not membership) of civil society groups during some of its meetings, but never at the sessions of the all-important Security Council. Organisations may speak as observers to the General Assembly, or as organisations with ‘consultative status’ with the UN Economic and Social Council for example. There are civil society organisations on all issues, ranging from disarmament to oceanic noise pollution, and from mental health to refugees. There are also private individuals who are invited to speak at special United Nations meetings. It is therefore common to witness heart wrenching first-hand accounts of sexual abuses, torture, or discrimination. Such testimonies have the power to galvanise the international community. Yet, no matter how powerful these testimonies are, it is ultimately up to the member states to determine the course of action. The Secretariat, including the Secretary-General who leads the United Nations, cannot take action on its own and can only appeal to member states to ‘do something’. Because of this, the United Nations remains undeniably and irrevocably an international governmental organisation and not a level of authority above the states.
Here, the other designation sometimes used to describe IGOs – ‘intergovernmental organisation’ – is helpful in appreciating the difference in ‘global governance’ (which IGOs bring to our international system) and ‘global government’ (which does not currently exist). Virtually all IGOs are intergovernmental. This means that their power rests with governments (the member states) not with the organisation. States are free to leave the organisations, or even in some cases to ignore them. There are usually consequences for both actions, but the fact remains that even in extreme cases – when an organisation like the United Nations imposes sanctions, or authorises war, on a state – international governmental organisations do not rule over states. Such punitive measures are only possible when the members of the UN Security Council are in accord, agree with such proposals, and a coalition of states agrees to finance and partake in the operation. Therefore, the power rests with the states themselves, especially the more powerful states, and there are regular examples of states rejecting a certain course of action because it was not in their national interest. Here, the failures of the United Nations to establish a coordinated response to the Syrian war comes to mind, despite hundreds of thousands killed and millions displaced since 2011.
If an IGO was not intergovernmental, as explained above, it would be in the rare category of ‘supranational’. To have supranational powers means that an organisation is actually able to govern its members and have a degree of independence from its member states. The only clear example of a major organisation such as this is the European Union (EU). For that reason, it is often described as sui generis, or ‘unique’ in its own right. The European Union is unique because, unlike the United Nations and other international governmental organisations, it can actually be said to exercise a degree of sovereignty over its members via law-making powers in certain areas that its members agreed to relocate to the supranational level. It also has its own currency which, together with other capabilities, gives it some of the powers otherwise only seen in states. This is not without controversy in Europe and there is a rising tide of discontent with the growing power of the European Union and a desire in some political circles to weaken, or even dissolve, the organisation so that more of the power returns to the states. The ‘Brexit’ debate, when the British public voted in a 2016 referendum to leave the European Union, raised many of these issues and is an interesting instance of the idea of supranationalism being challenged.
Leaving aside bigger organisations like the European Union and the United Nations, international governmental organisations are typically more specific in nature – often dealing with just one particular issue or a specific geographical area. The work that they do is often clear from their names – for example, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) or the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). These are issue-based organisations and their members are worldwide. Then there are organisations of states in specific regions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU). These often emulate elements of the European Union, but none (as yet) feature supranational powers. Other organisations are neither geographically limited nor limited to a single issue. The Commonwealth of Nations, for example, is an organisation whose membership is restricted to former colonies of the United Kingdom. Having been around since 1949, the Commonwealth also has its own permanent secretariat. An international governmental organisation that does not have its own fixed secretariat is the BRICS – an intergovernmental organisation of only five countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) focusing on economic and financial issues of interest to its members. The point to remember is that as long as an organisation is composed exclusively of states, or governments (including government agencies), it is an international governmental organisation operating according to international norms.
These international governmental organisations are outside the United Nations but are almost always tied to the UN in some way or another. For some, these ties are explicitly spelled out in the document that establishes them. For others, the simple goal of ensuring that their work is relevant ties them to the United Nations at least tangentially. Take the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for example. The founding statute of the Agency dictates that its reports should go to the United Nations so that the Security Council may take action against any countries that fail to meet their obligations. This works out well for the international community – as the International Atomic Energy Agency monitors the use of nuclear technology while the UN Security Council enforces measures to ensure state compliance over nuclear safety and security. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/06%3A_International_Organizations/6.01%3A_International_Governmental_Organisations.txt |
International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) are non-governmental organisations that either work at the international level or have international members. International non-governmental organisations are a mixed bag, best described as those organisations that are not intergovernmental, business entities or terrorist organisations (Davies 2014, 3). There is no exact figure for the number of international non-governmental organisations that are currently active. The United Nations lists over 4,000 with consultative status – which may only be a fraction of their true number.
Some spectacular and headline-grabbing protests are organised by certain international non-governmental organisations. Images of Greenpeace protestors chaining themselves to ships, or of anti-globalisation protestors blocking streets, are usually well covered in the media. These are the organisations whose mission is to raise awareness among the general public on issues of concern. No less effective are those that carry out their missions away from the limelight. Mercy Corps, for example, helps disaster survivors in countries around the globe, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) is often the first highly skilled responder to a crisis and Oxfam is at the forefront of various poverty eradication programmes around the world. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan termed groups like these the ‘unsung heroes’ of the international community.
Hybrid organisations are those international organisations whose membership comprises both states and civil society members. The states may be represented by government departments or agencies; while civil society, as we have seen earlier, can be just about anyone or any organisation. One such hybrid international organisation is the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), which deals primarily with the preservation of the environment and whose members include government agencies from countries such as Fiji and Spain and non-governmental organisations from all corners of the globe. Individual members are often experts and affiliated to one of the IUCN’s six commissions. The number of hybrid organisations has increased as more and more partnerships are forged between states and civil society. There is now an understanding that hybrid organisations, where governments, non-governmental organisations and multinational corporations all have a say, can be highly effective because of the reach, expertise and funding that such groupings can command.
6.03: How International Organisations Shape Our World
One of the more visible international non-governmental organisations in the world is the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Today, the Red Cross is synonymous with work with victims of humanitarian crises, but before its founding there was no organisation to carry out such work and no guidelines for humanitarian concerns arising out of war and conflict. In 1862, Swiss businessman Henry Dunant published a book describing the aftermath of the 1859 Battle of Solferino, which he had experienced first-hand. He wrote how the soldiers were left wounded on the field with no medical care even after the battle had ended. Dunant managed to organise the local population into providing assistance to the sick and wounded. Many were moved by his account and in 1863 Dunant founded the International Committee of the Red Cross. Dunant’s efforts prompted a push to provide for the care of wounded soldiers and civilians caught in places of conflict. This was the start of the Geneva Conventions, which all UN members have since ratified. The Geneva Conventions form part of the international law that governs humanitarian concerns arising out of war and conflict and stand as testimony of how an international non-governmental organisation (in this case the Red Cross) can start a movement that later develops into international norms and standards.
States were once the judge, jury and executioner of all matters related to the conduct of international affairs. Under the guise of state sovereignty, the state could act with impunity as far as its citizens and lands were concerned. Those days are effectively over as the pressure of outside interests, amplified through international non-governmental organisations, have eroded state impunity. In no other area has there been such a major leap forward than in the development of norms involving international human rights. It also used to be the case that monarchs, presidents, prime ministers and other state leaders held immunity from any kind of criminal prosecution while they were in power. That too, has now changed. The International Criminal Court, which sits in The Hague, now has the jurisdiction to hold individuals responsible for a range of crimes. The United Nations briefly discussed the idea of an international criminal court in the 1950s, but it took the efforts of a coalition of international non-governmental organisations, calling themselves the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, to realise the vision of a world court for heinous crimes. In 1997, the Coalition eventually managed to garner the political will, and within a few short years the Court had been established. Today, approximately two thirds of the world’s states are members and dozens of individuals have been prosecuted for war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity.
There are many success stories of how international organisations, once thought to be the tools of states, have come into their own and set the agenda for the international community. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of environmental preservation. It took the combined efforts of vocal non-governmental organisations and might of the United Nations to bring states together for a watershed conference on the environment in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Often called the Earth Summit, the UN Conference on Environment and Development was revolutionary because it emphasised the collective responsibility of states towards the wellbeing of the earth. Due to the Earth Summit, states signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Convention to Combat Desertification – treaties that became important milestones in the fight to save the environment from the harmful practices of mankind. The momentum the Earth Summit generated still has an impact today as nations continue to work together, albeit often acrimoniously, to combat climate change.
For the average citizen, the most important international organisations might be those whose work can be felt on the ground. The UN Development Programme has been a lifeline for many impoverished nations, helping to raise populations out of absolute poverty, developing programmes to allow the people to be economically sustainable and closing the gender equality gap that exists in many developing nations. In these cases, instead of states contributing to the organisation and keeping it financially afloat, it is sometimes international governmental organisations such as the World Bank that provide the means for the states to pursue development policies that would otherwise not be possible. However, the results of these assistance programmes have been mixed and they are often contentious, as they have sometimes left countries in significant debt or failed to improve their economies.
6.04: Conclusion
Like most other things, international organisations are only as good as the results they yield, but there is no denying that they play a central role in international affairs. Their growth, particularly in the twentieth century when the concept of global governance came of age, means that nearly every aspect of life is regulated in some way at the global level. International organisations, in their vast array of forms, complement and sometimes positively challenge the role of the state. Going back to the airport analogy used at the start of this chapter, we may not always be aware of how international organisations affect even the most mundane things in our lives. But, our lives would be materially different without them. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/06%3A_International_Organizations/6.02%3A_International_Non-Governmental_Organisations_and_Hybrid_International_Organisations.txt |
Patterns of globalisation have challenged the exclusivity of states as actors in international affairs. Globalisation links distant communities and opens up spaces for new social actors. Among the non-state actors benefiting from this change are public-interest-orientated non-governmental actors, often known as civil society groups. Alongside the state, profit-orientated corporate actors (which we will explore in the next chapter) and international governmental organisations (which we explored in the previous chapter), these civil society groups complete the mosaic of actors on the international stage.
The standard definition of civil society identifies it as the space outside of government, family and market. A place in which individuals and collective organisations advance allegedly common interests. Civil society organisations can include community groups, non-governmental organisations, social movements, labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faithbased organisations, media operators, academia, diaspora groups, lobby and consultancy groups, think tanks and research centres, professional associations, and foundations. Political parties and private companies can also be counted as borderline cases. The presence of civil society organisations in international affairs has become increasingly relevant. They have played a role in agenda setting, international law-making and diplomacy. Further, they have been involved in the implementation and monitoring of a number of crucial global issues. These range from trade to development and poverty reduction, from democratic governance to human rights, from peace to the environment, and from security to the information society. Because of these reasons, international relations cannot be fully captured without taking into account the actions of civil society organisations.
Different theoretical perspectives can be used to interpret global civil society. Liberals may understand it as the actor that provides a bottom-up contribution to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the international system as a whole. In essence, it is democracy in action as power is being held to account by the populace. Realists, however, may interpret global civil society as a tool used by the most powerful states to advance their ultimate interests abroad, often promoting and popularising ideas that are key to the national interest. Marxists may see global civil society as political vanguards that can spread a different world view that challenges the dominant order. Finally, some even argue that the concept of civil society as a sphere distinct from the family, state and market remains a Western concept that does not apply easily to societies where the boundaries between these spheres are more blurred. It is useful to keep these various perspectives in mind as you read through the chapter.
07: Global Civil Society
The activism of global civil society groups has been facilitated by a number of specific conditions. First, a number of international organisations have supported the inclusion of civil society actors within international decisionmaking. For example, the 1992 UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro provided a means for previously scattered groups to meet and create common platforms and networks. The European Union has followed a similar approach by integrating different types of civil society organisations within its governance mechanisms. Second, the state’s priorities for the allocation of resources changed in the 1980s and 1990s due to a trend towards the privatisation of industries. In that climate, it was common to see state-owned enterprises (such as utilities) being sold off to private companies. For that reason, in many Western nations, the state’s overall role in public affairs was reduced. In this context, civil society organisations were able to subcontract many functions from the state and take up new roles as service providers. Third, the globalisation process has generated a sense of common purpose among civil society actors. This has been a trigger for internal unification – increasing the sense of solidarity among civil society organisations. It has also united the groups that want to highlight the negative sides of globalisation. Finally, through the internet, groups from different parts of the world have been able to familiarise themselves with other political realities, like-minded organisations, and alternative forms of action. In this way, they have been able to increase their political know-how and their ability to join forces in addressing common targets.
The wider international system itself has offered an environment conducive to the development of these kinds of activities. By forming transnational networks, civil society organisations have used their leverage at the international level to achieve notable results. A transnational network can be defined as a permanent co-ordination between different civil society organisations (and sometimes individuals), located in several countries, collectively focused on a specific global issue. Major past examples are the Jubilee 2000 campaign, which worked through the 1990s to induce creditor governments and the International Monetary Fund to take steps toward debt relief for highly indebted poor countries. Another is the campaign to ban landmines, which led to the intergovernmental conference in Ottawa where the Mine Ban Treaty was signed in 1997. Ongoing campaigns, to mention a few, include mobilisation on environmental justice, gender recognition, LGBT rights and food security.
7.02: Global Civil Society as a Response to Transnational Exclusion
In today’s complex world, traditional institutions have struggled to provide effective and legitimate responses to global issues such as climate change, financial instability, disease epidemics, intercultural violence and global inequalities. As a response to these shortcomings, forms of so-called multilevel, stakeholder governance have been established that involve a combination of public and private actors. Civil society action at the international level is predominantly focused on building political frameworks with embedded democratic accountability. At present, most global governance bodies suffer from accountability deficits – that is, they lack the traditional formal mechanisms of democratic accountability that are found in states, such as popularly elected leaders, parliamentary oversight, and non-partisan courts. Instead, the executive councils of global regulatory bodies are mainly composed of bureaucrats who are far removed from the situations that are directly affected by the decisions they take. People in peripheral geographical areas and in marginalised sections of society are especially deprived of recognition, voice and influence in most contexts of global governance as it is currently practised. An apt depiction of such an international system is to describe it as characterised by ‘transnational exclusion’.
In recent decades most global regulatory bodies have begun to develop closer relations with civil society organisations precisely in order to fill this legitimacy gap. For example, the Committee on World Food Security within the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has reserved seats for different types of organisations, including non-governmental organisations and social movements, research centres, financial institutions, private sector associations and private philanthropic foundations. While the role of civil society organisations in these contexts is predominantly based on a consultative status, they allow the civil society organisations to have a seat at the table.
Given their need to balance a deeper impact on society with greater legitimacy, global governance institutions have been under pressure to be more inclusive and attentive to the political demands coming from below. Thanks to such dynamics, civil society actors have managed to increase their access to international agenda-setting, decision-making, monitoring and implementation in relation to global issues. At the same time, the challenge to the inclusion of civil society actors in global governance mechanisms remains significant. New institutional structures are continually emerging and the challenge in terms of integration is therefore endlessly renewed. New institutional filters are created and civil society actors have to constantly refocus and adapt to new circumstances. An example is provided by the announcement in 2009 that the main economic council of wealthy nations would shift from the G-8 to the G-20 format. The G-20 meets annually and is composed of 19 states plus the European Union. Together its members account for roughly 80 per cent of the world’s trade. In this instance, civil society activists have been lagging behind: activism around the G-8 was intense, but the meetings of the G-20 have only recently attracted a similar level of attention. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/07%3A_Global_Civil_Society/7.01%3A_Conditions_for_Transnational_Activism.txt |
At the core of the dynamics leading to the emergence of transnational activism is the perception of the possibility of change in the area of one specific global issue. This might arise due to a new issue becoming significant or the re-interpretation of a long-standing issue. Ultimately, the key feature of transnational activism in global governance is precisely its stubborn attempt to influence the normative battle on the right and legitimate interpretation of crucial global issues. In this perspective, civil society organisations should be seen not only as traditional problem solvers (providing solutions that governments are less suited to delivering) but also as problem generators (placing new problematic issues on the international agenda). While the perception of an unjust situation necessarily constitutes a precondition for action, it is only when the actor recognises the possibility of having a positive impact on such a situation that mobilisation may start. Two elements are necessary for such mobilisation: conceptualisation and political commitment.
Transnational mobilisation on global issues should be interpreted as the result of several steps. A crucial challenge for any transnational network is to present the issue at stake in such a way that it is perceived as problematic, urgent and also soluble. Think, for instance, of the case of feminism. Through the action of a number of feminist movements, beginning with the suffragettes in the late nineteenth century, the traditional role of women was challenged and eventually replaced by a new egalitarian position entitling women to have equal standing in society. The first step in cross-border mobilisations is therefore the production of knowledge and the creation of ‘frames’ through which the issue at stake can be correctly interpreted.
A second step consists of the external dissemination and strategic use of such knowledge. This is a crucial stage as it is the point at which information acquires a fully public dimension – and therefore political significance. Global public opinion needs to be attracted and its imagination captured for framing the terms of the conflict in such a way that the issue at stake becomes the focus of a general interest requiring public engagement. Dissemination often passes through scientific channels. When networks become active players in the communities of experts on global issues, they tend to be perceived by public opinion as credible sources of information and this increases their influence on policymaking. However, dissemination can also be executed though other forms, including public action such as mass protests.
In order to successfully promote change a third step is necessary. The task here consists in gaining a recognised role in the public sphere as a rightful advocate of general interests. To the question ‘In whose name do you speak?’, transnational networks need to offer a response that enables them to claim representation of interests that are wider than just those of a small group. Once transnational networks succeed in shaping a challenge associated to a particular global issue, the political opportunity for mobilising and network building arises.
Although success necessarily depends on international circumstances, national conditions often play an important role in the rise of global social movements. In national contexts, civil society organisations are rooted in a web of social relations and common identities. They have access to important resources (such as people and money) but operate in highly formalised political systems that shape and constrain their mobilisation and impact through a number of political filters. For instance, while democratic countries tend to leave space for activism, the room for manoeuvre in countries ruled by other kinds of regime may be more limited. At the global level, however, there are few such restrictions. This factor widens the options for political action. In fact, transnational networks may help increase the political opportunities that are present in national contexts; they often perform a facilitating role, providing space for actors who are usually voiceless and excluded. Transnational networks can also amplify local voices by setting them in the context of global issues and policies, thus strengthening local or national activism.
Transnational networks can therefore be understood as organisational responses to the new global socio-political environment in which political opportunities on the one hand and scarce resources (finance, knowledge, etc.) on the other create conditions in which a network structure can perform better than other organisational forms. As this combination is inherently contingent, transnational networks tend to have a limited political life. On the one hand, networks are created in response to a specific issue; it is difficult to adapt them to a different issue and in many cases easier to simply create a new network. On the other hand, social movements and especially networks are cyclical phenomena. The interaction between the set of values shared by social movements and global political opportunities leads to the emergence of different projects of political change, reflecting also the heterogeneity of actors – for instance, balancing reformist with more radical attitudes. Individual networks, therefore, fit a specific set of conditions – internal and external to global movements – but when some of them change, the factors that led to their rise may dissolve, mobilisation may decline rapidly and networks are unlikely to maintain their significance unless they adapt their strategy and at times their own identity to the new political contexts. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/07%3A_Global_Civil_Society/7.03%3A_Values_Promotion_and_Creating_Change.txt |
While it is clear that civil society organisations cannot aim at replacing the traditional channels of political representation, it is recognised that they often play a key role in ‘broadcasting’ viewpoints that struggle to be included in the political agenda. From the activist perspective the issue of political representation should not be interpreted as a matter of who they represent but, rather, what they aim to represent. It is the issues they tackle and the values they seek to uphold that are crucial – possibly more than their constituencies. Civil society organisations usually claim to advance the public interest. While it may not be clear what the public interest is with regard to many global issues, the ambition of civil society is, as argued above, to contribute within the normative battlefield of global public opinion. To explore the issue of legitimacy we can look at the two extremes of the civil society spectrum – the divide between mainstream politics and radical groups. At one extreme there are the civil society organisations established by governments and international organisations. At the other we find civil society organisations that are considered criminal, such as terrorist groups and mafia organisations. These represent the two extremes of co-optation and ostracisation. In other words, they are examples of full integration into and full exclusion from the political system.
For groups closer to the mainstream of politics, or those groups seeking to enter the mainstream, there is always the risk of co-optation by the institutional system. Civil society organisations need financial resources, public recognition and political support – all of which can be provided or facilitated by the political system. At the same time, the political system may take advantage of the fragmentation and proliferation of civil society organisations by picking and choosing, on the basis of political convenience, the groups most inclined to cooperate with the current political agenda. In this way, there is a danger that some civil society organisations may find themselves used instrumentally to facilitate top-down representation of specific interests. On the other hand, issues of violence and resistance to political systems are always controversial, depending as they do on political interpretation. To borrow an old phrase, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Those who take an oppositional stand to the status quo and agitate for material changes have often been criminalised and/or politically marginalised. We should always remember that the term ‘civil’ is normatively loaded and tends to be interpreted in line with the predominant ideology. For this reason, history is at times ironic: prominent political leaders such as South African president Nelson Mandela and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat were long considered to be leaders of criminal groups, perhaps even terrorists, and yet in due course they were both awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
7.05: The Case of the Moratorium on the Death Penalty
The goal of abolishing the death penalty is a key aspiration of human rights activism. It is a contemporary example of how initiatives backed by civil society organisations can have lasting impact. While the topic of the death penalty has been debated for centuries, it is only in recent decades that significant institutional changes have occurred, with a number of countries removing capital punishment from their legal systems. The anti-death penalty stance only managed to gain importance at the United Nations level due to the specific transnational mobilisation of civil society organisations. While earlier activism contributed to creating the right political context at the national level, it was the campaign for a moratorium on the death penalty that specifically targeted the United Nations. This ultimately led to a significant UN General Assembly resolution in 2007 that was reconfirmed several times in subsequent years. In themselves, the resolutions and the changed attitude of a number of states are remarkable achievements in terms of human rights promotion, even if the death penalty still remains in some states.
The campaign developed through a multi-stage process of normative promotion. It began in a specific place – Italy. It then became stronger by ‘going transnational’ via civil society organisations networking together and sharing resources and ideas. The campaign then returned to the national domains so that key target states could be persuaded to back it. Finally, the campaign targeted the United Nations, where it successfully achieved the backing of the General Assembly. The dynamics of the process cannot be fully captured without making clear the part played by tactics of persuasion. Humanitarian diplomacy developed by civil society organisations through persuasion activities remains key. In this case the undertaking featured two main components. First, the idea of the right to life was communicated persuasively as a desirable outcome – something that attached well to several already popular international agendas. Second, an empathic process was generated by using powerful narratives drawn from individual cases. These were mainly stories told by people previously sentenced to death and now pardoned, or moving accounts by their relatives. In both cases, civil society organisations played a central role as either reason-based frame creators or emotion-based narrative disseminators. They played an important role as an alternative and/or adjunct to diplomatic politics and achieved a clear and lasting impact at the international level.
7.06: Conclusion
Over recent decades, civil society activities have been responsible for a number of important contributions. While this is still far from a decisive move towards a comprehensive democratisation of world politics, the incremental steps should not be underestimated. At least two kinds of impact can be identified. In the first instance, civil society organisations have managed to influence political decision-makers by giving voice to the voiceless and framing new issues. At the same time they have managed to pressurise global governance institutions so that today the overall level of transparency, consultation, outside evaluation and efficiency is measurably higher than it was in the past. Such results cannot be attributed solely to civil society, but they have been achieved in part by civil mobilisations.
Nevertheless, we need to acknowledge that in absolute terms the impact has been modest and uneven (see Scholte 2011). Most transnational activism has come from Western organisations, with significant exceptions in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Other parts of the world are still socially disconnected. Russia, China, most of Africa and the Arab world constitute islands which remain relatively isolated from the general growth of transnational civil society. And just as civil society organisations are unevenly concentrated in the Global North, the political results they have achieved also exhibit geopolitical imbalance. The gains realised by political activism have mostly been in line with agendas framed in northern states and benefitting northern constituencies. However, this is unlikely to continue as agendas arise from the developing world and international Western power and influence gradually declines. In such a climate, Western civil society organisations will have to share the stage with civil society organisations coming from the developing world. This will not always be easy, but it will hopefully make the future global civil society more genuinely ‘global’. | textbooks/socialsci/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/07%3A_Global_Civil_Society/7.04%3A_Contested_Legitimacy.txt |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.