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Justice O'Connor | 2,001 | 14 | dissenting | Atwater v. Lago Vista | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620702/atwater-v-lago-vista/ | "able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion" of a full custodial arrest. 2 U. S., at 21. The majority insists that a bright-line rule focused on probable cause is necessary to vindicate the State's interest in easily administrable law enforcement rules. See ante, at 347-351. Probable cause itself, however, is not a model of precision. "The quantum of information which constitutes probable causeevidence which would `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that a [crime] has been committedmust be measured by the facts of the particular case." Wong Sun v. United 3 U.S. 4, 47 (163) The rule I proposewhich merely requires a legitimate reason for the decision to escalate the seizure into a full custodial arrestthus does not undermine an otherwise "clear and simple" rule. Cf. ante, at 347. While clarity is certainly a value worthy of consideration in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it by no means trumps the values of liberty and privacy at the heart of the Amendment's protections. What the Terry rule lacks in precision it makes up for in fidelity to the Fourth Amendment's command of reasonableness and sensitivity to the competing values protected by that Amendment. Over the past 30 years, it appears that the Terry rule has been workable and easily applied by officers on the street. At bottom, the majority offers two related reasons why a bright-line rule is necessary: the fear that officers who arrest for fine-only offenses will be subject to "personal [42 U.S. C.] *367 183 liability for the misapplication of a constitutional standard," ante, at 350, and the resulting "systematic disincentive to arrest where arresting would serve an important societal interest," ante, at 351. These concerns are certainly valid, but they are more than adequately resolved by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity was created to shield government officials from civil liability for the performance of discretionary functions so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See (182). This doctrine is "the best attainable accommodation of competing values," namely, the obligation to enforce constitutional guarantees and the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion. 14. In (187), we made clear that the standard of reasonableness for a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is distinct from the standard of reasonableness for qualified immunity purposes. If a law enforcement officer "reasonably but mistakenly conclude[s]" that the constitutional predicate for a search or |
Justice O'Connor | 2,001 | 14 | dissenting | Atwater v. Lago Vista | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620702/atwater-v-lago-vista/ | mistakenly conclude[s]" that the constitutional predicate for a search or seizure is present, he "should not be held personally liable." This doctrine thus allays any concerns about liability or disincentives to arrest. If, for example, an officer reasonably thinks that a suspect poses a flight risk or might be a danger to the community if released, cf. ante, at 351, he may arrest without fear of the legal consequences. Similarly, if an officer reasonably concludes that a suspect may possess more than four ounces of marijuana and thus might be guilty of a felony, cf. ante, at 348-34, and n. 1, 351, the officer will be insulated from liability for arresting the suspect even if the initial assessment turns out to be factually incorrect. As we have said, "officials will not be liable for mere mistakes in judgment." (178). Of course, even the specter of liability can entail substantial social costs, such as inhibiting public officials in the discharge of their duties. See, e. g., 14. We may not ignore the central command of the Fourth Amendment, however, to avoid these costs. II The record in this case makes it abundantly clear that Ms. Atwater's arrest was constitutionally unreasonable. Atwater readily admitsas she did when Officer Turek pulled her overthat she violated Texas' seatbelt law. Brief for Petitioners 2-3; Record 381, 384. While Turek was justified in stopping Atwater, see 517 U. S., 1, neither law nor reason supports his decision to arrest her instead of simply giving her a citation. The officer's actions cannot sensibly be viewed as a permissible means of balancing Atwater's Fourth Amendment interests with the State's own legitimate interests. There is no question that Officer Turek's actions severely infringed Atwater's liberty and privacy. Turek was loud and accusatory from the moment he approached Atwater's car. Atwater's young children were terrified and hysterical. Yet when Atwater asked Turek to lower his voice because he was scaring the children, he responded by jabbing his finger in Atwater's face and saying, "You're going to jail." Record 382, 384. Having made the decision to arrest, Turek did not inform Atwater of her right to remain silent. at 0, 704. He instead asked for her license and insurance information. But cf. (166). Atwater asked if she could at least take her children to a friend's house down the street before going to the police station. Record 384. But Turekwho had just castigated Atwater for not caring for her childrenrefused and said he would take the children into custody as well. Only the intervention of neighborhood *36 children who had witnessed |
Justice O'Connor | 2,001 | 14 | dissenting | Atwater v. Lago Vista | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620702/atwater-v-lago-vista/ | Only the intervention of neighborhood *36 children who had witnessed the scene and summoned one of Atwater's friends saved the children from being hauled to jail with their mother. 385-386. With the children gone, Officer Turek handcuffed Ms. Atwater with her hands behind her back, placed her in the police car, and drove her to the police station. Ironically, Turek did not secure Atwater in a seatbelt for the drive. At the station, Atwater was forced to remove her shoes, relinquish her possessions, and wait in a holding cell for about an hour. A judge finally informed Atwater of her rights and the charges against her, and released her when she posted bond. Atwater returned to the scene of the arrest, only to find that her car had been towed. at 38. Ms. Atwater ultimately pleaded no contest to violating the seatbelt law and was fined $50. Even though that fine was the maximum penalty for her crime, Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 545.4(d) (1), and even though Officer Turek has never articulated any justification for his actions, the city contends that arresting Atwater was constitutionally reasonable because it advanced two legitimate interests: "the enforcement of child safety laws and encouraging [Atwater] to appear for trial." Brief for Respondents 15. It is difficult to see how arresting Atwater served either of these goals any more effectively than the issuance of a citation. With respect to the goal of law enforcement generally, Atwater did not pose a great danger to the community. She had been driving very slowlyapproximately 15 miles per hourin broad daylight on a residential street that had no other traffic. Record 380. Nor was she a repeat offender; until that day, she had received one traffic citation in her lifea ticket, more than 10 years earlier, for failure to signal a lane change. Although Officer Turek had stopped Atwater approximately three months earlier because he thought that Atwater's son was not wearing a seatbelt, Turek had been mistaken, at 37, 703. *370 Moreover, Atwater immediately accepted responsibility and apologized for her conduct. Thus, there was every indication that Atwater would have buckled herself and her children in had she been cited and allowed to leave. With respect to the related goal of child welfare, the decision to arrest Atwater was nothing short of counterproductive. Atwater's children witnessed Officer Turek yell at their mother and threaten to take them all into custody. Ultimately, they were forced to leave her behind with Turek, knowing that she was being taken to jail. Understandably, the 3-year-old boy was "very, very, very traumatized." at |
Justice O'Connor | 2,001 | 14 | dissenting | Atwater v. Lago Vista | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620702/atwater-v-lago-vista/ | Understandably, the 3-year-old boy was "very, very, very traumatized." at 3. After the incident, he had to see a child psychologist regularly, who reported that the boy "felt very guilty that he couldn't stop this horrible thing he was powerless to help his mother or sister." at 6. Both of Atwater's children are now terrified at the sight of any police car. at 3, 5. According to Atwater, the arrest "just never leaves us. It's a conversation we have every other day, once a week, and it'sit raises its head constantly in our lives." at 5. Citing Atwater surely would have served the children's interests well. It would have taught Atwater to ensure that her children were buckled up in the future. It also would have taught the children an important lesson in accepting responsibility and obeying the law. Arresting Atwater, though, taught the children an entirely different lesson: that "the bad person could just as easily be the policeman as it could be the most horrible person they could imagine." Respondents also contend that the arrest was necessary to ensure Atwater's appearance in court. Atwater, however, was far from a flight risk. A 16-year resident of Lago Vista, population 2,486, Atwater was not likely to abscond. See Record 376; Texas State Data Center, 17 Total Population Estimates for Texas Places 15 Although she *3 was unable to produce her driver's license because it had been stolen, she gave Officer Turek her license number and address. Record 386. In addition, Officer Turek knew from their previous encounter that Atwater was a local resident. The city's justifications fall far short of rationalizing the extraordinary intrusion on Gail Atwater and her children. Measuring "the degree to which [Atwater's custodial arrest was] needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests," against "the degree to which it intrud[ed] upon [her] privacy," 526 U. S., it can hardly be doubted that Turek's actions were disproportionate to Atwater's crime. The majority's assessment that "Atwater's claim to live free of pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it specific to her case," ante, at 347, is quite correct. In my view, the Fourth Amendment inquiry ends there. III The Court's error, however, does not merely affect the disposition of this case. The per se rule that the Court creates has potentially serious consequences for the everyday lives of Americans. A broad range of conduct falls into the category of fine-only misdemeanors. In Texas alone, for example, disobeying any sort of traffic warning sign is a misdemeanor punishable only by fine, see Tex. |
Justice O'Connor | 2,001 | 14 | dissenting | Atwater v. Lago Vista | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620702/atwater-v-lago-vista/ | sign is a misdemeanor punishable only by fine, see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 472.022 (1 and Supp. 2000-2001), as is failing to pay a highway toll, see 284.070, and driving with expired license plates, see 502.407. Nor are fine-only crimes limited to the traffic context. In several for example, littering is a criminal offense punishable only by fine. See, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann.7 (West 1); Ga. Code Ann. 16 7-43 ; Iowa Code 321.36, 805.8(2)(af) (Supp. 2001). To be sure, such laws are valid and wise exercises of the ' power to protect the public health and welfare. My concern lies not with the decision to enact or enforce these *372 laws, but rather with the manner in which they may be enforced. Under today's holding, when a police officer has probable cause to believe that a fine-only misdemeanor offense has occurred, that officer may stop the suspect, issue a citation, and let the person continue on her way. Cf. 517 U. S., 06. Or, if a traffic violation, the officer may stop the car, arrest the driver, see ante, at 354, search the driver, see United search the entire passenger compartment of the car including any purse or package inside, see New v. and impound the car and inventory all of its contents, see 47 U.S. 367, (187); 45 U.S. 1, (10). Although the Fourth Amendment expressly requires that the latter course be a reasonable and proportional response to the circumstances of the offense, the majority gives officers unfettered discretion to choose that course without articulating a single reason why such action is appropriate. Such unbounded discretion carries with it grave potential for abuse. The majority takes comfort in the lack of evidence of "an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests." Ante, at 353, and n. 25. But the relatively small number of published cases dealing with such arrests proves little and should provide little solace. Indeed, as the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual. After today, the arsenal available to any officer extends to a full arrest and the searches permissible concomitant to that arrest. An officer's subjective motivations for making a traffic stop are not relevant considerations in determining the reasonableness of the stop. See But it is precisely because these motivations are beyond our purview that we must vigilantly ensure that officers' poststop actionswhich are properly within our reachcomport with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of reasonableness. *373 * * * The Court neglects the Fourth |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | dissenting | Davis v. Passman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110097/davis-v-passman/ | I dissent because, for me, the case presents very grave questions of separation of powers, rather than Speech or Debate Clause issues, although the two have certain common roots. Congress could, of course, make Bivens-type remedies available to its staff employeesand to other congressional employees but it has not done so. On the contrary, Congress has historically treated its employees differently from the arrangements for other Government employees. Historically, staffs of Members have been considered so intimately a part of the policymaking and political process that they are not subject to being selected, compensated, or tenured as others who serve the Government. The vulnerability of employment on congressional staffs derives not only from the hazards of elections but also from the imperative need for loyalty, confidentiality, and political compatibilitynot simply to a political party, an institution, or an administration, but to the individual Member. A Member of Congress has a right to expect that every person on his or her staff will give total loyalty to the political positions of the Member, total confidentiality, and total support. This may, on occasion, lead a Member to employ a *250 particular person on a racial, ethnic, religious, or gender basis thought to be acceptable to the constituency represented, even though in other branches of Governmentor in the private sectorsuch selection factors might be prohibited. This might lead a Member to decide that a particular staff position should be filled by a Catholic or a Presbyterian or a Mormon, a Mexican-American or an Oriental-Americanor a woman rather than a man. Presidents consciously select and dispense withtheir appointees on this basis and have done so since the beginning of the Republic. The very commission of a Presidential appointee defines the tenure as "during the pleasure of the President." Although Congress altered the ancient "spoils system" as to the Executive Branch and prescribed standards for some limited segments of the Judicial Branch, it has allowed its own Members, Presidents, and Judges to select their personal staffs without limit or restraintin practical effect their tenure is "during the pleasure" of the Member. At this level of Governmentstaff assistants of Members long-accepted concepts of separation of powers dictate, for me, that until Congress legislates otherwise as to employment standards for its own staffs, judicial power in this area is circumscribed. The Court today encroaches on that barrier. Cf. Sinking-Fund Cases, In relation to his or her constituents, and in the performance of constitutionally defined functions, each Member of the House or Senate occupies a position in the Legislative Branch comparable to that of the President in the |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | Two Terms ago, this Court unanimously agreed that Congress could not pass a law directing that, in the hypo- thetical pending case of Smith v. Jones, “Smith wins.” Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S. n. 17 (slip op., at 13, n. 17). Today, the plurality refuses to enforce even that limited principle in the face of a very real statute that dictates the disposition of a single pend- ing case. Contrary to the plurality, I would not cede un- qualified authority to the Legislature to decide the out- come of such a case. Article III of the Constitution vests that responsibility in the Judiciary alone. I A Article III, of the Constitution confers the “judicial Power of the United States” on “one supreme Court” and such “inferior Courts” as Congress might establish. That provision, our cases have recognized, is an “inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and bal- ances,” which sets aside for the Judiciary the authority to decide cases and controversies according to law. Northern Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (plurality opinion). “Under the basic concept 2 PATCHAK v. ZINKE ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting of separation of powers,” the judicial power to interpret and apply the law “can no more be shared with another branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto.” (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). The Framers’ decision to establish a judiciary “truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive,” The Federalist No. 78, p. 466 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamil- ton), was born of their experience with legislatures “ex- tending the sphere of [their] activity and drawing all power into [their] impetuous vortex,” No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison). Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, colo- nial legislatures routinely functioned as courts of equity, “grant[ing] exemptions from standing law, prescrib[ing] the law to be applied to particular controversies, and even decid[ing] the merits of cases.” Manning, Response, Deriv- ing Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitu- tion, In Virginia, for instance, Thomas Jefferson lamented that the assem- bly had, “in many instances, decided rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy.” Notes on the State of Virginia 120 (W. Peden ed. 1982). And in Penn- sylvania, the Council of Censors—a body charged with ensuring compliance with the state constitution— denounced the state assembly’s practice of “extending their deliberations to the cases of individuals” in order to ease the “hardships which will always |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | individuals” in order to ease the “hardships which will always arise from the operation of general laws.” Report of the Committee of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors 38, 43 (F. Bailey ed. 1784). “[T]here is reason to think,” the Censors reported, “that favour and partiality have, from the nature of public bodies of men, predominated in the distribution of this relief.” Given the “disarray” produced by this “system of legisla- Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 3 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting tive equity,” the Framers resolved to take the innovative step of creating an independent judiciary. They recog- nized that such a structural limitation on the power of the legislative and executive branches was necessary to secure individual freedom. As James Madison put it, “[w]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary con- trol.” The Federalist No. 47, at 303 (citing 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws). The Constitution’s division of power thus reflects the “concern that a legislature should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person.” INS v. (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). The Framers protected against that threat, both in “specific provisions, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause,” and in the “general allocation” of the judicial power to the Judiciary alone. As Chief Justice Mar- shall wrote, the Constitution created a straightforward distribution of authority: The Legislature wields the power “to prescribe general rules for the government of society,” but “the application of those rules to individuals in soci- ety” is the “duty” of the Judiciary. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136 (1810). Article III, in other words, sets out not only what the Judiciary can do, but also what Con- gress cannot. Congress violates this arrangement when it arrogates the judicial power to itself and decides a particular case. We first enforced that rule in United States v. 13 Wall. 128 (1872), when the Radical Republican Congress passed a law targeting suits by pardoned Confederates. Although this Court had held that a pardon was proof of loyalty and entitled claimants to damages for property seized by the Union, see United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall. 531, 543 (1870), Congress sought to block Confeder- ate supporters from receiving such compensation. It 4 PATCHAK v. ZINKE ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting therefore enacted a statute barring rebels from using a pardon as evidence of loyalty, instead requiring the courts to dismiss for want of jurisdiction any suit based on a pardon. This Court declared the law unconstitutional. Congress, in |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | a pardon. This Court declared the law unconstitutional. Congress, in addition to impairing the President’s pardon power, had “prescribe[d] rules of decision to the Judicial Department in cases pending before it.” 13 Wall., at 146. The Court accordingly held that the statute “passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power.” We have frequently reiterated this basic premise of the separation of powers. In (1944), the Court recognized that “changing the rules of decision for the determination of a pending case” would impermissibly interfere with judicial independence, but held that such concerns were absent when Congress con- sented to a claims settlement pursuant to its broad power “to provide for the payment of debts.” ; see 462 U.S., 66, n. 9 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (“When Congress grants particular individuals relief or benefits under its spending power, the danger of oppressive action that the separation of powers was de- signed to avoid is not implicated.”). As we also explained in United (1980), because Congress has “no judicial powers” to ren- der judgment “directly,” it likewise cannot do so indirectly, by “direct[ing] a court to find a judgment in a certain way.” That sort of legislative intervention constitutes an exercise of the judicial power, leaving “the court no adjudi- catory function to perform.” Most recently, we reaffirmed the fundamental proposition that “Congress could not enact a statute directing that, in ‘Smith v. Jones,’ ‘Smith wins.’ ” Bank Markazi, 578 U. S., at n. 17 (slip op., at 13, n. 17). Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 5 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting B As the plurality acknowledges, ante, at 14, the facts of this case are stark. The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (Band) sought land on which to build a casino. The Band identified a 147-acre tract of land in rural southwestern Michigan (called the Bradley Property), and in 2005 the Secretary of the Interior an- nounced a final decision to take the property into trust on behalf of the Band. See (2005). Fearing an “irreversibl[e] change [to] the rural character of the area,” David Patchak, a neighboring landowner, filed a lawsuit challenging the transfer. The suit alleged that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to take the Brad- ley Property into trust. The Secretary asserted several grounds for dismissing the case, but this Court ultimately granted review and determined that “Patchak’s suit may proceed.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Potta- watomi (Patchak I ). Following remand, while summary judgment briefing was underway in the District Court, the Band persuaded Congress to enact a standalone statute, the Gun Lake Trust Land |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | to enact a standalone statute, the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (Gun Lake Act), to termi- nate the suit. Pub. L. 113–179, Section 2(a) of the Act provides that the land “described in 70 Fed. Reg. 25596”—the Bradley Property—“is reaffirmed as trust land, and the actions of the Secretary of the Interior in taking that land into trust are ratified and confirmed.” Then Congress went further. In it provided: “NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including an action pending in a Fed- eral court as of the date of enactment of this Act) re- lating to the land described in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be 6 PATCHAK v. ZINKE ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting promptly dismissed.” When Congress passed the Act in 2014, no other suits relating to the Bradley Property were pending, and the six-year statute of limitations on challenges to the Secre- tary’s action under the Administrative Procedure Act had expired. See 28 U.S. C. The Committees that recommended the legislation affirmed that the statute would make no “changes in existing [Indian] law.” H. R. Rep. No. 113–590, p. 5 (2014); S. Rep. No. 113–194, p. 4 (2014). Recognizing that the “clear intent” of Congress was “to moot this litigation,” the District Court dismissed Patchak’s case against the Secretary. The D. C. Circuit affirmed, also based on the “plain” directive of 828 F.3d, at 1001. II Congress has previously approached the boundary between legislative and judicial power, but it has never gone so far as to target a single party for adverse treat- ment and direct the precise disposition of his pending case. Section 2(b)—remarkably—does just that. The plurality cites a smattering of “narrow statutes” that this Court has previously upheld. Ante, at 14. Yet none is as brazen as either in terms of dictating a particular outcome or in singling out a particular party. Indeed, the bulk of those cases involved statutes that prospectively governed an open-ended class of disputes and left the courts to apply any new legal standard in the first instance. In for example, we addressed an enactment that permanently altered the legal status of a public bridge going forward by reclassifying it as a postal road. That provision, we later said, did not prescribe an “arbitrary rule of decision” but instead “left [the court] to Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 7 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting apply its ordinary rules” to determine whether the redes- ignation of the structure meant that it was an obstruction of interstate commerce. –147. And |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | that it was an obstruction of interstate commerce. –147. And in the statute at issue made reference to specific cases only as a shorthand for identifying preexisting environmental law requirements. The statute applied gener- ally—“replac[ing] the legal standards” for timber harvest- ing across 13 national forests—and explicitly reserved for judicial determination whether pending and future timber sales complied with the new standards. Even Bank Markazi, which disclaimed a number of limits on Congress’s authority to intervene in ongoing litigation, did not suggest that Congress could dictate the result in a pending case. There, Congress inserted itself into a long-running dispute over whether terrorist victims could satisfy their judgments against Iran’s central bank, enacting a statute that eliminated certain legal impedi- ments to obtaining the bank’s assets. We upheld the law because it “establish[ed] new substantive standards” and entrusted “application of those standards” to the court. 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 18). But the Court in Bank Markazi did not have before it anything like which prevents the court from apply- ing any new legal standards and explicitly dictates the dismissal of a pending proceeding. The Court instead stressed that the judicial findings contemplated by the statute in Bank Markazi left “plenty” for the court “to adjudicate” before ruling that the bank was liable. at n. 20 (slip op., at 17, n. 20). The law, for instance, did not define the terms “beneficial interest” and “equitable title.” The District Court needed to resolve the scope of those phrases. Nor did it decide whether the assets were owned by the bank. That issue was also assigned to the court. And lastly, the statute did not settle whether the assets were held in New York or Luxembourg. The court 8 PATCHAK v. ZINKE ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting had to sort that out too. See ibid.1 Section 2(b) goes much further than the statute in Bank Markazi by disposing of the case outright, wresting any adjudicative responsibility from the courts. For all of the plurality’s discussion of the Federalist Papers and “exclusive” judicial power, ante, at 5, it is idle to suggest that preserves any role for the court beyond that of stenographer. In addition, the Court in Bank Markazi repeatedly emphasized that the law was not a “one-case-only regime.” 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 1). The law instead governed a category of postjudgment execution claims filed by over a thousand plaintiffs who, in 16 different actions, had ob- tained judgments against Iran in excess of $1.75 billion— facts suggesting more generality than is true of many Acts of Congress. |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | more generality than is true of many Acts of Congress. By contrast, targets a single pending case. Al- though the formal language of the provision—reaching any action “relating to” the Bradley Property—could theoreti- cally suggest a broader application, its practical operation unequivocally confirms that it concerns solely Patchak’s suit. See Commodity Futures Trading (explaining that the Court “re- view[s] Article III challenges with an eye to the practi- cal effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary”). In an effort to identify a set of disputes to which might apply, the plurality asserts that the provision extends to any action relating to the trust status of the property. Ante, at 15. Yet as the D. C. Circuit recognized, no other cases were pending when the provision was enacted; affected “only Patchak’s lawsuit.” —————— 1 Not every Member of the Court thought these responsibilities ade- quate under Article III, see Bank Markazi, 578 U. S., at – (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (slip op., at 12–13), but all save two did, and that’s a comfortable enough margin to establish the point. Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 9 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting And as the Band concedes, no additional suits challenging the transfer could have been filed under the APA—or any other statute of which we are aware—due to the expira- tion of the statute of limitations. Brief for Respondent Band 6. The plurality thus is simply incorrect when it asserts that the Act applies to a broad “class of cases.” Ante, at 8, 15. What are those cases? This is not a question of probing Congress’s “unex- pressed motives.” Ante, at 15. The text and operation of the provision instead make clear that the range of poten- tial applications is a class of one. Congress, in crafting a law tailored to Patchak’s suit, has pronounced the equiva- lent of “Smith wins.” III The plurality refuses to “jealously guard[ ]” against such a basic intrusion on judicial independence. Northern It instead focuses on general tenets of jurisdiction stripping. In its view, falls comfortably within Congress’s power to regulate the juris- diction of the federal courts, and accordingly does not constitute an exercise of judicial power. But nothing in specifies that the statute is juris- dictional. That has special significance: To rein in “profli- gate use of the term ‘jurisdiction,’ ” this Court in recent cases has adopted a “bright line” rule treating statutory limitations as nonjurisdictional unless Congress “clearly states” otherwise. ; The Gun Lake Act does not clearly state that it imposes a |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | Lake Act does not clearly state that it imposes a jurisdictional restriction— the term is not mentioned anywhere in the title, headings, or text of the Act. Indeed, we have previously found that nearly identical statutory language “says nothing about whether a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Reed Elsevier, 10 PATCHAK v. ZINKE ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting Compare 17 U.S. C. the statute in Reed Elsevier (“no civil action shall be instituted”), with (“an action shall not be filed or maintained”).2 And since the Gun Lake Act was passed well after our series of cases setting forth a clear statement rule, we may “presume” that Congress was conscious of that obligation when it drafted United (1997). After stretching to read as jurisdictional, the plu- rality dedicates considerable effort to defending Congress’s broad authority over the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Ante, at 7–10. That background principle is undoubtedly correct—and undoubtedly irrelevant for the purposes of evaluating For while the greater power to create inferior federal courts generally includes the power to strip those courts of jurisdiction, at a certain point that lesser exercise of authority invades the judicial function. “Congress has the power (within limits) to tell the courts what classes of cases they may decide, but not to prescribe or superintend how they decide those cases.” Arlington v. FCC, (majority opinion of Scalia, J.) (emphasis added; citations omitted). In other words, Congress cannot, under the guise of altering federal juris- diction, dictate the result of a pending proceeding. after all, drew precisely the same distinction when it considered the provision stripping jurisdiction —————— 2 The plurality suggests an analogy to Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 which addressed in passing the familiar hurdle in habeas proceedings that “an appeal may not be taken” unless a judge issues a “certificate of appealability.” and appears alongside other provisions that speak in “clear jurisdictional language,” Gonzalez, 565 U.S., at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nothing similar is at issue here. Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 11 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting over any suit based on a pardon. Chief Justice Chase’s opinion for the Court explained that if the statute had “simply” removed jurisdiction over “a particular class of cases,” it would be regarded as “an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power.” 13 Wall., at 145, 146. But because the withdrawal of jurisdiction was a “means to an end,” founded “solely on the application of a rule of decision,” the Court held that the law violated the separation of powers. ; |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | held that the law violated the separation of powers. ; see R. Fallon, J. Manning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 324 (recog- nizing that “not every congressional attempt to influence the outcome of cases, even if phrased in jurisdictional language, can be justified as a valid exercise of a power over jurisdiction”). Contrary to the plurality, I would hold that Congress exercises the judicial power when it manipulates jurisdic- tional rules to decide the outcome of a particular pending case. Because the Legislature has no authority to direct entry of judgment for a party, it cannot achieve the same result by stripping jurisdiction over a particular proceed- ing. Does the plurality really believe that there is a mate- rial difference between a law stating “The court lacks jurisdiction over Jones’s pending suit against Smith” and one stating “In the case of Smith v. Jones, Smith wins”? In both instances, Congress has resolved the specific case in Smith’s favor. Over and over, the plurality intones that does not impinge on the judicial power because the provision “changes the law.” See ante, at 6–7, 10–14. But all that does is deprive the court of jurisdiction in a single proceeding. If that is sufficient to change the law, the plurality’s rule “provides no limiting principle” on Con- gress’s ability to assume the role of judge and decide the outcome of pending cases. Northern 458 U.S., at 12 PATCHAK v. ZINKE ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 73. In my view, the concept of “changing the law” must imply some measure of generality or preservation of an adjudicative role for the courts. The weight of our juris- diction stripping precedent bears this out. Almost all of the examples the plurality cites, see ante, at 10, 13, con- templated the wholesale repeal of a generally applicable jurisdictional provision. See Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916) (“The [provision] applies with the same force to all cases and was embodied in a statute that no doubt was intended to apply to all.”); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245 (1845); see also ; The Court, to date, has never sustained a law that withdraws jurisdiction over a particular lawsuit. The closest analogue is of course Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869), which the plurality nonchalantly cites as one of its leading authorities. McCardle arose amid a pitched national debate over Reconstruction of the former Confederacy. William McCardle, an unreconstructed newspaper editor, was being held in military custody for inciting insurrection. After unsuccessfully applying for federal habeas |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | custody for inciting insurrection. After unsuccessfully applying for federal habeas relief in the circuit court, McCardle ap- pealed to the Supreme Court, raising a broad challenge to the constitutionality of Reconstruction. The Court heard argument on his habeas appeal over the course of four days in March 1868. Before the Court could render its decision, however, the Radical Republican Congress— in an acknowledged effort to sweep the case from the docket—enacted a statute withdrawing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 239–241 (1973). The Court unanimously dismissed McCardle’s appeal. In a brief opinion, Chief Justice Chase sidestepped any Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 13 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting consideration of Congress’s attempt to preclude a decision in the case. Faced with a “plain[ ] instance of positive exception,” the Court held that it lacked power to review McCardle’s The Court’s decision in McCardle has been alternatively described as “caving to the political dominance” of the Radical Republicans or “acceding to Congress’s effort to silence the Court.” Meltzer, The Story of Ex parte McCardle, in Federal Courts Stories 73 Read for all it is worth, the decision is also inconsistent with the approach the Court took just three years later in where Chief Justice Chase (a dominant character in this drama) stressed that “[i]t is of vital importance” that the legislative and judicial powers “be kept distinct.” 13 Wall., The facts of McCardle, however, can support a more limited understanding of Congress’s power to divest the courts of jurisdiction. For starters, the repealer provision covered more than a single pending dispute; it applied to a class of cases, barring anyone from invoking the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases for the next two decades. In addition, the Court’s decision did not foreclose all avenues for judicial review of McCardle’s complaint. As Chase made clear in the penultimate para- graph of the opinion—and confirmed later that year in his opinion for the Court in Ex parte Yerger, (1869)—the statute did not deny “the whole appellate power of the Court.” McCardle, by taking a different procedural route and filing an original habeas action, could have had his case heard on the merits.3 —————— 3 The plurality surmises that McCardle reserved an alternative ave- nue for relief in response to a perceived problem under the Suspension Clause. Ante, n. 4. But regardless of the basis for that reserva- tion, our point is simply that, in sustaining a jurisdictional repeal that leaves a claimant without any prospect for relief, the plurality goes beyond |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | claimant without any prospect for relief, the plurality goes beyond what the Court in McCardle upheld. 14 PATCHAK v. ZINKE ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting Section 2(b), on the other hand, has neither saving grace. It ends Patchak’s suit for good. His federal case is dismissed, and he has no alternative means of review anywhere else. See 25 U.S. C. 322(a) (providing that state courts, absent the consent of the tribe, may not exercise civil jurisdiction over trust land). Section 2(b) thus reaches further than the typical jurisdictional repeal, which “takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case,” Landgraf, 511 U.S., at Because singles out Patchak’s suit, specifies how it must be resolved, and deprives him of any judicial forum for his claim, the decision to uphold that provision surpasses even McCardle as the highwater mark of legislative encroachment on Article III. Indeed, although the stakes of this particular dispute may seem insignificant, the principle that the plurality would enshrine is of historic consequence. In no uncertain terms, the plurality disavows any limitations on Con- gress’s power to determine judicial results, conferring on the Legislature a colonial-era authority to pick winners and losers in pending litigation as it pleases. The Court in Bank Markazi said it was holding the line against this sort of legislative usurpation. See 578 U. S., at –, and n. 17, (slip op., at 12–13, and n. 17, 18). The plurality would yield even that last ditch. IV While the plurality reaches to read the Gun Lake Act as stripping jurisdiction, JUSTICE GINSBURG’s concurrence, joined by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, strains further to construe as restoring the Government’s sovereign immunity from suit. To reinstate sovereign immunity after it has been waived, Congress must express “an unambiguous intention to withdraw” a remedy. Congress has not made that showing here. Section 2(b)—which provides that “an Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 15 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting action relating to the [Bradley Property] shall be promptly dismissed”—bears none of the unmistakable hallmarks of a provision withdrawing the sovereign’s consent to suit. The concurrence first relies on a hunch, based on the Court’s earlier determination that Patchak’s suit was not barred by sovereign immunity. See Patchak I, 567 U.S., at 224. But hunches do not make for an unambiguous expression of intent. Nor, of course, does one lone refer- ence to “immunity” in the legislative history. United (“[T]he ‘unequivocal expression’ of elimination of sovereign immunity that we insist upon cannot be supplied by a committee report.”). Saving the text for last, the concurrence fails to |
Justice Roberts | 2,018 | 0 | dissenting | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | report.”). Saving the text for last, the concurrence fails to identify a single instance where the Court has treated a statute that does not mention “immunity,” “consent to be sued,” or even the “United States” as restoring sovereign immunity. The only basis for its interpretation is the purported simi- larity between the language of the Gun Lake Act and the waiver of immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act. In drawing this comparison, however, JUSTICE GINSBURG leaves out the critical element of that waiver. See ante, at 2 (opinion concurring in judgment). In full, the APA pro- vision states that a suit “shall not be dismissed on the ground that it is against the United States.” 5 U.S. C. (emphasis added). Section 2(b), as noted, contains no such reference to the sovereign. As for JUSTICE BREYER’s concurrence, “dot[ting] all the i’s,” “simplif[ying] judicial decisionmaking,” and “elimi- nat[ing] the cost of litigating a lawsuit” are nothing but cavalier euphemisms for exercising the judicial power. Ante, at 2. JUSTICE BREYER assumes that is consti- tutionally unobjectionable, and that seeks the same “real-world result.” But if is constitutional, it is because the provision establishes new substantive 16 PATCHAK v. ZINKE ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting standards and leaves the court to apply those standards in the first instance. That is the rule set forth plainly in Bank Markazi. And if that is so, does not simply supplement —it short-circuits the requisite adjudica- tive process and decides the suit outright. The proper allocation of authority under the Constitution is very much part of the “real world.” Pursuant to that basic equilibrium, Congress cannot “gild the lily” by relieving the Judiciary of its job—applying the law to the case before it. * * * The Framers saw this case coming. They knew that if Congress exercised the judicial power, it would be impos- sible “to guard the Constitution and the rights of individu- als from serious oppressions.” The Federalist No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton). Patchak thought his rights were violated, and went to court. He expected to have his case decided by judges whose independence from political pressure was ensured by the safeguards of Article III—life tenure and salary protection. It was instead decided by Congress, in favor of the litigant it preferred, under a law adopted just for the occasion. But it is our responsibility under the Constitution to decide cases and controversies according to law. It is our responsibility to, as the judicial oath provides, “administer justice without respect to per- sons.” 28 U.S. C. And it is our responsibility to “firm[ly]” and “inflexibl[y]” |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | concurring | Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118239/eastern-enterprises-v-apfel/ | JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S opinion correctly concludes that the Coal Act's imposition of retroactive liability on petitioner violates the Takings Clause. I write separately to emphasize that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, 9, cl. 3, even more clearly reflects the principle that "[r]etrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 1398, p. 272 (5th ed. 1891). Since however, this Court has considered the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply only in the criminal context. I have never been convinced of the soundness of this limitation, which in Calder was *539 principally justified because a contrary interpretation would render the Takings Clause unnecessary. See In an appropriate case, therefore, I would be willing to reconsider Calder and its progeny to determine whether a retroactive civil law that passes muster under our current Takings Clause jurisprudence is nonetheless unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Today's case, however, does present an unconstitutional taking, and I join Justice O'CONNOR's well-reasoned opinion in full. Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. The plurality's careful assessment of the history and purpose of the statute in question demonstrates the necessity to hold it arbitrary and beyond the legitimate authority of the Government to enact. In my view, which is in full accord with many of the plurality's conclusions, the relevant portions of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act), 26 U.S. C. 9701 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. II), must be invalidated as contrary to essential due process principles, without regard to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I concur in the judgment holding the Coal Act unconstitutional but disagree with the plurality's Takings Clause analysis, which, it is submitted, is incorrect and quite unnecessary for decision of the case. I must record my respectful dissent on this issue. I The final Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. The provision is known as the Takings Clause. The concept of a taking under the Clause has become a term of art, and my discussion begins here. *540 Our cases do not support the plurality's conclusion that the Coal Act takes property. The Coal Act imposes a staggering financial burden on the petitioner, Eastern Enterprises, but it regulates the former mine owner without regard to property. It does not operate upon or alter an identified property interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by a property interest. The Coal Act does not |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | concurring | Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118239/eastern-enterprises-v-apfel/ | measured by a property interest. The Coal Act does not appropriate, transfer, or encumber an estate in land (e. g., a lien on a particular piece of property), a valuable interest in an intangible (e. g., intellectual property), or even a bank account or accrued interest. The law simply imposes an obligation to perform an act, the payment of benefits. The statute is indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the property it uses to do so. To the extent it affects property interests, it does so in a manner similar to many laws; but until today, none were thought to constitute takings. To call this sort of governmental action a taking as a matter of constitutional interpretation is both imprecise and, with all due respect, unwise. As the role of Government expanded, our experience taught that a strict line between a taking and a regulation is difficult to discern or to maintain. This led the Court in Pennsylvania Coal to try to span the two concepts when specific property was subjected to what the owner alleged to be excessive regulation. "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The quoted sentence is, of course, the genesis of the so-called regulatory takings doctrine. See ("Prior to Justice Holmes's exposition in Pennsylvania Coal it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a `direct appropriation' of property or the functional equivalent of a `practical ouster of [the owner's] possession' " (citations omitted)). Without denigrating the importance the *541 regulatory takings concept has assumed in our law, it is fair to say it has proved difficult to explain in theory and to implement in practice. Cases attempting to decide when a regulation becomes a taking are among the most litigated and perplexing in current law. See Penn Transp. ; Kaiser Until today, however, one constant limitation has been that in all of the cases where the regulatory taking analysis has been employed, a specific property right or interest has been at stake. After the decision in Pennsylvania Coal we confronted cases where specific and identified properties or property rights were alleged to come within the regulatory takings prohibition: air rights for high-rise buildings, Penn zoning on parcels of real property, e. g., MacDonald, Sommer & ; ; trade secrets, ; right of access to property, e. g., PruneYard Shopping ; Kaiser right to affix on structures, ; right to transfer property by devise or intestacy, e. g., |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | concurring | Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118239/eastern-enterprises-v-apfel/ | right to transfer property by devise or intestacy, e. g., ; creation of an easement, ; ; right to build or improve, liens on real property, ; right to mine coal, Keystone Bituminous Coal ; right to sell personal property, ; and the right to extract mineral deposits, ; United States *542 v. Eureka Mining Co., The regulations in the cited cases were challenged as being so excessive as to destroy, or take, a specific property interest. The plurality's opinion disregards this requirement and, by removing this constant characteristic from takings analysis, would expand an already difficult and uncertain rule to a vast category of cases not deemed, in our law, to implicate the Takings Clause. The difficulties in determining whether there is a taking or a regulation even where a property right or interest is identified ought to counsel against extending the regulatory takings doctrine to cases lacking this specificity. The existence of at least this outer boundary for application of the regulatory takings rule provides some necessary predictability for governmental entities. Our definition of a taking, after all, is binding on all of the States as well as the Federal Government. The plurality opinion would throw one of the most difficult and litigated areas of the law into confusion, subjecting States and municipalities to the potential of new and unforeseen claims in vast amounts. The existing category of cases involving specific property interests ought not to be obliterated by extending regulatory takings analysis to the amorphous class of cases embraced by the plurality's opinion today. True, the burden imposed by the Coal Act may be just as great if the Government had appropriated one of Eastern's plants, but the mechanism by which the Government injures Eastern is so unlike the act of taking specific property that it is incongruous to call the Coal Act a taking, even as that concept has been expanded by the regulatory takings principle. In the terminology of our regulatory takings analysis, the character of the governmental action renders the Coal Act not a taking of property. While the usual taking occurs when the government physically acquires property for itself, e. g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. our regulatory takings analysis recognizes a taking may occur when property is not appropriated by the government *543 or is transferred to other private parties. See, e. g., United ; As the range of governmental conduct subjected to takings analysis has expanded, however, we have been careful not to lose sight of the importance of identifying the property allegedly taken, lest all governmental action be subjected to |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | concurring | Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118239/eastern-enterprises-v-apfel/ | property allegedly taken, lest all governmental action be subjected to examination under the constitutional prohibition against taking without just compensation, with the attendant potential for money damages. We have asked how the challenged governmental action is implemented with particular emphasis on the extent to which a specific property right is affected. See ; (declaring a law, which otherwise would not be a taking because of its insignificant economic impact, a taking because the character of the governmental action destroyed the right to pass property to one's heirs, a right which "has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times"); Penn The Coal Act neither targets a specific property interest nor depends upon any particular property for the operation of its statutory mechanisms. The liability imposed on Eastern no doubt will reduce its net worth and its total value, but this can be said of any law which has an adverse economic effect. The circumstance that the statute does not take money for the Government but instead makes it payable to third persons is not a factor I rely upon to show the lack of a taking. *544 While there are instances where the Government's selfenrichment may make it all the more evident a taking has occurred, e. g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, ; United the Government ought not to have the capacity to give itself immunity from a takings claim by the device of requiring the transfer of property from one private owner directly to another. Cf. Hawaii Housing At the same time, the Government's imposition of an obligation between private parties, or destruction of an existing obligation, must relate to a specific property interest to implicate the Takings Clause. For example, in United we confronted a statute which was alleged to destroy an existing creditor's lien in certain chattels to the benefit of the debtor. We acknowledged that, given the nature of the property interest at stake, which resembled a contractual obligation, the takings challenge "fits but awkwardly into the analytic framework" of our regulatory takings analysis. We decided the analysis could apply because the property interest was a "traditional property interes[t]," though in the end the statute was found inapplicable to the lien at issue. In so holding, we relied on Louisville Joint Stock Land which invalidated the Frazier-Lemke Farm-Mortgage Act, because it interfered with mortgages on farms and thus worked a "`taking of substantive rights in specific property acquired by the Bank prior to' " the (quoting ). Unlike the statutes at issue in Security Industrial Bank and the Coal Act does not affect an obligation |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | concurring | Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118239/eastern-enterprises-v-apfel/ | Bank and the Coal Act does not affect an obligation relating to a specific property interest. If the plurality is adopting its novel and expansive concept of a taking in order to avoid making a normative judgment about the Coal Act, it fails in the attempt; for it must make the normative judgment in all events. See, e. g., ante, at 537 ("[T]he governmental action implicates fundamental principles *545 of fairness"). The imprecision of our regulatory takings doctrine does open the door to normative considerations about the wisdom of government decisions. See, e. g., This sort of analysis is in uneasy tension with our basic understanding of the Takings Clause, which has not been understood to be a substantive or absolute limit on the government's power to act. The Clause operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge. The Clause presupposes what the government intends to do is otherwise constitutional: "As its language indicates, and as the Court has frequently noted, [the Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power. This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Given that the constitutionality of the Coal Act appears to turn on the legitimacy of Congress' judgment rather than on the availability of compensation, see ante, at 521 ("[I]n a case such as this one, it cannot be said that monetary relief against the Government is an available remedy"), the more appropriate constitutional analysis arises under general due process principles rather than under the Takings Clause. It should be acknowledged that there are passages in some of our cases on the imposition of retroactive liability for an employer's withdrawal from a pension plan which might give some support to the plurality's discussion of the Takings Clause. See ; Concrete & Products of Cal., In the Court said the definition of a taking was not controlled by "any set formula," but was dependent "on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case." The Court then applied the three-factor regulatory takings analysis set forth in Penn which examines the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental This analysis did not result in a finding of a |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | concurring | Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118239/eastern-enterprises-v-apfel/ | This analysis did not result in a finding of a taking. The Court, moreover, prefaced the entire takings discussion with the admonition it would be surprising to discover that there had been a taking in the instance where a due process attack had been rejected. See at ; see also Concrete at (quoting at ). At best, is equivocal on the question whether we should apply the regulatory takings analysis to instances like the one now before us. My reading of and Concrete is that we should proceed first to general due process principles, reserving takings analysis for cases where the governmental action is otherwise permissible. See ; see also Duke Power (upholding on due process grounds the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S. C. 2210 (1970 ed., Supp. V), which placed a cap on civil liability for nuclear accidents, but declining to address petitioner's request that the Act be declared a taking because compensation would be available under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C. 1491(a)(1) (1976 *547 ed.)). These authorities confirm my view that the case is controlled not by the Takings Clause but by well-settled due process principles respecting retroactive laws. Given my view that the takings analysis is inapplicable in this case, it is unnecessary to comment upon the plurality's effort to resolve a jurisdictional question despite little briefing by the parties on a point which has divided the Courts of Appeals. II When the constitutionality of the Coal Act is tested under the Due Process Clause, it must be invalidated. Accepted principles forbidding retroactive legislation of this type are sufficient to dispose of the case. Although we have been hesitant to subject economic legislation to due process scrutiny as a general matter, the Court has given careful consideration to due process challenges to legislation with retroactive effects. As today's plurality opinion notes, for centuries our law has harbored a singular distrust of retroactive statutes. Ante, at 532-533. In the words of Chancellor Kent: "A retroactive statute would partake in its character of the mischiefs of an ex post facto law. ; and in every other case relating to contracts or property, it would be against every sound principle." 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *455; see also Justice Story reached a similar conclusion: "Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with sound legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 1398 (5th ed. 1891). The Court's due process jurisprudence reflects this distrust. For example, in the Court held due process requires |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | concurring | Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118239/eastern-enterprises-v-apfel/ | distrust. For example, in the Court held due process requires an inquiry into whether in enacting the retroactive law the legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. Even though prospective economic legislation carries with it *548 the presumption of constitutionality, "[i]t does not follow that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. The retrospective aspects of [economic] legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former." We have repeated this formulation in numerous recent decisions and given serious consideration to retroactivity-based due process challenges, all without questioning the validity of the underlying due process principle. United ; Concrete at 636-; General Motors ; United ; United ; Pension Benefit Guaranty These decisions treat due process challenges based on the retroactive character of the statutes in question as serious and meritorious, thus confirming the vitality of our legal tradition's disfavor of retroactive economic legislation. Indeed, it is no accident that the primary retroactivity precedents upon which today's plurality opinion relies in its takings analysis were grounded in due process. Ante, at 524-528 (citing Turner R. A. and Concrete ). These cases reflect our recognition that retroactive lawmaking is a particular concern for the courts because of the legislative "tempt[ation] to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals." ; see also Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, If retroactive laws change the legal consequences of transactions long closed, the change can destroy the reasonable certainty and security which are the very objects of property ownership. *549 As a consequence, due process protection for property must be understood to incorporate our settled tradition against retroactive laws of great severity. Groups targeted by retroactive laws, were they to be denied all protection, would have a justified fear that a government once formed to protect expectations now can destroy them. Both stability of investment and confidence in the constitutional system, then, are secured by due process restrictions against severe retroactive legislation. The case before us represents one of the rare instances where the Legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by due process. The plurality opinion demonstrates in convincing fashion that the remedy created by the Coal Act bears no legitimate relation to the interest which the Government asserts in support of the statute. Ante, at 529-537. In our tradition, the degree of retroactive effect is a significant determinant in the constitutionality of a statute. United ; United ; see also As the plurality explains today, |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | concurring | Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118239/eastern-enterprises-v-apfel/ | ; United ; see also As the plurality explains today, in creating liability for events which occurred 35 years ago the Coal Act has a retroactive effect of unprecedented scope. Ante, at 532. While we have upheld the imposition of liability on former employers based on past employment relationships, the statutes at issue were remedial, designed to impose an "actual, measurable cost of [the employer's] business" which the employer had been able to avoid in the past. Turner ; accord, Concrete ; at -192; R. A. As Chancellor Kent noted: "Such statutes have been held valid when clearly just and reasonable, and conducive to the general welfare, even though they might operate in a degree upon existing rights." 1 Kent, Commentaries on American Law, at *455*456. The Coal Act, however, does not serve *550 this purpose. Eastern was once in the coal business and employed many of the beneficiaries, but it was not responsible for their expectation of lifetime health benefits or for the perilous financial condition of the 1950 and 1974 plans which put the benefits in jeopardy. As the plurality opinion discusses in detail, the expectation was created by promises and agreements made long after Eastern left the coal business. Eastern was not responsible for the resulting chaos in the funding mechanism caused by other coal companies leaving the framework of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. Ante, at 535-536. This case is far outside the bounds of retroactivity permissible under our law. Finding a due process violation in this case is consistent with the principle that "under the deferential standard of review applied in substantive due process challenges to economic legislation there is no need for mathematical precision in the fit between justification and means." Concrete at 639 (citing Turner 428 U. S.,). Statutes may be invalidated on due process grounds only under the most egregious of circumstances. This case represents one of the rare instances in which even such a permissive standard has been violated. Application of the Coal Act to Eastern would violate the proper bounds of settled due process principles, and I concur in the plurality's conclusion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | Congress has used the term “Indian” in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 to describe those individuals who are entitled to special protections and benefits under federal Indian law. The Act specifies that benefits shall be available to individuals who qualify as Indian either as a result of blood quantum or as descendants of members of “any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdic tion.” 25 U.S. C. In contesting the Secretary of the Interior’s acquisition of trust land for the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode Island, the parties have focused on the meaning of “now” in the Act’s definition of “Indian.” Yet to my mind, whether “now” means 1934 (as the Court holds) or the present time (as respondents would have it) sheds no light on the question whether the Secretary’s actions on behalf of the Narragansett were permitted under the statute. The plain text of the Act clearly authorizes the Secretary to take land into trust for Indian tribes as well as individual Indians, and it places no temporal limitation on the definition of “Indian tribe.”1 Because the Narra —————— 1 In 25 U.S. C. Congress defined both “Indian” and “tribe.” Section 479 states, in relevant part: 2 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR STEVENS, J., dissenting gansett Tribe is an Indian tribe within the meaning of the Act, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I This case involves a challenge to the Secretary of the Interior’s acquisition of a 31-acre parcel of land in Charlestown, Rhode Island, to be held in trust for the Narragansett Tribe.2 That Tribe has existed as a continu ous political entity since the early 17th century. Although it was once one of the most powerful tribes in New Eng land, a series of wars, epidemics, and difficult relations with the State of Rhode Island sharply reduced the Tribe’s ancestral landholdings. Two blows, delivered centuries apart, exacted a particu larly high toll on the Tribe. First, in 1675, King Philip’s War essentially destroyed the Tribe, forcing it to accept the Crown as sovereign and to submit to the guardianship of the Colony of Rhode Island. Then, in 1880, the State of Rhode Island passed a “detribalization” law that abolished tribal authority, ended the State’s guardianship of the —————— “The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.” Notably the word “now,” which is used to define one of the categories of Indians, does not appear in the definition of “tribe.” 2 In 1991, the Narragansett Tribe purchased the 31-acre parcel in fee simple from a private developer. In 1998, the Bureau of Indian Affairs notified the State of the Secretary’s decision to take the land into unreserved trust for the Tribe. The Tribe “acquired [the land] for the express purpose of building much needed low-income Indian Housing via a contract between the Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housing Authority (NIWHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Devel opment (HUD).” App. 46a. Cite as: 555 U. S. (2009) 3 STEVENS, J., dissenting Tribe, and attempted to sell all tribal lands. The Narra gansett originally assented to detribalization and ceded all but two acres of its ancestral land. In return, the Tribe received $5,000. See Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Operations) to Assis tant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Operations) 4 (July 19, 1982) (Recommendation for Acknowledgment). Recognizing that its consent to detribalization was a mistake, the Tribe embarked on a century-long campaign to recoup its losses.3 Obtaining federal recognition was critical to this effort. The Secretary officially recognized the Narragansett as an Indian tribe in 1983, Final Deter mination for Federal Acknowledgement of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, and with that recognition the Tribe qualified for the bundle of fed eral benefits established in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA or Act),4 25 U.S. C. et seq. The Tribe’s attempt to exercise one of those rights, the ability to peti tion the Secretary to take land into trust for the Tribe’s benefit, is now vigorously contested in this litigation. II The Secretary’s trust authority is located in 25 U.S. C. —————— 3 Indeed, this litigation stems in part from the Tribe’s suit against (and subsequent settlement with) Rhode Island and private landowners on the ground that the 1880 sale violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934)). See generally F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2005) (hereinafter Cohen); G. Taylor, The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reor ganization Act, 1934–45 (1980). 4 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR STEVENS, J., dissenting That provision |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | (1980). 4 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR STEVENS, J., dissenting That provision grants the Secretary power to take “in trust for [an] Indian tribe or individual Indian” “any interest in lands for the purpose of providing land for Indians.”5 The Act’s language could not be clearer: To effectuate the Act’s broad mandate to revitalize tribal development and cultural self-determination, the Secre tary can take land into trust for a tribe or he can take land into trust for an individual Indian. Though Congress outlined the Secretary’s trust author ity in it specified which entities would be considered “tribes” and which individuals would qualify as “Indian” in An individual Indian, tells us, “shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” as well as “all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” A tribe, goes on to state, “shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.” Because federal recognition is generally required before a tribe can receive federal benefits, the Secretary has interpreted this defini tion of “tribe” to refer only to recognized tribes. See 25 CFR (2008) (stating that recognition “is a prerequi site to the protection, services, and benefits of the Federal government available to Indian tribes by virtue of their status as tribes”); (defining “tribe” for the purposes —————— 5 Section 465 reads more fully: “The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assign ment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. “Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.” Cite as: 555 U. S. (2009) 5 STEVENS, J., dissenting of land acquisition to mean “any Indian tribe, band, na tion, pueblo, community, rancheria, colony, or other group of Indians, which is recognized by the Secretary as eligible for the special programs and services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs”).6 Having separate definitions for “Indian” and “tribe” is essential for the administration of IRA benefits. The statute reflects Congress’ intent to extend certain benefits to individual Indians, e.g., 25 U.S. C. (offering loans to Indian students for |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | e.g., 25 U.S. C. (offering loans to Indian students for tuition at vocational and trade schools); (granting hiring preferences to Indians seeking federal employment related to Indian affairs), while directing other benefits to tribes, e.g., (allowing tribes to adopt constitutions and bylaws); (giving loans to Indian-chartered corporations). Section 465, by giving the Secretary discretion to steer benefits to tribes and individuals alike, is therefore unique. But establishing this broad benefit scheme was undoubtedly intentional: The original draft of the IRA presented to Congress directed the Secretary to take land into trust only for entities such as tribes. Compare H. R. 7902, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1934) (“Title to any land acquired pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or community for whom the land is acquired” ), with 25 U.S. C. (“Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act shall be —————— 6 The regulations that govern the tribal recognition process, 25 CFR et seq. (2008), were promulgated pursuant to the President’s general mandate established in the early 1830’s to manage “all Indian affairs and all matters arising out of Indian relations,” 25 U.S. C. and to “prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs,” Thus, contrary to the argument pressed by the Governor of Rhode Island before this Court, see Reply Brief for Petitioner Carcieri 9, the requirement that a tribe be federally recognized before it is eligible for trust land does not stem from the IRA. 6 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR STEVENS, J., dissenting taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired” ). The Secretary has long exercised his trust author ity in accordance with this design. In the years immedi ately following the adoption of the IRA, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior repeatedly advised that the Secretary could take land into trust for federally recog nized tribes and for individual Indians who qualified for federal benefits by lineage or blood quantum. For example, in 1937, when evaluating whether the Secretary could purchase approximately 2,100 acres of land for the Mole Lake Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, the Solicitor instructed that the purchase could not be “completed until it is determined whether the beneficiary of the trust title should be designated as a band or whether the title should be taken for the individual Indi ans in the |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | should be taken for the individual Indi ans in the vicinity of Mole Lake who are of one half or more Indian blood.” Memorandum from the Solicitor to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 2758 (Feb. 8, 1937). Because the Mole Lake Chippewa was not yet recognized by the Federal Government as an Indian tribe, the Solici tor determined that the Secretary had two options: “Either the Department should provide recognition of this group, or title to the purchased land should be taken on behalf of the individuals who are of one half or more Indian blood.” The tribal trust and individual trust options were simi larly outlined in other post-1934 opinion letters, including those dealing with the Shoshone Indians of Nevada, the St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, and the Nahma and Beaver Island Indians of Michigan. See 1 Dept. of Interior, Opinions of the Solicitor Relating to Indian Af fairs, 1917–1974, pp. 706–707, 724–725, 747–748 (1979). Unless and until a tribe was formally recognized by the Federal Government and therefore eligible for trust land, Cite as: 555 U. S. (2009) 7 STEVENS, J., dissenting the Secretary would take land into trust for individual Indians who met the blood quantum threshold. Modern administrative practice has followed this well trodden path. Absent a specific statute recognizing a tribe and authorizing a trust land acquisition,7 the Secretary has exercised his trust authority—now governed by regu lations promulgated in 1980 after notice-and-comment rulemaking, et seq.; —to acquire land for federally recognized Indian tribes like the Narragansett. The Grand Traverse Band of Ottowa and Chippewa Indians, although denied federal recognition in 1934 and 1943, see Dept. of Interior, Office of Federal Acknowledgement, Memorandum from Acting Deputy Commissioner to Assistant Secretary 4 (Oct. 3, 1979) (GTB–V001–D002), was the first tribe the Secretary rec ognized under the 1980 regulations, see 45 Fed. Reg. 19322. Since then, the Secretary has used his trust au thority to expand the Tribe’s land base. See, e.g., 49 Fed. Reg. 2025–2026 (1984) (setting aside a 12.5-acre parcel as reservation land for the Tribe’s exclusive use). The Tu —————— 7 Although Congress has passed specific statutes granting the Secre tary authority to take land into trust for certain tribes, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Secretary lacks residual authority to take land into trust under 25 U.S. C. of the IRA. Some of these stat utes place explicit limits on the Secretary’s trust authority and can be properly read as establishing the outer limit of the Secretary’s trust authority with respect to the specified tribes. See, e.g., (au thorizing |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | with respect to the specified tribes. See, e.g., (au thorizing trust land for the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, the Passamaquoddy Tribe of Maine, and the Penobscot Tribe of Maine). Other statutes, while identifying certain parcels the Secretary will take into trust for a tribe, do not purport to diminish the Secretary’s residual authority under See, e.g., (Mohegan Tribe); (Wampanoag Tribe); (Miccosukee Tribe). Indeed, the Secre tary has invoked his authority to take additional land into trust for the Miccosukee Tribe despite the existence of a statute authorizing and directing him to acquire certain land for the Tribe. See Post- Argument En Banc Brief for National Congress of American Indians et al. as Amici Curiae 7 and App. 9 in No. 03–2647 (CA1). 8 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR STEVENS, J., dissenting nica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana has similarly benefited from administrative recognition, (1981), followed by tribal trust acquisition. And in 2006, the Secretary took land into trust for the Snoqualmie Tribe which, although unrecognized as an Indian tribe in the 1950’s, regained federal recognition in 1999. See 71 Fed. Reg. 5067 (taking land into trust for the Tribe); 62 Fed. Reg. 45864 (1997) (recognizing the Snoqualmie as an Indian tribe). This brief history of places the case before us into proper context. Federal recognition, regardless of when it is conferred, is the necessary condition that triggers a tribe’s eligibility to receive trust land. No party has dis puted that the Narragansett Tribe was properly recog nized as an Indian tribe in 1983. See Indeed, given that the Tribe has a documented history that stretches back to 1614 and has met the rigorous criteria for administrative recognition, Recommendation for Acknowledgment 1, 7–18, it would be difficult to sus tain an objection to the Tribe’s status. With this in mind, and in light of the Secretary’s longstanding authority under the plain text of the IRA to acquire tribal trust land, it is perfectly clear that the Secretary’s land acquisition for the Narragansett was entirely proper. III Despite the clear text of the IRA and historical pedigree of the Secretary’s actions on behalf of the Narragansett, the majority holds that one word (“now”) nestled in one clause in one of ’s several definitions demonstrates that the Secretary acted outside his statutory authority in this case. The consequences of the majority’s reading are both curious and harsh: curious because it turns “now” into the most important word in the IRA, limiting not only some individuals’ eligibility for federal benefits but also a tribe’s; harsh because it would result in the unsupportable Cite as: 555 U. S. |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | would result in the unsupportable Cite as: 555 U. S. (2009) 9 STEVENS, J., dissenting conclusion that, despite its 1983 administrative recogni tion, the Narragansett Tribe is not an Indian tribe under the IRA. In the Court’s telling, when Congress granted the Secre tary power to acquire trust land “for the purpose of provid ing land for Indians,” 25 U.S. C. it meant to permit land acquisitions for those persons whose tribal membership qualify them as “Indian” as defined by In other words, the argument runs, the Secretary can acquire trust land for “persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” This strained construction, advanced by petitioners, explains the majority’s laser-like focus on the meaning of “now”: If the Narragansett Tribe was not recognized or under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the Tribe’s members do not belong to an Indian tribe “now under Federal jurisdiction” and would therefore not be “Indians” under by virtue of their tribal membership. Petitioners’ argument works only if one reads “Indians” (in the phrase in “providing land for Indians”) to refer to individuals, not an Indian tribe. To petitioners, this reading is obvious; the alternative, they insist, would be “nonsensical.” Reply Brief for Petitioner State of Rhode Island 3. This they argue despite the clear evidence of Congress’ intent to provide the Secretary with the option of acquiring either tribal trusts or individual trusts in service of “providing land for Indians.” And they ignore unambiguous evidence that Congress used “Indian tribe” and “Indians” interchangeably in other parts of the IRA. See (discussing “any claim or suit of any Indian tribe against the United States” in the first sentence and “any claim of such Indians against the United States” in the last sentence ). In any event, this much must be admitted: Without the benefit of context, a reasonable person could conclude that “Indians” refers to multiple individuals who each qualify 10 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR STEVENS, J., dissenting as “Indian” under the IRA. An equally reasonable person could also conclude that “Indians” is meant to refer to a collective, namely, an Indian tribe. Because “[t]he mean ing—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context,” the proper course of action is to widen the interpretive lens and look to the rest of the statute for clarity. Doing so would lead to ’s last sentence, which specifies that the Secretary is to hold land in trust “for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired.” Put simply, in Congress used the |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | the land is acquired.” Put simply, in Congress used the term “Indians” to refer both to tribes and individuals.8 The majority nevertheless dismisses this reading of the statute. The Court notes that even if the Secretary has authority to take land into trust for a tribe, it must be an “Indian tribe,” with ’s definition of “Indian” determin ing a tribe’s eligibility. The statute’s definition of “tribe,” the majority goes on to state, itself makes reference to “Indian tribe.” Thus, the Court concludes, “[t]here simply is no legitimate way to circumvent the definition of ‘In dian’ in delineating the Secretary’s authority under ” Ante, at 13. The majority bypasses a straightforward explanation on its way to a circular one. Requiring that a tribe be an “Indian tribe” does not demand immediate reference to the definition of “Indian”; instead, it simply reflects the re quirement that the tribe in question be formally recog nized as an Indian tribe. As explained above, the Secre tary has limited benefits under federal Indian law— including the acquisition of trust land—to recognized —————— 8 The majority continues to insist, quite incorrectly, that Congress meant the term “Indians” in to have the same meaning as the term “Indian” in That the text of the statute tells a different story appears to be an inconvenience the Court would rather ignore. Cite as: 555 U. S. (2009) 11 STEVENS, J., dissenting tribes. Recognition, then, is the central requirement for being considered an “Indian tribe” for purposes of the Act. If a tribe satisfies the stringent criteria established by the Secretary to qualify for federal recognition, including the requirement that the tribe prove that it “has existed as a community from historical times until the present,” 25 CFR7(b) (2008), it is a fortiori an “Indian tribe” as a matter of law. The Narragansett Tribe is no different. In 1983, upon meeting the criteria for recognition, the Secretary gave notice that “the Narragansett Indian Tribe exists as an Indian tribe.” How the Narragansett could be an Indian tribe in 1983 and yet not be an Indian tribe today is a proposition the majority cannot explain. The majority’s retort, that because “tribe” refers to “Indian,” the definition of “Indian” must control which groups can be considered a “tribe,” is entirely circular. Yes, the word “tribe” is defined in part by reference to “Indian tribe.” But the word “Indian” is also defined in part by reference to “Indian tribe.” Relying on one defini tion to provide content to the other is thus “completely circular and explains nothing.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | “completely circular and explains nothing.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, The Governor of Rhode Island, for his part, adopts this circular logic and offers two examples of why reading the statute any other way would be implausible. He first argues that if ’s definition of “Indian” does not deter mine a tribe’s eligibility, the Secretary would have author ity to take land into trust “for the benefit of any group that he deems, at his whim and fancy, to be an ‘Indian tribe.’ ” Reply Brief for Petitioner Carcieri 7. The Governor carica tures the Secretary’s discretion. This Court has long made clear that Congress—and therefore the Secretary—lacks constitutional authority to “bring a community or body of people within [federal jurisdiction] by arbitrarily calling 12 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR STEVENS, J., dissenting them an Indian tribe.” United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). The Governor’s next objection, that condoning the acquisition of trust land for the Narragan sett Tribe would allow the Secretary to acquire land for an Indian tribe that lacks Indians, is equally unpersuasive. As a general matter, to obtain federal recognition, a tribe must demonstrate that its “membership consists of indi viduals who descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes which combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity.” 25 CFR7(e) (2008). If the Governor suspects that the Narragansett is not an Indian tribe because it may lack members who are blood quantum Indians, he should have challenged the Secretary’s decision to recognize the Tribe in 1983 when such an objection could have been properly received.9 —————— 9 The Department of the Interior found “a high degree of retention of [Narragansett] family lines” between 1880 and 1980, and remarked that “[t]he close intermarriage and stability of composition, plus the geographic stability of the group, reflect the maintenance of a socially distinct community.” Recommendation for Acknowledgment 10. It also noted that the Narragansett “require applicants for full voting mem bership to trace their Narragansett Indian bloodlines back to the ‘Detribalization Rolls of 1880–84.’ ” The record in this case does not tell us how many members of the Narragansett currently qualify as “Indian” by meeting the individual blood quantum require ment. Indeed, it is possible that a significant number of the Narragan sett are blood quantum Indians. Accordingly, nothing the Court decides today prevents the Secretary from taking land into trust for those members of the Tribe who independently qualify as “Indian” under 25 U.S. C. Although the record does not demonstrate how many members of the Narragansett qualify as blood |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Carcieri v. Salazar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145908/carcieri-v-salazar/ | demonstrate how many members of the Narragansett qualify as blood quantum Indians, JUSTICE BREYER nevertheless assumes that no member of the Tribe is a blood quantum Indian. Ante, at 4 (concurring opinion). This assumption is misguided for two reasons. To start, the record’s silence on this matter is to be expected; the parties have consistently focused on the Secretary’s authority to take land into trust for the Tribe, not for individual mem bers of the Tribe. There is thus no legitimate basis for interpreting the lack of record evidence as affirmative proof that none of the Tribe’s Cite as: 555 U. S. (2009) 13 STEVENS, J., dissenting In sum, petitioners’ arguments—and the Court’s conclu sion—are based on a misreading of the statute. “[N]ow,” the temporal limitation in the definition of “Indian,” only affects an individual’s ability to qualify for federal benefits under the IRA. If this case were about the Secretary’s decision to take land into trust for an individual who was incapable of proving her eligibility by lineage or blood quantum, I would have no trouble concluding that such an action was contrary to the IRA. But that is not the case before us. By taking land into trust for a validly recog nized Indian tribe, the Secretary acted well within his statutory authority.10 IV The Court today adopts a cramped reading of a statute Congress intended to be “sweeping” in scope. Morton v. Mancari, In so doing, the Court ignores the “principle deeply rooted in [our] Indian juris prudence” that “ ‘statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians.’ ” County of Yakima v. Confederated —————— members are “Indian.” Second, neither the statute nor the relevant regulations mandate that a tribe have a threshold amount of blood quantum Indians as members in order to receive trust land. JUSTICE BREYER’s unwarranted assumption about the Narragansett’s member ship, even if true, would therefore also be irrelevant to whether the Secretary’s actions were proper. 10 Petitioners advance the additional argument that the Secretary lacks authority to take land into trust for the Narragansett because the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S. C. et seq., implicitly repealed the Secretary’s trust authority as applied to lands in Rhode Island. This claim plainly fails. While the Tribe agreed to subject the 1,800 acres it obtained in the Settlement Act to the State’s civil and criminal laws, the 31-acre parcel of land at issue here was not part of the settlement lands. And, critically, nothing in the text of the Settlement Act suggests that Con- gress intended to prevent the |
Justice Scalia | 2,014 | 9 | majority | Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679202/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd/ | We must decide whether the Foreign Sovereign Immu- nities Act of 976 (FSIA or Act), 28 U.S. C. 602 et seq., limits the scope of discovery available to a judg ment creditor in a federal postjudgment execution pro ceeding against a foreign sovereign. I. Background In 200, petitioner, Republic of Argentina, defaulted on its external debt. In 2005 and 200, it restructured most of that debt by offering creditors new securities (with less favorable terms) to swap out for the defaulted ones. Most bondholders went along. Respondent, NML Capital, Ltd. (NML), among others, did not. NML brought actions against Argentina in the Southern District of New York to collect on its debt, and prevailed in every one. It is owed around $2.5 billion, —————— The District Court’s jurisdiction rested on Argentina’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity memorialized in its bond indenture agreement, which states: “To the extent that [Argentina] or any of its revenues, assets or properties shall be entitled to any immunity from suit from attachment prior to judgment from execution of a judgment or 2 REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA v. NML CAPITAL, LTD. Opinion of the Court which Argentina has not paid. Having been unable to collect on its judgments from Argentina, NML has at tempted to execute them against Argentina’s property. That postjudgment litigation “has involved lengthy at tachment proceedings before the district court and multi ple appeals.” EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 20, 203, and n. 2 (CA2 202) (referring the reader to prior opinions “[f]or additional background on Argentina’s de fault and the resulting litigation”). Since 2003, NML has pursued discovery of Argentina’s property. In 200, “ ‘[i]n order to locate Argentina’s assets and accounts, learn how Argentina moves its assets through New York and around the world, and accurately identify the places and times when those assets might be subject to attachment and execution (whether under [United States law] or the law of foreign jurisdictions),’ ” NML served subpoenas on two nonparty banks, Bank of America (BOA) and Banco de la Nación Argentina (BNA), an Argentinian bank with a branch in New York City. For the most part, the two subpoenas target the same kinds of information: docu ments relating to accounts maintained by or on behalf of Argentina, documents identifying the opening and closing dates of Argentina’s accounts, current balances, transac tion histories, records of electronic fund transfers, debts owed by the bank to Argentina, transfers in and out of Argentina’s accounts, and information about transferors and transferees. Argentina, joined by BOA, moved to quash the BOA subpoena. NML moved to |
Justice Scalia | 2,014 | 9 | majority | Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679202/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd/ | BOA, moved to quash the BOA subpoena. NML moved to compel compliance but, before —————— from any other legal or judicial process or remedy, [Argentina] has irrevocably agreed not to claim and has irrevocably waived such im munity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction (and consents generally for the purposes of the [FSIA] to the giving of any relief or the issue of any process in connection with any Related Proceeding or Related Judgment)” App. 06–07. Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 3 Opinion of the Court the court ruled, agreed to narrow its subpoenas by exclud ing the names of some Argentine officials from the ini- tial electronic-fund-transfer message search. NML also agreed to treat as confidential any documents that the banks so designated. The District Court denied the motion to quash and granted the motions to compel. Approving the subpoenas in principle, it concluded that extraterritorial asset discov ery did not offend Argentina’s sovereign immunity, and it reaffirmed that it would serve as a “clearinghouse for information” in NML’s efforts to find and attach Argenti na’s assets. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3. But the court made clear that it expected the parties to negotiate further over specific production requests, which, the court said, must include “some reasonable definition of the information being sought.” There was no point, for in stance, in “getting information about something that might lead to attachment in Argentina because that would be useless information,” since no Argentinian court would allow attachment. “Thus, the district court sought to limit the subpoenas to discovery that was rea sonably calculated to lead to attachable property.” 695 F.3d, 4–205. NML and BOA later negotiated additional changes to the BOA subpoena. NML expressed its willingness to narrow its requests from BNA as well, but BNA neither engaged in negotiation nor complied with the subpoena. Only Argentina appealed, arguing that the court’s order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act be cause it permitted discovery of Argentina’s extraterritorial assets. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that “be cause the Discovery Order involves discovery, not attach ment of sovereign property, and because it is directed at third-party banks, not at Argentina itself, Argentina’s sovereign immunity is not infringed.” We granted certiorari. 57 U. S. (204). 4 REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA v. NML CAPITAL, LTD. Opinion of the Court II. Analysis A The rules governing discovery in postjudgment execu tion proceedings are quite permissive. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(2) states that, “[i]n aid of the judg ment or execution, the judgment creditor may obtain discovery from any person—including |
Justice Scalia | 2,014 | 9 | majority | Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679202/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd/ | execution, the judgment creditor may obtain discovery from any person—including the judgment debtor— as provided in the rules or by the procedure of the state where the court is located.” See 2 C. Wright, A. Miller, & R. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure p. 60 (2d ed. 997) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (court “may use the discovery devices provided in [the federal rules] or may obtain discovery in the manner provided by the practice of the state in which the district court is held”). The general rule in the federal system is that, subject to the district court’s discretion, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(). And New York law entitles judgment creditors to discover “all matter relevant to the satisfac tion of [a] judgment,” N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. (West 997), permitting “investigation [of] any person shown to have any light to shed on the subject of the judgment debtor’s assets or their whereabouts,” D. Siegel, New York Practice p. 89 (5th ed. 20). The meaning of those rules was much discussed at oral argument. What if the assets targeted by the discovery request are beyond the jurisdictional reach of the court to which the request is made? May the court nonetheless permit discovery so long as the judgment creditor shows that the assets are recoverable under the laws of the jurisdictions in which they reside, whether that be Florida or France? We need not take up those issues today, since Argentina has not put them in contention. In the Court of Appeals, Argentina’s only asserted ground for objection to Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 5 Opinion of the Court the subpoenas was the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See (“Argentina argues that the normally broad scope of discovery in aid of execution is limited in this case by principles of sovereign immunity”). And Argentina’s petition for writ of certiorari asked us to decide only whether that Act “imposes [a] limit on a United States court’s authority to order blanket post-judgment execution discovery on the assets of a foreign state used for any activity anywhere in the world.” Pet. for Cert. 4. Plainly, then, this is not a case about the breadth of Rule 69(a)(2).2 We thus assume without deciding that, as the Government conceded at argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, and as the Second Circuit concluded below, “in a run-of the-mill execution proceeding the district court would have been within its discretion to order the discovery from third-party banks about the |
Justice Scalia | 2,014 | 9 | majority | Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679202/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd/ | discretion to order the discovery from third-party banks about the judgment debtor’s assets located outside the United States.” The single, narrow question before us is whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act specifies a different rule when the judgment debtor is a foreign state. B To understand the effect of the Act, one must know something about the regime it replaced. Foreign sovereign immunity is, and always has been, “a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a re striction imposed by the Constitution.” B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, Ac cordingly, this Court’s practice has been to “defe[r] to the decisions of the political branches” about whether and —————— 2 On one of the final pages of its reply brief, Argentina makes for the first time the assertion (which it does not develop, and for which it cites no authority) that the scope of Rule 69 discovery in aid of execution is limited to assets upon which a United States court can execute. Reply Brief 9. We will not revive a forfeited argument simply because the petitioner gestures toward it in its reply brief. 6 REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA v. NML CAPITAL, LTD. Opinion of the Court when to exercise judicial power over foreign states. For the better part of the last two centuries, the political branch making the determination was the Executive, which typically requested immunity in all suits against friendly foreign states. at –487. But then, in 952, the State Department embraced (in the so-called Tate Letter) the “restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity, which holds that immunity shields only a foreign sover eign’s public, noncommercial acts. and n. 9. The Tate Letter “thr[ew] immunity determinations into some disarray,” since “political considerations sometimes led the Department to file suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive theory.” Republic of (internal quotation marks omitted). Further muddling matters, when in particular cases the State Department did not suggest immunity, courts made immunity determinations “generally by refer ence to prior State Department decisions.” 46 U.S., Hence it was that “sovereign immunity decisions were [being] made in two different branches, subject to a variety of factors, sometimes including diplo matic considerations. Not surprisingly, the governing standards were neither clear nor uniformly applied.” at 488. Congress abated the bedlam in 976, replacing the old executive-driven, factor-intensive, loosely common-law based immunity regime with the Foreign Sovereign Im munities Act’s “comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state.” The key word there—which goes |
Justice Scalia | 2,014 | 9 | majority | Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679202/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd/ | action against a foreign state.” The key word there—which goes a long way toward deciding this case—is comprehensive. We have used that term often and advisedly to describe the Act’s sweep: “Congress established [in the FSIA] a com prehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity.” The Act “compre Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 7 Opinion of the Court hensively regulat[es] the amenability of foreign nations to suit in the United States.” This means that “[a]fter the enactment of the FSIA, the Act— and not the pre-existing common law—indisputably gov erns the determination of whether a foreign state is enti tled to sovereign immunity.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 33 (200). As the Act itself instructs, “[c]laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts in conformity with the principles set forth in this [Act].” 28 U.S. C. (emphasis added). Thus, any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court must stand on the Act’s text. Or it must fall. The text of the Act confers on foreign states two kinds of immunity. First and most significant, “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States except as provided in sections 605 to 607.” That provision is of no help to Argentina here: A foreign state may waive jurisdictional immunity, and in this case Argentina did so, see 695 F.3d, Consequently, the Act makes Argentina “liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” The Act’s second immunity-conferring provision states that “the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment[,] arrest[,] and execu tion except as provided in sections 60 and 6 of this chapter.” The exceptions to this immunity defense (we will call it “execution immunity”) are narrower. “The property in the United States of a foreign state” is subject to attachment, arrest, or execution if () it is “used for a commercial activity in the United States,” and (2) some other enumerated exception to immunity applies, such as the one allowing for waiver, see The Act goes on to confer a more robust execution immu nity on designated international-organization property, 8 REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA v. NML CAPITAL, LTD. Opinion of the Court property of a foreign central bank, and “property of a foreign state [that] is, or is intended to be, used in connection with a military activity” and is either “of a military character” or “under the control of a military authority or defense agency,” |
Justice Scalia | 2,014 | 9 | majority | Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679202/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd/ | “under the control of a military authority or defense agency,” That is the last of the Act’s immunity-granting sections. There is no third provision forbidding or limiting discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debt or’s assets. Argentina concedes that no part of the Act “expressly address[es] [postjudgment] discovery.” Brief for Petitioner 22. Quite right. The Act speaks of discovery only once, in a subsection requiring courts to stay discov ery requests directed to the United States that would interfere with criminal or national-security matters, And that section explicitly suspends certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when such a stay is entered, see Elsewhere, it is clear when the Act’s provisions specifically applicable to suits against sovereigns displace their general federal-rule counter parts. See, e.g., Far from containing the “plain statement” necessary to preclude application of federal discovery rules, Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, the Act says not a word on the subject.3 Argentina would have us draw meaning from this si lence. Its argument has several parts. First, it asserts that, before and after the Tate Letter, the State Depart ment and American courts routinely accorded absolute execution immunity to foreign-state property. If a thing belonged to a foreign sovereign, then, no matter where it —————— 3 Argentina and the United States suggest that, under the terms of Rule 69 itself, the Act trumps the federal rules, since Rule 69(a)() states that “a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” But, since the Act does not contain implicit discovery-immunity protections, it does not “apply” (in the relevant sense) at all. Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 9 Opinion of the Court was found, it was immune from execution. And absolute immunity from execution necessarily entailed immunity from discovery in aid of execution. Second, by codifying execution immunity with only a small set of exceptions, Congress merely “partially lowered the previously uncon ditional barrier to post-judgment relief.” Brief for Peti tioner 29. Because the Act gives “no indication that it was authorizing courts to inquire into state property beyond the court’s limited enforcement authority,” ib Argen tina contends, discovery of assets that do not fall within an exception to execution immunity (plainly true of a foreign state’s extraterritorial assets) is forbidden. The argument founders at each step. To begin with, Argentina cites no case holding that, before the Act, a foreign state’s extraterritorial assets enjoyed absolute execution immunity in United States courts. No surprise there. Our courts generally lack authority in the first place to execute against property |
Justice Scalia | 2,014 | 9 | majority | Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679202/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd/ | lack authority in the first place to execute against property in other countries, so how could the question ever have arisen? See Wright & Miller at 56 (“[A] writ of execution can be served anywhere within the state in which the district court is held”). More importantly, even if Argentina were right about the scope of the common-law execution immunity rule, then it would be obvious that the terms of execution immunity are narrower, since the text of that provision immunizes only foreign-state property “in the United States.” So even if Argentina were correct that execution immunity implies coextensive discovery in-aid-of-execution immunity, the latter would not shield from discovery a foreign sovereign’s extraterritorial assets. But what of foreign-state property that would enjoy execution immunity under the Act, such as Argentina’s diplomatic or military property? Argentina maintains that, if a judgment creditor could not ultimately execute a judgment against certain property, then it has no business pursuing discovery of information pertaining to that prop 0 REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA v. NML CAPITAL, LTD. Opinion of the Court erty. But the reason for these subpoenas is that NML does not yet know what property Argentina has and where it is, let alone whether it is executable under the relevant jurisdiction’s law. If, bizarrely, NML’s subpoenas had sought only “information that could not lead to executable assets in the United States or abroad,” then Argentina likely would be correct to say that the subpoenas were unenforceable—not because information about nonexecut able assets enjoys a penumbral “discovery immunity” under the Act, but because information that could not possibly lead to executable assets is simply not “relevant” to execution in the first place, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann.4 But of course that is not what the subpoenas seek. They ask for infor mation about Argentina’s worldwide assets generally, so that NML can identify where Argentina may be holding property that is subject to execution. To be sure, that request is bound to turn up information about property that Argentina regards as immune. But NML may think the same property not immune. In which case, Argenti na’s self-serving legal assertion will not automatically prevail; the District Court will have to settle the matter. * * * Today’s decision leaves open what Argentina thinks is a gap in the statute. Could the 976 Congress really have meant not to protect foreign states from postjudgment —————— 4 The dissent apparently agrees that the Act has nothing to say about the scope of postjudgment discovery of a foreign sovereign’s extraterri torial assets. It also |
Justice Scalia | 2,014 | 9 | majority | Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679202/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd/ | discovery of a foreign sovereign’s extraterri torial assets. It also apparently agrees that the rules limit discovery to matters relevant to execution. Our agreement ends there. The dissent goes on to assert that, unless a judgment creditor proves up front that all of the information it seeks is relevant to execution under the laws of all foreign jurisdictions, discovery of information concerning extraterri torial assets is limited to that which the Act makes relevant to execu tion in the United States. Post, at 2 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.). We can find no basis in the Act or the rules for that position. Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) Opinion of the Court discovery “clearinghouses”? The riddle is not ours to solve (if it can be solved at all). It is of course possible that, had Congress anticipated the rather unusual circumstances of this case (foreign sovereign waives immunity; foreign sovereign owes money under valid judgments; foreign sovereign does not pay and apparently has no executable assets in the United States), it would have added to the Act a sentence conferring categorical discovery-in-aid-of execution immunity on a foreign state’s extraterritorial assets. Or, just as possible, it would have done no such thing. Either way, “[t]he question is not what Con gress ‘would have wanted’ but what Congress enacted in the FSIA.” Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 68 (992).5 Nonetheless, Argentina and the United States urge us to consider the worrisome international-relations conse quences of siding with the lower court. Discovery orders as sweeping as this one, the Government warns, will cause “a substantial invasion of [foreign states’] sovereignty,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8, and will “[u]ndermin[e] international comity,” Worse, such orders might provoke “reciprocal adverse treatment of the United States in foreign courts,” and will “threaten harm to the United States’ foreign relations more generally,” These apprehensions are better directed to that branch of government with author- ity to amend the Act—which, as it happens, is the same branch that forced our retirement from the immunity-by factor-balancing business nearly 40 years ago.6 —————— 5 NML also argues that, even if Argentina had a claim to immunity from postjudgment discovery, it waived it in its bond indenture agree ment, see n. The Second Circuit did not address this argu ment. Nor do we. 6 Although this appeal concerns only the meaning of the Act, we have no reason to doubt that, as NML concedes, “other sources of law” ordinarily will bear on the propriety of discovery requests of this nature 2 REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA v. |
Justice Breyer | 1,998 | 2 | concurring | Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118169/oubre-v-entergy-operations-inc/ | This case focuses upon a worker who received a payment from her employer and in return promised not to bring an age-discrimination suit. Her promise failed the procedural tests of validity set forth in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S. C. 626(f)(1). I agree with the majority that, because of this procedural failing, the worker is free to bring her age-discrimination suit without "tendering back" her employer's payment as a precondition. As a conceptual matter, a "tender back" requirement would imply that the worker had ratified her promise by keeping *431 her employer's payment. For that reason, it would bar suit, including suit by a worker (without other assets) who had already spent the money he received for the promise. Yet such an act of ratification could embody some of the same procedural failings that led Congress to find the promise not to sue itself invalid. For these reasons, as the majority points out, a tender back precondition requirement would run contrary to Congress' statutory command. See ante, at 426-427. Cf. 1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts 85, Comment b (1979) (a promise ratifying a voidable contract "may itself be voidable for the same reason as the original promise, or it may be voidable or unenforceable for some other reason"); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 982 (1973) ("[C]ourts must avoid allowing a recovery that has the effect of substantially enforcing the contract that has been declared unenforceable, since to do so would defeat the policy that led to the rule in the first place"). I write these additional words because I believe it important to specify that the statute need not, and does not, thereby make the worker's procedurally invalid promise totally void, i. e., without any legal effect, say, like a contract the terms of which themselves are contrary to public policy. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts 7, Comment a (1979); 2 178. Rather, the statute makes the contract that the employer and worker tried to create voidable, like a contract made with an infant, or a contract created through fraud, mistake, or duress, which contract the worker may elect either to avoid or to ratify. See 1 7, and Comment b. To determine whether a contract is voidable or void, courts typically ask whether the contract has been made under conditions that would justify giving one of the parties a choice as to validity, making it voidable, e. g., a contract with an infant; or whether enforcement of the contract would violate the law or public policy irrespective of the conditions in which the contract |
Justice Breyer | 1,998 | 2 | concurring | Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118169/oubre-v-entergy-operations-inc/ | public policy irrespective of the conditions in which the contract was formed, making it void, e. g., a contract *432 to commit murder. Compare 1 7, Comment b (voidable), with 2 178, and Comment d (void). The statute before us reflects concern about the conditions (of knowledge and free choice) surrounding the making of a contract to waive an age-discrimination claim. It does not reflect any relevant concern about enforcing the contract's substantive terms. Nor does this statute, unlike the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as amended, 45 U.S. C. 51 et seq., say that a contract waiving suit and thereby avoiding liability is void. 55. Rather, as the majority's opinion makes clear, see ante, at 426-427, the OWBPA prohibits courts from finding ratification in certain circumstances, such as those presented here, namely, a worker's retention of an employer's payment for an invalid release. That fact may affect ratification, but it need not make the contract void, rather than voidable. That the contract is voidable rather than void may prove important. For example, an absolutely void contract, it is said, "is void as to everybody whose rights would be affected by it if valid." 17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts 7, p. 31 (1991). Were a former worker's procedurally invalid promise not to sue absolutely void, might it not become legally possible for an employer to decide to cancel its own reciprocal obligation, say, to pay the worker, or to provide ongoing health benefitswhether or not the worker in question ever intended to bring a lawsuit? It seems most unlikely that Congress, enacting a statute meant to protect workers, would have wanted to createas a result of an employer's failure to follow the lawany such legal threat to all workers, whether or not they intend to bring suit. To find the contract voidable, rather than void, would offer legal protection against such threats. At the same time, treating the contract as voidable could permit an employer to recover his own reciprocal payment (or to avoid his reciprocal promise) where doing so seems *433 most fair, namely, where that recovery would not bar the worker from bringing suit. Once the worker (who has made the procedurally invalid promise not to sue) brings an agediscrimination suit, he has clearly rejected (avoided) his promise not to sue. As long as there is no "tender back" precondition, his (invalid) promise will not have barred his suit in conflict with the statute. Once he has sued, however, nothing in the statute prevents his employer from asking for restitution of his reciprocal payment or relief from any ongoing |
Justice O'Connor | 1,996 | 14 | majority | Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118007/meghrig-v-kfc-western-inc/ | We consider whether 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 76 (RCRA), 42 U.S. C. 6972, authorizes a private cause of action to recover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or the environment. We conclude that it does not. I Respondent KFC Western, Inc. (KFC), owns and operates a "Kentucky Fried Chicken" restaurant on a parcel of property in Los Angeles. In 88, KFC discovered during the course of a construction project that the property was contaminated with petroleum. The County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services ordered KFC to attend to the problem, and KFC spent $211,000 removing and disposing of the oil-tainted soil. Three years later, KFC brought this suit under the citizen suit provision of RCRA, as amended, 42 *482 U. S. C. 6972(a),[*] seeking to recover these cleanup costs from petitioners Alan and Margaret Meghrig. KFC claimed that the contaminated soil was a "solid waste" covered by RCRA, see 42 U.S. C. 6903(27), that it had previously posed an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment," see 6972(a)(1)(B), and that the Meghrigs were responsible for "equitable restitution" of KFC's cleanup costs under 6972(a) because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the waste's "past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal." See App. 12- (first amended complaint). The District Court held that 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that 6972(a)(1)(B) does not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment" at the time suit is filed, and dismissed KFC's complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. A21-A23. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, over a dissent, finding that a district court had authority under 6972(a) to award restitution of past cleanup costs, and *483 that a private party can proceed with a suit under 6972(a)(1)(B) upon an allegation that the waste at issue presented an "imminent and substantial endangerment" at the time it was cleaned up, The Ninth Circuit's conclusion regarding the remedies available under RCRA conflicts with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in and its interpretation of the "imminent endangerment" requirement represents a novel application of federal statutory law. We granted certiorari to address the conflict between the Circuits and to consider the correctness of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of RCRA, and now reverse. II RCRA is a comprehensive environmental |
Justice O'Connor | 1,996 | 14 | majority | Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118007/meghrig-v-kfc-western-inc/ | RCRA, and now reverse. II RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste. See Unlike the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 80 (CERCLA), as amended, 42 U.S. C. 9601 et seq. RCRA is not principally designed to effectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate those who have attended to the remediation of environmental hazards. Cf. General Electric RCRA's primary purpose, rather, is to reduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, "so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment." 42 U.S. C. 6902(b). Chief responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of RCRA rests with the Administrator of the Environmental *484 Protection Agency (EPA), see 6928, 6973, but like other environmental laws, RCRA contains a citizen suit provision, 6972, which permits private citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances. Two requirements of 6972(a) defeat KFC's suit against the Meghrigs. The first concerns the necessary timing of a citizen suit brought under 6972(a)(1)(B): That section permits a private party to bring suit against certain responsible persons, including former owners, "who ha[ve] contributed or who [are] contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." (Emphasis added.) The second defines the remedies a district court can award in a suit brought under 6972(a)(1)(B): Section 6972(a) authorizes district courts "to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both." (Emphasis added.) It is apparent from the two remedies described in 6972(a) that RCRA's citizen suit provision is not directed at providing compensation for past cleanup efforts. Under a plain reading of this remedial scheme, a private citizen suing under 6972(a)(1)(B) could seek a mandatory injunction, i. e., one that orders a responsible party to "take action" by attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i. e., one that "restrains" a responsible party from further violating RCRA. Neither remedy, however, is susceptible of the interpretation adopted by the Ninth Circuit, as neither contemplates the award of past cleanup costs, whether these are denominated "damages" or "equitable restitution." In this regard, a comparison between the relief |
Justice O'Connor | 1,996 | 14 | majority | Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118007/meghrig-v-kfc-western-inc/ | "equitable restitution." In this regard, a comparison between the relief available under RCRA's citizen suit provision and that which Congress *485 has provided in the analogous, but not parallel, provisions of CERCLA is telling. CERCLA was passed several years after RCRA went into effect, and it is designed to address many of the same toxic waste problems that inspired the passage of RCRA. Compare 42 U.S. C. 6903(5) (RCRA definition of "hazardous waste") and 6903(27) (RCRA definition of "solid waste") with 9601() (CERCLA provision incorporating certain "hazardous substance[s]," but specifically excluding petroleum). CERCLA differs markedly from RCRA, however, in the remedies it provides. CERCLA's citizen suit provision mimics 6972(a) in providing district courts with the authority "to order such action as may be necessary to correct the violation" of any CERCLA standard or regulation. 42 U.S. C. 9659(c). But CERCLA expressly permits the Government to recover "all costs of removal or remedial action," 9607(a)(4)(A), and it expressly permits the recovery of any "necessary costs of response, incurred by any person consistent with the national contingency plan," 9607(a)(4)(B). CERCLA also provides that "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable" for these response costs. See 9613(f)(1). Congress thus demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide for the recovery of cleanup costs, and that the language used to define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy. That RCRA's citizen suit provision was not intended to provide a remedy for past cleanup costs is further apparent from the harm at which it is directed. Section 6972(a)(1)(B) permits a private party to bring suit only upon a showing that the solid or hazardous waste at issue "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." The meaning of this timing restriction is plain: An endangerment can only be "imminent" if it "threaten[s] to occur immediately," Webster's New International Dictionary of English Language 1245 (2d ed. 34), and the reference *486 to waste which "may present" imminent harm quite clearly excludes waste that no longer presents such a danger. As the Ninth Circuit itself intimated in this language "implies that there must be a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later." It follows that 6972(a) was designed to provide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the risk of future "imminent" harms, not a remedy that compensates for past cleanup efforts. Cf. 6902(b) (national policy behind RCRA is "to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment"). |
Justice O'Connor | 1,996 | 14 | majority | Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118007/meghrig-v-kfc-western-inc/ | present and future threat to human health and the environment"). Other aspects of RCRA's enforcement scheme strongly support this conclusion. Unlike CERCLA, RCRA contains no statute of limitations, compare 9613(g)(2) (limitations period in suits under CERCLA 9607), and it does not require a showing that the response costs being sought are reasonable, compare 9607(a)(4)(A) and (B) (costs recovered under CERCLA must be "consistent with the national contingency plan"). If Congress had intended 6972(a) to function as a cost-recovery mechanism, the absence of these provisions would be striking. Moreover, with one limited exception, see a private party may not bring suit under 6972(a)(1)(B) without first giving 90 days' notice to the Administrator of the EPA, to "the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur," and to potential defendants, see 6972(b)(2)(A)(i) (iii). And no citizen suit can proceed if either the EPA or the State has commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, a separate enforcement action, see 6972(b)(2)(B) and (C). Therefore, if RCRA were designed to compensate private parties for their past cleanup efforts, it would be a wholly irrational mechanism for doing so. Those parties with insubstantial problems, problems that neither the State nor *487 the Federal Government feel compelled to address, could recover their response costs, whereas those parties whose waste problems were sufficiently severe as to attract the attention of Government officials would be left without a recovery. Though it agrees that KFC's complaint is defective for failing properly to allege an "imminent and substantial endangerment," the Government (as amicus ) nonetheless joins KFC in arguing that 6972(a) does not in all circumstances preclude an award of past cleanup costs. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22-28. The Government posits a situation in which suit is properly brought while the waste at issue continues to pose an imminent endangerment, and suggests that the plaintiff in such a case could seek equitable restitution of money previously spent on cleanup efforts. Echoing a similar argument made by KFC, see Brief for Respondent 11-, the Government does not rely on the remedies expressly provided in 6972(a), but rather cites a line of cases holding that district courts retain inherent authority to award any equitable remedy that is not expressly taken away from them by Congress. See, e. g., ; Wyandotte Transp. ; Hecht RCRA does not prevent a private party from recovering its cleanup costs under other federal or state laws, see 6972(f) (preserving remedies under statutory and common law), but the limited remedies described in 6972(a), along with the stark differences between the language of that section and the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,996 | 14 | majority | Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118007/meghrig-v-kfc-western-inc/ | stark differences between the language of that section and the cost recovery provisions of CERCLA, amply demonstrate that Congress did not intend for a private citizen to be able to undertake a cleanup and then proceed to recover its costs under RCRA. As we explained in Middlesex County Sewerage where Congress has provided "elaborate enforcement provisions" for remedying the violation *488 of a federal statute, as Congress has done with RCRA and CERCLA, "it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens suing under" the statute. "`[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.' " at -15 ). Without considering whether a private party could seek to obtain an injunction requiring another party to pay cleanup costs which arise after a RCRA citizen suit has been properly commenced, cf. United (CA3 82) (requiring funding of a diagnostic study is an appropriate form of relief in a suit brought by the Administrator under 6973), or otherwise recover cleanup costs paid out after the invocation of RCRA's statutory process, we agree with the Meghrigs that a private party cannot recover the cost of a past cleanup effort under RCRA, and that KFC's complaint is defective for the reasons stated by the District Court. Section 6972(a) does not contemplate the award of past cleanup costs, and 6972(a)(1)(B) permits a private party to bring suit only upon an allegation that the contaminated site presently poses an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment," and not upon an allegation that it posed such an endangerment at some time in the past. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Irizarry v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145796/irizarry-v-united-states/ | Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated in response to our decision in states that "[b]efore the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party's prehearing submission, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure." The question presented by this case is whether that Rule applies to every sentence that is a variance from the recommended Federal Sentencing Guidelines range even though not considered a "departure" as that term was used when Rule 32(h) was promulgated. I Petitioner, Richard Irizarry, pleaded guilty to one count of making a threatening interstate communication, in violation of (c). Petitioner made the following admissions in the factual resume accompanying his plea: (1) On November 5, 2003, he sent an e-mail threatening to kill his ex-wife and her new husband; (2) he had sent "dozens" of similar e-mails in violation of a restraining order; (3) he intended the e-mails to "convey true threats to kill or injure multiple persons"; and () at all times he acted knowingly and willfully. App. 273-275. The presentence report (PSR), in addition to describing the threatening e-mails, reported that petitioner had asked another inmate to kill his ex-wife's new husband. Brief for United States 6. The PSR advised against an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and recommended a Guidelines sentencing range of 1-to-51 months of imprisonment, based on enhancements for violating court protective orders, making multiple threats, and intending to carry out those threats. Brief for Petitioner 9. As possible grounds for a departure, the probation officer stated that petitioner's criminal history category might not adequately reflect his "`past criminal conduct or the likelihood that [petitioner] will commit other crimes.'" The Government made no objection to the PSR, but advised the court that it intended to call petitioner's ex-wife as a witness at the sentencing hearing. App. 293. Petitioner objected to the PSR's application of the enhancement based on his intention to carry out the threats and its rejection of an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Four witnesses testified at the sentencing hearing. Petitioner's ex-wife described incidents of domestic violence, the basis for the restraining order against petitioner, and the threats petitioner made against her and her family and friends. She emphasized at some length her genuine concern that petitioner fully intended to carry out his threats. A special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was called to describe documents recovered from petitioner's vehicle when he was arrested; those documents indicated he intended |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Irizarry v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145796/irizarry-v-united-states/ | vehicle when he was arrested; those documents indicated he intended to track down his ex-wife and their children. Petitioner's cellmate next testified that petitioner "was obsessed with the idea of getting rid of" *2201 his ex-wife's husband. Finally, petitioner testified at some length, stating that he accepted responsibility for the e-mails, but that he did not really intend to carry out his threats. Petitioner also denied speaking to his cellmate about killing his ex-wife's husband. After hearing from counsel, the trial judge delivered a thoughtful oral decision, which included findings resolving certain disputed issues of fact. She found that petitioner had deliberately terrorized his ex-wife, that he intended to carry out one or more of his threats, "that he still intends to terrorize Ms. Smith by whatever means he can and that he does not accept responsibility for what he has done." After giving both petitioner and counsel an opportunity to make further comment, the judge concluded: "I've considered all of the evidence presented today, I've considered everything that's in the presentence report, and I've considered the statutory purpose of sentencing and the sentencing guideline range. I find the guideline range is not appropriate in this case. I find Mr. Irizarry's conduct most disturbing. I am sincerely convinced that he will continue, as his ex-wife testified, in this conduct regardless of what this court does and regardless of what kind of supervision he's under. And based upon that, I find that the maximum time that he can be incapacitated is what is best for society, and therefore the guideline range, I think, is not high enough. "The guideline range goes up to 51 months, which is only nine months shorter than the statutory maximum. But I think in Mr. Irizarry's case the statutory maximum is what's appropriate, and that's what I'm going to sentence him." The court imposed a sentence of 60 months of imprisonment to be followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. Defense counsel then raised the objection that presents the issue before us today. He stated, "We didn't have notice of [the court's] intent to upwardly depart. What the law is on that now with," to which the Court responded, "I think the law on that is out the window You had notice that the guidelines were only advisory and the court could sentence anywhere within the statutory range." The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed petitioner's sentence, reasoning that Rule 32(h) did not apply because "the above-guidelines sentence imposed by the district court in this case was a variance, not a guidelines departure." |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Irizarry v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145796/irizarry-v-united-states/ | in this case was a variance, not a guidelines departure." The Court of Appeals declined to extend the rule to variances. "After [United] parties are inherently on notice that the sentencing guidelines range is advisory. Given Booker, parties cannot claim unfair surprise or inability to present informed comment." Because the Courts of Appeals are divided with respect to the applicability of Rule 32(h) to Guidelines variances,[1] we granted *2202 certiorari. 552 U.S. We now affirm. II At the time of our decision in the Guidelines were mandatory; the Sentencing Reform Act of 198, 211 et seq., prohibited district courts from disregarding "the mechanical dictates of the Guidelines" except in narrowly defined Confronted with the constitutional problems that might otherwise arise, we held that the provision of Rule 32 that allowed parties an opportunity to comment on the appropriate sentencenow Rule 32(i)(1)(C)would be "render[ed] meaningless" unless the defendant were given notice of any contemplated departure. Justice SOUTER disagreed with our conclusion with respect to the text of Rule 32 and conducted a due process analysis. (dissenting opinion). Any expectation subject to due process protection at the time we decided that a criminal defendant would receive a sentence within the presumptively applicable guideline range did not survive our decision in United which invalidated the mandatory features of the Guidelines. Now faced with advisory Guidelines, neither the Government nor the defendant may place the same degree of reliance on the type of "expectancy" that gave rise to a special need for notice in Indeed, a sentence outside the Guidelines carries no presumption of unreasonableness. ; see also It is, therefore, no longer the case that "were we to read Rule 32 to dispense with notice [of a contemplated non-Guidelines sentence], we would then have to confront the serious question whether [such] notice in this setting is mandated by the Due Process Clause." The due process concerns that motivated the Court to require notice in a world of mandatory Guidelines no longer provide a basis for this Court to extend the rule set forth in either through an interpretation of Rule 32(h) itself or through Rule 32(i)(1)(C). And contrary to what the dissent argues, post, at 220-2205 (opinion of BREYER, J.), the rule does not apply to 3553 variances by its terms. "Departure" is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines. The notice requirement set out in applied to a narrow category of cases. The only relevant departures were those authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3553(b) (1988 ed.), which required |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Irizarry v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145796/irizarry-v-united-states/ | those authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3553(b) (1988 ed.), which required "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." That determination could only be made based on "the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission." And the notice requirement only applied to the subcategory of those departures that were based on "a ground not identified as a ground for departure either in the presentence report or in a pre-hearing submission." -139, ; see also Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(h). Although the Guidelines, as the "starting point and the initial benchmark," continue to play a role in the sentencing determination, see Gall, *2203 552 U.S., at there is no longer a limit comparable to the one at issue in on the variances from Guidelines ranges that a District Court may find justified under the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. V). Rule 32(i)(1)(C) requires the district court to allow the parties to comment on "matters relating to an appropriate sentence," and given the scope of the issues that may be considered at a sentencing hearing, a judge will normally be well-advised to withhold her final judgment until after the parties have had a full opportunity to present their evidence and their arguments. Sentencing is "a fluid and dynamic process and the court itself may not know until the end whether a variance will be adopted, let alone on what grounds." United Adding a special notice requirement whenever a judge is contemplating a variance may create unnecessary delay; a judge who concludes during the sentencing hearing that a variance is appropriate may be forced to continue the hearing even where the content of the Rule 32(h) notice would not affect the parties' presentation of argument and evidence. In the case before us today, even if we assume that the judge had contemplated a variance before the sentencing hearing began, the record does not indicate that a statement announcing that possibility would have changed the parties' presentations in any material way; nor do we think it would in most cases. The Government admits as much in arguing that the error here was harmless. Brief for United States 37-38. Sound practice dictates that judges in all cases should make sure that the information provided to the parties in advance of the hearing, and in the hearing itself, has given them an adequate opportunity to confront and debate the |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Irizarry v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145796/irizarry-v-united-states/ | given them an adequate opportunity to confront and debate the relevant issues. We recognize that there will be some cases in which the factual basis for a particular sentence will come as a surprise to a defendant or the Government. The more appropriate response to such a problem is not to extend the reach of Rule 32(h)'s notice requirement categorically, but rather for a district judge to consider granting a continuance when a party has a legitimate basis for claiming that the surprise was prejudicial. As Judge Boudin has noted, "In the normal case a competent lawyer. will anticipate most of what might occur at the sentencing hearingbased on the trial, the pre-sentence report, the exchanges of the parties concerning the report, and the preparation of mitigation evidence. Garden variety considerations of culpability, criminal history, likelihood of re-offense, seriousness of the crime, nature of the conduct and so forth should not generally come as a surprise to trial lawyers who have prepared for sentencing." Vega-Santiago, The fact that Rule 32(h) remains in effect today does not justify extending its protections to variances; the justification for our decision in no longer exists and such an extension is apt to complicate rather than to simplify sentencing procedures. We have confidence in the ability of district judges and counselespecially in light of Rule 32's other procedural protections[2]to make sure that all relevant *220 matters relating to a sentencing decision have been considered before the final sentencing determination is made. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | second_dissenting | Smith v. Wade | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110915/smith-v-wade/ | Although I agree with the result reached in JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent, I write separately because I cannot agree with the approach taken by either the Court or JUSTICE REHNQUIST. Both opinions engage in exhaustive, but ultimately unilluminating, exegesis of the common law of the availability of punitive damages in 1871. Although both the Court and JUSTICE REHNQUIST display admirable skills in legal research and analysis of great numbers of musty cases, the results do not significantly further the goal of the inquiry: to establish the intent of the 42d Congress. In interpreting 1983, we have often looked to the common law as it existed in 1871, in the belief that, when Congress was silent on a point, it intended to adopt the principles of the common law with which it was familiar. See, e. g., ; This approach makes sense when there was a generally prevailing rule of common law, for then it is reasonable to assume that Congressmen were familiar with that rule and imagined that it would cover the cause of action that they were creating. But when a significant split in authority existed, it strains credulity to argue that Congress simply assumed that one view rather than the other would govern. Particularly in a case like this one, in which those interpreting the common law of 1871 must resort to dictionaries in an attempt to translate the language of the late 19th century into terms that judges of the late 20th century can understand, see ante, at 39-41, n. 8; 61-64, nn. 3, 4, and in an area in which the courts of the earlier period frequently used inexact and contradictory language, see ante, at 45-47, n. 12, we cannot safely infer anything about congressional intent from the divided contemporaneous judicial opinions. The battle of the string citations can have no winner. Once it is established that the common law of 1871 provides us with no real guidance on this question, we should turn to the policies underlying 1983 to determine which rule best accords with those policies. In Fact Concerts, we identified the purposes of 1983 as pre-eminently to compensate victims of constitutional violations and to deter further See also ; and n. 9. The conceded availability of compensatory damages, particularly when coupled with the availability of attorney's fees under 1988, completely fulfills the goal of compensation, leaving only deterrence to be served by awards of punitive damages. We must then confront the close question whether a standard permitting an award of unlimited punitive damages on the basis of recklessness will chill public officials in the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | second_dissenting | Smith v. Wade | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110915/smith-v-wade/ | the basis of recklessness will chill public officials in the performance of their duties more than it will deter violations of the Constitution, and whether the availability of punitive damages for reckless violations of the Constitution in addition to attorney's fees will create an *94 incentive to bring an ever-increasing flood of 1983 claims, threatening the ability of the federal courts to handle those that are meritorious. Although I cannot concur in JUSTICE REHNQUIST's wholesale condemnation of awards of punitive damages in any context or with the suggestion that punitive damages should not be available even for intentional or malicious violations of constitutional rights, I do agree with the discussion in Part V of his opinion of the special problems of permitting awards of punitive damages for the recklessness of public officials. Since awards of compensatory damages and attorney's fees already provide significant deterrence, I am persuaded that the policies counseling against awarding punitive damages for the recklessness of public officials outweigh the desirability of any incremental deterrent effect that such awards may have. Consequently, I dissent. |
Justice Marshall | 1,976 | 15 | majority | Charlotte v. Firefighters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109471/charlotte-v-firefighters/ | The city of Charlotte, N. C., refuses to withhold from the paychecks of its firefighters dues owing to their *284 union, Local 660, International Association of Firefighters. We must decide whether this refusal violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I Local 660 represents about 351 of the 543 uniformed members of the Charlotte Fire Department. Since 1969 the union and individual members have repeatedly requested the city to withhold dues owing to the union from the paychecks of those union members who agree to a checkoff. The city has refused each request. After the union learned that it could obtain a private group life insurance policy for its membership only if it had a dues checkoff agreement with the city, the union and its officers filed suit in federal court alleging, inter alia, that the city's refusal to withhold the dues of union members violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[1] The complaint asserted that *285 since the city withheld amounts from its employees' paychecks for payment to various other organizations, it could not arbitrarily refuse to withhold amounts for payment to the union. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina ruled against the city. The court determined that, although the city had no written guidelines, its "practice has been to allow check offs from employees' pay to organizations or programs as required by law or where the check off option is available to all City employees or where the check off option is available to all employees within a single employee unit such as the Fire Department." The court further found that the city has "not allowed check off options serving only single employees or programs which are not available either to all City employees or to all employees engaged in a particular section of City employment." Finding, however, that withholding union dues from the paychecks of union members would be no more difficult than processing any other deduction allowed by the city, the District Court concluded that the city had not offered a rational explanation for its refusal to withhold for the union. Accordingly, the District Court held that the city's refusal to withhold moneys when requested to do so by the respondents for the benefit of Local 660 "constitutes a violation of the individual [respondents'] rights to equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment." at -503. The court ordered that so long as the city continued "without clearly stated and fair standards, to withhold moneys from the paychecks of City employees for other |
Justice Marshall | 1,976 | 15 | majority | Charlotte v. Firefighters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109471/charlotte-v-firefighters/ | withhold moneys from the paychecks of City employees for other purposes," it was enjoined from refusing to withhold union dues from the paychecks of the respondents. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and we granted certiorari. We reverse. *286 II Since it is not here assertedand this Court would reject such a contention if it were madethat respondents' status as union members or their interest in obtaining a dues checkoff is such as to entitle them to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, the city's practice must meet only a relatively relaxed standard of reasonableness in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.[2] The city presents three justifications for its refusal to allow the dues checkoff requested by respondents. First, it argues, North Carolina law makes it illegal for the city to enter into a contract with a municipal union, N. C. Gen. Stat. 95-98 and an agreement with union members to provide a dues checkoff, with the union as a third-party beneficiary, would in effect be such a contract. See 40 N. C. Op. Atty. Gen. 591 Thus, compliance with the state law, and with the public policy it represents of discouraging dealing with municipal unions, is said to provide a sufficient basis for refusing respondents' request. Second, it claims, a dues checkoff is a proper subject of collective bargaining, which the city asserts Congress may shortly require of state and local governments. Under this theory, the desire to preserve the checkoff as a bargaining chip in any future collective-bargaining process is in itself an adequate basis for the refusal. Lastly, the city contends, allowing withholding only when it benefits all city or departmental employees is a legitimate method for avoiding the burden of withholding money for all persons or organizations that request a checkoff. Because we find that this explanation provides a sufficient justification for *287 the challenged practice, we have no occasion to address the first two reasons proffered. The city submitted affidavits to show that it would be unduly burdensome and expensive for it to withhold money for every organization or person that requested it, App. 17, 45, 55, and respondents did not contest this showing. As respondents concede, it was therefore reasonable, and permissible under the Equal Protection Clause, for the city to develop standards or restrictions to determine who would be eligible for withholding. Mathews v. Diaz, ante, at 82-83. See Brief for Respondents 9. Within the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause, of course, the choice of those standards is for the city and not for the courts. Thus, our inquiry |
Justice Marshall | 1,976 | 15 | majority | Charlotte v. Firefighters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109471/charlotte-v-firefighters/ | the city and not for the courts. Thus, our inquiry is not whether standards might be drawn that would include the union but whether the standards that were drawn were reasonable ones with "some basis in practical experience." South Of course, the fact that the standards were drawn and applied in practice rather than pursuant to articulated guidelines is of no import for equal protection purposes. The city allows withholding for taxes, retirement-insurance programs, savings programs, and certain charitable organizations.[3] These categories, the District *288 Court found, are those in which the checkoff option can, or must, be availed of by all city employees, or those in an entire department. Although the District Court found that this classification did not present a rational basis for rejecting respondents' requests, 381 F. Supp., at we disagree. The city has determined that it will provide withholding only for programs of general interest in which all city or departmental employees can, without more, participate. Employees can participate in the union checkoff only if they join an outside organization the union. Thus, Local 660 does not fit the category of groups for which the city will withhold. We cannot say that denying withholding to associational or special interest groups that claim only some departmental employees as members and that employees must first join before being eligible to participate in the checkoff marks an arbitrary line so devoid of reason as to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, this division seems a reasonable method for providing the benefit of withholding to employees in their status as employees, while limiting the number of instances of withholding and the financial and administrative burdens attendant thereon. Given the permissibility of creating standards and the reasonableness of the standards created, the District Court's conclusion that it would be no more difficult for the city to withhold dues for the union than to process other deductions is of no import. We may accept, arguendo, that the difficulty involved in processing any individual deduction is neither great nor different in kind from that involved in processing any other deduction. However, the city has not drawn its lines in order to exclude individual deductions, but in order to avoid the cumulative burden of processing deductions every time a request is made; and inherent in such a line-drawing process are difficult choices and "some harsh and apparently arbitrary consequences" Mathews v. Diaz, *289 ante, at 83. See ante, at 82-84; Cf. ; Respondents recognize the legitimacy of such a process and concede that the city "is free to develop fair and reasonable standards to |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | The question presented is whether a person who has not submitted a claim against a bankruptcy has a right to a jury trial when sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover an allegedly fraudulent monetary transfer. We hold that the Seventh Amendment entitles such a person to a trial by jury, notwithstanding Congress' designation of fraudulent conveyance actions as "core proceedings" in 28 U.S. C. 157(b)(2)(H) (1982 ed., Supp. V). I The Chase & Sanborn Corporation filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1983. A plan of reorganization approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida vested in respondent Nordberg, the trustee in bankruptcy, causes of action for fraudulent conveyances. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. In respondent filed suit against petitioners Granfinanciera, S. A., and Medex, Ltda., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The complaint alleged that petitioners had received $1.7 million from Chase & Sanborn's corporate predecessor within one year of the date its bankruptcy petition was filed, without receiving consideration or reasonably equivalent value in return. Respondent sought to avoid what he alleged were constructively and actually fraudulent transfers and to recover damages, costs, expenses, and interest under 11 U.S. C. 548(a)(1) and (a)(2), 550(a)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). App. to Pet. for Cert. 41. The District Court referred the proceedings to the Bankruptcy Court. Over five months later, and shortly before the Colombian Government nationalized Granfinanciera, respondent *37 served a summons on petitioners in Bogota, Colombia. In their answer to the complaint following Granfinanciera's nationalization, both petitioners requested a "trial by jury on all issues so triable." App. 7. The Bankruptcy Judge denied petitioners' request for a jury trial, deeming a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer "a core action that originally, under the English common law, as I understand it, was a non-jury issue." App. to Pet. for Cert. 34. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed with prejudice respondent's actual fraud claim but entered judgment for respondent on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The District Court affirmed without discussing petitioners' claim that they were entitled to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also affirmed. The court found that petitioners lacked a statutory right to a jury trial, because the constructive fraud provision under which suit was brought 11 U.S. C. 548(a)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. V) contains no mention of a right to a jury trial, and 28 U.S. |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | of a right to a jury trial, and 28 U.S. C. 1411 (1982 ed., Supp. V) "affords jury trials only in personal injury or wrongful death suits." The Court of Appeals further ruled that the Seventh Amendment supplied no right to a jury trial, because actions to recover fraudulent conveyances are equitable in nature, even when a plaintiff seeks only monetary relief, and because "bankruptcy itself is equitable in nature and thus bankruptcy proceedings are inherently equitable." The court read our opinion in to say that "Congress may convert a creditor's legal right into an equitable claim and displace any seventh amendment right to trial by jury," and held that Congress had done so by designating fraudulent conveyance actions "core proceedings" triable by bankruptcy judges sitting without juries. 835 F.2d, *38 We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners were entitled to a jury trial, and now reverse. II Before considering petitioners' claim to a jury trial, we must confront a preliminary argument. Respondent contends that the judgment below should be affirmed with respect to Granfinanciera though not Medex because Granfinanciera was a commercial instrumentality of the Colombian Government when it made its request for a jury trial. Respondent argues that the Seventh Amendment preserves only those jury trial rights recognized in England at common law in the late 18th century, and that foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities were immune from suit at common law. Suits against foreign sovereigns are only possible, respondent asserts, in accordance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S. C. 1330, 1602-1611, and respondent reads 1330(a)[1] to prohibit trial by jury of a case against a foreign state. Respondent concludes that Granfinanciera has no right to a jury trial, regardless of the merits of Medex's Seventh Amendment claim. We decline to address this argument because respondent failed to raise it below and because the question it poses has not been adequately briefed and argued. Without cross-petitioning for certiorari, a prevailing party may, of course, "defend its judgment on any ground properly raised below whether or not that ground was relied upon, rejected, or even considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals," provided that an affirmance on the alternative ground would neither expand nor contract the rights of either party established by the judgment below. See, e. g., ; United Respondent's present defense of the judgment, however, is not one he advanced below.[2] Although "we could consider grounds supporting [the] judgment different from those on which the Court of Appeals rested its decision," "where the ground presented here has |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | Appeals rested its decision," "where the ground presented here has not been raised below we exercise this authority `only in exceptional cases.' " quoting This is not such an exceptional case. Not only do we lack guidance from the District Court or the Court of Appeals on this issue, but difficult questions remain whether a jury trial is available to a foreign state upon request under 28 U.S. C. 1330 and, if not, under what circumstances a business enterprise that has since become an arm of a foreign state may be entitled to a jury trial. Compare Gould, (jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1330 determined by party's status when act complained of occurred); Morgan Guaranty Trust of N. (status at time complaint was filed is decisive for 1330 jurisdiction), with ; cert. denied, Moreover, petitioners alleged in their reply brief, without contradiction by respondent at oral argument, that affirmance on the ground that respondent now urges would "unquestionably enlarge the respondent's rights under the circuit court's decision and concomitantly decrease those of the petitioner" by "open[ing] up new areas of discovery in aid of execution" and by allowing respondent, for the first time, to recover any judgment he wins against Granfinanciera from Colombia's central banking institutions and possibly those of other Colombian governmental instrumentalities. Reply Brief for Petitioners 19. Whatever the merits of these claims, their plausibility, coupled with respondent's failure to offer rebuttal, furnishes an additional reason not to consider respondent's novel argument in support of the judgment at this late stage in the litigation. We therefore leave for another day the questions respondent's argument raises under the FSIA. III Petitioners rest their claim to a jury trial on the Seventh Amendment alone.[3] The Seventh Amendment provides: "In *41 Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." We have consistently interpreted the phrase "Suits at common law" to refer to "suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered." Although "the thrust of the *42 Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791," the Seventh Amendment also applies to actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty. The form of our analysis is familiar. "First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | familiar. "First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature." The second stage of this analysis is more important than the first. If, on balance, these two factors indicate that a party is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, we must decide whether Congress may assign and has assigned resolution of the relevant claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that does not use a jury as factfinder.[4] *43 A There is no dispute that actions to recover preferential or fraudulent transfers were often brought at law in late 18th-century England. As we noted in (2) : "In England, long prior to the enactment of our first Judiciary Act, common law actions of trover and money had and received were resorted to for the recovery of preferential payments by bankrupts." See, e. g., Smith v. Payne, 6 T. R. 152, 101 Eng. Rep. 484 (K. B. 1795) (trover); Barnes v. Freeland, 6 T. R. 80, 101 Eng. Rep. (K. B. 17) (trover); Smith v. Hodson, 4 T. R. 211, 100 Eng. Rep. 979 (K. B. 1791) (assumpsit; goods sold and delivered); Vernon v. Hanson, 2 T. R. 287, 100 Eng. Rep. 156 (K. B. 1788) (assumpsit; money had and received); Thompson v. Freeman, 1 T. R. 155, 99 Eng. Rep. 1026 (K. B. 1786) (trover); Rust v. Cooper, 2 Cowp. 629, 98 Eng. Rep. 1277 (K. B. 1777) (trover); Harman v. Fishar, 1 Cowp. 117, 98 Eng. Rep. 998 (K. B. 1774) (trover); Martin v. Pewtress, 4 Burr. 2477, 98 Eng. Rep. 299 (K. B. 1769) (trover); Alderson v. Temple, 4 Burr. 2235, 98 Eng. Rep. 165 (K. B. 1768) (trover). These actions, like all suits at law, were conducted before juries. Respondent does not challenge this proposition or even contend that actions to recover fraudulent conveyances or preferential transfers were more than occasionally tried in courts of equity. He asserts only that courts of equity had concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law over fraudulent conveyance actions. Brief for Respondent 37-38. While respondent's assertion that courts of equity sometimes provided relief in fraudulent conveyance actions is true, however, it hardly suffices to undermine petitioners' submission that the present action for monetary relief would not have sounded in equity 200 years ago in England. In at we contrasted suits at law with "those where equitable rights alone were recognized" in holding that the Seventh Amendment |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | rights alone were recognized" in holding that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury *44 trial applies to all but the latter actions. Respondent adduces no authority to buttress the claim that suits to recover an allegedly fraudulent transfer of money, of the sort that he has brought, were typically or indeed ever entertained by English courts of equity when the Seventh Amendment was adopted. In fact, prior decisions of this Court, see, e. g., and scholarly authority compel the contrary conclusion: "[W]hether the trustee's suit should be at law or in equity is to be judged by the same standards that are applied to any other owner of property which is wrongfully withheld. If the subject matter is a chattel, and is still in the grantee's possession, an action in trover or replevin would be the trustee's remedy; and if the fraudulent transfer was of cash, the trustee's action would be for money had and received. Such actions at law are as available to the trustee to-day as they were in the English courts of long ago. If, on the other hand, the subject matter is land or an intangible, or the trustee needs equitable aid for an accounting or the like, he may invoke the equitable process, and that also is beyond dispute." 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences 98, pp. 183-184 (footnotes omitted). The two cases respondent discusses confirm this account of English practice. Ex parte Scudamore, 3 Ves. jun. 85, 30 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ch. 1796), involved the debtor's assignment of his share of a law partnership's receivables to repay a debt shortly before the debtor was declared bankrupt. Other creditors petitioned chancery for an order directing the debtor's law partner to hand over for general distribution among creditors the debtor's current and future shares of the partnership's receivables, which he held in trust for the assignee. The Chancellor refused to do so, finding the proposal inequitable. Instead, he directed the creditors to bring an action at law against the assignee if they thought themselves entitled *45 to relief. Although this case demonstrates that fraudulent conveyance actions could be brought in equity, it does not show that suits to recover a definite sum of money would be decided by a court of equity when a petitioner did not seek distinctively equitable remedies. The creditors in Ex parte Scudamore asked the Chancellor to provide injunctive relief by ordering the debtor's former law partner to convey to them the debtor's share of the partnership's receivables that came into his possession in the future, along with receivables he |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | into his possession in the future, along with receivables he then held in trust for the debtor. To the extent that they asked the court to order relinquishment of a specific preferential transfer rather than ongoing equitable relief, the Chancellor dismissed their suit and noted that the proper means of recovery would be an action at law against the transferee. Respondent's own cause of action is of precisely that sort. Hobbs v. Hull, 1 Cox 445, 29 Eng. Rep. 1242 (Ch. 1788), also fails to advance respondent's case. The assignees in bankruptcy there sued to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance of real in trust by a husband to his wife, in return for her relinquishment of a cause of action in divorce upon discovering his adultery. The court dismissed the suit, finding that the transfer was not fraudulent, and allowed the assignees to bring an ejectment or other legal action in the law courts. The salient point is that the bankruptcy assignees sought the traditional equitable remedy of setting aside a conveyance of land in trust, rather than the recovery of money or goods, and that the court refused to decide their legal claim to ejectment once it had ruled that no equitable remedy would lie. The court's sweeping statement that "Courts of Equity have most certainly been in the habit of exercising a concurrent jurisdiction with the Courts of Law on the statutes of Elizabeth respecting fraudulent conveyances," 30 Eng. Rep., at 1242, is not supported by reference to any cases that sought the recovery of a fixed sum of money without the need for an accounting or *46 other equitable relief. Nor has respondent repaired this deficit.[5] We therefore conclude that respondent would have had to bring his action to recover an alleged fraudulent conveyance *47 of a determinate sum of money at law in 18th-century England, and that a court of equity would not have adjudicated it.[6] B The nature of the relief respondent seeks strongly supports our preliminary finding that the right he invokes should be denominated legal rather than equitable. Our decisions establish beyond peradventure that "[i]n cases of fraud or mistake, as under any other head of chancery jurisdiction, a court of the United States will not sustain a bill in equity to obtain only a decree for the payment of money by way of *48 damages, when the like amount can be recovered at law in an action sounding in tort or for money had and received." citing ; ; See also Atlas ; quoting ; Dairy Queen, ; Indeed, in our |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | Atlas ; quoting ; Dairy Queen, ; Indeed, in our view (2), removes all doubt that respondent's cause of action should be characterized as legal rather than as equitable. In Schoenthal, the trustee in bankruptcy sued in equity to recover alleged preferential payments, claiming that it had no adequate remedy at law. As in this case, the recipients of the payments apparently did not file claims against the bankruptcy The Court held that the suit had to proceed at law instead, because the long-settled rule that suits in equity will not be sustained where a complete remedy exists at law, then codified at 28 U.S. C. 384, "serves to guard the right of trial by jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment and to that end it should be liberally construed." 287 U.S., at The Court found that the trustee's suit indistinguishable from respondent's suit in all relevant respects could not go forward in equity because an adequate remedy *49 was available at law. There, as here, "[t]he preferences sued for were money payments of ascertained and definite amounts," and "[t]he bill discloses no facts that call for an accounting or other equitable relief." Respondent's fraudulent conveyance action plainly seeks relief traditionally provided by law courts or on the law side of courts having both legal and equitable dockets.[7] Unless Congress may and has permissibly withdrawn jurisdiction over that action by courts of law and assigned it exclusively to non-Article III tribunals sitting without juries, the Seventh Amendment guarantees petitioners a jury trial upon request. IV Prior to passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Stat. 2549 (1978 Act), "[s]uits to recover preferences constitute[d] no part of the proceedings in bankruptcy." *50 at -95. Although related to bankruptcy proceedings, fraudulent conveyance and preference actions brought by a trustee in bankruptcy were deemed separate, plenary suits to which the Seventh Amendment applied. While the 1978 Act brought those actions within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, it preserved parties' rights to trial by jury as they existed prior to the effective date of the 1978 Act. 28 U.S. C. 1480(a) (repealed). The Amendments, however, designated fraudulent conveyance actions "core proceedings," 28 U.S. C. 157(b)(2)(H) (1982 ed., Supp. V), which bankruptcy judges may adjudicate and in which they may issue final judgments, 157(b)(1), if a district court has referred the matter to them, 157(a). We are not obliged to decide today whether bankruptcy courts may conduct jury trials in fraudulent conveyance suits brought by a trustee against a person who has not entered a claim against the either in the |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | has not entered a claim against the either in the rare procedural posture of this case, see or under the current statutory scheme, see 28 U.S. C. 1411 (1982 ed., Supp. V). Nor need we decide whether, if Congress has authorized bankruptcy courts to hold jury trials in such actions, that authorization comports with Article III when non-Article III judges preside over the actions subject to review in, or withdrawal by, the district courts. We also need not consider whether jury trials conducted by a bankruptcy court would satisfy the Seventh Amendment's command that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law," given that district courts may presently set aside clearly erroneous factual findings by bankruptcy courts. Bkrtcy. Rule 8013. The sole issue before us is whether the Seventh Amendment confers on petitioners a right to a jury trial in the face of Congress' decision to allow a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate the claims against them. * A In Atlas we noted that "when Congress creates new statutory `public rights,' it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be `preserved' in `suits at common law.' " We emphasized, however, that Congress' power to block application of the Seventh Amendment to a cause of action has limits. Congress may only deny trials by jury in actions at law, we said, in cases where "public rights" are litigated: "Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those situations involving `public rights,' e. g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights. Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well as a vast range of other cases, are not at all implicated."[8] We adhere to that general teaching. As we said in Atlas : " `On the common law side of the federal courts, the aid of juries is not only deemed appropriate but is required by the Constitution itself.' " at n. 7, quoting (2). Congress may devise novel causes of action involving public rights free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment if it assigns their adjudication to tribunals without statutory authority to employ juries as factfinders.[9] But it lacks the power to strip parties *52 contesting matters of private right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury. As we recognized in Atlas to hold otherwise would be to |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | we recognized in Atlas to hold otherwise would be to permit Congress to eviscerate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee by assigning to administrative agencies or courts of equity all causes of action not grounded in state law, whether they originate in a newly fashioned regulatory scheme or possess a long line of common-law forebears. -458. The Constitution nowhere grants Congress such puissant authority. "[L]egal claims are not magically converted into equitable issues by their presentation to a court of equity," nor can Congress conjure away the Seventh Amendment by mandating that traditional legal claims be brought there or taken to an administrative tribunal. In certain situations, of course, Congress may fashion causes of action that are closely analogous to common-law claims and place them beyond the ambit of the Seventh Amendment by assigning their resolution to a forum in which jury trials are unavailable. See, e. g., Atlas at -461 ; See also -383 ; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Congress' power to do so is limited, however, just as its power to place adjudicative authority in non-Article III tribunals is circumscribed. See v. *53 Union Carbide Agricultural Products 589, 593-5 ; ; Northern Pipeline Construction v. Marathon Pipe Line ; Unless a legal cause of action involves "public rights," Congress may not deprive parties litigating over such a right of the Seventh Amendment's guarantee to a jury trial. In Atlas we noted that Congress may effectively supplant a common-law cause of action carrying with it a right to a jury trial with a statutory cause of action shorn of a jury trial right if that statutory cause of action inheres in, or lies against, the Federal Government in its sovereign capacity. Our case law makes plain, however, that the class of "public rights" whose adjudication Congress may assign to administrative agencies or courts of equity sitting without juries is more expansive than Atlas 's discussion suggests. Indeed, our decisions point to the conclusion that, if a statutory cause of action is legal in nature, the question whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does not employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer as the question whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal. For if a statutory cause of action, such as respondent's right to recover a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S. C. 548(a)(2), is not a "public right" for Article III purposes, then Congress may not assign its adjudication to a specialized non-Article III court lacking "the essential attributes |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | to a specialized non-Article III court lacking "the essential attributes of the judicial power." at And if the action must be tried under the auspices of an Article III court, then the Seventh Amendment affords the parties a right to a jury trial whenever the cause of action is legal in nature. Conversely, if Congress may assign the adjudication of a statutory cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal, then the *54 Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder. See, e. g., Atlas ; ; at In addition to our Seventh Amendment precedents, we therefore rely on our decisions exploring the restrictions Article III places on Congress' choice of adjudicative bodies to resolve disputes over statutory rights to determine whether petitioners are entitled to a jury trial. In our most recent discussion of the "public rights" doctrine as it bears on Congress' power to commit adjudication of a statutory cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal, we rejected the view that "a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise `between the government and others.' " Northern Pipeline Construction quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 4 We held, instead, that the Federal Government need not be a party for a case to revolve around "public rights." v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products ; The crucial question, in cases not involving the Federal Government, is whether "Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, [has] create[d] a seemingly `private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary." at 593-5. See (challenged provision involves public rights because "the dispute arises in the context of a federal regulatory scheme that virtually occupies the field"). If a statutory right is not closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program Congress has power to enact, and if that right neither belongs to nor exists against the Federal Government, *55 then it must be adjudicated by an Article III court.[10] If the right is legal in nature, then it carries with it the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial. B Although the issue admits of some debate, a bankruptcy trustee's right to recover a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S. C. 548(a)(2) seems to us more accurately characterized as a private rather than a public right as we have used those terms in our Article III decisions. In Northern Pipeline Construction the plurality noted *56 that the restructuring of debtor-creditor |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | Construction the plurality noted *56 that the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations in bankruptcy "may well be a `public right.' "[11] But the plurality also emphasized that state-law causes of action for breach of contract or warranty are paradigmatic private rights, even when asserted by an insolvent corporation in the midst of Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. The plurality further said that "matters from their nature subject to `a suit at common law or in equity or admiralty' " lie at the "protected core" of Article III judicial power, ; see a point we reaffirmed in There can be little doubt that fraudulent conveyance actions by bankruptcy trustees suits which, we said in 287 U. S., at -95 "constitute no part of the proceedings in bankruptcy but concern controversies arising out of it" are quintessentially suits at common law that more nearly resemble state-law contract claims brought by a bankrupt corporation to augment the bankruptcy than they do creditors' hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res. See Gibson 1022-1025. They therefore appear matters of private rather than public right.[12] *57 Our decision in under the Seventh Amendment rather than Article III, confirms this analysis. Petitioner, an officer of a bankrupt corporation, made payments from corporate funds within four months of bankruptcy on corporate notes on which he was an accommodation maker. When petitioner later filed claims against the bankruptcy the trustee counterclaimed, arguing that the payments petitioner made constituted voidable preferences because they reduced his potential personal liability on the notes. We held that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to order petitioner to surrender the preferences and that it could rule on the trustee's claim without according petitioner a jury trial. Our holding did not depend, however, on the fact that "[bankruptcy] courts are essentially courts of equity" because "they characteristically proceed in summary fashion to deal with the assets of the bankrupt they are administering." Notwithstanding the fact that bankruptcy courts "characteristically" supervised summary proceedings, they were statutorily invested with jurisdiction at law as well, and could also oversee plenary proceedings. See Atlas 430 U. S., at ; (9) Our decision turned, rather, on the bankruptcy court's having "actual or constructive possession" of the bankruptcy 382 U.S., and its power and obligation to consider objections by the trustee in deciding whether to allow claims against the Citing approvingly, we expressly stated that, if petitioner had not submitted a claim to the bankruptcy court, the trustee could have recovered the preference only by a plenary action, and that petitioner would have *58 been entitled |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | plenary action, and that petitioner would have *58 been entitled to a jury trial if the trustee had brought a plenary action in federal court. See 382 U.S., -328. We could not have made plainer that our holding in Schoenthal retained its vitality: "[A]lthough petitioner might be entitled to a jury trial on the issue of preference if he presented no claim in the bankruptcy proceeding and awaited a federal plenary action by the trustee, when the same issue arises as part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims, it is triable in equity."[13] Unlike JUSTICE WHITE, see post, at 72-75, 78, we do not view the Court's conclusion in Katchen as resting on an accident of statutory history. We read Schoenthal and Katchen as holding that, under the Seventh Amendment, a creditor's right to a jury trial on a bankruptcy trustee's preference claim depends upon whether the creditor has submitted a claim against the not upon Congress' precise definition of the "bankruptcy " or upon whether Congress chanced to deny jury trials to creditors who have not filed claims and who are sued by a trustee to recover an alleged preference. Because petitioners here, like the petitioner in Schoenthal, have not filed claims against the respondent's fraudulent conveyance action does not arise "as part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims." Nor is that action integral to the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations. Congress therefore cannot divest petitioners of *59 their Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. Katchen thus supports the result we reach today; it certainly does not compel its opposite.[14] *60 The 1978 Act abolished the statutory distinction between plenary and summary bankruptcy proceedings, on which the Court relied in Schoenthal and Katchen. Although the 1978 Act preserved parties' rights to jury trials as they existed prior to the day it took effect, 28 U.S. C. 1480(a) (repealed), in the Amendments Congress drew a new distinction between "core" and "non-core" proceedings and classified fraudulent conveyance actions as core proceedings triable by bankruptcy judges. 28 U.S. C. 157(b)(2)(H) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Whether 28 U.S. C. 1411 (1982 ed., Supp. V) purports to abolish jury trial rights in what were formerly plenary actions is unclear, and at any rate is not a question we need decide here. See The decisive point is that in neither the 1978 Act nor the Amendments did Congress "creat[e] a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law," because traditional rights and remedies were inadequate to cope with a manifest public problem. Atlas Rather, |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | inadequate to cope with a manifest public problem. Atlas Rather, Congress simply reclassified a pre-existing, common-law cause of action that was not integrally related to the reformation of debtor-creditor relations[15] and *61 that apparently did not suffer from any grave deficiencies. This purely taxonomic change cannot alter our Seventh Amendment analysis. Congress cannot eliminate a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial merely by relabeling the cause of action to which it attaches and placing exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative agency or a specialized court of equity. See Gibson 1022-1025. Nor can Congress' assignment be justified on the ground that jury trials of fraudulent conveyance actions would "go far to dismantle the statutory scheme," Atlas 430 U. S., at or that bankruptcy proceedings have been placed in "an administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible." at To be sure, we owe some deference to Congress' judgment after it has given careful consideration to the constitutionality of a legislative provision. See Northern Pipeline Construction But respondent has adduced no evidence that Congress considered the constitutional implications of its designation of all fraudulent conveyance actions as core proceedings. Nor can it seriously be argued that permitting jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions brought by a trustee against a person who has not entered a claim against the would "go far to dismantle the statutory scheme," as we used that phrase in Atlas when our opinion in that case, following Schoenthal, plainly assumed that such claims carried with them a right to a jury trial.[16] In addition, one cannot easily say that "the *62 jury would be incompatible" with bankruptcy proceedings, in view of Congress' express provision for jury trials in certain actions arising out of bankruptcy litigation. See 28 U.S. C. 1411 (1982 ed., Supp. V); Gibson 1024-1025; Warner, Katchen Up in Bankruptcy: The New Jury Trial Right, 63 Am. Bankr. L. J. 1, 48 (1989) (hereinafter Warner). And JUSTICE WHITE's claim that juries may serve usefully as checks only on the decisions of judges who enjoy life tenure, see *63 post, at 82-83, overlooks the extent to which judges who are appointed for fixed terms may be beholden to Congress or Executive officials, and thus ignores the potential for juries to exercise beneficial restraint on their decisions. It may be that providing jury trials in some fraudulent conveyance actions if not in this particular case, because respondent's suit was commenced after the Bankruptcy Court approved the debtor's plan of reorganization would impede swift resolution of bankruptcy proceedings and increase the expense of Chapter 11 reorganizations.[17] But |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112317/granfinanciera-sa-v-nordberg/ | proceedings and increase the expense of Chapter 11 reorganizations.[17] But "these considerations are insufficient to overcome the clear command of the Seventh Amendment." See also quoting 4 ; 416 U. S., -384[18] V We do not decide today whether the current jury trial provision 28 U.S. C. 1411 (1982 ed., Supp. V) permits bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions like the one respondent initiated. Nor do we express any view as to whether the Seventh Amendment or Article III allows jury trials in such actions to be held before non-Article III bankruptcy judges subject to the oversight provided by the district courts pursuant to the Amendments. We leave those issues for future decisions.[19] We do hold, however, that whatever the answers to these questions, the Seventh Amendment entitles petitioners to the jury trial they requested. Accordingly, the judgment of *65A the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. *65B JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Scalia | 1,994 | 9 | dissenting | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | Today's judgment certainly seems reasonable enough as a determination of what a capital sentencing jury should be permitted to consider. That is not, however, what it purports to be. It purports to be a determination that any capital sentencing scheme that does not permit jury consideration of such material is so incompatible with our national traditions of criminal procedure that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States. There is really no basis for such a pronouncement, neither in *179 any near uniform practice of our people, nor in the jurisprudence of this Court. With respect to the former I shall discuss only current practice, since the parties and amici have addressed only that, and since traditional practice may be relatively uninformative with regard to the new schemes of capital sentencing imposed upon the States by this Court's recent jurisprudence. The overwhelming majority of the 32 States that permit juries to impose or recommend capital sentences do not allow specific information regarding parole to be given to the jury. To be sure, in many of these States the sentencing choices specifically include "life without parole," so that the jury charge itself conveys the information whether parole is available. In at least eight of those States, however, the jury's choice is not merely between "life without parole" and "death," but among some variation of (parole eligible) "life," "life without parole," and "death"[1]so that the precise date of availability of parole is relevant to the jury's choice. Moreover, even among those States that permit the jury to choose only between "life" (unspecified) and "death," South is not alone in keeping parole information from the jury. Four other States in widely separated parts of the country follow that same course,[2] and there are other States that lack *180 any clear practice.[3] By contrast, the parties and their amici point to only 10 States that arguably employ the procedure which, according to today's opinions, the Constitution requires.[4] This picture of national practice falls far short of demonstrating a principle so widely shared that it is part of even a current and temporary American consensus. As for our prior jurisprudence: The opinions of Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor rely on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process, rather than on the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibition, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But cf. ante, at 172 (Souter, J., concurring). The prior law applicable to that subject indicates that petitioner's due process rights would be violated if he was "sentenced to death `on the basis |
Justice Scalia | 1,994 | 9 | dissenting | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | violated if he was "sentenced to death `on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.' " quoting Both opinions try to bring this case within that description, but it does not fit. The opinions paint a picture of a prosecutor who repeatedly stressed that petitioner would pose a threat to society upon his release. The record tells a different story. *181 Rather than emphasizing future dangerousness as a crucial factor, the prosecutor stressed the nature of petitioner's crimes: the crime that was the subject of the prosecution, the brutal murder of a 79-year-old woman in her home, and three prior crimes confessed to by petitioner, all rapes and beatings of elderly women, one of them his grandmother. I am sure it was the sheer depravity of those crimes, rather than any specific fear for the future, which induced the South jury to conclude that the death penalty was justice. Not only, moreover, was future dangerousness not emphasized, but future dangerousness outside of prison was not even mentioned. The trial judge undertook specifically to prevent that, in response to the broader request of petitioner's counsel that the prosecutor be prevented from arguing future dangerousness at all: "Obviously, I will listen carefully to the argument of the solicitor to see if it contravenes the actual factual circumstance. Certainly, I recognize the right of the State to argue concerning the defendant's dangerous propensity. I will not allow the solicitor, for example, to say to the jury anything that would indicate that the defendant is not going to be jailed for the period of time that is encompassed within the actual law. The fact that we do not submit the parole eligibility to the jury does not negate the fact that the solicitor must stay within the trial record." App. 56-57. As I read the record, the prosecutor followed this admonitionand the Due Process Clause requires nothing more. Both Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor focus on two portions of the prosecutor's final argument to the jury in the sentencing phase. First, they stress that the prosecutor asked the jury to answer the question of "what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our midst." That statement, however, was not made (as they imply) in the course of an argument about future dangerousness, but was a response to *182 petitioner's mitigating evidence. Read in context, the statement is not even relevant to the issue in this case: "The defense in this case as to sentence [is] a diversion. It's putting the blame on society, on his father, |
Justice Scalia | 1,994 | 9 | dissenting | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | diversion. It's putting the blame on society, on his father, on his grandmother, on whoever else he can, spreading it out to avoid that personal responsibility. That he came from a deprived background. That he didn't have all of the breaks in life and certainly that helps shape someone. But we are not concerned about how he got shaped. We are concerned about what to do with him now that he is in our midst." at 110. Both opinions also seize upon the prosecutor's comment that the jury's verdict would be "an act of self-defense." That statement came at the end of admonition of the jury to avoid emotional responses and enter a rational verdict: "Your verdict shouldn't be returned in anger. Your verdict shouldn't be an emotional catharsis. Your verdict shouldn't be a response to that eight-year-old kid [testifying in mitigation] and really shouldn't be a response to the gruesome grotesque handiwork of [petitioner]. Your verdict should be a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense." at 109-110. This reference to "self-defense" obviously alluded, neither to defense of the jurors' own persons, nor specifically to defense of persons outside the prison walls, but to defense of all members of society against this individual, wherever he or they might be. Thus, as I read the record (and bear in mind that the trial judge was on the lookout with respect to this point), the prosecutor did not invite the jury to believe that petitioner would be eligible for parolehe did not mislead the jury. The rule the majority adopts in order to overturn this sentence therefore goes well beyond what would be necessary to counteract prosecutorial misconduct (a disposition with *183 which I might agree). It is a rule at least as sweeping as this: that the Due Process Clause overrides state law limiting the admissibility of information concerning parole whenever the prosecution argues future dangerousness. Justice Blackmun appears to go even further, requiring the admission of parole ineligibility even when the prosecutor does not argue future dangerousness. See ante, at 163-164; but see ante, at 174 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). I do not understand the basis for this broad prescription. As a general matter, the Court leaves it to the States to strike what they consider the appropriate balance among the many factors probative value, prejudice, reliability, potential for confusion, among othersthat determine whether evidence ought to be admissible. Even in the capital punishment context, the Court has noted that "the wisdom of the decision to permit juror consideration of |
Justice Scalia | 1,994 | 9 | dissenting | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | "the wisdom of the decision to permit juror consideration of [postsentencing contingencies] is best left to the States." "[T]he States, and not this Court, retain `the traditional authority' to determine what particular evidence is relevant." One reason for leaving it that way is that a sensible code of evidence cannot be invented piecemeal. Each item cannot be considered in isolation, but must be given its place within the whole. Preventing the defense from introducing evidence regarding parolability is only half of the rule that prevents the prosecution from introducing it as well. If the rule is changed for defendants, many will think that evenhandedness demands a change for prosecutors as well. State's attorneys ought to be able to say that if, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you do not impose capital punishment upon this defendant (or if you impose anything less than life without parole) he may be walking the streets again in eight years! Many would not favor the admission of such an argumentbut would prefer it to a state scheme in which defendants can call attention to the unavailability of parole, but prosecutors cannot note *184 its availability. This Court should not force state legislators into such a difficult choice unless the isolated state evidentiary rule that the Court has before it is not merely less than ideal, but beyond a high threshold of unconstitutionality. The low threshold the Court constructs today is difficult to reconcile with our almost simultaneous decision in Romano v. Oklahoma, ante, p. 1. There, the Court holds that the proper inquiry when evidence is admitted in contravention of a state law is "whether the admission of evidence. so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury's imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process." Ante, at 12. I do not see why the unconstitutionality criterion for excluding evidence in accordance with state law should be any less demanding than the unconstitutionality criterion Romano recites for admitting evidence in violation of state law: "fundamental unfairness." And "fundamentally unfair" the South rule is assuredly not. The notion that the South jury imposed the death penalty "just in case" Simmons might be released on parole seems to me quite farfetched. And the notion that the decision taken on such grounds would have been altered by information on the current state of the law concerning parole (which could of course be amended) is even more farfetched. And the scenario achieves the ultimate in farfetchedness when there is added the fact that, according to uncontroverted testimony of prison officials in this case, |
Justice Scalia | 1,994 | 9 | dissenting | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | according to uncontroverted testimony of prison officials in this case, even current South law (as opposed to discretionary prison regulations) does not prohibit furloughs and workrelease programs for life-without-parole inmates. See App. 16-17. When the prosecution has not specifically suggested parolability, I see no more reason why the United States Constitution should compel the admission of evidence showing that, under the State's current law, the defendant would be nonparolable, than that it should compel the admission of evidence showing that parolable life-sentence murderers are in fact *185 almost never paroled, or are paroled only after age 70; or evidence to the effect that escapes of life-without-parole inmates are rare; or evidence showing that, though under current law the defendant will be parolable in 20 years, the recidivism rate for elderly prisoners released after long incarceration is negligible. All of this evidence may be thought relevant to whether the death penalty should be imposed, and a petition raising the last of these claims has already arrived. See Pet. for Cert. in Rudd v. Texas, O. T. 1993, No. 93-7955. As I said at the outset, the regime imposed by today's judgment is undoubtedly reasonable as a matter of policy, but I see nothing to indicate that the Constitution requires it to be followed coast to coast. I fear we have read today the first page of a whole new chapter in the "death-isdifferent" jurisprudence which this Court is in the apparently continuous process of composing. It adds to our insistence that state courts admit "all relevant mitigating evidence," see, e. g., ; a requirement that they adhere to distinctive rules, more demanding than what the Due Process Clause normally requires, for admitting evidence of other sortsFederal Rules of Death Penalty Evidence, so to speak, which this Court will presumably craft (at great expense to the swiftness and predictability of justice) year by year. The heavily outnumbered opponents of capital punishment have successfully opened yet another front in their guerilla war to make this unquestionably constitutional sentence a practical impossibility. I dissent. |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | My disagreement with the opinion and judgment of the Court in these cases is narrow but dispositive. Because 28 U.S. C. 1343 (3) refers to "any Act of Congress providing for equal rights," because 42 U.S. C. 1983 is such an Act of Congress, and because 1983 by its terms clearly covers lawsuits such as the ones here involved, I would hold that the plaintiffs properly brought these cases in Federal District Court.[1] *673 First of all, it seems to me clear that this Court has already settled the question whether 1983 creates a cause of action for these plaintiffs. We have explicitly recognized that the case of held that suits in federal court under 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States."[2] And a long line of this Court's cases necessarily stands for that proposition. ; ; Van ; ; ; ; ; ; California Dept. of Human ; U.S. 471; ; ; I think it is far too late in the day, therefore, to argue that the plaintiffs in these cases did not state causes of action cognizable in the federal courts. Even if this impressive weight of authority did not exist, however, and the question before us were one of first impression, it seems clear to me that the plain language of 1983 would dictate the same result. For that statute confers a cause of action for the deprivation under color of state law of "any rights secured by the Constitution and laws." Only if the legislative history showed unambiguously that those words cannot mean what they say would it be possible to conclude that there were no federal causes of action in the present cases. But, as the Court correctly states, "the legislative history of the provisions at issue in these cases ultimately provides us with little guidance as to the proper resolution of the question presented here." Ante, at 610. The Court's reading of 1983 and 1343 (3) results in the conclusion that Congress intended 1983 to create some causes of action which could not be heard in a federal court under 1343 (3), even though 1983 and 1343 (3) both originated in the same statute ( 1 of the so-called Ku Klux Klan Act). This anomaly is quite contrary to the Court's understanding up to now that "the common origin of 1983 and 1343 (3) in 1 of the 1871 Act suggests that the two provisions were meant to be, and are, complementary." Examining See Section 1983 is a statute "providing for |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | complementary." Examining See Section 1983 is a statute "providing for equal rights." The Revised Statutes of 1874 included 1979, the predecessor of 1983, in Title XXIV, entitled "Civil Rights." Several sections in the Title, including 1979, were cross-referenced to the predecessors of 1343 (3), Rev. Stat. 563 (12) and 629 (16). In the context of the Revised Statutes, the term "providing * for equal rights" found in 629 (16) served to identify the sections of the Civil Rights Title which involved rights enforceable through civil actions. The Court's reasoning to the contrary seems to rely solely on the fact that 1983 does not create any rights. Section 1343 (3) does not require, however, that the Act create rights. Nor does it require that the Act "provide" them. It refers to any Act of Congress that provides "for" equal rights. Section 1983 provides for rights when it creates a cause of action for deprivation of those rights under color of state law. It is, therefore, one of the statutes for which 1343 (3), by its terms, confers jurisdiction upon the federal district courts. Today's decision may not have a great effect on the scope of federal jurisdiction. If the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, any plaintiff raising a federal question may bring an action in federal court under 28 U.S. C. 1331 (a). Many other sections of Title 28 confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts over statutory questions without any requirement that a monetary minimum be in controversy. See, e. g., 28 U.S. C. 1333 (admiralty and maritime jurisdiction); 28 U.S. C. 1334 (bankruptcy); 28 U.S. C. 1337 (Acts of Congress regulating commerce). Still other plaintiffs will find their way into the federal courts through jurisdictional provisions codified with the substantive law, and not incorporated in Title 28. See, e. g., 12 U.S. C. 2614 (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974); 15 U.S. C. 1640 (e) (Truth in Lending Act); 42 U.S. C. 7604 (1976 ed., Supp. I) (Clean Air Act). Finally, even a welfare recipient with a federal statutory claim may sue in a federal court if his lawyer can link this claim to a substantial constitutional contention. And under the standard of substantiality established by such a constitutional claim would not be hard to construct. But to sacrifice even one lawsuit to the Court's cramped reading of 28 U.S. C. 1343 (3) is to deprive a plaintiff of a *676 federal forum without justification in the language or history of the law. I respectfully dissent. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL believe that the issue discussed in |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 174 (ERISA), 2 U.S. C. et seq., generally obligates administrators to manage ERISA plans “in accordance with the documents and instruments govern ing” them. At a more specific level, the Act requires covered pension benefit plans to “provide that benefits under the plan may not be assigned or alien ated,” but this bar does not apply to qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs), The question here is whether the terms of the limitation on assignment or alienation invalidated the act of a divorced spouse, the designated under her ex-husband’s ERISA pension plan, who purported to waive her entitle ment by a federal common law waiver embodied in a divorce decree that was not a QDRO. We hold that such a waiver is not rendered invalid by the text of the antialien ation provision, but that the plan administrator properly disregarded the waiver owing to its conflict with the des ignation made by the former husband in accordance with 2 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN Opinion of the Court plan documents. I The decedent, William Kennedy, worked for E. I. Du- Pont de Nemours & Company and was a participant in its savings and investment plan (SIP), with power both to “designate any or beneficiaries to receive all or part” of the funds upon his death, and to “replace or revoke such designation.” App. 48. The plan requires “[a]ll authorizations, designations and requests concerning the Plan [to] be made by employees in the manner pre scribed by the [plan administrator],” and pro vides forms for designating or changing a at 34, 5–57. If at the time the participant dies “no sur viving spouse exists and no designation is in effect, distribution shall be made to, or in accordance with the directions of, the executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate.” The SIP is an ERISA “ ‘employee pension benefit plan,’ ” ; 2 U.S. C. and the parties do not dispute that the plan satisfies ERISA’s antialienation provision, which requires it to “provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”1 The plan does, however, permit a to submit a “qualified disclaimer” of benefits as defined under the Tax Code, see 2 U.S. C. which has the effect of switching the to an “alternate determined according to a valid designa —————— 1 The plan states that “[e]xcept as provided by Section 401(a)(13) of the [Internal Revenue] Code, no assignment of the rights or interests of account holders under this Plan will be permitted or recognized, nor |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | holders under this Plan will be permitted or recognized, nor shall such rights or interests be subject to attachment or other legal processes for debts.” App. 50–51. Title 2 U.S. C. in language substantially tracking the text of provides that “[a] trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.” Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) 3 Opinion of the Court tion made by the deceased.” Supp. Record 8–87 (Exh. 15). In 171, William married Liv Kennedy, and, in 174, he signed a form designating her to take benefits under the SIP, but naming no contingent to take if she disclaimed her 47 F.3d, at William and Liv divorced in subject to a decree that Liv “is divested of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to [a]ny and all sums the proceeds [from], and any other rights related to any retirement plan, pension plan, or like benefit program existing by reason of [William’s] past or present or future employment.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 4–5. William did not, however, execute any documents removing Liv as the SIP even though he did execute a new -designation form naming his daughter, Kari Kennedy, as the benefici ary under DuPont’s Pension and Retirement Plan, also governed by ERISA. On William’s death in 2001, petitioner Kari Kennedy was named executrix and asked DuPont to distribute the SIP funds to William’s Estate. DuPont, instead, relied on William’s designation form and paid the balance of some $400,000 to Liv. The Estate then sued respondents DuPont and the SIP plan administrator (together, DuPont), claiming that the divorce decree amounted to a waiver of the SIP benefits on Liv’s part, and that DuPont had violated ERISA by paying the bene fits to William’s designee.2 —————— 2 The Estate now says that William’s -designation form for the Pension and Retirement Plan applied to the SIP as well, but the form on its face applies only to DuPont’s “Pension and Retirement Plan.” App. 2. In the District Court, in fact, the Estate stipulated that William “never executed any forms or documents to remove or replace Liv Kennedy as his sole under either the SIP or [a plan that merged into the SIP].” In any event, the Estate did not raise this argument in the Court of Appeals, and we will not 4 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN Opinion of the Court So far as it matters here, the District |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | the Court So far as it matters here, the District Court entered summary judgment for the Estate, to which it ordered DuPont to pay the value of the SIP benefits. The court relied on Fifth Circuit precedent establishing that a bene ficiary can waive his rights to the proceeds of an ERISA plan “ ‘provided that the waiver is explicit, voluntary, and made in good faith.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38 ). The Fifth Circuit nonetheless reversed, distinguishing prior decisions enforcing federal common law waivers of ERISA benefits because they involved life-insurance poli cies, which are considered “ ‘welfare plan[s]’ ” under ERISA and consequently free of the antialienation provision. 47 F.3d, at 42. The Court of Appeals held that Liv’s waiver constituted an assignment or alienation of her interest in the SIP benefits to the Estate, and so could not be hon ored. The court relied heavily on the ERISA provision for bypassing the antialienation provision when a marriage breaks up: under 2 U.S. C. a court order that satisfies certain statutory requirements is known as a qualified domestic relations order, which is exempt from the bar on assignment or alienation. Be cause the Kennedys’ divorce decree was not a QDRO, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that it could not give effect to Liv’s waiver incorporated in it, given that “ERISA provides a specific mechanism—the QDRO—for addressing the elimination of a spouse’s interest in plan benefits, but that mechanism is not invoked.” We granted certiorari to resolve a split among the —————— address it in the first instance. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 38, 45–4 (12). 3 Section 105(d)(3)(A) provides that the antialienation provision “shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order, except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order.” Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) 5 Opinion of the Court Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts over a di vorced spouse’s ability to waive pension plan benefits through a divorce decree not amounting to a QDRO.4 552 U. S. (2008). We subsequently realized that this case implicates the further split over whether a ’s federal common law waiver of plan benefits is effective where that waiver is inconsistent with plan documents,5 and after oral argument we invited supplemental briefing on that latter issue, upon which the disposition of this case ultimately turns. We now affirm, albeit on reasoning different from the Fifth Circuit’s rationale. |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | affirm, albeit on reasoning different from the Fifth Circuit’s rationale. II A By its terms, the antialienation provision, requires a plan to provide expressly that benefits be nei ther “assigned” nor “alienated,” the operative verbs having histories of legal meaning: to “assign” is “[t]o transfer; as to assign property, or some interest therein,” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th rev. ed. 18), and to “alienate” is “[t]o convey; to transfer the title to property,” We think it fair to say that Liv did not assign or alienate anything to William or to the Estate later standing in his —————— 4 Compare (federal common law waiver in divorce decree does not conflict with antialiena tion provision); Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, ; v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721 with (federal common law waiver in divorce decree barred by antialienation provision). 5 Compare ; ; ; Fox Valley, ; ; with Metropolitan Life Ins. (plan documents control); KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN Opinion of the Court shoes. The Fifth Circuit saw the waiver as an assignment or alienation to the Estate, thinking that Liv’s waiver trans ferred the SIP benefits to whoever would be next in line; without a designated contingent the Estate would take them. The court found support in the applica ble Treasury Department regulation that defines “assign ment” and “alienation” to include “[a]ny direct or indirect arrangement (whether revo cable or irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant or a right or interest enforce able against the plan in, or to, all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become, payable to the participant or” (a)– 13(c)(1)(ii) (2008). See (relying upon the regulation to interpret the meaning of “assign ment” and “alienation” in The Circuit treated Liv’s waiver as an “ ‘indirect arrangement’ ” whereby the Estate gained an “ ‘interest enforceable against the plan.’ ” 47 F.3d, Casting the alienation net this far, though, raises ques tions that leave one in doubt. Although it is possible to speak of the waiver as an “arrangement” having the indi rect effect of a transfer to the next possible it would be odd usage to speak of an estate as the transferee of its own decedent’s property, just as it would be to speak of the decedent in his lifetime as his own transferee. And treating the estate or even the ultimate estate as the assignee or transferee would be strange under the terms of the regulation: it would be hard to say the estate or future “acquires” |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | would be hard to say the estate or future “acquires” a right or interest when at the time of the waiver there was no estate and the benefi ciary of a future estate might be anyone’s guess. If there were a contingent (or the participant made a Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) 7 Opinion of the Court subsequent designation) the estate would get no interest; as for an estate the identity could ultimately turn on the law of intestacy applied to facts as yet un known, or on the contents of the participant’s subsequent will, or simply on the participant’s future exercise of (or failure to invoke) the power to designate a new directly under the terms of the plan. Thus, if such a waiver created an “arrangement” assigning or transferring anything under the statute, the assignor would be blind folded, operating, at best, on the fringe of what “assign ment” or “alienation” normally suggests. The questionability of this broad reading is confirmed by exceptions to it that are apparent right off the bat. Take the case of a surviving spouse’s interest in pension bene fits, for example. Depending on the circumstances, a surviving spouse has a right to a survivor’s annuity or to a lump-sum payment on the death of the participant, unless the spouse has waived the right and the participant has eliminated the survivor annuity benefit or designated a different See ; 2 U.S. C. (b)(1)(C), (c)(2). This waiver by a spouse is plainly not barred by the antialienation provision. Like wise, DuPont concedes that a qualified disclaimer under the Tax Code, which allows a party to refuse an interest in property and thereby eliminate federal tax, would not violate the antialienation provision. See Brief for Respon dents 21–23; 2 U.S. C. In each example, though, we fail to see how these waivers would be permis- sible under the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the statute and regulation. Our doubts, and the exceptions that call the Fifth Cir cuit’s reading into question, point us toward authority we have drawn on before, the law of trusts that “serves as ERISA’s backdrop.” Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 101 We explained before that is much like a spendthrift trust provision barring assign 8 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN Opinion of the Court ment or alienation of a benefit, see and the cognate trust law is highly suggestive here. Al though the of a spendthrift trust traditionally lacked the means to transfer his beneficial interest to anyone else, he did have the power to |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | interest to anyone else, he did have the power to disclaim prior to accepting it, so long as the disclaimer made no attempt to direct the interest to a in his stead. See 2 Restatement (Third) of Trusts Comment c, p. 35 (“A designated of a spendthrift trust is not required to accept or retain an interest prescribed by the terms of the trust. On the other hand, a purported disclaimer by which the attempts to direct who is to receive the interest is a precluded transfer”); E. Gris wold, Spendthrift Trusts p. 03 (2d ed. 147) (“The American cases, though not entirely clear, generally take the view that the interest under a spendthrift trust may be disclaimed”); (hereinafter Fratcher))). We do not mean that the whole law of spendthrift trusts and disclaimers turns up in but the general principle that a designated spendthrift can disclaim his trust interest magnifies the improbability that a statute written with an eye on the old law would effectively force a to take an interest willy-nilly. Common sense and common law both say that “[t]he law certainly is not so absurd as to force a man to take an estate against his will.” Townson v. Tickell, 3 Barn. & Ald. 31, 3, 10 Eng. Rep. 575, 57– (K. B. 181). —————— DuPont argues that Liv’s waiver would have been an invalid dis claimer at common law because it was given for consideration in the divorce settlement. But the authorities DuPont cites fail to support the Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) Opinion of the Court The Treasury is certainly comfortable with the state of the old law, for the way it reads its own regulation “no party ‘acquires from’ a a ‘right or interest enforceable against the plan’ pursuant to a ’s waiver of rights where the does not attempt to direct her interest in pension benefits to another person.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18. And, being neither “plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the regulation,” the Treasury Department’s interpretation of its regulation is controlling. Auer v. Robbins, 51 U.S. 452, 417 —————— proposition that a ’s otherwise valid disclaimer was invalid at common law because she received consideration. See Roseberry v. 245 Va., at 42 S. E. 2d, at ; Smith v. Bank of Del., 43 Del. Ch. 124, 12–127, 21 A.2d 57, (1); 54 Mich. App. 31, 38–3, 78– 7 (174); 4 Fratcher ; 1 Restatement (Second) of Trusts §3, Comment c (157). It is true that the receipt of considera tion prevents a from making a qualified disclaimer for |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | considera tion prevents a from making a qualified disclaimer for gift tax purposes, see 2 CFR §25.2518–2 (2008), and there is common law authority for the proposition that a renunciation by a devisee is ineffec tive against existing creditors if “it is shown that those who would take such property on renunciation had agreed to pay to the devisee some thing of value in consideration of such renunciation.” W. Bowe & D. Parker, Page on Law of Wills p. 48 ; see also Schoonover v. Osborne, But at common law the receipt of consideration did not necessarily render a disclaimer invalid. See Commerce Trust 3 S.W.2d 8–87 (Mo. 15); Central Nat. 18– 12, (Ohio Prob. Ct. 15); In re Wimperis [114] 1 Ch. 502, 508–510; see also In re Estate of Baird, 131 Wash. 2d 514, 51, n. 5, In any event, our point is not that Liv’s waiver was a valid disclaimer at common law: only that reading the terms of 2 U.S. C. to bar all non-QDRO waivers is unsound in light of background common law principles. 7 It is true that the Government’s position regarding the applicability of the antialienation provision to a waiver has fluctuated. The Labor Department previously took the position that “application of such a federal common-law waiver rule to pension plans would conflict with ERISA’s anti-alienation provision.” Brief for Secretary of Labor as 10 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN Opinion of the Court The Fifth Circuit found “significant support” for its contrary holding in the QDRO subsections, reasoning that “[i]n the marital-dissolution context, the QDRO provisions supply the sole exception to the anti-alienation provision,” 47 F.3d, a point that echoes in DuPont’s argu ment here. But the negative implication of the QDRO language is not that simple. If a QDRO provided a way for a former spouse like Liv merely to waive benefits, this would be powerful evidence that the antialienation provi sion was meant to deny any effect to a waiver within a divorce decree but not a QDRO, else there would have been no need for the QDRO exception. But this is not so, and DuPont’s argument rests on a false premise. In fact, a seeking only to relinquish her right to benefits cannot do this by a QDRO, for a QDRO by definition re quires that it be the “creat[ion] or recogni[tion of] the existence of an alternate payee’s right to, or assign[ment] to an alternate payee [of] the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a partici |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | portion of the benefits payable with respect to a partici pant under a plan.” 2 U.S. C. §105(d)(3)(B)(i)(I). There is no QDRO for a simple waiver; there must be some succeeding designation of an alternate payee.8 Not being a —————— Amicus Curiae 1 in v. Weaver, No. 01–0447 And it likewise asserted that “waiver of pension benefits is generally imper missible under [].” Brief for Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae 5 in In re Estate of No. 72–7 The Labor Department has reconsidered that view and has now taken the Treasury’s position. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, n. But “the change in interpretation alone presents no separate ground for disregarding the [Treasury’s and the Labor] Department’s present interpretation.” Long Island Care at Home, 171 Nor does the fact that the interpretation is stated in a legal brief make it unworthy of deference, as “[t]here is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.” Auer, 51 U.S., at 42. 8 Even if one understands Liv’s waiver to have resulted somehow in her interest reverting to William, he does not qualify as an “alternate Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) 11 Opinion of the Court mechanism for simply renouncing a claim to benefits, then, the QDRO provisions shed no light on whether a may waive by a non-QDRO. In sum, Liv did not attempt to direct her interest in the SIP benefits to the Estate or any other potential benefici ary, and accordingly we think that the better view is that her waiver did not constitute an assignment or alienation rendered void under the terms of B DuPont has three other reasons for saying that Liv’s waiver was barred by ERISA. They are unavailing. First, it argues that even if the waiver is not an assign ment or alienation barred under the terms of §105(d)(3)(A) still prohibits it, in providing that “shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order [that is not a QDRO].” At the very least, DuPont reasons, Liv’s waiver included a “recognition” of William’s rights with respect to the SIP benefits. But DuPont overlooks the point that when subsection (d)(3)(A) provides that the bar to assignments or alienations extends to non-QDRO domestic relations orders, it does nothing to expand the scope of prohibited assignment and alienation under subsection (d)(1). Whether Liv’s action is seen as a waiver or as a domestic relations order |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | seen as a waiver or as a domestic relations order that incorpor ated a waiver, subsection (d)(1) does not cover it and §105(d)(3)(A) does not independently bar it. Second, DuPont relies upon §105(d)(3)(H)(iii)(II), pro viding that if a domestic relations order is not a QDRO, —————— payee,” which is defined by statute as “any spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect to such participant.” 2 U.S. C. §105(d)(3)(K). 12 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN Opinion of the Court “the plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts (including any interest thereon) to the person or persons who would have been entitled to such amounts if there had been no order.” According to DuPont, because the divorce decree was not a QDRO this provision calls for paying benefits as if there had been no order. But DuPont has wrenched this language out of its setting, reading clause (iii) of subparagraph (H) as if there were no clause (i): “During any period in which the issue of whether a domestic relations order is a qualified domestic rela tions order is being determined the plan adminis trator shall separately account for the amounts (here inafter in this subparagraph referred to as the ‘segregated amounts’) which would have been payable to the alternate payee during such period if the order had been determined to be a qualified domestic rela tions order.” §105(d)(3)(H)(i). Thus it is clear that subparagraph (H) speaks of a domes tic relations order that distributes certain benefits (the “segregated amounts”) to an alternate payee, when the question for the plan administrator is whether the order is effective as a QDRO. That is the circumstance in which, for want of a QDRO, clause (iii) tells the plan administra tor not to pay the alternate, but to distribute the segre gated amounts as if there had been no order. Clause (iii) does not, as DuPont suggests, state a general rule that a non-QDRO domestic relations order is a nullity in any proceeding that would affect the determination of a bene ficiary. And of course clause (iii) says nothing here at all; the divorce decree names no alternate payee, and there are consequently no “segregated amounts.” Third, DuPont claims that a plan cannot recognize a waiver of benefits in a non-QDRO divorce decree because ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | laws insofar as they Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) 13 Opinion of the Court may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan,” with “State law” being defined to include “decisions” or “other State action having the effect of law.” (c)(1). DuPont says that Liv’s waiver, expressed in a state court decision and related to an employee benefit plan, is thus preempted. But recognizing a waiver in a divorce decree would not be giving effect to state law; the argu ment is that the waiver should be treated as a creature of federal common law, in which case its setting in a state divorce decree would be only happenstance. A court would merely be applying federal law to a document that might also have independent significance under state law. See, e.g., 45–4 ; 210 F.3d 28, ; Lyman Lumber 877 F.2d 2, 3–4 III The waiver’s escape from inevitable nullity under the express terms of the antialienation clause does not, how ever, control the decision of this case, and the question remains whether the plan administrator was required to honor Liv’s waiver with the consequence of distributing the SIP balance to the Estate.10 We hold that it was not, —————— This preemption provision does not apply to QDROs. See 10 Despite our following answer to the question here, our conclusion that does not make a nullity of a waiver leaves open any questions about a waiver’s effect in circumstances in which it is consis tent with plan documents. Nor do we express any view as to whether the Estate could have brought an action in state or federal court against Liv to obtain the benefits after they were distributed. Compare (“If state law is not pre empted, the diversion of retirement benefits will occur regardless of whether the interest in the pension plan is enforced against the plan or the recipient of the pension benefit”), with Sweebe v. Sweebe, 474 Mich. 151, 15–15, (200) (distinguishing and holding that “while a plan administrator must pay benefits to the named as required by ERISA,” after the benefits are dis 14 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN Opinion of the Court and that the plan administrator did its statutory ERISA duty by paying the benefits to Liv in conformity with the plan documents. ERISA requires “[e]very employee benefit plan [to] be established and maintained pursuant to a written instru ment,” 2 U.S. C. “specify[ing] the basis on which payments are made to and from the plan,” The plan administrator is obliged to act “in accordance with the |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | plan administrator is obliged to act “in accordance with the documents and instruments govern ing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of [Title I] and [Title IV] of [ERISA],” and the Act provides no ex emption from this duty when it comes time to pay benefits. On the contrary, (which the Estate happens to invoke against DuPont here) reinforces the directive, with its provision that a participant or may bring a cause of action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” The Estate’s claim therefore stands or falls by “the terms of the plan,” a straightforward rule of hewing to the directives of the plan documents that lets employers “ ‘establish a uniform administrative scheme, [with] a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.’ ”11 v. Egel —————— tributed “the consensual terms of a prior contractual agreement may prevent the named from retaining those proceeds”); Pardee v. Pardee, OK CIV APP. 27, ¶¶20, 27, 313–314, 315–31 (2004) (distinguishing and holding that ERISA did not preempt enforcement of allocation of ERISA benefits in state-court divorce decree as “the pension plan funds were no longer entitled to ERISA protection once the plan funds were distributed”). 11 We express no view regarding the ability of a participant or benefi ciary to bring a cause of action under 2 U.S. C. where the terms of the plan fail to conform to the requirements of ERISA and the party seeks to recover under the terms of the statute. Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) 15 Opinion of the Court hoff, ); see also Curtiss- Wright (ERISA’s statutory scheme “is built around reliance on the face of written plan documents”). The point is that by giving a plan participant a clear set of instructions for making his own instructions clear, ERISA forecloses any justification for enquiries into nice expressions of intent, in favor of the virtues of adhering to an uncomplicated rule: “simple administration, avoid[ing] double liability, and ensur[ing] that beneficiaries get what’s coming quickly, without the folderol essential under less-certain rules.” Fox Valley & Vicinity Const. Workers Pension 2 (Easter brook, J., dissenting). And the cost of less certain rules would be too plain. Plan administrators would be forced “to examine a multi tude of external documents that might purport to affect the dispensation of benefits,” 77 F.3d 78, 82– and be drawn |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | dispensation of benefits,” 77 F.3d 78, 82– and be drawn into litigation like this over the meaning and enforceability of purported waivers. The Estate’s suggestion that a plan administrator could resolve these sorts of disputes through interpleader actions merely restates the problem with the Estate’s position: it would destroy a plan administrator’s ability to look at the plan documents and records conforming to them to get clear distribution instructions, without going into court. The Estate of course is right that this guarantee of simplicity is not absolute. The very enforceability of QDROs means that sometimes a plan administrator must look for the beneficiaries outside plan documents notwith standing §105(d)(3)(J) provides that a “person who is an alternate payee under a [QDRO] shall be considered for purposes of any provision of [ERISA] a under the plan.” But this in effect means that 1 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN Opinion of the Court a plan administrator who enforces a QDRO must be said to enforce plan documents, not ignore them. In any case, a QDRO enquiry is relatively discrete, given the specific and objective criteria for a domestic relations order that quali fies as a QDRO,12 see §§105(d)(3)(C), (D), requirements that amount to a statutory checklist working to “spare [an administrator] from litigation-fomenting ambiguities,” Metropolitan Life Ins. This is a far cry from asking a plan adminis trator to figure out whether a claimed federal common law waiver was knowing and voluntary, whether its language addressed the particular benefits at issue, and so forth, on into factually complex and subjective determinations. See, e.g., at (“[W]aiver provisions are often sweeping in their terms, leaving their precise effect on plan benefits unclear”); 15 (making “fact-driven determination” that marriage termination agreement constituted a valid waiver under federal com mon law). These are good and sufficient reasons for holding the line, just as we have done in cases of state laws that might —————— 12 To qualify as a QDRO, a divorce decree must “clearly specif[y]” the name and last known mailing address of the participant and the name and mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the order; the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid by the plan to each such alternate payee or the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be determined; the number of payments or period to which the order applies; and each plan to which such order applies. §105(d)(3)(C). A domestic relations order cannot qualify as a QDRO if it requires a plan to provide any type or |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | if it requires a plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or any option, not otherwise provided under the plan; requires the plan to provide increased benefits; or requires the payment of benefits to an alternate payee that are required to be paid to another alternate payee under another order previously determined to be a QDRO. §105(d)(3)(D). A plan is required to establish written procedures for determining whether a domestic relations order is a QDRO. §105(d)(3)(G)(ii). Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) 17 Opinion of the Court blur the bright-line requirement to follow plan documents in distributing benefits. Two recent preemption cases are instructive here. held that ERISA preempted a state law permitting the testamen tary transfer of a nonparticipant spouse’s community property interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. We rejected the entreaty to create “through case law a new class of persons for whom plan assets are to be held and administered,” explaining that “[t]he statute is not amenable to this sweeping extratextual extension.” at 850. And in we held that ERISA preempted a state law providing that the designation of a spouse as the of a nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon We said the law was at fault for standing in the way of making payments “simply by identifying the specified by the plan docu ments,” at and thus for purporting to “undermine the congressional goal of ‘minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]’ on plan administrators,” at 14–150 ); see (identifying “the conflict between the plan documents (which require making payments to the named benefici ary) and the statute (which requires making payments to someone else)”). What goes for inconsistent state law goes for a federal common law of waiver that might obscure a plan adminis trator’s duty to act “in accordance with the documents and instruments.” See Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 25 (“The authority of courts to develop a ‘federal common law’ under ERISA is not the authority to revise the text of the statute”). And this case does as well as any other in pointing out the wisdom of protecting the plan documents rule. Under the terms of the SIP Liv was William’s designated The plan provided an easy way for William to change the designation, but for 18 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN Opinion of the Court whatever reason he did not. The plan provided a way to disclaim an interest in the SIP account, but Liv did not purport to follow it.13 The plan administrator therefore did exactly what required: “the documents control, |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | majority | Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145914/kennedy-v-plan-administrator-for-dupont-sav-and-investment-plan/ | plan administrator therefore did exactly what required: “the documents control, and those name [the ex-wife].” McMillan v. Parrott, 13 F.2d 310, It is no answer, as the Estate argues, that William’s -designation form should not control because it is not one of the “documents and instruments governing the plan” under and was not treated as a plan document by the plan administrator. That is beside the point. It is uncontested that the SIP and the summary plan description are “documents and instruments govern ing the plan.” See Curtiss-Wright (explaining that 2 U.S. C. and (b)(4) require a plan administrator to make available the “governing plan documents”). Those documents provide that the plan administrator will pay benefits to a participant’s desig nated with designations and changes to be made in a particular way. William’s designation of Liv as his was made in the way required; Liv’s waiver was not.14 IV Although Liv’s waiver was not rendered a nullity by the terms of §105, the plan administrator properly distrib —————— 13 The Estate does not contend that Liv’s waiver was a valid dis claimer under the terms of the plan. We do not address a situation in which the plan documents provide no means for a to re nounce an interest in benefits. 14 The Estate also contends that requiring a plan administrator to distribute benefits in conformity with plan documents will allow a who murders a participant to obtain benefits under the terms of the plan. The “slayer” case is not before us, and we do not address it. See v. (declining to decide whether ERISA preempts state statutes forbidding a murder ing heir from receiving property as a result of the killing). Cite as: 555 U. S. (200) 1 Opinion of the Court uted the SIP benefits to Liv in accordance with the plan documents. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed on the latter ground. It is so ordered |
Justice Stewart | 1,974 | 18 | majority | American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108909/american-pipe-constr-co-v-utah/ | This case involves an aspect of the relationship between a statute of limitations and the provisions of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 regulating class actions in the federal courts. While the question presented is a limited one, the details of the complex proceedings, originating almost a decade ago, must be briefly recounted. On March 10, 1964, a federal grand jury returned indictments charging a number of individuals and companies, including the petitioners here, with criminal violations of 1 of the Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 1. The indictments alleged that the defendants combined and conspired together in restraint of trade in steel and concrete pipe by submitting collusive and rigged bids for the sale of such pipe and by dividing and allocating business among themselves. Shortly thereafter, on June 19, 1964, pleas of nolo contendere were accepted and judgments of guilt were entered. Four days later, on June 23, 1964, the United States filed civil complaints in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the same companies, which complaints, as subsequently amended, sought to restrain further violations of the Sherman Act and violations of the Clayton and False Claims Acts. These civil actions were the subject of extended negotiations between the Government and the defendants which culminated in a "Final Judgment," entered on May 24, 1968, in which the companies consented to a decree enjoining *541 them from engaging in certain specified future violations of the antitrust laws.[1] Eleven days short of a year later, on May 13, the State of Utah commenced a civil action for treble damages against the petitioners in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, claiming that the petitioners had conspired to rig prices in the sale of concrete and steel pipe in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act. The suit purported to be brought as a class action in which the State represented "public bodies and agencies of the state and local government in the State of Utah who are end users of pipe acquired from the defendants" and also those States in the "Western Area" which had not previously filed similar actions. This action was found to be timely under the federal statute of limitations governing antitrust suits[2] because of the provision of 5 (b) of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 16 (b), which states that "[w]henever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, the running of the statute of limitations in respect |
Justice Stewart | 1,974 | 18 | majority | American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108909/american-pipe-constr-co-v-utah/ | laws, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended *542 during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter"[3] Since the Government's civil actions against the petitioners had ended in a consent judgment entered on May 24, 1968, Utah's suit, commenced on May 13, was timely under 5 (b), with 11 days to spare.[4] On a motion made by the majority of the petitioners, the suit was subsequently transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation from Utah to the United States District Court for the Central District of California for trial by Judge Martin Pence, Chief Judge of the District of Hawaii, sitting in the California District by assignment. The transfer and assignment were found appropriate because of the prior concentration of more than 100 actions arising out of the same factual situation in the Central District of California before Judge Pence. In re Concrete Pipe, In November the petitioners moved for an order pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) (1) that the suit could not be maintained as a class action.[5] This motion *543 was subsequently granted. In his memorandum opinion in support of the order granting the motion Judge Pence found that those "Prerequisites to a class action" contained in Rule 23 (a) (2) through (4) appeared to have been met, or at least that minor deficiencies in meeting those standards for determining the suitability of proceeding as a class would "not be fatal to the plaintiffs' class action." 49 F. R. D. 17, 20.[6] But the requirement of Rule 23 (a) (1) that "the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable" was found by Judge Pence not to be satisfied: While the complaint had alleged that the members of the class totaled more than 800, Judge Pence, relying on his extensive experience in dealing with litigation involving the same defendants and similar causes of action, concluded that the number of entities which ultimately could demonstrate injury from the trade practices of the petitioners was far lower, and, further, that "[f]rom prior actual experience in like cases involving the same alleged conspiracy, this court could not find that number so numerous that joinder of all members was impracticable" 49 F. R. D., at 21. On December 12, eight days after entry of the order denying class action status,[7] the respondents, consisting *544 of more than 60 towns, municipalities, and water districts in |
Justice Stewart | 1,974 | 18 | majority | American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108909/american-pipe-constr-co-v-utah/ | of more than 60 towns, municipalities, and water districts in the State of Utah, all of which had been claimed as members of the original class, filed motions to intervene as plaintiffs in Utah's action either as of right, under Rule 24 (a) (2)[8] or, in the alternative, by permission under Rule 24 (b) (2),[9] and for other relief not pertinent here. On March 30, 1970, the District Court denied the respondents' motion in all respects, concluding that the limitations period imposed by 4B of the Clayton Act, as tolled by 5 (b), had run as to all these respondents and had not been tolled by the institution of the class action in their behalf. 50 F. R. D. 99. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed as to the denial of leave to intervene as of right under Rule 24 (a) (2), but, with one judge dissenting, reversed as to denial of permission to intervene *545 under Rule 24 (b) (2).[10] Finding that "as to members of the class Utah purported to represent, and whose claims it tendered to the court, suit was actually commenced by Utah's filing," the appellate court concluded that "[i]f the order [denying class action status], through legal fiction, is to project itself backward in time it must fictionally carry backward with it the class members to whom it was directed, and the rights they presently possessed. It cannot leave them temporally stranded in the present." We granted certiorari to consider a seemingly important question affecting the administration of justice in the federal courts. I Under Rule 23 as it stood prior to its extensive amendment in 1966, -1050, a so-called "spurious" class action could be maintained when "the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought."[11] The Rule, however, contained no mechanism *546 for determining at any point in advance of final judgment which of those potential members of the class claimed in the complaint were actual members and would be bound by the judgment. Rather, "[w]hen a suit was brought by or against such a class, it was merely an invitation to joinderan invitation to become a fellow traveler in the litigation, which might or might not be accepted." 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 23.10 [1], p. *547 23-2603 (2d ed.). Cf. ; Zahn v. International Paper Co., ante, at 296 and n. 6. A recurrent source of abuse under the |
Justice Stewart | 1,974 | 18 | majority | American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108909/american-pipe-constr-co-v-utah/ | and n. 6. A recurrent source of abuse under the former Rule lay in the potential that members of the claimed class could in some situations await developments in the trial or even final judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation would be favorable to their interests. If the evidence at the trial made their prospective position as actual class members appear weak, or if a judgment precluded the possibility of a favorable determination, such putative members of the class who chose not to intervene or join as parties would not be bound by the judgment. This situationthe potential for so-called "one-way intervention"aroused considerable criticism upon the ground that it was unfair to allow members of a class to benefit from a favorable judgment without subjecting themselves to the binding effect of an unfavorable one.[12] The 1966 amendments were designed, in part, specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that members of the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and judgments.[13] Under the present Rule, a determination whether an action shall be maintained as a class action is made by the court "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action" Rule 23 (c) (1).[14] Once it is determined that the action may be maintained as a class action under subdivision *548 (b) (3),[15] the court is mandated to direct to members of the class "the best notice practicable under the circumstances" advising them that they may be excluded from the class if they so request, that they will be bound by the judgment, whether favorable or not if they do not request exclusion, and that a member who does not request exclusion may enter an appearance in the case. Rule 23 (c) (2).[16] Finally, the present Rule provides that in Rule 23 (b) (3) actions the judgment shall include all those found to be members of the class who have received notice and who have not requested exclusion. *549 Rule 23 (c) (3).[17] Thus, potential class members retain the option to participate in or withdraw from the class action only until a point in the litigation "as soon as practicable after the commencement" of the action when the suit is allowed to continue as a class action and they are sent notice of their inclusion within the confines of the class. Thereafter they are either non-parties to the suit and ineligible to participate in a recovery or to be bound by a judgment, |
Justice Stewart | 1,974 | 18 | majority | American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108909/american-pipe-constr-co-v-utah/ | in a recovery or to be bound by a judgment, or else they are full members who must abide by the final judgment, whether favorable or adverse. Under former Rule 23, there existed some difference of opinion among the federal courts of appeals and district courts as to whether parties should be allowed to join or intervene as members of a "spurious" class after the termination of a limitation period, when the initial class action complaint had been filed before the applicable statute of limitations period had run. A majority of the courts ruling on the question, emphasizing the representative nature of a class suit, concluded that such intervention was proper.[18] Other courts concluded that since a "spurious" class action was essentially a device *550 to permit individual joinder or intervention, each individual so participating would have to satisfy the timeliness requirement.[19] This conflict in the implementation of the former Rule was never resolved by this Court. Under present Rule 23, however, the difficulties and potential for unfairness which, in part, convinced some courts to require individualized satisfaction of the statute of limitations by each member of the class, have been eliminated, and there remain no conceptual or practical obstacles in the path of holding that the filing of a timely class action complaint commences the action for all members of the class as subsequently determined.[20] Whatever the merit in the conclusion that one seeking to join a class after the running of the statutory period asserts a "separate cause of action" which must individually meet the timeliness requirements, such a concept is simply inconsistent with Rule 23 as presently drafted. A federal class action is no longer "an invitation to joinder" but a truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions. Under the circumstances of this case, where the District Court found that the named plaintiffs asserted claims that were "typical of the claims or defenses of the class" and would "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," Rule 23 (a) (3), (4), *551 the claimed members of the class stood as parties to the suit until and unless they received notice thereof and chose not to continue. Thus, the commencement of the action satisfied the purpose of the limitation provision as to all those who might subsequently participate in the suit as well as for the named plaintiffs. To hold to the contrary would frustrate the principal function of a class suit, because then the sole means by which members of the class could assure their participation in |
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