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Justice Stevens | 1,990 | 16 | majority | Howlett v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112456/howlett-v-rose/ | state courts or to control or affect their modes of procedure," and found from the fact that the state court was a court of general jurisdiction with cognizance over wrongful-death actions that the court's jurisdiction was "appropriate to the occasion," "The existence of the jurisdiction creat[ed] an implication of duty to exercise it," at which could not be overcome by disagreement with the policy of the federal Act, In McKnett, the state court refused to exercise jurisdiction over a FELA cause of action against a foreign corporation for an injury suffered in another State. We held "[w]hile Congress has not attempted to compel states to provide courts for the enforcement of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general jurisdiction from refusing to do so solely because the suit is brought under a federal law." 292 U.S., at Because the state court had "general jurisdiction of the class of actions to which that here brought belongs, in cases between litigants situated like those in the case at bar," the refusal to hear the FELA action constituted discrimination against rights arising under federal laws, in violation of the Supremacy Clause. We unanimously reaffirmed these principles in We held that the Rhode Island courts could not decline jurisdiction over treble damages claims under the federal *374 Emergency Price Control Act when their jurisdiction was otherwise "adequate and appropriate under established local law." 0 U.S., at 394. The Rhode Island court had distinguished our decisions in McKnett and Mondou on the grounds that the federal Act was a "penal statute," which would not have been enforceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause if passed by another State. We rejected that argument. We observed that the Rhode Island court enforced the "same type of claim" arising under state law and claims for double damages under federal law. 0 U.S., at 394. We therefore concluded that the court had "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this action." [18] The court could not decline to exercise this jurisdiction to enforce federal law by labeling it "penal." The policy of the federal Act was to be considered "the prevailing policy in every state" which the state court could not refuse to enforce " `because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers.' " (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R. 241 U. S., at 2). On only three occasions have we found a valid excuse for a state court's refusal to entertain a federal cause |
Justice Stevens | 1,990 | 16 | majority | Howlett v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112456/howlett-v-rose/ | for a state court's refusal to entertain a federal cause of action. Each of them involved a neutral rule of judicial administration. In the state statute permitted discretionary dismissal of both federal and state claims where neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was a resident of the forum State.[19] In the City Court denied jurisdiction over a *375 FELA action on the grounds that the cause of action arose outside its territorial jurisdiction. Although the state court was not free to dismiss the federal claim "because it is a federal one," we found no evidence that the state courts "construed the state jurisdiction and venue laws in a discriminatory fashion." Finally, in Mayfield, we held that a state court could apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens to bar adjudication of a FELA case if the State "enforces its policy impartially so as not to involve a discrimination against Employers' Liability Act suits." IV The parties disagree as to the proper characterization of the District Court of Appeal's decision. Petitioner argues that the court adopted a substantive rule of decision that state agencies are not subject to liability under Respondents, stressing the court's language that it had not "opened its own courts for federal actions against the state," 537 So. 2d, at argue that the case simply involves the court's refusal to take cognizance of 1983 actions against state defendants. We conclude that whether the question is framed in pre-emption terms, as petitioner would have it, or in the obligation to assume jurisdiction over a "federal" cause of action, as respondents would have it, the Florida court's refusal to entertain one discrete category of 1983 claims, when the court entertains similar state-law actions against state defendants, violates the Supremacy Clause. If the District Court of Appeal meant to hold that governmental entities subject to 1983 liability enjoy an immunity over and above those already provided in 1983, that holding directly violates federal law. The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law. See, e. g., Monessen Southwestern R. 376 U. S. 0, 5 ; Chesapeake & Ohio R. A State may not, by statute or common law, create a cause of action under 1983 against an entity whom Congress has not subjected to liability. Since this Court has construed the word "person" in 1983 to exclude States, neither a federal court nor a state court may entertain a 1983 action against such a defendant. Conversely, since the Court has held that municipal corporations and similar governmental entities are "persons," see 436 U.S. |
Justice Stevens | 1,990 | 16 | majority | Howlett v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112456/howlett-v-rose/ | corporations and similar governmental entities are "persons," see 436 U.S. 6, ; cf. n. 9; Mt. Healthy City Bd. of a state court entertaining a 1983 action must adhere to that interpretation. "Municipal defenses including an assertion of sovereign immunity to a federal right of action are, of course, controlled by federal law." n. 30. "By including municipalities within the class of `persons' subject to liability for violations of the Federal Constitution and laws, Congress the supreme sovereign on matters of federal law abolished whatever vestige of the State's sovereign immunity the municipality possessed." In we unanimously concluded that a California statute that purported to immunize public entities and public employees from any liability for parole release decisions was pre-empted by 1983 "even though the federal cause of action [was] being asserted in the state courts." We explained: " `Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S. C. 1983 or 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction *377 may be enforced. See The immunity claim raises a question of federal law.' cert. denied," n. 8. In we followed Martinez and held that a Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute that effectively shortened the statute of limitations and imposed an exhaustion requirement on claims against public agencies and employees was pre-empted insofar as it was applied to 1983 actions. After observing that the lower federal courts, with one exception, had determined that notice-of-claim statutes were inapplicable to 1983 actions brought in federal courts, we stated that such a consensus also demonstrated that "enforcement of the notice-of-claim statute in 1983 actions brought in state court. interfer[ed] with and frustrat[ed] the substantive right Congress created." We concluded: "The decision to subject state subdivisions to liability for violations of federal rights was a choice that Congress, not the Wisconsin Legislature, made, and it is a decision that the State has no authority to override." While the Florida Supreme Court's actual decision in Hill is consistent with the foregoing reasoning, the Court of Appeal's extension of Hill to persons subject by 1983 to liability is flatly inconsistent with that reasoning and the holdings in both Martinez and Felder. Federal law makes governmental defendants that are not arms of the State, such as municipalities, liable for their constitutional violations. See St. 121-1 ; 436 U.S. 6 Florida law, as interpreted by |
Justice Stevens | 1,990 | 16 | majority | Howlett v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112456/howlett-v-rose/ | 121-1 ; 436 U.S. 6 Florida law, as interpreted by the District Court of Appeal, would make all such defendants absolutely immune from liability under the federal statute. To the extent that the Florida law of sovereign immunity reflects a substantive disagreement with the extent to which governmental entities should be held liable for their constitutional *378 violations, that disagreement cannot override the dictates of federal law. "Congress surely did not intend to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action." If, on the other hand, the District Court of Appeal meant that 1983 claims are excluded from the category of tort claims that the Circuit Court could hear against a school board, its holding was no less violative of federal law. Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. This case does not present the questions whether Congress can require the States to create a forum with the capacity to enforce federal statutory rights or to authorize service of process on parties who would not otherwise be subject to the court's jurisdiction.[20] The State of Florida has constituted the Circuit Court for Pinellas County as a court of general jurisdiction.[21] It exercises jurisdiction over tort claims by private citizens against state entities (including school boards), of the size and type of petitioner's claim here, and it can enter judgment against them. That court also exercises jurisdiction over 1983 actions against individual officers[] and is fully competent to provide the remedies the federal *379 statute requires. Cf. 396 U.S. 9, Petitioner has complied with all the state-law procedures for invoking the jurisdiction of that court. The mere facts, as argued by respondents' amici, that state common law and statutory law do not make unlawful the precise conduct that 1983 addresses and that 1983 actions "are more likely to be frivolous than are other suits," Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 17, clearly cannot provide sufficient justification for the State's refusal to entertain such actions. These reasons have never been asserted by the State and are not asserted by the school board. More importantly, they are not the kind of neutral policy that could be a "valid excuse" for the state court's refusal to entertain federal actions. To the extent that the Florida rule is based upon the judgment that parties who are otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the court should not be held liable for activity that would not subject them to liability under state law, we understand that to |
Justice Stevens | 1,990 | 16 | majority | Howlett v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112456/howlett-v-rose/ | them to liability under state law, we understand that to be only another way of saying that the court disagrees with the content of federal law. Sovereign immunity in Florida turns on the nature of the claim whether the duty allegedly breached is discretionary not on the subject matter of the dispute. There is no question that the Circuit Court, which entertains state common-law and statutory claims against state entities in a variety of their capacities, ranging from law enforcement to schooling to the protection of individuals using parking lots,[23] has jurisdiction over the subject of this suit. That court cannot reject petitioner's 1983 claim *380 because it has chosen, for substantive policy reasons, not to adjudicate other claims which might also render the school board liable. The federal law is law in the State as much as laws passed by the state legislature. A "state court cannot `refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers.' " 0 U. S., (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R. 241 U. S., at 2). The argument by amici that suits predicated on federal law are more likely to be frivolous and have less of an entitlement to the State's limited judicial resources warrants little response. A State may adopt neutral procedural rules to discourage frivolous litigation of all kinds, as long as those rules are not pre-empted by a valid federal law. A State may not, however, relieve congestion in its courts by declaring a whole category of federal claims to be frivolous. Until it has been proved that the claim has no merit, that judgment is not up to the States to make. Respondents have offered no neutral or valid excuse for the Circuit Court's refusal to hear 1983 actions against state entities. The Circuit Court would have had jurisdiction if the defendant were an individual officer and the action were based on It would also have had jurisdiction over the defendant school board if the action were based on established state common law or statutory law. A state policy that permits actions against state agencies for the failure of their officials to adequately police a parking lot and for the negligence of such officers in arresting a person on a roadside, but yet declines jurisdiction over federal actions for constitutional violations by the same persons can be based only on the rationale that such persons should not be held liable for 1983 |
Justice Stevens | 1,990 | 16 | majority | Howlett v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112456/howlett-v-rose/ | that such persons should not be held liable for 1983 violations in the courts of the State. That reason, whether presented in terms of direct disagreement with substantive federal law or simple refusal to take cognizance of *381 the federal cause of action, flatly violates the Supremacy Clause. V Respondents offer two final arguments in support of the judgment of the District Court of Appeal.[24] First, at oral argument but not in their brief they argued that a federal court has no power to compel a state court to entertain a claim over which the state court has no jurisdiction as a matter of state law. Second, respondents argue that sovereign immunity is not a creature of state law, but of long-established legal principles which have not been set aside by We find no merit in these contentions. The fact that a rule is denominated jurisdictional does not provide a court an excuse to avoid the obligation to enforce federal law if the rule does not reflect the concerns of power over the person and competence over the subject matter that jurisdictional rules are designed to protect. It is settled that a court of otherwise competent jurisdiction may not avoid its parallel obligation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to entertain another State's cause of action by invocation of the term "jurisdiction." See First Nat. Bank of ; U.S. 609, ; ; A State cannot "escape this constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly created under the laws of other states by the simple device of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise competent." *382 Hughes, U. S., at[25] Similarly, a State may not evade the strictures of the Privileges and Immunities Clause by denying jurisdiction to a court otherwise competent. See 0 U.S. 183, ; ; cf. White v. As our discussion of McKnett, and Mondou establishes, the same is true with respect to a state court's obligations under the Supremacy Clause.[26] The force *383 of the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can be evaded by mere mention of the word "jurisdiction." Indeed, if this argument had merit, the State of Wisconsin could overrule our decision in by simply amending its notice-of-claim statute to provide that no state court would have jurisdiction of an action in which the plaintiff failed to give the required notice. The Supremacy Clause requires more than that. Respondents' argument that Congress did not intend to abrogate an immunity with an ancient common-law heritage is the same argument, in slightly different dress, as the argument that we have already |
Justice Stevens | 1,990 | 16 | majority | Howlett v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112456/howlett-v-rose/ | slightly different dress, as the argument that we have already rejected that the State are free to redefine the federal cause of action. Congress did take common-law principles into account in providing certain forms of absolute and qualified immunity, see ; ; and in excluding States and arms of the State from the definition of person, see ; ; see also But as to persons that Congress subjected to liability, individual States may not exempt such persons from federal liability by relying on their own common-law heritage. If we were to uphold the immunity claim in this case, every State would have the same opportunity to extend the mantle of sovereign immunity to "persons" who would otherwise be subject to 1983 liability. States would then be free to nullify for their own people the legislative decisions that Congress has made on behalf of all the People. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,016 | 5 | majority | Sheriff v. Gillie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203763/sheriff-v-gillie/ | Ohio law authorizes the State’s Attorney General to retain, as independent contractors, “special counsel” to act on the Attorney General’s behalf in collecting certain debts owed to Ohio or an instrumentality of the State. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Lexis 2014). As required by the Attorney General, special counsel use the Attorney Gen- eral’s letterhead in communicating with debtors. App. 93. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S. C. et seq. (FDCPA or Act), aims to eliminate “abusive debt collection practices.” (a)–(d). To that end, the Act imposes various procedural and substantive obligations on debt collectors. See, e.g., d (prohibit- ing harassing, oppressive, or abusive conduct); e (barring “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] in connection with the collection of any debt”); g(a) (setting out requirements for the contents of initial notices to consumers). The FDCPA excludes from the definition of “debt collector” “any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” 2 SHERIFF v. GILLIE Opinion of the Court a(6)(C). This case involves litigation between debtors to Ohio institutions and special counsel who sought to collect money owed to the institutions. The petition raises two questions: (1) Do special counsel appointed by Ohio’s Attorney General qualify as “state officers” exempt from the FDCPA’s governance? (2) Is special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead a false or misleading representation proscribed by e? Assuming, arguendo, that special counsel do not rank as “state officers,” we hold, nevertheless, that their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead does not offend e. Not fairly described as “false” or “misleading,” use of the let- terhead accurately conveys that special counsel, in seeking to collect debts owed to the State, do so on behalf of, and as instructed by, the Attorney General. I Responding to reports of abusive practices by third- party collectors of consumer debts, Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” (e). Primarily governing “debt collector[s],” the Act defines that term to include “any person in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” a(6). Excluded from the definition is “any offi- cer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,016 | 5 | majority | Sheriff v. Gillie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203763/sheriff-v-gillie/ | of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” a(6)(C). Among other proscriptions, the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from employing “false, deceptive, or misleading” Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 3 Opinion of the Court practices. e. “Without limiting” this general ban, e enumerates 16 categories of conduct that qualify as false or misleading. Two of those categories are perti- nent to our review: “[t]he use or distribution of any written communication which simulates or is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court, official, or agency of any State, or which creates a false impression as to its source, authorization, or ap- proval,” e(9); and “[t]he use of any business, com- pany, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector’s business, company, or organization,” e(14). A debt collector who violates the Act is liable for both actual and statutory damages. k(a). This case concerns the debt collection practices of those charged with collecting overdue debts owed to Ohio-owned agencies and instrumentalities. Among such debts are past-due tuition owed to public universities and unpaid medical bills from state-run hospitals. Under Ohio law, overdue debts are certified to the State’s Attorney Gen- eral, who is responsible for collecting, settling, or other- wise disposing of them. (A), (C), (F). Carrying out this responsibility, the Attorney General may appoint private attorneys as “special counsel to represent the state” in collecting certified claims. Special counsel enter into year-long retention agree- ments “on an independent contractor basis” to “provide legal services on behalf of the Attorney General to one or more State Clients.” App. 143–144. The Attorney Gen- eral’s Office assigns individual claims to special counsel, who are paid a set percentage of the funds they collect for the State. ; at 144–145, 149–152. With “the prior approval of the Attorney General,” special counsel may litigate and settle claims on behalf of the State. at 149. Special counsel may continue to represent private clients so long as doing so does not create a conflict of 4 SHERIFF v. GILLIE Opinion of the Court interest with their work for the Attorney General. Among the special counsel appointed by the Attorney General in 2012 were Mark Sheriff, a partner at the law firm of Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder, and Bringardner Co. LPA (Wiles firm), and Eric Jones, of the Law Offices of Eric A. Jones, LLC. When special counsel contact debtors on behalf of the State, the Attorney General requires them to |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,016 | 5 | majority | Sheriff v. Gillie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203763/sheriff-v-gillie/ | behalf of the State, the Attorney General requires them to use his letterhead. Consistent with this requirement, Sarah Sheriff, an employee of the Wiles firm, sent re- spondent Hazel Meadows a debt collection letter on the Ohio Attorney General’s letterhead. The letter reads: “Sir/Madam: Per your request, this is a letter with the current balance owed for your University of Akron loan that has been placed with the Ohio Attorney General. Feel free to contact me at [telephone num- ber] should you have any further questions.” Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC, (CA6 2015). The amount Meadows owed is listed in the letter’s subject line. After the body of the letter, Sheriff ’s signature appears, followed by the firm’s name, its address, and the designation “Special Counsel to the Attorney General for the State of Ohio.” 1 The letter concludes with a notice that it is “an attempt to collect a debt” and that the senders “are debt collectors.” Respondent Pamela Gillie received a letter, also on the Ohio Attorney General’s letterhead, in relation to a debt she owed to a state-run hospital: “Dear Sir/Madam, You have chosen to ignore repeated attempts to resolv[e] the referenced medical claim. If you cannot make immediate full payment call —————— 1 As noted above, Mark Sheriff, not Sarah Sheriff, was appointed special counsel. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 5 Opinion of the Court DENISE HALL at Eric A. Jones, L.L.C., [phone num- ber] at my office to make arrangements to pay this debt.” That text is followed by a bolded, all-caps notice that the letter is “a communication from a debt collector.” Signed by Eric A. Jones, “Outside Counsel for the Attorney General’s Office,” the letter includes Jones’s telephone and fax numbers. A tear-away portion at the bottom of the page for return of payment is addressed to Jones’s law office. After receiving these letters, Meadows and Gillie filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, asserting that Mark Sheriff, Sarah Sheriff, Jones, and their law firms had violated the FDCPA. By sending debt collection notices on the Attorney General’s letterhead rather than the letter- head of their private firms, Meadows and Gillie alleged, defendants had employed deceptive and misleading means to attempt to collect consumer debts. The Ohio Attorney General intervened as a defendant and counterclaimant, seeking a declaratory judgment that special counsel’s use of his letterhead, as authorized by Ohio law,2 is neither false nor misleading. Further, the Attorney General urged, special counsel should be deemed officers of |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,016 | 5 | majority | Sheriff v. Gillie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203763/sheriff-v-gillie/ | Attorney General urged, special counsel should be deemed officers of the State and therefore outside the FDCPA’s compass. The District Court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding that special counsel are “officers” of the State of Ohio and, in any event, their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead is not false or misleading. —————— 2 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Lexis 2014) requires the Attorney General to provide special counsel with his “official letterhead station- ery” for the collection of tax debts. The Attorney General has interpreted this provision as mandating the use of his letterhead for tax claims, but permitting its use for the collection of other debts. Whether this is a correct interpretation of Ohio law is not before us. 6 SHERIFF v. GILLIE Opinion of the Court 37 F. Supp. 3d 928 (2014). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment. Because special counsel are independent contractors, the court determined, they are not entitled to the FDCPA’s state-officer exemption. 785 F.3d, at 1097–1098. Turning to the deceptive and mis- leading practices charge, the Court of Appeals concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an unsophisticated consumer would be misled “into believ- ing it is the Attorney General who is collecting on the account.” The court therefore remanded the case for trial on this issue. Judge Sutton dissented from both holdings. In his view, “deputizing private lawyers to act as assistant attor- neys general makes them ‘officers’ of the State for collection purposes.” He further concluded that special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead “accurately describes the relevant legal realities—that the law firm acts as an agent of the Attorney General and stands in [his] shoes in collecting money owed to the State.” –1111. The Sixth Circuit denied en banc rehearing. We granted certiorari, 577 U. S. (2015), and now reverse.3 II As they did below, petitioners maintain that, as special counsel appointed by the Attorney General, they are “of- ficers” exempt from the FDCPA’s governance, and that, in any case, the debt collection letters they sent to respond- ents comply with the Act. We pretermit the question —————— 3 We granted the petition for certiorari filed by Mark Sheriff, Sarah Sheriff, the Wiles firm, and the Ohio Attorney General. Jones and the Law Offices of Eric A. Jones, LLC, filed a separate petition for certio- rari as well as a separate brief in this case in support of petitioners. We refer to defendants collectively as “petitioners.” Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of the |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,016 | 5 | majority | Sheriff v. Gillie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203763/sheriff-v-gillie/ | Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of the Court whether, as petitioners contend and Judge Sutton would have held, special counsel qualify as state officers. For purposes of this decision, we assume, arguendo, that special counsel are not “officers” within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, rank simply as “debt collectors” within the FDCPA’s compass. We conclude, nevertheless, that petitioners complied with the Act, as their use of the At- torney General’s letterhead accurately conveys that spe- cial counsel act on behalf of the Attorney General. Special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letter- head at the Attorney General’s direction does not offend e’s general prohibition against “false or mislead- ing representation[s].” The letterhead identifies the prin- cipal—Ohio’s Attorney General—and the signature block names the agent—a private lawyer hired as outside coun- sel to the Attorney General. It would not transgress e, respondents acknowledge, if, in lieu of using the Attorney General’s letterhead, special counsel’s communi- cations opened with a bold-face statement: “We write to you as special counsel to the [A]ttorney [G]eneral who has authorized us to collect a debt you owe to [the State or an instrumentality thereof].” Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). If that representation is accu- rate, i.e., not “false or misleading,” it would make scant sense to rank as unlawful use of a letterhead conveying the very same message, particularly in view of the inclu- sion of special counsel’s separate contact information and the conspicuous notation that the letter is sent by a debt collector.4 Our conclusion is bolstered by the character of the rela- —————— 4 Although respondents argued below that Sarah Sheriff’s inaccurate use of the “special counsel” designation also violates the FDCPA, they have not pursued that argument before this Court. In any case, the letter merely conveyed the debtor’s remaining balance, without any suggestion of followup action. Sarah Sheriff’s misstatement of her title thus qualifies as an immaterial, harmless mistake. 8 SHERIFF v. GILLIE Opinion of the Court tionship between special counsel and the Attorney Gen- eral. As earlier recounted, special counsel “provide legal services on behalf of the Attorney General to one or more State Clients” in furtherance of the Attorney General’s responsibilities as debt collector for state-owned entities and instrumentalities. App. 143–144. In performing this function, special counsel work closely with attorneys in the Attorney General’s Office. For example, Assistant Attor- neys General “frequently assist Special Counsel in draft- ing pleadings, and sometimes join cases as co-counsel to assist Special Counsel with particularly sensitive or com- plex cases.” Special counsel and Assistant |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,016 | 5 | majority | Sheriff v. Gillie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203763/sheriff-v-gillie/ | particularly sensitive or com- plex cases.” Special counsel and Assistant Attorneys General even stand in one another’s stead, as needed, to cover proceedings in ongoing litigation. Given special counsel’s alliance with attorneys within the Attorney General’s Office, a debtor’s impression that a letter from special counsel is a letter from the Attorney General’s Office is scarcely inaccurate.5 On safe ground with respect to e’s general pro- scription against false and misleading representations, special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead is consistent too with e(9)’s specific prohibition against “falsely represent[ing]” that a communication is “authorized, issued, or approved” by a State. In enacting this provision, Congress sought to prevent debt collectors from “misrepresenting” that they are “government offi- cial[s].” S. Rep. No. 95–382, p. 8 (1977). Here, the Attor- ney General authorized—indeed required—special counsel to use his letterhead in sending debt collection communi- cations. Special counsel create no false impression in doing just what they have been instructed to do. Instead, their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead conveys on —————— 5 We address here only “special counsel.” The considerations relevant to that category may not carry over to other debt-collector relationships. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 9 Opinion of the Court whose authority special counsel writes to the debtor. As a whole, the communication alerts the debtor to both the basis for the payment obligation and the official responsi- ble for enforcement of debts owed to the State, while the signature block conveys who the Attorney General has engaged to collect the debt. Nor did special counsel, in sending letters on the Attor- ney General’s letterhead, use a name other than their “true name,” in violation of e(14). Although the FDCPA does not say “what a ‘true name’ is, its import is straightforward: A debt collector may not lie about his institutional affiliation.” (Sutton, J., dissenting). Special counsel do not employ a false name when using the Attorney General’s letterhead at his in- struction, for special counsel, as the Attorney General’s agents, act for him in debt-related matters. Far from misrepresenting special counsel’s identity, letters sent by special counsel accurately identify the office primarily responsible for collection of the debt (the Attorney Gen- eral), special counsel’s affiliation with that office, and the address (special counsel’s law firm) to which payment should be sent.6 We further note a federalism concern. “Ohio’s enforce- ment of its civil code—by collecting money owed to it—[is] a core sovereign function.” Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC, No. 14–3836 (CA6, July 14, 2015), App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a (Sutton, J., |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,016 | 5 | majority | Sheriff v. Gillie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203763/sheriff-v-gillie/ | 14, 2015), App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of rehear- ing en banc). Ohio’s Attorney General has chosen to appoint special counsel to assist him in fulfilling his obliga- —————— 6 Because we conclude that the letters sent by petitioners were truth- ful, we need not consider the parties’ arguments as to whether a false or misleading statement must be material to violate the FDCPA, or whether a potentially false or misleading statement should be viewed from the perspective of “the least sophisticated consumer,” Brief for Respondent Gillie et al. 57, or “[t]he average consumer who has de- faulted on a debt,” Brief for Petitioners 41. 10 SHERIFF v. GILLIE Opinion of the Court tion to collect the State’s debts, and he has instructed his appointees to use his letterhead when acting on his behalf. There is no cause, in this case, to construe federal law in a manner that interferes with “States’ arrangements for conducting their own governments.” ). The Sixth Circuit’s contrary exposition is unconvincing. Use of the Attorney General’s letterhead, the Court of Appeals emphasized, has led to confusion among debtors, as the Attorney General has received phone calls inquiring whether letters sent by special counsel are authentic. 785 F.3d, at 1107. But the Sixth Circuit overlooked that the Attorney General’s prompt and invariable answer to those inquiries was “yes.” To the extent that consumers may be concerned that the letters are a “scam,” the solution is for special counsel to say more, not less, about their role as agents of the Attorney General. Special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead, furthermore, encour- ages consumers to use official channels to ensure the legitimacy of the letters, assuaging the very concern the Sixth Circuit identified. In addition to the specter of consumer confusion, the Sixth Circuit stressed the risk of intimidation—that the Attorney General’s letterhead would “place pressure on those individuals receiving the letters” to pay their state debts. There are two bases for this concern, neither of which is persuasive. First, invocation of the Attorney General’s imprimatur could lead debtors to prioritize their debt to the State over other, private debts out of a belief that the consequences of failing to pay a state debt would be more severe. This impression is not false; the State does have enforcement powers beyond those afforded private creditors. A debtor’s tax refund, for example, “may be applied in satisfaction” of her debt, regardless of whether the State has obtained a judgment, Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 11 Opinion of the Court (Lexis 2013), |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,016 | 5 | majority | Sheriff v. Gillie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203763/sheriff-v-gillie/ | U. S. (2016) 11 Opinion of the Court (Lexis 2013), and a debt owed to the State takes priority over most private debts in state probate proceedings, (Lexis Supp. 2015). “The special consequences of state debts explain why the Act bars debt collectors unaffiliated with a State from using the State’s name to scare debtors into paying. When the State itself is doing the demanding, however, nothing about the resulting fear misleads.” (Sutton, J., dissenting). In other words, e bars debt collectors from deceiving or misleading consumers; it does not protect consumers from fearing the actual consequences of their debts. Second, debtors might worry that the letters imply that the Attorney General, as the State’s top law enforcement official, intends to take punitive action against them. “But neither of the milquetoast letters [received by respond- ents] threatens criminal prosecution, civil penalties, or any action whatsoever.” at 1116–1117. Use of the Attorney General’s letterhead merely clarifies that the debt is owed to the State, and the Attorney General is the State’s debt collector. The FDCPA is not sensibly read to require special counsel to obscure that reality.7 * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. —————— 7 Having determined that use of the Attorney General’s letterhead inaccurately suggested that the letters were from the Attorney Gen- eral’s Office, the Sixth Circuit remanded to the District Court for trial on whether this practice was “materially false, deceptive and mislead- ing.” 1109– 1110 (2015). But all of the relevant facts are undisputed, and the application of the FDCPA to those facts is a question of law. The District Court therefore properly granted summary judgment for defendants |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,996 | 19 | majority | Ornelas v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118030/ornelas-v-united-states/ | Petitioners each pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. They reserved their right to appeal the District Court's denial of their motion to suppress the cocaine found in their car. The District Court had found reasonable suspicion to stop and question petitioners as they entered their car, and probable cause to remove one of the interior panels where a package containing two kilograms of cocaine was found. The Court of Appeals opined that the findings of reasonable suspicion to stop, and probable cause to search, should be reviewed "deferentially," and "for clear error." We hold that the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo. The facts are not disputed. In the early morning of a December day in Detective Michael Pautz, a 20-year veteran of the Milwaukee County Sheriff's Department with 2 years specializing in drug enforcement, was conducting drug-interdiction surveillance in downtown Milwaukee. *692 Pautz noticed a 1981 two-door Oldsmobile with California license plates in a motel parking lot. The car attracted Pautz's attention for two reasons: because older model, twodoor General Motors cars are a favorite with drug couriers because it is easy to hide things in them; and because California is a "source State" for drugs. Detective Pautz radioed his dispatcher to inquire about the car's registration. The dispatcher informed Pautz that the owner was either Miguel Ledesma Ornelas or Miguel Ornelas Ledesma from San Jose, California; Pautz was unsure which name the dispatcher gave. Detective Pautz checked the motel registry and learned that an Ismael Ornelas accompanied by a second man had registered at 4 a.m., without reservations. Pautz called for his partner, Donald Hurrle, a detective with approximately 25 years of law enforcement experience, assigned for the past 6 years to the drug enforcement unit. When Hurrle arrived at the scene, the officers contacted the local office of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and asked DEA personnel to run the names Miguel Ledesma Ornelas and Ismael Ornelas through the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADDIS), a federal database of known and suspected drug traffickers. Both names appeared in NADDIS. The NADDIS report identified Miguel Ledesma Ornelas as a heroin dealer from El Centro, California, and Ismael Ornelas, Jr., as a cocaine dealer from Tucson, Arizona. The officers then summoned Deputy Luedke and the department's drug-sniffing dog, Merlin. Upon their arrival, Detective Pautz left for another assignment. Detective Hurrle informed Luedke of what they knew and together they waited. Sometime later, petitioners emerged from the motel and got into the Oldsmobile. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,996 | 19 | majority | Ornelas v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118030/ornelas-v-united-states/ | petitioners emerged from the motel and got into the Oldsmobile. Detective Hurrle approached the car, identified himself as a police officer, and inquired whether they had any illegal drugs or contraband. Petitioners answered "No." Hurrle then asked for identification and was given two California driver's licenses bearing the names *693 Saul Ornelas and Ismael Ornelas. Hurrle asked them if he could search the car and petitioners consented. The men appeared calm, but Ismael was shaking somewhat. Deputy Luedke, who over the past nine years had searched approximately 2,000 cars for narcotics, searched the Oldsmobile's interior. He noticed that a panel above the right rear passenger armrest felt somewhat loose and suspected that the panel might have been removed and contraband hidden inside. Luedke would testify later that a screw in the doorjam adjacent to the loose panel was rusty, which to him meant that the screw had been removed at some time. Luedke dismantled the panel and discovered two kilograms of cocaine. Petitioners were arrested. Petitioners filed pretrial motions to suppress, alleging that the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights when the officers detained them in the parking lot and when Deputy Luedke searched inside the panel without a warrant.[1] The Government conceded in the court below that when the officers approached petitioners in the parking lot, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, so the encounter was an investigatory stop. See An investigatory stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion, and a warrantless search of a car is valid if based on probable cause, *694 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the circumstances gave the officers reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause. The Magistrate found, as a finding of fact, that there was no rust on the screw and hence concluded that Deputy Luedke had an insufficient basis to conclude that drugs would be found within the panel. The Magistrate nonetheless recommended that the District Court deny the suppression motions because he thought, given the presence of the drug-sniffing dog, that the officers would have found the cocaine by lawful means eventually and therefore the drugs were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. See The District Court adopted the Magistrate's recommendation with respect to reasonable suspicion, but not its reasoning as to probable cause. The District Court thought that the model, age, and source-State origin of the car, and the fact that two men traveling together checked into a motel at 4 o'clock in the morning without reservations, formed a drug-courier profile and that this profile |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,996 | 19 | majority | Ornelas v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118030/ornelas-v-united-states/ | without reservations, formed a drug-courier profile and that this profile together with the NADDIS reports gave rise to reasonable suspicion of drugtrafficking activity; in the court's view, reasonable suspicion became probable cause when Deputy Luedke found the loose panel. Accordingly, the court ruled that the cocaine need not be excluded.[2] The Court of Appeals reviewed deferentially the District Court's determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause; it would reverse only upon a finding of "clear error."[3]* The court found no clear error in the reasonable-suspicion analysis and affirmed that determination. With respect to the probable-cause finding, however, the court remanded the case for a determination on whether Luedke was credible when testifying about the loose panel. On remand, the Magistrate Judge expressly found the testimony credible. The District Court accepted the finding, and once again ruled that probable cause supported the search. The Seventh Circuit held that determination not clearly erroneous. Judgt. order reported at We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Circuits over the applicable standard of appellate review.[4] Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" mean is not possible. They are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with "`the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' " ; see United As such, the standards are "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal *696 rules." We have described reasonable suspicion simply as "a particularized and objective basis" for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, United and probable cause to search as existing where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, see at -176; We have cautioned that these two legal principles are not "finely-tuned standards," comparable to the standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. They are instead fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed. ; at ; ; The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause. The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact: "[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,996 | 19 | majority | Ornelas v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118030/ornelas-v-united-states/ | law and fact: "[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another *697 way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." We think independent appellate review of these ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause is consistent with the position we have taken in past cases. We have never, when reviewing a probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion determination ourselves, expressly deferred to the trial court's determination. See, e. g., ; A policy of sweeping deference would permit, "[i]n the absence of any significant difference in the facts," "the Fourth Amendment's incidence [to] tur[n] on whether different trial judges draw general conclusions that the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable cause." Such varied results would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law. This, if a matter-of-course, would be unacceptable. In addition, the legal rules for probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application. Independent review is therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles. See (where the "relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through its application to the particular circumstances of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give the trier of fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip a federal appellate court of its primary function as an expositor of law"). Finally, de novo review tends to unify precedent and will come closer to providing law enforcement officers with a defined "`set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of *698 law enforcement.' " New ; see also It is true that because the mosaic which is analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is multifaceted, "one determination will seldom be a useful `precedent' for another," n. 11. But there are exceptions. For instance, the circumstances in and were so alike that we concluded that reversing the Court of Appeals' decision in was necessary to be faithful to Carroll. We likewise recognized the similarity of facts in United and The same was true both in United and see at 572 ("The facts in this case closely resemble the facts in Ross "); and in United and see at 443 (Powell, J., concurring) ("facts [in Mendenhall ] [are] remarkably similar to those in the present case"). And even where |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,996 | 19 | majority | Ornelas v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118030/ornelas-v-united-states/ | similar to those in the present case"). And even where one case may not squarely control another one, the two decisions when viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on the subject. The Court of Appeals, in adopting its deferential standard of review here, reasoned that de novo review for warrantless searches would be inconsistent with the "`great deference' " paid when reviewing a decision to issue a warrant, see Illi- *699 nois v. See United We cannot agree. The Fourth Amendment demonstrates a "strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant," and the police are more likely to use the warrant process if the scrutiny applied to a magistrate's probablecause determination to issue a warrant is less than that for warrantless searches. Were we to eliminate this distinction, we would eliminate the incentive. We therefore hold that as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. A trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and events of the community; likewise, a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise. The background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve deference. For example, what may not amount to reasonable suspicion at a motel located alongside a transcontinental highway at the height of the summer tourist season may rise to that level in December in Milwaukee. That city is unlikely to have been an overnight stop selected at the last minute by a traveler coming from California to points east. The 85-mile width of Lake Michigan blocks any further eastward progress. And while the city's salubrious summer climate and seasonal attractions bring many tourists at that time of year, the same is not true in December. Milwaukee's average daily high temperature in that month is 31 degrees and its average daily low is 17 degrees; the percentage of possible sunshine is only 38 percent. It is a reasonable inference that a Californian stopping in Milwaukee in December is either there *700 to transact business or to visit family or friends. The background facts, though rarely the subject of explicit findings, inform the judge's assessment of the historical facts. In a similar |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | concurring | Molina-Martinez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3195996/molina-martinez-v-united-states/ | I agree with the Court that the Fifth Circuit’s rigid approach to unpreserved Guidelines errors is incorrect. And I agree that petitioner has shown a reasonable proba- bility that the District Court would have imposed a differ- ent sentence in his case if his recommended Guidelines sentence had been accurately calculated. Unlike the Court, however, I would not speculate about how often the reasonable probability test will be satisfied in future cases. The Court’s predictions in dicta about how plain-error review will play out are predicated on the view that sen- tencing judges will continue to rely very heavily on the Guidelines in the future, but that prediction may not turn out to be accurate. We should not make predictions about the future effects of Guidelines errors, particularly since some may misunderstand those predictions as veiled directives. I “ ‘No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before the tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” United 2 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of ALITO, J. ). Consistent with this principle, Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Crimi- nal Procedure treats defendants who preserve their claims much more favorably than those who fail to register a timely objection. When the defendant has made a timely objection to an error, the Government generally bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless. By contrast, when a defendant has failed to make a timely objection, “[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” ; see also at 741–742 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). This framework applies to errors in the calculation of an advisory Guidelines sentence. If the defendant does not call the error to the attention of the sentencing judge, the defendant may obtain relief on appeal only if he or she proves that the error was prejudicial—specifically, that there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for the error, the sentence would have been different. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, Meeting this burden “should not be too easy for defendants.” at 82. Instead, the standard should be robust enough to “enforce the policies that underpin Rule 52(b) generally, to encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpre- served error.” By placing this burden on the defend- ant, Rule 52(b) compels defense counsel to devote careful attention to the potential complexities |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | concurring | Molina-Martinez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3195996/molina-martinez-v-united-states/ | defense counsel to devote careful attention to the potential complexities of the Guidelines at sentencing, thus providing the district court—which “is ordinarily in the best position to determine the relevant facts and adjudicate the dispute”—with “the opportunity to consider and resolve” any objections. ; see also (“[A]ppellate-court authority to remedy” unpreserved errors “is strictly circumscribed” in order to “induce the Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 3 Opinion of ALITO, J. timely raising of claims and objections”); United States v. Vonn, (“[T]he value of finality requires defense counsel to be on his toes, not just the judge, and the defendant who just sits there when a mis- take can be fixed cannot just sit there when he speaks up later on”); at 742–743 (KENNEDY, J., concur- ring) (“[T]he operation of Rule 52(b) does not permit a party to withhold an objection and then to demand automatic reversal”). Whether a defendant can show a “reasonable probabil- ity” of a different sentence depends on the “particular facts and circumstances” of each case. United States v. 569 U. S. – (2013) (slip op., at 13–14). “We have previously warned against courts’ determining whether an error is harmless through the use of manda- tory presumptions and rigid rules rather than case-specific application of judgment, based upon examination of the record.” (citing (1946)). Instead of relying on presumptions, a court of appeals must “engage in [a] full-record assessment” to determine whether a defendant who forfeited a claim of Guidelines error has met his case-specific burden of show- ing of prejudice. at (slip op., at 14). The answer may be affected by a variety of factors, includ- ing any direct evidence, the nature and magnitude of the error, the sentencing judge’s view of the Guidelines,1 the —————— 1 See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Report on the Con- tinuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing 3 (2012) (Booker Report) (“[T]he Commission’s analysis of individual judge data showed that the identity of the judge has played an increas- ingly important role in the sentencing outcomes in many districts”); Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 Houston L. Rev. 1227, 1266 (2014) (“Inter- Judge Disparity Has Increased Since Booker”); Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, (2010) (“[I]n their guideline sentencing patterns, judges have responded 4 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of ALITO, J. approach of the circuit in question,2 and the particular crime at issue.3 Under the specific circumstances here, Molina-Martinez met his burden. As the Court points out, Molina-Martinez demonstrated that the Guidelines “were the focal |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | concurring | Molina-Martinez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3195996/molina-martinez-v-united-states/ | points out, Molina-Martinez demonstrated that the Guidelines “were the focal point for the proceedings”; that “[t]he 77-month sentence the Dis- trict Court selected is conspicuous for its position as the lowest sentence within what the District Court believed to be the applicable range”; and that “the District Court’s selection of a sentence at the bottom of the range, despite the Government’s request for the maximum Guidelines sentence, ‘evinced an intention to give the minimum recommended by the Guidelines.’ ” Ante, at 13. This evidence establishes a “reasonable probability that the District Court would have imposed a different sentence had it known that 70 months was in fact the lowest sen- tence the Commission deemed appropriate.” In concluding otherwise, the Fifth Circuit applied exactly the sort of strict, categorical rule against which we have warned. Under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, Molina- Martinez could not satisfy his burden with circumstantial evidence regarding the parties’ sentencing arguments or the District Court’s selection of a sentence at the very bottom of the range. See (CA5 —————— in starkly different ways to Booker, with some following a ‘free at last’ pattern and others a ‘business as usual’ pattern”). 2 See, e.g., Booker Report 6 (“The influence of the guidelines has varied by circuit”); (“Different Districts Have Had Very Different Post-Booker Experiences”); Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1268, 1277, 1319–1323 (2014) (presenting “evidence of substantial interdistrict differences in sentencing outcomes”). 3 See, e.g., Booker Report 5 (“The influence of the guidelines has generally remained stable in drug trafficking, firearms, and immigra- tion offenses, but has diminished in fraud and child pornography offenses”). Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 5 Opinion of ALITO, J. 2014) (per curiam). Rather, the Fifth Circuit would re- quire a defendant to produce direct evidence, such as an “explicit statement suggesting that the Guidelines range was a primary factor in sentencing.” But there is no good reason to preclude defendants from showing preju- dice via the type of circumstantial evidence at issue here. As this case illustrates, the manner in which a district court applies an incorrect Guidelines range can itself serve as evidence of an effect on substantial rights. I thus con- cur in the Court’s opinion insofar as it rejects the Fifth Circuit’s misguided approach and finds that Molina- Martinez demonstrated a reasonable probability of a different sentence absent the Guidelines error. II I cannot, however, join the Court’s dicta speculating that “most” defendants who forfeit a Guidelines error will be able to show a |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | concurring | Molina-Martinez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3195996/molina-martinez-v-united-states/ | forfeit a Guidelines error will be able to show a reasonable probability of prejudice. Ante, at 9, 11, 15. Things may turn out that way, but I see no reason to prejudge an empirical question that is unnec- essary to our decision in this case and that will be worked out by the lower courts on a case-by-case basis.4 —————— 4 Some of the Court’s dicta could perhaps be interpreted not as predic- tions, but as instructions to lower courts to side with the forfeiting defendant unless the Government can point to “unusual circum- stances.” See ante, at 11–12 (“[I]n the ordinary case a defendant will satisfy his burden to show prejudice by pointing to the application of an incorrect, higher Guidelines range and the sentence he received there- under. Absent unusual circumstances, he will not be required to show more”). For several reasons, however, I do not think the opinion can be fairly viewed as requiring such a result. First, the Court makes clear that today’s decision does not shift the burden of persuasion from a forfeiting defendant to the Government. See ante, at 14 (Under Rule 52(b), “ ‘[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice,’ ” and “[t]he holding here does not” shift the burden). Second, the opinion acknowledges that a “court’s reliance on an incorrect range” will not always “suffice to show an effect on the defendant’s substantial rights”—even where “the 6 MOLINA-MARTINEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of ALITO, J. The Court’s proclamations about what will occur in “most” cases are based on Sentencing Commission statis- tics indicating that the Guidelines tend to influence sen- tences. See ante, at 10. Perhaps these statistics are pro- bative of the Guidelines’ current impact on sentencing. But they provide an unstable and shifting basis for the Court’s prophecies about the future. The Guidelines are now entirely advisory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), and in time the lower courts may increasingly drift away from the Guidelines and back toward the sentencing regime that prevailed prior to their issuance.5 As circumstances change, and as judges who —————— record is silent as to what the district court might have done had it considered the correct Guidelines range.” Ante, at 11. It follows that even where the Government fails to identify any direct evidence of harmlessness, the defendant cannot automatically satisfy his burden simply by pointing to the application of an incorrect Guidelines range. Instead of employing a strict presumption against the Government, the Court emphasizes, “a reviewing |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | concurring | Molina-Martinez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3195996/molina-martinez-v-united-states/ | strict presumption against the Government, the Court emphasizes, “a reviewing court must consider the facts and circumstances of the case before it.” ; see also (“ ‘Our essen- tial point is that particular facts and circumstances matter’ ” (quoting United States v. 569 U. S. (2013) (slip op., at 13))). Given these caveats, I do not read the Court’s opinion as replacing the Fifth Circuit’s inflexible pro-Government presumption with an equally inflexible pro-defendant presumption. Rather, I take the Court at its word: “The decision today simply states that courts reviewing sentenc- ing errors cannot apply a categorical rule requiring additional evidence in cases, like this one, where the district court applied an incorrect range but nevertheless sentenced the defendant within the correct range.” Ante, at 14. 5 See, e.g., Assessing Booker and Its Aftermath, Practice Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines pp. 1–14 to 1–16 (D. Debold ed., 5th ed. 2016) (Debold) (“Since the first weeks after Booker, district courts have been engaged in a dynamic debate over the precise weight to be given the now advisory Guidelines,” and “there are reasons to expect continued evolution in sentencing norms”); (“[D]istrict courts can be expected to continue to test the boundaries of their discretion. Accordingly, while it is clear that district courts now enjoy more discretion at sentencing, the proper bounds of that discretion will continue to be explored”). Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of ALITO, J. spent decades applying mandatory Guidelines ranges are replaced with new judges less wedded to the Guidelines, the statistics underlying the Court’s forecasts may change dramatically.6 Because I cannot join the Court’s question- able predictions, I concur only in part and in the judgment. —————— 6 See, e.g., Yang, 89 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 1277 (finding that “Judges who have no prior experience sentencing under the mandatory Guide- lines regime are more likely to depart from the Guidelines- recommended range than their pre-Booker counterparts, suggesting that newer judges are less anchored to the Guidelines”); at 1318– 1319 (“The ‘anchor’ effect of the Guidelines sentence may be more prominent for pre-Booker appointees because these judges are more acculturated to and experienced with constraining their sentences to the dictates of the Guidelines. In contrast, the ‘anchor’ effect is less prominent for post-Booker appointees. These potential anchoring differences may ‘increase as the years go by and the bench is filled with individuals who have no history with binding guidelines’ ”); see also, e.g., Debold at 1–16 (“Sentencing judges, particularly more recent appointees, are also growing increasingly skeptical of the Guidelines as they become more |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | This case, an original action brought by the States of Oklahoma and Texas against the State of New arises out of a dispute over the interpretation of various provisions of the Canadian River Compact (Compact), which was ratified by New Oklahoma, and Texas in 1951 and consented to by Congress by the Act of May 17, 195, Each State has filed exceptions to a report submitted by the Special Master (Report) appointed by this Court. *4 I The Canadian River[1] is an interstate river which rises along the boundary between southeastern Colorado and northeastern New in the vicinity of Raton, New From its headwaters, the Canadian River flows south to the Conchas Dam in New then generally east for 65 river miles to the Ute Reservoir in New and then into the Texas Panhandle. After traversing the panhandle, the river flows into Oklahoma where it eventually empties into the Arkansas River, a tributary of the Mississippi. In the late 1930's, Congress authorized, and the Corps of Engineers completed, the construction of Conchas Dam on the mainstream of the Canadian River, approximately 30 miles northwest of Tucumcari, New Congress also authorized the Tucumcari project, a federal reclamation project designed to irrigate over 4,000 acres of land and serve the municipal and industrial needs of Tucumcari, New The project lands are situated southeast of Conchas Dam and are served by the Conchas Canal, which diverts water from Conchas Reservoir. The project was completed in 1950. In 1949, the Texas congressional delegation proposed that Congress authorize a massive Canadian River reclamation project, known as the Sanford project because of its proximity to Sanford, Texas, for the purpose of serving the municipal and industrial requirements of 11 Texas cities in the Texas Panhandle region. Legislation to authorize the Sanford project was introduced in the House of Representatives, along with a bill authorizing New Oklahoma, and Texas to negotiate an interstate compact to equitably apportion *5 the waters of the Canadian River. The legislation authorizing the States to enter into an interstate compact was passed by Congress, and the Canadian River Compact Commission was created. The Compact Commission consisted of one commissioner from each State and one federal representative. Each commissioner and the federal representative had the assistance of engineering advisers, a group collectively known as the Engineering Advisory Committee. This committee submitted several proposals to the Compact Commission. The final draft of the Canadian River Compact was presented on December 6, 1950, and was signed on that day by the members of the Compact Commission.[] *6 Congress enacted legislation authorizing the Sanford project on |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | Commission.[] *6 Congress enacted legislation authorizing the Sanford project on December 9, 1950, but as a result of an amendment proposed by the New delegation, the bill specifically provided that actual construction of the project could not commence until Congress consented to the Compact. See 43 U.S. C. 600c(b). That consent was granted on May 17, 195, and the Sanford Dam, creating Lake Meredith Reservoir with a capacity of over 1.4 million acre-feet of water, was completed in 1964. Lake Meredith is approximately 165 river miles east of Ute Reservoir and is located north of Amarillo, Texas. During the 1950's, New selected a site on the Canadian River mainstream approximately 1 mile west of Logan, New and about 45 miles downstream from Conchas Dam for the construction of Ute Dam and Reservoir. Construction of Ute Dam was completed in 1963, with an initial storage capacity of 109,600 acre-feet. In 198, New began construction to enlarge the reservoir, and, in 1984, the enlargement was completed, giving Ute Reservoir a capacity of 7,800 acre-feet. In 1984, the reservoir's actual capacity to store water was 46,617 acre-feet, the remaining capacity being occupied by silt. The Special Master estimated that because of additional silting, reservoir storage capacity was reduced to 41,700 acre-feet in 19 and currently is about 37,900 acre-feet. Report of Special Master 16-17. *7 As early as 198, Oklahoma and Texas expressed concern that the enlargement of Ute Reservoir would violate the 00,000 acre-feet limitation in Article IV(b) of the Compact. See n. All attempts by the Commission to resolve this budding dispute were unsuccessful, in large part because any Commission action requires a unanimous vote and New would not agree to the interpretation of the Compact proposed by Oklahoma and Texas. This litigation followed, with Oklahoma and Texas contending that Article IV(b) of the Compact imposes a 00,000 acre-feet limit on New 's constructed reservoir capacity available for conservation storage downstream from Conchas Dam, and that capacity for the so-called "desilting pool" portion of Ute Reservoir was not exempt from the Article IV(b) limitation because it was not allocated solely to "sediment control." In the spring of 19, while the case was pending, the portion of the Canadian River above Conchas Dam flooded, and a sizeable quantity of water, approximately 50,000 acre-feet, spilled over Conchas Dam. This was the first major spill over Conchas Dam since 1941-194, a spill which predated the Compact. New caught approximately 60 percent of the spill in Ute Reservoir, which filled the reservoir to its capacity, and the remaining 40 percent flowed on down the river. |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | and the remaining 40 percent flowed on down the river. As of June 3, 1988, Ute Reservoir contained approximately 3,000 acre-feet of stored water, of which some 180,900 acre-feet was alleged by New to be flood water spilled from Conchas Dam earlier in 19. Report of Special Master 47. After New refused to count the spill waters stored in Ute Reservoir for purposes of the 00,000 acre-feet limitation in Article IV(b), Texas and Oklahoma filed a supplemental complaint in this case, claiming that if the 00,000 acre-feet limitation applies to actual stored water, then water spilling over Conchas Dam or seeping back from the Tucumcari project constitutes "waters which originate below Conchas Dam" within the meaning of Article IV(b). New *8 disputed all of these contentions and argued that water which first enters the river above Conchas Dam is not subject to the Article IV(b) limitation even if it is stored in Ute Reservoir, or anywhere else in New below Conchas Dam. We referred Texas' and Oklahoma's complaint and supplemental complaint in this original case to a Special Master. 484 U.S. 103 ; After considering voluminous evidence, the written submissions of the States, twice hearing extended oral argument on the issues, and circulating a draft report to the States for their comments, the Master filed a Report on October 15, making the following recommendations relevant to our decision in this case: (1) Article IV(b) imposes a limitation on stored water, not physical reservoir capacity. () Waters originating in the Canadian River Basin above Conchas Dam, but reaching the mainstream of the Canadian River below Conchas Dam as a result of spills or releases from Conchas Dam or seepage and return flow from the Tucumcari project, are subject to the Article IV(b) limitation. (3) The issue whether, and to what extent, the water in the "desilting pool" in Ute Reservoir should be exempt from the Article IV(b) limitation should be referred to the Canadian River Compact Commission for good-faith negotiations and possible resolution. The referral would be without prejudice to later invoke the Court's jurisdiction if the issue cannot be resolved within one year. (4) If the foregoing recommendations are approved, New will have been in violation of Article IV(b) of the Compact since 19, and the case should be returned to the Special Master for determination of any injury to Oklahoma and Texas and recommendations for appropriate relief. Report, at 4-5. The Master also recommended that the Court use this case to articulate various jurisdictional prerequisites and procedural *9 guidelines for application in future interstate compact litigation. at 6-34.[3] We |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | for application in future interstate compact litigation. at 6-34.[3] We ordered the Master's Report to be filed and set a briefing schedule, and heard oral argument on the States' exceptions to the Master's Report. We now address those exceptions in turn. II Oklahoma has filed an exception to the Master's recommendation in Part VI of his Report that the Article IV(b) limitation on "conservation storage" be interpreted to apply only to the quantity of water New actually stores at Ute Reservoir for conservation purposes. As of 1984, Ute Reservoir had a storage capacity of approximately 7,800 acre-feet, although it is conceded that not all of that capacity is chargeable as existing for "conservation storage." Some of the capacity is for purposes excluded from the Compact definition of "conservation storage," such as for sediment control. Oklahoma contends that the term "conservation storage" should be interpreted to apply to the physical capacity of reservoirs located below Conchas Dam, a view which, if adopted, would result in a finding that New has been in violation of Article IV(b) since at least 1984, when the enlargement of Ute Reservoir was completed. The Special Master conceded, as do we, that Oklahoma's suggested interpretation of Article IV(b)'s conservation storage limitation finds some support in the plain language of the Compact definition of "conservation storage" and in the language of Article IV(b) itself. The Compact defines "conservation storage" in pertinent part as "that portion of the capacity of reservoirs available for the storage of water" for various purposes and "excludes any portion of the capacity of *30 reservoirs" allocated to other purposes. Art. II(d) (emphasis added). Likewise, Article IV(b) refers to "the amount of conservation storage in New available for impounding these waters." (Emphasis added.) However, other provisions in the Compact appear to focus on stored water, not reservoir capacity. For example, Article V sets forth an elaborate formula for determining the amount of water Texas may actually impound at any one time; Article VII provides that the "Commission may permit New to impound more water than the amount set forth in Article IV" (emphasis added); and Article VIII requires each State to "furnish to the Commission at intervals designated by the Commission accurate records of the quantities of water stored in reservoirs pertinent to the administration of this Compact." (Emphasis added.) We agree with the Special Master that nothing on the face of the Compact indicates a clear intention to treat the New "conservation storage" limitation differently from the Texas stored water limitation, and we see no compelling justification for doing so. In fact, several early |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | no compelling justification for doing so. In fact, several early drafts of the Compact uniformly referred to stored water, and only in the final draft did the "conservation storage" language appear in Article IV(b). There is nothing in the contemporaneous memoranda and statements of the Compact Commissioners and their staffs to explain exactly why this change was made; nor is there anything which indicates an intent to draw a distinction between the limitations placed on New and those placed on Texas. Rather, as the Master pointed out, it is most probable that the terms "stored water," "storage," and "conservation storage capacity" were being used loosely and interchangeably by the drafters and their staffs. See Report, at 4-43. There is no obvious reason why Texas and Oklahoma would have wanted to restrict New 's ability to increase reservoir capacity below Conchas Dam, particularly in light of the fact that larger reservoirs actually promote one of the *31 purposes stated in Article I of the Compact, which is to capture and conserve as much of the Canadian River's flood flows as possible, flows which might otherwise be dissipated and therefore wasted. Furthermore, as New points out, sedimentation alone would constantly reduce New 's storage capacity below the 00,000 acre-feet limit, forcing New to repeatedly either build new reservoir capacity or enlarge existing reservoirs. Either of those options would be extremely expensive, and Oklahoma points to no persuasive evidence that the drafters of the Compact intended that New should bear such a burden. We overrule Oklahoma's exception to Part VI of the Master's Report. III New has excepted to Part VII of the Master's Report, in which the Master recommended that water spilling or released from Conchas Dam, as well as return flow and seepage from the Tucumcari project, be subject to Article IV(b)'s 00,000 acre-feet limitation on conservation storage, if the water is impounded in Ute Dam or other downstream dams in New New argues that the Compact does not impose any restriction on New 's impoundment of these waters because they originate above Conchas Dam, and Article IV(a) gives New the "free and unrestricted use of all waters originating in the drainage basin of Canadian River above Conchas Dam." (Emphasis added.) Texas and Oklahoma counter that the word "originating," as used in Article IV of the Compact, simply means "entering." See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. In Texas' and Oklahoma's view, all the conservation storage waters which end up in Ute Reservoir, whether they spill over or are released through Conchas Dam, or seep back from the Tucumcari project, are subject |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | Dam, or seep back from the Tucumcari project, are subject to the 00,000 acre-feet conservation storage limitation of Article IV(b) because they "originate" below Conchas Dam. The Special Master recommended that such waters be subject to the Article IV(b) limitation because he concluded that *3 the intent of the Compact drafters was to give New free and unrestricted use of waters originating in the Canadian River drainage basin above Conchas Dam only if the waters were "stored, used or diverted for use at or above Conchas Dam." Report, at 59. New asserts that the word "originating" as used in Article IV has a plain, unambiguous meaning and that the waters "originating" below Conchas Dam referred to in Article IV(b) do not include any waters "originating" above Conchas. But we do not agree that the meaning of the word is as plain as New suggests. As the Special Master pointed out, a literal reading of the language of Article IV(a) could not have been intended since such a reading would include all of the waters originating in the drainage basin of the Canadian River above Conchas Dam, including all of the waters in tributaries that arise in Colorado, such as the Vermejo River, and would purport to foreclose any claim that Colorado had in the waters arising in that State. This would be an extremely implausible reading in light of the fact that Colorado was not a party to the Compact. New 's answer is that the language of Article IV(a), giving it the right to all Canadian River waters originating above Conchas, does not mean what it says and should be interpreted to include only those waters in the drainage basin "originating" in New a limitation that appeared in earlier drafts of the Compact and that was reflected in the legislative history of the Act approving the Compact. S. Rep. No. 119, 8d Cong., d Sess., (195). But as Texas points out, New nevertheless claims the right to use and store all of the water in the Canadian River that is found in New above Conchas Dam, even though some of it admittedly has its source in Colorado, not in New a result unsupported by New 's present interpretation of the language in Article IV(a). Likewise, if literally read, Article IV(a) would retain New 's right to water having a source above Conchas even if the water escaped its *33 grasp and flowed into Texas; but New concedes that the Article does not go so far, if for no other reason than the fact that Article V gives Texas the |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | reason than the fact that Article V gives Texas the right to all of the water found in the Canadian River in Texas, subject to a storage limitation. In light of the above ambiguity, which the dissent refuses to recognize, it is fairly arguable that if, by virtue of its right to water originating in the drainage basin in New above Conchas Dam, New also has the right to use and store water in the Canadian River in New that originated in Colorado, Article IV(b) should be construed in the same way: Any water found in the river below Conchas, including spills, seepage, and return flow from Tucumcari, must be deemed to have originated below Conchas and be subject to the 00,000 acre-feet storage limitation. In effect, this was the conclusion the Special Master came to after examining in detail the purpose and negotiating history of the Compact.[4] *34 The Master reviewed considerable evidence regarding the drafters' intent as to the meaning of Article IV and concluded that New 's suggested interpretation was not consistent *35 with the available evidence.[5] Although the question is not free from doubt, we agree with the Master. Contrary to New 's assertions, there is substantial evidence that, in drafting the Compact, Texas and Oklahoma agreed that storage limitations were not necessary for waters above Conchas Dam because the waters in that basin had been fully developed. "[T]he negotiators recognized that full development had already been made of all waters of Canadian River originating above Conchas Dam and that accordingly there *36 would be no purpose in placing a limitation upon any increase in the amount of storage of such waters." Joint Statement of Agreed Material Facts D.34. The evidence strongly suggests that the negotiators believed that any future water development along the Canadian River in New would necessarily occur below Conchas Dam, and that 00,000 acre-feet of storage rights would be ample for New 's purposes below Conchas Dam. Indeed, in a letter to the Governor, New 's Compact Commissioner, John Bliss, specifically stated that "storage capacity for all projects which may be feasible below Conchas will probably not equal the 00,000 acre foot storage limit."[6] Plaintiffs' Exh. 30, p. 1. *37 The central purpose of the Compact was to settle the respective rights of the States to Canadian River water; and the Compact and its negotiating history plainly show that the parties agreed that no more than 00,000 acre-feet of storage rights would satisfy all of New 's future needs for water below Conchas Dam. Had they thought more was needed, the limit |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | Conchas Dam. Had they thought more was needed, the limit would have been higher. Under these circumstances, we see no persuasive reason why Texas and Oklahoma would have agreed to let New impound substantially more than 00,000 acre-feet of water for conservation storage purposes below Conchas Dam simply because some of the water first entered the river above Conchas Dam. Nor do we believe that the evidence supports the conclusion that New 's negotiator intended that result either. In our view, the Compact's ambiguous use of the term "originating" can only be harmonized with the apparent intent of the Compact drafters if it is interpreted so that waters which spill over or are released from Conchas Dam, or which return from the Tucumcari project, are considered waters originating below Conchas Dam. This view is strengthened by the fact that both the Bureau of Reclamation in studying the Sanford project, and the engineers advising the Compact commissioners during negotiations, included outflows and spills from Conchas Dam in their estimates of the water supply available to Texas.[7] See Joint Statement of Agreed Material *38 Facts C.7, D.16. New points out that the States and the Master agree that nothing in Article IV would prevent New from simply enlarging Conchas Reservoir to capture all of the waters flowing into the river above Conchas Dam. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. That reading of the Compact is correct, but we fail to see how it refutes Texas' and Oklahoma's interpretation of the Compact. New apparently has never attempted to enlarge Conchas Reservoir because doing so is economically infeasible, and there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the drafters contemplated that New would seek to enlarge Conchas Reservoir in the future. Instead, as noted above, the Compact drafters were operating on the assumption that New had fully developed its uses of water above Conchas Dam and would not need additional water for above Conchas uses. It does not necessarily follow that New 's entitlement under Article IV(a) to all of the Canadian River water it can use from Conchas Reservoir gives New the unrestricted right to store that water at any point downstream from Conchas Dam. Any right New has to water spilling over Conchas Dam arises by virtue of Article IV(b), under which New may store for its use 00,000 acre-feet of water originating below Conchas Dam.[8] *39 It is worth noting the Special Master's observation that New 's construction of Article IV, if accepted, would have a deleterious impact on the water supply to the Sanford project and hence would "run |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | water supply to the Sanford project and hence would "run counter to the Congressional intention in conditioning funding of the Sanford Project on execution of the Compact and in subsequently approving the Compact." Report, at 57. Congress had been informed that the project would rely in part on water arriving in Texas in the mainstream of the Canadian. Yet New 's version of the Compact would, as a practical matter, permit it to prevent any and all water entering the river above Conchas from ever reaching Texas, whether by enlarging Ute Reservoir or building additional facilities, and at the same time to impound at Ute Dam most if not all of the principal tributary inflow below Conchas. All of New 's needs for water above Conchas and for the Tucumcari project are fully satisfied. No one suggests otherwise. It is also plain that it was agreed in the Compact that 00,000 acre-feet of water storage would be adequate to satisfy New 's needs for water below Conchas. That allocation was indeed generous. Since the signing of the Compact, there have been no developments in the area below Conchas which require substantial amounts of water for consumptive uses. According to the Special Master, slightly over 1,000 acre-feet for such purposes has been sold from Ute Dam since 1963. New is entitled to 00,000 acre-feet of conservation storage below Conchas Dam, which the Compact anticipated would take care of any future developments in the area below Conchas Dam. As we construe the Compact, if New has at any time stored more than that amount, it was not entitled to do so. Any water stored in excess of that amount should have been *40 allowed to flow through the Ute Dam, to be put to use by the downstream States, rather than impounded in New Accordingly, we overrule New 's exceptions to Part VII of the Report.[9] IV In Part VIII of his Report, the Master recommended that this Court remand to the Canadian River Commission the question whether certain water stored in Ute Reservoir, water which New has designated a "desilting pool,"[10] is exempt from the Article IV(b) limitation on New 's conservation storage because it allegedly serves a "sediment control" purpose within the meaning of Article II(d). Oklahoma and Texas except to this recommendation, arguing that there is sufficient evidence in the record to make a final determination on this issue, that the water in the desilting pool should be counted towards the Article IV(b) limitation, and that it is neither appropriate nor practical to refer the *41 matter to the |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | appropriate nor practical to refer the *41 matter to the Commission. The Master acknowledged that the record developed in this case probably was sufficient to permit him to decide this issue, Report, at 99-100, but he declined to address it until after the States had first made some attempt, via the Canadian River Commission, to negotiate a settlement. We sustain Texas' and Oklahoma's exception to Part VIII of the Master's Report insofar as those States argue that the matter should not be referred to the Commission. "Where the States themselves are before this Court for the determination of a controversy between them, neither can determine their rights inter sese, and this Court must pass upon every question essential to such a determination" 81 U.S. 163, It is true that the Court has "often expressed [a] preference that, where possible, States settle their controversies by `mutual accommodation and agreement,'" and 35 U.S. 589, ), but the Court "does have a serious responsibility to adjudicate cases where there are actual, existing controversies" between the States over the waters in interstate 373 U.S., at There is no doubt that such a dispute exists in this case, Oklahoma and Texas have properly invoked this Court's jurisdiction, and there is no claim that the "desilting pool" issue has not been properly presented. Thus, we see no legal basis for the Master refusing to decide the question and instead sending it to the Commission. Thus, we remand the "desilting pool" question to the Master for such further proceedings as may be necessary and a recommendation on the merits.[11] *4 V The States' exceptions to the Special Master's Report are overruled except for Oklahoma's and Texas' challenge to the Master's recommendation that the "desilting pool" issue be referred to the Canadian River Commission, which is sustained in part.[1] The case is remanded to the Master for such further proceedings and recommendations as may be necessary. So ordered. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. An interstate compact, though provided for in the Constitution, and ratified by Congress, is nonetheless essentially a contract between the signatory States. The Court's opinion *43 overruling New 's objections to the Report of the Special Master varies the terms of a contract to which the States of Oklahoma, New and Texas freely agreed. I do not believe it is within the Court's power to do this, and I therefore dissent from Part III of the Court's opinion, which restricts New 's use of waters that spill over Conchas Dam. |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | New 's use of waters that spill over Conchas Dam. I concur in Parts I, II, and IV of the Court's opinion. The Canadian River traverses three States. It originates in the high country of northern New flowing southeast from there into the Texas Panhandle. New has erected two dams on the river, Conchas Dam and Ute Dam, which provide irrigation water for farming and municipal water for the city of Tucumcari, New In Texas, the Sanford project diverts water to serve the municipal and industrial requirements of Texas cities throughout the Texas Panhandle region, from Amarillo to Lubbock. The river flows eastward from this project across the Texas Panhandle and into Oklahoma, and thence southeasterly throughout almost the entire State of Oklahoma until it joins the Arkansas River in the Eufala Reservoir a few miles west of Fort Smith, Arkansas. In 1950, New Texas, and Oklahoma convened to draft the Canadian River Compact (Compact), which apportioned the Canadian's waters in a manner that they hoped would serve New 's and Texas' already substantial needs while anticipating the future needs of those States and Oklahoma. Article IV of the Compact, which governs the allocation of water to New provides as follows: "(a) New shall have free and unrestricted use of all waters originating in the drainage basin of Canadian River above Conchas Dam. "(b) New shall have free and unrestricted use of all waters originating in the drainage basin of Canadian River in New below Conchas Dam, provided that the amount of conservation storage in New available for impounding these waters which originate in *44 the drainage basin of Canadian River below Conchas Dam shall be limited to an aggregate of two hundred thousand (00,000) acre-feet." I part company with the majority's interpretation of this Article, based on my view that this provision means what it says. By its express terms, Article IV places no restrictions on New 's use of waters originating above Conchas Dam. It imposes only two restrictions on its use of the waters originating in the drainage basin of the Canadian River below Conchas Dam: First, New 's enjoyment of these lower-basin waters is restricted to waters located in New ; second, New may allocate no more than 00,000 acre-feet of its total storage capacity for the conservation of these lower basin waters. The Compact thus distinguishes between water "originating" in the lower basin and water "originating" at or above the upper basin. New enjoys free and unrestricted use of the latter. The ordinary understanding of what it means for waters to "originate" in a basin |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | what it means for waters to "originate" in a basin is that they "arise" or "com[e] into existence" in that location. See 10 Oxford English Dictionary 935-936 (d ed. 1989). Thus, according to the plain meaning of Article IV(a), New may make unrestricted use of the Canadian River waters that arise above Conchas Dam. These waters may be stored, used, or diverted for use without limitation. Unlike the waters that enter the Canadian River below Conchas Dam, these waters may pass into the lower basin without being subject to the 00,000 acre-feet conservation storage restriction of Article IV(b). Despite the clear import of the Compact's terms, the Court concludes that the Compact cannot mean what it says, and instead fashions a different allocation than that which is literally described. The Court concludes that "the intent of the Compact drafters was to give New free and unrestricted use of waters originating in the Canadian River drainage basin above Conchas Dam only if the waters were *45 `stored, used or diverted for use at or above Conchas Dam.'" Ante, at 3 (quoting Report of Special Master 59) (emphasis in original). The emphasized terms do not appear anywhere in the Compact, and reflect not the intent of the parties, but instead the intent that the Court now imputes to them. Although the Compact grants New use of "all" waters originating above Conchas Dam, the Court reads this to mean "some": specifically excluding water that eventually winds up below Conchas Dam. Ante, at 3-33. Accordingly, the Court holds that any water found in the river below Conchas, including spills and seepage from above Conchas Dam, is not subject to free and unrestricted use even though it clearly originated above Conchas Dam. A compact is a contract among its parties. 48 U.S. 14, 18 Congressional consent elevates an interstate compact into a law of the United States, yet it remains a contract which is subject to normal rules of enforcement and construction. Thus, "unless the compact to which Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with its express terms." 46 U.S. 554, Accordingly, where the terms of the compact are unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the express mandate of the signatory States. The Court asserts that we may rewrite the express terms of Article IV(a) because of its understanding of the practical consequences of faithfully applying that provision. Ante, at 30-3. The Court contends that, if taken at its word, the Compact would permit New to lay claim to any water originating above Conchas Dam, including tributaries |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | claim to any water originating above Conchas Dam, including tributaries that arise in Colorado. The Court further asserts that a literal interpretation would permit New to then chase this water down and continue to claim access to it as it passes down through Texas and Oklahoma. Based on its view that the Compact could not have been drafted to produce the implausible consequence that New could appropriate *46 Colorado's, Texas', and Oklahoma's waters, the Court abandons the literal text of the Compact and casts off in search of a new interpretation of the word "originating." Ante, at 3. The Court's approach conjures up impractical consequences where none exist. The language of the Compact does not in any way support the notion that Colorado (a State that did not even participate in the Compact) might forfeit its waters to New Colorado's rights are not implicated by the Compact at all. Although a small portion of the Canadian River's waters arise in Colorado, only New Texas, and Oklahoma participated in the Compact and are parties to it. By its terms, the Compact allocates only those rights over the interstate waters of the Canadian River belonging to those three States. See Art. X. Thus, the Compact could not, and did not purport to, allocate Colorado's portion of the Canadian River. Any dispute between Colorado and the signatory States to this Compact must be resolved outside the terms of the Compact, and there is no reason to construe this Compact as though it purported to deal with Colorado's claims. Similarly, Article V of the Compact dispels any concern that New 's rights under a literal reading of Article IV(a) extend to waters originating above Conchas Dam that have left the State. That provision gives Texas "free and unrestricted use of all waters of [the] Canadian River in Texas," subject to certain storage limitations. The Compact gives New no rights to recapture errant water that reaches Texas because that water is then "in" Texas and therefore subject to Texas' rights under the Compact. The majority's failure to reconcile Article V with Article IV violates the ordinary rule of statutory and contract interpretation that all provisions of a Compact must be read together in a meaningful manner. See United 43 *47 Had the Compact's drafters intended to limit New 's free and unrestricted use of the Canadian River waters originating above Conchas Dam in the manner announced today, they would certainly have done so more directly. For example, they might have drafted Article IV(a) to provide that "the amount of conservation storage in New below Conchas |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | that "the amount of conservation storage in New below Conchas Dam shall be limited to an aggregate of 00,000 acre-feet." But they did not. Instead, they specifically agreed that only waters "which originate in the drainage basin of [the] Canadian River below Conchas Dam" were to be so restricted. The only reasonable conclusion to draw from this is that they intended the word "originating" to have some content. The Court's free-form exploration of the practical consequences of the parties' agreement, and its reliance on evidence outside of the Compact to introduce ambiguity into Compact terms, is both contrary to our precedents and unfair to the parties. When parties to a contract have expressed their intent on a matter in unambiguous terms, we should not substitute our will for their purpose. at The parties made an agreement, and have acted in reliance upon the terms of that contract and settled principles of contract law. The contract law principles of all three States disallow recourse to evidence outside the record under these circumstances. In those jurisdictions, where the language of an agreement clearly expresses the intent of the parties, courts may not rely on extrinsic evidence to vary its terms. See, e. g., Mercury Investment 706 P.d 53, 59 ; Hobbs 560 S.W.d 85, ; 790 P.d 50, Even viewed as a federal statute, the Court's treatment of the Compact's plain language is improper. Congress gave its blessing to this Compact and, in doing so, codified the agreement as federal law. As we stated in 565-566 *48 : "Where Congress has exercised its constitutional power over waters, courts have no power to substitute their own notions of an `equitable apportionment' for the apportionment chosen by Congress." Even if I agreed with the Court that it is appropriate in this case to look outside the Compact to determine the meaning of Article IV(a), I would not agree with its conclusion that the parties intended to include overflow waters from the upper basin of Conchas Dam within the term "waters which originate in the drainage basin of Canadian River below Conchas Dam." I do not find either piece of evidence relied upon by the Court to be supportive of that position, let alone persuasive. The Court says that the Compact negotiators did not place any limitation on the amount of storage of waters originating above Conchas Dam because they believed that those waters were already being fully used. Accordingly, the Court reasons, the negotiators assumed that any future development of the river's waters in New would necessarily occur only below Conchas Dam, and that |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | New would necessarily occur only below Conchas Dam, and that 00,000 acre-feet of storage rights would be more than sufficient to satisfy those development needs. Ante, at 36. The Court concludes that "these circumstances," demonstrate that Texas and Oklahoma could not have intended to permit New to impound any more than the 00,000 acre-feet of water for conservation storage purposes below Conchas Dam. Ante, at 37. As a preliminary matter, the record simply does not bear out the Court's view. The only evidence that directly addresses the issue establishes that the 00,000 acre-feet limitation was derived solely from New 's perceived requirements for Canadian River waters originating in the lower basin. The "Hill memorandum," authored by Raymond Hill, Chairman of the Engineering Advisory Committee, and approved by the Compact Commission at its final meeting on January 31, 1951, stated that the storage limitation *49 was directed only towards impoundment of "the flood flows of Ute Creek and other minor tributaries of Canadian River entering the stream below Conchas Dam and above any contemplated storage works on Canadian River in Texas." Plaintiff's Exh. 38, p. 3 (emphasis added). The storage limits thus appear to have been directed at waters entering New below Conchas Dam but before the river enters Texas. Indeed, a letter from New 's Commissioner, John Bliss, to Senator Anderson of New written the day after the Compact was signed, expressly noted that the 00,000 acre-feet limitation did not apply to spills. Plaintiff's Exh. 8. By contrast, there is no direct support whatsoever for the Court's statement that the Compact's 00,000 acre-feet limitation on lower basin waters was intended to apply to upper basin waters captured in the lower basin. Even assuming that the Court's view of the facts is correct, I do not see how these facts support its conclusion. The Court observes that at the time of the Compact, New had fully developed reliable supplies of water above Conchas Reservoir, and thus there would be no purpose in placing a limitation upon any increase in the amount of storage of those waters. The Engineering Advisory Committee determined that "above Conchas, the available water supply has all been put to use any further development above Conchas would deplete the supply available for Tucumcari Project; thus future developments would emphasize the better utilization of existing supplies." Plaintiff's Exh. 109, p. 1. This assessment, on its face, refers to the usage of normal water flows and not to the specific issue raised in this case, overflows and spills. In asserting that further development of the upper basin would draw |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | majority | Oklahoma v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112624/oklahoma-v-new-mexico/ | asserting that further development of the upper basin would draw on Tucumcari project waters, the engineer advisers did not contemplate spill waters or return flows from Tucumcari. As the Special Master himself concluded: "The most that can be said about the Engineer Advisors' treatment of Conchas spills is that they apparently did not *50 project that they would recur with the frequency and magnitude that they subsequently have." Report of Special Master 67 (emphasis added). The Court also relies on the fact that a 1960 study by the Bureau of Reclamation included outflows from Conchas Dam in estimating water supply to Sanford Reservoir, Texas. See Plaintiff's Exh. 10, pp. 64, 67, 70-71. This too has no bearing on the intent of the parties to this Compact, or the meaning of Article IV. The Bureau published the final draft of its report nearly a decade after the Compact was signed. The Bureau's report simply acknowledges that in light of the massive spills over Conchas Dam that occurred in 1941 and 194, it might be reasonable to assume that occasional spills might contribute to the Sanford project's water supply. This conclusion does not favor one view or another about New 's right to capture some of the overflow from Conchas Dam, since it is clear that New was physically incapable of capturing all of the overflow from the massive floods that have occurred twice this century. The Bureau's estimates merely reflect reality; they do not suggest that the Compact requires waters flowing from Conchas spills to serve the Sanford project alone. Finally, putting aside the Court's dismissive treatment of the Compact terms and the parties' expectations, today's decision makes little practical sense. The Court's decision will not protect the rights of the downstream States, except to the extent that it will force New to behave inefficiently in using its water. Oklahoma and Texas do not dispute that New could, if it desired, enlarge the reservoir behind Conchas Dam to capture all of the Canadian River's waters and dry up the river beds of the downstream States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 33-34; ante, at 38. The Court also acknowledges that the Compact gives New the included right to capture additional waters at or above Conchas and then divert them to downstream locations. See ante, at 4, n. 1. The Court's construction, therefore, does *51 not prevent New from capturing flood waters and diverting them to projects below Conchas Dam; it merely forces the State to take its rightful waters by means of costly, inefficient, and wasteful engineering. The Canadian is an unpredictable |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | This suit attacking the Texas system of financing public education was initiated by Mexican-American parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary *5 schools in the Edgewood Independent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.[1] They brought a class action on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the State who are members of minority groups or who are poor and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants[2] were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The complaint *6 was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court was impaneled in January[3] In December [4] the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[5] The State appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presented. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the decision of the District Court. I The first Texas State Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools.[6] Early in its history, Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its schools, relying on mutual participation by the local school districts and the State. As early as 1883, the state *7 constitution was amended to provide for the creation of local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection. of school buildings" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools."[7] Such local funds as were raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each district from the State's Permanent and Available School Funds.[8] The Permanent School Fund, its predecessor established in 1854 with $2,000,000 realized from an annexation settlement,[9] was thereafter endowed with millions of acres of public land set aside to assure a continued source of income for school support.[10] The Available School Fund, which received income from the Permanent School Fund as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and other designated taxes,[11] served as the disbursing arm for most state educational funds throughout the late 1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to finance a program providing free textbooks throughout the State.[12] Until recent times, Texas was a predominantly rural State and its population and property wealth were spread *8 relatively evenly across the State.[13] Sizable differences in the value of assessable property |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | the State.[13] Sizable differences in the value of assessable property between local school districts became increasingly evident as the State became more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population shifts became more pronounced.[14] The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities in population and taxable property between districts were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education.[15] In due time it became apparent to those concerned with financing public education that contributions from the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities.[16] Prior to 1939, the Available School Fund contributed money to every school district at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child.[17] Although the amount was increased several times in the early 1940's,[18]*9 the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1945.[19] Recognizing the need for increased state funding to help offset disparities in local spending and to meet Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major reform. In 1947, an 18-member committee, composed of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore alternative systems in other States and to propose a funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or basic educational offering to each child and that would help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of the Gilmer-Aikin bills, named for the Committee's co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program.[20] Today, this Program accounts for approximately half of the total educational expenditures in Texas.[21] The Program calls for state and local contributions to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State, supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 80% of the Program, and the school districts are responsibleas a unitfor providing the remaining 20%. The districts' share, known as the Local Fund Assignment, is apportioned among the school districts *10 under a formula designed to reflect each district's relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a complicated economic index that takes into account the relative value of each county's contribution to the State's total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property in the State.[22] Each county's assignment is then divided among its school districts on the basis of each |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | divided among its school districts on the basis of each district's share of assessable property within the county.[23] The district, in turn, finances its share of the Assignment out of revenues from local property taxation. The design of this complex system was twofold. First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heaviest burden on the school districts most capable of paying. Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a Local Fund Assignment that would force every school district to contribute to the education of its children[24] but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.[25] Today every school district does impose a property tax from which it derives locally expendable *11 funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. In the years since this program went into operation in 1949, expenditures for educationfrom state as well as local sourceshave increased steadily. Between 1949 and 1967, expenditures increased approximately 500%.[26] In the last decade alone the total public school budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion[27] and these increases have been reflected in consistently rising per-pupil expenditures throughout the State.[28] Teacher salaries, by far the largest item in any school's budget, have increased dramaticallythe state-supported minimum salary for teachers possessing college degrees has risen from $2,400 to $6,000 over the last 20 years.[29] The school district in which appellees reside, the Edge-wood Independent School District, has been compared throughout this litigation with the Alamo Heights Independent School District. This comparison between the least and most affluent districts in the San Antonio area serves to illustrate the manner in which the dual system of finance operates and to indicate the extent to which substantial disparities exist despite the State's impressive progress in recent years. Edgewood is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in its 25 elementary *12 and secondary schools. The district is situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominantly of Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the student population is Mexican-American and over 6% is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil is $5,960the lowest in the metropolitan areaand the median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest.[30] At an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertythe highest in the metropolitan areathe district contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-1968 school |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | to the education of each child for the 1967-1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local total of $248.[31] Federal funds added another $108 for a total of $356 per pupil.[32] Alamo Heights is the most affluent school district in San Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly "Anglo," having only 18% Mexican-Americans *13 and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property value per pupil exceeds $49,000,[33] and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled with the $225 provided from that Program, the district was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by a $36 per-pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights spent $594 per pupil. Although the 1967-1968 school year figures provide the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid,[34] more recent partial statistics indicate that the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been significant. For the 1970- school year, the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was $356 per pupil, a 62% increase over the 1967-1968 school year. Indeed, state aid alone in 1970- equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-1968 school budget from local, state, and federal sources. Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil in 1970-.[35] These recent figures *14 also reveal the extent to which these two districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. Alamo Heights, because of its relative wealth, was required to contribute out of its local property tax collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20% of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its grant.[36] It appears then that, at least as to these two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential of each.[37] *15 Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State[38] still exist. And it was *16 these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' dual system of public school financing violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court held that the |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court held that the Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in the manner in which education is provided for its people. Finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that education is a "fundamental" interest, the District Court held that the Texas system could be sustained only if the State could show that it was premised upon some compelling state interest. On this issue the court concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state interests they fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications." Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted dual system of financing education could not withstand the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with fundamental constitutional rights[39] or that involve suspect classifications.[40] If, as previous decisions have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must *17 demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision," and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the "less drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,[41] the Texas financing system and its counterpart in virtually every other State will not pass muster. The State candidly admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system would contend that it has yet achieved perfection."[42] Apart from its concession that educational financing in Texas has "defects"[43] and "imperfections,"[44] the State defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable basis." This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. II The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school financing. In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, *18 that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and appellate processes,[45] |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | to equal treatment in the criminal trial and appellate processes,[45] and on cases disapproving wealth restrictions on the right to vote.[46] Those cases, the District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it regarded those precedents as controlling. It then reasoned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the undeniable importance of education,[47] that there is a fundamental right to education and that, absent some compelling state justification, the Texas system could not stand. We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect-classification nor the fundamental-interest analysis persuasive. A The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court in this case, and by several other courts that have recently struck down school-financing laws in other States,[48] is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination *19 heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through a simplistic process of analysis: since, under the traditional systems of financing public schools, some poorer people receive less expensive educations than other more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, and whether the relativerather than absolutenature of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence. Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must be analyzed more closely than they were in the court below. The case comes to us with no definitive description of the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class. Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which the discrimination claimed here might be described. The Texas system of school financing might be regarded as discriminating (1) against "poor" persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally "indigent,"[49] or *20 (2) against those who are relatively poorer than others,[50] or (3) against all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | (3) against all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer school districts.[51] Our task must be to ascertain whether, in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the resulting classification may be regarded as suspect. The precedents of this Court provide the proper starting point. The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In and its progeny,[52] the Court invalidated state laws that prevented an indigent criminal defendant from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the trial and appeal process. The payment requirements in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were totally unable to pay for transcripts. And the Court in each case emphasized that no constitutional violation would have been shown if the State had provided some "adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript. ; ; ; Likewise, in a decision establishing an indigent defendant's right to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay for counsel from their own resources and who had no other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not insurmountable. Nor does it deal with relative differences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less wealthy. and struck down criminal penalties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply because *22 of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the disadvantaged class was composed only of persons who were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those cases do not touch on the question whether equal protection is denied to persons with relatively less money on whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The Court has not held that fines must be structured to reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and often do, consider the defendant's ability to pay, but in such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial discretion rather than by constitutional mandate. Finally, in the Court invalidated the Texas filing-fee requirement for primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying facts found in the previous cases were present there. |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | classifying facts found in the previous cases were present there. The size of the fee, often running into the thousands of dollars and, in at least one case, as high as $8,900, effectively barred all potential candidates who were unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided "no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot" ( at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute denial of a position on the primary ballot. Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the class disadvantaged by the Texas school-financing system discrimination against a class of definably "poor" personsmight arguably meet the criteria established in these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishing characteristics of wealth classifications can be found here. First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the "poor," appellees have made no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any *23 designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A recent and exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect to contend that the `poor' live in `poor' districts Thus, the major factual assumption of Serranothat the educational financing system discriminates against the `poor'is simply false in Connecticut."[53] Defining "poor" families as those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level,"[54] the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the poor were clustered around commercial and industrial areasthose same areas that provide the most attractive sources of property tax income for school districts.[55] Whether a similar pattern would be discovered in Texas is not known, but there is no basis on the record in this case for assuming that the poorest peopledefined by reference to any level of absolute impecunityare concentrated in the poorest districts. Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of education may be determined by the amount of money *24 expended for it,[56] a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that, |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | for it,[56] a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.[57] Nor, indeed, in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can any system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate" education for all children in the State. By providing 12 years of free public-school education, and by assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating funds, the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee, for the welfare of the state as a whole, that all people shall have at least an adequate program of education. This is what is meant by `A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.' "[58] The State repeatedly asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled this desire and that it now assures "every child in every school district an adequate education."[59] No proof was offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the State's assertion. *25 For these two reasonsthe absence of any evidence that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of "poor" people or that it results in the absolute deprivation of educationthe disadvantaged class is not susceptible of identification in traditional terms.[60] As suggested above, appellees and the District Court may have embraced a second or third approach, the second of which might be characterized as a theory of relative or comparative discrimination based on family income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correlation exists between the wealth of families within each district and the expenditures therein for education. That is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower the dollar amount of education received by the family's children. The principal evidence adduced in support of this comparative-discrimination claim is an affidavit submitted by Professor Joel S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory, *26 noted, first, a positive correlation between the wealth of school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. Second, the court found a similar correlation between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, measured in terms of median family income. n. 3. If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then it might be argued that expenditures on education equated by appellees to the quality of educationare dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative-discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered questions, including whether a |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | theory would still face serious unanswered questions, including whether a bare positive correlation or some higher degree of correlation[61] is necessary to provide a basis for concluding that the financing system is designed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the comparatively poor,[62] and whether a class of this size and diversity could ever claim the special protection accorded "suspect" classes. These questions need not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees' proof fails to support their allegations or the District Court's conclusions. Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of approximately 10% of the school districts in Texas. His findings, previously set out in the margin,[63] show only *27 that the wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest family incomes and devote the least amount of money to education. For the remainder of the districts 96 districts composing almost 90% of the samplethe correlation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next to the most money on education are populated by families having next to the lowest median family incomes while the districts spending the least have the highest median family incomes. It is evident that, even if the conceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees, no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of comparative wealth discrimination.[64] This brings us, then, to the third way in which the classification scheme might be defineddistrict wealth discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by the evidence is between district property wealth and expenditures, it may be argued that discrimination might be found without regard to the individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect correlation between district property wealth and expenditures from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be *28 viewed as encompassing every child in every district except the district that has the most assessable wealth and spends the most on education.[65] Alternatively, as suggested in MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion, post, at 96, the class might be defined more restrictively to include children in districts with assessable property which falls below the statewide average, or median, or below some other artificially defined level. However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts.[66] The system of alleged discrimination and the class |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | other districts.[66] The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. We thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class. *29 But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees have not relied solely on this contention.[67] They also assert that the State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a "fundamental" right and that accordingly the prior decisions of this Court require the application of the strict standard of judicial review. ; ; It is this questionwhether education is a fundamental right, in the sense that it is among the rights and liberties protected by the Constitutionwhich has so consumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent years.[68] B In a unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." What was said there in the context of racial discrimination has lost none of its vitality with the passage of time: "Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our *30 recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after Brown was decided. (BURGER, C. J.), 237, 238-239 (WHITE, J.), ; Abington School ; ; ; ; Interstate Consolidated Street R. Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts from our historic dedication to public education. We are in complete agreement with the conclusion of |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | education. We are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel below that "the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society" cannot be doubted.[69] But the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice *31 Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate travel, admonished that "[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights." U. S., at 655, 661. In his view, if the degree of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated, depending on a majority's view of the importance of the interest affected, we would have gone "far toward making this Court a `super-legislature.' " We would, indeed, then be assuming a legislative role and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence. But MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S response in Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the limits of the fundamental-rights rationale employed in the Court's equal protection decisions: "The Court today does not `pick out particular human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection' To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands." (Emphasis in original.) MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S statement serves to underline what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting to strict judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving AFDC benefits, the Court explained: "[I]n moving from State to State appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." (Emphasis in original.) *32 The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of constitutional significance,[70] and the Court's decision, therefore, did not require an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance of that right.[71] decided only last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, involving a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law, urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests which are |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | argued that the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests which are particularly important to the poor," such as the " `need for decent shelter' " and the " `right to retain peaceful possession of one's home.' " MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S analysis, in his opinion for the Court, is instructive: "We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access *33 to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease, without the payment of rent Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions." (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, in the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that the "administration of public welfare assistance involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings,"[72] provided no basis for departing from the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative classifications involving questions of economic and social policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by showing some compelling state interest. See also ; The lesson of these cases in addressing the question now before the Court is plain. It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. *34 ;[73]Dunn v. ;[74]Police Dept. of ;[75]Skinner v.[76] *35 Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation. It is appellees' contention, however, that education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other rights and liberties accorded |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | a peculiarly close relationship to other rights and liberties accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the corollary right to receive information[77] becomes little more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate, and utilize available knowledge. A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the right to vote.[] Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be divorced from the educational foundation *36 of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately developed. We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is not to be doubted.[79] These are indeed goals to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are not values to be pursued by a implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities. Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures *37 in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levels are involved and whereas is true in the present caseno charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process. Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the political process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment.[80] If so, appellees' thesis would cast serious doubt on the authority of and We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The present case, in another basic sense, is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has *38 applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived," "infringed," or "interfered" with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or liberty. See Skinner v. ; ; Dunn v. A critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court in expresses well the salient point:[81] "This is not a complaint that Congress has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others similarly situated] "[The federal law in question] does not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state law. We need only decide whether the challenged limitation on the relief effected was permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights is *39 inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles that a `statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,' that a legislature need not `strike at all evils at the |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | a legislature need not `strike at all evils at the same time,' and that `reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind' " (Emphasis in original.) The Texas system of school financing is not unlike the federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. Every step leading to the establishment of the system Texas utilizes todayincluding the decisions permitting localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and continuously expanding state aidwas implemented in an effort to extend public education and to improve its quality.[82] Of course, every reform that benefits some more than others may be criticized for what it fails to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the Constitution.[83] *40 C It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights. We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the inappropriateness of the strict-scrutiny test. A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. This case represents far more than a challenge to the manner in which Texas provides for the education of its children. We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures.[84] This Court has often admonished against such interferences with the State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause: "The broad discretion as to classification possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has long been recognized. [T]he passage of time has only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed by a legislature in |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | area of discretion which is needed by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. *41 It has been pointed out that in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes." See also ; Thus, we stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet, we are urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the present system or to throw out the property tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.[85] *42 In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels. Education, perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of "intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems." The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggests that "there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them," and that, within the limits of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems" should be entitled to respect. -547. On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of the major *43 sources of controversy concerns the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of education[86] an assumed correlation underlying virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District Court in this case. Related to the questioned relationship between cost and quality is the equally unsettled controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public education.[87] And the question regarding |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | of a system of public education.[87] And the question regarding the most effective relationship between state boards of education and local school boards, in terms of their respective responsibilities and degrees of control, is now undergoing searching re-examination. The ultimate wisdom as to these and related problems of education is not likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions. *44 It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between national and state power under our federal system. Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining whether a State's laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny. While "[t]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional provisions under which this Court examines state action,"[88] it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State. The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These same considerations are relevant to the determination whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, nevertheless bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. It is to this question that we next turn our attention. III The basic contours of the Texas school finance system have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will now describe in more detail that system and how it operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school *45 district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable amount of funds is derived from each source.[89] The State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school in the State. Funds are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher compensated at the state-supported minimum salary for every 25 students.[90] Each school district's |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | state-supported minimum salary for every 25 students.[90] Each school district's other supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for every 30 teachers;[91] one "special service" teacher librarian, nurse, doctor, etc.for every 20 teachers;[92] superintendents, vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children are also provided.[93] Additional funds are earmarked for current operating expenses, for student transportation,[94] and for free textbooks.[95] The program is administered by the State Board of Education and by the Central Education Agency, which also have responsibility for school accreditation[96] and for monitoring the statutory teacher-qualification standards.[97] As reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted to the Edgewood School District over the last three years,[98] the State's financial contribution to education is steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, however, *46 has been content to rely alone on funds from the Foundation Program. By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its Local Fund Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem tax on property located within its borders. The Fund Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to assure that each district would have some ability to provide a more enriched educational program.[99] Every district supplements its Foundation grant in this manner. In some districts, the local property tax contribution is insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts, the local share may far exceed even the total Foundation grant. In part, local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category of property varies from its assessed value.[100] The greatest interdistrict disparities, however, are attributable to differences in the amount of assessable property available within any district. Those districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have a greater capability for supplementing state funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues are devoted to paying higher salaries to more teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attributes of schools in property-affluent districts are lower pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.[101] *47 This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas school financing structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The District Court found that the State had failed even "to establish a reasonable basis" for a system that results in different levels of per-pupil 337 F. Supp., We disagree. In its reliance on state as well as local resources, the Texas system is comparable to the systems employed *48 in virtually |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | system is comparable to the systems employed *48 in virtually every other State.[102] The power to tax local property for educational purposes has been recognized in Texas at least since 1883.[103] When the growth of commercial and industrial centers and accompanying shifts in population began to create disparities in local resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investment of state funds. The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas legislators and educators based the Gilmer-Aikin bills, was a product of the pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig.[104] Their efforts were devoted to establishing a means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational program without sacrificing the vital element of local participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis *49 represented an accommodation between these two competing forces. As articulated by Professor Coleman: "The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces: the desire by members of society to have educational opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its own children."[105] The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these two forces. While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and encourages a large measure of participation in and control of each district's schools at the local level. In an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived. The merit of local control was recognized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in MR. JUSTICE STEWART stated there that "[d]irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our society." THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in his dissent, agreed that "[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an educational standpoint as well." The persistence of attachment to government at the lowest level where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part, local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the freedom to devote more money to the education of one's children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity *50 it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the Nation-State |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments."[106] No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public education. Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, they attack the school-financing system precisely because, in their view, it does not provide the same level of local control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in more equality in educational expenditures. While it is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others,[107]*51 the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis for striking down the entire system. It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly effectuates the State's goals. 397 U. S., Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, other methods of satisfying the State's interest, which occasion "less drastic" disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn v. ; It is also well to remember that even those districts that have reduced ability to make free decisions with respect to how much they spend on education still retain under the present system a large measure of authority as to how available funds will be allocated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous other decisions with respect to the operation of the schools.[108] The people of Texas may be *52 justified in believing that other systems of school financing, which place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired local autonomy. That is, they may believe *53 that along with increased control of the purse strings at the state level will go increased control over local policies.[109] Appellees further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." They see no justification for a system that allows, as they contend, |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | no justification for a system that allows, as they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines of political subdivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of *54 local taxationindeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental unitsrequires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. It is equally inevitable that some localities are going to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.[110] Nor is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level of taxable wealth within any district may result from any number of events, some of which local residents can and do influence. For instance, commercial and industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within a district by various actionspublic and private. Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional method of providing for education then it might be an equally impermissible means of providing other necessary services customarily financed largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of local property taxation and control as would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live. In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in unequal expenditures between children *55 who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say that such disparities are the product of a system that is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. Texas has acknowledged its shortcomings and has persistently endeavorednot without some successto ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditures without sacrificing the benefits of local participation. The Texas plan is not the result of hurried, ill-conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product of purposeful discrimination against any group or class. On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving substance to the presumption of validity to which the Texas system is entitled, it is important to remember that at every stage of its development it has constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. Metropolis Theatre U.S. 61, One also must remember that the system here |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | U.S. 61, One also must remember that the system here challenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other State. In its essential characteristics, the Texas plan for financing public education reflects what many educators for a half century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational authorities in 50 States, especially where the alternatives proposed are only recently conceived and nowhere yet tested. The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest. We hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this standard. *56 IV In light of the considerable attention that has focused on the District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. It cannot be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the District Court and approved by our dissenting Brothers today would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval in public education. Some commentators have concluded that, whatever the contours of the alternative financing programs that might be devised and approved, the result could not avoid being a beneficial one. But, just as there is nothing simple about the constitutional issues involved in these cases, there is nothing simple or certain about predicting the consequences of massive change in the financing and control of public education. Those who have devoted the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of these cases have found no clear or dependable answers and their scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence in the desirability of completely uprooting the existing system. The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by the lack of consensus with respect to whether it may be said with any assurance that the poor, the racial minorities, or the children in overburdened core-city school districts would be benefited by abrogation of traditional modes of financing education. Unless there is to be a substantial increase in state expenditures on education across the boardan event the likelihood of which is open to considerable question[111]these groups stand to *57 realize gains in terms of increased per-pupil expenditures only if they reside in districts that presently spend at relatively low levels, i. e., in those districts that would benefit from the redistribution of existing resources. Yet, recent studies have indicated that the poorest families are not invariably clustered in the most impecunious school districts.[112] Nor does it now appear that there is any more |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | Nor does it now appear that there is any more than a random chance that racial minorities are concentrated in property-poor districts.[113] Additionally, *58 several research projects have concluded that any financing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of expenditures is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower educational expenditures in the major urban centers,[114] a result that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing conditions in those areas. These practical considerations, of course, play no role in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional limitations on this Court's function. The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. We hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already *59 have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them. Reversed. MR. |
Justice Stevens | 1,980 | 16 | majority | Martinez v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110169/martinez-v-california/ | The two federal questions that appellants ask us to decide are (1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates a California statute granting absolute immunity to public employees who make parole-release determinations, and (2) whether such officials are absolutely immune from liability in an action brought under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S. C. 1983.[1] We agree with the California Court of Appeal that the state statute is valid when applied to claims arising under state law, and we conclude that appellants have not alleged a claim for relief under federal law. The case arises out of the murder of a 15-year-old girl by a parolee. Her survivors brought this action in a California court claiming that the state officials responsible for the parole-release decision are liable in damages for the harm caused by the parolee. The complaint alleged that the parolee, one Thomas, was convicted of attempted rape in December 1969. He was first committed to a state mental hospital as a "Mentally Disordered Sex Offender not amenable to treatment" and thereafter sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 to 20 years, with a recommendation that he not be paroled. Nevertheless, five years later, appellees decided to parole Thomas to the care of his mother. They were fully informed about his history, his propensities, and the likelihood that he would commit another violent crime. Moreover, in making their release determination they failed to observe certain "requisite formalities." Five months after his release Thomas tortured *280 and killed appellants' decedent. We assume, as the complaint alleges, that appellees knew, or should have known, that the release of Thomas created a clear and present danger that such an incident would occur. Their action is characterized not only as negligent, but also as reckless, willful, wanton and malicious.[2] Appellants prayed for actual and punitive damages of $2 million. The trial judge sustained a demurrer to the complaint and his order was upheld on appeal. After the California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition for a hearing, we noted probable jurisdiction. I Section 845.8 (a) of the Cal. Gov't Code Ann. (West Supp. 1979) provides: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from determining whether to revoke his parole or release." The California courts held that this statute provided appellees with a complete defense to appellants' state-law claims.[3] They considered and rejected the contention that the immunity *281 statute as so construed |
Justice Stevens | 1,980 | 16 | majority | Martinez v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110169/martinez-v-california/ | the contention that the immunity *281 statute as so construed violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.[4] Like the California courts, we cannot accept the contention that this statute deprived Thomas' victim of her life without due process of law because it condoned a parole decision that led indirectly to her death. The statute neither authorized nor immunized the deliberate killing of any human being. It is not the equivalent of a death penalty statute which expressly authorizes state agents to take a person's life after prescribed procedures have been observed. This statute merely provides a defense to potential state tort-law liability. At most, the availability of such a defense may have encouraged members of the parole board to take somewhat greater risks of recidivism in exercising their authority to release prisoners than they otherwise might. But the basic risk that repeat offenses may occur is always present in any parole system. A legislative decision that has an incremental impact on the probability that death will result in any given situation such as setting the speed limit at 55-miles-per-hour instead of 45cannot be characterized as state action depriving a person of life just because it may set in motion a chain of events that ultimately leads to the random death of an innocent bystander. Nor can the statute be characterized as an invalid deprivation of property. Arguably, the cause of action for wrongful death that the State has created is a species of "property" *282 protected by the Due Process Clause. On that hypothesis, the immunity statute could be viewed as depriving the plaintiffs of that property interest insofar as they seek to assert a claim against parole officials.[5] But even if one characterizes the immunity defense as a statutory deprivation, it would remain true that the State's interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational. We have no difficulty in accepting California's conclusion that there "is a rational relationship between the state's purposes and the statute."[6] In fashioning state policy in a "practical *283 and troublesome area" like this, see cert. denied, That inhibiting effect could impair the State's ability to implement a parole program designed to promote rehabilitation of inmates as well as security within prison walls by holding out a promise of potential rewards. Whether one agrees or disagrees with California's decision to provide absolute immunity for parole officials in a case of this kind, |
Justice Stevens | 1,980 | 16 | majority | Martinez v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110169/martinez-v-california/ | immunity for parole officials in a case of this kind, one cannot deny that it rationally furthers a policy that reasonable lawmakers may favor. As federal judges, we have no authority to pass judgment on the wisdom of the underlying policy determination. We therefore find no merit in the contention that the State's immunity statute is unconstitutional when applied to defeat a tort claim arising under state law. II We turn then to appellants' 1983 claim that appellees, by their action in releasing Thomas, subjected appellants' decedent to a deprivation of her life without due process of law.[7]*284 It is clear that the California immunity statute does not control this claim even though the federal cause of action is being asserted in the state courts.[8] We also conclude that it is not necessary for us to decide any question concerning the immunity of state parole officials as a matter of federal law because, as we recently held in "[t]he first inquiry in any 1983 suit is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right `secured by the Constitution and laws'" of the United States.[9] The answer to that inquiry disposes of this case. Appellants contend that the decedent's right to life is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. But the Fourteenth Amendment protected her only from deprivation by the "State of life without due process of law." Although the decision to release Thomas from prison *285 was action by the State, the action of Thomas five months later cannot be fairly characterized as state action. Regardless of whether, as a matter of state tort law, the parole board could be said either to have had a "duty" to avoid harm to his victim or to have proximately caused her death, see ; we hold that, taking these particular allegations as true, appellees did not "deprive" appellants' decedent of life within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Her life was taken by the parolee five months after his release.[10] He was in no sense an agent of the parole board. Cf. Further, the parole board was not aware that appellants' decedent, as distinguished from the public at large, faced any special danger. We need not and do not decide that a parole officer could never be deemed to "deprive" someone of life by action taken in connection with the release of a prisoner on parole.[11] But we do hold that at least under the particular circumstances of this parole decision, appellants' decedent's death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers' action to hold them responsible under |
Justice Kennedy | 2,003 | 4 | majority | Overton v. Bazzetta | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130150/overton-v-bazzetta/ | The State of Michigan, by regulation, places certain restrictions on visits with prison inmates. The question before the Court is whether the regulations violate the substantive due process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the First or Eighth Amendments as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. *129 I The population of Michigan's prisons increased in the early 1990's. More inmates brought more visitors, straining the resources available for prison supervision and control. In particular, prison officials found it more difficult to maintain order during visitation and to prevent smuggling or trafficking in drugs. Special problems were encountered with the increase in visits by children, who are at risk of seeing or hearing harmful conduct during visits and must be supervised with special care in prison visitation facilities. The incidence of substance abuse in the State's prisons also increased in this period. Drug and alcohol abuse by prisoners is unlawful and a direct threat to legitimate objectives of the corrections system, including rehabilitation, the maintenance of basic order, and the prevention of violence in the prisons. In response to these concerns, the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC or Department) revised its prison visitation policies in 1995, promulgating the regulations here at issue. One aspect of the Department's approach was to limit the visitors a prisoner is eligible to receive, in order to decrease the total number of visitors. Under MDOC's regulations, an inmate may receive visits only from individuals placed on an approved visitor list, except that qualified members of the clergy and attorneys on official business may visit without being listed. Mich. Admin. Code Rule 791.6609(2) (1999); Director's Office Mem. 1995-59 The list may include an unlimited number of members of the prisoner's immediate family and 10 other individuals the prisoner designates, subject to some restrictions. Rule 791.6609(2). Minors under the age of 18 may not be placed on the list unless they are the children, stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings of the inmate. Rule 791.6609(2)(b);268a (West Supp. 2003). If an inmate's parental rights *130 have been terminated, the child may not be a visitor. Rule 791.6609(6)(a) (1999). A child authorized to visit must be accompanied by an adult who is an immediate family member of the child or of the inmate or who is the legal guardian of the child. Rule 791.6609(5); Mich. Dept. of Corrections Procedure OP-SLF/STF-05.03.140, p. 9 (effective date Sept. 15, 1999). An inmate may not place a former prisoner on the visitor list unless the former prisoner is a member of the inmate's immediate family and the warden has given prior approval. Rule 791.6609(7). |
Justice Kennedy | 2,003 | 4 | majority | Overton v. Bazzetta | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130150/overton-v-bazzetta/ | family and the warden has given prior approval. Rule 791.6609(7). The Department's revised policy also sought to control the widespread use of drugs and alcohol among prisoners. Prisoners who commit multiple substance-abuse violations are not permitted to receive any visitors except attorneys and members of the clergy. Rule 791.6609(11)(d). An inmate subject to this restriction may apply for reinstatement of visitation privileges after two years. Rule 791.6609(12). Reinstatement is within the warden's discretion. Respondents are prisoners, their friends, and their family members. They brought this action under Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S. C. 1983, alleging that the restrictions upon visitation violate the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. It was certified as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Inmates who are classified as the highest security risks, as determined by the MDOC, are limited to noncontact visitation. This case does not involve a challenge to the method for making that determination. By contrast to contact visitation, during which inmates are allowed limited physical contact with their visitors in a large visitation room, inmates restricted to noncontact visits must communicate with their visitors through a glass panel, the inmate and the visitor being on opposite sides of a booth. In some facilities the booths are located in or at one side of the same room used for contact visits. The case before us concerns the regulations as they pertain to noncontact visits. *131 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan agreed with the prisoners that the regulations pertaining to noncontact visits were invalid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and we granted certiorari, II The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the restrictions on noncontact visits are invalid. This was error. We first consider the contention, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that the regulations infringe a constitutional right of association. We have said that the Constitution protects "certain kinds of highly personal relationships," And outside the prison context, there is some discussion in our cases of a right to maintain certain familial relationships, including association among members of an immediate family and association between grandchildren and grandparents. See ; This is not an appropriate case for further elaboration of those matters. The very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration. See ; And, as our cases have established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration. See at -126; Some curtailment of that freedom must |
Justice Kennedy | 2,003 | 4 | majority | Overton v. Bazzetta | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130150/overton-v-bazzetta/ | incarceration. See at -126; Some curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison context. We do not hold, and we do not imply, that any right to intimate association is altogether terminated by incarceration or is always irrelevant to claims made by prisoners. We *132 need not attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association at any length or determine the extent to which it survives incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate interests. This suffices to sustain the regulation in question. See We have taken a similar approach in previous cases, such as which we cited with approval in In we found it unnecessary to decide whether an asserted First Amendment right survived incarceration. Prison administrators had reasonably exercised their judgment as to the appropriate means of furthering goals, and that was the controlling rationale for our decision. We must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them. See, e. g., ; ; (19); ; at 85, ; ; The burden, moreover, is not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it. See ; ; Respondents have failed to do so here. In we held that four factors are relevant in deciding whether a prison regulation affecting a constitutional right that survives incarceration withstands constitutional challenge: whether the regulation has a "`valid, rational connection'" to a legitimate governmental interest; whether alternative means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right; what impact an accommodation of the right would have on guards and inmates and prison resources; and whether there are "ready alternatives" to the regulation. 482 U.S., at -91. *133 Turning to the restrictions on visitation by children, we conclude that the regulations bear a rational relation to MDOC's valid interests in maintaining internal security and protecting child visitors from exposure to sexual or other misconduct or from accidental injury. The regulations promote internal security, perhaps the most legitimate of goals, see, e. g., by reducing the total number of visitors and by limiting the disruption caused by children in particular. Protecting children from harm is also a legitimate goal, see, e. g., The logical connection between this interest and the regulations is demonstrated by trial testimony that reducing the number of children allows guards to supervise them better to ensure their safety and to minimize the disruptions they cause within the visiting areas. As |
Justice Kennedy | 2,003 | 4 | majority | Overton v. Bazzetta | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130150/overton-v-bazzetta/ | minimize the disruptions they cause within the visiting areas. As for the regulation requiring children to be accompanied by a family member or legal guardian, it is reasonable to ensure that the visiting child is accompanied and supervised by those adults charged with protecting the child's best interests. Respondents argue that excluding minor nieces and nephews and children as to whom parental rights have been terminated bears no rational relationship to these interests. We reject this contention, and in all events it would not suffice to invalidate the regulations as to all non-contact visits. To reduce the number of child visitors, a line must be drawn, and the categories set out by these regulations are reasonable. Visits are allowed between an inmate and those children closest to him or herchildren, grandchildren, and siblings. The prohibition on visitation by children as to whom the inmate no longer has parental rights is simply a recognition by prison administrators of a status determination made in other official proceedings. MDOC's regulation prohibiting visitation by former inmates bears a self-evident connection to the State's interest in maintaining prison security and preventing future crimes. *134 We have recognized that "communication with other felons is a potential spur to criminal behavior." Finally, the restriction on visitation for inmates with two substance-abuse violations, a bar which may be removed after two years, serves the legitimate goal of deterring the use of drugs and alcohol within the prisons. Drug smuggling and drug use in prison are intractable problems. See, e. g., ; ; Withdrawing visitation privileges is a proper and even necessary management technique to induce compliance with the rules of inmate behavior, especially for high-security prisoners who have few other privileges to lose. In this regard we note that numerous other States have implemented similar restrictions on visitation privileges to control and deter substance-abuse violations. See Brief for State of Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae 4-9. Respondents argue that the regulation bears no rational connection to preventing substance abuse because it has been invoked in certain instances where the infractions were, in respondents' view, minor. Even if we were inclined, though, to substitute our judgment for the conclusions of prison officials concerning the infractions reached by the regulations, the individual cases respondents cite are not sufficient to strike down the regulations as to all noncontact visits. Respondents also contest the 2-year bar and note that reinstatement of visitation is not automatic even at the end of two years. We agree the restriction is severe. And if faced with evidence that MDOC's regulation is treated as a de |
Justice Kennedy | 2,003 | 4 | majority | Overton v. Bazzetta | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130150/overton-v-bazzetta/ | with evidence that MDOC's regulation is treated as a de facto permanent ban on all visitation for certain inmates, we might reach a different conclusion in a challenge to a particular application of the regulation. Those issues are not presented in this case, which challenges the validity of the restriction on noncontact visits in all instances. *135 Having determined that each of the challenged regulations bears a rational relationship to a legitimate interest, we consider whether inmates have alternative means of exercising the constitutional right they seek to assert. Were it shown that no alternative means of communication existed, though it would not be conclusive, it would be some evidence that the regulations were unreasonable. That showing, however, cannot be made. Respondents here do have alternative means of associating with those prohibited from visiting. As was the case in inmates can communicate with those who may not visit by sending messages through those who are allowed to visit. Although this option is not available to inmates barred all visitation after two violations, they and other inmates may communicate with persons outside the prison by letter and telephone. Respondents protest that letter writing is inadequate for illiterate inmates and for communications with young children. They say, too, that phone calls are brief and expensive, so that these alternatives are not sufficient. Alternatives to visitation need not be ideal, however; they need only be available. Here, the alternatives are of sufficient utility that they give some support to the regulations, particularly in a context where visitation is limited, not completely withdrawn. Another relevant consideration is the impact that accommodation of the asserted associational right would have on guards, other inmates, the allocation of prison resources, and the safety of visitors. See ; Accommodating respondents' demands would cause a significant reallocation of the prison system's financial resources and would impair the ability of corrections officers to protect all who are inside a prison's walls. When such consequences are present, we are "particularly deferential" to prison administrators' regulatory judgments. *136 Finally, we consider whether the presence of ready alternatives undermines the reasonableness of the regulations. does not impose a least-restrictive-alternative test, but asks instead whether the prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted right while not imposing more than a de minimis cost to the valid goal. 482 U.S., -91. Respondents have not suggested alternatives meeting this high standard for any of the regulations at issue. We disagree with respondents' suggestion that allowing visitation by nieces and nephews or children for whom parental rights have been terminated is |
Justice Kennedy | 2,003 | 4 | majority | Overton v. Bazzetta | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130150/overton-v-bazzetta/ | or children for whom parental rights have been terminated is an obvious alternative. Increasing the number of child visitors in that way surely would have more than a negligible effect on the goals served by the regulation. As to the limitation on visitation by former inmates, respondents argue the restriction could be time limited, but we defer to MDOC's judgment that a longer restriction better serves its interest in preventing the criminal activity that can result from these interactions. Respondents suggest the duration of the restriction for inmates with substance-abuse violations could be shortened or that it could be applied only for the most serious violations, but these alternatives do not go so far toward accommodating the asserted right with so little cost to goals that they meet 's high standard. These considerations cannot justify the decision of the Court of Appeals to invalidate the regulation as to all noncontact visits. III Respondents also claim that the restriction on visitation for inmates with two substance-abuse violations is a cruel and unusual condition of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The restriction undoubtedly makes the prisoner's confinement more difficult to bear. But it does not, in the circumstances of this case, fall below the standards mandated by the Eighth Amendment. Much of *137 what we have said already about the withdrawal of privileges that incarceration is expected to bring applies here as well. Michigan, like many other States, uses withdrawal of visitation privileges for a limited period as a regular means of effecting prison discipline. This is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for conditions of confinement. Cf. Nor does the regulation create inhumane prison conditions, deprive inmates of basic necessities, or fail to protect their health or safety. Nor does it involve the infliction of pain or injury, or deliberate indifference to the risk that it might occur. See, e. g., ; If the withdrawal of all visitation privileges were permanent or for a much longer period, or if it were applied in an arbitrary manner to a particular inmate, the case would present different considerations. An individual claim based on indefinite withdrawal of visitation or denial of procedural safeguards, however, would not support the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the entire regulation is invalid. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Chicago v. Morales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118299/chicago-v-morales/ | In 1992, the Chicago City Council enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang *46 members" from "loitering" with one another or with other persons in any public place. The question presented is whether the Supreme Court of Illinois correctly held that the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. I Before the ordinance was adopted, the city council's Committee on Police and Fire conducted hearings to explore the problems created by the city's street gangs, and more particularly, the consequences of public loitering by gang members. Witnesses included residents of the neighborhoods where gang members are most active, as well as some of the aldermen who represent those areas. Based on that evidence, the council made a series of findings that are included in the text of the ordinance and explain the reasons for its enactment.[1] The council found that a continuing increase in criminal street gang activity was largely responsible for the city's rising murder rate, as well as an escalation of violent and drug related crimes. It noted that in many neighborhoods throughout the city, "`the burgeoning presence of street gang members in public places has intimidated many law abiding citizens.' " Furthermore, the council stated that gang members "`establish control over identifiable areas by loitering in those areas and intimidating others from entering those areas; and [m]embers of criminal street gangs avoid arrest by committing no offense punishable under existing laws when they know the police are present' " It further found that "`loitering in public places by *47 criminal street gang members creates a justifiable fear for the safety of persons and property in the area' " and that "`[a]ggressive action is necessary to preserve the city's streets and other public places so that the public may use such places without fear.' " Moreover, the council concluded that the city "`has an interest in discouraging all persons from loitering in public places with criminal gang members.' " The ordinance creates a criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to $500, imprisonment for not more than six months, and a requirement to perform up to 120 hours of community service. Commission of the offense involves four predicates. First, the police officer must reasonably believe that at least one of the two or more persons present in a "`public place' " is a "`criminal street gang membe[r].' " Second, the persons must be "`loitering,' " which the ordinance defines as "`remain[ing] in any one place with no apparent purpose.' " Third, the officer must then order "`all' |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Chicago v. Morales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118299/chicago-v-morales/ | apparent purpose.' " Third, the officer must then order "`all' " of the persons to disperse and remove themselves "`from the area.' " Fourth, a person must disobey the officer's order. If any person, whether a gang member or not, disobeys the officer's order, that person is guilty of violating the ordinance. [2] *48 Two months after the ordinance was adopted, the Chicago Police Department promulgated General Order 92-4 to provide guidelines to govern its enforcement.[3] That order purported to establish limitations on the enforcement discretion of police officers "to ensure that the anti-gang loitering ordinance is not enforced in an arbitrary or discriminatory way." Chicago Police Department, General Order 92-4, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a. The limitations confine the authority to arrest gang members who violate the ordinance to sworn "members of the Gang Crime Section" and certain other designated officers,[4] and establish detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership in such gangs. at 66a67a. In addition, the order directs district commanders to "designate areas in which the presence of gang members has a demonstrable effect on the activities of law abiding persons in the surrounding community," and provides that the ordinance "will be enforced only within the designated *49 areas." at 68a69a. The city, however, does not release the locations of these "designated areas" to the public.[5] II During the three years of its enforcement,[6] the police issued over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested over 42,000 people for violating the ordinance.[7] In the ensuing enforcement proceedings, 2 trial judges upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance, but 11 others ruled that it was invalid.[8] In respondent Youkhana's case, the trial judge held that the "ordinance fails to notify individuals what conduct *50 is prohibited, and it encourages arbitrary and capricious enforcement by police."[9] The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in the Youkhana case,[10] consolidated and affirmed other pending appeals in accordance with Youkhana,[11] and reversed the convictions of respondents Gutierrez, Morales, and others.[12] The Appellate Court was persuaded that the ordinance impaired the freedom of assembly of nongang members in violation of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I of the Illinois Constitution, that it was unconstitutionally vague, that it improperly criminalized status rather than conduct, and that it jeopardized rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.[13] The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. It held "that the gang loitering ordinance violates due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties." The court did not reach the contentions that the ordinance |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Chicago v. Morales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118299/chicago-v-morales/ | The court did not reach the contentions that the ordinance "creates a status offense, permits arrests without probable cause or is overbroad." In support of its vagueness holding, the court pointed out that the definition of "loitering" in the ordinance drew no distinction between innocent conduct and conduct calculated *51 to cause harm.[14] "Moreover, the definition of `loiter' provided by the ordinance does not assist in clearly articulating the proscriptions of the ordinance." -61. Furthermore, it concluded that the ordinance was "not reasonably susceptible to a limiting construction which would affirm its validity."[15] We granted certiorari, and now affirm. Like the Illinois Supreme Court, we conclude that the ordinance enacted by the city of Chicago is unconstitutionally vague. III The basic factual predicate for the city's ordinance is not in dispute. As the city argues in its brief, "the very presence of a large collection of obviously brazen, insistent, and lawless gang members and hangers-on on the public ways intimidates residents, who become afraid even to leave their homes and go about their business. That, in turn, imperils community residents' sense of safety and security, detracts from property values, and can ultimately destabilize entire neighborhoods."[16] The findings in the ordinance explain that it was motivated by these concerns. We have no doubt *52 that a law that directly prohibited such intimidating conduct would be constitutional,[17] but this ordinance broadly covers a significant amount of additional activity. Uncertainty about the scope of that additional coverage provides the basis for respondents' claim that the ordinance is too vague. We are confronted at the outset with the city's claim that it was improper for the state courts to conclude that the ordinance is invalid on its face. The city correctly points out that imprecise laws can be attacked on their face under two different doctrines.[18] First, the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Second, even if an enactment does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, it may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. 3 While we, like the Illinois courts, conclude that the ordinance is invalid on its face, we do not rely on the overbreadth doctrine. We agree with the city's submission that the law does not have a sufficiently substantial impact on conduct *53 protected by the First Amendment |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Chicago v. Morales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118299/chicago-v-morales/ | substantial impact on conduct *53 protected by the First Amendment to render it unconstitutional. The ordinance does not prohibit speech. Because the term "loiter" is defined as remaining in one place "with no apparent purpose," it is also clear that it does not prohibit any form of conduct that is apparently intended to convey a message. By its terms, the ordinance is inapplicable to assemblies that are designed to demonstrate a group's support of, or opposition to, a particular point of view. Cf. ; Its impact on the social contact between gang members and others does not impair the First Amendment "right of association" that our cases have recognized. See On the other hand, as the United States recognizes, the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[19] We have expressly identified this "right to remove from one place to another according to inclination" as "an attribute of personal liberty" protected by the Constitution. ; see also[20]*54 Indeed, it is apparent that an individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is "a part of our heritage" (19), or the right to move "to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct" identified in Blackstone's Commentaries. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 130 (1765).[21] *55 There is no need, however, to decide whether the impact of the Chicago ordinance on constitutionally protected liberty alone would suffice to support a facial challenge under the overbreadth doctrine. Cf. ; Planned Parenthood of Central ; n. 3, 3-360, and n. 9. For it is clear that the vagueness of this enactment makes a facial challenge appropriate. This is not an ordinance that "simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement." See Hoffman It is a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement, see and infringes on constitutionally protected rights, see When vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to facial attack.[22] *56 Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Accordingly, we first consider whether the ordinance provides fair notice to the citizen and then discuss its potential for arbitrary enforcement. IV "It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Chicago v. Morales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118299/chicago-v-morales/ | a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits" The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the term "loiter" may have a common and accepted but the definition of that term in this ordinance"to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose"does not. It is difficult to imagine how *57 any citizen of the city of Chicago standing in a public place with a group of people would know if he or she had an "apparent purpose." If she were talking to another person, would she have an apparent purpose? If she were frequently checking her watch and looking expectantly down the street, would she have an apparent purpose?[23] Since the city cannot conceivably have meant to criminalize each instance a citizen stands in public with a gang member, the vagueness that dooms this ordinance is not the product of uncertainty about the normal of "loitering," but rather about what loitering is covered by the ordinance and what is not. The Illinois Supreme Court emphasized the law's failure to distinguish between innocent conduct and conduct threatening harm.[24] Its decision followed the precedent set by a number of state courts that have upheld ordinances that criminalize loitering combined with some other overt act or evidence of criminal intent.[25] However, state * courts have uniformly invalidated laws that do not join the term "loitering" with a second specific element of the crime.[26] The city's principal response to this concern about adequate notice is that loiterers are not subject to sanction until after they have failed to comply with an officer's order to disperse. "[W]hatever problem is created by a law that criminalizes conduct people normally believe to be innocent is solved when persons receive actual notice from a police order of what they are expected to do."[27] We find this response unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law. "No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the of penal statutes." Although it is true that a loiterer is not subject to criminal sanctions unless he or she disobeys a dispersal order, the loitering is the conduct that the ordinance is designed to prohibit.[28] If the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty. If the police are able to decide arbitrarily |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Chicago v. Morales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118299/chicago-v-morales/ | of liberty. If the police are able to decide arbitrarily which members of the public they will order to disperse, then the Chicago ordinance becomes indistinguishable from the law we held invalid in[29] Because an officer may issue an order only after prohibited conduct has already occurred, it cannot provide the kind of advance notice that will protect the putative loiterer from being ordered to disperse. Such an order cannot retroactively give adequate warning of the boundary between the permissible and the impermissible applications of the law.[30] Second, the terms of the dispersal order compound the inadequacy of the notice afforded by the ordinance. It provides that the officer "shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area." App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a. This vague phrasing raises a host of questions. After such an order issues, how long must the loiterers remain apart? How far must they move? If each loiterer walks around the block and they meet again at the same location, are they subject to arrest or merely to being ordered to disperse again? As we do here, we have found vagueness in a criminal statute exacerbated by the use of the standards of "neighborhood" and "locality." We remarked in Connally that "[b]oth terms are elastic and, dependent upon circumstances, may be equally satisfied by areas measured by rods or by miles." at Lack of clarity in the description of the loiterer's duty to obey a dispersal order might not render the ordinance unconstitutionally *60 vague if the definition of the forbidden conduct were clear, but it does buttress our conclusion that the entire ordinance fails to give the ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is permitted. The Constitution does not permit a legislature to "set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large." United This ordinance is therefore vague "not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." V The broad sweep of the ordinance also violates "`the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' " 461 U. S., at 3. There are no such guidelines in the ordinance. In any public place in the city of Chicago, persons who stand or sit in the company of a gang member may be ordered to disperse |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Chicago v. Morales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118299/chicago-v-morales/ | company of a gang member may be ordered to disperse unless their purpose is apparent. The mandatory language in the enactment directs the police to issue an order without first making any inquiry about their possible purposes. It matters not whether the reason that a gang member and his father, for example, might loiter near Wrigley Field is to rob an unsuspecting fan or just to get a glimpse of Sammy Sosa leaving the ballpark; in either event, if their purpose is not apparent to a nearby police officer, she may indeed, she "shall"order them to disperse. Recognizing that the ordinance does reach a substantial amount of innocent conduct, we turn, then, to its language to determine if it "necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat." As we discussed in the context of fair notice, *61 see the principal source of the vast discretion conferred on the police in this case is the definition of loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose." As the Illinois Supreme Court interprets that definition, it "provides absolute discretion to police officers to decide what activities constitute loitering." We have no authority to construe the language of a state statute more narrowly than the construction given by that State's highest court.[31] "The power to determine the of a statute carries with it the power to prescribe its extent and limitations as well as the method by which they shall be determined." Nevertheless, the city disputes the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation, arguing that the text of the ordinance limits the officer's discretion in three ways. First, it does not permit the officer to issue a dispersal order to anyone who is moving along or who has an apparent purpose. Second, it does not permit an arrest if individuals obey a dispersal order. Third, no order can issue unless the officer reasonably believes that one of the loiterers is a member of a criminal street gang. Even putting to one side our duty to defer to a state court's construction of the scope of a local enactment, we find each of these limitations insufficient. That the ordinance does not apply to people who are movingthat is, to activity that would not constitute loitering under any possible definition of the termdoes not even address the question of how much discretion the police enjoy in deciding which stationary persons *62 to disperse under the ordinance.[32] Similarly, that the ordinance does not permit an arrest until after a dispersal order has been disobeyed does not provide any guidance to |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Chicago v. Morales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118299/chicago-v-morales/ | order has been disobeyed does not provide any guidance to the officer deciding whether such an order should issue. The "no apparent purpose" standard for making that decision is inherently subjective because its application depends on whether some purpose is "apparent" to the officer on the scene. Presumably an officer would have discretion to treat some purposesperhaps a purpose to engage in idle conversation or simply to enjoy a cool breeze on a warm eveningas too frivolous to be apparent if he suspected a different ulterior motive. Moreover, an officer conscious of the city council's reasons for enacting the ordinance might well ignore its text and issue a dispersal order, even though an illicit purpose is actually apparent. It is true, as the city argues, that the requirement that the officer reasonably believe that a group of loiterers contains a gang member does place a limit on the authority to order dispersal. That limitation would no doubt be sufficient if the ordinance only applied to loitering that had an apparently harmful purpose or effect,[33] or possibly if it only applied to loitering by persons reasonably believed to be criminal gang members. But this ordinance, for reasons that are not explained in the findings of the city council, requires no harmful purpose and applies to nongang members as well as suspected gang members.[34] It applies to everyone in the city *63 who may remain in one place with one suspected gang member as long as their purpose is not apparent to an officer observing them. Friends, relatives, teachers, counselors, or even total strangers might unwittingly engage in forbidden loitering if they happen to engage in idle conversation with a gang member. Ironically, the definition of loitering in the Chicago ordinance not only extends its scope to encompass harmless conduct, but also has the perverse consequence of excluding from its coverage much of the intimidating conduct that motivated its enactment. As the city council's findings demonstrate, the most harmful gang loitering is motivated either by an apparent purpose to publicize the gang's dominance of certain territory, thereby intimidating nonmembers, or by an equally apparent purpose to conceal ongoing commerce in illegal drugs. As the Illinois Supreme Court has not placed any limiting construction on the language in the ordinance, we must assume that the ordinance means what it says and that it has no application to loiterers whose purpose is apparent. The relative importance of its application to harmless loitering is magnified by its inapplicability to loitering that has an obviously threatening or illicit purpose. Finally, in its opinion striking down the |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Chicago v. Morales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118299/chicago-v-morales/ | or illicit purpose. Finally, in its opinion striking down the ordinance, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to accept the general order issued by the police department as a sufficient limitation on the "vast amount of discretion" granted to the police in its enforcement. We agree. See That the police have adopted internal rules limiting their enforcement to certain designated areas in the city would not provide a defense to a loiterer who might be arrested elsewhere. Nor could a person who knowingly loitered with a well-known gang member anywhere in the city *64 safely assume that they would not be ordered to disperse no matter how innocent and harmless their loitering might be. VI In our judgment, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly concluded that the ordinance does not provide sufficiently specific limits on the enforcement discretion of the police "to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity."[35] We recognize the serious and difficult problems testified to by the citizens of Chicago that led to the enactment of this ordinance. "We are mindful that the preservation of liberty depends in part on the maintenance of social order." However, in this instance the city has enacted an ordinance that affords too much discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the public streets. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is Affirmed. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | concurring | Rose v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111884/rose-v-rose/ | I agree with the Court that Mr. Rose may be compelled to use his veterans' disability benefits to discharge his child support obligation. I would rest this conclusion, however, on a ground that the Court disdains the distinction between familial support obligations and other debts. The Court apparently views as an insuperable obstacle to acknowledging that this distinction makes the difference here. I disagree: while stare decisis concerns may counsel against overruling 's interpretation of the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act, I see no reason whatsoever to extend 's equation of business debts with family support obligations absent the clearest congressional direction to do so. Read in light of this *637 Nation's common law heritage, the language of this statute, like that in incorporates, rather than rejects, this distinction. The anti-attachment provision of 38 U.S. C. 3101(a) says: "Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and such payment made to, or on account of, a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." In my view, the bar against "levy, attachment, or seizure" is simply a means of enforcing the "exempt[ion] from the claims of creditors." The plain intent of 3101(a) is to protect the veteran and his family against the claims of creditors. It is not intended to protect the veteran against claims by his family. As JUSTICE STEVENS explained in dissent in Congress simply intended: " `[T]o relieve the person exempted from the pressure of claims hostile to his dependents' essential needs as well as his own personal ones, not to relieve him of familial obligations and destroy what may be the family's last and only security, short of public relief.' " quoting See Our Anglo-American tradition accords a special sanctity to the support obligation. Unlike other debts, for example, the obligation to support spouse and child is enforced on threat of contempt. These obligations, moreover, may not be discharged in bankruptcy. 11 U.S. C. 523(a)(5). Indeed, even before the bankruptcy laws specifically excepted the *638 support obligation from the discharge, this Court inferred such an exception, explaining the difference between a support obligation and other debts: "We think the reasoning of] recognizes the doctrine that a decree awarding alimony to the wife or children, or both, is not a debt which has |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | concurring | Rose v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111884/rose-v-rose/ | or children, or both, is not a debt which has been put in the form of a judgment, but is rather a legal means for enforcing the obligation of the husband and father to support and maintain his wife and children. He owes this duty not because of any contractual obligation or as a debt due from him to the wife, but because of the policy of the law which imposes the obligation upon the husband. The law interferes when the husband neglects or refuses to discharge this duty and enforces it against him by means of legal proceedings. "The obligation continues after the discharge in bankruptcy as well as before, and is no more than the duty devolved by the law upon the husband to support his children and is not a debt in any just sense." Particularly relevant is the fact that the common law generally will not enforce similar anti-attachment provisions against a family member's claim for support. In discussing the very similar anti-attachment provision at issue in JUSTICE STEVENS noted in dissent: "The language used in the `anti-attachment' provision of the [Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act] is comparable to that found in so-called `spendthrift clauses' that have protected trust beneficiaries from the claims of commercial creditors for centuries. As stated by Dean Griswold, `[i]t is widely held, however, that even where such trusts are generally valid, the interest of the beneficiary may be reached for the support of his wife or *639 children, or for the payment of alimony to his wife.' E. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts 389 (2d ed. 1947)." See As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 631-632, until we had carefully refused to hold that anti-attachment provisions similar to 3101(a) shield the beneficiary from the support claims of his spouse and children. ; In addition, state courts all along have asserted that 3101(a), its predecessors, and similar statutes do not make the support obligation unenforceable. ; ; ; ; ; ; ; In re Gardner, ; ; but cf. n. 11 (citing cases). In short, the support obligation has always been granted a special place in our law. While the broad language of 3101(a) seems clearly meant to bar the ordinary creditor's attachment, I cannot find, in light of this Nation's common law tradition, that the language of 3101(a) expresses anything like the unequivocal congressional intent necessary to bar family members from enforcing the veteran's support obligation. The contrary holding in is hopelessly anomalous, and should be relegated to the status of "a derelict on the waters of the law." Accordingly, *640 I concur in |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | concurring | Rose v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111884/rose-v-rose/ | the waters of the law." Accordingly, *640 I concur in Parts I, II-A, II-B, II-D, and III of the Court's opinion, and object only to its failure to rest its holding squarely on the unique force of the support obligation. JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I concur in the judgment of the Court that none of the statutes cited by appellant or the United States bars the Tennessee court from basing child support awards on a parent's veterans' benefits, or from enforcing such an award by civil contempt. I cannot, however, join much of the Court's analysis, which unnecessarily, and in my view erroneously, suggests that certain state actions not before us here are permissible because they do not frustrate the purposes of the federal provisions. While incompatibility with the purpose of a federal statute may invalidate a state law that does not violate its text, I know of no precedent for the proposition, which these portions of the opinion adopt, that compatibility with the purpose of a federal statute can save a state law that violates its text. Such a doctrine in effect asserts a power to narrow statutory texts, insofar as their pre-emptive effect is concerned, so as to make them more precisely tailored to the purpose that the Court perceives. I Title 38 U.S. C. 3107(a)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. III) provides "All or any part of the compensation payable on account of any veteran may if the veteran's children are not in the custody of the veteran, be apportioned as may be prescribed by the Administrator." I agree with the Court that the language of this statute (1) gives the Administrator only discretionary authority to make apportionments; (2) does not on its face bar States from using veterans' benefits as the basis for child support orders where no such apportionment has been made or denied; and (3) should not be construed to have that as its purpose, in light of the presumption against federal intrusion into the field of family law. Ante, at 626-628. *641 I think those conclusions quite adequate to support the holding that 3107 does not bar Tennessee from entering the order at issue here. I would not reach the question whether the State may enter a support order that conflict with an apportionment ruling made by the Administrator, or whether the Administrator may make an apportionment ruling that conflicts with a support order entered by the State. Ante, at 627. Those questions are not before us, since the Administrator has made no such ruling. Moreover, I am not |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | concurring | Rose v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111884/rose-v-rose/ | Administrator has made no such ruling. Moreover, I am not at all certain that the Court answers those questions correctly. I am not persuaded that if the Administrator makes an apportionment ruling, a state court may enter a conflicting child support order. It would be extraordinary to hold that a federal officer's authorized allocation of federally granted funds between two claimants can be overridden by a state official. Congress could, I suppose, enact such a peculiar scheme, but it is at least not clear that it has done so here. Moreover, while I agree with the Court that one possible use of the Administrator's apportionment authority is to facilitate direct, separate payments of benefits to a spouse in accordance with a previous state-court order, see ante, at 626, I see nothing in the statute to indicate that is the only possible use. II For related reasons, I disagree with the Court's construction of 38 U.S. C. 211(a), which provides that "[d]ecisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision." The Court finds this inapplicable because it does not explicitly exclude state-court jurisdiction, as it does federal; ante, at 629, and because its underlying purpose of "achiev[ing] uniformity in the administration of *642 veterans' benefits and protect[ing] the Administrator from expensive and time-consuming litigation," ib would not be impaired. I would find it inapplicable for a much simpler reason. Had the Administrator granted or denied an application to apportion benefits, state-court action providing a contrary disposition would arguably conflict with the language of 211 making his decisions "final and conclusive" and if so would in my view be pre-empted, regardless of the Court's perception that it does not conflict with the "purposes" of 211. But there is absolutely no need to pronounce upon that issue here. Because the Administrator can make an apportionment only upon receipt of a claim, Veterans' Administration Manual M21-1, ch. 26, ¶ 26.01 and because no claim for apportionment of the benefits at issue here has ever been filed, the Administrator has made no "decision" to which finality and conclusiveness can attach. See ( 211 does not bar claim that a statute regarding benefits is unconstitutional because Administrator has made no decision as to that issue). The Court again expresses views on a significant issue that is not presented. III Finally, 38 U.S. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | concurring | Rose v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111884/rose-v-rose/ | significant issue that is not presented. III Finally, 38 U.S. C. 3101(a) provides that "[p]ayments of benefits under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration made to, or on account of, a beneficiary. shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." The Court holds that this statute does not apply to attachments, levies, or seizures to enforce child support obligations again on the basis that these actions would not frustrate the "purpose" of the provision. It reaches that conclusion by deducing, on the basis of legislative history and the apportionment provision, that the "purpose" of veterans' disability benefits is "in part, the support of veterans' dependents." Ante, at 631. The *643 words of 3101(a), however, extend to all use of the enumerated judicial processes ("attachment, levy, or seizure by any legal or equitable process whatever"), and I see no basis for consulting "purpose" to exclude, with no textual justification, some (but not all) state proceedings. Moreover, even if that mode of analysis is legitimate, it is not clear to me that depriving a veteran of benefits in favor of his children does not conflict with the statute's purpose. Little is proved by the statements in the House and Senate Reports that veterans' disability benefits are intended to compensate for impaired earning capacity and to provide reasonable compensation for disabled veterans and their families, ante, at 630, citing H. R. Rep. No. 96-1155, p. 4 (1980) and S. Rep. No. 98-604, p. 24 (1984); that intent would still be effectuated in the vast majority of situations (which is all that is needed to explain the statements) whether or not attachment for child support is allowed. These excerpts are extremely weak support for the proposition that a veteran's family has a right in the benefits, enforceable in state courts, as against the veteran a proposition which, as JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurrence notes, rests uneasily with our decision in Ante, at 631. And the apportionment statute only demonstrates, at most, that Congress intended to permit children access to those benefits by means of an order of the Administrator, but says nothing about whether state courts may garnish, attach, or seize them on behalf of a veteran's children. In light of 3101(a)'s explicit prohibition of such orders, I am reluctant to find authority to issue them. Once again, however, this issue need not have been reached. Neither an order basing the amount of a veteran's child support obligation in part on his disability benefits nor |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | concurring | Rose v. Rose | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111884/rose-v-rose/ | child support obligation in part on his disability benefits nor an order that he satisfy that obligation on pain of being held in contempt is an attachment, garnishment, or seizure. Neither directs the disposition of the veteran's disability benefits or even specifically requires him to use them to satisfy his obligation. *644 Cf. In other words, child support orders operate on the veteran's person, not on his property. They therefore are not prohibited by 3101(a), and accordingly do not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause. I may add that this distinction between moving against property and moving against the veteran's person is not a technical and irrational one. It is one thing to prohibit a State from attaching a veteran's disability benefits to satisfy routine debts, but quite another to prohibit it from compelling him to satisfy an obligation so important to the public policy of the State that it is exempt from the State's constitutional bar on imprisonment for debt in civil cases, see Tenn. Const., Art. I, 18; -347 permitting imprisonment to be imposed for default. See Tenn. Code. Ann. 36-5-104 (1984). * * * In sum, with respect to three of the four statutes at issue, it seems to me the Court's opinion reaches important issues that need not be decided; resolves them by a process that assumes a broad power to limit clear text on the basis of apparent congressional purpose; and even on that assumption may resolve them incorrectly. With regard to the remaining statute, 42 U.S. C. (a), I agree with the analysis contained in Part II-D of the Court's opinion. |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | dissenting | United States v. LaSalle Nat. Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109901/united-states-v-lasalle-nat-bank/ | This case is here only because of judicial misreadings of a passage in the Court's opinion in That passage has been read by the federal courts, in this case and in others, to mean that a summons *320 under 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S. C. 7602, is improper if issued in aid of an investigation solely for criminal purposes.[1] Yet the statute itself contains no such limitation, and the Donaldson opinion in fact clearly stated that there are but two limits upon enforcement of such a summons: It must be "issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution." I adhere to that view. The Court concedes that the task of establishing the "purpose" of an individual agent is "undesirable and unrewarding." Ante, at 316. Yet the burden it imposes todayto discover the "institutional good faith" of the entire Internal Revenue Serviceis, in my view, even less desirable and less rewarding. The elusiveness of "institutional good faith" as described by the Court can produce little but endless discovery proceedings and ultimate frustration of the fair administration of the Internal Revenue Code. In short, I fear that the Court's new criteria will prove wholly unworkable. Earlier this year the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had occasion to deal with the issue now before us in the case of United Judge Friendly's perceptive opinion for his court in that case read the Donaldson opinion correctly: This Court was there "laying down an objective test, `prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution,' that would avoid a need for determining the thought processes of special agents; and the `good faith' requirement of the holding related to such wholly different matters as those mentioned in" the case of United[2] "Such a view would be *321 consistent with the only rationale that has ever been offered for preventing an otherwise legitimate use of an Internal Revenue Service third party summons, namely that Congress could not have intended the statute to trench on the power of the grand jury or to broaden the Government's right to discovery in a criminal case" -42. Instead of standing by the objective and comparatively bright-line test of Donaldson, as now clarified, the Court today further muddies the waters. It does not even attempt to identify the source of the requirements it now adds to enforcement proceedings under 7402 (b) and 7604 (a) of the Code. These requirements are not suggested by anything in the statutes themselves, and nobody suggests that they derive from the Constitution. They are simply imposed by the Court from |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | An individual facing serious criminal charges brought by the United States has little but the Constitution and his attorney standing between him and prison. He might readily give all he owns to defend himself. We have held, however, that the Government may effectively remove a defendant’s primary weapon of defense—the attorney he selects and trusts—by freezing assets he needs to pay his lawyer. That ruling is not at issue. But today the Court goes further, holding that a defendant may be hobbled in this way without an oppor- tunity to challenge the Government’s decision to freeze those needed assets. I cannot subscribe to that holding and respectfully dissent. I The facts of this case are important. They highlight the significance to a defendant of being able to hire his counsel of choice, and the potential for unfairness inherent in giving the prosecutor the discretion to take that right away. Kerri Kaley worked as a sales representative for a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary, selling prescription medi- cal devices. Kaley and other sales representatives occa- sionally obtained outmoded or surplus devices from staff 2 KALEY v. UNITED STATES ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting members at the medical facilities they served, when, for example, those devices were no longer needed because they had been superseded by newer models. Kaley sold the unwanted devices to a Florida company, dividing the proceeds among the sales representatives. Kaley learned in January 2005 that a federal grand jury was investigating those activities as a conspiracy to sell stolen prescription medical devices. Kaley and her hus- band (who allegedly helped ship the products to Florida) retained counsel, who immediately set to work preparing their defense against any impending charges. Counsel regularly discussed the investigation with the Kaleys, helped review documents demanded by the grand jury, and met with prosecutors in an attempt to ward off an indictment. Nonetheless preparing for the worst, the Kaleys applied for a $500,000 equity line of credit on their home to pay estimated legal fees associated with a trial. They used that money to purchase a $500,000 certificate of deposit, which they set aside until it would be needed to pay their attorneys for the trial. In February 2007, the grand jury returned a seven- count indictment charging the Kaleys and another sales representative, Jennifer Gruenstrass, with violations of federal law. The indictment alleged that a “money judg- ment” of over $2 million and the $500,000 certificate of deposit were subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S. C. because those assets constituted “proceeds” of the alleged crimes. Armed with this indictment, the prosecution obtained an |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | alleged crimes. Armed with this indictment, the prosecution obtained an ex parte order pursuant to 21 U.S. C. thereby freezing all of the Kaleys’ assets listed in the indictment, including the certificate of deposit set aside for legal fees. The Government did not seek to freeze any of Gruenstrass’s assets. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order, requesting a hearing at which they could argue that there was no prob- able cause to believe their assets were forfeitable, because Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 3 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting their alleged conduct was not criminal. They argued they were entitled to such a hearing because the restraining order targeted funds they needed and had set aside to retain for trial the same counsel who had been preparing their defense for two years. And they contended that the prosecution was baseless because the Government could not identify anyone who claimed ownership of the medical devices alleged to have been “stolen.” During a telephone conference with a Magistrate Judge on the motion, the prosecution conceded that it had been able to trace only $140,000 in allegedly criminal proceeds to the Kaleys, which led the Magistrate Judge to question the lawfulness of restraining the listed assets. Just two business days after that conference, the Gov- ernment obtained a superseding indictment that added a count of conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S. C. Adding that charge enabled the Gov- ernment to proceed under a much broader forfeiture provi- sion than the one in the original indictment. While the civil forfeiture provision in authorized forfeit- ure of property that “constitutes or is derived from pro- ceeds traceable to” a qualifying criminal violation, the criminal forfeiture provision now invoked by the Govern- forfeiture of property “in- volved in” a qualifying offense, or “any property traceable to such property.” The superseding indictment alleged that a sum of more than $2 million, the certificate of de- posit reserved to pay legal expenses, and now the Kaleys’ home were subject to forfeiture. And again, the Govern- ment sought an order freezing substantially all those assets. The Kaleys objected, repeating the arguments they had previously raised, and also contending that the prosecu- tors were being vindictive in adding the money laundering charge and seeking broader forfeiture. The District Court nonetheless entered the broader order requested by the 4 KALEY v. UNITED STATES ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting Government, and the restraint on the Kaleys’ assets re- mains in place. While the Kaleys’ appeal from that denial was pending, the Government proceeded to trial separately against their codefendant Gruenstrass. |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | the Government proceeded to trial separately against their codefendant Gruenstrass. As the Government had not sought to freeze Gruenstrass’s assets, she was repre- sented by her chosen counsel. Her counsel argued that the Government was pitching a fraud without a victim, be- cause no Government witness took the stand to claim ownership of the allegedly stolen devices. The jury acquit- ted Gruenstrass on all charges in less than three hours—a good omen for the Kaleys and their counsel as they pre- pared for their own trial. II The issues at stake here implicate fundamental consti- tutional principles. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de- fence.” In many ways, this is the most precious right a defendant has, because it is his attorney who will fight for the other rights the defendant enjoys. United States v. Cronic, And more than 80 years ago, we found it “hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.” Indeed, we recently called the “right to select counsel of one’s choice the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee” of the Sixth Amendment. United States v. The Amendment requires “that a particular guarantee of fair- ness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.” An individual’s right to counsel of choice is violated “whenever the defendant’s choice is wrongfully denied,” and such Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 5 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting error “pervades the entire trial.” A violation of this right is therefore a “structural error,” ibid.; that is, one of the very few kinds of errors that “undermine the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole.” United States v. Davila, 569 U. S. (2013) (slip op., at 12). It is of course true that the right to counsel of choice is (like most rights) not absolute. A defendant has no right to choose counsel he cannot afford, counsel who is not a member of the bar, or counsel with an impermissible conflict of interest. 486 U.S. 1, 159 (1988). And a district court need not always shuffle its calendar to accommodate a defendant’s preferred coun- sel if it has legitimate reasons not to do so. Morris v. Slappy, But none of those limitations is imposed at the unreviewable discretion of a prosecutor—the party who wants the defendant to lose at trial. This Court has held that the prosecution may freeze |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | trial. This Court has held that the prosecution may freeze assets a defendant needs to retain his counsel of choice upon “a finding of probable cause to believe that the assets are forfeitable.” United 615 (1989). The Kaleys do not challenge that holding here. But the Court in acknowledged and re- served the crucial question whether a defendant had the right to be heard before the Government could take such action.1 There was good reason for that caution. The possibility that a prosecutor could elect to hamstring his target by preventing him from paying his counsel of choice raises substantial concerns about the fairness of the entire pro- ceeding. “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic require- —————— 1 Because the District Court in had imposed the restraining order after an “extensive, 4-day hearing on the question of probable cause,” it was “pointless” for this Court to decide whether a hearing was required to “adequately establish[ ]” probable n. 10, 616. 6 KALEY v. UNITED STATES ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting ment of due process.” In re Murchison, (1955). Issues concerning the denial of counsel of choice implicate the overall fairness of the trial because they “bear[ ] directly on the ‘framework within which the trial proceeds.’ ” ). III Notwithstanding the substantial constitutional issues at stake, the majority believes that syllogistic-type reasoning effectively resolves this case. Ante, at 12. The majority’s reasoning goes like this: First, to freeze assets prior to trial, the Government must show probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed an offense giving rise to forfeiture. Second, grand jury determinations of probable cause are nonreviewable. Therefore, the Kaleys cannot “relitigate [the] grand jury finding” of probable cause to avoid a pretrial restraint of assets they need to retain their counsel of choice. I do not view the matter as nearly so “straightforward,” and neither did the multiple Courts of Appeals since that have granted defendants the type of hearing the Kaleys request. See ante, at 3, n. 4. To begin with, the majority’s conclusion is wrong on its own terms. To freeze assets prior to trial, the Government must show probable cause to believe both that (1) a de- fendant has committed an offense giving rise to forfeiture and (2) the targeted assets have the requisite connection to the alleged criminal conduct. 21 U.S. C. §8(e)(1)(A). The Solicitor General concedes—and all Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have held—that “defendants are entitled to show that the assets that are restrained are not actually the proceeds of the charged criminal offense,” |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | are not actually the proceeds of the charged criminal offense,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 45; that is, that the second prong of the required showing is not satisfied. But by listing prop- erty in the indictment and alleging that it is subject to Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 7 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting forfeiture—as required to restrain assets before trial under §8(e)(1)(A)—the grand jury found probable cause to believe those assets were linked to the charged offenses, just as it found probable cause to believe the Kaleys com- mitted the underlying crimes. App. 60–61 (separate in- dictment section alleging criminal forfeiture, including of the certificate of deposit); see United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 645 (CA10 1998); United ; Dept. of Jus- tice, Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual 128 (2013) (“That the indictment alleges that property is subject to forfeiture indicates that the grand jury has made a probable cause determination.”). Neither the Government nor the major- ity gives any reason why the District Court may reconsider the grand jury’s probable cause finding as to traceability— and in fact constitutionally must, if asked—but may not do so as to the underlying charged offenses.2 In any event, the hearing the Kaleys seek would not be mere relitigation of the grand jury proceedings. At that hearing, the District Court would consider the merits of the prosecution to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the Kaleys’ assets are forfeitable, not to determine whether the Kaleys may be tried at all. If the judge agrees with the Kaleys, he will merely hold that the Government has not met its burden at that hearing to justify freezing the assets the Kaleys need to pay their attorneys. The Government may proceed with the prose- —————— 2 The majority’s only response is to characterize the grand jury’s finding of traceability as merely a “technical matter.” Ante, at 11, n. 9. But the indictment draws no distinction between the grand jury’s finding of probable cause to believe that the Kaleys committed a crime and its finding of probable cause to believe that certain assets are traceable to that crime. Both showings must be made to justify a pretrial asset restraint under and there is nothing in that case or the indictment that justifies treating one grand jury finding differently than the other. 8 KALEY v. UNITED STATES ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting cution, but the Kaleys will have their chosen counsel at their side. Even though the probable cause standard applies at both the indictment stage and the pretrial asset restraint hearing, the judge’s determination will |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | and the pretrial asset restraint hearing, the judge’s determination will be based on differ- ent evidence than that previously presented to the grand jury. For its part, the Government may choose to put on more or less evidence at the hearing than it did before the grand jury. And of course the Kaleys would have the opportunity to tell their side of the story—something the grand jury never hears. See United Here, much of what the Kaleys want to present comes from Gruenstrass’s trial— evidence that the grand jury obviously could not have considered. So even if the judge determined that probable cause to justify the pretrial asset restraint had not been adequately established, that determination would not in any way amount to “looking into and revising the judg- ment of the grand jury upon the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the finding was founded upon sufficient proof.” Ante, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The judge’s decision based on the evidence presented at the hearing would have no necessary legal or logical consequence for the underlying prosecution because it would be based on different evi- dence and used for a different purpose. The majority warns that allowing a judge to consider the underlying merits of the prosecution for purposes of determining whether a defendant’s assets may be re- strained pretrial could create “legal dissonance” with the grand jury’s indictment, which “could not but undermine the criminal justice system’s integrity.” Ante, at 10–11. But as explained, such a judicial finding based on different evidence with both sides present would not contradict the grand jury’s probable cause finding based on what was Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 9 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting before it. That finding would still suffice to accomplish its purpose—to call for a trial on the merits of the charges. Rather than creating “dissonance,” the traditional roles of the principal actors in our justice system would remain respected: The grand jury decides whether a defendant should be required to stand trial, the judge decides pre- trial matters and how the trial should proceed, and the jury decides whether the defendant is guilty of the crime. Indeed, in the bail context—the pretrial determination that is perhaps the closest analogue to the pretrial re- straint of assets at issue here—we allow judicial inquiries into the underlying merits of the indicted charges, without concern about intruding into the province of the grand jury. An indictment charging sufficiently serious crimes gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that a defend- ant is not eligible for pretrial release. See |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | a defend- ant is not eligible for pretrial release. See 18 U.S. C. and (f). Such a defendant is nonetheless entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which he may contest (among other things) “the weight of the evidence against” him, Yet no one would say that the district court encroached on the grand jury’s role if the court de- termined that it would not authorize pretrial detention because of the weakness of the prosecution’s case. See, e.g., United 1479–1480 (CA11 1985) (recognizing that in considering the “weight of the evidence” to decide whether the presumption is rebutted, “it may well be necessary to open up the issue of probable cause since that too is a question of evidentiary weight”). That makes sense, because the district court has considered the underlying merits of the charges based on different information and for a different purpose than the grand jury did. Such a defendant would be granted pre- trial release, but would still have to show up for trial.3 —————— 3 The majority cites cases in which courts have correctly rejected re- quests for a judicial redetermination of the grand jury’s probable cause 10 KALEY v. UNITED STATES ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting In any event, few things could do more to “undermine the criminal justice system’s integrity,” ante, at 11, than to allow the Government to initiate a prosecution and then, at its option, disarm its presumptively innocent opponent by depriving him of his counsel of choice—without even an opportunity to be heard. That is the result of the Court’s decision in this case, and it is fundamentally at odds with our constitutional tradition and basic notions of fair play. IV The majority is no more persuasive in applying the due process balancing test set forth in4 As an initial matter, the majority —————— finding for purposes of determining whether the rebuttable presumption of pretrial detention is triggered. See ante, at 8–9, n. 6. But those cases do not question the judge’s authority to consider the underlying merits of the Government’s case (including what the grand jury has alleged in the indictment) for purposes of determining whether that presumption has been rebutted. E.g., United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 706 (CA7 1986) (“evidence probative of guilt is admitted at a detention hearing only to support or challenge the weight of the gov- ernment’s case against the defendant”); see also United (releasing a defendant pretrial after determining that “the weight of the evidence now overcomes the presumption of detention”). The majority notes that this inquiry in the bail context is authorized by statute, |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | this inquiry in the bail context is authorized by statute, but that does not alter the crucial point: Where the prosecutor seeks to use the indictment to impose another significant pretrial consequence on a defendant, judges are allowed to inquire into the underlying merits of the prosecution (includ- ing the very same matters the grand jury has considered) as part of the inquiry into whether that consequence is justified, and that has not resulted in “dissonance” or the undermining of the grand jury’s role. 4 Under our due process precedents, it is clear that the test applies in this case, rather than the inquiry set forth in Medina v. California, We held in Medina that is inapplicable when “assessing the validity of state procedural rules” that “are part of the criminal process.” We have therefore applied Medina rather than only when considering such due process challenges, including, for example, the allocation of burdens of proof or what type of evidence may be admitted. See, e.g., – Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 11 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting gives short shrift to the Kaleys’ interests at stake. “The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 Whatever serious crimes the grand jury alleges the Kaleys committed, they are presumptively innocent of those charges until final judgment. Their right to vindicate that presumption by choosing the advocate they believe will best defend them is, as explained, at the very core of the Sixth Amendment. I suspect that, for the Kaleys, that right could hardly be more precious than it is now. In addition to potentially losing the property the Government has already frozen— including their home—the Kaleys face maximum prison terms of five years (18 U.S. C. ten years and 20 years for the charges in the superseding indictment. The indictment means they must stand trial on those charges. But the Kaleys plainly have an urgent interest in having their chosen counsel—who has worked with them since the grand jury’s investigation began, two years before the indictment—mount their best possible defense at trial. The majority alludes to our cases recognizing that in- dictments may result in the temporary deprivation of a defendant’s liberty without judicial review, and suggests that indictments therefore must also be “good enough” to deprive a defendant of property without judicial review. Ante, at 9–10. Even if this greater-includes-the-lesser —————— 446 (burden of proving incompetence to stand trial); ; (admissibility of testimony about a prior crime of |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | trial); ; (admissibility of testimony about a prior crime of which the defendant was acquitted). This case is not about such questions, but about the collateral issue of the pretrial deprivation of property a defendant needs to exercise his right to counsel of choice. therefore provides the relevant inquiry. 12 KALEY v. UNITED STATES ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting reasoning might be valid in other contexts, it is not when the property at issue is needed to hire chosen counsel. In the context of a prosecution for serious crimes, it is far from clear which interest is greater—the interest in tem- porary liberty pending trial, or the interest in using one’s available means to avoid imprisonment for many years after trial. Retaining one’s counsel of choice ensures the fundamental fairness of the actual trial, and thus may be far more valuable to a criminal defendant than pretrial release. As for the Government’s side, the Court echoes the Government’s concerns that a hearing would place de- mands on its resources and interfere with its desire to keep its trial strategy close to the vest. These concerns are somewhat curious in light of the majority’s emphasis on how easy it is to make a probable cause showing. And they are even more surprising in light of the extensive discovery obligations already imposed on the Government by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and Brady v. Maryland, The emphasis the Gov- ernment places on pretrial secrecy evokes an outdated conception of the criminal trial as “a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.” (1970). Moreover, recall that the Government concedes that due process guarantees defendants a hearing to contest the traceability of the restrained assets to the charged con- duct. If a defendant requests such a hearing, the Gov- ernment will likely be required to reveal something about its case to demonstrate that the assets have the requisite connection to the charged offenses. In any event, these concerns are exaggerated. What the Government would be required to show in a pretrial re- straint hearing is similar to pretrial showings prosecutors make in other contexts on a daily basis. As mentioned Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 13 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting when the Government seeks an order detaining a defendant pending trial, it routinely makes an extensive evidentiary showing—voluntarily disclosing much of its evidence and trial strategy—in support of that relief. See Brief for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae 11–18. The Government makes similar showings in the context of other pretrial motions, |
Justice Roberts | 2,014 | 0 | dissenting | Kaley v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654756/kaley-v-united-states/ | makes similar showings in the context of other pretrial motions, such as motions to admit hearsay evidence under the co- conspirator exception, or to discover attorney-client com- munications made in furtherance of a future crime. at 19–28. In those contexts, as in this one, the decision how much to “show its hand” rests fully within the Government’s discretion. If it has a strong case and believes that pretrial restraint is necessary to preserve the assets for forfeit- ure, the Government may choose to make a strong evi- dentiary showing and have little concern about doing so. In a closer case, where the Government is more concerned about tipping its hand, it may elect to forgo a pretrial restraint of those assets the defendant needs to pay his counsel. I see no great burden on the Government in allowing it to strike this balance as it sees fit when consid- ering a pretrial asset restraint that would deprive a de- fendant of his right to counsel of choice. In the end, it is a bit much to argue that the Government has discretion to deprive a defendant—without a hearing—of the counsel he has chosen to present his defense, simply to avoid the mere possibility of a premature peek at some aspect of what the Government intends to do at trial. The majority also significantly underestimates the amount of control judges can exercise in these types of hearings. The Circuits that allow such hearings have afforded judges a great deal of flexibility in structuring them. Judges need not apply the Federal Rules of Evi- dence during the hearings, and they can take many steps, including in camera proceedings, to ensure that witness 14 KALEY v. UNITED STATES ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting safety and grand jury secrecy are fully preserved. See ; United Moreover, experience in the Second Circuit, where defendants have for more than 20 years been afforded the type of hearing the Kaleys seek, indicates that such hear- ings do not occur so often as to raise substantial concerns about taxing the resources of the Government and lower courts. See Brief for New York Council of Defense Law- yers as Amicus Curiae 4–9. As the majority notes, only 25 reported cases appear to have addressed such hearings. This relative rarity is unsurprising. To even be entitled to the hearing, defendants must first show a genuine need to use the assets to retain counsel of choice. See United (CA2 2013). And defendants too have an incentive not to tip their hands as to trial strategy—perhaps to an even greater extent than the |
Subsets and Splits