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Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | concurring | HL v. Matheson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110432/hl-v-matheson/ | the physician while apparently willing to perform the abortion believed that notifying her parents would have adverse consequences. In fact, nothing in the record shows that the physician had any information about appellant's parents or familial situation, or even that he had examined appellant. A This case does not come to us on the allegations of the complaint alone. An evidentiary hearing occurred after the trial court had denied appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction. Appellant was the only witness, and her testimony and statements by her counselmake clear beyond any question that the "bare bones" averments of the complaint were deliberate, and that appellant is arguing that a mere notice requirement is invalid per se without regard to the minor's age, whether she is emancipated, whether her parents are likely to be obstructive, or whether there is some health or other reason why notification would not be in the minor's best interests. *416 On direct examination, appellant merely verified the allegations of her complaint by affirming each allegation as paraphrased for her by her lawyer in a series of leading questions.[2] Her testimony on cross-examination added nothing to the complaint.[3] In addition, appellant's lawyer insistently objected to all questions by counsel for the State as to the appellant's reasons for not wishing to notify her parents.[4] The trial court, on its own initiative, pressed unsuccessfully to elicit some reasons, inquiring how it could "find out the validity of [appellant's] reasons without [the State's lawyer] being permitted to cross-examine her." Tr. 9. Appellant's lawyer replied: "It is our position [c]onstitutionally that she has the right to make [the abortion] decision and if she has consulted with a counselor and the counselor concurs that those are valid reasons, why then "In terms of going beyond [the complaint allegations], our point is that the specifics of the reasons are really irrelevant to the [c]onstitutional issue." *417 When appellant's lawyer insisted that the facts with respect to this particular minor were irrelevant, the trial court sustained the validity of the statute.[5] In sum, and as the Court's opinion emphasizes, appellant alleges nothing more than that she desires an abortion, that she has decidedfor reasons which she declined to reveal that it is in her best interest not to notify her parents, and that a physician would be willing to perform the abortion if notice were not required. Although the trial court did not rule in terms of standing, it is clear that these bald allegations do not confer standing to claim that 76-7-304 (2) unconstitutionally burdens the right either of a mature minor |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | concurring | HL v. Matheson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110432/hl-v-matheson/ | (2) unconstitutionally burdens the right either of a mature minor or of a minor whose best interests would not be served by parental notification.[6] They confer standing only to claim that 76-7-304 (2) is an unconstitutional burden upon an unemancipated *418 minor who desires an abortion without parental notification but also desires not to explain to anyone her reasons either for wanting the abortion or for not wanting to notify her parents.[7] B On the facts of this case, I agree with the Court that 76-7-304 (2) is not an unconstitutional burden on appellant's right to an abortion. Numerous and significant interests compete when a minor decides whether or not to abort her *419 pregnancy. The right to make that decision may not be unconstitutionally burdened. ; Planned Parenthood of Central -75. In addition, the minor has an interest in effectuating her decision to abort, if that is the decision she makes. ; The State, aside from the interest it has in encouraging childbirth rather than abortion, cf. ; has an interest in fostering such consultation as will assist the minor in making her decision as wisely as possible. Planned Parenthood of Central ; post, at 422-423 The State also may have an interest in the family itself, the institution through which "we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural." Parents have a traditional and substantial interest in, as well as a responsibility for, the rearing and welfare of their children, especially during immature years. None of these interests is absolute. Even an adult woman's right to an abortion is not unqualified. at Particularly when a minor becomes pregnant and considers an abortion, the relevant circumstances may vary widely depending upon her age, maturity, mental and physical condition, the stability of her home if she is not emancipated, her relationship with her parents, and the like. If we were to accept appellant's claim that 76-7-304 (2) is per se an invalid burden on the asserted right of a minor to make the abortion decision, the circumstances which normally are relevant wouldas her counsel insistedbe The Court would have to decide that the minor's wishes are virtually absolute. To be sure, our cases have emphasized the necessity to consult a physician. But we have never held with respect to a minor that the opinion *420 of a single physician as to the need or desirability of an abortion outweighs all state and parental interests.[8] In sum, a State may not validly require notice to parents in all cases, without providing an independent decisionmaker to whom |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | concurring | HL v. Matheson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110432/hl-v-matheson/ | in all cases, without providing an independent decisionmaker to whom a pregnant minor can have recourse if she believes that she is mature enough to make the abortion decision independently or that notification otherwise would not be in her best interests. My opinion in joined by three other Justices, stated at some length the reasons why such a decisionmaker is needed.[9] The circumstances relevant to the abortion decision by a minor can and do vary so substantially that absolute rules requiring parental notice in all cases or in none[10]would create an inflexibility that often would allow for no consideration of the rights and interests identified above. Our cases have never gone to this extreme, and in my view should not. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. As the Court points out, this is a class action in which the appellant represents all unmarried "`minor women who are suffering unwanted pregnancies and desire to terminate the pregnancies but may not do so' because of their physicians' insistence on complying with 76-7-304 (2)" of the Utah *421 Code. Ante, at 401. The Utah Supreme Court held that the statute may validly be applied to all members of that class. This appeal therefore squarely presents the question whether that holding is consistent with the Constitution of the United States. The Court, however, declines to reach this question and instead decides the narrower question presented by the appellant's particular factual situation. Because I believe we have a duty to answer the broader question decided by the Utah Supreme Court, I am unable to join the opinion of the Court. In Planned Parenthood of Central the Court held that a pregnant minor's right to make the decision to obtain an abortion may not be conditioned on parental consent. My dissent from that holding, does not qualify my duty to respect it as a part of our law. See However, as I noted in neither that case nor "determines the constitutionality of a statute which does no more than require notice to the parents, without affording them or any other third party an absolute veto." n. 1. Since the outcome in this case is not controlled by the principles that I considered dispositive of the parental consent issue in that case plainly dictate that the Utah statute now before us be upheld. The fact that a state statute may have some impact upon a minor's exercise of his or her rights begins, rather than ends, the constitutional inquiry. Once the statute's impact is identified, it must be evaluated in light of the state interests underlying the |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | concurring | HL v. Matheson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110432/hl-v-matheson/ | be evaluated in light of the state interests underlying the statute. The state interest that the Utah statute at issue in this case attempts to advance is essentially the same state interest considered in As I noted in that interest is fundamental and substantial: "The State's interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a variety of protective measures. Because he *422 may not foresee the consequences of his decision, a minor may not make an enforceable bargain. He may not lawfully work or travel where he pleases, or even attend exhibitions of constitutionally protected adult motion pictures. Persons below a certain age may not marry without parental consent. Indeed, such consent is essential even when the young woman is already pregnant. The State's interest in protecting a young person from harm justifies the imposition of restraints on his or her freedom even though comparable restraints on adults would be constitutionally impermissible. Therefore, the holding in [ ] that the abortion decision is entitled to constitutional protection merely emphasizes the importance of the decision; it does not lead to the conclusion that the state legislature has no power to enact legislation for the purpose of protecting a young pregnant woman from the consequences of an incorrect decision. "The abortion decision is, of course, more important than the decision to attend or to avoid an adult motion picture, or the decision to work long hours in a factory. It is not necessarily any more important than the decision to run away from home or the decision to marry. But even if it is the most important kind of a decision a young person may ever make, that assumption merely enhances the quality of the State's interest in maximizing the probability that the decision be made correctly and with full understanding of the consequences of either alternative." -103. In my opinion, the special importance of a young woman's abortion decision, emphasized by JUSTICE MARSHALL in dissent, post, at 435-436, provides a special justification for reasonable state efforts intended to ensure that the decision be wisely made. Such reasonable efforts surely may include a requirement that an abortion be procured only after consultation *423 with a licensed physician. And, because "the most significant consequences of the [abortion] decision are not medical in character," the State unquestionably has an interest in ensuring that a young woman receive other appropriate consultation as well. In my opinion, the quality of that interest is plainly sufficient to support a state legislature's determination that such appropriate consultation should include parental advice. Of course, a conclusion that the |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | concurring | HL v. Matheson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110432/hl-v-matheson/ | should include parental advice. Of course, a conclusion that the Utah statute is invalid would not prevent young pregnant women from voluntarily seeking the advice of their parents prior to making the abortion decision. But the State may legitimately decide that such consultation should be made more probable by ensuring that parents are informed of their daughter's decision: "If there is no parental-[notice] requirement, many minors will submit to the abortion procedure without ever informing their parents. An assumption that the parental reaction will be hostile, disparaging, or violent no doubt persuades many children simply to bypass parental counsel which would in fact be loving, supportive, and, indeed, for some indispensable. It is unrealistic, in my judgment, to assume that every parent-child relationship is either (a) so perfect that communication and accord will take place routinely or (b) so imperfect that the absence of communication reflects the child's correct prediction that the parent will [act] arbitrarily to further a selfish interest rather than the child's interest. A state legislature may conclude that most parents will be primarily interested in the welfare of their children,[[1]] and further, that the imposition *424 of a parental-[notice] requirement is an appropriate method of giving the parents an opportunity to foster that welfare by helping a pregnant distressed child to make and to implement a correct decision." Utah's interest in its parental-notice statute is not diminished by the fact that there can be no guarantee that meaningful parent-child consultation will actually occur. Good-faith compliance with the statute's requirements would tend to facilitate communication between daughters and parents regarding the abortion decision. The possibility that some parents will not react with compassion and understanding upon being informed of their daughter's predicament or that, even if they are receptive, they will incorrectly advise her, does not undercut the legitimacy of the State's attempt to establish a procedure that will enhance the probability that a pregnant young woman exercise as wisely as possible her right to make the abortion decision. The fact that certain members of the class of unmarried "minor women who are suffering unwanted pregnancies and desire to terminate the pregnancies" may actually be emancipated or sufficiently mature to make a well-reasoned abortion *425 decision does not, in my view, undercut the validity of the Utah statute. As I stated in a state legislature has constitutional power to utilize, for purposes of implementing a parental-notice requirement, a yardstick based upon the chronological age of unmarried pregnant women. That this yardstick will be imprecise or even unjust in particular cases does not render its use by a |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112889/reno-v-catholic-social-services-inc/ | I agree that the District Courts in these two cases, Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. (CSS), and INS v. League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), erred in extending the application period for legalization beyond May 4, 1988, the end of the 12-month interval specified by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. I would not, however, reach this result on ripeness grounds. The Court holds that a member of the plaintiff class in CSS or LULAC who failed to apply to the INS during the 12-month period does not now have a ripe claim to extend the application deadline. In my view, that claim became ripe after May 4, 1988, even if it was not ripe before. The claim may well lack merit, but it is no longer premature. The Court of Appeals did not consider the problem of ripeness, and the submissions to this Court have not discussed *68 that problem except in passing. See Pet. for Cert. 11, n. 13; Brief for Petitioners 20; Brief for Respondents 17, n. 23. Rather, certiorari was granted on two questions, to which the parties rightly have adhered: first, whether the District Courts had jurisdiction under 8 U.S. C. 1255a(f), the judicial-review provision of Title II of the Reform Act; and second, whether the courts properly extended the application period. See Pet. for Cert. i. The Court finds the jurisdictional challenge meritless under see ante, at 53-56, as do I. But instead of proceeding to consider the second question presented, the Court sua sponte attempts to resolve the case on ripeness grounds. It reaches out to hold that "the promulgation of the challenged regulations did not itself give each CSS and LULAC class member a ripe claim; a class member's claim would ripen only once he took the affirmative steps that he could take before the INS blocked his path by applying the regulation to him." Ante, at 59. This is new and, in my view, incorrect law. Moreover, even if it is correct, the new ripeness doctrine propounded by the Court is irrelevant to the case at hand. Our prior cases concerning anticipatory challenges to agency rules do not specify when an anticipatory suit may be brought against a benefit-conferring rule, such as the INS regulations here. An anticipatory suit by a would-be beneficiary, who has not yet applied for the benefit that the rule denies him, poses different ripeness problems than a preenforcement suit against a duty-creating rule, see Abbott Even if he succeeds in his anticipatory action, the would-be beneficiary will not receive the benefit until |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112889/reno-v-catholic-social-services-inc/ | action, the would-be beneficiary will not receive the benefit until he actually applies for it; and the agency might then deny him the benefit on grounds other than his ineligibility under the rule. By contrast, a successful suit against the duty-creating rule will relieve the plaintiff immediately of a burden that he otherwise would bear. *69 Yet I would not go so far as to state that a suit challenging a benefit-conferring rule is necessarily unripe simply because the plaintiff has not yet applied for the benefit. "Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, If it is "inevitable" that the challenged rule will "operat[e]" to the plaintiff's disadvantageif the court can make a firm prediction that the plaintiff will apply for the benefit, and that the agency will deny the application by virtue of the rulethen there may well be a justiciable controversy that the court may find prudent to resolve. I do not mean to suggest that a simple anticipatory challenge to the INS regulations would be ripe under the approach I propose. Cf. ante, at 58-59, n. 19. That issue need not be decided because, as explained below, these cases are not a simple anticipatory challenge. See infra, at 71-74. My intent is rather to criticize the Court's reasoningits reliance on a categorical rule that would-be beneficiaries cannot challenge benefit-conferring regulations until they apply for benefits. Certainly the line of cases beginning with Abbott Laboratories does not support this categorical approach. That decision itself discusses with approval an earlier case that involved an anticipatory challenge to a benefit-conferring rule. "[I]n United the Court held to be a final agency action an FCC regulation announcing a Commission policy that it would not issue a television license to an applicant already owning five such licenses, even though no spe- cific application was before the Commission." *70 More recently, in the Court held that a facial challenge to the variance provision of an EPA pollution-control regulation was ripe even "prior to application of the regulation to a particular [company's] request for a variance." And in Pacific & Elec. the Court permitted utilities to challenge a state law imposing a moratorium on the certification of nuclear power plants, even though the utilities had not yet applied for a certificate. See To be sure, all of these decisions involved licenses, certificates, or variances, which exempt the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112889/reno-v-catholic-social-services-inc/ | these decisions involved licenses, certificates, or variances, which exempt the bearer from otherwise-applicable duties; but the same is true of the instant cases. The benefit conferred by the Reform Actan adjustment in status to lawful temporary resident alien, see 8 U.S. C. 1255a(a)readily can be conceptualized as a "license" or "certificate" to remain in the United States, or a "variance" from the immigration laws. As for the Court there stated: "Absent [explicit statutory authorization for immediate judicial review], a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency action `ripe' for judicial review under the APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him. (The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately. Such agency action is `ripe' for review at once, whether or not explicit statutory review apart from the APA is provided.)" *71 This language does not suggest that an anticipatory challenge to a benefit-conferring rule will of necessity be constitutionally unripe, for otherwise an "explicit statutory review" provision would not help cure the ripeness problem. Rather, Lujan points to the prudential considerations that weigh in the ripeness calculus: the need to "fles[h] out" the controversy and the burden on the plaintiff who must "adjust his conduct immediately." These are just the kinds of factors identified in the two-part, prudential test for ripeness that Abbott Laboratories articulated. "The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." See ; Pacific ; National Crushed At the very least, where the challenge to the benefit-conferring rule is purely legal, and where the plaintiff will suffer hardship if he cannot raise his challenge until later, a justiciable, anticipatory challenge to the rule may well be ripe in the prudential sense. Thus I cannot agree with the Court that ripeness will never obtain until the plaintiff actually applies for the benefit. But this new rule of ripeness law, even if correct, is irrelevant here. These cases no longer fall in the above-described category of anticipatory actions, where a would-be beneficiary simply seeks to invalidate a benefit-conferring rule before he applies for benefits. As the cases progressed in the District Courts, respondents amended their complaints to request an additional remedy beyond the invalidation of the INS |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112889/reno-v-catholic-social-services-inc/ | request an additional remedy beyond the invalidation of the INS regulations: an extension of the 12-month application period. Compare Sixth Amended Complaint in CSS (Record, Doc. No. 140) and First Amended Complaint in LULAC (Record, Doc. No. 56) with Third Amended Complaint in CSS (Record, Doc. No. 69) and Complaint in LULAC (Record, *72 Doc. No. 1). That period expired on May 4, 1988, and the District Courts thereafter granted an extension. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a28a, 50a60a The only issue before us is whether these orders should have been entered. See ante, at 48-49, 52-53. Even if the Court is correct that a plaintiff cannot seek to invalidate an agency's benefit-conferring rule before applying to the agency for the benefit, it is a separate question whether the would-be beneficiary must make the wholly futile gesture of submitting an application when the application period has expired and he is seeking to extend it. In the instant cases, I do not see why a class member who failed to apply to the INS within the 12-month period lacks a ripe claim to extend the application deadline, now that the period actually has expired. If Congress in the Reform Act had provided for an 18-month application period, and the INS had closed the application period after only 12 months, no one would argue that court orders extending the period for 6 more months should be vacated on ripeness grounds. The orders actually before us are not meaningfully distinguishable. Of course, respondents predicate their argument for extending the period on the invalidity of the INS regulations, see infra, at 75-77, not on a separate statutory provision governing the length of the period, but this difference does not change the ripeness calculus. The "basic rationale" behind our ripeness doctrine "is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements," when those "disagreements" are premised on "contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Union Carbide, There is no contingency to the closing of the 12-month application period. It is certain that an alien who now applies to the INS for legalization will be denied that benefit because the period has closed. Nor does prudence justify this Court in postponing an alien's claim to extend the period, since that *73 claim is purely legal and since a delayed opportunity to seek legalization will cause grave uncertainty. The Court responds to this point by reiterating that class members who failed to apply to the INS have not yet suffered a "concrete" injury, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112889/reno-v-catholic-social-services-inc/ | to the INS have not yet suffered a "concrete" injury, because the INS has not denied them legalization by virtue of the challenged regulations. See ante, at 59-60, n. 20. At present, however, class members are seeking to redress a different, and logically prior, injury: the denial of the very opportunity to apply for legalization. The Court's ripeness analysis focuses on the wrong question: whether "the promulgation of the challenged regulations [gave] each CSS and LULAC class member a ripe claim." Ante, at 59 But the question is not whether the class members' claims were ripe at the inception of these suits, when respondents were seeking simply to invalidate the INS regulations and the 12-month application period had not yet closed. Whatever the initial status of those claims, they became ripe once the period had in fact closed and respondents had amended their complaints to seek an extension. In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, this Court held that "since ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing, it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the District Court's decision that must govern." Accord, Similarly, in the cases before us, it is the situation now (and, as it happens, at the time of the District Courts' orders), rather than at the time of the initial complaints, that must govern. The Court also suggests that respondents' claim to extend the application period may well be "flatly" barred by 8 U.S. C. 1255a(f)(2), which provides: "No denial of adjustment of status [under Title II of the Reform Act] based on a late filing of an application for such adjustment may be reviewed by [any] court" See ante, at 60, n. 20. I find it remarkable that the Court might construe 1255a(f)(2) as barring any suit seeking to extend the application deadline *74 set by the INS, while at the same time interpreting 1255a(f)(1) not to bar respondents' substantive challenge to the INS regulations, see ante, at 53-56. As the INS itself observes, the preclusive language in 1255a(f)(1) is "broader" than in 1255a(f)(2), because the latter provision uses the word "denial" instead of "determination." See Brief for Petitioners 19. If Congress in the Reform Act had provided for an 18-month application period, and the INS had closed the period after only 12 months, I cannot believe that 1255a(f)(2) would preclude a suit seeking to extend the period by 6 months. Nor do I think that 1255a(f)(2) bars respondents' claim to extend the period, because that claim is predicated on their substantive challenge to the INS regulations, which in turn |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112889/reno-v-catholic-social-services-inc/ | their substantive challenge to the INS regulations, which in turn is permitted by 1255a(f)(1). In any event, 1255a(f)(2) concerns reviewability, not ripeness; whether or not that provision precludes the instant actions, the Court's ripeness analysis remains misguided. Of course, the closing of the application period was not an unalloyed benefit for class members who had failed to apply. After May 4, 1988, those aliens had ripe claims, but they also became statutorily ineligible for legalization. The Reform Act authorizes the INS to adjust the status of an illegal alien only if he "appl[ies] for such adjustment during the 12-month period beginning on a date designated by the Attorney General." 8 U.S. C. 1255a(a)(1)(A). As the INS rightly argues, this provision precludes the legalization of an alien who waited to apply until after the 12-month period had ended. The District Courts' orders extending the application period were not unripe, either constitutionally or prudentially, but they were impermissible under the Reform Act. "A court is no more authorized to overlook the valid [requirement] that applications be [submitted] than it is to overlook any other valid requirement for the receipt of benefits." *75 Respondents assert that equity requires an extension of the time limit imposed by 1255a(a)(1)(A). Whether that provision is seen as a limitations period subject to equitable tolling, see or as a substantive requirement subject perhaps to equitable estoppel, see Office of Personnel the District Courts needed some special reason to exercise that equitable power against the United States. The only reason respondents adduce is supposed "affirmative misconduct" by the INS. See ; Respondents argue that the INS engaged in "affirmative misconduct" by promulgating the invalid regulations, which deterred aliens who were ineligible under those regulations from applying for legalization. See Plaintiffs' Submission Re Availability of Remedies for the Plaintiff Class in CSS, pp. 6-15 (Record, Doc. No. 164), Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Remedies in LULAC (Record, Doc. No. 40). The District Courts essentially accepted the argument, ordering remedies coextensive with the INS' supposed "misconduct." The CSS court extended the application period for those class members who "knew of [the INS'] unlawful regulation and thereby concluded that they were ineligible for legalization and by reason of that conclusion did not file an application," App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a; the LULAC court provided an almost identical remedy, see at 59a. I cannot agree that a benefit-conferring agency commits "affirmative misconduct," sufficient to justify an equitable extension of the statutory time period for application, simply *76 by promulgating a regulation that incorrectly specifies the eligibility criteria for the benefit. When Congress passes a |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112889/reno-v-catholic-social-services-inc/ | the eligibility criteria for the benefit. When Congress passes a benefits statute that includes a time period, it has two goals. It intends both that eligible claimants receive the benefit and that they promptly assert their claims. The broad definition of "misconduct" that respondents propose would give the first goal absolute priority over the second, but I would not presume that Congress intends such a prioritization. Rather, absent evidence to the contrary, Congress presumably intends that the two goals be harmonized as best possible, by requiring would-be beneficiaries to make a timely application and concurrently to contest the invalid regulation. "We have generally been much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights." The broad equitable remedy entered by the District Courts in these cases is contrary to Congress' presumptive intent in the Reform Act, and thus is error. "`Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory requirements and provisions than can courts of law.'" I therefore agree with the Court that the District Courts' orders extending the application period must be vacated. I also agree that "front-desked" aliens already have "applied" within the meaning of 1255a(a)(1)(A). See ante, at 67, n. 29. On remand, respondents may be able to demonstrate particular instances of "misconduct" by the INS, beyond the promulgation of the invalid regulations, that might perhaps justify an extension for certain members of the LULAC class or the CSS class. See Brief for Respondents 16-20, 35-42. I would not preclude the possibility of a narrower order requiring the INS to adjudicate the applications of both "frontdesked" aliens and some aliens who were not "front-desked," but neither would I endorse that possibility, because at this *77 point respondents have made only the most general suggestions of "misconduct." |
Justice Burger | 1,977 | 12 | majority | United States v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109659/united-states-v-washington/ | The question presented in this case is whether testimony given by a grand jury witness suspected of wrongdoing may be used against him in a later prosecution for a substantive criminal offense when the witness was not informed in advance of his testimony that he was a potential defendant in danger of indictment.[1] (1) The facts are not in dispute. Zimmerman and Woodard were driving respondent's van truck when a Washington, D. C., policeman stopped them for a traffic offense. Seeing a motorcycle in the rear of the van which he identified as stolen, the officer arrested both men and impounded respondent's vehicle. When respondent came to reclaim the van, he told police that Zimmerman and Woodard were friends who were driving the van with his permission. He explained the presence of the stolen motorcycle by saying that while driving the van himself he had stopped to assist an unknown motorcyclist whose machine had broken down. Respondent then allowed the motorcycle to be placed in his van to take it for repairs. Soon after this the van stalled and he walked to a nearby gasoline station to call Zimmerman and Woodard for help, leaving the van with the unknown *183 motorcyclist. After reaching Zimmerman by phone, respondent waited at the gasoline station for his friends, then returned to the spot he had left the van when they failed to appear; by that time the van had disappeared. Respondent said he was not alarmed, assuming his friends had repaired the van and driven it away. Shortly thereafter, Zimmerman and Woodard were arrested with the stolen motorcycle in the van. Not surprisingly, the officer to whom respondent related this tale was more than a little skeptical; he told respondent he did not believe his story, and advised him not to repeat it in court, "because you're liable to be in trouble if you [do so]." The officer also declined to release the van. Respondent then repeated this story to an Assistant United Attorney working on the case. The prosecutor, too, was dubious of the account; nevertheless, he released the van to respondent. At the same time, he served respondent with a subpoena to appear before the grand jury investigating the motorcycle theft. When respondent appeared before the grand jury, the Assistant United Attorney in charge had not yet decided whether to seek an indictment against him. The prosecutor was aware of respondent's explanation, and was also aware of the possibility that respondent could be indicted by the grand jury for the theft if his story was not believed. The prosecutor did not |
Justice Burger | 1,977 | 12 | majority | United States v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109659/united-states-v-washington/ | if his story was not believed. The prosecutor did not advise respondent before his appearance that he might be indicted on a criminal charge in connection with the stolen motorcycle. But respondent, after reciting the usual oath to tell the truth, was given a series of other warnings, as follows: "Q "You have a right to remain silent. You are not required to say anything to us in this Grand Jury at any time or to answer any question.[2] *184 "Anything you say can be used against you in Court. "You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we question you and have him outside the Grand Jury during any questioning. "If you cannot afford a lawyer and want one a lawyer will be provided for you. "If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. "You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer. "Now, do you understand those rights, sir? "A Yes, I do. "Q And do you want to answer questions of the Grand Jury in reference to a stolen motorcycle that was found in your truck? "A Yes, sir. "Q And do you want a lawyer here or outside the Grand Jury room while you answer those questions? "A No, I don't think so." In response to questions, respondent again related his version of how the stolen motorcycle came to be in the rear of his van. Subsequently, the grand jury indicted respondent, Zimmerman, and Woodard for grand larceny and receiving stolen property. Respondent moved to suppress his testimony and quash the indictment, arguing that it was based on evidence obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Superior Court for the District of *185 Columbia suppressed the testimony and dismissed the indictment, holding that before the Government could use respondent's grand jury testimony at trial, it had first to demonstrate that respondent had knowingly waived his privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Notwithstanding the comprehensive warnings described earlier, the court found no effective waiver had been made, holding that respondent was not properly advised of his Fifth Amendment rights. The court thought the Constitution required, at a minimum, that "inquiry be made of the suspect to determine what his educational background is, and what his formal education is and whether or not he understands that this is a constitutional privilege and whether he fully understands the consequences of what might result in the event that he does |
Justice Burger | 1,977 | 12 | majority | United States v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109659/united-states-v-washington/ | of what might result in the event that he does waive his constitutional right and in the event that he does make incriminatory statements" The court also held that respondent should have been told that his testimony could lead to his indictment by the grand jury before which he was testifying, and could then be used to convict him in a criminal prosecution. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression order.[3] That court also took the position that "the most significant failing of the prosecutor was in not advising [respondent] that he was a potential defendant. Another shortcoming was in the prosecutor's waiting until after administering the oath in the cloister *186 of the grand jury before undertaking to furnish what advice was given."[4] (2) The implicit premise of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' holding is that a grand jury inquiry, like police custodial interrogation, is an "interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime [that] contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." But this Court has not decided that the grand jury setting presents coercive elements which compel witnesses to incriminate themselves. Nor have we decided whether any Fifth Amendment warnings whatever are constitutionally required for grand jury witnesses; moreover, we have no occasion to decide these matters today, for even assuming that the grand jury setting exerts some pressures on witnesses generally or on those who may later be indicted, the comprehensive warnings respondent received in this case plainly satisfied any possible claim to warnings. Accordingly, respondent's grand jury testimony may properly be used against him in a subsequent trial for theft of the motorcycle. Although it is well settled that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends to grand jury proceedings, it is also axiomatic that the Amendment does not automatically preclude self-incrimination, whether spontaneous or in response to questions put by government officials. "It does not preclude *187 a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him," United for "those competent and freewilled to do so may give evidence against the whole world, themselves included." United ; accord, ; ; Indeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable. In addition to guaranteeing the right to remain silent unless immunity is granted, the Fifth Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a "genuine compulsion of testimony." Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most |
Justice Burger | 1,977 | 12 | majority | United States v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109659/united-states-v-washington/ | Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions. Accordingly, unless the record reveals some compulsion, respondent's incriminating testimony cannot conflict with any constitutional guarantees of the privilege.[5] The Constitution does not prohibit every element which influences a criminal suspect to make incriminating admissions. See ; Of course, for many witnesses the grand jury room engenders an atmosphere conducive to truthtelling, for it is likely that upon being brought *188 before such a body of neighbors and fellow citizens, and having been placed under a solemn oath to tell the truth, many witnesses will feel obliged to do just that. But it does not offend the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment if in that setting a witness is more likely to tell the truth than in less solemn surroundings. The constitutional guarantee is only that the witness be not compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. The test is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne. (3) After being sworn, respondent was explicitly advised that he had a right to remain silent and that any statements he did make could be used to convict him of crime. It is inconceivable that such a warning would fail to alert him to his right to refuse to answer any question which might incriminate him. This advice also eliminated any possible compulsion to self-incrimination which might otherwise exist. To suggest otherwise is to ignore the record and reality. Indeed, it seems self-evident that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious posture to later complain that his answers were compelled. Moreover, any possible coercion or unfairness resulting from a witness' misimpression that he must answer truthfully even questions with incriminatory aspects is completely removed by the warnings given here. Even in the presumed psychologically coercive atmosphere of police custodial interrogation, does not require that any additional warnings be given simply because the suspect is a potential defendant; indeed, such suspects are potential defendants more often than not. United cert. denied, Respondent points out that unlike one subject to custodial interrogation, whose arrest should inform him only too clearly that he is a potential criminal defendant, a grand jury witness *189 may well be unaware that he is targeted for possible prosecution. While this may be so in some situations, it is an overdrawn generalization. In any case, events here clearly put respondent on notice that he was a suspect in the motorcycle theft. He knew that the grand jury was investigating that theft and that his |
Justice Burger | 1,977 | 12 | majority | United States v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109659/united-states-v-washington/ | the grand jury was investigating that theft and that his involvement was known to the authorities. Respondent was made abundantly aware that his exculpatory version of events had been disbelieved by the police officer, and that his friends, whose innocence his own story supported, were to be prosecuted for the theft. The interview with the prosecutor put him on additional notice that his implausible story was not accepted as true. The warnings he received in the grand jury room served further to alert him to his own potential criminal liability. In sum, by the time he testified respondent knew better than anyone else of his potential defendant status. However, all of this is largely irrelevant, since we do not understand what constitutional disadvantage a failure to give potential defendant warnings could possibly inflict on a grand jury witness, whether or not he has received other warnings. It is firmly settled that the prospect of being indicted does not entitle a witness to commit perjury, and witnesses who are not grand jury targets are protected from compulsory self-incrimination to the same extent as those who are. Because target witness status neither enlarges nor diminishes the constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination, potential-defendant warnings add nothing of value to protection of Fifth Amendment rights. Respondent suggests he must prevail under There, the petitioner was charged with a gambling conspiracy. As part of its case, the Government introduced Garner's income tax returns, in one of which he had identified his occupation as "professional gambler," and in all of which he had reported substantial income from wagering. The Court recognized that Garner was indeed compelled by law to file a tax return, but held that this did not *190 constitute compelled self-incrimination. The Court noted that Garner did not claim his Fifth Amendment privilege, instead making the incriminating disclosure that he was a professional gambler. Garner holds that the Self-Incrimination Clause is violated only when the Government compels disclosures which it knows will incriminate the declarant that is, only when it intentionally places the individual under "compulsions to incriminate, not merely compulsions to make unprivileged disclosures." But the distinction between compulsion to incriminate and compulsion to disclose what the Government is entitled to know is of no help to respondent; in this case there was no compulsion to do either. In decided shortly after Garner, we reaffirmed the need for showing overbearing compulsion as a prerequisite to a Fifth Amendment violation. There, the Government agent interrogated the taxpayer for the explicit purpose of securing information that would incriminate him. There, as here, the interrogation was |
Justice Burger | 1,977 | 12 | majority | United States v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109659/united-states-v-washington/ | that would incriminate him. There, as here, the interrogation was not conducted in an inherently coercive setting; hence the claim of compelled self-incrimination was rejected.[6] (4) Since warnings were given, we are not called upon to decide whether such warnings were constitutionally required. However, *191 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that whatever warnings are required are insufficient if given "in the cloister of the grand jury." 328 A.2d, That court gave no reason for its view that warnings must be given outside the presence of the jury, but respondent now advances two justifications. First, it could be thought that warnings given to respondent before the grand jury came too late, because of the short time to assimilate their significance, and because of the presence of the grand jurors. But respondent does not contend that he did not understand the warnings given here. In any event, it is purely speculative to attribute any such effects to warnings given in the presence of the jury immediately before taking the stand. If anything, the proximity of the warnings to respondent's testimony and the solemnity of the grand jury setting seem likely to increase their effectiveness. Second, respondent argues that giving the oath in the presence of the grand jury undermines assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege by placing the witness in fear that the grand jury will infer guilt from invocation of the privilege. But this argument entirely overlooks that the grand jury's historic role is as an investigative body; it is not the final arbiter of guilt or innocence. Moreover, it is well settled that invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege in a grand jury proceeding is not admissible in a criminal trial, where guilt or innocence is actually at stake. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | dissenting | Muniz v. Hoffman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109300/muniz-v-hoffman/ | I I believe that petitioners are entitled to trial by jury under 18 U.S. C. 3692, which provides that, with certain exceptions not here material: "In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury" In enacting this language in 1948, Congress reaffirmed the purpose originally expressed in 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S. C. 111 (1946 ed.). That Act was intended to shield the organized labor movement from the intervention of a federal judiciary perceived by some as hostile to labor. The Act severely constrained the power of a federal court to issue an injunction against any person "participating or interested in a labor dispute." Section 11 provided for trial by jury in "all cases arising under this Act in which a person shall be charged with contempt." In the context of the case now before us, I view this section as affording, at the very least, a jury trial in any criminal contempt proceeding involving an alleged violation of an injunction issued against a participant in a "labor dispute." Any such injunction issued by a federal court was one "arising under" the Act, for it could have been issued only in accordance with the Act's prescriptions.[1] The evident congressional intent was to provide *479 for the interposition of a jury when disobedience of such an injunction was alleged.[2] For the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE STEWART, post, at 485-486. I am persuaded that 10 (h) and 10 (l) of the National Labor Relations Act made inapplicable only the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and did not disturb 11. The broad mandate of 11, to afford trial by jury in a contempt proceeding involving an injunction issued in a labor dispute, was thus continued in 3692.[3] See II I would reverse the judgment against Local 70 on constitutional grounds.[4] Article III, 2, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except *480 in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury" And the Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed" (Emphasis added.) The Court fails to give effect to this language when it declares that a $10,000 fine is not "of such magnitude that a jury should |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | dissenting | Muniz v. Hoffman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109300/muniz-v-hoffman/ | fine is not "of such magnitude that a jury should have been interposed to guard against bias or mistake." Ante, at 477. I have previously protested this Court's refusal to recognize a right to jury trial in cases where it deems an offense to be "petty."[5] But even the "petty offense" exception cannot justify today's result, for it is impossible fairly to characterize either the offense or its penalty as "petty."[6] Disobedience of an injunction obtained by the Board is hardly a transgression trivial by its nature; and the imposition of a $10,000 fine is not a matter most locals would take lightly. In any event, the Constitution deprives us of the power to grant or withhold trial by jury depending upon our assessment of the substantiality of the penalty. To the argument that the Framers could not have intended to provide trial by jury in cases involving only *481 "small" fines and imprisonment, the response of Justices McReynolds and Butler in District of is apt: "In a suit at common law to recover above $20.00, a jury trial is assured. And to us, it seems improbable that while providing for this protection in such a trifling matter the framers of the Constitution intended that it might be denied where imprisonment for a considerable time or liability for fifteen times $20.00 confronts the accused." I would follow the clear command of Art. III and the Sixth Amendment and reverse the judgment as to Local 70. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | A New Jersey law prohibits the importation of most "solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State" In this case we are required to decide whether this statutory prohibition violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. I The statutory provision in question is ch. 363 of 1973 N. J. Laws, which took effect in early 1974. In pertinent part it provides: "No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey, until the commissioner [of the State Department of Environmental Protection] shall determine that such action can be permitted without endangering the public health, safety and *619 welfare and has promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the treatment and disposal of such waste in this State." N. J. Stat. Ann. 13:1I- (West Supp. 1978).[1] As authorized by ch. 363, the Commissioner promulgated regulations permitting four categories of waste to enter the State.[] Apart from these narrow exceptions, however, New Jersey closed its borders to all waste from other States. Immediately affected by these developments were the operators of private landfills in New Jersey, and several cities in other States that had agreements with these operators for waste disposal. They brought suit against New Jersey and its Department of Environmental Protection in state court, attacking the statute and regulations on a number of state and federal grounds. In an oral opinion granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the trial court declared the law unconstitutional because it discriminated against interstate commerce. The New Jersey Supreme Court consolidated this case with another reaching the same conclusion, *60 Hackensack Meadowlands Development and reversed, 68 N. J. 451, It found that ch. 363 advanced vital health and environmental objectives with no economic discrimination against, and with little burden upon, interstate commerce, and that the law was therefore permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The court also found no congressional intent to pre-empt ch. 363 by enacting in 1965 the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 4 U.S. C. 351 et seq., as amended by the Resource Recovery Act of 1970, The plaintiffs then appealed to this Court.[3] After noting probable jurisdiction, and hearing oral argument, we remanded for reconsideration of the appellants' preemption claim in light of the newly enacted Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Again the New Jersey Supreme Court found no federal pre-emption of the state law, 73 N. J. 56, and again we |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | the state law, 73 N. J. 56, and again we noted probable jurisdiction, We agree with the New Jersey court that the state law has not been pre-empted by federal legislation.[4] The dispositive *61 question, therefore, is whether the law is constitutionally permissible in light of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.[5] II Before it addressed the merits of the appellants' claim, the New Jersey Supreme Court questioned whether the interstate movement of those wastes banned by ch. 363 is "commerce" at all within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Any doubts on that score should be laid to rest at the outset. The state court expressed the view that there may be two definitions of "commerce" for constitutional purposes. When relied on "to support some exertion of federal control or regulation," the Commerce Clause permits "a very sweeping concept" of commerce. 68 N. J., at But when relied on "to strike down or restrict state legislation," that Clause and the term "commerce" have a "much more confined reach." The state court reached this conclusion in an attempt to *6 reconcile modern Commerce Clause concepts with several old cases of this Court holding that States can prohibit the importation of some objects because they "are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce." These articles include items "which, on account of their existing condition, would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death, such as rags or other substances infected with the germs of yellow fever or the virus of small-pox, or cattle or meat or other provisions that are diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit for human use or consumption." See also and cases cited therein. The state court found that ch. 363 as narrowed by the state regulations, see n. banned only "those wastes which can[not] be put to effective use," and therefore those wastes were not commerce at all, unless "the mere transportation and disposal of valueless waste between states constitutes interstate commerce within the meaning of the constitutional provision." 68 N. J., at 468, We think the state court misread our cases, and thus erred in assuming that they require a two-tiered definition of commerce. In saying that innately harmful articles "are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce," the Bowman Court was stating its conclusion, not the starting point of its reasoning. All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset. In Bowman and similar cases, the Court held simply that because the articles' worth in interstate commerce was far outweighed by the |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | articles' worth in interstate commerce was far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very movement, States could prohibit their transportation across state lines. Hence, we reject the state court's suggestion that the banning of "valueless" out-of-state wastes by ch. 363 implicates no constitutional protection. Just as Congress has power to regulate the interstate movement of these wastes, States are *63 not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement. Cf. 46 U.S. 794, 80-814; Meat III A Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce among the States, many subjects of potential federal regulation under that power inevitably escape congressional attention "because of their local character and their number and diversity." South Carolina State Highway In the absence of federal legislation, these subjects are open to control by the States so long as they act within the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause itself. See Raymond Motor Transportation, 434 U.S. 49, The bounds of these restraints appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of this Court giving effect to its basic purpose. That broad purpose was well expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in his opinion for the Court in H. P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. 537-538: "This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units. As the Court said in Baldwin v. Seelig, 94 U. S. [511], 57, `what is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.'" The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an alertness to the evils of "economic isolation" and protectionism, while at the same time recognizing that incidental *64 burdens on interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its people. Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected. See, e. g., H. P. Hood & Sons, v. Du ; 67 U.S. 307, The clearest example of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders. Cf. 91 U.S. 75. But where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach, the general contours of |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | adopted a much more flexible approach, the general contours of which were outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, 14: "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." See also Raymond Motor Transportation, at 441-44; 43 U.S. 333, 35-354; Great A&P Tea 44 U.S. 366, 371-37. The crucial inquiry, therefore, must be directed to determining whether ch. 363 is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental. *65 The purpose of ch. 363 is set out in the statute itself as follows: "The Legislature finds and determines that the volume of solid and liquid waste continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment and disposal of these wastes continues to pose an even greater threat to the quality of the environment of New Jersey, that the available and appropriate land fill sites within the State are being diminished, that the environment continues to be threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste which originated or was collected outside the State, and that the public health, safety and welfare require that the treatment and disposal within this State of all wastes generated outside of the State be prohibited." The New Jersey Supreme Court accepted this statement of the state legislature's purpose. The state court additionally found that New Jersey's existing landfill sites will be exhausted within a few years; that to go on using these sites or to develop new ones will take a heavy environmental toll, both from pollution and from loss of scarce open lands; that new techniques to divert waste from landfills to other methods of disposal and resource recovery processes are under development, but that these changes will require time; and finally, that "the extension of the lifespan of existing landfills, resulting from the exclusion of out-of-state waste, may be of crucial importance in preventing further virgin wetlands or other undeveloped lands from being devoted to landfill purposes." 68 N. J., at 460-465, 348 A.d, at 509-51. Based on these findings, the court |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | 348 A.d, at 509-51. Based on these findings, the court concluded that ch. 363 was designed to protect, not the State's economy, but its environment, and that its substantial benefits outweigh its "slight" burden on interstate commerce. 348 A.d, at 515-519. The appellants strenuously contend that ch. 363, "while outwardly cloaked `in the currently fashionable garb of environmental *66 protection,' is actually no more than a legislative effort to suppress competition and stabilize the cost of solid waste disposal for New Jersey residents" They cite passages of legislative history suggesting that the problem addressed by ch. 363 is primarily financial: Stemming the flow of out-of-state waste into certain landfill sites will extend their lives, thus delaying the day when New Jersey cities must transport their waste to more distant and expensive sites. The appellees, on the other hand, deny that ch. 363 was motivated by financial concerns or economic protectionism. In the words of their brief, "[n]o New Jersey commercial interests stand to gain advantage over competitors from outside the state as a result of the ban on dumping out-of-state waste." Noting that New Jersey landfill operators are among the plaintiffs, the appellee's brief argues that "[t]he complaint is not that New Jersey has forged an economic preference for its own commercial interests, but rather that it has denied a small group of its entrepreneurs an economic opportunity to traffic in waste in order to protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry at large." This dispute about ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved, because its resolution would not be relevant to the constitutional issue to be decided in this case. Contrary to the evident assumption of the state court and the parties, the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends. Thus, it does not matter whether the ultimate aim of ch. 363 is to reduce the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to save remaining open lands from pollution, for we assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents' pocketbooks as well as their environment. And it may be assumed as well that New Jersey may pursue those ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected. But whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against *67 articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect, ch. 363 violates |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | its face and in its plain effect, ch. 363 violates this principle of nondiscrimination. The Court has consistently found parochial legislation of this kind to be constitutionally invalid, whether the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure a steady supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly ruinous outside competition, 94 U. S., at 5-54; or to create jobs by keeping industry within the State, Foster-Fountain Packing 78 U.S. 1, ; 78 U.S. 16; -404; or to preserve the State's financial resources from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants, In each of these cases, a presumably legitimate goal was sought to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the national economy. Also relevant here are the Court's decisions holding that a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders. 1 U.S. 9; 6 U.S. 553. These cases stand for the basic principle that a "State is without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of the State."[6]Foster-Fountain Packing at *68 The New Jersey law at issue in this case falls squarely within the area that the Commerce Clause puts off limits to state regulation. On its face, it imposes on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill space. It is true that in our previous cases the scarce natural resource was itself the article of commerce, whereas here the scarce resource and the article of commerce are distinct. But that difference is without consequence. In both instances, the State has overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons. It does not matter that the State has shut the article of commerce inside the State in one case and outside the State in the other. What is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade. The appellees argue that not all laws which facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce are forbidden protectionist regulations. In particular, they point to quarantine laws, which this Court has repeatedly upheld even though they appear to single out interstate commerce for special treatment. See at ; 15 U. S., at In the appellees' view, ch. 363 is analogous to such health-protective measures, since it reduces the exposure of New Jersey |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | health-protective measures, since it reduces the exposure of New Jersey residents to the allegedly harmful effects of landfill sites. It is true that certain quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden protectionist measures, even though they were directed against out-of-state commerce. See 09 U.S. 51; ; at But those quarantine laws banned the importation of articles such as diseased livestock that required destruction as soon *69 as possible because their very movement risked contagion and other evils. Those laws thus did not discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin. The New Jersey statute is not such a quarantine law. There has been no claim here that the very movement of waste into or through New Jersey endangers health, or that waste must be disposed of as soon and as close to its point of generation as possible. The harms caused by waste are said to arise after its disposal in landfill sites, and at that point, as New Jersey concedes, there is no basis to distinguish out-of-state waste from domestic waste. If one is inherently harmful, so is the other. Yet New Jersey has banned the former while leaving its landfill sites open to the latter. The New Jersey law blocks the importation of waste in an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State with the entire burden of slowing the flow of refuse into New Jersey's remaining landfill sites. That legislative effort is clearly impermissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or necessary to send their waste into New Jersey for disposal, and New Jersey claims the right to close its borders to such traffic. Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may find it expedient or necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New York for disposal, and those States might then claim the right to close their borders. The Commerce Clause will protect New Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all. The judgment is Reversed. MR. |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | dissenting | Commissioner v. McCoy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111962/commissioner-v-mccoy/ | I continue to be troubled by this Court's willingness to dispose of appeals and petitions for certiorari through summary per curiam opinions, without the benefit of briefing on the merits or review of the full record of proceedings below. I have elaborated this view before, see as have other Justices of this Court, see but the admonition bears repeating. *8 My doubts about summary dispositions encompass concerns about both the parties who seek our review and the integrity, perceived and actual, of our proceedings. The Rules of this Court urge litigants filing petitions for certiorari to focus on the exceptional need for this Court's review rather than on the merits of the underlying case. Summary disposition thus flies in the face of legitimate expectations of the parties seeking redress in this Court and deprives them of any opportunity to argue the merits of their claims before judgment. Moreover, briefing on the merits should be encouraged not only because parties expect and deserve it, but because it leads to greater accuracy in our decisions. Briefing helps this Court to reduce as much as possible the inevitable incidence of error and confusion in our opinions each Term. Finally, the practice of summary disposition demonstrates insufficient respect for lower court judges and for our own dissenting colleagues on this Court. I adhere to the view that whenever the Court contemplates a summary disposition, it should review the full record below and invite the parties to file supplemental briefs on the merits if they wish. I remain unconvinced that this slight modification of our practice would unduly burden the Court. The benefits of increasing the fairness and accuracy of our decisionmaking and the value of according greater respect to our colleagues on this and other courts more than justify these modest accommodations |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Scheffer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118191/united-states-v-scheffer/ | The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that the President violated the Constitution in June 1991, when he promulgated Rule 707 of the Military Rules of Evidence. Had I been a member of that court, I would not have decided that question without first requiring the parties to brief and argue the antecedent question whether Rule 707 violates Article 36(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S. C. 836(a). As presently advised, I am persuaded that the Rule does violate the statute and should be held invalid for that reason. I also agree with the Court of Appeals that the Rule is unconstitutional. This Court's contrary holding rests on a serious undervaluation of the importance of the citizen's constitutional right to present a defense *321 to a criminal charge and an unrealistic appraisal of the importance of the governmental interests that undergird the Rule. Before discussing the constitutional issue, I shall comment briefly on the statutory question. I Rule 707 is a blanket rule of exclusion.[1] No matter how reliable and how probative the results of a polygraph test may be, Rule 707 categorically denies the defendant any opportunity to persuade the court that the evidence should be received for any purpose. Indeed, even if the parties stipulate in advance that the results of a lie detector test may be admitted, the Rule requires exclusion. The principal charge against the respondent in this case was that he had knowingly used methamphetamine. His principal defense was "innocent ingestion"; even if the urinalysis test conducted on April 7, 1992, correctly indicated that he did ingest the substance, he claims to have been unaware of that fact. The results of the lie detector test conducted three days later, if accurate, constitute factual evidence that his physical condition at that time was consistent with the theory of his defense and inconsistent with the theory of the prosecution. The results were also relevant because they tended to confirm the credibility of his testimony. Under Rule 707, even if the results of the polygraph test were more reliable than the results of the urinalysis, the weaker evidence is admissible and the stronger evidence is inadmissible. Under the now discredited reasoning in a case decided 75 years ago, that anomalous result would also have been reached in nonmilitary cases tried in the federal courts. In recent years, however, we have not only repudiated Frye `s general approach to scientific evidence, but the federal courts have also been engaged in the process of rejecting the oncepopular view that all lie detector evidence |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Scheffer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118191/united-states-v-scheffer/ | of rejecting the oncepopular view that all lie detector evidence should be categorically inadmissible.[2] Well reasoned opinions are concluding, consistently with this Court's decisions in and General Electric that the federal rules wisely allow district judges to exercise broad discretion when evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence.[3] Those opinions correctly observe that the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of civil and criminal cases in the federal courts do not contain any blanket prohibition against the admissibility of polygraph evidence. *323 In accord with the modern trend of decisions on this admissibility issue, in the Court of Military Appeals held that an accused was "entitled to attempt to lay" the foundation for admission of favorable polygraph evidence. United The President responded to Gipson by adopting Rule 707. The governing statute authorized him to promulgate evidentiary rules "which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts." 10 U.S. C. 836(a).[4] Thus, if there are military concerns that warrant a special rule for military tribunals, the statute gives him ample authority to promulgate special rules that take such concerns into account. Rule 707 has no counterpart in either the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, to the extent that the use of the lie detector plays a special role in the military establishment, military practices are more favorable to a rule of admissibility than is the less structured use of lie detectors in the civilian sector of our society. That is so because the military carefully regulates the administration of polygraph tests to ensure reliable results. The military maintains "very stringent standards for polygraph examiners"[5] and has established its own Polygraph *324 Institute, which is "generally considered to be the best training facility for polygraph examiners in the United States."[6] The military has administered hundreds of thousands of such tests and routinely uses their results for a wide variety of official decisions.[7] *325 The stated reasons for the adoption of Rule 707 do not rely on any special military concern. They merely invoke three interests: (1) the interest in excluding unreliable evidence; (2) the interest in protecting the trier of fact from being misled by an unwarranted assumption that the polygraph evidence has "an aura of near infallibility"; and (3) the interest in avoiding collateral debates about the admissibility of particular test results. It seems clear that those interests pose less serious concerns in the military than in the civilian context. |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Scheffer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118191/united-states-v-scheffer/ | serious concerns in the military than in the civilian context. Disputes about the qualifications of the examiners, the equipment, and the testing procedures should seldom arise with respect to the tests conducted by the military. Moreover, there surely is no reason to assume that military personnel who perform the factfinding function are less competent than ordinary jurors to assess the reliability of particular results, or their relevance to the issues.[8] Thus, there is no identifiable military concern that justifies the President's promulgation of a special military rule that is more burdensome to the accused in military trials than the evidentiary rules applicable to the trial of civilians. It, therefore, seems fairly clear that Rule 707 does not comply with the statute. I do not rest on this ground, however, because briefing might persuade me to change my views, and because the Court has decided only the constitutional question. II The Court's opinion barely acknowledges that a person accused of a crime has a constitutional right to present a *326 defense. It is not necessary to point to "any particular language in the Sixth Amendment," ante, at 307, to support the conclusion that the right is firmly established. It is, however, appropriate to comment on the importance of that right before discussing the three interests that the Government relies upon to justify Rule 707. The Sixth Amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Because this right "is an essential attribute of the adversary system itself," we have repeatedly stated that few rights "are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."[9] According to Joseph Story, that provision was included in the Bill of Rights in reaction to a notorious common-law rule categorically excluding defense evidence in treason and felony cases.[10] Our holding in that this right is applicable to the States, rested on the premises that it "is in plain terms the right to present a defense" and that it "is a fundamental element of due process *327 of law."[11] Consistent with the history of the provision, the Court in that case held that a state rule of evidence that excluded "whole categories" of testimony on the basis of a presumption of unreliability was unconstitutional.[12] The blanket rule of inadmissibility held invalid in covered the testimony of alleged accomplices. Both before and after that decision, the Court has recognized the potential injustice produced by rules that exclude entire categories of relevant evidence that is potentially unreliable. At common law interested parties such as |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Scheffer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118191/united-states-v-scheffer/ | is potentially unreliable. At common law interested parties such as defendants,[13] their spouses,[14] and their co-conspirators[15] were not competent *328 witnesses. "Nor were those named the only grounds of exclusion from the witness stand; conviction of crime, want of religious belief, and other matters were held sufficient. Indeed, the theory of the common law was to admit to the witness stand only those presumably honest, appreciating the sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by the result, and free from any of the temptations of interest. The courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors." And, of course, under the regime established by Frye v. United States, scientific evidence was inadmissible unless it met a stringent "general acceptance" test. Over the years, with respect to category after category, strict rules of exclusion have been replaced by rules that broaden the discretion of trial judges to admit potentially unreliable evidence and to allow properly instructed juries to evaluate its weight. While that trend has included both rulemaking and nonconstitutional judicial decisions, the direction of the trend has been consistent and it has been manifested in constitutional holdings as well. Commenting on the trend that had followed the decision in Benson, the Court in 1918 observed that in the "years which have elapsed since the decision of the Ben- son Case, the disposition of courts and of legislative bodies to remove disabilities from witnesses has continued, as that decision shows it had been going forward before, under dominance of the conviction of our time that the *329 truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the court, rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent, with the result that this principle has come to be widely, almost universally, accepted in this country and in Great Britain." See also It was in a case involving the disqualification of spousal testimony that Justice Stewart stated: "Any rule that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing of justice." State evidentiary rules may so seriously impede the discovery of truth, "as well as the doing of justice," that they preclude the "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense" that is guaranteed by the Constitution,[16] In we concluded that "where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Scheffer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118191/united-states-v-scheffer/ | implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice."[17] As the Court notes today, restrictions on the "defendant's right to present relevant evidence," ante, at 308, must comply with the admonition in that they "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." Applying that admonition to Arkansas' blanket rule prohibiting the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony, we concluded that a "State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case." That statement of constitutional law is directly relevant to this case. *331 III The constitutional requirement that a blanket exclusion of potentially unreliable evidence must be proportionate to the purposes served by the rule obviously makes it necessary to evaluate the interests on both sides of the balance. Today the Court all but ignores the strength of the defendant's interest in having polygraph evidence admitted in certain cases. As the facts of this case illustrate, the Court is quite wrong in assuming that the impact of Rule 707 on respondent's defense was not significant because it did not preclude the introduction of any "factual evidence" or prevent him from conveying "his version of the facts to the court-martial members." Ante, at 317. Under such reasoning, a rule that excluded the testimony of alibi witnesses would not be significant as long as the defendant is free to testify himself. But given the defendant's strong interest in the outcome an interest that was sufficient to make his testimony presumptively untrustworthy and therefore inadmissible at common lawhis uncorroborated testimony is certain to be less persuasive than that of a third-party witness. A rule that bars him "from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility," ibid., unquestionably impairs any "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense"; indeed, it is sure to be outcome determinative in many cases. Moreover, in this case the results of the polygraph test, taken just three days after the urinalysis, constitute independent factual evidence that is not otherwise available and that strongly supports his defense of "innocent ingestion." Just as flight or other evidence of "consciousness of guilt" may sometimes be relevant, on some occasions evidence of "consciousness of innocence" may also be relevant to the central issue at trial. Both the answers to the questions propounded by the examiner, and the physical manifestations produced by those utterances, were probative of an innocent state of mind shortly after he ingested the drugs. In Dean Wigmore's view, both "conduct" and "utterances" may constitute *332 factual |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Scheffer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118191/united-states-v-scheffer/ | Wigmore's view, both "conduct" and "utterances" may constitute *332 factual evidence of a "consciousness of innocence."[18] As the Second Circuit has held, when there is a serious factual dispute over the "basic defense [that defendant] was unaware of any criminal wrongdoing," evidence of his innocent state of mind is "critical to a fair adjudication of criminal charges."[19] The exclusion of the test results in this case cannot be fairly equated with a ruling that merely prevented the defendant from encumbering the record with cumulative evidence. Because the Rule may well have affected the outcome of the trial, it unquestionably "infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused." Ante, at 308. The question, then, is whether the three interests on which the Government relies are powerful enough to support a categorical rule excluding the results of all polygraph tests no matter how unfair such a rule may be in particular cases. *333 Reliability There are a host of studies that place the reliability of polygraph tests at 85% to 90%.[20] While critics of the polygraph argue that accuracy is much lower, even the studies cited by the critics place polygraph accuracy at 70%.[21] Moreover, to the extent that the polygraph errs, studies have repeatedly shown that the polygraph is more likely to find innocent people guilty than vice versa.[22] Thus, exculpatory polygraphslike the one in this caseare likely to be more reliable than inculpatory ones. Of course, within the broad category of lie detector evidence, there may be a wide variation in both the validity and the relevance[23] of particular test results. Questions about the examiner's integrity, independence, choice of questions, or training in the detection of deliberate attempts to provoke misleading physiological responses may justify exclusion of *334 specific evidence. But such questions are properly addressed in adversary proceedings; they fall far short of justifying a blanket exclusion of this type of expert testimony. There is no legal requirement that expert testimony must satisfy a particular degree of reliability to be admissible. Expert testimony about a defendant's "future dangerousness" to determine his eligibility for the death penalty, even if wrong "most of the time," is routinely admitted. Studies indicate that handwriting analysis, and even fingerprint identifications, may be less trustworthy than polygraph evidence in certain cases.[24] And, of course, even highly dubious eyewitness *335 testimony is, and should be, admitted and tested in the crucible of cross-examination. The Court's reliance on potential unreliability as a justification for a categorical rule of inadmissibility reveals that it is "overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally. |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Scheffer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118191/united-states-v-scheffer/ | capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."[25] * The Role of the Jury It is the function of the jury to make credibility determinations. In my judgment evidence that tends to establish either a consciousness of guilt or a consciousness of innocence may be of assistance to the jury in making such determinations. That also was the opinion of Dean Wigmore: "Let the accused's whole conduct come in; and whether it tells for consciousness of guilt or for consciousness of innocence, let us take it for what it is worth, remembering that in either case it is open to varying explanations and is not to be emphasized. Let us not deprive an innocent person, falsely accused, of the inference which common sense draws from a consciousness of innocence and its natural manifestations." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 293, p. 232 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). There is, of course, some risk that some "juries will give excessive weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise," ante, at 313-314. In my judgment, however, it is much more likely that juries will be guided by the instructions of the trial judge concerning the credibility of expert as well as lay witnesses. The strong presumption that juries will follow the court's instructions, see, e. g., 4 U.S. 200, applies to exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence. Common *337 sense suggests that the testimony of disinterested third parties that is relevant to the jury's credibility determination will assist rather than impair the jury's deliberations. As with the reliance on the potential unreliability of this type of evidence, the reliance on a fear that the average jury is not able to assess the weight of this testimony reflects a distressing lack of confidence in the intelligence of the average American.[26] Collateral Litigation The potential burden of collateral proceedings to determine the examiner's qualifications is a manifestly insufficient justification for a categorical exclusion of expert testimony. Such proceedings are a routine predicate for the admission of any expert testimony, and may always give rise to searching cross-examination. If testimony that is critical to a fair determination of guilt or innocence could be excluded for that reason, the right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense would be an illusion. It is incongruous for the party that selected the examiner, the equipment, the testing procedures, and the questions asked of the defendant |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Scheffer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118191/united-states-v-scheffer/ | the testing procedures, and the questions asked of the defendant to complain about the examinee's burden of proving that the test was properly conducted. While there may well be a need for substantial collateral proceedings when the party objecting to admissibility has a basis for questioning some aspect of the examination, it seems quite obvious that the Government is in no position to challenge *338 the competence of the procedures that it has developed and relied upon in hundreds of thousands of cases. In all events the concern about the burden of collateral debates about the integrity of a particular examination, or the competence of a particular examiner, provides no support for a categorical rule that requires exclusion even when the test is taken pursuant to a stipulation and even when there has been a stipulation resolving all potential collateral issues. Indeed, in this very case there would have been no need for any collateral proceedings because respondent did not question the qualifications of the expert who examined him, and surely the Government is in no position to argue that one who has successfully completed its carefully developed training program[27] is unqualified. The interest in avoiding burdensome collateral proceedings might support a rule prescribing minimum standards that must be met before any test is admissible,[28] but it surely does not support the blunderbuss at issue.[29] IV The Government's concerns would unquestionably support the exclusion of polygraph evidence in particular cases, and may well be sufficient to support a narrower rule designed to respond to specific concerns. In my judgment, however, *339 those concerns are plainly insufficient to support a categorical rule that prohibits the admission of polygraph evidence in all cases, no matter how reliable or probative the evidence may be. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Souter | 2,003 | 20 | majority | United States v. Banks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131146/united-states-v-banks/ | Officers executing a warrant to search for cocaine in respondent Banks's apartment knocked and announced their authority. The question is whether their 15-to-20-second wait before a forcible entry satisfied the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S. C. We hold that it did. I With information that Banks was selling cocaine at home, North Las Vegas Police Department officers and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents got a warrant to search his two-bedroom apartment. As soon as they arrived there, about 2 o'clock on a Wednesday afternoon, officers posted in front called out "police search warrant" and rapped hard enough on the door to be heard by officers at the back door. Brief for United States 3 There was no indication whether anyone was home, and after waiting for 15 to 20 seconds with no answer, the officers broke open the front door with a battering ram. Banks was in the shower and testified that he heard nothing until the crash of the door, which brought him out dripping to confront the police. The search produced weapons, crack cocaine, and other evidence of drug dealing. In response to drug and firearms charges, Banks moved to suppress evidence, arguing that the officers executing the search warrant waited an unreasonably short time before forcing entry, and so violated both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S. C. 3109.[1] The District Court denied the motion, and Banks pleaded guilty, reserving his right to challenge the search on appeal. *34 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered suppression of the evidence found. In assessing the reasonableness of the execution of the warrant, the panel majority set out a nonexhaustive list of "factors that an officer reasonably should consider" in deciding when to enter premises identified in a warrant, after knocking and announcing their presence but receiving no express acknowledgment: "(a) size of the residence; (b) location of the residence; (c) location of the officers in relation to the main living or sleeping areas of the residence; (d) time of day; (e) nature of the suspected offense; (f) evidence demonstrating the suspect's guilt; (g) suspect's prior convictions and, if any, the type of offense for which he was convicted; and (h) any other observations triggering the senses of the officers that reasonably would lead one to believe that immediate entry was necessary." The majority also defined four categories of intrusion after knock and announcement, saying that the classification "aids in the resolution of the essential question whether the entry made herein was reasonable under the circumstances": "(1) entries in which exigent circumstances exist and non-forcible entry |
Justice Souter | 2,003 | 20 | majority | United States v. Banks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131146/united-states-v-banks/ | "(1) entries in which exigent circumstances exist and non-forcible entry is possible, permitting entry to be made simultaneously with or shortly after announcement; (2) entries in which exigent circumstances exist and forced entry by destruction of property is required, necessitating more specific inferences of exigency; (3) entries in which no exigent circumstances exist and non-forcible entry is possible, requiring an explicit refusal of admittance or a lapse of a significant amount of time; and (4) entries in which no exigent circumstances exist and forced entry by destruction of property is required, mandating an explicit refusal of admittance or a *35 lapse of an even more substantial amount of time." The panel majority put the action of the officers here in the last category, on the understanding that they destroyed the door without hearing anything to suggest a refusal to admit even though sound traveled easily through the small apartment. The majority held the 15-to-20-second delay after knocking and announcing to be "[in]sufficient to satisfy the constitutional safeguards." Judge Fisher dissented, saying that the majority ought to come out the other way based on the very grounds it stressed: Banks's small apartment, the loud knock and announcement, the suspected offense of dealing in cocaine, and the time of the day. Judge Fisher thought the lapse of 15 to 20 seconds was enough to support a reasonable inference that admittance had been constructively denied. We granted certiorari to consider how to go about applying the standard of reasonableness to the length of time police with a warrant must wait before entering without permission after knocking and announcing their intent in a felony case. We now reverse. II There has never been a dispute that these officers were obliged to knock and announce their intentions when executing the search warrant, an obligation they concededly honored. Despite this agreement, we start with a word about standards for requiring or dispensing with a knock and announcement, since the same criteria bear on when the officers could legitimately enter after knocking. The Fourth Amendment says nothing specific about formalities in exercising a warrant's authorization, speaking to the manner of searching as well as to the legitimacy of searching at all simply in terms of the right to be "secure. against unreasonable searches and seizures." Although the notion of reasonable execution must therefore be fleshed *36 out, we have done that case by case, largely avoiding categories and protocols for searches. Instead, we have treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining |
Justice Souter | 2,003 | 20 | majority | United States v. Banks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131146/united-states-v-banks/ | no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case; it is too hard to invent categories without giving short shrift to details that turn out to be important in a given instance, and without inflating marginal ones. See, e. g., ; ; Go-Bart Importing We have, however, pointed out factual considerations of unusual, albeit not dispositive, significance. In we held that the common law knock-and-announce principle is one focus of the reasonableness enquiry; and we subsequently decided that although the standard generally requires the police to announce their intent to search before entering closed premises, the obligation gives way when officers "have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence," 4 When a warrant applicant gives reasonable grounds to expect futility or to suspect that one or another such exigency already exists or will arise instantly upon knocking, a magistrate judge is acting within the Constitution to authorize a "no-knock" entry.[2] And even when executing a warrant silent about *37 that, if circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door, they may go straight in. at 4, 6, n. 7. Since most people keep their doors locked, entering without knocking will normally do some damage, a circumstance too common to require a heightened justification when a reasonable suspicion of exigency already justifies an unwarned entry. We have accordingly held that police in exigent circumstances may damage premises so far as necessary for a no-knock entrance without demonstrating the suspected risk in any more detail than the law demands for an unannounced intrusion simply by lifting the latch. United Either way, it is enough that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances.[3] III Like Ramirez, this case turns on the significance of exigency revealed by circumstances known to the officers, for the only substantive difference between the two situations goes to the time at which the officers reasonably anticipated some danger calling for action without delay.[4] Whereas the *38 Ramirez Magistrate Judge found in advance that the customary warning would raise an immediate risk that a wanted felon would elude capture or pose a threat to the officers, see here the Government claims that a risk of losing evidence arose shortly after knocking and announcing. Although the police concededly arrived at Banks's door without reasonable suspicion of facts justifying a no-knock entry, they argue that announcing their |
Justice Souter | 2,003 | 20 | majority | United States v. Banks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131146/united-states-v-banks/ | facts justifying a no-knock entry, they argue that announcing their presence started the clock running toward the moment of apprehension that Banks would flush away the easily disposable cocaine, prompted by knowing the police would soon be coming in. While it was held reasonable for the police in Ramirez to enter forcibly upon arrival, the Government argues it was equally reasonable for the officers to go in with force here as soon as the danger of disposal had ripened. Banks does not, of course, deny that exigency may develop in the period beginning when officers with a warrant knock to be admitted, and the issue comes down to whether it was reasonable to suspect imminent loss of evidence after the 15 to 20 seconds the officers waited prior to forcing their way. Though we agree with Judge Fisher's dissenting opinion that this call is a close one, we think that after 15 or 20 seconds without a response, police could fairly suspect that cocaine would be gone if they were reticent any longer. Courts of Appeals have, indeed, routinely held similar wait times to be reasonable in drug cases with similar facts including easily disposable evidence (and some courts have found even shorter ones to be reasonable enough).[5] * A look at Banks's counterarguments shows why these courts reached sensible results, for each of his reasons for saying that 15 to 20 seconds was too brief rests on a mistake about the relevant enquiry: the fact that he was actually in the shower and did not hear the officers is not to the point, and the same is true of the claim that it might have taken him longer than 20 seconds if he had heard the knock and headed straight for the door. As for the shower, it is enough to say that the facts known to the police are what count in judging reasonable waiting time, cf., e. g., 6 and there is no indication that the police knew that Banks was in the shower and thus unaware of an impending search that he would otherwise have tried to frustrate. And the argument that 15 to 20 seconds was too short for Banks to have come to the door ignores the very risk that justified prompt entry. True, if the officers were to justify their timing here by claiming that Banks's failure to admit them fairly suggested a refusal to let them in, Banks could at least argue that no such suspicion can arise until an occupant *40 has had time to get to the door,[6] a time |
Justice Souter | 2,003 | 20 | majority | United States v. Banks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131146/united-states-v-banks/ | has had time to get to the door,[6] a time that will vary with the size of the establishment, perhaps five seconds to open a motel room door, or several minutes to move through a townhouse. In this case, however, the police claim exigent need to enter, and the crucial fact in examining their actions is not time to reach the door but the particular exigency claimed. On the record here, what matters is the opportunity to get rid of cocaine, which a prudent dealer will keep near a commode or kitchen sink. The significant circumstances include the arrival of the police during the day, when anyone inside would probably have been up and around, and the sufficiency of 15 to 20 seconds for getting to the bathroom or the kitchen to start flushing cocaine down the drain. That is, when circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the point of putting his drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time to the entrance, that governs when the police may reasonably enter; since the bathroom and kitchen are usually in the interior of a dwelling, not the front hall, there is no reason generally to peg the travel time to the location of the door, and no reliable basis for giving the proprietor of a mansion a longer wait than the resident of a bungalow, or an apartment like Banks's. And 15 to 20 seconds does not seem an unrealistic guess about the time someone would need to get in a position to rid his quarters of cocaine. Once the exigency had matured, of course, the officers were not bound to learn anything more or wait any longer before going in, even though their entry entailed some harm to the building. Ramirez held that the exigent need of law enforcement trumps a resident's interest in avoiding all property damage, see 523 U.S., at and there is no reason to treat a post-knock exigency differently from the no-knock counterpart in Ramirez *41 IV Our emphasis on totality analysis necessarily rejects positions taken on each side of this case. Ramirez, for example, cannot be read with the breadth the Government espouses, as "reflect[ing] a general principle that the need to damage property in order to effectuate an entry to execute a search warrant should not be part of the analysis of whether the entry was " Brief for United States 18; Reply Brief for United States 4. At common law, the knock-and-announce rule was traditionally "justified in part by the belief that announcement generally would avoid `the destruction |
Justice Souter | 2,003 | 20 | majority | United States v. Banks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131146/united-states-v-banks/ | by the belief that announcement generally would avoid `the destruction or breaking of any house by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue.'" -936 One point in making an officer knock and announce, then, is to give a person inside the chance to save his door. That is why, in the case with no reason to suspect an immediate risk of frustration or futility in waiting at all, the reasonable wait time may well be longer when police make a forced entry, since they ought to be more certain the occupant has had time to answer the door. It is hard to be more definite than that, without turning the notion of a reasonable time under all the circumstances into a set of sub-rules as the Ninth Circuit has been inclined to do. Suffice it to say that the need to damage property in the course of getting in is a good reason to require more patience than it would be reasonable to expect if the door were open. Police seeking a stolen piano may be able to spend more time to make sure they really need the battering ram. On the other side, we disapprove of the Court of Appeals's four-part scheme for vetting knock-and-announce entries. To begin with, the demand for enhanced evidence of exigency before a door can reasonably be damaged by a warranted no-knock intrusion was already bad law before the Court of Appeals decided this case. In Ramirez (a case from the *42 Ninth Circuit), we rejected an attempt to subdivide felony cases by accepting "mild exigency" for entry without property damage, but requiring "more specific inferences of exigency" before damage would be -71 The Court of Appeals did not cite Ramirez. Nor did the appeals court cite United There, we recently disapproved a framework for making reasonable suspicion determinations that attempted to reduce what the Circuit described as "troubling uncertainty" in reasonableness analysis, by "describ[ing] and clearly delimit[ing]" an officer's consideration of certain factors. Here, as in Arvizu, the Court of Appeals's overlay of a categorical scheme on the general reasonableness analysis threatens to distort the "totality of the circumstances" principle, by replacing a stress on revealing facts with resort to pigeonholes. Attention to cocaine rocks and pianos tells a lot about the chances of their respective disposal and its bearing on reasonable time. Instructions couched in terms like "significant amount of time," and "an even more substantial amount of time," 282 F.3d, tell very little. V Last, there is Banks's claim that the entry violated 18 U.S. C. 3109. Ramirez held that the |
Justice Souter | 2,003 | 20 | majority | United States v. Banks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131146/united-states-v-banks/ | entry violated 18 U.S. C. 3109. Ramirez held that the result should be the same under the Fourth Amendment and 3109, permitting an officer to enter by force "if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance." We explained the statute's "`requirement of prior notice before forcing entry [as] codif[ying] a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law,'" ); see also 1 U.S. 585, and we held that 3109 implicates the exceptions to the common law knock-and-announce *43 requirement that inform the Fourth Amendment The upshot is that 3109 is subject to an exigent circumstances exception, ib which qualifies the requirement of refusal after notice, just as it qualifies the obligation to announce in the first place. Absent exigency, the police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the time necessary to infer one. But in a case like this, where the officers knocked and announced their presence, and forcibly entered after a reasonable suspicion of exigency had ripened, their entry satisfied 3109 as well as the Fourth Amendment, even without refusal of admittance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. So ordered. |
Justice Powell | 1,986 | 17 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111670/henderson-v-united-states/ | The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S. C. 3161 et seq. ( ed. and Supp. II), as amended in 1979 and in commands that a defendant be tried within 70 days of the latest of either the filing of an indictment or information, or the first appearance before a judge or magistrate. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes from this time "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." This case requires us to decide the narrow questions whether that exclusion is limited to reasonably necessary delays, and whether it applies to delays occasioned by the filing of posthearing briefs on motions. I A jury convicted petitioners of charges arising out of manufacture, possession, and distribution of controlled substances.[1]*323 The evidence at trial showed that in February and April 1980 petitioner Henderson, under the alias "Richard Martin," placed orders with a scientific supply company in Ohio for chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of illegal drugs. The orders attracted the attention of the Drug Enforcement Agency. Agents obtained a warrant from a United States Magistrate, authorizing installation of an electronic transmitter in one of the chemical containers. Henderson drove from California to Ohio, picked up the second order of chemicals on June 24, and headed west. Agents lost the tracking signal despite their following by both car and plane, only to receive it later in July from petitioner Freedman's house near Watsonville, California. A search pursuant to warrant on July 17 revealed an illicit drug factory. The last of the codefendants, Peter Bell, was arraigned on September 3, 1980.[2] The Speedy Trial Act requires that trial begin within 70 days of the latest indictment, information, or appearance in this case, September 3. 18 U.S. C. 3161(c)(1). A timely trial would have commenced on November 12, 1980, barring periods of excludable delay. Overlapping filings by petitioners and the Government, however, kept a suppression motion pending from its filing on November 3, 1980, through a hearing *324 on that motion on March 25, 1981.[3] The court deferred decision on the motion pending receipt of posthearing submissions from the parties, the last of which was filed on December 15, 1981. See App. 29-31. The District Court finally denied the motion to suppress on January 19, From January 25 to May 10, both parties filed additional motions before the District Court on January 25 the Government moved to set the case for trial, and on March 23 petitioners moved to reconsider the motion to suppress. On |
Justice Powell | 1,986 | 17 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111670/henderson-v-united-states/ | 23 petitioners moved to reconsider the motion to suppress. On February 3, the court held a hearing on the Government's motion and granted a continuance through April 21 to allow defense counsel to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the suppression motion.[4] After a hearing on May 10, the court denied petitioners' motion to reconsider the motion to suppress, and set a trial date of September 13, The court also entered an order excluding, for purposes of the Act, the time from May 10 to September 13 based on a provision of the Act that allows such exclusion by the Court to satisfy the "ends of justice." ; see 18 U.S. C. 3161(h)(8)(A).[5] *325 On July 23, Thornton filed a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The other two petitioners subsequently joined this motion. The District Judge held a hearing almost two months later, on September 8, and denied the motion from the bench on that date. He filed a memorandum and order outlining his reasons exactly 30 days later. At that time, the judge also entered an order excluding the time from October 8 to November 1, again based on the "interests of justice." 3 Record, Doc. Nos. 98-99. Trial commenced on November 1, Petitioners appealed their convictions, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court could exclude from their Speedy Trial Act computation only delays that were "reasonably necessary." The Court of Appeals held that the statute "excludes delays resulting from pretrial motions without qualification." The court noted that Congress had explicitly provided that the excludability of certain other delays depended on their reasonableness, but had not done so for delays from pretrial motions. Judge Ferguson dissented, relying on the Act's legislative history and the interpretations of other Circuits. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits.[6] We now affirm. *326 II The Speedy Trial Act requires that a criminal trial must commence within 70 days of the latest of a defendant's indictment, information, or appearance, barring periods of excludable delay. United ; see 18 U.S. C. 3161(c)(1). Section 3161(h) (1)(F) (subsection (F)) excludes from these 70 days certain delays occasioned by the filing of pretrial motions: "(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence: "(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to "(F) delay resulting from |
Justice Powell | 1,986 | 17 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111670/henderson-v-united-states/ | including but not limited to "(F) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion" A On its face, subsection (F) excludes "[a]ny period of delay" caused by "any pretrial motion," "from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing." The plain terms of the statute appear to exclude all time between the filing of and the hearing on a motion whether that hearing was prompt or not. Moreover, subsection (F) does not require *327 that a period of delay be "reasonable" to be excluded, although Congress clearly knew how to limit an exclusion: in 3161(h)(7), Congress provided for exclusion of a "reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted." Apart from this single instance, every other provision in 3161(h) provides for exclusion of "any period of delay."[7] The provision excludes, for example, all of the time consumed by an interlocutory appeal, 3161(h)(1)(E), by a competency examination, 3161(h)(1)(A), and by the defendant's unavailability, 3161(h)(3)(A). As the Court of Appeals concluded: "The difference between (7) and (1) through (6) is a strong indication that exclusion of the periods defined in (1)-(6) was intended to be automatic." 746 F.2d, at The legislative history of the 1979 Amendments to the Act supports this reading of subsection (F).[8] That history shows that Congress was aware of the breadth of the exclusion it was enacting in subsection (F). The Senate Judiciary Committee *328 acknowledged that "if basic standards for prompt consideration of pretrial motions are not developed," the liberalized 1979 Amendments to subsection (F) "could become a loophole which could undermine the whole Act." S. Rep. No. 96-212, p. 34 (1979). In its subsequent consideration of subsection (F), the House of Representatives did not qualify the exclusion in any way or limit such potential abuse by statute. Instead the House adopted the Senate's version "with the intention that potentially excessive and abusive use of this exclusion be precluded by district or circuit guidelines, rules, or procedures relating to motions practice." H. R. Rep. No. 96-390, p. 10 (1979). Congress clearly envisioned that any limitations should be imposed by circuit or district court rules rather than by the statute itself.[9] Such rules, developed pursuant to 3166(f), should provide the assurance of a speedy disposition of pretrial motions. Petitioners largely concede these arguments and advance two other contentions for limiting subsection (F)'s |
Justice Powell | 1,986 | 17 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111670/henderson-v-united-states/ | arguments and advance two other contentions for limiting subsection (F)'s exclusion to time that is "reasonably necessary" for the disposition of pretrial motions. First, they contend that the phrase "other prompt disposition" within subsection (F) implies that a district court may not unreasonably delay a criminal trial by deferring a hearing on a pretrial motion. Two of the Courts of Appeals that have limited the exclusion in subsection (F) to delays that are "reasonably necessary" have relied on this argument. United ; United But a reading of subsection (F) in connection with 3161 (h)(1)(J) (subsection (J)), which allows exclusion of up to 30 *329 days while the district court has a motion "under advisement," i. e., 30 days from the time the court receives all the papers it reasonably expects, undermines this conclusion. The phrase "prompt disposition" was intended to prevent a district court from using subsection (F) to exclude time after a motion is taken under advisement when that time fails to qualify for exclusion under subsection (J). Subsection (F), written in the disjunctive, excludes time in two situations. The first arises when a pretrial motion requires a hearing: subsection (F) on its face excludes the entire period between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the hearing. The second situation concerns motions that require no hearing and that result in a "prompt disposition." There, the promptness requirement was "intended to provide a point at which time will cease to be excluded, where motions are decided on the papers filed without hearing." S. Rep. No. 96-212, The "point at which time will cease to be excluded" is identified by subsection (J), which permits an exclusion of 30 days from the time a motion is actually "under advisement" by the court. Without the promptness requirement in subsection (F), a court could exclude time beyond subsection (J)'s 30-day "under advisement" provision simply by designating the additional period as time "from the filing of the motion" through its "disposition" under subsection (F). As the Senate Committee on the Judiciary explained: "In using the words `prompt disposition', the committee intends to make it clear that, in excluding time between filing and disposition on the papers, the Committee does not intend to permit circumvention of the 30-days, `under advisement' provision contained in Subsection (h)(1)(J). Indeed, if motions are so simple or routine that they do not require a hearing, necessary advisement time should be considerably less than 30 days." We therefore conclude that for pretrial motions that require a hearing, the phrase "or other prompt disposition" in subsection *330 (F) does not |
Justice Powell | 1,986 | 17 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111670/henderson-v-united-states/ | "or other prompt disposition" in subsection *330 (F) does not imply that only "reasonably necessary" delays may be excluded between the time of filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing thereon. Petitioners' second argument rests on the sentence that immediately follows the extract quoted above: "Nor does the Committee intend that additional time be made eligible for exclusion by postponing the hearing date or other disposition of the motions beyond what is reasonably necessary." Four Courts of Appeals have relied on this legislative history to support their "reasonably necessary" qualification in subsection (F). United ; United ; United cert. denied sub nom. ; United Any qualification of subsection (F)'s exclusion based on this sentence, which appears in the paragraph discussing motions decided without a hearing, would be at odds with the plain language of the statute. It also would be contrary to other passages contained in both the House and Senate Reports that specifically concern the "hearings" provision of subsection (F). See We therefore decline to read into subsection (F) a "reasonably necessary" qualification based on this single sentence from the Senate Report. We instead hold that Congress intended subsection (F) to exclude from the Speedy Trial Act's 70-day limitation all time between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is "reasonably necessary." B The remaining issue is whether subsection (F) excludes time after a hearing on a motion but before the district court receives all the submissions by counsel it needs to decide that motion. Cf. 3161(h)(1) (excluding "[a]ny period of delay resulting *331 from other proceedings concerning the defendant"). Although the language of subsection (F) is not clear on this point, we are convinced that its structure, as well as reason, requires that such time be excluded. The provisions of the Act are designed to exclude all time that is consumed in placing the trial court in a position to dispose of a motion. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 96-212, at 9-10. District courts often find it impossible to resolve motions on which hearings have been held until the parties have submitted posthearing briefs or additional factual materials, especially where the motion presents complicated issues. It would not have been sensible for Congress to exclude automatically all the time prior to the hearing on a motion and 30 days after the motion is taken under advisement, but not the time during which the court remains unable to rule because it is awaiting the submission by counsel of additional |
Justice Powell | 1,986 | 17 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111670/henderson-v-united-states/ | because it is awaiting the submission by counsel of additional materials. Moreover, for motions decided solely on the papers, Congress has allowed exclusion of time during which the parties are filing their briefs. 18 U.S. C. 3161(h)(1)(F), (J); see It is consistent with this exclusion to exclude time when the court awaits the briefs and materials needed to resolve a motion on which a hearing has been held motions that the Senate Judiciary Committee recognized as typically more difficult than motions decided on the papers. See S. Rep. No. 96-212, We therefore hold that subsection (F) excludes time after a hearing has been held where a district court awaits additional filings from the parties that are needed for proper disposition of the motion. III We now calculate the number of nonexcludable days before petitioners' trial. The Act began to run on September 3, 1980, the date of arraignment of codefendant Bell. On October 22, 1980, the District Court entered with the consent of the parties a continuance through November 12. The District Court excluded that continuance from the Speedy Trial *332 Act's 70-day limit under 3161(h)(8)(A) in "the interest of justice." App. 26-27; see -624. That exclusion is not challenged in this Court. The motion to suppress was filed during this continuance, on November 3, 1980. App. 27. The hearing on this and subsequent motions was held on March 25, 1981. This time is automatically excludable under 3161(h)(1)(F). The court declined to reach a final decision on the suppression motion at that hearing because it needed further information. -29. The court did not receive all filings in connection with the motion until December 15, 1981, when the Government submitted its response to petitioners' memorandum and request for an evidentiary hearing. That time is also excludable, plus 30 days for the District Court to take the matter under advisement. We therefore exclude the period from March 25, 1981, through January 14, On January 25, the Government filed a motion to set the case for trial, noticed for February 3. We need not decide whether this time is excludable under subsection (F) as it does not affect the disposition of this case. On February 3, the court continued the case until April 21, to afford defense counsel the opportunity to file a motion to reconsider the suppression ruling. The District Court subsequently found that this time was excludable under 3161(h)(8)(A) as a continuance necessary for the "interests of justice."[10] On March 23, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration. Under subsection (F), an exclusion for this pending motion ran from |
Justice Breyer | 2,005 | 2 | majority | Small v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/ | The United States Criminal Code makes it "unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess any firearm." (g)(1) The question before us focuses upon the words "convicted in any court." Does this phrase apply only to convictions entered in any domestic court or to foreign convictions as well? We hold that the phrase encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions. I In 1994 petitioner, Gary Small, was convicted in a Japanese court of having tried to smuggle several pistols, a rifle, and ammunition into Japan. Small was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. After his release, Small returned to the United States, where he bought a gun from a Pennsylvania gun dealer. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under the "unlawful gun possession" statute here at issue. Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to challenge his conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction, being a foreign conviction, fell outside the scope of the illegal gun possession statute. The Federal District Court rejected Small's argument, as did the Court of Appeals for the Third ; n. 2. Because the Circuits disagree about the matter, we granted certiorari. Compare United ; United with United ; United *388 II A The question before us is whether the statutory reference "convicted in any court" includes a conviction entered in a foreign court. The word "any" considered alone cannot answer this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says, "I'll see any film," may or may not mean to include films shown in another city. In law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase "`any person'" may or may not mean to include "`persons'" outside "the jurisdiction of the state." See, e.g., United ("[G]eneral words," such as the word "`any,'" must "be limited" in their application "to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them"); ; United ; Middlesex County Sewerage ; (10) Thus, even though the word "any" demands a broad interpretation, see, e.g., United we must look beyond that word itself. In determining the scope of the statutory phrase we find help in the "commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind." 07 U.S. 197, 204, n. This notion has led the Court to adopt the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, *389 application. See Foley Bros., 28 ; see also at ; 249-21 That presumption would apply, for example, were we to consider whether this statute prohibits unlawful gun possession abroad as well as |
Justice Breyer | 2,005 | 2 | majority | Small v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/ | this statute prohibits unlawful gun possession abroad as well as domestically. And, although the presumption against extraterritorial application does not apply directly to this case, we believe a similar assumption is appropriate when we consider the scope of the phrase "convicted in any court" here. For one thing, the phrase describes one necessary portion of the "gun possession" activity that is prohibited as a matter of domestic law. For another, considered as a group, foreign convictions differ from domestic convictions in important ways. Past foreign convictions for crimes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment may include a conviction for conduct that domestic laws would permit, for example, for engaging in economic conduct that our society might encourage. See, e.g., Art. 13 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, in Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure 171 (H. Berman & J. Spindler transls. 2d ed. 1972) (criminalizing "Private Entrepreneurial Activity"); Art. 13, ; cf., e.g., Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de Cuba, ch. II, Art. 103, p. 68 (Dec. 30, 1987) (forbidding propaganda that incites against the social order, international solidarity, or the Communist state). They would include a conviction from a legal system that is inconsistent with an American understanding of fairness. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Submitted to the House Committee on International Relations and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., 702-70, *390 183, 2023 (describing failures of "due process" and citing examples in which "the testimony of one man equals that of two women"). And they would include a conviction for conduct that domestic law punishes far less severely. See, e.g., Singapore Vandalism Act, ch. 108, 2, 3, III Statutes of Republic of Singapore, pp. 27-28 (imprisonment for up to three years for an act of vandalism). Thus, the key statutory phrase "convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" somewhat less reliably identifies dangerous individuals for the purposes of U.S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at issue. In addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign convictions are at issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the statutory definition is not consistent with the statute's language; it is not easy for those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign court (say, of economic crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations. Cf. 1 United States Sentencing |
Justice Breyer | 2,005 | 2 | majority | Small v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/ | uncertain about their legal obligations. Cf. 1 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 4A1.2(h) ("[S]entences resulting from foreign convictions are not counted" as a "prior sentence" for criminal history purposes). These considerations, suggesting significant differences between foreign and domestic convictions, do not dictate our ultimate conclusion. Nor do they create a "clear statement" rule, imposing upon Congress a special burden of specificity. See post, at 399 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). They simply convince us that we should apply an ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes here an assumption that helps us determine Congress' intent where Congress likely did not consider the matter and where other indicia of intent are in approximate balance. Cf. We consequently assume a congressional intent that the phrase *391 "convicted in any court" applies domestically, not extraterritorially. But, at the same time, we stand ready to revise this assumption should statutory language, context, history, or purpose show the contrary. B We have found no convincing indication to the contrary here. The statute's language does not suggest any intent to reach beyond domestic convictions. Neither does it mention foreign convictions nor is its subject matter special, say, immigration or terrorism, where one could argue that foreign convictions would seem especially relevant. To the contrary, if read to include foreign convictions, the statute's language creates anomalies. For example, the statute creates an exception that allows gun possession despite a prior conviction for an antitrust or business regulatory crime. 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20)(A). In doing so, the exception speaks of "Federal or State" antitrust or regulatory offenses. If the phrase "convicted in any court" generally refers only to domestic convictions, this language causes no problem. But if "convicted in any court" includes foreign convictions, the words "Federal or State" prevent the exception from applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory conviction is at issue. An individual convicted of, say, a Canadian antitrust offense could not lawfully possess a gun, Combines Investigation Act, 2 R. S. C. 198, ch. C-34, 61(6), (9) (198), but a similar individual convicted of, say, a New York antitrust offense, could lawfully possess a gun. For example, the statute specifies that predicate crimes include "a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." (g)(9). Again, the language specifies that these predicate crimes include only crimes that are "misdemeanor[s] under Federal or State law." 921(a)(33)(A). If "convicted in any court" refers only to domestic convictions, this language creates no problem. If the phrase also refers to *392 foreign convictions, the language creates an apparently senseless distinction between (covered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed within the United States and |
Justice Breyer | 2,005 | 2 | majority | Small v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/ | (covered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed within the United States and (uncovered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed abroad. For example, the statute provides an enhanced penalty where unlawful gun possession rests upon three predicate convictions for a "serious drug offense." 924(e)(1) ( ed., Supp. II). Again the statute defines the relevant drug crimes through reference to specific federal crimes and with the words "offense under State law." 924(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii) ( ed.). If "convicted in any court" refers only to domestic convictions, this language creates no problem. But if the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the language creates an apparently senseless distinction between drug offenses committed within the United States (potentially producing enhanced punishments) and similar offenses committed abroad (not producing enhanced punishments). For example, the statute provides that offenses that are punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to two years, and characterized under state law as misdemeanors, are not predicate crimes. 921(20). This exception is presumably based on the determination that such state crimes are not sufficiently serious or dangerous so as to preclude an individual from possessing a firearm. If "convicted in any court" refers only to domestic convictions, this language creates no problem. But if the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the language creates another apparently senseless distinction between less serious crimes (misdemeanors punishable by more than one year's imprisonment) committed within the United States (not predicate crimes) and similar offenses committed abroad (predicate crimes). These illustrative examples taken together suggest that Congress did not consider whether the generic phrase "convicted in any court" applies to domestic as well as foreign convictions. *393 The statute's lengthy legislative history confirms the fact that Congress did not consider whether foreign convictions should or should not serve as a predicate to liability under the provision here at issue. Congress did consider a Senate bill containing language that would have restricted predicate offenses to domestic offenses. See S. Rep. No. 101, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 31 (18) (defining predicate crimes in terms of "Federal" crimes "punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year" and crimes "determined by the laws of the State to be a felony"). And the Conference Committee ultimately rejected this version in favor of language that speaks of those "convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year," 928(g)(1). See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 16, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 28-29 (18). But the history does not suggest that this language change reflected a congressional view on the matter before us. Rather, the enacted version is simpler and it avoids |
Justice Breyer | 2,005 | 2 | majority | Small v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/ | us. Rather, the enacted version is simpler and it avoids potential difficulties arising out of the fact that States may define the term "felony" differently. And as far as the legislative history is concerned, these latter virtues of the new language fully explain the change. Thus, those who use legislative history to help discern congressional intent will see the history here as silent, hence a neutral factor, that simply confirms the obvious, namely, that Congress did not consider the issue. Others will not be tempted to use or to discuss the history at all. But cf. post, at 406 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The statute's purpose does offer some support for a reading of the phrase that includes foreign convictions. As the Government points out, Congress sought to "`keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.'" Brief for United States 16 ); see also 44 U.S. ; 41 U.S. 814, And, as the dissent properly notes, post, at 402-403, one convicted of a serious crime abroad may well be as dangerous as one convicted of a similar crime in the United States. The force of this argument is weakened significantly, however, by the empirical fact that, according to the Government, since 18, there have probably been no more than "10 to a dozen" instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32. This empirical fact reinforces the likelihood that Congress, at best, paid no attention to the matter. C In sum, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered the added enforcement advantages flowing from inclusion of foreign crimes, weighing them against, say, the potential unfairness of preventing those with inapt foreign convictions from possessing guns. See The statute itself and its history offer only congressional silence. Given the reasons for disfavoring an inference of extraterritorial coverage from a statute's total silence and our initial assumption against such coverage, see we conclude that the phrase "convicted in any court" refers only to domestic courts, not to foreign courts. Congress, of course, remains free to change this conclusion through statutory amendment. For these reasons, the judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of this case. |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | United States v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117926/united-states-v-williams/ | This case presents the question whether respondent Lori Williams, who paid a tax under protest to remove a lien on her property, has standing to bring a refund action under 28 U.S. C. 1346(a)(1), even though the tax she paid was assessed against a third party. We hold that respondent has standing to sue for a refund. Respondent's suit falls within the broad language of 1346(a)(1), which gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear "[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected," and only a strained reading of other relevant provisions would bar her suit. She had no realistic alternative to payment of a tax she did not owe,[1] and we do not believe Congress intended to leave parties in respondent's position without a remedy. I Before this litigation commenced, respondent Lori Williams and her then-husband Jerrold Rabin jointly owned their home. As part owner of a restaurant, Rabin personally incurred certain tax liabilities, which he failed to satisfy. In June 1987 and March 1988, the Government assessed Rabin close to $15,000 for these liabilities, and thereby placed a lien in the assessed amount on all his property, including his interest in the house. See 26 U.S. C. 6321 ("If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."). The Government has not alleged that Williams is personally liable for these or any subsequent assessments. *530 Meanwhile, Rabin and Williams divided their marital property in contemplation of divorce. Williams did not have notice of the lien when Rabin deeded his interest in the house to her on October 25, 1988, for the Government did not file its tax lien until November 10, 1988. As consideration for the house, Williams assumed three liabilities for Rabin (none of them tax liabilities) totaling almost $650,000. App. 7-8 (Statement of Uncontroverted Facts presented by attorneys for United States). In the ensuing months, the Government made further assessments on Rabin in excess of $26,000, but did not file notice of them until June 22, 1989. Williams entered a contract on May 9, 1989, to sell the 9, house, and agreed to a closing date of July 3. One week before the closing, the Government gave actual notice to Williams and the purchaser of over $41,000 in tax liens which, it claimed, were valid against the property |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | United States v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117926/united-states-v-williams/ | tax liens which, it claimed, were valid against the property or proceeds of the sale. The purchaser threatened to sue Williams if the sale did not go through on schedule. Believing she had no realistic alternativenone having been suggested by the GovernmentWilliams, under protest, authorized disbursement of $41,937 from the sale proceeds directly to the Internal Revenue Service so that she could convey clear title. After the Government denied Williams' claim for an administrative refund, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, claiming she had taken the property free of the Government's lien under 26 U.S. C. 6323(a) (absent proper notice, tax lien not valid against purchaser). To enforce her rights, she invoked 28 U.S. C. 1346(a)(1), which waives the Government's sovereign immunity from suit by authorizing federal courts to adjudicate "[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected." In a trial on stipulated facts, the Government maintained that it was irrelevant whether the Government had a right to Williams' money; her plea could not be entertained, the Government *531 insisted, because she lacked standing to seek a refund under 1346(a)(1).[2] According to the Government, that provision authorizes actions only by the assessed party, i. e., Rabin. The District Court accepted this jurisdictional argument, relying on precedent set in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.[3] The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, guided by Fourth Circuit precedent.[4] To resolve this conflict among the Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari, and now affirm. II The question before us is whether the waiver of sovereign immunity in 1346(a)(1) authorizes a refund suit by a party who, though not assessed a tax, paid the tax under protest to remove a federal tax lien from her property. In resolving this question, we may not enlarge the waiver beyond the purview of the statutory language. Department of Our task is to discern the "unequivocally expressed" intent of Congress, construing ambiguities in favor of immunity. United To fathom the congressional instruction, we turn first to the language of 1346(a). This provision does not say that only the person assessed may sue. Instead, the statute uses broad language: *532 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of: "(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | United States v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117926/united-states-v-williams/ | collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internalrevenue laws." 28 U.S. C. 1346(a) (1988 ed. and Supp. V) (emphasis added). Williams' plea to recover a tax "erroneously collected" falls squarely within this language. The broad language of 1346(a)(1) mirrors the broad common-law remedy the statute displaced: actions of assumpsit for money had and received, once brought against the tax collector personally rather than against the United States. See Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Controversies, Assumpsit afforded a remedy to those who, like Williams, had paid money they did not owetypically as a result of fraud, duress, or mistake. See H. Ballantine, Shipman on CommonLaw Pleading 163-164 (3d ed. 1923). Assumpsit refund actions were unavailable to volunteers, a limit that would not have barred Williams because she paid under protest. See III Acknowledging the evident breadth of 1346(a)(1), the Government relies on the interaction of three other provisions to narrow the waiver of sovereign immunity. The Government argues: Under 26 U.S. C. 7422, a party may *5 not bring a refund action without first exhausting administrative remedies; under 26 U.S. C. 6511, only a "taxpayer" may exhaust; under 26 U.S. C. 7701(a)(14), Williams is not a taxpayer. It is undisputed that 7422 requires administrative exhaustion.[5] If Williams iseligible to exhaust, she did so by filing an administrative claim. But to show that Williams is not eligible to exhaust, the Government relies first on 26 U.S. C. 6511(a), which provides in part: "(a) Period of limitation on filing claim "Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid." (Emphasis added.) From the statute's use of the term "taxpayer," rather than "person who paid the tax," the Government concludes that only a "taxpayer" may file for administrative relief under 7422, and thereafter pursue a refund action under 28 U.S. C. 1346(a)(1).[6] Then, to show that Williams is not *534 a "taxpayer," the Government relies on 26 U.S. C. 7701 (a)(14), which defines "taxpayer" as "any person subject to any internal revenue tax." According to the Government, a party who pays a |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | United States v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117926/united-states-v-williams/ | tax." According to the Government, a party who pays a tax is not "subject to" it unless she is the one assessed. The Government's argument fails at both statutory junctures. First, the word "taxpayer" in 6511(a)the provision governing administrative claimscannot bear the weight the Government puts on it. This provision's plain terms provide only a deadline for filing for administrative relief,[7] not a limit on who may file. To read the term "taxpayer" as implicitly limiting administrative relief to the party assessed is inconsistent with other provisions of the refund scheme, which expressly contemplate refunds to parties other than the one assessed. Thus, in authorizing the Secretary to award a credit or refund "[i]n the case of any overpayment," 26 U.S. C. 6402(a) describes the recipient not as the "taxpayer," but as "the person who made the overpayment." Similarly, in providing for credits and refunds for sales taxes and taxes on tobacco and alcohol, 26 U.S. C. 6416(a) and 26 U.S. C. 6419(a) describe the recipient as "the person who paid the tax." *535 Further, even if, as the Government contends, only "taxpayers" could seek administrative relief under 6511, the Government's claim that Williams is not at this point a "taxpayer" is unpersuasive. Section 7701(a)(14), defining "taxpayer," informs us that "[w]hen used in [the Internal Revenue Code], where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, [t]he term `taxpayer' means any person subject to any internal revenue tax."[8] That definition does not exclude Williams. The Government reads the definition as if it said "any person who is assessed any internal revenue tax," but these are not Congress' words. The general phrase "subject to" is broader than the specific phrase "assessed" and, in the tax collection context before us, we think it is broad enough to include Williams. In placing a lien on her home and then accepting her tax payment under protest, the Government surely subjected Williams to a tax, even though she was not the assessed party. In support of its reading of "taxpayer," the Government cites our observation in Colorado Nat. Bank of that "[t]he taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for the tax itself." The Government takes this language out of context. We were not interpreting the term "taxpayer" in the Internal Revenue Code, but deciding whether a state tax scheme was consistent with federal law. In particular, we were determining whether Colorado had imposed its service tax on a bank's customers (which was consistent with federal law) or on the bank itself (which was not). Though the bank collected and paid the tax, |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | United States v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117926/united-states-v-williams/ | was not). Though the bank collected and paid the tax, its incidence fell on the customers. Favoring substance over form, we said: "The person liable for the tax [the bank], primarily, cannot always be said to be the real taxpayer. *536 The taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for the tax itself." As a result, we determined that the tax had been imposed on the customers rather than the bank. If Colorado Nat. Bank is relevant at all, it shows our preference for commonsense inquiries over formalisma preference that works against the Government's technical argument in this case. IV As we have just developed, 28 U.S. C. 1346(a)(1) clearly allows one from whom taxes are erroneously or illegally collected to sue for a refund of those taxes. And 26 U.S. C. 6402(a), with similar clarity, authorizes the Secretary to pay out a refund to "the person who made the overpayment." The Government's strained reading of 1346(a)(1), we note, would leave people in Williams' position without a remedy. See at 9, n. 1. This consequence reinforces our conclusion that Congress did not intend refund actions under 1346(a)(1) to be unavailable to persons situated as Lori Williams is. Though the Government points to three other remedies, none was realistically open to Williams. Nor would any of the vaunted remedies be available to others in her situation. See, e. g., ; ; If the Government has not levied on propertyas it has not levied on Williams' homethe owner cannot challenge such a levy under 26 U.S. C. 7426. Nor would an action under 28 U.S. C. 2410(a)(1) to quiet title afford meaningful relief to someone in Williams' position. The first lien on her property, for nearly $15,000, was filed just six months before the closing; and liens in larger sumover $26,000, out of $41,937were filed only 11 days before the closing. (Williams did not receive actual notice of any of the liens until barely a week before the closing.) She simply did not have *537 time to bring a quiet title action. She urgently sought to sell the property, but a sale would have been difficult before a final judgment in such litigation, which could have been protracted. In contrast, a refund suit would allow her to sell the property and simultaneously pay off the lien, leaving her free to litigate with the Government without tying up her real property, whose worth far exceeded the value of the Government's liens. Nor may Williams and persons similarly situated rely on 6325(b)(3) for such an arrangement. This provision permits the Government to discharge a lien |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | United States v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117926/united-states-v-williams/ | arrangement. This provision permits the Government to discharge a lien on property if the owner sets aside a fund that becomes subject to a new lien; the parties then can litigate the propriety of the new lien after the property is sold. However, 6325(b)(3) and its implementing regulation render this remedy doubtful indeed, for it is available only at the Government's discretion. See 6325(b)(3) ("[T]he Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge [of a federal tax lien] of any part of the property subject to the lien if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to an agreement with the Secretary, the proceeds of such sale are to be held, as a fund subject to the liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as such liens and claims had with respect to the discharged property.") (emphasis added); 26 CFR 301.6325-1(b)(3) ("A district director [of the Internal Revenue Service] may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to a [tax lien] if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to a written agreement with the district director, the proceeds of the sale are held, as a fund subject to the liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as the lien or claim had with respect to the discharged property.") (emphasis added). So far as the record shows, the Government did not afford Williams an opportunity to substitute a fund pursuant to *538 6325(b)(3).[9] This omission is not surprising, for on the Government's theory of who may sue under 1346(a)(1), the Government had scant incentive to agree to such an arrangement with people caught in Williams' bind. Under 6325(b)(3), the Government does not receive cash, but another lien (albeit one on a fund). In contrast, if the Government resists a 6325(b)(3) agreement, it is likely to get cash immediately: property owners eager to remove a tax lien will have to pay, as did Williams. If they may not sue under 1346(a)(1), their payment is nonrefundable. An agreement pursuant to 6325(b)(3) thus dependent on the district director's grace cannot sensibly be described as available to Williams. We do not agree with the Government that, if 1346(a)(1) authorizes some third-party suits, the levy, quiet title, and separate-fund remedies become superfluous. Section 1346(a)(1) is a postdeprivation remedy, available only if the taxpayer has paid the Government in full. The other remedies offer predeprivation relief. The levy provision in 26 U.S. C. 7426(a)(1) is available "without |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | United States v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117926/united-states-v-williams/ | levy provision in 26 U.S. C. 7426(a)(1) is available "without regard to whether such property has been surrendered to or sold by the Secretary." Likewise, 28 U.S. C. 2410 allows a property owner to have a lien discharged without ever paying the tax. Under 26 U.S. C. 6325(b)(3), the lien on the property is removed in exchange for a new lien, rather than a cash payment. V Finally, the Government urges that allowing Williams to sue will violate the principle that parties may not challenge *539 the tax liabilities of others. According to the Government, undermining this principle will lead to widespread abuse: In particular, parties will volunteer to pay the tax liabilities of others, only to seek a refund once the Government has ceased collecting from the real taxpayer. Although parties generally may not challenge the tax liabilities of others, this rule is not unyielding. A taxpayer's fiduciary may litigate the taxpayer's liability, even though the fiduciary is not herself liable. See 26 CFR 301.6903-1(a) ; ; 15 J. Law of Federal Income Taxation 58.08 (refund claims for decedents filed by executor, administrator, or other fiduciary of estate). Similarly, certain transferees may litigate the tax liabilities of the transferor; if the transfer qualifies as a fraudulent conveyance under state law, the Code treats the transferee as the taxpayer, see 26 U.S. C. 6901(a)(1)(A); 5 J. Rabkin & M. Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation 73.10, pp. 73-82 to 73-87 so the transferee may contest the transferor's liability either in tax court, see 14 53.50, or in a refund suit under 1346(a)(1). See 53.55. Furthermore, the Court has allowed a refund action by parties who were not assessed, albeit under a different statute. See The burden on the principle that a party may not challenge the tax liability of another is mitigated, moreover, because Williams' main challenge is to the existence of a lien against her property, rather than to the underlying assessment on *540 her husband. That is, her primary claim is not that her husband never owed the tax[10]a matter that, had she not paid these taxes herself under the duress of a lien, would not normally be her concern. Rather, she asserts that the Government has attached a lien on the wrong property, because the house belongs to her rather than to hima scenario which leaves her "subject to" the tax in a meaningful and immediate way. We do not find disarming the Government's forecast that allowing Williams to sue will lead to rampant abuse. The Government's posited scenario seems implausible; it is not clear what |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117895/lebron-v-national-railroad-passenger-corporation/ | The Court holds that Amtrak is a Government entity and therefore all of its actions are subject to constitutional challenge. Lebron, however, expressly disavowed this argument below, and consideration of this broad and unexpected question is precluded because it was not presented in the petition for certiorari. The question on which we granted certiorari is narrower: Whether the alleged suppression of Lebron's speech by Amtrak, as a concededly private entity, should be imputed to the Government. Because Amtrak's decision to reject Lebron's billboard proposal was a matter of private business judgment and not of Government coercion, I would affirm the judgment below. I This Court's Rule 14.1(a) provides: "Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court." While "[t]he statement of any question *401 presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question," ib questions that are merely "related" or "complementary" to the question presented are not "fairly included therein." In we held that a regulatory taking argument, while subsidiary to the umbrella question whether a taking had occurred, was only complementary to the physical taking inquiry set forth in the petition and thus was barred under Rule 14.1(a). See Here, state action is the umbrella claim. Subsidiary to that claim, but complementary to each other, are two distinct questions: whether Amtrak is a Government entity, and whether Amtrak's conduct as a private actor is nevertheless attributable to the Government. We granted certiorari on the following question, set forth in the petition: "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Amtrak's asserted policy barring the display of political advertising messages in Pennsylvania Station, New York, was not state action, where: "(a) the United States created Amtrak, endowed it with governmental powers, owns all its voting stock, and appoints all the members of its Board; "(b) the United States-appointed Board approved the advertising policy challenged here; "(c) the United States keeps Amtrak afloat every year by subsidizing its losses; and "(d) Pennsylvania Station was purchased for Amtrak by the United States and is shared with several other governmental entities." Pet. for Cert. i. The question asks whether the challenged policy "was not state action" and therefore may, at first blush, appear to present the umbrella inquiry. suggests otherwise. The petition there recited two decisions by the Courts of Appeals and asked: "Was it error for the state appellate court to disregard *402 the rulings and hold that there was no taking under the fifth and fourteenth amendments?" Instead of focusing on whether "there was no taking," we read the question as |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117895/lebron-v-national-railroad-passenger-corporation/ | whether "there was no taking," we read the question as a whole. Since the decisions by the Courts of Appeals and the lower court opinion involved only physical takings, we concluded: "Fairly construed, then, petitioners' question presented is the equivalent of the question, `Did the court below err in finding no physical taking?' " Just so here. The question asks whether the lower court erred and thus directs our attention to the decisions below. The District Court, in its thorough order, explicitly noted Lebron's theory of the case: "Plaintiff does not contend that Amtrak is a governmental agency. What plaintiff contends is that the federal government is sufficiently entwined in Amtrak's operations and authority that the particular actions at issue must be deemed governmental action." Before the Court of Appeals, in order to distinguish a long line of cases which held that Amtrak is not a Government agency, Lebron stated: "Since Lebron does not contend that Amtrak is a governmental entity per se, but rather is so interrelated to state entities that it should be treated as a state actor here, these cases are inapposite." Brief for Michael A. Lebron in No. 93-7127 (CA2), p. 30, n. 39. The Court of Appeals, like the District Court, substantively discussed only the second question that Lebron argues herewhether Amtrak's conduct in this case implicates "the presence of government action in the activities of private entities." To introduce its analysis, the Court of Appeals did state that "[t]he Rail Passenger Service Act of 70 created Amtrak as a private, for-profit corporation under the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act," ib relying on Congress' characterization of the corporation in 45 U.S. C. 541. In so asserting, the Court of Appeals did not "`pas[s] upon' " the question such that it is now a proper basis for reversal, ante, at 379, *403 but rather merely identified the question that the court had to address and focused the inquiry on the precise argument presented by Lebron. This observation by the Court of Appeals is much likeindeed, much less extensive thanour discussion of Amtrak's status as a private corporation in National Railroad Passenger I agree with the Court that Atchison does not bind us, ante, at 393-394, but, by the same token, I do not see how the court below could be said to have addressed the issue. A passing observation could not constitute binding precedent; so, too, it could not serve as the basis for reversal. The question set forth in the petition focused on the specific action by Amtrak, not on the general nature of |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117895/lebron-v-national-railroad-passenger-corporation/ | specific action by Amtrak, not on the general nature of the corporation as a private or public entity. Lebron asked whether "Amtrak's asserted policy barring the display of political advertising messages in Pennsylvania Station, New York, was not state action." App. to Pet. for Cert. i. The list that follows this question, while partially concerning Amtrak's nature as an entity, went to support the thrust of the query, which is whether these enumerated attributes render Amtrak's advertising policy state action. Lebron's emphasis on the specific action challenged is the crucial difference between his alternative arguments for state action. The first inquirywhether Amtrak is a Government entityfocuses on whether Amtrak is so controlled by the Government that it should be treated as a Government agency, and all of its decisions considered state action. The second inquiry takes Lebron at his word that Amtrak is not a Government entity and instead focuses on the State's influence on particular actions by Amtrak as a private actor. Fairly construed, the question presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the advertising policy of Amtrak, as a private entity, is not attributable to the Federal Government despite the corporation's links thereto. This question is closely related and complementary to, but *404 certainly not inclusive of, the question answered by the Court today, which is whether those links render Amtrak the functional equivalent of a Government agency. In my view, the latter question is barred by Rule 14.1(a). Relying on United States Nat. Bank of the Court argues that it properly addresses whether Amtrak is a Government entity because that inquiry is "prior to the clearly presented question," namely, whether Amtrak's decision is attributable to the Government. Ante, at 382. Independent Ins. Agents, however, held only that the Court of Appeals had authority to consider a waived claim sua sponte and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.[*] That is quite different from the purpose for which the Court now marshals the case, which is to justify its consideration of a waived question in the first instance. As explained below, I do not question the Court's authority, only its prudence. In any event, the dispute in Independent Ins. Agents centered on the interpretation of a statute that may not have existed, and, as the Court recognizes, ante, at 383, n. 3, the decision simply applied the traditional principle that "[t]here can be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining the existence of a law." South Here, one need not assume the existence of any predicate legal rule to accept Lebron's word that |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117895/lebron-v-national-railroad-passenger-corporation/ | of any predicate legal rule to accept Lebron's word that Amtrak is a private entity. The mere fact that one question must be answered before another does not insulate the former from Rule 14.1(a) and other waiver rules. In *405 we held that Fourth Amendment claims are not ordinarily cognizable in federal habeas proceedings and distinguished several cases by noting that "the issue of the substantive scope of the writ was not presented in the petition[s] for certiorari." We thus recognized that those decisions properly avoided the question of cognizability, which question, of course, is logically anterior to the merits of the Fourth Amendment claims presented. In we held that the Government had conceded that the petitioner had a Fourth Amendment interest in the searched home, an inquiry that precedes the question that was preserved, whether the search was reasonable. In because the question was neither litigated below nor included in the petition, we assumed the existence of a cause of action under 20(a) of the Investment Company Act of 40 before addressing the requirements of such an action. See also Finally, in the Court held that a state legislator did not violate the antiextortion Hobbs Act, 18 U.S. C. 51, by accepting campaign contributions without an explicit exchange of improper promises. The Court reached this question only after declining to consider whether the Act applies to local officials at all, because that question was neither argued below nor included in the petition for certiorari. McCormick, n. 6; see also (accepting the assumption, because the argument was waived, that the Hobbs Act is a "federal `payment for official action' statute" even though "I think it well to bear in mind that the statute may not exist"). The Court does not take issue with these cases but argues further that, because the question whether Amtrak is a Government entity is "dependent upon many of the same factual inquiries [as the clearly presented question], refusing to regard *406 it as embraced within the petition may force us to assume what the facts will show to be ridiculous, a risk which ought to be avoided." Ante, at 382. A certain circularity inheres in this logic, because the Court must first answer the omitted question in order to determine whether its answer turns on "the same factual inquiries" as the clearly presented question. As for the facts, the record is shaped by the parties' arguments below. Perhaps serendipity has given the Court a factual record adequate to decide a question other than that advanced below, but there is no guarantee of such convergence. It |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117895/lebron-v-national-railroad-passenger-corporation/ | below, but there is no guarantee of such convergence. It is rather unfair to hold a party to a record that it may have developed differently in response to a different theory of the case. It is this risk of unfairness, rather than the fear of seeming "ridiculous," that we should avoid. Rule 14.1(a), of course, imposes only a prudential limitation, but one that we disregard "only in the most exceptional cases." ; see also United This is not one of them. As noted before, not only did Lebron disavow the argument that Amtrak is a Government entity below, he did so in order to distinguish troublesome cases. Lebron's postpetition attempt to resuscitate the claim that he himself put to rest is precisely the kind of bait-and-switch strategy that waiver rules, prudential or otherwise, are supposed to protect against. In Steagald, at for example, we stated unequivocally that "the Government, through its assertions, concessions, and acquiescence, has lost its right to challenge petitioner's assertion that he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched home." I see no difference here. The Rule's prudential limitation on our power of review serves two important purposes, both of which the Court disserves by deciding that Amtrak is a Government entity. First, the Rule provides notice and enables the respondent to sharpen its arguments in opposition to certiorari. "By *407 forcing the petitioner to choose his questions at the outset, Rule 14.1(a) relieves the respondent of the expense of unnecessary litigation on the merits and the burden of opposing certiorari on unpresented questions." Lebron argues that Amtrak has waived its Rule 14.1(a) argument by failing to object in the brief in opposition to certiorari. But that is exactly the point: The question set forth did not fairly include an argument that Amtrak is a Government agency, and, indeed, the petition was devoted to whether Amtrak's private decision should be imputed to the State. Even at pages 16-18, the petition did not "fairly embrac[e] the argument that Lebron now advances," ante, at 380, but rather argued that the composition of Amtrak's board "renders an otherwise private entity a state actor," Pet. for Cert. 16 (emphasis added)thus specifically repeating the concession he now wishes to withdraw. Amtrak could not respond to a point not argued and did not waive an argument that was not at issue. Not until the merits brief did Amtrak have notice that Lebron would contradict his persistent assertion that the corporation was a private entity. Second, the Rule assists the management of our cases. "Rule 14.1(a) forces the parties to focus |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117895/lebron-v-national-railroad-passenger-corporation/ | of our cases. "Rule 14.1(a) forces the parties to focus on the questions the Court has viewed as particularly important, thus enabling us to make efficient use of our resources." We normally grant only petitions that present an important question of law on which the lower courts are in conflict. Here, the lower courts have generally held that Amtrak is not a Government entity, see, e. g., ; (CA5), cert. denied, and none of our cases suggest otherwise. Even where the lower courts are in clear conflict, we often defer consideration of novel questions of law to permit further development. Despite the prevalence of publicly owned corporations, whether they are Government agencies is a question *408 seldom answered, and then only for limited purposes. See Cherry Cotton Mills, ; National Railroad Passenger Answering this question today merely opens the back door to premature adjudication of similarly broad and novel theories in the future. Weeding out such endeavors, Rule 14.1(a), like other waiver rules, rests firmly upon a limited view of our judicial power. See, e. g., ("The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them"). "The doctrine of judicial restraint teaches us that patience in the judicial resolution of conflicts may sometimes produce the most desirable result." Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 Judicature 183 Whether the result of today's decision is desirable I do not decide. But I think it clear that the Court has exhibited little patience in reaching that result. II Accepting Lebron's concession that Amtrak is a private entity, I must "traverse th[e] difficult terrain," ante, at 378, that the Court sees fit to avoid, and answer the question that is properly presented to us: whether Amtrak's decision to ban Lebron's speech, although made by a concededly private entity, is nevertheless attributable to the Government and therefore considered state action for constitutional purposes. Reflecting the discontinuity that marks the law in this area, we have variously characterized the inquiry as whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action," Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison ; whether the State, by encouraging the challenged conduct, could be thought "responsible for those *409 actions," ; and whether "the alleged infringement of federal rights [is] `fairly attributable to the State,' " quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Whatever the semantic formulation, I remain of the view that the conduct of a private actor is not subject to constitutional challenge |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117895/lebron-v-national-railroad-passenger-corporation/ | of a private actor is not subject to constitutional challenge if such conduct is "fundamentally a matter of private choice and not state action." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Lebron relies heavily on There, the Court perceived a symbiotic relationship between a racially segregated restaurant and a state agency from which the restaurant leased public space. Noting that the State stood to profit from the discrimination, the Court held that the government had "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with" the private restaurant that it was in effect "a joint participant in the challenged activity." Focusing on this language, Lebron argues that various features of Amtrak's structure and managementits statutory genesis, the heavy reliance on federal subsidies, and a board appointed by the Presidentplaces it in a symbiotic relationship with the Government such that the decision to ban Lebron's speech should be imputed to the State. Our decision in Burton, however, was quite narrow. We recognized "the limits of our inquiry" and emphasized that our decision depended on the "peculiar facts [and] circumstances present." We have since noted that Burton limited its "actual holding to lessees of public property," Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison and our recent decisions in this area have led commentators to doubt its continuing vitality, see, e. g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 18-3, p. 1701, n. 13 (2d ed. 88) ("The only surviving explanation of the result in Burton may be that found in Justice Stewart's concurrence"). *410 In Jackson, we held that a private utility's termination of service to a customer is not subject to due process challenge, even though the termination was made pursuant to a state law. In doing so, we made clear that the question turns on whether the challenged conduct results from private choice: "Respondent's exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing so `state action' for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." The rule applies even where the private entity makes its decision in an environment heavily regulated by the government. involved a private school for troubled students who were transferred there by authority of a state law, and for whose education the State paid the school. Public funds comprised 90% to 99% of the school budget. The school fired petitioners, and a state grievance board reviewed that personnel action. Despite the school's pervasive ties to the State, we held that the discharge decisions were not subject to constitutional challenge because those actions "were not compelled or even influenced by any |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117895/lebron-v-national-railroad-passenger-corporation/ | those actions "were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation." We noted that "in contrast to the extensive regulation of the school generally, the various regulators showed relatively little interest in the school's personnel matters." Likewise, in we held that the decisions of a regulated hospital to discharge its patients were not subject to constitutional challenge. Although various Medicaid regulations and benefit adjustment procedures may have encouraged the hospital's decisions to discharge its patients early, we held that the State was not "responsible for those actions" because such actions "ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State." at 1008. See also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Olympic Comm., These cases differ markedly from the "interdependence" or "joint participation" analysis of Burton and stand for the principle that, unless the government affirmatively influenced or coerced the private party to undertake the challenged action, such conduct is not state action for constitutional purposes. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete is not to the contrary. In that case, the Court held that a private attorney's exercise of a peremptory challenge is attributable to the government and therefore subject to constitutional inquiry. Although the opinion cited Burton, see 624, it emphasized that a private party exercising a peremptory challenge enjoys the "overt, significant assistance of the court," The decision therefore is an application of which focused on the use of the State's coercive power, through its courts, to effect the litigant's allegedly unconstitutional choice. Moreover, Edmonson stressed that a litigant exercising a peremptory challenge performs a "traditional function of the government," 500 U.S., a theory of state action established by that is independent from Burton and not relevant to this case. Relying thus on Shelley and Marsh, Edmonson did not necessarily extend the "interdependence" rationale of Burton beyond the limited facts of that case. Given the pervasive role of government in our society, a test of state action predicated upon public and private "interdependence" sweeps much too broadly and would subject to constitutional challenge the most pedestrian of everyday activities, a problem that the Court recognized in Burton itself, see 365 U.S., -726. A more refined inquiry is that established by Jackson, Blum, and San Francisco Arts & Athletics: The conduct of a private entity is not subject to constitutional scrutiny if the challenged action results from *412 the exercise of private choice and not from state influence or coercion. Applying this principle to the facts before us, I see no basis to impute to the Government Amtrak's decision to disapprove Lebron's |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117895/lebron-v-national-railroad-passenger-corporation/ | to impute to the Government Amtrak's decision to disapprove Lebron's advertisement. Although a number of factors indicate the Government's pervasive influence in Amtrak's management and operation, none suggest that the Government had any effect on Amtrak's decision to turn down Lebron's proposal. The advertising policy that allegedly violates the First Amendment originated with a predecessor to Amtrak, the wholly private Pennsylvania Railroad Company. A 67 lease by that company, for example, prohibited "any advertisement which in the judgement of Licensor is or might be deemed to be slanderous, libelous, unlawful, immoral, [or] offensive to good taste"App. 326, ¶ Amtrak simply continued this policy after it took over. The specific decision to disapprove Lebron's advertising was made by Amtrak's Vice President of Real Estate and Operations Development, who, as a corporate officer, was neither appointed by the President nor directed by the Presidentappointed board to disapprove Lebron's proposal. Lebron nevertheless contends that the board, through its approval of the advertising policy, controlled the adverse action against him. This contention rests on the faulty premise that Amtrak's directors are state actors simply because they were appointed by the President; it assumes that the board members sit as public officials and not as business directors, thus begging the question whether Amtrak is a Government agency or a private entity. In any event, even accepting Lebron's premise that the board's approval has constitutional significance, the factual record belies his contention. The particular lease that permitted Amtrak to disallow Lebron's billboard was neither reviewed nor approved directly by the board. In fact, minutes of meetings dating back to showed that the board approved only one contract between Amtrak and Transportation Displays, Incorporated, *413 the billboard leasing company that served as Amtrak's agent, and even then it is not clear whether the board approved the contract or merely delegated authority to execute the licensing agreement. App. 402. In short, nothing in this case suggests that the Government controlled, coerced, or even influenced Amtrak's decision, made pursuant to corporate policy and private business judgment, to disapprove the advertisement proposed by Lebron. Presented with this question, the Court of Appeals properly applied our precedents and did not impute Amtrak's decision to the Government. I would affirm on this basis and not reverse the Court of Appeals based on a theory that is foreign to this case. Respectfully, I dissent. |
Justice Marshall | 1,986 | 15 | second_dissenting | Green v. Mansour | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111540/green-v-mansour/ | I concur in JUSTICE BRENNAN'S and JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S dissents. I contribute to this proliferation of opinions only to add a few words as to why, even under the view of the Eleventh Amendment accepted by the majority in State the majority reaches an incorrect result in this case. I JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion cogently explains how the decision of the majority today repudiates The Court in that case did not approve notice relief as a "mere case-management device," ante, at 71, nor does the majority suggest how informing class members of state administrative procedures serves a case-management function in federal-court litigation. Rather, the Court, explicitly posing the question whether "the modified notice contemplated by the Seventh Circuit constitute[s] permissible prospective relief or a `retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury,' " concluded that "this relief falls on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment line rather than on the Edelman side." II In abandoning the result it reached six years ago, the majority misapplies its own Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The majority states that there are two kinds of remedies that can be sought against a state officer: prospective relief "designed to end a continuing violation of federal law," *80 and retrospective relief serving mere "compensatory or deterrence interests." Ante, at 68. Only in the former class of relief, it concludes, do the federal interests involved outweigh the Eleventh Amendment interests implicated by a suit against a state officer in his official capacity.[*] "Prospective" and "retrospective" labels, however, should be irrelevant to analysis of this case. The notice relief at issue here imposes no significant costs on the State, creates no direct liabilities against the State, and respects the institutions of state government. See This Court has never held that the Eleventh Amendment poses any bar to such relief. Indeed, notice of the availability of possible relief through existing state administrative remedies, where the state agency and state courts would be the sole arbiters of what relief would be granted, assists in the vindication of state law by informing class members that they may have causes of action under that law. In the Eleventh Amendment balance set up by the majority opinion, it is thus hard to see what weight, if any, exists on the State's side of the scale, and why that weight should overcome the interest in vindicating federal law. *81 I would hold that whether the Eleventh Amendment was intended simply to provide that a State cannot be sued in federal court where the basis of jurisdiction is that the plaintiff is |
Justice Marshall | 1,986 | 15 | second_dissenting | Green v. Mansour | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111540/green-v-mansour/ | where the basis of jurisdiction is that the plaintiff is a citizen of another State or an alien (as I believe), or was intended to constitutionalize a much broader principle of state sovereign immunity (as the majority believes), there is simply nothing offensive to that Amendment in an order that the State notify class members of the possibility that they may be entitled to relief through the state administrative process. Because that order neither imposes significant costs on the State nor creates any direct liabilities against it, the Court properly placed it "on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment line." JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. I joined JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dissent in State and I join his dissent in this case. I fully agree that the Court's Eleventh Amendment approach, as demonstrated by the difference between the result in this case and that in is sterile, produces inconsistent decisions, and is in serious need of reconsideration. Cf. But I also would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case for the additional reason expressed in my dissent (joined by JUSTICES BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS) in namely, the waiver by Michigan, "as a willing recipient of federal funds," of any Eleventh Amendment barrier that otherwise might exist. The State too easily avoids its responsibilities, and the Court by its decision today allows the State to go its way unimpeded and unburdened with any remedy for those who have been wronged during the period of Michigan's noncompliance with federal law. |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | These cases present the question whether conscientious objection to a particular war, rather than objection to war as such, relieves the objector from responsibilities of military training and service. Specifically, we are called upon to decide whether conscientious scruples relating to a particular conflict are within the purview of established provisions[1] relieving conscientious objectors to war from military service. Both petitioners also invoke constitutional principles barring government interference with the exercise of religion and requiring governmental neutrality in matters of religion. In No. 85, petitioner Gillette was convicted of wilful failure to report for induction into the armed forces. Gillette defended on the ground that he should have been ruled exempt from induction as a conscientious objector to war. In support of his unsuccessful request for classification as a conscientious objector, this petitioner had stated his willingness to participate in a war of national defense or a war sponsored by the United Nations as a peace-keeping measure, but declared his opposition to American military operations in Vietnam, which he characterized as "unjust." Petitioner concluded that he could not in conscience enter and serve in the armed forces during the period of the Vietnam conflict. Gillette's view of his duty to abstain from any involvement in a war seen as unjust is, in his words, "based on a humanist approach to religion," and his personal decision concerning military service was guided by fundamental principles of conscience and deeply held views about the purpose and obligation of human existence. *440 The District Court determined that there was a basis in fact to support administrative denial of exemption in Gillette's case. The denial of exemption was upheld, and Gillette's defense to the criminal charge rejected, not because of doubt about the sincerity or the religious character of petitioner's objection to military service, but because his objection ran to a particular war. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals concluded that Gillette's conscientious beliefs "were specifically directed against the war in Vietnam," while the relevant exemption provision of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S. C. App. 456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. V), "requires opposition `to participation in war in any form.' " In No. 325, petitioner Negre, after induction into the Army, completion of basic training, and receipt of orders for Vietnam duty, commenced proceedings looking to his discharge as a conscientious objector to war. Application for discharge was denied, and Negre sought judicial relief by habeas corpus. The District Court found a basis in fact for the Army's rejection of petitioner's application for discharge. Habeas relief was denied, and |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | of petitioner's application for discharge. Habeas relief was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal, because, in the language of the Court of Appeals, Negre "objects to the war in Vietnam, not to all wars," and therefore does "not qualify for separation [from the Army], as a conscientious objector."[2] Again, no question is raised as to the sincerity or the religious quality of this petitioner's views. In line with religious counselling and numerous religious texts, Negre, *441 a devout Catholic, believes that it is his duty as a faithful Catholic to discriminate between "just" and "unjust" wars, and to forswear participation in the latter. His assessment of the Vietnam conflict as an unjust war became clear in his mind after completion of infantry training, and Negre is now firmly of the view that any personal involvement in that war would contravene his conscience and "all that I had been taught in my religious training." We granted certiorari in these cases, in order to resolve vital issues concerning the exercise of congressional power to raise and support armies, as affected by the religious guarantees of the First Amendment. We affirm the judgments below in both cases. I Each petitioner claims a nonconstitutional right to be relieved of the duty of military service in virtue of his conscientious scruples.[3] Both claims turn on the proper construction of 6 (j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S. C. App. 456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. V), which provides: "Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."[4] *442 This language controls Gillette's claim to exemption, which was asserted administratively prior to the point of induction. Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 prescribes that post-induction claims to conscientious objector status shall be honored, if valid, by the various branches of the armed forces.[5] Section 6 (j) of the Act, as construed by the courts, is incorporated by the various service regulations issued pursuant to the Directive,[6] and thus the standards for measuring claims of in-service objectors, such as Negre, are the same as the statutory tests applicable in a pre-induction situation. *443 For purposes of determining the statutory status of conscientious objection to a particular war, the focal language of 6 (j) is the phrase, "conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." This language, on a straightforward reading, can bear but one meaning; |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | language, on a straightforward reading, can bear but one meaning; that conscientious scruples relating to war and military service must amount to conscientious opposition to participating personally in any war and all war. See ; See also United It matters little for present purposes whether the words, "in any form," are read to modify "war" or "participation." On the first reading, conscientious scruples must implicate "war in any form," and an objection involving a particular war rather than all war would plainly not be covered by 6 (j). On the other reading, an objector must oppose "participation in war." It would strain good sense to read this phrase otherwise than to mean "participation in all war." For the word "war" would still be used in an unqualified, generic sense, meaning war as such. Thus, however the statutory clause be parsed, it remains that conscientious objection must run to war in any form.[7] A different result cannot be supported by reliance on the materials of legislative history.[8] Petitioners and *444 amici point to no episode or pronouncement in the legislative history of 6 (j), or of predecessor provisions, that tends to overthrow the obvious interpretation of the words themselves.[9] *445 It is true that the legislative materials reveal a deep concern for the situation of conscientious objectors to war, who absent special status would be put to a hard choice between contravening imperatives of religion and conscience or suffering penalties. Moreover, there are clear indications that congressional reluctance to impose such a choice stems from a recognition of the value of conscientious action to the democratic community at large, and from respect for the general proposition that fundamental principles of conscience and religious duty may sometimes override the demands of the secular state. See United ; United See generally Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection (1950). But there are countervailing considerations, which are also the concern of Congress,[10] and the legislative materials simply do not support the view that Congress intended to recognize any conscientious claim whatever as a basis for relieving the claimant from the general responsibility or the various incidents of military service. The claim that is recognized by 6 (j) is a *446 claim of conscience running against war as such. This claim, not one involving opposition to a particular war only, was plainly the focus of congressional concern. Finding little comfort in the wording or the legislative history of 6 (j), petitioners rely heavily on dicta in the decisional law dealing with objectors whose conscientious scruples ran against war as such, but who indicated certain |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | scruples ran against war as such, but who indicated certain reservations of an abstract nature. It is instructive that none of the cases relied upon embraces an interpretation of 6 (j) at variance with the construction we adopt today.[11] presented the only previous occasion for this Court to focus on the "participation in war in any form" language of 6 (j). In Sicurella a Jehovah's Witness who opposed participation in secular wars was held to possess the requisite conscientious scruples concerning war, although he was not opposed to participation in a "theocratic war" commanded by Jehovah. The Court noted that the "theocratic war" reservation was highly abstractno such war had occurred since biblical times, and none was contemplated. Congress, on the other hand, had in mind "real shooting wars," and Sicurella's abstract reservations did not undercut his conscientious opposition to participating in such wars. Plainly, Sicurella cannot be read to support the claims of those, like petitioners, *447 who for a variety of reasons consider one particular "real shooting war" to be unjust, and therefore oppose participation in that war.[12] It should be emphasized that our cases explicating the "religious training and belief" clause of 6 (j), or cognate clauses of predecessor provisions, are not relevant to the present issue. The question here is not whether these petitioners' beliefs concerning war are "religious" in nature. Thus, petitioners' reliance on United and is misplaced. Nor do we decide that conscientious objection to a particular war necessarily falls within 6 (j)'s expressly excluded class[13] of "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." Rather, we hold that Congress intended to exempt persons who oppose participating in all war"participation in war in any form" and that persons who object solely to participation in a particular war are not within the purview of the exempting section, even though the latter objection may have such roots in a claimant's conscience and personality that it is "religious" in character. A further word may be said to clarify our statutory holding. Apart from abstract theological reservations, two other sorts of reservations concerning use of force have been thought by lower courts not to defeat a conscientious *448 objector claim. Willingness to use force in self-defense, in defense of home and family, or in defense against immediate acts of aggressive violence toward other persons in the community, has not been regarded as inconsistent with a claim of conscientious objection to war as such. See, e. g., United ; United But surely willingness to use force defensively in the personal situations mentioned is quite different |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | force defensively in the personal situations mentioned is quite different from willingness to fight in some wars but not in others. Cf. Somewhat more apposite to the instant situation are cases dealing with persons who oppose participating in all wars, but cannot say with complete certainty that their present convictions and existing state of mind are unalterable. See, e. g., United v. Owen, Unwillingness to deny the possibility of a change of mind, in some hypothetical future circumstances, may be no more than humble good sense, casting no doubt on the claimant's present sincerity of belief. At any rate there is an obvious difference between present sincere objection to all war, and present opposition to participation in a particular conflict only. II Both petitioners argue that 6 (j), construed to cover only objectors to all war, violates the religious clauses of the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Petitioners contend that Congress interferes with free exercise of religion by failing to relieve objectors to a particular war from military service, when the objection is religious or conscientious in nature. While the two religious clausespertaining to "free exercise" and *449 "establishment" of religionoverlap and interact in many ways, see Abington School ; Freund, Public Aid To Parochial Schools, it is best to focus first on petitioners' other contention, that 6 (j) is a law respecting the establishment of religion. For despite free exercise overtones, the gist of the constitutional complaint is that 6 (j) impermissibly discriminates among types of religious belief and affiliation.[14] On the assumption that these petitioners' beliefs concerning war have roots that are "religious" in nature, within the meaning of the Amendment as well as this Court's decisions construing 6 (j), petitioners ask how their claims to relief from military service can be permitted to fail, while other "religious" claims are upheld by the Act. It is a fact that 6 (j), properly construed, has this effect. Yet we cannot conclude in mechanical fashion, or at all, that the section works an establishment of religion. An attack founded on disparate treatment of "religious" claims invokes what is perhaps the central purpose of the Establishment Clausethe purpose of ensuring governmental neutrality in matters of religion. See ; Here *450 there is no claim that exempting conscientious objectors to war amounts to an overreaching of secular purposes and an undue involvement of government in affairs of religion. Cf. ; To the contrary, petitioners ask for greater "entanglement" by judicial expansion of the exemption |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | ask for greater "entanglement" by judicial expansion of the exemption to cover objectors to particular wars. Necessarily the constitutional value at issue is "neutrality." And as a general matter it is surely true that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization. See ; The metaphor of a "wall" or impassable barrier between Church and State, taken too literally, may mislead constitutional analysis, see ; but the Establishment Clause stands at least for the proposition that when government activities touch on the religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary impact. Abington School ; ; A The critical weakness of petitioners' establishment claim arises from the fact that 6 (j), on its face, simply does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or religious belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning war. The section says that anyone who is conscientiously opposed to all war shall be relieved of military service. The specified objection must have a grounding in "religious training and belief," but no particular *451 sectarian affiliation or theological position is required. The Draft Act of 1917, 4, extended relief only to those conscientious objectors affiliated with some "well-recognized religious sect or organization" whose principles forbade members' participation in war, but the attempt to focus on particular sects apparently broke down in administrative practice, n. 19 and the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act, 5 (g), discarded all sectarian restriction.[15] Thereafter Congress has framed the conscientious objector exemption in broad terms compatible with "its long-established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs." United Thus, there is no occasion to consider the claim that when Congress grants a benefit expressly to adherents of one religion, courts must either nullify the grant or somehow extend the benefit to cover all religions. For 6 (j) does not single out any religious organization or religious creed for special treatment. Rather petitioners' contention is that since Congress has recognized one sort of conscientious objection concerning war, whatever its religious basis, the Establishment Clause commands that another, different objection be carved out and protected by the courts.[16] Properly phrased, petitioners' contention is that the special statutory status accorded conscientious objection to all war, but not objection to a particular war, works *452 a de facto discrimination among religions. This happens, say petitioners, because some religious faiths themselves distinguish between personal participation in "just" and in "unjust" wars, commending the |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | personal participation in "just" and in "unjust" wars, commending the former and forbidding the latter, and therefore adherents of some religious faithsand individuals whose personal beliefs of a religious nature include the distinctioncannot object to all wars consistently with what is regarded as the true imperative of conscience. Of course, this contention of de facto religious discrimination, rendering 6 (j) fatally underinclusive, cannot simply be brushed aside. The question of governmental neutrality is not concluded by the observation that 6 (j) on its face makes no discrimination between religions, for the Establishment Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality, "religious gerrymanders," as well as obvious abuses. See also ; Illinois ex rel. Still a claimant alleging "gerrymander" must be able to show the absence of a neutral, secular basis for the lines government has drawn. See -109; Board of ; ; For the reasons that follow, we believe that petitioners have failed to make the requisite showing with respect to 6 (j). Section 6 (j) serves a number of valid purposes having nothing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, religion, or cluster of religions.[17] There are considerations *453 of a pragmatic nature, such as the hopelessness of converting a sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting man, but no doubt the section reflects as well the view that "in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the State has always been maintained." United See United 380 U. S., at We have noted that the legislative materials show congressional concern for the hard choice that conscription would impose on conscientious objectors to war, as well as respect for the value of conscientious action and for the principle of supremacy of conscience.[18] Naturally the considerations just mentioned are affirmative in character, going to support the existence of an exemption rather than its restriction specifically to persons who object to all war. The point is that these affirmative purposes are neutral in the sense of the Establishment Clause. Quite apart from the question whether the Free Exercise Clause might require some sort of exemption,[19] it is hardly impermissible for Congress to attempt to accommodate free exercise values, in line with "our happy tradition" of "avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of conscience." United See Abington School -9 ; ; *454 See also -373 "Neutrality" in matters of religion is not inconsistent with "benevolence" by way of exemptions from onerous duties, so long as an exemption is tailored broadly enough that it reflects valid secular purposes. In the draft area for 30 years the exempting provision |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | In the draft area for 30 years the exempting provision has focused on individual conscientious belief, not on sectarian affiliation. The relevant individual belief is simply objection to all war, not adherence to any extraneous theological viewpoint. And while the objection must have roots in conscience and personality that are "religious" in nature, this requirement has never been construed to elevate conventional piety or religiosity of any kind above the imperatives of a personal faith. In this state of affairs it is impossible to say that 6 (j) intrudes upon "voluntarism" in religious life, see or that the congressional purpose in enacting 6 (j) is to promote or foster those religious organizations that traditionally have taught the duty to abstain from participation in any war. A claimant, seeking judicial protection for his own conscientious beliefs, would be hard put to argue that 6 (j) encourages membership in putatively "favored" religious organizations, for the painful dilemma of the sincere conscientious objector arises precisely because he feels himself bound in conscience not to compromise his beliefs or affiliations. B We conclude not only that the affirmative purposes underlying 6 (j) are neutral and secular, but also that valid neutral reasons exist for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war, and that the section therefore cannot be said to reflect a religious preference. *455 Apart from the Government's need for manpower, perhaps the central interest involved in the administration of conscription laws is the interest in maintaining a fair system for determining "who serves when not all serve."[] When the Government exacts so much, the importance of fair, evenhanded, and uniform decisionmaking is obviously intensified. The Government argues that the interest in fairness would be jeopardized by expansion of 6 (j) to include conscientious objection to a particular war. The contention is that the claim to relief on account of such objection is intrinsically a claim of uncertain dimensions, and that granting the claim in theory would involve a real danger of erratic or even discriminatory decisionmaking in administrative practice. A virtually limitless variety of beliefs are subsumable under the rubric, "objection to a particular war."[21] All the factors that might go into nonconscientious dissent from policy, also might appear as the concrete basis of an objection that has roots as well in conscience and religion. Indeed, over the realm of possible situations, opposition to a particular war may more likely be political and nonconscientious, than otherwise. See United 133 F. 2d, at 708. The difficulties of sorting *456 the two, with a sure hand, are considerable. Moreover, the belief that a |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | a sure hand, are considerable. Moreover, the belief that a particular war at a particular time is unjust is by its nature changeable and subject to nullification by changing events. Since objection may fasten on any of an enormous number of variables, the claim is ultimately subjective, depending on the claimant's view of the facts in relation to his judgment that a given factor or congeries of factors colors the character of the war as a whole. In short, it is not at all obvious in theory what sorts of objections should be deemed sufficient to excuse an objector, and there is considerable force in the Government's contention that a program of excusing objectors to particular wars may be "impossible to conduct with any hope of reaching fair and consistent results" Brief 28. For their part, petitioners make no attempt to provide a careful definition of the claim to exemption that they ask the courts to carve out and protect. They do not explain why objection to a particular conflictmuch less an objection that focuses on a particular facet of a conflict should excuse the objector from all military service whatever, even from military operations that are connected with the conflict at hand in remote or tenuous ways.[22] They suggest no solution to the problems arising from the fact that altered circumstances may quickly render the objection to military service moot. To view the problem of fairness and evenhanded decisionmaking, in the present context, as merely a commonplace chore of weeding out "spurious claims," is to minimize substantial difficulties of real concern to a responsible legislative body. For example, under the petitioners' unarticulated scheme for exemption, an objector's claim to exemption might be based on some feature of a current conflict that most would regard as incidental, *457 or might be predicated on a view of the facts that most would regard as mistaken. The particular complaint about the war may itself be "sincere," but it is difficult to know how to judge the "sincerity" of the objector's conclusion that the war in toto is unjust and that any personal involvement would contravene conscience and religion. To be sure we have ruled, in connection with 6 (j), that "the `truth' of a belief is not open to question"; rather, the question is whether the objector's beliefs are "truly held." United See also United v. Ballard, But we must also recognize that "sincerity" is a concept that can bear only so much adjudicative weight. Ours is a Nation of enormous heterogeneity in respect of political views, moral codes, and religious persuasions. |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | in respect of political views, moral codes, and religious persuasions. It does not bespeak an establishing of religion for Congress to forgo the enterprise of distinguishing those whose dissent has some conscientious basis from those who simply dissent. There is a danger that as between two would-be objectors, both having the same complaint against a war, that objector would succeed who is more articulate, better educated, or better counseled. There is even a danger of unintended religious discrimination a danger that a claim's chances of success would be greater the more familiar or salient the claim's connection with conventional religiosity could be made to appear. At any rate, it is true that "the more discriminating and complicated the basis of classification for an exemptioneven a neutral onethe greater the potential for state involvement" in determining the character of persons' beliefs and affiliations, thus "entangl[ing] government in difficult classifications of what is or is not religious," or what is or is not conscientious. -699 Cf. Presbyterian While the danger of erratic decisionmaking unfortunately exists in any system of conscription that takes individual differences into account, no doubt the dangers would be enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate scope were honored in theory. In addition to the interest in fairness, the Government contends that neutral, secular reasons for the line drawn by 6 (j)between objection to all war and objection to a particular warmay be found in the nature of the conscientious claim that these petitioners assert. Opposition to a particular war, states the Government's brief, necessarily involves a judgment "that is political and particular," one "based on the same political, sociological and economic factors that the government necessarily considered" in deciding to engage in a particular conflict. Brief 24-26. Taken in a narrow sense, these considerations do not justify the distinction at issue, for however "political and particular" the judgment underlying objection to a particular war, the objection still might be rooted in religion and conscience, and although the factors underlying that objection were considered and rejected in the process of democratic decisionmaking, likewise the viewpoint of an objector to all war was no doubt considered and "necessarily" rejected as well. Nonetheless, it can be seen on a closer view that this line of analysis, conjoined with concern for fairness, does support the statutory distinction. Tacit at least in the Government's view of the instant cases is the contention that the limits of 6 (j) serve an overriding interest in protecting the integrity of democratic decisionmaking against claims to individual noncompliance. Despite emphasis on claims that have a "political and |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | noncompliance. Despite emphasis on claims that have a "political and particular" component, the logic of the *459 contention is sweeping. Thus the "interest" invoked is highly problematical, for it would seem to justify governmental refusal to accord any breathing space whatever to noncompliant conduct inspired by imperatives of religion and conscience. On the other hand, some have perceived a danger that exempting persons who dissent from a particular war, albeit on grounds of conscience and religion in part, would "open the doors to a general theory of selective disobedience to law" and jeopardize the binding quality of democratic decisions. Report of the National Advisory on Selective Service, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? 50 (1967). See also Other fields of legal obligation aside, it is undoubted that the nature of conscription, much less war itself, requires the personal desires and perhaps the dissenting views of those who must serve to be subordinated in some degree to the pursuit of public purposes. It is also true that opposition to a particular war does depend inter alia upon particularistic factual beliefs and policy assessments, beliefs and assessments that presumably were overridden by the government that decides to commit lives and resources to a trial of arms. Further, it is not unreasonable to suppose that some persons who are not prepared to assert a conscientious objection, and instead accept the hardships and risks of military service, may well agree at all points with the objector, yet conclude, as a matter of conscience, that they are personally bound by the decision of the democratic process. The fear of the National Advisory on Selective Service, apparently, is that exemption of objectors to particular wars would weaken the resolve of those who otherwise would feel themselves bound to serve despite personal cost, uneasiness at the *460 prospect of violence, or even serious moral reservations or policy objections concerning the particular conflict. We need not and do not adopt the view that a categorical, global "interest" in stifling individualistic claims to noncompliance, in respect of duties generally exacted, is the neutral and secular basis of 6 (j). As is shown by the long history of the very provision under discussion, it is not inconsistent with orderly democratic government for individuals to be exempted by law, on account of special characteristics, from general duties of a burdensome nature. But real dangersdangers of the kind feared by the might arise if an exemption were made available that in its nature could not be administered fairly and uniformly over the run of relevant fact situations. Should |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | and uniformly over the run of relevant fact situations. Should it be thought that those who go to war are chosen unfairly or capriciously, then a mood of bitterness and cynicism might corrode the spirit of public service and the values of willing performance of a citizen's duties that are the very heart of free government. In short, the considerations mentioned in the previous paragraph, when seen in conjunction with the central problem of fairness, are without question properly cognizable by Congress. In light of these valid concerns, we conclude that it is supportable for Congress to have decided that the objector to all warto all killing in warhas a claim that is distinct enough and intense enough to justify special status, while the objector to a particular war does not. Of course, we do not suggest that Congress would have acted irrationally or unreasonably had it decided to exempt those who object to particular wars. Our analysis of the policies of 6 (j) is undertaken in order to determine the existence vel non of a neutral, secular justification for the lines Congress has drawn. We find that justifying reasons exist and therefore hold that the Establishment Clause is not violated. *461 III Petitioner's remaining contention is that Congress interferes with the free exercise of religion by conscripting persons who oppose a particular war on grounds of conscience and religion. Strictly viewed, this complaint does not implicate problems of comparative treatment of different sorts of objectors, but rather may be examined in some isolation from the circumstance that Congress has chosen to exempt those who conscientiously object to all war.[23] And our holding that 6 (j) comports with the Establishment Clause does not automatically settle the present issue. For despite a general harmony of purpose between the two religious clauses of the First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause no doubt has a reach of its own. Abington School 374 U. S., at Nonetheless, our analysis of 6 (j) for Establishment Clause purposes has revealed governmental interests of a kind and weight sufficient to justify under the Free Exercise Clause the impact of the conscription laws on those who object to particular wars. Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government. See ; ; cf. Cleveland v. United 3 U.S. 14, To be sure, the Free Exercise Clause bars "governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such," or interference with the dissemination of religious ideas. See ; ; It prohibits misuse |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | dissemination of religious ideas. See ; ; It prohibits misuse of secular governmental programs "to impede the observance of one or all religions or to discriminate invidiously between religions, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect." 366 U. S., at And even as to neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims, the Free Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government's valid aims. See id.; See generally Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, However, the impact of conscription on objectors to particular wars is far from unjustified. The conscription laws, applied to such persons as to others, are not designed to interfere with any religious ritual or practice, and do not work a penalty against any theological position. The incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners' position are strictly justified by substantial governmental interests that relate directly to the very impacts questioned. And more broadly, of course, there is the Government's interest in procuring the manpower necessary for military purposes, pursuant to the constitutional grant of power to Congress to raise and support armies. Art. I, 8. *463 IV Since petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims to relief from military service are without merit, it follows that in Gillette's case (No. 85) there was a basis in fact to support administrative denial of exemption, and that in Negre's case (No. 325) there was a basis in fact to support the Army's denial of a discharge. Accordingly, the judgments below are Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the Court's judgment and in Part I of the opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in No. 85.[*] Gillette's objection is to combat service in the Vietnam war, not to wars in general, and the basis of his objection is his conscience. His objection does not put him into the statutory exemption which extends to one "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."[1] He stated his views as follows: "I object to any assignment in the United Armed Forces while this unnecessary and unjust war is being waged, on the grounds of religious belief specifically `Humanism.' This essentially means respect and love for man, faith in his inherent goodness and perfectability, and confidence in his capability to improve some of the pains of the human condition." This position is substantially the same as that of Sisson in United v. Sisson, 7 F. Supp. 902, appeal *464 |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | in United v. Sisson, 7 F. Supp. 902, appeal *464 dismissed, where the District Court summarized the draftee's position as follows: "Sisson's table of ultimate values is moral and ethical. It reflects quite as real, pervasive, durable, and commendable a marshalling of priorities as a formal religion. It is just as much a residue of culture, early training, and beliefs shared by companions and family. What another derives from the discipline of a church, Sisson derives from the discipline of conscience." 7 F. Supp., at 905. There is no doubt that the views of Gillette are sincere, genuine, and profound. The District Court in the present case faced squarely the issue presented in Sisson and being unable to distinguish the case on the facts, refused to follow Sisson. The question, Can a conscientious objector, whether his objection be rooted in "religion" or in moral values, be required to kill? has never been answered by the Court.[2], did no more than hold that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require a State to make its university available to one who would not take military training. United denied naturalization to a person who "would not promise in advance to bear arms in defense of the United unless he believed the war to be morally justified." The question of compelling a man to kill against his conscience was not squarely involved. Most of the talk in the majority opinion concerned "serving in the armed forces of the *465 Nation in time of war." Such service can, of course, take place in noncombatant roles. The ruling was that such service is "dependent upon the will of Congress and not upon the scruples of the individual, except as Congress provides." The dicta of the Court in the case squint towards the denial of Gillette's claim, though as I have said, the issue was not squarely presented. Yet if dicta are to be our guide, my choice is the dicta of Chief Justice Hughes who, dissenting in spoke as well for Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone: "Nor is there ground, in my opinion, for the exclusion of Professor because his conscientious scruples have particular reference to wars believed to be unjust. There is nothing new in such an attitude. Among the most eminent statesmen here and abroad have been those who condemned the action of their country in entering into wars they thought to be unjustified. Agreements for the renunciation of war presuppose a preponderant public sentiment against wars of aggression. If, while recognizing the power of Congress, the mere holding of religious or conscientious scruples against |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | Congress, the mere holding of religious or conscientious scruples against all wars should not disqualify a citizen from holding office in this country, or an applicant otherwise qualified from being admitted to citizenship, there would seem to be no reason why a reservation of religious or conscientious objection to participation in wars believed to be unjust should constitute such a disqualification." I think the Hughes view is the constitutional view. It is true that the First Amendment speaks of the free exercise of religion, not of the free exercise of conscience or belief. Yet conscience and belief are the main ingredients of First Amendment rights. They are the *466 bedrock of free speech as well as religion. The implied First Amendment right of "conscience" is certainly as high as the "right of association" which we recognized in and Some indeed have thought it higher.[3] Conscience is often the echo of religious faith. But, as this case illustrates, it may also be the product of travail, meditation, or sudden revelation related to a moral comprehension of the dimensions of a problem, not to a religion in the ordinary sense. Tolstoy[4] wrote of a man, one Van der Veer, "who, as he himself says, is not a Christian, and who refuses military service, not from religious motives, but from motives of the simplest kind, motives intelligible and common to all men, of whatever religion or nation, whether Catholic, Mohammedan, Buddhist, Confucian, whether Spaniards or Japanese. "Van der Veer refuses military service, not because he follows the commandment. `Thou shalt do no murder,' not because he is a Christian, but because he holds murder to be opposed to human nature." *467 Tolstoy[5] goes on to say: "Van der Veer says he is not a Christian. But the motives of his refusal and action are Christian. He refuses because he does not wish to kill a brother man; he does not obey, because the commands of his conscience are more binding upon him than the commands of men. Thereby he shows that Christianity is not a sect or creed which some may profess and others reject; but that it is naught else than a life's following of that light of reason which illumines all men. "Those men who now behave rightly and reasonably do so, not because they follow prescriptions of Christ, but because that line of action which was pointed out eighteen hundred years ago has now become identified with human conscience." The "sphere of intellect and spirit," as we described the domain of the First Amendment in West Virginia Board of was |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | of the First Amendment in West Virginia Board of was recognized in United where we gave a broad construction to the statutory exemption of those who by their religious training or belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. We said: "A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by *468 the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition."[6] does not answer the present question as Gillette is not "opposed to participation in war in any form." But the constitutional infirmity in the present Act seems obvious once "conscience" is the guide. As Chief Justice Hughes said in the case: "But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the State has always been maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." 283 U.S., at -634. The law as written is a species of those which show an invidious discrimination in favor of religious persons and against others with like scruples. MR. JUSTICE BLACK once said: "The First Amendment has lost much if the religious follower and the atheist[7] are no longer to be *469 judicially regarded as entitled to equal justice under law." 3 (dissenting). We said as much in our recent decision in where we struck down as unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the teaching of the doctrine of evolution in the public schools: "Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." at While there is no Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth Amendment, our decisions are clear that invidious classifications violate due process. held that segregation by race in the public schools was an invidious discrimination, and reached the same result based on penalties imposed on naturalized, not nativeborn, citizens. A classification of "conscience" based on a "religion" and a "conscience" based on more generalized, philosophical grounds is equally invidious by reason of our First Amendment standards. I had assumed that the welfare of the single |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | standards. I had assumed that the welfare of the single human soul was the ultimate test of the vitality of the First Amendment. This is an appropriate occasion to give content to our dictum in Board of at : "[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. The test of its substance *470 is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order." I would reverse this judgment. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in No. 325, Negre v. Larsen. I approach the facts of this case with some diffidence, as they involve doctrines of the Catholic Church in which I was not raised. But we have on one of petitioner's briefs an authoritative lay Catholic scholar, Dr. John T. Noonan, Jr., and from that brief I deduce the following: Under the doctrines of the Catholic Church a person has a moral duty to take part in wars declared by his government so long as they comply with the tests of his church for just wars.[1] Conversely, a Catholic has a moral duty not to participate in unjust wars.[2] *471 The Fifth Commandment, "Thou shall not kill," provides a basis for the distinction between just and unjust wars. In the 16th century Francisco Victoria, Dominican master of the University of Salamanca and pioneer in international law, elaborated on the distinction. "If a subject is convinced of the injustice of a war, he ought not to serve in it, even on the command of his prince. This is clear, for no one can authorize the killing of an innocent person." He realized not all men had the information of the prince and his counsellors on the causes of a war, but where "the proofs and tokens of the injustice of the war may be such that ignorance would be no excuse even to the subjects" who are not normally informed, that ignorance will not be an excuse if they participate.[3] Well over 400 years later, today, the Baltimore Catechism makes an exception to the Fifth Commandment for a "soldier fighting a just war."[4] No one can tell a Catholic that this or that war is either just or unjust. This is a personal decision that an individual must make on the basis of his own conscience after studying the facts.[5] *472 Like the distinction between just and unjust wars, the duty to obey conscience is not a new doctrine in the Catholic Church. When told to stop preaching by the Sanhedrin, to which they were subordinate by law, "Peter and the apostles |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | which they were subordinate by law, "Peter and the apostles answered and said, `We must obey God rather than men.' "[6] That duty has not changed. Pope Paul VI has expressed it as follows: "On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience. In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience, in order that he may come to God, the end and purpose of life."[7] While the fact that the ultimate determination of whether a war is unjust rests on individual conscience, the Church has provided guides. Francisco Victoria referred to "killing of an innocent person." World War II had its impact on the doctrine. Writing shortly after the war Cardinal Ottaviani stated: "[M]odern wars can *473 never fulfil those conditions which (as we stated earlier on in this essay) governtheoreticallya just and lawful war. Moreover, no conceivable cause could ever be sufficient justification for the evils, the slaughter, the destruction, the moral and religious upheavals which war today entails. In practice, then, a declaration of war will never be justifiable."[8] The full impact of the horrors of modern war were emphasized in the Pastoral Constitution announced by Vatican II: "The development of armaments by modern science has immeasurably magnified the horrors and wickedness of war. Warfare conducted with these weapons can inflict immense and indiscriminate havoc which goes far beyond the bounds of legitimate defense. Indeed, if the kind of weapons now stocked in the arsenals of the great powers were to be employed to the fullest, the result would be the almost complete reciprocal slaughter of one side by the other, not to speak of the widespread devastation that would follow in the world and the deadly after-effects resulting from the use of such arms. "All these factors force us to undertake a completely fresh reappraisal of war." "[I]t is one thing to wage a war of self-defense; it is quite another to seek to impose domination on another nation." The Pastoral Constitution announced that "[e]very act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation."[9] Louis Negre is a devout Catholic. In 1951 when he was four, his family immigrated to this country from *474 France.[10] He attended Catholic schools in Bakersfield, California, until graduation from high school. Then he attended Bakersfield Junior College for two years. Following that, he was inducted into the Army. At the time of his induction he had his |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | Gillette v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108285/gillette-v-united-states/ | Army. At the time of his induction he had his own convictions about the Vietnam war and the Army's goals in the war. He wanted, however, to be sure of his convictions. "I agreed to myself that before making any decision or taking any type of stand on the issue, I would permit myself to see and understand the Army's explanation of its reasons for violence in Vietnam. For, without getting an insight on the subject, it would be unfair for me to say anything, without really knowing the answer."[11] On completion of his advanced infantry training, "I knew that if I would permit myself to go to Vietnam I would be violating my own concepts of natural law and would be going against all that I had been taught in my religious training." Negre applied for a discharge as a conscientious objector. His application was denied. He then refused to comply with an order to proceed for shipment to Vietnam. A general court-martial followed, but he was acquitted. After that he filed this application for discharge as a conscientious objector. *475 Negre is opposed under his religious training and beliefs to participation in any form in the war in Vietnam. His sincerity is not questioned. His application for a discharge, however, was denied because his religious training and beliefs led him to oppose only a particular war[12] which according to his conscience was unjust. For the reasons I have stated in my dissent in the Gillette case decided this day, I would reverse the judgment. |
Justice Burger | 1,973 | 12 | majority | Brown v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108760/brown-v-united-states/ | Petitioners were convicted by a jury of transporting stolen goods and of conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce, contrary to 18 U.S. C. 2314 and 18 U.S. C. 371. The central issue now is whether petitioners have standing to challenge the lawfulness of the seizure of merchandise stolen by them but stored in the premises of one Knuckles, a coconspirator. At the time of the seizure from Knuckles, petitioners were in police custody in a different State. Knuckles successfully challenged the introduction of the stolen goods seized from his store under a faulty warrant, and his case was separately tried. The evidence against petitioners is largely uncontroverted. Petitioner Brown was the manager of a warehouse in Cincinnati, Ohio, owned by a wholesale clothing and household goods company. He was entrusted with the warehouse keys. Petitioner Smith was a truck driver for the company. During and 1969, the company had experienced losses attributed to pilferage amounting to approximately $60,000 each year. One West, a buyer and supervisor for the company, recovered a slip of paper he had seen drop from Brown's pocket. On the slip, in Brown's handwriting, was a list of warehouse merchandise, together with a price on each item that was well below wholesale cost. West estimated that the lowest legitimate wholesale price for these items would have been a total of about $6,400, while the total as priced by Brown's list was $2,200. The police were *225 promptly notified and set up a surveillance of the warehouse. Ten days later, petitioners were observed wheeling carts containing boxes of merchandise from the warehouse to a truck. From a concealed point, the police took 20 photographs of petitioners loading the merchandise onto the truck. Petitioners then locked the warehouse, and drove off. They were followed and stopped by the police, placed under arrest, advised of their constitutional rights, and, with the loaded truck, taken into custody to police headquarters. The goods in the truck had not been lawfully taken from the warehouse and had a total value of about $6,500. Following their arrest, and after being fully informed of their constitutional rights, both petitioners made separate confessions to police indicating that they had conspired with Knuckles to steal from the warehouse, that they had stolen goods from the warehouse in the past, and that they had taken these goods, on two occasions about two months before their arrest, to Knuckles' store in Manchester, Kentucky. Petitioners also indicated that they had "sold" the previously stolen goods on delivery to Knuckles for various amounts of cash. Knuckles' store was then |
Justice Burger | 1,973 | 12 | majority | Brown v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108760/brown-v-united-states/ | Knuckles for various amounts of cash. Knuckles' store was then searched pursuant to a warrant, and goods stolen from the company, worth over $100,000 in retail value, were discovered. Knuckles was at the store during the search, but petitioners were in custody in Ohio. Prior to trial, petitioners and Knuckles[1] moved to suppress the stolen merchandise found at Knuckles' store. The prosecution conceded that the warrant for the search of Knuckles' store was defective. The District Court held a hearing on petitioners' motion to suppress the Petitioners, however, alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in Knuckles' premises or in *226 the goods seized there, nor was any evidence of such an interest presented to the District Court. After the hearing, the District Court granted Knuckles' motion to suppress the goods seized, but denied petitioners' motion for lack of standing. The charges against Knuckles were severed for separate trial. At petitioners' trial, stolen merchandise seized from Knuckles' store was received in The events leading to petitioners' arrests upon leaving the warehouse and while they were in possession of stolen goods were fully described by police officers who were eyewitnesses. The 20 photographs taken of the crime in progress were admitted into There was additional incriminating testimony by the owner of the service station from whom petitioners rented trucks used in the thefts, and by five witnesses who saw petitioners unloading boxes from a truck late at night and carrying the boxes into Knuckles' store. The prosecutor also introduced into evidence, over petitioners' objections, portions of each petitioner's confession which implicated the other in a manner now conceded to be contrary to Those considerable parts of each petitioner's confession which did not implicate the other were admitted without objection. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that a error had occurred, but went on to conclude that the independent proof of petitioners' guilt was "so overwhelming that the error was harmless," citing The Court of Appeals also held that the stolen merchandise seized pursuant to the defective warrant was properly admitted against petitioners, stating: "This ruling [of the District Court] was correct because appellants claimed no possessory or proprietary *227 rights in the goods or in Knuckles' store, and it is clear that they cannot assert the Fourth Amendment right of another." (1) Petitioners contend that they have "automatic" standing to challenge the search and seizure at Knuckles' store. They rely on the decision of this Court in establishing a rule of "automatic" standing to contest an allegedly illegal |
Justice Burger | 1,973 | 12 | majority | Brown v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108760/brown-v-united-states/ | a rule of "automatic" standing to contest an allegedly illegal search where the same possession needed to establish standing is "an essential element of the offense charged." That case involved (a) a seizure of contraband narcotics, (b) a defendant who was present at the seizure,[2] and (c) an offense in which the defendant's possession of the seized narcotics at the time of the contested search and seizure was a critical part of the Government's case. Jones, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Jones, emphasized the "dilemma" inherent in a defendant's need to allege "possession" to contest a seizure, when such admission of possession could later be used against him. Mr. Justice Frankfurter quoted the words of Judge Learned Hand: "Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims, they *228 must take on that role, with enough detail to cast them without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma." The self-incrimination dilemma, so central to the Jones decision, can no longer occur under the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution. Subsequent to Jones, in we held that a prosecutor may not use against a defendant at trial any testimony given by that defendant at a pretrial hearing to establish standing to move to suppress U.S., at 389-394. For example, under the doctrine the defendant is permitted to establish the requisite standing by claiming "possession" of incriminating If he is granted standing on the basis of such evidence, he may then nonetheless press for its exclusion; but, whether he succeeds or fails to suppress the evidence, his testimony on that score is not directly admissible against him in the trial. Thus, petitioners in this case could have asserted, at the pretrial suppression hearing, a possessory interest in the goods at Knuckles' store without any danger of incriminating themselves. They did not do so. But it is not necessary for us now to determine whether our decision in makes Jones' "automatic" standing unnecessary. We reserve that question for a case where possession at the time of the contested search and seizure is "an essential element of the offense charged." U. S., at Here, unlike Jones, the Government's case against petitioners does not depend on petitioners' possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure.[3]*2 The stolen goods seized |
Justice Burger | 1,973 | 12 | majority | Brown v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108760/brown-v-united-states/ | of the contested search and seizure.[3]*2 The stolen goods seized had been transported and "sold" by petitioners to Knuckles approximately two months before the challenged search. The conspiracy and transportation alleged by the indictment were carefully limited to the period before the day of the search. In deciding this case, therefore, it is sufficient to hold that there is no standing to contest a search and seizure where, as here, the defendants: (a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (b) alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises; and (c) were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure. The vice of allowing the Government to allege possession as part of the crime charged, and yet deny that there was possession sufficient for standing purposes, is not present. The Government cannot be accused of taking "advantage of contradictory positions." See United v. Allsenberrie, ; United v. Cowan, ; Niro v. United ; United v. Bozza, But cf. United v. Price, (CA2), cert. denied, Again, we do not decide that this vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction warrants the continued survival of Jones' "automatic" standing now that our decision in has removed the danger of coerced self-incrimination. We simply see no reason to afford such "automatic" standing where, as here, there was no risk to a defendant of either self-incrimination or prosecutorial self-contradiction. Petitioners were afforded a full hearing on standing and failed to allege any legitimate interest of any kind in the premises searched or the merchandise seized. *230 Nor, incidentally, does the record reveal any such interest.[4] As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, petitioners had no standing to contest the defective warrant used to search Knuckles' store; they could not then and cannot now rely on the Fourth Amendment rights of another. "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. ;" Alderman v. United See Wong Sun v. United (2) The Solicitor General concedes that, under statements made by petitioners were improperly admitted into Neither petitioner testified at the trial. The prosecution tendered police testimony as to statements made by Smith implicating Brown in the crimes charged, even though these statements were made out of Brown's presence.[5] This testimony was *231 admitted into Similar statements, made by Brown relating to Smith, were also admitted. Petitioners' counsel made timely objections. Upon an independent examination of the record, we agree with the Court |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Logue v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108814/logue-v-united-states/ | Reagan Logue, a federal prisoner confined in a county jail pending trial, fashioned a noose from a bandage covering a laceration on his left arm and hanged himself. His mother and adoptive father sued the United States for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S. C. 1346 (b),[1] claiming that negligence on the part of Government agents and employees proximately caused the death of their son. The District Court determined that Logue's death was the result of negligence for which the United States was liable, and awarded damages. *523 The Court of Appeals reversed this judgment, rehearing en banc denied, We granted certiorari in order to consider the application to this case of the Act's exclusion of employees of a "contractor with the United States." 28 U.S. C. 2671. On May 22, 1968, Reagan Logue was arrested by Deputy United States Marshal Del Bowers on a bench warrant charging Logue with conspiracy to smuggle 229 pounds of marihuana into the United States. After a hearing, he was taken to the Nueces County jail in Corpus Christi, Texas, to await trial. This jail is one of some 800 institutions operated by state and local governments that contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons to provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of federal prisoners.[2] *524 On the day after his initial incarceration Logue attempted to commit suicide by slashing veins in his left arm. He was immediately taken to a hospital emergency room for treatment of the laceration. While the wound turned out to be relatively minor, Logue was admitted to the hospital's psychiatric floor because of the attending doctor's observation that he was actively hallucinating and out of touch with reality. The psychiatrist who later took charge of the case, recognizing Logue's suicidal tendencies, recommended to federal officials that he be committed to a medical facility for rehabilitation.[3] On the following day, May 24, the District Court ordered that Logue be transferred to a federal medical facility pursuant to 18 U.S. C. 4244. While awaiting the processing of papers and other steps preparatory to the actual transfer, however, federal officials made arrangements to transfer Logue back to the Nueces County jail.[4] Before the transfer, Bowers informed the chief jailer of Logue's suicidal tendencies and requested that he prepare for Logue a special cell removed of all dangerous objects that might be used in another suicide attempt. Such a cell was prepared by the jail authorities, and Logue was placed in it. Bowers made no specific arrangements for constant surveillance of Logue once he *525 was confined, and the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Logue v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108814/logue-v-united-states/ | surveillance of Logue once he *525 was confined, and the jail employees made only periodic checks when they were on that floor for some other reason. The day after his return to the jail, Logue removed the Kerlix bandage that had been applied to the laceration on his left arm and hanged himself. The District Court found that there had been a contract between the Government and Nueces County whereby the latter undertook to house federal prisoners in the county jail at Corpus Christi. That court nonetheless found that the United States was liable for the negligence of the employees of the Nueces County sheriff as well as for the negligence of its own employee. The court found the former to have been negligent because their surveillance of Logue was "inadequate," and it found Bowers to have been negligent in failing to make "specific arrangements for constant surveillance of the prisoner." The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court, stating in its that: "We interpret [18 U.S. C. 4002] as fixing the status of the Nueces County jail as that of a `contractor.' Title 28 U.S. C., Sec. 2671 This insulates the United States from liability under the FTCA for the negligent acts or omissions of the jail's employees. We find no support in the record for holding that Deputy Marshal Bowers had any power or authority to control any of the internal functions of the Nueces County jail. The deputy marshal, accordingly, violated no duty of safekeeping with respect to the deceased." The Federal Tort Claims Act makes the United States liable for money damages "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government *526." 28 U.S. C. 1346 (b). Section 2671 of Title 28 U.S. C. contains the following definitions: "As used in this chapter and sections 1346 (b) and 2401 (b) of this title, the term `Federal agency' includes the executive departments, the military departments, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the United States. " `Employee of the government' includes officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation." For the Government to be liable for the negligence of an employee of the Nueces County jail, he must be shown to be |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Logue v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108814/logue-v-united-states/ | the Nueces County jail, he must be shown to be an "employee of the Government" as that term is used in the Federal Tort Claims Act. Though petitioners do not always distinguish between their two theories, they appear to contend alternatively that the Nueces County jail is a "Federal agency" by reason of its contract for the care of federal prisoners, or that the employees of the jail are "acting on behalf of" the Bureau of Prisons or the Government in performing services for federal prisoners. The Court of Appeals rejected these contentions, and we believe that it was right in doing so. We read that portion of the Court of Appeals' as treating the "contractor" exemption from the definition of "Federal agency" in 2671 as adopting the common-law distinction between the liability of an employer for the negligent acts of his own employees *527 and his liability for the employees of a party with whom he contracts for a specified performance. Both the modern common law as reflected in the Restatement of Agency[5] and the law of Texas[6] make the distinction between the servant or agent relationship and that of independent contractor turn on the absence of authority in the principal to control the physical conduct of the contractor in performance of the contract. In one of the factors relied upon by the Court in determining that both military and civilian National Guard personnel were employees of the States, rather than of the United States, for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, was the "supervision exercised by the States over both military and civilian personnel," The courts of appeals that have had occasion to decide the question appear to have unvaryingly held that the "contractor with the United States" language of 2671 adopts the traditional distinction between employees of the principal and employees of an independent contractor with the principal, and to have also held that the critical factor in making this determination is the authority of *528 the principal to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor. See, e. g., ; ; ; Petitioners cite the commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts 409 to the effect that the common-law distinction that shields the employer from liability for injuries caused to another by the negligent act of a contractor or his servant is subject to so many exceptions that it is the general rule "only in the sense that it is applied where no good reason is found for departing from it." Congress, of course, could have left the determination as to whose negligence the Government |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Logue v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108814/logue-v-united-states/ | have left the determination as to whose negligence the Government should be liable for under the Federal Tort Claims Act to the law of the State involved, as it did with other aspects of liability under the Act. But it chose not to do this, and instead incorporated into the definitions of the Act the exemption from liability for injury caused by employees of a contractor. While this congressional choice leaves the courts free to look to the law of torts and agency to define "contractor," it does not leave them free to abrogate the exemption that the Act provides. Petitioners suggest that because 18 U.S. C. 4042 imposes a duty on the Bureau of Prisons to "provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons charged with offenses against the United States" the Nueces County employees who were discharging the Government's obligation by contract should be held to be employees of the Government for purposes of liability under the Act.[7] This Court held in United that a breach of the *529 duty imposed on the Government by 18 U.S. C. 4042 was actionable under the Act. But the same public law that imposed this duty on the Government also authorized the Government to contract with state and local authorities to provide safekeeping and care: "For the purpose of providing suitable quarters for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons held under authority of any enactment of Congress, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons may contract, for a period not exceeding three years, with the proper authorities of any State, Territory, or political subdivision thereof, for the imprisonment, subsistence, care, and proper employment of such persons. "The rates to be paid for the care and custody of said persons shall take into consideration the character of the quarters furnished, sanitary conditions, and quality of subsistence and may be such as will permit and encourage the proper authorities to provide reasonably decent, sanitary, and healthful quarters and subsistence for such persons." 18 U.S. C. 4002 (emphasis added). Thus, Congress not only authorized the Government to make contracts such as the one here in question, but rather clearly contemplated that the day-to-day operations of the contractor's facilities were to be in the hands of the contractor, with the Government's role limited to the payment of sufficiently high rates to induce the contractor to do a good job. The contract entered into between the Government and Nueces County reflects a similar division of responsibility. The county undertakes to provide custody in accordance with the Bureau of Prisons' "rules and regulations |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Logue v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108814/logue-v-united-states/ | in accordance with the Bureau of Prisons' "rules and regulations governing the care and custody of persons committed" under the contract. *530 These rules in turn specify standards of treatment for federal prisoners, including methods of discipline, rules for communicating with attorneys, visitation privileges, mail, medical services, and employment. But the agreement gives the United States no authority to physically supervise the conduct of the jail's employees; it reserves to the United States only "the right to enter the institution. at reasonable hours for the purpose of inspecting the same and determining the conditions under which federal offenders are housed." The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the deputy marshal had no authority to control the activities of the sheriff's employees is supported by both the enabling statute and the contract actually executed between the parties. We agree with its resultant holding that the sheriff's employees were employees of a "contractor with the United States," and not, therefore, employees of a "Federal agency." The judges of the Court of Appeals who dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc pointed out that petitioners alternatively contended in that court, as they do here, that even though the sheriffs' employees might not be "employees" of a federal agency, they might nonetheless be "acting on behalf of a Federal agency in an official capacity" If petitioners were successful in establishing this contention, of course, an employee of the Nueces County jail would be an "employee of the government" under 2671 even though he was not an "employee" of a federal agency. The legislative history to which we are referred by the parties sheds virtually no light on the congressional purpose in enacting the "acting on behalf of" language of 2671. The long gestation period of the Act in the committees of Congress has been recounted in and this lengthy period may have something to do with the paucity *531 of helpful committee reports on this point. One of the more immediate antecedents of the bill that Congress enacted contained identical "acting on behalf of" language: "and persons acting on behalf of a Federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation." H. R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1942), in Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, p. 1 (1942). One of the appendices to the hearings on these bills compares the provisions of H. R. 6463, containing the "acting on behalf of" language, with previous |
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