author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Kennedy | 1,999 | 4 | majority | Mitchell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118278/mitchell-v-united-states/ | imprisonment. The Government often has a motive to demand a severe sentence, so the central purpose of the privilegeto protect a defendant from being the unwilling instrument of his or her own condemnationremains of vital importance. Our holding today is a product of existing precedent, not only but also by in which the Court could "discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent's capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned." 451 U.S., at -463. Although Estelle was a capital case, its reasoning applies with full force here, where the Government seeks to use petitioner's silence to infer commission of disputed criminal acts. See To say that an adverse factual inference may be drawn from silence at a sentencing hearing held to determine the specifics of the crime is to confine by ignoring Estelle. We are unwilling to truncate our precedents in this way. The rule against adverse inferences from a defendant's silence in criminal proceedings, including sentencing, is of proven utility. Some years ago the Court expressed concern that "[t]oo many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege." Later, it quoted with apparent approval Wigmore's observation that "`[t]he layman's natural first suggestion would probably be that the resort to privilege in each instance is a clear confession *330 of crime,' " (quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence 2272, 6). It is far from clear that citizens, and jurors, remain today so skeptical of the principle or are often willing to ignore the prohibition against adverse inferences from silence. Principles once unsettled can find general and wide acceptance in the legal culture, and there can be little doubt that the rule prohibiting an inference of guilt from a defendant's rightful silence has become an essential feature of our legal tradition. This process began even before When was being considered by this Court, some 44 States did not allow a prosecutor to invite the jury to make an adverse inference from the defendant's refusal to testify at trial. See The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for teaching that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defendant committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is whether the Government has carried its burden to prove its allegations while respecting the defendant's individual rights. The Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant to the crime |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Bennett v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/ | The issue presented is whether substantive provisions of the 1978 Amendments to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary *634 Education Act apply retroactively for determining if Title I funds were misused during the years This case was previously before the Court, and we then held that the Federal Government may recover misused funds from States that provided assurances that federal grants would be spent only on eligible programs. We expressly declined, however, to address the retroactive effect of substantive provisions of the 1978 Amendments. and n. 7. On remand from our decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the standards of the 1978 Amendments should apply to determine if funds were improperly expended in previous years. State of New Dept. of We granted certiorari, and we now reverse. I Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Stat. 27, as amended, 20 U.S. C. 241a et seq. (1976 ed.), provided federal grants-in-aid to support compensatory education for disadvantaged children in low-income areas.[1] Based on the theory that poverty and low scholastic achievement are closely related, Title I allocated funds to local school districts based on their numbers of impoverished children and the State's average per-pupil expenditures. H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, pp. 4, 8 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-856, p. 5 (1978); see 20 U.S. C. 241a, 241c(a)(2) (1976 ed.); S. Rep. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (1965). Within particular school districts, Title I funds were in turn directed to schools that had high concentrations *635 of children from low-income families. 241e(a)(1)(A). Once Title I funds reached the level of targeted schools, however, all children in those schools who needed compensatory education services were eligible for the program regardless of family income. H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 4; 45 CFR 116a.21(e) (1977); 45 CFR 116.(f) (1972). Respecting the deeply rooted tradition of state and local control over education, Congress left to local officials the development of particular programs to meet the needs of educationally disadvantaged children. Federal restrictions on the use of funds at the local level sought only to assure that Title I moneys were properly used "to provide specific types of children in specific areas with special services above and beyond those normally provided as part of the district's regular educational program." H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 4. The goal of providing assistance for compensatory programs for certain disadvantaged children while respecting the tradition of state and local control over education was implemented by statutory provisions that governed the distribution of Title I funds. Local school |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Bennett v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/ | that governed the distribution of Title I funds. Local school districts determined the content of particular programs, and the appropriate state education agency approved the applications for Title I assistance submitted by local education agencies. 20 U.S. C. 241e(a) (1976 ed.). After determining that the applications complied with the requirements of federal law, the state education agencies distributed Title I funds to the school districts. 241e(a), 241g. The state education agencies in turn received grants from the Department of Education upon providing assurances to the Secretary that the local educational agencies would spend the funds only on programs which satisfied the requirements of Title I.[2]Bell v. New *636 ; 20 U.S. C. 241f(a)(1) (1976 ed.). As we previously held that if Title I funds were expended in violation of the provided assurances, the Federal Government may recover the misused funds from the States. This case arises from a determination by the Department of Education that respondent New must repay $1,031,304 in Title I funds that were improperly spent during the years 1970-1972 in Newark, N. There is no contention that the Newark School District received an incorrect allocation of Title I funds or that funds were not used for compensatory education programs. Instead, the Secretary's demand for repayment rests on the finding that Title I funds were not directed to the proper schools within the Newark School District. Regulations in effect when the moneys were expended provided that school attendance areas within a school district could receive Title I funds if either the percentage or number of children from low-income families residing in the area was at least as high as the districtwide 45 CFR 116.(d) (1972). Alternatively, the entire school district could be designated as eligible for Title I services, but only if there were no wide variances in the concentrations of children from low-income families among school attendance areas in the district. A federal audit completed in 1975 determined that the New Department of Education had incorrectly approved grant applications allowing 13 Newark schools to receive Title I funds in violation of these requirements. App. 9-51. The auditors found that during the 1971-1972 school year, the percentage of children from low-income families for the 13 schools ranged from 13% to 33.5%, while the districtwide average for Newark was 33.9%. Consequently, for that school year the auditors disallowed Title I expenditures totaling $1,029,630. The auditors also found that funds were misused during the 1970-1971 school year, *637 but because of the statute of limitations, only $1,674 remains at issue for that year. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a-37a. In |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Bennett v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/ | for that year. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a-37a. In June 1976, the Department issued a final determination letter to New demanding repayment of the misused funds. App. 52-58. New sought further administrative review, and hearings were held before the Education Appeal Board (Board). In those proceedings, New argued that the Department was not authorized to compel repayment, that the auditors had miscalculated the percentages of children from low-income families, and that the entire Newark School District qualified as a Title I project area under the regulations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a-58a. The Board rejected each of these arguments, a-58a, and ordered repayment. The Secretary declined to review the Board's order, which thereby became final. at 59a. New then sought judicial review, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Department did not have authority to issue the order demanding repayment. State of New Dept. of Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not address arguments made by New challenging the Department's determination that funds were misused. After remand from our decision in the State argued for the first time that the 1978 Amendments to Title I, Stat. 2143, 20 U.S. C. 2701 et seq., should determine whether the funds were misused during the years n. 1. The Court of Appeals agreed and remanded the case to the Secretary to determine whether the disputed expenditures conformed to the 1978 standards. We hold that the substantive standards of the 1978 Amendments do not affect obligations under previously made grants, and we reverse. Our holding does not address whether the Secretary correctly determined that Title I funds were misused under the law in effect during the years 1970-1972, and New may renew its contentions in this regard on remand. *638 II The Court of Appeals based its holding on a presumption that statutory amendments apply retroactively to pending Relying on language from the Court of Appeals observed that "[a] federal court or administrative agency must `apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.' " We conclude, however, that reliance on such a presumption in this context is inappropriate. Both the nature of the obligations that arose under the Title I program and itself suggest that changes in substantive requirements for federal grants should not be presumed to operate retroactively. Moreover, practical considerations related to the administration of federal grant programs imply that obligations generally should be determined by reference to the law in effect when |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Bennett v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/ | be determined by reference to the law in effect when the grants were made.[3] As we explained in our first decision in this case, "the pre-1978 version [of Title I] contemplated that States misusing federal funds would incur a debt to the Federal Government for the amount misused." Although our conclusion was based on the statutory provisions, we also acknowledged that Title I, like many other federal grant programs, was "much in the nature of a contract." Pennhurst State School and "The State chose to participate in the Title I program and, as a condition of receiving the *639 grant, freely gave its assurances that it would abide by the conditions of Title I." A State that failed to fulfill its assurances has no right to retain the federal funds, and the Federal Government is entitled to recover amounts spent contrary to terms of the grant agreement. ; see (WHITE, concurring). In order to obtain the Title I funds involved here, New gave assurances that the money would be distributed to local education agencies for programs that qualified under the existing statute and regulations. See 20 U.S. C. 241f(a) (1976 ed.); 45 CFR 116.31(c) (1972). Assuming that these assurances were not met for the years 1970-1972, see 461 U.S., the State became liable for the improper expenditures; as a correlative, the Federal Government had, before the 1978 Amendments, a pre-existing right of recovery. and n. 7. The fact that the Government's right to recover any misused funds preceded the 1978 Amendments indicates that the presumption announced in does not apply here. held that a statutory provision for attorney's fees applied retroactively to a fee request that was pending when the statute was enacted. This holding rested on the general principle that a court must apply the law in effect at the time of its decision, see United which concluded holds true even if the intervening law does not expressly state that it applies to pending however, expressly acknowledged limits to this principle. "The Court has refused to apply an intervening change to a pending action where it has concluded that to do so would infringe upon or deprive a person of a right that had matured or become unconditional." This limitation comports with another venerable rule of statutory interpretation, i. e., that statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have only prospective effect. See, e. g., United ; Cf. Practical considerations related to the enforcement of the requirements of grant-in-aid programs also suggest that expenditures must presumptively be evaluated by the law in effect when the grants were |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Bennett v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/ | evaluated by the law in effect when the grants were made. The federal auditors who completed their review of the disputed expenditures in 1975 could scarcely base their findings on the substantive standards adopted in the 1978 Amendments.[4] Similarly, New when it applied for and received Title I funds for the years 1970-1972 had no basis to believe that the propriety of the expenditures would be judged by any standards other than the ones in effect at the time. Cf. Pennhurst State School and at 24-25. Retroactive application of changes in the substantive requirements of a federal grant program would deny both federal auditors and grant recipients fixed, predictable standards for determining if expenditures are proper. Requiring audits to be redetermined in response to every statutory change that occurs while review is pending would be unworkable and would unfairly make obligations depend on the fortuitous timing of completion of the review process. Moreover, the practical difficulties associated with retroactive application of substantive provisions in the 1978 Amendments would be particularly objectionable, because Congress *641 expressly intended those Amendments to strengthen the auditing process by clarifying the Department's responsibilities and specifying the procedures to be followed. See ; S. Rep. No. 95-856, 131; H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 53, 161. We conclude that absent a clear indication to the contrary in the relevant statutes or legislative history, changes in the substantive standards governing federal grant programs do not alter obligations and liabilities arising under earlier grants. III Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history indicates that Congress intended the substantive standards of the 1978 Amendments to apply retroactively. Congress adopted the amendments as part of a general reauthorization of Title I that did not depart from the program's basic philosophy, but instead sought to clarify and simplify provisions concerning implementation. H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 2, 8; S. Rep. No. 95-586, at 2, 8, 130. The substantive provisions of the 1978 Amendments to Title I were expressly made applicable for grants between October 1, 1978, and September 30, 20 U.S. C. 2702. See also Pub. L. 95-561, 1530, The House Report similarly stated that the changed requirements were intended to clarify "the manner in which school districts are to distribute Title I funds among eligible schools and children." H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 21 (emphasis added). Thus, both the general purpose of the 1978 Amendments and the more specific references in the statute and legislative history suggest that the new requirements were intended to apply prospectively. The Court of Appeals did not rely on evidence from the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Bennett v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/ | Court of Appeals did not rely on evidence from the legislative history to conclude that the 1978 Amendments in general have retroactive effect. Instead, the court below observed that the amendments to the school attendance area *642 eligibility requirements "were designed to correct regulations that frustrated the basic objectives of the Title I program." -37. This observation mischaracterizes both the regulations in effect prior to 1976 and the provisions adopted by Congress in 1978. Regulations adopted in 1967, see and in effect for nearly 10 years, generally restricted Title I assistance to school attendance areas having a percentage of low-income children at least as high as the districtwide ; see also Office of Education, Title I Program Guide No. 44, ¶ 1.1 (1968) (explaining eligibility requirements). This requirement deliberately channeled funds to the poorest areas within any particular school district. One consequence of this comparative approach, however, was that a school located in a disadvantaged district might be ineligible for assistance even though it would have qualified if it were located in a wealthier district.[5] Although later changes in the eligibility standards attempted to mitigate this incidental effect, *643 they do not indicate that the earlier regulations conflicted with the policies of Title I. During consideration of 1974 Amendments to Title I, a House Committee observed that inflexible application of the existing regulations might make schools with high proportions of low-income children ineligible. H. R. Rep. No. 93-805, p. ("[I]t was never intended by the Act to render any school with a 30% concentration ineligible"). Although the 1974 Amendments made changes in the school eligibility requirements, they did not specifically address this situation.[6] Apparently prompted by the concerns of Congress, the Department modified its regulations in 1976 to permit a school attendance area to qualify for funds if more than 30% of its children were from low-income families, even though the districtwide average might exceed 30%. See 429 (1976), codified in 45 CFR 116a.20 (b)(2) (1977); National Institute of Education, Title I Funds Allocation: The Current Formula 57, 109 (1977). The 1978 Amendments refined this alternative by lowering the percentage to 25% and requiring the school district to guarantee that state and federal funding for compensatory education would not be reduced for any other school attendance area that received Title I funds in the preceding year. 20 U.S. C. 2732(a)(1). The evolution of the school eligibility requirements no doubt reflects a reassessment of the proper means to implement *644 the goals of Title I. Nonetheless, the changes made since 1976 simply do not support the conclusion of the Court of |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Bennett v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/ | simply do not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the contention of New that the earlier regulations were inconsistent with Title I's policies. The regulations in place from 1967 to 1976 targeted assistance to the neediest areas within each school district in conformance with the statutory directive that funds should go to school attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low-income families. See 20 U.S. C. 241e(a) (1976 ed.). Moreover, available funds never were sufficient to provide services to all eligible students, H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 7, and Title I required funds to be concentrated on particular projects rather than diffused among all eligible school attendance areas. See 20 U.S. C. 241e(a)(1)(B) (1976 ed.); 45 CFR 116.(c) (1972). Thus, the school eligibility requirements helped to assure that funds would not be spread so thinly as to impair the effectiveness of particular Title I projects. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 1814, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966) (suggesting that limited funds should be directed to schools with highest concentrations of children from low-income families); S. Rep. No. 95-856, at 7 ("[T]itle I is successful in directing substantial federal aid to those areas which have the highest proportions of children from low-income families"). Congress did not abandon the concerns underlying the earlier regulations when it enacted the 1978 Amendments. Legislative Reports spoke approvingly of the longstanding policy to direct funds to school attendance areas "having the highest concentrations of low-income families." ; H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 21. Although the 1978 Amendments relaxed the eligibility requirements for school attendance areas, the intent was "to give districts more flexibility without watering down the targeting features intended to give the programs a focus when funds are limited." The 25% eligibility standard was itself the product of a compromise at Conference. The House bill, see but not the Senate amendment, provided that any school *645 attendance area having a 20% concentration of poor children must be designated as eligible for Title I. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-53, p. 255 (1978). The Conference agreed to an amendment that made the designation of these areas optional, increased the required percentage to 25%, and provided that other areas must retain the same amount of funds they received the preceding year. Although it is fair to infer that Congress determined that the targeting features of Title I would not be unduly compromised by adoption of the 25% standard, the background to the 1978 Amendments does not suggest the earlier regulations frustrated the program or that Congress intended the Amendments to apply |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Bennett v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/ | the program or that Congress intended the Amendments to apply to prior grants. IV New urges that we affirm the holding below on the ground that the Court of Appeals reached an equitable result. The determination by the Secretary does not question the good faith of New or the Newark School District with respect to the disputed expenditures, which we acknowledge might be permissible under standards enacted in 1978 or currently in effect.[7] Nonetheless, we find no inequity in requiring repayment of funds that were spent contrary to the assurances provided by the State in obtaining the grants. Particular cases might appear to present exceptions to this rule, but given the statutory and administrative framework for assuring compliance with the requirements of Title I, we do not think recognizing such *646 exceptions is within the province of the courts. Congress has already accommodated equitable concerns in the statutory provisions governing recovery of misused funds. Those provisions limit liability for repayment to funds received during the five years preceding the final written notice of liability, 20 U.S. C. 884 (1976 ed.), repealed and replaced by 20 U.S. C. 1234a(g), and authorize the Secretary, under certain conditions, to return to the State up to 75% of any amount recovered. 1234e(a). Of course, if Congress believes that the equities so warrant, it may relax the requirements applicable to prior grants or forgive liability entirely. The role of a court in reviewing a determination by the Secretary that funds have been misused is to judge whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and reflect application of the proper legal standards. Where the Secretary has properly concluded that funds were misused under the legal standards in effect when the grants were made, a reviewing court has no independent authority to excuse repayment based on its view of what would be the most equitable outcome. Cf. Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Education, post, at 662-663. Because the Court of Appeals has not yet addressed New 's arguments that the demanded repayment does not reflect proper application of the standards in effect during 1970-1972, the State may renew these contentions on remand. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | In 1992, Congress amended the patent laws and expressly abrogated the States' sovereign immunity from claims of patent infringement Respondent College Savings then sued the State of Florida for patent infringement, and the Court of Appeals held that Congress had validly abrogated the State's sovereign immunity from infringement suits pursuant to its authority under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment We hold that, under City of the statute cannot be sustained as legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and accordingly reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals I Since 1987, respondent College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered savings bank located in Princeton, New Jersey, has marketed and sold certificates of deposit known as the CollegeSure CD, which are essentially annuity contracts for financing future college expenses College Savings obtained *631 a patent for its financing methodology, designed to guarantee investors sufficient funds to cover the costs of tuition for colleges Petitioner Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid) is an entity created by the State of Florida that administers similar tuition prepayment contracts available to Florida residents and their children See Fla Stat 240551(1) College Savings claims that, in the course of administering its tuition prepayment program, Florida Prepaid directly and indirectly infringed College Savings' patent College Savings brought an infringement action under 35 US C 271(a) against Florida Prepaid in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in November 1994[1] By the time College Savings filed its suit, Congress had already passed the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act), 35 US C 271(h), 2(a) Before this legislation, the patent laws stated only that "whoever" without authority made, used, or sold a patented invention infringed the patent 35 US C 271(a) (1988 ed)[2] Applying this Court's decision in Atas- *632 cadero State the Federal Circuit had held that the patent laws failed to contain the requisite statement of intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity from infringement suits See, e g, In response to Chew and similar decisions, Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act to "clarify that States, instrumentalities of States, and officers and employees of States acting in their official capacity, are subject to suit in Federal court by any person for infringement of and plant variety protections" preamble, ; see also H R Rep No 101-0, pt 1, pp 7, 33 (hereinafter H R Rep); S Rep No 102-280, pp 7, 1, "As 1, 5-6 (1992) (hereinafter S Rep) Section 271(h) now states: used in this section, the term `whoever' includes |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | now states: used in this section, the term `whoever' includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity" Section 2(a) addresses the sovereign immunity issue even more specifically: "Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person for infringement of a patent under section 271, or for any other violation under this title" Relying on these provisions, College Savings alleged that Florida Prepaid had willfully infringed its patent under *633 271, as well as contributed to and induced infringement College Savings sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages, attorney's fees, and costs After this Court decided of Florida Prepaid moved to dismiss the action on the grounds of sovereign immunity[3] Florida Prepaid argued that the Patent Remedy Act was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity College Savings responded that Congress had properly exercised its power pursuant to 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the guarantees of the Due Process Clause in 1 of the Amendment The United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute Agreeing with College Savings, the District Court denied Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, The Federal Circuit held that Congress had clearly expressed its intent to abrogate the States' immunity from suit in federal court for patent infringement, and that Congress had the power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to do so The court reasoned that are property subject to the protections of the Due Process Clause and that Congress' objective in enacting the Patent Remedy Act was permissible because it sought to prevent States from depriving patent owners of this property without due process See The court rejected Florida Prepaid's argument that it and other States had not deprived patent owners of their property without due process, and refused to "deny Congress the authority to subject all states to suit for patent infringement in the federal courts, regardless of the extent of procedural due process that may exist at any particular time" Finally, *634 the court held that the Patent Remedy Act was a proportionate response to state infringement and an appropriate measure to protect patent owners' property under this Court's |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | appropriate measure to protect patent owners' property under this Court's decision in City of The court concluded that significant harm results from state infringement of -1354, and "[t]here is no sound reason to hold that Congress cannot subject a state to the same civil consequences that face a private party infringer," We granted certiorari, and now reverse II The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State" As the Court recently explained in at 54: "Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, `we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition which it confirms' That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that `"[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent"' quoting The Federalist No 81 For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States `was not contemplated by *635 the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States' " Here, College Savings sued the State of Florida in federal court, and it is undisputed that Florida has not expressly consented to suit College Savings and the United States argue that Florida has impliedly waived its immunity under That argument, however, is foreclosed by our decision in the companion case overruling the constructive waiver theory announced in Parden See College Savings Bank v Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed Expense Bd, post, p 666 College Savings and the United States nonetheless contend that Congress' enactment of the Patent Remedy Act validly abrogated the States' sovereign immunity To determine the merits of this proposition, we must answer two questions: "first, whether Congress has `unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity,' and second, whether Congress has acted `pursuant to a valid exercise of power'" We agree with the parties and the Federal Circuit that in enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Congress has made its intention to abrogate the States' immunity "`unmistakably clear in the language of the statute'" Indeed, Congress' intent to abrogate could not have been any clearer See 35 US C 2(a) ("Any State shall not be immune, under the eleventh |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | 2(a) ("Any State shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court for infringement of a patent") Whether Congress had the power to compel States to surrender their sovereign immunity for these purposes, however, is another matter Congress justified the Patent Remedy Act under three sources of constitutional authority: the Patent Clause, Art I, 8, cl 8; the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art I, 8, cl 3; and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment *636 See S Rep, at 7-8; H R Rep, at 39-40[4] In of course, this Court overruled the plurality opinion in our only prior case finding congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to an Article I power (the Commerce Clause) -73 makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause Ibid The Federal Circuit recognized this, and College Savings and the United States do not contend otherwise Instead, College Savings and the United States argue that the Federal Circuit properly concluded that Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act to secure the Fourteenth Amendment's protections against deprivations of property without due process of law The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "Section 1 No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law "Section 5 The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article" While reaffirming the view that state sovereign immunity does not yield to Congress' Article I powers, this Court in *637 also reaffirmed its holding in Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445 that Congress retains the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment Our opinion explained that in Fitzpatrick, "we recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution" The Court further described Fitzpatrick as holding that "through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore that 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment" College Savings and the United States are correct in suggesting that "appropriate" legislation pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could abrogate state sovereignty Congress itself apparently thought the Patent Remedy Act could be so justified: "[T]he bill is justified |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | Remedy Act could be so justified: "[T]he bill is justified as an acceptable method of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment The Court in Lemelson v Ampex Corp [, 372 F Supp 708] recognized that a patent is a form of property, holding that a right to compensation exists for patent infringement Additionally, because courts have continually recognized patent rights as property, the fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving a person of property without due process of law" S Rep, at 8 (footnotes omitted) We have held that "[t]he `provisions of this article,' to which 5 refers, include the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" City of But the legislation must nonetheless be "appropriate" under 5 as that term was construed in City of *638 There, this Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat 1488, 42 US C 2000bb et seq, exceeded Congress' authority under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as RFRA was made applicable to the States RFRA was enacted "in direct response to" this Court's decision in Employment Div, Dept of Human Resources of Ore v Smith, 494 US 872 which construed the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to hold that "neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest" City of Through RFRA, Congress reinstated the compelling governmental interest test eschewed by Smith by requiring that a generally applicable law placing a "substantial burden" on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a "compelling governmental interest" and must employ the "least restrictive means" of furthering that interest 521 US, at 515-516 In holding that RFRA could not be justified as "appropriate" enforcement legislation under 5, the Court emphasized that Congress' enforcement power is "remedial" in nature We recognized that "[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into `legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States'" We also noted, however, that "`[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited,'" ib and held that "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is It has been given the power `to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation," Canvassing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and *639 case law examining the propriety of Congress' various voting rights measures,[5] the Court explained: "While the line between measures that remedy or |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | Court explained: "While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect" -520 We thus held that for Congress to invoke 5, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct RFRA failed to meet this test because there was little support in the record for the concerns that supposedly animated the law And, unlike the measures in the voting rights cases, RFRA's provisions were "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object" that RFRA could not be understood "as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior" ; see also Can the Patent Remedy Act be viewed as remedial or preventive legislation aimed at securing the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment for patent owners? Following City of we must first identify the Fourteenth Amendment "evil" or "wrong" that Congress intended to remedy, guided *640 by the principle that the propriety of any 5 legislation "`must be judged with reference to the historical experience it reflects'" The underlying conduct at issue here is state infringement of and the use of sovereign immunity to deny patent owners compensation for the invasion of their patent rights See H R Rep, at 3738 ("[P]atent owners are effectively denied a remedy for damages resulting from infringement by a State or State entity"); S Rep, at 6 ("[P]laintiffs in patent infringement cases against a State are foreclosed from damages, regardless of the State conduct") It is this conduct thenunremedied patent infringement by the Statesthat must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation that Congress sought to redress in the Patent Remedy Act In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations Unlike the undisputed record of racial discrimination confronting Congress in the voting rights cases, see City of -527, Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part of the States The House Report acknowledged that "many states comply with patent law" and could provide only two examples of patent infringement suits against the States See H R Rep, The Federal Circuit |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | against the States See H R Rep, The Federal Circuit in its opinion identified only eight patent-infringement suits prosecuted against the States in the 110 years between 1880 and 1990 See -1354 Testimony before the House Subcommittee in favor of the bill acknowledged that "states are willing and able to respect patent rights The fact that there are so few reported cases involving patent infringement claims against states underlies the point" Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H R 3886 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong, 2d Sess, 56 (hereinafter House Hearings) (statement of William *641 S Thompson); ("[S]tates do occasionally find themselves in patent infringement suits") Even the bill's sponsor conceded that "[w]e do not have any evidence of massive or widespread violation of patent laws by the States either with or without this State immunity" (statement of Rep Kastenmeier)[6] The Senate Report, as well, contains no evidence that unremedied patent infringement by States had become a problem of national import At most, Congress heard testimony that patent infringement by States might increase in the future, see House Hearings 22 (statement of Jeffrey Samuels); ; and acted to head off this speculative harm See H R Rep, College Savings argues that by infringing a patent and then pleading immunity to an infringement suit, a State not only infringes the patent, but deprives the patentee of property without due process of law and "takes" the property in the patent without paying the just compensation required *642 by the Fifth Amendment[7] The United States declines to defend the Act as based on the Just Compensation Clause, but joins in College Savings' defense of the Act as designed to prevent a State from depriving a patentee of property without due process of law Florida Prepaid contends that Congress may not invoke 5 to protect property interests that it has created in the first place under Article I Patents, however, have long been considered a species of property See Brown v Duchesne, 19 How 183, ; cf, Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co v Wright, 94 US 92, As such, they are surely included within the "property" of which no person may be deprived by a State without due process of law And if the Due Process Clause protects we know of no reason why Congress might not legislate against their deprivation without due process under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment Though may be considered "property" for purposes of our analysis, the legislative record still provides little support for the proposition |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | the legislative record still provides little support for the proposition that Congress sought to remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation in enacting the Patent Remedy Act The Due Process Clause provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" U S Const, Amdt 14, 1 (emphasis added) This Court has accordingly held that "[i]n procedural due process claims, the deprivation by *643 state action of a constitutionally protected interest is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law" Zinermon v Burch, 494 US 113, Thus, under the plain terms of the Clause and the clear import of our precedent, a State's infringement of a patent, though interfering with a patent owner's right to exclude others, does not by itself violate the Constitution Instead, only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a deprivation of property without due process result See Parratt v Taylor, 451 US 527, ; Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, ; (O'Connor, J, concurring) ("[I]n challenging a property deprivation, the claimant must either avail himself of the remedies guaranteed by state law or prove that the available remedies are inadequate When adequate remedies are provided and followed, no deprivation of property without due process can result") Congress, however, barely considered the availability of state remedies for patent infringement and hence whether the States' conduct might have amounted to a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment It did hear a limited amount of testimony to the effect that the remedies available in some States were uncertain[8] *644 The primary point made by these witnesses, however, was not that state remedies were constitutionally inadequate, but rather that they were less convenient than federal remedies, and might undermine the uniformity of patent law See, e g, House Hearings 43 ("[U]niformity again dictates that that sovereign immunity is a mistake in this field because of the variance among the State's laws"), ; [9] Congress itself said nothing about the existence or adequacy of state remedies in the statute or in the Senate Report, and made only a few fleeting references to state remedies in the House Report, essentially repeating the testimony of the witnesses See H R Rep, at 37, n 158 ("[T]he availability of a State remedy is tenuous and could vary significantly State to State"); The need for uniformity in the construction of patent law is undoubtedly important, but that is a factor which belongs to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | undoubtedly important, but that is a factor which belongs to the Article I patent-power calculus, rather than to any determination of whether a state plea of sovereign immunity deprives a patentee of property without due process of law We have also said that a state actor's negligent act that causes unintended injury to a person's property does not "deprive" that person of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause See Daniels v Williams, 474 US 327, Actions predicated on direct patent infringement, however, do not require any showing of intent to infringe; instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with respect to damages See 35 US C 271(a) (1994 ed, Supp III); 5 D Chisum, Patents 1602[2], p 16-31 ("`It is, of course, elementary, that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of the patent' ") Congress did not focus on instances of intentional or reckless infringement on the part of the States Indeed, the evidence before Congress suggested that most state infringement was innocent or at worst negligent See S Rep, at 10 ("`It is not always clear that with all the products that [government] buy[s], that anyone is really aware of the patent status of any particular invention or device or product' "); H R Rep, at 39 ("[I]t should be very rare for a court to find willful infringement on the part of a State or State agency") Such negligent conduct, however, does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does not respond to a history of "widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights" of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic 5 legislation City of 521 U S, at 526 Instead, Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not *646 necessarily violate the Constitution Though the lack of support in the legislative record is not determinative, see identifying the targeted constitutional wrong or evil is still a critical part of our 5 calculus because "[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one," Here, the record at best offers scant support for Congress' conclusion that States were depriving patent owners of property without due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court patent actions Because of this lack, the provisions of the Patent Remedy Act are "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118316/florida-prepaid-postsecondary-ed-expense-bd-v-college-savings-bank/ | or preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior" An unlimited range of state conduct would expose a State to claims of direct, induced, or contributory patent infringement, and the House Report itself cited testimony acknowledging "`it[`]s difficult for us to identify a patented product or process which might not be used by a state'" H R Rep, [10] Despite subjecting States to this expansive liability, Congress did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses to offer any *647 state-court remedy for patent owners whose it had infringed Nor did it make any attempt to confine the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement, such as nonnegligent infringement or infringement authorized pursuant to state policy; or providing for suits only against States with questionable remedies or a high incidence of infringement Instead, Congress made all States immediately amenable to suit in federal court for all kinds of possible patent infringement and for an indefinite duration Our opinion in City of discussed with approval the various limits that Congress imposed in its voting rights measures, see 521 US, -533, and noted that where "a congressional enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends legitimate under 5," The Patent Remedy Act's indiscriminate scope offends this principle, and is particularly incongruous in light of the scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy In sum, it simply cannot be said that "many of [the acts of infringement] affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional" The historical record and the scope of coverage therefore make it clear that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment The examples of States avoiding liability for patent infringement by pleading sovereign immunity in a federal-court patent action are scarce enough, but any plausible argument that such action on the part of the State deprived patentees of property and left them without a remedy under state law is scarcer still The statute's apparent and more basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent infringement and to place States on the same footing as private parties under *648 that regime[11] These are proper Article I concerns, but that Article does not give Congress the power to enact such legislation after The judgment of the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,978 | 11 | dissenting | Robertson v. Wegmann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109877/robertson-v-wegmann/ | It is disturbing to see the Court, in this decision, although almost apologetically self-described as "a narrow one," ante, at 594, cut back on what is acknowledged, ante, at 590, to be the "broad sweep" of 42 U.S. C. Accordingly, I dissent. I do not read the emphasis of 1988, as the Court does, ante, at 585 and 593-594, n. 11, to the effect that the Federal District Court "was required to adopt" the Louisiana statute, and was free to look to federal common law only as a secondary matter. It seems to me that this places the cart before the horse. Section 1988 requires the utilization of federal law ("shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States"). It authorizes resort to the state statute only if the federal laws "are not adapted to the object" of "protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication" or are "deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law." Even then, state statutes are an alternative source of law only if "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Surely, federal law is the rule and not the exception. Accepting this as the proper starting point, it necessarily follows, it seems to me, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed, not reversed. To be sure, survivorship of a civil rights action under 1983 upon the death of either party is not specifically covered by the federal statute. But that does not mean that "the laws of the United States" are not "suitable" or are "not adapted to the object" or are "deficient in the provisions necessary." The federal law and *596 the underlying federal policy stand bright and clear. And in the light of that brightness and of that clarity, I see no need to resort to the myriad of state rules governing the survival of state actions. First. In a case that concerned the availability of compensatory damages for a violation of 1982, a remedial question, as here, not governed explicitly by any federal statute other than 1988, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, painted with a broad brush the scope of the federal court's choice-of-law authority: "[A]s we read 1988, both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes. The rule of damages, whether drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is |
Justice Blackmun | 1,978 | 11 | dissenting | Robertson v. Wegmann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109877/robertson-v-wegmann/ | rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired." The Court's present reading of 1988 seems to me to be hyperlogical and sadly out of line with the precept set forth in that quoted material. The statute was intended to give courts flexibility to shape their procedures and remedies in accord with the underlying policies of the Civil Rights Acts, choosing whichever rule "better serves" those policies I do not understand the Court to deny a federal court's authority under 1988 to reject state law when to apply it seriously undermines substantial federal concerns. But I do not accept the Court's apparent conclusion that, absent such an extreme inconsistency, 1988 restricts courts to state law on matters of procedure and remedy. That conclusion too often would interfere with the efficient redress of constitutional rights. Second. The Court's reading of 1988 cannot easily be squared with its treatment of the problems of immunity and damages under the Civil Rights Acts. Only this Term, in *597 the Court set a rule for the award of damages under 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process by resort to "federal common law." Though the case arose from Illinois, the Court did not feel compelled to inquire into Illinois' statutory or decisional law of damages, nor to test that law for possible "inconsistency" with the federal scheme, before embracing a federal common-law rule. Instead, the Court fashioned a federal damages rule, from common-law sources and its view of the type of injury, to govern such cases uniformly State to State. -259, and n. 13. Similarly, in constructing immunities under 1983, the Court has consistently relied on federal common-law rules. As recognizes, at 258 n. 13, in attributing immunity to prosecutors, ; to judges, ; and to other officials, matters on which the language of 1983 is silent, we have not felt bound by the tort immunities recognized in the particular forum State and, only after finding an "inconsistency" with federal standards, then considered a uniform federal rule. Instead, the immunities have been fashioned in light of historic common-law concerns and the policies of the Civil Rights Acts.[1] Third. A flexible reading of 1988, permitting resort to a federal rule of survival because it "better serves" the policies of the Civil Rights Acts, would be consistent with the methodology employed in the other major choice-of-law provision in the federal structure, namely, the Rules of Decision Act. 28 *598 U. S. C. 1652.[2] That Act provides that state law is to govern a civil trial in a federal court "except where the Constitution or treaties |
Justice Blackmun | 1,978 | 11 | dissenting | Robertson v. Wegmann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109877/robertson-v-wegmann/ | in a federal court "except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide." The exception has not been interpreted in a crabbed or wooden fashion, but, instead, has been used to give expression to important federal interests. Thus, for example, the exception has been used to apply a federal common law of labor contracts in suits under 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S. C. 185 (a), Textile ; to apply federal common law to transactions in commercial paper issued by the United States where the United States is a party, Clearfield Trust ; and to avoid application of governing state law to the reservation of mineral rights in a land acquisition agreement to which the United States was a party and that bore heavily upon a federal wildlife regulatory program, United See also Auto : "[S]tate law is applied [under the Rules of Decision Act] only because it supplements and fulfills federal policy, and the ultimate question is what federal policy requires." (WHITE, J., dissenting.) Just as the Rules of Decision Act cases disregard state law where there is conflict with federal policy, even though no explicit conflict with the terms of a federal statute, so, too, state remedial and procedural law must be disregarded under 1988 where that law fails to give adequate expression to important federal concerns. See The opponents of the 1866 Act were distinctly aware that the legislation that became 1988 would *599 give the federal courts power to shape federal common-law rules. See, for example, the protesting remarks of Congressman Kerr relative to 3 of the 1866 Act (which contained the predecessor version of 1988): "I might go on and in this manner illustrate the practical working of this extraordinary measure. [T]he authors of this bill feared, very properly too, that the system of laws heretofore administered in the Federal courts might fail to supply any precedent to guide the courts in the enforcement of the strange provisions of this bill, and not to be thwarted by this difficulty, they confer upon the courts the power of judicial legislation, the power to make such other laws as they may think necessary. Such is the practical effect of the last clause of the third section [of 1988] "That is to say, the Federal courts may, in such cases, make such rules and apply such law as they please, and call it common law" (emphasis in original). Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1271 (1866). Fourth. Section 1983's critical concerns are compensation of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,978 | 11 | dissenting | Robertson v. Wegmann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109877/robertson-v-wegmann/ | 1271 (1866). Fourth. Section 1983's critical concerns are compensation of the victims of unconstitutional action, and deterrence of like misconduct in the future. Any crabbed rule of survivorship obviously interferes directly with the second critical interest and may well interfere with the first. The unsuitability of Louisiana's law is shown by the very case at hand. It will happen not infrequently that a decedent's only survivor or survivors are nonrelatives or collateral relatives who do not fit within the four named classes of Louisiana statutory survivors. Though the Court surmises, ante, at 591-592, that "surely few persons are not survived" by a spouse, children, parents, or siblings, any lawyer who has had experience in estate planning or in probating estates knows that that situation is frequently encountered. The Louisiana survivorship rule applies no matter how malicious or ill-intentioned a defendant's action was. In this case, as *600 the Court acknowledges, ante, at 586 n. 2, the District Court found that defendant Garrison brought state perjury charges against plaintiff Shaw "in bad faith and for purposes of harassment," a finding that the Court of Appeals affirmed as not clearly erroneous. The federal interest in specific deterrence, when there was malicious intention to deprive a person of his constitutional rights, is particularly strong, as n. 11. Insuring a specific deterrent under federal law gains importance from the very premise of the Civil Rights Act that state tort policy often is inadequate to deter violations of the constitutional rights of disfavored groups. The Louisiana rule requiring abatement appears to apply even where the death was intentional and caused, say, by a beating delivered by a defendant. The Court does not deny this result, merely declaiming, ante, at 594, that in such a case it might reconsider the applicability of the Louisiana survivorship statute. But the Court does not explain how either certainty or federalism is served by such a variegated application of the Louisiana statute, nor how an abatement rule would be workable when made to depend on a fact of causation often requiring an entire trial to prove. It makes no sense to me to make even a passing reference, ante, at 592, to behavioral influence. The Court opines that no official aware of the intricacies of Louisiana survivorship law would "be influenced in his behavior by its provisions." But the defendants in Shaw's litigation obviously have been "sweating it out" through the several years of proceedings and litigation in this case. One can imagine the relief occasioned when the realization dawned that Shaw's death mightjust mightabate the action. To that extent, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,978 | 11 | dissenting | Robertson v. Wegmann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109877/robertson-v-wegmann/ | that Shaw's death mightjust mightabate the action. To that extent, the deterrent against behavior such as that attributed to the defendants in this case surely has been lessened. As to compensation, it is no answer to intimate, as the Court *601 does, ante, at 591-592, that Shaw's particular survivors were not personally injured, for obviously had Shaw been survived by parents or siblings, the cause of action would exist despite the absence in them of so deep and personal an affront, or any at all, as Shaw himself was alleged to have sustained. The Court propounds the unreasoned conclusion, ib that the "goal of compensating those injured by a deprivation of rights provides no basis for requiring compensation of one who is merely suing as the executor of the deceased's estate." But the Court does not purport to explain why it is consistent with the purposes of 1983 to recognize a derivative or independent interest in a brother or parent, while denying similar interest to a nephew, grandparent, or legatee. Fifth. The Court regards the Louisiana system's structuring of survivorship rights as not unreasonable. Ante, at 592. The observation, of course, is a gratuitous one, for as the Court immediately observes, at 592 n. 8, it does not resolve the issue that confronts us here. We are not concerned with the reasonableness of the Louisiana survivorship statute in allocating tort recoveries. We are concerned with its application in the face of a claim of civil rights guaranteed the decedent by federal law. Similarly, the Court's observation that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S. C. 908 (d), 909 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V), and Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S. C. 59, limit survival to specific named relatives or dependents (albeit a larger class of survivors than the Louisiana statute allows) is gratuitous. Those statutes have as their main purpose loss shifting and compensation, rather than deterrence of unconstitutional conduct. And, although the Court does not mention it, any reference to the survival rule provided in 42 U.S. C. 1986 governing that statute's principle of vicarious liability, would be off point. There it was the extraordinary character of the liability created by 1986, of failing to prevent wrongful acts, that apparently induced Congress to limit recovery to *602 widows or next of kin in a specified amount of statutory damages. Cf. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 749-752, 756-763 (1871); Moor v. County of n. 26. The Court acknowledges, ante, at 590, "the broad sweep of 1983," but seeks to justify the application of a rule of nonsurvivorship |
Justice Blackmun | 1,978 | 11 | dissenting | Robertson v. Wegmann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109877/robertson-v-wegmann/ | seeks to justify the application of a rule of nonsurvivorship here because it feels that Louisiana is comparatively generous as to survivorship anyway. This grudging allowance of what the Louisiana statute does not give, just because it gives in part, seems to me to grind adversely against the statute's "broad sweep." Would the Court's decision be otherwise if actions for defamation and malicious prosecution in fact did not survive at all in Louisiana? The Court by omission admits, ante, at 591, and n. 6, that that question of survival has not been litigated in Louisiana. See Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 6 n. 23 Defamation and malicious prosecution actions wholly abate upon the death of the plaintiff in a large number of States, see ante, at 591, and n. 6. Does it make sense to apply a federal rule of survivorship in those States while preserving a different state rule, stingier than the federal rule, in Louisiana? Sixth. A federal rule of survivorship allows uniformity, and counsel immediately know the answer. Litigants identically aggrieved in their federal civil rights, residing in geographically adjacent States, will not have differing results due to the vagaries of state law. Litigants need not engage in uncertain characterization of a 1983 action in terms of its nearest tort cousin, a questionable procedure to begin with, since the interests protected by tort law and constitutional law may be quite different. Nor will federal rights depend on the arcane intricacies of state survival lawwhich differs in Louisiana according to whether the right is "strictly personal," La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 428 (West 1960); whether the action concerns property damage, La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2315, ¶ 2 *603 (West 1971); or whether it concerns "other damages," See The policies favoring so-called "absolute" survivorship, viz., survivorship in favor of a decedent's nonrelated legatees in the absence of familial legatees, are the simple goals of uniformity, deterrence, and perhaps compensation. A defendant who has violated someone's constitutional rights has no legitimate interest in a windfall release upon the death of the victim. A plaintiff's interest in certainty, in an equal remedy, and in deterrence supports such an absolute rule. I regard as unanswered the justifications advanced by the District Court and the Court of Appeals: uniformity of decisions and fulfillment of the great purposes of 1363-1365; Seventh. Rejecting Louisiana's survivorship limitations does not mean that state procedure and state remedies will cease to serve as important sources of civil rights law. State law, for instance, may well be |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | This case involves the process by which Ohio classifies prisoners for placement at its highest security prison, known as a "Supermax" facility. Supermax facilities are maximum-security prisons with highly restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the general prison population. We must consider what process the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires Ohio to afford to inmates before assigning them to Supermax. We hold that the procedures Ohio has adopted provide sufficient procedural protection to comply with due process requirements. The use of Supermax prisons has increased over the last 20 years, in part as a response to the rise in prison gangs and prison violence. See generally U. S. Dept. of Justice, National nstitute of Corrections, C. Riveland, Supermax Prisons: Overview and General Considerations 1 http://www.nicic.org/pubs//014937.pdf (as visited June 9, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). About 30 States now operate Supermax prisons, in addition to the two somewhat comparable facilities operated by the Federal Government. *214 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2. n 1998, Ohio opened its only Supermax facility, the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), after a riot in one of its maximum-security prisons. OSP has the capacity to house up to inmates in single-inmate cells and is designed to "`separate the most predatory and dangerous prisoners from the rest of the general [prison] population.'" See (quoting deposition of R. Wilkinson, pp. 24-25). Conditions at OSP are more restrictive than any other form of incarceration in Ohio, including conditions on its death row or in its administrative control units. The latter are themselves a highly restrictive form of solitary confinement. See Austin and n. 5 (citing Ohio Admin. Code 5120-9-13 (2001) ). n the OSP almost every aspect of an inmate's life is controlled and monitored. nmates must remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day. A light remains on in the cell at all times, though it is sometimes dimmed, and an inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to further discipline. During the one hour per day that an inmate may leave his cell, access is limited to one of two indoor recreation cells. ncarceration at OSP is synonymous with extreme isolation. n contrast to any other Ohio prison, including any segregation unit, OSP cells have solid metal doors with metal strips along their sides and bottoms which prevent conversation or communication with other inmates. All meals are taken alone in the inmate's cell instead of in a common eating area. Opportunities for visitation |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | instead of in a common eating area. Opportunities for visitation are rare and in all events are conducted through glass walls. t is fair to say OSP inmates are deprived of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact. Aside from the severity of the conditions, placement at OSP is for an indefinite period of time, limited only by an *2 inmate's sentence. For an inmate serving a life sentence, there is no indication how long he may be incarcerated at OSP once assigned there. Austin nmates otherwise eligible for parole lose their eligibility while incarcerated at Placement at OSP is determined in the following manner: Upon entering the prison system, all Ohio inmates are assigned a numerical security classification from level 1 through level 5, with 1 the lowest security risk and 5 the highest. See Brief for Petitioners 7. The initial security classification is based on numerous factors (e. g., the nature of the underlying offense, criminal history, or gang affiliation) but is subject to modification at any time during the inmate's prison term if, for instance, he engages in misconduct or is deemed a security risk. bid. Level 5 inmates are placed in OSP, and levels 1 through 4 inmates are placed at lower security facilities throughout the State. bid. Ohio concedes that when OSP first became operational, the procedures used to assign inmates to the facility were inconsistent and undefined. For a time, no official policy governing placement was in effect. See Austin Haphazard placements were not uncommon, and some individuals who did not pose high-security risks were designated, nonetheless, for n an effort to establish guidelines for the selection and classification of inmates suitable for OSP, Ohio issued Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Policy 111-07 (Aug. 31, 1998). This policy has been revised at various points but relevant here are two versions: the "Old Policy" and the "New Policy." The Old Policy took effect on January 28, but problems with assignment appear to have persisted even under this written set of standards. -736. After forming a committee to study the matter and retaining a national expert in prison security, Ohio promulgated the New Policy in early The New Policy provided more guidance regarding *216 the factors to be considered in placement decisions and afforded inmates more procedural protection against erroneous placement at Although the record is not altogether clear regarding the precise manner in which the New Policy operates, we construe it based on the policy's text, the accompanying forms, and the parties' representations at oral argument and in their briefs. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | the parties' representations at oral argument and in their briefs. The New Policy appears to operate as follows: A classification review for OSP placement can occur either (1) upon entry into the prison system if the inmate was convicted of certain offenses, e. g., organized crime, or (2) during the term of incarceration if an inmate engages in specified conduct, e. g., leads a prison gang. App. 42-43. The review process begins when a prison official prepares a "Security Designation Long Form" (Long Form). d., This three-page form details matters such as the inmate's recent violence, escape attempts, gang affiliation, underlying offense, and other pertinent details. d., 38-45. A three-member Classification Committee (Committee) convenes to review the proposed classification and to hold a hearing. At least 48 hours before the hearing, the inmate is provided with written notice summarizing the conduct or offense triggering the review. d., At the time of notice, the inmate also has access to the Long Form, which details why the review was initiated. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-17. The inmate may attend the hearing, may "offer any pertinent information, explanation and/or objections to [OSP] placement," and may submit a written statement. App. 22. He may not call witnesses. f the Committee does not recommend OSP placement, the process terminates. d., See also Brief for Petitioners 9. f the Committee does recommend OSP placement, it documents the decision on a "Classification Committee Report" (CCR), setting forth "the nature of the threat the inmate presents and the committee's reasons for the recommendation," App. 64, as well as a summary of any information *217 presented at the hearing, The Committee sends the completed CCR to the warden of the prison where the inmate is housed or, in the case of an inmate just entering the prison system, to another designated official. d., f, after reviewing the CCR, the warden (or the designated official) disagrees and concludes that OSP is inappropriate, the process terminates and the inmate is not placed in f the warden agrees, he indicates his approval on the CCR, provides his reasons, and forwards the annotated CCR to the Bureau of Classification (Bureau) for a final decision. d., (The Bureau is a body of Ohio prison officials vested with final decisionmaking authority over all Ohio inmate assignments.) The annotated CCR is served upon the inmate, notifying him of the Committee's and warden's recommendations and reasons. d., The inmate has days to file any objections with the Bureau. bid. After the -day period, the Bureau reviews the CCR and makes a final determination. f it concludes |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | the CCR and makes a final determination. f it concludes OSP placement is inappropriate, the process terminates. f the Bureau approves the warden's recommendation, the inmate is transferred to The Bureau's chief notes the reasons for the decision on the CCR, and the CCR is again provided to the inmate. bid. nmates assigned to OSP receive another review within 30 days of their arrival. That review is conducted by a designated OSP staff member, who examines the inmate's file. d., f the OSP staff member deems the inmate inappropriately placed, he prepares a written recommendation to the OSP warden that the inmate be transferred to a lower security institution. Brief for Petitioners 9; App. 25. f the OSP warden concurs, he forwards that transfer recommendation to the Bureau for appropriate action. f the inmate is deemed properly placed, he remains in OSP and his placement is reviewed on at least an annual basis according to the initial three-tier classification review process outlined above. Brief for Petitioners 9-10. *218 This action began when a class of current and former OSP inmates brought suit under Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S. C. 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against various Ohio prison officials. We refer to the class of plaintiff inmates, respondents here, collectively as "the inmates." We refer to the prison officials, petitioners here, as "Ohio." The inmates' complaint alleged that Ohio's Old Policy, which was in effect at the time the suit was brought, violated due process. n addition the inmates brought a claim that certain conditions at OSP violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments, but that claim was settled in the District Court. The extent to which the settlement resolved the practices that were the subject of the inmates' Eighth Amendment claim is unclear but, in any event, that issue is not before us. The inmates' suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On the eve of trial Ohio promulgated its New Policy and represented that it contained the procedures to be followed in the future. The District Court and Court of Appeals evaluated the adequacy of the New Policy, and it therefore forms the basis for our determination here. After an 8-day trial with extensive evidence, including testimony from expert witnesses, the District Court made findings and conclusions and issued a detailed remedial order. First, relying on this Court's decision in the District Court found that the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to Austin -740. Second, the District Court found Ohio had denied the inmates due |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | the District Court found Ohio had denied the inmates due process by failing to afford a large number of them notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard before transfer; failing to give inmates sufficient notice of the grounds serving as the basis for their retention at OSP; and failing to give the inmates sufficient opportunity to understand the reasoning and evidence *219 used to retain them at d., Third, the District Court held that, although Ohio's New Policy provided more procedural safeguards than its Old Policy, it was nonetheless inadequate to meet procedural due process requirements. d., n a separate order it directed extensive modifications to that policy. (Austin ). The modifications the District Court ordered to Ohio's New Policy included both substantive and procedural reforms. The former narrowed the grounds that Ohio could consider in recommending assignment to For instance, possession of drugs in small amounts, according to the District Court, could not serve as the basis for an OSP assignment. d., The following are some of the procedural modifications the District Court ordered: (1) Finding that the notice provisions of Ohio's New Policy were inadequate, the District Court ordered Ohio to provide the inmates with an exhaustive list of grounds believed to justify placement at OSP and a summary of all evidence upon which the Committee would rely. Matters not so identified, the District Court ordered, could not be considered by the Committee. d., (2) The District Court supplemented the inmate's opportunity to appear before the Committee and to make an oral or written statement by ordering Ohio to allow inmates to present documentary evidence and call witnesses before the Committee, provided that doing so would not be unduly hazardous or burdensome. The District Court further ordered that Ohio must attempt to secure the participation of any witness housed within the prison system. d., -1027. (3) Finding the New Policy's provision of a brief statement of reasons for a recommendation of OSP placement inadequate, the District Court ordered the Committee to summarize all evidence supporting its recommendation. d., Likewise, the District Court ordered the Bureau to prepare a "detailed and specific" statement "set[ting] *220 out all grounds" justifying OSP placement including "facts relied upon and reasoning used." bid. The statement shall "not use conclusory," "vague," or "boilerplate language," and must be delivered to the inmate within five days. d., -1028. (4) The District Court supplemented the New Policy's 30-day and annual review processes, ordering Ohio to notify the inmate twice per year both in writing and orally of his progress toward a security level reduction. Specifically, that |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | of his progress toward a security level reduction. Specifically, that notice must "advise the inmate what specific conduct is necessary for that prisoner to be reduced from Level 5 and the amount of time it will take before [Ohio] reduce[s] the inmate's security level classification." d., Ohio appealed. First, it maintained that the inmates lacked a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding placement at Second, it argued that, even assuming a liberty interest, its New Policy provides constitutionally adequate procedures and thus the District Court's modifications were unnecessary. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's conclusion that the inmates had a liberty interest in avoiding placement at The Court of Appeals also affirmed the District Court's procedural modifications in their entirety. d., Finally, it set aside the District Court's far-reaching substantive modifications, concluding they exceeded the scope of the District Court's authority. This last aspect of the Court of Appeals' ruling is not the subject of review in this Court. We granted certiorari to consider what process an inmate must be afforded under the Due Process Clause when he is considered for placement at For reasons discussed below, we conclude that the inmates have a protected liberty interest in avoiding assignment at We further hold that the procedures set forth in the New Policy are sufficient to satisfy the Constitution's requirements; it follows, then, that the procedural modifications *221 ordered by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals were in error. Withdrawing from the position taken in the Court of Appeals, Ohio in its briefs to this Court conceded that the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment at See Pet. for Cert. i; Brief for Petitioners i. The United States, supporting Ohio as amicus curiae, disagrees with Ohio's concession and argues that the inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding assignment to a prison facility with more restrictive conditions of confinement. See Brief for United States 10. At oral argument Ohio initially adhered to its earlier concession, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, but when pressed, the State backtracked. See We need reach the question of what process is due only if the inmates establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest, so it is appropriate to address this threshold question at the outset. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake. A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word "liberty," see, e. g., or it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies, see, e. g., We have held that the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement. We have also held, however, that a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or regulations, subject to the important limitations set forth in involved prisoners' claims to procedural due process protection before placement in segregated confinement for 30 days, imposed as discipline for disruptive behavior. observed that some of our earlier cases, in particular, had employed a methodology for identifying state-created liberty interests that emphasized "the language of a particular [prison] regulation" instead of "the nature of the deprivation." n we criticized this methodology as creating a disincentive for States to promulgate procedures for prison management, and as involving the federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons. d., For these reasons, we abrogated the methodology of parsing the language of particular regulations. "[T]he search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. The time has come to return to the due process principles we believe were correctly established in and applied in and Meachum. Following we recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation *223 to the ordinary incidents of prison life." d., After it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves "in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." d., Applying this refined inquiry, found no liberty interest protecting against a 30-day assignment to segregated confinement because it did not "present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate's] sentence." d., We noted, for example, that inmates in the general population experienced "significant amounts of `lockdown time'" and that the degree of confinement in disciplinary segregation was not excessive. d., We did |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | confinement in disciplinary segregation was not excessive. d., We did not find, moreover, the short duration of segregation to work a major disruption in the inmate's environment. bid. The standard requires us to determine if assignment to OSP "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." d., n 's wake the Courts of Appeals have not reached consistent conclusions for identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular prison system. Compare, e. g., and with See also This divergence indicates the difficulty of locating the appropriate baseline, an issue that was not explored at length in the briefs. We need not resolve the issue here, however, for we are satisfied that assignment to OSP imposes an atypical and significant hardship under any plausible baseline. For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted *224 from cell to cell; the light, though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially severe limitations on all human contact, these conditions likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities, but here there are two added components. First is the duration. Unlike the 30-day placement in placement at OSP is indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just annually. Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration. Austin While any of these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context. t follows that respondents have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP's harsh conditions may well be necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials and to other prisoners. See infra, at 227. That necessity, however, does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty interest in their avoidance. V A liberty interest having been established, we turn to the question of what process is due an inmate whom Ohio seeks to place in Because the requirements of due process are "flexible and cal[l] for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," we generally have declined to establish rigid rules and instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular procedures. The framework, established in requires consideration of three distinct factors: "First, the private interest that will be |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | three distinct factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation * of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." d., The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's procedural modifications under the assumption that altered the first Mathews factor. t reasoned that, "[i]n this first factor, affects the due process balance: because only those conditions that constitute `atypical and significant hardships' give rise to liberty interests, those interests will necessarily be of a weight requiring greater due process protection." -359. This proposition does not follow from concerned only whether a state-created liberty interest existed so as to trigger Mathews balancing at all. Having found no liberty interest to be at stake, had no occasion to consider whether the private interest was weighty vis-à-vis the remaining Mathews factors. Applying the three factors set forth in Mathews, we find Ohio's New Policy provides a sufficient level of process. We first consider the significance of the inmate's interest in avoiding erroneous placement at Prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty curtailed by definition, so the procedural protections to which they are entitled are more limited than in cases where the right at stake is the right to be free from confinement at all. See, e. g., ; The private interest at stake here, while more than minimal, must be evaluated, nonetheless, within the context of the prison system and its attendant curtailment of liberties. The second factor addresses the risk of an erroneous placement under the procedures in place, and the probable value, if any, of additional or alternative procedural safeguards. The New Policy provides that an inmate must receive notice *226 of the factual basis leading to consideration for OSP placement and a fair opportunity for rebuttal. Our procedural due process cases have consistently observed that these are among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous deprivations. See v. nmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, ; Cleveland Bd. of ; Requiring officials to provide a brief summary of the factual basis for the classification review and allowing the inmate a rebuttal opportunity safeguards against the inmate's being mistaken for another or singled out for insufficient reason. n addition to having the opportunity to be heard at the Committee stage, Ohio also invites the inmate to submit objections prior to the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | also invites the inmate to submit objections prior to the final level of review. This second opportunity further reduces the possibility of an erroneous deprivation. Although a subsequent reviewer may overturn an affirmative recommendation for OSP placement, the reverse is not true; if one reviewer declines to recommend OSP placement, the process terminates. This avoids one of the problems apparently present under the Old Policy, where, even if two levels of reviewers recommended against placement, a later reviewer could overturn their recommendation without explanation. f the recommendation is OSP placement, Ohio requires that the decisionmaker provide a short statement of reasons. This requirement guards against arbitrary decisionmaking while also providing the inmate a basis for objection before the next decisionmaker or in a subsequent classification review. The statement also serves as a guide for future behavior. See *227 As we have noted, Ohio provides multiple levels of review for any decision recommending OSP placement, with power to overturn the recommendation at each level. n addition to these safeguards, Ohio further reduces the risk of erroneous placement by providing for a placement review within 30 days of an inmate's initial assignment to The third Mathews factor addresses the State's interest. n the context of prison management, and in the specific circumstances of this case, this interest is a dominant consideration. Ohio has responsibility for imprisoning nearly 44,000 inmates. Austin The State's first obligation must be to ensure the safety of guards and prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves. See Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, provides the backdrop of the State's interest. Clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a means of disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs seek nothing less than to control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls. See Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 6. Murder of an inmate, a guard, or one of their family members on the outside is a common form of gang discipline and control, as well as a condition for membership in some gangs. See, e. g., United ; United Testifying against, or otherwise informing on, gang activities can invite one's own death sentence. t is worth noting in this regard that for prison gang members serving life sentences, some without the possibility of parole, the deterrent effects of ordinary criminal punishment may be substantially diminished. See *228 The problem of scarce resources is another component of the State's interest. The cost of keeping a single prisoner in one of Ohio's |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | cost of keeping a single prisoner in one of Ohio's ordinary maximum-security prisons is $34,167 per year, and the cost to maintain each inmate at OSP is $49,007 per year. See Austin We can assume that Ohio, or any other penal system, faced with costs like these will find it difficult to fund more effective education and vocational assistance programs to improve the lives of the prisoners. t follows that courts must give substantial deference to prison management decisions before mandating additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards when correctional officials conclude that a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior. The State's interest must be understood against this background. Were Ohio to allow an inmate to call witnesses or provide other attributes of an adversary hearing before ordering transfer to OSP, both the State's immediate objective of controlling the prisoner and its greater objective of controlling the prison could be defeated. This problem, moreover, is not alleviated by providing an exemption for witnesses who pose a hazard, for nothing in the record indicates simple mechanisms exist to determine when witnesses may be called without fear of reprisal. The danger to witnesses, and the difficulty in obtaining their cooperation, make the probable value of an adversary-type hearing doubtful in comparison to its obvious costs. A balance of the Mathews factors yields the conclusion that Ohio's New Policy is adequate to safeguard an inmate's liberty interest in not being assigned to Ohio is not, for example, attempting to remove an inmate from free society for a specific parole violation, see, e. g., 408 U. S., at or to revoke good-time credits for specific, serious misbehavior, see, e. g., where more formal, adversary-type procedures might be useful. Where the inquiry draws more on the experience of prison administrators, and where the State's interest implicates the *229 safety of other inmates and prison personnel, the informal, nonadversary procedures set forth in and provide the appropriate model. ; Although abrogated 's and 's methodology for establishing the liberty interest, these cases remain instructive for their discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards. Ohio's New Policy provides informal, nonadversary procedures comparable to those we upheld in and and no further procedural modifications are necessary in order to satisfy due process under the Mathews test. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals should have ordered the New Policy altered. The effect of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of in particular 18 U.S. C. 3626(a)(1)(A), in this case has not been discussed at any length in the briefs. n view of our disposition it is unnecessary |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | majority | Wilkinson v. Austin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799975/wilkinson-v-austin/ | the briefs. n view of our disposition it is unnecessary to address its application here. Prolonged confinement in Supermax may be the State's only option for the control of some inmates, and claims alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments were resolved, or withdrawn, by settlement in an early phase of this case. Here, any claim of excessive punishment in individual circumstances is not before us. The complaint challenged OSP assignments under the Old Policy, and the unwritten policies that preceded it, and alleged injuries resulting from those systems. Ohio conceded that assignments made under the Old Policy were, to say the least, imprecise. The District Court found constitutional violations had arisen under those earlier versions, and held *230 that the New Policy would produce many of the same constitutional problems. Austin 189 F. Supp. 2d, -754. We now hold that the New Policy as described in this opinion strikes a constitutionally permissible balance between the factors of the Mathews framework. f an inmate were to demonstrate that the New Policy did not in practice operate in this fashion, resulting in a cognizable injury, that could be the subject of an appropriate future challenge. On remand, the Court of Appeals, or the District Court, may consider in the first instance what, if any, prospective relief is still a necessary and appropriate remedy for due process violations under Ohio's previous policies. Any such relief must, of course, satisfy the conditions set forth in 18 U.S. C. 3626(a)(1)(A). * * * The Court of Appeals was correct to find the inmates possess a liberty interest in avoiding assignment at The Court of Appeals was incorrect, however, to sustain the procedural modifications ordered by the District Court. The portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion reversing the District Court's substantive modifications was not the subject of review upon certiorari and is unaltered by our decision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. t is so ordered. |
Justice Kavanaugh | 2,020 | 23 | majority | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | To establish standing under Article III of the Constitu- tion, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) that the injury was caused by the defend- ant, and (3) that the injury would likely be redressed by the requested judicial relief. See Plaintiffs James Thole and Sherry Smith are two retired participants in U. S. Bank’s retirement plan. Of decisive importance to this case, the plaintiffs’ retirement plan is a defined-benefit plan, not a defined-contribution plan. In a defined-benefit plan, retirees receive a fixed payment each month, and the payments do not fluctuate with the value of the plan or because of the plan fiduciaries’ good or bad in- vestment decisions. By contrast, in a defined-contribution plan, such as a 401(k) plan, the retirees’ benefits are typi- cally tied to the value of their accounts, and the benefits can turn on the plan fiduciaries’ particular investment deci- sions. See (2007); Hughes Aircraft 439– 2 THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A. Opinion of the Court 440 (1999). As retirees and vested participants in U. S. Bank’s de- fined-benefit plan, Thole receives $2,1.38 per month, and Smith receives $42.26 per month, regardless of the plan’s value at any one moment and regardless of the investment decisions of the plan’s fiduciaries. Thole and Smith have been paid all of their monthly pension benefits so far, and they are legally and contractually entitled to receive those same monthly payments for the rest of their lives. Even though the plaintiffs have not sustained any mone- tary injury, they filed a putative class-action suit against U. S. Bank and others (collectively, U. S. Bank) for alleged mismanagement of the defined-benefit plan. The alleged mismanagement occurred more than a decade ago, from 2007 to 2010. The plaintiffs sued under ERISA, the aptly named Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S. C. et seq. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated ERISA’s du- ties of loyalty and prudence by poorly investing the assets of the plan. The plaintiffs requested that U. S. Bank repay the plan approximately $750 million in losses that the plan allegedly suffered. The plaintiffs also asked for injunctive relief, including replacement of the plan’s fiduciaries. See ERISA (3), 29 U.S. C. (3). No small thing, the plaintiffs also sought attorney’s fees. In the District Court, the plaintiffs’ attorneys requested at least $31 million in attorney’s fees. The U. S. District Court for the District of Minnesota dis- missed the case, and the U. S. |
Justice Kavanaugh | 2,020 | 23 | majority | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | of Minnesota dis- missed the case, and the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the plaintiffs lack statutory standing. We granted certiorari. 588 U. S. (2019). We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the ground that the plaintiffs lack Ar- ticle III standing. Thole and Smith have received all of their monthly benefit payments so far, and the outcome of Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 3 Opinion of the Court this suit would not affect their future benefit payments. If Thole and Smith were to lose this lawsuit, they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits that they are al- ready slated to receive, not a penny less. If Thole and Smith were to win this lawsuit, they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits that they are already slated to re- ceive, not a penny more. The plaintiffs therefore have no concrete stake in this lawsuit. To be sure, their attorneys have a stake in the lawsuit, but an “interest in attorney’s fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underly- ing claim.” 480 (1990); see Steel (19) Because the plaintiffs themselves have no concrete stake in the lawsuit, they lack Article III standing. * * * If Thole and Smith had not received their vested pension benefits, they would of course have Article III standing to sue and a cause of action under ERISA to re- cover the benefits due to them. See 29 U.S. C. But Thole and Smith have received all of their monthly pension benefits so far, and they will receive those same monthly payments for the rest of their lives. To nonetheless try to demonstrate their standing to chal- lenge alleged plan mismanagement, the plaintiffs have ad- vanced four alternative arguments. First, analogizing to trust law, Thole and Smith contend that an ERISA defined-benefit plan participant possesses an equitable or property interest in the plan, meaning in essence that injuries to the plan are by definition injuries to the plan participants. Thole and Smith contend, in other words, that a plan fiduciary’s breach of a trust-law duty of prudence or duty of loyalty itself harms ERISA defined-ben- efit plan participants, even if the participants themselves 4 THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A. Opinion of the Court have not suffered (and will not suffer) any monetary losses. The basic flaw in the plaintiffs’ trust-based theory of standing is that the participants |
Justice Kavanaugh | 2,020 | 23 | majority | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | the plaintiffs’ trust-based theory of standing is that the participants in a defined-benefit plan are not similarly situated to the beneficiaries of a private trust or to the participants in a defined-contribution plan. See Varity (trust law informs but does not control interpretation of ERISA). In the private trust context, the value of the trust property and the ultimate amount of money received by the benefi- ciaries will typically depend on how well the trust is man- aged, so every penny of gain or loss is at the beneficiaries’ risk. By contrast, a defined-benefit plan is more in the na- ture of a contract. The plan participants’ benefits are fixed and will not change, regardless of how well or poorly the plan is managed. The benefits paid to the participants in a defined-benefit plan are not tied to the value of the plan. Moreover, the employer, not plan participants, receives any surplus left over after all of the benefits are paid; the em- ployer, not plan participants, is on the hook for plan short- falls. See 551 U.S., at –99. As this Court has stated before, plan participants possess no equitable or property interest in the plan. See Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S., at 439–441; see also The trust-law analogy therefore does not fit this case and does not support Article III standing for plaintiffs who allege mismanage- ment of a defined-benefit plan. Second, Thole and Smith assert standing as representa- tives of the plan itself. But in order to claim “the interests of others, the litigants themselves still must have suffered an injury in fact, thus giving” them “a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute.” Hol- (internal quo- tation marks omitted); cf. 125–126 (1991) (suggesting that shareholder must “main- Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 5 Opinion of the Court tain some continuing financial stake in the litigation” in or- der to have Article III standing to bring an insider trading suit on behalf of the corporation); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194–195 (1976) (vendor who “independently” suffered an Article III injury in fact could then assert the rights of her customers). The plaintiffs themselves do not have a concrete stake in this suit. The plaintiffs point to the Court’s decisions upholding the Article III standing of assignees—that is, where a party’s right to sue has been legally or contractually assigned to another party. But here, the plan’s claims have not been legally or contractually assigned to Thole or Smith. Cf. Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 290 ; |
Justice Kavanaugh | 2,020 | 23 | majority | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 290 ; Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 771–774 (2000) (qui tam statute makes a relator a partial assignee and “gives the relator himself an interest in the lawsuit”) (emphasis deleted). The plaintiffs’ invocation of cases in- volving guardians, receivers, and executors falls short for basically the same reason. The plaintiffs have not been le- gally or contractually appointed to represent the plan. Third, in arguing for standing, Thole and Smith stress that ERISA affords the Secretary of Labor, fiduciaries, ben- eficiaries, and participants—including participants in a de- fined-benefit plan—a general cause of action to sue for res- toration of plan losses and other equitable relief. See ERISA (3), 29 U.S. C. (3). But the cause of action does not affect the Article III standing analysis. This Court has rejected the argument that “a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact require- ment whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 9); see (1997). The Court has emphasized that “Article III stand- 6 THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A. Opinion of the Court ing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a stat- utory violation.” Spokeo, 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 9). Here, the plaintiffs have failed to plausibly and clearly al- lege a concrete injury.1 Fourth, Thole and Smith contend that if defined-benefit plan participants may not sue to target perceived fiduciary misconduct, no one will meaningfully regulate plan fiduci- aries. For that reason, the plaintiffs suggest that defined- benefit plan participants must have standing to sue. But this Court has long rejected that kind of argument for Arti- cle III standing. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., (12) (the “ ‘assumption that if respond- ents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing’ ”) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, (1974)). In any event, the argument rests on a faulty premise in this case because defined-benefit plans are regulated and monitored in multiple ways. To begin with, employers and their shareholders often possess strong incentives to root out fiduciary misconduct because the employers are enti- tled to the plan surplus and are often on the hook for plan shortfalls. Therefore, about the last thing a rational em- ployer wants or needs is a mismanaged retirement plan. Cf. |
Justice Kavanaugh | 2,020 | 23 | majority | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | ployer wants or needs is a mismanaged retirement plan. Cf. ERISA 29 U.S. C. Moreover, ERISA ex- pressly authorizes the Department of Labor to enforce ERISA’s fiduciary obligations. See ERISA 29 U.S. C. And the Department of Labor has a substantial motive to aggressively pursue fiduciary miscon- duct, particularly to avoid the financial burden of failed de- fined-benefit plans being backloaded onto the Federal Gov- ernment. When a defined-benefit plan fails and is unable —————— 1 To be clear, our decision today does not concern suits to obtain plan information. See, e.g., ERISA 29 U.S. C. Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 7 Opinion of the Court to pay benefits to retirees, the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is required by law to pay the vested pension benefits of the retirees, often in full. The Depart- ment of Labor is well positioned to understand the relation- ship between plan failure and the PBGC because, by law, the PBGC operates within the Department of Labor, and the Secretary of Labor chairs the Board of the PBGC. See ERISA (d), 29 U.S. C. (d). On top of all that, fiduciaries (including trustees who are fiduciaries) can sue other fiduciaries—and they would have good reason to sue if, as Thole and Smith posit, one fiduciary were using the plan’s assets as a “personal piggybank.” Brief for Peti- tioners 2. In addition, depending on the nature of the fidu- ciary misconduct, state and federal criminal laws may ap- ply. See, e.g., 18 U.S. C. 1954; ERISA 29 U.S. C. In short, under ERISA, fiduciaries who manage defined-benefit plans face a regulatory phal- anx. In sum, none of the plaintiffs’ four theories supports their Article III standing in this case. One last wrinkle remains. According to the plaintiffs’ amici, plan participants in a defined-benefit plan have standing to sue if the mismanagement of the plan was so egregious that it substantially increased the risk that the plan and the employer would fail and be unable to pay the participants’ future pension benefits. Cf. 568 U.S. 3, ; 545–546 (CA5 2016); But the plaintiffs do not assert that theory of standing in this Court. In any event, the plaintiffs’ complaint did not plausibly and clearly claim that the alleged mismanage- ment of the plan substantially increased the risk that the plan and the employer would fail and be unable to pay the plaintiffs’ future pension benefits. It is true that the plain- tiffs’ complaint alleged that the plan was underfunded for a 8 THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A. Opinion of the Court period of |
Justice Kavanaugh | 2,020 | 23 | majority | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | S. BANK N. A. Opinion of the Court period of time. But a bare allegation of plan underfunding does not itself demonstrate a substantially increased risk that the plan and the employer would both fail. Cf. LaRue, (“Misconduct by the administrators of a defined benefit plan will not affect an individual’s entitle- ment to a defined benefit unless it creates or enhances the risk of default by the entire plan”).2 * * * Courts sometimes make standing law more complicated than it needs to be. There is no ERISA exception to Article III. And under ordinary Article III standing analysis, the plaintiffs lack Article III standing for a simple, com- monsense reason: They have received all of their vested pension benefits so far, and they are legally entitled to re- ceive the same monthly payments for the rest of their lives. Winning or losing this suit would not change the plaintiffs’ monthly pension benefits. The plaintiffs have no concrete stake in this dispute and therefore lack Article III standing. We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. It is so ordered. —————— 2 Even if a defined-benefit plan is mismanaged into plan termination, the federal PBGC by law acts as a backstop and covers the vested pension benefits up to a certain amount and often in full. For example, if the plan and the employer in this case were to fail, the PBGC would be re- quired to pay these two plaintiffs all of their vested pension benefits in full. See ERISA (b), 29 U.S. C. (b); Tr. of Oral Arg. 18–19; see also Congressional Research Service, Pension Benefit Guar- anty Corporation (PBGC): A Primer 1 (2019); PBGC, General FAQs About PBGC, https://www.pbgc.gov/about/faq/general-faqs-about-pbgc. Any increased-risk-of-harm theory of standing therefore might not be available for plan participants whose benefits are guaranteed in full by the PBGC. But we need not decide that question in this case. Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 17–1712 JAMES J. THOLE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. U. S. BANK N. A., ET AL. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112474/portland-golf-club-v-commissioner/ | The Tax Court found that Portland Golf Club's nonmember activity qualified as a trade or business under 162(a) of the *172 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S. C. 162(a), and it allowed the club to deduct expenses associated with the activity from its income. 55 TCM 212 (1988), ¶ 88,076 P-H Memo TC. The Court of Appeals remanded because it found the club's profit motive unclear. App. to Pet. for Cert. la, judgt. order reported at Although the Tax Court had determined that the club intended the gross receipts from the nonmember activity to exceed the direct costs, the Court of Appeals held that 162(a) requires an intent to produce gains in excess of both direct and indirect costs. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to allow the Tax Court to reconsider the club's profit motive, taking account of the overhead and other fixed costs attributable to the nonmember activity. I agree with that decision, and so would affirm the Court of Appeals. I join all but Parts III-B and IV of the Court's opinion. I otherwise concur only in the judgment because the Court decides a significant issue that is unnecessary to our disposition of the case and, in my view, decides it the wrong way. When the Court of Appeals instructed the Tax Court to consider the club's indirect costs, it did not specify how the club should allocate these costs between its member and nonmember activities. In particular, it left open the possibility that the club could use one allocation method to calculate its expenses under 162(a), while using some other allocation method to demonstrate its profit motivation. See ante, at 167-168. Although the Court purports to affirm the Court of Appeals, its opinion eliminates this possibility, and thus works a dramatic change in the remand order. The Court rules in Parts III-B and IV that, if the club uses the so-called gross-to-gross method to allocate its fixed costs when computing its expenses, it must use the same allocation method to prove its profit motivation. The Tax Court and Court of Appeals, in my view, should have had the opportunity to consider this issue in the first instance. Because the Court has *173 reached the question, however, I must state my disagreement with its conclusion. A taxpayer's profit motive, in my view, cannot turn upon the particular accounting method by which it reports its ordinary and necessary expenses to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The Court cites no authority for its novel rule and we cannot adopt it simply because we confront a hard case. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112474/portland-golf-club-v-commissioner/ | cannot adopt it simply because we confront a hard case. Section 162(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." 26 U.S. C. 162(a). Although the section does not require a profit motivation by its express terms, we have inferred such a requirement because the words "trade or business," in their ordinary usage, contemplate activities undertaken to earn a profit. See ; Yet, I see no justification for making the profit-motive requirement more demanding than necessary to distinguish trades and businesses from other activities pursued by taxpayers. See Because an activity may be a trade or business even if the taxpayer intended to show losses on its income tax forms under a permissible accounting method, the Court endorses an improper conception of profit motivation. A taxpayer often may choose from among different accounting methods when computing its ordinary and necessary expenses under 162(a). In this case, as stipulated by the IRS, the club could have allocated its fixed costs either by the gross-to-gross method or by the so-called actual-use method. Although the gross-to-gross method showed a net loss for the relevant tax years, the actual-use method would have shown a net profit. See ante, at 158, n. 5. If profit motivation turns upon the allocation method employed by the club in filling out its tax forms, then the status of the nonmember activity as a trade or business may lie within the control of *174 the club's accountants. I find this interpretation of the words "trade or business" simply "to affront common understanding and to deny the facts of common experience." A taxpayer does not alter the nature of an enterprise by selecting one reasonable allocation method over another. The Court's decision also departs from the traditional practice of the courts and the IRS. Rather than relying on strict consistency in accounting, the courts long have evaluated profit motivation according to a variety of factors that indicate whether the taxpayer acted in a manner characteristic of one engaged in a trade or business. See, e. g., ; (2); see Boyle, What is a Trade or Business?, ; Lee, A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, (4). In a regulation based on a wide range of prior court decisions, the IRS itself has explained 162 and profit motivation as follows: "Deductions are allowable under section 162 for expenses of carrying on activities which constitute a trade or business of the taxpayer and under section 212 |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112474/portland-golf-club-v-commissioner/ | trade or business of the taxpayer and under section 212 for expenses incurred in connection with activities engaged in for the production or collection of income or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income. Except as provided in section 183 and [26 CFR] 1.183-1 [which authorize individuals and S-corporations to offset hobby losses], no deductions are allowable for expenses incurred in connection with activities which are not engaged in for profit. The determination whether an activity is engaged in for profit is to be made by reference to objective standards, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances of each case. Although a reasonable expectation of profit is not required, the facts and circumstances *175 must indicate that the taxpayer entered into the activity, or continued the activity, with the objective of making a profit." 26 CFR 1.183-2(a) To facilitate the application of this general standard, the IRS has supplied a list of nine factors, also based on a wide body of case law, for evaluating the taxpayer's profit motive. These factors include: (1) the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors; (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. See 1.183-2(b)(1) to (9). The Court today limits this longstanding approach by pinning the profit-motive requirement to the accounting method that a taxpayer uses to report its ordinary and necessary expenses under 162(a). Although the tax laws in general strive to reflect the true economic income of a taxpayer, the IRS at times allows taxpayers to use accounting methods that understate their income or overstate their expenses. In this case, as the Court itself acknowledges, the IRS stipulated that the club could use the gross-to-gross allocation method to calculate its expenses under 162(a) even though this method tends to exaggerate the percentage of fixed costs attributable to the club's nonmember sales. See ante, at 157-158, n. 4. Yet, I see no basis for saying that, when the club took advantage of this unconditional stipulation, it committed itself to the legal position that the gross-to-gross method best reflects economic |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112474/portland-golf-club-v-commissioner/ | the legal position that the gross-to-gross method best reflects economic reality. Some inconsistency will exist if the club uses the gross-to-gross allocation method in computing the expenses, while using some other reasonable accounting method to prove that it undertook the nonmember activity *176 as a trade or business. But the solution to this inconsistency lies in altering the stipulation in other cases, not in changing the longstanding interpretation of profit motivation. The precise effect of the Court's holding with respect to the club remains unclear. The Court states only that the club may not offset its losses from nonmember sales against its investment income. But I do not understand how the Court can confine its ruling to investment income alone. If the club's nonmember activity does not qualify as a trade or business, then the club cannot use 162(a) to deduct any of the expenses associated with the nonmember activity, not even to the extent of gross receipts. Confronted with this difficulty at oral argument, respondent stated that, in the absence of statutory authority, the IRS has allowed an offset of expenses against gross receipts out of its own "generosity," a characteristic as rare as it is implausible. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43. The IRS, indeed, asserts the authority to disallow the offset in the future. See Cf. 26 U.S. C. 183 (authorizing individuals and S-corporations to offset hobby losses). This possibility further counsels against making the profit-motive requirement more stringent than necessary to determine whether the club undertook the nonmember activity as a trade or business. For these reasons, I join the Court's opinion, with the exception of Parts III-B and IV, and concur in the judgment. |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108961/alexander-v-gardner-denver-co/ | This case concerns the proper relationship between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective-bargaining agreements in the resolution and enforcement of an individual's rights to equal employment opportunities under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq. Specifically, we must decide under what circumstances, if any, an employee's statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII may be foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement. I In May 1966, petitioner Harrell Alexander, Sr., a black, was hired by respondent Gardner-Denver Co. (the company) to perform maintenance work at the company's plant in Denver, Colorado. In June petitioner was awarded a trainee position as a drill operator. He remained at that job until his discharge from employment on September 29, The company informed petitioner that he was being discharged for producing too many defective or unusable parts that had to be scrapped. *39 On October 1, petitioner filed a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement in force between the company and petitioner's union, Local No. 3029 of the United Steelworkers of America (the union). The grievance stated: "I feel I have been unjustly discharged and ask that I be reinstated with full seniority and pay." No explicit claim of racial discrimination was made. Under Art. 4 of the collective-bargaining agreement, the company retained "the right to hire, suspend or discharge [employees] for proper cause."[1] Article 5, 2, provided, however, that "there shall be no discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry,"[2] and Art. 23, 6 (a), stated that "[n]o employee will be discharged, suspended or given a written warning notice except for just cause." *40 The agreement also contained a broad arbitration clause covering "differences aris[ing] between the Company and the as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement" and "any trouble aris[ing] in the plant."[3] Disputes were to be submitted to a multistep *41 grievance procedure, the first four steps of which involved negotiations between the company and the union. If the dispute remained unresolved, it was to be remitted to compulsory arbitration. The company and the union were to select and pay the arbitrator, and *42 his decision was to be "final and binding upon the Company, the and any employee or employees involved." The agreement further provided that "[t]he arbitrator shall not amend, take away, add to, or change any of the provisions of this Agreement, and the arbitrator's decision must be based solely upon an |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108961/alexander-v-gardner-denver-co/ | and the arbitrator's decision must be based solely upon an interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement." The parties also agreed that there "shall be no suspension of work" over disputes covered by the grievance-arbitration clause. The union processed petitioner's grievance through the above machinery. In the final pre-arbitration step, petitioner raised, apparently for the first time, the claim that his discharge resulted from racial discrimination. The company rejected all of petitioner's claims, and the grievance proceeded to arbitration. Prior to the arbitration hearing, however, petitioner filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which referred the complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 5, At the arbitration hearing on November 20, petitioner testified that his discharge was the result of racial discrimination and informed the arbitrator that he had filed a charge with the Colorado Commission because he "could not rely on the union." The union introduced a letter in which petitioner stated that he was "knowledgeable that in the same plant others have scrapped an equal amount and sometimes in excess, but by all logical reasoning I have been the target of preferential discriminatory treatment." The union representative also testified that the company's usual practice was to transfer unsatisfactory trainee drill operators back to their former positions. On December 30, the arbitrator ruled that petitioner had been "discharged for just cause." He made no reference to petitioner's claim of racial discrimination. *43 The arbitrator stated that the union had failed to produce evidence of a practice of transferring rather than discharging trainee drill operators who accumulated excessive scrap, but he suggested that the company and the union confer on whether such an arrangement was feasible in the present case. On July 25, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determined that there was not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq., had occurred. The Commission later notified petitioner of his right to institute a civil action in federal court within 30 days. Petitioner then filed the present action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that his discharge resulted from a racially discriminatory employment practice in violation of 703 (a) (1) of the Act, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-2 (a) (1). The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The court found that the claim of racial discrimination had been submitted to the arbitrator and resolved adversely to petitioner.[4] It then held that petitioner, having voluntarily elected to pursue |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108961/alexander-v-gardner-denver-co/ | It then held that petitioner, having voluntarily elected to pursue his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective-bargaining agreement, was bound by the arbitral decision and thereby precluded from suing his employer under Title VII. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam on the basis of the District Court's opinion. We granted petitioner's application for certiorari. We reverse. *44 II Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq., to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. McDonnell Douglas ; Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal. To this end, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit. In the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of Stat. 103, Congress amended Title VII to provide the Commission with further authority to investigate individual charges of discrimination, to promote voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title VII, and to institute civil actions against employers or unions named in a discrimination charge. Even in its amended form, however, Title VII does not provide the Commission with direct powers of enforcement. The Commission cannot adjudicate claims or impose administrative sanctions. Rather, final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts. The Act authorizes courts to issue injunctive relief and to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate to remedy the effects of unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (f) and (g) ( ed., Supp. II). Courts retain these broad remedial powers despite a Commission finding of no reasonable cause to believe that the Act has been violated. McDonnell *45 Douglas Taken together, these provisions make plain that federal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance with Title VII. In addition to reposing ultimate authority in federal courts, Congress gave private individuals a significant role in the enforcement process of Title VII. Individual grievants usually initiate the Commission's investigatory and conciliatory procedures. And although the amendment to Title VII empowers the Commission to bring its own actions, the private right of action remains an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII. 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (f) (1) ( ed., Supp. II). In such cases, the private litigant not |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108961/alexander-v-gardner-denver-co/ | ed., Supp. II). In such cases, the private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices. ; ; See also Pursuant to this statutory scheme, petitioner initiated the present action for judicial consideration of his rights under Title VII. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held, however, that petitioner was bound by the prior arbitral decision and had no right to sue under Title VII.[5] Both courts evidently thought that this result was *46 dictated by notions of election of remedies and waiver and by the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes, as enunciated by this Court in Textile Workers and the Steelworkers trilogy.[6] See also Boys ; Gateway Coal We disagree. III Title VII does not speak expressly to the relationship between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective-bargaining agreements. It does, however, vest federal courts with plenary powers to enforce the statutory requirements; and it specifies with precision the jurisdictional prerequisites that an individual must satisfy before he is entitled to institute a lawsuit. In the present case, these prerequisites were met when petitioner (1) filed timely a charge of employment discrimination with the Commission, and (2) received and acted upon the Commission's statutory notice of the right to sue. 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (b), (e), and (f). See McDonnell Douglas There is no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual's right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction. In addition, legislative enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination.[7] In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000a et seq., Congress indicated that it considered the policy against discrimination to be of the "highest priority." at Consistent with this view, Title VII provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in several forums. See 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (b) ( ed., Supp. II) (EEOC); 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (c) ( ed., Supp. II) (state and local agencies); 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (f) ( ed., Supp. II) (federal courts). And, in general, submission of a *48 claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to another.[8] Moreover, the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.[9] The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating *49 to employment discrimination. In sum, Title VII's |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108961/alexander-v-gardner-denver-co/ | institutions relating *49 to employment discrimination. In sum, Title VII's purpose and procedures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the District Court relied in part on the doctrine of election of remedies.[10] That doctrine, which refers to situations where an individual pursues remedies that are legally or factually inconsistent,[11] has no application in the present context. In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory *50 rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums. The resulting scheme is somewhat analogous to the procedure under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,[12] where disputed transactions may implicate both contractual and statutory rights. Where the statutory right underlying a particular claim may not be abridged by contractual agreement, the Court has recognized that consideration of the claim by the arbitrator as a contractual dispute under the collective-bargaining agreement does not preclude subsequent consideration of the claim by the National Labor Relations Board as an unfair labor practice charge or as a petition for clarification of the union's representation certificate under the Act.[13] Cf. There, as here, the relationship between the forums is complementary since consideration of the claim by both forums may promote the policies underlying *51 each. Thus, the rationale behind the election-of-remedies doctrine cannot support the decision below.[14] We are also unable to accept the proposition that petitioner waived his cause of action under Title VII. To begin, we think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII. It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to strike. Mastro Plastics ; Boys These rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union members. Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment opportunities. Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108961/alexander-v-gardner-denver-co/ | opportunities. Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of *52 prospective waiver. See The actual submission of petitioner's grievance to arbitration in the present case does not alter the situation. Although presumably an employee may waive his cause of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement,[15] mere resort to the arbitral forum to enforce contractual rights constitutes no such waiver. Since an employee's rights under Title VII may not be waived prospectively, existing contractual rights and remedies against discrimination must result from other concessions already made by the union as part of the economic bargain struck with the employer. It is settled law that no additional concession may be exacted from any employee as the price for enforcing those rights. J. I. Case 321 U.S. 2, 8-9 Moreover, a contractual right to submit a claim to arbitration is not displaced simply because Congress also has provided a statutory right against discrimination. Both rights have legally independent origins and are equally available to the aggrieved employee. This point becomes apparent through consideration of the role of the arbitrator in the system of industrial self-government.[16]*53 As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator's task is to effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of authority is the collective-bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and apply that agreement in accordance with the "industrial common law of the shop" and the various needs and desires of the parties. The arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties: "[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." United Steelworkers of If an arbitral decision is based "solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation," rather than on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has "exceeded the scope of the submission," and the award will not be enforced. Thus the arbitrator has |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108961/alexander-v-gardner-denver-co/ | the award will not be enforced. Thus the arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions *54 of contractual rights, and this authority remains regardless of whether certain contractual rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title VII. IV The District Court and the Court of Appeals reasoned that to permit an employee to have his claim considered in both the arbitral and judicial forums would be unfair since this would mean that the employer, but not the employee, was bound by the arbitral award. In the District Court's words, it could not "accept a philosophy which gives the employee two strings to his bow when the employer has only one." This argument mistakes the effect of Title VII. Under the Steelworkers trilogy, an arbitral decision is final and binding on the employer and employee, and judicial review is limited as to both. But in instituting an action under Title VII, the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process. An employer does not have "two strings to his bow" with respect to an arbitral decision for the simple reason that Title VII does not provide employers with a cause of action against employees. An employer cannot be the victim of discriminatory employment practices. The District Court and the Court of Appeals also thought that to permit a later resort to the judicial forum would undermine substantially the employer's incentive to arbitrate and would "sound the death knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts." Again, we disagree. The primary incentive for an employer to enter into an arbitration agreement is the union's reciprocal promise not to strike. As the *55 Court stated in Boys "a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration." It is not unreasonable to assume that most employers will regard the benefits derived from a no-strike pledge as outweighing whatever costs may result from according employees an arbitral remedy against discrimination in addition to their judicial remedy under Title VII. Indeed, the severe consequences of a strike may make an arbitration clause almost essential from both the employees' and the employer's perspective. Moreover, the grievance-arbitration machinery of the collective-bargaining agreement remains a relatively inexpensive and expeditious means for resolving a wide range of disputes, including claims of discriminatory employment practices. Where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a nondiscrimination clause similar to Title VII, and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108961/alexander-v-gardner-denver-co/ | and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may well produce a settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee. An employer thus has an incentive to make available the conciliatory and therapeutic processes of arbitration which may satisfy an employee's perceived need to resort to the judicial forum, thus saving the employer the expense and aggravation, associated with a lawsuit. For similar reasons, the employee also has a strong incentive to arbitrate grievances, and arbitration may often eliminate those misunderstandings or discriminatory practices that might otherwise precipitate resort to the judicial forum. V Respondent contends that even if a preclusion rule is not adopted, federal courts should defer to arbitral decisions on discrimination claims where: (i) the claim *56 was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective-bargaining agreement prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the suit under Title VII; and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on the claim and to fashion a remedy.[17] Under respondent's proposed rule, a court would grant summary judgment and dismiss the employee's action if the above conditions were met. The rule's obvious consequence in the present case would be to deprive the petitioner of his statutory right to attempt to establish his claim in a federal court. At the outset, it is apparent that a deferral rule would be subject to many of the objections applicable to a preclusion rule. The purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal. Furthermore, we have long recognized that "the choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive right to be vindicated." U. S. Bulk Respondent's deferral rule is necessarily premised on the assumption that arbitral processes are commensurate with judicial processes and that Congress impliedly intended federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions on Title VII issues. We deem this supposition unlikely. Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the special role of the arbitrator, whose task is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the *57 requirements of enacted legislation. Where the collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with Title VII, the arbitrator must follow the agreement. To be sure, the tension between contractual and statutory objectives may be mitigated where a collective-bargaining agreement contains provisions facially similar to those of Title VII. But other facts may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to judicial |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108961/alexander-v-gardner-denver-co/ | facts may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the protection of Title VII rights. Among these is the fact that the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land. United Steelworkers of[18] Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations. On the other hand, the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts. Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under *58 oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. See ; -437. And as this Court has recognized, "[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award." United Steelworkers of Indeed, it is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts.[19] It is evident that respondent's proposed rule would not allay these concerns. Nor are we convinced that the solution lies in applying a more demanding deferral standard, such as that adopted by the Fifth Circuit in[20] As *59 respondent points out, a standard that adequately insured effectuation of Title VII rights in the arbitral forum would tend to make arbitration a procedurally complex, expensive, and time-consuming process. And judicial enforcement of such a standard would almost require courts to make de novo determinations of the employees' claims. It is uncertain whether any minimal savings in judicial time and expense would justify the risk to vindication of Title VII rights. A deferral rule also might adversely affect the arbitration system as well as the enforcement scheme of Title VII. Fearing that the arbitral forum cannot adequately protect their rights under Title VII, some employees may elect to bypass arbitration and institute a lawsuit. The possibility of voluntary compliance or settlement of Title VII claims would thus be reduced, and the result could well be more litigation, not less. We think, therefore, that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | This case requires us to determine whether a dispute over layoffs which occurred well after expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement must be said to arise under the agreement despite its expiration. The question arises in the context of charges brought by the National Labor Relations Board (Board), alleging an unfair labor practice in violation of 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 158(a)(1) and (5). We interpret our earlier decision in Nolde I Petitioner Litton operated a check printing plant in Santa Clara, California. The plant utilized both coldtype and hottype printing processes. Printing Specialties & Paper Products Union No. 777, Affiliated With District Council No. 1 (Union), represented the production employees at the plant. The Union and Litton entered into a collective-bargaining agreement (Agreement) which, with extensions, remained in effect until October 3, Section 19 of the Agreement is a broad arbitration provision: *194 "Differences that may arise between the parties hereto regarding this Agreement and any alleged violations of the Agreement, the construction to be placed on any clause or clauses of the Agreement shall be determined by arbitration in the manner hereinafter set forth." App. 34. Section 21 of the Agreement sets forth a two-step grievance procedure, at the conclusion of which, if a grievance cannot be resolved, the matter may be submitted for binding arbitration. Soon before the Agreement was to expire, an employee sought decertification of the Union. The Board conducted an election on August 17, in which the Union prevailed by a vote of 28 to 27. On July 2, 1980, after much postelection legal maneuvering, the Board issued a decision to certify the Union. No contract negotiations occurred during this period of uncertainty over the Union's status. Litton decided to test the Board's certification decision by refusing to bargain with the Union. The Board rejected Litton's position and found its refusal to bargain an unfair labor practice. Litton Financial Printing Division, 256 N. L. R. B. 516 (1981). Meanwhile, Litton had decided to eliminate its coldtype operation at the plant, and in late August and early September 1980, laid off 10 of the persons working in the plant at that time. The laid off employees worked either primarily or exclusively with the coldtype operation, and included 6 of the 11 most senior employees in the plant. The layoffs occurred without any notice to the Union. The Union filed identical grievances on behalf of each laid off employee, claiming a violation of the Agreement, which had provided that "in case of layoffs, lengths of continuous service |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | provided that "in case of layoffs, lengths of continuous service will be the determining factor if other things such as aptitude and ability are equal." App. 30. Litton refused to submit to the grievance and arbitration procedure or to negotiate over the decision to lay off the employees, and took a position later interpreted by the Board as a refusal to arbitrate *195 under any and all circumstances. It offered instead to negotiate concerning the effects of the layoffs. On November 24, 1980, the General Counsel for the Board issued a complaint alleging that Litton's refusal to process the grievances amounted to an unfair labor practice within the meaning of 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S. C. 158(a)(1) and (5). App. 15. On September 4, 1981, an Administrative Law Judge found that Litton had violated the NLRA by failing to process the grievances. Relying upon the Board's decision in American Sink Top & Cabinet 2 N. L. R. B. 408 the Administrative Law Judge went on to state that if the grievances remained unresolved at the conclusion of the grievance process, Litton could not refuse to submit them to arbitration. App. 115-118. The Administrative Law Judge held also that Litton violated 8(a)(1) and (5) when it bypassed the Union and paid severance wages directly to the 10 laid off employees, and Litton did not contest that determination in further proceedings. Over six years later, the Board affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. 286 N. L. R. B. 817 The Board found that Litton had a duty to bargain over the layoffs and violated 8(a) by failing to do so. Based upon well-recognized Board precedent that the unilateral abandonment of a contractual grievance procedure upon expiration of the contract violates 8(a)(1) and (5), the Board held that Litton had improperly refused to process the layoff grievances. See Bethlehem Steel 136 N. L. R. B. 1500, 1503 enforced in pertinent part, The Board proceeded to apply its recent decision in Indiana & Electric 284 N. L. R. B. 53 which contains the Board's current understanding of the principles of postexpiration arbitrability and of our opinion in Nolde The Board held that Litton's "wholesale repudiation" of its obligation to arbitrate any contractual grievance *196 after the expiration of the Agreement also violated 8(a)(1) and (5), as the Agreement's broad arbitration clause lacked "language sufficient to overcome the presumption that the obligation to arbitrate imposed by the contract extended to disputes arising under the contract and occurring after the contract had expired. Thus, [Litton] |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | contract and occurring after the contract had expired. Thus, [Litton] remained `subject to a potentially viable contractual commitment to arbitrate even after the [Agreement] expired.'" 286 N. L. R. B., at 818 Litton did not seek review of, and we do not address here, the Board's determination that Litton committed an unfair labor practice by its unilateral abandonment of the grievance process and wholesale repudiation of any postexpiration obligation to arbitrate disputes. In fashioning a remedy, the Board went on to consider the arbitrability of these particular layoff grievances. Following Indiana & the Board declared its determination to order arbitration "only when the grievances at issue `arise under' the expired contract." 286 N. L. R. B., at 821 ). In finding that the dispute about layoffs was outside this category, the Board reasoned as follows: "The conduct that triggered the grievances occurred after the contract had expired. The right to layoff by seniority if other factors such as ability and experience are equal is not `a right worked for or accumulated over time.' Indiana & And, as in Indiana & Electric, there is no indication here that `the parties contemplated that such rights could ripen or remain enforceable even after the contract expired.' Therefore, [Litton] had no contractual obligation to arbitrate the grievances." 286 N. L. R. B., at 821-822. Although the Board refused to order arbitration, it did order Litton to process the grievances through the two-step grievance *197 procedure, to bargain with the Union over the layoffs, and to provide a limited backpay remedy. The Board sought enforcement of its order, and both the Union and Litton petitioned for review. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order, with the exception of that portion holding the layoff grievances not arbitrable. On that question, the Court of Appeals was willing to "assume without deciding that the Board's Indiana & decision is a reasonably defensible construction of the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain." The court decided, nevertheless, that the Board had erred, because the right in question, the right to layoff in order of seniority if other things such as aptitude and ability are equal, did arise under the Agreement. The Court of Appeals thought the Board's contrary conclusion was in conflict with two later Board decisions, where the Board had recognized that seniority rights may arise under an expired contract, United Chrome Products, Inc., 288 N. L. R. B. 1176 and Uppco, Inc., 288 N. L. R. B. 937 The court cited a second conflict, one between Indiana & and the court's own interpretation of Nolde Bros. in Local |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | and the court's own interpretation of Nolde Bros. in Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas Culinary Union, Local In Royal Center, the Court of Appeals had rejected the argument that only rights accruing or vesting under a contract prior to termination are covered by the posttermination duty to arbitrate. Litton petitioned for a writ of certiorari. Because of substantial disagreement as to the proper application of our decision in Nolde[1] we granted review limited to the *198 question of arbitrability of the layoff grievances. II A Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S. C. 158(a) (5) and (d), require an employer to bargain "in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." The Board has taken the position that it is difficult to bargain if, during negotiations, an employer is free to alter the very terms and conditions that are the subject of those negotiations. The Board has determined, with our acceptance, that an employer commits an unfair labor practice if, without bargaining to impasse, it effects a unilateral change of an existing term or condition of employment. See In Katz the union was newly certified and the parties had yet to reach an initial agreement. The Katz doctrine has been extended as well to cases where, as here, an existing agreement has expired and negotiations on a new one have yet to be completed. See, e. g., Laborers Health and Welfare Trust *199 Numerous terms and conditions of employment have been held to be the subject of mandatory bargaining under the NLRA. See generally 1 C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 772-844 Litton does not question that arrangements for arbitration of disputes are a term or condition of employment and a mandatory subject of bargaining. See at 813 (citing cases); United States Gypsum 94 N. L. R. B. 112, 131 (1951). The Board has ruled that most mandatory subjects of bargaining are within the Katz prohibition on unilateral changes. The Board has identified some terms and conditions of employment, however, which do not survive expiration of an agreement for purposes of this statutory policy. For instance, it is the Board's view that union security and dues check-off provisions are excluded from the unilateral change doctrine because of statutory provisions which permit these obligations only when specified by the express terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. See 29 U.S. C. 158(a)(3) (union security conditioned upon agreement of the parties); 186(c)(4) (dues check-off valid only until termination date of agreement); Indiana & 284 N. L. R. B., at 55 (quoting Bethlehem Steel, 136 |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | N. L. R. B., at 55 (quoting Bethlehem Steel, 136 N. L. R. B., at 1502). Also, in recognition of the statutory right to strike, no-strike clauses are excluded from the unilateral change doctrine, except to the extent other dispute resolution methods survive expiration of the agreement. See 29 U.S. C. 158(d)(4), 163 (union's statutory right to strike); Southwestern Steel & Supply, In Hilton-Davis Chemical 185 N. L. R. B. 241 (1970), the Board determined that arbitration clauses are excluded from the prohibition on unilateral changes, reasoning that the commitment to arbitrate is a "voluntary surrender of the right of final decision which Congress reserved to [the] parties. [A]rbitration is, at bottom, a consensual surrender of the economic power which the parties are otherwise *200 free to utilize." The Board further relied upon our statements acknowledging the basic federal labor policy that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." See also 29 U.S. C. 173(d) (phrased in terms of parties' agreed-upon method of dispute resolution under an existing bargaining agreement). Since Hilton-Davis, the Board has adhered to the view that an arbitration clause does not, by operation of the NLRA as interpreted in Katz, continue in effect after expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement. B The Union argues that we should reject the Board's decision in Hilton-Davis Chemical and instead hold that arbitration provisions are within Katz' prohibition on unilateral changes. The unilateral change doctrine, and the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of that doctrine, represent the Board's interpretation of the NLRA requirement that parties bargain in good faith. And "[i]f the Board adopts a rule that is rational and consistent with the Act then the rule is entitled to deference from the courts." Fall River Dyeing & Finishing ; see, e. g., We think the Board's decision in Hilton-Davis Chemical is both rational and consistent with the Act. The rule is grounded in the strong statutory principle, found in both the language of the NLRA and its drafting history, of consensual rather than compulsory arbitration. See Indiana & ; Hilton-Davis Chemical The rule conforms with our statement that "[n]o obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely by operation of law. The law compels a party to submit his grievance to arbitration only if he has contracted to do so." Gateway *201 Coal v. Mine We reaffirm today that under the NLRA arbitration is a matter of consent, and that it will not be imposed upon parties beyond the scope |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | it will not be imposed upon parties beyond the scope of their agreement. In the absence of a binding method for resolution of postexpiration disputes, a party may be relegated to filing unfair labor practice charges with the Board if it believes that its counterpart has implemented a unilateral change in violation of the NLRA. If, as the Union urges, parties who favor labor arbitration during the term of a contract also desire it to resolve postexpiration disputes, the parties can consent to that arrangement by explicit agreement. Further, a collective-bargaining agreement might be drafted so as to eliminate any hiatus between expiration of the old and execution of the new agreement, or to remain in effect until the parties bargain to impasse.[2] Unlike the Union's suggestion that we impose arbitration of postexpiration disputes upon parties once they agree to arbitrate disputes arising under a contract, these. alternatives would reinforce the statutory policy that arbitration is not compulsory. III The Board argues that it is entitled to substantial deference here because it has determined the remedy for an unfair labor practice. As noted above, we will uphold the Board's interpretation of the NLRA so long as it is "rational and consistent with the Act." Fall River Dyeing & Finishing at And we give the greatest latitude to the Board when its decision reflects its "`difficult *202 and delicate responsibility' of reconciling conflicting interests of labor and management," v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 0 U.S. 251, We have accorded the Board considerable authority to structure its remedial orders to effect the purposes of the NLRA and to order the relief it deems appropriate. See Shepard v. ; Virginia Electric & Power v. The portion of the Board's decision which we review today does discuss the appropriate remedy for a violation of the NLRA. But it does not follow that we must accord the same deference we recognized in Virginia Electric & Power and Shepard. Here, the Board's remedial discussion is not grounded in terms of any need to arbitrate these grievances in order "to effectuate the policies of the Act." Virginia Electric & Power at Rather, the Board's decision not to order arbitration of the layoff grievances rests upon its interpretation of the Agreement, applying our decision in Nolde and the federal common law of collective-bargaining agreements. The Board now defends its decision on the ground that it need not "reflexively order that which a complaining party may regard as `complete relief' for every unfair labor practice," Shepard v. 2; but its decision did not purport to rest upon such grounds. Although |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | decision did not purport to rest upon such grounds. Although the Board has occasion to interpret collective-bargaining agreements in the context of unfair labor practice adjudication, see v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 1 the Board is neither the sole nor the primary source of authority in such matters. "Arbitrators and courts are still the principal sources of contract interpretation." v. Strong, Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S. C. 185, "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements." Textile v. Lincoln Mills *203 of Alabama, We would risk the development of conflicting principles were we to defer to the Board in its interpretation of the contract, as distinct from its devising a remedy for the unfair labor practice that follows from a breach of contract. We cannot accord deference in contract interpretation here only to revert to our independent interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements in a case arising under 301. See Local Union 1395, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical v. 254 U. S. App. D. C. 360, 363-364, IV The duty not to effect unilateral changes in most terms and conditions of employment, derived from the statutory command to bargain in good faith, is not the sole source of possible constraints upon the employer after the expiration date of a collective-bargaining agreement. A similar duty may arise as well from the express or implied terms of the expired agreement itself. This, not the provisions of the NLRA, was the source of the obligation which controlled our decision in Nolde We now discuss that precedent in the context of the case before us. In Nolde a union brought suit under 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S. C. 185, to compel arbitration. Four days after termination of a collective-bargaining agreement, the employer decided to cease operations. The employer settled employee wage claims, but refused to pay severance wages called for in the agreement, and declined to arbitrate the resulting dispute. The union argued that these wages "were in the nature of `accrued' or `vested' rights, earned by employees during the term of the contract on essentially the same basis as vacation pay, but payable only upon termination of employment." Nolde *204 We agreed that "whatever the outcome, the resolution of that claim hinges on the interpretation ultimately given the contract clause providing for severance pay. The dispute therefore, although arising after the expiration of the collective-bargaining contract, clearly arises under that contract." We acknowledged that "the arbitration duty is a creature of the collective-bargaining agreement" and that |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | duty is a creature of the collective-bargaining agreement" and that the matter of arbitrability must be determined by reference to the agreement, rather than by compulsion of law. With this understanding, we held that the extensive obligation to arbitrate under the contract in question was not consistent with an interpretation that would eliminate all duty to arbitrate as of the date of expiration. That argument, we noted, "would preclude the entry of a post-contract arbitration order even when the dispute arose during the life of the contract but arbitration proceedings had not begun before termination. The same would be true if arbitration processes began but were not completed, during the contract's term." We found "strong reasons to conclude that the parties did not intend their arbitration duties to terminate automatically with the contract," and noted that "the parties' failure to exclude from arbitrability contract disputes arising after termination affords a basis for concluding that they intended to arbitrate all grievances arising out of the contractual relationship," We found a presumption in favor of postexpiration arbitration of matters unless "negated expressly or by clear implication," ib but that conclusion was limited by the vital qualification that arbitration was of matters and disputes arising out of the relation governed by contract. *205 A Litton argues that provisions contained in the Agreement rebut the Nolde presumption that the duty to arbitrate disputes arising under an agreement outlasts the date of expiration. The Agreement provides that its stipulations "shall be in effect for the time hereinafter specified," App. 22, in other words, until the date of expiration and no longer. The Agreement's no-strike clause, which Litton characterizes as a quid pro quo for arbitration, applies only "during the term of this [a]greement," Finally, the Agreement provides for "interest arbitration" in case the parties are unable to conclude a successor agreement, proving that where the parties wished for arbitration other than to resolve disputes as to contract interpretation, they knew how to draft such a clause. These arguments cannot prevail. The Agreement's unlimited arbitration clause, by which the parties agreed to arbitrate all "[d]ifferences that may arise between the parties" regarding the Agreement, violations thereof, or "the construction to be placed on any clause or clauses of the Agreement," places it within the precise rationale of Nolde It follows that if a dispute arises under the contract here in question, it is subject to arbitration even in the postcontract period. B With these matters resolved, we come to the crux of our inquiry. We agree with the approach of the Board and those courts which |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | with the approach of the Board and those courts which have interpreted Nolde to apply only where a dispute has its real source in the contract. The object of an arbitration clause is to implement a contract, not to transcend it. Nolde does not announce a rule that postexpiration grievances concerning terms and conditions of employment remain arbitrable. A rule of that sweep in fact would contradict the rationale of Nolde The Nolde presumption is limited to disputes arising under the contract. A postexpiration grievance can be *206 said to arise under the contract only where it involves facts and occurrences that arose before expiration, where an action taken after expiration infringes a right that accrued or vested under the agreement, or where, under normal principles of contract interpretation, the disputed contractual right survives expiration of the remainder of the agreement. Any other reading of Nolde seems to assume that postexpiration terms and conditions of employment which coincide with the contractual terms can be said to arise under an expired contract, merely because the contract would have applied to those matters had it not expired. But that interpretation fails to recognize that an expired contract has by its own terms released all its parties from their respective contractual obligations, except obligations already fixed under the contract but as yet unsatisfied. Although after expiration most terms and conditions of employment are not subject to unilateral change, in order to protect the statutory right to bargain, those terms and conditions no longer have force by virtue of the contract. See Office and Professional Employees Ins. Trust ("An expired [collective-bargaining agreement]. is no longer a `legally enforceable document'" ); cf. (Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S. C. 185, does not provide for federal court jurisdiction where a bargaining agreement has expired, although rights and duties under the expired agreement "retain legal significance because they define the status quo" for purposes of the prohibition on unilateral changes). The difference is as elemental as that between Nolde and Katz. Under Katz, terms and conditions continue in effect by operation of the NLRA. They are no longer agreed-upon terms; they are terms imposed by law, at least so far as there is no unilateral right to change them. As the Union acknowledges, the obligation not to make unilateral *207 changes is "rooted not in the contract but in preservation of existing terms and conditions of employment and applies before any contract has been negotiated." Brief for Respondent Union 34, n. 21. Katz illustrates this point with utter clarity, for in Katz the employer was barred |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | with utter clarity, for in Katz the employer was barred from imposing unilateral changes even though the parties had yet to execute their first collective-bargaining agreement. Our decision in Laborers Health and Welfare Trust further demonstrates the distinction between contractual obligations and postexpiration terms imposed by the NLRA. There, a bargaining agreement required employer contributions to a pension fund. We assumed that under Katz the employer's failure to continue contributions after expiration of the agreement could constitute an unfair labor practice, and if so the Board could enforce the obligation. We rejected, however, the contention that such a failure amounted to a violation of the ERISA obligation to make contributions "under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement in accordance with the terms and conditions of such agreement." 29 U.S. C. 1145. Any postexpiration obligation to contribute was imposed by the NLRA, not by the bargaining agreement, and so the District Court lacked jurisdiction under 502(g)(2) of ERISA, 29 U.S. C. 1132(g)(2), to enforce the obligation. As with the obligation to make pension contributions in Advanced Lightweight Concrete other contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining agreement. Exceptions are determined by contract interpretation. Rights which accrued or vested under the agreement will, as a general rule, survive termination of the agreement. And of course, if a collective-bargaining agreement provides in explicit terms that certain benefits continue after the agreement's expiration, disputes as to such continuing benefits may be found to arise under the agreement, and so become subject to the contract's arbitration *208 provisions. See United Steelworkers of Finally, as we found in Nolde structural provisions relating to remedies and dispute resolution for example, an arbitration provision may in some cases survive in order to enforce duties arising under the contract. Nolde ' statement to that effect under 301 of the LMRA is similar to the rule of contract interpretation which might apply to arbitration provisions of other commercial contracts.[3] We presume as a matter of contract interpretation that the parties did not intend a pivotal dispute resolution provision to terminate for all purposes upon the expiration of the agreement. C The Union, and JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent, argue that we err in reaching the merits of the issue whether the posttermination grievances arise under the expired agreement because, it is said, that is an issue of contract interpretation to be submitted to an arbitrator in the first instance. Whether or not a company is bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the court, and a party cannot be forced to "arbitrate the arbitrability question." AT&T Inc. v. *209 Communications We acknowledge that where an effective bargaining agreement exists between the parties, and the agreement contains a broad arbitration clause, "there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that `[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.'" ). But we refuse to apply that presumption wholesale in the context of an expired bargaining agreement, for to do so would make limitless the contractual obligation to arbitrate. Although "`[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of coverage,'" AT&T we must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate this dispute, and we cannot avoid that duty because it requires us to interpret a provision of a bargaining agreement. We apply these principles to the layoff grievances in the present case. The layoffs took place almost one year after the Agreement had expired. It follows that the grievances are arbitrable only if they involve rights which accrued or vested under the Agreement, or rights which carried over after expiration of the Agreement, not as legally imposed terms and conditions of employment but as continuing obligations under the contract. The contractual right at issue, that "in case of layoffs, lengths of continuous service will be the determining factor if other things such as aptitude and ability are equal," App. 30, involves a residual element of seniority. Seniority provisions, the Union argues, "create a form of earned advantage, accumulated over time, that can be understood as a special form of deferred compensation for time already worked." Brief for Respondent Union 23-25, n. 14. Leaving aside the *210 question whether a provision requiring all layoffs to proceed in inverse order of seniority would support an analogy to the severance pay at issue in Nolde which was viewed as a form of deferred compensation, the layoff provision here cannot be so construed, and cannot be said to create a right that vested or accrued during the term of the Agreement or a contractual obligation that carries over after expiration. The order of layoffs under the Agreement was to be determined primarily with reference to "other factors such as aptitude and ability." Only where all such factors were equal was the employer required to look to seniority. Here, any arbitration proceeding would of necessity focus upon whether aptitude and ability and any unenumerated |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112623/litton-financial-printing-div-litton-business-systems-inc-v-nlrb/ | focus upon whether aptitude and ability and any unenumerated "other factors" were equal long after the Agreement had expired, as of the date of the decision to lay off employees and in light of Litton's decision to close down its coldtype printing operation. The important point is that factors such as aptitude and ability do not remain constant, but change over time. They cannot be said to vest or accrue or be understood as a form of deferred compensation. Specific aptitudes and abilities can either improve or atrophy. And the importance of any particular skill in this equation varies with the requirements of the employer's business at any given time. Aptitude and ability cannot be measured on some universal scale, but only by matching an employee to the requirements of an employer's business at that time. We cannot infer an intent on the part of the contracting parties to freeze any particular order of layoff or vest any contractual right as of the Agreement's expiration.[4] *211 V For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that the Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Board's order in its entirety and remanded the cause for further proceedings. It is so ordered. |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | concurring | Chambers v. Mississippi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108718/chambers-v-mississippi/ | We would not ordinarily expect an appellate court in the state or federal system to remain silent on a constitutional issue requiring decision in the case before it. Normally, a court's silence on an important question would simply indicate that it was unnecessary to decide the issue because it was not properly before the court or for some other reason. As my Brother REHNQUIST points out, the Court stated in that "when the highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary." Under this rule it becomes the petitioner's burden to demonstrate that under the applicable state law his claim was properly before the state court and was therefore necessarily rejected, although silently, by affirmance of the judgment. If he fails to do so, we need not entertain and decide the federal question that he presses. It is not our invariable practice, however, that we will not ourselves canvass state law to determine whether the federal question, presented to but not discussed by the state supreme court, was properly raised in accordance with state procedures. The Court surveyed state law in Street, itself, with little if any help from the appellant; and I think it is appropriate here where the does not contest our jurisdiction and seemingly *304 concedes that the question was properly raised below and necessarily decided by the Supreme Court. There is little doubt that ordinarily enforces a rule of contemporaneous objection with respect to evidence; the three opinions in ; ; make this sufficiently clear. Also, that case came here, and we not only noted the existence of the rule but recognized that it served a legitimate state interest. The same rule obtains where the proponent of evidence claims error in its exclusion: "The rejection of evidence not apparently admissible is not error, in the absence of an offer or sufficient statement of the purpose of its introduction, by which the court may determine its relevancy or admissibility. This Court has consistently followed this rule requiring definiteness and sufficiency of an offer of proof." There are cases stating that in proper circumstances the contemporaneous-objection rule will not be enforced and that the Supreme Court in some circumstances will consider an issue raised there for the first time. In the only issue in the appellate court concerned appellant's mental condition at the time of the crime, an issue not raised at trial. The court said |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | concurring | Chambers v. Mississippi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108718/chambers-v-mississippi/ | crime, an issue not raised at trial. The court said "[t]he rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, is not without exceptions, among which are errors `affecting fundamental rights of the parties or affecting *305 public policy,' if to act on which will work no injustice to any party to the appeal." The court proceeded to consider the issue. In a convicted defendant asserted in the Supreme Court for the first time the inadmissibility of certain evidence on the grounds of an illegal search and seizure, violation of the rule against self-incrimination, and improper cross-examination. The court considered these questions and reversed the conviction, saying that "[e]rrors affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. [W]here fundamental and constitutional rights are ignored, due process does not exist, and a fair trial in contemplation of law cannot be had." The reach of these cases was left in doubt when, in affirming the judgment in the Supreme Court refused to consider a claim of illegally obtained evidence because the matter had not been presented to the trial court. The case did not come within the court ruled, because Henry's counsel were experienced and adequate, and Henry was bound by their mistakes. This Court vacated that judgment and remanded for determination whether there had been a deliberate bypass, reading law as extending no discretion to give relief from the contemporaneous-objection rule where "petitioner was represented by competent local counsel familiar with local procedure." n. 5. In its initial opinion on remand, the Supreme Court of reasserted the necessity to object at the time testimony is offered in the trial court, but it said "[n]evertheless if it appears to the trial judge that the *306 foregoing rule of procedure would defeat justice and bring about results not justified or intended by substantive law, the rule may be relaxed and subordinated to the primary purpose of the law to enforce constitutional rights in the interest of justice."[*] In King v. (10), this statement from the Henry opinion was interpreted as giving the Supreme Court of the as well as the trial court, sufficient latitude to treat the request for a peremptory instruction to the jury after failure to object to the introduction of allegedly illegally obtained evidence as if the appellant had made timely objection. Moreover, in Wood v. (12), where a convicted defendant complained of a wide-ranging and allegedly unfair cross-examination of defense witnesses, and where |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | concurring | Chambers v. Mississippi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108718/chambers-v-mississippi/ | wide-ranging and allegedly unfair cross-examination of defense witnesses, and where there had been a failure to object to part of the prejudicial inquiry, the Supreme Court nevertheless considered the question, stating: "We note also that no objection was made to the testimony of Donald Ray Boyd when he was asked whether he had ever been in jail. However, it was stated in that in extreme cases a failure to object to questions which were violative of a constitutional right did not in all events have to be objected to before they would receive consideration by this Court. The appellant in this case was being tried for murder. The evidence of defendant's guilt was extremely close. A shred of evidence one way or the other could have been persuasive to the jury. In our opinion, this warrants our *307 consideration of the questions and responses to which repeated objections were made and sustained by the court, as well as the consideration of the testimony of Donald Ray Boyd wherein he was asked whether he had been in jail or not though no formal objection was made thereto." These cases seemingly preserve some aspects of the rule, and hence anticipate some situations where the contemporaneous-objection requirement will not be enforced, despite Henry. There will be occasions where the Supreme Court of will consider constitutional claims made in that court for the first time. Where this leaves the matter of our jurisdiction in the light of decisions such as is not clear. There, while acknowledging that motions for a new trial after final judgment were not favored in Georgia, the Court recognized that such motions had been granted in "exceptional" or "extraordinary" cases, their availability being within the well-informed discretion of the courts. It was claimed that denying Williams' motion was an adequate state ground precluding review here, but "since his motion was based upon a constitutional objection, and one the validity of which has in principle been sustained here, the discretionary decision to deny the motion does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to find that the substantive issue is properly before us." In the circumstances before us, where there were repeated offers of evidence and objections to its exclusion, although not on constitutional grounds, where the matter was presented in federal due process terms to the Supreme Court and where the does not now deny that the issue was properly before the state court and could have been considered by it, I am inclined, although *308 dubitante, to conclude with the Court that we have jurisdiction. As to the merits, I |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | The question is under what circumstances the distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable *919 for acts of copyright infringement by third parties using the product. We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. I A Respondents, Grokster, Ltd., and StreamCast Networks, Inc., defendants in the trial court, distribute free software products that allow computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks, so called because users' computers communicate directly with each other, not through *920 central servers. The advantage of peer-to-peer networks over information networks of other types shows up in their substantial and growing popularity. Because they need no central computer server to mediate the exchange of information or files among users, the high-bandwidth communications capacity for a server may be dispensed with, and the need for costly server storage space is eliminated. Since copies of a file (particularly a popular one) are available on many users' computers, file requests and retrievals may be faster than on other types of networks, and since file exchanges do not travel through a server, communications can take place between any computers that remain connected to the network without risk that a glitch in the server will disable the network in its entirety. Given these benefits in security, cost, and efficiency, peer-to-peer networks are employed to store and distribute electronic files by universities, government agencies, corporations, and libraries, among others.[1] Other users of peer-to-peer networks include individual recipients of Grokster's and StreamCast's software, and although the networks that they enjoy through using the software can be used to share any type of digital file, they have prominently employed those networks in sharing copyrighted music and video files without authorization. A group of copyright holders (MGM for short, but including motion picture studios, recording companies, songwriters, and music publishers) sued Grokster and StreamCast for their users' copyright infringements, alleging that they *921 knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works in violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S. C. 101 et seq. ( ed. and Supp. II).[2] MGM sought damages and an injunction. Discovery during the litigation revealed the way the software worked, the business aims of each defendant company, and the predilections of the users. Grokster's eponymous software employs what is known as FastTrack technology, a protocol developed by others and licensed to Grokster. |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | technology, a protocol developed by others and licensed to Grokster. StreamCast distributes a very similar product except that its software, called Morpheus, relies on what is known as Gnutella technology.[3] A user who downloads and installs either software possesses the protocol to send requests for files directly to the computers of others using software compatible with FastTrack or Gnutella. On the FastTrack network opened by the Grokster software, the user's request goes to a computer given an indexing capacity by the software and designated a supernode, or to some other computer with comparable power and capacity to collect temporary indexes of the files available on the computers of users connected to it. The supernode (or indexing computer) searches its own index and may communicate the search request to other supernodes. If the file is found, the supernode discloses its location to the computer requesting it, and the requesting user can download the file directly from the computer located. The copied file is placed in a designated sharing folder on the requesting user's computer, where it is available for other users to download in turn, along with any other file in that folder. *922 In the Gnutella network made available by Morpheus, the process is mostly the same, except that in some versions of the Gnutella protocol there are no supernodes. In these versions, peer computers using the protocol communicate directly with each other. When a user enters a search request into the Morpheus software, it sends the request to computers connected with it, which in turn pass the request along to other connected peers. The search results are communicated to the requesting computer, and the user can download desired files directly from peers' computers. As this description indicates, Grokster and StreamCast use no servers to intercept the content of the search requests or to mediate the file transfers conducted by users of the software, there being no central point through which the substance of the communications passes in either direction.[4] Although Grokster and StreamCast do not therefore know when particular files are copied, a few searches using their software would show what is available on the networks the software reaches. MGM commissioned a statistician to conduct a systematic search, and his study showed that nearly 90% of the files available for download on the FastTrack system were copyrighted works.[5] Grokster and StreamCast dispute this figure, raising methodological problems and arguing that free copying even of copyrighted works may be authorized by the rightholders. They also argue that potential noninfringing uses of their software are significant in kind, even if infrequent |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | of their software are significant in kind, even if infrequent in practice. Some musical performers, for example, have gained new audiences by distributing *923 their copyrighted works for free across peer-to-peer networks, and some distributors of unprotected content have used peer-to-peer networks to disseminate files, Shakespeare being an example. Indeed, StreamCast has given Morpheus users the opportunity to download the briefs in this very case, though their popularity has not been quantified. As for quantification, the parties' anecdotal and statistical evidence entered thus far to show the content available on the FastTrack and Gnutella networks does not say much about which files are actually downloaded by users, and no one can say how often the software is used to obtain copies of unprotected material. But MGM's evidence gives reason to think that the vast majority of users' downloads are acts of infringement, and because well over 100 million copies of the software in question are known to have been downloaded, and billions of files are shared across the FastTrack and Gnutella networks each month, the probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering. Grokster and StreamCast concede the infringement in most downloads, Brief for Respondents 10, n. 6, and it is uncontested that they are aware that users employ their software primarily to download copyrighted files, even if the decentralized FastTrack and Gnutella networks fail to reveal which files are being copied, and when. From time to time, moreover, the companies have learned about their users' infringement directly, as from users who have sent e-mail to each company with questions about playing copyrighted movies they had downloaded, to whom the companies have responded with guidance.[6] App. 559-563, 808-816, 939-954. And MGM notified the companies of 8 million copyrighted files that could be obtained using their software. Grokster and StreamCast are not, however, merely passive recipients of information about infringing use. The record is replete with evidence that from the moment Grokster *924 and StreamCast began to distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage infringement. After the notorious file-sharing service, Napster, was sued by copyright holders for facilitation of copyright infringement, A&M Records, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, StreamCast gave away a software program of a kind known as OpenNap, designed as compatible with the Napster program and open to Napster users for downloading files from other Napster and OpenNap users' computers. Evidence indicates that "[i]t was always [StreamCast's] intent to use [its OpenNap network] to be able to capture email addresses of |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | OpenNap network] to be able to capture email addresses of [its] initial target market so that [it] could promote [its] StreamCast Morpheus interface to them," App. 861; indeed, the OpenNap program was engineered "`to leverage Napster's 50 million user base,'" StreamCast monitored both the number of users downloading its OpenNap program and the number of music files they downloaded. It also used the resulting OpenNap network to distribute copies of the Morpheus software and to encourage users to adopt it. Internal company documents indicate that StreamCast hoped to attract large numbers of former Napster users if that company was shut down by court order or otherwise, and that StreamCast planned to be the next Napster. A kit developed by StreamCast to be delivered to advertisers, for example, contained press articles about StreamCast's potential to capture former Napster users, and it introduced itself to some potential advertisers as a company "which is similar to what Napster was," It broadcast banner advertisements to users of other Napster-compatible software, urging them to adopt its OpenNap. An internal e-mail from a company executive stated: "`We have put this network in *925 place so that when Napster pulls the plug on their free service or if the Court orders them shut down prior to that we will be positioned to capture the flood of their 32 million users that will be actively looking for an alternative.'" Thus, StreamCast developed promotional materials to market its service as the best Napster alternative. One proposed advertisement read: "Napster Inc. has announced that it will soon begin charging you a fee. That's if the courts don't order it shut down first. What will you do to get around it?" Another proposed ad touted StreamCast's software as the "#1 alternative to Napster" and asked "[w]hen the lights went off at Napster where did the users go?"[7] StreamCast even planned to flaunt the illegal uses of its software; when it launched the OpenNap network, the chief technology officer of the company averred that "[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and get sued. It's the best way to get in the new[s]." The evidence that Grokster sought to capture the market of former Napster users is sparser but revealing, for Grokster launched its own OpenNap system called Swaptor and inserted digital codes into its Web site so that computer users using Web search engines to look for "Napster" or "[f]ree file sharing" would be directed to the Grokster Web site, where they could download the Grokster software. And Grokster's name is an apparent derivative of Napster. StreamCast's executives |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | Grokster's name is an apparent derivative of Napster. StreamCast's executives monitored the number of songs by certain commercial artists available on their networks, and an internal communication indicates they aimed to have a larger number of copyrighted songs available on their networks *926 than other file-sharing networks. The point, of course, would be to attract users of a mind to infringe, just as it would be with their promotional materials developed showing copyrighted songs as examples of the kinds of files available through Morpheus. Morpheus in fact allowed users to search specifically for "Top 40" songs, which were inevitably copyrighted. Similarly, Grokster sent users a newsletter promoting its ability to provide particular, popular copyrighted materials. Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners 7-8. In addition to this evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote further, the business models employed by Grokster and StreamCast confirm that their principal object was use of their software to download copyrighted works. Grokster and StreamCast receive no revenue from users, who obtain the software itself for nothing. Instead, both companies generate income by selling advertising space, and they stream the advertising to Grokster and Morpheus users while they are employing the programs. As the number of users of each program increases, advertising opportunities become worth more. Cf. App. 539, 804. While there is doubtless some demand for free Shakespeare, the evidence shows that substantive volume is a function of free access to copyrighted work. Users seeking Top 40 songs, for example, or the latest release by Modest Mouse, are certain to be far more numerous than those seeking a free Decameron, and Grokster and StreamCast translated that demand into dollars. Finally, there is no evidence that either company made an effort to filter copyrighted material from users' downloads or otherwise impede the sharing of copyrighted files. Although Grokster appears to have sent e-mails warning users about infringing content when it received threatening notice from the copyright holders, it never blocked anyone from continuing to use its software to share copyrighted files. *927 StreamCast not only rejected another company's offer of help to monitor infringement, but blocked the Internet Protocol addresses of entities it believed were trying to engage in such monitoring on its networks, B After discovery, the parties on each side of the case crossmoved for summary judgment. The District Court limited its consideration to the asserted liability of Grokster and StreamCast for distributing the current versions of their software, leaving aside whether either was liable "for damages arising from past versions of their software, or from other past activities." |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | past versions of their software, or from other past activities." The District Court held that those who used the Grokster and Morpheus software to download copyrighted media files directly infringed MGM's copyrights, a conclusion not contested on appeal, but the court nonetheless granted summary judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast as to any liability arising from distribution of the then-current versions of their software. Distributing that software gave rise to no liability in the court's view, because its use did not provide the distributors with actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement. Case No. CV 01 08 SVW (PJWx) App. 1213. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In the court's analysis, a defendant was liable as a contributory infringer when it had knowledge of direct infringement and materially contributed to the infringement. But the court read Sony Corp. of as holding that distribution of a commercial product capable of substantial noninfringing uses could not give rise to contributory liability for infringement unless the distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement and failed to act on that knowledge. The fact that the software was capable of substantial noninfringing uses in the Ninth Circuit's view meant *928 that Grokster and StreamCast were not liable, because they had no such actual knowledge, owing to the decentralized architecture of their software. The court also held that Grokster and StreamCast did not materially contribute to their users' infringement because it was the users themselves who searched for, retrieved, and stored the infringing files, with no involvement by the defendants beyond providing the software in the first place. The Ninth Circuit also considered whether Grokster and StreamCast could be liable under a theory of vicarious infringement. The court held against liability because the defendants did not monitor or control the use of the software, had no agreed-upon right or current ability to supervise its use, and had no independent duty to police infringement. We granted certiorari. II A MGM and many of the amici fault the Court of Appeals's holding for upsetting a sound balance between the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement. The more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City ; see generally Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, ; Lichtman & Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 395 |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | An Economic Perspective, 16 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 395 The tension between the two values is the subject of this case, with its claim that digital distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright holders as never before, because every copy is identical to the original, copying is easy, *929 and many people (especially the young) use file-sharing software to download copyrighted works. This very breadth of the software's use may well draw the public directly into the debate over copyright policy, Peters, Brace Memorial Lecture: Copyright Enters the Public Domain, 51 J. Copyright Soc. 701, 705-717 (address by Register of Copyrights), and the indications are that the ease of copying songs or movies using software like Grokster's and Napster's is fostering disdain for copyright protection, Wu, When Code Isn't Law, As the case has been presented to us, these fears are said to be offset by the different concern that imposing liability, not only on infringers but on distributors of software based on its potential for unlawful use, could limit further development of beneficial technologies. See, e. g., Lemley & Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, ; Brief for Innovation Scholars and Economists as Amici Curiae 15-20; Brief for Emerging Technology Companies as Amici Curiae 19-25; Brief for Intel Corporation as Amicus Curiae 20-22.[8] The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, however, a powerful one, given the number of infringing downloads that occur every day using StreamCast's and Grokster's software. When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to *930 enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement. See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, see Gershwin Pub. and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it, Shapiro, Bernstein &[9] Although "[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another," Sony Corp. v. Universal City these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law, ; Kalem ; Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, *931 at ; 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright 12.04[A] (2005). B Despite the currency of these principles of secondary liability, this Court has dealt with secondary copyright infringement in only one recent case, and because MGM has tailored its principal claim |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | recent case, and because MGM has tailored its principal claim to our opinion there, a look at our earlier holding is in order. In Sony Corp. v. Universal City this Court addressed a claim that secondary liability for infringement can arise from the very distribution of a commercial product. There, the product, novel at the time, was what we know today as the videocassette recorder or VCR. Copyright holders sued Sony as the manufacturer, claiming it was contributorily liable for infringement that occurred when VCR owners taped copyrighted programs because it supplied the means used to infringe, and it had constructive knowledge that infringement would occur. At the trial on the merits, the evidence showed that the principal use of the VCR was for "`time-shifting,'" or taping a program for later viewing at a more convenient time, which the Court found to be a fair, not an infringing, use. There was no evidence that Sony had expressed an object of bringing about taping in violation of copyright or had taken active steps to increase its profits from unlawful taping. Although Sony's advertisements urged consumers to buy the VCR to "`record favorite shows'" or "`build a library'" of recorded programs, neither of these uses was necessarily infringing, On those facts, with no evidence of stated or indicated intent to promote infringing uses, the only conceivable basis for imposing liability was on a theory of contributory infringement arising from its sale of VCRs to consumers with knowledge that some would use them to infringe. But because the VCR was "capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses," we held the manufacturer *932 could not be faulted solely on the basis of its distribution. This analysis reflected patent law's traditional staple article of commerce doctrine, now codified, that distribution of a component of a patented device will not violate the patent if it is suitable for use in other ways. 35 U.S. C. 271(c); Aro Mfg. ; n. 6 The doctrine was devised to identify instances in which it may be presumed from distribution of an article in commerce that the distributor intended the article to be used to infringe another's patent, and so may justly be held liable for that infringement. "One who makes and sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination will be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts; he will be presumed to intend that they shall be used in the combination of the patent." New York Scaffolding ; see also James Heekin ; ; Thomson-Houston Electric ; Red Jacket Mfg. ; ; |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | ; ; Thomson-Houston Electric ; Red Jacket Mfg. ; ; (No. 11,702) (CC SDNY 1872). In sum, where an article is "good for nothing else" but infringement, at there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe, see Henry v. A. B. Dick overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more acute *933 fault than the mere understanding that some of one's products will be misused. It leaves breathing room for innovation and a vigorous commerce. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City 464 U. S., ; Dawson Chemical v. Rohm & Haas 4 U.S. 176, ; Henry v. A. B. Dick at The parties and many of the amici in this case think the key to resolving it is the Sony rule and, in particular, what it means for a product to be "capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses." Sony Corp. v. Universal City MGM advances the argument that granting summary judgment to Grokster and StreamCast as to their current activities gave too much weight to the value of innovative technology, and too little to the copyrights infringed by users of their software, given that 90% of works available on one of the networks was shown to be copyrighted. Assuming the remaining 10% to be its noninfringing use, MGM says this should not qualify as "substantial," and the Court should quantify Sony to the extent of holding that a product used "principally" for infringement does not qualify. See Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners 31. As mentioned before, Grokster and StreamCast reply by citing evidence that their software can be used to reproduce public domain works, and they point to copyright holders who actually encourage copying. Even if infringement is the principal practice with their software today, they argue, the noninfringing uses are significant and will grow. We agree with MGM that the Court of Appeals misapplied Sony, which it read as limiting secondary liability quite beyond the circumstances to which the case applied. Sony barred secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for infringement. The *934 Ninth Circuit has read Sony's limitation to mean that whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held contributorily liable for third parties' infringing use of it; it read the rule as being this broad, even when an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent of design and distribution of the product, unless the distributors had "specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contributed to the infringement, and failed to act upon that information." 380 F. 3d, at Because the Circuit found the StreamCast and Grokster software capable of substantial lawful use, it concluded on the basis of its reading of Sony that neither company could be held liable, since there was no showing that their software, being without any central server, afforded them knowledge of specific unlawful uses. This view of Sony, however, was error, converting the case from one about liability resting on imputed intent to one about liability on any theory. Because Sony did not displace other theories of secondary liability, and because we find below that it was error to grant summary judgment to the companies on MGM's inducement claim, we do not revisit Sony further, as MGM requests, to add a more quantified description of the point of balance between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur. It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required. C Sony's rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from *935 the common law.[10]Sony Corp. v. Universal City Thus, where evidence goes beyond a product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not preclude liability. The classic case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces commission of infringement by another, or "entic[es] or persuad[es] another" to infringe, Black's Law Dictionary 790 as by advertising. Thus at common law a copyright or patent defendant who "not only expected but invoked [infringing use] by advertisement" was liable for infringement "on principles recognized in every part of the law." Kalem 222 U. S., at See also Henry v. A. B. Dick 224 U. S., |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | See also Henry v. A. B. Dick 224 U. S., at -49 ; Thomson-Houston Electric v. Kelsey Electric R. Specialty ; Rumford Chemical (No. 12,133) (CC NJ 1876) (demonstrations of infringing activity along with "avowals of the [infringing] purpose and use for which it was made" supported liability for patent infringement). *936 The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases is no different today.[11] Evidence of "active steps taken to encourage direct infringement," Oak Industries, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged overcomes the law's reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use, see, e. g., Water Technologies 850 F.2d 0, 8 ; Fromberg, ; Haworth ; F. Supp. 1198, overruled on other grounds, Cf. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 37 ("There is a definite tendency to impose greater responsibility upon a defendant whose conduct was intended to do harm, or was morally wrong"). For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as *937 shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential. Accordingly, just as Sony did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe, 464 U. S., n. 19, mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise. III A The only apparent question about treating MGM's evidence as sufficient to withstand summary judgment under the theory of inducement goes to the need on MGM's part to adduce evidence that StreamCast and Grokster |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | on MGM's part to adduce evidence that StreamCast and Grokster communicated an inducing message to their software users. The classic instance of inducement is by advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed to stimulate others to commit violations. MGM claims that such a message is shown here. It is undisputed that StreamCast beamed onto the computer screens of users of Napster-compatible programs ads urging the adoption of its OpenNap program, which was designed, as its name implied, to invite the custom of patrons of Napster, then under attack in the courts for facilitating massive infringement. Those who accepted StreamCast's OpenNap program were offered software to perform the same services, which a factfinder could conclude *938 would readily have been understood in the Napster market as the ability to download copyrighted music files. Grokster distributed an electronic newsletter containing links to articles promoting its software's ability to access popular copyrighted music. And anyone whose Napster or free file-sharing searches turned up a link to Grokster would have understood Grokster to be offering the same file-sharing ability as Napster, and to the same people who probably used Napster for infringing downloads; that would also have been the understanding of anyone offered Grokster's suggestively named Swaptor software, its version of OpenNap. And both companies communicated a clear message by responding affirmatively to requests for help in locating and playing copyrighted materials. In StreamCast's case, of course, the evidence just described was supplemented by other unequivocal indications of unlawful purpose in the internal communications and advertising designs aimed at Napster users ("When the lights went off at Napster where did the users go?" App. 836 ). Whether the messages were communicated is not to the point on this record. The function of the message in the theory of inducement is to prove by a defendant's own statements that his unlawful purpose disqualifies him from claiming protection (and incidentally to point to actual violators likely to be found among those who hear or read the message). See Proving that a message was sent out, then, is the preeminent but not exclusive way of showing that active steps were taken with the purpose of bringing about infringing acts, and of showing that infringing acts took place by using the device distributed. Here, the summary judgment record is replete with other evidence that Grokster and StreamCast, unlike the manufacturer and distributor in Sony, acted with a purpose to cause copyright violations by use of software suitable for illegal use. See *939 Three features of this evidence of intent are particularly notable. First, each company showed itself |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | of intent are particularly notable. First, each company showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement, the market comprising former Napster users. StreamCast's internal documents made constant reference to Napster, it initially distributed its Morpheus software through an OpenNap program compatible with Napster, it advertised its OpenNap program to Napster users, and its Morpheus software functions as Napster did except that it could be used to distribute more kinds of files, including copyrighted movies and software programs. Grokster's name is apparently derived from Napster, it too initially offered an OpenNap program, its software's function is likewise comparable to Napster's, and it attempted to divert queries for Napster onto its own Web site. Grokster and StreamCast's efforts to supply services to former Napster users, deprived of a mechanism to copy and distribute what were overwhelmingly infringing files, indicate a principal, if not exclusive, intent on the part of each to bring about infringement. Second, this evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance by MGM's showing that neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their software. While the Ninth Circuit treated the defendants' failure to develop such tools as irrelevant because they lacked an independent duty to monitor their users' activity, we think this evidence underscores Grokster's and StreamCast's intentional facilitation of their users' infringement.[12] Third, there is a further complement to the direct evidence of unlawful objective. It is useful to recall that StreamCast *940 and Grokster make money by selling advertising space, by directing ads to the screens of computers employing their software. As the record shows, the more the software is used, the more ads are sent out and the greater the advertising revenue becomes. Since the extent of the software's use determines the gain to the distributors, the commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume use, which the record shows is infringing.[13] This evidence alone would not justify an inference of unlawful intent, but viewed in the context of the entire record its import is clear. The unlawful objective is unmistakable. B In addition to intent to bring about infringement and distribution of a device suitable for infringing use, the inducement theory of course requires evidence of actual infringement by recipients of the device, the software in this case. As the account of the facts indicates, there is evidence of infringement on a gigantic scale, and there is no serious issue of the adequacy of MGM's showing on this point in order to survive the companies' summary judgment requests. Although |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | majority | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799994/metro-goldwyn-mayer-studios-inc-v-grokster-ltd/ | in order to survive the companies' summary judgment requests. Although *941 an exact calculation of infringing use, as a basis for a claim of damages, is subject to dispute, there is no question that the summary judgment evidence is at least adequate to entitle MGM to go forward with claims for damages and equitable relief. * * * In sum, this case is significantly different from Sony and reliance on that case to rule in favor of StreamCast and Grokster was error. Sony dealt with a claim of liability based solely on distributing a product with alternative lawful and unlawful uses, with knowledge that some users would follow the unlawful course. The case struck a balance between the interests of protection and innovation by holding that the product's capability of substantial lawful employment should bar the imputation of fault and consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts of others. MGM's evidence in this case most obviously addresses a different basis of liability for distributing a product open to alternative uses. Here, evidence of the distributors' words and deeds going beyond distribution as such shows a purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of copyright infringement. If liability for inducing infringement is ultimately found, it will not be on the basis of presuming or imputing fault, but from inferring a patently illegal objective from statements and actions showing what that objective was. There is substantial evidence in MGM's favor on all elements of inducement, and summary judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast was error. On remand, reconsideration of MGM's motion for summary judgment will be in order. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
per_curiam | 1,978 | 200 | per_curiam | Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109947/board-of-trustees-of-keene-state-college-v-sweeney/ | The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. In Construction we stated that "[t]o dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only `articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'" quoting McDonnell Douglas We stated in McDonnell Douglas that the plaintiff "must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer's] stated reason for [the plaintiff's] rejection was in fact pretext." The Court of Appeals in the present case, however, referring to McDonnell Douglas, stated that "in requiring the defendant to prove absence of discriminatory motive, the Supreme Court placed the burden squarely on the party with the greater access to such evidence."[1] *25 While words such as "articulate," "show," and "prove," may have more or less similar meanings depending upon the context in which they are used, we think that there is a significant distinction between merely "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" and "prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive." By reaffirming and emphasizing the McDonnell Douglas analysis in Construction we made it clear that the former will suffice to meet the employee's prima facie case of discrimination. Because the Court of Appeals appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than warrants, its judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration in the light of[2] It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Almeida-Sanchez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108845/almeida-sanchez-v-united-states/ | Trial and conviction in this case were in the United District for the Southern District of California under an indictment charging that petitioner, contrary to 21 U.S. C. 176a (1964 ed.), had knowingly received, concealed, and facilitated the transportation of approximately 161 pounds of illegally imported marihuana. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. He appealed on the sole ground that the District had erroneously denied his motion to suppress marihuana allegedly seized from his automobile in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The motion to suppress was heard on stipulated evidence in the District[1] United Border Patrol Officers Shaw and Carrasco stopped petitioner's car shortly after midnight as it was traveling from Calexico, on the California-Mexico border, toward Blythe, California. *286 The stop was made on Highway 78 near Glamis, California, 50 miles by road from Calexico. The highway was "about the only north-south road in California coming from the Mexican border that does not have an established checkpoint."[2] Because of that, "it is commonly used to evade check points by both marijuana and alien smugglers." On occasions "but not at all times," officers of the Border Patrol "maintain a roving check of vehicles and persons on that particular highway." Pursuant to this practice "they stopped this vehicle for the specific purpose of checking for aliens." Petitioner's identification revealed that he was a resident of Mexicali, Mexico, but that he held a work permit for the United Petitioner had come from Mexicali, had picked up the car in Calexico and was on his way to Blythe to deliver it. He intended to return to Mexicali by bus.[3] The officers had been advised by an official bulletin that aliens illegally entering the United sometimes concealed themselves by sitting upright behind the back seat rest of a car, with their legs folded under the back seat from which the springs had been removed. While looking under the rear seat of petitioner's car for aliens, the officers discovered packages believed by them to contain marihuana. Petitioner was placed under arrest and advised of his rights. His car was then searched for additional marihuana, which was found in substantial amounts. On this evidence, the motion to suppress was denied, *287 and petitioner was convicted. A divided of Appeals affirmed, relying on its prior cases and on 287 (a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S. C. 1357 (a) (3), which provides that officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall have the power, without warrant, to search any vehicle for aliens within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United[4] |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Almeida-Sanchez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108845/almeida-sanchez-v-united-states/ | a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United[4] I dissent from the reversal of this judgment. I The Fourth Amendment protects the people "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and also provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause" The ordinary rule is that to be reasonable under the Amendment a search must be authorized by warrant issued by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. The *288 Amendment's overriding prohibition is nevertheless against "unreasonable" searches and seizures; and the legality of searching, without warrant and without probable cause, individuals and conveyances seeking to enter the country has been recognized by Congress and the courts since the very beginning. said as much; and in the repeated that neither warrant nor probable cause was required to authorize a stop and search at the external boundaries of the United : "Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in." This much is undisputed in this case. Persons and their effects may be searched at the border for dutiable articles or contraband. Conveyances may be searched for the same purposes, as well as to determine whether they carry aliens not entitled to enter the country. Neither, apparently, is it disputed that warrantless searches for aliens without probable cause may be made at fixed checkpoints away from the border. The problem in this case centers on the roving patrol operating away from, but near, the border. These patrols may search for aliens without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle searched is carrying aliens illegally into the country. But without probable cause, the majority holds the search unreasonable, although at least one Justice, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, would uphold searches by roving patrols if authorized by an area warrant issued on less than probable cause in the traditional sense. I agree with MR. JUSTICE POWELL that such a warrant so issued would satisfy the Fourth Amendment, and I would expect that such warrants would be readily issued. But I disagree with him *289 and the majority that either a warrant or probable cause is required in the circumstances of this case. As the has reaffirmed today in Cady v. Dombrowski, post, p. 433, the governing standard under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and in my view, that standard is sufficiently flexible to authorize the search involved in this |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Almeida-Sanchez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108845/almeida-sanchez-v-united-states/ | is sufficiently flexible to authorize the search involved in this case. In the proceeding under the "general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures," weighed the governmental interest claimed to justify the official intrusion against the constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen. -21. The "`need to search'" was balanced "`against the invasion which the search entails,'" quoting from In any event, as put by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the "question is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure." Warrantless but probable-cause searches of the person and immediate surroundings have been deemed reasonable when incident to arrest, see ; and in the stop of a suspected individual and a pat-down for weapons without a warrant were thought reasonable on less than traditional probable cause. In an inspection of every structure in an entire area to enforce the building codes was deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without probable cause, or suspicion that any particular house or structure was in violation of law, although a warrant, issuable without probable cause, or reasonable suspicion of a violation, was required with respect to nonconsenting property owners. Also, in Colonnade Catering MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, writing for the and recognizing that the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and seizures, ruled that the historic power of the Government to control the liquor traffic authorized warrantless inspections of licensed premises without probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, not to check on liquor quality or conditions under which it was sold, but solely to enforce the collection of, the federal excise tax.[5]United involved the Gun Control Act of 1968 and its authorization to federal officers to inspect firearms dealers. The public need to enforce an important regulatory program was held to justify random inspections of licensed establishments without warrant and probable cause. The has been particularly sensitive to the Amendment's broad standard of "reasonableness" where, as in Biswell and Colonnade, authorizing statutes permitted the challenged searches. We noted in Colonnade that "Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary *291 to meet the evils at hand," ; and in Biswell we relied heavily upon the congressional judgment that the authorized inspection procedures played an important part in the regulatory -317. In the case before us, 8 U.S. C. 1357 (a) (3), authorizes Border Patrol officers, without warrant, to search any vehicle for aliens "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United " and within the distance of 25 miles from such |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Almeida-Sanchez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108845/almeida-sanchez-v-united-states/ | " and within the distance of 25 miles from such external boundary to have access to private lands, but not dwellings "for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United" At the very least, this statute represents the considered judgment of Congress that proper enforcement of the immigration laws requires random searches of vehicles without warrant or probable cause within a reasonable distance of the international borders of the country. It is true that "[u]ntil 1875 alien migration to the United was unrestricted." But the power of the National Government to exclude aliens from the country is undoubted and sweeping. "That the government of the United through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power." Chae Chan "The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively is settled by our previous adjudications." *292 Lem Moon See also Fong Yue ; ; United ex rel. ; Oceanic Steam Navigation ; United ex rel. Since 1875, Congress has given "almost continuous attention to the problems of immigration and of excludability of certain defined classes of aliens. The pattern generally has been one of increasing control." at -762. It was only as the illegal entry of aliens multiplied that Congress addressed itself to enforcement mechanisms. In 1917, immigration authorities were authorized to board and search all conveyances by which aliens were being brought into the United Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 16, This basic authority, substantially unchanged, is incorporated in 8 U.S. C. 1225 (a). In 1946, it was represented to Congress that "[i]n the enforcement of the immigration laws it is at times desirable to stop and search vehicles within a reasonable distance from the boundaries of the United and the legal right to do so should be conferred by law." H. R. Rep. No. 186, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1945). The House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization was "of the opinion that the legislation is highly desirable," ib and its counterpart in the Senate, S. Rep. No. 632, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1945), stated that "[t] here |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Almeida-Sanchez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108845/almeida-sanchez-v-united-states/ | 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1945), stated that "[t] here is no question but that this is a step in the right direction." The result was express statutory authority, Act of Aug. 7, 1946, to conduct searches of vehicles for aliens within a reasonable distance from the border without warrant or possible cause. Moreover, in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. *293 163, Congress permitted the entry onto private lands, excluding dwellings, within a distance of 25 miles from any external boundaries of the country "for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United" 287 (a) (3), The judgment of Congress obviously was that there are circumstances in which it is reasonably necessary, in the enforcement of the immigration laws, to search vehicles and other private property for aliens, without warrant or probable cause, and at locations other than at the border. To disagree with this legislative judgment is to invalidate 8 U.S. C. 1357 (a) (3) in the face of the contrary opinion of Congress that its legislation comported with the standard of reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment. This I am quite unwilling to do. The external boundaries of the United are extensive. The Canadian border is almost 4,000 miles in length; the Mexican, almost 2,000. Surveillance is maintained over the established channels and routes of communication. But not only is inspection at regular points of entry not infallible, but it is also physically impossible to maintain continuous patrol over vast stretches of our borders. The fact is that illegal crossings at other than the legal ports of entry are numerous and recurring. If there is to be any hope of intercepting illegal entrants and of maintaining any kind of credible deterrent, it is essential that permanent or temporary checkpoints be maintained away from the borders, and roving patrols be conducted to discover and intercept illegal entrants as they filter to the established roads and highways and attempt to move away from the border area. It is for this purpose that the Border Patrol maintained the roving patrol involved in this case and conducted random, spot checks of automobiles and other vehicular traffic. *294 The United in this case reports that in fiscal year Border Patrol traffic checking operations located over 39,000 deportable aliens, of whom approximately 30,000 had entered the United by illegally crossing the border at a place other than a port of entry. This was said to represent nearly 10% of the number of such aliens located by the Border Patrol by all means throughout |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Almeida-Sanchez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108845/almeida-sanchez-v-united-states/ | aliens located by the Border Patrol by all means throughout the United[6] Section 1357 (a) (3) authorizes only searches for aliens and only searches of conveyances and other property. No searches of the person or for contraband are authorized by the section. The authority extended by the statute is limited to that reasonably necessary for the officer to assure himself that the vehicle or other conveyance is not carrying an alien who is illegally within this country; and more extensive searches of automobiles without probable cause are not permitted by the section. ; see Guided by the principles of Camara, Colonnade, and Biswell, I cannot but uphold the judgment of Congress that for purposes of enforcing the immigration laws it is reasonable to treat the exterior boundaries of the country as a zone, not a line, and that there are recurring circumstances in which the search of vehicular traffic without warrant and without probable cause may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment although not carried out at the border itself. *295 This has also been the considered judgment of the three s of Appeals whose daily concern is the enforcement of the immigration laws along the Mexican-American border, and who, although as sensitive to constitutional commands as we are, perhaps have a better vantage point than we here on the Potomac to judge the practicalities of border-area law enforcement and the reasonableness of official searches of vehicles to enforce the immigration statutes. The of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, like other circuits, recognizes that at the border itself, persons may be stopped, identified, and searched without warrant or probable cause and their effects and conveyances likewise subjected to inspection. There seems to be no dissent on this proposition. Away from the border, persons and automobiles may be searched for narcotics or other contraband only on probable cause; but under 1357 (a) (3), automobiles may be stopped without warrant or probable cause and a limited search for aliens carried out in those portions of the conveyance capable of concealing any illegal immigrant. This has been the consistent view of that court. In Fumagalli was stopped at a checkpoint in Imperial, California, 49 miles north of the international boundary. In the course of looking in the trunk for an illegal entrant, the odor of marihuana was detected and marihuana discovered. Fumagalli contended that the trunk of the automobile could not be examined to locate an illegal entrant absent probable cause to believe that the vehicle carried such a person. The court, composed of Judges Merrill, Hufstedler, and Byrne, rejected the position, stating |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Almeida-Sanchez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108845/almeida-sanchez-v-united-states/ | of Judges Merrill, Hufstedler, and Byrne, rejected the position, stating that "[w]hat all of these cases make clear is that probable cause is not required for an immigration search within approved limits [footnote omitted] but is generally required to sustain the legality of a search for contraband *296 in a person's automobile conducted away from the international borders. Appellant has confused the two rules in his attempt to graft the probable cause standards of the narcotics cases onto the rules justifying immigration inspections" 429 F.2d, at Among prior cases reaffirmed was Fernandez v. United where an automobile was stopped 18 miles north of Oceanside, California, on Highway 101 at a point 60 to 70 miles north of the Mexican border. An inspection for illegally entering aliens was conducted, narcotics were discovered and seized, and the stop and seizure were sustained under the statute. The Immigration Service, it was noted, had been running traffic checks in this area for 31 years, many illegal entrants had been discovered there, and there were at least a dozen other such checkpoints operating along the border between the United and Mexico.[7] The s of Appeal for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits share the problem of enforcing the immigration laws along the Mexican-American border. Both courts agree with the Ninth Circuit that 1357 (a) (3) is not void and that there are recurring circumstances where, as the statute permits, a stop of an automobile without warrant or probable cause and a search of it for aliens are constitutionally permissible. In United v. De Leon, De Leon was stopped without warrant or probable cause, *297 while driving on the highway leading north of Laredo, Texas, approximately 10 miles from the Mexican border. The purpose of the stop was to inspect for illegally entering aliens. De Leon opened the trunk as he was requested to do. A false bottom in the trunk and what was thought to be an odor of marihuana were immediately noticed and some heroin was seized. Judge Wisdom, writing for himself and Judges Godbold and Roney, concluded that: "Stopping the automobile ten miles from the Mexican border to search for illegal aliens was reasonable. See United v. McDaniel, [ ]; United v. Warner, 5 Cir. ; Marsh v. United 5 Cir. 1965, 8 U.S. C. 1225, 1357; 19 U.S. C. 482, 1581, 8 C. F. R. 287.1 [1973]; 19 C. F. R. 23.1 23.11 []. Once the vehicle was reasonably stopped pursuant to an authorized border check the agents were empowered to search the vehicle, including the trunk, for aliens." Similarly, United v. McDaniel, |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Almeida-Sanchez v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108845/almeida-sanchez-v-united-states/ | vehicle, including the trunk, for aliens." Similarly, United v. McDaniel, upheld a stop and an ensuing search for aliens that uncovered another crime. Judge Goldberg, with Judges Wisdom and Clark, was careful to point out, however, that the authority granted under the statute must still be exercised in a manner consistent with the standards of reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment. "Once the national frontier has been crossed, the search in question must be reasonable upon all of its facts, only one of which is the proximity of the search to an international border." This view appears to have been the law in the Fifth Circuit for many years.[8] *298 The of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has expressed similar views. In the automobile was stopped in New Mexico some distance from the Mexican border, the purpose being to search for aliens. Relying on the statute, the court, speaking through Judge Breitenstein, concluded that "[i]n the circumstances the initial stop and search for aliens were proper." However, when it was determined by the officers that there were no occupants of the car illegally in the country, whether in the trunk or elsewhere, the court held that the officers had no business examining the contents of a jacket found in the trunk. The evidence in this case was excluded. The clear rule of the circuit, however, is that conveyances may be stopped and examined for aliens without warrant or probable cause when in all the circumstances it is reasonable to do so.[9] Congress itself has authorized vehicle searches at a reasonable distance from international frontiers in order to aid in the enforcement of the immigration laws. Congress has long considered such inspections constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment. So, also, those courts and judges best positioned to make intelligent and sensible assessments of the requirements of reasonableness in the context of controlling illegal entries into this country have consistently and almost without dissent come to the same conclusion that is embodied in the judgment that is reversed today.[10] *299 II I also think that 1357 (a) (3) was validly applied in this case and that the search for aliens and the discovery of marihuana were not illegal under the Fourth Amendment. It was stipulated that the highway involved here was one of the few roads in California moving away from the Mexican border that did not have an established check station and that it is commonly used by alien smugglers to evade regular checkpoints. The automobile, when stopped sometime after midnight, was 50 miles along the road from the border town of |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Southeastern Community College v. Davis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110104/southeastern-community-college-v-davis/ | This case presents a matter of first impression for this Court: Whether 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination against an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" in federally funded programs "solely by reason of his handicap," forbids professional schools from imposing physical qualifications for admission to their clinical training programs. I Respondent, who suffers from a serious hearing disability, seeks to be trained as a registered nurse. During the 1973-1974 academic year she was enrolled in the College Parallel program of Southeastern Community College, a state institution that receives federal funds. Respondent hoped to progress to Southeastern's Associate Degree Nursing program, completion of which would make her eligible for state certification as a registered nurse. In the course of her application to the nursing program, she was interviewed by a member of the nursing faculty. It became apparent that respondent had difficulty understanding questions asked, and on inquiry she acknowledged a history of hearing problems and dependence on a hearing aid. She was advised to consult an audiologist. *401 On the basis of an examination at Duke University Medical Center, respondent was diagnosed as having a "bilateral, sensori-neural hearing loss." App. 127a. A change in her hearing aid was recommended, as a result of which it was expected that she would be able to detect sounds "almost as well as a person would who has normal hearing." at 127a-128a. But this improvement would not mean that she could discriminate among sounds sufficiently to understand normal spoken speech. Her lipreading skills would remain necessary for effective communication: "While wearing the hearing aid, she is well aware of gross sounds occurring in the listening environment. However, she can only be responsible for speech spoken to her, when the talker gets her attention and allows her to look directly at the talker." at 128a. Southeastern next consulted Mary McRee, Executive Director of the North Carolina Board of Nursing. On the basis of the audiologist's report, McRee recommended that respondent not be admitted to the nursing program. In McRee's view, respondent's hearing disability made it unsafe for her to practice as a nurse.[1] In addition, it would be impossible for respondent to participate safely in the normal clinical training program, and those modifications that would be necessary to enable safe participation would prevent her from *402 realizing the benefits of the program: "To adjust patient learning experiences in keeping with [respondent's] hearing limitations could, in fact, be the same as denying her full learning to meet the objectives of your nursing programs." at 132a-133a. After respondent was notified that she was not |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Southeastern Community College v. Davis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110104/southeastern-community-college-v-davis/ | at 132a-133a. After respondent was notified that she was not qualified for nursing study because of her hearing disability, she requested reconsideration of the decision. The entire nursing staff of Southeastern was assembled, and McRee again was consulted. McRee repeated her conclusion that on the basis of the available evidence, respondent "has hearing limitations which could interfere with her safely caring for patients." at 139a. Upon further deliberation, the staff voted to deny respondent admission. Respondent then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, alleging both a violation of 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S. C. 794 ( ed., Supp. III),[2]*403 and a denial of equal protection and due process. After a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of Southeastern. It confirmed the findings of the audiologist that even with a hearing aid respondent cannot understand speech directed to her except through lipreading, and further found: "[I]n many situations such as an operation room intensive care unit, or post-natal care unit, all doctors and nurses wear surgical masks which would make lipreading impossible. Additionally, in many situations a Registered Nurse would be required to instantly follow the physician's instructions concerning procurement of various types of instruments and drugs where the physician would be unable to get the nurse's attention by other than vocal means." Accordingly, the court concluded: "[Respondent's] handicap actually prevents her from safely performing in both her training program and her proposed profession. The trial testimony indicated numerous situations where [respondent's] particular disability would render her unable to function properly. Of particular concern to the court in this case is the potential of danger to future patients in such situations." Based on these findings, the District Court concluded that respondent was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" protected against discrimination by 504. In its view, "[o]therwise qualified, can only be read to mean otherwise able to function sufficiently in the position sought in spite of the handicap, if proper training and facilities are suitable and available." 424 F. Supp., Because respondent's disability would prevent her from functioning "sufficiently" in Southeastern's nursing program, the court *404 held that the decision to exclude her was not discriminatory within the meaning of 504.[3] On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. It did not dispute the District Court's findings of fact, but held that the court had misconstrued 504. In light of administrative regulations that had been promulgated while the appeal was pending, see[4] the appellate court believed that 504 required Southeastern |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Southeastern Community College v. Davis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110104/southeastern-community-college-v-davis/ | pending, see[4] the appellate court believed that 504 required Southeastern to "reconsider plaintiff's application for admission to the nursing program without regard to her hearing ability." It concluded that the District Court had erred in taking respondent's handicap into account in determining whether she was "otherwise qualified" for the program, rather than confining its inquiry to her "academic and technical qualifications." The Court of Appeals also suggested that 504 required "affirmative conduct" on the part of Southeastern to modify its program to accommodate the disabilities of applicants, "even when such modifications become expensive." Because of the importance of this issue to the many institutions covered by 504, we granted certiorari. We now reverse.[5] *405 II As previously noted, this is the first case in which this Court has been called upon to interpret 504. It is elementary that "[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip ; see Greyhound ; Santa Fe Industries, Section 504 by its terms does not compel educational institutions to disregard the disabilities of handicapped individuals or to make substantial modifications in their programs to allow disabled persons to participate. Instead, it requires only that an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" not be excluded from participation in a federally funded program "solely by reason of his handicap," indicating only that mere possession of a handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function in a particular context.[6] *406 The court below, however, believed that the "otherwise qualified" persons protected by 504 include those who would be able to meet the requirements of a particular program in every respect except as to limitations imposed by their handicap. See Taken literally, this holding would prevent an institution from taking into account any limitation resulting from the handicap, however disabling. It assumes, in effect, that a person need not meet legitimate physical requirements in order to be "otherwise qualified." We think the understanding of the District Court is closer to the plain meaning of the statutory language. An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap. The regulations promulgated by the Department of HEW to interpret 504 reinforce, rather than contradict, this conclusion. According to these regulations, a "[q]ualified handicapped person" is, "[w]ith respect to postsecondary and vocational education services, a handicapped person who meets the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the [school's] education program or activity." 45 CFR 84.3 (3) An explanatory note states: "The term `technical standards' refers to |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Southeastern Community College v. Davis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110104/southeastern-community-college-v-davis/ | An explanatory note states: "The term `technical standards' refers to all nonacademic admission criteria that are essential to participation in the program in question." 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, p. 405 (emphasis supplied). *407 A further note emphasizes that legitimate physical qualifications may be essential to participation in particular programs.[7] We think it clear, therefore, that HEW interprets the "other" qualifications which a handicapped person may be required to meet as including necessary physical qualifications. III The remaining question is whether the physical qualifications Southeastern demanded of respondent might not be necessary for participation in its nursing program. It is not open to dispute that, as Southeastern's Associate Degree Nursing program currently is constituted, the ability to understand speech without reliance on lipreading is necessary for patient safety during the clinical phase of the program. As the District Court found, this ability also is indispensable for many of the functions that a registered nurse performs. Respondent contends nevertheless that 504, properly interpreted, compels Southeastern to undertake affirmative action that would dispense with the need for effective oral communication. First, it is suggested that respondent can be given individual supervision by faculty members whenever she attends patients directly. Moreover, certain required courses might be dispensed with altogether for respondent. It is not *408 necessary, she argues, that Southeastern train her to undertake all the tasks a registered nurse is licensed to perform. Rather, it is sufficient to make 504 applicable if respondent might be able to perform satisfactorily some of the duties of a registered nurse or to hold some of the positions available to a registered nurse.[8] Respondent finds support for this argument in portions of the HEW regulations discussed above. In particular, a provision applicable to postsecondary educational programs requires covered institutions to make "modifications" in their programs to accommodate handicapped persons, and to provide "auxiliary aids" such as sign-language interpreters.[9] Respondent *409 argues that this regulation imposes an obligation to ensure full participation in covered programs by handicapped individuals and, in particular, requires Southeastern to make the kind of adjustments that would be necessary to permit her safe participation in the nursing program. We note first that on the present record it appears unlikely respondent could benefit from any affirmative action that the regulation reasonably could be interpreted as requiring. Section 84.44 (d) (2), for example, explicitly excludes "devices or services of a personal nature" from the kinds of auxiliary aids a school must provide a handicapped individual. Yet the only evidence in the record indicates that nothing less than close, individual attention by a nursing instructor |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Southeastern Community College v. Davis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110104/southeastern-community-college-v-davis/ | nothing less than close, individual attention by a nursing instructor would be sufficient to ensure patient safety if respondent took part in the clinical phase of the nursing program. See Furthermore, it also is reasonably clear that 84.44 (a) does not encompass the kind of curricular changes that would be necessary to accommodate respondent in the nursing program. In light of respondent's inability to function in clinical courses without close supervision, Southeastern, with prudence, could *410 allow her to take only academic classes. Whatever benefits respondent might realize from such a course of study, she would not receive even a rough equivalent of the training a nursing program normally gives. Such a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program is far more than the "modification" the regulation requires. Moreover, an interpretation of the regulations that required the extensive modifications necessary to include respondent in the nursing program would raise grave doubts about their validity. If these regulations were to require substantial adjustments in existing programs beyond those necessary to eliminate discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals, they would do more than clarify the meaning of 504. Instead, they would constitute an unauthorized extension of the obligations imposed by that statute. The language and structure of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 reflect a recognition by Congress of the distinction between the evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons and affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps. Section 501 (b), governing the employment of handicapped individuals by the Federal Government, requires each federal agency to submit "an affirmative action program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals" These plans "shall include a description of the extent to which and methods whereby the special needs of handicapped employees are being met." Similarly, 503 (a), governing hiring by federal contractors, requires employers to "take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals." The President is required to promulgate regulations to enforce this section. Under 501 (c) of the Act, by contrast, state agencies such as Southeastern are only "encourage[d] to adopt and implement such policies and procedures." Section 504 does not refer at all to affirmative action, and except as it applies to *411 federal employers it does not provide for implementation by administrative action. A comparison of these provisions demonstrates that Congress understood accommodation of the needs of handicapped individuals may require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it in those instances where it wished to do so.[10] Although an agency's interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled to some deference, |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Southeastern Community College v. Davis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110104/southeastern-community-college-v-davis/ | statute under which it operates is entitled to some deference, "this deference is constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and history." Here, neither the language, purpose, nor history of 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation on all recipients of federal funds.[11] Accordingly, we hold that even if *412 HEW has attempted to create such an obligation itself, it lacks the authority to do so. IV We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons always will be clear. It is possible to envision situations where an insistence on continuing past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered program. Technological advances can be expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped or otherwise to qualify them for some useful employment. Such advances also may enable attainment of these goals without imposing undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State. Thus, situations may arise where a *413 refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory. Identification of those instances where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimination against the handicapped continues to be an important responsibility of HEW. In this case, however, it is clear that Southeastern's unwillingness to make major adjustments in its nursing program does not constitute such discrimination. The uncontroverted testimony of several members of Southeastern's staff and faculty established that the purpose of its program was to train persons who could serve the nursing profession in all customary ways. See, e. g., App. 35a, 52a, 53a, 71a, 74a. This type of purpose, far from reflecting any animus against handicapped individuals, is shared by many if not most of the institutions that train persons to render professional service. It is undisputed that respondent could not participate in Southeastern's nursing program unless the standards were substantially lowered. Section 504 imposes no requirement upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person.[12] *414 One may admire respondent's desire and determination to overcome her handicap, and there well may be various other types of service for which she can qualify. In this case, however, we hold that there was no violation of 504 when Southeastern concluded that respondent did not qualify for admission to its program. Nothing in the language or history of 504 reflects an intention to limit the freedom of an educational institution to |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.