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Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Schneble v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108488/schneble-v-florida/ | Petitioner Schneble and his codefendant Snell were tried jointly in a Florida state court for murder. At the trial neither defendant took the stand, but police *428 witnesses testified to certain admissions made by each defendant implicating both of them in the murder. Both defendants were convicted, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. This Court vacated and remanded the case for further consideration in the light of Upon remand, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed Snell's conviction, finding that it had been obtained in violation of Bruton, but affirmed petitioner's conviction. We again granted certiorari, limited[*] to the question of whether petitioner's conviction had been obtained in violation of the Bruton rule. In the circumstances of this case, we find that any violation of Bruton that may have occurred at petitioner's trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm. The State's case showed that a threesome consisting of petitioner, Snell, and the victim, Mrs. Maxine Collier, left New Orleans in a borrowed automobile en route to Florida. While they were traveling across the Florida Panhandle, Mrs. Collier was murdered, and her body placed in the trunk of the automobile. The body was then transported in the car to the environs of Tampa, where it was left behind some bushes in a trash dump. Petitioner and Snell then continued their odyssey southward to the Florida Keys, and thence north along the east coast of Florida. They were apprehended for unrelated offenses in West Palm Beach, but upon discovering blood in the trunk of the car police officers there *429 commenced the investigation that ultimately led to the charging of petitioner and Snell with the murder of Mrs. Collier. The investigating officers testified at the trial that petitioner initially, while admitting knowledge of the murder, claimed that Snell had shot Mrs. Collier while petitioner was away from the car taking a walk. Petitioner later conceded, however, that his earlier story was false. He admitted to the police that it was he who had strangled Mrs. Collier, and that Snell had finally shot her in the head as she lay dying. The state court held these admissions of petitioner to be voluntary and admissible. Since our grant of certiorari here was limited to the Bruton issue, our treatment of that question assumes that these admissions were properly before the trial court. One of the investigating officers also related at trial a statement made to him by Snell. Petitioner challenges this testimony as violative of Bruton, since Snell did not take the stand and thus was not available for cross-examination. According to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Schneble v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108488/schneble-v-florida/ | stand and thus was not available for cross-examination. According to the testimony of this officer, Snell said petitioner had occupied the rear seat of the car and had never left Snell alone in the car with Mrs. Collier during the trip. While Snell's statement fell far short of the type of comprehensive and detailed confession made by petitioner, it did tend to undermine petitioner's initial (but later abandoned) claim that he had left Snell alone during the time at which the murder occurred. Snell's statement also placed petitioner in the position in the car from which the victim could more easily have been strangled. Thus, petitioner claims, the introduction of Snell's out-of-court statement, not subject to effective cross-examination, deprived petitioner of his right of confrontation in violation of Bruton. The Court held in Bruton that the admission of a confession of a codefendant who did not take the stand deprived the defendant of his rights under the Sixth *430 Amendment Confrontation Clause, when that confession implicated the defendant. Even when the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the declarant, the Court in Bruton determined that the danger of misuse of the confession by the jury was too great to be constitutionally permissible. Bruton was held to be retroactive in and thus applies to the instant case even though it was tried more than two years prior to Bruton. The mere finding of a violation of the Bruton rule in the course of the trial, however, does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction. In some cases the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless error. In the defendant was tried for murder jointly with three others. As in the instant case, he admitted being at the scene of the crime, but denied complicity. One of his codefendants, who confessed and implicated him, took the stand and was subject to cross-examination. The other two codefendants, whose statements corroborated defendant's presence at the scene of the crime, did not take the stand. Nothing the overwhelming evidence of Harrington's guilt, and the relatively insignificant prejudicial impact of these codefendants' statements, the Court held that any violation of Bruton that had occurred was harmless error. In the instant case, petitioner's confession was minutely detailed and completely consistent with the objective evidence. He informed police of the precise location at which they ultimately located the body, and guided them |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Schneble v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108488/schneble-v-florida/ | at which they ultimately located the body, and guided them to this out-of-the-way spot. Although petitioner initially tried to put the sole blame on Snell, *431 this version of the facts did not satisfactorily explain certain deep rope burns on petitioner's hands. When confronted with the fact of the rope burns, petitioner admitted that he and Snell had plotted to kill Mrs. Collier in order to steal her money and the automobile. Petitioner confessed that he had strangled Mrs. Collier with a plastic cord, and recounted the commission of the crime in minute and grisly detail culminating in Snell's shooting the victim in the head because she still showed signs of life after the strangulation. These details of petitioner's later account of the offense were internally consistent, were corroborated by other objective evidence, and were not contradicted by any other evidence in the case. They were consistently reiterated by petitioner on several occasions after his first exposition of them. Not only is the independent evidence of guilt here overwhelming, as in Harrington, but the allegedly inadmissible statements of Snell at most tended to corroborate certain details of petitioner's comprehensive confession. True, under the judge's charge, the jury might have found the confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible. But this argument proves too much; without Schneble's confession and the resulting discovery of the body, the State's case against Schneble was virtually nonexistent. The remaining evidence in the casethe disappearance of Mrs. Collier sometime during the trip, and Snell's statement that Schneble sat in the back seat of the car during the trip and never left Snell alone with Mrs. Colliercould not by itself convict Schneble of this or any other crime. Charged as they were by the judge that they must be "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt" and "to a moral certainty" of Schneble's guilt before they could convict him, the jurors could on no rational hypothesis have found Schneble guilty without reliance on his confession. Judicious application *432 of the harmless-error rule does not require that we indulge assumptions of irrational jury behavior when a perfectly rational explanation for the jury's verdict, completely consistent with the judge's instructions, stares us in the face. See Having concluded that petitioner's confession was considered by the jury, we must determine on the basis of "our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact on the minds of an average jury," whether Snell's admissions were sufficiently prejudicial to petitioner as to require reversal. In Bruton, the Court pointed out that "[a] defendant is entitled to a |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | dissenting | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | Petitioner’s situation does not excite sympathy, but the Court’s holding will stand for a rule in circumstances less peculiar than those here. I disagree with my colleagues with respect to the interest at stake for a criminal defen dant in a case like this, and I respectfully dissent. This case turns on whether plain-error review applies to an unpreserved claim that the Government breached its plea agreement and on identifying the relevant effect, or substantial rights implicated, under the third prong of United I agree with the majority that plain error is the proper test, but depart from the Court’s holding that the effect in question is length of incarceration for the offense charged (as to which the error here probably made no ultimate differ ence). I would hold that the relevant effect is conviction in the absence of trial or compliance with the terms of the plea agreement dispensing with the Government’s obliga tion to prove its case. The first two conditions for recognizing plain error, that there be error and that it be clear, see at 732–, are without doubt satisfied here. Before sentencing, a collo quy in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Proce dure 11 laid the ground for satisfying the requirement 2 PUCKETT v. UNITED STATES SOUTER, J., dissenting that the error be obvious, by making a public record of the terms of the plea agreement between Puckett and the Government. Both the written agreement and the Gov ernment’s representation to the District Court included the Government’s statement that Puckett qualified for a three-level reduction in his offense level under the Sen tencing Guidelines, because of his acceptance of responsi bility for his offense. See App. 54a (“The government agrees that Puckett has demonstrated acceptance of re sponsibility and thereby qualifies for a three-level reduc tion in his offense level”); at 68a (“The government agrees that Mr. Puckett has demonstrated acceptance of responsibility and thereby would qualify for a three level reduction in his offense level”). Puckett does indeed appear to have satisfied the condi tions on which the Government’s commitment was prem ised: he accepted responsibility for committing “his of fense[s]” and “assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 2003). His subsequent criminality (during the unusual 3-year break between his guilty plea and sentencing) was not a failure on his part to accept respon sibility for his prior crimes (the benefit of which the Gov ernment had already received by |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | dissenting | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | benefit of which the Gov ernment had already received by the time Puckett pleaded guilty). In any case, the Government could have insisted on a provision in the plea agreement allowing it to back out of its commitment if Puckett engaged in additional criminal conduct prior to sentencing, and did not do so. It should therefore be bound by the terms of the agreement it made, whether or not Puckett was in fact entitled to the reduction. In administering the criminal law no less than the civil, parties are routinely bound by agreements they wish they had not made. This is why the Government has no choice but to admit that it breached the plea agreement Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 3 SOUTER, J., dissenting when, at sentencing, it objected to the three-level reduc tion. Despite its contention that the plain-error doctrine does not save Puckett from his failure to object at the sentencing hearing, the Government does not deny that a deal is a deal and it does not deny that it broke its word. The plain-error doctrine will not, however, avail Puckett anything unless the remaining conditions set out in are satisfied, the third requiring a showing that sentenc ing Puckett on a plea given in return for an unfulfilled promise by the Government violated his substantial rights. See 507 U.S., at The majority understands the effect in question to be length of incarceration. See ante, at 12, n. 4 (“When the rights acquired by the defen dant relate to sentencing, the ‘outcome’ he must show to have been affected is his sentence”). Since Puckett can hardly show that a court apprised of his subsequent criminality would have given him the three-level reduction even in the absence of the Government’s breach, in the majority’s view he cannot satisfy the “substantial rights” criterion and so fails to qualify for correction of the admit ted clear error. I, on the contrary, would identify the effect on substan tial rights as the criminal conviction itself, regardless of length of incarceration. My reason is simply that under the Constitution the protected liberty interest in freedom from criminal taint, subject to the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, is properly understood to require a trial or plea agreement honored by the Government before the stigma of a conviction can be imposed. That protection does not vanish if a convicted defendant turns out to get a light sentence. It is the trial leading to possible conviction, not the sentencing hearing alone, that is the focus of this guarantee, and it is |
Justice Souter | 2,009 | 20 | dissenting | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | that is the focus of this guarantee, and it is the possibility of criminal conviction itself, without more, that calls for due process protection. In a legal system consti tuted this way, it is hard to imagine anything less fair 4 PUCKETT v. UNITED STATES SOUTER, J., dissenting than branding someone a criminal not because he was tried and convicted, but because he entered a plea of guilty induced by an agreement the Government refuses to honor. Agreements must therefore be kept by the Government as well as by the individual, and if the plain-error doctrine can ever rescue a defendant from the consequence of for feiting rights by inattention, it should be used when the Government has induced an admission of criminality by making an agreement that it deliberately breaks after the defendant has satisfied his end of the bargain. Redressing such fundamentally unfair behavior by the Government, whether by vacating the plea or enforcing the plea agree ment, see (1971), is worth the undoubted risk of allowing a defen dant to game the system and the additional administra tive burdens, see ante, at 5, 10–11. If the Judiciary is worried about gamesmanship and extra proceedings, all it needs to do is to minimize their likelihood by making it plain that it will require the Government to keep its word or seek rescission of the plea agreement if it has cause to do so. Thus, I would find that a defendant’s substantial rights have been violated whenever the Government breaches a plea agreement, unless the defendant got just what he bargained for anyway from the sentencing court. What I have said about the third criterion deter mines my treatment of the fourth, addressing whether leaving the error uncorrected “may be said ‘seriously [to] affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” ). If I am right that in this case the protected interest is in the guarantee that no one is liable to spend a day behind bars as a convict without a trial or his own agreement, then the fairness and integrity of the Judicial Branch suffer when a court imprisons a defendant after he pleaded guilty in Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 5 SOUTER, J., dissenting reliance on a plea agreement, only to have the Govern ment repudiate the obligation it agreed upon. That is precisely what happened here, yet the Judiciary denies relief under an appellate procedure for correcting patent error. Judicial repute does not escape without damage in the eyes of anyone who sees beyond the oddity of this case. Puckett |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | Our decision in this case turns on the resolution of the narrow question whether the Klamath River Indian Reservation in northern California was terminated by Act of Congress or whether it remains "Indian country," within the meaning of 18 U.S. C. 1151.[1] When established, the reservation was described as "a strip of territory commencing at the Pacific Ocean and extending 1 mile in width on each side of the Klamath River" *484 for a distance of approximately 20 miles, encompassing an area not exceeding 25,000 acres. This description is taken from President Franklin Pierce's Executive Order issued November 16, 1855, pursuant to the authority granted by the Act of March 3, 1853, 238, and the Act of March 3, 1855, 699.[2] Petitioner Raymond Mattz is a Yurok, or Klamath River, Indian who, since the age of nine, regularly fished, as his grandfather did before him, with dip, gill, and trigger nets, at a location called Brooks Riffle on the Klamath River. On September 24, 1969, a California game warden confiscated five gill nets owned by Mattz. The nets were stored near Brooks Riffle, approximately 200 feet from the river, and within 20 miles of the river's mouth. The respondent Director of the Department of Fish and game instituted a forfeiture proceeding in state court. Mattz intervened and asked for the return of his nets. He alleged, among other things, that he was an enrolled member of the Yurok Tribe, that the nets were seized within Indian country, and that the state statutes prohibiting the use of gill nets, Cal. Fish & Game Code 8664, 8686, and 8630, therefore were inapplicable to him. The state trial court, relying on found that the Klamath River Reservation in 1892 "for all practical purposes almost immediately lost its identity,"[3] and concluded that the area where the *485 nets were seized was not Indian country. The court thereby disposed of petitioner's primary defense to the forfeiture. It did not reach other issues bearing upon the application of the California statutes to Indian country and the existence of Indian fishing rights there. On appeal, the State Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that, inasmuch as the area in question had been opened for unrestricted homestead entry in 1892, the earlier reservation status of the land had terminated. The Supreme Court of California, one judge dissenting, denied a petition for hearing. See We granted certiorari, because the judgments of the state courts appeared to be in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court. We now reverse. The reversal, of course, does not dispose of the underlying forfeiture issue. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | of course, does not dispose of the underlying forfeiture issue. On remand, the questions relating to the existence of Mattz' fishing rights and to the applicability of California law notwithstanding reservation status will be addressed. We intimate no opinion on those issues. I While the current reservation status of the Klamath River Reservation turns primarily upon the effect of an 1892 Act of Congress which opened the reservation land for settlement, the meaning and effect of that Act cannot be determined without some reference to the Yurok Tribe and the history of the reservation between 1855 and 1892. The Yurok Indians apparently resided in the area of the lower Klamath River for a substantial period before 1855 when the Klamath River Reservation was established. Little is known of their prior history. There are sources, however, that provide us with relatively *486 detailed information about the tribe, its culture, living conditions, and customs for the period following 1855.[4] That the tribe had inhabited the lower Klamath River well before 1855 is suggested by the name. Yurok means "down the river." The names of the neighboring tribes, the Karok and the Modok, mean, respectively, "up the river" and "head of the river," and these appellations, as would be expected, coincide with the respective homelands. Powers 19; Kroeber 15.[5] *487 By the Act of March 3, 1853, the President was "authorized to make five military reservations from the public domain in the State of California or the Territories of Utah and New Mexico bordering on said State, for Indian purposes." The Act of March 3, 1855, appropriated funds for "collecting, removing, and subsisting the Indians of California. on two additional military reservations, to be selected as heretofore Provided, That the President may enlarge the quantity of reservations heretofore selected, equal to those hereby provided for." President Pierce then issued his order of November 16, 1855, specifying the Klamath River Reservation and stating, "Let the reservation be made, as proposed." Kappler 817. The site was ideally selected for the Yuroks. They had lived in the area; the arable land, although limited, was "peculiarly adapted to the growth of vegetables," 1856 Report 238; and the river, which ran through a canyon its entire length, abounded in salmon and other fish. Ibid.; 1858 Report 286.[6] In 1861 nearly all the arable lands on the Klamath River Reservation were destroyed by a freshet, and, upon recommendation of the local Indian agent, some of the Indians were removed to the Smith River Reservation, established for that purpose in 1862. Only a small number of Yuroks moved to the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | 1862. Only a small number of Yuroks moved to the new reservation, however, and nearly all those who did move returned within a few *488 years to the Klamath River. Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D. 205, 208 (1904); Kappler 830; 1864 Report 122. The Smith River Reservation was then discontinued. Act of July 27, 1868, 221. The total Yurok population on the Klamath River Reservation in the 1860's cannot be stated with precision. In 1852, based in part on a rough census made by a trader, it was estimated500. Kroeber 16-17.[7]*489 The effect of the 1861 flood cannot be firmly established; but it is clear that the tribe remained on the Klamath thereafter.[8] For later years, Kroeber estimated that the population in 1895 was 900, and, in 1910, 668. Kroeber 19. From this it would appear that the flood at least did not cause a dissolution of the tribe; on the contrary, the Yuroks continued to reside in the area through the turn of the century and beyond. The Act of April 8, 1864, designated California as one Indian superintendency. It also recited that "there shall be set apart by the President, and at his discretion, not exceeding four tracts of land, within the limits of said state, to be retained by the United for the purposes of Indian reservations." It further provided that "the several Indian reservations in California which shall not be retained under this act, shall be surveyed into lots or parcels and be offered for sale at public outcry, and thence afterward shall be held subject to sale at private entry." At the time of the passage of the 1864 Act there were, apparently, three reservations in California: the Klamath River, the Mendocino, and the Smith River. It appears, also, that the President did not take immediate *490 action, upon the passage of the Act, to recognize reservations in California. It was not until 1868 that any formal recognition occurred, and then it was the Congress, rather than the President, that acted. In that year Congress discontinued the Smith River Reservation, and restored the Mendocino to the public lands. No similar action was taken with respect to the Klamath River Reservation. Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D., 09. Congress made appropriations for the Round Valley Reservation, and for it and the Hoopa Valley Reservation in 1869, although neither of these, apparently, had been established theretofore by formal Executive Order.[9] The Klamath River Reservation, although not reestablished by Executive Order or specific congressional action, continued, certainly, in de facto existence. Yuroks remained on reservation land, and |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | in de facto existence. Yuroks remained on reservation land, and the Department of Indian Affairs regarded the Klamath River Reservation as "in a state of reservation" throughout the period from 1864 to 1891.[10] No steps were taken to sell the reservation, or parts thereof, under the 1864 Act. Indeed, in 1879, all trespassers there were removed by the military. In 1883 the Secretary of the Interior directed that allotments of land be made to the Indians on the reservation.[11] In February the Senate, by *491 resolution, directed the Secretary of the Interior "to inform the Senate what proceedings, if any, have been had in his Department relative to the survey and sale of the Klamath Indian reservation in pursuance of the provisions of the act approved April 8, 1864." 20 Cong. Rec. 1818. In response, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, by letter dated February 18, to the Secretary disclosed that no proceedings to this effect had been undertaken.[12] An Assistant Attorney General for the Department of the Interior expressed a similar view in an opinion dated January 20, 1891.[13] *492 In in a forfeiture suit, the United District Court for the Northern District of California concluded that the area within the Klamath River Reservation was not Indian country, within the meaning of Rev. Stat. 2133, prescribing the penalty for unlicensed trading in Indian country. The court concluded that the land composing the reservation was not retained or recognized as reservation land pursuant to the 1864 Act and that, therefore, it no longer constituted an Indian reservation. United This holding was expressly affirmed on appeal to a circuit judge. The Assistant Attorney General, in the opinion referred to above, conceded the probable correctness of the judgment but was not convinced that his own views were erroneous, and he could not assent to the reasoning of the court. He felt that the court's comments as to the abandoned status of the reservation "were dicta and not essential to the decision of the case before the court." Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D., 15. Thus, as of 1891, it may be fair to say that the exact legal status of the Klamath River Reservation was obscure and uncertain. The petitioner in his brief here, *493 p. 14, states that the reservation "ceased to exist in 1876, at the latest." Any question concerning the reservation's continuing legal existence, however, appears to have been effectively laid to rest by an Executive Order dated October 16, 1891, issued by President Benjamin Harrison.[14] By the specific terms of that order, the Hoopa Valley Reservation, which, as we |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | of that order, the Hoopa Valley Reservation, which, as we already have noted, was located in 1864 and formally set apart in 1876, and which was situated about 50 miles upstream from the Klamath River's mouth, was extended so as to include all land, one mile in width on each side of the river, from "the present limits" of the Hoopa Valley Reservation to the Pacific Ocean. The Klamath River Reservation, or what had been the reservation, thus was made part of the Hoopa Valley Reservation, as extended. The reason for incorporating the Klamath River Reservation in the Hoopa Valley Reservation is apparent. The 1864 Act had authorized the President to "set apart" no more than four tracts for Indian reservations in California. By 1876, and certainly by 1891, four reservations already had been so set apart. These were the Round Valley, referred to above, the Mission,[15] the Hoopa *494 Valley, and the Tule River. Kappler 830-831. Thus, recognition of a fifth reservation along the Klamath River was not permissible under the 1864 Act. Accordingly, the President turned to his authority under the Act to expand an existing, recognized reservation. He enlarged the Hoopa Valley Reservation to include what had been the Klamath River Reservation as well as an intervening riparian strip connecting the two tracts.[16] The President's continuing authority so to enlarge reservations and, specifically, the legality of the 1891 Executive Order, was affirmed by this Court in reh. denied, and is not challenged here. II This general background as to the origin and development of the Klamath River Reservation is not contested by either party. The reservation's existence, pursuant to the Executive Order of 1891, is conceded. The present controversy relates to its termination subsequent to 1891, and turns primarily upon the effect of the Act of June 17, 1892, entitled "An act to provide for the *495 disposition and sale of lands known as the Klamath River Indian Reservation." This Act provided: "That all of the lands embraced in what was Klamath River Reservation in the State of California, as set apart and reserved under authority of law by an Executive order dated November sixteenth, eighteen hundred and fifty-five, are hereby declared to be subject to settlement, entry, and purchase under the laws of the United granting homestead rights and authorizing the sale of mineral, stone, and timber lands: Provided, That any Indian now located upon said reservation may, at any time within one year from the passage of this act, apply to the Secretary of the Interior for an allotment. And the Secretary of the Interior |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | Interior for an allotment. And the Secretary of the Interior may reserve from settlement, entry, or purchase any tract or tracts of land upon which any village or settlement of Indians is now located, and may set apart the same for the permanent use and occupation of said village or settlement of Indians. Provided further, That the proceeds arising from the sale of said lands shall constitute a fund to be used under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior for the maintenance and education of the Indians now residing on said lands and their children." The respondent Director argues that this statute effected the termination of the Klamath River Reservation. The petitioner urges the contrary. It is our task, in light of the language and purpose of the Act, as well as of the historical background, outlined above, to determine the proper meaning of the Act and, consequently, the current status of the reservation. *496 The respondent relies upon what he feels is significant language in the Act and upon references in the legislative history. He contends, "The fact that the lands were to be opened up for settlement and sale by homesteaders strongly militates against a continuation of such reservation status." Brief for Respondent 3. We conclude, however, that this is a misreading of the effect of the allotment provisions in the 1892 Act. The meaning of those terms is to be ascertained from the overview of the earlier General Allotment Act of 1887, That Act permitted the President to make allotments of reservation lands to resident Indians and, with tribal consent, to sell surplus lands. Its policy was to continue the reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and grazing. When all the lands had been allotted and the trust expired, the reservation could be abolished.[17] Unallotted lands were made available to non-Indians with the purpose, in part, of promoting interaction between the races and of encouraging Indians to adopt white ways. See 6 of the General Allotment Act, ; United Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 115-117, 127-129, 776-777 (1958).[18]*497 Under the 1887 Act, however, the President was not required to open reservation land for allotment; he merely had the discretion to do so. In view of the discretionary nature of this presidential power, Congress occasionally enacted special legislation in order to assure that a particular reservation was in fact opened to allotment.[19] The 1892 Act was but one example of this. Its allotment provisions, which do not differ materially from those of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | allotment provisions, which do not differ materially from those of the General Allotment Act of 1887, and which in fact refer to the earlier Act, do not, alone, recite or even suggest that Congress intended thereby to terminate the Klamath River Reservation. See Rather, allotment under the 1892 Act is completely consistent with continued reservation status. This Court unanimously observed, in an analogous setting in Seymour, "The Act did no more [in this respect] than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the reservation in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development of its wards." See United ; United See also ; III The respondent further urges, however, that his view of the effect of the 1892 Act is supported by the Act's reference *498 to "what was [the] Klamath River Reservation." According to the respondent, this reference, and other references in the legislative history, compel the conclusion that Congress intended to terminate the reservation in 1892. The 1892 Act, to be sure, does refer to the Klamath River Reservation in the past tense. But this is not to be read as a clear indication of congressional purpose to terminate. Just a few weeks before the bill (H. R. 38, 52d Cong., 1st Sess.), which eventually became the Act, was reported out of committee on February 5, 1892, H. R. Rep. No. 52d Cong., 1st Sess., the President had formally extended the Hoopa Valley Reservation to include the Klamath River Reservation. And only that portion of the extension which had been the Klamath River Reservation was the subject of the 1892 Act. The reference to the Klamath River Reservation in the past tense seems, then, merely to have been a natural, convenient, and shorthand way of identifying the land subject to allotment under the 1892 Act.[20] We do not believe *499 the reference can be read as indicating any clear purpose to terminate the reservation directly or by innuendo. The respondent also points to numerous statements in the legislative history that, in his view, indicate that the reservation was to be terminated. We need not refer in detail to the cited passages in H. R. Rep. No. or to the debates on the bill, 23 Cong. Rec. 1598-1599, 3918-3919 (1892), for there is no challenge here to the view that the House was generally hostile to continued reservation status of the land in question. In our estimation, however, this very fact, in proper perspective, supports the petitioner and undermines the respondent's position. As early |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | supports the petitioner and undermines the respondent's position. As early as 1879, there were efforts in Congress to abolish the Klamath River Reservation. From that date to 1892 strong sentiment existed to this effect. But it does not appear that termination ever commanded majority support. The advocates of termination argued that the reservation, as of 1879, long had been abandoned; that the land was useless as a reservation; and that many white settlers had moved on to the land and their property should be protected. See H. R. Rep. No. 1354, 46th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1880). That whites had settled there is clear, but the view that no Indians remained after the flood of 1861 appears to have been a gross misconception on the part of those who sought termination.[21] *500 The first bill providing for public entry and sale of the Klamath River Reservation was introduced in the Senate on May 28, 1879. S. Res. 34, 46th Cong., 1st Sess.; 9 Cong. Rec. 1651. The resolution referred to the reservation's having been "abandoned" in 1855 "and the tribe removed to another reservation established for its use." No action was taken on the bill, and another, of the same purport, was introduced on January 12, 1880, in the House. H. R. 3454, 46th Cong., 2d Sess.; 10 Cong. Rec. 286. This bill provided that the reservation "be, and the same is hereby, abolished," and authorized and directed the Secretary of the Interior to survey the lands and have them made subject to homestead and preemption entry and sale "the same as other public lands." It is clear from the report on this second bill, H. R. Rep. No. 1354, that the establishment of the reservation in 1855 was viewed as a mistake and an injustice. According to the Report, the reservation had been abandoned after the 1861 freshet, and the Indians had moved to the Smith River and, later, the Hoopa Valley Reservations. White settlers had moved in and wished to exploit the lumber and soil of the area which, some said, "has no equal in California as a fruit and wine growing country." Inasmuch as the reservation blocked access to the river, the resources of the area could not be developed. Although unmentioned in that Report, the Office of Indian Affairs opposed the bill. See H. R. Rep. No. 1148, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1882). The bill as reported was recommitted and no further action was taken. 10 Cong. Rec. 3126 (1880). An identical bill was introduced in the following Congress. H. R. 60, 47th Cong., 1st |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | in the following Congress. H. R. 60, 47th Cong., 1st Sess.; 13 Cong. Rec. 90 (1881). The Commissioner of Indian Affairs opposed the bill as introduced, but stated that he would not opposed it if provision for prior allotments to the Indians was made. H. R. Rep. No. 1148, The *501 Commissioner's proposed amendment was approved by the Committee, 13 Cong. Rec. 3414 (1882), but no action on the bill was taken by the full House. In 1883 and 1884 three more bills were introduced. It is of interest to note that each acceded to the request of the Commissioner that provision be made for prior allotments to resident Indians. H. R. 112, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.; 15 Cong. Rec. 62 (1883); S. 813, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.; 15 Cong. Rec. 166 (1883); H. R. 7505, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.; 15 Cong. Rec. 5923 (1884). Each bill would have "abolished" the reservation and would have made the land subject to homestead and pre-emption entry. None of the bills was enacted, although passage must have been generally regarded as likely, for the Indian Bureau in 1883 began the work of allotment and survey, perhaps in anticipation of passage. In 1885 two bills were introduced in the House. Each was substantially identical to those introduced in 1883 and 1884. H. R. 158 and H. R. 165, 49th Cong., 1st Sess.; 17 Cong. Rec. 370 (1885). No action was taken on either bill. No further bills, apparently, were introduced until During the intervening period, however, the General Allotment Act of 1887, was passed and thereafter amended, The Rising Star Tea case, was also decided. In a bill providing for the allotment of the Klamath River Reservation was introduced. The allotments, however, were to be made in a manner inconsistent with the General Allotment Act. H. R. 12104, 50th Cong., 2d Sess.; 20 Cong. Rec. 756 And after affirmance of the Rising Star Tea case by the circuit court, identical bills were introduced in the House and the Senate providing, without mention of allotment, that "all of the lands embraced in what was Klamath River Reservation are hereby declared *502 to be subject to settlement, entry, and purchase" under the land laws. H. R. 113, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.; 21 Cong. Rec. 229 ; S. 2297, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.; 21 Cong. Rec. 855 (1890). The Indian Office opposed the bills, recommending that they be amended to provide for allotments to the Indians under the General Allotment Act, that surplus lands be restored to the public domain, and that the proceeds be held in |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | the public domain, and that the proceeds be held in trust for the Klamath River Indians. See Short v. United No. 102-63, pp. 44-45 (Report of Commissioner, Court of Claims, 1972). H. R. 113 was reported out of committee with certain amendments, including one to the effect that proceeds arising from the sale of lands were to be used for the "removal, maintenance, and education" of the resident Indians, the Hoopa Valley Reservation being considered the place of removal. Allotments to the Indians on the Klamath Reservation, however, were emphatically rejected. H. R. Rep. No. 1176, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1890). The bill was so amended and passed the House. 21 Cong. Rec. 10701-10702 (1890). It died in the Senate. In light of the passage of this last bill in the House and the presence of the Rising Star Tea opinions, the Indian Department moved to have the Klamath River Reservation land protected for the Indians residing there. The details of this effort, including the opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, referred to above, are outlined in the Commissioner's report in Short v. United These efforts culminated in President Harrison's Executive Order of October 1891 expanding the Hoopa Valley Reservation to include the Klamath River Reservation. It is against this background of repeated legislative efforts to terminate the reservation, and to avoid allotting reservation lands to the Indians, that the 1892 Act was introduced. H. R. 38, 52d Cong., 1st Sess.; 23 Cong. *503 Rec. 125 (1892). The bill provided for the settlement, entry, and purchase of the reservation land and specified that the proceeds should be used for the "removal, maintenance, and education" of the resident Indians. No allotments were provided for, as the Indians were "semicivilized, disinclined to labor, and have no conception of land values or desire to cultivate the soil." H. R. Rep. No. 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1892). The House Committee on Indian Affairs amended the bill by changing the word "and" to "or" in the proviso relating to the use of proceeds. The bill passed the House without change. 23 Cong. Rec. 1598-1599 (1892). It was struck out in the Senate, however, and another version was substituted deleting reference to the removal of the Indians and providing that before public sale the land should be allotted to the Indians under the General Allotment Act of 1887, as amended. This substitute measure had the support of the Interior Department. The Senate called for a conference with the House, and the conference adopted the Senate version with amendments. Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 153, 52d |
Justice Blackmun | 1,973 | 11 | majority | Mattz v. Arnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108812/mattz-v-arnett/ | Senate version with amendments. Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 153, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892). The bill was then passed and became the 1892 Act. IV Several conclusions may be drawn from this account. First, the respondent's reliance on the House Report and on comments made on the floor of the House is not well placed. Although the primary impetus for termination of the Klamath River Reservation had been with the House since 1871, this effort consistently had failed to accomplish the very objectives the respondent now seeks to achieve. Likewise, the House in 1892 failed to accomplish these objectives, for the Senate version, supported by the Interior Department, was substituted for that of *504 the House. The Senate version, ultimately enacted, provided for allotments to the Indians and for the proceeds of sales to be held in trust for the "maintenance and education," not the removal, of the Indians. The legislative history relied upon by the respondent does not support the view that the reservation was terminated; rather, by contrast with the bill as finally enacted, it compels the conclusion that efforts to terminate the reservation by denying allotments to the Indians failed completely. A second conclusion is also inescapable. The presence of allotment provisions in the 1892 Act cannot be interpreted to mean that the reservation was to be terminated. This is apparent from the very language of 18 U.S. C. 1151, defining Indian country "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent" therein. More significantly, throughout the period from 1871-1892 numerous bills were introduced which expressly provided for the termination of the reservation and did so in unequivocal terms. Congress was fully aware of the means by which termination could be effected. But clear termination language was not employed in the 1892 Act. This being so, we are not inclined to infer an intent to terminate the reservation.[22] The Court stated in United 215 U. S., 85, that "when Congress has *505 once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress." A congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history. See ; United[23] Finally, our conclusion that the 1892 Act did not terminate the Klamath River Reservation is reinforced by repeated recognition of the reservation status of the land after 1892 by the Department of the Interior and by Congress. In 1904 the Department, in Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I. D. 205, ruled that the 1892 Act reconfirmed the continued existence of the reservation. |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | This case presents the question whether a minor but permanent physical occupation of an owner's property authorized by government constitutes a "taking" of property for which just compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. New York law provides that a landlord must permit a cable television company to install its cable facilities upon his property. N. Y. Exec. Law 828(1) (McKinney Supp. -1982). In this case, the cable installation occupied portions of appellant's roof and the side of her building. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that this appropriation does not amount to a taking. Because we conclude that such a physical occupation of property is a taking, we reverse. I Appellant Jean Loretto purchased a five-story apartment building located at 303 West 105th Street, New York in 1971. The previous owner had granted appellees Teleprompter Corp. and Teleprompter Manhattan CATV (collectively Teleprompter)[1] permission to install a cable on the building and the exclusive privilege of furnishing cable *422 television (CATV) services to the tenants. The New York Court of Appeals described the installation as follows: "On June 1, 1970 TelePrompter installed a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length along the length of the building about 18 inches above the roof top, and directional taps, approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches, on the front and rear of the roof. By June 8, 1970 the cable had been extended another 4 to 6 feet and cable had been run from the directional taps to the adjoining building at 305 West 105th Street." Teleprompter also installed two large silver boxes along the roof cables. The cables are attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals, and other equipment is installed by bolts. Initially, Teleprompter's roof cables did not service appellant's building. They were part of what could be described as a cable "highway" circumnavigating the city block, with service cables periodically dropped over the front or back of a building in which a tenant desired service. Crucial to such a network is the use of so-called "crossovers"cable lines extending from one building to another in order to reach a new group of tenants.[2] Two years after appellant purchased the building, Teleprompter connected a "noncrossover" line i. e., one that provided CATV service to appellant's own tenantsby dropping a line to the first floor down the front of appellant's building. *423 Prior to 1973, Teleprompter routinely obtained authorization for its installations from property owners along the cable's route, compensating the owners |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | from property owners along the cable's route, compensating the owners at the standard rate of 5% of the gross revenues that Teleprompter realized from the particular property. To facilitate tenant access to CATV, the State of New York enacted 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973. Section 828 provides that a landlord may not "interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or premises," and may not demand payment from any tenant for permitting CATV, or demand payment from any CATV company "in excess of any amount which the [State Commission on Cable Television] shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable."[3] The landlord may, however, require the CATV company or the tenant to bear the cost of installation and to indemnify for any damage caused by the installation. Pursuant to 828(1)(b), the State Commission has ruled that a one-time $1 payment *424 is the normal fee to which a landlord is entitled. In the Matter of Implementation of Section 828 of the Executive Law, No. 90004, Statement of General Policy (New York State Commission on Cable Television, Jan. 15, 1976) (Statement of General Policy), App. 51-52; Clarification of General Policy (Aug. 27, 1976), App. 68-69. The Commission ruled that this nominal fee, which the Commission concluded was equivalent to what the landlord would receive if the property were condemned pursuant to New York's Transportation Corporations Law, satisfied constitutional requirements "in the absence of a special showing of greater damages attributable to the taking." Statement of General Policy, App. 52. Appellant did not discover the existence of the cable until after she had purchased the building. She brought a class action against Teleprompter in 1976 on behalf of all owners of real property in the State on which Teleprompter has placed CATV components, alleging that Teleprompter's installation was a trespass and, insofar as it relied on 828, a taking without just compensation. She requested damages and injunctive relief.[4] Appellee of New York, which has granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise to provide CATV within certain areas of Manhattan, intervened. The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city, upholding the constitutionality of 828 in both crossover and noncrossover situations. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, over dissent, upheld the statute. The court concluded that the law requires the landlord to allow both crossover and noncrossover installations but permits him to *425 request payment from the CATV company under 828(1)(b), at a level determined by the State Cable Commission, only for noncrossovers. The court then ruled that the |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | Commission, only for noncrossovers. The court then ruled that the law serves a legitimate police power purposeeliminating landlord fees and conditions that inhibit the development of CATV, which has important educational and community benefits. Rejecting the argument that a physical occupation authorized by government is necessarily a taking, the court stated that the regulation does not have an excessive economic impact upon appellant when measured against her aggregate property rights, and that it does not interfere with any reasonable investment-backed expectations. Accordingly, the court held that 828 does not work a taking of appellant's property. Chief Judge Cooke dissented, reasoning that the physical appropriation of a portion of appellant's property is a taking without regard to the balancing analysis courts ordinarily employ in evaluating whether a regulation is a taking. In light of its holding, the Court of Appeals had no occasion to determine whether the $1 fee ordinarily awarded for a noncrossover installation was adequate compensation for the taking. Judge Gabrielli, concurring, agreed with the dissent that the law works a taking but concluded that the $1 presumptive award, together with the procedures permitting a landlord to demonstrate a greater entitlement, affords just compensation. We noted probable jurisdiction. II The Court of Appeals determined that 828 serves the legitimate public purpose of "rapid development of and maximum penetration by a means of communication which has important educational and community aspects," and thus is within the State's police power. We have no reason to question that determination. It is a separate question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid. See Penn Transportation *426 ; Delaware, L. & W. R. We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve. Our constitutional history confirms the rule, recent cases do not question it, and the purposes of the Takings Clause compel its retention. A In Penn Transportation the Court surveyed some of the general principles governing the Takings Clause. The Court noted that no "set formula" existed to determine, in all cases, whether compensation is constitutionally due for a government restriction of property. Ordinarily, the Court must engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." But the inquiry is not standardless. The economic impact of the regulation, especially the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, is of particular significance. "So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A `taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." As Penn affirms, the Court has often upheld substantial regulation of an owner's use of his own property where deemed necessary to promote the public interest. At the same time, we have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a property restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings Clause. Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case, "the character of the government action" not only is an important factor in resolving whether the action works a taking but also is determinative. *427 When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking.[5] As early as 1872, in this Court held that the defendant's construction, pursuant to state authority, of a dam which permanently flooded plaintiff's property constituted a taking. A unanimous Court stated, without qualification, that "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution." Seven years later, the Court reemphasized the importance of a physical occupation by distinguishing a regulation that merely restricted the use of private property. In Northern Transportation the Court held that the city's construction *428 of a temporary dam in a river to permit construction of a tunnel was not a taking, even though the plaintiffs were thereby denied access to their premises, because the obstruction only impaired the use of plaintiffs' property. The Court distinguished earlier cases in which permanent flooding of private property was regarded as a taking, e. g., as involving "a physical invasion of the real estate of the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession." In this case, by contrast, "[n]o entry was made upon the plaintiffs' lot." Since these early cases, this Court has consistently distinguished between flooding cases involving a permanent physical occupation, on the one hand, and cases involving a more temporary invasion, or government action outside the owner's property that causes consequential damages within, on the other. A taking has always been found only in the former situation. See United ; ; United ; ; United States v. Kansas Life Ins. Co., In St. the Court |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | States v. Kansas Life Ins. Co., In St. the Court applied the principles enunciated in to a situation closely analogous to the one presented today. In that case, the Court held that the city of St. Louis could exact reasonable compensation for a telegraph company's placement of telegraph poles on the city's public streets. The Court reasoned: "The use which the [company] makes of the streets is an exclusive and permanent one, and not one temporary, shifting and in common with the general public. The ordinary traveler, whether on foot or in a vehicle, passes to and fro along the streets, and his use and occupation *429 thereof are temporary and shifting. The space he occupies one moment he abandons the next to be occupied by any other traveller. But the use made by the telegraph company is, in respect to so much of the space as it occupies with its poles, permanent and exclusive. It as effectually and permanently dispossesses the general public as if it had destroyed that amount of ground. Whatever benefit the public may receive in the way of transportation of messages, that space is, so far as respects its actual use for purposes of highway and personal travel, wholly lost to the public. ". It matters not for what that exclusive appropriation is taken, whether for steam railroads or street railroads, telegraphs or telephones, the state may if it chooses exact from the party or corporation given such exclusive use pecuniary compensation to the general public for being deprived of the common use of the portion thus appropriated."[6] Similarly, in Western Union Telegraph a telegraph company constructed and operated telegraph lines over a railroad's right of way. In holding that federal law did not grant the company the right of eminent domain or the right to operate the lines absent the railroad's consent, the Court assumed that *430 the invasion of the telephone lines would be a compensable taking. Later cases, relying on the character of a physical occupation, clearly establish that permanent occupations of land by such installations as telegraph and telephone lines, rails, and underground pipes or wires are takings even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his land. See, e. g., ; Southwestern Bell Telephone Cf. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel See generally 2 J. Sackman, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain 6.21[7] More recent cases confirm the distinction between a permanent physical occupation, a physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property. In United the Court ruled that frequent flights immediately above a landowner's property constituted a taking, comparing such overflights to the quintessential form of a taking: "If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it." *431 As the Court further explained, "We would not doubt that, if the United States erected an elevated railway over respondents' land at the precise altitude where its planes now fly, there would be a partial taking, even though none of the supports of the structure rested on the land. The reason is that there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it." The Court concluded that the damages to the respondents "were not merely consequential. They were the product of a direct invasion of respondents' domain." See also Two wartime takings cases are also instructive. In United the Court unanimously held that the Government's seizure and direction of operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners constituted a taking, though members of the Court differed over which losses suffered during the period of Government control were compensable. The plurality had little difficulty concluding that because there had been an "actual taking of possession and control," the taking was as clear as if the Government held full title and ownership. In United by contrast, the Court found no taking where the Government had issued a wartime order requiring nonessential gold mines to cease operations for the purpose of conserving equipment and manpower for use in mines more essential to the war effort. Over dissenting Justice Harlan's complaint that "as a practical matter the Order led to consequences no different from those that would have followed the temporary acquisition of physical possession of these mines by the United States," the Court reasoned that "the Government did not occupy, *432 use, or in any manner take physical possession of the gold mines or of the equipment connected with them." The Court concluded that the temporary though severe restriction on use of the mines was justified by the exigency of war.[8] Cf. Although this Court's most recent cases have not addressed the precise issue before us, they have emphasized that physical |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | the precise issue before us, they have emphasized that physical invasion cases are special and have not repudiated the rule that any permanent physical occupation is a taking. The cases state or imply that a physical invasion is subject to a balancing process, but they do not suggest that a permanent physical occupation would ever be exempt from the Takings Clause. Penn Transportation as noted above, contains one of the most complete discussions of the Takings Clause. The Court explained that resolving whether public action works a taking is ordinarily an ad hoc inquiry in which several factors are particularly significant the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action. 438 U.S., The opinion does not repudiate the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.[9] *433 In Kaiser the Court held that the Government's imposition of a navigational servitude requiring public access to a pond was a taking where the landowner had reasonably relied on Government consent in connecting the pond to navigable water. The Court emphasized that the servitude took the landowner's right to exclude, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." The Court explained: "This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioner's private property; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina. And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay compensation. See United ; Portsmouth" Although the easement of passage, not being a permanent occupation of land, was not considered a taking per se, Kaiser Aetna reemphasizes that a physical invasion is a government intrusion of an unusually serious character.[10] *434 Another recent case underscores the constitutional distinction between a permanent occupation and a temporary physical invasion. In PruneYard Shopping the Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that shopping center owners permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on their property, to which they had already invited the general public. The Court emphasized that the State Constitution does not prevent the owner from restricting expressive activities by imposing reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to minimize interference with the owner's commercial functions. Since the invasion was temporary and limited in |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | commercial functions. Since the invasion was temporary and limited in nature, and since the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all persons from his property, "the fact that [the solicitors] may have `physically invaded' [the owners'] property cannot be viewed as determinative."[11] In short, when the "character of the governmental action," Penn 438 U. S., is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to *435 whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner. B The historical rule that a permanent physical occupation of another's property is a taking has more than tradition to commend it. Such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests. To borrow a metaphor, cf. the government does not simply take a single "strand" from the "bundle" of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand. Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights "to possess, use and dispose of it." United To the extent that the government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys each of these rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the space. The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.[12] See Kaiser Aetna, * -180; see also Restatement of Property 7 (6). Second, the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power to control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the property. Although deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking, see it is clearly relevant. Finally, even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the property. Moreover, an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's property. As Part indicates, property law has long protected an owner's expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his property. To require, as well, that |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | the possession of his property. To require, as well, that the owner permit another to exercise complete dominion literally adds insult to injury. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, and n. 110 (1967). Furthermore, such an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion. See n. 19, infra. The traditional rule also avoids otherwise difficult linedrawing problems. Few would disagree that if the State required landlords to permit third parties to install swimming pools on the landlords' rooftops for the convenience of the tenants, the requirement would be a taking. If the cable installation here occupied as much space, again, few would disagree that the occupation would be a taking. But constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied.[13]*437 Indeed, it is possible that in the future, additional cable installations that more significantly restrict a landlord's use of the roof of his building will be made. Section 828 requires a landlord to permit such multiple installations.[14] Finally, whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred presents relatively few problems of proof. The placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to dispute. Once the fact of occupation is shown, of course, a court should consider the extent of the occupation as one relevant factor in determining the compensation due.[15] For that reason, moreover, there is *438 less need to consider the extent of the occupation in determining whether there is a taking in the first instance. C Teleprompter's cable installation on appellant's building constitutes a taking under the traditional test. The installation involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building, completely occupying space immediately above and upon the roof and along the building's exterior wall.[16] In light of our analysis, we find no constitutional difference between a crossover and a noncrossover installation. The portions of the installation necessary for both crossovers and noncrossovers permanently appropriate appellant's property. Accordingly, each type of installation is a taking. Appellees raise a series of objections to application of the traditional rule here. Teleprompter notes that the law applies only to buildings used as rental property, and draws the *439 conclusion that the law is simply a permissible regulation of the use of real property. |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | majority | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110783/loretto-v-teleprompter-manhattan-catv-corp/ | simply a permissible regulation of the use of real property. We fail to see, however, why a physical occupation of one type of property but not another type is any less a physical occupation. Insofar as Teleprompter means to suggest that this is not a permanent physical invasion, we must differ. So long as the property remains residential and a CATV company wishes to retain the installation, the landlord must permit it.[17] Teleprompter also asserts the related argument that the State has effectively granted a tenant the property right to have a CATV installation placed on the roof of his building, as an appurtenance to the tenant's leasehold. The short answer is that 828(1)(a) does not purport to give the tenant any enforceable property rights with respect to CATV installation, and the lower courts did not rest their decisions on this ground.[18] Of course, Teleprompter, not appellant's tenants, actually owns the installation. Moreover, the government does not have unlimited power to redefine property rights. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, *440 Finally, we do not agree with appellees that application of the physical occupation rule will have dire consequences for the government's power to adjust landlord-tenant relationships. This Court has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails. See, e. g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, ; Queenside Hills Realty ; ; Home Building & Loan (4) ; Edgar A. Levy Leasing ; 256 U.S. (11) In none of these cases, however, did the government authorize the permanent occupation of the landlord's property by a third party. Consequently, our holding today in no way alters the analysis governing the State's power to require landlords to comply with building codes and provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common area of a building. So long as these regulations do not require the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity. See Penn Transportation[19] *441 III Our holding today is very narrow. We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the property owner entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property regulation. We do not, however, question the equally substantial authority upholding a State's broad power to impose |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | dissenting | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | I join JUSTICE ALITO’s opinion in full but write separately regarding the accrual date for a Fourth Amendment unreasonable-seizure claim. JUSTICE ALITO suggests that a claim for unreasonable seizure based on a warrantless arrest might not accrue until the “first appearance” under Illinois law (or the “initial appearance” under federal law)—which ordinarily represents the first judicial deter- mination of probable cause for that kind of arrest—rather than at the time of the arrest. See post, at 1, 9 (dissenting opinion); see also (taking a similar approach). Which of those events is the correct one for purposes of accrual makes no difference in this case, because both the arrest and the first appearance occurred more than two years before petitioner filed suit. See ante, at 4; see also (petitioner’s claim was untimely regardless of whether it accrued on day of arrest or first appearance). I would leave for another case (one where the question is dispositive) whether an unreasonable-seizure claim would accrue on the date of the first appearance if that appear- ance occurred on some day after the arrest. I think the answer to that question might turn on the meaning of “seizure,” rather than on the presence or absence of any form of legal process. See post, at 7–8 (describing the ordinary meaning of “seizure”). Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 1 ALITO, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 14–9496 ELIJAH MANUEL, PETITIONER v. CITY OF JOLIET, ILLINOIS, ET AL. |
Justice Stevens | 1,980 | 16 | dissenting | Rush v. Savchuk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110171/rush-v-savchuk/ | As the Court notes, appellant Rush had no contact with Minnesota that would support personal jurisdiction over him in that State. Ante, at 322. Moreover, precludes the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction over his property in that forum if the intangible property attached is unrelated to the action. It does not follow, however, that the plaintiff may not obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over appellant's insurance policy, since his carrier does business in Minnesota and since it has also specifically contracted in the policy attached to defend the very litigation that plaintiff has instituted in Minnesota. In this kind of case, the Minnesota statute authorizing jurisdiction is correctly characterized as the "functional equivalent" of a so-called direct-action statute. The impact of the judgment is against the insurer.[*] I believe such a direct-action statute is valid as applied to a suit brought by a forum resident, see cert. denied, so long as it is understood that the forum may exercise no power whatsoever over the individual defendant. As so understood, it makes no difference whether the insurance company is sued in its own name or, as Minnesota law provides, in the guise of a suit against the individual defendant. In this case, although appellant Rush may have a contractual obligation to his insurer to appear in court to testify and generally to cooperate in the defense of the lawsuit, it is my understanding that Minnesota law does not compel him to do so through the contempt power or otherwise. Moreover, any judgment formally entered against the individual defendant may only be executed against the proceeds of his insurance policy. In my opinion, it would violate the Due Process Clause to make any use of such a judgment against that individualfor example, by giving the judgment collateral-estoppel effect in a later action against him arising from the same accident. Accord, Minichiello v. ; Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth after But we are not now faced with any problem concerning use of a quasi in rem judgment against an individual defendant personally. I am therefore led to the conclusion that the Federal Constitution does not require the Minnesota courts to dismiss this action. |
per_curiam | 1,974 | 200 | per_curiam | Gerstein v. Coe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109056/gerstein-v-coe/ | A three-judge District Court entered a declaratory judgment holding unconstitutional a Florida statute, (3) which forbids an abortion without the consent of the husband, if the woman is married, and if unmarried and under the age of 18, without the consent of a parent. Because it was anticipated that the State would respect the declaratory judgment, the court declined to issue an injunction against the enforcement of the statute. The State of Florida appeals from the declaratory judgment invalidating the statute. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S. C. 1253, under which this appeal is sought to be taken, does not authorize an appeal from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. ; ; Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., Division of St. Mary's Hospital, ; see also The declaratory judgment is appealable to the Court of Appeals, and we are informed that an *280 appeal to that court has already been taken. It is suggested that we treat the statement of jurisdiction as a petition for certiorari before judgment to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1254 (1). The petition for certiorari is denied |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108439/united-states-v-standard-oil-co-of-cal/ | The United States sought injunctive relief against appellee, alleging that appellee combined and conspired to restrain and monopolize the distribution and sale of petroleum products in American Samoa, in violation of 3 of the Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 3.[1] The District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that American Samoa is not a "Territory of the United States" within the meaning of 3. The United States has appealed pursuant to the Expediting Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 29. We note probable jurisdiction and reverse. American Samoa is a group of seven small islands in the South Pacific. Treaties with Great Britain and Germany *559 recognize the claims of the United States to the islands. T. S. No. 314. By Act of Congress, 48 U.S. C. 1661, powers to govern the islands are vested in the President, who has delegated the authority to the Secretary of the Interior, Exec. Order No. 10264, The District Court distinguished between "organized" and other Territories, holding that only the former are Territories within 3 and that American Samoa is not "organized."[2] Section 3 extends to "any Territory of the United States." Congress, of course, did not have Samoa in mind when it enacted the Sherman Act. Yet, as this Court pointed out in holding that Puerto Rico is within the coverage of 3, "that is not enough. It is necessary to go further and to say that if the acquisition of that insular dependency had been foreseen, Congress would have so varied its comprehensive language as to exclude it from the operation of the act." Puerto There is no more reason to think that Congress would have done so for Samoa than for Puerto Rico. The Court stressed in Puerto Rico that Congress intended by 3 "to exert all the power it possessed in respect of the subject matter trade and commerce," and the Court therefore found it "equally reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to include all territories to which its powers might extend. The same reason which requires the utmost liberality of construction in respect of the word `trade,' also requires the same degree of liberality of construction in respect of the word `territory'; and we hold, accordingly, that the word `territory' was used in its most comprehensive sense, as embracing *560 all organized territories, whether incorporated into the United States or not, including Puerto Rico." There is no question that Congress has power to apply the Sherman Act to Samoa. Because "Congress intended to include all Territories |
per_curiam | 2,002 | 200 | per_curiam | Mathias v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118508/mathias-v-worldcom-technologies-inc/ | We granted certiorari to consider three questions: (1) whether a state commission's action relating to the enforcement of an interconnection agreement is reviewable in federal court under 47 U.S. C. 252(e)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. IV); (2) whether a state commission waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily participating in the regulatory scheme established by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Stat. 56; and (3) whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young, permits suit for prospective relief against state public utility commissioners in their official capacities for alleged *684 ongoing violations of that Act. After full briefing and oral argument, it is now clear that petitioners were the prevailing parties below, and seek review of uncongenial findings not essential to the judgment and not binding upon them in future litigation. As a general rule, a party may not appeal from a favorable judgment simply to obtain review of findings it deems erroneous. See New York Telephone We have since granted certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the same questions, arising in the same factual context. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., and United Our decision in those cases is released today. See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., ante, p. 635. The writ in this case is dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | The Supplemental Jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S. C. enables federal district courts to entertain claims not otherwise within their adjudicatory authority when those claims “are so related to claims within [federal- court competence] that they form part of the same case or controversy.” Included within this supple- mental jurisdiction are state claims brought along with federal claims arising from the same episode. When dis- trict courts dismiss all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, they ordinarily dismiss as well all related state claims. See A district court may also dismiss the related state claims if there is a good reason to decline jurisdiction. See (2), and (). This case concerns the time within which state claims so dismissed may be refiled in state court. Section 1367(d), addressing that issue, provides: “The period of limitations for any [state] claim [ joined with a claim within federal-court competence] shall be tolled while the claim is pending [in federal court] and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless 2 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court State law provides for a longer tolling period.” The question presented: Does the word “tolled,” as used in mean the state limitations period is suspended during the pendency of the federal suit; or does “tolled” mean that, although the state limitations period continues to run, a plaintiff is accorded a grace period of 30 days to refile in state court post dismissal of the federal case? Petitioner urges the first, or stop-the-clock, reading. Respondent urges, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted, the second, or grace-period, reading. In the case before us, plaintiff-petitioner Stephanie C. Artis refiled her state-law claims in state court 59 days after dismissal of her federal suit.1 Reading as a grace-period prescription, her complaint would be time barred. Reading as stopping the limitations clock during the pendency of the federal-court suit, her com- plaint would be timely. We hold that ’s instruc- tion to “toll” a state limitations period means to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock. Because the D. C. Court of Appeals held that did not stop the D. C. Code’s limitations clock, but merely provided a 30-day grace period for refiling in D. C. Superior Court, we reverse the D. C. Court of Appeals’ judgment. I A Section 1367, which Congress added to Title 28 as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, codifies the court-developed pendent and ancillary juris- —————— 1 The nonfederal claims Artis asserted arose under the D. C. Code and common law; |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | asserted arose under the D. C. Code and common law; on dismissal of her federal-court suit, she refiled those claims in D. C. Superior Court. For the purpose at hand, District of Columbia law and courts are treated as state law and courts. See 28 U.S. C. (“As used in this section, the term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.”). Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 3 Opinion of the Court diction doctrines under the label “supplemental jurisdic- tion.” See Exxon Mobil (describing the development of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction doctrines and subse- quent enactment of at 579– (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (same). The House Report accompanying the Act explains that Congress sought to clarify the scope of federal courts’ authority to hear claims within their sup- plemental jurisdiction, appreciating that “[s]upplemental jurisdiction has enabled federal courts and litigants to deal economically—in single rather than multiple litiga- tion—with related matters.” H. R. Rep. No. 101–73, p. 28 (1990) (H. R. Rep.). Section 1367(a) provides, in relevant part, that a district court with original jurisdiction over a claim “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims form[ing] part of the same case or controversy.” “[N]ot every claim within the same ‘case or controversy’ as the claim within the federal courts’ original jurisdiction will be decided by the federal court.” Section 1367(c) states: “The district courts may decline to exercise supple- mental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if— “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, “(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has orig- inal jurisdiction, “(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or “() in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” If a district court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a claim asserted under and the plaintiff wishes to continue pursuing it, she must refile the claim in state ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court court. If the state court would hold the claim time barred, however, then, absent a curative provision, the district court’s dismissal of the state-law claim without prejudice would be tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon (1988) (under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, if the statute of limitations on state-law claims expires before the federal court “relinquish[es] jurisdiction[,] a dis- missal will foreclose the plaintiff from litigating his claims”). To prevent that result, supplies “a tolling rule that must be applied by |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | result, supplies “a tolling rule that must be applied by state courts.” Jinks, 538 U.S., at Section 1367(d) provides: “The period of limitations for any claim asserted un- der subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” This case requires us to determine how ’s tolling rule operates. B Petitioner Artis worked as a health inspector for re- spondent, the District of Columbia (the “District”). In November 2010, Artis was told she would lose her job. Thirteen months later, Artis sued the District in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that she had suffered employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 2 U.S. C. et seq. She also asserted three allied claims under D. C. law: retaliation in violation of the District of Columbia Whistleblower Act, D. C. Code ; termination in violation of the District of Columbia False Claims Act, and Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 5 Opinion of the Court wrongful termination against public policy, a common-law claim. Artis alleged that she had been subjected to gender discrimination by her supervisor, and thereafter encoun- tered retaliation for reporting the supervisor’s unlawful activities. See Artis v. District of Columbia, 51 F. Supp. 3d 135, 137 On June 27, the District Court granted the Dis- trict’s motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claim. Having dismissed Artis’ sole federal claim, the District Court, pursuant to declined to exer- cise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state- law claims. “Artis will not be prejudiced,” the court noted, “because 28 U.S. C. provides for a tolling of the statute of limitations during the period the case was here and for at least 30 days thereafter.” Fifty-nine days after the dismissal of her federal action, Artis refiled her state-law claims in the D. C. Superior Court, the appropriate local court. The Superior Court granted the District’s motion to dismiss, holding that Artis’ claims were time barred, because they were filed 29 days too late. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a. When Artis first asserted her state-law claims in the District Court, nearly two years remained on the applicable three-year statute of limitations.2 But two and a half years passed before the federal court relinquished |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | and a half years passed before the federal court relinquished jurisdiction. Unless —————— 2 The D. C. False Claims Act and the tort of wrongful termination each have a three-year statute of limitations that started to run on the day Artis lost her job in November 2010. See D. C. Code (D. C. False Claims Act); (tort of wrongful termination governed by D. C.’s catchall three-year limitations period and claim accrues on the date when plaintiff has unequivocal notice of termina- tion). Artis’ whistleblower claim had a one-year limitations period, which began to accrue when Artis “first bec[a]m[e] aware” that she had been terminated for reporting her supervisor’s misconduct. D. C. Code (a)(2). The parties dispute the date the whistleblower claim accrued. See Brief for Petitioner 10, n. 2; Brief for Respondent 8, n. 2. 6 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court paused the limitations clock during that time, Artis would have had only 30 days to refile. The Superior Court rejected Artis’ stop-the-clock reading of reasoning that Artis could have protected her state-law claims by “pursuing [them] in a state court while the federal court proceeding [was] pending.” In tension with that explanation, the court noted that duplicative filings in federal and state court are “generally disfavored as ‘wasteful’ and ‘against [the interests of] judicial efficiency.’ ” at 1a, n. 1 (quoting (D. C. 2000); alteration in original). The D. C. Court of Appeals affirmed. That court began by observing that two “competing approaches [to ] have evolved nationally”: the stop-the-clock reading and the grace-period reading.3 Without further comment on ’s text, the D. C. Court of Appeals turned to the legislative history. Section 1367(d)’s purpose, the court noted, was “to prevent the loss of claims to statutes of limitations where state law might fail to toll the running of the period of limitations while a supplemental claim was pending in federal court.” at 338 (quoting H. R. Rep., at 30; internal quotation marks omitted). Following the lead of the California Supreme Court, the D. C. Court of Appeals determined that Con- —————— 3 The high courts of Maryland and Minnesota, along with the Sixth Circuit, have held that ’s tolling rule pauses the clock on the statute of limitations until 30 days after the state-law claim is dis- missed. See In re Vertrue Inc. Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, ; Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 755, 759–760 (Minn. 2010); 180–182, 957 A.2d 98, 992–993 (2008). In addition to the D. C. Court of Appeals, the high courts of California and the Northern Mariana |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | Appeals, the high courts of California and the Northern Mariana Islands have held that provides only a 30-day grace period for the refiling of otherwise time-barred claims. See Los ; Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 7 Opinion of the Court gress had intended to implement a 1969 recommendation by the American Law Institute (ALI) to allow refiling in state court “within 30 days after dismissal.” 135 A.3d, at 338 ). The D. C. Court of Appeals also concluded that the grace-period approach “better accommodates federalism concerns,” by trenching significantly less on state statutes of limitations than the stop-the-clock approach. 135 A.3d, at 338–339. Construing as affording only a 30- day grace period, the court commented, was “consistent with [its] presumption favoring narrow interpretations of federal preemption of state law.” To resolve the division of opinion among State Supreme Courts on the proper construction of see n. 3, we granted certiorari. 0 U. S. (2017). II A As just indicated, statutes that shelter from time bars claims earlier commenced in another forum generally employ one of two means. First, the period (or statute) of limitations may be “tolled” while the claim is pending elsewhere. Ordinarily, —————— Among illustrations: 21 U.S. C. (allowing suits to proceed against certain biomaterial providers and providing that “[a]ny appli- cable statute of limitations shall toll during the period from the time a claimant files a petition with the Secretary under this paragraph until such time as either (i) the Secretary issues a final decision on the petition, or (ii) the petition is withdrawn,” (b)(3)(C)); 28 U.S. C. (permitting the removal of “mass actions” to federal court and providing that “[t]he limitations periods on any claims asserted in a mass action that is removed to Federal court pursuant to this subsec- tion shall be deemed tolled during the period that the action is pending in Federal court,” (d)(11)(D)); 2 U.S. C. (providing a remedy against the United States for certain injuries caused by em- ployees of the Public Health Service, and stating that “[t]he time limit for filing a claim under this subsection shall be tolled during the 8 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court “tolled,” in the context of a time prescription like means that the limitations period is suspended (stops running) while the claim is sub judice elsewhere, then starts running again when the tolling period ends, picking up where it left off. See Black’s Law Dictionary 188 (6th ed. 1990) (“toll,” when paired with the grammatical object “statute of limitations,” means “to suspend or stop tempo- rarily”). This dictionary definition |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | means “to suspend or stop tempo- rarily”). This dictionary definition captures the rule gen- erally applied in federal courts. See, e.g., v. Fumero Soto, (Court’s opin- ion “use[d] the word ‘tolling’ to mean that, during the relevant period, the statute of limitations ceases to run”).5 Our decisions employ the terms “toll” and “suspend” inter- changeably. For example, in American Pipe & Constr. Co. —————— pendency of a[n] [administrative] request for benefits,” (p)(3) (A)(ii)). See also (3) (2011–2012) (“A Wisconsin law limiting the time for commencement of an action on a Wisconsin cause of action is tolled from the period of commencement of the action in a non-Wisconsin forum until the time of its final disposition in that forum.”). The dissent maintains that “stop clock examples [from the U. S. Code] often involve situations where some disability prevents the plaintiff from proceeding to court.” Post, at 12, n. 7. Plainly, however, the several statutes just set out do not fit that description: They do not involve “disabilities.” Instead, like they involve claims earlier commenced in another forum. 5 As we recognized in there may be different ways of “calculating the amount of time avail- able to file suit after tolling has ended.” at (emphasis added). In addition to the “common-law” stop-the-clock effect, at 655, under which the plaintiff must file within the amount of time left in the limitations period, a statute might either provide for the limita- tions period to be “renewed,” so that “the plaintiff has the benefit of a new period as long as the original,” or “establish a fixed period such as six months or one year during which the plaintiff may file suit, without regard to the length of the original limitations period or the amount of time left when tolling began.” at Notably, under each of the “tolling effect[s]” enumerated in ib the word “tolled” means that the progression of the limitations clock is stopped for the duration of “tolling.” Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 9 Opinion of the Court v. Utah, we characterized as a “toll- ing” prescription a rule “suspend[ing] the applicable stat- ute of limitations,” ; accordingly, we applied the rule to stop the limitations clock, at 560–561.6 We have similarly comprehended what tolling means in deci- sions on equitable tolling. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Wald- burger, 573 U. S. (slip op., at 7) (describing equitable tolling as “a doctrine that pauses the running of, or ‘tolls’ a statute of limitations” (some internal quotation marks omitted)); United n. 2 (1991) ( per curiam) (“Principles of equitable tolling usually dictate that |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | ( per curiam) (“Principles of equitable tolling usually dictate that when a time bar has been suspended and then begins to run again upon a later event, the time remaining on the clock is calculated by subtracting from the full limitations period whatever time ran before the clock was stopped.”). In lieu of “tolling” or “suspending” a limitations period by pausing its progression, a legislature might elect sim- ply to provide a grace period. When that mode is adopted, the statute of limitations continues to run while the claim is pending in another forum. But the risk of a time bar is averted by according the plaintiff a fixed period in which to refile. A federal statute of that genre is 28 U.S. C. §215. That provision prescribes a six-year limitations period for suits seeking money damages from the United States for breach of contract. §215(a). The statute fur- ther provides: “In the event that any action is timely brought and is thereafter dismissed without prejudice, the action may be recommenced within one year after such dismissal, regardless of whether the action would other- wise then be barred by this section.” §215(e).7 Many —————— 6 The dissent’s notion that federal tolling periods may be understood as grace periods, not stop-the-clock periods, see post, at 7–8, is entirely imaginative. 7 Also illustrative, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prescribes a five- year limitations period for certain suits. 15 U.S. C. ). Where a 10 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court States have enacted similar grace-period provisions. See App. to Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae 1a–25a. For example, Georgia law provides: “When any case has been commenced in either a state or federal court within the applicable statute of limi- tations and the plaintiff discontinues or dismisses the same, it may be recommenced in a court of this state or in a federal court either within the original appli- cable period of limitations or within six months after the discontinuance or dismissal, whichever is later” –2–61(a) (2007). Tellingly, the District has not identified any federal statute in which a grace-period meaning has been ascribed to the word “tolled” or any word similarly rooted. Nor has the dissent, for all its mighty strivings, identified even one federal statute that fits its bill, i.e., a federal statute that says “tolled” but means something other than “suspended,” or “paused,” or “stopped.” From what statutory text, then, does the dissent start? See post, at 5.8 Turning from statutory texts to judicial decisions, only once did an opinion |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | statutory texts to judicial decisions, only once did an opinion of this Court employ tolling language to describe a grace period: 90 U.S. 536 (1989). In Hardin, we held that, in 2 U.S. C. suits, federal courts should give effect to state statutes —————— government agency has brought a timely suit, however, an individual may bring an action “not later than one year after the commencement of that proceeding or action.” 8 Reasons of history, context, and policy, the dissent maintains, would have made it sensible for Congress to have written a grace-period statute. See post, at –5. But “[t]he controlling principle in this case is the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written[,] giving each word its ordi- nary, contemporary, common meaning.” Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 0 U. S. (2017) (slip op., ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 11 Opinion of the Court sheltering claims from time bars during periods of a plain- tiff ’s legal disability. We there characterized a state statute providing a one-year grace period as “tolling” or “suspend[ing]” the limitations period “until one year after the disability has been removed.” 90 U.S., at 537. This atypical use of “tolling” or “suspending” to mean some- thing other than stopping the clock on a limitations period is a feather on the scale against the weight of decisions in which “tolling” a statute of limitations signals stopping the clock. B In determining the meaning of a statutory provision, “we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.” Moskal v. United States, 98 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1367(d) is phrased as a tolling provision. It suspends the statute of limitations for two adjacent time periods: while the claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days postdismissal. Artis urges that the phrase “shall be tolled” in has the same meaning it does in the statutes at 7, n. That is, the limitations clock stops the day the claim is filed in federal court and, 30 days postdismissal, restarts from the point at which it had stopped. The District reads “tolled” for ’s purposes differ- ently. To “toll,” the District urges, means to “remove or take away an effect.” Brief for Respondent 12–13. To “toll” a limitations period, then, would mean to “remov[e] the bar that ordinarily would accompany its expiration.” at 1.9 “[T]here is nothing special,” the District main- —————— 9 This is indeed a definition sometimes |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | District main- —————— 9 This is indeed a definition sometimes used in reference to a right. See, e.g., (“[A]n adverse possession toll[s] the right of entry of the heirs, and, consequently, extinguish[es], by the lapse of time, their right of action for the land.”). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 188 (6th ed. 1990) (“toll” can mean 12 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court tains, “about tolling limitations periods versus tolling any other fact, right, or consequence.” But the District offers no reason why, in interpreting “tolled” as used in we should home in only on the word itself, ignoring the information about the verb’s ordinary meaning gained from its grammatical object. Just as when the object of “tolled” is “bell” or “highway traveler,” the object “period of limitations” sheds light on what it means to “be tolled.” The District’s reading, largely embraced by the dissent, is problematic for other reasons as well. First, it tenders a strained interpretation of the phrase “period of limita- tions.” In the District’s view, “period of limitations” means “the effect of the period of limitations as a time bar.” See provides that ‘the period of limitations’—here its effect as a time bar—‘shall be [re- moved or taken away] while the claim is pending [in fed- eral court] and for a period of 30 days after it is dis- missed.’ ” (alterations in original)). Second, the first portion of the tolling period, the duration of the claim’s pendency in federal court, becomes superfluous under the District’s construction. The “effect” of the limitations period as a time bar, on the District’s reading, becomes operative only after the case has been dismissed. That being so, what need would there be to remove anything while the claim is pending in federal court? Furthermore, the District’s reading could yield an ab- —————— “bar, defeat, or take away; thus, to toll the entry means to deny or take away the right of entry”). The dissent, also relying on this sense of the word “toll,” cites as support for the proposition that ’s tolling instruction is ambiguous. See post, at 3; But, importantly, the grace-period statutes noted in 62 U.S., at 660, n. 13, were precise about their operation. provides no support for the notion that a statute’s instruction that a “period of limitations shall be tolled” plausibly could mean that the limitations clock continues to run but its effect as a bar is removed during the tolling. See post, at 2–3. Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 13 Opinion of the Court surdity: It could permit a plaintiff |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | Opinion of the Court surdity: It could permit a plaintiff to refile in state court even if the limitations period on her claim had expired before she filed in federal court. To avoid that result, the District’s proposed construction of “tolled” as “removed” could not mean simply “removed.” Instead, “removed” would require qualification to express “removed, unless the period of limitations expired before the claim was filed in federal court.” In sum, the District’s interpretation maps poorly onto the language of while Artis’ interpretation is a natural fit. C The D. C. Court of Appeals adopted the District’s grace- period construction primarily because it was convinced that in drafting Congress embraced an ALI Two decades before the enactment of the ALI, in its 1969 Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, did recommend a 30-day grace period for refiling certain claims. The ALI proposed the following statutory language: “If any claim in an action timely commenced in a fed- eral court is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, a new action on the same claim brought in another court shall not be barred by a statute of limitations that would not have barred the original action had it been commenced in that court, if such new action is brought in a proper court, federal or State, within thirty days after dismissal of the original claim has become final or within such longer period as may be available under applicable State law.” ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts p. 65 (1969) (ALI Study). Congress, however, did not adopt the ALI’s grace-period 1 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court formulation. Instead, it ordered tolling of the state limita- tions period “while the claim is pending” in federal court. Although the provision the ALI proposed, like established a 30-day federal floor on the time allowed for refiling, it did not provide for tolling the period of limita- tions while a claim is pending.10 True, the House Report contained a citation to the ALI Study, but only in refer- ence to a different provision, 28 U.S. C. (the general venue statute). There, Congress noted that its approach was “taken from the ALI Study.” H. R. Rep., at 23. Had Congress similarly embraced the ALI’s grace-period for- mulation in one might expect the House Report to have said as much.11 D The District asks us to zero in on ’s “express inclusion” of the “period of 30 days after the claim is dis- missed” within the |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | 30 days after the claim is dis- missed” within the tolling period. Brief for Respondent 20 Under Artis’ stop-the- —————— 10 The District emphasizes that the Reporter’s note accompanying the ALI’s proposed statute stated: “[A]ny governing statute of limitations is tolled by the commencement of an action in a federal court, and for at least thirty days following dismissal in any case in which the dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction.” ALI Study 66. The similarity between this language and the District argues, rebuts any argument that Congress did not adopt the ALI’s We are unpersuaded. The District offers no explanation why, if Congress wanted to follow the substance of the ALI’s grace-period recommenda- tion, it would neither cite the ALI Study in the legislative history of see infra this page, nor adopt the precise language of either the proposed statute or the Reporter’s note. The ALI Study, moreover, cautions that the Reporter’s notes reflect “the Reporter’s work alone,” not a position taken by the Institute. ALI Study, p. x. 11 The dissent offers a history lesson on the ancient common-law prin- ciple of “journey’s account,” see post, at 5–6, and n. but nothing suggests that the 101st Congress had any such ancient law in mind when it drafted Cf. post, at 9. More likely, Congress was mindful that “suspension” during the pendency of other litigation is “the common-law rule.” 62 U.S., 55. Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 15 Opinion of the Court clock interpretation, the District contends, “the inclusion of 30 days within the tolling period would be relegated to insignificance in the mine-run of cases.” (cita- tion and internal quotation marks omitted). In Congress did provide for tolling not only while the claim is pending in federal court, but also for 30 days thereafter. Including the 30 days within ’s tolling period accounts for cases in which a federal action is commenced close to the expiration date of the relevant state statute of limitations. In such a case, the added days give the plain- tiff breathing space to refile in state court. Adding a brief span of days to the tolling period is not unusual in stop-the-clock statutes. In this respect, closely resembles 6 U.S. C. which provides, in a subsection titled “Tolling of limitations period,” that if a plaintiff submits a claim for war-related vessel damage to the Secretary of Transportation, “the running of the limitations period for bringing a civil action is suspended until the Secretary denies the claim, and for 60 days thereafter.” Numerous other statutes similarly append a fixed number of days to |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | other statutes similarly append a fixed number of days to an initial tolling period. See, e.g., 22 U.S. C. §11k(c) (“Statutes of limitations on assessments shall be suspended with respect to any vested property while vested and for six months thereafter.”); 26 U.S. C. )(1) (“In any case under title 11 of the United States Code, the running of the time prescribed by subsection (a) for filing a petition in the Tax Court with respect to any deficiency shall be suspended for the period during which the debtor is pro- hibited by reason of such case from filing a petition in the Tax Court with respect to such deficiency, and for 60 days thereafter.”); (“The running of the period of limitations provided in section 6501 or 6502 shall be suspended for the period during which the Secretary is prohibited from making the assessment and for 60 days thereafter.”); 50 U.S. C. §000(c) (“The running of a 16 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court statute of limitations against the collection of tax deferred under this section shall be suspended for the period of military service of the servicemember and for an addi- tional period of 270 days thereafter.”). Thus, the “30 days” provision casts no large shadow on Artis’ interpretation. Section 1367(d)’s proviso, “unless State law provides for a longer tolling period,” could similarly aid a plaintiff who filed in federal court just short of the expiration of the state limitations period. She would have the benefit of ’s 30-days-to-refile prescription, or such longer time as state law prescribes.12 It may be that, in most cases, the state-law tolling period will not be longer than ’s. But in some cases it undoubtedly will. For example, Indiana permits a plaintiff to refile within three years of dismissal. See Ind. Code §3–11–8–1 (2017). And Louisiana provides that after dismissal the limitations period “runs anew.” La. Civ. Code Ann., Arts. 362, 366 (West 2007). III Satisfied that Artis’ text-based arguments overwhelm the District’s, we turn to the District’s contention that the stop-the-clock interpretation of raises a signifi- cant constitutional question: Does the statute exceed Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper —————— 12 The dissent, post, at 8–9, conjures up absurdities not presented by this case, for the District of Columbia has no law of the kind the dissent describes. All agree that the phrase “unless State law provides for a longer tolling period” leaves room for a more generous state-law regime. The dissent posits a comparison between the duration of the federal suit, plus 30 days, and a state-law grace |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | the federal suit, plus 30 days, and a state-law grace period. But of course, as the dissent recognizes, post, at 9, the more natural comparison is between the amount of time a plaintiff has left to refile, given the benefit of ’s tolling rule, and the amount of time she would have to refile under the applicable state law. Should the extraordinary circumstances the dissent envisions in fact exist in a given case, the comparison the dissent makes would be far from inevitable. Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 17 Opinion of the Court Clause, Art. I, cl. 18, because its connection to Con- gress’ enumerated powers is too attenuated or because it is too great an incursion on the States’ domain? Brief for Respondent 6–9. To avoid constitutional doubt, the District urges, we should adopt its reading. “[W]here an alternative interpretation of [a] statute is fairly possible,” the District reminds, we have construed legislation in a manner that “avoid[s] [serious constitutional] problems” raised by “an otherwise acceptable construction.” INS v. St. Cyr, (internal quotation marks omitted). But even if we regarded the District’s reading of as “fairly possible,” our precedent would undermine the proposition that presents a serious constitutional problem. See Jinks, 538 U.S., at 61–65. In Jinks, we unanimously rejected an argument that impermissibly exceeds Congress’ enumerated powers.13 Section 1367(d), we held, “is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress’s power ‘[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,’ and to assure that those tribunals may fairly and effi- ciently exercise ‘[t]he judicial Power of the United States.’ ” 2 (quoting U. S. Const., Art. I, cl. 9, and Art. III, In two principal ways, we explained, is “condu- cive to the due administration of justice in federal court.” 538 U.S., 2 —————— 13 The dissent refers to an “understanding,” post, at 1, by the Court in that ac- cords only a 30-day “window” for refiling in state court. Scattered characterizations in the Jinks briefing might be seen as conveying that understanding. See post, at 1, n. 9. The opinion itself, however, contains nary a hint of any such understanding. And indeed, one year earlier, we described as having the effect of stopping the clock, i.e., “toll[ing] the state statute of limitations for 30 days in addition to however long the claim had been pending in federal court.” Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 53 U.S. 533, 52 18 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court First, “it provides an alternative to the unsatisfactory options that federal judges faced when they decided whether to |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | options that federal judges faced when they decided whether to retain jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims that might be time barred in state court.” Section 1367(d) thus “unquestionably promotes fair and efficient operation of the federal courts.” at Second, “eliminates a serious impediment to access to the federal courts on the part of plaintiffs pursu- ing federal- and state-law claims” arising from the same episode. With tolling available, a plaintiff disin- clined to litigate simultaneously in two forums is no longer impelled to choose between forgoing either her federal claims or her state claims. Moreover, we were persuaded that was “plainly adapted” to Congress’ exercise of its enumerated power: there was no cause to suspect that Congress had enacted as a “ ‘pretext’ for ‘the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to [it],’ ”; nor was there reason to believe that the connection between and Congress’ authority over the federal courts was too attenuated. (quoting Wheat. 316, 23 (1819)). Our decision in Jinks also rejected the argument that was not “proper” because it violates principles of state sovereignty by prescribing a procedural rule for state courts’ adjudication of purely state-law claims. 538 U.S., –65. “Assuming [without deciding] that a princi- pled dichotomy can be drawn, for purposes of determining whether an Act of Congress is ‘proper,’ between federal laws that regulate state-court ‘procedure’ and laws that change the ‘substance’ of state-law rights of action,” we concluded that the tolling of state limitations periods “falls on the [permissible] ‘substantive’ side of the line.” The District’s contention that a stop-the-clock prescrip- tion serves “no federal purpose” that could not be served by a grace-period prescription is unavailing. Brief for Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 19 Opinion of the Court Respondent 9. Both devices are standard, off-the-shelf means of accounting for the fact that a claim was timely pressed in another forum. Requiring Congress to choose one over the other would impose a tighter constraint on Congress’ discretion than we have ever countenanced. The concern that a stop-the-clock prescription entails a greater imposition on the States than a grace-period pre- scription, moreover, may be more theoretical than real. Consider the alternative suggested by the D. C. Superior Court. Plaintiffs situated as Artis was could simply file two actions and ask the state court to hold the suit filed there in abeyance pending disposition of the federal suit. See Were the dissent’s position to prevail, cautious plaintiffs would surely take up the D. C. Superior Court’s suggestion. How it genuinely advances federalism concerns to drive plaintiffs to resort to wasteful, inefficient duplication to preserve |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | Artis v. District of Columbia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4460812/artis-v-district-of-columbia/ | drive plaintiffs to resort to wasteful, inefficient duplication to preserve their state-law claims is far from apparent. See, e.g., 751 A.2d, at (it “work[s] against judicial efficiency to compel prudent federal litigants who present state claims to file duplicative and wasteful protective suits in state court”). We do not gainsay that statutes of limitations are “fun- damental to a well-ordered judicial system.” Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 6 U.S. 78, 87 (1980). We note in this regard, however, that a stop-the-clock rule is suited to the primary purposes of limitations statutes: “preventing surprises” to defendants and “barring a plaintiff who has slept on his rights.” American Pipe & Constr. 55 Whenever applies, the defendant will have notice of the plaintiff ’s claims within the state-prescribed limitations period. Likewise, the plaintiff will not have slept on her rights. She will have timely asserted those rights, en- deavoring to pursue them in one litigation. 20 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Opinion of the Court * * * For the reasons stated, we resist unsettling the usual understanding of the word “tolled” as it appears in legisla- tive time prescriptions and court decisions thereon. The judgment of the D. C. Court of Appeals is therefore re- versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 3 U. S. (2018) 1 GORSUCH, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 16–60 STEPHANIE C. ARTIS, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118192/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-television-inc/ | Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 permits a copyright owner "to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just" as amended, 17 US C 504(c)(1) In this case, we consider whether 504(c) or the Seventh Amendment grants a right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages We hold that although the statute is silent on the point, the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial, which includes a right to a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages We therefore reverse I Petitioner C Elvin Feltner owns Krypton International Corporation, which in 1990 acquired three television stations in the southeastern United Respondent Columbia Pictures Television, Inc, had licensed several television series to these stations, including "Who's the Boss," "Silver Spoons," "Hart to Hart," and "T J Hooker" After the stations became delinquent in making their royalty payments to Columbia, Krypton and Columbia entered into negotiations to restructure the stations' debt These discussions were unavailing, and Columbia terminated the stations' license *343 agreements in October Despite Columbia's termination, the stations continued broadcasting the programs Columbia sued Feltner, Krypton, the stations, various Krypton subsidiaries, and certain Krypton officers in Federal District Court alleging, inter alia, copyright infringement arising from the stations' unauthorized broadcasting of the programs Columbia sought various forms of relief under the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act), 17 US C 101 et seq, including a permanent injunction, 502; impoundment of all copies of the programs, 503; actual damages or, in the alternative, statutory damages, 504; and costs and attorney's fees, 505 On Columbia's motion, the District Court entered partial summary judgment as to liability for Columbia on its copyright infringement claims[1] Columbia exercised the option afforded by 504(c) of the Copyright Act to recover "Statutory Damages" in lieu of actual damages In relevant part, 504(c) provides: "Statutory Damages "(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just "(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118192/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-television-inc/ | court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $100,000 In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of *344 copyright, the court [in] its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200 "17 US C 504(c) The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial on statutory damages, ruling instead that such issues would be determined at a bench trial After two days of trial, the trial judge held that each episode of each series constituted a separate work and that the airing of the same episode by different stations controlled by Feltner constituted separate violations; accordingly, the trial judge determined that there had been a total of 440 acts of infringement The trial judge further found that Feltner's infringement was willful and fixed statutory damages at $20,000 per act of infringement Applying that amount to the number of acts of infringement, the trial judge determined that Columbia was entitled to $8,800,000 in statutory damages, plus costs and attorney's fees The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in all relevant respects Columbia Pictures [2] Most importantly for present purposes, the court rejected Feltner's argument that he was entitled to have a jury determine statutory damages Relying on Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, which held that 25(b) of the Copyright Act of 1909, the statutory predecessor of 504(c), required the trial judge to assess statutory damages[3]the Court of *345 Appeals held that 504(c) does not grant a right to a jury determination of statutory damages The court reasoned that "[i]f Congress intended to overrule Krofft by having the jury determine the proper award of statutory damages, it would have altered" the language "as the court considers just" in 504(c) The Court of Appeals further concluded that the "Seventh Amendment does not provide a right to a jury trial on the issue of statutory damages because an award of such damages is equitable in nature" Ibid We granted certiorari 521 US 1151 II Before inquiring into the applicability of the Seventh Amendment, we must "`first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided' " Tull v United 481 US 412, 417, n 3 ) Such a construction is not possible here, for we cannot discern "any congressional intent to grant the right to |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118192/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-television-inc/ | cannot discern "any congressional intent to grant the right to a jury trial," 481 US, at 417, n 3, on an award of statutory damages[4] The language of 504(c) does not grant a right to have a jury assess statutory damages Statutory damages are to be assessed in an amount that "the court considers just" 504(c)(1) Further, in the event that "the court finds" the infringement was willful or innocent, "the court in its discretion" may, within limits, increase or decrease the amount of *346 statutory damages 504(c)(2) These phrases, like the entire statutory provision, make no mention of a right to a jury trial or, for that matter, to juries at all The word "court" in this context appears to mean judge, not jury Cf F W Woolworth Co v Contemporary Arts, Inc, 344 US 228, In fact, the other remedies provisions of the Copyright Act use the term "court" in contexts generally thought to confer authority on a judge, rather than a jury See, e g, 502 ("court may grant temporary and final injunctions"); 503(a) ("[T]he court may order the impounding of all copies or phonorecords"); 503(b) ("As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the destruction or other reasonable disposition of all copies or phonorecords"); 505 ("[T]he court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs" of litigation, and "the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee") In contrast, the Copyright Act does not use the term "court" in the subsection addressing awards of actual damages and profits, see 504(b), which generally are thought to constitute legal relief See Dairy Queen, Inc v Wood, 369 US 469, ; see also Arnstein v Porter, 154 F2d 464, ; Video Views, Inc v Studio 21, Ltd, 925 F2d 1010, ; 3 M Nimmer & D Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 1210[B] ("beyond dispute that a plaintiff who seeks to recover actual damages is entitled to a jury trial" (footnotes omitted)) *347 Feltner relies on Lorillard v 434 US 575, in which we held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat 602, 29 US C 621 et seq, provides a statutory right to a jury trial in an action for unpaid wages even though the statute authorizes "the court to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate," 626(b) That holding, however, turned on two crucial factors: The ADEA's remedial provisions were expressly to be enforced in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 US C 101 et seq, which had been |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118192/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-television-inc/ | amended, 29 US C 101 et seq, which had been uniformly interpreted to provide a right to a jury trial, Lorillard v 434 U S, at 580-581; and the statute used the word "legal," which we found to be a "term of art" used in cases "in which legal relief is available and legal rights are determined" by juries, id, Section 504(c), in contrast, does not make explicit reference to another statute that has been uniformly interpreted to provide a right to jury trial and does not use the word "legal" or other language denoting legal relief or rights[5] We thus discern no statutory right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages Accordingly, we must reach the constitutional question III The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved " U S Const, Amdt 7 Since Justice Story's time, the Court *348 has understood "Suits at common law" to refer "not merely [to] suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [to] suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered" Parsons v Bedford, 3 Pet 433, The Seventh Amendment thus applies not only to common-law causes of action, but also to "actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty" Granfinanciera, S A v 492 US 33, (citing Curtis v 415 U S, 3) To determine whether a statutory action is more analogous to cases tried in courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty, we examine both the nature of the statutory action and the remedy sought See 492 US, at Unlike many of our recent Seventh Amendment cases, which have involved modern statutory rights unknown to 18th-century England, see, e g, Wooddell v Electrical Workers, 502 US 93 ; Granfinanciera v ; Tull v United 481 US 412 ; Curtis v in this case there are close analogues to actions seeking statutory damages under 504(c) Before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the common law and statutes in England and this country granted copyright owners causes of action for infringement More importantly, copyright suits for monetary *349 damages were tried in courts of law, and thus before |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118192/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-television-inc/ | damages were tried in courts of law, and thus before juries By the middle of the 17th century, the common law recognized an author's right to prevent the unauthorized publication of his manuscript See, e g, Stationers Co v Patentees, Carter's Rep 89, 124 Eng Rep 8 (C P 1666) This protection derived from the principle that the manuscript was the product of intellectual labor and was as much the author's property as the material on which it was written See Millar v 4 Burr 2303, 2398, 98 Eng Rep 201, 252 (K B 1769) (opinion of Mansfield, C J) (common-law copyright derived from principle that "it is just, that an Author should reap the pecuniary Profits of his own ingenuity and Labour"); 1 W Patry, Copyright Law and Practice 3 (1994) Actions seeking damages for infringement of common-law copyright, like actions seeking damages for invasions of other property rights, were tried in courts of law in actions on the case See Millar v 396 2397, 98 Eng Rep, 51 Actions on the case, like other actions at law, were tried before juries See McClenachan v McCarty, 1 Dall ; 5 J Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶3811[5] (2d ed 1996); 1 J Chitty, Treatise on Pleading and Parties to Actions 164 (1892) In 1710, the first English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was enacted to protect published books 8 Anne ch 19 (1710) Under the Statute of Anne, damages for infringement were set at "one Penny for every Sheet which shall be found in [the infringer's] custody, either printed or printing, published, or exposed to Sale," half ("one Moiety") to go to the Crown and half to the copyright owner, and were "to be recovered by Action of Debt, Bill, Plaint, or Information" 1 Like the earlier practice with regard to common-law copyright claims for damages, actions seeking damages under the Statute of Anne were tried in courts of law See *350 Beckford v Hood, 7 T R 621, 627, 101 Eng Rep 1164, 1167 (K B 1798) (opinion of Kenyon, C J) ("[T]he statute having vested that right in the author, the common law gives the remedy by action on the case for the violation of it") The practice of trying copyright damages actions at law before juries was followed in this country, where statutory copyright protections were enacted even before adoption of the Constitution In 1783, the Continental Congress passed a resolution recommending that the secure copyright protections for authors See U S Copyright Office, Copyright Enactments: Laws Passed in the United Since 1783 Relating to Copyright, |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118192/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-television-inc/ | Laws Passed in the United Since 1783 Relating to Copyright, Bulletin No 3, p 1 (rev ed 1963) (hereinafter Copyright Enactments) Twelve (all except Delaware) responded by enacting copyright statutes, each of which provided a cause of action for damages, and none of which made any reference to equity jurisdiction At least three of these state statutes expressly stated that damages were to be recovered through actions at law, see id, (in Connecticut, damages for double the value of the infringed copy "to be recovered in any court of law in this State"); id, ; id, while four others provided that damages would be recovered in an "action of debt," a prototypical action brought in a court of law before a jury See F Maitland, Forms of Action at Common Law 357 (1929) (hereinafter Maitland); see Copyright Enactments 4-9 (in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, damages enforceable by "action of debt"); id, Although these statutes were short-lived, and hence few courts had occasion to interpret them, the available evidence suggests that the practice was for copyright actions seeking damages to be tried to a jury See Hudson & Goodwin v Moreover, three of the state statutes specifically authorized an award of damages from a statutory range, just as 504(c) does today See Copyright Enactments 4 (in Massachusetts, damages of not less than £5 and not more than £3,000); id, ; id, Although we have found no direct evidence of the practice under these statutes, there is no reason to suppose that such actions were intended to deviate from the traditional practice: The damages were to be recovered by an "action of debt," see id, which was an action at law, see Maitland 357 In 1790, Congress passed the first federal copyright statute, the Copyright Act of 1790, which similarly authorized the awarding of damages for copyright infringements Act of May 31, 1790, ch 15, 2, 6, 1 St4, 125 The Copyright Act of 1790 provided that damages for copyright infringement of published works would be "the sum of fifty cents for every sheet which shall be found in [the infringer's] possession, to be recovered by action of debt in any court of record in the United wherein the same is cognizable" 2 Like the Statute of Anne, the Copyright Act of 1790 provided that half ("one moiety") of such damages were to go to the copyright owner and half to the United For infringement of an unpublished manuscript, the statute entitled a copyright owner to "all damages occasioned by such injury, to be recovered by a special action on |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118192/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-television-inc/ | such injury, to be recovered by a special action on the case founded upon this act, in any court having cognizance thereof" 6 There is no evidence that the Copyright Act of 1790 changed the practice of trying copyright actions for damages in courts of law before juries As we have noted, actions on the case and actions of debt were actions at law for which a *352 jury was required See [6] Moreover, actions to recover damages under the Copyright Act of 1831 which differed from the Copyright Act of 1790 only in the amount (increased to $1 from 50 cents) authorized to be recovered for certain infringing sheetswere consistently tried to juries See, e g, Backus v 7 How 798, (jury awarded damages of $2,06975); Reed v 20 F Cas 431, (No 11,6) (CC Md 1845) (jury awarded damages of $200); Millett v 17 F Cas 374, (No 9,600) (SDNY 1844) (jury awarded damages of $625); Dwight v 8 F Cas 183, (No 4,215) (SDNY 1843) (jury awarded damages of $2,000) Columbia does not dispute this historical evidence In fact, Columbia makes no attempt to draw an analogy between an action for statutory damages under 504(c) and any historical cause of actionincluding those actions for monetary relief that we have characterized as equitable, such as actions for disgorgement of improper profits See Teamsters v 494 US 558, ; Tull v United 481 U S, at 4 Rather, Columbia merely contends that statutory damages are clearly equitable in nature We are not persuaded We have recognized the "general rule" that monetary relief is legal, Teamsters v and an award of statutory damages may serve purposes traditionally associated with legal relief, such as compensation and punishment See Curtis v 415 U S, 6 ; Tull v United 481 U S, *353 ("Remedies intended to punish culpable individuals were issued by courts of law, not courts of equity") Nor, as we have previously stated, is a monetary remedy rendered equitable simply because it is "not fixed or readily calculable from a fixed formula" Id, n 7 And there is historical evidence that cases involving discretionary monetary relief were tried before juries See, e g, Coryell v 1 N J L 77 (1791) (jury award of "exemplary damages" in an action on a promise of marriage) Accordingly, we must conclude that the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial where the copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury determine the amount of statutory damages, if any, awarded |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118192/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-television-inc/ | jury determine the amount of statutory damages, if any, awarded to the copyright owner It has long been recognized that "by the law the jury are judges of the damages" Lord Townshend v Hughes, 2 Mod 150, 151, 86 Eng Rep 994, 994-995 (C P 1677) Thus in Dimick v Schiedt, 293 US 474 the Court stated that "the common law rule as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution" was that "in cases where the amount of damages was uncertain[,] their assessment was a matter so peculiarly within the province of the jury that the Court should not alter it" Id, And there is overwhelming evidence that the consistent practice at common law was for juries to award damages See, e g, Duke of York v Pilkington, 2 Show 246, 89 Eng Rep 918 (K B 1760) (jury award of £100,000 in a slander action); Wilkes v Wood, Lofft 1, 19, 98 Eng Rep 489, 499 (C P 1763) (jury award of £1,000 in an action of trespass); Huckle v Money, 2 Wils 205, 95 Eng Rep 768 (C P 1763) (upholding jury award of £300 in an action for trespass, assault and imprisonment); Genay v Norris, 1 S C L 6, 7 (1784) (jury award of £400); Coryell v ; see also K Redden, Punitive Damages *354 22, p 27 (1980) (describing "primacy of the jury in the awarding of damages") More specifically, this was the consistent practice in copyright cases In Hudson & Goodwin v for example, a jury awarded a copyright owner £100 under the Connecticut copyright statute, which permitted damages in an amount double the value of the infringed copy In addition, juries assessed the amount of damages under the Copyright Act of 1831, even though that statute, like the Copyright Act of 1790, fixed damages at a set amount per infringing sheet See Backus v 02 (jury awarded damages of $2,06975); Reed v at ; Dwight v at ; Millett v at Relying on Tull v United Columbia contends that the Seventh Amendment does not provide a right to a jury determination of the amount of the award In Tull, we held that the Seventh Amendment grants a right to a jury trial on all issues relating to liability for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act, 33 US C 1251, 1319(d),[7] see 481 US, at 5, but then went on to decide that Congress could constitutionally authorize trial judges to assess the amount of the civil penalties, see id, at 6-7[8] According to Columbia, Tull demonstrates that a jury |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118192/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-television-inc/ | at 6-7[8] According to Columbia, Tull demonstrates that a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages is not necessary "to preserve `the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury' " Id, at 6 ) *355 In Tull, however, we were presented with no evidence that juries historically had determined the amount of civil penalties to be paid to the Government[9] Moreover, the awarding of civil penalties to the Government could be viewed as analogous to sentencing in a criminal proceeding See 481 US, (Scalia, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part)[10] Here, of course, there is no similar analogy, and there is clear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff Tull is thus inapposite As a result, if a party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of statutory damages under 504(c) in order "to preserve `the substance of the commonlaw right of trial by jury' " Id, at 6 * * * For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on all issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages under 504(c) of the Copyright Act, including the amount itself The judgment below is reversed, and we remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion It is so ordered Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment |
Justice Scalia | 1,987 | 9 | majority | Richardson v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111865/richardson-v-marsh/ | In we held that a defendant is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his nontestifying codefendant's confession naming him as a participant in the crime is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider *202 that confession only against the codefendant. Today we consider whether Bruton requires the same result when the codefendant's confession is redacted to omit any reference to the defendant, but the defendant is nonetheless linked to the confession by evidence properly admitted against him at I Respondent Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with assaulting Cynthia Knighton and murdering her 4-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott. Respondent and Williams were tried jointly, over her objection. (Martin was a fugitive at the time of ) At the trial, Knighton testified as follows: On the evening of October 29, 1978, she and her son were at Scott's home when respondent and her boyfriend Martin visited. After a brief conversation in the living room, respondent announced that she had come to "pick up something" from Scott and rose from the couch. Martin then pulled out a gun, pointed it at Scott and the Knightons, and said that "someone had gotten killed and [Scott] knew something about it." Respondent immediately walked to the front door and peered out the peephole. The doorbell rang, respondent opened the door, and Williams walked in, carrying a gun. As Williams passed respondent, he asked, "Where's the money?" Martin forced Scott upstairs, and Williams went into the kitchen, leaving respondent alone with the Knightons. Knighton and her son attempted to flee, but respondent grabbed Knighton and held her until Williams returned. Williams ordered the Knightons to lie on the floor and then went upstairs to assist Martin. Respondent, again left alone with the Knightons, stood by the front door and occasionally peered out the peephole. A few minutes later, Martin, Williams, and Scott came down the stairs, and Martin handed a paper grocery bag to respondent. Martin and Williams then forced Scott and the Knightons into the basement, where Martin shot them Only Cynthia Knighton survived. *203 In addition to Knighton's testimony, the State introduced (over respondent's objection) a confession given by Williams to the police shortly after his arrest. The confession was redacted to omit all reference to respondent indeed, to omit all indication that anyone other than Martin and Williams participated in the crime.[1] The confession largely corroborated *204 Knighton's account of the activities of persons other than respondent in the house. In addition, the confession described a conversation |
Justice Scalia | 1,987 | 9 | majority | Richardson v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111865/richardson-v-marsh/ | in the house. In addition, the confession described a conversation Williams had with Martin as they drove to the Scott home, during which, according to Williams, Martin said that he would have to kill the victims after the robbery. At the time the confession was admitted, the jury was admonished not to use it in any way against respondent. Williams did not testify. After the State rested, respondent took the stand. She testified that on October 29, 1978, she had lost money that Martin intended to use to buy drugs. Martin was upset, and suggested to respondent that she borrow money from Scott, with whom she had worked in the past. Martin and respondent picked up Williams and drove to Scott's house. During the drive, respondent, who was sitting in the backseat, "knew that [Martin and Williams] were talking" but could not hear the conversation because "the radio was on and the speaker was right in [her] ear." Martin and respondent were admitted into the home, and respondent had a short conversation with Scott, during which she asked for a loan. Martin then pulled a gun, and respondent walked to the door to see where the car was. When she saw Williams, she opened the door for him. Respondent testified that during the robbery she did not feel free to leave and was too scared to flee. She said that she did not know why she prevented the Knightons from escaping. She admitted taking the bag from Martin, but said that after Martin and Williams took the victims into the basement, she left the house without the bag. Respondent insisted that she had possessed no prior knowledge that Martin and Williams were armed, had heard no conversation about anyone's being harmed, and had not intended to rob or kill anyone. *205 During his closing argument, the prosecutor admonished the jury not to use Williams' confession against respondent. Later in his argument, however, he linked respondent to the portion of Williams' confession describing his conversation with Martin in the car.[2] (Respondent's attorney did not object to this.) After closing arguments, the judge again instructed the jury that Williams' confession was not to be considered against respondent. The jury convicted respondent of two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of an armed robbery and one count of assault with intent to commit murder. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, People v. Marsh, No. 46128 (Dec. 17, 1980), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, Respondent then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus |
Justice Scalia | 1,987 | 9 | majority | Richardson v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111865/richardson-v-marsh/ | then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2254. She alleged that her conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and that introduction of Williams' confession at the joint trial had violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The District Court denied the petition. Civ. Action No. 83-CV-2665-DT (ED Mich., Oct. 11, 1984). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that in determining whether Bruton bars the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession, a court must assess the confession's "inculpatory *206 value" by examining not only the face of the confession, but also all of the evidence introduced at Here, Williams' account of the conversation in the car was the only direct evidence that respondent knew before entering Scott's house that the victims would be robbed and killed. Respondent's own testimony placed her in that car. In light of the "paucity" of other evidence of malice and the prosecutor's linkage of respondent and the statement in the car during closing argument, admission of Williams' confession "was powerfully incriminating to [respondent] with respect to the critical element of intent." Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, the Confrontation Clause was violated. We granted certiorari, because the Sixth Circuit's decision conflicts with those of other Courts of Appeals which have declined to adopt the "evidentiary linkage" or "contextual implication" approach to Bruton questions, see, e. g., United II The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, extended against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of a criminal defendant "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine witnesses. See Therefore, where two defendants are tried jointly, the pretrial confession of one cannot be admitted against the other unless the confessing defendant takes the stand. Ordinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a witness "against" a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant. This accords with the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions, which we have applied in many varying contexts. For example, in *207 we held that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of can be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility, even though they are inadmissible as evidence of his guilt, so long as the jury is instructed accordingly. Similarly, in we held that evidence of the defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement, so long as the |
Justice Scalia | 1,987 | 9 | majority | Richardson v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111865/richardson-v-marsh/ | for the purpose of sentence enhancement, so long as the jury was instructed it could not be used for purposes of determining guilt. Accord, See also ; ; U.S. 62 In Bruton, however, we recognized a narrow exception to this principle: We held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant. We said: "[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint" -136 *208 There is an important distinction between this case and Bruton, which causes it to fall outside the narrow exception we have created. In Bruton, the codefendant's confession "expressly implicat[ed]" the defendant as his accomplice. Thus, at the time that confession was introduced there was not the slightest doubt that it would prove "powerfully incriminating." By contrast, in this case the confession was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant's own testimony).[3] Where the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence. Specific testimony that "the defendant helped me commit the crime" is more vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence more difficult to thrust out of mind. Moreover, with regard to such an explicit statement the only issue is, plain and simply, whether the jury can possibly be expected to forget it in assessing the defendant's guilt; whereas with regard to inferential incrimination the judge's instruction may well be successful in dissuading the jury from entering onto the path of inference in the first place, so that there is no incrimination to forget. In short, while it may not always be simple for the members of a jury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incriminating inference, there does not exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so that is the foundation of Bruton's exception to the general rule. Even more significantly, evidence requiring linkage differs from evidence incriminating on its face in the practical effects which |
Justice Scalia | 1,987 | 9 | majority | Richardson v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111865/richardson-v-marsh/ | evidence incriminating on its face in the practical effects which application of the Bruton exception would produce. If *209 limited to facially incriminating confessions, Bruton can be complied with by redaction a possibility suggested in that opinion itself. If extended to confessions incriminating by connection, not only is that not possible, but it is not even possible to predict the admissibility of a confession in advance of The "contextual implication" doctrine articulated by the Court of Appeals would presumably require the trial judge to assess at the end of each trial whether, in light of all of the evidence, a nontestifying codefendant's confession has been so "powerfully incriminating" that a new, separate trial is required for the defendant. This obviously lends itself to manipulation by the defense and even without manipulation will result in numerous mistrials and appeals. It might be suggested that those consequences could be reduced by conducting a pretrial hearing at which prosecution and defense would reveal the evidence they plan to introduce, enabling the court to assess compliance with Bruton ex ante rather than ex post. If this approach is even feasible under the Federal Rules (which is doubtful see, e. g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 14), it would be time consuming and obviously far from foolproof. One might say, of course, that a certain way of assuring compliance would be to try defendants separately whenever an incriminating statement of one of them is sought to be used. That is not as facile or as just a remedy as might seem. Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system, accounting for almost one-third of federal criminal trials in the past five years. Memorandum from David L. Cook, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Supreme Court Library (Feb. 20, 1987) (available in Clerk of Court's case file). Many joint trials for example, those involving large conspiracies to import and distribute illegal drugs involve a dozen or more codefendants. Confessions by one or more of the defendants are commonplace and indeed the probability of confession increases with the number *210 of participants, since each has reduced assurance that he will be protected by his own silence. It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system to require, in all these cases of joint crimes where incriminating statements exist, that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the |
Justice Scalia | 1,987 | 9 | majority | Richardson v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111865/richardson-v-marsh/ | testifying, and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. Joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling more accurate assessment of relative culpability advantages which sometimes operate to the defendant's benefit. Even apart from these tactical considerations, joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.[4] The other way of assuring compliance with an expansive Bruton rule would be to forgo use of codefendant confessions. That price also is too high, since confessions "are more than merely `desirable'; they are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." *211 The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process. On the precise facts of Bruton, involving a facially incriminating confession, we found that accommodation inadequate. As our discussion above shows, the calculus changes when confessions that do not name the defendant are at issue. While we continue to apply Bruton where we have found that its rationale validly applies, see Cruz v. New York, ante, p. 186, we decline to extend it further. We hold that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence.[5] In the present case, however, the prosecutor sought to undo the effect of the limiting instruction by urging the jury to use Williams' confession in evaluating respondent's case. See and n. 2. On remand, the court should consider whether, in light of respondent's failure to object to the prosecutor's comments, the error can serve as the basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus. See The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | majority | New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112114/new-york-state-club-assn-inc-v-city-of-new-york/ | New York City has adopted a local law that forbids discrimination by certain private clubs. The New York Court of Appeals rejected a facial challenge to this law based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We sit in review of that judgment. I In 1965, New York City adopted a Human Rights Law that prohibits discrimination by any "place of public accommodation, resort or amusement."[1] This term is defined broadly *5 in the Law to cover such various places as hotels, restaurants, retail stores, hospitals, laundries, theaters, parks, public conveyances, and public halls, in addition to numerous other places that are specifically listed. N. Y. C. Admin. Code 8-102(9) Yet the Law also exempted from its coverage various public educational facilities and "any institution, club or place of accommodation which proves that it is in its nature distinctly private." The city adopted this Law soon after the Federal Government adopted civil rights legislation to bar discrimination in places of public accommodation, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 42 U.S. C. 2000a(e). In 1984, New York City amended its Human Rights Law. The basic purpose of the amendment is to prohibit discrimination in certain private clubs that are determined to be sufficiently "public" in nature that they do not fit properly within the exemption for "any institution, club or place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private." As the City Council stated at greater length: "It is hereby found and declared that the city of New York has a compelling interest in providing its citizens an environment where all persons, regardless of race, creed, color, national origin or sex, have a fair and equal opportunity to participate in the business and professional life of the city, and may be unfettered in availing themselves of employment opportunities. Although city, state and federal laws have been enacted to eliminate discrimination in employment, women and minority group members have not attained equal opportunity in business and the professions. One barrier to the advancement of women and minorities in the business and professional life of the city is the discriminatory practices of certain membership organizations where business *6 deals are often made and personal contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed. While such organizations may avowedly be organized for social, cultural, civic or educational purposes, and while many perform valuable services to the community, the commercial nature of some of the activities occurring therein and the prejudicial impact of these activities on business, professional and employment opportunities of minorities and women cannot be ignored." Local Law No. 63 |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | majority | New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112114/new-york-state-club-assn-inc-v-city-of-new-york/ | minorities and women cannot be ignored." Local Law No. 63 of 1984, 1, App. 14-15. For these reasons, the City Council found that "the public interest in equal opportunity" outweighs "the interest in private association asserted by club members." It cautioned, however, that it did not purpose "to interfere in club activities or subject club operations to scrutiny beyond what is necessary in good faith to enforce the human rights law," and the amendments were not intended as an attempt "to dictate the manner in which certain private clubs conduct their activities or select their members, except insofar as is necessary to ensure that clubs do not automatically exclude persons from consideration for membership or enjoyment of club accommodations and facilities and the advantages and privileges of membership, on account of invidious discrimination." The specific change wrought by the amendment is to extend the antidiscrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law to any "institution, club or place of accommodation [that] has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business." N. Y. C. Admin. Code 8-102(9) Any such club "shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private." Nonetheless, the city also stated that any such club "shall be deemed to be in its nature distinctly private" if it is "a corporation incorporated *7 under the benevolent orders law or described in the benevolent orders law but formed under any other law of this state, or a religious corporation incorporated under the education law or the religious corporations law." The City Council explained that it drafted the amendment in this way so as to meet the specific problem confronting women and minorities in the city's business and professional world: "Because small clubs, benevolent orders and religious corporations have not been identified in testimony before the Council as places where business activity is prevalent, the Council has determined not to apply the requirements of this local law to such organizations." Local Law No. 63, 1, App. 15. Immediately after the 1984 Law became effective, the New York State Club Association filed suit against the city and some of its officers in state court, seeking a declaration that the Law is invalid on various state grounds and is unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and requesting that defendants be enjoined from enforcing it. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court upheld the Law against all challenges, |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | majority | New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112114/new-york-state-club-assn-inc-v-city-of-new-york/ | judgment, the trial court upheld the Law against all challenges, including the federal constitutional challenges. The intermediate state appellate court affirmed this judgment on appeal; one judge dissented, however, concluding that the exemption for benevolent orders violates the Equal Protection Clause because it fails to accord equal protection to similarly situated persons. The State Club Association appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed in a unanimous opinion. The court rejected the First Amendment challenge to Local Law 63, relying heavily on the decisions in and Board of Directors of It ruled that any infringement on associational rights is amply justified by the city's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women and minorities. In addition, the *8 Law employs the least restrictive means to achieve its ends because it interferes with the policies and activities of private clubs only "to the extent necessary to ensure that they do not automatically exclude persons from membership or use of the facilities on account of invidious discrimination." The court denied relief on the equal protection claim without discussing it. The State Club Association appealed to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction, and we now affirm the judgment below, upholding Local Law 63 against appellant's facial attack on its constitutionality. II The initial question in this case is whether appellant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of Local Law 63 in this Court.[2] We hold that it does. Appellant is a nonprofit corporation, which essentially consists of a consortium of 125 other private clubs and associations in the State of New York, many of which are located in *9 New York City. In we held that an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members "when (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." See also Automobile Appellees focus on the first part of this test; they read the requirement that the association's members "would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right" as meaning that appellant's member associations must have standing to sue only on behalf of themselves, and not on behalf of anyone else, such as their own individual members. This reading of Hunt is incorrect. Under Hunt, an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when those members would have standing to bring the same suit. It does not matter what specific analysis is |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | majority | New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112114/new-york-state-club-assn-inc-v-city-of-new-york/ | same suit. It does not matter what specific analysis is necessary to determine that the members could bring the same suit, for the purpose of the first part of the Hunt test is simply to weed out plaintiffs who try to bring cases, which could not otherwise be brought, by manufacturing allegations of standing that lack any real foundation. Here, however, the appellant consortium has standing to sue on behalf of its member associations as long as those associations would have standing to bring the same challenge to Local Law 63.[3] In this regard, it is sufficient to note that appellant's member associations would have standing to bring this same suit on behalf of their *10 own individual members, since those individuals "are suffering immediate or threatened injury" to their associational rights as a result of the Law's enactment. ; see App. 10, 32, 34-35, 38.[4] Thus the case is properly before us. III New York City's Human Rights Law authorizes the city's Human Rights Commission or any aggrieved individual to initiate a complaint against any "place of public accommodation, resort or amusement" that is alleged to have discriminated in violation of the Law. N. Y. C. Admin. Code 8-109(1) The Commission investigates the complaint and determines whether probable cause exists to find a violation. When probable cause is found, the Commission may settle the matter by conciliatory measures, if possible; if the matter is not settled, the Commission schedules a hearing in which the defending party may present evidence and answer the charges against it. After the hearing is concluded, the Commission states its findings of fact and either dismisses the complaint or issues a cease-and-desist order. 8-109(2). Any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission *11 is entitled to seek judicial review of the order, and the Commission may seek enforcement of its orders in judicial proceedings. 8-110. None of these procedures has come into play in this case, however, for appellant brought this suit challenging the constitutionality of the 1984 Law on its face before any enforcement proceedings were initiated against any of its member associations. Although such facial challenges are sometimes permissible and often have been entertained, especially when speech protected by the First Amendment is at stake, to prevail on a facial attack the plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged law either "could never be applied in a valid manner" or that even though it may be validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it nevertheless is so broad that it "may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties." City Council of Los |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | majority | New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112114/new-york-state-club-assn-inc-v-city-of-new-york/ | constitutionally protected speech of third parties." City Council of Los Properly understood, the latter kind of facial challenge is an exception to ordinary standing requirements, and is justified only by the recognition that free expression may be inhibited almost as easily by the potential or threatened use of power as by the actual exercise of that power. Both exceptions, however, are narrow ones: the first kind of facial challenge will not succeed unless the court finds that "every application of the statute created an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas," Taxpayers for at n. 15, and the second kind of facial challenge will not succeed unless the statute is "substantially" overbroad, which requires the court to find "a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court." We are unpersuaded that appellant is entitled to make either one of these two distinct facial challenges. Appellant conceded at oral argument, understandably we think, that the antidiscrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law *12 certainly could be constitutionally applied at least to some of the large clubs, under this Court's decisions in and Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The clubs that are covered under the Law contain at least 400 members. They thus are comparable in size to the local chapters of the Jaycees that we found not to be protected private associations in and they are considerably larger than many of the local clubs that were found to be unprotected in some which included as few as 20 members. See ; Cf. Village of Belle The clubs covered by Local Law 63 also provide "regular meal service" and receive regular payments "directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business." N. Y. C. Admin. Code 8-102(9) The city found these two characteristics to be significant in pinpointing organizations which are "commercial" in nature, "where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed." Local Law 63, 1, App. 15. These characteristics are at least as significant in defining the nonprivate nature of these associations, because of the kind of role that strangers play in their ordinary existence, as is the regular participation of strangers at meetings, which we emphasized in and See ; It may well be that a considerable amount of private or intimate association occurs in such a setting, as is also true in many restaurants and other places of public accommodation, but that fact alone does not afford the entity as a |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | majority | New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112114/new-york-state-club-assn-inc-v-city-of-new-york/ | that fact alone does not afford the entity as a whole any constitutional immunity to practice discrimination when the government has barred it from doing so. Although there may be clubs that would be entitled to constitutional protection despite the presence of these characteristics, surely it cannot be said that Local Law 63 is invalid on its face because it infringes the private associational rights of each and every club covered by it. *13 The same may be said about the contention that the Law infringes upon every club member's right of expressive association. The ability and the opportunity to combine with others to advance one's views is a powerful practical means of ensuring the perpetuation of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed to individuals as against the government. "Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." This is not to say, however, that in every setting in which individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution. at ; ; Railway Mail On its face, Local Law 63 does not affect "in any significant way" the ability of individuals to form associations that will advocate public or private viewpoints. It does not require the clubs "to abandon or alter" any activities that are protected by the First Amendment. If a club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share the views that the club's members wish to promote, the Law erects no obstacle to this end. Instead, the Law merely prevents an association from using race, sex, and the other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the city considers to be more legitimate criteria for determining membership. It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion. In the case before us, however, it seems sensible enough to believe that many of the large clubs covered by the Law are not of this kind. We *14 could hardly hold otherwise on the record before us, which contains no specific evidence on the characteristics of any club covered by the Law. The facial attack based on the claim that |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | majority | New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112114/new-york-state-club-assn-inc-v-city-of-new-york/ | the Law. The facial attack based on the claim that Local Law 63 is invalid in all of its applications must therefore fail. Appellant insists, however, that there are some clubs within the reach of the Law that are "distinctively private" and that the Law is therefore overbroad and invalid on its face. But as we have indicated, this kind of facial challenge also falls short. The overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine" that is used "sparingly and only as a last resort." A law is constitutional unless it is "substantially overbroad." To succeed in its challenge, appellant must demonstrate from the text of Local Law 63 and from actual fact that a substantial number of instances exist in which the Law cannot be applied constitutionally. Yet appellant has not identified those clubs for whom the antidiscrimination provisions will impair their ability to associate together or to advocate public or private viewpoints. No record was made in this respect, we are not informed of the characteristics of any particular clubs, and hence we cannot conclude that the Law threatens to undermine the associational or expressive purposes of any club, let alone a substantial number of them. We therefore cannot conclude that the Law is substantially overbroad and must assume that "whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied." -616.[5] Appellant claims, however, that the Law erects an "irrebuttable" presumption that the clubs covered under it are not *15 private in nature, and contends that its member associations will not be permitted to raise the constitutionality of the Law in individual administrative and judicial proceedings. Cf. -548, n. 6. Even if this were a correct interpretation of what the Law says and the decisions below at least suggest the contrary view[6] it does not affect our analysis. Although the city's Human Rights Commission may not be empowered to consider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates, under accepted legal principles it would be quite unusual if the Commission "could not construe its own statutory mandate in the light of federal constitutional principles." Ohio Civil Rights And even if this were also true, nothing in the Law purports to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims that may be raised on appeal from the administrative enforcement proceedings. N. Y. C. Admin. Code 8-110 ; Dayton Christian at These opportunities for individual associations to contest the constitutionality of the Law as it may be applied against them are adequate to assure that any overbreadth under the |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | majority | New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112114/new-york-state-club-assn-inc-v-city-of-new-york/ | them are adequate to assure that any overbreadth under the Law will be curable through case-by-case analysis of specific facts. IV Appellant also contends that the exemption in Local Law 63 for benevolent and religious corporations, which deems them to be "distinctly private" in nature, violates the Equal Protection Clause.[7] Since, as just discussed, it has not been demonstrated that the Law affects "in any significant way" *16 the fundamental interests of any clubs covered by the Law, heightened scrutiny does not apply. See ; On this state of the record, the equal protection challenge must fail unless the city could not reasonably believe that the exempted organizations are different in relevant respects from appellant's members. As written, the legislative classification on its face is not manifestly without reasoned support. The City Council explained that it limited the Law's coverage to large clubs and excluded smaller clubs, benevolent orders, and religious corporations because the latter associations "have not been identified in testimony before the Council as places where business activity is prevalent." Local Law No. 63, 1, App. 15. This explanation echoes the logic of the decision in New York ex rel. 2 U.S. 63 which upheld a New York law that exempted benevolent orders from having to file certain documents with the State that must be filed by most other corporations and associations. See N. Y. Civ. Rights Law 53 (McKinney 1976). The Court rejected a claim that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, finding on the evidence before it that the legislative distinction was justified because benevolent orders were judged not to pose the same dangers as other groups that were required to file the documents. Bryant, In addition, New York State law indicates that benevolent orders and religious corporations are unique and thus that a rational basis exists for their exemption here. For well over a century, the State has extended special treatment in the law to these associations, and each continues to be treated in a separate body of legislation. See N. Y. Ben. Ord. Law 1-14 ; N. Y. Relig. Corp. Law 1-437 It is plausible that these associations differ in their practices and purposes from other private clubs that are now covered under Local Law 63. As the Appellate Division in this case pointed out, *17 the benevolent orders are organized under the relevant law " `solely for the benefit of [their] membership and their beneficiaries,' " and thus are not "public" organizations. 505 N. Y. S. 2d, at quoting N. Y. Ins. Law 4501(a) Similarly, religious organizations are " `created for religious |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | majority | New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112114/new-york-state-club-assn-inc-v-city-of-new-york/ | Law 4501(a) Similarly, religious organizations are " `created for religious purposes' " and are "patently not engaged in commercial activity for the benefit of non-members." -395, 505 N. Y. S. 2d, at quoting N. Y. Relig. Corp. Law 2 (McKinney 1952). Appellant contends, however, that the benevolent and religious corporations exempted in the Law are in fact no different in nature from the other clubs and associations that are now made subject to the city's antidiscrimination restrictions. Because the Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike," appellant contends that the exemption violates the Clause. In support of its argument, appellant observes that appellees offered no evidence to support the city's position that benevolent and religious groups are actually different from other private associations. Legislative classifications, however, are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of showing a statute to be unconstitutional is on the challenging party, not on the party defending the statute: "those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker." In a case such as this, the plaintiff can carry this burden by submitting evidence to show that the asserted grounds for the legislative classification lack any reasonable support in fact, but this burden is nonetheless a considerable one. United *18 The City Council's explanation for exempting benevolent orders and religious corporations from Local Law 63's coverage reflects a view that these associations are different in kind, at least in the crucial respect of whether business activity is prevalent among them, from the associations on whose behalf appellant has brought suit. Appellant has the burden of showing that this view is erroneous and that the issue is not truly debatable, a burden that appellant has failed to carry. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that a detailed examination of the practices, purposes, and structures of benevolent orders and religious corporations would show them to be identical in this and other critical respects to the private clubs that are covered under the city's antidiscrimination provisions. Without any such showing, appellant's facial attack on the Law under the Equal Protection Clause must founder. We therefore affirm the judgment below. So ordered. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112204/united-states-v-ron-pair-enterprises-inc/ | The Court's decision is based on two distinct lines of argument. First, the Court concludes that the language of 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S. C. 506(b), is clear and unambiguous. Second, the Court takes a very narrow view of Midlantic National and its progeny. I disagree with both aspects of the Court's opinion, and with the conclusion to which they lead. The relevant portion of 506(b) provides that "there shall be allowed to the holder of [an oversecured] claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose." The Court concludes that the only natural reading of 506(b) is that recovery of postpetition interest is "unqualified." Ante, at 241. As Justice Frankfurter remarked some time ago, however: "The notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification." United Although "the use of the comma is exceedingly arbitrary and indefinite," United the Court is able to read 506(b) the way that it does only because of the comma following the phrase "interest on such claim." Without this "capricious" bit of punctuation, In re Newbury Cafe, Inc., cert. pending, No. 87-1784, the relevant portion of 506(b) would read as follows: "there shall be allowed to the holder of [an oversecured] claim, interest on such claim and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided *250 for under the agreement under which such claim arose." The phrase "interest on such claim" would be qualified by the phrase "provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose," and nonconsensual liens would not accrue postpetition interest. See Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the words "and any" follow the phrase "interest on such claim." Those words simply indicate that interest accrues only on the amount of the claim, and not on "fees, costs, or charges" that happen to be incurred by the creditor. The Court's reliance on the comma is misplaced. "[P]unctuation is not decisive of the construction of a statute." See also ; ("Punctuation is a most fallible standard by which to interpret a writing; it may be resorted to when all other means fail; but the court will first take the instrument by its four corners, in order to ascertain its true meaning: if that is apparent on judicially inspecting the whole, the punctuation will not be suffered to change it"). Under this rule of construction, the Court has not hesitated in the past to change or ignore the punctuation |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112204/united-states-v-ron-pair-enterprises-inc/ | hesitated in the past to change or ignore the punctuation in legislation in order to effectuate congressional intent. See, e. g., ; Although punctuation is not controlling, it can provide useful confirmation of conclusions drawn from the words of a statute. United The Court attempts to buttress its interpretation of 506(b) by suggesting that any other reading would be inconsistent with the remaining portions of 506, which "make no distinction between consensual and nonconsensual liens." Ante, at 242, n. 5. But 506(b), regardless of how it is read, does distinguish between types of liens. The phrase "provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose" certainly refers to consensual liens, and must qualify some preceding language. Even under the Court's interpretation, "reasonable fees, costs, or charges" can only be awarded if provided for in a consensual lien. Thus, limiting postpetition interest to consensual liens simply reinforces a distinction that already exists in 506(b). For the same reason, I find unavailing the Court's assertion, ibid., that Congress would have used the phrase "security interest" if it wanted to limit postpetition interest to consensual liens. Even if I believed that the language of 506(b) were clearer than it is, I would disagree with the Court's conclusion, for Midlantic counsels against inferring congressional intent to change pre-Code bankruptcy law. At issue in Midlantic was 554(a) of the Code, 11 U.S. C. 554(a), which provided that "[a]fter notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate." Despite this unequivocal language the Court held that 554(a) does not authorize a trustee to abandon hazardous property in contravention of a state statute or regulation reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety. Relying on only three pre-Code cases (one did not deal with state laws and in another the relevant language was arguably dicta), the Court concluded that under pre-Code bankruptcy law there *252 were restrictions on a trustee's power to abandon property. -501. The Court stated that the "normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific," and noted that it had "followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications." Given the pre-Code law and Congress' goal of protecting the environment, the Court was "unwilling to assume that by enactment of 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned longstanding restrictions on the common law abandonment power." The Court characterizes Midlantic as involving "a situation where |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112204/united-states-v-ron-pair-enterprises-inc/ | power." The Court characterizes Midlantic as involving "a situation where bankruptcy law, under the proposed interpretation, was in clear conflict with state or federal laws of great importance." Ante, at 245. Though I agree with that characterization, I think there is more to Midlantic than conflict with state or federal laws. Contrary to the Court's intimation, Midlantic did not "concer[n] statutory language which. was open to interpretation." Ante, at 245. The language of 554(a) is "absolute in its terms," and the Court in Midlantic did not attempt to argue otherwise. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that such clear language was insufficient to demonstrate specific congressional intent to change pre-Code law. The rule of Midlantic is that bankruptcy statutes will not be deemed to have changed pre-Code law unless there is some indication that Congress thought that it was effecting such a change. See ("Nowhere in the House and Senate Reports is there any indication that this language should be read so intrusively. If Congress had intended, by 523(a)(7) [of the Code] or by any other provision, to discharge state criminal sentences, `we can be certain that there would have been hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so *253 likely to arouse public outrage' ") ). The first step under Midlantic is to ascertain whether there was an established pre-Code bankruptcy practice. See -501. That question is easily answered here. Prior to the 1978 enactment of the Code, this Court, as well as every Court of Appeals to address the question, had refused to allow postpetition interest on nonconsensual liens such as the tax lien involved in this case. See City of New ; In re Kerber Packing Co., ; United ; United ; United ; See also In re Boston & Maine Corp., cert. denied sub nom. City of In order to deflect this line of cases, the Court refers to the practice "of denying postpetition interest to the holders of nonconsensual liens, while allowing it to holders of consensual liens," as "an exception to an exception." Ante, at 246. Regardless of how it is labeled, Cf. the practice was more widespread and more well established than the practice in Midlantic, and was certainly one that Congress "[would have been] aware of when enacting the Code." Ante, at 246. The denial of postpetition interest on nonconsensual liens was based on the distinction between types of liens as well as equitable considerations. Unlike consensual liens, to which the parties voluntarily agree, nonconsensual liens depend for their existence only on legislative fiat. Thus, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112204/united-states-v-ron-pair-enterprises-inc/ | liens depend for their existence only on legislative fiat. Thus, the justification for the allowance of postpetition interest on consensual *254 liens "that when the creditor extended credit, he relied upon the particular security given as collateral to secure both the principal of the debt and interest until payment and, if the collateral is sufficient to pay him, the contract between the parties ought not be abrogated by bankruptcy," United 269 F. 2d, at 724 has no application to nonconsensual liens. The allowance of interest on nonconsensual liens is akin to a penalty on the debtor for the nonpayment of taxes or other monetary obligations imposed by law. Permitting postpetition interest on nonconsensual liens drains the pool of assets to the detriment of lower priority creditors who are not responsible for the debtor's inability to pay and who cannot avoid the imposition of postpetition interest. See In re Boston & Maine Corp., 719 F. 2d, at 497. Indeed, the Court acknowledges that "the payment of postpetition interest is arguably somewhat in tension with the desirability of paying all creditors as uniformly as practicable." Ante, at 245-246. The second step under Midlantic is to look for some indicia that Congress knew it was changing pre-Code law. See -505. As the Court said only last Term, "[I]t is most improbable that [a change in the existing bankruptcy rules] would have been made without even any mention in the legislative history." United Savings Assn. of The legislative history of 506(b) is "wholly inconclusive," Best Repair and there is no statement in that history acknowledging that 506(b) was to work a major change in pre-Code law. Because there is no evidence whatsoever that 506(b) was meant to allow postpetition interest on nonconsensual liens, it should not be assumed that Congress "silently abrogated" the pre-Code law. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | majority | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | This case arises out of a disagreement between a group of retired employees and their former employer about the meaning of certain expired collective-bargaining agree- ments. The retirees (and their former union) claim that these agreements created a right to lifetime contribution- free health care benefits for retirees, their surviving spouses, and their dependents. The employer, for its part, claims that those provisions terminated when the agree- ments expired. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sided with the retirees, relying on its conclusion in nternational Union, United Auto, Aerospace, & Agricultural mplement Workers of that retiree health care benefits are unlikely to be left up to future negotiations. We granted certiorari and now conclude that such reason- ing is incompatible with ordinary principles of contract law. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for it to apply ordinary principles of contract law in the first instance. 2 M&G POLYMERS USA, LLC v. TACKETT Opinion of the Court A Respondents Hobert Freel Tackett, Woodrow K. Pyles, and Harlan B. Conley worked at (and retired from) the Point Pleasant Polyester Plant in Apple Grove, West Virginia (hereinafter referred to as the Plant). During their employment, respondent United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied ndus- trial and Service Workers nternational Union, AFL-CO- CLC, or its predecessor unions (hereinafter referred to as the Union), represented them in collective bargaining. Tackett and Pyles retired in 1996, and Conley retired in 1998. They represent a class of retired employees from the Plant, along with their surviving spouses and other dependents. Petitioner M&G Polymers USA, LLC, is the current owner of the Plant. When M&G purchased the Plant in 2000, it entered a master collective-bargaining agreement and a Pension, nsurance, and Service Award Agreement (P & agree- ment) with the Union, generally similar to agreements the Union had negotiated with M&G’s predecessor. The P & agreement provided for retiree health care benefits as follows: “Employees who retire on or after January 1, 1996 and who are eligible for and receiving a monthly pen- sion under the 1993 Pension Plan whose full years of attained age and full years of attained continuous service at the time of retirement equals 95 or more points will receive a full Company contribution to- wards the cost of [health care] benefits described in this Exhibit B–1 Employees who have less than 95 points at the time of retirement will receive a re- duced Company contribution. The Company contribu- tion will be reduced by 2% for every point less than 95. Employees |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | majority | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | reduced by 2% for every point less than 95. Employees will be required to pay the balance of Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 3 Opinion of the Court the health care contribution, as estimated by the Company annually in advance, for the [health care] benefits described in this Exhibit B–1. Failure to pay the required medical contribution will result in can- cellation of coverage.” App. 415–416. Exhibit B–1, which described the health care benefits at issue, opened with the following durational clause: “Effec- tive January 1, 1998, and for the duration of this Agree- ment thereafter, the Employer will provide the following program of hospital benefits, hospital-medical benefits, surgical benefits and prescription drug benefits for eligible employees and their dependents ” at 377–378 (emphasis deleted). The P & agreement provided for renegotiation of its terms in three years.1 B n December 2006, M&G announced that it would begin requiring retirees to contribute to the cost of their health care benefits. Respondent retirees, on behalf of them- selves and others similarly situated, sued M&G and re- lated entities, alleging that the decision to require these contributions breached both the collective-bargaining agreement and the P & agreement, in violation of of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA) and of the Employee Retirement ncome Security Act of 1974 (ERSA),2 Specifically, the retir- ees alleged that M&G had promised to provide lifetime contribution-free health care benefits for them, their surviving spouses, and their dependents. They pointed to —————— 1 n accordance with this provision, M&G and the Union began bar- gaining anew in 2003, ultimately reaching a new agreement in 2005. The provisions of the existing agreements remained in effect during the course of those negotiations. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 25, n. 1. 2 The Union was a plaintiff in the suit and is a respondent here. For ease of reference, we refer to the respondents collectively as “the retirees.” 4 M&G POLYMERS USA, LLC v. TACKETT Opinion of the Court the language in the 2000 P & agreement providing that employees with a certain level of seniority “will receive a full Company contribution towards the cost of [health care] benefits described in Exhibit B–1.” The retirees alleged that, with this promise, M&G had created a vested right to such benefits that continued beyond the expiration of the 2000 P & agreement. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. t concluded that the cited language unambiguously did not create a vested right to retiree benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed based on the reasoning of |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | majority | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | The Court of Appeals reversed based on the reasoning of its earlier decision in (CA6 2009) (Tackett ). involved a similar claim that an employer had breached a collective-bargaining agree- ment when it terminated retiree benefits. 716 F.2d, at 1478. Although the court found the text of the provision in that case ambiguous, it relied on the “context” of labor negotiations to resolve that ambiguity in favor of the retirees’ interpretation. Specifically, the court inferred that parties to collective bargaining would intend retiree benefits to vest for life because such benefits are “not mandatory” or required to be included in collective- bargaining agreements, are “typically understood as a form of delayed compensation or reward for past services,” and are keyed to the acquisition of retirement status. The court concluded that these inferences “out- weigh[ed] any contrary implications [about the termina- tion of retiree benefits] derived from” general termination clauses. Applying the inferences on review of the District Court’s dismissal of the action, the Court of Ap- peals concluded that the retirees had stated a plausible claim. Tackett “Keeping in mind the context of the labor-management negotiations identified in” the court found “it unlikely that [the Union] Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 5 Opinion of the Court would agree to language that ensures its members a ‘full Company contribution,’ if the company could unilaterally change the level of contribution.” The court con- strued the language about “employees” contributing to their health care premiums as limited to employees who had not attained the requisite seniority points to be enti- tled to a full company contribution. And it discerned an intent to vest lifetime contribution-free health care benefits from provisions tying eligibility for health care benefits to eligibility for pension benefits. at 490–491. On remand, the District Court conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of the retirees. t declined to revisit the question whether the P & agreement created a vested right to retiree benefits, concluding that the Court of Appeals had definitively resolved that issue. t then issued a permanent injunction ordering M&G to reinstate contribution-free health care benefits for the individual respondents and similarly situated retirees. 853 F. Supp. 2d 697 (SD Ohio 2012). The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that, al- though the District Court had erred in treating Tackett as a conclusive resolution of the meaning of the P & agree- ment, it had not erred in “presum[ing]” that, “in the ab- sence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the agreements indicated an intent to vest lifetime contribution-free bene- fits.” (Tackett ). And because the District |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | majority | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | lifetime contribution-free bene- fits.” (Tackett ). And because the District Court had concluded that the prof- fered extrinsic evidence was inapplicable, it had not clearly erred in finding that the agreement created those vested rights. We granted certiorari, 572 U. S. (2014), and now vacate and remand. This case is about the interpretation of collective- bargaining agreements that define rights to welfare bene- 6 M&G POLYMERS USA, LLC v. TACKETT Opinion of the Court fits plans. The LMRA grants federal courts jurisdiction to resolve disputes between employers and labor unions about collective-bargaining agreements. 29 U.S. C. When collective-bargaining agreements create pension or welfare benefits plans, those plans are subject to rules established in ERSA. ERSA defines pension plans as plans, funds, or programs that “provid[e] retirement in- come to employees” or that “resul[t] in a deferral of in- come.” t defines welfare benefits plans as plans, funds, or programs established or maintained to provide participants with additional benefits, such as life insurance and disability coverage. ERSA treats these two types of plans differently. Although ERSA imposes elaborate minimum funding and vesting standards for pension plans, 1082, 1083, 1084, it explicitly exempts welfare benefits plans from those rules, 1081(a)(1). Welfare benefits plans must be “established and maintained pursuant to a writ- ten instrument,” but “[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERSA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans,” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). As we have previously recognized, “[E]mployers have large leeway to design disability and other welfare plans as they see fit.” Black & Decker Dis- ability And, we have observed, the rule that contractual “provisions ordi- narily should be enforced as written is especially appro- priate when enforcing an ERSA [welfare benefits] plan.” Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident ns. Co., 571 U. S. (slip op., at 7). That is because the “focus on the written terms of the plan is the linchpin of a system that is not so complex that administrative costs, or litiga- tion expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering [welfare benefits] plans in the first place.” at (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 7 Opinion of the Court omitted). We interpret collective-bargaining agreements, includ- ing those establishing ERSA plans, according to ordinary principles of contract law, at least when those principles are not inconsistent with federal labor policy. See Textile 456–457 (1957). “n this endeavor, as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.” S. A. v. Animal- Feeds nt’l Corp., (internal |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | majority | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | intentions control.” S. A. v. Animal- Feeds nt’l Corp., (internal quo- tation marks omitted). “Where the words of a contract in writing are clear and unambiguous, its meaning is to be ascertained in accordance with its plainly expressed in- tent.” 11 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts p. 108 (4th ed. 2012) (Williston) (internal quotation marks omitted). n this case, the Court of Appeals applied the inferences to conclude that, in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the provisions of the contract indicated an intent to vest retirees with lifetime benefits. Tackett –. As we now explain, those inferences conflict with ordinary principles of con- tract law. A 1 The Court of Appeals has long insisted that its Yard- Man inferences are drawn from ordinary contract law. n itself, the court purported to apply “traditional rules for contractual interpretation.” 716 F.2d, at The court first concluded that the provision governing retiree insurance benefits—which stated only that the employer “will provide” such benefits—was ambiguous as to the duration of those benefits. To resolve that ambiguity, it looked to other provisions of the agree- ment. The agreement included provisions for terminating active employees’ insurance benefits in the case of layoffs 8 M&G POLYMERS USA, LLC v. TACKETT Opinion of the Court and for terminating benefits for a retiree’s spouse and dependents in case of the retiree’s death before the expira- tion of the collective-bargaining agreement, but no provi- sion specifically addressed the duration of retiree health care benefits. –1482. From the existence of these termination provisions and the absence of a termi- nation provision specifically addressing retiree benefits, the court inferred an intent to vest those retiree benefits for life. The court then purported to apply the rule that con- tracts should be interpreted to avoid illusory promises. t noted that the retiree insurance provisions “contain[ed] a promise that the company will pay an early retiree’s in- surance upon such retiree reaching age 65 but that the retiree must bear the cost of company insurance until that time.” Employees could retire at age 55, but the agreement containing this promise applied only for a 3-year term. Thus, retirees between the ages of 55 and 62 would not turn 65 and become eligible for the company contribution before the 3-year agreement ex- pired. n light of this fact, the court reasoned that the promise would be “completely illusory for many early retirees under age 62” if the retiree benefits terminated when the contract expired. Finally, the court turned to “the context” of labor nego- tiations. t observed that “[b]enefits for retirees are |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | majority | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | labor nego- tiations. t observed that “[b]enefits for retirees are not mandatory subjects of collective bar- gaining” and that “employees are presumably aware that the union owes no obligation to bargain for continued benefits for retirees.” Based on these observations, the court concluded that “it is unlikely that such benefits would be left to the contingencies of future negotia- tions.” t also asserted that “retiree benefits are in a sense ‘status’ benefits which, as such, carry with them an inference that they continue so long as the prerequisite status is maintained.” Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 9 Opinion of the Court Although the contract included a general durational clause—meaning that the contract itself would expire at a set time—the court concluded that these contextual clues “outweigh[ed] any contrary implications derived from a routine duration clause.” 2 Two years after the court took this analysis even further. n a dispute between retirees and a steel company over retiree health insurance benefits, it con- strued the language “will continue to provide at its ex- pense, supplemental medicare and major medical benefits for Pensioners aged 65 and over” to “unambiguously con- fe[r]” lifetime benefits. Yet it had interpreted similar language—“will provide insurance benefits equal to the active group”—to be ambiguous in The court refused to give any weight to provi- sions that supported a contrary construction—namely, one establishing a fund to pay pension, but not welfare, bene- fits, and another providing for the continuation of pension, but not welfare, benefits after the agreement expired. 770 F.2d, at –616. According to the court, a contrary interpretation “would render the Company’s promise [of benefits for retirees aged 65 and over] in sub- stantial part nugatory and illusory” to retirees who were 62 or younger when the 3-year agreement was signed. And it faulted the District Court for failing “to give effect” to ’s admonition “that retiree benefits normally are interminable.” The Court of Appeals has continued to extend the rea- soning of Relying on ’s statement that context considerations outweigh the effect of a gen- eral termination clause, it has concluded that, “ ‘[a]bsent specific durational language referring to retiree benefits themselves,’ a general durational clause says nothing 10 M&G POLYMERS USA, LLC v. TACKETT Opinion of the Court about the vesting of retiree benefits.” t has also held that a provision that “ties eligibility for retirement-health benefits to eligibility for a pension [leaves] little room for debate that retirees’ health benefits ves[t] upon retirement.” (internal quotation marks omitted). Commenting on these extensions of the court has acknowledged that “there is a reasonable argument |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | majority | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | the court has acknowledged that “there is a reasonable argument to be made that, while th[e] court has repeatedly cautioned that does not create a presumption of vesting, [it] ha[s] gone on to apply just such a presumption.” v. ArvinMeritor, nc., 549 F.3d 1064, 1074 B We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ assessment that the inferences applied in and its progeny repre- sent ordinary principles of contract law. As an initial matter, violates ordinary con- tract principles by placing a thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective-bargaining agree- ments. That rule has no basis in ordinary principles of contract law. And it distorts the attempt “to ascertain the intention of the parties.” 11 Williston at 18 (empha- sis added); see also 559 U.S., at Yard- Man’s assessment of likely behavior in collective bargain- ing is too speculative and too far removed from the context of any particular contract to be useful in discerning the parties’ intention. And the Court of Appeals derived its assessment of likely behavior not from record evidence, but instead from its own suppositions about the intentions of employees, unions, and employers negotiating retiree benefits. See 716 F.2d, For example, it asserted, without any foundation, that, “when parties contract for benefits which accrue upon achievement of retiree Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 11 Opinion of the Court status, there is an inference that the parties likely in- tended those benefits to continue as long as the benefi- ciary remains a retiree.” ; see also (“[]t is unlikely that [retiree] benefits would be left to the contingen- cies of future negotiations”). Although a court may look to known customs or usages in a particular industry to de- termine the meaning of a contract, the parties must prove those customs or usages using affirmative evidentiary support in a given case. 12 Williston accord, Robin- ; Oelricks v. Ford, relied on no record evidence indicating that employers and unions in that industry customarily vest retiree benefits. Worse, the Court of Appeals has taken the inferences in and applied them indiscriminately across industries. See, e.g., ; (electron- ics); Because the Court of Appeals did not ground its Yard- Man inferences in any record evidence, it is unsurprising that the inferences rest on a shaky factual foundation. For example, relied in part on the premise that retiree health care benefits are not subjects of mandatory collective bargaining. Parties, however, can and do volun- tarily agree to make retiree benefits a subject of mandato- ry collective bargaining. ndeed, the employer and union in this case |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | majority | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | collective bargaining. ndeed, the employer and union in this case entered such an agreement in 2001. App. 435–436. also relied on the premise that re- tiree benefits are a form of deferred compensation, but that characterization is contrary to Congress’ determi- nation otherwise. n ERSA, Congress specifically defined plans that “resul[t] in a deferral of income by employ- ees” as pension plans, and plans that offer medical benefits as welfare plans, Thus, retiree health care benefits are not a form of deferred compensation. 12 M&G POLYMERS USA, LLC v. TACKETT Opinion of the Court Further compounding this error, the Court of Appeals has refused to apply general durational clauses to provi- sions governing retiree benefits. Having inferred that parties would not leave retiree benefits to the contingen- cies of future negotiations, and that retiree benefits gener- ally last as long as the recipient remains a retiree, the court in explicitly concluded that these infer- ences “outweigh[ed] any contrary implications derived from a routine duration clause terminating the agreement generally.” 716 F.2d, –1483. The court’s subse- quent decisions went even further, requiring a contract to include a specific durational clause for retiree health care benefits to prevent vesting. E.g., at These decisions distort the text of the agreement and conflict with the principle of contract law that the written agreement is presumed to encompass the whole agreement of the parties. See 1 W. Story, Law of Contracts (M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1874); see also 11 Williston Perhaps tugged by these inferences, the Court of Ap- peals misapplied other traditional principles of contract law, including the illusory promises doctrine. That doc- trine instructs courts to avoid constructions of contracts that would render promises illusory because such promises cannot serve as consideration for a contract. See 3 Williston But the Court of Appeals construed provisions that admittedly benefited some class of retirees as “illusory” merely because they did not equally benefit all retirees. See – 1481. That interpretation is a contradiction in terms—a promise that is “partly” illusory is by definition not illusory. f it benefits some class of retirees, then it may serve as consideration for the union’s promises. And the court’s interpretation is particularly inappropriate in the context of collective-bargaining agreements, which are negotiated on behalf of a broad category of individuals and conse- quently will often include provisions inapplicable to some Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 13 Opinion of the Court category of employees. The Court of Appeals also failed even to consider the traditional principle that courts should not construe am- biguous writings to create lifetime promises. |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | majority | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | should not construe am- biguous writings to create lifetime promises. See 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts p. 216 (1960) (explain- ing that contracts that are silent as to their duration will ordinarily be treated not as “operative in perpetuity” but as “operative for a reasonable time” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court recognized that “traditional rules of contractual interpretation require a clear manifes- tation of intent before conferring a benefit or obligation,” but asserted that “the duration of the benefit once clearly conferred is [not] subject to this stricture.” n. 2. n stark contrast to this assertion, however, the court later applied that very stricture to noncollectively bargained contracts offering retiree bene- fits. See 400 (CA6 1998) (“To vest benefits is to render them forever unalterable. Because vesting of welfare plan benefits is not required by law, an employer’s commitment to vest such benefits is not to be inferred lightly; the intent to vest must be found in the plan documents and must be stated in clear and express language” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The different treatment of these two types of employment contracts only underscores ’s devia- tion from ordinary principles of contract law. Similarly, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the traditional principle that “contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining agreement.” Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, nc. v. NLRB, That principle does not preclude the conclusion that the parties intended to vest lifetime benefits for retirees. ndeed, we have already recognized that “a collective-bargaining agreement [may] provid[e] in explicit terms that certain benefits continue after the agreement’s 14 M&G POLYMERS USA, LLC v. TACKETT Opinion of the Court expiration.” But when a contract is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life. C There is no doubt that and its progeny af- fected the outcome here. As in its previous decisions, the Court of Appeals here cited the “context of labor- management negotiations” and reasoned that the Union likely would not have agreed to language ensuring its members a “full Company contribution” if the company could change the level of that contribution. Tackett 561 F.3d, at 490 (internal quotation marks omitted). t simi- larly concluded that the tying of eligibility for health care benefits to receipt of pension benefits suggested an intent to vest health care benefits. And it framed its anal- ysis from beginning to end in light of the principles it announced in and its progeny. See 561 F.3d, at |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Laird v. Nelms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108559/laird-v-nelms/ | Respondents brought this action in the United States District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S. C. 1346 (b), 2671-2680. They sought recovery for property damage allegedly resulting from a sonic boom caused by California-based United States military planes flying over North Carolina on a training mission. The District Court entered summary judgment for petitioners, but on respondents' appeal the United States Court of *798 Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. That court held that, although respondents had been unable to show negligence "either in the planning or operation of the flight," they were nonetheless entitled to proceed on a theory of strict or absolute liability for ultrahazardous activities conducted by petitioners in their official capacities. That court relied on its earlier opinion in United which in turn had distinguished this Court's holding in We granted certiorari. Dalehite held that the Government was not liable for the extensive damage resulting from the explosion of two cargo vessels in the harbor of Texas City, Texas, in 1947. The Court's opinion rejected various specifications of negligence on the part of Government employees that had been found by the District Court in that case, and then went on to treat petitioners' claim that the Government was absolutely or strictly liable because of its having engaged in a dangerous activity. The Court said with respect to this aspect of the plaintiffs' claim: "[T]he Act does not extend to such situations, though of course well known in tort law generally. It is to be invoked only on a `negligent or wrongful act or omission' of an employee. Absolute liability, of course, arises irrespective of how the tortfeasor conducts himself; it is imposed automatically when any damages are sustained as a result of the decision to engage in the dangerous activity." This Court's resolution of the strict-liability issue in Dalehite did not turn on the question of whether the law of Texas or of some other State did or did not recognize strict liability for the conduct of ultrahazardous activities. It turned instead on the question of whether the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act permitted *799 under any circumstances the imposition of liability upon the Government where there had been neither negligence nor wrongful act. The necessary consequence of the Court's holding in Dalehite is that the statutory language "negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government," is a uniform federal limitation on the types of acts committed by its employees for which the United States has consented to be sued. Regardless of state law characterization, the Federal |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Laird v. Nelms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108559/laird-v-nelms/ | to be sued. Regardless of state law characterization, the Federal Tort Claims Act itself precludes the imposition of liability if there has been no negligence or other form of "misfeasance or nonfeasance," 346 U.S., at on the part of the Government. It is at least theoretically possible to argue that since Dalehite in discussing the legislative history of the Act said that "wrongful" acts could include some kind of trespass, and since courts imposed liability in some of the early blasting cases on the theory that the plaintiff's action sounded in trespass, liability could be imposed on the Government in this case on a theory of trespass which would be within the Act's waiver of immunity. We believe, however, that there is more than one reason for rejecting such an alternate basis of governmental liability here. The notion that a military plane on a high-altitude training flight itself intrudes upon any property interest of an owner of the land over which it flies was rejected in United There this Court, construing the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S. C. 401, said: "It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universeCujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. *800 Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim." -261. Thus, quite apart from what would very likely be insuperable problems of proof in connecting the passage of the plane over the owner's air space with any ensuing damage from a sonic boom, this version of the trespass theory is ruled out by established federal law. Perhaps the precise holding of United could be skirted by analogizing the pressure wave of air characterizing a sonic boom to the concussion that on occasion accompanies blasting, and treating the air wave striking the actual land of the property owner as a direct intrusion caused by the pilot of the plane in the mold of the classical common-law theory of trespass. It is quite clear, however, that the presently prevailing view as to the theory of liability for blasting damage is frankly conceded to be |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Laird v. Nelms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108559/laird-v-nelms/ | of liability for blasting damage is frankly conceded to be strict liability for undertaking an ultrahazardous activity, rather than any attenuated notion of common-law trespass. See Restatement of Torts 519, 520 (e); W. Law of Torts 75 (4th ed. 1971). While a leading North Carolina case on the subject of strict liability discusses the distinction between actions on the case and actions sounding in trespass that the earlier decisions made, it, too, actually grounds liability on the basis that he who engages in ultrahazardous activity must pay his way regardless of what precautions he may have taken. Guilford Realty & Ins. More importantly, however, Congress in considering the Federal Tort Claims Act cannot realistically be said *801 to have dealt in terms of either the jurisprudential distinctions peculiar to the forms of action at common law or the metaphysical subtleties that crop up in even contemporary discussions of tort theory. See The legislative history discussed in Dalehite indicates that Congress intended to permit liability essentially based on the intentionally wrongful or careless conduct of Government employees, for which the Government was to be made liable according to state law under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but to exclude liability based solely on the ultrahazardous nature of an activity undertaken by the Government. A House Judiciary Committee memorandum explaining the "discretionary function" exemption from the bill when that exemption first appeared in the draft legislation in 1942 made the comment that "the cases covered by that subsection would probably have been exempted. by judicial construction" in any event, but that the exemption was intended to preclude any possibility "that the act would be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government growing out of a legally authorized activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project, where no wrongful act or omission on the part of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious" Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, pp. 65-66 (1942). The same memorandum, after noting the erosion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity over the years, observed with respect to the bill generally: "Yet a large and highly important area remains in which no satisfactory remedy has been provided *802 for the wrongs of Government officers or employees, the ordinary `commonlaw' type of tort, such as personal injury or property damage caused by the negligent operation of an automobile." The type of trespass subsumed under |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Laird v. Nelms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108559/laird-v-nelms/ | operation of an automobile." The type of trespass subsumed under the Act's language making the Government liable for "wrongful" acts of its employees is exemplified by the conduct of the Government agents in Liability of this type under the Act is not to be broadened beyond the intent of Congress by dressing up the substance of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities in the garments of common-law trespass. To permit respondent to proceed on a trespass theory here would be to judicially admit at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away at the front door. We do not believe the Act permits such a result. Shortly after the decision of this Court in Dalehite, the facts of the Texas City catastrophe were presented to Congress in an effort to obtain legislative relief from that body. Congress, after conducting hearings and receiving reports, ultimately enacted a bill granting compensation to the victims in question. ; H. R. Rep. No. 2024, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. Rep. No. 2363, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 1305, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. Rep. No. 684, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. Rep. No. 684, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). At no time during these hearings was there any effort made to modify this Court's construction of the Tort Claims Act in Dalehite. Both by reason of stare decisis and by reason of Congress' failure to make any statutory change upon again reviewing the subject, we regard the principle enunciated in Dalehite as controlling here. Since Dalehite held that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not authorize suit against the Government on claims *803 based on strict liability for ultrahazardous activity, the Court of Appeals in the instant case erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. While as a matter of practice within the Circuit it may have been proper to rely upon United it is clear that the holding of the latter case permitting imposition of strict liability on the Government where state law permits it is likewise inconsistent with Dalehite. Dalehite did not depend on the factual question of whether the Government was handling dangerous property, as opposed to operating a dangerous instrument but, rather, on the Court's determination that the Act did not authorize the imposition of strict liability of any sort upon the Government. Indeed, even the dissenting opinion in Dalehite did not disagree with the conclusion of the majority on that point. Our reaffirmation of the construction put on the Federal Tort Claims Act in Dalehite makes it unnecessary to treat the scope |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | second_dissenting | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | As the Court analyzes this case, it presents the question whether the State of Texas, or indeed the Federal Government, has the power to prohibit the public desecration of the American flag. The question is unique. In my judgment rules that apply to a host of other symbols, such as state flags, armbands, or various privately promoted emblems of political or commercial identity, are not necessarily controlling. Even if flag burning could be considered just another species of symbolic speech under the logical application of the rules that the Court has developed in its interpretation of the First Amendment in other contexts, this case has an intangible dimension that makes those rules inapplicable. A country's flag is a symbol of more than "nationhood and national unity." Ante, at 407, 410, 413, and n. 9, 417, 420. It also signifies the ideas that characterize the society that has chosen that emblem as well as the special history that has animated the growth and power of those ideas. The fleurs-de-lis and the tricolor both symbolized "nationhood and national unity," but they had vastly different meanings. The message conveyed by some flags the swastika, for example may survive long after it has outlived its usefulness as a symbol of regimented unity in a particular nation. *437 So it is with the American flag. It is more than a proud symbol of the courage, the determination, and the gifts of nature that transformed 13 fledgling Colonies into a world power. It is a symbol of freedom, of equal opportunity, of religious tolerance, and of good will for other peoples who share our aspirations. The symbol carries its message to dissidents both at home and abroad who may have no interest at all in our national unity or survival. The value of the flag as a symbol cannot be measured. Even so, I have no doubt that the interest in preserving that value for the future is both significant and legitimate. Conceivably that value will be enhanced by the Court's conclusion that our national commitment to free expression is so strong that even the United States as ultimate guarantor of that freedom is without power to prohibit the desecration of its unique symbol. But I am unpersuaded. The creation of a federal right to post bulletin boards and graffiti on the Washington Monument might enlarge the market for free expression, but at a cost I would not pay. Similarly, in my considered judgment, sanctioning the public desecration of the flag will tarnish its value both for those who cherish the ideas for |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | second_dissenting | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | value both for those who cherish the ideas for which it waves and for those who desire to don the robes of martyrdom by burning it. That tarnish is not justified by the trivial burden on free expression occasioned by requiring that an available, alternative mode of expression including uttering words critical of the flag, see be employed. It is appropriate to emphasize certain propositions that are not implicated by this case. The statutory prohibition of flag desecration does not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." West Virginia Board of The statute does not compel any conduct or any profession of respect for any idea or any symbol. *438 Nor does the statute violate "the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication." The content of respondent's message has no relevance whatsoever to the case. The concept of "desecration" does not turn on the substance of the message the actor intends to convey, but rather on whether those who view the act will take serious offense. Accordingly, one intending to convey a message of respect for the flag by burning it in a public square might nonetheless be guilty of desecration if he knows that others perhaps simply because they misperceive the intended message will be seriously offended. Indeed, even if the actor knows that all possible witnesses will understand that he intends to send a message of respect, he might still be guilty of desecration if he also knows that this understanding does not lessen the offense taken by some of those witnesses. Thus, this is not a case in which the fact that "it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense" provides a special "reason for according it constitutional protection," The case has nothing to do with "disagreeable ideas," see ante, at 409. It involves disagreeable conduct that, in my opinion, diminishes the value of an important national asset. The Court is therefore quite wrong in blandly asserting that respondent "was prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the core of our First Amendment values." Ante, at 411. Respondent was prosecuted because of the method he chose to express his dissatisfaction with those policies. Had he chosen to spray-paint or perhaps convey with a motion picture projector his message of dissatisfaction on the facade of the Lincoln Memorial, there would be no question about the power of the Government to |
Justice Kennedy | 2,001 | 4 | concurring | Cook v. Gralike | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621075/cook-v-gralike/ | I join the opinion of the Court, holding 15 et seq. of Article VIII of the Missouri Constitution violative of the Constitution of the United States. It seems appropriate, however, to add these brief observations with respect to Part III of the opinion. The Court does not say the States are disabled from requesting specific action from Congress or from expressing their concerns to it. As the Court holds, however, the mechanism the State seeks to employ here goes well beyond this prerogative. A State is not permitted to interpose itself between the people and their National Government as it seeks to do here. Whether a State's concern is with the proposed enactment of a constitutional amendment or an ordinary federal statute it simply lacks the power to impose any conditions on the election of Senators and Representatives, save neutral provisions as to the time, place, and manner of elections pursuant to Article I, 4. As the Court observed in U. S. Term Limits, the Elections Clause is a "grant of authority to issue procedural regulations," and not "a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints." The Elections Clause thus delegates but limited power over federal elections to the States. The Court rules, as it must, that the amendments to Article VIII of the Missouri Constitution do not regulate the time or place of federal elections; rather, those provisions are an attempt to control the actions of the State's congressional delegation. *528 The dispositive principle in this case is fundamental to the Constitution, to the idea of federalism, and to the theory of representative government. The principle is that Senators and Representatives in the National Government are responsible to the people who elect them, not to the States in which they reside. The Constitution was ratified by Conventions in the several States, not by the States themselves, U. S. Const., Art. VII, a historical fact and a constitutional imperative which underscore the proposition that the Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States. U. S. Const., preamble. The idea of federalism is that a National Legislature enacts laws which bind the people as individuals, not as citizens of a State; and, it follows, freedom is most secure if the people themselves, not the States as intermediaries, hold their federal legislators to account for the conduct of their office. If state enactments were allowed to condition or control certain actions of federal legislators, accountability would be blurred, with the legislators having the excuse |
Justice Kennedy | 2,001 | 4 | concurring | Cook v. Gralike | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621075/cook-v-gralike/ | accountability would be blurred, with the legislators having the excuse of saying that they did not act in the exercise of their best judgment but simply in conformance with a state mandate. As noted in the concurring opinion in Thornton, "[n]othing in the Constitution or The Federalist Papers supports the idea of state interference with the most basic relation between the National Government and its citizens, the selection of legislative representatives." Yet that is just what Missouri seeks to do through its lawto wield the power granted to it by the Elections Clause to handicap those who seek federal office by affixing pejorative labels next to their names on the ballot if they do not pledge to support the State's preferred position on a certain issue. Neither the design of the Constitution nor sound principles of representative government are consistent with the right or power of a State to interfere with the direct line of accountability between the National Legislature and the people who elect it. For these reasons Article VIII is void. *529 This said, it must be noted that when the Constitution was enacted, respectful petitions to legislators were an accepted mode of urging legislative action. See W. Miller, Arguing About Slavery 105-107 This right is preserved to individuals (the people) in the First Amendment. Even if a State, as an entity, is not itself protected by the Petition Clause, there is no principle prohibiting a state legislature from following a parallel course and by a memorial resolution requesting the Congress of the United States to pay heed to certain state concerns. From the earliest days of our Republic to the present time, States have done so in the context of federal legislation. See, e. g., 22 Annals of Cong. 153-154 (1811) (reprinting a resolution by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requesting that the charter of the Bank of the United States not be renewed); 2000 Ala. Acts 66 (requesting targeted relief for Medicare cuts); 2000 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 186 (urging Congress to allow state-inspected meat to be shipped in interstate commerce). Indeed, the situation was even more complex in the early days of our Nation, when Senators were appointed by state legislatures rather than directly elected. At that time, it appears that some state legislatures followed a practice of instructing the Senators whom they had appointed to pass legislation, while only requesting that the Representatives, who had been elected by the people, do so. See 22 Annals of Cong., at 153-154. I do not believe that the situation should be any different with |
Justice Kennedy | 2,001 | 4 | concurring | Cook v. Gralike | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621075/cook-v-gralike/ | not believe that the situation should be any different with respect to a proposed constitutional amendment, and indeed history bears this out. See, e. g., 13 Annals of Cong. 95- (1803) (reprinting a resolution from the State of Vermont and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts requesting that Congress propose to the legislatures of the States a constitutional amendment akin to the Twelfth Amendment). The fact that the Members of the First Congress decided not to codify a right to instruct legislative representatives does not, in my view, prove that they *530 intended to prohibit nonbinding petitions or memorials by the State as an entity. If there are to be cases in which a close question exists regarding whether the State has exceeded its constitutional authority in attempting to influence congressional action, this case is not one of them. In today's case the question is not close. Here the State attempts to intrude upon the relationship between the people and their congressional delegates by seeking to control or confine the discretion of those delegates, and the interference is not permissible. With these observations, I concur in the Court's opinion. Justice Thomas, concurring in Parts I and IV and concurring in the judgment. I continue to believe that, because they possess "reserved" powers, "the people of the States need not point to any affirmative grant of power in the Constitution in order to prescribe qualifications for their representatives in Congress, or to authorize their elected state legislators to do so." U. S. Term Limits, For this reason, I disagree with the Court's premise, derived from U. S. Term Limits, that the States have no authority to regulate congressional elections except for the authority that the Constitution expressly delegates to them. See ante, at 522. Nonetheless, the parties conceded the validity of this premise, see Brief for Petitioner 25-26; Brief for Respondents 12-13, and I therefore concur. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice O'Connor joins, concurring in the judgment. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but on the ground that Missouri's Article VIII violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, I believe that Article VIII violates the First Amendment right of a political candidate, once lawfully on the ballot, to *531 have his name appear unaccompanied by pejorative language required by the State. Our ballot access cases based on First Amendment grounds have rarely distinguished between the rights of candidates and the rights of voters. In we said: "[T]he rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect |
Justice Kennedy | 2,001 | 4 | concurring | Cook v. Gralike | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621075/cook-v-gralike/ | do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters." And in we said that "voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both." Actions such as the present one challenging ballot provisions have in most instances been brought by the candidates themselves, and no one questions the standing of respondents Gralike and Harmon to raise a First Amendment challenge to such laws.[*] Article I, 4, provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof" Missouri justifies Article VIII as a "time, place, and manner" regulation of election. Restrictions of this kind are valid "provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Missouri's Article VIII flunks two of these three requirements. Article VIII is not only not content neutral, but it *532 actually discriminates on the basis of viewpoint because only those candidates who fail to conform to the State's position receive derogatory labels. The result is that the State injects itself into the election process at an absolutely critical pointthe composition of the ballot, which is the last thing the voter sees before he makes his choiceand does so in a way that is not neutral as to issues or candidates. The candidates who are thus singled out have no means of replying to their designation which would be equally effective with the voter. In we held that a Louisiana statute requiring the designation of a candidate's race on the ballot violated the Equal Protection Clause. In describing the effect of such a designation, the Court said: "[B]y directing the citizen's attention to the single consideration of race or color, the State indicates that a candidate's race or color is an importantperhaps paramountconsideration in the citizen's choice, which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines." So, too, here the State has chosen one and only one issue to comment on the position of the candidates. During the campaign, they may debate tax reform, Social Security, national security, and a host of other issues; but when it comes to the ballot on which one or the other of them is chosen, the State is saying that the issue of term limits is paramount. Although uttered in a different context, what we said in Police Dept. of |
Justice Marshall | 1,975 | 15 | majority | Murphy v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109270/murphy-v-florida/ | The question presented by this case is whether the petitioner was denied a fair trial because members of the jury had learned from news accounts about a prior felony conviction or certain facts about the crime with which he was charged. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that petitioner has not been denied due process, and we therefore affirm the judgment below. I Petitioner was convicted in the Dade County, Fla., Criminal Court in 1970 of breaking and entering a home, while armed, with intent to commit robbery, and of assault with intent to commit robbery. The charges stemmed from the January 1968 robbery of a Miami Beach home and petitioner's apprehension, with three others, while fleeing from the scene. The robbery and petitioner's arrest received extensive press coverage because petitioner had been much in the news before. He had first made himself notorious for his part in the 1964 theft of the Star of India sapphire from a museum in New York. His flamboyant lifestyle made him a continuing subject of press interest; he was generally referred toat least in the mediaas "Murph the Surf." Before the date set for petitioner's trial on the instant charges, he was indicted on two counts of murder in *796 Broward County, Fla. Thereafter the Dade County court declared petitioner mentally incompetent to stand trial; he was committed to a hospital and the prosecutor nolle prossed the robbery indictment. In August 1968 he was indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiring to transport stolen securities in interstate commerce. After petitioner was adjudged competent for trial, he was convicted on one count of murder in Broward County (March 1969) and pleaded guilty to one count of the federal indictment involving stolen securities (December 1969). The indictment for robbery was refiled in August 1969 and came to trial one year later. The events of 1968 and 1969 drew extensive press coverage. Each new case against petitioner was considered newsworthy, not only in Dade County but elsewhere as well.[1] The record in this case contains scores of articles reporting on petitioner's trials and tribulations during this period; many purportedly relate statements that petitioner or his attorney made to reporters. Jury selection in the present case began in August 1970. Seventy-eight jurors were questioned. Of these, 30 were excused for miscellaneous personal reasons; 20 were excused peremptorily by the defense or prosecution; 20 were excused by the court as having prejudged petitioner; and the remaining eight served as the jury and two alternates. Petitioner's motions to dismiss the chosen jurors, on the ground that |
Justice Marshall | 1,975 | 15 | majority | Murphy v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109270/murphy-v-florida/ | motions to dismiss the chosen jurors, on the ground that they were aware that he had previously been convicted of either the 1964 Star of India theft or the Broward County murder, were denied, as was his renewed motion for a change of venue based on allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity. *797 At trial, petitioner did not testify or put in any evidence; assertedly in protest of the selected jury, he did not cross-examine any of the State's witnesses. He was convicted on both counts, and after an unsuccessful appeal he sought habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The District Court denied petitioner relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, in order to resolve the apparent conflict between the decision below and that of the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. over the applicability of to state criminal proceedings. II The defendant in Marshall was convicted of dispensing certain drugs without a prescription. In the course of the trial seven of the jurors were exposed to various news accounts relating that Marshall had previously been convicted of forgery, that he and his wife had been arrested for other narcotics offenses, and that he had for some time practiced medicine without a license. After interviewing the jurors, however, the trial judge denied a motion for a mistrial, relying on the jurors' assurances that they could maintain impartiality in spite of the news articles. Noting that the jurors had been exposed to information with a high potential for prejudice, this Court reversed the conviction. It did so, however, expressly "[i]n the exercise of [its] supervisory power to formulate and apply proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law in the federal courts," and not as a matter of constitutional compulsion. *798 In the face of so clear a statement, it cannot be maintained that Marshall was a constitutional ruling now applicable, through the Fourteenth Amendment, to the States. Petitioner argues, nonetheless, that more recent decisions of this Court have applied to state cases the principle underlying the Marshall decision:[2] that persons who have learned from news sources of a defendant's prior criminal record are presumed to be prejudiced. We cannot agree that Marshall has any application beyond the federal courts. Petitioner relies principally upon and In each of these cases, this Court overturned a state-court conviction obtained in a trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted by press coverage. In the rural community in which the trial was held had been subjected to a barrage of inflammatory publicity |
Justice Marshall | 1,975 | 15 | majority | Murphy v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109270/murphy-v-florida/ | held had been subjected to a barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial, including information on the defendant's prior convictions, his confession to 24 burglaries and six murders including the one for which he was tried, and his unaccepted offer to plead guilty in order to avoid the death sentence. As a result, eight of the 12 jurors had formed an opinion that the defendant was guilty before the trial began; some went "so far as to say that it would take evidence to overcome their belief" in his guilt. In these circumstances, the Court readily found actual prejudice against the petitioner to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible. Prejudice was presumed in the circumstances under which the trials in Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard were *799 held. In those cases the influence of the news media, either in the community at large or in the courtroom itself, pervaded the proceedings. In Rideau the defendant had "confessed" under police interrogation to the murder of which he stood convicted. A 20-minute film of his confession was broadcast three times by a television station in the community where the crime and the trial took place. In reversing, the Court did not examine the voir dire for evidence of actual prejudice because it considered the trial under review "but a hollow formality" the real trial had occurred when tens of thousands of people, in a community of 150,000, had seen and heard the defendant admit his guilt before the cameras. The trial in Estes had been conducted in a circus atmosphere, due in large part to the intrusions of the press, which was allowed to sit within the bar of the court and to overrun it with television equipment. Similarly, Sheppard arose from a trial infected not only by a background of extremely inflammatory publicity but also by a courthouse given over to accommodate the public appetite for carnival. The proceedings in these cases were entirely lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob. They cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about a state defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process. To resolve this case, we must turn, therefore, to any indications in the totality of circumstances that petitioner's trial was not fundamentally fair. III The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have "a panel |
Justice Marshall | 1,975 | 15 | majority | Murphy v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109270/murphy-v-florida/ | standard of fairness requires that a defendant have "a panel of impartial, `indifferent' jurors." Qualified *800 jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. "To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." At the same time, the juror's assurances that he is equal to this task cannot be dispositive of the accused's rights, and it remains open to the defendant to demonstrate "the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality." The voir dire in this case indicates no such hostility to petitioner by the jurors who served in his trial as to suggest a partiality that could not be laid aside. Some of the jurors had a vague recollection of the robbery with which petitioner was charged and each had some knowledge of petitioner's past crimes,[3] but none betrayed any belief in the relevance of petitioner's past to the present case.[4] Indeed, four of the six jurors volunteered their *801 views of its irrelevance, and one suggested that people who have been in trouble before are too often singled out for suspicion of each new crimea predisposition that could only operate in petitioner's favor. In the entire voir dire transcript furnished to us, there is only one colloquy on which petitioner can base even a colorable claim of partiality by a juror. In response to a leading and hypothetical question, presupposing a two- or three-week presentation of evidence against petitioner and his failure to put on any defense, one juror conceded that his prior impression of petitioner would dispose him to convict.[5] We cannot attach great significance *802 to this statement, however, in light of the leading nature of counsel's questions and the juror's other testimony indicating that he had no deep impression of petitioner at all. The juror testified that he did not keep up with current events and, in fact, had never heard of petitioner until he arrived in the room for prospective jurors where some veniremen were discussing him. He did not know that petitioner was "a convicted jewel thief" even then; it was petitioner's counsel who informed him of this fact. And he volunteered that petitioner's murder conviction, of which he had just heard, |
Justice Marshall | 1,975 | 15 | majority | Murphy v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109270/murphy-v-florida/ | that petitioner's murder conviction, of which he had just heard, would not be relevant to his guilt or innocence in the present case, since "[w]e are not trying him for murder." Even these indicia of impartiality might be disregarded in a case where the general atmosphere in the community or courtroom is sufficiently inflammatory, but the circumstances surrounding petitioner's trial are not at all of that variety. Petitioner attempts to portray them as inflammatory by reference to the publicity to which the community was exposed. The District Court found, however, that the news articles concerning petitioner had appeared almost entirely during the period between December 1967 and January 1969, the latter date being seven months before the jury in this case was selected. They were, moreover, largely factual in nature. Compare with The length to which the trial court must go in order *803 to select jurors who appear to be impartial is another factor relevant in evaluating those jurors' assurances of impartiality. In a community where most veniremen will admit to a disqualifying prejudice, the reliability of the others' protestations may be drawn into question; for it is then more probable that they are part of a community deeply hostile to the accused, and more likely that they may unwittingly have been influenced by it. In for example, the Court noted that 90% of those examined on the point were inclined to believe in the accused's guilt, and the court had excused for this cause 268 of the 430 veniremen. In the present case, by contrast, 20 of the 78 persons questioned were excused because they indicated an opinion as to petitioner's guilt.[6] This may indeed be 20 more than would occur in the trial of a totally obscure person, but it by no means suggests a community with sentiment so poisoned against petitioner as to impeach the indifference of jurors who displayed no animus of their own. In sum, we are unable to conclude, in the circumstances presented in this case, that petitioner did not receive a fair trial. Petitioner has failed to show that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or that the jury-selection process of which he complains permits an inference of actual prejudice. The judgment of the Court of Appeals must therefore be Affirmed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 1,999 | 16 | majority | Nasa v. Flra | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118306/nasa-v-flra/ | On October 12, 1978, Congress enacted the Inspector General Act (IGA), 5 U.S. C. App. 1 et seq., p. 1381, which created an Office of Inspector General (OIG) in each of several federal agencies, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The following day, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 5 U.S. C. 7101 et seq., which provides certain protections, including union representation, to a variety of federal employees. The question presented by this case is whether an investigator employed in NASA's Office of Inspector General (NASAOIG) can be considered a "representative" of NASA when examining a NASA employee, such that the right to union representation in the FSLMRS may be invoked. 7114(a)(2)(B). Although certain arguments of policy may support a negative answer to that question, the plain text of the two statutes, buttressed by administrative deference and Congress' countervailing policy concerns, dictates an affirmative answer. I In January 1993, in response to information supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), NASA's OIG conducted *232 an investigation of certain threatening activities of an employee of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, which is also a component of NASA. A NASAOIG investigator contacted the employee to arrange for an interview and, in response to the employee's request, agreed that both the employee's lawyer and union representative could attend. The conduct of the interview gave rise to a complaint by the union representative that the investigator had improperly limited his participation. The union filed a charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) alleging that NASA and its OIG had committed an unfair labor practice. See 7116(a)(1), (8). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled for the union with respect to its complaint against NASAOIG. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a. The ALJ concluded that the OIG investigator was a "representative" of NASA within the meaning of 7114(a)(2)(B), and that certain aspects of the investigator's behavior had violated the right to union representation under that section. at 64a65a, 69a70a. On review, the Authority agreed that the NASAOIG investigator prevented the union representative from actively participating in the examination and (1) ordered both NASA and NASAOIG to cease and desist (a) requiring bargaining unit employees to participate in OIG interviews under 7114(a)(2)(B) without allowing active participation of a union representative, and (b) likewise interfering with, coercing, or restraining employees in exercising their rights under the statute; and (2) directed NASA to (a) order NASAOIG to comply with 7114(a)(2)(B), and (b) post appropriate notices at the Huntsville facility. NASA, 50 F. L. R. A. 601, |
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