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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,002 | 5 |
majority
|
Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121161/columbus-v-ours-garage-wrecker-service-inc/
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If, as Ours Garage and TRAO argue, the safety exception of 14501(c)(2)(A) reaches only States, then localities are preempted not only from enacting, but equally from enforcing, safety regulations governing motor carriers of propertyeven if those regulations are enacted by the state legislature. It is unlikely that Congress would preserve States' power to enact safety rules and, at the same time, bar the ordinary method by which States enforce such rules through their local instrumentalities.[3] *437 Finally, we reiterate, reading the term "State" as used in 14501 to exclude political subdivisions would yield a decision at odds with our federal system's traditional comprehension of "the safety regulatory authority of a State," 14501(c)(2)(A). To repeat the essential observation made in Mortier: "The principle is well settled that local governmental units are created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them in its absolute discretion." -608 Whether and how to use that discretion is a question central to state self-government. See, e. g., Holt Civic In Ohio, as in other States, the delegation of governing authority from State to local unit has long occupied the attention of the State's lawmakers. See D. Wilcox, Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio: A Study in the Relations of City and Commonwealth 52-54, 63 (1896) (citing Ohio Const., Art. XIII (1851)). The Ohio Constitution currently grants municipalities within the State general authority "to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with the general laws." Art. XVIII, 3. Ohio's Legislature has enacted several statutes empowering cities to regulate motor vehicles and highways. See, e. g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 5.22 ; 723.01 ("Municipal corporations shall have special power to regulate the use of the streets."). Particularly relevant here, Ohio has exempted tow trucks from the State's regulation of motor carriers, *438 4921.02(A)(8), thus leaving tow-truck regulation largely to the cities, It is the expressed intent of 14501(c)(2)(A) that the preemption rule of 14501(c)(1) "not restrict" the existing "safety regulatory authority of a State." Compare 14501(c)(2)(A) with 14501(c)(2)(B) and (C) (preemption "does not apply" to state or local power to regulate in particular areas), and 14501(c)(3) (preemption rule "shall not affect" multistate, state, or local authority to regulate particular areas at the behest of carriers). Preemption analysis "start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,002 | 5 |
majority
|
Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121161/columbus-v-ours-garage-wrecker-service-inc/
|
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Medtronic, Section 14501(c)(2)(A) seeks to save from preemption state power "in a field which the States have traditionally occupied." A saving provision of that order is hardly comparable to exercises of congressional spending authority that, as a condition for receipt of funds, explicitly restrict the prerogative of States to entrust governance of a matter to localities. Such programs typically make uniform statewide regulation a condition of funding, or, conversely, provide funds to localities on the condition that they be spent at that level in accordance with federal prescriptions and without state interference. See, e. g., 23 U.S. C. 153 (grants to support traffic safety conditioned on a motorcycle helmet law that applies "throughout the State"); 158 (highway grants withheld unless "State has in effect a law" setting the drinking age at 21); 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(1) (Medicaid grants available only if a State ensures that its plan for medical assistance is "in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them"); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U. S. *439 256, 270 (State may not restrict local use of funds that the United States makes available to localities to spend at their discretion).[4] This case, by contrast, deals not with States' voluntary agreements to relinquish authority vis-à-vis their political subdivisions in exchange for federal funds, but with preemption stemming from Congress' power to regulate commerce, in a field where States have traditionally allowed localities to address local concerns. Congress' clear purpose in 14501(c)(2)(A) is to ensure that its preemption of States' economic authority over motor carriers of property, 14501(c)(1), "not restrict" the preexisting and traditional state police power over safety. That power typically includes the choice to delegate the State's "safety regulatory authority" to localities. Forcing a State to refrain from doing so would effectively "restrict" that very authority. Absent a basis more reliable than statutory language insufficient to demonstrate a "clear and manifest purpose" to the *440 contrary, federal courts should resist attribution to Congress of a design to disturb a State's decision on the division of authority between the State's central and local units over safety on municipal streets and roads. III The Court of Appeals supported its reading of 14501(c)(2)(A) to disallow delegation from State to city in part by reference to the statute's deregulatory purpose. See 246 F. 3d, ; accord, -446; ; R. We now turn to that justification. The Conference Report on the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 observed that
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,002 | 5 |
majority
|
Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121161/columbus-v-ours-garage-wrecker-service-inc/
|
the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 observed that "[s]tate economic regulation of motor carrier operations is a huge problem for national and regional carriers attempting to conduct a standard way of doing business." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, p. 87 (1994). Carrying more weight, in the Act itself Congress reported its finding that "the regulation of intrastate transportation of property by the States" unreasonably burdened free trade, interstate commerce, and American consumers. Pub. L. 103-305, 601(a)(1), Congress therefore concluded that "certain aspects of the State regulatory process should be preempted." 601(a)(2). These declarations of deregulatory purpose, however, do not justify interpreting through a deregulatory prism "aspects of the State regulatory process" that Congress determined should not be preempted. A congressional decision to enact both a general policy that furthers a particular goal and a specific exception that might tend against that goal does not invariably call for the narrowest possible construction of the exception. Such a construction is surely resistible here, for 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule and 14501(c)(2)(A)'s safety exception to it do not necessarily conflict. The problem to which the congressional conferees attended was "[s]tate economic regulation"; *441 the exemption in question is for state safety regulation. Corroboratively, the measure's legislative history shows that the deregulatory aim of the legislation had been endorsed by a key interest groupthe American Trucking Association subject to "some conditions that would allow regulatory protection to continue for non-economic factors, such as insurance [and] safety." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 88. The conferees believed that the legislation "address[ed] these conditions." ; see also Ace Auto 1 F. 3d, at 776. The construction of 14501 that respondents Ours Garage and TRAO advocate, moreover, does not guarantee uniform regulation. On respondents' reading as on petitioners', a State could, without affront to the statute, pass discrete, nonuniform safety regulations applicable to each of its several constituent municipalities. Ohio thus could adopt the Columbus regulations to govern in that city, the Toledo regulations to govern there, and so on down the line. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38. Indeed, because 14501(c)(2)(A) refers only to "political" subdivisions, nothing in the statute's text would impede a State from creating an administrative agency organized into local offices, each of which could craft local rules suitable to its assigned jurisdiction. There is no reason to suppose that Congress meant to stop the States from spreading their authority among municipalities unless they employ such artificial or inefficient schemes. Furthermore, 49 U.S. C. 31141 (1994 ed.) affords the Secretary of Transportation a means to prevent the safety exception from overwhelming
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,002 | 5 |
majority
|
Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121161/columbus-v-ours-garage-wrecker-service-inc/
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Transportation a means to prevent the safety exception from overwhelming the lawmakers' deregulatory purpose. That provision authorizes the Secretary to void any "State law or regulation on commercial motor vehicle safety" that, in the Secretary's judgment, "has no safety benefit [or] would cause an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce." 31141(a), (c)(4); see also 31132(8) ("`State law' includes [for the purposes of 31141] a law enacted by a political subdivision of a State"); 31132(9) (parallel definition of "State regulation"). Under this authority, *442 the Secretary can invalidate local safety regulations upon finding that their content or multiplicity threatens to clog the avenues of commerce. We reiterate that 14501(c)(2)(A) shields from preemption only "safety regulatory authority" (and "authority of a State to regulate with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements"). Local regulation of prices, routes, or services of tow trucks that is not genuinely responsive to safety concerns garners no exemption from 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule. * * * For the reasons stated, we hold that 14501(c)(2)(A) spares from preemption local as well as state regulation. We express no opinion, however, on the question whether Columbus' particular regulations, in whole or in part, qualify as exercises of "safety regulatory authority" or otherwise fall within 14501(c)(2)(A)'s compass. This question, which was not reached by the Court of Appeals,[5] remains open on remand. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
|
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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Since 180, the Immigration and Nationality Act has provided two methods through which an otherwise deportable alien who claims that he will be persecuted if deported can seek relief. Section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S. C. 1253(h), requires the Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his "life or freedom would be threatened" on account of one of the listed factors if he is deported. In we held that to qualify for this entitlement to withholding of deportation, an alien must demonstrate that "it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution" in the country to which he would be returned. The Refugee Act of 180, also established a second type of broader relief. Section 208(a) of the Act, 8 U.S. C. 1158(a), authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 1(a)(42), 8 U.S. C. 11(a)(42). In we rejected an alien's contention that the 208(a) "well-founded fear" standard governs applications for withholding of deportation under 243(h).[1] Similarly, today we reject the Government's contention that the 243(h) standard, which requires an alien to show that he is more likely than not to be subject to persecution, governs applications for asylum under 208(a). Congress used different, broader language to define the term "refugee" as used in 208(a) than it used to describe the class of aliens who have *424 a right to withholding of deportation under 243(h). The Act's establishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be deported to the country where they are in danger, mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act of 180. In addition, the legislative history of the 180 Act makes it perfectly clear that Congress did not intend the class of aliens who qualify as refugees to be coextensive with the class who qualify for 243(h) relief. I Respondent is a 38-year-old Nicaraguan citizen who entered the United in 17 as a visitor. After she remained in the United longer than permitted, and failed to take advantage of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) offer of voluntary departure, the INS commenced deportation proceedings against her. Respondent
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
|
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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voluntary departure, the INS commenced deportation proceedings against her. Respondent conceded that she was in the country illegally, but requested withholding of deportation pursuant to 243(h) and asylum as a refugee pursuant to 208(a). To support her request under 243(h), respondent attempted to show that if she were returned to Nicaragua her "life or freedom would be threatened" on account of her political views; to support her request under 208(a), she attempted to show that she had a "well-founded fear of persecution" upon her return. The evidence supporting both claims related primarily to the activities of respondent's brother who had been tortured and imprisoned because of his political activities in Nicaragua. Both respondent and her brother testified that they believed the Sandinistas knew that the two of them had fled Nicaragua together and that even though she had not been active politically herself, she would be interrogated about her brother's whereabouts and *425 activities. Respondent also testified that because of her brother's status, her own political opposition to the Sandinistas would be brought to that government's attention. Based on these facts, respondent claimed that she would be tortured if forced to return. The Immigration Judge applied the same standard in evaluating respondent's claim for withholding of deportation under 243(h) as he did in evaluating her application for asylum under 208(a). He found that she had not established "a clear probability of persecution" and therefore was not entitled to either form of relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed that respondent had "failed to establish that she would suffer persecution within the meaning of section 208(a) or 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act." at a. In the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, respondent did not challenge the BIA's decision that she was not entitled to withholding of deportation under 243(h), but argued that she was eligible for consideration for asylum under 208(a), and contended that the Immigration Judge and BIA erred in applying the "more likely than not" standard of proof from 243(h) to her 208(a) asylum claim. Instead, she asserted, they should have applied the "well-founded fear" standard, which she considered to be more generous. The court agreed. Relying on both the text and the structure of the Act, the court held that the "well-founded fear" standard which governs asylum proceedings is different, and in fact more generous, than the "clear probability" standard which governs withholding of deportation proceedings. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court interpreted the standard to require asylum applicants
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
|
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
|
Circuit, the court interpreted the standard to require asylum applicants to present " `specific facts' through objective evidence to prove either past persecution or `good reason' to fear future persecution." at 1453 ). *42 The court remanded respondent's asylum claim to the BIA to evaluate under the proper legal standard. We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict on this important question.[2][3] *427 II The Refugee Act of 180 established a new statutory procedure for granting asylum to refugees.[4] The 180 Act added a new 208(a) to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 152, reading as follows: "The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 11(a)(42)(A) of this title." 8 U.S. C. 1158(a). Under this section, eligibility for asylum depends entirely on the Attorney General's determination that an alien is a *428 "refugee," as that term is defined in 1(a)(42), which was also added to the Act in 180. That section provides: "The term `refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" 8 U.S. C. 11(a)(42). Thus, the "persecution or well-founded fear of persecution" standard governs the Attorney General's determination whether an alien is eligible for asylum.[5] In addition to establishing a statutory asylum process, the 180 Act amended the withholding of deportation provision,[]*42 243(h). See n. 15. Prior to 1, the Attorney General had discretion whether to grant withholding of deportation to aliens under 243(h). In 1, however, the United agreed to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the 151 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See 1 U.S.T. 223, 25-27, T.I.A.S. No. 577 (1); see generally Article 33.1 of the Convention, U.N.T.S. 150, 17 (154), reprinted in 1 U.S.T. 25, 27, which is the counterpart of 243(h) of our statute, imposed a mandatory duty on contracting not to return
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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statute, imposed a mandatory duty on contracting not to return an alien to a country where his "life or freedom would be threatened" on account of one of the enumerated reasons.[7] See infra, at 441. Thus, although 243(h) itself did not constrain the Attorney General's discretion after 1, presumably he honored the dictates of the United Nations Convention.[8] In any event, the 180 Act removed the Attorney General's discretion in 243(h) proceedings.[] *430 In we considered it significant that in enacting the 180 Act Congress did not amend the standard of eligibility for relief under 243(h). While the terms "refugee" and hence "well-founded fear" were made an integral part of the 208(a) procedure, they continued to play no part in 243(h). Thus we held that the prior consistent construction of 243(h) that required an applicant for withholding of deportation to demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution" upon deportation remained in force. Of course, this reasoning, based in large part on the plain language of 243(h), is of no avail here since 208(a) expressly provides that the "well-founded fear" standard governs eligibility for asylum. The Government argues, however, that even though the "well-founded fear" standard is applicable, there is no difference between it and the "would be threatened" test of 243(h). It asks us to hold that the only way an applicant can demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution" is to prove a "clear probability of persecution." The statutory language does not lend itself to this reading. To begin with, the language Congress used to describe the two standards conveys very different meanings. The "would be threatened" language of 243(h) has no subjective component, but instead requires the alien to establish by objective evidence that it is more likely than not that he or she will be subject to persecution upon deportation.[] See In contrast, the reference to "fear" in the 208(a) standard obviously makes the eligibility determination turn to some extent on the subjective mental state of the *431 lien.[11] "The linguistic difference between the words `well-founded fear' and `clear probability' may be as striking as that between a subjective and an objective frame of reference. We simply cannot conclude that the standards are identical." cert. pending, No. 8-388; see also ; That the fear must be "well-founded" does not alter the obvious focus on the individual's subjective beliefs, nor does it transform the standard into a "more likely than not" one. One can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place. As one leading authority
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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chance of the occurrence taking place. As one leading authority has pointed out: "Let us presume that it is known that in the applicant's country of origin every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote labor camp. In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who has managed to escape from the country in question will have `well-founded fear of being persecuted' upon his eventual return." 1 A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law 180 (1). This ordinary and obvious meaning of the phrase is not to be lightly discounted. See 4 U.S. 1, ; Ernst & With regard to this very statutory scheme, we have considered ourselves bound to " `assume "that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." ' " 4 U.S. 183, The different emphasis of the two standards which is so clear on the face of the statute is significantly highlighted by the fact that the same Congress simultaneously drafted 208(a) and amended 243(h). In doing so, Congress chose to maintain the old standard in 243(h), but to incorporate a different standard in 208(a). " `[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' " (quoting United v. Wong Kim Bo, (CA5 172)). The contrast between the language used in the two standards, and the fact that Congress used a new standard to define the term "refugee," certainly indicate that Congress intended the two standards to differ. III The message conveyed by the plain language of the Act is confirmed by an examination of its history.[12] Three aspects of that history are particularly compelling: The pre-180 experience under 203(a)(7), the only prior statute dealing with asylum; the abundant evidence of an intent to conform the definition of "refugee" and our asylum law to the United Nations Protocol to which the United has been bound *433 since 1; and the fact that Congress declined to enact the Senate version of the bill that would have made a refugee ineligible for asylum unless "his deportation or return would be prohibited by 243(h)." The Practice Under ″ 203(a)(7). The statutory definition of the term "refugee" contained in 1(a)(42) applies to two asylum provisions within the Immigration and Nationality Act.[13] Section 207, 8 U.S. C. 1157, governs the admission of refugees who seek admission from foreign countries. Section 208, 8 U.S. C. 1158,
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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admission from foreign countries. Section 208, 8 U.S. C. 1158, sets out the process by which refugees currently in the United may be granted asylum. Prior to the 180 amendments there was no statutory basis for granting asylum to aliens who applied from within the United[14] Asylum for aliens applying for admission from foreign countries had, however, been the subject of a previous statutory provision, and Congress' intent with respect to the changes that it sought to create in that statute are instructive in discerning the meaning of the term "well-founded fear." Section 203(a)(7) of the pre-180 statute authorized the Attorney General to permit "conditional entry" to a certain number of refugees fleeing from Communist-dominated areas or the Middle East "because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion." 7 *434 Stat. 13, 8 U.S. C. 1153(a)(7) (17 ed.). The standard that was applied to aliens seeking admission pursuant to 203(a)(7) was unquestionably more lenient than the "clear probability" standard applied in 243(h) proceedings. In Matter of Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 5, 5-570 (17), for example, the BIA "found no support" for the argument that "an alien deportee is required to do no more than meet the standards applied under section 203(a)(7) of the Act when seeking relief under section 243(h)." Similarly, in Matter of Adamska, (17), the Board held that an alien's inability to satisfy 243(h) was not determinative of her eligibility under the "substantially broader" standards of 203(a)(7). One of the differences the Board highlighted between the statutes was that 243(h) requires a showing that the applicant "would be" subject to persecution, while 203(a)(7) only required a showing that the applicant was unwilling to return "because of persecution or fear of persecution." 12 I. & N., at (emphasis in original). In sum, it was repeatedly recognized that the standards were significantly different.[15] At first glance one might conclude that this wide practice under the old 203(a)(7), which spoke of "fear of persecution," is not probative of the meaning of the term "well-founded fear of persecution" which Congress adopted in 180. Analysis of the legislative history, however, demonstrates that Congress added the "well-founded" language only because that was the language incorporated by the United Nations Protocol to which Congress sought to conform. See infra, at 43-437. Congress was told that the extant asylum procedure *435 for refugees outside of the United was acceptable under the Protocol, except for the fact that it made various unacceptable geographic and political distinctions.[1] The legislative history indicates that congress in no way wished to modify
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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history indicates that congress in no way wished to modify the standard that had been used under 203(a)(7).[17]*43 Adoption of the INS's argument that the term "well-founded fear" requires a showing of clear probability of persecution would clearly do violence to Congress' intent that the standard for admission under 207 be no different than the one previously applied under 203(a)(7).[18] The United Nations Protocol. If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of "refugee," and indeed the entire 180 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United refugee law into conformance with the 17 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1 U.S.T. 223, T.I.A.S. No. 577, to which the United *437 acceded in 1.[1] Indeed, the definition of "refugee" that Congress adopted, see is virtually identical to the one prescribed by Article 1(2) of the Convention which defines a "refugee" as an individual who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." Compare 1 U.S.T. with 1 U.S.T. 21. Not only did Congress adopt the Protocol's standard in the statute, but there were also many statements indicating Congress' intent that the new statutory definition of "refugee" be interpreted in conformance with the Protocol's definition. The Conference Committee Report, for example, stated that the definition was accepted "with the understanding that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol." S. Rep. No. -50, p. 20 (180); see also H. R. Rep., at It is thus appropriate to consider what the phrase "well-founded fear" means with relation to the Protocol. The origin of the Protocol's definition of "refugee" is found in the 14 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO). See The IRO defined a "refugee" as a person who had a "valid objection" to returning to his country of nationality, and specified that "fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or political opinions" constituted a valid objection. See IRO Constitution, Annex 1, Pt. 1, C1(a)(i). The term was then incorporated in the United Nations Convention *438 Relating to
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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then incorporated in the United Nations Convention *438 Relating to the Status of Refugees,[20] U.N.T.S. 150 (July 28, 151). The Committee that drafted the provision explained that "[t]he expression `well-founded fear of being the victim of persecution' means that a person has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason why he fears persecution." U. N. Rep., at 3. The 17 Protocol incorporated the "well-founded fear" test, without modification. The standard, as it has been consistently understood by those who drafted it, as well as those drafting the documents that adopted it, certainly does not require an alien to show that it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted in order to be classified as a "refugee."[] In interpreting the Protocol's definition of "refugee" we are further guided by the analysis set forth in the Office of the *43 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 17).[22] The Handbook explains that "[i]n general, the applicant's fear should be considered well founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there." at Ch. II B(2)(a) 42; see also 37-41. The High Commissioner's analysis of the United Nations' standard is consistent with our own examination of the origins of the Protocol's definition,[23] as well as the conclusions of *440 many scholars who have studied the matter.[24] There is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a % chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no "well-founded fear" of the event happening. See As we pointed out in a moderate interpretation of the "well-founded fear" standard would indicate "that so long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility." -425. In we dealt with the issue of withholding of deportation, or nonrefoulement, under 243(h). This provision corresponds to Article 33.1 of the Convention.[25] Significantly though, Article 33.1 does not extend this right to everyone who meets the definition of "refugee." Rather, it provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social group or political opinion." 1 U.S.T., at 27, U.N.T.S., at 17 (emphasis added). Thus, Article 33.1 requires that an applicant satisfy two burdens: first, that he or she be a "refugee," i. e., prove at least a "well-founded *441 fear of persecution"; second, that the "refugee" show that his or her life or freedom "would be threatened" if deported. Section 243(h)'s imposition of a "would be threatened" requirement is entirely consistent with the United ' obligations under the Protocol. Section 208(a), by contrast, is a discretionary mechanism which gives the Attorney General the authority to grant the broader relief of asylum to refugees. As such, it does not correspond to Article 33 of the Convention, but instead corresponds to Article 34. See Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F. 2d, at n. 15. That Article provides that the contracting "shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees." Like 208(a), the provision is precatory; it does not require the implementing authority actually to grant asylum to all those who are eligible. Also like 208(a), an alien must only show that he or she is a "refugee" to establish eligibility for relief. No further showing that he or she "would be" persecuted is required. Thus, as made binding on the United through the Protocol, Article 34 provides for a precatory, or discretionary, benefit for the entire class of persons who qualify as "refugees," whereas Article 33.1 provides an entitlement for the subcategory that "would be threatened" with persecution upon their return. This precise distinction between the broad class of refugees and the subcategory entitled to 243(h) relief is plainly revealed in the 180 Act. See 47 U. S., n. 22. Congress' Rejection of S. 3. Both the House bill, H. R. 281, th Cong., 1st Sess. (17), and the Senate bill, S. 3, th Cong., 1st Sess. (17), provided that an alien must be a "refugee" within the meaning of the Act in order to be eligible for asylum. The two bills differed, however, in that the House bill authorized the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to any refugee, whereas the Senate bill imposed the additional *442 requirement that a refugee could not obtain asylum unless "his deportation or return would be prohibited under section 243(h)."[2] S. Rep., at 2. Although this restriction, if adopted, would have curtailed the Attorney General's discretion to grant asylum to refugees pursuant to 208(a), it would not have affected the standard used to determine whether an
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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not have affected the standard used to determine whether an alien is a "refugee." Thus, the inclusion of this prohibition in the Senate bill indicates that the Senate recognized that there is a difference between the "well-founded fear" standard and the clear-probability standard.[27] The enactment of the House bill rather than the Senate bill in turn demonstrates that Congress eventually refused to restrict eligibility for asylum only to aliens meeting the stricter standard. "Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub *443 silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language." Nachman 44 U.S. 35, 32-33 (180) ; cf. Gulf Oil 41 U.S. 18, (174); 4 U. S., IV The INS makes two major arguments to support its contention that we should reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that an applicant can only show a "well-founded fear of persecution" by proving that it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted. We reject both of these arguments: the first ignores the structure of the Act; the second misconstrues the federal courts' role in reviewing an agency's statutory construction. First, the INS repeatedly argues that the structure of the Act dictates a decision in its favor, since it is anomalous for 208(a), which affords greater benefits than 243(h), see n. to have a less stringent standard of eligibility. This argument sorely fails because it does not take into account the fact that an alien who satisfies the applicable standard under 208(a) does not have a right to remain in the United ; he or she is simply eligible for asylum, if the Attorney General, in his discretion, chooses to grant it. An alien satisfying 243(h)'s stricter standard, in contrast, is automatically entitled to withholding of deportation.[28] In Matter of for example, the Board held that the alien was eligible for both asylum and withholding of deportation, but granted him the more limited remedy only, exercising its discretion to deny him asylum. See also 552 F. Supp. 8 ; Matter *444 of Interim Decision No. 258 We do not consider it at all anomalous that out of the entire class of "refugees," those who can show a clear probability of persecution are entitled to mandatory suspension of deportation and eligible for discretionary asylum, while those who can only show a well-founded fear of persecution are not entitled to anything, but are eligible for the discretionary relief of asylum. There is no basis for the INS's assertion that the discretionary/mandatory distinction has no
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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for the INS's assertion that the discretionary/mandatory distinction has no practical significance. Decisions such as Matter of and Matter of clearly demonstrate the practical import of the distinction. Moreover, the 180 Act amended 243(h) for the very purpose of changing it from a discretionary to a mandatory provision. See -42. Congress surely considered the discretionary/mandatory distinction important then, as it did with respect to the very definition of "refugee" involved here. The House Report provides: "The Committee carefully considered arguments that the new definition might expand the numbers of refugees eligible to come to the United and force substantially greater refugee admissions than the country could absorb. However, merely because an individual or group comes within the definition will not guarantee resettlement in the United" H. R. Rep., at This vesting of discretion in the Attorney General is quite typical in the immigration area, see, e. g., 450 U.S. 13 (181). If anything is anomalous, it is that the Government now asks us to restrict its discretion to a narrow class of aliens. Congress has assigned to the Attorney General and his delegates the task of making these hard individualized decisions; although Congress could have crafted a narrower definition, it chose to authorize the Attorney *445 General to determine which, if any, eligible refugees should be denied asylum. The INS's second principal argument in support of the proposition that the "well-founded fear" and "clear probability" standard are equivalent is that the BIA so construes the two standards. The INS argues that the BIA's construction of the Refugee Act of 180 is entitled to substantial deference, even if we conclude that the Court of Appeals' reading of the statutes is more in keeping with Congress' intent.[2] This argument is unpersuasive. *44 The question whether Congress intended the two standards to be identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide. Employing traditional tools of statutory construction, we have concluded that Congress did not intend the two standards to be identical.[30] In *447 U. S. A. 47 U.S. 837 we explained: "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional *448 intent. [Citing cases.] If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect." n. The narrow legal question whether the two standards are the same is, of course, quite different from the question of interpretation that arises in each case in which the
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
majority
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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of interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply either or both standards to a particular set of facts. There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like "well-founded fear" which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling " `any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,' " the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program. See quoting 415 U.S. 1, (174). But our task today is much narrower, and is well within the province of the Judiciary. We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the "well-founded fear" test should be applied.[31] Instead, we merely hold that the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that the two standards are identical.[32] *44 Our analysis of the plain language of the Act, its symmetry with the United Nations Protocol, and its legislative history, lead inexorably to the conclusion that to show a "well-founded fear of persecution," an alien need not prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted in his or her home country. We find these ordinary canons of statutory construction compelling, even without regard to the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien. See 385 U.S. 4, (1); 37 U.S. 120, (1); Fong Haw 333 U.S. (148). Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or her home country. In enacting the Refugee Act of 180 Congress sought to "give the United sufficient flexibility to respond to situations involving political or religious dissidents and detainees throughout the world." H. R. Rep., at Our holding today increases that flexibility by rejecting the Government's contention that the Attorney General may not even consider granting asylum to one who *450A fails to satisfy the strict 243(h) standard. Whether or not a "refugee" is eventually granted asylum is a matter which Congress has left for the Attorney General to decide. But it is clear that Congress did not intend to restrict eligibility for that relief to those who could prove that it is more likely than not that they will be persecuted if deported. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.
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per_curiam
| 1,971 | 200 |
per_curiam
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Piccirillo v. New York
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108238/piccirillo-v-new-york/
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The occasion for granting the writ in this case was to resolve the important question whether it is necessary to accord "transactional" immunity, see to compel a witness to give testimony before a state grand jury over his claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, or whether mere "use" immunity suffices to that end, see, e. g., ; Uniformed Sanitation Men After considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties on this writ, we have reached the conclusion that the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in which makes clear that transactional immunity is required in New York and also indicates that such court's earlier *549 decision in the case before us, may have rested on that premise, makes this case an inappropriate vehicle for deciding a question of such far-reaching importance. With the intervening decision in Gold, no controversy any longer exists between the parties as to the question which impelled us to grant the writ: whether, in the circumstances involved in this case, Piccirillo was entitled to "use" or "transactional" immunity. While it is true that, technically speaking, issues remain in the case concerning the kind of immunity required by federal law and, if it be "transactional" rather than "use" immunity in such a case as this, the proper scope of such immunity, both issues arise only against the sterile background of agreement between the parties that Piccirillo is entitled to "transactional" immunity under state law. Thus, our determination upon the fundamental constitutional question underlying this case would be in no sense necessary to its resolution in this instance. In this posture of affairs, we conclude that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents from the dismissal of this writ as improvidently granted. He would vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the New York Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of its later opinion in MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
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United States v. Kras
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
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The Bankruptcy Act and one of this Court's complementary Orders in Bankruptcy impose fees and make the payment of those fees a condition to a discharge in voluntary bankruptcy Appellee Kras, an indigent petitioner in bankruptcy, challenged the fees on Fifth Amendment grounds Upon receiving notice of the constitutional issue in the District Court, the Government moved to intervene as of right under 28 US C 2403 and Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Leave to intervene was granted The District Court held the fee provisions to be unconstitutional as applied to Kras It reached this conclusion in the face of an earlier contrary holding by a unanimous First Circuit In re cert denied, Pursuant to 28 US C 1252, the Government appealed We noted probable jurisdiction I Section 14 (b) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 US C 32 (b) (2), provides that, upon the expiration of the time fixed by the court for filing of objections, "the court shall discharge the bankrupt if no objection has been filed and if the filing fees required to be paid by this title have been paid in full" Section 14 (c), 11 US C 32 (c), similarly provides that the court "shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt (8) has failed to pay the filing fees required to be paid by this title in full" Section 59 (g), 11 US C 95 (g), relates to the dismissal of a petition in bankruptcy and states that "in the case of a dismissal for failure to pay the costs," notice to creditors shall not be required Three separate sections of the *436 Act thus contemplate the imposition of fees and condition a discharge upon payment of those fees Three charges are imposed: $37 for the referee's salary and expense fund, $10 for compensation of the trustee,[1] and $3 for the clerk's services 40 (c) (1), 48 (c), and 52 (a), 11 US C 68 (c) (1), 76 (c), and 80 (a) These total $50[2] The fees are payable upon the filing of the petition Section 40 (c) (1), contains a proviso that in of voluntary bankruptcy, all the fees "may be paid in installments, if so authorized by General Order of the Supreme Court of the United States" The Court's General Order in Bankruptcy No 35 (4), as amended June 23, 1947, 11 US C App, p 2210, complements 40 (c) (1) and provides that, upon a proper showing by the bankrupt, the fees may be paid in installments within a six-month period, which may be extended
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
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United States v. Kras
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
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in installments within a six-month period, which may be extended not to exceed three months[3] *437 II Robert William Kras presented his voluntary petition in bankruptcy to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on May 28, The petition was accompanied by Kras' motion for leave to file and proceed in bankruptcy without payment of any of the filing fees as a condition precedent to discharge The motion was supported by Kras' affidavit containing the following allegations that have not been controverted by the Government: 1 Kras resides in a 2 1/2-room apartment with his wife, two children, ages 5 years and 8 months, his mother, and his mother's 6-year-old daughter His younger child suffers from cystic fibrosis and is undergoing treatment in a medical center 2 Kras has been unemployed since May except for odd jobs producing about $300 in and a like amount in His last steady job was as an insurance agent with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company He was discharged by Metropolitan in when premiums he had collected were stolen from his home and he was unable to make up the amount to his employer Metropolitan's claim against him has increased to over $1,000 and is one of the debts listed in his bankruptcy petition He has diligently sought steady employment in New York City, but, because of unfavorable references from Metropolitan, he has been unsuccessful Mrs Kras was employed until March when she was *438 forced to stop because of pregnancy All her attention now will be devoted to caring for the younger child who is coming out of the hospital soon 3 The Kras household subsists entirely on $210 per month public assistance received for Kras' own family and $156 per month public assistance received for his mother and her daughter These benefits are all expended for rent and day-to-day necessities The rent is $102 per month Kras owns no automobile and no asset that is non-exempt under the bankruptcy law He receives no unemployment or disability benefit His sole assets are wearing apparel and $50 worth of essential household goods that are exempt under 6 of the Act, 11 US C 24, and under New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules 5205 (1963) He has a couch of negligible value in storage on which a $6 payment is due monthly 4 Because of his poverty, Kras is wholly unable to pay or promise to pay the bankruptcy fees, even in small installments He has been unable to borrow money The New York City Department of Social Services refuses to
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
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United States v. Kras
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
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The New York City Department of Social Services refuses to allot money for payment of the fees He has no prospect of immediate employment 5 Kras seeks a discharge in bankruptcy of $6,42869 in total indebtedness in to relieve himself and his family of the distress of financial insolvency and creditor harassment and in to make a new start in life It is especially important that he obtain a discharge of his debt to Metropolitan soon "because until that is cleared up Metropolitan will continue to falsely charge me with fraud and give me bad references which prevent my getting employment" The District Court's opinion contains an granting Kras' motion for leave to file his petition in bankruptcy without prepayment of fees He was adjudged a bankrupt on September 13, *439 Later, the referee, upon consent of the parties, entered an allowing Kras to conduct all necessary proceedings in bankruptcy up to but not including discharge The referee stayed the discharge pending disposition of this appeal III In the District Court Kras first presented a statutory argumentand, alternatively, one based in common lawthat he was entitled to relief from payment of the bankruptcy charges because of the provisions of 28 US C 1915 (a)[4] This is the in forma pauperis statute that has its origin in the Act of July 20, 1892, c 209, See also 28 US C 832-836 (1940 ed) The District Court rejected the argument despite the seeming facial application of 1915 (a) to a bankruptcy proceeding as well as to any other It reached this result by noting that 51 (2) of the Bankruptcy Act, as originally adopted in 1898, had provided for a waiver of fees upon the filing of an affidavit of inability to pay; that by the passage of the Referees' Salary Bill in 1946, bankruptcy petitions in forma pauperis were abolished, H R Rep No 1037, 79th Cong, 1st Sess, 6 (1945); S Rep No 959, 79th Cong, 2d Sess, 7 (1946); and that the 1946 statute, being later and having a positive and specific provision for postponement of fees in of indigency, overrode the earlier general provisions of 1915 (a) -1210 To the same effect are *440 In re 428 F 2d, at 1186-1187, and In re 323 F Supp 1082, the reasoning of which the District Court adopted So also is In re 341 F Supp 1297, The appellee may well have abandoned the argument on this appeal Tr of Oral Arg 44-45 In any event, we agree, for the reasons stated by the District Court and by the courts
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
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United States v. Kras
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
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reasons stated by the District Court and by the courts in and in the two that 1915 (a) is not now available in bankruptcy See 2 W Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 5101, pp 1873-18 Neither do we perceive any common-law right to proceed without payment of fees Congress, of course, sometime might conclude that 1915 (a) should be made applicable to bankruptcy and legislate accordingly The District Court went on to hold, 331 F Supp, at 1210-1215, that the prescribed fees, payment of which was required as a condition precedent to discharge, served to deny Kras "his Fifth Amendment right of due process, including equal protection" Id, It held that a discharge in bankruptcy was a "fundamental interest" that could be denied only when a "compelling government interest" was demonstrated It noted, id, that provision should be made by the referee for the survival, beyond bankruptcy, of the bankrupt's obligation to pay the fees The court rested its decision primarily upon Boddie v Connecticut, 401 US 371 which came down after the First Circuit's decision in supra A number of other district courts and bankruptcy referees have reached the same result[5] *441 Kras contends that his case falls squarely within Boddie The Government, on the other hand, stresses the differences between divorce (with which Boddie was concerned) and bankruptcy, and claims that Boddie is not controlling and that the fee requirements constitute a reasonable exercise of Congress' plenary power over bankruptcy IV Boddie was a challenge by welfare recipients to certain Connecticut procedures, including the payment of court fees and costs, that allegedly restricted their access to the courts for divorce The plaintiffs, simply by reason of their indigency, were unable to bring their actions The Court reversed a district court judgment that a State could limit access to its courts by fees "which effectively bar persons on relief from commencing actions therein" 286 F Supp 968, Mr Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, stressed state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving marriage and identified the would-be indigent divorce plaintiff with any other action's impoverished defendant forced into court by the institution of a lawsuit against him He declared that "a meaningful opportunity to be heard" was firmly imbedded in our due process jurisprudence, 401 US, and that this was to be protected against denial by laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular individuals, id, The Court then concluded that Connecticut's refusal to admit these good-faith divorce plaintiffs to its courts equated with the denial of an opportunity to be heard and, in the absence of a sufficient *442
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
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United States v. Kras
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
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be heard and, in the absence of a sufficient *442 countervailing justification for the State's action, a denial of due process, id, But the Court emphasized that "we go no further than necessary to dispose of the case before us" Id, "We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any individual, for, as we have already noted, in the case before us this right is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship The requirement that these appellants resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-created matter Thus we hold only that a State may not, consistent with the obligations imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so" Id, -383 MR JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in the result, rested his conclusion on equal protection rather than due process "I do not see the length of the road we must follow if we accept my Brother HARLAN'S invitation" Id, MR JUSTICE BRENNAN concurred in part, for he discerned no distinction between divorce and "any other right arising under federal or state law" and he, also, found a denial of equal protection Id, Mr Justice Black dissented, id, feeling that the Connecticut court costs were barred by neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Just two months after Boddie was decided, the Court denied certiorari in MR JUSTICE *443 BRENNAN was of the opinion that certiorari should have been granted Mr Justice Black, in an opinion applicable to and to seven other then-pending 402 US 954, dissented and would have heard argument in all eight "or reverse them outright on the basis of the decision in Boddie" Id, For him "the need to file for a discharge in bankruptcy seem[ed] more `fundamental' than a person's right to seek a divorce" Id, And MR JUSTICE DOUGLAS similarly dissented from the denial of certiorari in and in four other because "obtaining a fresh start in life through bankruptcy proceedings seemingly come[s] within the Equal Protection Clause" 402 US 960, Thus, although a denial of certiorari normally carries no implication or inference, Chessman v Teets, 354 US 156, 164 n 13 ; Brown v Allen, 344 US 443 the pointed dissents of Mr Justice Black
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
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United States v. Kras
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
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344 US 443 the pointed dissents of Mr Justice Black and MR JUSTICE DOUGLAS to the denial in so soon after Boddie, and Mr Justice Harlan's failure to join the dissenters, surely are not without some significance as to their and the Court's attitude about the application of the Boddie principle to bankruptcy fees V We agree with the Government that our decision in Boddie does not control the disposition of this case and that the District Court's reliance upon Boddie is misplaced A Boddie was based on the notion that a State cannot deny access, simply because of one's poverty, to a "judicial proceeding [that is] the only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand" 401 US, Throughout the opinion there is constant and recurring reference to Connecticut's exclusive control over the establishment, enforcement, and dissolution of the marital *444 relationship The Court emphasized that "marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society," ibid, and spoke of "state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship," id, "[R]esort to the state courts [was] the only avenue to dissolution of marriages," id, which was "not only the paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, the only available one," id, The Court acknowledged that it knew "of no instance where two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the State's judicial machinery," id, In the light of all this, we concluded that resort to the judicial process was "no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in court" and we resolved the case "in light of the principles enunciated in our due process decisions that delimit rights of defendants compelled to litigate their differences in the judicial forum," id, -377 B The appellants in Boddie, on the one hand, and Robert Kras, on the other, stand in materially different postures The denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie touched directly, as has been noted, on the marital relationship and on the associational interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of that relationship On many occasions we have recognized the fundamental importance of these interests under our Constitution See, for example, Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 ; Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535 ; Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 ; Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438 ; Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 The Boddie appellants' inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their freedom to
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
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United States v. Kras
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
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inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their freedom to pursue other protected associational *445 activities Kras' alleged interest in the elimination of his debt burden, and in obtaining his desired new start in life, although important and so recognized by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act, does not rise to the same constitutional level See Dandridge v 397 US 471 ; Richardson v 404 US 78 If Kras is not discharged in bankruptcy, his position will not be materially altered in any constitutional sense Gaining or not gaining a discharge will effect no change with respect to basic necessities[6] We see no fundamental interest that is gained or lost depending on the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy C Nor is the Government's control over the establishment, enforcement, or dissolution of debts nearly so exclusive as Connecticut's control over the marriage relationship in Boddie In contrast with divorce, bankruptcy is not the only method available to a debtor for the adjustment of his legal relationship with his creditors The utter exclusiveness of court access and court remedy, as has been noted, was a potent factor in Boddie But "[w]ithout a prior judicial imprimatur, individuals may freely enter into and rescind commercial contracts " 401 US, However unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular situation, a debtor, in theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors At times the happy passage of the applicable limitation period, or other acceptable creditor arrangement, will provide the answer Government's role with respect to the private commercial relationship is qualitatively and quantitatively different from its *446 role in the establishment, enforcement, and dissolution of marriage Resort to the court, therefore, is not Kras' sole path to relief Boddie's emphasis on exclusivity finds no counterpart in the bankrupt's situation See Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp, 337 US 541, D We are also of the opinion that the filing fee requirement does not deny Kras the equal protection of the laws Bankruptcy is hardly akin to free speech or marriage or to those other rights, so many of which are imbedded in the First Amendment, that the Court has come to regard as fundamental and that demand the lofty requirement of a compelling governmental interest before they may be significantly regulated See Shapiro v US 618, 638 Neither does it touch upon what have been said to be the suspect criteria of race, nationality, or alienage Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365, Instead, bankruptcy legislation is in the area of economics and social welfare See Dandridge v
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
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United States v. Kras
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
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the area of economics and social welfare See Dandridge v 397 U S, at 484-485; Richardson v 404 U S, at 81; Lindsey v 405 US 56, ; Jefferson v Hackney, 406 US 535, This being so, the applicable standard, in measuring the propriety of Congress' classification, is that of rational justification Flemming v Nestor, 363 US 603, ; Dandridge v 397 U S, at 485-486; Richardson v 404 U S, at 81 E There is no constitutional right to obtain a discharge of one's debts in bankruptcy The Constitution, Art I, 8, cl 4, merely authorizes the Congress to "establish uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States" Although the first bankruptcy law in England was enacted in 1542, 34 & 35 Hen 8, c 4, and a discharge provision first appeared *447 in 1705, 4 Anne, c 17, primarily as a reward for cooperating debtors, J MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 20-21 voluntary bankruptcy was not known in this country at the adoption of the Constitution Indeed, for the entire period prior to the present Act of 1898, the Nation was without a federal bankruptcy law except for three short periods aggregating about 15 1/2 years The first statute was the Act of April 4, 1800, c 19, 2 Stat 19, and it was repealed by the Act of December 19, 1803, c 6, 2 Stat 248 The second was the Act of August 19, 1841, c 9, 5 Stat 440, repealed less than two years later by the Act of March 3, 1843, c 82, 5 Stat 614 The third was the Act of March 2, 1867, c 176, 14 Stat 517; it was repealed by the Act of June 7, 1878, c 160, 20 Stat 99 Voluntary petitions were permitted under the 1841 and 1867 Acts See 1 W Collier, Bankruptcy ¶¶ 003-005, pp 6-9 Professor MacLachlan has said that the development of the discharge "represents an independent public policy in favor of extricating an insolvent debtor from what would otherwise be a financial impasse" J MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 88 (footnote omitted) But this obviously is a legislatively created benefit, not a constitutional one, and, as noted, it was a benefit withheld, save for three short periods, during the first 110 years of the Nation's life The mere fact that Congress has delegated to the District Court supervision over the proceedings by which a petition for discharge is processed does not convert a statutory benefit into a constitutional right of access to a court Then, too, Congress might have delegated the responsibility to an administrative agency F
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
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United States v. Kras
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
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might have delegated the responsibility to an administrative agency F The rational basis for the fee requirement is readily apparent Congressional power over bankruptcy, of course, is plenary and exclusive Kalb v Feuerstein, 308 US 433, By the 1946 Amendment, Congress, as has been noted, abolished the *448 theretofore existing practices of the pauper petition and of compensating the referee from the fees he collected It replaced that system with one for salaried referees and for fixed fees for every petition filed and a specified percentage of distributable assets It sought to make the system self-sustaining and paid for by those who use it rather than by tax revenues drawn from the public at large H R Rep No 1037, 79th Cong, 1st Sess, 4-6 (1945); S Rep No 959, 79th Cong, 2d Sess 2, 5-6 (1946)[7] The propriety of the requirement that the fees be paid ultimately has been recognized even by those district courts that have held the payment of the fee as a precondition to a discharge to be unconstitutional, for those courts would make the payments survive the bankruptcy as a continuing obligation of the bankrupt In re 323 F Supp, at 1093; In re Ottman, 336 F Supp 6, 8 See O'Brien v Trevethan, 336 F Supp 1029, Further, the reasonableness of the structure Congress produced, and congressional concern for the debtor, are apparent from the provisions permitting the debtor to file his petition without payment of any fee, with consequent freedom of subsequent earnings and of after-acquired assets (with the rare exception specified in 70 (a) of the Act, 11 US C 110 (a)) from the claims of then-existing obligations These provisions, coupled with the bankrupt's ability to obtain a stay of all debt enforcement actions pending at the filing of the petition or thereafter *449 commenced, 11 (a) and 2 (a) (15), 11 US C 29 (a) and 11 (a) (15); 1A W Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 1103 ; 1 id, 62 [4] enable a bankrupt to terminate his harassment by creditors, to protect his future earnings and property, and to have his new start with a minimum of effort and financial obligation They serve also, as an incidental effect, to promote and not to defeat the purpose of making the bankruptcy system financially self-sufficient Cf Lindsey v 405 U S, at -79 G If the $50 filing fees are paid in installments over six months as General Order No 35 (4) permits on a proper showing, the required average weekly payment is $192 If the payment period is extended for the additional three
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,973 | 11 |
majority
|
United States v. Kras
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108655/united-states-v-kras/
|
If the payment period is extended for the additional three months as the Order permits, the average weekly payment is lowered to $128[8] This is a sum less than the payments Kras makes on his couch of negligible value in storage, and less than the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a pack or two of cigarettes If, as Kras alleges in his affidavit, a discharge in bankruptcy will afford him that new start he so desires, and the Metropolitan then no longer will charge him with fraud and give him bad references,[9] and if he really needs and desires that discharge, this much available revenue should be within his able-bodied reach when the adjudication in bankruptcy has stayed collection and has brought to a halt whatever harassment, if any, he may have sustained from creditors VI Mr Justice Harlan, in his opinion for the Court in Boddie, meticulously pointed out, as we have noted *450 above, that the Court went "no further than necessary to dispose of the case before us" and did "not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any individual" 401 US, -383 The Court obviously stopped short of an unlimited rule that an indigent at all times and in all has the right to relief without the payment of fees We decline to extend the principle of Boddie to the no-asset bankruptcy proceeding That relief, if it is to be forthcoming, should originate with Congress See Shaeffer, Proceedings in Bankruptcy In Forma Pauperis, 69 Colo L Rev 1203 Reversed MR
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,984 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111248/fcc-v-league-of-women-voters-of-cal/
|
The court jester who mocks the King must choose his words with great care. An artist is likely to paint a flattering portrait of his patron. The child who wants a new toy *409 does not preface his request with a comment on how fat his mother is. Newspaper publishers have been known to listen to their advertising managers. Elected officials may remember how their elections were financed. By enacting the statutory provision that the Court invalidates today, a sophisticated group of legislators expressed a concern about the potential impact of Government funds on pervasive and powerful organs of mass communication. One need not have heard the raucous voice of Adolf Hitler over Radio Berlin to appreciate the importance of that concern. As JUSTICE WHITE correctly notes, the statutory prohibitions against editorializing and candidate endorsements rest on the same foundation. In my opinion that foundation is far stronger than merely "a rational basis" and it is not weakened by the fact that it is buttressed by other provisions that are also designed to avoid the insidious evils of government propaganda favoring particular points of view. The quality of the interest in maintaining government neutrality in the free market of ideas of avoiding subtle forms of censorship and propaganda outweigh the impact on expression that results from this statute. Indeed, by simply terminating or reducing funding, Congress could curtail much more expression with no risk whatever of a constitutional transgression. In order to explain my assessment of the case, it is necessary first to supplement the majority's description of the impact of the statute on free expression and then to comment on the justification for that impact. I The relevant facts may be briefly stated. Appellee League of Women Voters of California, a nonprofit organization, wants to enlist the "editorial support" of educational broadcasters in support of its causes. App. 8. Appellee Henry Waxman, a regular listener and viewer of educational stations, desires to hear the "editorial opinions" of educational *410 stations. Appellee Pacifica, a nonprofit educational corporation which operates five educational radio stations the broadcasts from which reach 20 percent of the Nation's population wants to "broadcast its views on various important public issues, and clearly label those views as being editorials broadcast on behalf of the Pacifica management." -10. In short, Pacifica wants to broadcast its views to Waxman via its radio stations; Waxman wants to listen to those views on his radio; and the League of Women Voters wants a chance to convince Pacifica to take positions its members favor in its radio broadcasts.
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,984 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111248/fcc-v-league-of-women-voters-of-cal/
|
to take positions its members favor in its radio broadcasts. All of these wants could be realized but for the fact that Pacifica receives public funds to finance its broadcasts. Because the Government subsidizes its broadcasts, a federal statute prohibits Pacifica from broadcasting its views labeled as such via the radio stations it operates. That statute now provides: "No noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation under subpart C of this part may engage in editorializing. No noncommercial educational broadcasting station may support or oppose any candidate for public office." 47 U.S. C. 399.[1] Although appellees originally challenged the validity of the entire statute, in their amended complaint they limited their attack to the prohibition against editorializing.[2] In its analysis *411 of the case, the Court assumes that the ban on political endorsements is severable from the first section and that it may be constitutional.[3] In view of the fact that the major *412 difference between the ban on political endorsements is based on the content of the speech, it is apparent that the entire rationale of the Court's opinion rests on the premise that it may be permissible to predicate a statutory restriction on candidate endorsements on the difference between the content of that kind of speech and the content of other expressions of editorial opinion. The Court does not tell us whether speech that endorses political candidates is more or less worthy of protection than other forms of editorializing, but it does iterate and reiterate the point that "the expression of editorial opinion" is a special kind of communication that "is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection." Ante, at 375-376; see also ante, at 380 n. 13, 381, 382, 383, and 384.[4] Neither the fact that the statute regulates only one kind of speech, nor the fact that editorial opinion has traditionally been an important kind of speech, is sufficient to identify the character or the significance of the statute's impact on speech. Three additional points are relevant. First, the statute does not prohibit Pacifica from expressing its opinion through any avenue except the radio stations for which it receives federal financial support. It eliminates the subsidized channel of communication as a forum for Pacifica itself, and thereby deprives Pacifica of an advantage it would otherwise have over other speakers, but it does not exclude Pacifica from the marketplace for ideas. Second, the statute does not curtail the expression of opinion by individual commentators *413 who participate in Pacifica's programs. The only comment that is prohibited as a
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,984 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111248/fcc-v-league-of-women-voters-of-cal/
|
Pacifica's programs. The only comment that is prohibited as a statement that Pacifica agrees or disagrees with the opinions that others may express on its programs. Third, and of greatest significance for me, the statutory restriction is completely neutral in its operation it prohibits all editorials without any distinction being drawn concerning the subject matter or the point of view that might be expressed.[5] *414 II The statute does not violate the fundamental principle that the citizen's right to speak may not be conditioned upon the sovereign's agreement with what the speaker intends to say.[6] On the contrary, the statute was enacted in order to protect that very principle to avoid the risk that some speakers will be rewarded or penalized for saying things that appeal to or are offensive to the sovereign.[7] The interests the statute *415 is designed to protect are interests that underlie the First Amendment itself. In my judgment the interest in keeping the Federal Government out of the propaganda arena is of overriding importance. That interest is of special importance in the field of electronic communication, not only because that medium is so powerful and persuasive, but also because it is the one form of communication that is licensed by the Federal Government.[8] When the Government already has great potential *416 power over the electronic media, it is surely legitimate to enact statutory safeguards to make sure that it does not cross the threshold that separates neutral regulation from the subsidy of partisan opinion. The Court does not question the validity of the basic interests served by 399. See ante, at 386. Instead, it suggests that the statute does not substantially serve those interests because the Public Broadcasting Act operates in many other respects to insulate local stations from governmental interference. See ante, at 388-390. In my view, that is an indication of nothing more than the strength of the governmental interest involved here Congress enacted many safeguards because the evil to be avoided was so grave. Organs of official propaganda are antithetical to this Nation's heritage, and Congress understandably acted with great caution in this area.[9] It is no answer to say that the other statutory provisions "substantially reduce the risk of governmental interference with the editorial judgments of local stations without restricting those stations' ability to speak on matters of public concern." Ante, at 390. The other safeguards protect the stations from interference with judgments that they will necessarily make in selecting programming, but those judgments are relatively amorphous. No safeguard is foolproof; and the fact that funds
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,984 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111248/fcc-v-league-of-women-voters-of-cal/
|
amorphous. No safeguard is foolproof; and the fact that funds are dispensed according to largely "objective" criteria certainly is no guarantee. Individuals must always make judgments in allocating funds, and pressure can be exerted in subtle ways as well as through outright fund-cutoffs. Members of Congress, not members of the Judiciary, live in the world of politics. When they conclude that there is a real danger of political considerations influencing the dispensing of this money and that this provision is necessary to insulate grantees from political pressures in addition to the other safeguards, that judgment is entitled to our respect. *417 The magnitude of the present danger that the statute is designed to avoid is admittedly a matter about which reasonable judges may disagree.[10] Moreover, I would agree that the risk would be greater if other statutory safeguards were removed. It remains true, however, that Congress has the power to prevent the use of public funds to subsidize the expression of partisan points of view, or to suppress the propagation of dissenting opinions. No matter how great or how small the immediate risk may be, there surely is more than a theoretical possibility that future grantees might be influenced by the ever present tie of the political purse strings, even if those strings are never actually pulled. "[O]ne who knowns that he may dissent knows also that he somehow consents when he does not dissent." H. Arendt, Crises of the Republic 88 (1972), citing 1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 419 (1945).[11] *418 III The Court describes the scope of 399's ban as being "defined solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech," ante, at 383, and analogizes this case to the regulation of speech we condemned in Consolidated Edison This description reveals how the Court manipulates labels without perceiving the critical differences behind the two cases. In Consolidate Edison the class of speakers that was affected by New York's prohibition consisted of regulated public utilities that had been expressing their opinion on the issue of nuclear power by means of written statements inserted in their customers' monthly bills. Although the scope of the prohibition was phrased in general terms and applied to a selected group of speakers, it was obviously directed at spokesmen for a particular point of view. The justification for the restriction was phrased in terms of the potential offensiveness of the utilities' messages to their audiences. It was a classic case of a viewpoint-based prohibition. It this case, however, although the regulation applies only to a defined class of noncommercial broadcast licensees,
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,984 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111248/fcc-v-league-of-women-voters-of-cal/
|
applies only to a defined class of noncommercial broadcast licensees, it is common ground that these licensees represent heterogenous points of view.[12] There is simply no sensible basis for considering this regulations a viewpoint restriction or, to use the Court's favorite phrase, to condemn it as "content-based" because it applies equally to station owners of all shades of opinion. Moreover, the justification for the prohibition is not based on the "offensiveness" of the messages in the sense that that term was used in Consolidated Edison. Here, it is true that taxpayers might find it offensive if their tax moneys were being used to subsidize the expression of editorial *419 opinion with which they disagree, but it is the fact of the subsidy not just the expression of the opinion that legitimates this justification. Furthermore, and of greater importance, the principal justification for this prohibition is the overriding interest in forestalling the creation of propaganda organs for the Government. I respectfully dissent.
|
Justice Douglas
| 1,973 | 10 |
dissenting
|
INS v. Hibi
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108872/ins-v-hibi/
|
The Court today summarily reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals, which found that the Government was estopped from denying citizenship to respondent under the Nationality Act of 1940.[1] The Court reasons that estoppel is not even arguably applicable because there was no "affirmative misconduct" on the part of the United States; it implies that there were merely failures to "fully publicize" the rights given by the Act and "to have stationed in the Philippine Islands during all of the time those rights were available an authorized naturalization representative." Failures of this kind could, perhaps, be excused if caused by the exigencies of war as long as good-faith efforts to carry out the provisions of the Act had been made. But the Court ignores the record and the decisions below when it speaks only of these failures. In 1942, Congress amended the Nationality Act of 1940 to extend the benefits of citizenship to individuals who had fought in the Armed Forces of the United States during World War II, authorizing the appointment of naturalization *10 officers to confer these benefits on noncitizens outside the jurisdiction of a naturalization court.[2] Between 1943 and 1946, these officers traveled from post to post, through England, Iceland, North Africa, and the islands of the Pacific, naturalizing thousands of foreign nationals pursuant to the mandate of Congress. The story in the Philippines was different. After the Japanese occupation of the Philippines ended, an American vice-consul was authorized to commence naturalization proceedings in 1945. Almost immediately thereafter, the Philippine Government expressed its concern about *11 Filipino men leaving the Territory after being granted American citizenship. In response to these concerns, the Commissioner of Immigration, on September 13, 1945, wrote a letter to the Attorney General recommending that the "situation be handled by revoking the authority previously granted [the vice-consul] and by omitting to designate any representative authorized to confer citizenship in the Philippine Islands." The Commissioner's recommendation was approved by the Attorney General on September 26, 1945, and the authority of the vice-consul to naturalize alien servicemen immediately revoked. Because of this action, there was no authorized naturalization representative in the Philippines. The District Court found as a fact that respondent, had he known about his right to be naturalized while he was in the Armed Forces and had means been available, would have applied for naturalization. Instead, with no means available, respondent was discharged from the Armed Forces in December 1945, thereby losing his right to claim citizenship under 702 of the 1940 Act.[3] The Court's opinion ignores the deliberateand successful effort on the
|
per_curiam
| 1,978 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Cleland v. National College of Business
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109813/cleland-v-national-college-of-business/
|
The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress from restricting the educational courses for which veterans' benefits are available under the GI Bill[1] without including identical course limitations in other federal educational assistance programs. *214 A veteran seeking educational assistance benefits must file an application with the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration. Before approving the application, the Administrator must determine whether the veteran's proposed educational program satisfies various requirements, including the so-called 85-15 requirement and the two-year rule. The 85-15 requirement requires the Administrator to disapprove an application if the veteran enrolls in a course in which more than 85% of the students "are having all or part of their tuition, fees, or other charges paid to or for them by the educational institution, by the Veterans' Administration and/or by grants from any Federal agency."[2] The Administration, however, may waive the requirement if he determines that it would be in the interest of both the veteran and the Federal Government. The two-year rule requires the Administrator to disapprove the enrollment of an eligible veteran in a course that has been offered by a covered educational institution for less than two years. The rule applies to courses offered at branches and extensions of proprietary educational institutions located beyond the normal commuting distance of the institution.[3] Appellee National College of Business is a proprietary educational *215 institution which has extension programs in several States. Most of its courses have a veteran enrollment of 85% or more. Appellee is therefore affected by both the 85-15 requirement and the two-year rule. Appellee brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, challenging the constitutionality of the restrictions.[4] Appellee contended that the restrictions arbitrarily denied otherwise eligible veterans of educational benefits and denied veterans equal protection because they were not made applicable to persons whose educations were being subsidized under other federal educational assistance programs.[5] The District Court held the 85-15 requirement and the two-year rule unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement. We reverse.[6] I The course restrictions challenged by appellee evolved in response to problems experienced in the administration of *216 earlier versions of the veterans' educational assistance program. When extension of the World War II GI Bill to veterans of the Korean war was under consideration by Congress in 1952, the House Select Committee to Investigate Educational Training and Loan Guarantee Programs under the GI Bill studied the problems that had arisen under the earlier program. The Committee's work led to passage of the first version of the 85-15 requirement,
|
per_curiam
| 1,978 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Cleland v. National College of Business
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109813/cleland-v-national-college-of-business/
|
to passage of the first version of the 85-15 requirement, which applied only to nonaccredited courses not leading to a college degree that were offered by proprietary institutions. Stat. 667. The purpose of the requirement is not disputed: "Congress was concerned about schools which developed courses specifically designed for those veterans with available Federal moneys to purchase such courses. The ready availability of these funds obviously served as a strong incentive to some schools to enroll eligible veterans. The requirement of a minimum enrollment of students not wholly or partially subsidized by the Veterans' Administration was a way of protecting veterans by allowing the free market mechanism to operate. "The price of the course was also required to respond to the general demands of the open market as well as to those with available Federal moneys to spend. A minimal number of nonveterans were required to find the course worthwhile and valuable or the payment of Federal funds to veterans who enrolled would not be authorized." S. Rep. No. 94-1243, P. 88 (Senate Report). These same considerations prompted extension of the requirement in 1974 to courses not leading to a standard college degree offered by accredited institutions. 203 (3) of Stat. 1582. See also Senate Report 88. In 1976 the 85-15 requirement was further extended to courses leading to a standard college degree. The Veterans' Administration had found increased recruiting by institutions *217 within this category "directed exclusively at veterans." In recommending approval of the extension, the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs agreed with the Veterans' Administration that "`if an institution of higher learning cannot attract sufficient nonveteran and nonsubsidized students to its programs, it presents a great potential for abuse of our GI educational programs.'" The Committee further noted that, in view of the magnitude of the expenditures under the GI Bill, it was essential "to limit those situations in which substantial abuse could occur." Finally, the Committee emphasized that "the requirement that no more than 85% of the student body be in receipt of VA benefits is not onerous particularly given the fact that under today's GI Bill veterans do not comprise a major portion of those attending institutions of higher learning" [7] The two-year rule is also a product of Congress' judgment regarding potential abuses of the veterans' educational assistance program based upon experience with administration of earlier versions of the GI Bill. Thus, following World War II schools and courses developed "which were almost exclusively aimed at veterans eligible for GI bill payments." In response, the first version of the rule was enacted. It barred the
|
per_curiam
| 1,978 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Cleland v. National College of Business
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109813/cleland-v-national-college-of-business/
|
first version of the rule was enacted. It barred the payment of benefits to veterans attending institutions in operation less than one year. Stat. 653. As with the 85-15 requirement, the rule "was a *218 device intended by Congress to allow the free market mechanism to operate and weed out those institutions [which] could survive only by the heavy influx of Federal payments." Senate Report 128. Following the Korean war, Congress amended the rule to cover courses that had not been in operation for at least two years. 227 of the Korean Conflict GI Bill (Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952), Stat. 667. In its report accompanying the amendment, the House Veterans' Affairs Committee characterized the rule as "a real safeguard to assure sound training for the veteran, at reasonable cost, by seasoned institutions" and observed that had the rule been in effect during the administration of the World War II GI Bill "considerable savings would have resulted and much better training would have been realized in many areas." H. R. Rep. No. 1943, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1952). In 1976, Congress again amended the two-year rule, making it applicable to, among other institutions, branches of private institutions such as appellee that are located beyond the normal commuting distance from the main institution. The considerations underlying the extended coverage are fully set forth in the Report of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs accompanying the legislation. Senate Report, There had been a "spectacular" rise in both the number of institutions establishing branch campuses and in the veteran enrollment at those extensions. These institutions were entering into "extensive recruiting contracts directed almost exclusively at veterans." Senate Report 129. In a report dealing with the problems generated by these developments. the Veterans' Administration had stated: "`[A] number of instances have been brought to our attention which represent abuse of our educational programs. Some of these cases involved contracting between non-profit *219 schools and profit schools or organizations whereby courses designed by the latter are offered by the non-profit, accredited school on a semester-or quarter-hour basis. In others, there are arrangements between nonprofit, accredited schools and outside profit firms whereby the latter, for a percentage of the tuition payment, perform recruiting services primarily for the establishing of these branch locations for the school. These recruiting efforts are aimed almost exclusively at veterans.'" [8] In recommending adoption of the amendment, the Committee concluded that the situation presented "great potential for abuse and in several instances that potential appear[ed] to have been realized." II As the legislative history demonstrates, the 85-15 requirement and the
|
per_curiam
| 1,978 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Cleland v. National College of Business
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109813/cleland-v-national-college-of-business/
|
As the legislative history demonstrates, the 85-15 requirement and the two-year rule are valid exercises of Congress' power. Experience with administration of the veterans' educational assistance program since World War II revealed a need for legislation that would minimize the risk that veterans' benefits would be wasted on educational programs of little value. It was not irrational for Congress to conclude that restricting benefits to established courses that have attracted a substantial number of students whose educations are not being subsidized would be useful in accomplishing this objective and "prevent charlatans from grabbing the veteran's education money." Both restrictions are based upon the rational assumption that if "the free market mechanism [were allowed] to operate," it would "weed out those institutions [which] could survive only by the heavy influx of Federal payments." *220 The otherwise reasonable restrictions are not made irrational by virtue of their absence from other federal educational assistance programs. They were imposed in direct response to problems experienced in the administration of this country's GI bills. There is no indication that identical abuses have been encountered in other federal grant programs. In any event, the Constitution does not require Congress to detect and correct abuses in the administration of all related programs before acting to combat those experienced in one. For "[e]vils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause [generally] goes no further" (Citations omitted.) When tested by their rationality, therefore, the 85-15 requirement and the two-year rule are plainly proper exercises of Congress' authority. While agreeing that the restrictions were rationally related to legitimate legislative objectives, the District Court concluded that veterans' educational benefits approach "fundamental and personal rights" and therefore a more "elevated standard of review" was appropriate. Subjecting the 85-15 and two-year requirements to this heightened scrutiny, the court observed that they were not precisely tailored to prevent federal expenditures on courses of little value. Since some quality courses would be affected by the restrictions, the court held them unconstitutional. The District Court's error was not its recognition of the importance of veterans' benefits but its failure to give appropriate deference to Congress' judgment as to how best to combat abuses that had arisen in the administration of those *221 benefits.
|
per_curiam
| 1,978 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Cleland v. National College of Business
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109813/cleland-v-national-college-of-business/
|
that had arisen in the administration of those *221 benefits. Legislative precision has never been constitutionally required in cases of this kind.[9] "The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits is well established. Governmental decisions to spend money to improve the general public welfare in one way and not another are `not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.' In enacting legislation of this kind a government does not deny equal protection `merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."' Since it was rational for Congress to conclude that established courses with a substantial enrollment of nonsubsidized students were more likely to be quality courses, the 85-15 and *222 two-year requirements satisfy "the constitutional test normally applied in cases like this." The judgment is reversed. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,977 | 18 |
concurring
|
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109684/smith-v-organization-of-foster-families-for-equality-reform/
|
The foster parent-foster child relationship involved in this litigation is, of course, wholly a creation of the State. New York law defines the circumstances under which a child may be placed in foster care, prescribes the obligations of the foster parents, and provides for the removal of the child from the foster home "in [the] discretion" of the agency with custody of the child. N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law 383 () (McKinney 1976). The agency compensates the foster parents, and reserves in its contracts the authority to decide as it sees fit whether and when a child shall be returned to his natural family or placed elsewhere. See Part I-A of the Court's opinion, ante, at 83-88. Were it not for the system of foster care that the State maintains, the relationship for which constitutional protection is asserted would not even exist. The New York Legislature and the New York courts have made it unmistakably clear that foster care is intended only as a temporary way station until a child can be returned to his natural parents or placed for adoption. Thus, Soc. Serv. Law 384-b (1) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977) states a legislative finding that "many children who have been placed in foster care experience unnecessarily protracted stays in such care without being adopted or returned to their parents or other custodians. Such unnecessary stays may deprive these children of positive, nurturing family relationships and have deleterious effects on their development into responsible, productive *857 citizens." And, specifically repudiating the contention that New York law contemplates that a child will have a "secure, stable and continuous" relationship with a third-party custodian as the child's "psychological parent," the New York Court of Appeals has "[p]articularly rejected the notion, if that it be, that third-party custodians may acquire some sort of squatter's rights in another's child." 55 n. 85 n. In these circumstances, I cannot understand why the Court thinks itself obliged to decide these cases on the assumption that either foster parents or foster children in New York have some sort of "liberty" interest in the continuation of their relationship.[1] Rather than tiptoeing around this central *858 issue, I would squarely hold that the interests asserted by the appellees are not of a kind that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects. At the outset, I would reject, as does the Court, the apparent holding of the District Court that "the trauma of separation from a familiar environment" or the "harmful consequences of a precipitous and perhaps improvident decision to remove a child from his foster family," Organization
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,977 | 18 |
concurring
|
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109684/smith-v-organization-of-foster-families-for-equality-reform/
|
decision to remove a child from his foster family," Organization of Foster constitutes a "grievous loss" which therefore is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Not every loss, however "grievous," invokes the protection of the Due Process Clause. Its protections extend only to a deprivation by a State of "life, liberty, or property." And when a state law does operate to deprive a person of his liberty or property, the Due Process Clause is applicable even though the deprivation may not be "grievous." "[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we look not to the `weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." Board of See ; ; at 575-. *859 Clearly, New York has deprived nobody of his life in these cases. It seems to me just as clear that the State has deprived nobody of his liberty or property. Putting to one side the District Court's erroneous "grievous loss" analysis, the appellees are left with very little ground on which to stand. Their argument seems to be that New York, by providing foster children with the opportunity to live in a foster home and to form a close relationship with foster parents, has created "liberty" or "property" that it may not withdraw without complying with the procedural safeguards that the Due Process Clause confers. But this Court's decision in illustrates the fallacy of that argument. At issue in Meachum was a claim by Massachusetts state prisoners that they could not constitutionally be transferred to another institution with less favorable living conditions without a prior hearing that would fully probe the reasons for their transfer. In accord with previous cases, see, e. g., ; Board of ; the Court recognized that where state law confers a liberty or property interest, the Due Process Clause requires certain minimum procedures " `to ensure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.' " quoting But the predicate for invoking the Due Process Clause the existence of state-created liberty or propertywas missing in Meachum just as it is missing here. New York confers no right on foster families to remain intact, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts or circumstances. As was true of prison transfers in Meachum, transfers in and out of foster families "are made for a variety of reasons and often involve no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve the safety and welfare of the [child]." *860 Similarly, New York law provides no basis for a justifiable expectation on the part of foster families that their relationship will continue indefinitely. Cf.
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,977 | 18 |
concurring
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Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109684/smith-v-organization-of-foster-families-for-equality-reform/
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of foster families that their relationship will continue indefinitely. Cf. The District Court in this litigation recognized as much, noting that the typical foster-care contract gives the agency the right to recall the child "upon request," and commenting that the discretionary authority vested in the agency "is on its face incompatible with plaintiffs' claim of legal entitlement." To be sure, the New York system has not operated perfectly. As the state legislature found, foster care has in many cases been unnecessarily protracted, no doubt sometimes resulting in the expectation on the part of some foster families that their relationship will continue indefinitely. But, as already noted, the New York Court of Appeals has unequivocally rejected the notion that under New York law prolonged third-party custody of children creates some sort of "squatter's rights." And, as this Court stated in a mere subjective "expectancy" is not liberty or property protected by the Due Process Clause. This is not to say that under the law of New York foster children are the pawns of the State, who may be whisked from family to family at the whim of state officials. The Court discusses in Part III of its opinion the various state and local procedures intended to assure that agency discretion is exercised in a manner consistent with the child's best interests. Unlike the prison transfer situation in it does not appear that child custody decisions can be made "for whatever reason or for no reason at all." But the protection that foster children have is simply the requirement of state law that decisions about their placement be determined in the light of their best interests. See, e. g., ; In re Jewish Child Care Assn. (Sanders), ; State ex rel. 380 N. Y. S. d 50, appeal dismissed and leave to appeal denied, This requirement is not "liberty or property" protected by the Due Process Clause, and it confers no right or expectancy of any kind in the continuity of the relationship between foster parents and children. See, e. g., at 55 n. n. : "Third-party custodians acquire `rights' only derivatively by virtue of the child's best interests being considered" What remains of the appellees' argument is the theory that the relation of the foster parent to the foster child may generate emotional attachments similar to those found in natural families. The Court surmises that foster families who share these attachments might enjoy the same constitutional interest in "family privacy" as natural families. See, e. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, ante, at 504-505 (plurality opinion of POWELL, J.); 15-153; 68 U.S.
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Justice Stewart
| 1,977 | 18 |
concurring
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Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109684/smith-v-organization-of-foster-families-for-equality-reform/
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at 504-505 (plurality opinion of POWELL, J.); 15-153; 68 U.S. 510; 6 U.S. 390. On this score, the Court hypothesizes the case of "a child [who] has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years in the care of the same foster parents" Ante, at 844. The foster family might then "hold the same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural family." But under New York's foster-care laws, any case where the foster parents had assumed the emotional role of the child's natural parents would represent not a triumph of the system, to be constitutionally safeguarded from state intrusion, but a failure. The goal of foster care, at least in New York, is not to provide a permanent substitute for the natural or adoptive home, but to prepare the child for his return to his real parents or placement in a permanent adoptive home *86 by giving him temporary shelter in a family setting. See Part I-A of the Court's opinion, ante, at 83-88. Thus, the New York Court of Appeals has recognized that the development of close emotional ties between foster parents and a child may hinder the child's ultimate adjustment in a permanent home, and provide a basis for the termination of the foster family relationship. In re Jewish Child Care Assn. (Sanders), [] See also State ex rel. Wallace v. Perhaps it is to be expected that children who spend unduly long stays in what should have been temporary foster care will develop strong emotional ties with their foster parents. But this does not mean, and I cannot believe, that such breakdowns of the New York system must be protected or forever frozen in their existence by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[3] One of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court has held, is the freedom to "establish a home and bring up children." If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, *863 over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest, I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on "the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." 31 U.S. 158, But this constitutional concept is simply not in point when we deal with foster families as New York law
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,986 | 19 |
majority
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Davidson v. Cannon
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111556/davidson-v-cannon/
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Petitioner sued prison officials seeking damages under 42 U.S. C. 1983 for injuries he suffered when they negligently failed to protect him from another inmate. On December 19, 1980, petitioner was threatened by one McMillian, a fellow inmate at the New Jersey State Prison at Leesburg. Petitioner sent a note reporting the incident that found its way to respondent Cannon, the Assistant Superintendent of the prison, who read the note and sent it on to respondent James, a Corrections Sergeant.[] Cannon subsequently testified that he did not view the situation as urgent because on previous occasions when petitioner had a serious problem he had contacted Cannon directly. James received the note at about 2 p.m. on December 19, and was informed of its contents. James then attended to other matters, which he described as emergencies, and left the note on his desk unread. By the time he left the prison that evening James had forgotten about the note, and since *346 neither he nor Cannon worked on December 20 or 21, the officers on duty at that time had not been informed of the threat. Petitioner took no steps other than writing the note to alert the authorities that he feared an attack, nor did he request protective custody. He testified that he did not foresee an attack, and that he wrote the note to exonerate himself in the event that McMillian started another fight. He also testified that he wanted officials to reprimand McMillian in order to forestall any future incident. On Sunday, December 21, McMillian attacked petitioner with a fork, breaking his nose and inflicting other wounds to his face, neck, head, and body. Petitioner brought this 1983 suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, claiming that respondents (and two others) had violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a bench trial, the District Court held that petitioner had not established an Eighth Amendment violation "because [respondents] did not act with deliberate or callous indifference to [petitioner's] needs and because the incident complained of was a single attack." App. 89. The court also found, however, that respondents "negligently failed to take reasonable steps to protect [petitioner], and that he was injured as a result." Petitioner was thereby deprived, see of his liberty interest in personal security, see ; and because New Jersey law provides that "[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for any injury caused by a prisoner to any other prisoner," N. J. Stat. Ann. 59:5-2(b)(4) (1982), the court concluded that the deprivation
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,986 | 19 |
majority
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Davidson v. Cannon
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111556/davidson-v-cannon/
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Stat. Ann. 59:5-2(b)(4) (1982), the court concluded that the deprivation was without due process. Petitioner was awarded compensatory damages of $2,000. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, hearing the case en banc, reversed. While accepting the District Court's conclusion that respondents had been negligent, and agreeing that the attack on petitioner implicated *347 a recognized liberty interest, the majority held that respondents' negligence did not work a "deprivation" of that interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. The court conceded that language in Parratt supported the District Court's position that merely negligent conduct causing injury could constitute a Fourteenth Amendment "deprivation," but concluded that "Parratt does not so hold." Accordingly, the court ruled that petitioner had failed to make out a violation of his procedural or substantive due process rights, stating that 1983 provides no remedy "for the type of negligence found in this case." Two judges who joined the majority opinion also wrote separately to suggest that even if respondents' negligence had "deprived" petitioner of liberty, the State's decision not to provide a remedy, in view of its strong interest in protecting its prison officials from liability, did not violate due process. Three judges dissented, essentially embracing the position of the District Court. We granted certiorari, and set this case for oral argument with Daniels v. Williams, ante, p. 327. Finding the principles enunciated in Daniels controlling here, we affirm. In Daniels, we held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated by the lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life, liberty, or property. In other words, where a government official is merely negligent in causing the injury, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required. In this case, petitioner does not challenge the District Court's finding that respondents " `did not act with deliberate or callous indifference to [petitioner's] needs,' " Instead, he claims only that respondents "negligently failed to protect him from another inmate." Brief for Petitioner 2. Daniels therefore controls. Respondents' lack of due care in this case led to serious injury, but that lack of care simply does not approach the sort *348 of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was designed to prevent. Daniels, ante, at 331-333. Far from abusing governmental power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression, respondent Cannon mistakenly believed that the situation was not particularly serious, and respondent James simply forgot about the note. The guarantee of due process has never been understood to mean that the State must guarantee due care on the part
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,986 | 19 |
majority
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Davidson v. Cannon
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111556/davidson-v-cannon/
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that the State must guarantee due care on the part of its officials. In an effort to limit the potentially broad sweep of his claim, petitioner emphasizes that he "does not ask this Court to read the Constitution as an absolute guarantor of his liberty from assault by a fellow prisoner, even if that assault is caused by the negligence of his jailers." Brief for Petitioner 17. Describing his claim as one of "procedural due process, pure and simple," all he asks is that New Jersey provide him a remedy. But the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a remedy when there has been no "deprivation" of a protected interest. Petitioner's claim, based on respondents' negligence, is quite different from one involving injuries caused by an unjustified attack by prison guards themselves, see (CA2), (Friendly, J.), cert. denied sub nom. or by another prisoner where officials simply stood by and permitted the attack to proceed, see cert. denied sub nom. As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. [For opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS concurring in the judgment, see ante, p. 336].
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Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
majority
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United States v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/622304/united-states-v-jones/
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We decide whether the attachment of a Global- Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individu- al’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I In 2004 respondent Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in the District of Columbia, came under suspicion of trafficking in narcotics and was made the target of an investigation by a joint FBI and Metropolitan Police Department task force. Officers employed various investigative techniques, including visual surveillance of the nightclub, installation of a camera focused on the front door of the club, and a pen register and wiretap covering Jones’s cellular phone. Based in part on information gathered from these sources, in 2005 the Government applied to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a warrant authorizing the use of an electronic tracking device on the Jeep Grand Cherokee registered to Jones’s 2 UNITED STATES v. JONES Opinion of the Court wife. A warrant issued, authorizing installation of the de- vice in the District of Columbia and within 10 days. On the 11th day, and not in the District of Columbia but in Maryland,1 agents installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot. Over the next 28 days, the Govern- ment used the device to track the vehicle’s movements, and once had to replace the device’s battery when the vehicle was parked in a different public lot in Maryland. By means of signals from multiple satellites, the device established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated that location by cellular phone to a Gov- ernment computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over the 4-week period. The Government ultimately obtained a multiple-count indictment charging Jones and several alleged co- conspirators with, as relevant here, conspiracy to distrib- ute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S. C. and 846. Before trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the GPS device. The District Court granted the motion only in part, suppressing the data obtained while the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence. 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, (2006). It held the remaining data admissible, because “ ‘[a] person traveling in an automo- bile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.’ ”
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Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
majority
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United States v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/622304/united-states-v-jones/
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privacy in his movements from one place to another.’ ” (quoting United (1983)). Jones’s trial in October 2006 produced a hung jury on the conspiracy count. In March 2007, a grand jury returned another indict- —————— 1 In this litigation, the Government has conceded noncompliance with the warrant and has argued only that a warrant was not required. United Cite as: 565 U. S. (20) 3 Opinion of the Court ment, charging Jones and others with the same conspir- acy. The Government introduced at trial the same GPS- derived locational data admitted in the first trial, which connected Jones to the alleged conspirators’ stash house that contained $850,000 in cash, 97 kilograms of cocaine, and 1 kilogram of cocaine base. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the District Court sentenced Jones to life imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction because of ad- mission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device which, it said, violated the Fourth Amend- ment. United The D. C. Circuit denied the Government’s petition for rehearing en banc, with four judges dissenting. 625 F.3d 766 We granted certiorari, 564 U. S. (2011). II A The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an “effect” as that term is used in the Amendment. United (1977). We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle,2 and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a “search.” —————— 2 As we have noted, the Jeep was registered to Jones’s wife. The Gov- ernment acknowledged, however, that Jones was “the exclusive driver.” (internal quotation marks omitted). If Jones was not the owner he had at least the property rights of a bailee. The Court of Appeals concluded that the vehicle’s registration did not affect his ability to make a Fourth Amendment objection, ib and the Govern- ment has not challenged that determination here. We therefore do not consider the Fourth Amendment significance of Jones’s status. 4 UNITED STATES v. JONES Opinion of the Court It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private proper- ty for the purpose of obtaining informatio We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted. Entick
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Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
majority
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United States v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/622304/united-states-v-jones/
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C. P. 5), is a “case we have described as a ‘monument of English freedom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American statesman’ at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be ‘the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law’ ” with regard to search and (1989) (quoting (16)). In that case, Lord Camden expressed in plain terms the significance of property rights in search-and- seizure analysis: “[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law.” Entick, The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close con- nection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to “the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures”; the phrase “in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” would have been superfluous. Consistent with this understanding, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law tres- pass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century. ; Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 816 (2004). Thus, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. Cite as: 565 U. S. (20) 5 Opinion of the Court 438 (1928), we held that wiretaps attached to telephone wires on the public streets did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants,” Our later cases, of course, have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach. In we said that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” and found a violation in attachment of an eavesdropping device to a public telephone booth. Our later cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in that case, which said that a violation occurs when government offic- ers violate a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” See, e.g., (2000); ; Smith v. Maryland, The Government contends that the Harlan standard shows that no search occurred here, since Jones had no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the area of the Jeep accessed by Government agents (its underbody) and in the locations of the Jeep on the public roads, which were visible to all. But we need not address the Government’s contentions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulatio At bottom, we must “assur[e]
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Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
majority
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United States v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/622304/united-states-v-jones/
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fall with the Katz formulatio At bottom, we must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” As ex- plained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for gov- ernment trespass upon the areas (“persons, houses, pa- pers, and effects”) it enumerates.3 Katz did not repudiate —————— 3 JUSTICE ALITO’s concurrence (hereinafter concurrence) doubts the wisdom of our approach because “it is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in this case.” Post, at 3 (opinion concurring in judgment). But in fact it posits a situation that is not far afield—a constable’s concealing himself 6 UNITED STATES v. JONES Opinion of the Court that understanding. Less than two years later the Court upheld defendants’ contention that the Government could not introduce against them conversations between other people obtained by warrantless placement of electronic surveillance devices in their homes. The opinion rejected the dissent’s contention that there was no Fourth Amendment violation “unless the conversational privacy of the homeowner himself is invaded.”4 “[W]e [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the home” More recently, in (1992), the Court unanimously rejected the argument that although a “seizure” had occurred “in a ‘technical’ sense” when a trailer home was forcibly removed, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because law en- forcement had not “invade[d] the [individuals’] privacy,” Katz, the Court explained, established that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth —————— in the target’s coach in order to track its movements. There is no doubt that the information gained by that trespassory activity would be the product of an unlawful search—whether that information consisted of the conversations occurring in the coach, or of the destinations to which the coach traveled. In any case, it is quite irrelevant whether there was an 18th-century analog. Whatever new methods of investigation may be devised, our task, at a minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have constituted a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred. 4 Thus, the concurrence’s attempt to recast Alderman as meaning that individuals have a “legitimate expectation of privacy in all conversa- tions that [take] place under their roof,” post, at 6–7, is foreclosed by the Court’s opinio
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Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
majority
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United States v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/622304/united-states-v-jones/
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roof,” post, at 6–7, is foreclosed by the Court’s opinio The Court took as a given that the homeowner’s “conversational privacy” had not been violated. Cite as: 565 U. S. (20) 7 Opinion of the Court Amendment violations,” but did not “snuf[f ] out the previ- ously recognized protection for property.” As Justice Brennan explained in his concurrence in Knotts, Katz did not erode the principle “that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a consti- tutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (opinion concurring in judgment). We have embodied that preservation of past rights in our very definition of “reasonable expectation of privacy” which we have said to be an expectation “that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” (internal quotation marks omitted). Katz did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope.5 The Government contends that several of our post-Katz cases foreclose the conclusion that what occurred here constituted a search. It relies principally on two cases in —————— 5 The concurrence notes that post-Katz we have explained that “ ‘an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a consti- tutional violatio’ ” Post, at 6 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)). That is undoubtedly true, and undoubtedly irrele- vant. Karo was considering whether a seizure occurred, and as the concurrence explains, a seizure of property occurs, not when there is a trespass, but “when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Post, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise with a search. Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain informatio Related to this, and similarly irrelevant, is the concurrence’s point that, if analyzed separately, neither the installation of the device nor its use would constitute a Fourth Amendment search. See Of course not. A trespass on “houses” or “effects,” or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy. 8 UNITED STATES v. JONES Opinion of the Court which we rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to “beepers,” electronic tracking devices that represent an- other form of electronic monitoring. The first case, Knotts, upheld against Fourth Amendment
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Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
majority
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United States v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/622304/united-states-v-jones/
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electronic monitoring. The first case, Knotts, upheld against Fourth Amendment challenge the use of a “beeper” that had been placed in a container of chloroform, allowing law enforcement to monitor the location of the We said that there had been no infringement of Knotts’ reasonable expectation of pri- vacy since the information obtained—the location of the automobile carrying the container on public roads, and the location of the off-loaded container in open fields near Knotts’ cabin—had been voluntarily conveyed to the pub- lic.6 at –282. But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. The holding in Knotts addressed only the former, since the latter was not at issue. The beeper had been placed in the container before it came into Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the Knotts did not challenge that installation, and we specifically de- clined to consider its effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis. Knotts would be relevant, per- haps, if the Government were making the argument that what would otherwise be an unconstitutional search is not such where it produces only public informatio The Government does not make that argument, and we know of no case that would support it. The second “beeper” case, United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), does not suggest a different conclusio There we addressed the question left open by Knotts, whether the installation of a beeper in a container —————— 6 Knotts noted the “limited use which the government made of the signals from this particular beeper,” ; and reserved the question whether “different constitutional principles may be applicable” to “dragnet-type law enforcement practices” of the type that GPS tracking made possible here, Cite as: 565 U. S. (20) 9 Opinion of the Court amounted to a search or As in Knotts, at the time the beeper was installed the container belonged to a third party, and it did not come into posses- sion of the defendant until Thus, the specific question we considered was whether the in- stallation “with the consent of the original owner consti- tute[d] a search or seizure when the container is deliv- ered to a buyer having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper.” We held not. The Government, we said, came into physical contact with the container only before it belonged to the defendant Karo; and the transfer of the container with the unmonitored beeper inside did not convey any information and thus did not invade Karo’s privacy. See at 7. That conclu- sion is perfectly consistent with the one
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Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
majority
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United States v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/622304/united-states-v-jones/
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7. That conclu- sion is perfectly consistent with the one we reach here. Karo accepted the container as it came to him, beeper and all, and was therefore not entitled to object to the beeper’s presence, even though it was used to monitor the contain- er’s locatio Cf. On 751–752 (1952) (no search or seizure where an informant, who was wearing a concealed microphone, was invited into the defendant’s business). Jones, who possessed the Jeep at the time the Government trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device, is on much different footing. The Government also points to our exposition in New that “[t]he exterior of a car is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a ‘search.’ ” That state- ment is of marginal relevance here since, as the Govern- ment acknowledges, “the officers in this case did more than conduct a visual inspection of respondent’s vehicle,” Brief for United States 41 By attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area. In Class itself we suggested that this would make a difference, for we concluded that an officer’s momentary reaching into the interior of a vehicle did constitute a 10 UNITED STATES v. JONES Opinion of the Court 475 U.S., –115. Finally, the Government’s position gains little support from our conclusion in v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), that officers’ information-gathering intrusion on an “open field” did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search even though it was a trespass at common law, at 183. Quite simply, an open field, unlike the curtilage of a home, see United (1987), is not one of those protected areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment. at –177. See also The Government’s physical intrusion on such an area—unlike its intrusion on the “effect” at issue here—is of no Fourth Amendment significance.8 B The concurrence begins by accusing us of applying “18th-century tort law.” Post, at 1. That is a distortio What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against un- reasonable searches, which we believe must provide at —————— 7 The Government also points to (1974), in which the Court rejected the claim that the inspection of an impounded vehicle’s tire tread and the collection of paint scrapings from its exterior violated the Fourth Amendment. Whether the plural- ity said so because no search occurred or because the search was rea- sonable is unclear. Compare at 1 (“[W]e fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed”), with at 2 (“Under circumstances such as these, where probable cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a car
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Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
majority
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United States v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/622304/united-states-v-jones/
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exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable ”). 8 Thus, our theory is not that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with “any technical trespass that led to the gathering of evidence.” Post, at 3 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) The Fourth Amendment protects against trespassory searches only with regard to those items (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”) that it enumerates. The trespass that occurred in may properly be understood as a “search,” but not one “in the constitutional sense.” 466 U.S., at 170, 183. Cite as: 565 U. S. (20) 11 Opinion of the Court a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted. The concurrence does not share that belief. It would apply exclusively Katz’s reasonable-expectation- of-privacy test, even when that eliminates rights that previously existed. The concurrence faults our approach for “present[ing] particularly vexing problems” in cases that do not involve physical contact, such as those that involve the transmis- sion of electronic signals. Post, at 9. We entirely fail to understand that point. For unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make tres- pass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis. In fact, it is the concurrence’s insistence on the exclusiv- ity of the Katz test that needlessly leads us into “particu- larly vexing problems” in the present case. This Court has to date not deviated from the understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a search. See 533 U.S., at –32. We accordingly held in Knotts that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thorough- fares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” 460 U.S., at Thus, even assuming that the concurrence is correct to say that “[t]raditional surveillance” of Jones for a 4-week period “would have required a large team of agents, multi- ple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” post, at our cases suggest that such visual observation is constitu- tionally permissible. It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without an accompany- ing trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that questio And answering it affirmatively leads us needlessly into additional thorny problems. The concurrence posits that “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements UNITED STATES v. JONES Opinion of the Court on public streets” is okay, but that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses” is no good. Post,
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Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
majority
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United States v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/622304/united-states-v-jones/
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monitoring in investigations of most offenses” is no good. Post, at 13 That introduces yet another novelty into our jurisprudence. There is no prece- dent for the proposition that whether a search has oc- curred depends on the nature of the crime being investi- gated. And even accepting that novelty, it remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is “surely” too long and why a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving sub- stantial amounts of cash and narcotics is not an “extra- ordinary offens[e]” which may permit longer observatio See post, at 13–14. What of a 2-day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to grapple with these “vexing problems” in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here. III The Government argues in the alternative that even if the attachment and use of the device was a search, it was reasonable—and thus lawful—under the Fourth Amend- ment because “officers had reasonable suspicion, and in- deed probable cause, to believe that [Jones] was a leader in a large-scale cocaine distribution conspiracy.” Brief for United States 50–51. We have no occasion to consider this argument. The Government did not raise it below, and the D. C. Circuit therefore did not address it. See 625 F.3d, at 767 (Ginsburg, Tatel, and Griffith, JJ., concur- ring in denial of rehearing en banc). We consider the argument forfeited. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 56, 4 (2002). * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Cite as: 565 U. S. (20) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 10– UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,007 | 1 |
dissenting
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Kimbrough v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145841/kimbrough-v-united-states/
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I continue to disagree with the remedy fashioned in United The Court's post- sentencing cases illustrate why the remedial majority in was mistaken to craft a remedy far broader than necessary to correct constitutional error. The Court is now confronted with a host of questions about how to administer a sentencing scheme that has no basis in the statute. Because the Court's decisions in this area are necessarily grounded in policy considerations rather than law, I respectfully dissent. In the Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment insofar as they permit a judge to make findings that raise a sentence beyond the level justified by the "`facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.'" ). In my view, this violation was more suitably remedied by requiring any such facts to be submitted to the jury. -325, (THOMAS, J., dissenting in part). That approach would have been consistent with our longstanding presumption of the severability of unconstitutional applications of statutory provisions. (THOMAS, J., dissenting in part). And it would have achieved compliance with the Sixth Amendment while doing the least amount of violence to the mandatory sentencing regime that Congress enacted. (THOMAS, J., dissenting in part). The Court, however, *578 chose a more sweeping remedy. Despite acknowledging that under the mandatory Guidelines not "every sentence gives rise to a Sixth Amendment violation," the Court rendered the Guidelines advisory in their entirety and mandated appellate review of all sentences for "reasonableness." Because the Court's "solution fail[ed] to tailor the remedy to the wrong," I dissented from the remedial opinion. As a result of the Court's remedial approach, we are now called upon to decide a multiplicity of questions that have no discernibly legal answers. Last Term, in the Court held that a Court of Appeals may treat sentences within the properly calculated Guidelines range as presumptively reasonable. Today, in WL 4292116, the Court holds that a Court of Appeals may not require sentences that deviate substantially from the Guidelines range to be justified by extraordinary circumstances. And here the Court holds that sentencing courts are free to reject the Sentencing Guidelines' 100-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio. These outcomes may be perfectly reasonable as a matter of policy, but they have no basis in law. Congress did not mandate a reasonableness standard of appellate review that was a standard the remedial majority in fashioned out of whole cloth. See -312, (SCALIA, J., dissenting in part). The Court must now give content to that standard, but in so doing it does not and cannot rely on any statutory
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,007 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Kimbrough v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145841/kimbrough-v-united-states/
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doing it does not and cannot rely on any statutory language or congressional intent. We are asked here to determine whether, under the new advisory Guidelines regime, district courts may impose sentences based in part on their disagreement with a categorical policy judgment reflected in the Guidelines. But the Court's answer to that question necessarily derives from something other than the statutory language or congressional intent because Congress, by making the Guidelines mandatory, quite clearly intended to bind district courts to the Sentencing Commission's categorical policy judgments. See (b) ( ed. and Supp. V) (excised by ). By rejecting this statutory approach, the remedial majority has left the Court with no law to apply and forced it to assume the legislative role of devising a new sentencing scheme. Although I joined Justice SCALIA's dissent in Rita accepting the remedial opinion as a matter of "statutory stare decisis," 551 U.S., at I am now convinced that there is no principled way to apply the remedy certainly not one based on the statute. Accordingly, I think it best to apply the statute as written, including (b), which makes the Guidelines mandatory. Cf. Applying the statute as written, it is clear that the District Court erred by departing below the mandatory Guidelines range. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating petitioner's sentence and remanding for resentencing.
|
Justice White
| 1,970 | 6 |
majority
|
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108190/phoenix-v-kolodziejski/
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In this Court held that a State could not restrict the vote in school district elections to owners and lessees of real property and parents of school children because the exclusion of otherwise qualified voters was not shown to be necessary to promote a compelling state interest. This ruling, by its terms applicable to elections of public officials, was extended to elections for the approval of revenue bonds to finance local improvements in Our decision in Cipriano did not, however, reach the question now presented for decision: Does the Federal Constitution permit a State to restrict to real property taxpayers the vote in elections to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds? This question arises in the following factual setting: On June 10, 1969, the City of Phoenix, Arizona, held an election to authorize the issuance of $60,450,000 in general obligation bonds as well as certain revenue bonds. Under Arizona law, property taxes were to be levied to service this indebtedness, although the city was legally privileged to use other revenues for this purpose.[1] The *206 general obligation bonds were to be issued to finance various municipal improvements, with the largest amounts to go for the city sewer system, parks and playgrounds, police and public safety buildings, and libraries. Pursuant to Arizona constitutional and statutory provisions,[2] only otherwise qualified voters who were also real property taxpayers were permitted to vote on these bond issues. All of the bond issues submitted to the voters were approved by a majority of those voting. On June 16, 1969, six days after the election in Phoenix, this Court held in that restricting the franchise to property taxpayers in elections on revenue bonds violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That ruling was applied to the case before the Court in which under local law the authorization of the revenue bonds was not yet final when the challenge to the election was raised in the Court. On August 1, 1969, appellee Kolodziejski, a Phoenix resident who was otherwise qualified to vote but who owned no real property, filed *207 her complaint in the United States Court for the of Arizona challenging the constitutionality of the restriction on the franchise in Arizona bond elections and attacking the validity of the June 1969 election approving the Phoenix bond issues. A Court of three judges was convened. In the Court, appellants conceded that, under this Court's decisions in Cipriano and the bond election was invalid with regard to the revenue bonds that had been approved. The Court perceived no significant difference between revenue bonds and general
|
Justice White
| 1,970 | 6 |
majority
|
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108190/phoenix-v-kolodziejski/
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Court perceived no significant difference between revenue bonds and general obligation bonds and therefore held that the exclusion of nonproperty-owning voters from the election on the general obligation bonds was unconstitutional under Cipriano and Because the authorization of the Phoenix general obligation bonds was not final on the date of the Cipriano decision, the court held the Cipriano rule applicable and declared the June 10, 1969, bond election invalid. The appellants were enjoined from taking further action to issue the bonds approved in that election. The City of Phoenix and the members of the City Council appealed from the judgment of the Court with respect to the general obligation bonds. We noted probable jurisdiction, We affirm the judgment of the Court but do not agree that the ruling in this case should be retroactive to the date of the Cipriano decision. I In the denial of the franchise to nonproperty owners in elections on revenue bonds was held to be a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the nonproperty owners since they, as well as property owners, are substantially affected by the issuance of revenue bonds to finance municipal utilities. It is now argued that the rationale of Cipriano does not render unconstitutional the exclusion of nonproperty *208 owners from voting in elections on general obligation bonds. The argument proceeds on two related fronts. First, it is said that the Arizona statutes require that property taxes be levied in an amount sufficient to service the general obligation bonds,[3] the law thus expressly placing a special burden on property owners for the benefit of the entire community. Second, and more generally, whereas revenue bonds are secured by the revenues from the operation of particular facilities and these revenues may be earned from both property owners and nonproperty owners, general obligation bonds are secured by the general taxing power of the issuing municipality. Since most municipalities rely to a substantial extent on property tax revenues which will be used to make debt service payments if other revenue sources prove insufficient,[4] general obligation bonds are in effect a lien on the real property subject to taxation by the issuing municipality. Whatever revenues are actually used to service the bonds, an unavoidable potential tax burden is imposed only on those who own realty since that property cannot be moved beyond the reach of the municipality's taxing power. Hence, according to appellants, the State is justified in recognizing the unique interests of real property owners by allowing only property taxpayers to participate in elections to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds. Concededly, the
|
Justice White
| 1,970 | 6 |
majority
|
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108190/phoenix-v-kolodziejski/
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to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds. Concededly, the case of elections to approve general obligation bonds was not decided in But we have concluded that the principles *209 of that case, and of dictate a like result where a State excludes nonproperty taxpayers from voting in elections for the approval of general obligation bonds. The differences between the interests of property owners and the interests of nonproperty owners are not sufficiently substantial to justify excluding the latter from the franchise. This is so for several reasons. First, it is unquestioned that all residents of Phoenix, property owners and nonproperty owners alike, have a substantial interest in the public facilities and the services available in the city and will be substantially affected by the ultimate outcome of the bond election at issue in this case. Presumptively, when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise. Arizona nevertheless excludes nonproperty owners from participating in bond elections and vests in the majority of individual property owners voting in the election the power to approve or disapprove facilities that the municipal government has determined should be financed by issuing general obligation bonds. Placing such power in property owners alone can be justified only by some overriding interest of those owners that the State is entitled to recognize. Second, although Arizona law ostensibly calls for the levy of real property taxes to service general obligation bonds, other revenues are legally available for this purpose. According to the parties' stipulation in this case, it is anticipated with respect to the instant bonds, as has been true in the past, that more than half of the debt service requirements will be satisfied not from real property taxes but from revenues from other local taxes paid by nonproperty owners as well as those who own real *210 property.[5] Not only do those persons excluded from the franchise have a great interest in approving or disapproving municipal improvements, but they will also contribute, as directly as property owners, to the servicing of the bonds by the payment of taxes to be used for this purpose. Third, the justification for restricting the franchise to the property owners would seem to be strongest in the case of a municipality which, unlike Phoenix, looks only to property tax revenues for servicing general obligation bonds. But even in such a case the justification would be insufficient. Property taxes may be paid initially by property owners, but a
|
Justice White
| 1,970 | 6 |
majority
|
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108190/phoenix-v-kolodziejski/
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taxes may be paid initially by property owners, but a significant part of the ultimate burden of each year's tax on rental property will very likely be borne by the tenant rather than the landlord since, as the parties also stipulated in this case, the landlord will treat the property tax as a business expense and normally will be able to pass all or a large part of this cost on to the tenants in the form of higher rent.[6] Since most city residents not owning their *211 own homes are lessees of dwelling units, virtually all residents share the burden of property taxes imposed and used to service general obligation bonds. Moreover, property taxes on commercial property,[7] much of which is owned by corporations having no vote, will be treated as a cost of doing business and will normally be reflected in the prices of goods and services purchased by nonproperty owners and property owners alike. While in theory the expected future income from real property, and hence property values in a municipality, may depend in part on the predicted future levels of property taxes,[8] the actual impact of an increase in property taxes is problematical.[9] Moreover, to the extent that property values are directly affected by the additional potential tax burden entailed in the bond issue, any adverse effect would normally be offset at least in substantial part by the favorable effects on property values of the improvements to be financed by the bond issue.[10] *212 It is true that a general obligation bond may be loosely described as a "lien" on the property within the jurisdiction of the municipality in the sense that the issuer undertakes to levy sufficient taxes to service the bond. In theory, if the economy of the issuing city were to collapse, the levy of sufficiently high property taxes on property producing little or no income might result in some cases in defaults, foreclosures, and tax sales. Nothing before us, however, indicates that the possibility of future foreclosures to meet bond obligations significantly affects current real estate values or the ability of the concerned property owner to liquidate his holdings to avoid the risk of those future difficulties; the price of real estate appears to be more a function of the health of the local economy than a reflection of the level of property taxes imposed to finance municipal improvements. In any event, we are not convinced that the risk of future economic collapse that might result in bond obligations becoming an unshiftable, unsharable burden on property owners is sufficiently real or substantial
|
Justice White
| 1,970 | 6 |
majority
|
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108190/phoenix-v-kolodziejski/
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unsharable burden on property owners is sufficiently real or substantial to justify denying the vote in a current bond election to all those nonproperty owners who have a significant interest in the facilities to be financed, who are now indirectly sharing the property tax burden, and who will be paying other taxes used by the municipality to service its general obligation bonds. We thus conclude that, although owners of real property have interests somewhat different from the interests of nonproperty owners in the issuance of general obligation bonds, there is no basis for concluding that nonproperty owners are substantially less interested in the issuance of these securities than are property owners. That there is no adequate reason to restrict the franchise on the issuance of general obligation bonds to property owners is further evidenced by the fact that only 14 *213 States now restrict the franchise in this way;[11] most States find it possible to protect property owners from excessive property tax burdens by means other than restricting the franchise to property owners. The States now allowing all qualified voters to vote in general obligation bond elections do not appear to have been significantly less successful in protecting property values and in soundly financing their municipal improvements. Nor have we been shown that the 14 States now restricting the franchise have unique problems that make it necessary to limit the vote to property owners. We must therefore affirm the Court's declaratory judgment that the challenged provisions of the Arizona Constitution and statutes, as applied to exclude nonproperty owners from elections for the approval of the issuance of general obligation bonds, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. II In view of the fact that over the years many general obligation bonds have been issued on the good-faith assumption that restriction of the franchise in bond elections was not prohibited by the Federal Constitution, *214 it would be unjustifiably disruptive to give our decision in this case full retroactive effect. We therefore adopt a rule similar to that employed with respect to the applicability of the Cipriano decision: our decision in this case will apply only to authorizations for general obligation bonds that are not final as of June 23, 1970, the date of this decision. In the case of States authorizing challenges to bond elections within a definite period, all elections held prior to the date of this decision will not be affected by this decision unless a challenge on the grounds sustained by this decision has been or is brought within the period specified by state
|
Justice White
| 1,970 | 6 |
majority
|
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108190/phoenix-v-kolodziejski/
|
been or is brought within the period specified by state law. In the case of States, including apparently Arizona,[12] that do not have a well-defined period for bringing challenges to bond elections, all elections held prior to the date of this decision that have not yet been challenged on the grounds sustained in this decision prior to the date of this decision will not be open to challenge on the basis of our ruling in this case. In addition, in States with no definite challenge period, the validity of general obligation bonds that have been issued before this decision and prior to the commencement of an action challenging the issuance on the grounds sustained by this decision will not be affected by the decision in this case. Since appellee in this case brought her constitutional challenge to the Phoenix election prior to the date of our decision in this case and no bonds have been issued pursuant to *215 that election, our decision applies to the election involved in this case. The Court was therefore correct in holding that the June 10, 1969, bond election in Phoenix was constitutionally invalid and in enjoining the issuance of bonds pursuant to the approval obtained in that election. Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the judgment and in Part I of the opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR.
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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After the Civil War, Congress enacted legislation imposing on the Federal Judiciary the responsibility to remedy both abuses of power by persons acting under color of state law and lawless conduct that state courts are neither fully competent, nor always certain, to prevent.[1] The Ku Klux Act of 1871, was a response to the massive, organized lawlessness that infected our Southern States during the post-Civil War era. When a question concerning this statute's coverage arises, it is appropriate to consider whether *308 the controversy has a purely local character or the kind of federal dimension that gave rise to the legislation. Based on detailed, undisputed findings of fact, the District Court concluded that the portion of 2 of the Ku Klux Act now codified at 42 U.S. C. 1985(3) provides a federal remedy for petitioners' violent concerted activities on the public streets and private property of law-abiding citizens. National Organization for The Court of Appeals affirmed. National Organization for The holdings of the courts below are supported by the text and the legislative history of the statute and are fully consistent with this Court's precedents. Admittedly, important questions concerning the meaning of 1985(3) have been left open in our prior cases, including whether the statute covers genderbased discrimination and whether it provides a remedy for the kind of interference with a woman's right to travel to another State to obtain an abortion revealed by this record. Like the overwhelming majority of federal judges who have spoken to the issue,[2] I am persuaded that traditional principles *309 of statutory construction readily provide affirmative answers to these questions. It is unfortunate that the Court has analyzed this case as though it presented an abstract question of logical deduction rather than a question concerning the exercise and allocation of power in our federal system of government. The Court ignores the obvious (and entirely constitutional) congressional intent behind 1985(3) to protect this Nation's citizens from what amounts to the theft of their constitutional rights by organized and violent mobs across the country. The importance of the issue warrants a full statement of the facts found by the District Court before reaching the decisive questions in this case. I Petitioners are dedicated to a cause that they profoundly believe is far more important than mere obedience to the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia or the police power of its cities. To achieve their goals, the individual petitioners "have agreed and combined with one another and with defendant Operation Rescue to organize, coordinate and participate in `rescue' demonstrations at abortion clinics
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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organize, coordinate and participate in `rescue' demonstrations at abortion clinics in various parts of the country, including the Washington metropolitan area. The purpose of these `rescue' demonstrations is to disrupt operations at the target clinic and indeed ultimately to cause the clinic to cease operations entirely."[3] The scope of petitioners' conspiracy is nationwide; it far exceeds the bounds or jurisdiction of any one State. They have blockaded clinics across the country, and their activities have been enjoined in New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, Connecticut, California, Kansas, and Nevada, as well as the *310 District of Columbia metropolitan area. They have carried out their "rescue" operations in the District of Columbia and Maryland in defiance of federal injunctions.[4] Pursuant to their overall conspiracy, petitioners have repeatedly engaged in "rescue" operations that violate local law and harm innocent women. Petitioners trespass on clinic property and physically block access to the clinic, preventing patients, as well as physicians and medical staff, from entering the clinic to render or receive medical or counseling services. Uncontradicted trial testimony demonstrates that petitioners' conduct created a "substantial risk that existing or prospective patients may suffer physical or mental harm."[5] Petitioners make no claim that their conduct is a legitimate form of protected expression. Petitioners' intent to engage in repeated violations of law is not contested. They trespass on private property, interfere with the ability of patients to obtain medical and counseling *311 services, and incite others to engage in similar unlawful activity. They also engage in malicious conduct, such as defacing clinic signs, damaging clinic property, and strewing nails in clinic parking lots and on nearby public streets.[6] This unlawful conduct is "vital to [petitioners'] avowed purposes and goals."[7] They show no signs of abandoning their chosen method for advancing their goals.[8] Rescue operations effectively hinder and prevent the constituted authorities of the targeted community from providing local citizens with adequate protection.[9] The lack of advance warning of petitioners' activities, combined with limited police department resources, makes it difficult for the police to prevent petitioners' ambush by "rescue" from closing a clinic for many hours at a time. The trial record is replete with examples of petitioners overwhelming local law enforcement officials by sheer force of numbers. In one "rescue" in Falls Church, Virginia, the demonstrators vastly outnumbered the police department's complement of 30 deputized officers. The police arrested 240 rescuers, but were unable to prevent the blockade from closing the clinic for more than six hours. Because of the large-scale, highly organized nature of petitioners' activities, the local authorities are unable to protect the victims of petitioners'
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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local authorities are unable to protect the victims of petitioners' conspiracy.[10] *312 Petitioners' conspiracy had both the purpose and effect of interfering with interstate travel. The number of patients who cross state lines to obtain an abortion obviously depends, to some extent, on the location of the clinic and the quality of its services. In the Washington metropolitan area, where interstate travel is routine, 20 to 30 percent of the patients at some clinics were from out of State, while at least one clinic obtained over half its patients from other States. The District Court's conclusions in this regard bear repetition: "[Petitioners] engaged in this conspiracy for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving women seeking abortions and related medical and counselling services, of the right to travel. The right to travel includes the right to unobstructed interstate travel to obtain an abortion and other medical services. Testimony at trial establishes that clinics in Northern Virginia provide medical services to plaintiffs' members and patients who travel from out of state. Defendants' activities interfere with these persons' right to unimpeded interstate travel by blocking their access to abortion *313 clinics. And, the Court is not persuaded that clinic closings affect only intra-state travel, from the street to the doors of the clinics. Were the Court to hold otherwise, interference with the right to travel could occur only at state borders. This conspiracy, therefore, effectively deprives organizational plaintiffs' non-Virginia members of their right to interstate travel."[11] To summarize briefly, the evidence establishes that petitioners engaged in a nationwide conspiracy; to achieve their goal they repeatedly occupied public streets and trespassed on the premises of private citizens in order to prevent or hinder the constituted authorities from protecting access to abortion clinics by women, a substantial number of whom traveled in interstate commerce to reach the destinations blockaded by petitioners. The case involves no ordinary trespass, nor anything remotely resembling the peaceful picketing of a local retailer. It presents a striking contemporary example of the kind of zealous, politically motivated, lawless conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku Klux Act in 1871 and gave it its name. II The text of the statute makes plain the reasons Congress considered a federal remedy for such conspiracies both necessary and appropriate. In relevant part the statute contains two independent clauses which I separately identify in the following quotation: "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, [first] for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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[first] for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or [second] for the purpose *314 of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S. C. 1985(3). The plain language of the statute is surely broad enough to cover petitioners' conspiracy. Their concerted activities took place on both the public "highway" and the private "premises of another." The women targeted by their blockade fit comfortably within the statutory category described as "any person or class of persons." Petitioners' interference with police protection of women seeking access to abortion clinics "directly or indirectly" deprived them of equal protection of the laws and of their privilege of engaging in lawful travel. Moreover, a literal reading of the second clause of the statute describes petitioners' proven "purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory" from securing "to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." No one has suggested that there would be any constitutional objection to the application of this statute to petitioners' nationwide conspiracy; it is obvious that any such constitutional claim would be frivolous. Accordingly, if, as it sometimes does, the Court limited its analysis to the statutory text, it would certainly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. For both the first clause and the second clause of 1985(3) plainly describe petitioners' conspiracy. *315 III The Court bypasses the statute's history, intent, and plain language in its misplaced reliance on prior precedent. Of course, the Court has never before had occasion to construe the second clause of 1985(3). The first clause, however, has been narrowly construed in and In the first of these decisions, the Court held that 1985(3) did not apply to wholly private conspiracies.[12] In the Court rejected that
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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apply to wholly private conspiracies.[12] In the Court rejected that view but limited the application of the statute's first clause to conspiracies motivated by discriminatory intent to deprive plaintiffs of rights constitutionally protected against private (and not just governmental) deprivation. Finally, Carpenters reemphasized that the first clause of 1985(3) offers no relief from the violation of rights protected against only state interference. -834. To date, the Court has recognized as rights protected against private encroachment (and, hence, by 1985(3)) only the constitutional right of interstate travel and rights granted by the Thirteenth Amendment. For present purposes, it is important to note that in each of these cases the Court narrowly construed 1985(3) to avoid what it perceived as serious constitutional problems with the statute itself. Because those problems are not at issue here, it is even more important to note a larger point about our precedent. In the course of applying Civil War era legislation to civil rights issues unforeseeable in 1871, the Court has adopted a flexible approach, interpreting the statute to reach current concerns without exceeding the bounds of its intended purposes or the constitutional powers *316 of Congress.[13] We need not exceed those bounds to apply the statute to these facts. The facts and decision in are especially instructive here. In overruling an important part of Collins, the Court found that the conduct the plaintiffs allegedÔÇöa Mississippi highway attack on a white man suspected of being a civil rights worker and the two black men who were passengers in his carÔÇöwas emblematic of the antiabolitionist violence that 1985(3) was intended to prevent. A review of the legislative history demonstrated, on the one hand, that Congress intended the coverage of 1985(3) to reach purely private conspiracies, but on the other hand, that it wanted to avoid the "constitutional shoals" that would lie in the path of a general federal tort law punishing an ordinary assault and battery committed by two or more persons. The racial motivation for the battery committed by the defendants in the case before the Court placed their conduct "close to the core of the coverage intended by Congress." It therefore satisfied the limiting construction that the Court placed on the reference to a deprivation of "equal" privileges and immunities in the first clause of the Act. The Court explained that construction: "The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purposeÔÇöby requiring, as an element of the cause of
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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congressional purposeÔÇöby requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. See the remarks of Representatives Willard and Shellabarger, [Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 100 (1871)]. The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise *317 class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." A footnote carefully left open the question "whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable under the portion of 1985(3) before us. " Neither of our two more recent opinions construing 1985(3) has answered the question left open in or has involved the second clause of the statute.[14] After holding that the statute did apply to such facts, and that requiring a discriminatory intent would prevent its overapplication, the Court held that 1985(3) would be within the constitutional power of Congress if its coverage were limited to constitutional rights secured against private action. The facts in that case identified two such grounds. *318 One ground was 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. The other was the right to travel. The Court explained how the petitioners could show a violation of the latter. As with the class-based animus requirement, the Court was less concerned with the specifics of that showing than with the constitutionality of 1985(3); it emphasized that whatever evidence they presented had to "make it clear that the petitioners had suffered from conduct that Congress may reach under its power to protect the right of interstate travel." The concerns that persuaded the Court to adopt a narrow reading of the text of 1985(3) in are not presented in this case. Giving effect to the plain language of 1985(3) to provide a remedy against the violent interference with women exercising their privilege ÔÇö indeed, their right ÔÇö to engage in interstate travel to obtain an abortion presents no danger of turning the statute into a general tort law. Nor does anyone suggest that such relief calls into question the constitutional powers of Congress. When the Court rejected its earlier holding in Collins, it provided both an "authoritative construction" of 1985(3), see ante, at 289 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and a sufficient reason for rejecting the doctrine of stare decisis whenever it would result in an unnecessarily narrow construction of the statute's plain language. The Court wrote: "Whether or not was correctly decided on its own facts
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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"Whether or not was correctly decided on its own facts is a question with which we need not here be concerned. But it is clear, in the light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have passed since that case was decided, that many of the constitutional problems there perceived simply do not exist. Little reason remains, therefore, not to accord to the words of the statute their apparent meaning." -96. *319 Once concerns about the constitutionality of 1985(3) are properly put aside, we can focus more appropriately on giving the statute its intended effect. On the facts disclosed by this record, I am convinced that both the text of the statute and its underlying purpose support the conclusion that petitioners' conspiracy was motivated by a discriminatory animus and violated respondents' protected right to engage in interstate travel. IV The question left open in ÔÇö whether the coverage of 1985(3) is limited to cases involving racial bias ÔÇö is easily answered. The text of the statute provides no basis for excluding from its coverage any cognizable class of persons who are entitled to the equal protection of the laws. This Court has repeatedly and consistently held that gender-based classifications are subject to challenge on constitutional grounds, see, e. g., ; Mississippi Univ. for A parallel construction of post-Civil War legislation that, in the words of Justice Holmes, "dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal rights, and protected them in the lump," United is obviously appropriate. The legislative history of the Act confirms the conclusion that even though it was primarily motivated by the lawless conduct directed at the recently emancipated citizens, its protection extended to "all the thirty-eight millions of the citizens of this nation." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 484 (1871). Given then prevailing attitudes about the respective roles of males and females in society, it is possible that the enacting legislators did not anticipate protection of women against class-based discrimination. That, however, is not a sufficient reason for refusing to construe the statutory text in accord with its plain meaning, particularly when that construction fulfills the central purpose of the legislation. See Union *320 The gloss that Justice Stewart placed on the statute in then, did not exclude gender-based discrimination from its coverage. But it does require us to resolve the question whether a conspiracy animated by the desire to deprive women of their right to obtain an abortion is "class based." V The terms "animus" and "invidious" are susceptible to different interpretations. The Court today announces that it could find
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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different interpretations. The Court today announces that it could find class-based animus in petitioners' mob violence "only if one of two suggested propositions is true: (1) that opposition to abortion can reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent, or (2) that intent is irrelevant, and a classbased animus can be determined solely by effect." Ante, at 270. The first proposition appears to describe a malevolent form of hatred or ill will. When such an animus defends itself as opposition to conduct that a given class engages in exclusively or predominantly, we can readily unmask it as the intent to discriminate against the class itself. See for instance, involved behavior animated by the desire to keep African-American citizens from exercising their constitutional rights. The defendants were no less guilty of a class-based animus because they also opposed the cause of desegregation or rights of African-American suffrage, and the Court did not require the plaintiffs in to prove that their beatings were motivated by hatred for African-Americans. Similarly, a decision disfavoring female lawyers,[15] female owners of liquor establishments,[16]*321 or pregnant women[17] may appropriately be characterized as "invidiously discriminatory" even if the decision-makers have goals other than ÔÇö or in addition to ÔÇö discrimination against individual women.[18] The second proposition deserves more than the Court's disdain. It plausibly describes an assumption that intent *322 lies behind the discriminatory effects from which Congress intended 1985(3) to protect American citizens. Congress may obviously offer statutory protections against behavior that the Constitution does not forbid, including forms of discrimination that undermine 1985(3)'s guarantee of equal treatment under the law. Regardless of whether the examples of paternalistic discrimination given above involve a constitutional violation, as a matter of statutory construction it is entirely appropriate to conclude that each would satisfy the class-based animus requirement because none of them poses any danger of converting 1985(3) into a general tort law or creating concerns about the constitutionality of the statute. Both forms of class-based animus that the Court proposes are present in this case. Sex-Based Discrimination It should be noted that a finding of class-based animus in this case does not require finding that to disfavor abortion is "ipso facto " to discriminate invidiously against women. See ante, at 271. Respondents do not take that position, and they do not rely on abstract propositions about "opposition to abortion" per se. See ante, at 269-270. Instead, they call our attention to a factual record showing a particular lawless conspiracy employing force to prevent women from exercising their constitutional rights. Such a conspiracy, in the terms of
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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their constitutional rights. Such a conspiracy, in the terms of the Court's first proposition, may "reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent." See ante, at 270. To satisfy the class-based animus requirement of 1985(3), the conspirators' conduct need not be motivated by hostility toward individual women. As women are unquestionably a protected class, that requirement ÔÇö as well as the central purpose of the statute ÔÇö is satisfied if the conspiracy is aimed at conduct that only members of the protected class have the capacity to perform. It is not necessary that the intended effect upon women be the sole purpose of the conspiracy. It *323 is enough that the conspiracy be motivated "at least in part" by its adverse effects upon women. Cf. Personnel Administrator of ; Arlington The immediate and intended effect of this conspiracy was to prevent women from obtaining abortions. Even assuming that the ultimate and indirect consequence of petitioners' blockade was the legitimate and nondiscriminatory goal of saving potential life, it is undeniable that the conspirators' immediate purpose was to affect the conduct of women.[19] Moreover, petitioners target women because of their sex, specifically, because of their capacity to become pregnant and to have an abortion.[20] *324 It is also obvious that petitioners' conduct was motivated "at least in part" by the invidious belief that individual women are not capable of deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy, or that they should not be allowed to act on such a decision. Petitioners' blanket refusal to allow any women access to an abortion clinic overrides the individual class member's choice, no matter whether she is the victim of rape or incest, whether the abortion may be necessary to save her life,[21] or even whether she is merely seeking advice or information about her options. Petitioners' conduct is designed to deny every woman the opportunity to exercise a constitutional right that only women possess. Petitioners' conspiracy, which combines massive defiance of the law with violent obstruction of the constitutional rights of their fellow citizens, represents a paradigm of the kind of conduct that the statute was intended to cover.[22] *325 The Court recognizes that the requisite animus may "readily be presumed" on the basis of the relationship between the targeted activity and membership in the targeted class. Ante, at 270. But the Court insists that opposition to an act engaged in exclusively by members of a protected class does not involve class-based animus unless the act itself is an "irrational object of disfavor." The Court's view requires a subjective judicial interpretation inappropriate in the civil rights
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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requires a subjective judicial interpretation inappropriate in the civil rights context, where what seems rational to an oppressor seems equally irrational to a victim. Opposition to desegregation, and opposition to the voting rights of both African-Americans and women, were certainly at one time considered "rational" propositions. But such propositions were never free of the class-based discrimination from which 1985(3) protects the members of both classes. The activity of traveling to a clinic to obtain an abortion is, of course, exclusively performed by women. Opposition to that activity may not be "irrational," but violent interference with it is unquestionably "aimed at" women. The Court offers no justification for its newly crafted suggestion that deliberately imposing a burden on an activity exclusively performed by women is not class-based discrimination unless opposition to the activity is also irrational. The Court is apparently willing to presume discrimination only when opposition to the targeted activity is ÔÇö in its eyes ÔÇö wholly pretextual: that is, when it thinks that no rational person would oppose the activity, except as a means of achieving a separate and distinct goal.[23] The Court's analysis makes sense only if every member of a protected class *326 exercises all of her constitutional rights, or if no rational excuse remains for otherwise invidious discrimination. Not every member of every protected class chooses to exercise all of his or her constitutional rights; not all of them want to. That many women do not obtain abortions ÔÇö that many women oppose abortion ÔÇö does not mean that those who violently prevent the exercise of that right by women who do exercise it are somehow cleansed of their discriminatory intent. In enacting a law such as 1985(3) for federal courts to enforce, Congress asked us to see through the excuses ÔÇö the "rational" motives ÔÇö that will always disguise discrimination. Congress asked us to foresee, and speed, the day when such discrimination, no matter how well disguised, would be unmasked. Statutory Relief from Discriminatory Effects As for the second definition of class-based animus, disdainfully proposed by the Court, there is no reason to insist that a statutory claim under 1985(3) must satisfy the restrictions we impose on constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. A congressional statute may offer relief from discriminatory effects even if the Fourteenth Amendment prevents only discriminatory intent. The Court attempts to refute the finding of class-based animus by relying on our cases holding that the governmental denial of either disability benefits for pregnant women or abortion funding does not violate the Constitution. That reliance is misplaced for several
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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not violate the Constitution. That reliance is misplaced for several reasons. Cases involving constitutional challenges to governmental plans denying financial benefits to pregnant women, and cases involving equal protection challenges to facially neutral statutes with discriminatory effects, involve different concerns and reach justifiably different results than a case involving citizens' statutory protection against burdens imposed on their constitutional rights. *327 In we faced the question whether a State's disability insurance system violated the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding benefits for normal pregnancy. A majority of the Court concluded that the system did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. of course, did not purport to establish that, as a matter of logic, a classification based on pregnancy is gender neutral. As an abstract statement, that proposition is simply false; a classification based on pregnancy is a sex-based classification, just as, to use the Court's example, a classification based on the wearing of yarmulkes is a religion-based classification. Nor should be understood as holding that, as a matter of law, pregnancy-based classifications never violate the Equal Protection Clause. In fact, as the language of the opinion makes clear, what held was that not every legislative classification based on pregnancy was equivalent, for equal protection purposes, to the explicitly gender-based distinctions struck down in and That must be understood in these narrower terms is apparent from the sentence which the Court quotes in part: "While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those considered in and " n. 20[24] Central to the holding in was the Court's belief that the disability insurance system before it was a plan that *328 conferred benefits evenly on men and women.[25] Later cases confirmed that the holding in depended on an analysis of the insurance plan as a benefit program with an overall nondiscriminatory effect.[26]Nashville Gas applied a statute without an intent requirement to an employer's policy denying accumulated seniority to employees returning from pregnancy leave. Notwithstanding the Court found that the policy burdened only women, and therefore constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court stated that "petitioner has not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer. The distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one of semantics."[27] The distinction between *329 those who oppose abortion and those who physically threaten women and obstruct their access to abortion clinics
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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physically threaten women and obstruct their access to abortion clinics is also more than semantic. Petitioners in this case form a mob that seeks to impose a burden on women by forcibly preventing the exercise of a right that only women possess. The discriminatory effect of petitioners' conduct is beyond doubt. is inapplicable for another reason. The issue of class-based animus in this case arises in a statutory, not a constitutional, context. There are powerful reasons for giving 1985(3) a reading that is broader than the constitutional holdings on which the Court relies.[28] In our constitutional *330 cases, we apply the intent standard to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred. In cases under 1985(3), we apply the class-based animus test not to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred ÔÇö the violation is independently established ÔÇö but to determine whether that violation can be remedied. Given the differing roles the intent standard and the class-based animus requirement play in our jurisprudence, there is no justification for applying the same stringent standards in the context of 1985(3) as in our constitutional cases. As a matter of statutory interpretation, I have always believed that rules that place special burdens on pregnant women discriminate on the basis of sex, for the capacity to become pregnant is the inherited and immutable characteristic that "primarily differentiates the female from the male." General Electric I continue to believe that that view should inform our construction of civil rights legislation. That view was also the one affirmed by Congress in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 0e et seq.[29] The Act categorically expressed Congress' view that *331 "discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex." Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock had held that a pregnancy-based classification did not constitute forbidden sex discrimination if the classification related to benefits and did not have a discriminatory effect. In the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Congress rejected `s focus on benefits and overall impact, instead insisting that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy necessarily constitutes prohibited sex discrimination. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, pp. 2-3 (1978). The statements of the bill's proponents demonstrate their disapproval of the Court's reluctance in Gilbert and to recognize that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is always genderbased discrimination. See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 10581 (remarks of Rep. Hawkins) ("[I]t seems only commonsense, that since only women can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant people is necessarily discrimination against women").[30]
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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pregnant, discrimination against pregnant people is necessarily discrimination against women").[30] Two Terms ago, in Automobile the Court again faced the question whether a classification based on childbearing capacity violated a statutory ban on discrimination. That case, arising under Title VII, concerned Johnson Controls' "fetal-protection policy," which excluded all women "capable of bearing children" from jobs requiring exposure to lead. Johnson Controls sought to justify the policy on the basis that maternal exposure to lead created health risks for a fetus. The first question the Court addressed was whether the policy was facially discriminatory or, alternatively, facially neutral with merely a discriminatory effect. The *332 Court concluded that the policy was facially discriminatory. The policy was not neutral, the Court held, "because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company's male employees in the same way as it applies to that of the females." Johnson Controls, I had thought, signaled the Court's recognition that classifications based on ability to become pregnant are necessarily discriminatory. VI Respondents' right to engage in interstate travel is inseparable from the right they seek to exercise. That right, unduly burdened and frustrated by petitioners' conspiracy, is protected by the Federal Constitution, as we recently reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Almost two decades ago, the Court squarely held that the right to enter another State for the purpose of seeking abortion services available there is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, 2.[31] A woman's right to engage in interstate travel for this purpose is either entitled to special respect because she is exercising a constitutional right, or because restrictive rules in her home State may make travel to another State imperative. Federal courts are uniquely situated to protect that right for the same reason they are well suited to protect the privileges and immunities of those who enter other States to ply their trade. See, e. g., *333 The District Court's conclusion that petitioners intended to interfere with the right to engage in interstate travel is well supported by the record. Interference with a woman's ability to visit another State to obtain an abortion is essential to petitioners' achievement of their ultimate goal ÔÇö the complete elimination of abortion services throughout the United States. No lesser purpose can explain their multistate "rescue" operations. Even in a single locality, the effect of petitioners' blockade on interstate travel is substantial. Between 20 and 30 percent of the patients at a targeted clinic in Virginia were from out of State and over half of the patients at one of
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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State and over half of the patients at one of the Maryland clinics were interstate Making their destination inaccessible to women who have engaged in interstate travel for a single purpose is unquestionably a burden on that travel. That burden was not only a foreseeable and natural consequence of the blockades, but indeed was also one of the intended consequences of petitioners' conspiracy. Today the Court advances two separate reasons for rejecting the District Court's conclusion that petitioners deliberately deprived women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. First, relying on an excerpt from our opinion in United the Court assumes that "`the predominant purpose' " or "the very purpose" of the conspiracy must be to impede interstate travel. Ante, at 275, 276. Second, the Court assumes that even an intentional restriction on out-of-state travel is permissible if it imposes an equal burden on intrastate travel. The first reason reflects a mistaken understanding of Guest and and the second is unsupported by precedent or reason. In the Guest case, the Court squarely held that the Federal Constitution protects the right to engage in interstate travel from private interference. Not a word in that opinion suggests that the constitutional protection is limited to impediments *334 that discriminate against nonresidents. Instead, the Court broadly referred to the federal commerce power that "authorizes Congress to legislate for the protection of individuals from violations of civil rights that impinge on their free movement in interstate commerce." It then held that the right of interstate travel was one of the federal rights protected from private interference by the criminal statute that had been enacted as 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, later codified at 18 U.S. C. 241. That statute had previously been construed to contain a "stringent scienter requirement" to save it from condemnation as a criminal statute failing to provide adequate notice of the proscribed ; see also The Guest opinion then explained why this history would limit the coverage of 18 U.S. C. 241: "This does not mean, of course, that every criminal conspiracy affecting an individual's right of free interstate passage is within the sanction of 18 U.S. C. 241. A specific intent to interfere with the federal right must be proved, and at a trial the defendants are entitled to a jury instruction phrased in those terms. [1945]. Thus, for example, a conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not, of itself, violate 241. But if the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that right, then, whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes a proper object of the federal law under which the indictment in this case was brought." 383 U.S., at Today the Court assumes that the same sort of scienter requirement should apply to 1985(3) because 18 U.S. C. 241 is its "criminal counterpart." Ante, at 275. *335 The Court is mistaken. The criminal sanctions that were originally included in 2 of the Ku Klux Act were held unconstitutional over a century ago. United ; The statute now codified at 18 U.S. C. 241 was enacted in 1870, a year earlier than the Ku Klux Act. The texts of the two statutes are materially different. Even if that were not so, it would be inappropriate to assume that a strict scienter requirement in a criminal statute should be glibly incorporated in a civil statute.[32] But what is most significant is the dramatic difference between the language of 18 U.S. C. 241, which includes an unequivocal "intent" requirement and the language of 1985(3), which broadly describes a purpose to deprive another of a protected privilege "either directly or indirectly." An indirect interference with the right to travel may violate 1985(3) even if it would not violate 241.[33] *336 The Court interpreted the right to interstate travel more generously in It wrote: "Under these allegations it is open to the petitioners to prove at trial that they had been engaging in interstate travel or intended to do so, that their federal right to travel interstate was one of the rights meant to be discriminatorily *337 impaired by the conspiracy, that the conspirators intended to drive out-of-state civil rights workers from the State, or that they meant to deter the petitioners from associating with such persons. This and other evidence could make it clear that the petitioners had suffered from conduct that Congress may reach under its power to protect the right of interstate travel." 403 U. S., In that paragraph the Court mentions that the plaintiffs' federal right to travel may have been "discriminatorily" impaired. The use of that word was appropriate because of the Court's earlier discussion of the importance of classbased discriminatory animus in interpreting the statute, but was entirely unnecessary in order to uphold the constitutionality of the statute as applied to conduct that "Congress may reach under its power to protect the right of interstate travel."
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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under its power to protect the right of interstate travel." Moreover, "in the light of the evolution of decisional law," in recent years, today no one could possibly question the power of Congress to prohibit private blockades of streets and highways used by interstate travelers, even if the conspirators indiscriminately interdicted both local and out-of-state The implausibility of the Court's readings of and Guest is matched by its conclusion that a burden on interstate travel is permissible as long as an equal burden is imposed on local The Court has long recognized that a burden on interstate commerce may be invalid even if the same burden is imposed on local commerce. See ; Dean Milk ; Southern Pacific The fact that an impermissible burden is most readily identified when it discriminates against nonresidents does not justify immunizing conduct that evenhandedly disrupts both local and interstate travel. The defendants in for example, *338 could not have refuted the claim that they interfered with the right to travel by demonstrating that they indiscriminately attacked local civil rights activists as well as nonresidents. In this case petitioners have deliberately blockaded access to the destinations sought by a class of women including both local and interstate Even though petitioners may not have known which of the travelers had crossed the state line, petitioners unquestionably knew that many of them had. The conclusion of the District Court that petitioners "engaged in this conspiracy for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving women seeking abortions and related medical counselling services, of the right to travel," is abundantly supported by the record. Discrimination is a necessary element of the class-based animus requirement, not of the abridgment of a woman's right to engage in interstate travel. Perhaps nowhere else in its opinion does the Court reject such obvious assumptions of the authors of 1985(3). The Reconstruction Congress would have been startled, I think, to learn that 1985(3) protected freed slaves and their supporters from Klan violence not covered by the Thirteenth Amendment only if the Klan members spared local African-Americans and abolitionists their wrath. And it would have been shocked to learn that its law offered relief from a Klan lynching of an out-of-state abolitionist only if the plaintiff could show that the Klan specifically intended to prevent his travel between the States. Yet these are the impossible requirements the Court imposes on a 1985(3) plaintiff who has shown that her right to travel has been deliberately and significantly infringed. It is difficult to know whether the Court is waiting until only a few
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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know whether the Court is waiting until only a few States have abortion clinics before it finds that petitioners' behavior violates the right to travel, or if it believes that petitioners could never violate that right as long as they oppose the abortion a woman seeks to obtain as well as the travel necessary to obtain it. *339 VII Respondents have unquestionably established a claim under the second clause of 1985(3), the state hindrance provision.[34] The record amply demonstrates petitioners' successful efforts to overpower local law enforcement officers. During the "rescue" operations, the duly constituted authorities are rendered ineffective, and mob violence prevails.[35] A conspiracy that seeks by force of numbers to prevent local officials from protecting the victims' constitutional rights presents exactly the kind of pernicious combination that the second clause of 1985(3) was designed to counteract. As we recognized in the second clause of 1985(3) explicitly concerns such interference with state officials and for that reason does not duplicate the coverage of the first clause. Petitioners' conspiracy hinders the lawful authorities from protecting women's constitutionally protected right to choose whether to end their pregnancies. Though this may be a right that is protected only against state infringement, it is clear that by preventing government officials from safeguarding the exercise of that right, petitioners' conspiracy effects a deprivation redressable under 1985(3). See ; at 840, n. 2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan *340 Assn. v. A conspiracy that seeks to interfere with law enforcement officers' performance of their duties entails sufficient involvement with the State to implicate the federally protected right to choose an abortion and to give rise to a cause of action under 1985(3). We have not previously considered whether class-based animus is an element of a claim under the second clause of 1985(3). We have, however, confronted the question whether the class-based animus requirement developed in should extend to another part of the Ku Klux Act, the portion now codified at 1985(2). That provision, which generally proscribes conspiracies to interfere with federal proceedings, was enacted as part of the same paragraph of the Ku Klux Act that also contained what is now 1985(3).[36] For that reason, in the defendants contended that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the alleged conspiracy to intimidate witnesses had been motivated by the kind of class-based animus described in The Court of Appeals rejected this contention. Its reasoning, which we briefly summarized in Kush, is highly relevant here: "Noting the Federal Government's unquestioned constitutional authority
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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highly relevant here: "Noting the Federal Government's unquestioned constitutional authority to protect the processes of its own courts, and the absence of any need to limit the first part of 1985(2) to avoid creating a general federal tort law, the Court of Appeals declined to impose the limitation set forth in " Kush suggests that `s strictly construed class-based animus requirement, developed for the first clause of 1985(3), should not limit the very different second clause. We explained: *341 "Although itself arose under the first clause of 1985(3), petitioners argue that its reasoning should be applied to the remaining portions of 1985 as well. We cannot accept that argument for three reasons. First, the scope of the opinion is carefully confined to `the portion of 1985(3) now before us,' [, 403 U. S.,] at 99; see also There is no suggestion in the opinion that its reasoning applies to any other portion of 1985. Second, the analysis in the opinion relied heavily on the fact that the sponsors of the 1871 bill added the `equal protection' language in response to objections that the `enormous sweep of the original language' vastly extended federal authority and displaced state control over private That legislative background does not apply to the portions of the statute that prohibit interference with federal officers, federal courts, or federal elections. Third, and of greatest importance, the statutory language that provides the textual basis for the `class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus' requirement simply does not appear in the portion of the statute that applies to this case." It is true, of course, that the reference to "equal protection" appears in both the first and the second clauses of 1985(3), but the potentially unlimited scope of the former is avoided by the language in the latter that confines its reach to conspiracies directed at the "constituted authorities of any State or Territory." The deliberate decision in that "carefully confined" its holding to "the portion of 1985(3) now before us," coupled with the inapplicability of `s rationale to the second clause, makes it entirely appropriate to give that clause a different and more natural construction. Limited to conspiracies that are sufficiently massive to supplant local law enforcement authorities, the second clause requires no further restriction to honor the congressional purpose of creating an effective civil rights remedy without *342 federalizing all tort law. The justification for a narrow reading of `s judicially crafted requirement of class-based animus simply does not apply to the state hindrance clause. An action under that clause entails both a
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Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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hindrance clause. An action under that clause entails both a violation of the victims' constitutional rights and state involvement. This situation is so far removed from the question whether facially neutral legislation constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause that the strict intent standards developed in that area can have no application. In the context of a conspiracy that hinders state officials and violates respondents' constitutional rights, class-based animus can be inferred if the conspirators' conduct burdens an activity engaged in predominantly by members of the class. Indeed, it would be faithful both to and to the text of the state hindrance clause to hold that the clause proscribes conspiracies to prevent local law enforcement authorities from protecting activities that are performed exclusively by members of a protected class, even if the conspirators' animus were directed at the activity rather than at the class members. Thus, even if yarmulkes, rather than Jews, were the object of the conspirators' animus, the statute would prohibit a conspiracy to hinder the constituted authorities from protecting access to a synagogue or other place of worship for persons wearing yarmulkes. Like other civil rights legislation, this statute should be broadly construed to provide federal protection against the kind of disorder and anarchy that the States are unable to control effectively. With class-based animus understood as I have suggested, the conduct covered by the state hindrance clause would be as follows: a large-scale conspiracy that violates the victims' constitutional rights by overwhelming the local authorities and that, by its nature, victimizes predominantly members of a particular class. I doubt whether it would be possible to describe conduct closer to the core of 1985(3)'s coverage. This account would perfectly describe the conduct of the Ku Klux Klan, the group whose activities prompted the enactment *343 of the statute. This description also applies to petitioners, who have conspired to deprive women of their constitutional right to choose an abortion by overwhelming the local police and by blockading clinics with the intended effect of preventing women from exercising a right only they possess. The state hindrance clause thus provides an independent ground for affirmance.[37] VIII In sum, it is irrelevant whether the Court is correct in its assumption that "opposition to abortion" does not necessarily evidence an intent to disfavor women. Many opponents of *344 abortion respect both the law and the rights of others to make their own decisions on this important matter. Petitioners, however, are not mere opponents of abortion; they are defiant lawbreakers who have engaged in massive concerted conduct that is designed to
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,993 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112805/bray-v-alexandria-womens-health-clinic/
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have engaged in massive concerted conduct that is designed to prevent all women from making up their own minds about not only the issue of abortion in general, but also whether they should (or will) exercise a right that all women ÔÇö and only women ÔÇö possess. Indeed, the error that infects the Court's entire opinion is the unstated and mistaken assumption that this is a case about opposition to abortion. It is not. It is a case about the exercise of federal power to control an interstate conspiracy to commit illegal acts. I have no doubt that most opponents of abortion, like most members of the citizenry at large, understand why the existence of federal jurisdiction is appropriate in a case of this kind. The Court concludes its analysis of 1985(3) by suggesting that a contrary interpretation would have condemned the massive "sit-ins" that were conducted to promote desegregation in the 1960's ÔÇö a "wildly improbable result." See ante, at 282. This suggestion is profoundly misguided. It assumes that we must totally reject the class-based animus requirement to affirm the District Court, when, in fact, we need only construe that requirement to satisfy its purpose. Moreover, the demonstrations in the 1960's were motivated by a desire to extend the equal protection of the laws to all classes ÔÇö not to impose burdens on any disadvantaged class. Those who engaged in the nonviolent "sit-ins" to which the Court refers were challenging "a political and economic system that had denied them the basic rights of dignity and equality that this country had fought a Civil War to secure." The suggestion that there is an analogy between their struggle to achieve equality and these petitioners' concerted efforts to deny women equal access to a constitutionally protected privilege may have rhetorical appeal, but it is *345 insupportable on the record before us, and does not justify the majority's parsimonious construction of an important federal statute.[38] I respectfully dissent.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
dissenting
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Bowers v. Hardwick
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111738/bowers-v-hardwick/
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This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, ante, at 191, than was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," namely, "the right to be let alone." The statute at issue, denies individuals the right to decide for themselves whether to engage in particular forms of private, consensual sexual activity. The Court concludes that 16-6-2 is valid essentially because "the laws of many still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." Ante, at 190. But the fact that the moral judgments expressed by statutes like 16-6-2 may be " `natural and familiar ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United' " quoting Like Justice Holmes, believe that "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry V. t is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, believe we must analyze respondent Hardwick's claim in the light of the values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy. f that right means anything, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making choices about the most intimate *200 aspects of their lives, it must do more than assert that the choice they have made is an " `abominable crime not fit to be named among Christians.' " 46 S.E. 8, n its haste to reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the Constitution does not "confe[r] a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy," ante, at 190, the Court relegates the actual statute being challenged to a footnote and ignores the procedural posture of the case before it. A fair reading of the statute and of the complaint clearly reveals that the majority has distorted the question this case presents. First, the Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity is particularly hard to justify in light of the broad language Georgia has used. Unlike the Court, the Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens that their lives may be controlled in a way that
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
dissenting
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Bowers v. Hardwick
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111738/bowers-v-hardwick/
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that their lives may be controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it limited the choices of those other citizens. Cf. ante, at 188, n. 2. Rather, Georgia has provided that "[a] person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another." (a) The sex or status of the persons who engage in the act is irrelevant as a matter of state law. n fact, to the extent can discern a legislative purpose for Georgia's 1968 enactment of 16-6-2, that purpose seems to have been to broaden the coverage of the law to reach heterosexual as well as homosexual activity.[1] therefore see no basis for the *201 Court's decision to treat this case as an "as applied" challenge to 16-6-2, see ante, at 188, n. 2, or for Georgia's attempt, both in its brief and at oral argument, to defend 16-6-2 solely on the grounds that it prohibits homosexual activity. Michael Hardwick's standing may rest in significant part on Georgia's apparent willingness to enforce against homosexuals a law it seems not to have any desire to enforce against heterosexuals. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5; cf. 0 F.2d 1202, But his claim that 16-6-2 involves an unconstitutional intrusion into his privacy and his right of intimate association does not depend in any way on his sexual orientation. Second, disagree with the Court's refusal to consider whether 16-6-2 runs afoul of the Eighth or Ninth Amendments or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ante, at 196, n. 8. Respondent's complaint expressly invoked the Ninth Amendment, see App. 6, and he relied heavily before this Court on which identifies that Amendment as one of the specific constitutional provisions giving "life and substance" to our understanding of privacy. See Brief for Respondent Hardwick 10-12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. More importantly, the procedural posture of the case requires that we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment if there is any ground on which respondent may be entitled to relief. This case is before us on petitioner's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). See App. 17. t is a well-settled principle of law that "a complaint should not be dismissed merely because a plaintiff's allegations do not support the particular legal theory he advances, for the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." *202 ; see F.2d 7,
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Bowers v. Hardwick
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111738/bowers-v-hardwick/
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relief on any possible theory." *202 ; see F.2d 7, ; ; United ; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1357, pp. 601-602 ; see also Thus, even if respondent did not advance claims based on the Eighth or Ninth Amendments, or on the Equal Protection Clause, his complaint should not be dismissed if any of those provisions could entitle him to relief. need not reach either the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause issues because believe that Hardwick has stated a cognizable claim that 16-6-2 interferes with constitutionally protected interests in privacy and freedom of intimate association. But neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause is so clearly irrelevant that a claim resting on either provision should be peremptorily dismissed.[2] The Court's cramped reading of the *203 issue before it makes for a short opinion, but it does little to make for a persuasive one. "Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government." 4 U.S. 747, n construing the right to privacy, the Court has proceeded along two somewhat distinct, *204 albeit complementary, lines. First, it has recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain decisions that are properly for the individual to make. E. g., ; Second, it has recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain places without regard for the particular activities in which the individuals who occupy them are engaged. E. g., United ; ; The case before us implicates both the decisional and the spatial aspects of the right to privacy. A The Court concludes today that none of our prior cases dealing with various decisions that individuals are entitled to make free of governmental interference "bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case." Ante, at 190-191. While it is true that these cases may be characterized by their connection to protection of the family, see the Court's conclusion that they extend no further than this boundary ignores the warning in against "clos[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's life. "[T]he concept of privacy embodies the `moral fact that a person belongs to himself and
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Bowers v. Hardwick
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111738/bowers-v-hardwick/
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the `moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole.' " 4 U. S., at 777, n. 5 quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 288-289 And so we protect the decision whether to *205 marry precisely because marriage "is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." We protect the decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters so dramatically an individual's self-definition, not because of demographic considerations or the Bible's command to be fruitful and multiply. Cf. And we protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not because of a preference for stereotypical households. Cf. -506 The Court recognized in 468 U. S., at that the "ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties with others." Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality," Paris Adult Theatre ; see also The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds. See Karst, The Freedom of ntimate Association, 89 Yale L. J. 624, 7 ; cf. ; n a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose *206 how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make different choices. For example, in holding that the clearly important state interest in public education should give way to a competing claim by the Amish to the effect that extended formal schooling threatened their way of life, the Court declared: "There can be no assumption that today's majority is `right' and the Amish and others like them are `wrong.' A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different." The Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Bowers v. Hardwick
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111738/bowers-v-hardwick/
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merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others. B The behavior for which Hardwick faces prosecution occurred in his own home, a place to which the Fourth Amendment attaches special significance. The Court's treatment of this aspect of the case is symptomatic of its overall refusal to consider the broad principles that have informed our treatment of privacy in specific cases. Just as the right to privacy is more than the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to engage in specific behavior, so too, protecting the physical integrity of the home is more than merely a means of protecting specific activities that often take place there. Even when our understanding of the contours of the right to privacy depends on "reference to a `place,' " "the essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is `not the breaking of [a person's] doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,' but rather is `the invasion of his indefensible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.' " 4 U.S. 207, *207 quoting Boyd v. United 0 The Court's interpretation of the pivotal case of is entirely unconvincing. Stanley held that Georgia's undoubted power to punish the public distribution of constitutionally unprotected, obscene material did not permit the State to punish the private possession of such material. According to the majority here, Stanley relied entirely on the First Amendment, and thus, it is claimed, sheds no light on cases not involving printed materials. Ante, at 195. But that is not what Stanley said. Rather, the Stanley Court anchored its holding in the Fourth Amendment's special protection for the individual in his home: " `The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.' "These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us. He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home." -565, quoting 277 U. S., at The central place that Stanley gives Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead, a case raising no First Amendment
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Bowers v. Hardwick
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111738/bowers-v-hardwick/
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Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead, a case raising no First Amendment claim, shows that Stanley rested as much on the Court's understanding of the Fourth Amendment as it did on the First. ndeed, in Paris Adult Theatre the Court suggested that reliance on the Fourth *208 Amendment not only supported the Court's outcome in Stanley but actually was necessary to it: "f obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself carried with it a `penumbra' of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court would not have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the narrow basis of the `privacy of the home,' which was hardly more than a reaffirmation that `a man's home is his castle.' " "The right of the people to be secure in their houses," expressly guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, is perhaps the most "textual" of the various constitutional provisions that inform our understanding of the right to privacy, and thus cannot agree with the Court's statement that "[t]he right pressed upon us here has no support in the text of the Constitution," ante, at 195. ndeed, the right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy. The Court's failure to comprehend the magnitude of the liberty interests at stake in this case leads it to slight the question whether petitioner, on behalf of the State, has justified Georgia's infringement on these interests. believe that neither of the two general justifications for 16-6-2 that petitioner has advanced warrants dismissing respondent's challenge for failure to state a claim. First, petitioner asserts that the acts made criminal by the statute may have serious adverse consequences for "the general public health and welfare," such as spreading communicable diseases or fostering other criminal activity. Brief for Petitioner 37. nasmuch as this case was dismissed by the District Court on the pleading, it is not surprising that the record before us is barren of any evidence to support petitioner's claim.[3] n light of the state of the record, see *209 no justification for the Court's attempt to equate the private, consensual sexual activity at issue here with the "possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods," ante, at 195, to which Stanley refused to extend its n. 11. None of the behavior so mentioned in Stanley can properly be viewed as "[v]ictimless," ante, at 195: drugs and weapons are inherently dangerous, see, e. g., McLaughlin v. United 4 U.S. 16 and for property to be "stolen," someone must have been
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Bowers v. Hardwick
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111738/bowers-v-hardwick/
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and for property to be "stolen," someone must have been wrongfully deprived of it. Nothing in the record before the Court provides any justification for finding the activity forbidden by 16-6-2 to be physically dangerous, either to the persons engaged in it or to others.[4] *210 The core of petitioner's defense of 16-6-2, however, is that respondent and others who engage in the conduct prohibited by 16-6-2 interfere with Georgia's exercise of the " `right of the Nation and of the to maintain a decent society,' " Paris Adult Theater -60, quoting Essentially, petitioner argues, and the Court agrees, that the fact that the acts described in 16-6-2 "for hundreds of years, if not thousands, have been uniformly condemned as immoral" is a sufficient reason to permit a State to ban them today. Brief for Petitioner 19; see ante, at 190, 192-194, 196. cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court's security. See, e. g., ; ;[5] As Justice Jackson wrote so eloquently *211 for the Court in West Virginia Board of "we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order." See also Karst, 89 Yale L. J., at 627. t is precisely because the issue raised by this case touches the heart of what makes individuals what they are that we should be especially sensitive to the rights of those whose choices upset the majority. The assertion that "traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe" the conduct involved, Brief for Petitioner 20, cannot provide an adequate justification for 16-6-2. That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the behavior at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments on the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine. See, e. g., 429- ; Thus, far from buttressing his case, petitioner's invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical status during the Middle Ages undermines his suggestion that 16-6-2 represents a legitimate use of secular coercive power.[6] A State can no more punish private behavior because *212 of religious intolerance
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Bowers v. Hardwick
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111738/bowers-v-hardwick/
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no more punish private behavior because *212 of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus. "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." No matter how uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority of this Court, we have held that "[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty." 422 U.S. 5, See also ; United Dept. of Nor can 16-6-2 be justified as a "morally neutral" exercise of Georgia's power to "protect the public environment," Paris Adult Theatre -69. Certainly, some private behavior can affect the fabric of society as a whole. Reasonable people may differ about whether particular sexual acts are moral or immoral, but "we have ample evidence for believing that people will not abandon morality, will not think any better of murder, cruelty and dishonesty, merely because some private sexual practice which they abominate is not punished by the law." H. L. A. Hart, mmorality and Treason, reprinted in The Law as Literature 220, 225 Petitioner and the Court fail to see the difference between laws that protect public sensibilities and those that enforce private morality. Statutes banning *213 public sexual activity are entirely consistent with protecting the individual's liberty interest in decisions concerning sexual relations: the same recognition that those decisions are intensely private which justifies protecting them from governmental interference can justify protecting individuals from unwilling exposure to the sexual activities of others. But the mere fact that intimate behavior may be punished when it takes place in public cannot dictate how can regulate intimate behavior that occurs in intimate places. See Paris Adult Theatre n. 13 ).[7] This case involves no real interference with the rights of others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest, cf. 4 U.S. 54, let alone an interest that can justify invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live their lives differently. V t took but three years for the Court to see the error in its analysis in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. *214 586 (1940), and to recognize that the threat to national cohesion posed by a refusal to salute the flag was vastly outweighed by the threat to those same values posed by compelling such a salute. See West Virginia Board of can only hope that here, too, the
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
concurring
|
Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111789/clarke-v-securities-industry-assn/
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Analysis of the purposes of the branching limitations on national banks demonstrates that respondent is well within the "zone of interest" as that test has been applied in our *410 prior decisions. Because I believe that these cases call for no more than a straightforward application of those prior precedents, I do not join Part II of the Court's opinion, which, in my view, engages in a wholly unnecessary exegesis on the "zone of interest" test. I do join the remainder of the Court's opinion, which upholds the Comptroller of the Currency's interpretation of the McFadden Act. Petitioners argument that respondent lacks standing to challenge the Comptroller's decision in these cases is predicated on their reading of the purpose behind the branching limitations of the McFadden Act. They argue that Congress' only concern in not allowing national banks to maintain more branches than their state counterparts may maintain under state law was to ensure that the national banks not use their newly granted branching authority to gain a competitive edge over state banks.[1] Close examination of the Act and its history, however, convinces me that this was not the only purpose of the branching restrictions. Rather, the McFadden Act was in large part a compromise in which Congress started from a general antibranching rule and created a limited exception just large enough to allow national banks to compete effectively with state banks, but also narrow enough to continue to serve the policy of exercising control on the financial power of national banks. The general policy against branching was based in part on a concern about the national bank's potential for becoming massive financial institutions that would establish monopolies on financial services. Petitioners' "zone of interest" argument is therefore predicated on too narrow a reading of the statutory purposes, and hence too narrow a view of the applicable zone of interest that the broad legislative scheme sought to protect. The National Currency Act of 1863, and the National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, which provided, inter alia, for federal chartering of national banks, *411 ended the 57-year hiatus during which there was no federal involvement in banking. The National Bank Act in Rev. Stat. 5190 provided that "[t]he usual business of each national banking association shall be transacted at an office or banking-house located in the place specified in its organization certificate,"[2] and in 1902 the Comptroller of the Currency stated his view that this statute prohibited national banks from branching. See Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, H. R. Doc. No. 10, Vol. 2, 72d Cong., 2d
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
concurring
|
Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111789/clarke-v-securities-industry-assn/
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H. R. Doc. No. 10, Vol. 2, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 45-47 (1902). In 1911 the Attorney General issued an opinion affirming that view. He explained that neither the statute nor national banks' inherent powers gave them the legal authority to establish branches. Lowry National Bank, 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 81, approved in First National Bank in St. By the early 1900's, some States, most notably California, had begun to authorize their state banks to branch. See J. Chapman & R. Branch Banking 84-92 (1980 reprint); G. Cartinhour & R. Branch, Group and Chain Banking and Historical Survey of Branch Banking in the United States 195-215 (1980 reprint). Controversy soon began to brew over the prohibition on national banks' branching. See Chapman & Many argued that it was restraining the national banks too much; not only was it having the salutary effect of preventing the national banks from overpowering other institutions, but it was also having the negative effect of threatening the national banks' vitality by not allowing them to compete fairly with their state counterparts. Others argued that branching was inherently evil and dangerous, and that Congress should certainly not allow national banks to branch, even though Congress might not be able to prohibit States from allowing their banks to engage in branching. See generally C. *412 The Branch Banking Question 2-16 (1926); S. South-worth, Branch Banking in the United States 163-184 (1928). Congress began to focus on the branch banking issue in 1922, when the Comptroller of the Currency called for legislative action to reduce the competitive disparity. The next five years saw extensive legislative debate on the branch banking crisis and the optimum way to deal with it. See generally As JUSTICE WHITE explains, ante, at 401-402, the legislation that was eventually passed in 1927, the McFadden Act, reflected a compromise between these factions. On the one hand, the antibranching group succeeded in preventing a wholesale abandonment of all branching restrictions; on the other hand, the probranching group succeeded in obtaining legislation that would allow national banks to establish branches within the city limits if state banks could do so. See Chapman &[3] The campaign against unlimited branch banking of national banks was far more than just a campaign to protect the local bank lobby.[4] There was real fear of the effect that a central *413 bank with unlimited branching power could have on the financial and political climate of the country.[5] Senator Reed, for example, exclaimed: "There are advocates of the general branch bank system. There were advocates of a single national bank, and we had
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
concurring
|
Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111789/clarke-v-securities-industry-assn/
|
were advocates of a single national bank, and we had one once, with branches scattered almost everywhere. It grew so arrogant and so powerful that it dared look `Old Hickory' Jackson in the eye and tell him it could put up and pull down Presidents, and it required a vast amount of assurance for any capitalist in the world to say that to old Andrew Jackson. Andrew Jackson struck down the branch bank system, and he lives in song and story, and in the hearts of the American people, because he destroyed an institution that was creating a complete monopoly of credits and of money." 66 Cong. Rec. 4438 (1925). The McFadden Act's branching limitations were thus geared in part "to prevent monopoly and to prevent an extreme concentration of financial power." See Hearings on Federal Branching Policy before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 408 (1977) (Professor Kenneth Scott explaining various justifications for the Act). It is quite apparent that in the final compromise legislation this view was well represented.[6] See also ante, at 401-402, and n. 16. *414 The legislative spirit of maintaining restraints on national banks' branching while allowing them just enough flexibility to compete with state banks was again in force six years later when Congress enacted the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), which allowed national banks to maintain branches outside of their home cities if state banks could. See 12 U.S. C. 36(c)(1). As the Court explained in First National the actual impetus for the changes in the branching rules at that time was the Comptroller of the Currency's advocacy of a total elimination of all branching restrictions. See at 259 (citing Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency pursuant to S. Res. No. 71, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 7-10 (1931)). The proposal engendered the same sort of debate that the McFadden Act had, with some seeking a total lifting of restrictions on branch banking, and others wanting no further relaxation of the restrictions. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 584, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); 76 Cong. Rec. 9890-9899 (1932). In setting out the reasons for their opposition, many Members of Congress described the issue in terms of stopping the undue concentration of financial power. For example, when the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency reported out a bill which would have allowed national banks to establish branches without regard to state law, the minority Report complained: "Advocates of the branch-banking system ignore the
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
concurring
|
Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111789/clarke-v-securities-industry-assn/
|
minority Report complained: "Advocates of the branch-banking system ignore the fact that such a system has never been tried in a country of 120,000,000 population, 3,000 miles across. They ignore the tendency in this country to centralize control of everything, and especially of credit. I believe that the branch-banking system would put us at the mercy of the *415 financial centers." S. Rep. No. 584, The bill discussed in that Report was not enacted; instead, in the midst of a filibuster by the antibranching forces, another compromise was reached, which continued to contain a general limitation on branching. As one of the conferees explained, "the controversy over the respective merits of what are known as `unit banking' and `branch banking systems,' a controversy that has been alive and sharp for years," was not settled. "It is not here proposed to give the advocates of branch banking any advantage." 77 Cong. Rec. 5896 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Luce).[7] Petitioners therefore misconstrue the statute when they assert that the sole purpose of the restriction on branching was to ensure that national banks not use their new branching power to gain a competitive advantage over state banks, whose branching power was limited by state law. Petitioners argue that the McFadden Act represented a rejection of any earlier or contemporaneous sentiment against branch banking in general, and that the restrictions were merely a throw-in to protect the state banks whose own States may have precluded them from branching. Were that really the case, I would agree that other competitors were merely incidental beneficiaries of the legislation, and that respondent, *416 which does not represent state banks, would fall outside of the protected zone of interest. But this argument is not faithful to the actual history. Instead, it is clear that Congress maintained restrictions on branching for all the reasons that have been cited. The exception that was created in 1927 and broadened in 1933 was merely a concession to the reality that unless national banks could establish at least some branches they could not effectively compete with state banks that could legally branch. While protecting state banks from the effects of the new branching power was certainly one of Congress' goals, it is equally certain that the legislation also sought to control national banks for the sake of the aforementioned broader competitive interests.[8] Given this understanding of the multiple purposes behind the branch banking restrictions, this case falls squarely within our decisions in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, ; Arnold ; and Investment Company Just as the Court found in Association of Data
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Bennett v. New Jersey
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/
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The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, was a part of the broader program that President *647 Johnson characterized as the "war on poverty."[1] Title I of the Act authorized the expenditure of large sums of federal money to improve the education of children in low-income areas. The statute, however, did not contain a specific definition of the schools that would qualify for assistance under the program. It merely stated that "payments under this subchapter will be used for programs and projects (A) which are designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children in school attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low-income families." 20 U.S. C. 241e(a)(1) (1976 ed.). As the case comes to us, the underlying issue is whether 10 of the public schools in Newark, New Jersey,[2] that received federal assistance in the 1971-1972 school year were located "in school attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low-income families" within the meaning of the Act as it was enacted and as it was clarified by subsequent amendments. If funds were incorrectly allocated to those schools, the total federal grant was not increased; instead, the consequence was a lower distribution to other Newark schools that admittedly qualified for federal aid.[3] There is *648 no dispute about the fact that the money that was allocated to these schools like that allotted to over 60 other schools in Newark was used in programs and projects properly designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.[4] The only "misuse" of federal funds that is at issue is the suggestion that the money should have been spent in different school-attendance areas. The remedy for this misuse is not a redistribution to the more needy areas, but is a recapture of the funds by the Federal Government. The Court agrees that the areas in dispute would have qualified for federal assistance under the statute as amended in 1978, and under the Secretary's regulations that are now in effect. Ante, at 645. I think the Court would also agree that the Secretary had authority under the original Act to issue the regulations that are in effect today; indeed, in 1976 the Secretary did issue regulations that would have qualified seven of the attendance areas that are now in dispute.[5] As the case comes to us it is also clear that we must assume that none of the disputed areas qualified under the Secretary's regulations that were in effect in 1971-1972.[6] Thus, the *649 question for decision is whether the legal standard that should govern
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Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
dissenting
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Bennett v. New Jersey
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/
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for decision is whether the legal standard that should govern the disposition of this controversy is to be derived from the Secretary's regulations in effect during the 1971-1972 school year which admittedly were violated or from the statutory language, which plainly was broad enough to authorize these expenditures when the statute was first enacted in 1965 as well as after its amendment in 1978. The Court holds that the now repudiated regulations must be strictly enforced. I agree with the Court's view that the fact that its holding produces an inequitable outcome does not authorize a reviewing court to depart from the controlling legal standard,[7] but I am convinced that the Court has seriously misread the intent of Congress. I In order to understand the impact of the regulations that must be strictly enforced under the Court's holding and which I submit Congress later repudiated it is useful to set forth the relevant facts concerning one of the school-attendance areas where federal money was allegedly "misused." The federal auditors disallowed expenditures of $104,842 for special programs at Newark's South 17th Street Elementary School. The disallowance was based on a determination that only 33.5% of the 1,549 children in the school were from low-income families.[8] Because the average percentage of children from low-income families in the entire *650 Newark School District was slightly higher 33.9% the South 17th Street Elementary School did not satisfy one of the eligibility criteria in the Secretary's regulations.[9] Under those regulations, unless the entire Newark School District qualified for assistance, only those school-attendance areas in which the percentage exceeded the districtwide average could qualify. Thus, even though South 17th Street's percentage of 33.5 would have qualified for federal aid in any other school district in New Jersey and, indeed, in almost any school district in the entire United States,[10] it did not meet the Secretary's rigid standard. *651 When the anomalous consequences of this regulation came to the attention of Congress during its consideration of amendments to the Act in 1974, the House Committee on Labor and Education issued a Report that expressed the opinion that "it was never intended by the Act to render any school with a 30% concentration ineligible."[11] Presumably it was that Report that prompted the Secretary to modify the regulations in 1976 to permit school-attendance areas with more than 30% of the children from low-income families to qualify even though the districtwide percentage was even higher.[12] Regardless of whether that is a correct explanation *652 of the regulatory change in 1976, it is significant that
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Bennett v. New Jersey
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/
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of the regulatory change in 1976, it is significant that the Secretary then interpreted the 1965 Act as allowing a school in a 30% area to qualify even though its attendance area had a lower percentage than the districtwide average. In its consideration of the 1978 Amendments, Congress plainly expressed its disapproval of the kind of interpretation of the 1965 Act that is reflected in the regulations involved in this case. One example, described in the hearings before the Subcommittee on Elementary, Secondary and Vocational Education, provides a precise analogue to this case: "In Baltimore City any school district which has less than 30.3% Title I children was not eligible to receive Title I funds. This minimum is higher than the maximum incidence in schools receiving Title I funds in 11 other counties. This means there are schools in relatively affluent counties receiving Title I assistance with no more than 5% Title I children while schools in Baltimore City with 25-30% Title I children are excluded from the program."[13] In response to testimony of that kind, Congress amended the statute to make it clear that a local school district could designate any attendance area with a 25% incidence of poverty as eligible for Title I funds. The House Report explained the purpose of the change (which originally proposed a reduction to 20%): "[C]urrent OE regulations [45 CFR 116a-20(b)(2)] provide that any school attendance area with 30 percent *653 or more children from low-income families (based on eligibility for free lunch) may be designated a target area. The Committee bill reduces this minimum to 20 percent out of a concern that inflexible targeting requirement could force some school districts with very high incidences of poverty to declare school[s] with 20 percent low-income enrollment ineligible, while schools with only 10 percent low-income enrollment or less might be eligible in wealthier neighboring districts."[14] When Congress amended the Act in 1978 to provide that any school-attendance area would be eligible for federal assistance if at least 25% of its children were from low-income families, it did not change the basic eligibility standard that had been adopted in 1965. Thus, the statute as amended in 1978, like the statute prior to those Amendments, provides that a "local educational agency shall use funds received under this subchapter in school attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low-income families (hereinafter referred to as `eligible school attendance areas')." 20 U.S. C. 2732(a)(1). In adding the specific provision that a local educational agency may designate any school-attendance area in which at least 25% of the children are from
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Bennett v. New Jersey
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111376/bennett-v-new-jersey/
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in which at least 25% of the children are from low-income families, Congress did not broaden that standard, but merely ensured that the Secretary would not improperly narrow it. Thus, the only practical effect of the 1978 Amendments was to deny the Secretary the legal authority to promulgate the kind of rigid regulation that is being strictly enforced today. II In my opinion this is plainly a case for application of the normal rule that a reviewing court must apply the law in effect at the time of its decision. As JUSTICE WHITE correctly noted when this litigation was before the Court two Terms ago: *654 "A federal court or administrative agency must `apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.' Accord, Gulf Offshore Here, nothing in the 1978 Amendments or the legislative history suggests that the Amendments were not intended to be applied retroactively, and their application to this case would not result in manifest injustice." In my view, it is the Court's holding, rather than an application of the 1978 Amendments to this case, that results in manifest injustice. Ever since the statute was enacted in 1965 Congress has expressed a strong preference for allowing broad discretion to local governmental units in the administration of these federally funded programs.[15] We should therefore adopt a strong presumption supportive of a local school board's decision concerning the proper allocation of money among different school-attendance areas subject to its jurisdiction.[16] Finally, it is appropriate to note that, just as the 1978 Amendments *655 themselves protected local school districts from overly prescriptive federal regulations, Congress in 1981 again identified the same interest in further amendatory legislation. Thus, the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act in 1981 directed that federal assistance be provided "in a manner which will eliminate burdensome, unnecessary and unproductive paperwork and free the schools of unnecessary federal supervision, direction and control," and specifically indicated that federal assistance of the kind involved in this case would be most effective "if educational officials, principals, teachers, and supporting personnel are freed from overly prescriptive regulations and administrative burdens which are not necessary for fiscal accountability and make no contribution to the instructional program." Ibid.[17] In sum, I simply cannot understand how the Court reaches the conclusion that its disposition of this case accords with the intent of Congress. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,983 | 14 |
majority
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South Dakota v. Neville
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110832/south-dakota-v-neville/
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, held that a State could force a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against We now address a question left open in and hold that the admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to such a test likewise does not offend the right against I Two Madison, South Dakota, police officers stopped respondent's car after they saw him fail to stop at a stop sign. The officers asked respondent for his driver's license and asked him to get out of the car. As he left the car, respondent staggered and fell against the car to support himself. *5 The officers smelled alcohol on his breath. Respondent did not have a driver's license, and informed the officers that it was revoked after a previous driving-while-intoxicated conviction. The officers asked respondent to touch his finger to his nose and to walk a straight line. When respondent failed these field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest and read his rights.[1] Respondent acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed to talk without a lawyer present. App. 11. Reading from a printed card, the officers then asked respondent to submit to a blood-alcohol test and warned him that he could lose his license if he refused.[2] Respondent refused to take the test, stating "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." The officers again read the request to *6 submit to a test, and then took respondent to the police station, where they read the request to submit a third time. Respondent continued to refuse to take the test, again saying he was too drunk to pass it.[3] South Dakota law specifically declares that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test "may be admissible into evidence at the trial." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 32-23-10.1[4] Nevertheless, respondent sought to suppress all evidence of his refusal to take the blood-alcohol test. The Circuit Court granted the suppression motion for three reasons: the South Dakota statute allowing evidence of refusal violated respondent's federal constitutional rights; the officers failed to advise respondent that the refusal could be used against him at trial; and the refusal was irrelevant to the issues before the court. The State appealed from the entire order. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the act of refusal on the grounds that 32-23-10.1, which allows the introduction of this evidence, violated the federal and state privilege against [5] The court reasoned that *7 the refusal was a communicative act involving respondent's testimonial capacities and that the State compelled this communication
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,983 | 14 |
majority
|
South Dakota v. Neville
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110832/south-dakota-v-neville/
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respondent's testimonial capacities and that the State compelled this communication by forcing respondent " `to choose between submitting to a perhaps unpleasant examination and producing *8 testimonial evidence against himself,' " cert. denied, ).[6] Since other jurisdictions have found no Fifth Amendment violation from the admission of evidence of refusal to submit to blood-alcohol tests,[7] we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. II The situation underlying this case that of the drunk driver occurs with tragic frequency on our Nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here. This Court, although not having the daily contact with the problem that the state courts have, has repeatedly lamented the tragedy. See ; (deploring "traffic irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways"); (footnote omitted) ("The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our *9 wars"); As part of its program to deter drinkers from driving, South Dakota has enacted an "implied consent" law. S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 32-23-10 This statute declares that any person operating a vehicle in South Dakota is deemed to have consented to a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for driving while intoxicated. In this Court upheld a state-compelled blood test against a claim that it infringed the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, made applicable to the through the Fourteenth Amendment.[8] We recognized that a coerced blood test infringed to some degree the "inviolability of the human personality" and the "requirement that the State procure the evidence against an accused `by its own independent labors,' " but noted the privilege has never been given the full scope suggested by the values it helps to protect. We therefore held that the privilege bars the State only from compelling "communications" or "testimony." Since a blood test was "physical or real" evidence rather than testimonial evidence, we found it unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege. then, clearly allows a State to force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood-alcohol test.[9] South Dakota, however, has declined to authorize its police officers to administer a blood-alcohol test against the suspect's will. Rather, to avoid violent confrontations, the South Dakota statute permits a suspect to *560 refuse the test, and indeed requires police officers to inform the suspect of his right to refuse. S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 32-23-10 This permission is not without a price, however. South Dakota law authorizes the Department of Public Safety, after providing the person who has refused the
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