author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,983 | 14 |
majority
|
Rice v. Rehner
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111011/rice-v-rehner/
|
federal prohibition against taking intoxicants into this Indian colony does not deprive the State of Nevada of its sovereignty over the area in question. The Federal Government does not assert *724 exclusive jurisdiction within the colony. Enactments of the Federal Government passed to protect and guard its Indian wards only affect the operation, within the colony, of such state laws as conflict with the federal enactments." United This historical tradition of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over the use and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country is justified by the relevant state interests involved. See Confederated at Rehner's distribution of liquor has a significant impact beyond the limits of the Pala Reservation. The State has an unquestionable interest in the liquor traffic that occurs within its borders, and this interest is independent of the authority conferred on the States by the Twenty-first Amendment. Liquor sold by Rehner to other Pala tribal members or to nonmembers can easily find its way out of the reservation and into the hands of those whom, for whatever reason, the State does not wish to possess alcoholic beverages, or to possess them through a distribution network over which the State has no control. This particular "spillover" effect is qualitatively different from any "spillover" effects of income taxes or taxes on cigarettes. "A State's regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate state intervention." New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache There can be no doubt that Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area. In the area of liquor regulation, we find no "congressional enactments demonstrating a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." 448 U. S., at With respect to the regulation of liquor transactions, as opposed to the state income taxation involved in Indians cannot be said to "possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government." -168. *725 The court below erred in thinking that there was some single notion of tribal sovereignty that served to direct any pre-emption analysis involving Indians. See[11] Because we find that there is no tradition of sovereign immunity that favors the Indians in this respect, and because we must consider that the activity in which Rehner seeks to engage potentially has a substantial impact beyond the reservation, we may accord little if any weight to any asserted interest in tribal sovereignty in this case. B We must next determine whether the state authority to license the sale of liquor is pre-empted by federal law. ; at The court below held that 1161
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,983 | 14 |
majority
|
Rice v. Rehner
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111011/rice-v-rehner/
|
federal law. ; at The court below held that 1161 pre-empted state regulation of licensing and distribution, and that the reference to state law in 1161 was not sufficiently explicit to permit application of the state licensing law. *726 We disagree with both aspects of the court's analysis. As we explained in Part II-A above, the tribes have long ago been divested of any inherent self-government over liquor regulation by both the explicit command of Congress and as a "necessary implication of their dependent status." Confederated Congress has also historically permitted concurrent state regulation through the imposition of criminal penalties on those who supply Indians with liquor, or who introduce liquor into Indian country. Therefore, this is not a case in which we apply a presumption of a lack of state authority. The presumption of pre-emption derives from the rule against construing legislation to repeal by implication some aspect of tribal self-government. See 426 U. S., -; (19). Because there is no aspect of exclusive tribal self-government that requires the deference reflected in our requirement that Congress expressly provide for the application of state law, we have only to determine whether application of the state licensing laws would "impair a right granted or reserved by federal law." Mescalero Apache 411 U. S., at ; Kake Our examination of 1161 leads us to conclude that Congress authorized, rather than pre-empted, state regulation over Indian liquor transactions. The legislative history of 1161 indicates both that Congress intended to remove federal prohibition on the sale and use of alcohol imposed on Indians in 1, and that Congress intended that state laws would apply of their own force to govern tribal liquor transactions as long as the tribe itself approved these transactions by enacting an ordinance. It is clear that by 1953, federal law curtailing liquor traffic with the Indians came to be "viewed as discriminatory." Indian Law, 82. As originally introduced, the bill that was later to become 1161 was intended only to "[t]o terminate Federal discriminations against the Indians of Arizona." See Hearings on H. R. 1055 before the Subcommittee on Indian *727 Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 6, 1953) (Hearings), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-4.[12] In hearings on this original bill, Representative Rhodes of Arizona, speaking on behalf of Representative Patten, who introduced the bill, stated that the sole purpose of the bill was to eliminate federal prohibition because it was discriminatory and had a detrimental effect on the Indians. He also commented that the bill would permit
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,983 | 14 |
majority
|
Rice v. Rehner
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111011/rice-v-rehner/
|
the Indians. He also commented that the bill would permit Arizona to amend its Constitution to remove the state prohibitions on sale of liquor to Indians and on introduction of liquor into Indian country. At these same hearings, Dillon S. Myer, Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior, submitted a revision of the bill proposed by Representative Patten. This revision was different from the original bill in a number of respects, the most important of which for present purposes is that the revision applied to all States, and not just to Arizona. In the context of discussing the bill, Commissioner Myer stated: "We certainly do not intend to try to revise State laws regarding Indians or anyone else, and it should be clear that is provided. [The revision] is intended to eliminate all of the sections in the statutes which discriminate against Indians and at the same time not interfere with State laws, and at the same time provide opportunity for the tribes to have prohibition on the reservation if they wish to, if it is not covered by State law." at A-26 A-27. In a later hearing, the Department of the Interior submitted an unofficial report in which it was again urged that federal Indian liquor prohibition be ended generally, and not just in Arizona, as long as liquor "transactions are in conformity with the ordinances of the tribes concerned and are not contrary to state law." See Hearings (May 6, 1953), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-54. Representative D'Ewart read into the record a telegram sent by the *728 Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council. The telegram indicated that the Navajo people supported the "anti-discrimination bill" as a measure to ensure "equal rights." at A-59. Representative Patten, the sponsor of the original bill, stated that "if this bill were passed to remove all discrimination, the Indians would still have to comply with State law in every regard" See Hearings (June 2, 1953), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-69. Representative Patten's remarks are particularly valuable in determining the meaning of 1161. As the sponsor of the bill, Representative Patten's interpretation is an " `authoritative guide to the statute's construction.' " The House Report explained the bill as eliminating discrimination caused by legislation "applicable only to Indians." H. R. Rep. No. 775, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1953). It included an official report of the Department of the Interior stating that federal prohibition would be lifted only if liquor "transactions are in conformity with the ordinances of the tribes
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,983 | 14 |
majority
|
Rice v. Rehner
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111011/rice-v-rehner/
|
"transactions are in conformity with the ordinances of the tribes concerned and are not contrary to State law." The Senate Report also expressed these sentiments: "if this bill is enacted, a State or local municipality or Indian tribes, if they desire, by the enactment of proper legislation or ordinance, to restrict the sales of intoxicants to Indians, they may do so." S. Rep. No. 722, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1953) It is clear then that Congress viewed 1161 as abolishing federal prohibition, and as legalizing Indian liquor transactions as long as those transactions conformed both with tribal ordinances and state law. It is also clear that Congress contemplated that its absolute but not exclusive power to regulate Indian liquor transactions would be delegated to the tribes themselves, and to the States, which historically shared *729 concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government in this area. Early administrative practice and our prior decision in United confirm this understanding of 1161. As noted above, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior was heavily involved in drafting the revised bill that eventually became 1161. In a 1954 administrative opinion, ironically rendered in response to California's interpretation of 1161, the Department's Solicitor stated plainly that the Bureau contemplated that liquor transactions on reservations would be subject to state laws, including state licensing laws. Specifically, the Solicitor stated: "The fact that a tribe in California may by ordinance authorize the sale of liquor on its reservation in packages for consumption only off the premises where it is sold would not, in my opinion, impinge upon the foregoing authority of the State Board of Equalization to license sales of liquor on such reservation for consumption both on and off the premises where the liquor is sold. In such circumstances, if any person so licensed by the State were to sell liquor on the reservation for on-premises consumption in accordance with his license, presumably he would be immune from State prosecution and, thus, the license issued by the State agency would be fully effective insofar as State law is concerned." Memo. Sol. M-36241 (Sept. 22, 1954), Liquor Tribal Ordinance Regulating Traffic Within Reservation, 2 Op. Solicitor of Dept. of Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 17-19, pp. 1648, 1650 In the Department of the Interior's Indian Law, 82-383, the Solicitor, citing the 1954 opinion, stated that "if a tribal ordinance permits only package sales on a reservation for consumption off the premises, a State license to sell for consumption on the premises will give protection only against *730 State prosecutions, but not against
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,983 | 14 |
majority
|
Rice v. Rehner
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111011/rice-v-rehner/
|
give protection only against *730 State prosecutions, but not against Federal prosecutions under section 1." (Footnote omitted; emphasis added.)[13] Both Rehner and the court below believed that 1161 was merely an exemption from federal criminal liability, and affirmatively empowered neither Indian tribes nor the State to regulate liquor transactions. See ; Brief for Respondent 9. Our decision in rejected this argument with respect to Indian tribes, and there is no reason to accept it with respect to the State. In we held that in enacting 1161 Congress intended to delegate to the tribes a portion of its authority over liquor transactions on reservations. Since we found this delegation on the basis of the statutory language requiring that liquor transactions conform "both with the laws of the State and with an ordinance duly adopted" by the governing tribe we would ignore the plain language of the statute *731 if we failed to find this same delegation in favor of the States.[14] Rehner argues that merely acknowledged that Indian tribes "possessed independent authority" over liquor transactions. Brief for Respondent 67. As we noted in the context of our discussion of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, we expressly declined to base our holding in on the doctrine of tribal self-government; rather, we held merely that the tribal authority was sufficient to protect the congressional decision to delegate licensing authority. See 419 U.S., at It cannot be doubted that the State's police power over liquor transactions within its borders is broad enough to protect the same congressional decision in favor of the State. The thrust of Rehner's argument, and the primary focus of the court below, is that state authority in this area is pre-empted because such authority requires an express statement by Congress in the light of the canon of construction that we quoted in : " `State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.' " -171 As we have established above, because of the lack of a tradition of self-government in the area of liquor regulation, it is not necessary that Congress indicate expressly that the State has jurisdiction to regulate the licensing and distribution of alcohol.[15] *732 Even if this canon of construction were applicable to this case, our result would be the same. The canon is quoted from Indian Law, at 845. In that same volume, the Solicitor of the Interior Department assumed that 1161 would result in state prosecutions for failing to have a state license. See 82-383. Whatever Congress had to do
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,983 | 14 |
majority
|
Rice v. Rehner
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111011/rice-v-rehner/
|
a state license. See 82-383. Whatever Congress had to do to provide "expressly" for the application of state law, the Solicitor obviously believed that Congress had done it in 1161. Indeed, even in we suggested that 1161 satisfied the canon of construction requiring that Congress expressly provide for application of state law. In discussing statutes that did satisfy the canon, we cited 1161 and stated that "state liquor laws may be applicable within reservations." n. 16.[16] More important, we have consistently refused to apply such a canon of construction when application would be tantamount to a formalistic disregard of congressional intent. "We give this rule [resolving ambiguities *733 in favor of Indians] the broadest possible scope, but it remains at base a canon for construing the complex treaties, statutes, and contracts which define the status of Indian tribes. A canon of construction is not a license to disregard clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent." DeCoteau v. District Court, See also In the present case, congressional intent is clear from the face of the statute and its legislative history.[17] We conclude that 1161 was intended to remove federal discrimination that resulted from the imposition of liquor prohibition on Native Americans. Congress was well aware that the Indians never enjoyed a tradition of tribal self-government insofar as liquor transactions were concerned. Congress was also aware that the States exercised concurrent authority insofar as prohibiting liquor transactions with Indians was concerned. By enacting 1161, Congress intended to delegate a portion of its authority to the tribes as well as to the States, so as to fill the void that would be created by the absence of the discriminatory federal prohibition. *734 Congress did not intend to make tribal members "super citizens" who could trade in a traditionally regulated substance free from all but self-imposed regulations. See Rather, we believe that in enacting 1161, Congress intended to recognize that Native Americans are not "weak and defenseless," and are capable of making personal decisions about alcohol consumption without special assistance from the Federal Government. Application of the state licensing scheme does not "impair a right granted or reserved by federal law." Kake[18] On the contrary, such application of state law *735 is "specifically authorized by Congress and [does] not interfere with federal policies concerning the reservations." Warren Trading Post III The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
concurring
|
C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087961/c-a-carbone-inc-v-clarkstown/
|
The town of Clarkstown's flow control ordinance requires all "acceptable waste" generated or collected in the town to be disposed of only at the town's solid waste facility. Town of Clarkstown, Local Law 9, 3.CD (1990) (Local Law 9). The Court holds today that this ordinance violates the Commerce Clause because it discriminates against interstate commerce. Ante, at 390. I agree with the majority's ultimate conclusion that the ordinance violates the dormant Commerce Clause. In my view, however, the town's ordinance is unconstitutional not because of facial or effective discrimination against interstate commerce, but rather because it imposes an excessive burden on interstate commerce. I also write separately to address the contention that flow control ordinances of this sort have been expressly authorized by Congress, and are thus outside the purview of the dormant Commerce Clause. I The scope of the dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial creation. On its face, the Clause provides only that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To regulate Commerce among the several States" U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. This Court long ago concluded, however, that the Clause not only empowers Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but also imposes limitations on the States in the absence of congressional action: "This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units. [W]hat is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation." H. P. Hood & Sons, *402 Our decisions therefore hold that the dormant Commerce Clause forbids States and their subdivisions to regulate interstate commerce. We have generally distinguished between two types of impermissible regulations. A facially nondiscriminatory regulation supported by a legitimate state interest which incidentally burdens interstate commerce is constitutional unless the burden on interstate trade is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. See Brown-Forman ; Where, however, a regulation "affirmatively" or "clearly" discriminates against interstate commerce on its face or in practical effect, it violates the Constitution unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to protectionism. See ; Of course, there is no clear line separating these categories. "In either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity." Brown-Forman at Local Law 9 prohibits anyone except the town-authorized transfer station operator from processing discarded waste and shipping it
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
concurring
|
C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087961/c-a-carbone-inc-v-clarkstown/
|
transfer station operator from processing discarded waste and shipping it out of town. In effect, the town has given a waste processing monopoly to the transfer station. The majority concludes that this processing monopoly facially discriminates against interstate commerce. Ante, at 391-392. In support of this conclusion, the majority cites previous decisions of this Court striking down regulatory enactments requiring that a particular economic activity be performed within the jurisdiction. See, e. g., Dean Milk ; ; Foster-Fountain Packing ; South-Central Timber Development, Local Law 9, however, lacks an important feature common to the regulations at issue in these casesnamely, discrimination on the basis of geographic origin. In each of the cited cases, the challenged enactment gave a competitive advantage to local business as a group vis-à-vis their out-of-state or nonlocal competitors as a group. In effect, the regulating jurisdictionbe it a State (), a county ), or a city (Dean Milk) drew a line around itself and treated those inside the line more favorably than those outside the line. Thus, in the Court held that an Arizona law requiring that Arizona cantaloupes be packaged in Arizona before being shipped out of state facially discriminated against interstate commerce: The benefits of the discriminatory scheme benefited the Arizona packaging industry, at the expense of its competition in California. Similarly, in Dean Milk on which the majority heavily relies, the city of Madison drew a line around its perimeter and required that all milk sold in the city be pasteurized only by dairies located inside the line. This type of geographic distinction, which confers an economic advantage on local interests in general, is common to all the local processing cases cited by the majority. And the Court has, I believe, correctly concluded that these arrangements are protectionist either in purpose or practical effect, and thus amount to virtually per se discrimination. In my view, the majority fails to come to terms with a significant distinction between the laws in the local processing *404 cases discussed above and Local Law 9. Unlike the regulations we have previously struck down, Local Law 9 does not give more favorable treatment to local interests as a group as compared to out-of-state or out-of-town economic interests. Rather, the garbage sorting monopoly is achieved at the expense of all competitors, be they local or nonlocal. That the ordinance does not discriminate on the basis of geographic origin is vividly illustrated by the identity of the plaintiffs in this very action: Petitioners are local recyclers, physically located in Clarkstown, that desire to process waste themselves, and thus bypass the
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
concurring
|
C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087961/c-a-carbone-inc-v-clarkstown/
|
that desire to process waste themselves, and thus bypass the town's designated transfer facility. Because in-town processorslike petitionersand out-of-town processors are treated equally, I cannot agree that Local Law 9 "discriminates" against interstate commerce. Rather, Local Law 9 "discriminates" evenhandedly against all potential participants in the waste processing business, while benefiting only the chosen operator of the transfer facility. I believe this distinction has more doctrinal significance than the majority acknowledges. In considering state health and safety regulations such as Local Law 9, we have consistently recognized that the fact that interests within the regulating jurisdiction are equally affected by the challenged enactment counsels against a finding of discrimination. And for good reason. The existence of substantial in-state interests harmed by a regulation is "a powerful safeguard" against legislative discrimination. The Court generally defers to health and safety regulations because "their burden usually falls on local economic interests as well as other States' economic interests, thus insuring that a State's own political processes will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations." Raymond Motor Transp., See also Thus, while there is no bright *405 line separating those enactments which are virtually per se invalid and those which are not, the fact that in-town competitors of the transfer facility are equally burdened by Local Law 9 leads me to conclude that Local Law 9 does not discriminate against interstate commerce. II That the ordinance does not discriminate against interstate commerce does not, however, end the Commerce Clause inquiry. Even a nondiscriminatory regulation may nonetheless impose an excessive burden on interstate trade when considered in relation to the local benefits conferred. See Brown-Forman 476 U. S., at Indeed, we have long recognized that "a burden imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of the State enacting such statute." U.S. 78, Moreover, "the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." 397 U. S., at Judged against these standards, Local Law 9 fails. The local interest in proper disposal of waste is obviously significant. But this interest could be achieved by simply requiring that all waste disposed of in the town be properly processed somewhere. For example, the town could ensure proper processing by setting specific standards with which all town processors must comply. In fact, however, the town's purpose is narrower than merely ensuring proper disposal. Local Law
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
concurring
|
C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087961/c-a-carbone-inc-v-clarkstown/
|
purpose is narrower than merely ensuring proper disposal. Local Law 9 is intended to ensure the financial viability of the transfer facility. I agree with the majority that this purpose can be achieved by other means that would have a less dramatic impact on the flow of goods. For example, the town could finance the *406 project by imposing taxes, by issuing municipal bonds, or even by lowering its price for processing to a level competitive with other waste processing facilities. But by requiring that all waste be processed at the town's facility, the ordinance "squelches competition in the waste-processing service altogether, leaving no room for investment from outside." Ante, at 392. In addition, "`[t]he practical effect of [Local Law 9] must be evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of the other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, [jurisdiction] adopted similar legislation.' " - ). This is not a hypothetical inquiry. Over 20 States have enacted statutes authorizing local governments to adopt flow control laws.[*] If the localities in these States impose the type of restriction on the movement of waste that Clarkstown has adopted, the free movement of solid waste in the stream of commerce will be severely impaired. Indeed, pervasive flow control would result in the type of balkanization the Clause is primarily intended to prevent. See H. P. Hood & Sons U. S., at *407 Given that many jurisdictions are contemplating or enacting flow control, the potential for conflicts is high. For example, in the State of New Jersey, just south of Clarkstown, local waste may be removed from the State for the sorting of recyclables "as long as the residual solid waste is returned to New Jersey." Brief for New Jersey as Amicus Curiae 5. Under Local Law 9, however, if petitioners bring waste from New Jersey for recycling at their Clarkstown operation, the residual waste may not be returned to New Jersey, but must be transported to Clarkstown's transfer facility. As a consequence, operations like petitioners' cannot comply with the requirements of both jurisdictions. Nondiscriminatory state or local laws which actually conflict with the enactments of other States are constitutionally infirm if they burden interstate commerce. See ; Southern Pacific The increasing number of flow control regimes virtually ensures some inconsistency between jurisdictions, with the effect of eliminating the movement of waste between jurisdictions. I therefore conclude that the burden Local Law 9 imposes on interstate commerce is
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
concurring
|
C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087961/c-a-carbone-inc-v-clarkstown/
|
the burden Local Law 9 imposes on interstate commerce is excessive in relation to Clarkstown's interest in ensuring a fixed supply of waste to supply its project. III Although this Court canand often doesenforce the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause, the Clause is primarily a grant of congressional authority to regulate commerce among the States. Amicus National Association of Bond Lawyers (NABL) argues that the flow control ordinance in this case has been authorized by Congress. Given the residual nature of our authority under the Clause, and *408 because the argument that Congress has in fact authorized flow control is substantial, I think it appropriate to address it directly. Congress must be "unmistakably clear" before we will conclude that it intended to permit state regulation which would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause. SouthCentral Timber See also (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The State or locality has the burden of demonstrating this intent. Amicus NABL argues that Subchapter IV of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), as amended, 42 U.S. C. 6941 et seq., and its amendments, remove the constitutional constraints on local implementation of flow control. RCRA is a sweeping statute intended to regulate solid waste from cradle to grave. In addition to providing specific federal standards for the management of solid waste, RCRA Subchapter IV governs "State or Regional Solid Waste Plans." Among the objectives of the subchapter is to "assist in developing and encouraging methods for the disposal of solid waste which are environmentally sound"; this is to be accomplished by federal "assistance to States or regional authorities for comprehensive planning pursuant to Federal guidelines." 6941. Under RCRA, States are to submit solid waste management plans that "prohibit the establishment of new open dumps within the State," and ensure that solid waste will be "utilized for resource recovery or disposed of in sanitary landfills or otherwise disposed of in an environmentally sound manner." 6943(a)(2). The plans must also ensure that state and local governments not be "prohibited under State or local law from negotiating and entering into longterm *409 contracts for the supply of solid waste to resource recovery facilities [or] from entering into long-term contracts for the operation of such facilities." 6943(a)(5). Amicus also points to a statement in a House Report addressing 6943(a)(5), a statement evincing some concern with flow control: "This prohibition [on state or local laws prohibiting long-term contracts] is not to be construed to affect state planning which may require all discarded materials to be transported to a particular location." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1491, p. 34
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
concurring
|
C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087961/c-a-carbone-inc-v-clarkstown/
|
a particular location." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1491, p. 34 (1976) (emphasis added). Finally, in the Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Congress authorized the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to "provide technical assistance to States [and local governments] to assist in the removal or modification of legal, institutional, and economic impediments which have the effect of impeding the development of systems and facilities [for resource recovery]." 6948(d)(3). Among the obstacles to effective resource recovery are "impediments to institutional arrangements necessary to undertake projects. including the creation of special districts, authorities, or corporations where necessary having the power to secure the supply of waste of a project. " 6948(d)(3)(C) (emphasis added). I agree with amicus NABL that these references indicate that Congress expected local governments to implement some form of flow control. Nonetheless, they neither individually nor cumulatively rise to the level of the "explicit" authorization required by our dormant Commerce Clause decisions. First, the primary focus of the references is on legal impediments imposed as a result of statenot federallaw. In addition, the reference to local authority to "secure the supply of waste" is contained in 6948(d)(3)(C), which is a delegation not to the States but to EPA of authority to assist *410 local government in solving waste supply problems. EPA has stated in its implementing regulations that the "State plan should provide for substate cooperation and policies for free and unrestricted movement of solid and hazardous waste across State and local boundaries." 40 CFR 256.42(h) (1993). And while the House Report seems to contemplate that municipalities may require waste to be brought to a particular location, this stronger language is not reflected in the text of the statute. Cf. United ; In short, these isolated references do not satisfy our requirement of an explicit statutory authorization. It is within Congress' power to authorize local imposition of flow control. Should Congress revisit this area, and enact legislation providing a clear indication that it intends States and localities to implement flow control, we will, of course, defer to that legislative judgment. Until then, however, Local Law 9 cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
* A patent holder, and the holder’s lawful licensees, can recover for monetary injury when their exclusive rights are violated by others’ wrongful conduct. One form of patent injury occurs if unauthorized persons or entities copy, use, or otherwise infringe upon the patented inven- tion. Another form of injury to the patent holder or his licensees can occur when the actor induces others to in- fringe the patent. In the instant case, both forms of in- jury—direct infringement and wrongful inducement of others to commit infringement—were alleged. After two trials, the defendant was found liable for both types of injury. The dispute now before the Court concerns the inducement aspect of the case. I The patent holder who commenced this action is the petitioner here, Commil USA, LLC. The technical details of Commil’s patent are not at issue. So it suffices to say, with much oversimplification, that the patent is for a —————— * JUSTICE THOMAS joins Parts II–B and III of this opinion. 2 COMMIL USA, LLC v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court method of implementing short-range wireless networks. Suppose an extensive business headquarters or a resort or a college campus wants a single, central wireless system (sometimes called a Wi-Fi network). In order to cover the large space, the system needs multiple base stations so a user can move around the area and still stay connected. Commil’s patent relates to a method of providing faster and more reliable communications between devices and base stations. The particular claims of Commil’s patent are discussed in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 1364– 1365, 2 Commil brought this action against Cisco Systems, Inc., which makes and sells wireless networking equipment. In 2007, Commil sued Cisco in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Cisco is the re- spondent here. Commil alleged that Cisco had infringed Commil’s patent by making and using networking equip- ment. In addition Commil alleged that Cisco had induced others to infringe the patent by selling the infringing equipment for them to use, in contravention of Commil’s exclusive patent rights. At the first trial, the jury concluded that Commil’s patent was valid and that Cisco had directly The jury awarded Commil $3.7 million in damages. As to induced infringement, the jury found Cisco not liable. Commil filed a motion for a new trial on induced infringe- ment and damages, which the District Court granted because of certain inappropriate comments Cisco’s counsel had made during the first trial. A month before the second trial Cisco went
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
first trial. A month before the second trial Cisco went to the United States Patent and Trademark Office and asked it to re- examine the validity of Commil’s patent. The Office granted the request; but, undoubtedly to Cisco’s disap- pointment, it confirmed the validity of Commil’s patent. App. 159, 162. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 3 Opinion of the Court Back in the District Court, the second trial proceeded, limited to the issues of inducement and damages on that issue and direct infringement. As a defense to the claim of inducement, Cisco argued it had a good-faith belief that Commil’s patent was invalid. It sought to introduce evi- dence to support that assertion. The District Court, how- ever, ruled that Cisco’s proffered evidence of its good-faith belief in the patent’s invalidity was inadmissible. While the District Court’s order does not provide the reason for the ruling, it seems the court excluded this evidence on the assumption that belief in invalidity is not a defense to a plaintiff ’s claim that the defendant induced others to infringe. At the close of trial, and over Cisco’s objection, the Dis- trict Court instructed the jury that it could find induce- ment if “Cisco actually intended to cause the acts that constitute direct infringement and that Cisco knew or should have known that its actions would induce actual infringement.” The jury returned a verdict for Commil on induced infringement and awarded $63.7 million in damages. After the verdict, but before judgment, this Court issued its decision in Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U. S. (2011). That case, as will be discussed in more detail, held that, in an action for induced infringe- ment, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that the alleged inducer knew of the patent in question and knew the induced acts were infring at (slip op., at 10). Relying on that case, Cisco again urged that the jury instruction was incorrect because it did not state knowledge as the governing standard for inducement liability. The District Court denied Cisco’s motion and entered judgment in Commil’s favor. Cisco appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceed- 4 COMMIL USA, LLC v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court ings. The court concluded it was error for the District Court to have instructed the jury that Cisco could be liable for induced infringement if it “ ‘knew or should have known’ ” that its customers The panel held that
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
have known’ ” that its customers The panel held that “induced infringement ‘requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent in- fringement.’ ” (quoting at (slip op., at 10)). By stating that Cisco could be found liable if it “ ‘knew or should have known that its actions would induce actual infringement,’ ” the Court of Appeals explained, the District Court had allowed “the jury to find [Cisco] liable based on mere negligence where knowledge is required.” That ruling, which re- quires a new trial on the inducement claim with a corrected instruction on knowledge, is not in question here. What is at issue is the second holding of the Court of Appeals, addressing Cisco’s contention that the trial court committed further error in excluding Cisco’s evidence that it had a good-faith belief that Commil’s patent was in- valid. Beginning with the observation that it is “axiomatic that one cannot infringe an invalid patent,” the Court of Appeals reasoned that “evidence of an accused inducer’s good-faith belief of invalidity may negate the requisite intent for induced infringement.” The court saw “no principled distinction between a good-faith belief of invalidity and a good-faith belief of non-infringement for the purpose of whether a defendant possessed the specific intent to induce infringement of a patent.” Judge Newman dissented on that point. In Judge Newman’s view a defendant’s good-faith belief in a pa- tent’s invalidity is not a defense to induced infringement. She reasoned that “whether there is infringement in fact does not depend on the belief of the accused infringer that it might succeed in invalidating the patent.” (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Both parties filed petitions for rehearing en banc, which were Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 5 Opinion of the Court denied. Five judges, however, would have granted rehearing en banc to consider the question whether a good-faith belief in invalidity is a defense to induced infringement. at (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). This Court granted certiorari to decide that question. 574 U. S. (2014). II Although the precise issue to be addressed concerns a claim of improper inducement to infringe, the discussion to follow refers as well to direct infringement and contrib- utory infringement, so it is instructive at the outset to set forth the statutory provisions pertaining to these three forms of liability. These three relevant provisions are found in of the Patent Act. 35 U.S. C. Subsection (a) governs direct infringement and provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” Under this form of liability, a defendant’s mental state is irrelevant. Direct infringement is a strict-liability offense. 563 U. S., at (slip op., at 5, n. 2). Subsection (b) governs induced infringement: “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” In contrast to direct infringement, liability for inducing infringement attaches only if the defendant knew of the patent and that “the induced acts constitute patent in- fringement.” at (slip op., at 10). In Commil and the Government’s view, not only is knowledge or belief in 6 COMMIL USA, LLC v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court the patent’s validity irrelevant, they further argue the party charged with inducing infringement need not know that the acts it induced would infringe. On this latter point, they are incorrect, as will be explained below. Subsection (c) deals with contributory infringement: “Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be espe- cially made or especially adapted for use in an in- fringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non- infringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.” Like induced infringement, contributory infringement requires knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement. Aro Mfg. This case asks a question of first impression: whether knowledge of, or belief in, a patent’s validity is required for induced infringement under (b). A Before turning to the question presented, it is necessary to reaffirm what the Court held in Commil and the Government (which supports Commil in this case) argue that should be read as holding that only knowledge of the patent is required for induced in- fringement. That, as will be explained, would contravene ’s explicit holding that liability for induced infringement can only attach if the defendant knew of the patent and knew as well that “the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” 563 U. S., at (slip op., at 10). Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 7 Opinion of the Court In the plaintiff, SEB, had invented and patented a deep fryer. A few years later, Sunbeam asked Pentalpha to supply
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
fryer. A few years later, Sunbeam asked Pentalpha to supply deep fryers for Sunbeam to sell. To make the deep fryer, Pentalpha bought an SEB fryer and copied all but the cosmetic features. Pentalpha then sold the fryers to Sunbeam, which in turn sold them to custom- ers. SEB sued Pentalpha for induced infringement, argu- ing Pentalpha had induced Sunbeam and others to sell the infringing fryers in violation of SEB’s patent rights. In defense, Pentalpha argued it did not know the deep fryer it copied was patented and therefore could not be liable for inducing anyone to infringe SEB’s patent. The question presented to this Court was “whether a party who ‘actively induces infringement of a patent’ under 35 U.S. C. (b) must know that the induced acts constitute patent in- fringement.” at (slip op., at 1). After noting the language of (b) and the case law prior to passage of the Patent Act did not resolve the question, the Court turned to Aro II, a case about contributory infringement. The Court deemed that rules concerning contributory infringement were relevant to induced infringement, because the men- tal state imposed in each instance is similar. Before the Patent Act, inducing infringement was not a separate theory of indirect liability but was evidence of contributory infringement. 563 U. S., at (slip op., at 5). Thus, in many respects, it is proper to find common ground in the two theories of liability. Aro II concluded that to be liable for contributory in- fringement, a defendant must know the acts were infring- 377 U.S., at In the Court said this reasoning was applicable, explaining as follows: “Based on this premise, it follows that the same knowledge is needed for induced infringement under (b). As noted, the two provisions have a common COMMIL USA, LLC v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court origin in the pre-1952 understanding of contributory infringement, and the language of the two provisions creates the same difficult interpretive choice. It would thus be strange to hold that knowledge of the relevant patent is needed under (c) but not under (b). “Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringe- ment under (b) requires knowledge that the in- duced acts constitute patent infringement.” 563 U. S., at (slip op., at 10). In support of Commil, the Government argues against the clear language of According to the Gov- ernment, all requires is knowledge of the patent: “The Court did not definitively resolve whether Section 271(b) additionally requires knowledge of the infringing nature of the induced acts.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
the induced acts.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9. See also Brief for Petitioner 17. Together, Commil and the Government claim the “factual circumstances” of “did not require” the Court to decide whether knowledge of infringement is required for inducement liability. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12. See also Brief for Petitioner 23–24. But in the Court’s decision, its description of the factual circumstances suggests otherwise. The Court concluded there was enough evidence to support a finding that Pentalpha knew “the infringing nature of the sales it encouraged Sunbeam to make.” 563 U. S., at (slip op., at 14). It was not only knowledge of the existence of SEB’s patent that led the Court to affirm the liability finding but also it was the fact that Pentalpha copied “all but the cosmetic features of SEB’s fryer,” demonstrating Pental- pha knew it would be causing customers to infringe SEB’s patent. at (slip op., at 15). Accepting the Government and Commil’s argument would require this Court to depart from its prior hold Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 9 Opinion of the Court See at (slip op., at 10). See also at (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1) (“The Court is correct, in my view, to conclude that to induce in- fringement a defendant must know the acts constitute patent infringement” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the rationale is sound. Qualifying or limiting its holding, as the Government and Commil seek to do, would lead to the conclusion, both in inducement and contributory infringement cases, that a person, or entity, could be liable even though he did not know the acts were infring In other words, even if the defendant reads the patent’s claims differently from the plaintiff, and that reading is reasonable, he would still be liable because he knew the acts might infringe. requires more. It requires proof the defendant knew the acts were infring And the Court’s opinion was clear in rejecting any lesser mental state as the standard. at (slip op., at 13–14). B The question the Court confronts today concerns whether a defendant’s belief regarding patent validity is a defense to a claim of induced infringement. It is not. The scienter element for induced infringement concerns infringement; that is a different issue than validity. Section 271(b) requires that the defendant “actively induce[d] infringe- ment.” That language requires intent to “bring about the desired result,” which is infringement. at (slip op., at 4). And because infringement and validity are separate issues under the Act, belief regarding validity cannot negate the scienter required under
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
Act, belief regarding validity cannot negate the scienter required under (b). When infringement is the issue, the validity of the patent is not the question to be confronted. In Chemical the Court explained, “A party seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent of the patent- 10 COMMIL USA, LLC v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court ee’s charge of infringement.” It further held noninfringement and invalidity were “alternative grounds” for dismissing the suit. And in Deposit Guaranty Nat. the Court explained that an accused infringer “may prevail either by successfully attacking the validity of the patent or by successfully defending the charge of infringement.” at 334. These explanations are in accord with the long- accepted truth—perhaps the axiom—that infringement and invalidity are separate matters under patent law. See Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss R. Prods., Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 1365 (CA Fed. 2003). Indeed, the issues of infringement and validity appear in separate parts of the Patent Act. Part III of the Act deals with “Patents and Protection of Patent Rights,” including the right to be free from infringement. 329. Part II, entitled “Patentability of Inventions and Grants of Patents,” defines what constitutes a valid pa- tent. Further, noninfringement and invalidity are listed as two separate defenses, see (2), and defendants are free to raise either or both of them. See Were this Court to interpret (b) as permitting a defense of belief in invalidity, it would conflate the issues of infringement and validity. Allowing this new defense would also undermine a presumption that is a “common core of thought and truth” reflected in this Court’s precedents for a century. Radio Corp. of Under the Patent Act, and the case law before its passage, a patent is “presumed valid.” §22(a); at That presumption takes away any need for a plaintiff to prove his patent is valid to bring a claim. But if belief in invalidity were a defense to induced in- fringement, the force of that presumption would be less- ened to a drastic degree, for a defendant could prevail if he proved he reasonably believed the patent was invalid. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 11 Opinion of the Court That would circumvent the high bar Congress is presumed to have chosen: the clear and convincing standard. See Microsoft Corp. v. Ltd. Partnership, 564 U. S. – (2011) (slip op., at –10). Defendants must meet that standard to rebut the presumption of validity. To say that an invalid patent cannot be infringed, or that someone cannot be induced to infringe an invalid patent, is in
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
cannot be induced to infringe an invalid patent, is in one sense a simple truth, both as a matter of logic and semantics. See M. Swift & Sons, But the questions courts must address when interpreting and implementing the statutory framework require a determi- nation of the procedures and sequences that the parties must follow to prove the act of wrongful inducement and any related issues of patent validity. “Validity and in- fringement are distinct issues, bearing different burdens, different presumptions, and different evidence.” 720 F.3d, (opinion of Newman, J.). To be sure, if at the end of the day, an act that would have been an in- fringement or an inducement to infringe pertains to a patent that is shown to be invalid, there is no patent to be But the allocation of the burden to persuade on these questions, and the timing for the presentations of the relevant arguments, are concerns of central relevance to the orderly administration of the patent system. Invalidity is an affirmative defense that “can preclude enforcement of a patent against otherwise infringing conduct.” 6A Chisum on Patents p. 19–5 (2015). An accused infringer can, of course, attempt to prove that the patent in suit is invalid; if the patent is indeed invalid, and shown to be so under proper procedures, there is no liability. See at – (slip op., at 11–12). That is because invalidity is not a defense to infringement, it is a defense to liability. And because of that fact, a belief as to invalidity cannot negate the scienter required for induced infringement. 12 COMMIL USA, LLC v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court There are also practical reasons not to create a defense based on a good-faith belief in invalidity. First and fore- most, accused inducers who believe a patent is invalid have various proper ways to obtain a ruling to that effect. They can file a declaratory judgment action asking a federal court to declare the patent invalid. See MedIm- mune, 549 U.S. 11, They can seek inter partes review at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and receive a decision as to validity within 12 to 1 months. See Or they can, as Cisco did here, seek ex parte reexamination of the patent by the Patent and Trademark Office. And, of course, any accused infringer who believes the patent in suit is invalid may raise the affirmative defense of invalidity. §22(b)(2). If the defendant is successful, he will be immune from liability. Creating a defense of belief in invalidity, furthermore, would have negative consequences. It can render
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
in invalidity, furthermore, would have negative consequences. It can render litiga- tion more burdensome for everyone involved. Every ac- cused inducer would have an incentive to put forth a theory of invalidity and could likely come up with myriad arguments. See Sloan, Think it is Invalid? A New Defense to Negate Intent for Induced Infringement, 23 Fed. Cir. B. J. 613, 61 And since “it is often more difficult to determine whether a patent is valid than whether it has been infringed,” 50 U.S., at 99, accused induc- ers would likely find it easier to prevail on a defense re- garding the belief of invalidity than noninfringement. In addition the need to respond to the defense will increase discovery costs and multiply the issues the jury must resolve. Indeed, the jury would be put to the difficult task of separating the defendant’s belief regarding validity from the actual issue of validity. As a final note, “[o]ur law is no stranger to the possi- bility that an act may be ‘intentional’ for purposes of civil liability, even if the actor lacked actual knowledge that Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 13 Opinion of the Court her conduct violated the law.” 52– 53 (2010). Tortious interference with a contract provides an apt example. While the invalidity of a contract is a defense to tortious interference, belief in validity is irrele- vant. Restatement (Second) of Torts Comment i (1979). See also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 110 (5th ed. 194). In a similar way, a trespass “can be committed despite the actor’s mistaken belief that she has a legal right to enter the property.” at 53 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts and Comment e ). And of course, “[t]he general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.” 49 U.S. 192, (1). In the usual case, “I thought it was legal” is no defense. That concept mirrors this Court’s holding that belief in invalidity will not negate the scienter required under (b). III The Court is well aware that an “industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U.S. 3, (2006) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Some companies may use patents as a sword to go after defend- ants for money, even when their claims are frivolous. This tactic is often pursued through
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,015 | 4 |
majority
|
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2803251/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/
|
their claims are frivolous. This tactic is often pursued through demand letters, which “may be sent very broadly and without prior investigation, may assert vague claims of infringement, and may be designed to obtain payments that are based more on the costs of defending litigation than on the merit of the pa- tent claims.” L. Greisman, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Discussion Draft of Patent 14 COMMIL USA, LLC v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court Demand Letter Legislation before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the House Com- mittee on Energy and Commerce 2 (2014). This behavior can impose a “harmful tax on innovation.” No issue of frivolity has been raised by the parties in this case, nor does it arise on the facts presented to this Court. Nonetheless, it is still necessary and proper to stress that district courts have the authority and respon- sibility to ensure frivolous cases are dissuaded. If frivo- lous cases are filed in federal court, it is within the power of the court to sanction attorneys for bringing such suits. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11. It is also within the district court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases.” 35 U.S. C. §25; see also Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U. S. – (2014) (slip op., at 7–). These safe- guards, combined with the avenues that accused inducers have to obtain rulings on the validity of patents, militate in favor of maintaining the separation expressed through- out the Patent Act between infringement and validity. This dichotomy means that belief in invalidity is no de- fense to a claim of induced infringement. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 1 SCALIA, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 13–96 COMMIL USA, LLC, PETITIONER v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
This state murder case, with the death penalty imposed by a jury, comes here from the Supreme Court of Illinois. The grant of certiorari, was limited to three of four questions presented by the petition. These concern the nondisclosure to the defense of allegedly exculpatory evidence possessed by the prosecution or the police; the admission into evidence of a shotgun that was not the murder weapon; and the rejection of eight veniremen who had voiced general objections to capital punishment. The first and third issues respectively focus on the application of and I Petitioner Lyman A. Moore was convicted in 1964 of the first-degree murder of Bernard Zitek. Moore's appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois was held in abeyance while he petitioned the trial court for post-conviction relief. After a hearing in January 1967, that petition was denied. Moore's appeal from the denial was consolidated with his appeal from the conviction and sentence. With one justice dissenting and another not participating, the Illinois court affirmed the judgments. II The homicide was committed on April 25, 1962. The facts are important: A. The victim, Zitek, operated a bar-restaurant in the village of Lansing, southeast of Chicago. Patricia Hill was a waitress there. Donald O'Brien, Charles A. Mayer, and Henley Powell were customers. Another bar called the Ponderosa Tap was located in Dolton, also southeast of Chicago. It was owned by Robert Fair. William Joyce was the bartender. One of Fair's customers was Virgle Sanders. A third bar known as Wanda and Del's was in Chicago. Delbert Jones was the operator. William Leon Thompson was a patron. The Westmoreland Country Club was in Wilmette, about 50 miles north of Lansing. The manager there was Herbert Anderson. B. On the evening of April 25 Zitek was tending bar at his place in Lansing. Shortly before p. m. two men, one with a moustache, entered and ordered beer. Zitek admonished the pair several times for using profane *789 language. They continued in their profanity and, shortly, Zitek ejected them. About an hour later a man carrying a shotgun entered. He laid the weapon on the bar and shot and killed Zitek. The gunman ran out, pursued by patrons, and escaped in an automobile. C. At the trial waitress Hill positively identified Moore as one of the two men ejected from the bar and as the one who returned and killed Zitek. She testified that she had a clear and close view from her working area at the bar and that she observed Zitek's ejection of the two men and the shotgun killing an
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
ejection of the two men and the shotgun killing an hour later. D. A second in-court identification of Moore as the man who killed Zitek was made by the customer Powell. Powell, who at the time was playing pinochle with others, testified that he observed Moore enter the bar with a shotgun and shoot Zitek; that after the shooting he pursued Moore; and that outside the bar Moore stopped momentarily, turned, and shouted, "Don't come any further or I'll shoot you, too." E. Sanders testified that on April 27, two days after the murder, he was in the Ponderosa Tap and that a customer there, whom Sanders identified as "Slick," remarked to Sanders that it was "open season on bartenders" and that he had shot one in Lansing. At the trial Sanders identified Moore as the man who was in the Ponderosa Tap on April 27. Moore was with another man who had a moustache. The two asked for a ride to Harvey, Illinois. The owner, Fair, agreed to give them the ride. F. Fair testified that Moore was one of the two men who requested and were given the ride; that during the journey one of them was referred to as "Barbee"; and that one said "something like, `Well, if we hadn't had that trouble with the bartender in Lansing, we'd have been all right.' " G. The Ponderosa bartender, Joyce, testified that Sanders *790 and Fair were in that tavern on April 27; that Moore was there at the same time; and that he arranged with Fair for Fair to give Moore and his companion a ride. It is thus apparent that there were positive in-court identifications of Moore as the slayer by the waitress Hill and by the customer Powell, and that there were in-court identifications of Moore as having been present at the bar in Dolton two days later by Sanders, by Fair, and by Joyce. H. Six months after the slaying, in the early morning hours of October 31, 1962, a Chicago police officer was shot at from a 1957 Ford automobile. Two men fled the scene. The police "staked out" the car, and several hours later Moore and a moustached man, later identified as Jerry Barbee, were arrested when they approached and entered the vehicle. The automobile proved to be owned by Barbee. A fully loaded sawed-off 16-gauge shotgun was in the car.[1] The shotgun was introduced in evidence at Moore's trial.[2] The State conceded that the gun so introduced was not the murder weapon, and that the State's ballistics technician, if called, would
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
weapon, and that the State's ballistics technician, if called, would testify that the waddings taken from Zitek's body came, in his opinion, from a 12-gauge shotgun shell. I. The defense called manager Anderson of the West-moreland Country Club as a witness. He testified that Moore had been hired as a waiter there on April 24 (the day before the murder); that the club records indicated there was a special party at the club on the evening of April 25; and that Moore was paid for working *791 until sometime between p. m. and midnight. The club's bartender testified to the same effect. Each of these witnesses nevertheless admitted that he could not remember seeing Moore at the club that night, but said that he would have known if he had been absent for any substantial period of time. The club records also indicated that Moore worked at the club the afternoon of April 27, when, according to the testimony of Sanders, Fair, and Joyce, Moore was at the Ponderosa Tap in Dolton.[3] J. O'Brien, a customer at Zitek's, testified for the defense that he observed Zitek eject two men the evening of the 25th, and that Moore was not one of them. Although he was in the restaurant at the time of the homicide, he did not see the person who shot Zitek. A police officer testified that in his opinion O'Brien was drunk at the time. III Prior to the trial, the defense moved for disclosure of all written statements taken by the police from any witness. The State agreed to furnish existing statements of prosecution witnesses. At the post-conviction hearing, Moore argued, and the claim is presented here, that he was denied a fair trial because six items of evidence, unknown to him at the time of the trial, were not produced and, in fact, were suppressed by the State: A. On April 30, 1962, Sanders gave a statement to the police that he had met the man "Slick" for the first time "about six months ago" in Wanda and Del's tavern. Testimony at the post-conviction hearing by Lieutenant Turbin of the Lansing Police Department revealed that at the time of trial the police possessed an FBI report *792 that Moore was in Leavenworth Penitentiary from 1957 to March 4, 1962. That report thus proved that Sanders could not have met Moore at Wanda and Del's in November 1961. The defense was not given a copy of the statement made by Sanders. The prosecuting attorney asserted at the post-conviction hearing that he did not recall having seen the
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
post-conviction hearing that he did not recall having seen the statement before or during the trial. B. On the day Sanders gave his statement, that is, on April 30, the police raided Wanda and Del's looking for "Slick." "Slick" was not there, but Jones, the tavern's operator, said that he could identify "Slick." After Moore was arrested, Jones was not asked by the police whether Moore was "Slick." The defense was not advised of the raid until after the trial. At the post-conviction hearing Jones testified that Moore was not "Slick." His testimony, however, was stricken on the ground that it pertained to innocence or guilt and was not admissible upon collateral review. C. After the raid on Wanda and Del's, the police secured from their files a picture of James E. "Slick" Watts and assigned Lieutenant Turbin the task of finding Watts. His search was unsuccessful. Moore asserts that the attempt to find Watts was not made known to the defense until cross-examination of the Lansing police chief at the post-conviction hearing. D. After Moore was arrested on October 31, he was photographed by the police. The photograph was shown to William Leon Thompson, the patron of Wanda and Del's. Thompson testified at the post-conviction hearing that he told Lieutenant Turbin that the picture "didn't, to the best of my knowledge, resemble the man that I knew" as "Slick." He identified a picture of Watts as "the Slick I know." Defense counsel testified that through the course of the trial neither the police *793 nor the prosecutor advised them about Thompson and his disclaimer. E. At the start of the trial Sanders observed Moore for the first time since the alleged bragging incident at the Ponderosa Tap. Sanders remarked to the prosecuting attorney and to police officers who accompanied him into the courtroom that the person he knew as "Slick" was about 30-40 pounds heavier than Moore and did not wear glasses. One of the officers responded, "Well, you know how the jailhouse beans are." Moore contends that he and defense counsel were not advised of this remark of Sanders until after the trial had concluded. F. Mayer, one of the card players at Zitek's at the time of the murder, gave the police a written statement. On the back of the statement Officer Koppitz drew a sketch of the seating arrangement at the card table. The diagram shows that the corners of the table pointed north, south, east, and west. Cardplayer Powell was placed on the southwest side. The bar was about feet north of the table. The
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
The bar was about feet north of the table. The door was to the southwest. Moore argues that the diagram is exculpatory and contradicts Powell's testimony that he observed the shooting. Defense counsel testified that they were not shown the diagram during the trial. Moore argues, as to the first five items, that the State did not comply with the general request by the defense for all written statements given by prosecution witnesses; that the State failed to produce the pretrial statement of Sanders and the other evidence contradicting Sanders' identification of Moore as "Slick"; and that the evidence not produced was material and would have been helpful to his defense. The Illinois court held that the State had not suppressed material evidence favorable to Moore, that the *794 record shows that the prosecution presented its entire file to defense counsel, and that no further request for disclosure was Moore submits here the alternative claim that a specific request is not an "indispensable pre-requisite" for the disclosure of exonerating evidence by the State and that the defense could not be expected to make a request for specific evidence that it did not know was in existence. In 373 the petitioner and a companion were found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder and were sentenced to death. In his summation to the jury, Brady's counsel conceded that Brady was guilty, but argued that the jury should return its verdict "without capital punishment." Prior to the trial, counsel had requested that the prosecution allow him to examine the codefendant's extra-judicial statements. Some of these were produced, but another, in which the codefendant admitted the actual homicide, was withheld and did not come to Brady's notice until after his conviction. In a post-conviction proceeding, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that this denied Brady due process of law, and remanded the case for retrial on the issue of punishment. This Court affirmed. It held "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution's suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment. Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence's favorable *795 character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence. These
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence. These are the standards by which the prosecution's conduct in Moore's case is to be measured. Moore's counsel asked several prosecution witnesses if they had given statements to the police. Each witness (Hill, Powell, Fair) who had given a statement admitted doing so and the statement was immediately tendered. The same inquiry was not made of witness Sanders. He was the only state witness who was not asked the question. At the post-conviction hearing the inquiry was Sanders admitted making a statement to the police and the statement was tendered. The record discloses, as the Illinois court that the prosecutor at the trial submitted his entire file to the defense. The prosecutor, however, has no recollection that Sanders' statement was in the file. The statement, therefore, either was in that file and not noted by the defense or it was not in the possession of the prosecution at the trial. We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case. Here, the elusive "Slick" was an early lead the police abandoned when eyewitnesses to the killing and witnesses to Moore's presence at the Ponderosa were found. Unquestionably, as the State now concedes,[4] Sanders was in error when he indicated to the police that he met Moore at Wanda and Del's about six months prior to April 30, 1962. Moore's incarceration at Leavenworth until March shows that conclusion to have been an instance of mistaken identity. But the mistake was as to the identification of Moore as "Slick," not as to *796 the presence of Moore at the Ponderosa Tap on April 27.[5] "Sanders' testimony to the effect that it was Moore he spoke with at the Ponderosa Tap in itself is not significantly, if at all, impeached. Indeed, it is buttressed by the testimony of bartender Joyce and operator Fair, both of whom elaborated the incident by their description of the man, and by Moore's request for a ride to Harvey, Illinois, Fair's providing that ride, and Fair's hearing, on that trip, the reference to one of the men as `Barbee,' " and a second reference to trouble with a bartender in Lansing. The other four of the first five itemsthat Jones told police he could identify "Slick" and subsequently testified that Moore was not "Slick"; that the police had a picture of Watts and assigned the lieutenant, unsuccessfully, to find Watts; that Thompson had been shown a picture of Moore and told the police
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
been shown a picture of Moore and told the police that Moore was not "Slick"; and that on the day of the trial Sanders remarked that the man he knew as "Slick" looked heavier than Mooreare in exactly the same category. They all relate to "Slick," not Moore, and quite naturally go off on Sanders' initial misidentification of "Slick" with Moore. None of the five items serves to impeach in any way the positive identification by Hill and by Powell of *797 Moore as Zitek's killer, or the testimony of Fair and Joyce that Moore was at the Ponderosa Tap on April 27, or the testimony of Fair that the moustached Barbee was accompanying Moore at that time, and that one of the two men made the additional and undisputed admission on the ride to Harvey. We conclude, in the light of all the evidence, that Sanders' misidentification of Moore as Slick was not material to the issue of guilt. The remaining claim of suppression relates to the diagram on the back of Mayer's statement to the police.[6] Moore contends that the diagram shows that Powell was seated with his back to the entrance to Zitek's and, thus, necessarily contradicts his testimony that he was looking toward the entrance as he sat at the card table, and that the State knowingly permitted false testimony to remain uncorrected, in violation of In Napue the principal prosecution witness at Napue's murder trial was an accomplice then serving a sentence for the crime. He testified, in response to an inquiry by the prosecutor, that he had received no promise of consideration in return for his testimony. In fact, the prosecutor had promised him consideration, but he did nothing to correct the witness' false testimony. This Court held that the failure of the prosecutor to correct the testimony, which he knew to be false, denied Napue due process of law, and that this was so even though the false testimony went only to the credibility of the witness. See *798 also and We are not persuaded that the diagram shows that Powell's testimony was false. The officer who drew the diagram testified at the post-conviction hearing that it did not indicate the direction in which Powell was facing or looking at the time of the shooting. Powell testified that his position at the table gave him a view of the bartender; that at the moment he could not bid in the pinochle game and had laid his hand down and was looking toward the door when Moore walked in. There is nothing in the
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
door when Moore walked in. There is nothing in the diagram to indicate that Powell was looking in another direction or that it was impossible for him to see the nearby door from his seat at the card table. Furthermore, after the shooting he pursued Moore but stopped when the man warned him that he, too, might be shot. In summary, the background presence of the elusive "Slick," while somewhat confusing, is at most an insignificant factor. The attempt to identify Moore as "Slick" encountered difficulty, but nothing served to destroy the two-witness identification of Moore as Zitek's assailant, the three-witness identification of Moore as present at the Ponderosa Tap, the two-witness identification of Moore as one of the men who requested and obtained a ride from the Ponderosa in Dolton to Harvey, Illinois, and Fair's testimony as to the admission made on that ride. We adhere to the principles of Brady and Napue, but hold that the present record embraces no violation of those principles. IV The 16-gauge shotgun was admitted into evidence at the trial over the objection of the defense that it was not the murder weapon, that it had no connection with the crime charged, and that it was inadmissible under Illinois *799 law.[7] During his closing argument to the jury, the prosecuting attorney stated that the 16-gauge shotgun was not used to kill Zitek,[8] but that Moore and his companion, Barbee, were "the kind of people that use shotguns."[9] The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the shotgun was properly admitted into evidence as a weapon in Moore's possession at the time of his arrest, and was a weapon "suitable for the commission of the crime charged even though there is no showing that it was the actual weapon used." Moore claims that the gun's introduction denied him due process. Of course, the issue whether the shotgun was properly admitted into evidence under Illinois law is not subject to review here. The due process claim, however, appears to be raised for the first time before us. There is no claim by Moore, and there is nothing in the record to disclose, that due process was argued in the state courts. We could conclude, therefore, that the issue is not one properly presented for review. In any event, we are unable to conclude that the shotgun's introduction deprived Moore of the due process of law guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 16-gauge shotgun, found in the car, was in the constructive possession of both Moore and Barbee when they were arrested after the shooting incident
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
and Barbee when they were arrested after the shooting incident on October 31. There is substantial other evidence in the record *800 that a shotgun was used to kill Zitek, and that he suffered the wounds one would expect from a shotgun fired at close range. The testimony as to the murder itself, with all the details as to the shotgun wounds, is such that we cannot say that the presentation of the shotgun was so irrelevant or so inflammatory that Moore was denied a fair trial. The case is not federally reversible on this ground. V Inasmuch as the Court today has ruled that the imposition of the death penalty under statutes such as those of Illinois is violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Furman v. ante, p. 238, it is unnecessary for us to consider the claim of noncompliance with the standards. In in n. 21, the Court stated specifically "Nor, finally, does today's holding render invalid the conviction, as opposed to the sentence, in this or any other case" (emphasis in original). The sentence of death, however, may not now be imposed. The judgment, insofar as it imposes the death sentence, is reversed, Furman v. and the case is remanded for further proceedings. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE POWELL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Petitioner was convicted of murder in the Illinois state courts and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction and sentence by a divided court. This Court holds that the imposition of the death sentence violated the principle established today in Furman v. ante, p. 238, and that the sentence must be vacated, but the Court upholds the underlying conviction. I agree with the majority that the sentence is invalid and *801 join Part V of the opinion of the Court. I also agree that the introduction of the shotgun into evidence at petitioner's trial did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.[1] But, I believe that in failing to disclose to petitioner certain evidence that might well have been of substantial assistance to the defense, the State denied him a fair trial. The opinion of the Court relates at some length the facts relating to the crime with which petitioner was charged, the circumstances of his arrest, the course of the trial, and the developments at the post-conviction hearing. As these facts are complicated and quite confusing, *802 I have not reiterated them here. Rather, I have emphasized those that seem to me to be particularly important and
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
those that seem to me to be particularly important and I have added several details that are omitted from the Court's opinion. Two interrelated defenses were raised against the charge of murderalibi and misidentification. Petitioner's theory of the case was that he was not at the scene when the murder was committed and that those witnesses who testified that they saw him there were confusing him with someone else. Only two witnesses affirmatively asserted at trial that they saw the murder and that they could identify petitioner as the assailant. They were Patricia Hill, a waitress in the victim's bar, and Henley Powell, a customer. Aside from their testimony, the only other evidence introduced against petitioner related to statements that he allegedly made two days after the murder. There is a problem with the eyewitness testimony of Powell that did not become apparent until the post-conviction hearing in the trial court. At trial he testified as follows: "The defendant (indicating) came into the tavern while I was at the table. I first saw him when he walked in the door with a shotgun. I was sitting at the table along the wall. I was facing where the bartender was standing and I also had a view of the man that walked in the door. I was looking to the west." Abs. 32. But at the post-conviction hearing it was discovered that police officers who had investigated the murder possessed a statement by one Charles Mayer, who had been sitting with Powell at a table in the bar, which contained a diagram indicating that Powell was seated in a direction opposite that indicated in his trial testimony. *803 This diagram was never made available to defense counsel.[2] Donald O'Brien, who had also been seated at Powell and Mayer's table, testified at trial and contradicted the testimony of both Powell and Patricia Hill. Although O'Brien admitted that he did not actually see the shooting because his back was to the bar, he was certain that petitioner was not the man who had been ejected from the victim's bar only an hour before the killing. O'Brien's testimony greatly undercut the apparent retaliatory motive that the prosecution attributed to petitioner.[3] *804 Because of the contradictory testimony of those persons who were present at the scene of the murder, the statements allegedly made by the petitioner after the crime were crucial to the prosecution's case. The key prosecution witness in this regard was Virgle Sanders. He testified that two days after the murder he was in the Ponderosa Tavern, that petitioner (whom he knew as
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
in the Ponderosa Tavern, that petitioner (whom he knew as "Slick") was there also, and that petitioner said "[s]omething about it's season or open season on bartenders or something like that." Abs. 44. The bartender also testified that he recognized petitioner as being present at the same time as Sanders. And the owner of the tavern stated that he gave petitioner and petitioner's friend a short ride in his automobile, at the end of which the friend mentioned something about "trouble with the bartender." Abs. 52. After his trial and conviction petitioner learned that five days after the murder, Sanders gave a statement to the police in which he said that he had met "Slick" for the first time about six months before he spoke to him in the Ponderosa Tavern. As the Court notes, it would have been impossible for Sanders to have met the petitioner at the time specified, because petitioner was in federal prison at that time. At the post-conviction hearing, Sanders said that he was not positive when he first met the man known as "Slick," but that he definitely knew it was before Christmas 1961. Petitioner was not released from federal custody until March 1962. When confronted with this fact, Sanders indicated that it was impossible that petitioner was the man with whom he had spoken in the Ponderosa Tavern. Abs. 296. Sanders' trial identification was further impeached at the post-trial hearing by testimony that on *805 the day of trial he told police officers that petitioner was approximately 30 or 40 pounds lighter than he remembered "Slick" being. Abs. 294. Sanders' testimony that petitioner and "Slick" were not one and the same was corroborated at the hearing. The reason that Sanders could remember the first time that he had met "Slick" was that "Slick" had been involved in a scuffle with one William Thompson. Thompson testified at the hearing that he remembered the altercation, that he knew "Slick," that prior to the trial he had told police officers that petitioner was not "Slick," and that he remained certain that petitioner and "Slick" were different people. Finally, Sanders' testimony was corroborated by Delbert Jones, the owner of the tavern where "Slick" and Thompson scuffled. Jones testified that he was certain that petitioner was not the man known as "Slick." The fact is that Thompson and Jones were both familiar with one James E. Watts, whom they knew as "Slick," and who looked very much like the petitioner. The record makes clear that the police suspected Watts as the murderer and assigned a lieutenant to search
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
Watts as the murderer and assigned a lieutenant to search for him. A raid of Jones' bar was even made in the hope of finding this suspect. Sanders' testimony at the post-conviction hearing indicates that it was Watts who bragged about the murder, not petitioner. It is true that the bartender and the owner of the Ponderosa Tavern testified at trial that it was petitioner who was in the bar with Sanders, but the bartender had never seen "Slick" before, and the owner was drinking the entire afternoon. Furthermore, the fact remains that petitioner and Watts look very much alike. Petitioner urges that when the State did not reveal to him Sanders' statement about meeting "Slick" at an earlier time and the corroborative statements of *806 Thompson and Jones, it denied him due process. The Court answers this by saying that the statements were not material. It is evident from the foregoing that the statements were not merely material to the defense, they were absolutely critical. I find myself in complete agreement with Justice Schaeffer's dissent in the Illinois Supreme Court: "The defendant's conviction rests entirely upon identification testimony. The facts developed at the post-conviction hearing seriously impeached, if indeed they did not destroy, Sanders's trial testimony. Had those facts, and the identifications of `Slick' Watts by Thompson and Jones, been available at the trial, the jury may well have been unwilling to act upon the identifications of Patricia Hill and Henley Powell. Far more is involved in this case, in my opinion, than `the following up of useless leads and discussions with immaterial witnesses.' Certainly if Sanders's identification was material, the testimony of the other witnesses which destroyed that identification [was] also material. Consequently, I believe that the State's nondisclosure denied the defendant the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the constitution."[4] *807 Petitioner also urges that the failure of the prosecution to disclose the information concerning where the eyewitness Powell was sitting when he allegedly saw petitioner is another instance of suppression of evidence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Had this been the prosecution's only error, I would join the Court in finding the evidence to be immaterial. But if this evidence is considered together with other evidence that was suppressed, it must be apparent that the failure of the prosecution to disclose it contributed to the denial of due process. Even if material exculpatory evidence was not made available to petitioner, the State argues that because petitioner did not demand to see the evidence, he cannot now complain about nondisclosure. This argument is disingenuous at best. Prior to
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
about nondisclosure. This argument is disingenuous at best. Prior to trial, petitioner moved for discovery of all statements given to the prosecutor or the police by any witness possessing information relevant to the case. Abs. 5. In explaining why such a broad motion was made, petitioner's counsel stated that, "We want to circumvent the possibility that a witness gets on the stand and says, `Yes, I made a written statement,' and then the State's Attorney says, `But no, we don't have it in our possession,' or they say, `It's in the possession of Orlando Wilson [Superintendent of Police, Chicago, Ill.],' or `The Chief of Police of Lansing.' " Abs. 8. In *808 response to the motion, the prosecutor guaranteed defense counsel and the court that he would supply defense counsel with statements made either to the police or to the State's Attorney by witnesses who were called to testify at trial. Based on this representation, the motion for discovery was denied. Never was there any implication by the prosecutor that his guarantee was in any way dependent upon petitioner's making repeated and specific requests for such statements after each witness testified at trial. The prosecutor's guarantee certainly covered Sanders' statement. As for the statements of the bartender and owner of the Ponderosa Tavern and the statement and diagram of Charles Mayer, petitioner clearly demanded to see these things before trial. The prosecution took the position that it was bound to reveal only the statements of witnesses who testified. Hence, it is hard to imagine what sort of further demand petitioner might have Moreover, the very fact that petitioner made his motion for extensive discovery placed the prosecution on notice that the defense wished to see all statements by any witness that might be exculpatory. The motion served "the valuable office of flagging the importance of the evidence for the defense and thus impos[ing] on the prosecutor a duty to make a careful check of his files." United In my view, both 373 and require that the conviction in this case be reversed. Napue establishes that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated "when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected." And Brady holds that suppression of material evidence requires a new trial "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." There can be no doubt that there was suppression of evidence by the State and *809 that the evidence that the State relied on was "false" in the sense that it was incomplete and misleading. Both before and during the trial the prosecutor met
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
majority
|
Moore v. Illinois
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108613/moore-v-illinois/
|
misleading. Both before and during the trial the prosecutor met with Sanders and went over the statement that he had given the police five days after the murder. Abs. 301, 315. Thus, it is apparent that the prosecutor not only knew of the statement, but was actively using it to prepare his case. There was also testimony at the post-conviction hearing from the prosecution that it had discussed the location where Powell was sitting when he allegedly saw the murder. While the prosecutor could not remember whether or not he actually had Mayer's statement and diagram in his possession, he had some recollection that before trial he was informed of exactly where everyone at Powell's table was sitting. Abs. 323. No attempt was ever made at trial to communicate this information to the defense. Moreover, seated at the prosecutor's table throughout the trial was Police Lieutenant Turbin, who had investigated the case and who was assisting the prosecution. At the post-conviction hearing, he testified that throughout the trial he was not only aware of Sanders' statement and Mayer's diagram, but also that he had them in his file. He made no attempt to communicate his information to the prosecutor or to remind him about the evidence. When the State possesses information that might well exonerate a defendant in a criminal case, it has an affirmative duty to disclose that information. While frivolous information and useless leads can be ignored, if evidence is clearly relevant and helpful to the defense, it must be disclosed. Obviously some burden is placed on the shoulders of the prosecutor when he is required to be responsible for those persons who are directly assisting him in bringing an accused to justice. But this burden is the essence *8 of due process of law. It is the State that tries a man, and it is the State that must insure that the trial is fair. "A citizen has the right to expect fair dealing from his government, see "The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government."[5] See also ; My reading of the case leads me to conclude that the prosecutor knew that evidence existed that might help the defense, that the defense had asked to see it, and that it was never disclosed. It makes no difference whatever whether the evidence that was suppressed was found in the file of a police officer who directly aided the prosecution or in the file of the prosecutor himself. When the prosecutor consciously uses police officers as part of the prosecutorial
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
The statutes of the State of Wisconsin forbid the practice of medicine without a license from an Examining Board composed of practicing physicians. The statutes also define and forbid various acts of professional mis-conduct, proscribe fee splitting, and make illegal the practice of medicine under any name other than the name under which a license has issued if the public would be misled, such practice would constitute unfair competition with another physician, or other detriment to the profession would result. To enforce these provisions, the Examining Board is empowered under and 448.18 to warn and reprimand, temporarily to suspend the license, and "to institute criminal action or action to revoke license when it finds probable cause therefor under criminal or revocation statute."[1] When an investigative proceeding before the *38 Examining Board was commenced against him, appellee brought this suit against appellants, the individual members of the Board, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the statutes. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, the appellants appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction, I Appellee, a resident of Michigan and licensed to practice medicine there, obtained a Wisconsin license in August 1971 under a reciprocity agreement between Michigan and Wisconsin governing medical licensing. His practice in Wisconsin consisted of performing abortions *39 at an office in Milwaukee. On June 20, the Board sent to appellee a notice that it would hold an investigative hearing on July 12, under to determine whether he had engaged in certain proscribed acts.[2] The hearing would be closed to the public, although appellee and his attorney could attend. They would not, however, be permitted to cross-examine witnesses. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the Board would decide "whether to warn or reprimand if it finds such practice and whether to institute criminal action or action to revoke license if probable cause therefor exists under criminal or revocation statutes." App. 14. On July 6, appellee filed his complaint in this action under 42 U.S. C. 1983 seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order preventing the Board from investigating him and from conducting the investigative hearing. The District Court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. On July 12, appellants moved to dismiss the complaint. On the same day, appellee filed an amended complaint in which injunctive relief was sought on the ground that and 448.18 were unconstitutional and that appellants' acts with respect to him violated his constitutional rights. The District Court again denied appellee's motion for a temporary restraining order, but did not act upon appellants' motion to dismiss. On
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
but did not act upon appellants' motion to dismiss. On July 30, appellants submitted an amended motion to dismiss. *40 The Board proceeded with its investigative hearing on July 12 and 13, ; numerous witnesses testified and appellee's counsel was present throughout the proceedings. Appellee's counsel was subsequently informed that appellee could, if he wished, appear before the Board to explain any of the evidence which had been presented. App. 36-37. On September 18, the Board sent to appellee a notice that a "contested hearing"[3] would be held on October 4, to determine whether appellee had engaged in certain prohibited acts[4] and that based upon *41 the evidence adduced at the hearing the Board would determine whether his license would be suspended temporarily under Wis. Stat. Ann. 448.18 (7). Appellee moved for a restraining order against the contested hearing. The District Court granted the motion on October 1, Because the Board had moved from purely investigative proceedings to a hearing aimed at deciding whether suspension of appellee's license was appropriate, the District Court concluded that a substantial federal question had arisen, namely, whether the authority given to appellants both "to investigate physicians and present charges [and] to rule on those charges and impose punishment, at least to the extent of reprimanding or temporarily suspending" violated appellee's due process rights. Appellee's motion to request the convening of a three-judge court was also granted, and appellants' motion to dismiss was denied. The Board complied and did not go forward with the contested hearing. Instead, it noticed and held a final investigative session on October 4, at which appellee's attorney, but not appellee, appeared.[5] The Board thereupon issued "Findings of Fact," "Conclusions of Law," and a "Decision" in which the Board found that appellee had engaged in specified conduct proscribed by the statute. The operative portion of its "Decision" was the following: "Within the meaning of sec. 448.17, Stats., it is hereby determined that there is probable cause to believe that licensee has violated the criminal provisions of ch. 448, Stats., and that there is probable cause for an action to revoke the license of the licensee for engaging in unprofessional conduct. *42 "Therefore, it is the decision of this Board that the secretary verify this document and file it as a verified complaint with the District Attorney of Milwaukee County in accordance with sec. 448.18 (2), Stats., for the purpose of initiating an action to revoke the license of Duane R. Larkin, M. D., to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Wisconsin and initiating appropriate actions for violation of the
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
of Wisconsin and initiating appropriate actions for violation of the criminal laws relating to the practice of medicine." App. 59-60. On November 19, the three-judge District Court found that 448.18 (7) was unconstitutional as a violation of due process guarantees and enjoined the Board from enforcing it. Its holding was: "[F]or the board temporarily to suspend Dr. Larkin's license at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation would constitute a denial to him of his rights to procedural due process. Insofar as 448.18 (7) authorizes a procedure wherein a physician stands to lose his liberty or property, absent the intervention of an independent, neutral and detached decision maker, we concluded that it was unconstitutional and unenforceable." Judgment was entered on January 31, 1974, by which it was "Ordered and Adjudged that 448.18 (7), Wis. Stats., is unconstitutional and that the defendants are preliminarily enjoined until further notice from utilizing the provisions of 448.18 (7), Wis. Stats." Appellants took an appeal from that decision, and we noted probable jurisdiction on June 10, 1974. Subsequently, on July 25, 1974, the District Court, at the initial suggestion of appellants but joined in by a cross-motion of appellee, modified its judgment so as to withdraw *43 its declaration of unconstitutionality and to enjoin the enforcement of 448.18 (7) against appellee only. The amended judgment declared that appellee would suffer irreparable injury if the statute were applied to him and that his challenge to the statute's constitutionality had a high likelihood of success.[6] II Appellants correctly assert that the District Court's initial judgment conflicted with this Court's holding in that a state statute should not be declared unconstitutional by a district court if a preliminary injunction is granted a plaintiff to protect his interests during the ensuing litigation. "The question before [the District Court] was not whether the act was constitutional or unconstitutional but was whether the showing made raised serious questions, under the federal Constitution. and disclosed that enforcement of the act, pending final hearing, would inflict irreparable damages upon the complainants." The January 31, 1974, judgment should not have declared 448.18 (7) unconstitutional and it erroneously enjoined the Board from utilizing the section against any licensee. The District Court, however, has subsequently modified its judgment to eliminate the declaration of unconstitutionality *44 and to enjoin application of the statute only as against appellee.[7] Since appellants are no longer forbidden to apply the statutes to other persons, this issue in the has been effectively settled. We have also concluded that the amended judgment makes inappropriate extended treatment of appellants' contentions
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
the amended judgment makes inappropriate extended treatment of appellants' contentions that the District Court failed to make the findings and conclusions required by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52 (a), and failed to include in the order granting the injunction the reasons for its issuance as required by Rule 65 (d).[8] The District Court's *45 opinion and initial judgment were deficient in this respect, but its amended judgment found what the court said was contained in its prior opinion[9]that appellee would suffer irreparable injury if the statute were to be applied against him and that appellee's "challenge to the constitutionality of said statute has a high likelihood of success."[10] Cf. While a decision to vacate and remand for fuller emendation of the findings, conclusions, and judgment would be justified in view of their lack of specificity,[11] we doubt that such action, in the circumstances present here, would add anything essential to the determination of the merits. The District Court's decision turned upon the sequence of functions followed by appellants and not upon any factual issue peculiar to this We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1253,[12] and a *46 remand at this juncture would be a costly procedure to emphasize points that have already been made and recognized by both parties as well as by the District Court. III The District Court framed the constitutional issue, which it addressed as being whether "for the board temporarily to suspend Dr. Larkin's license at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation would constitute a denial to him of his rights to procedural due process." 368 F. Supp., at[13] The question was initially answered affirmatively, and in its amended judgment the court asserted that there was a high probability that appellee would prevail on the question. Its opinion stated that the "state medical examining board [did] not qualify as [an independent] decisionmaker [and could not] properly rule with regard to the merits of the same charges it investigated and, as in this presented to the district attorney." We disagree. On the present record, it is quite unlikely that appellee would ultimately prevail on the merits of the due process issue presented to the District Court, and it was an abuse of discretion to issue the preliminary injunction. Concededly, a "fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts. Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." In
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." In re at ; cf. In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Among these s are those in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome[14] and in which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him.[15] The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Very similar claims have been squarely rejected in prior decisions of this Court. In the Federal Trade Commission *48 had instituted proceedings concerning the respondents' multiple basing-point delivered-price system. It was demanded that the Commission members disqualify themselves because long before the Commission had filed its complaint it had investigated the parties and reported to Congress and to the President, and its members had testified before congressional committees concerning the legality of such a pricing system. At least some of the members had disclosed their opinion that the system was illegal. The issue of bias was brought here and confronted "on the assumption that such an opinion had been formed by the entire membership of the Commission as a result of its prior official investigations." The Court rejected the claim, saying: "[T]he fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents' basing point practices. Here, in contrast to the Commission's investigations, members of the cement industry were legally authorized participants in the hearings. They produced evidence volumes of it. They were free to point out to the Commission by testimony, by cross-examination of witnesses, and by arguments, conditions of the trade practices under attack which they thought kept these practices within the range of legally permissible business activities." In specific response to a due process argument, the Court asserted: "No decision of this Court would require
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
the Court asserted: "No decision of this Court would require us to hold that it would be a violation of procedural due process for a judge to sit in a after he had expressed *49 an opinion as to whether certain types of conduct were prohibited by law. In fact, judges frequently try the same more than once and decide identical issues each time, although these issues involve questions both of law and fact. Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot possibly be under stronger constitutional compulsions in this respect than a court." This Court has also ruled that a hearing examiner who has recommended findings of fact after rejecting certain evidence as not being probative was not disqualified to preside at further hearings that were required when reviewing courts held that the evidence had been erroneously excluded. The Court of Appeals had decided that the examiner should not again sit because it would be unfair to require the parties to try "issues of fact to those who may have prejudged them" But this Court unanimously reversed, saying: "Certainly it is not the rule of judicial administration that, statutory requirements apart a judge is disqualified from sitting in a retrial because he was reversed on earlier rulings. We find no warrant for imposing upon administrative agencies a stiffer rule, whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit because they ruled strongly against a party in the first hearing." 330 U.S., at More recently we have sustained against due process objection a system in which a Social Security examiner has responsibility for developing the facts and making a decision as to disability claims, and observed that the challenge to this combination of functions "assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures designed, *50 and working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity."[16] *51 That is not to say that there is nothing to the argument that those who have investigated should not then adjudicate. The issue is substantial, it is not new, and legislators and others concerned with the operations of administrative agencies have given much attention to whether and to what extent distinctive administrative functions should be performed by the same persons. No single answer has been reached. Indeed, the growth, variety, and complexity of the administrative processes have made any one solution highly unlikely. Within the Federal Government itself, Congress has addressed the issue in several different ways, providing for varying degrees of *52 separation from complete separation of functions to virtually none at all.[17] For the generality of agencies, Congress has been content with 5
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
the generality of agencies, Congress has been content with 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. 554 (d), which provides that no employee engaged in investigating or prosecuting may also participate or advise in the adjudicating function, but which also expressly exempts from this prohibition "the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency."[18] It is not surprising, therefore, to find that "[t]he law, both federal and state, generally rejects the idea that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating functions is a denial of due process" 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 13.02, p. 175 (1958). Similarly, our s, although they reflect the substance of the problem, offer no support for the bald proposition applied in this by the District Court that agency members who participate in an investigation are disqualified from adjudicating. The incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in this country will not yield to any single organizing principle. *53 Appellee relies heavily on In re in which a state judge, empowered under state law to sit as a "one-man grand jury" and to compel witnesses to testify before him in secret about possible crimes, charged two such witnesses with criminal contempt, one for perjury and the other for refusing to answer certain questions, and then himself tried and convicted them. This Court found the procedure to be a denial of due process of law not only because the judge in effect became part of the prosecution and assumed an adversary position, but also because as a judge, passing on guilt or innocence, he very likely relied on "his own personal knowledge and impression of what had occurred in the grand jury room," an impression that "could not be tested by adequate cross-examination."[19] Plainly enough, has not been understood to stand for the broad rule that the members of an administrative agency may not investigate the facts, institute proceedings, and then make the necessary adjudications. The Court did not purport to question the Cement or the Administrative Procedure Act and did not lay down any general principle that a judge before whom an alleged contempt is committed may not bring and preside over the ensuing contempt proceedings. The accepted rule is to the contrary. *54 ; Nor is there anything in this that comes within the strictures of[20] When the Board instituted its investigative procedures, it stated only that it would investigate whether proscribed conduct had occurred. Later in noticing the adversary hearing, it asserted only that it would determine if violations had been committed which would warrant suspension of appellee's license. Without
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
been committed which would warrant suspension of appellee's license. Without doubt, the Board then anticipated that the proceeding would eventuate in an adjudication of the issue; but there was no more evidence of bias or the risk of bias or prejudgment than inhered in the very fact that the Board had investigated and would now adjudicate.[21] Of course, we should be alert to the possibilities of bias that may lurk in the way particular procedures actually work in practice. The processes utilized by the Board, however, do not in themselves contain an unacceptable risk of bias. The *55 investigative proceeding had been closed to the public, but appellee and his counsel were permitted to be present throughout; counsel actually attended the hearings and knew the facts presented to the Board.[22] No specific foundation has been presented for suspecting that the Board had been prejudiced by its investigation or would be disabled from hearing and deciding on the basis of the evidence to be presented at the contested hearing. The mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing. Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators "are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances." United We are of the view, therefore, that the District Court was in error when it entered the restraining order against the Board's contested hearing and when it granted the preliminary injunction based on the untenable view that it would be unconstitutional for the Board to suspend appellee's license "at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation" The contested hearing should have been permitted to proceed. IV Nor do we think the situation substantially different because the Board, when it was prevented from going forward with the contested hearing, proceeded to make and issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law asserting that there was probable cause to believe that *56 appellee had engaged in various acts prohibited by the Wisconsin statutes.[23] These findings and conclusions were verified and filed with the district attorney for the purpose of initiating revocation and criminal proceedings. Although the District Court did not emphasize this aspect of the before it, appellee stresses it in attempting to show prejudice and prejudgment. We are not persuaded. Judges repeatedly issue arrest warrants on the basis that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person named in the
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
has been committed and that the person named in the warrant has committed it. Judges also preside at preliminary hearings where they must decide whether the evidence is sufficient to hold a defendant for trial. Neither of these pretrial involvements has been thought to raise any constitutional barrier against the judge's presiding over the criminal trial and, if the trial is without a jury, against making the necessary determination of guilt or innocence. Nor has it been thought that a judge is disqualified from presiding over injunction proceedings because he has initially assessed the facts in issuing or denying a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. It is also very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, and it does not violate due process of law.[24] We *57 should also remember that it is not contrary to due process to allow judges and administrators who have had their initial decisions reversed on appeal to confront and decide the same questions a second time around. See Cement 333 U. S., ; Donnelly Garment 330 U. S., at Here, the Board stayed within the accepted bounds of due process. Having investigated, it issued findings and conclusions asserting the commission of certain acts and ultimately concluding that there was probable cause to believe that appellee had violated the statutes. The risk of bias or prejudgment in this sequence of functions has not been considered to be intolerably high or to raise a sufficiently great possibility that the adjudicators would be so psychologically wedded to their complaints that they would consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed position. Indeed, just as there is no logical inconsistency between a finding of probable cause and an acquittal in a criminal proceeding, there is no incompatibility between the agency filing a complaint based on probable cause and a subsequent decision, when all the evidence is in, that there has been no violation of the statute. Here, if the Board now proceeded after an adversary hearing to determine that appellee's license to practice should not be temporarily suspended, it would not implicitly be admitting error in its prior finding of probable cause. Its position most probably would merely reflect the benefit *58 of a more complete view of the evidence afforded by an adversary hearing. The initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate
|
Justice White
| 1,975 | 6 |
majority
|
Withrow v. Larkin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109237/withrow-v-larkin/
|
initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have different bases and purposes. The fact that the same agency makes them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due process violation. Clearly, if the initial view of the facts based on the evidence derived from nonadversarial processes as a practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to ultimate decision, a substantial due process question would be raised. But in our view, that is not this[25] That the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high. Findings of that kind made by judges with special insights into local realities are entitled to respect, but injunctions resting on such factors should be accompanied by at least the minimum findings required by Rules 52 (a) and 65 (d).[26] *59 The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.
|
Justice Burger
| 1,980 | 12 |
majority
|
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110244/curtiss-wright-corp-v-general-elec-co/
|
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (b) allows a district court dealing with multiple claims or multiple parties to direct the entry of final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties; to do so, the court must make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. We granted certiorari in order to examine the use of this procedural device. I From 1968 to 1972, respondent General Electric Co. entered into a series of 21 contracts with petitioner Curtiss-Wright Corp. for the manufacture of components designed for use in nuclear powered naval vessels. These contracts had a total value of $215 million. In Curtiss-Wright brought a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking damages and reformation with regard to the 21 contracts. The complaint asserted claims based on alleged fraud, *4 misrepresentation, and breach of contract by General Electric. It also sought $19 million from General Electric on the outstanding balance due on the contracts already performed. General Electric counterclaimed for $1.9 million in costs allegedly incurred as the result of "extraordinary efforts" provided to Curtiss-Wright during performance of the contracts which enabled Curtiss-Wright to avoid a contract default. General Electric also sought, by way of counterclaim, to recover $52 million by which Curtiss-Wright was allegedly unjustly enriched as a result of these "extraordinary efforts." The facts underlying most of these claims and counter-claims are in dispute. As to Curtiss-Wright's claims for the $19 million balance due, however, the sole dispute concerns the application of a release clause contained in each of the 21 agreements, which states that "Seller agree[s] as a condition precedent to final payment, that the Buyer and the Government. are released from all liabilities, obligations and claims arising under or by virtue of this order." App. 103a. When Curtiss-Wright moved for summary judgment on the balance due, General Electric contended that so long as Curtiss-Wright's other claims remained pending, this provision constituted a bar to recovery of the undisputed balance. The District Court rejected this contention and granted summary judgment for Curtiss-Wright on this otherwise undisputed claim. Applying New York law by which the parties had agreed to be bound, the District Court held that Curtiss-Wright was entitled to payment of the balance due notwithstanding the release clause. The court also ruled that Curtiss-Wright was entitled to prejudgment interest at the New York statutory rate of 6% per annum. Curtiss-Wright then moved for a certification of the District Court's orders as final judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (b),[1] which
|
Justice Burger
| 1,980 | 12 |
majority
|
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110244/curtiss-wright-corp-v-general-elec-co/
|
judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (b),[1] which provides: "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an *5 action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." The court expressly directed entry of final judgment for Curtiss-Wright and made the determination that there was "no just reason for delay" pursuant to Rule 54 (b). The District Court also provided a written statement of reasons supporting its decision to certify the judgment as final. It acknowledged that Rule 54 (b) certification was not to be granted as a matter of course, and that this remedy should be reserved for the infrequent harsh case because of the overload in appellate courts which would otherwise result from appeals of an interlocutory nature. The essential inquiry was stated to be "whether, after balancing the competing factors, finality of judgment should be ordered to advance the interests of sound judicial administration and justice to the litigants." The District Court then went on to identify the relevant factors in the case before it. It found that certification would not result in unnecessary appellate review; that the claims *6 finally adjudicated were separate, distinct, and independent of any of the other claims or counterclaims involved; that review of these adjudicated claims would not be mooted by any future developments in the case; and that the nature of the claims was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals. Turning to considerations of justice to the litigants, the District Court found that Curtiss-Wright would suffer severe daily financial loss from nonpayment of the $19 million judgment because current interest rates were higher than the statutory prejudgment rate, a situation compounded by the large amount of
|
Justice Burger
| 1,980 | 12 |
majority
|
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110244/curtiss-wright-corp-v-general-elec-co/
|
prejudgment rate, a situation compounded by the large amount of money involved. The court observed that the complex nature of the remaining claims could, without certification, mean a delay that "would span many months, if not years." The court found that solvency of the parties was not a significant factor, since each appeared to be financially sound. Although the presence of General Electric's counterclaims and the consequent possibility of a setoff recovery were factors which weighed against certification, the court, in balancing these factors, determined that they were outweighed by the other factors in the case. Accordingly, it granted Rule 54 (b) It also granted General Electric's motion for a stay without bond pending appeal. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the case was controlled by its decision in Allis-Chalmers where the court had stated: "In the absence of unusual or harsh circumstances, we believe that the presence of a counterclaim, which could result in a set-off against any amounts due and owing to the plaintiff, weighs heavily against the grant of 54 (b) " In Allis-Chalmers, the court defined unusual or harsh circumstances *7 as those factors "involving considerations of solvency, economic duress, etc." n. 14. In the Third Circuit's view, the question was which of the parties should have the benefit of the amount of the balance due pending final resolution of the litigation. The court held that Allis-Chalmers dictated "that the matter remain in status quo when non-frivolous counterclaims are pending, and in the absence of unusual or harsh circumstances." The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Curtiss-Wright's inability to have use of the money from the judgment might seem harsh, but noted that the same could be said for General Electric if it were forced to pay Curtiss-Wright now but later prevailed on its counter The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had abused its discretion by granting Rule 54 (b) certification in this situation and dismissed the case for want of an appealable order; it also directed the District Court to vacate its Rule 54 (b) determination of finality. Curtiss-Wright's petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc were denied. Four judges dissented from that denial, observing that the case was in conflict with United Bank of We reverse. II Nearly a quarter of a century ago, in Roebuck & this Court outlined the steps to be followed in making determinations under Rule 54 (b). A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a "final judgment." It must be a
|
Justice Burger
| 1,980 | 12 |
majority
|
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110244/curtiss-wright-corp-v-general-elec-co/
|
is dealing with a "final judgment." It must be a "judgment" in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be "final" in the sense that it is "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action." 351 U.S., at 4. *8 Once having found finality, the district court must go on to determine whether there is any just reason for delay. Not all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved The function of the district court under the Rule is to act as a "dispatcher." It is left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court to determine the "appropriate time" when each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal. This discretion is to be exercised "in the interest of sound judicial administration." Thus, in deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of individual final judgments in a setting such as this, a district court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. Consideration of the former is necessary to assure that application of the Rule effectively "preserves the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals." It was therefore proper for the District Judge here to consider such factors as whether the claims under review were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.[2] Here the District Judge saw no sound reason to delay appellate resolution of the undisputed claims already adjudicated. The contrary conclusion of the Court of Appeals was strongly *9 influenced by the existence of nonfrivolous counter The mere presence of such claims, however, does not render a Rule 54 (b) certification inappropriate. If it did, Rule 54 (b) would lose much of its utility. In Cold Metal Process this Court explained that counterclaims, whether compulsory or permissive, present no special problems for Rule 54 (b) determinations; counterclaims are not to be evaluated differently from other Like other claims, their significance for Rule 54 (b) purposes turns on their interrelationship with the claims on which certification is sought. Here, the District Judge determined that General Electric's counterclaims were severable from the claims which had been determined in terms of both the factual and the legal issues involved. The Court of Appeals did not
|
Justice Burger
| 1,980 | 12 |
majority
|
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110244/curtiss-wright-corp-v-general-elec-co/
|
the legal issues involved. The Court of Appeals did not conclude otherwise. What the Court of Appeals found objectionable about the District Judge's exercise of discretion was the assessment of the equities involved. The Court of Appeals concluded that the possibility of a setoff required that the status quo be maintained unless petitioner could show harsh or unusual circumstances; it held that such a showing had not been made in the District Court. This holding reflects a misinterpretation of the standard of review for Rule 54 (b) certifications and a misperception of the appellate function in such cases. The Court of Appeals relied on a statement of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure, and its error derives from reading a description in the commentary as a standard of construction. When Rule 54 (b) was amended in 1946, the Notes of the Advisory Committee which accompanied the suggested amendment indicated that the entire lawsuit was generally the appropriate unit for appellate review, "and that this rule needed only the exercise of a discretionary power to afford a remedy in the infrequent harsh case to provide a simple, definite, workable rule." 28 U.S. C. App., p. 484; 5 F. R. D. 433, 473 (1946). *10 However accurate it may be as a description of cases qualifying for Rule 54 (b) treatment, the phrase "infrequent harsh case" in isolation is neither workable nor entirely reliable as a benchmark for appellate review. There is no indication it was ever intended by the drafters to function as such. In the Court stated that the decision to certify was with good reason left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court. At the same time, the Court noted that "[w]ith equally good reason, any abuse of that discretion remains reviewable by the Court of Appeals." 351 U.S., The Court indicated that the standard against which a district court's exercise of discretion is to be judged is the "interest of sound judicial administration." Admittedly this presents issues not always easily resolved, but the proper role of the court of appeals is not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts but to make sure that the conclusions derived from those weighings and assessments are juridically sound and supported by the record. There are thus two aspects to the proper function of a reviewing court in Rule 54 (b) cases. The court of appeals must, of course, scrutinize the district court's evaluation of such factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only
|
Justice Burger
| 1,980 | 12 |
majority
|
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110244/curtiss-wright-corp-v-general-elec-co/
|
prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units. But once such juridical concerns have been met, the discretionary judgment of the district court should be given substantial deference, for that court is "the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay." The reviewing court should disturb the trial court's assessment of the equities only if it can say that the judge's conclusion was clearly unreasonable. Plainly, sound judicial administration does not require that Rule 54 (b) requests be granted routinely. That is implicit in commending them to the sound discretion of a district court. Because this discretion "is, with good reason, vested by the rule primarily" in the district courts, and because the number of possible situations is large, we are *11 reluctant either to fix or sanction narrow guidelines for the district courts to follow. We are satisfied, however, that on the record here the District Court's assessment of the equities was reasonable. One of the equities which the District Judge considered was the difference between the statutory and market rates of interest. Respondent correctly points out that adjustment of the statutory prejudgment interest rate is a matter within the province of the legislature, but that fact does not make the existing differential irrelevant for Rule 54 (b) purposes. If the judgment is otherwise certifiable, the fact that a litigant who has successfully reduced his claim to judgment stands to lose money because of the difference in interest rates is surely not a "just reason for delay." The difference between the prejudgment and market interest rates was not the only factor considered by the District Court. The court also noted that the debts in issue were liquidated and large, and that absent Rule 54 (b) certification they would not be paid for "many months, if not years" because the rest of the litigation could be expected to continue for that period of time. The District Judge had noted earlier in his opinion on the merits of the release clause issue that respondent General Electric contested neither the amount of the debt nor the fact that it must eventually be paid. App. 164a-172a. The only contest was over the effect of the release clause on the timing of the payment, an isolated and strictly legal issue on which summary judgment had been entered against respondent. The question before the District Court thus came down to which of the parties should get the benefit of the difference between the prejudgment and market rates of interest on debts admittedly
|
Justice Burger
| 1,980 | 12 |
majority
|
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110244/curtiss-wright-corp-v-general-elec-co/
|
the prejudgment and market rates of interest on debts admittedly owing and adjudged to be due while unrelated claims were litigated. The central factor weighing in favor of General Electric was that its pending counterclaims created the possibility of a setoff against the amount it owed petitioner. *12 This possibility was surely not an insignificant factor, especially since the counterclaims had survived a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. at 173a-174a. But the District Court took this into account when it determined that both litigants appeared to be in financially sound condition, and that Curtiss-Wright would be able to satisfy a judgment on the counterclaims should any be entered. The Court of Appeals concluded that this was not enough, and suggested that the presence of such factors as economic duress and insolvency would be necessary to qualify the judgment for Rule 54 (b) 597 F.2d, at But if Curtiss-Wright were under a threat of insolvency, that factor alone would weigh against qualifying; that very threat would cast doubt upon Curtiss-Wright's capacity to produce all or part of the $19 million should General Electric prevail on some of its counter Such a showing would thus in fact be self-defeating. Nor is General Electric's solvency a dispositive factor; if its financial position were such that a delay in entry of judgment on Curtiss-Wright's claims would impair Curtiss-Wright's ability to collect on the judgment, that would weigh in favor of But the fact that General Electric is capable of paying either now or later is not a "just reason for delay." At most, as the District Court found, the fact that neither party is or will become insolvent renders that factor neutral in a proper weighing of the equities involved. The question in cases such as this is likely to be close, but the task of weighing and balancing the contending factors is peculiarly one for the trial judge, who can explore all the facets of a case. As we have noted, that assessment merits substantial deference on review. Here, the District Court's assessment of the equities between the parties was based on an intimate knowledge of the case and is a reasonable one. The District Court having found no other reason justifying delay, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in *13 granting petitioner's motion for certification under Rule 54 (b).[3] Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,986 | 16 |
concurring
|
Goldman v. Weinberger
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111616/goldman-v-weinberger/
|
Captain Goldman presents an especially attractive case for an exception from the uniform regulations that are applicable to all other Air Force personnel. His devotion to his faith is readily apparent. The yarmulke is a familiar and accepted sight.[1] In addition to its religious significance for the wearer, the yarmulke may evoke the deepest respect and admiration the symbol of a distinguished tradition[2] and an *511 eloquent rebuke to the ugliness of anti-Semitism.[3] Captain Goldman's military duties are performed in a setting in which a modest departure from the uniform regulation creates almost no danger of impairment of the Air Force's military mission. Moreover, on the record before us, there is reason to believe that the policy of strict enforcement against Captain Goldman had a retaliatory motive he had worn his yarmulke while testifying on behalf of a defendant in a court-martial proceeding.[4] Nevertheless, as the case has been argued,[5]*512 I believe we must test the validity of the Air Force's rule not merely as it applies to Captain Goldman but also as it applies to all service personnel who have sincere religious beliefs that may conflict with one or more military commands. JUSTICE BRENNAN is unmoved by the Government's concern that "while a yarmulke might not seem obtrusive to a Jew, neither does a turban to a Sikh, a saffron robe to a Satchidananda Ashram-Integral Yogi, nor do dreadlocks to a Rastafarian." Post, at 519. He correctly points out that "turbans, saffron robes, and dreadlocks are not before us in this case," and then suggests that other cases may be fairly decided by reference to a reasonable standard based on "functional utility, health and safety considerations, and the goal of a polished, professional appearance." As the Court has explained, this approach attaches no weight to the separate interest in uniformity itself. Because professionals in the military service attach great importance to that plausible interest, it is one that we must recognize as legitimate and rational even though personal experience or admiration for the performance of the "rag-tag band of soldiers" that won us our freedom in the Revolutionary War might persuade us that the Government has exaggerated the importance of that interest. The interest in uniformity, however, has a dimension that is of still greater importance for me. It is the interest in uniform treatment for the members of all religious faiths. The very strength of Captain Goldman's claim creates the danger that a similar claim on behalf of a Sikh or a Rastafarian might readily be dismissed as "so extreme, so unusual, or so faddish an
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,986 | 16 |
concurring
|
Goldman v. Weinberger
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111616/goldman-v-weinberger/
|
dismissed as "so extreme, so unusual, or so faddish an image that public confidence in his ability to perform his duties will be destroyed." Post, at 518. If exceptions from dress code regulations are to be granted on the basis of a multifactored test such as that proposed by JUSTICE BRENNAN, inevitably the decisionmaker's evaluation of the character *513 and the sincerity of the requester's faith as well as the probable reaction of the majority to the favored treatment of a member of that faith will play a critical part in the decision. For the difference between a turban or a dreadlock on the one hand, and a yarmulke on the other, is not merely a difference in "appearance" it is also the difference between a Sikh or a Rastafarian, on the one hand, and an Orthodox Jew on the other. The Air Force has no business drawing distinctions between such persons when it is enforcing commands of universal application.[6] As the Court demonstrates, the rule that is challenged in this case is based on a neutral, completely objective standard visibility. It was not motivated by hostility against, or any special respect for, any religious faith. An exception for yarmulkes would represent a fundamental departure from the true principle of uniformity that supports that rule. For that reason, I join the Court's opinion and its judgment.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
This action involves the scope of federal pre-emption under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S. C. 151 et seq. The RLA, which was extended in 19 to cover the airline industry, see Act of Apr. 10, 19, ch. 166, ; 45 U.S. C. 181-188, sets up a mandatory arbitral mechanism to handle disputes "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of s concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions," 45 U.S. C. 153 First (i). The question in this case is whether an aircraft mechanic who claims that he was discharged for refusing to certify the safety of a plane that he considered unsafe and for reporting his safety concerns to the Federal Aviation Administration may pursue available state-law remedies for wrongful discharge, or whether he may seek redress only through the RLA's arbitral mechanism. We hold that the RLA does not pre-empt his state-law causes of action. I Respondent Grant Norris is an aircraft mechanic licensed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). His aircraft mechanic's license authorizes him to approve an airplane and *249 return it to service after he has made, supervised, or inspected certain repairs performed on that plane. See Certification: Airmen Other Than Flight Crewmembers, 14 CFR 65.85 and 65.87 If he were to approve any aircraft on which the repairs did not conform to FAA safety regulations, the FAA could suspend or revoke his license. See Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding and Alteration, 14 CFR 43.12 On February 2, 1987, respondent was hired by petitioner Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (HAL). Many of the terms of his employment were governed by a collective-bargaining () negotiated between the carrier and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. Under the respondent's duties included inspecting and repairing all parts of a plane and its engine. On July 15, 1987, during a routine preflight inspection of a DC-9 plane, he noticed that one of the tires was worn. When he removed the wheel, respondent discovered that the axle sleeve, which should have been mirror smooth, was scarred and grooved. This damaged sleeve could cause the landing gear to fail. Respondent recommended that the sleeve be replaced, but his supervisor ordered that it be sanded and returned to the plane. This was done, and the plane flew as scheduled. At the end of the shift, respondent refused to sign the maintenance record to certify that the repair had been performed satisfactorily and that the airplane was fit to fly. See 14 CFR 43.9(a) The supervisor immediately suspended him pending a termination hearing. Respondent immediately went home
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
suspended him pending a termination hearing. Respondent immediately went home and called the FAA to report the problem with the sleeve.[1] Respondent then invoked the grievance procedure outlined in the and a "Step 1" grievance hearing was held *250 on July 31, 1987. Petitioner HAL accused respondent of insubordination, claiming that his refusal to sign the record violated the 's provision that an aircraft mechanic "may be required to sign work records in connection with the work he performs." Respondent relied on the 's guarantees that an employee may not be discharged without just cause and may not be disciplined for refusing to perform work that is in violation of health or safety laws. The hearing officer terminated respondent for insubordination. Still conforming to the procedures, respondent appealed his termination, seeking a "Step 3" grievance hearing. Before this hearing took place, HAL offered to reduce respondent's punishment to suspension without pay, but warned him that "any further instance of failure to perform [his] duties in a responsible manner" could result in discharge. Respondent did not respond to this offer, nor, apparently, did he take further steps to pursue his grievance through the procedures. On December 18, 1987, respondent filed suit against HAL in Hawaii Circuit Court. His complaint included two wrongful-discharge tortsdischarge in violation of the public policy expressed in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and implementing regulations, and discharge in violation of Hawaii's Whistleblower Protection Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. 378-61 to 378-69[2] He also alleged that HAL had breached the HAL removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, which dismissed the breach-of-contract claim as pre-empted by the *251 RLA, and remanded the other claims to the state trial court. The trial court then dismissed respondent's claim of discharge in violation of public policy, holding that it, too, was pre-empted by the RLA's provision of exclusive arbitral procedures. The state court certified its order as final to permit respondent to take an immediate appeal. In the meantime, respondent had filed a second lawsuit in state court, naming as defendants three of HAL's officers who allegedly directed, confirmed, or ratified the claimed retaliatory discharge.[3] He again sought relief for, among other things, discharge in violation of public policy and of the Hawaii Whistleblower Protection Act. The Hawaii trial court dismissed these two counts as pre-empted by the RLA and certified the case for immediate appeal. The Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed in both cases, concluding that the RLA did not pre-empt respondent's state tort actions. ; That court concluded that the plain language
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
tort actions. ; That court concluded that the plain language of 153 First (i) does not support pre-emption of disputes independent of a labor 842 P. 2d, 42, and interpreted the opinion in Consolidated Rail to limit RLA pre-emption to "disputes involving contractually defined rights." 842 P. 2d, 42. The court rejected petitioners' argument that the retaliatory discharge claims were pre-empted because determining whether HAL discharged respondent for insubordination, and thus for just cause, required construing the The court pointed to a case involving 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S. C. 185, in which the Court held that a claim of wrongful termination in retaliation for filing a state worker's compensation claim *252 did not require interpretation of a but depended upon purely factual questions concerning the employee's conduct and the employer's motive. Because the same was true in this action, said the Supreme Court of Hawaii, respondent's state tort claims were not pre-empted. We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases, II A Whether federal law pre-empts a state law establishing a cause of action is a question of congressional intent. See Allis-Chalmers Pre-emption of employment standards "within the traditional police power of the State" "should not be lightly inferred." Fort Halifax Packing ; see also Hillsborough Congress' purpose in passing the RLA was to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. ; see also 45 U.S. C. 151a. To realize this goal, the RLA establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for "the prompt and orderly settlement" of two classes of disputes. 45 U.S. C. 151a. The first class, those concerning "rates of pay, rules or working conditions," ib are deemed "major" disputes. Major disputes relate to "`the formation of collective [bargaining] s or efforts to secure them.' " quoting Elgin, J. & E. R. The second class of disputes, known as "minor" disputes, "gro[w] out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of s covering rates *253 of pay, rules, or working conditions." 45 U.S. C. 151a. Minor disputes involve "controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining in a particular fact situation." Thus, "major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them." citing 325 U. S., at Petitioners contend that the conflict over respondent's firing is a minor dispute. If so, it must be resolved only through the RLA mechanisms, including the carrier's internal dispute-resolution processes and an adjustment board established by the employer and the unions. See 45 U.S. C. 184; ; Thus, a determination
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
unions. See 45 U.S. C. 184; ; Thus, a determination that respondent's complaints constitute a minor dispute would pre-empt his state-law actions. B The Court's inquiry into the scope of minor disputes begins, of course, with the text of the statute. Petitioners point out that the statute defines minor disputes to include "disputes growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of ['s]." Petitioners argue that this disjunctive language must indicate that "grievances" means something other than labor-contract disputes, else the term "grievances" would be superfluous. Accordingly, petitioners suggest that "grievances" should be read to mean all employment-related disputes, including those based on statutory or common law. Even if we were persuaded that the word "or" carried this weight, but cf. United citing United ; petitioners' interpretation produces an overlap not unlike the one it purports to avoid. Their *254 expansive definition of "grievances" necessarily encompasses disputes growing out of "the interpretation or application" of 's. Thus, in attempting to save the term "grievances" from superfluity, petitioners would make the phrase after the "or" mere surplusage. We think it more likely that "grievances," like disputes over "the interpretation or application" of 's, refers to diss over how to give effect to the bargained-for The use of "grievance" to refer to a claim arising out of a is common in the labor-law context in general, see, e. g., and it has been understood in this way in the RLA context. See H. R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1934) (referring to RLA settlement of "minor disputes known as `grievances,' which develop from the interpretation and/or application of the contracts between the labor unions and the carriers"). Significantly, the adjustment boards charged with administration of the minor-dispute provisions have understood these provisions as pertaining only to disputes invoking contract-based rights. See, e. g., NRAB Fourth Div. Award No. 4548 (function of the National Rail Adjustment Board (Board) is to decide disputes in accordance with the controlling ); NRAB Third Div. Award No. 48 (1983) (issues not related to the interpretation or application of contracts are outside the Board's authority); NRAB Third Div. Award No. 19790 (1973) ("[T]his Board lacks jurisdiction to enforce rights created by State or Federal Statutes and is limited to questions arising out of interpretations and application of Railway Labor Agreements"); Northwest Airlines/Airline Pilots Assn., Int'l System Bd. of Adjustment, Decision of June 28, 1972, p. 13 ("[B]oth the traditional role of the arbitrator and admonitions of the courts require the Board to refrain from attempting to construe any of the provisions of
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
refrain from attempting to construe any of the provisions of the [RLA]"); United Airlines, Inc., 7 (BNA) (1967) ("The *255 jurisdiction of this System Board does not extend to interpreting and applying the Civil Rights Act"). Accordingly, we believe that the most natural reading of the term "grievances" in this context is as a synonym for disputes involving the application or interpretation of a See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1585 (1986) (the word "or" may be used to indicate "the synonymous, equivalent, or substitutive character of two words or phrases"). Nothing in the legislative history of the RLA[4] or other sections of the statute[5] undermines this conclusion. But even accepting that 151a is susceptible of more than one interpretation, no proposed interpretation demonstrates a clear and manifest congressional purpose to create a regime *256 that broadly pre-empts substantive protections extended by the States, independent of any negotiated labor C Our case law confirms that the category of minor disputes contemplated by 151a are those that are grounded in the We have defined minor disputes as those involving the interpretation or application of existing labor s. See, e. g., ; Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. ; 353 U. S., at (minor disputes are "controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining "); 9 U.S. 239, (RLA arbitral mechanism is meant to provide remedies for "adjustment of railroademployee disputes growing out of the interpretation of existing s"). Moreover, we have held that the RLA's mechanism for resolving minor disputes does not pre-empt causes of action to enforce rights that are independent of the More than 60 years ago, the Court rejected a railroad's argument that the existence of the RLA arbitration scheme preempted a state statute regulating the number of workers required to operate certain equipment. Missouri Pacific R. Not long thereafter, the Court rejected a claim that the RLA pre-empted an order by the Illinois Commerce Commission requiring cabooses on all trains; the operative required cabooses only on some of the trains. Terminal Assn. of St. Although the Court assumed that a railroad adjustment board would have jurisdiction under the RLA over this dispute, it concluded that the state law was enforceable nonetheless: "State laws have long regulated a great variety of conditions in transportation and industry, such as sanitary facilities and conditions, safety devices and protections, purity of water supply, fire protection, and innumerable others. Any of these matters might, we suppose, be the subject of a demand by work[ers] for better protection and upon refusal might be the subject of a labor dispute which would have such
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
the subject of a labor dispute which would have such effect on interstate commerce that federal agencies might be invoked to deal with some phase of it. But it cannot be said that the minimum requirements laid down by state authority are all set aside. We hold that the enactment by Congress of the [RLA] was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves" -7. Thus, under Norwood, substantive protections provided by state law, independent of whatever labor might govern, are not pre-empted under the RLA. Although Norwood and Terminal involved state workplace safety laws, the Court has taken a consistent approach in the context of state actions for wrongful discharge. In the Court held that a state-law claim of wrongful termination was pre-empted, not because the RLA broadly pre-empts state-law claims based on discharge or discipline, but because the employee's claim was firmly rooted in a breach of the itself. He asserted no right independent of that : "Here it is conceded by all that the only source of [Andrews'] right not to be discharged, and therefore to treat an alleged discharge as a `wrongful' one that entitles him * to damages, is the []. [T]he dis turns on the extent of [the railroad's] obligation to restore [Andrews] to his regular duties following injury in an automobile accident. The existence and extent of such an obligation in a case such as this will depend on the interpretation of the []. Thus [Andrews'] claim, and [the railroad's] disallowance of it, stem from differing interpretations of the []. His claim is therefore subject to the Act's requirement that it be submitted to the Board for adjustment." Here, in contrast, the is not the "only source" of respondent's right not to be discharged wrongfully. In fact, the "only source" of the right respondent asserts in this action is state tort law. Wholly apart from any provision of the petitioners had a state-law obligation not to fire respondent in violation of public policy or in retaliation for whistle-blowing. The parties' obligation under the RLA to arbitrate disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of the did not relieve petitioners of this duty. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. confirms that "minor disputes" subject to RLA arbitration are those that involve duties and rights created or defined by the In a railroad employee sought damages for workplace injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S. C. 51 et seq., which provides a remedy for a railroad worker injured through an employer's or co-worker's negligence. The railroad argued that,
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
through an employer's or co-worker's negligence. The railroad argued that, because the alleged injury resulted from conduct that was subject to the the employee's sole remedy was through RLA arbitration. The Court unanimously rejected this argument, emphasizing that the rights derived from the FELA were independent of the : "The fact that an injury otherwise compensable under the FELA was caused by conduct that may have been *259 subject to arbitration under the RLA does not deprive an employee of his opportunity to bring an FELA action for damages. The FELA not only provides railroad workers with substantive protection against negligent conduct that is independent of the employer's obligations under its collective-bargaining but also affords injured workers a remedy suited to their needs, unlike the limited relief that seems to be available through the Adjustment Board. It is inconceivable that Congress intended that a worker who suffered a disabling injury would be denied recovery under the FELA simply because he might also be able to process a narrow labor grievance under the RLA to a successful conclusion." -565. It likened to other cases in which the Court had concluded that "notwithstanding the strong policies encouraging arbitration, `different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers,' " quoting and distinguished it from Andrews, which involved a state wrongful-discharge claim "based squarely" on an alleged breach of a[6] *260 D The pre-emption standard that emerges from the line of cases leading to that a state-law cause of action is not pre-empted by the RLA if it involves rights and obligations that exist independent of the is virtually identical to the pre-emption standard the Court employs in cases involving 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S. C. 185.[7] In AllisChalmers the Court applied 301 pre-emption to a state-law claim for bad-faith handling of a worker's compensation claim because the duties the employer owed the employee, including the duty of good faith, were rooted firmly in the Its pre-emption finding was based on the fact that "the right asserted not only derives from the contract, but is defined by the contractual obligation of good faith, [so that] any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will involve contract interpretation." at 8. It cautioned, however, that other state-law rights, those that existed independent of the contract, would not be similarly pre-empted: "Of course, not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collectivebargaining is pre-empted by 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law. Nor is there
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
other provisions of the federal labor law. Nor is there any suggestion that Congress, in adopting 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of private s the force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent state regulation. Clearly, 301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law. In extending the pre-emptive effect of 301 beyond suits for breach *261 of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to pre-empt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract." at 1-2.[8] In a case remarkably similar to the case before us now, this Court made clear that the existence of a potential based remedy did not deprive an employee of independent remedies available under state law. In an employee covered by a labor was fired for filing an allegedly false worker's compensation claim. After filing a grievance pursuant to her which protected employees against discharge except for "proper" or "just" cause, she filed a complaint in state court, alleging that she had been discharged for exercising her rights under Illinois worker's compensation laws. The state court had held her state-law claim preempted because "the same analysis of the facts" was required in both the grievance proceeding and the state-court action. This Court reversed. It recognized that where the resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of the the claim is preempted. citing 9 U.S. 95 It observed, however, that "purely factual questions" about an employee's conduct or an employer's conduct and motives do not "requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining" * The state-law retaliatory discharge claim turned on just this sort of purely factual question: whether the employee was discharged or threatened with discharge, and, if so, whether the employer's motive in discharging her was to deter or interfere with her exercise of rights under Illinois worker's compensation law. While recognizing that "the state-law analysis might well involve attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination of whether Lingle was fired for just cause," the Court disagreed that "such parallelism render[ed] the state-law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis. For while there may be instances in which the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state law on the basis of the subject matter of the law in question, 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining s, and says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such s. In other words, even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the itself, the claim is `independent' of the for 301 pre-emption purposes." -410. The Court's ruling in Lingle that the LMRA pre-empts state law only if a state-law claim is dependent on the interpretation of a is fully consistent with the holding in -565, that the RLA does not pre-empt "substantive protection independent of the []," with the holding in Terminal that the RLA does not pre-empt basic "protection laid down by state authority," with the conclusion in Andrews, 406 U. S., *263 that a state-law claim is pre-empted where it "depend[s] on the interpretation" of the and with the description in of a minor dispute as one that can be "conclusively resolved" by reference to an existing Lingle, in fact, expressly relied on see -412, just as earlier RLA cases have drawn analogies to LMRA principles, see, e. g., Given this convergence in the pre-emption standards under the two statutes, we conclude that Lingle provides an appropriate framework for addressing pre-emption under the RLA, and we adopt the Lingle standard to resolve claims of RLA pre-emption.[9] E In reaching this conclusion, we reject petitioners' suggestion that this contract-dependent standard for minor disputes *264 is inconsistent with two of our prior cases, Elgin, J. & E. R. and was not a pre-emption case. Rather, it concerned the authority of union officials to settle railroad workers' individual claims for damages for alleged violations of the The railroad urged that the union representative, who had the authority to negotiate 's in major disputes, enjoyed similar authority to settle individual claims in minor disputes. In the course of rejecting this claim, the Court described minor disputes as including the "omitted case," that is, one "founded upon some incident of the employment relation, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective e. g., claims on account of personal injuries." 325 U.S., at This language is sweeping, but its effect is limited. The conflict in which the parties agreed was a minor dispute, concerned the terms of a and not some other "incident of the employment relationship," or any "omitted case." These references, therefore, are dicta. Moreover, even the "omitted case" dictum logically can refer to a norm that the parties have created but have omitted
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
a norm that the parties have created but have omitted from the 's explicit language, rather than to a norm established by a legislature or a court.[10] Finally, `s one specific example of an "omitted case"claims for personal injury that do not depend on the contractwas found in to be outside the RLA's exclusive jurisdiction. Nonetheless, to avoid any confusion, we expressly disavow any language in *265 suggesting that minor disputes encompass state-law claims that exist independent of the like involved no pre-emption analysis. The parties agreed that the disputea workers' challenge to the railroad's drug-testing policieswas governed by the RLA, because 's policy of conducting physical examinations was an implied term of the The only question before the Court was whether the employer's drug-testing policy constituted an attempt to add a new term to the existing making it a major dispute subject to a "protracted process" of bargaining and mediation, or whether the testing reflected the employer's interpretation and application of an implied term of the existing contract, producing a minor dispute subject to a less onerous process of arbitration. We concluded that the dispute was minor, stating that "[t]he distinguishing feature of [a minor dispute] is that the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing []." citing Garrison, The National Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L. J. 567, 568, 576 (1937). Obviously, to say that a minor dispute can be "conclusively resolved" by interpreting the is another way of saying that the dispute does not involve rights that exist independent of the Petitioners, however, pin their hopes on the observation that "[w]here an employer asserts a contractual right to take the contested action, the ensuing dispute is minor if the action is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' collective-bargaining" They argue that this action involves a minor dispute because the termination of respondent was "arguably justified" by the 's provision permitting termination for "just cause." This "arguably justified" standard, however, was employed only for policing the line between major and minor disputes. Recognizing that accepting a party's characterization of a dispute as "minor" ran the risk of undercutting *266 the RLA's prohibition "against unilateral imposition of new contractual terms," the Court held that a dispute would be deemed minor only if there was a sincere, nonfrivolous argument that it turned on the application of the existing that is, if it was "arguably justified" by that Obviously, this test said nothing about the threshold question whether the dispute was subject to the RLA in the first place. III Returning to the action
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,994 | 11 |
majority
|
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117857/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-norris/
|
RLA in the first place. III Returning to the action before us, the question under Lingle is whether respondent's state-law wrongful-discharge claims are independent of the Petitioners argue that resort to the is necessary to determine whether respondent, in fact, was discharged. This argument is foreclosed by Lingle itself. Lingle teaches that the issue to be decided in this actionwhether the employer's actions make out the element of discharge under Hawaii lawis a "purely factual questio[n]." Nor are we persuaded by petitioners' contention that the state tort claims require a determination whether the discharge, if any, was justified by respondent's failure to sign the maintenance record, as the required him to do. Although such a determination would be required with regard to respondent's separate allegation of discharge in violation of the the District Court dismissed that count as preempted by the RLA, and respondent does not challenge that dismissal. The state tort claims, by contrast, require only the purely factual inquiry into any retaliatory motive of the employer. Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court of Hawaii that respondent's claims for discharge in violation of public policy and in violation of the Hawaii Whistleblower Protection Act are not pre-empted by the RLA, and we affirm that court's judgment. It is so ordered.
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
concurring
|
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112563/automobile-workers-v-johnson-controls-inc/
|
The Court properly holds that Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy overtly discriminates against women, and thus is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unless it falls within the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception, set forth at 42 US C 2000e-2(e) The Court erroneously holds, however, that the BFOQ defense is so narrow that it could never justify a sex-specific fetal-protection policy I nevertheless concur in the judgment of reversal because on the record before us summary judgment in favor of Johnson Controls was improperly entered *212 by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals I In evaluating the scope of the BFOQ defense, the proper starting point is the language of the statute Cf ; Board of Ed of Westside Community Schools (Dist Title VII forbids discrimination on the basis of sex, except "in those certain instances where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise" 42 US C 2000e-2(e)(1) For the fetal-protection policy involved in this case to be a BFOQ, therefore, the policy must be "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation" of making batteries, which is Johnson Controls' "particular business" Although that is a difficult standard to satisfy, nothing in the statute's language indicates that it could never support a sex-specific fetal-protection policy[1] On the contrary, a fetal-protection policy would be justified under the terms of the statute if, for example, an employer could show that exclusion of women from certain jobs was reasonably necessary to avoid substantial tort liability Common sense tells us that it is part of the normal operation of business concerns to avoid causing injury to third parties, as well as to employees, if for no other reason than to avoid *213 tort liability and its substantial costs This possibility of tort liability is not hypothetical; every State currently allows children born alive to recover in tort for prenatal injuries caused by third parties, see W Keeton, D Dobbs, R Keeton, & D Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 55, p 368 (5th ed 1984), and an increasing number of courts have recognized a right to recover even for prenatal injuries caused by torts committed prior to conception, see 3 F Harper, F James, & O Gray, Law of Torts 183, pp 677-678, n 15 (2d ed 1986) The Court dismisses the possibility of tort liability by no more than speculating that if "Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has not
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
concurring
|
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112563/automobile-workers-v-johnson-controls-inc/
|
the woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable seems remote at best" Ante, at 208 Such speculation will be small comfort to employers First, it is far from clear that compliance with Title VII will pre-empt state tort liability, and the Court offers no support for that proposition[2] Second, although warnings may preclude claims by injured employees, they will not preclude claims by injured children because the general rule is that parents cannot waive causes of action on behalf of their children, and the parents' negligence will not be imputed to the children[3] Finally, although state tort liability *214 for prenatal injuries generally requires negligence, it will be difficult for employers to determine in advance what will constitute negligence Compliance with OSHA standards, for example, has been held not to be a defense to state tort or criminal liability See National Solid Wastes Management ; see also 29 US C 653(b)(4) Moreover, it is possible that employers will be held strictly liable, if, for example, their manufacturing process is considered "abnormally dangerous" See Restatement (Second) of Torts 869, Comment b (1979) Relying on Los Angeles Dept of Water and the Court contends that tort liability cannot justify a fetal-protection policy because the extra costs of hiring women is not a defense under Title VII Ante, at 210 This contention misrepresents our decision in There, we held that a requirement that female employees contribute more than male employees to a pension fund, in order to reflect the greater longevity of women, constituted discrimination against women under Title VII because it treated them as a class rather than as individuals 716-717 We did not in that case address in any detail the nature of the BFOQ defense, and we certainly did not hold that cost was irrelevant to the BFOQ analysis Rather, we merely stated in a footnote that "there has been no showing that sex distinctions are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the Department's retirement plan" We further noted that although Title VII does not contain a "cost-justification defense comparable to the affirmative defense available in a price discrimination *215 suit," "no defense based on the total cost of employing men and women was attempted in this case" and n 32 Prior decisions construing the BFOQ defense confirm that the defense is broad enough to include considerations of cost and safety of the sort that could form the basis for an employer's adoption of a fetal-protection policy In the Court held that being male was a BFOQ for
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
concurring
|
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112563/automobile-workers-v-johnson-controls-inc/
|
the Court held that being male was a BFOQ for "contact" guard positions in Alabama's maximum-security male penitentiaries The Court first took note of the actual conditions of the prison environment: "In a prison system where violence is the order of the day, where inmate access to guards is facilitated by dormitory living arrangements, where every institution is understaffed, and where a substantial portion of the inmate population is composed of sex offenders mixed at random with other prisoners, there are few visible deterrents to inmate assaults on women custodians" The Court also stressed that "[m]ore [was] at stake" than a risk to individual female employees: "The likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman would pose a real threat not only to the victim of the assault but also to the basic control of the penitentiary and protection of its inmates and the other security personnel" Under those circumstances, the Court observed that "it would be an oversimplification to characterize [the exclusion of women] as an exercise in `romantic paternalism' Cf " We revisited the BFOQ defense in Western Air Lines, this time in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) There, we endorsed the two-part inquiry for evaluating a BFOQ defense used by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in First, the job qualification must not be "so peripheral to the central mission of the employer's business" that no discrimination *216 could be "`reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business'" Although safety is not such a peripheral concern,[4] the inquiry "`adjusts to the safety factor'""`[t]he greater the safety factor, measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of that harm in case of an accident, the more stringent may be the job qualifications,'" (quoting ) Second, the employer must show either that all or substantially all persons excluded "`"would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved,"'" or that it is "`"impossible or highly impractical"'" to deal with them on an individual )) We further observed that this inquiry properly takes into account an employer's interest in safety"[w]hen an employer establishes that a job qualification has been carefully formulated to respond to documented concerns for public safety, it will not be overly burdensome to persuade a trier of fact that the qualification is `reasonably necessary' to safe operation of the business" and make clear that avoidance of substantial safety risks to third parties is inherently part of both an employee's ability to perform a job and an
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
concurring
|
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112563/automobile-workers-v-johnson-controls-inc/
|
both an employee's ability to perform a job and an employer's *217 "normal operation" of its business Indeed, in both cases, the Court approved the statement in that an employer could establish a BFOQ defense by showing that "all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved" See ; The Court's statement in this case that "the safety exception is limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to perform the job," ante, at 204, therefore adds no support to its conclusion that a fetal-protection policy could never be justified as a BFOQ On the facts of this case, for example, protecting fetal safety while carrying out the duties of battery manufacturing is as much a legitimate concern as is safety to third parties in guarding prisons () or flying airplanes ()[5] and also confirm that costs are relevant in determining whether a discriminatory policy is reasonably necessary for the normal operation of a business In the safety problem that justified exclusion of women from the prison guard positions was largely a result of inadequate staff and facilities See 433 US, If the cost of employing women could not be considered, the employer there should have been required to hire more staff and restructure the prison environment rather than exclude women Similarly, in the airline could have been *218 required to hire more pilots and install expensive monitoring devices rather than discriminate against older employees The BFOQ statute, however, reflects "Congress' unwillingness to require employers to change the very nature of their operations" Price The PDA, contrary to the Court's assertion, ante, at 204, did not restrict the scope of the BFOQ defense The PDA was only an amendment to the "Definitions" section of Title VII, 42 US C 2000e, and did not purport to eliminate or alter the BFOQ defense Rather, it merely clarified Title VII to make it clear that pregnancy and related conditions are included within Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions As we have already recognized, "the purpose of the PDA was simply to make the treatment of pregnancy consistent with general Title VII principles" Arizona Governing Comm for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation [6] This interpretation is confirmed by the PDA's legislative history As discussed in Newport Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v EEOC, the PDA was designed to overrule the decision in General Electric v Gilbert, where the Court *219 had held that "an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
concurring
|
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112563/automobile-workers-v-johnson-controls-inc/
|
plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all" The PDA thus "makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions" Newport at It does not, however, alter the standards for employer defenses The Senate Report, for example, stated that the PDA "defines sex discrimination, as proscribed in the existing statute, to include these physiological occurrences [pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions] peculiar to women; it does not change the application of Title VII to sex discrimination in any other way" S Rep No 95-331, pp 3-4 Similarly, the House Report stated that "[p]regnancy-based distinctions will be subject to the same scrutiny on the same terms as other acts of sex discrimination proscribed in the existing statute" H R Rep No 95-948, p 4 [7] In enacting the BFOQ standard, "Congress did not ignore the public interest in safety" The Court's narrow interpretation of the BFOQ defense in this case, however, means that an employer cannot exclude even pregnant women from an environment highly toxic to their fetuses It is foolish to think that Congress intended such a result, and neither the language of the BFOQ exception nor our cases requires it[8] *220 II Despite my disagreement with the Court concerning the scope of the BFOQ defense, I concur in reversing the Court of Appeals because that court erred in affirming the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Johnson Controls First, the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the level of risk avoidance that was part of Johnson Controls' "normal operation" Although the court did conclude that there was a "substantial risk" to fetuses from lead exposure in fertile women, it merely meant that there was a high risk that some fetal injury would occur absent a fetal-protection policy That analysis, of course, fails to address the extent of fetal injury that is likely to occur[9] If the fetal-protection policy insists on a risk-avoidance level substantially higher than other risk levels *221 tolerated by Johnson Controls such as risks to employees and consumers, the policy should not constitute a BFOQ[10] Second, even without more information about the normal level of risk at Johnson Controls, the fetal-protection policy at issue here reaches too far This is evident both in its presumption that, absent medical documentation to the contrary, all women are fertile regardless of their age, see and in its exclusion of presumptively fertile women from positions that might result in a promotion to a position involving high lead exposure, There has been no showing that either
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
concurring
|
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112563/automobile-workers-v-johnson-controls-inc/
|
high lead exposure, There has been no showing that either of those aspects of the policy is reasonably necessary to ensure safe and efficient operation of Johnson Controls' battery-manufacturing business Of course, these infirmities in the company's policy do not warrant invalidating the entire fetal-protection program Third, it should be recalled that until 1982 Johnson Controls operated without an exclusionary policy, and it has not identified any grounds for believing that its current policy is reasonably necessary to its normal operations Although it is now more aware of some of the dangers of lead exposure, it has not shown that the risks of fetal harm or the costs associated with it have substantially increased Cf 435 U S, in which we rejected a BFOQ defense because the employer had operated prior to the discrimination with no significant adverse effects Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to consider properly petitioners' evidence of harm to offspring caused by lead exposure in males The court considered that evidence only in its discussion of the business necessity standard, in which it focused on whether petitioners had met their burden of proof -890 The burden of proving that a discriminatory qualification is a BFOQ, however, rests with *222 the employer See, e g, Price ; 433 U S, Thus, the court should have analyzed whether the evidence was sufficient for petitioners to survive summary judgment in light of respondent's burden of proof to establish a BFOQ Moreover, the court should not have discounted the evidence as "speculative," merely because it was based on animal studies We have approved the use of animal studies to assess risks, see Industrial Union and OSHA uses animal studies in establishing its lead control regulations, see United Steelworkers of America, cert denied, It seems clear that if the Court of Appeals had properly analyzed that evidence, it would have concluded that summary judgment against petitioners was not appropriate because there was a dispute over a material issue of fact As Judge Posner observed below: "The issue of the legality of fetal protection is as novel and difficult as it is contentious and the most sensible way to approach it at this early stage is on a case-by-case basis, involving careful examination of the facts as developed by the full adversary process of a trial The record in this case is too sparse The district judge jumped the gun By affirming on this scanty basis we may be encouraging incautious employers to adopt fetal protection policies that could endanger the jobs of millions of women for minor gains in fetal safety
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
concurring
|
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112563/automobile-workers-v-johnson-controls-inc/
|
of millions of women for minor gains in fetal safety and health "But although the defendant did not present enough evidence to warrant the grant of summary judgment in its favor, there is no ground for barring it from presenting additional evidence at trial Therefore it would be equally precipitate for us to direct the entry of judgment in the plaintiffs' favor " *223 JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment I generally agree with the Court's analysis, but have some reservations, several of which bear mention First, I think it irrelevant that there was "evidence in the record about the debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive system," ante, at 198 Even without such evidence, treating women differently "on the basis of pregnancy" constitutes discrimination "on the basis of sex," because Congress has unequivocally said so Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 Stat 2076, 42 US C 2000e(k) Second, the Court points out that "Johnson Controls has shown no factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely the duties of the job involved," ante, at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted) In my view, this is not only "somewhat academic in light of our conclusion that the company may not exclude fertile women at all," ibid; it is entirely irrelevant By reason of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, it would not matter if all pregnant women placed their children at risk in taking these jobs, just as it does not matter if no men do so As Judge Easterbrook put it in his dissent below: "Title VII gives parents the power to make occupational decisions affecting their families A legislative forum is available to those who believe that such decisions should be made elsewhere" Third, I am willing to assume, as the Court intimates, ante, at 208-211, that any action required by Title VII cannot give rise to liability under state tort law That assumption, however, does not answer the question whether an action is required by Title VII (including the BFOQ provision) even if it is subject to liability under state tort law It is perfectly reasonable to believe that Title VII has accommodated state tort law through the BFOQ exception However, all that need be said in the present case is that Johnson has not demonstrated a substantial risk of tort liabilitywhich is *224 alone enough to defeat a tort-based assertion of the BFOQ exception Last, the Court goes far afield, it seems to me, in suggesting that increased cost aloneshort of "costs so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Conroy v. Aniskoff
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112840/conroy-v-aniskoff/
|
The Court begins its analysis with the observation: "The statutory command in 525 is unambiguous, unequivocal, and unlimited." Ante, at 514. In my view, discussion of that point is where the remainder of the analysis should have ended. Instead, however, the Court feels compelled to demonstrate that its holding is consonant with legislative history, including some dating back to 1917a full quarter century *519 before the provision at issue was enacted. That is not merely a waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the law. It says to the bar that even an "unambiguous [and] unequivocal" statute can never be dispositive; that, presumably under penalty of malpractice liability, the oracles of legislative history, far into the dimmy past, must always be consulted. This undermines the clarity of law, and condemns litigants (who, unlike us, must pay for it out of their own pockets) to subsidizing historical research by lawyers. The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: "The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself" But not the least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy. If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising candidate than legislative history. And the present case nicely proves that point. Judge Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends. If I may pursue that metaphor: The legislative history of 205 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act[1] contains a variety of diverse personages, a selected few of whomits "friends"the Court has introduced to us in support of its result. But there are many other faces in the crowd, most of which, I think, are set against today's result. I will limit my exposition of the legislative history to the enactment of four statutes: *520 1. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918 (1918 Act), ; 2. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (1940 Act or Act), ; 3. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942 (1942 Amendments), ; 4. The Selective Service Act of 1948, That, of course, cannot be said to be the "complete
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Conroy v. Aniskoff
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112840/conroy-v-aniskoff/
|
That, of course, cannot be said to be the "complete legislative history" relevant to this provision. Cf. ante, at 515. One of the problems with legislative history is that it is inherently open ended. In this case, for example, one could go back further in time to examine the Civil War-era relief Acts, many of which are in fact set forth in an appendix to the House Report on the 1918 Act, see App. A, H. R. Rep. No. 181, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 18-32 (1917) (hereinafter 1917 House Report). Or one could extend the search abroad and consider the various foreign statutes that were mentioned in that same House Report. See Those additional statutes might be of questionable relevance, but then so too are the 1918 Act and the 1940 Act, neither of which contained a provision governing redemption periods. Nevertheless, I will limit my legislative history inquiry to those four statutes for the simple reason that that is the scope chosen by the Court. The 1918 Act appears to have been the first comprehensive national soldiers' relief Act. See 55 Cong. Rec. 7787 (1917). The legislative history reveals that Congress intended[2] that *521 it serve the same vital purposeproviding "protection against suit to men in military service"as various state statutes had served during the Civil War. 1917 House Report 3; see also (setting forth text of numerous state soldiers' relief Acts from the Civil War era). Congress intended, however, that the 1918 Act should differ from the Civil War statutes "in two material respects." 55 Cong. Rec. 7787 (1917) The first was that, being a national statute, it would produce a disposition "uniform throughout the Nation." 1917 House Report 3; see also 55 Cong. Rec. 7787 (1917) But it is the second difference which has particular relevance to the Court's ruling today: "The next material difference between this law and the various State laws is this, and in this I think you will find the chief excellence of the bill which we propose: Instead of the bill we are now considering being arbitrary, inelastic, inflexible, the discretion as to dealing out even-handed justice between the creditor and the soldier, taking into consideration the fact that the soldier has been called to his country's cause, rests largely, and in some cases entirely, in the breast of the judge who tries the case."[3] This comment cannot be dismissed as the passing remark of an insignificant Member, since the speaker was the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, the committee that reported *522 the bill to the House floor. Moreover, his
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Conroy v. Aniskoff
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112840/conroy-v-aniskoff/
|
reported *522 the bill to the House floor. Moreover, his remarks merely echoed the House Report, which barely a page into its text stated: "We cannot point out too soon, or too emphatically, that the bill is not an inflexible stay of all claims against persons in military service." 1917 House Report 2. Congress intended to depart from the "arbitrary and rigid protection" that had been provided under the Civil War-era stay laws, ib which could give protection to men "who can and should pay their obligations in full," It is clear, therefore, that in the 1918 Act Congress intended to create flexible rules that would permit denial of protection to members of the military who could show no hardship. The 1918 Act expired by its own terms six months after the end of the First World War. See 1918 Act, 603, The 1940 Act was adopted as the Nation prepared for its coming participation in the Second World War. Both the House and Senate Reports described it as being, "in substance, identical with the [1918 Act]." H. R. Rep. No. 3001, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 3 (1940); S. Rep. No. 2109, 76 Cong., 3d Sess., 4 (1940). Moreover, in we acknowledged that the 1940 Act was "a substantial reenactment" of the 1918 Act, and looked to the legislative history of the 1918 Act for indications of congressional intent with respect to the 1940 Act. Relying on that legislative history, we found that "the very heart of the policy of the Act" was to provide "judicial discretion instead of rigid and undiscriminating suspension of civil proceedings." Although the Court never mentions this fact, it is clear that under the 1918 and 1940 Acts a redemption period would not be tolled during the period of military service. In both enactments, 205 governed only statutes of limitations and did not mention redemption periods.[4] Moreover, in *523 this Court held that neither 205 nor 302, which provides protection from foreclosures, conferred on a court any power to extend a statutory redemption period. Congress overturned the rule of Ebert in the 1942 Amendments, a central part of the legislative history that the Court curiously fails to discuss. Section 5 of those amendments rewrote 205 of the Act to place it in its current form, which directly addresses the redemption periods. See -771; ante, at 512-513, n. 1 (setting forth current version of 205). The crucial question in the present case (if one believes in legislative history) is whether Congress intended this amendment to be consistent with the "heart of the policy of the Act"conferring
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Conroy v. Aniskoff
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112840/conroy-v-aniskoff/
|
consistent with the "heart of the policy of the Act"conferring judicial discretionor rather intended it to confer an unqualified right to extend the period of redemption. Both the House and Senate Reports state that, under the amended 205, "[t]he running of the statutory period during which real property may be redeemed after sale to enforce any obligation, tax, or assessment is likewise tolled during the part of such period which occurs after the enactment of the [1942 Amendments]." H. R. Rep. No. 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1942) ; S. Rep. No. 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1942) The Reports also state that "[a]lthough the tolling of such periods is now within the spirit of the law, it has not been held to be within the letter thereof" (citing Ebert ). H. R. Rep. No. ; S. Rep. No. These statements surely indicate an intention to provide a tolling period for redemptions similar to that already provided for statutes of limitations which, on the basis of the legislative history I have described, *5 can be considered discretionary rather than rigid. The existence of discretionary authority to suspend the tolling is also suggested by the House floor debates. Responding to questions, Representative Sparkman (who submitted the Report on behalf of the House Committee on Military Affairs) agreed that, while the bill "pertains to all persons in the armed forces," a man "serving in the armed forces for more money than he got in civil life is not entitled to any of the benefits of the provisions of this bill." 88 Cong. Rec. 5364, 5365 (1942). In response to that last comment, another Representative inquired further whether "[t]his is to take care of the men who are handicapped because of their military service." Representative Sparkman answered affirmatively. He confirmed that Congress did not intend to abandon the discretionary nature of the scheme: "With reference to all these matters we have tried to make the law flexible by lodging discretion within the courts to do or not to do as justice and equity may require." And finally, at a later point in the debates, Representative Brooks made clear that the Act was intended to remedy the prejudice resulting from compelled military service: "We feel that the normal obligations of the man contracted prior to service induction should be suspended as far as practicable during this tour of duty, and that the soldier should be protected from default in his obligations due to his inability to pay caused by reduction in income due to service." The final component of the legislative history that I
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Conroy v. Aniskoff
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112840/conroy-v-aniskoff/
|
service." The final component of the legislative history that I shall treat is the extension of the 1940 Act in the Selective Service Act of 1948, The Court misconstrues Congress's intent in this enactment in two respects. First, it asserts that "because Congress extended the life of the Act indefinitely in 1948, well after the end of World War II, the complete legislative history confirms a congressional intent to protect all military personnel on active duty, just as the statutory language provides." Ante, at 515 (footnote omitted). *525 It is true enough that the War was over; but the draft was not. The extension of the 1940 Act was contained in the Selective Service Act of 1948, which required military service from citizens. And it would appear to have been contemplated that the "life of the Act" would be extended not "indefinitely," as the Court says, ib but for the duration of the draft. See H. R. Rep. No. 1881, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1948) (extension was intended to "continu[e] the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 in its application to the personnel inducted or entering the armed forces during the life of this act"). The legislative history states that Congress intended to extend the provisions of the 1940 Act "to persons serving in the armed forces pursuant to this act. " S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1948) Career members of the military such as petitioner would not have been serving "pursuant to" the Selective Service Act, since they were expressly excepted from its service requirement. See Selective Service Act of 1948 6(a), In this focus upon draftees, the legislative history of the 1948 extension merely replicates that of the 1940 Act and the 1942 Amendments. The former was enacted on the heels of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, and was introduced on the Senate floor with the explanation that it would provide "relief to those who are to be inducted into the military service for training under [the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940]." 86 Cong. Rec. 10292 (1940) (statement of Rep. Overton) In the debate on the 1942 Amendments, Representative Sparkman noted that "hundreds of thousands, and even millions, have been called" into military service since the enactment of the 1940 Act, and admonished his colleagues to "keep uppermost in your mind at all times the fact that the primary purpose of this legislation is to give relief to the boy that is called into service." 88 Cong. Rec. 5364 (1942). In other words, the legislative history
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Conroy v. Aniskoff
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112840/conroy-v-aniskoff/
|
Cong. Rec. 5364 (1942). In other words, the legislative history of the 1948 extension, like that of the Act itself and *526 of the 1942 Amendments, suggests an intent to protect those who were prejudiced by military service, as many who were drafted would be. The Court also errs in mistaking the probable effect of Congress's presumed awareness of our earlier opinions in Ebert and Boone. See ante, at 516. In Boone, we stated that the Act "is always to be liberally construed to protect those who have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation," but that discretion was vested in the courts to ensure that the immunities of the Act are not put to "unworthy use," since "the very heart of the policy of the Act" was to provide "judicial discretion instead of rigid and undiscriminating suspension of civil proceedings," at Awareness of Boone would likely have caused Congress to assume that the courts would vindicate "the very heart of the policy of the Act" by requiring a showing of prejudice. The Court argues, however, that Congress would also have been aware that Ebert recognized the "carefully segregated arrangement of the various provisions" of the Act, ante, at 516. It is already an extension of the normal convention to assume that Congress was aware of the precise reasoning (as opposed to the holding) of earlier judicial opinions; but it goes much further to assume that Congress not only knew, but expected the courts would continue to follow, the reasoning of a case (Ebert) whose holding Congress had repudiated six years earlier. See In any event, the Court seeks to use Ebert only to establish that Congress was aware that this Court was aware of the "carefully segregated arrangement" of the Act. That adds little, if anything, to direct reliance upon the plain language of the statute. After reading the above described legislative history, one might well conclude that the result reached by the Court today, though faithful to law, betrays the congressional intent. Many have done so. Indeed, as far as I am aware, every court that has chosen to interpret 205 in light of its *527 legislative history rather than on the basis of its plain text has found that Congress did not intend 205 to apply to career members of the military who cannot show prejudice or hardship. See, in addition to the court below, 2-225 ; ; The only scholarly commentary I am aware of addressing this issue concludes: "An examination of the legislative history of the Act
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Conroy v. Aniskoff
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112840/conroy-v-aniskoff/
|
concludes: "An examination of the legislative history of the Act shows that the prevailing interpretation of section 205 [i. e., the Court's interpretation] is not consistent with congressional intent." Folk, Tolling of Statutes of Limitations under Section 205 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, Finally, even the Government itself, which successfully urged in this case the position we have adopted, until recently believed, on the basis of legislative history, the contrary. See Townsend v. Secretary of Air Force, No. 90-1, 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 26578, *5*7 (CA4, Nov. 12, 1991); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 19 (filed June 2, 1992) (noting Government's position in Townsend that 205 requires a showing of prejudice); see also ("The Government argues that the statute does not mean what it says because the legislative history evinces Congress' intent to limit the applicability of [ 205] to those servicemen engaged in battle or who are otherwise handicapped from asserting their legal claims"). I confess that I have not personally investigated the entire legislative historyor even that portion of it which relates to the four statutes listed above. The excerpts I have examined and quoted were unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom I assigned the task. The other Justices have, in the aggregate, many more law clerks than I, and it is quite possible that if they all were unleashed upon this enterprise they would discover, in the legislative materials dating back to *528 1917 or earlier, many faces friendly to the Court's holding. Whether they would or not makes no difference to meand evidently makes no difference to the Court, which gives lipservice to legislative history but does not trouble to set forth and discuss the foregoing material that others found so persuasive. In my view, that is as it should be, except for the lipservice. The language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what Congress meant then Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have to correct it. We should not pretend to care about legislative intent (as opposed to the meaning of the law), lest we impose upon the practicing bar and their clients obligations that we do not ourselves take seriously.
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
Through the Interstate Commerce Act and its amendments, Congress has granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to regulate various activities of interstate rail carriers, including their decisions to cease service on their branch lines. Under Iowa state law, a shipper by rail who is injured as the result of a common carrier's failure to provide adequate rail service has available several causes of action for damages. In this case we are called upon to decide whether these state-law actions may be asserted against a regulated carrier when the Commission has approved its decision to abandon the line in question. I Petitioner, an interstate common carrier by rail, is subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. For some time prior to April 1973, petitioner operated a 5.6-mile railroad branch line between the towns of Kalo and Fort Dodge in Iowa. Respondent operated a brick manufacturing plant near Kalo, and used petitioner's railroad cars and branch line to transport its products to Fort Dodge and outward in interstate commerce.[1] *314 During the 1960's, the tracks on the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line were damaged by three mud slides. Petitioner made repairs after the first two slides, but following the last slide in when portions of the embankment wholly vanished under the waters of the Des Moines River, petitioner decided to stop using the branch line. Petitioner instead leased part of another railroad's parallel branch line to connect Kalo with Fort Dodge. In April 1973, the leased line was also damaged by a mud slide. By that time, respondent was the only shipper using the Kalo-Fort Dodge line. After inspecting the damage to the leased line, petitioner decided not to repair it. Petitioner then notified respondent that it would no longer provide service on the Kalo-Fort Dodge line, although it would continue to make cars available at Fort Dodge if respondent would ship its goods there by truck. Respondent determined that shipment by truck was not economically feasible, and notified its customers that it would complete existing contracts and then go out of business.[2] In November 1973, petitioner filed with the Commission an application for a certificate declaring that the public convenience and necessity permitted it to abandon the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line. The United Government intervened in support of petitioner's application. Respondent was the sole party appearing in opposition to the request, but failed to perfect its filing before the Commission.[3] In a *315 decision issued in April the Commission found that petitioner had abandoned the line due to conditions beyond its control and granted the request for a certificate.
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
beyond its control and granted the request for a certificate. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Abandonment, AB1, Sub. No. 24 App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. Respondent made no attempt to comply with the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act regarding judicial review of the Commission's decision.[4] Instead, while the abandonment request was still pending before the Commission, respondent filed this damages action against petitioner in state court. The complaint alleged that petitioner had violated 479.122 and state common law by refusing to provide cars on the branch line, by negligently failing to maintain the roadbed, and by tortiously interfering with respondent's contractual relations with its [5] The state trial *316 court, holding that the Interstate Commerce Act wholly pre-empted state law as to the matters in contention, dismissed the action. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that state abandonment law was not pre-empted and that the state and federal schemes represented "complimentary [sic], alternative means of relief for injured parties."[6] 295 N. W. *317 2d 467, (1979). After the Supreme Court of Iowa denied petitioner's application for review, we granted certiorari, We reverse. II Pre-emption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored "in the absence of persuasive reasonseither that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained." Florida Line & Avocado Growers, See De The underlying rationale of the pre-emption doctrine, as stated more than a century and a half ago, is that the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that "interfere with or are contrary to, the laws of congress" The doctrine does not and could not in our federal system withdraw from the either the "power to regulate where the activity regulated [is] a merely peripheral concern" of federal law, San Diego Building Trades or the authority to legislate when Congress could have regulated "a distinctive part of a subject which is peculiarly adapted to local regulation,. but did not," But when Congress has chosen to legislate pursuant to its constitutional powers, then a court must find local law pre-empted by federal regulation whenever the "challenged state statute `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" quoting Making this determination "is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether they are in conflict." And in deciding whether any conflict is present, a court's concern is necessarily with "the nature of the activities *318 which the have sought to regulate, rather than
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
activities *318 which the have sought to regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted." San Diego Building Trades at The Interstate Commerce Act is among the most pervasive and comprehensive of federal regulatory schemes and has consequently presented recurring pre-emption questions from the time of its enactment. Since the turn of the century, we have frequently invalidated attempts by the to impose on common carriers obligations that are plainly inconsistent with the plenary authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission or with congressional policy as reflected in the Act. These state regulations have taken many forms. For example, as early as 1907, the Court struck down a State's common-law cause of action to challenge as unreasonable a rail common carrier's rates because rate regulation was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission, and a state-court action "would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act." Texas & Pacific R. we held that the Interstate Commerce Commission's statutory authority to regulate extensions of service was exclusive and therefore stripped a similar state commission of all power to act in the same area. More recently, in we held that a city ordinance requiring a license from a municipal authority before a railroad could transfer passengers, an activity also subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act, was facially invalid as applied to an interstate carrier. "[I]t would be inconsistent with [federal] policy," we observed, "if local authorities retained the power to decide" whether the carriers could do what the Act authorized them to do. The common rationale of these cases is easily stated: "[T]here can be no divided authority over interstate commerce, and the acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and exclusive." Missouri Pacific R. Consequently, state efforts to regulate commerce must fall when they conflict with or interfere with federal authority over the same activity. III In deciding whether respondent's state-law damages action is pre-empted, we must determine what Congress has said about a carrier's ability to abandon a line, what Iowa state law provides on the same subject, and whether the two are inconsistent. To these tasks we now turn. A The Interstate Commerce Commission has been endowed by Congress with broad power to regulate a carrier's permanent or temporary cessation of service over lines used for interstate commerce. Under 1 (4) and 1 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, recodified at 49 U.S. C. 11101 (a) and 11121 (a) ( ed., Supp. III),[7] the Commission is empowered both to pass on the reasonableness of a carrier's temporary suspension of its service and, if necessary, to
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
carrier's temporary suspension of its service and, if necessary, to order it resumed. See ; In addition, and most relevant here, the Act endows the Commission with broad authority over abandonments, or permanent cessations of service. The Commission's power to regulate abandonments by rail carriers stems from the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, *320 -478, which added to the Interstate Commerce Act a new 1 (18), recodified at 49 U.S. C. 10903 (a) ( ed., Supp. III). That section stated in pertinent part: "[N]o carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment." This section, we have said, must be "construed to make federal authority effective to the full extent that it has been exerted and with a view of eliminating the evils that Congress intended to abate." Transit Among those evils is "[m]ultiple control in respect of matters affecting [interstate railroad] transportation," because such control, in the judgment of Congress, has proved "detrimental to the public interest." See Consequently, we have in the past concluded that the authority of the Commission to regulate abandonments is exclusive. Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern R. See Colorado v. United The Commission's authority over abandonments is also plenary. So broad is this power that it extends even to approval of abandonment of purely local lines operated by regulated carriers when, in the Commission's judgment, "the over-riding interests of interstate commerce requir[e] it." The broad scope of the Commission's authority under 1 (18) has been clear since the Court first interpreted that provision in Colorado v. United There, the Court rejected a challenge by the State of Colorado to the power of the Commission to grant a certificate permitting an abandonment of a wholly intrastate *321 branch line operated by an interstate carrier. Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court: "Congress has power to assume not only some control, but paramount control, insofar as interstate commerce is involved. It may determine to what extent and in what manner intrastate service must be subordinated in order that interstate service may be adequately rendered. The power to make the determination inheres in the United as an incident of its power over interstate commerce. The making of this determination involves an exercise of judgment upon the facts of the particular case. The authority to find the facts and to exercise thereon the judgment whether abandonment is
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
facts and to exercise thereon the judgment whether abandonment is consistent with public convenience and necessity, Congress conferred upon the Commission." -166. The exclusive and plenary nature of the Commission's authority to rule on carriers' decisions to abandon lines is critical to the congressional scheme, which contemplates comprehensive administrative regulation of interstate commerce. In deciding whether to permit an abandonment, the Commission must balance "the interests of those now served by the present line on the one hand, and the interests of the carrier and the transportation system on the other." Purcell v. United Once the Commission has struck that balance, its conclusion is entitled to considerable deference. "The weight to be given to cost of a relocated line as against the adverse effects upon those served by the abandoned line is a matter which the experience of the Commission qualifies it to decide. And, under the statute, it is not a matter for judicial redecision." at 3. The breadth of the Commission's statutory discretion suggests a congressional intent to limit judicial interference with the agency's work. The Act in fact spells out with considerable precision the remedies available to a shipper who is *322 injured either by the Commission's approval of an abandonment or by a carrier's abandoning a line without securing Commission approval. A shipper objecting to an abandonment may ask the Commission to investigate the carrier's action. 13 (1), recodified at 49 U.S. C. 11701 (b) ( ed., Supp. III). A shipper may also oppose any request for abandonment filed before the Commission. 49 CFR 1121.36[8] If ultimately dissatisfied with the Commission's action, a shipper may seek review of its action in the appropriate court of appeals, 28 U.S. C. 2321 (a), 23 (5). In addition, at the time that this action was filed in state court, 1 (20) of the Act expressly provided that a shipper believing a carrier's abandonment was unlawful could seek an injunction against it.[9] There is no provision in the Act for a civil damages action against a carrier for an abandonment *323 that has been approved by the Commission.[10] The structure of the Act thus makes plain that Congress intended that an aggrieved shipper should seek relief in the first instance from the Commission. In sum, the construction of the applicable federal law is straightforward and unambiguous. Congress granted to the Commission plenary authority to regulate, in the interest of interstate commerce, rail carriers' cessations of service on their lines. And at least as to abandonments, this authority is exclusive. Equally clear are the meanings of the state statutory and common-law
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
clear are the meanings of the state statutory and common-law obligations that petitioner seeks to challenge. The Iowa Court of Appeals held that and 479.122 "impos[e] on the railroads the unqualified and unconditional duty to furnish car service and transportation to all persons who apply," and that this state-law duty was not pre-empted by the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act imposing a similar According to respondent's complaint in the state court, petitioner's failure to carry out these "duties of a common carrier" injured it in the amount of $350,000. App. 78. The state court also held that respondent could maintain its causes of action for common-law negligence based on petitioner's alleged failure to maintain the roadbed and for common-law tort for purported interference with contractual relations *324 with respondent's -472. The negligence count as outlined in respondent's complaint claimed $150,000 in damages based on petitioner's alleged failure "to maintain the track in a proper manner" and "to properly maintain the railroad right-of-way." App. 79-80. The tort count alleged that "at all times material hereto, it was the avowed and publicized purpose of [petitioner] to close all unproductive lines under its control," and that this plan interfered with respondent's contracts and damaged it in the amount of $100,000. These, then, are the claims that the Iowa Court of Appeals held properly cognizable in the state courts. B Armed with these authoritative constructions of both the federal regulatory scheme and the state law, we must next determine whether they conflict. The Iowa Court of Appeals held that the two remedies for abandonment merely complemented one another. We disagree. Both the letter and the spirit of the Interstate Commerce Act are inconsistent with Iowa law as construed by that court. The decision below amounts to a holding that a State can impose sanctions upon a regulated carrier for doing that which only the Commission, acting pursuant to the will of Congress, has the power to declare unlawful or unreasonable. Cf. 357 U. S., It is true that not one of the three counts of respondent's state-court complaint mentions the word "abandonment," but compliance with the intent of Congress cannot be avoided by mere artful pleading. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the instant litigation represents little more than an attempt by a disappointed shipper to gain from the Iowa courts the relief it was denied by the Commission.[11] *325 Respondent's main cause of action alleges an improper failure to furnish cars on the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line. In Missouri Pacific R. v. Stroud, this Court confronted the precise question whether
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
R. v. Stroud, this Court confronted the precise question whether a state-court damages action would lie for a carrier's failure to furnish cars to carry a shipper's goods in interstate commerce.[12] The Court held that because the lumber shipped by the carrier moved in interstate, rather than intrastate, commerce, "[t]he state law has no application" at In the instant case, the bricks that respondent here shipped in petitioner's cars, like the lumber in Missouri Pacific, were moving in interstate commerce.[13] Respondent in essence seeks to use state law to compel petitioner to furnish cars in spite of the congressional decision to leave regulation of car service to the Commission. But "[t]he duty to provide cars is not absolute," and the law "`exacts only what is reasonable of the railroads under the existing circumstances.'" Milmine Grain v. Norfolk & Western R. 352 I. C. C. 575, 5 citing Elgin Coal v. Louisville & Nashville R. See Midland Valley R. v. The judgment as to what constitutes reasonableness belongs exclusively to the Commission. Cf. Purcell v. United 315 U. S., at -3. It would vitiate the overarching congressional intent of creating "an efficient and nationally integrated railroad system," to permit the State of Iowa to use the threat of damages to require a carrier to do exactly what the Commission is empowered to excuse. A system under which each State could, through its courts, impose on railroad carriers its own version of reasonable service requirements could hardly be more at odds with the uniformity contemplated by Congress in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act. The conclusion that a suit under state law conflicts with the purposes of the Act is merely bolstered when, as here, the Commission has actually approved the abandonment. In reaching its decision, the Commission expressly found that "the cessation of service occurred because of conditions over which [petitioner] had no control." App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a. Because Congress granted the exclusive discretion to make such judgments to the Commission, there is no further role that the state court could play. Even though the approval did not come until after respondent filed its civil suit, it would be contrary to the language of the statute to permit litigation challenging the lawfulness of the carrier's actions to go forward when the Commission has expressly found them to be reasonable. See 49 U.S. C. 1 (17) (a), recodified at 49 U.S. C. 10501 (c) ( ed., Supp. III). We therefore hold that Iowa's statutory cause of action for failure to furnish cars cannot be asserted against an interstate rail carrier on
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
cars cannot be asserted against an interstate rail carrier on the facts of this case. The same reasoning applies to respondent's other asserted causes of action, because they, too, are essentially attempts to litigate the issues underlying petitioner's abandonment of the Kalo-Fort Dodge line. The questions respondent seeks to raise in the state courtwhether roadbed maintenance was negligent or reasonable and whether petitioner abandoned its line with some tortious motiveare precisely the sorts of concerns that Congress intended the Commission to address in weighing abandonment requests from the carriers *327 subject to its regulation.[14] See Purcell v. United at 3; Chesapeake & Ohio R. v. United That alone might be enough to prohibit respondent from raising them in a state court. Cf. Pennsylvania R. v. Clark Bros. Coal Mining But we need not decide whether a state-court suit is barred when the Commission is empowered to rule on the underlying issues, because here the Commission has actually addressed the matters respondent wishes to raise in state court. The Commission's order approving the abandonment application found that after the first two landslides, petitioner "made necessary repairs to enable continuation of service," that further repairs after the slide would not have been "sufficient to insure continuous operations," that the abandonment was not "willful," that respondent has no right to "insist that a burdensome line be maintained solely for its own use," and that "continued operation of the line would be an unnecessary burden on [petitioner] and on interstate commerce." App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a-36a. These findings by the Commission, made pursuant to the authority delegated by Congress, simply leave no room for further litigation over the matters respondent seeks to raise in state court. Consequently, we hold that on the facts of this case, the Interstate Commerce Act also pre-empts Iowa's common-law causes of action for damages stemming from a carrier's negligence and tort when the judgments of fact and of reasonableness necessary to the decision have already been made by the Commission. *328 Nothing in our decision in Pennsylvania R. v. Puritan Coal Mining compels a contrary result. But because both respondents and the Iowa Court of Appeals rely heavily on its language, we discuss the case in some detail. In Puritan, this Court was called upon for the first time to interpret what was then 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act as it related to a carrier's duty to furnish cars. That section, which survives without substantive change in the Act as recodified,[15] provided that nothing in the Act "shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
"shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies." Relying on this language, this Court held that a shipper could pursue its state common-law remedies for failure to provide cars when the carrier had previously agreed to provide them, as long as "there is no administrative question involved." Without this provision, the opinion explained, "it might have been claimed that, Congress having entered the field, the whole subject of liability of carrier to shippers in interstate commerce had been withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the state courts," so 22 was added to make plain that the Act "was not intended to deprive the state courts of their general and concurrent jurisdiction." The Iowa Court of Appeals relied on this broad-sounding language in concluding that respondent's causes of action survived the enactment of and the various amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. Respondent urges essentially the same point in this Court. This analysis fails to take into account the fact that the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction over abandonments arises from the Transportation Act of 1920, and its authority over car service from the Esch Car Service Act, ch. 23, Our decision in Puritan preceded these amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, so it can hardly be viewed as *329 an authoritative construction of the Act as amended.[16] And even assuming for the sake of argument the continuing validity of that opinion's reasoning, it does not control the disposition of the instant case. The Court in Puritan expressly noted that the matters presented to the state courts for decision involved no questions of law or questions calling for an administrative judgment, and, in particular, no issue as to the reasonableness of the carrier's policies. 237 U.S., Instead, the state court was called upon to decide only the factual question whether the railroad had carried out the duties that it had agreed to undertake. The Court's opinion in Puritan recognized the importance of this distinction: "[I]t must be borne in mind that there are two forms of discrimination,one in the rule and the other in the manner of its enforcement; one in promulgating a discriminatory rule, the other in the unfair enforcement of a reasonable rule. In a suit where the rule of practice itself is attacked as unfair or discriminatory, a question is raised which calls for the exercise of the judgment and discretion of the administrative power which has been vested by Congress in the Commission. Until that body has declared the
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,981 | 15 |
majority
|
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110427/chicago-north-western-transp-co-v-kalo-brick-tile-co/
|
Congress in the Commission. Until that body has declared the practice to be discriminatory and unjust, no court has jurisdiction of a suit against an interstate carrier for damages occasioned by its enforcement. "But if the carrier's rule, fair on its face, has been unequally applied, and the suit is for damages, occasioned by its violation or discriminatory enforcement, there is *330 no administrative question involved, the courts being called upon to decide a mere question of fact." Here, we face the reverse of the situation that gave rise to the Puritan case. The questions presented to the state court in the instant litigation all involve evaluations of the reasonableness of petitioner's abandonment of the branch line. These issues call for the type of administrative evaluations and conclusions that Congress has entrusted to the informed discretion of the Commission. See Midland Valley R. v. 276 U. S., at -486; Great Northern R. v. Merchants Elevator 259 U.S. 2, Under the Puritan analysis, "no court has jurisdiction" of a suit such as respondent's until the Commission "has declared the practice to be unjust." And the Commission, in an exercise of its discretion, has done precisely the opposite; it has decided that the abandonment was proper.[17] Respondent has chosen not to seek judicial review of the Commission's judgment through the means provided by Congress.[18] For all of these reasons, to the extent that *331 the Puritan analysis has any application here, it supports petitioner's and the Commission's arguments that the Iowa courts lack jurisdiction to entertain respondent's suit for damages arising from petitioner's abandonment of the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line. Our decision today does not leave a shipper in respondent's position without a remedy if it is truly harmed. On the contrary, an aggrieved shipper is still free to pursue the avenues for relief set forth in the statute. Respondent could have gone to the Commission and challenged petitioner's refusal to provide service before any abandonment application was filed, but it did not. After petitioner filed its request for a certificate, respondent had the opportunity to present evidence to the Commission in support of its allegation, but failed to do so. Having lost its battle there, respondent could have followed the congressionally prescribed path by seeking review in the appropriate United court of appeals. This, too, respondent failed to do. The Act creates no other express remedies for a shipper who is damaged by a carrier's abandonment of a line. In particular, nothing in the Act suggests that Congress contemplated permitting a shipper to bring a civil damages action in state court.
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
The two issues are whether respondent 's allegation that the Drug Enforcement Administration instigated his abduction from Mexico for criminal trial in the United supports a claim against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act), 28 U.S. C. 134(b)(1), 271-280, and whether he may recover under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S. C. 1350. We hold that he is not entitled to a remedy under either statute. I We have considered the underlying facts before, United In an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Enrique Camarena-Salazar, was captured on assignment in Mexico and taken to a house in Guadalajara, where he was tortured over the course of a 2-day interrogation, then murdered. Based in part on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials in the United came to believe that respondent Humberto (Alvarez), a Mexican physician, was present at the house and acted to prolong the agent's life in order to extend the interrogation and torture. In 1990, a federal grand jury indicted Alvarez for the torture and murder of Camarena-Salazar, and the United District Court for the Central District of California issued a *98 warrant for his arrest. The DEA asked the Mexican Government for help in getting Alvarez into the United but when the requests and negotiations proved fruitless, the DEA approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez and bring him to the United for trial. As so planned, a group of Mexicans, including petitioner Jose Francisco Sosa, abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and brought him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by federal officers. Once in American custody, Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his seizure was "outrageous governmental conduct," and violated the extradition treaty between the United and Mexico. The District Court agreed, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and we reversed, holding that the fact of Alvarez's forcible seizure did not affect the jurisdiction of a federal court. The case was tried in 1992, and ended at the close of the Government's case, when the District Court granted Alvarez's motion for a judgment of acquittal. In after returning to Mexico, Alvarez began the civil action before us here. He sued Sosa, Mexican citizen and DEA operative Antonio Garate-Bustamante, five unnamed Mexican civilians, the United and four DEA So far as it matters here, Alvarez sought damages from the United under the FTCA, alleging false arrest, and from Sosa under the ATS, for a violation of the law of nations. The former statute authorizes suit "for personal
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
law of nations. The former statute authorizes suit "for personal injury caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S. C. 134(b)(1). The latter provides in its entirety that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation *99 of the law of nations or a treaty of the United" 1350. The District Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss the FTCA claim, but awarded summary judgment and $25,000 in damages to Alvarez on the ATS claim. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit then affirmed the ATS judgment, but reversed the dismissal of the FTCA claim. A divided en banc court came to the As for the ATS claim, the court called on its own precedent, "that [the ATS] not only provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction, but also creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the law of nations." The Circuit then relied upon what it called the "clear and universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention," to support the conclusion that Alvarez's arrest amounted to a tort in violation of international law. On the FTCA claim, the Ninth Circuit held that, because "the DEA had no authority to effect Alvarez's arrest and detention in Mexico," the United was liable to him under California law for the tort of false arrest, We granted certiorari in these companion cases to clarify the scope of both the FTCA and the ATS. We now reverse in each. II The Government seeks reversal of the judgment of liability under the FTCA on two principal grounds. It argues that the arrest could not have been tortious, because it was authorized by 21 U.S. C. 878, setting out the arrest authority of the DEA, and it says that in any event the liability asserted here falls within the FTCA exception to waiver of sovereign immunity for claims "arising in a foreign country," 28 U.S. C. 280(k). We think the exception applies and decide on that ground. *700 A The FTCA "was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United from suits in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like circumstances." ; see also 28 U.S. C. 274. The Act accordingly gives federal district courts jurisdiction over claims against the United for injury "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 134(b)(1). But the Act also limits its waiver of sovereign immunity in a number of ways. See 280 (no waiver as to, e. g., "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter," "[a]ny claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United" or "[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company"). Here the significant limitation on the waiver of immunity is the Act's exception for "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country," 280(k), a provision that on its face seems plainly applicable to the facts of this action. In the Ninth Circuit's view, once Alvarez was within the borders of the United his detention was not tortious, see 331 F.3d, at 3-37; the appellate court suggested that the Government's liability to Alvarez rested solely upon a false arrest claim. Alvarez's arrest, however, was said to be "false," and thus tortious, only because, and only to the extent that, it took place and endured in Mexico.[1] The actions *701 in Mexico are thus most naturally understood as the kernel of a "claim arising in a foreign country," and barred from suit under the exception to the waiver of immunity. Notwithstanding the straightforward language of the foreign country exception, the Ninth Circuit allowed the action to proceed under what has come to be known as the "headquarters doctrine." Some Courts of Appeals, reasoning that "[t]he entire scheme of the FTCA focuses on the place where the negligent or wrongful act or omission of the government employee occurred," 17 F.2d 755, 71 have concluded that the foreign country exception does not exempt the United from suit "for acts or omissions occurring here which have their operative effect in another country." at 72 (refusing to apply 280(k) where a communique sent from the United by a federal law enforcement officer resulted in plaintiff's wrongful detention in Germany).[2] Headquarters claims "typically involve allegations of negligent guidance in an office within the United of employees who cause damage while in a foreign country, or of activities which take place within a foreign country." (CA9 198). In such instances, these courts have concluded that 280(k) does not bar suit. *702 The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit here
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
bar suit. *702 The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit here was that, since Alvarez's abduction in Mexico was the direct result of wrongful acts of planning and direction by DEA agents located in California, "Alvarez's abduction fits the headquarters doctrine like a glove." 331 F.3d, at 38. "Working out of DEA offices in Los Angeles, [DEA agents] made the decision to kidnap Alvarez and gave [their Mexican intermediary] precise instructions on whom to recruit, how to seize Alvarez, and how he should be treated during the trip to the United DEA officials in Washington, D. C., approved the details of the operation. After Alvarez was abducted according to plan, DEA agents supervised his transportation into the United telling the arrest team where to land the plane and obtaining clearance in El Paso for landing. The United and California in particular, served as command central for the operation carried out in Mexico." at 38-39. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that Alvarez's claim did not "aris[e] in" a foreign country. The potential effect of this sort of headquarters analysis flashes the yellow caution light. "[I]t will virtually always be possible to assert that the negligent activity that injured the plaintiff [abroad] was the consequence of faulty training, selection or supervisionor even less than that, lack of careful training, selection or supervisionin the United" 75 F.2d 91, Legal malpractice claims, 817 F. Supp. 80, 91-93 allegations of negligent medical care, and even slip-and-fall cases, (CA5 198), can all be repackaged as headquarters claims based on a failure to train, a failure to warn, the offering of bad advice, or the adoption of a negligent policy. If *703 we were to approve the headquarters exception to the foreign country exception, the "`headquarters claim' [would] become a standard part of FTCA litigation" in cases potentially implicating the foreign country exception. at The headquarters doctrine threatens to swallow the foreign country exception whole, certainly at the pleadings stage. The need for skepticism is borne out by two considerations. One of them is pertinent to cases like this one, where harm was arguably caused both by individual action in a foreign country as well as by planning in the United ; the other is suggested simply because the harm occurred on foreign soil. B Although not every headquarters case is rested on an explicit analysis of proximate causation, this notion of cause is necessary to connect the domestic breach of duty (at headquarters) with the action in the foreign country (in a case like this) producing the foreign harm or injury. It is necessary, in other words,
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
foreign harm or injury. It is necessary, in other words, to conclude that the act or omission at home headquarters was sufficiently close to the ultimate injury, and sufficiently important in producing it, to make it reasonable to follow liability back to the headquarters behavior. Only in this way could the behavior at headquarters properly be seen as the act or omission on which all FTCA liability must rest under 275. See, e. g., at ; Recognizing this connection of proximate cause between domestic behavior and foreign harm or injury is not, however, sufficient of itself to bar application of the foreign country exception to a claim resting on that foreign consequence. *704 Proximate cause is causation substantial enough and close enough to the harm to be recognized by law, but a given proximate cause need not be, and frequently is not, the exclusive proximate cause of harm. See, e. g., 57A Am. Jur. 2d 529 (discussing proper jury instructions in cases involving multiple proximate causes); ("[I]n the ordinary case there may be several points along the chain of causality" pertinent to the enquiry). Here, for example, assuming that the direction by DEA officials in California was a proximate cause of the abduction, the actions of Sosa and others in Mexico were just as surely proximate causes, as well. Thus, understanding that California planning was a legal cause of the harm in no way eliminates the conclusion that the claim here arose from harm proximately caused by acts in Mexico. At most, recognition of additional domestic causation under the headquarters doctrine leaves an open question whether the exception applies to the claim. C Not only does domestic proximate causation under the headquarters doctrine fail to eliminate application of the foreign country exception, but there is good reason to think that Congress understood a claim "arising in" a foreign country in such a way as to bar application of the headquarters doctrine. There is good reason, that is, to conclude that Congress understood a claim "arising in a foreign country" to be a claim for injury or harm occurring in a foreign country. 28 U.S. C. 280(k). This sense of "arising in" was the common usage in state borrowing statutes contemporary with the Act, which operated to determine which State's statute of limitations should apply in cases involving transjurisdictional facts. When the FTCA was passed, the general rule, as set out in various state statutes, was that "a cause of action arising in another jurisdiction, which is barred by the laws of that jurisdiction, will [also] be barred in the domestic
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
of that jurisdiction, will [also] be barred in the domestic courts." 41 A. L. R. 4th 1025, 1029, 2 These borrowing *705 statutes were typically restricted by express terms to situations where a cause of action was time barred in the State "where [the] cause of action arose, or accrued, or originated." 75 A. L. R. 203, 211 (1931) (emphasis in original). Critically for present purposes, these variations on the theme of "arising in" were interpreted in tort cases in just the way that we read the FTCA today. A commentator noted in 192 that, for the purposes of these borrowing statutes, "[t]he courts unanimously hold that a cause of action sounding in tort arises in the jurisdiction where the last act necessary to establish liability occurred"; i. e., "the jurisdiction in which injury was received." Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, There is, moreover, specific reason to believe that using "arising in" as referring to place of harm was central to the object of the foreign country exception. Any tort action in a court of the United based on the acts of a Government employee causing harm outside the State of the district court in which the action is filed requires a determination of the source of the substantive law that will govern liability. When the FTCA was passed, the dominant principle in choice-of-law analysis for tort cases was lex loci delicti: courts generally applied the law of the place where the injury occurred. See 39 U. S., at 11-12 ; see also Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws 379 (1934) (defendant's liability determined by "the law of the place of wrong");[3] 377, Note 1 (place of wrong for *70 torts involving bodily harm is "the place where the harmful force takes effect upon the body" (emphasis in original));[4] For a plaintiff injured in a foreign country, then, the presumptive choice in American courts under the traditional rule would have been to apply foreign law to determine the tortfeasor's liability. See, e. g., Day & Zimmermann, (noting that Texas would apply Cambodian law to wrongful-death action involving explosion in Cambodia of an artillery round manufactured in United ); 10 F. Supp. 912 ; ; (ND Ill. 199) ; see also, e. g., 118 W. Va. 10, 188 S.E. 7 (193) ; Cameron The application of foreign substantive law exemplified in these cases was, however, what Congress intended to avoid by the foreign country exception. In 1942, the House Committee on the Judiciary considered an early draft of the FTCA that would have exempted all claims "arising
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
of the FTCA that would have exempted all claims "arising in a foreign country in behalf of an alien." H. R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 303(12). The bill was then revised, at the suggestion of the Attorney General, to omit the last five words. In explaining the amendment to the House Committee on the Judiciary, Assistant Attorney General Shea said that "[c]laims arising in a foreign country have been exempted from this bill, H. R. 43, whether or not the claimant is an alien. Since liability is to be determined by the law of the situs of the wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict the bill to claims arising in this country. This seems desirable because the law of the particular State is being applied. Otherwise, it will lead I think to a good deal of difficulty." Hearings on H. R. 5373 et al. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 (1942). The amended version, which was enacted into law and constitutes the current text of the foreign country exception, 28 U.S. C. 280(k), thus codified Congress's "unwilling[ness] to subject the United to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power." United v. Spelar, See also 17 F. 2d, at 72 (noting Spelar's explanation but attempting to recast the object behind the foreign country exception); Leaf v. United 73, n. 3 The object being to avoid application of substantive foreign law, Congress evidently used the modifier "arising in a foreign country" to refer to claims based on foreign harm or *708 injury, the fact that would trigger application of foreign law to determine liability. That object, addressed by the quoted phrase, would obviously have been thwarted, however, by applying the headquarters doctrine, for that doctrine would have displaced the exception by recasting claims of foreign injury as claims not arising in a foreign country because some planning or negligence at domestic headquarters was their cause.[5] And that, in turn, would have resulted in applying foreign law of the place of injury, in accordance with the choice-of-law rule of the headquarters jurisdiction. Nor, as a practical matter, can it be said that the headquarters doctrine has outgrown its tension with the exception. It is true that the traditional approach to choice of substantive tort law has lost favor, Simson, The Choice-of-Law Revolution in the United : Notes on Rereading Von Mehren, 3 Cornell Int'l L. J. 125 ("The traditional methodology of place of wrong has receded in importance, and new approaches and concepts such as governmental interest analysis, most significant relationship,
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
and concepts such as governmental interest analysis, most significant relationship, and better rule of law have taken over center stage" (footnotes omitted)).[]*709 But a good many still employ essentially the choice-of-law analysis in tort cases that the First Restatement exemplified. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts, ; see, e. g., Equally to the point is that in at least some cases that the Court of Appeals's approach would treat as arising at headquarters, not the foreign country, even the later methodologies of choice point to the application of foreign law. The Second Restatement itself, encouraging the general shift toward using flexible balancing analysis to inform choice of law,[7] includes a default rule for tort cases rooted in the traditional approach: "[i]n an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." Restatement 2d 14; see also Comment e ("On occasion, conduct and personal injury will occur in different states. In such instances, the local law of the state of injury will usually be applied to determine most issues involving the tort"). In practice, then, the new dispensation frequently leads to the traditional application of the *710 law of the jurisdiction of injury. See, e.g., ; ; 750 A.2d 102 In sum, current flexibility in choice-of-law methodology gives no assurance against applying foreign substantive law if federal courts follow headquarters doctrine to assume jurisdiction over tort claims against the Government for foreign harm. Based on the experience just noted, the expectation is that application of the headquarters doctrine would in fact result in a substantial number of cases applying the very foreign law the foreign country exception was meant to avoid.[8] Before concluding that headquarters analysis should have no part in applying the foreign country exception, however, *711 a word is needed to answer an argument for selective application of headquarters doctrine, that it ought to be permitted when a State's choice-of-law approach would not apply the foreign law of place of injury. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, The point would be well taken, of course, if Congress had written the exception to apply when foreign law would be applied. But that is not what Congress said. Its provision of an exception when a claim arises in a foreign country was written at a time when the phrase "arising in" was used in state statutes to express the position that a claim arises where the harm occurs;
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
the position that a claim arises where the harm occurs; and the odds are that Congress meant simply this when it used the "arising in" language.[9] Finally, even if it were not a stretch to equate "arising in a foreign country" with "implicating foreign law," the result of accepting headquarters analysis for foreign injury cases in which no application of foreign law would ensue would be a scheme of federal jurisdiction that would vary from State to State, benefiting or penalizing plaintiffs accordingly. The idea that Congress would have intended any *712 such jurisdictional variety is too implausible to drive the analysis to the point of grafting even a selective headquarters exception onto the foreign country exception itself. We therefore hold that the FTCA's foreign country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred. III Alvarez has also brought an action under the ATS against petitioner Sosa, who argues (as does the United supporting him) that there is no relief under the ATS because the statute does no more than vest federal courts with jurisdiction, neither creating nor authorizing the courts to recognize any particular right of action without further congressional action. Although we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we think that at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law. We do not believe, however, that the limited, implicit sanction to entertain the handful of international law cum common law claims understood in 1789 should be taken as authority to recognize the right of action asserted by Alvarez here. A Judge Friendly called the ATS a "legal Lohengrin," ; "no one seems to know whence it came," ib and for over 170 years after its enactment it provided jurisdiction in only one case. The first Congress passed it as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, in providing that the new federal district courts "shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the *713 law of nations or a treaty of the United" Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 9,[10] The parties and amici here advance radically different historical interpretations of this terse provision. Alvarez says that the ATS was intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the creation of a
|
Justice Souter
| 2,004 | 20 |
majority
|
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137006/sosa-v-alvarez-machain/
|
jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the creation of a new cause of action for torts in violation of international law. We think that reading is implausible. As enacted in 1789, the ATS gave the district courts "cognizance" of certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 81, pp. 4, 451 (J. Cooke ed. 191) (A. Hamilton) (using "jurisdiction" interchangeably with "cognizance"). The fact that the ATS was placed in 9 of the Judiciary Act, a statute otherwise exclusively concerned with federal-court jurisdiction, is itself support for its strictly jurisdictional nature. Nor would the distinction between jurisdiction and cause of action have been elided by the drafters of the Act or those who voted on it. As Fisher Ames put it, "there is a substantial difference between the jurisdiction of the courts and the rules of decision." 1 Annals of Cong. 807 (Gales ed. 1834). It is unsurprising, then, that an authority on the historical origins of the ATS has written that "section 1350 clearly does not create a statutory cause of action," and that the contrary suggestion is "simply frivolous." Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 9, 480 (198) ; Cf. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 87, 89 *714 In sum, we think the statute was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject. But holding the ATS jurisdictional raises a new question, this one about the interaction between the ATS at the time of its enactment and the ambient law of the era. Sosa would have it that the ATS was stillborn because there could be no claim for relief without a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action. Amici professors of federal jurisdiction and legal history take a different tack, that federal courts could entertain claims once the jurisdictional grant was on the books, because torts in violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the common law of the time. Brief for Vikram Amar et al. as Amici Curiae. We think history and practice give the edge to this latter position. 1 "When the United declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement." (179) In the years of the early Republic, this
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.