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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
judgments were all for naught Numerous States that have enacted sentencing guidelines similar to the one in Washington *328 State are now commanded to scrap everything and start over f the Constitution required this result, the majority's decision, while unfortunate, would at least be understandable and defensible As JUSTCE O'CONNOR's dissent demonstrates, however, this is simply not the case For that reason, and because the Constitution does not prohibit the dynamic and fruitful dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches of government that has marked sentencing reform on both the state and the federal levels for more than 20 years, dissent JUSTCE BREYER, with whom JUSTCE O'CONNOR joins, dissenting The Court makes clear that it means what it said in n its view, the Sixth Amendment says that "`any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury'" Ante, at 301 (quoting ) "`[P]rescribed statutory maximum'" means the penalty that the relevant statute authorizes "solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict" Ante, at 301, 303 (emphasis deleted) Thus, a jury must find, not only the facts that make up the crime of which the offender is charged, but also all (punishment-increasing) facts about the way in which the offender carried out that crime t is not difficult to understand the impulse that produced this holding magine a classic examplea statute (or mandatory sentencing guideline) that provides a 10-year sentence for ordinary bank robbery, but a 15-year sentence for bank robbery committed with a gun One might ask why it should matter for jury trial purposes whether the statute (or guideline) labels the gun's presence (a) a sentencing fact about the way in which the offender carried out the lesser crime of ordinary bank robbery, or (b) a factual element of *329 the greater crime of bank robbery with a gun? f the Sixth Amendment requires a jury finding about the gun in the latter circumstance, why should it not also require a jury to find the same fact in the former circumstance? The two sets of circumstances are functionally identical n both instances, identical punishment follows from identical factual findings (related to, e g, a bank, a taking, a thing-of-value, force or threat of force, and a gun) The only difference between the two circumstances concerns a legislative (or Sentencing Commission) decision about which label ("sentencing fact" or "element of a greater crime") to affix to one of the facts, namely, the presence of the gun, that will lead to the greater sentence Given the
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
gun, that will lead to the greater sentence Given the identity of circumstances apart from the label, the jury's traditional factfinding role, and the law's insistence upon treating like cases alike, why should the legislature's labeling choice make an important Sixth Amendment difference? The Court in and now here, concludes that it should not make a difference The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee applies similarly to both agree with the majority's analysis, but not with its conclusion That is to say, agree that, classically speaking, the difference between a traditional sentencing factor and an element of a greater offense often comes down to a legislative choice about which label to affix But cannot jump from there to the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment always requires identical treatment of the two scenarios That jump is fraught with consequences that threaten the fairness of our traditional criminal justice system; it distorts historical sentencing or criminal trial practices; and it upsets settled law on which legislatures have relied in designing punishment systems The Justices who have dissented from have written about many of these matters in other opinions See -554 ; ; ; at 569-572 *330 (BREYER, J, concurring in part and concurring in judgment); ; ; At the risk of some repetition, shall set forth several of the most important considerations here They lead me to conclude that must again dissent The majority ignores the adverse consequences inherent in its conclusion As a result of the majority's rule, sentencing must now take one of three forms, each of which risks either impracticality, unfairness, or harm to the jury trial right the majority purports to strengthen This circumstance shows that the majority's Sixth Amendment interpretation cannot be right A A first option for legislators is to create a simple, pure or nearly pure "charge offense" or "determinate" sentencing system See The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, n such a system, an indictment would charge a few facts which, taken together, constitute a crime, such as robbery Robbery would carry a single sentence, say, five years' imprisonment And every person convicted of robbery would receive that sentencejust as, centuries ago, everyone convicted of almost any serious crime was sentenced to death See, e g, Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About 82 N C L Rev 621, 630 Such a system assures uniformity, but at intolerable costs First, simple determinate sentencing systems impose identical punishments on people who committed their crimes in very different ways When dramatically different conduct *331 ends up being punished the same
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
dramatically different conduct *331 ends up being punished the same way, an injustice has taken place Simple determinate sentencing has the virtue of treating like cases alike, but it simultaneously fails to treat different cases differently Some commentators have leveled this charge at sentencing guidelines systems themselves See, e g, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem s Uniformity, Not Disparity, The charge is doubly applicable to simple "pure charge" systems that permit no departures from the prescribed sentences, even in extraordinary cases Second, in a world of statutorily fixed mandatory sentences for many crimes, determinate sentencing gives tremendous power to prosecutors to manipulate sentences through their choice of charges Prosecutors can simply charge, or threaten to charge, defendants with crimes bearing higher mandatory sentences Defendants, knowing that they will not have a chance to argue for a lower sentence in front of a judge, may plead to charges that they might otherwise contest Considering that most criminal cases do not go to trial and resolution by plea bargaining is the norm, the rule of to the extent it results in a return to determinate sentencing, threatens serious unfairness See Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L J 1097, 1100-1101 (explaining that the rule of hurts defendants by depriving them of sentencing hearings, "the only hearings they were likely to have"; forcing defendants to surrender sentencing issues like drug quantity when they agree to the plea; and transferring power to prosecutors) *332 B A second option for legislators is to return to a system of indeterminate sentencing, such as California had before the recent sentencing reform movement See ("With the increasing importance of probation, as opposed to imprisonment, as a part of the penological process, some States such as California developed the `indeterminate sentence,' where the time of incarceration was left almost entirely to the penological authorities rather than to the courts"); Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 Boston College L Rev 255, 267 ("n the late 1970s, California switched from an indeterminate criminal sentencing scheme to determinate sentencing") Under indeterminate systems, the length of the sentence is entirely or almost entirely within the discretion of the judge or of the parole board, which typically has broad power to decide when to release a prisoner When such systems were in vogue, they were criticized, and rightly so, for producing unfair disparities, including race-based disparities, in the punishment of similarly situated defendants See, e g, ante, at 315-316 (citing sources) The length of time a person spent in prison appeared
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
The length of time a person spent in prison appeared to depend on "what the judge ate for breakfast" on the day of sentencing, on which judge you got, or on other factors that should not have made a difference to the length of the sentence See at 4-5 (citing congressional and expert studies indicating that, before the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines were promulgated, punishments for identical crimes in the Second Circuit ranged from 3 to 20 years' imprisonment and that sentences varied depending upon region, gender of the defendant, and race of the defendant) And under such a system, the judge could vary the sentence greatly based upon his findings about how the defendant had committed the crime findings that might not have been *333 made by a "preponderance of the evidence," much less "beyond a reasonable doubt" See )) Returning to such a system would diminish the "`reason'" the majority claims it is trying to uphold Ante, at 302 (quoting 1 J Criminal Procedure 87, p 55 (2d ed 1872)) t also would do little to "ensur[e] [the] control" of what the majority calls "the peopl[e,]" i e, the jury, "in the judiciary," ante, at 306, since "the peopl[e]" would only decide the defendant's guilt, a finding with no effect on the duration of the sentence While "the judge's authority to sentence" would formally derive from the jury's verdict, the jury would exercise little or no control over the sentence itself t is difficult to see how such an outcome protects the structural safeguards the majority claims to be defending C A third option is that which the Court seems to believe legislators will in fact take That is the option of retaining structured schemes that attempt to punish similar conduct similarly and different conduct differently, but modifying them to conform to 's dictates Judges would be able to depart downward from presumptive sentences upon finding that mitigating factors were present, but would not be able to depart upward unless the prosecutor charged the aggravating fact to a jury and proved it beyond a reasonable doubt The majority argues, based on the single example of Kansas, that most legislatures will enact amendments along these lines in the face of the oncoming train See ante, at 309-310 ; Act of May 29, 2002, ch 170, 2002 Kan Sess Laws pp 1018-1023 (codified at Kan Stat Ann 21-4718 ); Brief for Kansas Appellate Defender Office as Amicus Curiae 3-7) t is therefore *334 worth exploring how this option could work in practice, as well as the assumptions on
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
could work in practice, as well as the assumptions on which it depends 1 This option can be implemented in one of two ways The first way would be for legislatures to subdivide each crime into a list of complex crimes, each of which would be defined to include commonly found sentencing factors such as drug quantity, type of victim, presence of violence, degree of injury, use of gun, and so on A legislature, for example, might enact a robbery statute, modeled on robbery sentencing guidelines, that increases punishment depending upon (1) the nature of the institution robbed, (2) the (a) presence of, (b) brandishing of, (c) other use of, a firearm, (3) making of a death threat, (4) presence of (a) ordinary, (b) serious, (c) permanent or life threatening, bodily injury, (5) abduction, (6) physical restraint, (7) taking of a firearm, (8) taking of drugs, (9) value of property loss, etc Cf United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 2B31 (Nov 2003) (hereinafter USSG) This possibility is, of course, merely a highly calibrated form of the "pure charge" system discussed in Part And it suffers from some of the same defects The prosecutor, through control of the precise charge, controls the punishment, thereby marching the sentencing system directly away from, not toward, one important guideline goal: rough uniformity of punishment for those who engage in roughly the same real criminal conduct The artificial (and consequently unfair) nature of the resulting sentence is aggravated by the fact that prosecutors must charge all relevant facts about the way the crime was committed before a presentence investigation examines the criminal conduct, perhaps before the trial itself, i e, before many of the facts relevant to punishment are known This "complex charge offense" system also prejudices defendants who seek trial, for it can put them in the untenable *335 position of contesting material aggravating facts in the guilt phases of their trials Consider a defendant who is charged, not with mere possession of cocaine, but with the specific offense of possession of more than 500 grams of cocaine Or consider a defendant charged, not with murder, but with the new crime of murder using a machete Or consider a defendant who the prosecution wants to claim was a "supervisor," rather than an ordinary gang member How can a Constitution that guarantees due process put these defendants, as a matter of course, in the position of arguing, " did not sell drugs, and if did, did not sell more than 500 grams," or " did not kill him, and if did, did not use a
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
not kill him, and if did, did not use a machete," or " did not engage in gang activity, and certainly not as a supervisor" to a single jury? See -558 ; The system can tolerate this kind of problem up to a point (consider the defendant who wants to argue innocence, and, in the alternative, second-degree, not first-degree, murder) But a rereading of the many distinctions made in a typical robbery guideline, see suggests that an effort to incorporate any real set of guidelines in a complex statute would reach well beyond that point The majority announces that there really is no problem here because "States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty" and defendants may "stipulat[e] to the relevant facts or consen[t] to judicial factfinding" Ante, at 310 The problem, of course, concerns defendants who do not want to plead guilty to those elements that, until recently, were commonly thought of as sentencing factors As to those defendants, the fairness problem arises because States may very well decide that they will not permit defendants to carve subsets of facts out of the new, -required 17-element robbery crime, seeking a judicial determination as to some of those facts and a jury determination as to others nstead, States may simply require defendants to plead guilty to all *336 17 elements or proceed with a (likely prejudicial) trial on all 17 elements The majority does not deny that States may make this choice; it simply fails to understand why any State would want to exercise it Ante, at 310, n 12 The answer is, as shall explain in a moment, that the alternative may prove too expensive and unwieldy for States to provide States that offer defendants the option of judicial factfinding as to some facts (i e, sentencing facts), say, because of fairness concerns, will also have to offer the defendant a second sentencing jury just as Kansas has done therefore turn to that alternative 2 The second way to make sentencing guidelines -compliant would be to require at least two juries for each defendant whenever aggravating facts are present: one jury to determine guilt of the crime charged, and an additional jury to try the disputed facts that, if found, would aggravate the sentence Our experience with bifurcated trials in the capital punishment context suggests that requiring them for run-of-the-mill sentences would be costly, both in money and in judicial time and resources Cf Kozinski & Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, and n 64 (estimating the costs
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, and n 64 (estimating the costs of each capital case at around $1 million more than each noncapital case); Tabak, How Empirical Studies Can Affect Positively the Politics of the Death Penalty, n the context of noncapital crimes, the potential need for a second indictment alleging aggravating facts, the likely need for formal evidentiary rules to prevent prejudice, and the increased difficulty of obtaining relevant sentencing information, all will mean greater complexity, added cost, and further delay See Part V, infra ndeed, cost and delay could lead legislatures *337 to revert to the complex charge offense system described in Part The majority refers to an amicus curiae brief filed by the Kansas Appellate Defender Office, which suggests that a two-jury system has proved workable in Kansas Ante, at 309-310 And that may be so But in all likelihood, any such workability reflects an uncomfortable fact, a fact at which the majority hints, ante, at 310, but whose constitutional implications it does not seem to grasp The uncomfortable fact that could make the system seem workable even desirable in the minds of some, including defense attorneys is called "plea bargaining" See Bibas, 110 Yale L J, at 1150, and n 330 (reporting that in 1996, fewer than 4% of adjudicated state felony defendants have jury trials, 5% have bench trials, and 91% plead guilty) See also ante, at 310 (making clear that plea bargaining applies) The Court can announce that the Constitution requires at least two jury trials for each criminal defendant one for guilt, another for sentencing but only because it knows full well that more than 90% of defendants will not go to trial even once, much less insist on two or more trials What will be the consequences of the Court's holding for the 90% of defendants who do not go to trial? The truthful answer is that we do not know Some defendants may receive bargaining advantages if the increased cost of the "double jury trial" guarantee makes prosecutors more willing to cede certain sentencing issues to the defense Other defendants may be hurt if a "single-jury-decides-all" approach makes them more reluctant to risk a trial perhaps because they want to argue that they did not know what was in the cocaine bag, that it was a small amount regardless, that they were unaware a confederate had a gun, etc See Bibas, 110 Yale L J, at 1100 ("Because for many defendants going to trial is not a desirable option, they are left without any real hearings at
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
desirable option, they are left without any real hearings at all"); *338 At the least, the greater expense attached to trials and their greater complexity, taken together in the context of an overworked criminal justice system, will likely mean, other things being equal, fewer trials and a greater reliance upon plea bargaining a system in which punishment is set not by judges or juries but by advocates acting under bargaining constraints At the same time, the greater power of the prosecutor to control the punishment through the charge would likely weaken the relation between real conduct and real punishment as well See, e g, Even if the Court's holding does not further embed plea-bargaining practices (as fear it will), its success depends upon the existence of present practice do not understand how the Sixth Amendment could require a sentencing system that will work in practice only if no more than a handful of defendants exercise their right to a jury trial The majority's only response is to state that "bargaining over elements probably favors the defendant," ante, at adding that many criminal defense lawyers favor its position, ante, at 312 But the basic problem is not one of "fairness" to defendants or, for that matter, "fairness" to prosecutors Rather, it concerns the greater fairness of a sentencing system that a more uniform correspondence between real criminal conduct and real punishment helps to create At a minimum, a two-jury system, by preventing a judge from taking account of an aggravating fact without the prosecutor's acquiescence, would undercut, if not nullify, legislative efforts to ensure through guidelines that punishments reflect a convicted offender's real criminal conduct, rather than that portion of the offender's conduct that a prosecutor decides to charge and prove Efforts to tie real punishment to real conduct are not new They are embodied in well-established preguidelines sentencing *339 practices practices under which a judge, looking at a presentence report, would seek to tailor the sentence in significant part to fit the criminal conduct in which the offender actually engaged For more than a century, questions of punishment (not those of guilt or innocence) have reflected determinations made, not only by juries, but also by judges, probation officers, and executive parole boards Such truth-seeking determinations have rested upon both adversarial and nonadversarial processes The Court's holding undermines efforts to reform these processes, for it means that legislatures cannot both permit judges to base sentencing upon real conduct and seek, through guidelines, to make the results more uniform n these and other ways, the two-jury system would work a
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
these and other ways, the two-jury system would work a radical change in pre-existing criminal law t is not surprising that this Court has never previously suggested that the Constitution outside the unique context of the death penalty might require bifurcated jury-based sentencing And it is the impediment the Court's holding poses to legislative efforts to achieve that greater systematic fairness that casts doubt on its constitutional validity D s there a fourth option? Perhaps Congress and state legislatures might, for example, rewrite their criminal codes, attaching astronomically high sentences to each crime, followed by long lists of mitigating facts, which, for the most part, would consist of the absence of aggravating facts -542 (explaining how legislatures can evade the majority's rule by making yet another labeling choice) But political impediments to legislative action make such rewrites difficult to achieve; and it is difficult to see why the Sixth Amendment would require legislatures to undertake them t may also prove possible to find combinations of, or variations upon, my first three options But am unaware of any *340 variation that does not involve (a) the shift of power to the prosecutor (weakening the connection between real conduct and real punishment) inherent in any charge offense system, (b) the lack of uniformity inherent in any system of pure judicial discretion, or (c) the complexity, expense, and increased reliance on plea bargains involved in a "two-jury" system The simple fact is that the design of any fair sentencing system must involve efforts to make practical compromises among competing goals The majority's reading of the Sixth Amendment makes the effort to find those compromises already difficult virtually impossible The majority rests its conclusion in significant part upon a claimed historical (and therefore constitutional) imperative According to the majority, the rule it applies in this case is rooted in "longstanding tenets of common-law criminal jurisprudence," ante, at 301: that every accusation against a defendant must be proved to a jury and that "`an accusation which lacks any particular fact which the law makes essential to the punishment is no accusation within the requirements of the common law, and it is no accusation in reason,'" ante, at 301-302 (quoting Criminal Procedure 87, at 55) The historical sources upon which the majority relies, however, do not compel the result it reaches See ante, at 323 ; -528 The quotation from to which the majority attributes great weight, stands for nothing more than the "unremarkable proposition" that where a legislature passes a statute setting forth heavier penalties than were available for committing a
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
setting forth heavier penalties than were available for committing a common-law offense and specifying those facts that triggered the statutory penalty, "a defendant could receive the greater statutory punishment only if the indictment expressly charged and the prosecutor proved the facts that made up the statutory offense, as opposed to simply those facts that made up *341 the common-law offense" (characterizing a similar statement of the law in J Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 51, 188 (15th ed 1862)) This is obvious when one considers the problem that was addressing He provides as an example "statutes whereby, when [a common-law crime] is committed with a particular intent, or with a particular weapon, or the like, it is subjected to a particular corresponding punishment, heavier than that for" the simple common-law offense (though, of course, his concerns were not "limited to that example," ante, at 302, n 5) 82, at 51-52 (discussing the example of common assault and enhanced-assault statutes, e g, "assaults committed with the intent to rob") That indictments historically had to charge all of the statutorily labeled elements of the offense is a proposition on which all can agree See -527 See also J Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 44 (11th ed 1849) ("[E]very fact or circumstance which is a necessary ingredient in the offence must be set forth in the indictment" so that "there may be no doubt as to the judgment which should be given, if the defendant be convicted"); 1 T Starkie, Criminal Pleading 68 (2d ed 1822) (the indictment must state "the criminal nature and degree of the offence, which are conclusions of law from the facts; and also the particular facts and circumstances which render the defendant guilty of that offence") Neither nor any other historical treatise writer, however, disputes the proposition that judges historically had discretion to vary the sentence, within the range provided by the statute, based on facts not proved at the trial See 85, at 54 ("[W]ithin the limits of any discretion as to the punishment which the law may have allowed, the judge, when he pronounces sentence, may suffer his discretion to be influenced by matter shown in aggravation or mitigation, not covered by the allegations of the indictment"); *342 K Stith & J Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 9 The modern history of preguidelines sentencing likewise indicates that judges had broad discretion to set sentences within a statutory range based on uncharged conduct Usually, the judge based his or her sentencing decision on facts gleaned from a presentence report,
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
her sentencing decision on facts gleaned from a presentence report, which the defendant could dispute at a sentencing hearing n the federal system, for example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 provided that probation officers, who are employees of the Judicial Branch, prepared a presentence report for the judge, a copy of which was generally given to the prosecution and defense before the sentencing hearing See Stith & See also ante, at 315 (describing the State of Washington's former indeterminate sentencing law) n this case, the statute provides that kidnaping may be punished by up to 10 years' imprisonment Wash Rev Code Ann 9A40030(3), 9A20021(1)(b) Modern structured sentencing schemes like Washington's do not change the statutorily fixed maximum penalty, nor do they purport to establish new elements for the crime nstead, they undertake to structure the previously unfettered discretion of the sentencing judge, channeling and limiting his or her discretion even within the statutory range (Thus, contrary to the majority's arguments, ante, at 308-309, kidnapers in the State of Washington know that they risk up to 10 years' imprisonment, but they also have the benefit of additional information about how long within the 10-year maximum their sentences are likely to be, based on how the kidnaping was committed) Historical treatises do not speak to such a practice because it was not done in the 19th century Cf 526 U S, at 244 This makes *343 sense when one considers that, prior to the 19th century, the prescribed penalty for felonies was often death, which the judge had limited, and sometimes no, power to vary See Lillquist, 82 N C L Rev, at 628-630 The 19th century saw a movement to a rehabilitative mode of punishment in which prison terms became a norm, shifting power to the judge to impose a longer or shorter term within the statutory maximum See ibid The ability of legislatures to guide the judge's discretion by designating presumptive ranges, while allowing the judge to impose a more or less severe penalty in unusual cases, was therefore never considered To argue otherwise, the majority must ignore the significant differences between modern structured sentencing schemes and the history on which it relies to strike them down And while the majority insists that the historical sources, particularly should not be "limited" to the context in which they were written, ante, at 302, n 5, it has never explained why the Court must transplant those discussions to the very different context of sentencing schemes designed to structure judges' discretion within a statutory sentencing range Given history's silence on
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
discretion within a statutory sentencing range Given history's silence on the question of laws that structure a judge's discretion within the range provided by the legislatively labeled maximum term, it is not surprising that our modern, pre- cases made clear that legislatures could, within broad limits, distinguish between "sentencing facts" and "elements of crimes" See 477 U S, at 85-88 By their choice of label, legislatures could indicate whether a judge or a jury must make the relevant factual determination History does not preclude legislatures from making this decision And, as argued in Part allowing legislatures to structure sentencing in this way has the dual effect of enhancing and giving meaning to the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right as to core crimes, while affording additional due process to defendants in the form of sentencing *344 hearings before judges hearings the majority's rule will eliminate for many s there a risk of unfairness involved in permitting Congress to make this labeling decision? Of course As we have recognized, the "tail" of the sentencing fact might "wa[g] the dog of the substantive offense" Congress might permit a judge to sentence an individual for murder though convicted only of making an illegal lane change See ante, at 306 (majority opinion) But that is the kind of problem that the Due Process Clause is well suited to cure foresaw the possibility that judges would have to use their own judgment in dealing with such a problem; but that is what judges are there for And, as Part makes clear, the alternatives are worse not only practically, but, although the majority refuses to admit it, constitutionally as well Historic practice, then, does not compel the result the majority reaches And constitutional concerns counsel the opposite The majority also overlooks important institutional considerations Congress and the States relied upon what they believed was their constitutional power to decide, within broad limits, whether to make a particular fact (a) a sentencing factor or (b) an element in a greater crime They relied upon as guaranteeing the constitutional validity of that proposition They created sentencing reform, an effort to change the criminal justice system so that it reflects systematically not simply upon guilt or innocence but also upon what should be done about this now-guilty offender Those efforts have spanned a generation They have led to state sentencing guidelines and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system E g, ante, at 314-318 (describing sentencing reform in the State of Washington) These systems are imperfect and they yield far from perfect results, but cannot believe the Constitution *345 forbids
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
from perfect results, but cannot believe the Constitution *345 forbids the state legislatures and Congress to adopt such systems and to try to improve them over time Nor can believe that the Constitution hamstrings legislatures in the way that JUSTCE O'CONNOR and have discussed V Now, let us return to the question posed at the outset Why does the Sixth Amendment permit a jury trial right (in respect to a particular fact) to depend upon a legislative labeling decision, namely, the legislative decision to label the fact a sentencing fact, instead of an element of the crime? The answer is that the fairness and effectiveness of a sentencing system, and the related fairness and effectiveness of the criminal justice system itself, depends upon the legislature's possessing the constitutional authority (within due process limits) to make that labeling decision To restrict radically the legislature's power in this respect, as the majority interprets the Sixth Amendment to do, prevents the legislature from seeking sentencing systems that are consistent with, and indeed may help to advance, the Constitution's greater fairness goals To say this is not simply to express concerns about fairness to defendants t is also to express concerns about the serious practical (or impractical) changes that the Court's decision seems likely to impose upon the criminal process; about the tendency of the Court's decision to embed further plea bargaining processes that lack transparency and too often mean nonuniform, sometimes arbitrary, sentencing practices; about the obstacles the Court's decision poses to legislative efforts to bring about greater uniformity between real criminal conduct and real punishment; and ultimately about the limitations that the Court imposes upon legislatures' ability to make democratic legislative decisions Whatever the faults of guidelines systems and there are many they are more likely to find their cure in legislation emerging from the experience of, and discussion among, all elements of the *346 criminal justice community, than in a virtually unchangeable constitutional decision of this Court V Taken together these three sets of considerations, concerning consequences, concerning history, concerning institutional reliance, leave me where was in i e, convinced that the Court is wrong Until now, would have thought the Court might have limited so that its underlying principle would not undo sentencing reform efforts Today's case dispels that illusion At a minimum, the case sets aside numerous state efforts in that direction Perhaps the Court will distinguish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but am uncertain how As a result of today's decision, federal prosecutors, like state prosecutors, must decide what to do next, how to handle tomorrow's case
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
second_dissenting
|
Blakely v. Washington
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136995/blakely-v-washington/
|
decide what to do next, how to handle tomorrow's case Consider some of the matters that federal prosecutors must know about, or guess about, when they prosecute their next case: (1) Does today's decision apply in full force to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? (2) f so, must the initial indictment contain all sentencing factors, charged as "elements" of the crime? (3) What, then, are the evidentiary rules? Can the prosecution continue to use, say, presentence reports, with their conclusions reflecting layers of hearsay? Cf Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, Are the numerous cases of this Court holding that a sentencing judge may consider virtually any reliable information still good law when juries, not judges, are required to determine the matter? See, e g, United States v Watts, 519 US 148, (evidence of conduct of which the defendant has been acquitted may be considered at sentencing) Cf Witte v United States, 515 US 389, (4) How are juries to deal with highly complex *347 or open-ended Sentencing Guidelines obviously written for application by an experienced trial judge? See, e g, USSG 3B11 (requiring a greater sentence when the defendant was a leader of a criminal activity that involved four or more participants or was "otherwise extensive" (emphasis added)); 3D11-3D12 (highly complex "multiple count" rules); 1B13 (relevant conduct rules) Ordinarily, this Court simply waits for cases to arise in which it can answer such questions But this case affects tens of thousands of criminal prosecutions, including federal prosecutions Federal prosecutors will proceed with those prosecutions subject to the risk that all defendants in those cases will have to be sentenced, perhaps tried, anew Given this consequence and the need for certainty, would not proceed further piecemeal; rather, would call for further argument on the ramifications of the concerns have raised But that is not the Court's view For the reasons given, dissent
|
Justice Burger
| 1,976 | 12 |
concurring
|
Belcher v. Stengel
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109562/belcher-v-stengel/
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I join the opinion of the Court. I note, however, several additional factors which came to light during plenary consideration of the case and which were not disclosed in the petition for certiorari. The three factors mentioned by the Court, ante, at 119, as tending to prove that the police officer acted in the course of his duties, are determinations made after the incident in question. There are, however, at least three contemporaneous factors, in addition to possession of the gun, which colored the officer's conduct as official: (1) The officer testified that he had formed an intention that he would arrest at least two of the men when he stood up to intervene in the altercation; (2) he intervened by using a can of mace issued to him by the police department; (3) he was acting pursuant to a police regulation which required his intervention in any disturbance of the peace, whether he was on or off duty. These factors seem to me important because of the possible negative inference otherwise created that the only objective fact at the time of the incident evidencing state action was the presence of the state-required gun. While, of course, subsequent determinations by state officials, such as mentioned by the Court, are important evidence of state action, they could not transform something into state action that otherwise would be deemed to be private conduct. Thus, it is unclear what the result would have been had the only contemporaneous evidence of state action been the presence of the state-required gun. I wish to make it clear that the Court is not passing on that question today, because it is not presented by the record in this case.
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,976 | 16 |
dissenting
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Doyle v. Ohio
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109491/doyle-v-ohio/
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Petitioners assert that the prosecutor's cross-examination about their failure to mention the purported "frame" until they testified at trial violated their constitutional right to due process and also their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. I am not persuaded by the first argument; though there is merit in a portion of the second, I do not believe it warrants reversal of these state convictions. I The Court's due process rationale has some of the characteristics of an estoppel theory. If (a) the defendant is advised that he may remain silent, and (b) he does remain silent, then we (c) presume that his decision was made in reliance on the advice, and (d) conclude that it is unfair in certain cases, though not others,[1] to use his silence to impeach his trial testimony. The key to the Court's analysis is apparently a concern that the Miranda warning, which is intended to increase the probability *621 that a person's response to police questioning will be intelligent and voluntary, will actually be deceptive unless we require the State to honor an unstated promise not to use the accused's silence against him. In my judgment there is nothing deceptive or prejudicial to the defendant in the Miranda warning.[2] Nor do I believe that the fact that such advice was given to the defendant lessens the probative value of his silence, or makes the prosecutor's cross-examination about his silence any more unfair than if he had received no such warning. This is a case in which the defendants' silence at the time of their arrest was graphically inconsistent with their trial testimony that they were the unwitting victims of a "frameup" in which the police did not participate. If defendants had been framed, their failure to mention that fact at the time of their arrest is almost *622 inexplicable; for that reason, under accepted rules of evidence, their silence is tantamount to a prior inconsistent statement and admissible for purposes of impeachment.[3] Indeed, there is irony in the fact that the Miranda warning provides the only plausible explanation for their silence. If it were the true explanation, I should think that they would have responded to the questions on cross-examination about why they had remained silent by stating that they relied on their understanding of the advice given by the arresting officers. Instead, however, they gave quite a different jumble of responses.[4] Those *623 responses negate the Court's presumption that their silence was induced by reliance on deceptive advice. Since the record requires us to put to one side the *624 Court's presumption that the defendants' silence
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,976 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Doyle v. Ohio
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109491/doyle-v-ohio/
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one side the *624 Court's presumption that the defendants' silence was the product of reliance on the Miranda warning, the Court's entire due process rationale collapses. For without reliance *625 on the waiver, the case is no different than if no warning had been given, and nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that there would be any unfairness in *626 using petitioners' prior inconsistent silence for impeachment purposes in such a case. Indeed, as a general proposition, if we assume the defendant's silence would be admissible for impeachment purposes if no Miranda warning had been given, I should think that the warning would have a tendency to salvage the defendant's credibility as a witness. If the defendant is a truthful witness, and if his silence is the consequence of his understanding of the Miranda warning, he may explain that fact when he is on the stand. Even if he is untruthful, the availability of that explanation puts him in a better position than if he had received no warning. In may judgment, the risk that a truthful defendant will be deceived by the Miranda warning and also will be unable to explain his honest misunderstanding is so much less than the risk that exclusion of the evidence will merely provide a shield for perjury that I cannot accept the Court's due process rationale. Accordingly, if we assume that the use of a defendant's silence for impeachment purposes would be otherwise unobjectionable, I find no merit in the notion that he is denied due process of law because he received a Miranda warning. II Petitioners argue that the State violated their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by asking the jury to draw an inference of guilt from their constitutionally protected silence. They challenge both the prosecutor's cross-examination and his closing argument. A Petitioners claim that the cross-examination was improper because it referred to their silence at the time of *627 their arrest, to their failure to testify at the preliminary hearing, and to their failure to reveal the "frame" prior to trial. Their claim applies to the testimony of each defendant at his own trial, and also to the testimony each gave as a witness at the trial of the other. Since I think it quite clear that a defendant may not object to the violation of another person's privilege,[5] I shall only discuss the argument that a defendant may not be cross-examined about his own prior inconsistent silence. In support of their objections to the cross-examination about their silence at the time of arrest, petitioners primarily rely on the statement
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,976 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Doyle v. Ohio
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109491/doyle-v-ohio/
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the time of arrest, petitioners primarily rely on the statement in that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that the defendant stood mute or claimed the privilege in the face of accusations during custodial interrogation.[6] There are two reasons why that statement does not adequately support petitioners' argument. First, it is not accurate to say that the petitioners "stood mute or claimed the privilege in the face of accusations." Neither petitioner claimed the privilege and *628 petitioner Doyle did not even remain silent.[7] The case is not one in which a description of the actual conversation between the defendants and the police would give rise to any inference of guilt if it were not so flagrantly inconsistent with their trial testimony. Rather than a claim of privilege, we simply have a failure to advise the police of a "frame" at a time when it most surely would have been mentioned if petitioners' trial testimony were true. That failure gave rise to an inference of guilt only because it belied their trial testimony. Second, the dictum in the footnote in Miranda relies primarily upon which held that the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth, prohibited the prosecution's use of the defendant's silence in its case in chief. But as long ago as this Court recognized the distinction between the prosecution's affirmative use of the defendant's prior silence and the use of prior silence for impeachment purposes. Raffel expressly held that the defendant's silence at a prior trial was admissible for purposes of impeachment despite the application in federal prosecutions of the prohibition that Griffin found in the Fifth Amendment. Raffel, Moreover, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the author of the Court's opinion in Miranda, joined the opinion in which squarely held that a valid constitutional objection to the admissibility of evidence as part of the Government's case in chief did not bar the use of that evidence to impeach the defendant's trial testimony. The availability of an objection to the affirmative use of improper evidence does not provide the defendant "with a shield against contradiction of his untruths." The need to ensure the integrity *629 of the truth-determining function of the adversary trial process has provided the predicate for an unbroken line of decisions so holding.[8] *630 Although I have no doubt concerning the propriety of the cross-examination about petitioners' failure to mention the purported "frame" at the time of their arrest, a more difficult question is presented by their objection to the questioning about their failure to testify at the preliminary hearing and their failure generally to
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,976 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Doyle v. Ohio
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109491/doyle-v-ohio/
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testify at the preliminary hearing and their failure generally to mention the "frame" before trial.[9] Unlike the failure *631 to make the kind of spontaneous comment that discovery of a "frame" would be expected to prompt, there is no significant inconsistency between petitioners' trial testimony *632 and their adherence to counsel's advice not to take the stand at the preliminary hearing; moreover, the decision not to divulge their defense prior to trial is probably attributable to counsel rather than to petitioners.[10] Nevertheless, unless and until this Court overrules[11] I think a state court is *633 free to regard the defendant's decision to take the stand as a waiver of his objection to the use of his failure to testify at an earlier proceeding or his failure to offer his version of the events prior to trial. B In my judgment portions of the prosecutor's argument to the jury overstepped permissible bounds. In each trial, he commented upon the defendant's silence not only as inconsistent with his testimony that he had been "framed," *634 but also as inconsistent with the defendant's innocence.[12] Comment on the lack of credibility of the defendant is plainly proper; it is not proper, however, for the prosecutor *635 to ask the jury to draw a direct inference of guilt from silenceto argue, in effect, that silence is inconsistent with innocence. But since the two inferencesperjury *636 and guiltare inextricably intertwined because they have a common source, it would be unrealistic to permit comment on the former but to find reversible error in the slightest reference to the latter. In the context of the entire argument and the entire trial, I am not persuaded that the rather sophisticated distinction between permissible comment on credibility and impermissible comment on an inference of guilt justifies a reversal of these state convictions.[13] Accordingly, although I have some doubt concerning the propriety of the cross-examination about the preliminary hearing and consider a portion of the closing argument improper, I would affirm these convictions.
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,977 | 13 |
concurring
|
Mandel v. Bradley
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109696/mandel-v-bradley/
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I join the opinion of the Court but write to emphasize the Court's treatment of the rule announced in In a dissent from the denial of certiorari in Colorado Springs Amusements, I stated why, in my view, the federal and state courts should give "appropriate, but not necessarily conclusive, weight to our summary dispositions," rather than be required, as the Court held in Hicks, "to treat our summary dispositions of appeals as conclusive precedents regarding constitutional challenges to like state statutes or ordinances." The Court by not relying on our summary affirmance in and effectively embraces that view, and vividly exposes the ambiguity inherent in summary dispositions and the nature of the detailed analysis that is *180 essential before a decision can be made whether it is appropriate to accord a particular summary disposition precedential effect. After today, judges of the state and federal systems are on notice that, before deciding a case on the authority of a summary disposition by this Court in another case, they must (a) examine the jurisdictional statement in the earlier case to be certain that the constitutional questions presented were the same and, if they were, (b) determine that the judgment in fact rests upon decision of those questions and not even arguably upon some alternative nonconstitutional ground. The judgment should not be interpreted as deciding the constitutional questions unless no other construction of the disposition is plausible. In other words, after today, "appropriate, but not necessarily conclusive, weight" is to be given this Court's summary dispositions. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR.
|
Justice White
| 1,987 | 6 |
dissenting
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Rose v. Rose
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111884/rose-v-rose/
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Title 38 U.S. C. 3101(a) provides that "[p]ayments of benefits under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration made to, or on account of, a beneficiary. shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatsoever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." As the Court apparently recognizes, albeit grudgingly, under the order that appellant pay over a portion of his veterans' disability benefits on pain of contempt constitutes a "seizure" of the benefits.[1] The plain language of 3101(a) prohibits any seizure of veterans' benefits, but the Court ignores that prohibition and creates an exception out of whole cloth, while seeming to recognize that there is no meritorious distinction between Wissner and this case, see ante, at 633-634. The Court's decision is also inconsistent with In Ridgway, a state court had "attempted to limit the reach of [the anti-attachment statute concerning veterans' life insurance benefits] on the theory that the purpose of the anti-attachment provision was to protect the policy proceeds from the claims of creditors, and that the provision has no application to minor children asserting *646 equitable interests." The Court held, however, that "[t]his contention fails to give effect to the unqualified sweep of the federal statute." The Court attempts to distinguish Ridgway by asserting that there the purpose of the statute providing life insurance policies was to benefit the veteran alone, while here the veteran's disability benefits are meant to support the veteran and his family. In support of this distinction the Court cites (1) a statement, taken from the legislative history of a 1984 bill increasing disability benefits, that "the [Veterans' Affairs] Committee periodically reviews the service-connected disability compensation program with a view toward assuring that the benefits authorized provide reasonable and adequate compensation for disabled veterans and their families," S. Rep. No. 98-604, p. 24, (1984), and (2) 38 U.S. C. 3107(a)(2), which provides for the apportionment of veterans' benefits by the Administrator when the veteran is separated from his wife or lacks custody of his children. The legislative history of the 1984 statute plainly is not intended as a comment on the scope of 3101(a), and even if it were it would not be controlling, since it was not made in conjunction with any amendment of that statute. The fact that the Administrator can apportion benefits for the use of a veteran's family supports rather than undercuts appellant's construction of 3101(a), because it demonstrates that, to the extent that Congress intended disability pay to benefit veterans' families, it created a mechanism for achieving that goal.[2]
|
Justice White
| 1,987 | 6 |
dissenting
|
Rose v. Rose
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111884/rose-v-rose/
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veterans' families, it created a mechanism for achieving that goal.[2] Two other statutes confirm that Congress does not intend veterans' disability benefits to be subject to state-court control. In 1975 and 1977, when amending the Social Security Act to provide that, notwithstanding any contrary law, federal benefits may be garnished to satisfy a child support or *647 alimony obligation, see 42 U.S. C. 659, Congress declined to extend permission to garnish veterans' disability pay, see 42 U.S. C. 662(f)(2). Also, when Congress passed the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Tit. X (1982), following this Court's decision in it permitted state divorce courts to apportion military retired pay in divorce proceedings, see 10 U.S. C. 1408, but withheld such permission for veterans' disability pay, see 10 U.S. C. 1408(a)(4). Of course, this case does not involve direct garnishment or apportionment of veterans' disability pay, but there is no plausible reason that Congress would have written these specific exceptions for disability pay if it contemplated that state courts would enter orders such as were entered against appellant in this case. I respectfully dissent.
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
concurring
|
Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/620672/pacific-operators-offshore-llp-v-valladolid/
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I join the Court’s judgment that the Ninth Circuit prop- erly remanded this case to the Benefits Review Board, and I agree with almost all of the Court’s opinion. My disagreement is limited to the last two substantive para- graphs of Part IV, which endorse the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial-nexus” test for determining the scope of cover- age under 43 U.S. C. The Court indulges in con- siderable understatement when it acknowledges that this test “may not be the easiest to administer,” ante, at 14. “Substantial nexus” is novel legalese with no established meaning in the present context. I agree with the Court’s rejection of some of the clearer rules proposed by the parties—which, though easier to apply, are unmoored from the text of But if we must adopt an inde- terminate standard (and the statute’s “as the result of ” language leaves us no choice) I prefer the devil we know to the devil of the Ninth Circuit’s imagining. I would hold that an employee may recover under if his injury was proximately caused by operations on the Outer Conti- nental Shelf (OCS). The term “proximate cause” is “shorthand for a concept: Injuries have countless causes, and not all should give rise 2 PACIFIC OPERATORS OFFSHORE, LLP v. VALLADOLID Opinion of SCALIA, J. to legal liability.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U. S. (20) (slip op., at 5). Life is too short to pursue every event to its most remote, “but-for,” consequences, and the doctrine of proximate cause provides a rough guide for courts in cutting off otherwise endless chains of cause-and-effect. See (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, as the Court notes in rejecting the Third Circuit’s “but for” test for coverage, we have interpreted statutes with language similar to as prescribing a proximate-cause standard. See ante, at 13–14. Although the doctrine of proximate cause is rooted in tort law and most commonly applied in negligence actions, it can also provide a useful guide in no-fault compensation schemes like this one. In Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 5, 9 (1994), we considered a no-fault veterans’ com- pensation statute covering injuries that occurred “as the result of ” medical treatment (precisely the language at issue here); we suggested that the requisite “causal con- nection” between the injury and medical treatment may be “limited to proximate causation so as to narrow the class of compensable cases by eliminating remote conse- quences.” Similarly, some state workers’ compensation laws use the concept of proximate cause to determine entitlement. See, e.g., Ex parte Patton, So. 3d (Ala. 20); ; Grant v. Grant Textiles,
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
concurring
|
Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/620672/pacific-operators-offshore-llp-v-valladolid/
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Patton, So. 3d (Ala. 20); ; Grant v. Grant Textiles, 372 S. C. 196, 201, (2007). Indeed, the statutory law of California, where Mr. Valladolid died while at work, limits workers’ compensa- tion liability to cases “[w]here the injury is proximately caused by the employment, either with or without negli- gence.” Cal. Lab. Code Ann. (West 20).* I —————— * Strange to say, the California Supreme Court has held that this Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 3 Opinion of SCALIA, J. see no reason why the scope of 43 U.S. C. could not similarly be cabined by the familiar limits of proxi- mate causation. To be sure, proximate cause is an imperfect legal doc- trine; I have no illusions that its tenets are easy to de- scribe or straightforward to apply. Judicial opinions do not provide a uniform formulation of the test, and border- line cases are rarely clear. But “it is often easier to dis- parage the product of centuries of common law than to devise a plausible substitute.” McBride, 564 U. S., at (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2–3). Unlike the substantial-nexus test, proximate cause provides a “vo- cabulary” for answering questions like the one raised by the facts of this case. It may be productive, for example, to consider whether the injury was “within the scope of the risk” created by OCS operations, or whether some “super- seding or intervening cause” exists. at (slip op., at 15). In addition to that vocabulary, precedents on proxi- mate cause “furnish illustrations of situations which judicious men upon careful consideration have adjudged to be on one side of the line or the other.” Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc., (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial nexus,” by contrast, is an indeterminate phrase that lacks all pedigree. Our case law has used it as a term of art in only one context, first appearing in Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in Complete Auto Trans- —————— unmistakable term-of-art reference to a rule found in the common law of torts does not establish a rule “identical to that found in the common law of torts,” but merely “elaborat[es] the general requirement that the injury arise out of the employment.” (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Perhaps (who knows?) later California Supreme Court cases will “clarify” this general requirement by saying that it requires a “substantial nexoos” between the employ- ment and the injury. 4 PACIFIC OPERATORS OFFSHORE, LLP v. VALLADOLID Opinion of SCALIA, J. it, : We sustain state taxes against Commerce Clause challenges if they are, inter alia,
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,012 | 9 |
concurring
|
Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/620672/pacific-operators-offshore-llp-v-valladolid/
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taxes against Commerce Clause challenges if they are, inter alia, “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]uch a nexus is established when the taxpayer ‘avails itself of the sub- stantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdic- tion.” Polar Tankers, (2009). That clarification—and any further clarification in the Commerce Clause context—will not be remotely help- ful to lower courts attempting to apply the substantial- nexus test in the very different legal context of workers’ compensation under In this latter context, I assume the Court means by “substantial nexus” a sub- stantial causal nexus—since ’s “as the result of ” language “plainly suggests causation,” ante, at 13. Like the word “nexus” itself, the definition of “substantial nexus” in our state-tax cases does not require any causal relationship whatsoever. The proximate-cause test, by comparison, represents a much more natural interpreta- tion of a statute that turns on causation. Does the Court mean to establish, by the novel “sub- stantial [causal] nexus” test, a new tertium quid of causal- ity—somewhere between but-for causality and proximate cause? One might think so, since there is no other sensi- ble reason to (1) reject but-for cause, (2) say nothing about the natural alternative (proximate cause), and (3) embrace the “substantial [causal] nexus” novelty. On the other hand, the Court’s opinion suggests at least some connec- tion (that is to say, in the Court’s favored lawspeak, some “nexus”) between the proximate-cause standard and the substantial-nexus test, since it cites one of our proximate- cause cases just before concluding that “[a]ccordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s ‘substantial-nexus’ test is more faithful to the text of ” than the Third Circuit’s but-for Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 5 Opinion of SCALIA, J. test. Ante, at 13–14. In the opinion below, moreover, the Ninth Circuit purported to endorse the Fifth Circuit’s pre- 1989 case law, which required “ ‘ that the claimant show a nexus similar to the proximate cause test in tort law.’ ” 604 F.3d 26, 40 (quoting Mills v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 846 F.2d 1013, 1015 (CA5 1988), rev’d en banc, (1989)). Who knows whether this is a tertium quid or not? The Court has given us a new test whose contours are entirely undescribed, and which has nothing to be said for it except that it will add complexity to the law and litiga- tion to the courts. Finally, I must note an additional uncertainty (or else a peculiarity) that the Court’s opinion creates:
|
Justice Sotomayor
| 2,013 | 24 |
majority
|
Evans v. Michigan
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/
|
When the State of Michigan rested its case at petitioner Lamar Evans’ arson trial, the court entered a directed verdict of acquittal, based upon its view that the State had not provided sufficient evidence of a particular element of the offense. It turns out that the unproven “element” was not actually a required element at all. We must de- cide whether an erroneous acquittal such as this neverthe- less constitutes an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, which would mean that Evans could not be retried. This Court has previously held that a judicial acquittal prem- ised upon a “misconstruction” of a criminal statute is an “acquittal on the merits [that] bars retrial.” Arizona v. Rumsey, Seeing no meaningful constitutional distinction between a trial court’s “miscon- struction” of a statute and its erroneous addition of a statutory element, we hold that a midtrial acquittal in these circumstances is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes as well. I The State charged Evans with burning “other real prop- erty,” a violation of (11). 2 EVANS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court The State’s evidence at trial suggested that Evans had burned down an unoccupied house. At the close of the State’s case, however, Evans moved for a directed ver- dict of acquittal. He pointed the court to the applicable Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions, which listed as the “Fourth” element of the offense “that the building was not a dwelling house.” 3 Mich. Crim. Jury Instr. p. 31–7 And the commentary to the Instructions emphasized, “an essential element is that the structure burned is not a dwelling house.” at 31–8. Evans argued that criminal- izes common-law arson, which requires that the structure burned be a dwelling, while the provision under which he was charged, covers all other real property.1 Persuaded, the trial court granted the motion. 491 Mich. 1, 8, The court that the “ ‘testimony [of the homeowner] was this was a dwelling house,’ ” so the nondwelling requirement of was not met. On the State’s appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 794 N.W.2d 848 (2010). Evans had conceded, and the court held, that under controlling precedent, burning “other real property” is a lesser included offense under Michigan law, and dis- —————— 1 (11), “Burning dwelling house,” pro- vides: “Any person who wilfully or maliciously burns any dwelling house, either occupied or unoccupied, or the contents thereof, whether owned by himself or another, or any building within the curtilage of such dwelling house, or the contents thereof, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
|
Justice Sotomayor
| 2,013 | 24 |
majority
|
Evans v. Michigan
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/
|
of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 20 years.” And “Burning of other real property,” provides: “Any person who wilfully or maliciously burns any building or other real property, or the contents thereof, other than those specified in the next preceding section of this chapter, the property of himself or another, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years.” Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court proving the greater offense is not required. 794 N.W. 2d, at 852 (on rehear- ing)).2 The court thus it was “undisputed that the trial court misperceived the elements of the offense with which [Evans] was charged and erred by directing a verdict.” 288 Mich. App., 794 N.W. 2d, at 852. But the court rejected Evans’ argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial. 21–422, 794 N.W. 2d, at 856. In a divided decision, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed. It held that “when a trial court grants a defend- ant’s motion for a directed verdict on the basis of an error of law that did not resolve any factual element of the charged offense, the trial court’s ruling does not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy and re- trial is therefore not barred.” 810 N.W. 2d, at 536–537. We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among state and federal courts on the question whether retrial is barred when a trial court grants an acquittal be- cause the prosecution had failed to prove an “element” of the offense that, in actuality, it did not have to prove.3 567 U. S. We now reverse. —————— 2 In other words, the pattern jury instructions were incorrect. The State later revised them. See 794 N.W. 2d 848, 852, n. 3 (2010). 3 Compare and (same conclusion), and United (same), with 8 (2006) (rejecting this distinction), and (holding double jeopardy barred retrial after trial court erroneously required extra element). 4 EVANS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court II A In answering this question, we do not write on a clean slate. Quite the opposite. It has been half a century since we first recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following a court-decreed acquittal, even if the ac- quittal is “based upon an egregiously erroneous founda- tion.” Fong (per curiam). A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal none- theless, and we have long held that “[a] verdict of acquittal could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and
|
Justice Sotomayor
| 2,013 | 24 |
majority
|
Evans v. Michigan
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/
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or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby vio- lating the Constitution.” United States v. 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896). Our cases have applied Fong Foo’s principle broadly. An acquittal is unreviewable whether a judge directs a jury to return a verdict of acquittal, e.g., Fong Foo, 369 U. S., at or forgoes that formality by entering a judgment of acquittal herself. See v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467–468 (2005) (collecting cases). And an acquittal precludes retrial even if it is premised upon an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, ; a mistaken understanding of what evidence would suffice to sustain a conviction, ; or a “misconstruction of the stat- ute” defining the requirements to convict, Rumsey, 467 U. S., at 203, ; cf. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144–145, n. 7 (16). In all these circumstances, “the fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous eviden- tiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles affects the accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character.” United States v. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Most relevant here, our cases have defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense. See and n. 11; 10 ; United States v. Martin Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). Thus an “acquittal” includes “a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict,” a “factual finding [that] necessarily establish[es] the criminal defendant’s lack of criminal culpability,” and any other “rulin[g] which relate[s] to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.” and n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). These sorts of sub- stantive rulings stand apart from procedural rulings that may also terminate a case midtrial, which we generally refer to as dismissals or mistrials. Procedural dismissals include rulings on questions that “are unrelated to factual guilt or innocence,” but “which serve other purposes,” including “a legal judgment that a defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be punished” because of some problem like an error with the indictment. at and n. 11. Both procedural dismissals and substantive rulings result in an early end to trial, but we in that the double jeopardy consequences of each differ. “[T]he law attaches particular significance to an acquit- tal,” so a merits-related ruling concludes proceedings absolutely. This is because “[t]o permit a se- cond trial after an acquittal, however mistaken the acquit- tal may have been, would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with
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would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior re- sources, might wear down the defendant so that ‘even though innocent he may be found guilty,’ ” ). And retrial following an acquittal would upset a defendant’s ex- pectation of repose, for it would subject him to additional “embarrassment, expense and ordeal” while “compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.” In contrast, a “termination of the proceedings 6 EVANS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court against [a defendant] on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused,” 437 U. S., at –99, i.e., some procedural ground, does not pose the same concerns, because no expectation of finality attaches to a properly granted mistrial. Here, “it is plain that the [trial court] evaluated the [State’s] evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Martin 430 U. S., at 572. The trial court granted Evans’ motion under a rule that requires the court to “direct a verdict of acquit- tal on any charged offense as to which the evidence is insufficient to support conviction.” Mich. Rule Crim. Proc. 6.419(A) And the court’s oral ruling leaves no doubt that it made its determination on the basis of “ ‘[t]he testimony’ ” that the State had 810 N.W. 2d, at This ruling was not a dismissal on a procedural ground “unrelated to factual guilt or inno- cence,” like the question of “preindictment delay” in but rather a determination that the State had failed to prove its 437 U. S., at 99. Under our precedents, then, Evans was acquitted. There is no question the trial court’s ruling was wrong; it was predicated upon a clear misunderstanding of what facts the State needed to prove under State law. But that is of no moment. Martin Rumsey, Smalis, and all instruct that an acquittal due to insufficient evidence precludes retrial, whether the court’s evaluation of the evidence was “correct or not,” Martin and regardless of whether the court’s decision flowed from an incorrect antecedent ruling of law. Here Evans’ acquittal was the product of an “erro- neous interpretatio[n] of governing legal principles,” but as in our other cases, that error affects only “the accuracy of [the] determination” to acquit, not “its essential charac- ter.” 437 U. S., at (internal quotation marks omitted). Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court B The court below saw things differently. It identified a “constitutionally meaningful difference” between this case and our previous decisions. Those cases, the
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between this case and our previous decisions. Those cases, the court found, “involve[d] evidentiary errors regarding the proof needed to establish a factual element of the crimes at issue,” but still ultimately involved “a resolution regarding the sufficiency of the factual elements of the charged offense.” –15, 810 N.W. 2d, at 542–543. When a court mistakenly “identifie[s] an extraneous element and dismisse[s] the case solely on that basis,” however, it has “not resolve[d] or even address[ed] any factual element necessary to establish” the offense. N.W. 2d, at 543, 546. As a result, the court below rea- soned, the case terminates “based on an error of law unrelated to [the] defendant’s guilt or innocence on the ele- ments of the charged offense,” and thus falls outside the definition of an acquittal. 810 N.W. 2d, at 546. We fail to perceive the difference. This case, like our previous ones, involves an antecedent legal error that led to an acquittal because the State failed to prove some fact it was not actually required to prove. Consider Rumsey. There the trial court, sitting as sentencer in a capital case involving a murder committed during a robbery, mistak- enly held that Arizona’s statutory aggravating factor describing killings for pecuniary gain was limited to mur- ders for hire. Accordingly, it found the State had failed to prove the killing was for pecuniary gain and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. After the State success- fully appealed and obtained a death sentence on remand, we held that retrial on the penalty phase question was a double jeopardy violation.4 —————— 4 Under (11), a capital de- fendant is “acquitted” of the death penalty if, at the end of a separate sentencing proceeding, the factfinder concludes that the prosecution 8 EVANS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court The only relevant difference between that situation and this one is that in Rumsey the trial court’s error was called a “misinterpretation” and a “misconstruction of the stat- ute,” whereas here the error has been designated the “erroneous addition of [an] extraneous element to the charged offense.” –4, 810 N.W. 2d, at 536. But we have emphasized that labels do not control our analysis in this context; rather, the sub- stance of a court’s decision does. See Smalis, 476 U. S., at 144, n. 5; –97; Martin 430 U. S., at 571. The error in Rumsey could just as easily have been characterized as the erroneous addition of an element of the statutory aggravating circumstance: that the homicide be a murder-for-hire. Conversely, the error here could be viewed as a misinterpretation of
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the error here could be viewed as a misinterpretation of the stat- ute’s phrase “building or other real property” to exclude dwellings.5 This is far too fine a distinction to be meaning- —————— has failed to prove required additional facts to support a sentence of death. Thus in Rumsey, the trial court’s initial “judgment, based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence, amounts to an acquittal on the merits and, as such, bars any retrial of the appropriateness of the death penalty.” 467 U. S., at 5 Indeed, it is possible that this is what the trial court thought it was doing, not articulating an additional element. The statute criminalizes burning “any building or other real property, other than those specified in” the previous section, which criminalizes the burning of a dwelling house. In light of the statute’s phrasing, the trial court interpreted “building or other real property” to be exclusive of the type of property described in although the Michigan courts have that the term is actually meant to be inclusive. So the trial court decision could be viewed as having given the statutory “building” element an unduly narrow construction (by limiting it to nondwellings), just as the trial court in Rumsey gave the pecuniary-gain provision an unduly narrow construction (by limiting it to contract killings). Nevertheless, we accept the parties’ and the Michigan courts’ alternative characterization of the trial court’s error as the “addition” of an extraneous element. Our observation simply underscores how malleable the distinction adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court, and defended by the State and the United States, can Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court ful, and we reject the notion that a defendant’s constitu- tional rights would turn on the happenstance of how an appellate court chooses to describe a trial court’s error. Echoing the Michigan Supreme Court, the State and the United States, as well as the dissent, emphasize Martin ’s description of an acquittal as the “resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” ; see Brief for Respondent 11–17; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11–15 (hereinafter U. S. Brief); see post, at 6–8. They observe that the Double Jeopardy Clause pro- tects against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same “offence,” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5, cl. 2, and they note that an offense comprises constituent parts called elements, which are facts that must be proved to sustain a convic- tion. See, e.g., United 696– 697 (1993). Consequently, they argue,
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tion. See, e.g., United 696– 697 (1993). Consequently, they argue, only if an actual element of the offense is resolved can it be said that there has been an acquittal of the offense, because “ ‘innocence of the charged offense’ cannot turn on something that is concededly not an element of the offense.” U. S. Brief 15. Because Evans’ trial ended without resolution of even one actual element, they conclude, there was no acquittal. This argument reads Martin too narrowly, and it is inconsistent with our decisions since then. Our focus in Martin was on the significance of a judicial acquittal under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29. The District Court in that case had “evaluated the Government’s evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a con- viction.” That determination of noncul- pability was enough to make the acquittal akin to a jury verdict; our holding did not depend upon defining the —————— be. And it belies the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 11 (opinion of ALITO, J.), that drawing this distinction is “quite easy” here, and that the basis for the trial court’s ruling could not be subject to “real dispute.” 10 EVANS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court “elements” of the offense. As we have at 5–6, confirms that the relevant distinction is between judicial determinations that go to “the criminal defendant’s lack of criminal culpability,” and those that hold “that a defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be punished because of a supposed” procedural error. 437 U. S., at Culpability (i.e., the “ultimate question of guilt or innocence”) is the touchstone, not whether any particular elements were resolved or whether the deter- mination of nonculpability was legally correct. at n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Perhaps most inconsistent with the State’s and United States’ argument is Burks. There we held that when a defendant raises insanity as a defense, and a court decides the “Government ha[s] failed to come forward with suffi- cient proof of [the defendant’s] capacity to be responsible for criminal acts,” the defendant has been acquitted be- cause the court decided that “criminal culpability ha[s] not been established.” Lack of insanity was not an “element” of Burks’ offense, bank robbery by use of a dangerous weapon. See 18 U.S. C. §3(d) (1976 ed.). Rather, insanity was an affirmative defense to criminal liability. Our conclusion thus depended upon equating a judicial acquittal with an order finding insufficient evi- dence of culpability, not insufficient evidence of any par- ticular element of the offense.6 —————— 6 To account for Burks, the United States posits that, “[a]s
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To account for Burks, the United States posits that, “[a]s used in [its] brief, the ‘elements’ of an offense encompass legally recognized defenses that would negate culpability.” U. S. Brief 11, n. 3. So too would the dissent hold that, “as used in this opinion, the ‘elements’ of an offense include legally recognized affirmative defenses that would negate culpability.” Post, at 8, n. 2. Rather than adopt a novel defini- tion of the word “element” to mean “elements and affirmative defenses,” and then promptly limit that novel definition to these circumstances, we prefer to read Burks for what it says, which is that the issue is whether the bottom-line question of “criminal culpability” was resolved. Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court In the end, this case follows those that have come before it. The trial court’s judgment of acquittal resolved the question of Evans’ guilt or innocence as a matter of the sufficiency of the evidence, not on unrelated procedural grounds. That judgment, “however erroneous” it was, precludes reprosecution on this charge, and so should have barred the State’s appeal as well. 437 U. S., at 69. III A The State, supported by the United States, offers three other reasons why the distinction drawn by the court be- low should be maintained. None persuades us. To start, the State argues that unless an actual element of the offense is resolved by the trial court, the only way to know whether the court’s ruling was an “acquittal” is to rely upon the label used by the court, which would wrongly allow the form of the trial court’s action to control. Brief for Respondent 17–18, 21–22. We disagree. Our decision turns not on the form of the trial court’s action, but rather whether it “serve[s]” substantive “purposes” or procedural ones. 437 U. S., at n. 11. If a trial court were to announce, midtrial, “The defendant shall be acquitted because he was prejudiced by preindictment delay,” the Double Jeopardy Clause would pose no barrier to reprose- cution, notwithstanding the “acquittal” label. Cf. Here we know the trial court acquitted Evans, not because it incanted the word “acquit” (which it did not), but because it acted on its view that the prosecu- tion had failed to prove its Next, the State and the United States fear that if the grounds for an acquittal are untethered from the actual elements of the offense, a trial court could issue an unre- viewable order finding insufficient evidence to convict for any reason at all, such as that the prosecution failed to
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reason at all, such as that the prosecution failed to 12 EVANS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court prove “that the structure burned [was] blue.” Brief for Respondent 16–17; U. S. Brief 15. If the concern is that there is no limit to the magnitude of the error that could yield an acquittal, the response is that we have long held as much. See If the concern is instead that our holding will make it easier for courts to insulate from review acquittals that are granted as a form of nullifi- cation, see Brief for Respondent 30, n. 58, we reject the premise. We presume here, as in other contexts, that courts exercise their duties in good faith. Cf. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. (2011) (slip op., at 13). Finally, the State suggests that because Evans induced the trial court’s error, he should not be heard to complain when that error is corrected and the State wishes to retry him. Brief for Respondent 32–33; cf. at 5–9. But we have recognized that “most [judgments of acquittal] re- sult from defense motions,” so “[t]o hold that a defendant waives his double jeopardy protection whenever a trial court error in his favor on a midtrial motion leads to an acquittal would undercut the adversary assumption on which our system of criminal justice rests, and would vitiate one of the fundamental rights established by the Fifth Amendment.” (citation omitted).7 It is true that when a defendant persuades the court to declare a mistrial, jeopardy continues and retrial is generally allowed. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976). But in such circumstances the defendant consents to a disposition that contemplates reprosecution, whereas when a defendant moves for acquittal he does not. See —————— 7 The dissent says that “defense counsel fooled the judge,” post, at 6, but surely that charge is not fair. Nothing suggests counsel exceeded the permissible bounds of zealous advocacy on behalf of his client. Counsel presented a colorable legal argument, and marshaled persua- sive authority: Michigan’s own criminal jury instructions, which, at the time, supported his position. See Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 13 Opinion of the Court The United States makes a related argument. It con- tends that Evans could have asked the court to resolve whether nondwelling status is an element of the offense before jeopardy attached, so having elected to wait until trial was underway to raise the point, he cannot now claim a double jeopardy violation. U. S. Brief 22–25. The Gov- ernment relies upon (1977), in which the District Court dismissed an
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relies upon (1977), in which the District Court dismissed an indict- ment midtrial because it had failed to allege the required intent element of the offense. We held that retrial on a corrected indictment was not barred, because the dismis- sal was akin to a mistrial, not an acquittal. This was clear because the District Court had separately denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, explaining that the defendant “ ‘has been proven [guilty] beyond any reasonable doubt in the world,’ ” while acknowledging that the error in the indictment required dismissal. at 26– 27. Because the defendant “invited the court to interrupt the proceedings before formalizing a finding on the merits” by raising the indictment issue so late, we held the princi- ples governing a defendant’s consent to mistrial should apply. at 28 (citing Dinitz, ). The Government suggests the situation here is “func- tionally similar,” because “identifying the elements of an offense is a necessary step in determining the sufficiency of a charging document.” U. S. Brief 23. But we can- not ignore the fact that what the trial court actually did here was rule on the sufficiency of the State’s proof, not the sufficiency of the information filed against him. Lee demonstrates that the two need not rise or fall together. And even if the Government is correct that Evans could have challenged the charging document on the same legal theory he used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, it matters that he made only the latter motion, a motion that necessarily may not be made until trial is underway. Evans cannot be penalized for requesting from the court a 14 EVANS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court ruling on the merits of the State’s case, as the Michigan Rules entitled him to do; whether he could have also brought a distinct procedural objection earlier on is beside the point. B In the alternative, the State and the United States ask us to reconsider our past decisions. Brief for Respondent 34–56 (suggesting overruling our cases since at least Fong Foo); U. S. Brief 27–32 (suggesting overruling Rumsey, and Smalis).8 We declined to revisit our cases when the United States made a similar request in Smalis. ; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Smalis v. Pennsylvania, O. T. 15, No. 85–227, pp. 19–25. And we decline to do so here. First, we have no reason to believe the existing rules have become so “unworkable” as to justify overruling precedent. The distinction drawn in has stood the test of time, and we expect courts
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has stood the test of time, and we expect courts will continue to have little “difficulty in distinguishing between those rulings which relate to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence and those which serve other purposes.” 437 U. S., at n. 11 (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, (collecting cases); 6 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Crimi- nal Procedure p. 629 (same). Second, the logic of these cases still holds. There is no —————— 8 The dissent’s true gripe may be with these cases as well, rather than our result here, which, we have follows inevitably from them. See post, at 5 (noting “how far [our cases] have departed from the common-law principles that applied at the time of the founding”); compare post, at 12 (“Permitting retrial in these egregious cases is especially appropriate”), with Fong (per curiam) (according finality to even those acquittals “based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation”). Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 15 Opinion of the Court question that a jury verdict of acquittal precludes retrial, and thus bars appeal of any legal error that may have led to that acquittal. See So, had the trial court here instructed the jury that it must find the burned structure was not a dwelling in order to convict, the jury would have acquitted Evans accordingly; “ ‘[a] jury is presumed to follow its instructions.’ ” Blueford v. Ar- kansas, 566 U.S. (slip op., at 6) ). And that would have been the end of the matter. From that prem- ise, Fong Foo’s holding follows: If a trial court instead exercises its discretion to direct a jury to return a verdict of acquittal, jeopardy also terminates notwithstanding any legal error, because there too it is the jury that returns an acquittal. And from there, Martin ’s conclusion is unavoidable: It should make no difference whether the court employs the formality of directing the jury to return an acquittal or whether the court enters an acquittal itself. Rumsey, Smalis, and merely apply Fong Foo and Martin in tandem: If a trial court makes an antecedent legal error (as in Fong Foo), and then grants a judgment of acquittal rather than directing the jury to acquit (as in Martin ), the result is an acquittal all the same. In other words, there is no way for antecedent legal errors to be reviewable in the context of judicial acquittals unless those errors are also reviewable when they give rise to jury acquittals (contrary to the settled understanding that a jury verdict of
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(contrary to the settled understanding that a jury verdict of acquittal is unreviewable), or unless we distinguish between juries that acquit pursuant to their instructions and judicial acquittals (notwithstand- ing that this is a purely formal distinction). Neither op- tion has become more attractive with time. We therefore reiterate: “any contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause must itself leave open a way of correcting legal errors is at odds with the well-established rule that the 16 EVANS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court bar will attach to a preverdict acquittal that is patently wrong in law.” Finally, the State and the United States object that this rule denies the prosecution a full and fair opportunity to present its evidence to the jury, while the defendant reaps a “windfall” from the trial court’s unreviewable error. Brief for Respondent 6; U. S. Brief 31–32. But sovereigns are hardly powerless to prevent this sort of situation, as we observed in 543 U. S., 74. Nothing obligates a jurisdiction to afford its trial courts the power to grant a midtrial acquittal, and at least two States disallow the practice. See (1) (2011); State v. Parfait, 96, 1814 (La. App. 1 Cir. 05/09/97), 693 So. 2d 1232, 1242. Many jurisdictions, including the federal system, allow or encourage their courts to defer considera- tion of a motion to acquit until after the jury returns a verdict, which mitigates double jeopardy concerns.9 See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29(b). And for cases such as this, in which a trial court’s interpretation of the relevant criminal statute is likely to prove dispositive, we see no reason why jurisdictions could not provide for mandatory continuances or expedited interlocutory appeals if they wished to pre- vent misguided acquittals from being entered.10 But having chosen to vest its courts with the power to grant midtrial acquittals, the State must bear the corresponding risk that some acquittals will be granted in error. —————— 9 If a court grants a motion to acquit after the jury has convicted, there is no double jeopardy barrier to an appeal by the government from the court’s acquittal, because reversal would result in reinstate- ment of the jury verdict of guilt, not a new trial. United States v. Wilson, 10 Here, the prosecutor twice asked the court for a recess to review the Michigan statutes and to discuss the question with her supervisor. 491 Mich., at 7, 810 N.W. 2d, at 538–. If the trial court’s refusal was ill- advised, that is a matter for state procedure to address, but it does not bear on the double jeopardy
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Arizona v. Roberson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112100/arizona-v-roberson/
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In we held that a suspect who has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." In this case asks us to craft an exception to that rule for cases in which the police want to interrogate a suspect about an offense that is unrelated to the subject of their initial interrogation. Several years ago the Supreme Court considered, and rejected, a similar argument, stating: "The only difference between Edwards and the appellant is that Edwards was questioned about the same offense *78 after a request for counsel while the appellant was reinterrogated about an unrelated offense. We do not believe that this factual distinction holds any legal significance for fifth amendment purposes." cert. denied, We agree with the Supreme Court's conclusion. I On April 1, 15, respondent was arrested at the scene of a just-completed burglary. The arresting officer advised him that he had a constitutional right to remain silent and also the right to have an attorney present during any interrogation. See Respondent replied that he "wanted a lawyer before answering any questions."[1] This fact was duly recorded in the officer's written report of the incident. In due course, respondent was convicted of the April 1, 15, burglary. On April 19, 15, while respondent was still in custody pursuant to the arrest three days earlier, a different officer interrogated him about a different burglary that had occurred on April 15. That officer was not aware of the fact that respondent had requested the assistance of counsel three days earlier. After advising respondent of his rights, the officer obtained an incriminating statement concerning the April 15 burglary. In the prosecution for that offense, the trial court suppressed that statement. In explaining his ruling, the trial judge relied squarely on the Supreme Court's opinion in 137 Ariz., at 9 P.2d, at characterizing the rule of the Edwards case as "clear and unequivocal."[2] *79 The Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression order in a brief opinion, stating: "In as in the instant case, the accused was continuously in police custody from the time of asserting his Fifth Amendment right through the time of the impermissible questioning. The coercive environment never dissipated." App. to Pet. for Cert. 24. The Supreme Court denied a petition for review. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict with certain other state court decisions.[3] 484 U.S. 5 We now affirm. *80 II A major
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Arizona v. Roberson
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484 U.S. 5 We now affirm. *80 II A major purpose of the Court's opinion in -442, was "to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." "As we have stressed on numerous occasions, `[o]ne of the principal advantages' of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application. ; see also New ] (concurring opinion); 442 U. S. [707, (19)]." 4 U.S. 412, The rule of the Edwards case came as a corollary to Miranda's admonition that "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." In such an instance, we had concluded in Miranda, "[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." at 4. In Edwards, we "reconfirm[ed] these views and, to lend them substance, emphasize[d] that it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel." We concluded that reinterrogation may only occur if "the accused himself initiates *81 further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Thus, the prophylactic protections that the Miranda warnings provide to counteract the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation and to "permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination," are implemented by the application of the Edwards corollary that if a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing such questioning without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the "inherently compelling pressures" and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect. As JUSTICE WHITE has explained, "the accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities' insistence to make a statement without counsel's presence may properly be viewed with skepticism." (15) We have repeatedly emphasized the virtues of a bright-line rule in cases following Edwards as well as Miranda. See 4 U.S. 25, ; ; ; see also (15); In (19), we explained that the "relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease upon the accused's request for an attorney has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of
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Arizona v. Roberson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112100/arizona-v-roberson/
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what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which benefits the accused and the State alike, has been thought to outweigh the burdens that the decision *82 in Miranda imposes on law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of trustworthy and highly probative evidence even though the confession might be voluntary under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis."[4] The Edwards rule thus serves the purpose of providing "clear and unequivocal" guidelines to the law enforcement profession. Surely there is nothing ambiguous about the requirement that after a person in custody has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." 451 U.S., at III Petitioner contends that the bright-line, prophylactic Edwards rule should not apply when the police-initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel occurs in the context of a separate investigation. According to petitioner, both our cases and the nature of the factual setting compel this distinction. We are unpersuaded. *83 Petitioner points to our holding in -104 (quoting ), that when a suspect asserts his right to cut off questioning, the police may " `scrupulously honor' " that right by "immediately ceas[ing] the interrogation, resum[ing] questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restrict[ing] the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation." The police in this case followed precisely that course, claims the State. However, as made clear, a suspect's decision to cut off questioning, unlike his request for counsel, does not raise the presumption that he is unable to proceed without a lawyer's advice. See ; at Petitioner points as well to which concerned a suspect who had "told the officers that he would not give a written statement unless his attorney was present but had `no problem' talking about the incident." We held that this was a limited request for counsel, that himself had drawn a distinction between oral and written statements and thus that the officers could continue to question him. Petitioner argues that Roberson's request for counsel was similarly limited, this time to the investigation pursuant to which the request was made. This argument is flawed both factually and legally. As a matter of fact, according to the initial
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,988 | 16 |
majority
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Arizona v. Roberson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112100/arizona-v-roberson/
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legally. As a matter of fact, according to the initial police report, respondent stated that "he wanted a lawyer before answering any questions."[5] As a matter of law, the presumption raised by a suspect's request for counsel that he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance does not disappear simply because the police have approached the suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate investigation. *84 That a suspect's request for counsel should apply to any questions the police wish to pose follows, we think, not only from Edwards and Miranda, but also from a case decided the same day as In we held that "a suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege." In the face of the warning that anything he said could be used as evidence against him, 's willingness to answer questions, without limiting such a waiver, see indicated that he felt comfortable enough with the pressures of custodial interrogation both to answer questions and to do so without an attorney. Since there is "no qualification of [the] broad and explicit warning" that "anything [a suspect] says may be used against him," 479 U.S., at 's decision to talk was properly considered to be equally unqualified. Conversely, Roberson's unwillingness to answer any questions without the advice of counsel, without limiting his request for counsel, indicated that he did not feel sufficiently comfortable with the pressures of custodial interrogation to answer questions without an attorney. This discomfort is precisely the state of mind that Edwards presumes to persist unless the suspect himself initiates further conversation about the investigation; unless he otherwise states, see there is no reason to assume that a suspect's state of mind is in any way investigation-specific, see Finally, petitioner raises the case of (15), which held that Moulton's "Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated by the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by him to his codefendant, a secret government informant, after indictment and at a meeting of the two to plan defense strategy for the upcoming trial." That case did not involve any *85 Miranda issue because Moulton was not in custody. In our opinion, we rejected an argument that the statements should be admissible because the police were seeking information regarding both the crime for which Moulton had already been indicted, and a separate, inchoate scheme. Following we recognized, though, that the continuing
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,988 | 16 |
majority
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Arizona v. Roberson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112100/arizona-v-roberson/
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separate, inchoate scheme. Following we recognized, though, that the continuing investigation of uncharged offenses did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Our recognition of that fact, however, surely lends no support to petitioner's argument that in the Fifth Amendment context, "statements about different offenses, developed at different times, by different investigators, in the course of two wholly independent investigations, should not be treated the same." Brief for Petitioner 32. This argument overlooks the difference between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The former arises from the fact that the suspect has been formally charged with a particular crime and thus is facing a state apparatus that has been geared up to prosecute him. The latter is protected by the prophylaxis of having an attorney present to counteract the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation, which arise from the fact of such interrogation and exist regardless of the number of crimes under investigation or whether those crimes have resulted in formal charges. In sum, our cases do not support petitioner's position. IV Petitioner's attempts at distinguishing the factual setting here from that in Edwards are equally unavailing. Petitioner first relies on the plurality opinion in 42 U. S., at which stated that Edwards laid down "a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards *8 was." Petitioner reasons that "the chances that an accused will be questioned so repeatedly and in such quick succession that it will `undermine the will' of the person questioned, or will constitute `badger[ing],' are so minute as not to warrant consideration, if the officers are truly pursuing separate investigations." Brief for Petitioner 1. It is by no means clear, though, that police engaged in separate investigations will be any less eager than police involved in only one inquiry to question a suspect in custody. Further, to a suspect who has indicated his inability to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting counsel, any further interrogation without counsel having been provided will surely exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling. Thus, we also disagree with petitioner's contention that fresh sets of Miranda warnings will "reassure" a suspect who has been denied the counsel he has clearly requested that his rights have remained untrammeled. See Especially in a case such as this, in which a period of three days elapsed between the unsatisfied request for counsel and the interrogation about a second offense, there
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,988 | 16 |
majority
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Arizona v. Roberson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112100/arizona-v-roberson/
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for counsel and the interrogation about a second offense, there is a serious risk that the mere repetition of the Miranda warnings would not overcome the presumption of coercion that is created by prolonged police custody.[] *87 The United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioner, suggests that a suspect in custody might have "good reasons for wanting to speak with the police about the offenses involved in the new investigation, or at least to learn from the police what the new investigation is about so that he can decide whether it is in his interest to make a statement about that matter without the assistance of counsel." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. The simple answer is that the suspect, having requested counsel, can determine how to deal with the separate investigations with counsel's advice. Further, even if the police have decided temporarily not to provide counsel, see n. they are free to inform the suspect of the facts of the second investigation as long as such communication does not constitute interrogation, see Rhode 44 U.S. 291 (10). As we have made clear, any "further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police" that the suspect himself initiates, are perfectly valid. Finally, we attach no significance to the fact that the officer who conducted the second interrogation did not know that respondent had made a request for counsel. In addition to the fact that Edwards focuses on the state of mind of the suspect and not of the police, custodial interrogation must be conducted pursuant to established procedures, and those procedures in turn must enable an officer who proposes to initiate an interrogation to determine whether the suspect has previously requested counsel. In this case respondent's request had been properly memorialized in a written report but the officer who conducted the interrogation simply failed to examine that report. Whether a contemplated reinterrogation concerns the same or a different offense, or whether the same or different law enforcement authorities are involved in the second investigation, the same need to determine *88 whether the suspect has requested counsel exists.[7] The police department's failure to honor that request cannot be justified by the lack of diligence of a particular officer. Cf. (12). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,000 | 1 |
majority
|
Baral v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118336/baral-v-united-states/
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Internal Revenue Code 6511(b)(2)(A) imposes a ceiling on the amount of credit or refund to which a taxpayer is entitled as compensation for an overpayment of tax: "[T]he amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return." 26 U.S. C. 6511(b)(2)(A). We are called upon in this case to decide when two types of remittance are "paid" for purposes of this section: a remittance by a taxpayer of estimated income tax, and a remittance by a taxpayer's employer of withholding tax. The plain language of a nearby Code section, 6513(b), provides the answer: These remittances are "paid" on the due date of the taxpayer's income tax return. I The relevant facts are not disputed. Two remittances were made to the Internal Revenue Service toward petitioner *433 David H. Baral's income tax liability for the 1988 tax year. The first, a withholding of $4,104 from Baral's wages throughout 1988, was a garden-variety collection of income tax by the employer, see 3402. The second, an estimated income tax of $1,100 remitted in January 1989, was sent by Baral himself out of concern that his employer's withholding might be inadequate to meet his tax obligation for the year, see 6654. In the ordinary course, Baral's income tax return for 1988 was due to be filed on April 15, 1989. Though he applied for and received an extension of time until August 15, Baral missed this deadline; he did not file the return until nearly four years later, on June 1, 1993. The Service, on July 19, 1993, assessed the tax liability reported on this belated return. On the return, Baral claimed that he (and his employer on his behalf) had remitted $1,175 more with respect to the 1988 taxable year than he actually owed. Baral requested that the Service apply this excess as a credit toward his outstanding tax obligations for the 1989 taxable year. The Service denied the requested credit. It did not dispute that Baral had timely filed the request under the relevant filing deadline"within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later." 6511(a); see 6511(b)(1). But the Service concluded that the claim exceeded the ceiling imposed by 6511(b)(2)(A). That provision states that "the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,000 | 1 |
majority
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Baral v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118336/baral-v-united-states/
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not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return." Ibid.; see generally (explaining that 6511 contains two separate timeliness provisions: (1) 6511(b)(1)'s filing deadline and (2) 6511(b)(2)'s ceilings, which are defined by reference to that provision's "look-back period[s]"). Since Baral had filed his return on June 1, 1993, and had earlier received a 4-month extension from the initial *434 due date, the relevant look-back period under 6511(b)(2)(A) extended from June 1, 1993, back to February 1, 1990 (i. e., three years plus four months). According to the Service, Baral had paid no portion of the overpaid tax during that period, and so faced a ceiling of zero on any allowable refund or credit. Baral then commenced the instant suit for refund in Federal District Court. That court sustained the Service's position and granted summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-1, judgt. order reported at The Court of Appeals looked to 6513(b)(1), which states that amounts of tax withheld from wages "shall be deemed to have been paid by [the taxpayer] on the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of his taxable year," and to 6513(b)(2), which makes similar provision for amounts submitted as estimated income tax, and concluded that, under these subsections, both of the remittances at issue were "paid" on April 15, 1989. Accord, e. g., ; ; In view of apparent tension between this approach and a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, (suggesting that a remittance respecting any sort of tax is "paid" under 6511 only when the Service assesses the tax liability), we granted certiorari, II The parties renew before us the contentions advanced below. The Government submits that 6513(b)(1) and (2) unequivocally provide that the two remittances at issue were "paid" on April 15, 1989, for purposes of 6511(b)(2)(A), so that they precede the look-back period, which, as commenced on February 1, 1990. Baral, on the other hand, urges that a tax cannot be "paid" within the meaning of *435 6511(b)(2)(A) until the tax liability is assessed (i. e., the value of the liability is definitively fixed). According to Baral, the requisite assessment might be made either when the taxpayer files his return (here June 1, 1993) or when the Service, under 6201, formally assesses the liability (here July 19, 1993), though he seems to prefer the latter date. See Brief for Petitioner 9
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,000 | 1 |
majority
|
Baral v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118336/baral-v-united-states/
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to prefer the latter date. See Brief for Petitioner 9 ("Payment of the income tax occurred at the earliest on June 1, 1993, when the amount of that tax first became known, and more precisely on July 19, 1993, when the income tax was assessed"). We agree with the Government that 6513(b)(1) and (2) settle the matter. We set out these provisions in full: "(b) Prepaid income tax "For purposes of section 6511 or 6512 "(1) Any tax actually deducted and withheld at the source during any calendar year under chapter 24 shall, in respect of the recipient of the income, be deemed to have been paid by him on the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of his taxable year with respect to which such tax is allowable as a credit under section 31. "(2) Any amount paid as estimated income tax for any taxable year shall be deemed to have been paid on the last day prescribed for filing the return under section 6012 for such taxable year (determined without regard to any extension of time for filing such return)." Subsection (1) resolves when the remittance of withholding tax by Baral's employer was "paid": Since Baral is a calendar year taxpayer, the $4,104 withheld from his wages during the 1988 calendar year was "paid" on April 15, 1989. Subsection (2) determines when Baral's remittance of estimated income tax was "paid": Since the referenced 6012 together with 6072(a) requires that a calendar year taxpayer like Baral file his income tax return on the April 15th following the close of the calendar year, the $1,100 remitted as an estimated income tax in respect of Baral's 1988 tax liability was *436 likewise "paid" on April 15, 1989. And both of these statutorily defined payment dates apply "[f]or purposes of section 6511," the provision directly at issue in this case. This means that, under 6511(b)(2)(A), both remittances at issue (the withholding and the estimated income tax) fall before, and hence outside, the look-back period, which commenced on February 1, 1990. Because neither these remittances nor any others were "paid" within the look-back period (February 1, 1990, to June 1, 1993), the ceiling on Baral's requested credit of $1,175 is zero, and the Service was correct to deny the requested credit. Baral disputes this reading of 6513(b). He claims that 6513(b)(1) and (2) establish a "deemed paid" date for payment of estimated tax and withholding tax, but in no sense prescribe when the income tax is "paid," which is the crucial inquiry under 6511(b)(2)(A). According to Baral, withholding tax and
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,000 | 1 |
majority
|
Baral v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118336/baral-v-united-states/
|
crucial inquiry under 6511(b)(2)(A). According to Baral, withholding tax and estimated tax are taxes in their own right (separate from the income tax), and are converted into income tax only on the income tax return. (On this view, payment of the income tax occurred no earlier than June 1, 1993, when Baral filed the return.) This reading is evident, he says, from the significance that the Treasury Regulations place on the filing of the return, see 26 CFR 301.6315-1 ; 301.6402-3(a)(1) (providing that "in the case of an overpayment of income taxes, a claim for credit or refund of such overpayment shall be made on the appropriate income tax return"), and from the fact that the Code's provisions regarding withholding and estimated tax are found in different subtitles (C and F, respectively) from the provisions governing income tax (A). We disagree. Withholding and estimated tax remittances are not taxes in their own right, but methods for collecting the income tax. Thus, 31(a)(1) of the Code provides that *437 amounts withheld from wages "shall be allowed to the recipient of the income as a credit against the [income] tax," and 6315 states that "[p]ayment of the estimated income tax, or any installment thereof, shall be considered payment on account of the income taxes imposed by subtitle A for the taxable year." Similarly, one of the regulations cited by Baral explains that a remittance of estimated income tax "shall be considered payment on account of the income tax for the taxable year for which the estimate is made." 26 CFR 301.6315-1 Baral's reading fails, moreover, to give any meaning to 26 U.S. C. 6513. That section exists "[f]or purposes of section 6511," and 6511 concerns credits and refunds, which result only when the aggregate of remittances (such as withholding tax and estimated income tax) exceed the tax liability, see 6401. Thus, the concepts of credit or refund have no meaning as applied to Baral's notion of withholding taxes and estimated taxes as freestanding taxes. Not surprisingly, the caption to 6513(b) describes withholding and estimated income tax remittances as "[p]repaid income tax." Taking a more metaphysical tack, Baral contends that income tax is "paid" under 6511(b)(2)(A) only when the income tax is assessedhere, June 1 or July 19, 1993, see at 434-435because the concept of payment makes sense only when the liability is "defined, known, and fixed by assessment," Brief for Petitioner 9. But the Code directly contradicts the notion that payment may not occur before assessment. See 6151(a) ("[T]he person required to make [a return of tax] shall, without assessment or notice
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,000 | 1 |
majority
|
Baral v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118336/baral-v-united-states/
|
make [a return of tax] shall, without assessment or notice and demand from the Secretary, pay such tax at the time and place fixed for filing the return" ); 6213(b)(4) ("Any amount paid as a tax or in respect of a tax may be assessed upon the receipt of such payment " ). Nor does Baral's argument find support in our decision in where we applied 6511's predecessor to a remittance of estimated *438 estate tax. To be sure, a part of our opinion seems to endorse petitioner's view that payment only occurs at assessment: "It is [the] erroneous assessment that gave rise to a claim for refund. Not until then was there such a claim as could start the time running for presenting the claim. In any responsible sense payment was then made by the application of the balance credited to the petitioners in the suspense account" But the remittance in Rosenman, unlike the ones here, was not governed by a "deemed paid" provision akin to 6513, and we therefore had no occasion to consider the implications of such a provision for determining when a tax is "paid" under the predecessor to 6511. See Moreover, if the quoted passage had represented our holding, we would have broadly rejected the Government's argument that payment occurred when the remittance of estimated estate tax was made, instead of rejecting the argument, as we did, only because it was not in accord with the "tenor" of the "business transaction,"[1] We observe, finally, that Baral's positionto the extent he submits that payment occurs only at the Service's assessmentwould work to the detriment of taxpayers who timely file their returns and claim a refund or credit as compensation *439 for an overpayment. The Service will not always assess the taxpayer's liability immediately upon receiving the return; the Service generally has three years in which to do so, see 26 U.S. C. 6501(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The Code does allow for payment of interest to the taxpayer on overpayments once the return has been filed and the tax paid, 26 U.S. C. 6611 (1994 ed. and Supp. III), but under Baral's view no interest could accrue during the time between the filing of the return and the Service's assessment. Fortunately for the timely taxpayer, the Code definitively rejects Baral's position in this setting. Section 6611(d) of 26 U.S. C. explains that the date of payment is determined according to the provisions of 6513, which, as at 435 436, plainly set a deemed date of payment for remittances of withholding and estimated income tax on the
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,995 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Purkett v. Elem
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117934/purkett-v-elem/
|
In my opinion it is unwise for the Court to announce a law-changing decision without first ordering full briefing and argument on the merits of the case The Court does this today when it overrules a portion of our opinion in [1] In the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a prosecutor to use peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from jury service because of their race The Court articulated a three-step process for proving such violations First, a pattern of peremptory challenges of black jurors may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose Second, the prosecutor may rebut that prima face case by tendering a race-neutral explanation for the strikes Third, the court must decide whether that explanation is pretextual at 96-98 At the second step of this inquiry, neither a mere denial of improper motive nor an incredible explanation will suffice to rebut the prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose At a minimum, as the Court held in the prosecutor "must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried" [2] *771 Today the Court holds that it did not mean what it said in Moreover, the Court resolves a novel procedural question without even recognizing its importance to the unusual facts of this case I In the Missouri trial court, the judge rejected the defendant's objection to the prosecutor's peremptory challenges of two jurors, juror number 22 and juror number 24, on the ground that the defendant had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination Accordingly, because the defendant had failed at the first step of the inquiry, the judge saw no need even to confirm the defendant's assertion that jurors 22 and 24 were black;[3] nor did the judge require the prosecutor to explain his challenges The prosecutor nevertheless did volunteer an explanation,[4] but the judge evaluated neither its credibility nor its sufficiency *772 The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, relying partly on the ground that the use of one-third of the prosecutor's peremptories to strike black venire men did not require an explanation, and partly on the ground that if any rebuttal was necessary then the volunteered "explanation constituted a legitimate `hunch,' " The court thus relied, alternatively, on steps one and two of the analysis without reaching the question whether the prosecutor's explanation might have been pretextual under step three The Federal District Court accepted a Magistrate's recommendation to deny petitioner's petition for habeas corpus without conducting a hearing The Magistrate had reasoned that state-court findings on the issue of purposeful discrimination are
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,995 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Purkett v. Elem
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117934/purkett-v-elem/
|
that state-court findings on the issue of purposeful discrimination are entitled to deference App to Pet for Cert A-27 Even though the trial court had made no such findings, the Magistrate treated the statement by the Missouri Court of Appeals that the prosecutor's reasons "constituted a legitimate `hunch' " as a finding of fact that was supported by the record[5] When the case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the parties apparently assumed that petitioner had satisfied the first step of the analysis[6] The disputed issue in the Court of *773 Appeals was whether the trial judge's contrary finding was academic because the prosecutor's volunteered statement satisfied step two and had not been refuted in step three The Court of Appeals agreed with the State that excluding juror 24 was not error because the prosecutor's concern about that juror's status as a former victim of a robbery was related to the case at hand The court did, however, find a violation with respect to juror 22 In rejecting the prosecutor's "race-neutral" explanation for the strike, the Court of Appeals faithfully applied the standard that we articulated in : The explanation was not "`related to the particular case to be tried ` " 476 US, Before applying the test, the Court of Appeals noted that its analysis was consistent with both the Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of and this Court's intervening opinion in Referring to the second stage of the three-step analysis, the Antwine court had observed: "We do not believe, however, that is satisfied by `neutral explanations' which are no more than facially legitimate, reasonably specific and clear Were facially neutral explanations sufficient without more, would be meaningless It would take little effort for prosecutors who are of such a mind to adopt rote `neutral explanations' which bear facial legitimacy but conceal a discriminatory motive We do not believe the Supreme Court intended a charade when it announced " 743 SW2d, at 65 In Hernandez, this Court rejected a claim stemming from a prosecutor's strikes of two Spanish-speaking Latino jurors The prosecutor explained that he struck the jurors because he feared that they might not accept an interpreter's * English translation of trial testimony given in Spanish Because the prosecutor's explanation was directly related to the particular case to be tried, it satisfied the second prong of the standard Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted, the plurality opinion in Hernandez expressly observed that striking all venire persons who speak a given language, "without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial," might constitute a
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,995 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Purkett v. Elem
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117934/purkett-v-elem/
|
to the particular circumstances of the trial," might constitute a pretext for racial discrimination 500 US, at 371-372 (opinion of Kennedy, J)[7] Based on our precedent, the Court of Appeals was entirely correct to conclude that the peremptory strike of juror 22 violated because the reason given was unrelated to the circumstances of the trial[8] *775 Today, without argument, the Court replaces the standard with the surprising announcement that any neutral explanation, no matter how "implausible or fantastic," ante, at 768, even if it is "silly or superstitious," ib is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination A trial court must accept that neutral explanation unless a separate "step three" inquiry leads to the conclusion that the peremptory challenge was racially motivated The Court does not attempt to explain why a statement that "the juror had a beard," or "the juror's last name began with the letter `S' " should satisfy step two, though a statement that "I had a hunch" should not See ante, at 769; 476 U S, It is not too much to ask that a prosecutor's explanation for his strikes be race neutral, reasonably specific, and trial related Nothing less will serve to rebut the inference of race-based discrimination that arises when the defendant has made out a prima facie case Cf Texas Dept of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, That, in any event, is what we decided in II The Court's peremptory disposition of this case overlooks a tricky procedural problem Ordinarily, a federal appeals court reviewing a claim of error in a habeas corpus proceeding must evaluate, with appropriate deference, the factual findings and legal conclusions of the state trial court But in this case, the only finding the trial judge made was that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case Everyone now agrees that finding was incorrect The state trial judge, holding that the defendant had failed at step one, *776 made no finding with respect to the sufficiency or credibility of the prosecutor's explanation at step two The question, then, is whether the reviewing court should (1) go on to decide the second step of the inquiry, (2) reverse and remand to the District Court for further proceedings, or (3) grant the writ conditioned on a proper step-two and (if necessary) step-three hearing in the state trial court This Court's opinion today implicitly ratifies the Court of Appeals' decision to evaluate on its own whether the prosecutor had satisfied step two I think that is the correct resolution of this procedural question, but it deserves
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,995 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Purkett v. Elem
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117934/purkett-v-elem/
|
the correct resolution of this procedural question, but it deserves more consideration than the Court has provided In many cases, a state trial court or a federal district court will be in a better position to evaluate the facts surrounding peremptory strikes than a federal appeals court But I would favor a rule giving the appeals court discretion, based on the sufficiency of the record, to evaluate a prosecutor's explanation of his strikes In this case, I think review is justified because the prosecutor volunteered reasons for the challenges The Court of Appeals reasonably assumed that these were the same reasons the prosecutor would have given had the trial court required him to respond to the prima facie case The Court of Appeals, in its discretion, could thus evaluate the explanations for their sufficiency This presents a pure legal question, and nothing is gained by remand if the appeals court can resolve that question on the facts before it Assuming the Court of Appeals did not err in reaching step two, a new problem arises when that court (or, as in today's case, this Court) conducts the step-two inquiry and decides that the prosecutor's explanation was sufficient Who may evaluate whether the prosecutor's explanation was pretextual under step three of ? Again, I think the question whether the Court of Appeals decides, or whether it refers the question to a trial court, should depend on the state of the record before the Court of Appeals Whatever *777 procedure is contemplated, however, I think even this Court would acknowledge that some implausible, fantastic, and silly explanations could be found to be pretextual without any further evidence Indeed, in Hernandez the Court explained that a trial judge could find pretext based on nothing more than a consistent policy of excluding all Spanishspeaking jurors if that characteristic was entirely unrelated to the case to be tried 500 US, at 371-372 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J) Parallel reasoning would justify a finding of pretext based on a policy of excusing jurors with beards if beards have nothing to do with the pending case In some cases, conceivably the length and unkempt character of a juror's hair and goatee type beard might give rise to a concern that he is a nonconformist who might not be a good juror In this case, however, the prosecutor did not identify any such concern He merely said he did not "`like the way [the juror] looked,' " that the facial hair "`look[ed] suspicious' " Ante, at 766 I think this explanation may well be pretextual as a matter
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,995 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Purkett v. Elem
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117934/purkett-v-elem/
|
think this explanation may well be pretextual as a matter of law; it has nothing to do with the case at hand, and it is just as evasive as "I had a hunch" Unless a reviewing court may evaluate such explanations when a trial judge fails to find that a prima facie case has been established, appellate or collateral review of claims will amount to nothing more than the meaningless charade that the Missouri Supreme Court correctly understood to disfavor Antwine, 743 S W 2d, at 65 In my opinion, preoccupation with the niceties of a threestep analysis should not foreclose meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial explanations that are entirely unrelated to the case to be tried I would adhere to the rule that such an explanation does not satisfy step two Alternatively, I would hold that, in the absence of an explicit trial court finding on the issue, a reviewing court may hold that such an explanation is pretextual as a matter of law The Court's unnecessary tolerance of silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations, together with its assumption that there is *778 a difference of constitutional magnitude between a statement that "I had a hunch about this juror based on his appearance," and "I challenged this juror because he had a mustache," demeans the importance of the values vindicated by our decision in I respectfully dissent
|
Justice Douglas
| 1,973 | 10 |
dissenting
|
Colgrove v. Battin
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108843/colgrove-v-battin/
|
Rule 13(d) (1) of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the United States District Court for the District of Montana provides: "A jury for the trial of civil cases shall consist of six persons" Federal Rule Civ. Proc. 48which came into being as a result of a recommendation of this Court to Congress which Congress did not reject[*]rests on a federal statute. The two Rules do not mesh; they collide. Rule 48 says that the only way to obtain a trial with less than 12 jurors or a verdict short of a unanimous one is by stipulation. As MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL makes clear in his dissent, while the parties under Rule 48 could stipulate for trial by an 11-man jury, under the Montana District Court rule only six jurors could be required. Since all apparently agree that the framers of Rule 48 presumed there would be a jury of 12 in the absence of stipulation, the only authority which could reduce 12 to six would be the authority that created Rule 48. Neither we nor the District Court, nor the Judicial Conference, nor a circuit court council has the authority to make that change. Whether the change, if made, would be constitutional is a question I therefore do not reach. *166 MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR.
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,976 | 15 |
dissenting
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South Dakota v. Opperman
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109537/south-dakota-v-opperman/
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The today holds that the Fourth Amendment permits a routine police inventory search of the closed *385 glove compartment of a locked automobile impounded for ordinary traffic violations. Under the 's holding, such a search may be made without attempting to secure the consent of the owner and without any particular reason to believe the impounded automobile contains contraband, evidence, or valuables, or presents any danger to its custodians or the public.[1] Because I believe this holding to be contrary to sound elaboration of established Fourth Amendment principles, I dissent. As MR. JUSTICE POWELL recognizes, the requirement of a warrant aside, resolution of the question whether an inventory search of closed compartments inside a locked automobile can ever be justified as a constitutionally "reasonable" search[2] depends upon a reconciliation of the owner's constitutionally protected privacy interests against governmental intrusion, and legitimate governmental interests furthered by securing the car and its contents. ; The fails clearly to articulate the reasons for its reconciliation of these interests in this case, but it is at least clear to me that the considerations *386 alluded to by the and further discussed by MR. JUSTICE POWELL, are insufficient to justify the 's result in this case. To begin with, the appears to suggest by reference to a "diminished" expectation of privacy, ante, at 368, that a person's constitutional interest in protecting the integrity of closed compartments of his locked automobile may routinely be sacrificed to governmental interests requiring interference with that privacy that are less compelling than would be necessary to justify a search of similar scope of the person's home or This has never been the law. The correctly observes that some prior cases have drawn distinctions between automobiles and homes or offices in Fourth Amendment cases; but even as the 's discussion makes clear, the reasons for distinction in those cases are not present here. Thus, and permitted certain probable-cause searches to be carried out without warrants in view of the exigencies created by the mobility of automobiles, but both decisions reaffirmed that the standard of probable cause necessary to authorize such a search was no less than the standard applicable to search of a home or Chambers, ;[3] In other contexts the has recognized that automobile travel sacrifices some privacy interests to the publicity of plain view, e. g., ; cf. But this recognition, too, is inapposite here, for there is no question of plain view in *387 this case.[4] Nor does this case concern intrusions of the scope that the apparently assumes would ordinarily be permissible in order to insure the
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Justice Marshall
| 1,976 | 15 |
dissenting
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South Dakota v. Opperman
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109537/south-dakota-v-opperman/
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assumes would ordinarily be permissible in order to insure the running safety of a car. While it may be that privacy expectations associated with automobile travel are in some regards less than those associated with a home or office, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, post, at 561-562, it is equally clear that "[t]he word `automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away"[5] Thus, we have recognized that "[a] search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy," United and accordingly or cases have consistently recognized that the nature and substantiality of interest required to justify a search of private areas of an automobile is no less than that necessary to justify an intrusion of similar scope into a home or See, e. g., United ; ;[6] *3 The 's opinion appears to suggest that its result may in any event be justified because the inventory search procedure is a "reasonable" response to "three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody ; the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property ; and the protection of the police from potential danger." Ante, at 369.[7] This suggestion is flagrantly misleading, however, because the record of this case explicitly belies any relevance of the last two concerns. In any event it is my view that none of these "needs," separately or together, can suffice to justify the inventory search procedure approved by the First, this search cannot be justified in any way as a safety measure, forthough the ignores itthe sole purpose given by the State for the Vermillion police's inventory procedure was to secure valuables, Record 75, 98. Nor is there any indication that the officer's search in this case was tailored in any way to safety concerns, or that ordinarily it is so circumscribed. Even aside from the actual basis for the police practice in this case, however, I do not believe that any blanket safety argument could justify a program of routine *390 searches of the scope permitted here. As MR. JUSTICE POWELL recognizes, ordinarily "there is little danger associated with impounding unsearched automobiles," ante, at 378.[8] Thus, while the safety rationale may not be entirely discounted when it is actually relied upon, it surely cannot justify the search of every car upon the basis of undifferentiated possibility of harm; on the contrary, such an intrusion could ordinarily be justified only in those individual cases where the officer's inspection was prompted by specific circumstances indicating the possibility *391 of a particular
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,976 | 15 |
dissenting
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South Dakota v. Opperman
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109537/south-dakota-v-opperman/
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by specific circumstances indicating the possibility *391 of a particular danger. See 27; cf. Second, the suggests that the search for valuables in the closed glove compartment might be justified as a measure to protect the police against lost property claims. Again, this suggestion is belied by the record, sincealthough the declines to discuss itthe South Dakota Supreme 's interpretation of state law explicitly absolves the police, as "gratuitous depositors," from any obligation beyond inventorying objects in plain view and locking the car. S. D. , ,[9] Moreover, as MR. JUSTICE POWELL notes, ante, at 378-379, it may well be doubted that an inventory procedure would in any event work significantly to minimize the frustrations of false claims.[10] Finally, the suggests that the public interest in protecting valuables that may be found inside a closed compartment of an impounded car may justify the inventory procedure. I recognize the genuineness of this governmental interest in protecting property from pilferage. But even if I assume that the posting of a guard would be fiscally impossible as an alternative means to *392 the same protective end,[11] I cannot agree with the 's conclusion. The 's result authorizesindeed it appears to requirethe routine search of nearly every[12] car impounded.[13] In my view, the Constitution does not permit such searches as a matter of routine; absent specific consent, such a search is permissible only in exceptional circumstances of particular necessity. It is at least clear that any owner might prohibit the police from executing a protective search of his impounded car, since by hypothesis the inventory is conducted for the owner's benefit. Moreover, it is obvious that not everyone whose car is impounded would want it to be searched. Respondent himself proves this; but *393 one need not carry contraband to prefer that the police not examine one's private possessions. Indeed, that preference is the premise of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, according to the 's result the law may presume that each owner in respondent's position consents to the search. I cannot agree. In my view, the 's approach is squarely contrary to the law of consent;[14] it ignores the duty, in the absence of consent, to analyze in each individual case whether there is a need to search a particular car for the protection of its owner which is sufficient to outweigh the particular invasion. It is clear to me under established principles that in order to override the absence of explicit consent, such a search must at least be conditioned upon the fulfillment of two requirements.[15] First, there must be specific cause to
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,976 | 15 |
dissenting
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South Dakota v. Opperman
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109537/south-dakota-v-opperman/
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of two requirements.[15] First, there must be specific cause to believe that a search of the scope to be undertaken is necessary in order to preserve the integrity of particular valuable property threatened by the impoundment: "[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably warrant that intrusion." Such a requirement of "specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this 's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence," at 21 n. 18, for "[t]he basic purpose of this *394 Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." Cf. United ; 413 U. S., at ; Second, even where a search might be appropriate, such an intrusion may only follow the exhaustion and failure of reasonable efforts under the circumstances to identify and reach the owner of the property in order to facilitate alternative means of security or to obtain his consent to the search, for in this context the right to refuse the search remains with the owner. Cf.[16] Because the record in this case shows that the procedures followed by the Vermillion police in searching respondent's car fall far short of these standards, in my view the search was impermissible and its fruits must be suppressed. First, so far as the record shows, the police in this case had no reason to believe that the glove compartment of the impounded car contained particular property of any substantial value. Moreover, the owner had apparently thought it adequate to protect whatever he left in the car overnight on the street in a business area simply to lock the car, and there is nothing in the record to show that the impoundment *395 lot would prove a less secure location against pilferage,[17] cf. Mozzetti v. Superior particularly when it would seem likely that the owner would claim his car and its contents promptly, at least if it contained valuables worth protecting.[18] Even if the police had cause to believe that the impounded car's glove compartment contained particular valuables, however, they made no effort to secure the owner's consent to the search. Although the relies, as it must, upon the fact that respondent was not present to make other arrangements for the care of his belongings, ante, at 375, in my view that is not the end of the inquiry. Here the police readily ascertained the ownership of the vehicle, Record 98-99, yet they searched it immediately without taking any steps to locate
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,976 | 15 |
dissenting
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South Dakota v. Opperman
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109537/south-dakota-v-opperman/
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they searched it immediately without taking any steps to locate respondent and procure his consent to the inventory or advise him to make alternative arrangements to safeguard his property, Such a failure is inconsistent with the rationale that the inventory procedure is carried out for the benefit of the owner. The 's result in this case elevates the conservation of property interestsindeed mere possibilities of property interestsabove the privacy and security interests *396 protected by the Fourth Amendment. For this reason I dissent. On the remand it should be clear in any event that this 's holding does not preclude a contrary resolution of this case or others involving the same issues under any applicable state law. See Statement of MR. JUSTICE WHITE. Although I do not subscribe to all of my Brother MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion, particularly some aspects of his discussion concerning the necessity for obtaining the consent of the car owner, I agree with most of his analysis and conclusions and consequently dissent from the judgment of the
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Justice White
| 1,971 | 6 |
majority
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Hill v. California
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108305/hill-v-california/
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On June 4, 1966, four armed men robbed a residence in Studio City, California. On June 5, Alfred Baum and Richard Bader were arrested for possession of narcotics; at the time of their arrest, they were driving petitioner Hill's car, and a search of the car produced property stolen in the Studio City robbery the day before. Bader and Baum both admitted taking part in the June 4 robbery, and both implicated Hill. Bader told the police that he was sharing an apartment with Hill at 9311 *799 Sepulveda Boulevard. He also stated that the guns used in the robbery and other stolen property were in the apartment. On June 6, Baum and Bader again told the police that Hill had been involved in the June 4 robbery. One of the investigating officers then checked official records on Hill, verifying his prior association with Bader, his age and physical description, his address, and the make of his car. The information the officer uncovered corresponded with the general descriptions by the robbery victims and the statements made by Baum and Bader. Hill concedes that this information gave the police probable cause to arrest him, and the police undertook to do so on June 6. Four officers went to the Sepulveda Boulevard apartment, verified the address, and knocked. One of the officers testified: "The door was opened and a person who fit the description exactly of Archie Hill, as I had received it from both the cards and from Baum and Bader, answered the door. We placed him under arrest for robbery." The police had neither an arrest nor a search warrant. After arresting the man who answered the door, they asked him whether he was Hill and where the guns and stolen goods were. The arrestee replied that he was not Hill, that his name was Miller, that it was Hill's apartment and that he was waiting for Hill. He also claimed that he knew nothing about any stolen property or guns, although the police testified that an automatic pistol and a clip of ammunition were lying in plain view on a coffee table in the living room where the arrest took place. The arrestee then produced identification indicating that he was in fact Miller, but the police were unimpressed and proceeded to search the apartment living room, bedroom, kitchen area, and bathfor a period which one officer described as "a couple of hours." During the course of the search, the police seized several *800 items: rent receipts and personal correspondence bearing Hill's name from a dresser drawer in the bedroom;
|
Justice White
| 1,971 | 6 |
majority
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Hill v. California
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108305/hill-v-california/
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bearing Hill's name from a dresser drawer in the bedroom; a starter pistol, two switchblade knives, a camera and case stolen in the Studio City robbery, and two hoodmasks made from white T-shirts, all from the bedroom; a22-caliber revolver from under the living room sofa; and two pages of petitioner Hill's diary from a bedroom dresser drawer.[1] *801 On October 20, 1966, Hill was found guilty of robbery on the basis of evidence produced at the preliminary hearing and the trial.[2] Eyewitnesses to the robbery were unable to identify Hill; the only substantial evidence of his guilt consisted of the items seized in the search of his apartment. In sustaining the admissibility of the evidence, the trial judge ruled that the arresting officers had acted in the good-faith belief that Miller was in fact Hill.[3] The District Court of Appeal agreed that the officers acted in good faith and that the arrest of Miller was valid but nonetheless thought the incident search of Hill's apartment unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.[4] The California Supreme Court in turn reversed, sustaining both the arrest and the search. We granted certiorari, and now affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court. *802 I Petitioner argues that decided after his conviction was affirmed by the California Supreme Court, should be applied to his case, which is before us on direct review. Chimel narrowed the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest, but in v. United States and v. United States, ante, p. 646, we held Chimel inapplicable to searches occurring before the date of decision in that caseregardless of whether a case was still on direct review when Chimel was decided, see or whether a Chimel challenge was asserted in a subsequent collateral attack on a conviction. See We also stated that in light of past decisions there was no difference in constitutional terms between state and federal prisoners insofar as retroactive application to their cases of a new interpretation of the Bill of Rights is concerned. Ante, at 656. The search of Hill's apartment, permissible in scope under pre-Chimel standards, will not be retrospectively invalidated because of that decision. II Based on our own examination of the record, we find no reason to disturb either the findings of the California courts that the police had probable cause to arrest Hill and that the arresting officers had a reasonable, goodfaith belief that the arrestee Miller was in fact Hill, or the conclusion that "[w]hen the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party,
|
Justice White
| 1,971 | 6 |
majority
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Hill v. California
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108305/hill-v-california/
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they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest." 446 P. 2d, at 523.[5] The police unquestionably had probable *803 cause to arrest Hill; they also had his address and a verified description. The mailbox at the indicated address listed Hill as the occupant of the apartment. Upon gaining entry to the apartment, they were confronted with one who fit the description of Hill received from various sources.[6] That person claimed he was Miller, not Hill. But aliases and false identifications are not uncommon.[7] Moreover, there was a lock on the door and Miller's explanation for his mode of entry was not convincing.[8] He also denied knowledge of firearms in the apartment although a pistol and loaded ammunition clip were in plain view in the room.[9] The upshot was that the officers *804 in good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith belief would not in itself justify either the arrest or the subsequent search. But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time. Nor can we agree with petitioner that however valid the arrest of Miller, the subsequent search violated the Fourth Amendment. It is true that Miller was not Hill; nor did Miller have authority or control over the premises, although at the very least he was Hill's guest. But the question is not what evidence would have been admissible against Hill (or against Miller for that matter) if the police, with probable cause to arrest Miller, had arrested him in Hill's apartment and then carried out the search at issue. Here there was probable cause to arrest Hill and the police arrested Miller in Hill's apartment, reasonably believing him to be Hill. In these circumstances the police were entitled to do what the law would have allowed them to do if Miller had in fact been Hill, that is, to search incident to arrest and to seize evidence of the crime the police had probable cause to believe Hill had committed. When judged in accordance with "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not *805 legal technicians, act," the arrest and subsequent search were reasonable and valid under the Fourth Amendment. III Finally, in his brief in this Court, petitioner argues that the admission in evidence
|
Justice White
| 1,971 | 6 |
majority
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Hill v. California
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108305/hill-v-california/
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in this Court, petitioner argues that the admission in evidence of the two pages of his diary Pages which contained what amounted to a confession of the robberyviolated the Fifth Amendment under Counsel for Hill conceded at oral argument that the Fifth Amendment issue was not raised at trial. Nor was the issue raised, briefed, or argued in the California appellate courts.[10] The petition for certiorari likewise ignored it. In this posture of the case, the question, although briefed and argued here, is not properly before us. In certiorari was granted to consider the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute, but at oral argument it developed that the federal question had never been raised, preserved, or passed upon in the state courts. Relying on a long line of cases, we dismissed the writ for want of In addition, we stated that there were sound policy reasons for adhering to such a rule. In the context of that case, we indicated the desirability of allowing state courts to pass first on the constitutionality of state statutes in light of a federal constitutional challenge; this assures both an adequate record and that the States have first opportunity to provide a definitive interpretation of their statutes. We also indicated that a federal habeas corpus remedy might remain if no state procedure for raising the issue was available following dismissal of the writ. These considerations are no less applicable in this *806 case. We therefore do not reach the Fifth Amendment question and affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of California. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or the decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the Court's opinion except for its conclusion that the Chimel case is not to be applied to this one. Two Terms ago, in we held that a search without a warrant, but incident to a lawful arrest, must be narrowly confined in scope if it is to pass constitutional muster. In such circumstances, we said: "There is ample justification for a search of the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control'construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. "There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occursor, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that
|
Justice White
| 1,971 | 6 |
majority
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Hill v. California
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108305/hill-v-california/
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desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. The `adherence to judicial processes' mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less." *807 The search here involved, fully described in the Court's opinion, plainly exceeded the bounds set forth in Chimel. The State contends that the search here was consistent with Chimel because conducted in the evening when it was not possible to obtain a search warrant. Whatever validity such a limiting principle might have in other contexts, it certainly cannot properly be invoked here. Baum and Bader had implicated Hill at least 24 hours prior to the search of Hill's apartment. Moreover, the State does not explain why it would not have been possible to observe the apartment after the mistaken arrest of Miller as Hill and then test before a magistrate the validity of their belief that they had probable cause for the issuance of a warrant authorizing a complete search of the apartment. Because I believe this case reveals an obvious violation of Chimel and because I consider we are duty bound to apply the principles there enunciated to cases, like this one, before us on direct review, see my separate opinion in Mackey v. United States (and companion cases), ante, p. 675, decided today, I am compelled to cast my vote for reversal of the judgment of the Supreme Court of California.
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
majority
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Tibbs v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110731/tibbs-v-florida/
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We granted certiorari to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause[1] bars retrial after a state appellate court sets aside a conviction on the ground that the verdict was against "the weight of the evidence." After examining the policies supporting the Double Jeopardy Clause, we hold that a reversal based on the weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence permits the State to initiate a new prosecution. I In 1974, Florida indicted petitioner Delbert Tibbs for the first-degree murder of Terry Milroy, the felony murder of Milroy, and the rape of Cynthia Nadeau. Nadeau, the State's chief trial witness, testified that she and Milroy were hitchhiking from St. Petersburg to Marathon, Fla., on February 3, 1974. A man in a green truck picked them up near Fort Myers and, after driving a short way, turned off the highway into a field. He asked Milroy to help him siphon gas from some farm machinery, and Milroy agreed. When Nadeau stepped out of the truck a few minutes later, she discovered the driver holding a gun on Milroy. The driver told Milroy that he wished to have sex with Nadeau, and ordered her to strip. After forcing Nadeau to engage in sodomy, the driver agreed that Milroy could leave. As Milroy started to walk away, however, the assailant shot him in the shoulder. When Milroy fell to the ground, pleading for his life, the gunman walked over and taunted, "Does it hurt, boy? You in *33 pain? Does it hurt, boy?" Tr. 50. Then, with a shot to the head, he killed Milroy. This deed finished, the killer raped Nadeau. Fearing for her life, she suggested that they should leave together and that she "would be his old lady." The killer seemed to agree and they returned to the highway in the truck. After driving a short distance, he stopped the truck and ordered Nadeau to walk directly in front of it. As soon as her feet hit the ground, however, she ran in the opposite direction. The killer fled with the truck, frightened perhaps by an approaching car. When Nadeau reached a nearby house, the occupants let her in and called the police. That night, Nadeau gave the police a detailed description of the assailant and his truck. Several days later a patrolman stopped Tibbs, who was hitchhiking near Ocala, Fla., because his appearance matched Nadeau's description. The Ocala Police Department photographed Tibbs and relayed the pictures to the Fort Myers police. When Nadeau examined these photos, she identified Tibbs as the assailant.[2] Nadeau subsequently picked Tibbs out of a lineup
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
majority
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Tibbs v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110731/tibbs-v-florida/
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the assailant.[2] Nadeau subsequently picked Tibbs out of a lineup and positively identified him at trial as the man who murdered Milroy and raped her.[3] *34 Tibbs' attorney attempted to show that Nadeau was an unreliable witness. She admitted during cross-examination that she had tried "just about all" types of drugs and that she had smoked marihuana shortly before the crimes occurred. She also evidenced some confusion about the time of day that the assailant had offered her and Milroy a ride. Finally, counsel suggested through questions and closing argument that Nadeau's former boyfriend had killed Milroy and that Nadeau was lying to protect her boyfriend. Nadeau flatly denied these suggestions.[4] In addition to these attempts to discredit Nadeau, Tibbs testified in his own defense. He explained that he was college educated, that he had published a story and a few poems, and that he was hitchhiking through Florida to learn more about how people live. He claimed that he was in Daytona Beach, across the State from Fort Myers, from the evening of February 1, 1974, through the morning of February 6. He also testified that he did not own a green truck, and *35 that he had not driven any vehicle while in Florida. Finally, he denied committing any of the crimes charged against him. Two Salvation Army officers partially corroborated Tibbs' story. These officers produced a card signed by Tibbs, indicating that he had slept at the Daytona Beach Salvation Army Transit Lodge on the evening of February 1, 1974. Neither witness, however, had seen Tibbs after the morning of February 2. Tibbs' other witnesses testified to his good reputation as a law-abiding citizen and to his good reputation for veracity. On rebuttal, the State produced a card, similar to the one introduced by Tibbs, showing that Tibbs had spent the night of February 4 at the Orlando Salvation Army Transit Lodge. This evidence contradicted Tibbs' claim that he had remained in Daytona Beach until February 6, as well as his sworn statements that he had been in Orlando only once, during the early part of January 1974, and that he had not stayed in any Salvation Army lodge after February 1. After the State presented this rebuttal evidence, Tibbs took the stand to deny both that he had been in Orlando on February 4 and that the signature on the Orlando Salvation Army card was his. The jury convicted Tibbs of first-degree murder and rape. Pursuant to the jury's recommendation, the judge sentenced Tibbs to death. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed. A plurality of
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
majority
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Tibbs v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110731/tibbs-v-florida/
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On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed. A plurality of three justices, while acknowledging that "the resolution of factual issues in a criminal trial is peculiarly within the province of a jury," identified six weaknesses in the State's case.[5] First, except for Nadeau's testimony, the State introduced no evidence placing Tibbs in or near Fort Myers on the day of the crimes. Second, although *36 Nadeau gave a detailed description of the assailant's truck, police never found the vehicle. Third, police discovered neither a gun nor car keys in Tibbs' possession. Fourth, Tibbs cooperated fully with the police when he was stopped and arrested. Fifth, the State introduced no evidence casting doubt on Tibbs' veracity.[6] Tibbs, on the other hand, produced witnesses who attested to his good reputation. Finally, several factors undermined Nadeau's believability. Although she asserted at trial that the crimes occurred during daylight, other evidence suggested that the events occurred after nightfall when reliable identification would have been more difficult. Nadeau, furthermore, had smoked marihuana shortly before the crimes and had identified Tibbs during a suggestive photograph session.[7] These weaknesses left the plurality in "considerable doubt that Delbert Tibbs [was] the man who committed the crimes for which he ha[d] been convicted." Therefore, the plurality concluded that the "interests of justice" required a new trial. [] Justice Boyd concurred specially, noting that " `[t]he test to be applied in determining the adequacy of a verdict is whether a jury of reasonable men could have returned that verdict.' " ). Apparently applying that standard, Justice Boyd found the State's evidence deficient. He concluded that "the weakness of the evidence presented in the trial court might well require that [Tibbs] be released from incarceration without further litigation," but "reluctantly concur[red]" in the plurality's decision to order a new trial because he understood Florida law to permit retrial. 337 So. 2d,[9] On remand, the trial court dismissed the indictment, concluding that retrial would violate the double jeopardy principles articulated in and 9[10] An intermediate appellate court disagreed and remanded the case for trial. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the latter decision, carefully elaborating the difference between a reversal stemming from insufficient evidence and one prompted by the weight of the evidence. (Tibbs II). As the court explained, a conviction rests upon insufficient evidence when, even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A reversal based on the weight of the evidence, on the other hand, draws the appellate court into questions of credibility.
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
majority
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Tibbs v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110731/tibbs-v-florida/
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other hand, draws the appellate court into questions of credibility. The "weight of the evidence" refers to "a determination [by] the trier of fact that *3 a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other."[11] The Florida Supreme Court then classified Tibbs I as a reversal resting on the weight of the evidence. Nadeau's testimony, if believed by the jury, was itself "legally sufficient to support Tibbs' conviction under Florida law." In deciding to upset Tibbs' conviction, the court in Tibbs I had stressed those "aspects of Nadeau's testimony which cast serious doubt on her believability," an approach that bespoke a reweighing of the evidence. "Only by stretching the point" the court concluded in Tibbs II, "could we possibly use an `insufficiency' analysis to characterize our previous reversal of Tibbs' convictions." [12] *39 Having found that it could not "fairly conclude that Tibbs' convictions were reversed on the grounds of evidentiary insufficiency," the Florida Supreme Court held that and do not bar retrial. Those decisions, the court believed, as well as United interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause to preclude retrial after reversal of a conviction only when the appellate court has set the conviction aside on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction. Other reversals, including those based on the weight of the evidence or made in the "interests of justice," do not implicate double jeopardy principles.[13] We granted certiorari to review this interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. II In 196, this Court ruled that a criminal defendant who successfully appeals a judgment against him "may be tried anew for the same offence of which he had been convicted." *40 United has persevered to the present. See United ; United Two considerations support the rule. First, the Court has recognized that society would pay too high a price "were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction." United Second, the Court has concluded that retrial after reversal of a conviction is not the type of governmental oppression targeted by the Double Jeopardy Clause. United See generally United[14] and carved a narrow exception from the understanding that a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction is subject to retrial. In those cases, we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes retrial "once the reviewing court has found the evidence *41 legally insufficient" to support conviction. ; This standard, we explained, "means that the government's case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
majority
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Tibbs v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110731/tibbs-v-florida/
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so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury." A conviction will survive review, we suggested, whenever "the evidence and inferences therefrom most favorable to the prosecution would warrant the jury's finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." See also In sum, we noted that the rule barring retrial would be "confined to cases where the prosecution's failure is clear." So defined, the exception recognized in and rests upon two closely related policies. First, the Double Jeopardy Clause attaches special weight to judgments of acquittal.[15] A verdict of not guilty, whether rendered by the jury or directed by the trial judge, absolutely shields the defendant from retrial.[16] A reversal based on the insufficiency of the evidence has the same effect because it means that no rational factfinder could have voted to convict the defendant. Second, and implement the principle that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding." This prohibition, lying at the core of the Clause's protections, prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction. Repeated prosecutorial sallies would unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction through sheer governmental perseverance. *42 See ; United For this reason, when a reversal rests upon the ground that the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove its case, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecutor from making a second attempt at conviction. As we suggested just last Term, these policies do not have the same force when a judge disagrees with a jury's resolution of conflicting evidence and concludes that a guilty verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See A reversal on this ground, unlike a reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict. Instead, the appellate court sits as a "thirteenth juror" and disagrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony. This difference of opinion no more signifies acquittal than does a disagreement among the jurors themselves. A deadlocked jury, we consistently have recognized, does not result in an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.[17] Similarly, an appellate court's disagreement with the jurors' weighing of the evidence does not require the special deference accorded verdicts of acquittal. A reversal based on the weight of the evidence, moreover, can occur only after the State both has presented sufficient *43 evidence to support conviction and has persuaded the jury to convict.
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
majority
|
Tibbs v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110731/tibbs-v-florida/
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to support conviction and has persuaded the jury to convict. The reversal simply affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment.[1] An appellate court's decision to give the defendant this second chance does not create "an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its superior resources, [will] wear down [the] defendant" and obtain conviction solely through its persistence. United[19] *44 While an appellate ruling based on the weight of the evidence thus fails to implicate the policies supporting and it does involve the usual principles permitting retrial after a defendant's successful appeal. Just as the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require society to pay the high price of freeing every defendant whose first trial was tainted by prosecutorial error, it should not exact the price of immunity for every defendant who persuades an appellate panel to overturn an error-free conviction and give him a second chance at acquittal. Giving the defendant this second opportunity, when the evidence is sufficient to support the first verdict, hardly amounts to "governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect." United 437 U. S., Petitioner Tibbs resists these arguments on the grounds that a distinction between the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence is unworkable and that such a distinction will undermine the rule by encouraging appellate judges to base reversals on the weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence. We find these arguments unpersuasive for two reasons. First, trial and appellate judges commonly distinguish between the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence.[20] We have no reason to believe that today's decision *45 will erode the demonstrated ability of judges to distinguish legally insufficient evidence from evidence that rationally supports a verdict. Second, our decision in places some restraints on the power of appellate courts to mask reversals based on legally insufficient evidence as reversals grounded on the weight of the evidence. We held in Jackson that the Due Process Clause forbids any conviction based on evidence insufficient to persuade a rational factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Due Process Clause, in other words, sets a lower limit on an appellate court's definition of evidentiary sufficiency.[] This limit, together with our belief that state appellate judges faithfully honor their obligations to enforce applicable state and federal laws, persuades us that today's ruling will not undermine In sum, we conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent an appellate court from granting a convicted defendant an opportunity to seek acquittal through a new trial.[22] *46 III We turn, finally, to
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
majority
|
Tibbs v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110731/tibbs-v-florida/
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through a new trial.[22] *46 III We turn, finally, to apply the above principles to the present case. A close reading of Tibbs I suggests that the Florida Supreme Court overturned Tibbs' conviction because the evidence, although sufficient to support the jury's verdict, did not fully persuade the court of Tibbs' guilt. The plurality based its review on a Florida rule directing the court in capital cases to "review the evidence to determine if the interests of justice require a new trial, whether the insufficiency of the evidence is a ground of appeal or not." See n. References to the "interests of justice" and the justices' own "considerable doubt" of Tibbs' guilt mark the plurality's conclusions.[23] Those conclusions, moreover, stem from the justices' determination that Tibbs' testimony was more reliable than that of Nadeau. This resolution of conflicting testimony in a manner contrary to the jury's verdict is a hallmark of review based on evidentiary weight, not evidentiary sufficiency. Any ambiguity in Tibbs I, finally, was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs II. Absent a conflict with the Due Process Clause, see n. that court's construction *47 of its prior opinion binds this Court.[24] In Tibbs II, of course, the court unequivocally held that Tibbs I was "one of those rare instances in which reversal was based on evidentiary weight." Thus, we conclude that Tibbs' successful appeal of his conviction rested upon a finding that the conviction was against the weight of the evidence, not upon a holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict. Under these circumstances, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial. Accordingly, the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is Affirmed.
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
dissenting
|
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108527/weber-v-aetna-casualty-surety-co/
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This case is distinguishable from and could be decided the other way on the basis of this Court's more recent decision in Yet I certainly do not regard the Court's decision as an unreasonable drawing of the line between Levy and Labine, and would not feel impelled to dissent if I regarded Levy as rightly decided. I do not so regard it. I must agree with Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, which described Levy and its companion case, as "constitutional curiosities," and called the Court's method of reaching the result "a process that can only be described as brute force." Since Levy was a constitutional holding, its doctrine is open to later re-examination to a greater extent than if it had decided a question of statutory construction or some other nonconstitutional issue. See ; Boys Markets, ; *1 The Equal Protection Clause was adopted as a part of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Five years later Mr. Justice Miller delivered this Court's initial construction of that amendment in his classic opinion in Slaughter-House Cases, After setting forth an account of the adoption of that amendment, he described the account as a "recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all." Referring to the Equal Protection Clause, he said: "We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision." In nearly 100 years of subsequent adjudication concerning this clause, the Court has adhered to the notion expressed in the Slaughter-House Cases that racial classifications are "suspect." See, e. g., But during that same period of time, this Court has proved Mr. Justice Miller a bad prophet with respect to nonracial classification. As noted in Levy, in the field of economic and social legislation, the Court has given great latitude to the legislatures in making classifications. ; The test has been whether there is any rational basis for the legislative classification. See "State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Under this test, so long as the "discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy," Allied Stores of Ohio, 358 U.S. 5, the Court will not attempt to weigh its social value or determine whether
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
dissenting
|
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108527/weber-v-aetna-casualty-surety-co/
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not attempt to weigh its social value or determine whether the classification might have been more finely drawn. However, this salutary principle has been departed from by the Court in recent years, as pointed out in its opinion here, where the Court has felt that the classification has affected what it conceives to be "fundamental personal rights." The difficulty with this approach, devoid as it is of any historical or textual support in the language of the Equal Protection Clause, is that it leaves apparently to the Justices of this Court the determination of what are, and what are not, "fundamental personal rights." Those who framed and ratified the Constitution and the various amendments to it chose to select certain particular types of rights and freedoms, and to guarantee them against impairment by majority action through legislation or otherwise. While the determination of the extent to which a right is protected may result in the drawing of fine lines, the fundamental sanction of the right itself is found in the language of the Constitution, and not elsewhere. The same is unfortunately not true of the doctrine of "fundamental personal rights." This body of doctrine created by the Court can only be described as a judicial superstructure, awkwardly engrafted upon the Constitution itself. The Court's experience with similar superstructures has not been a happy one. The first part of this century saw the evolution of the doctrine of "freedom of contract" which was held by the Court during part of that time to be a part of the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. This doctrine *180 had its just deserts in West Coast Hotel where Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, said: "The constitutional provision invoked is the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governing the States, as the due process clause invoked in the Adkins case governed Congress. In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law." In a similar vein it may be said that the Constitution does not speak of "fundamental personal rights," but speaks of the equal protection of the laws and prohibits the denial thereof. Two years ago, this Court in recognized that the broad latitude accorded state legislatures by both the contemporary history and the text of the Equal Protection
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
dissenting
|
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108527/weber-v-aetna-casualty-surety-co/
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the contemporary history and the text of the Equal Protection Clause was not limited to statutes regulating business or industry. There, in a case dealing with the administration of public welfare assistance which, the Court noted, "involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," the Court nonetheless quite properly applied the "rational basis" constitutional standard. It reaffirmed the historically correct statement of the meaning of equal protection in these words: "In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some `reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification `is not made with *181 mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' 0 U.S. 61, `The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodationsillogical, it may be, and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre 8 U.S. 61, `A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.'" The Court in today's opinion, recognizing that two different standards have been applied in equal protection cases, apparently formulates a hybrid standard which is the basis of decision here. The standard is a two-pronged one: "What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?" Surely there could be no better nor more succinct guide to sound legislation than that suggested by these two questions. They are somewhat less useful, however, as guides to constitutional adjudication. How is this Court to determine whether or not a state interest is "legitimate"? And how is the Court to know when it is dealing with a "fundamental personal right"? While the Court's opinion today is by no means a sharp departure from the precedents on which it relies, it is an extraordinary departure from what I conceive to be the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the import of the traditional presumption of constitutionality accorded to legislative enactments. Nowhere in the text of the Constitution, or in its plain implications, is there any guide for determining what is a "legitimate" state interest, or what is a "fundamental personal right." The traditional police power of the *182 States has been deemed to embrace any measure thought to further the well-being of the State in question, subject only to the specific prohibitions contained in the Federal Constitution. That Constitution of course contains numerous guarantees of individual liberty, which I would have no trouble describing
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
dissenting
|
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108527/weber-v-aetna-casualty-surety-co/
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of individual liberty, which I would have no trouble describing as "fundamental personal liberties," but the right of illegitimate children to sue in state court to recover workmen's compensation benefits is not among them. The relationship of the "legitimate" state interest and "fundamental personal right" analysis to the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law is approximately the same as that of "freedom of contract" to the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It is an invitation for judicial exegesis over and above the commands of the Constitution, in which values that cannot possibly have their source in that instrument are invoked to either validate or condemn the countless laws enacted by the various States. In refusing to accept the breadth of meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment urged upon the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases, Mr. Justice Miller said: "And still further, such a construction followed by the reversal of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases, would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment." 16 Wall., at Mr. Justice Harlan made clear in his dissent in Levy the exclusively statutory basis for wrongful-death actions as a matter of legal history, and the same may be even more emphatically said about claims for workmen's *183 compensation benefits. In spite of the Court's statement of a test, one part of which requires the determination of the extent to which "fundamental personal rights" might be endangered by the Louisiana classification here, we are nowhere told in the opinion just what "fundamental personal right" it is that is involved, to say nothing of whether it is "endangered." The Court says that, while society has long condemned "irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage," nonetheless "visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust." A fair-minded man might regard it as both, but the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires neither that state enactments be "logical" nor does it require that they be "just" in the common meaning of those terms. It requires only that there be some conceivable set of facts that may justify the classification involved. In the instant case I cannot condemn as irrational Louisiana's distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. In a statutory compensation scheme such as
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
dissenting
|
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108527/weber-v-aetna-casualty-surety-co/
|
and illegitimate children. In a statutory compensation scheme such as this, the State must inevitably draw rather fine and arbitrary lines. For example, Louisiana declares that parents will have priority in this scheme over first cousins, regardless of the degree of dependency or affection in any given case. Surely, no one would condemn this classification as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, since it is likely to reflect fairly the unarticulated intent of the decedent. Similarly, the State might rationally presume that the decedent would have preferred the compensation to go to his legitimate children, rather than those illegitimates whom he has not acknowledged. Although the majority argues that "the state interest in minimizing problems of proof is not significantly disturbed by our decision," ante, at 175 (emphasis added), it clearly recognizes, as it must, that under its decision *184 additional and sometimes more difficult problems of proof of paternity and dependency may be raised. This is particularly true with respect to petitioner's youngest child, who was not born until after the death of his father. I believe that a State's desire to lessen these problems under its statutory scheme is a rational basis for difference in treatment of the two classes. Finally, the majority apparently draws some comfort from the fact that the illegitimate children here could not have been acknowledged, since the decedent remained married to another woman while he raised these children. However, I do not believe that it follows from this fact that the statutory classification is irrational. On the contrary, this element of the statutory scheme points up another possible legislative purpose which I do not believe this Court should so freely dismiss. Louisiana, like many other States, has a wide variety of laws designed to encourage legally recognized and responsible family relationships. I believe this particular statutory provision, forbidding acknowledgment of illegitimate children when the parents were not free to marry (in this case because the father was already married to another woman), might be considered part of that statutory pattern designed to discourage formation of illicit family relationships. Whether this is a wise state policy, and whether this particular statute will be particularly effective in advancing it, are not matters for this Court's determination. Levy and today's decision are not only inconsistent with the long line of earlier cases construing the Equal Protection Clause to forbid only irrational classifications; they are quite inconsistent with decided two years after Levy. If state welfare legislation involving "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings" is to be judged by the traditional "reasonable basis" standard, I
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
concurring
|
Smith v. Phillips
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110645/smith-v-phillips/
|
I concur in the Court's opinion, but write separately to express my view that the opinion does not foreclose the use of "implied bias" in appropriate circumstances. I Determining whether a juror is biased or has prejudged a case is difficult, partly because the juror may have an interest *222 in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it. The problem may be compounded when a charge of bias arises from juror misconduct, and not simply from attempts of third parties to influence a juror. Nevertheless, I believe that in most instances a postconviction hearing will be adequate to determine whether a juror is biased. A hearing permits counsel to probe the juror's memory, his reasons for acting as he did, and his understanding of the consequences of his actions. A hearing also permits the trial judge to observe the juror's demeanor under cross-examination and to evaluate his answers in light of the particular circumstances of the case. I am concerned, however, that in certain instances a hearing may be inadequate for uncovering a juror's biases, leaving serious question whether the trial court had subjected the defendant to manifestly unjust procedures resulting in a miscarriage of justice. While each case must turn on its own facts, there are some extreme situations that would justify a finding of implied bias. Some examples might include a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction. Whether or not the state proceedings result in a finding of "no bias," the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury should not allow a verdict to stand under such circumstances.[*] *223 II None of our previous cases preclude the use of the conclusive presumption of implied bias in appropriate circumstances. on which the Court heavily relies, involved not juror misconduct, but the misconduct of a third party who attempted to bribe a juror. Under those circumstances, where the juror has not been accused of misconduct or has no actual stake in the outcome of the trial, and thus has no significant incentive to shield his biases, a postconviction hearing could adequately determine whether or not the juror was biased. In the Court rejected a claim that a juror's employment with the Federal Government was a ground to find implied bias, but did not foreclose a finding of implied bias in more serious situations. Justice
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
concurring
|
Smith v. Phillips
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110645/smith-v-phillips/
|
a finding of implied bias in more serious situations. Justice Reed, who concurred in the Court's opinion, wrote that he read "the Court's decision to mean that Government employees may be barred for implied bias when circumstances are properly brought to the court's attention which convince the court that Government employees would not be suitable jurors in a particular case." Moreover, this Court has used implied bias to reverse a conviction. In the Court held that prospective jurors who had heard the trial court announce the defendant's guilty *224 verdict in the first trial should be automatically disqualified from sitting on a second trial on similar charges. III Because there may be circumstances in which a postconviction hearing will not be adequate to remedy a charge of juror bias, it is important for the Court to retain the doctrine of implied bias to preserve Sixth Amendment rights. I read the Court's opinion as not foreclosing the use of implied bias in appropriate situations, and, therefore, I concur.
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,014 | 2 |
majority
|
American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2680437/american-broadcasting-cos-v-aereo-inc/
|
The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work pub- licly.” 17 U.S. C. The Act’s Transmit Clause defines that exclusive right as including the right to “transmit or otherwise communicate a performance of the [copyrighted] work to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.” We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes this exclusive right by selling its subscribers a technologi- cally complex service that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. We conclude that it does. 2 AMERICAN BROADCASTING I A For a monthly fee, Aereo offers subscribers broadcast television programming over the Internet, virtually as the programming is being broadcast. Much of this program- ming is made up of copyrighted works. Aereo neither owns the copyright in those works nor holds a license from the copyright owners to perform those works publicly. Aereo’s system is made up of servers, transcoders, and thousands of dime-sized antennas housed in a central warehouse. It works roughly as follows: First, when a subscriber wants to watch a show that is currently being broadcast, he visits Aereo’s website and selects, from a list of the local programming, the show he wishes to see. Second, one of Aereo’s servers selects an antenna, which it dedicates to the use of that subscriber (and that sub- scriber alone) for the duration of the selected show. A server then tunes the antenna to the over-the-air broad- cast carrying the show. The antenna begins to receive the broadcast, and an Aereo transcoder translates the sig- nals received into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. Third, rather than directly send the data to the sub- scriber, a server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive. In other words, Aereo’s system creates a subscriber-specific copy—that is, a “per- sonal” copy—of the subscriber’s program of choice. Fourth, once several seconds of programming have been saved, Aereo’s server begins to stream the saved copy of the show to the subscriber over the Internet. (The sub- scriber may instead direct Aereo to stream the program at a later time, but that aspect of Aereo’s service is not before us.) The subscriber can watch the streamed program on the screen of his personal computer, tablet, smart phone, Internet-connected television, or other Internet-connected
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,014 | 2 |
majority
|
American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2680437/american-broadcasting-cos-v-aereo-inc/
|
personal computer, tablet, smart phone, Internet-connected television, or other Internet-connected device. The streaming continues, a mere few seconds Cite as: 5 U. S. (2014) 3 Opinion of the Court behind the over-the-air broadcast, until the subscriber has received the entire show. See A Dictionary of Computing 494 (defining “streaming” as “[t]he process of providing a steady flow of audio or video data so that an Internet user is able to access it as it is transmitted”). Aereo emphasizes that the data that its system streams to each subscriber are the data from his own personal copy, made from the broadcast signals received by the particular antenna allotted to him. Its system does not transmit data saved in one subscriber’s folder to any other subscriber. When two subscribers wish to watch the same program, Aereo’s system activates two separate antennas and saves two separate copies of the program in two sepa- rate folders. It then streams the show to the subscribers through two separate transmissions—each from the sub- scriber’s personal copy. B Petitioners are television producers, marketers, distrib- utors, and broadcasters who own the copyrights in many of the programs that Aereo’s system streams to its sub- scribers. They brought suit against Aereo for copyright infringement in Federal District Court. They sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing their right to “perform” their works “publicly,” as the Transmit Clause defines those terms. The District Court denied the preliminary injunction. Relying on prior Cir- cuit precedent, a divided panel of the Second Circuit af- firmed. WNET, ). In the Second Circuit’s view, Aereo does not perform publicly within the meaning of the Transmit Clause because it does not transmit “to the public.” Rather, each time Aereo streams a program to a subscriber, it sends a private transmission that is avail- 4 AMERICAN BROADCASTING able only to that subscriber. The Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc, over the dissent of two judges. WNET, We granted certiorari. II This case requires us to answer two questions: First, in operating in the manner described above, does Aereo “perform” at all? And second, if so, does Aereo do so “pub- licly”? We address these distinct questions in turn. Does Aereo “perform”? See (“[T]he owner of [a] copyright has the exclusive righ[t] to perform the copyrighted work publicly” (emphasis added)); (“To perform a work ‘publicly’ means [among other things] to transmit a performance of the work to the public ” (emphasis added)). Phrased another way, does Aereo “transmit a performance” when a subscriber watches a show using Aereo’s system, or is it only the subscriber
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,014 | 2 |
majority
|
American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2680437/american-broadcasting-cos-v-aereo-inc/
|
show using Aereo’s system, or is it only the subscriber who transmits? In Aereo’s view, it does not perform. It does no more than supply equipment that “emulate[s] the operation of a home antenna and [digital video recorder (DVR)].” Brief for Respondent 41. Like a home antenna and DVR, Aereo’s equipment simply re- sponds to its subscribers’ directives. So it is only the subscribers who “perform” when they use Aereo’s equip- ment to stream television programs to themselves. Considered alone, the language of the Act does not clearly indicate when an entity “perform[s]” (or “trans- mit[s]”) and when it merely supplies equipment that allows others to do so. But when read in light of its pur- pose, the Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in activities like Aereo’s performs. A History makes plain that one of Congress’ primary purposes in amending the Copyright Act in 1976 was to Cite as: 5 U. S. (2014) 5 Opinion of the Court overturn this Court’s determination that community antenna television (CATV) systems (the precursors of modern cable systems) fell outside the Act’s scope. In Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), the Court considered a CATV system that carried local television broadcasting, much of which was copyrighted, to its subscribers in two cities. The CATV provider placed antennas on hills above the cities and used coaxial cables to carry the signals received by the antennas to the home television sets of its subscribers. The system amplified and modulated the signals in order to improve their strength and efficiently transmit them to subscribers. A subscriber “could choose any of the programs he wished to view by simply turning the knob on his own television set.” The CATV provider “neither edited the programs received nor originated any programs of its own.” Asked to decide whether the CATV provider infringed copyright holders’ exclusive right to perform their works publicly, the Court held that the provider did not “per- form” at all. See 17 U.S. C. (1964 ed.) (granting copyright holder the exclusive right to “perform in public for profit” a nondramatic literary work), (granting copyright holder the exclusive right to “perform publicly” a dramatic work). The Court drew a line: “Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform.” 392 U.S., at 398 (footnote omitted). And a CATV provider “falls on the viewer’s side of the line.” The Court reasoned that CATV providers were unlike broadcasters: “Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV systems simply carry, without editing, whatever pro- grams they receive. Broadcasters procure programs and propagate them to the public; CATV systems
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,014 | 2 |
majority
|
American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2680437/american-broadcasting-cos-v-aereo-inc/
|
procure programs and propagate them to the public; CATV systems re- ceive programs that have been released to the public 6 AMERICAN BROADCASTING and carry them by private channels to additional viewers.” Instead, CATV providers were more like viewers, for “the basic function [their] equipment serves is little different from that served by the equipment generally furnished by” viewers. “Essentially,” the Court said, “a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer’s capac- ity to receive the broadcaster’s signals [by] provid[ing] a well-located antenna with an efficient connection to the viewer’s television set.” Viewers do not become performers by using “amplifying equipment,” and a CATV provider should not be treated differently for providing viewers the same equipment. at 398–400. In Teleprompter the Court considered the copyright liability of a CATV provider that carried broad- cast television programming into subscribers’ homes from hundreds of miles away. Although the Court recognized that a viewer might not be able to afford amplifying equipment that would provide access to those distant signals, it nonetheless found that the CATV provider was more like a viewer than a broadcaster. –409. It explained: “The reception and rechanneling of [broadcast television signals] for simultaneous viewing is essentially a viewer function, irrespective of the distance between the broadcasting station and the ultimate viewer.” The Court also recognized that the CATV system exer- cised some measure of choice over what to transmit. But that fact did not transform the CATV system into a broad- caster. A broadcaster exercises significant creativity in choosing what to air, the Court reasoned. In contrast, the CATV provider makes an initial choice about which broadcast stations to retransmit, but then “ ‘simply carr[ies], without editing, whatever programs [it] re- ceive[s].’ ” (quoting (altera- Cite as: 5 U. S. (2014) 7 Opinion of the Court tions in original)). B In 1976 Congress amended the Copyright Act in large part to reject the Court’s holdings in and Teleprompter. See H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, pp. 86–87 (1976) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.) (The 1976 amendments “completely overturned” this Court’s narrow construction of the Act in and Teleprompter). Congress enacted new language that erased the Court’s line be- tween broadcaster and viewer, in respect to “perform[ing]” a work. The amended statute clarifies that to “perform” an audiovisual work means “to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” ; see (defining “[a]udiovisual works” as “works that consist of a series of related images which are intrin- sically intended to be shown by the use of machines together with accompanying sounds”). Under this new
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,014 | 2 |
majority
|
American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2680437/american-broadcasting-cos-v-aereo-inc/
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use of machines together with accompanying sounds”). Under this new language, both the broadcaster and the viewer of a televi- sion program “perform,” because they both show the pro- gram’s images and make audible the program’s sounds. See H. R. Rep., at 63 (“[A] broadcasting network is per- forming when it transmits [a singer’s performance of a song] and any individual is performing whenever he or she communicates the performance by turning on a receiving set”). Congress also enacted the Transmit Clause, which specifies that an entity performs publicly when it “trans- mit[s] a performance to the public.” ; see (defining “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance” as “to communi- cate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent”). Cable system activities, like those of the CATV systems in and Teleprompter, lie at the heart of the activ- ities that Congress intended this language to cover. See H. R. Rep., at 63 (“[A] cable television system is perform- 8 AMERICAN BROADCASTING ing when it retransmits [a network] broadcast to its sub- scribers”); see also (“[T]he concep[t] of public perfor- mance cover[s] not only the initial rendition or show- ing, but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the public”). The Clause thus makes clear that an entity that acts like a CATV system itself performs, even if when doing so, it simply enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals. Congress further created a new section of the Act to regulate cable companies’ public performances of copy- righted works. See Section 111 creates a complex, highly detailed compulsory licensing scheme that sets out the conditions, including the payment of compulsory fees, under which cable systems may retransmit broadcasts. H. R. Rep., at 88 (Section 111 is primarily “directed at the operation of cable television systems and the terms and conditions of their liability for the retransmission of copy- righted works”). Congress made these three changes to achieve a similar end: to bring the activities of cable systems within the scope of the Copyright Act. C This history makes clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider. Rather, Aereo, and not just its sub- scribers, “perform[s]” (or “transmit[s]”). Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach. See (“[C]able systems are commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted program material”). Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, almost
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Justice Breyer
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American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2680437/american-broadcasting-cos-v-aereo-inc/
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to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, almost as they are being broadcast. In providing this service, Aereo uses its own equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ Cite as: 5 U. S. (2014) 9 Opinion of the Court homes. By means of its technology (antennas, trans- coders, and servers), Aereo’s system “receive[s] programs that have been released to the public and carr[ies] them by private channels to additional viewers.” 392 U.S., It “carr[ies] whatever programs [it] receive[s],” and it offers “all the programming” of each over-the-air station it carries. 400. Aereo’s equipment may serve a “viewer function”; it may enhance the viewer’s ability to receive a broadcaster’s programs. It may even emulate equipment a viewer could use at home. But the same was true of the equipment that was before the Court, and ultimately before Congress, in and Teleprompter. We recognize, and Aereo and the dissent emphasize, one particular difference between Aereo’s system and the cable systems at issue in and Teleprompter. The systems in those cases transmitted constantly; they sent continuous programming to each subscriber’s televi- sion set. In contrast, Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program. Only at that moment, in automatic response to the sub- scriber’s request, does Aereo’s system activate an antenna and begin to transmit the requested program. This is a critical difference, says the dissent. It means that Aereo’s subscribers, not Aereo, “selec[t] the copy- righted content” that is “perform[ed],” post, at 4 (opinion of SCALIA, J.), and for that reason they, not Aereo, “transmit” the performance. Aereo is thus like “a copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card.” Post, at 5. A copy shop is not directly liable whenever a patron uses the shop’s machines to “reproduce” copyrighted materials found in that library. See (“exclusive righ[t] to reproduce the copyrighted work”). And by the same token, Aereo should not be directly liable whenever its patrons use its equipment to “transmit” copyrighted television programs to their screens. 10 AMERICAN BROADCASTING In our view, however, the dissent’s copy shop argument, in whatever form, makes too much out of too little. Given Aereo’s overwhelming likeness to the cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments, this sole technological difference between Aereo and traditional cable companies does not make a critical difference here. The subscribers of the and Teleprompter cable systems also selected what programs to display on their receiving sets. Indeed, as we explained in such a subscriber “could choose any of the programs he wished to view by simply
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American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
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any of the programs he wished to view by simply turning the knob on his own television set.” 392 U.S., The same is true of an Aereo subscriber. Of course, in the television signals, in a sense, lurked behind the screen, ready to emerge when the sub- scriber turned the knob. Here the signals pursue their ordinary course of travel through the universe until to- day’s “turn of the knob”—a click on a website—activates machinery that intercepts and reroutes them to Aereo’s subscribers over the Internet. But this difference means nothing to the subscriber. It means nothing to the broad- caster. We do not see how this single difference, invisible to subscriber and broadcaster alike, could transform a system that is for all practical purposes a traditional cable system into “a copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card.” In other cases involving different kinds of service or technology providers, a user’s involvement in the opera- tion of the provider’s equipment and selection of the con- tent transmitted may well bear on whether the provider performs within the meaning of the Act. But the many similarities between Aereo and cable companies, consid- ered in light of Congress’ basic purposes in amending the Copyright Act, convince us that this difference is not critical here. We conclude that Aereo is not just an equipment supplier and that Aereo “perform[s].” Cite as: 5 U. S. (2014) 11 Opinion of the Court III Next, we must consider whether Aereo performs peti- tioners’ works “publicly,” within the meaning of the Transmit Clause. Under the Clause, an entity performs a work publicly when it “transmit[s] a performance of the work to the public.” Aereo denies that it satisfies this definition. It reasons as follows: First, the “performance” it “transmit[s]” is the performance created by its act of transmitting. And second, because each of these performances is capable of being received by one and only one subscriber, Aereo transmits privately, not pub- licly. Even assuming Aereo’s first argument is correct, its second does not follow. We begin with Aereo’s first argument. What perfor- mance does Aereo transmit? Under the Act, “[t]o ‘trans- mit’ a performance is to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” And “[t]o ‘per- form’ ” an audiovisual work means “to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” Petitioners say Aereo transmits a prior performance of their works. Thus when Aereo retransmits a network’s prior broadcast, the underlying broadcast (itself a
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Justice Breyer
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American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
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retransmits a network’s prior broadcast, the underlying broadcast (itself a perfor- mance) is the performance that Aereo transmits. Aereo, as discussed above, says the performance it transmits is the new performance created by its act of transmitting. That performance comes into existence when Aereo streams the sounds and images of a broadcast program to a subscriber’s screen. We assume arguendo that Aereo’s first argument is correct. Thus, for present purposes, to transmit a perfor- mance of (at least) an audiovisual work means to com- municate contemporaneously visible images and contem- poraneously audible sounds of the work. Cf. United States v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 12 AMERICAN BROADCASTING (holding that a download of a work is not a performance because the data transmitted are not “contemporaneously perceptible”). When an Aereo subscriber selects a program to watch, Aereo streams the program over the Internet to that subscriber. Aereo thereby “communicate[s]” to the subscriber, by means of a “device or process,” the work’s images and sounds. And those images and sounds are contemporaneously visible and audible on the subscriber’s computer (or other Internet-connected device). So under our assumed defini- tion, Aereo transmits a performance whenever its sub- scribers watch a program. But what about the Clause’s further requirement that Aereo transmit a performance “to the public”? As we have said, an Aereo subscriber receives broadcast television signals with an antenna dedicated to him alone. Aereo’s system makes from those signals a personal copy of the selected program. It streams the content of the copy to the same subscriber and to no one else. One and only one subscriber has the ability to see and hear each Aereo transmission. The fact that each transmission is to only one subscriber, in Aereo’s view, means that it does not transmit a performance “to the public.” In terms of the Act’s purposes, these differences do not distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems, which do perform “publicly.” Viewed in terms of Congress’ regula- tory objectives, why should any of these technological differ- ences matter? They concern the behind-the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers television programming to its view- ers’ screens. They do not render Aereo’s commercial objec- tive any different from that of cable companies. Nor do they significantly alter the viewing experience of Aereo’s subscribers. Why would a subscriber who wishes to watch a television show care much whether images and sounds are delivered to his screen via a large multisubscriber antenna or one small dedicated antenna, whether they Cite as: 5 U. S. (2014) 13 Opinion of the Court arrive instantaneously or after
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American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
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(2014) 13 Opinion of the Court arrive instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or whether they are transmitted directly or after a personal copy is made? And why, if Aereo is right, could not mod- ern CATV systems simply continue the same commercial and consumer-oriented activities, free of copyright re- strictions, provided they substitute such new technologies for old? Congress would as much have intended to protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo as from those of cable companies. The text of the Clause effectuates Congress’ intent. Aereo’s argument to the contrary relies on the premise that “to transmit a performance” means to make a single transmission. But the Clause suggests that an entity may transmit a performance through multiple, discrete transmissions. That is because one can “trans- mit” or “communicate” something through a set of actions. Thus one can transmit a message to one’s friends, irre- spective of whether one sends separate identical e-mails to each friend or a single e-mail to all at once. So can an elected official communicate an idea, slogan, or speech to her constituents, regardless of whether she communicates that idea, slogan, or speech during individual phone calls to each constituent or in a public square. The fact that a singular noun (“a performance”) follows the words “to transmit” does not suggest the contrary. One can sing a song to his family, whether he sings the same song one-on-one or in front of all together. Similarly, one’s colleagues may watch a performance of a particular play—say, this season’s modern-dress version of “Measure for Measure”—whether they do so at separate or at the same showings. By the same principle, an entity may transmit a performance through one or several transmis- sions, where the performance is of the same work. The Transmit Clause must permit this interpretation, for it provides that one may transmit a performance to the public “whether the members of the public capable of 14 AMERICAN BROADCASTING receiving the performance receive it at the same time or at different times.” Were the words “to transmit a performance” limited to a single act of communication, members of the public could not receive the performance communicated “at different times.” Therefore, in light of the purpose and text of the Clause, we conclude that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to multiple people, it transmits a performance to them re- gardless of the number of discrete communications it makes. We do not see how the fact that Aereo transmits via personal copies of programs could make a
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American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
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Aereo transmits via personal copies of programs could make a difference. The Act applies to transmissions “by means of any device or process.” And retransmitting a television program using user-specific copies is a “process” of transmitting a performance. A “cop[y]” of a work is simply a “material objec[t] in which a work is fixed and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi- cated.” So whether Aereo transmits from the same or separate copies, it performs the same work; it shows the same images and makes audible the same sounds. There- fore, when Aereo streams the same television program to multiple subscribers, it “transmit[s] a performance” to all of them. Moreover, the subscribers to whom Aereo transmits television programs constitute “the public.” Aereo com- municates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to a large number of people who are unre- lated and unknown to each other. This matters because, although the Act does not define “the public,” it specifies that an entity performs publicly when it performs at “any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.” The Act thereby suggests that “the pub- lic” consists of a large group of people outside of a family Cite as: 5 U. S. (2014) 15 Opinion of the Court and friends. Neither the record nor Aereo suggests that Aereo’s subscribers receive performances in their capacities as owners or possessors of the underlying works. This is relevant because when an entity performs to a set of peo- ple, whether they constitute “the public” often depends upon their relationship to the underlying work. When, for example, a valet parking attendant returns cars to their drivers, we would not say that the parking service pro- vides cars “to the public.” We would say that it provides the cars to their owners. We would say that a car dealer- ship, on the other hand, does provide cars to the public, for it sells cars to individuals who lack a pre-existing relation- ship to the cars. Similarly, an entity that transmits a performance to individuals in their capacities as owners or possessors does not perform to “the public,” whereas an entity like Aereo that transmits to large numbers of pay- ing subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the works does so perform. Finally, we note that Aereo’s subscribers may receive the same programs at different times and locations. This fact does not help Aereo, however, for the Transmit Clause expressly provides that an entity may perform publicly “whether the
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American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
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expressly provides that an entity may perform publicly “whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.” In other words, “the public” need not be situated together, spatially or temporally. For these reasons, we conclude that Aereo transmits a performance of petitioners’ copyrighted works to the public, within the meaning of the Transmit Clause. IV Aereo and many of its supporting amici argue that to apply the Transmit Clause to Aereo’s conduct will impose copyright liability on other technologies, including new 16 AMERICAN BROADCASTING technologies, that Congress could not possibly have wanted to reach. We agree that Congress, while intending the Transmit Clause to apply broadly to cable companies and their equivalents, did not intend to discourage or to control the emergence or use of different kinds of technologies. But we do not believe that our limited holding today will have that effect. For one thing, the history of cable broadcast transmis- sions that led to the enactment of the Transmit Clause informs our conclusion that Aereo “perform[s],” but it does not determine whether different kinds of providers in different contexts also “perform.” For another, an entity only transmits a performance when it communicates contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds of a work. See Brief for Respondent 31 (“[I]f a distributor sells [multiple copies of a digital video disc] by mail to consumers, [its] distribution of the DVDs merely makes it possible for the recipients to perform the work themselves—it is not a ‘device or process’ by which the distributor publicly performs the work” (emphasis in original)). Further, we have interpreted the term “the public” to apply to a group of individuals acting as ordinary mem- bers of the public who pay primarily to watch broadcast television programs, many of which are copyrighted. We have said that it does not extend to those who act as own- ers or possessors of the relevant product. And we have not considered whether the public performance right is in- fringed when the user of a service pays primarily for something other than the transmission of copyrighted works, such as the remote storage of content. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31 (distinguishing cloud- based storage services because they “offer consumers more numerous and convenient means of playing back copies that the consumers have already lawfully acquired” (em- phasis in original)). In addition, an entity does not trans- Cite as: 5 U. S. (2014) 17 Opinion of the Court mit to the
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American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.
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S. (2014) 17 Opinion of the Court mit to the public if it does not transmit to a substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle. We also note that courts often apply a statute’s highly general language in light of the statute’s basic purposes. Finally, the doctrine of “fair use” can help to prevent inappropriate or inequitable applications of the Clause. See Corp. of We cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to technologies not before us. We agree with the Solicitor General that “[q]uestions involving cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues not before the Court, as to which ‘Congress has not plainly marked [the] course,’ should await a case in which they are squarely presented.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 34 (quoting (alteration in original)). And we note that, to the extent commercial actors or other interested entities may be concerned with the relationship between the development and use of such technologies and the Copyright Act, they are of course free to seek action from Congress. Cf. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S. C. * * * In sum, having considered the details of Aereo’s practices, we find them highly similar to those of the CATV systems in and Teleprompter. And those are activities that the 1976 amendments sought to bring within the scope of the Copyright Act. Insofar as there are differ- ences, those differences concern not the nature of the service that Aereo provides so much as the technological manner in which it provides the service. We conclude that those differences are not adequate to place Aereo’s activi- ties outside the scope of the Act. For these reasons, we conclude that Aereo “perform[s]” 18 AMERICAN BROADCASTING petitioners’ copyrighted works “publicly,” as those terms are defined by the Transmit Clause. We therefore reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 5 U. S. (2014) 1 SCALIA, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 13–461 AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. AEREO, INC., FKA BAMBOOM LABS, INC.
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majority
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Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118471/great-west-life-annuity-ins-co-v-knudson/
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The question presented is whether 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S. C. 1132(a)(3) ( ed.), authorizes this action by petitioners to enforce a reimbursement provision of an ERISA plan. *207 I Respondent Janette Knudson was rendered quadriplegic by a car accident in June 1992. Because her then-husband, respondent Eric Knudson, was employed by petitioner Earth Systems, Inc., Janette was covered by the Health and Welfare Plan for Employees and Dependents of Earth Systems, Inc. (Plan). The Plan covered $411,157.11 of Janette's medical expenses, of which all except $75,000 was paid by petitioner Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance pursuant to a "stop-loss" insurance agreement with the Plan. The Plan includes a reimbursement provision that is the basis for the present lawsuit. This provides that the Plan shall have "the right to recover from the [beneficiary] any payment for benefits" paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party. App. 58. Specifically, the Plan has "a first lien upon any recovery, whether by settlement, judgment or otherwise," that the beneficiary receives from the third party, not to exceed "the amount of benefits paid [by the Plan] [or] the amount received by the [beneficiary] for such medical treatment" If the beneficiary recovers from a third party and fails to reimburse the Plan, "then he will be personally liable to [the Plan] up to the amount of the first lien." Pursuant to an agreement between the Plan and Great-West, the Plan "assign[ed] to Great-West all of its rights to make, litigate, negotiate, settle, compromise, release or waive" any claim under the reimbursement provision. In late 1993, the Knudsons filed a tort action in California state court seeking to recover from Hyundai Motor Company, the manufacturer of the car they were riding in at the time of the accident, and other alleged tortfeasors. The parties to that action negotiated a $650,000 settlement, a notice of which was mailed to Great-West. This allocated $256,745.30 to a Special Needs Trust under Cal. Prob. Code Ann. 1 to provide for *208 Janette's medical care; $373,426 to attorney's fees and costs; $5,000 to reimburse the California Medicaid program (MediCal); and $13,828.70 (the portion of the settlement attributable to past medical expenses) to satisfy Great-West's claim under the reimbursement provision of the Plan. The day before the hearing scheduled for judicial approval of the settlement, Great-West, calling itself a defendant and asserting that the state-court action involved federal claims related to ERISA, filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California a notice
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Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
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District Court for the Central District of California a notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1441 ( ed.). That court concluded that Great-West was not a defendant and could not remove the case, and therefore remanded to the state court, which approved the settlement. The state court's order provided that the defendants would pay the settlement amount allocated to the Special Needs Trust directly to the trust, and the remaining amounts to respondents' attorney, who, in turn, would tender checks to Medi-Cal and Great-West. Great-West, however, never cashed the check it received from respondents' attorney. Instead, at the same time that Great-West sought to remove the state-law tort action, it filed this action in the same federal court (the United States District Court for the Central District of California), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under 502(a)(3) to enforce the reimbursement provision of the Plan by requiring the Knudsons to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of any proceeds recovered from third parties. Great-West subsequently filed an amended complaint adding Earth Systems and the Plan as plaintiffs and seeking a temporary restraining order against continuation of the state-court proceedings for approval of the settlement. The District Court denied the temporary restraining order, a ruling that petitioners did not appeal. After the state court approved the settlement and the money was disbursed, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Knudsons. It held that the language of the Plan limited its right of reimbursement to the amount received by *209 respondents from third parties for past medical treatment, an amount that the state court determined was $13,828.70. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds. Judgt. order reported at Citing FMC Medical it held that judicially decreed reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not equitable relief and is therefore not authorized by 502(a)(3). We granted certiorari. II We have observed repeatedly that ERISA is a "`comprehensive and reticulated statute,' the product of a decade of congressional study of the Nation's private employee benefit system." We have therefore been especially "reluctant to tamper with [the] enforcement scheme" embodied in the statute by extending remedies not specifically authorized by its text. Mut. Life Ins. Indeed, we have noted that ERISA's "carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides `strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.' " (quoting at 146-). Section 502(a)(3) authorizes a civil action: "by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice
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Justice Scalia
| 2,002 | 9 |
majority
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Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118471/great-west-life-annuity-ins-co-v-knudson/
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beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of the terms of the plan." 29 U.S. C. 1132(a)(3) ( ed.). As we explained in "`[e]quitable' relief must mean something less than all relief." n. 8. *210 Thus, in we rejected a reading of the statute that would extend the relief obtainable under 502(a)(3) to whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular case at issue (which could include legal remedies that would otherwise be beyond the scope of the equity court's authority). Such a reading, we said, would "limit the relief not at all " and "render the modifier [`equitable'] superfluous." Instead, we held that the term "equitable relief" in 502(a)(3) must refer to "those categories of relief that were typically available in equity" Here, petitioners seek, in essence, to impose personal liability on respondents for a contractual obligation to pay moneyrelief that was not typically available in equity. "A claim for money due and owing under a contract is `quintessentially an action at law.' " Wal-Mart Stores, "Almost invariably suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for `money damages,' as that phrase has traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's breach of legal duty." And "[m]oney damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief." Nevertheless, petitioners, along with their amicus the United States, struggle to characterize the relief sought as "equitable" under the standard set by We are not persuaded. A First, petitioners argue that they are entitled to relief under 502(a)(3)(A) because they seek "to enjoin a[n] act or practice"respondents' failure to reimburse the Plan "which violates the terms of the plan." But an injunction to compel the payment of money past due under a contract, *211 or specific performance of a past due monetary obligation, was not typically available in equity.[1] See, e. g., 3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts 359 (1979); 3 Dobbs 12.8(2), at 199; 5A A. Corbin, Contracts 1142, p. 119 (1964) (hereinafter Corbin). Those rare cases in which a court of equity would decree specific performance of a contract to transfer funds were suits that, unlike the present case, sought to prevent future losses that either were incalculable or would be greater than the sum awarded. For example, specific performance might be available to
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Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
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sum awarded. For example, specific performance might be available to enforce an agreement to lend money "when the unavailability of alternative financing would leave the plaintiff with injuries that are difficult to value; or to enforce an obligor's duty to make future monthly payments, after the obligor had consistently refused to make past payments concededly due, and thus threatened the obligee with the burden of bringing multiple damages actions." Bowen, See also 3 Dobbs 12.8(2), at 200; 5A Corbin 1142, at 117 118. Typically, however, specific performance of a contract to pay money was not available in equity. *212 upon which petitioners rely, is not to the contrary. We held in Bowen that the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that precludes actions seeking "money damages" against federal agencies, 5 U.S. C. 702, does not bar a State from seeking specific relief to obtain money to which it claims entitlement under the federal Medicaid statute, 42 U.S. C. 1396b(d) ( ed. and Supp. V). Bowen "did not turn on distinctions between `equitable' actions and other actions but rather [on] what Congress meant by `other than money damages' " in the Administrative Procedure Act. Department of Furthermore, Bowen, unlike petitioners' claim, did not deal with specific performance of a contractual obligation to pay past due sums. Rather, claimed not only that the Federal Government failed to reimburse it for past expenses pursuant to a statutory obligation, but that the method the Federal Government used to calculate reimbursements would lead to underpayments in the future. Thus, the suit was not merely for past due sums, but for an injunction to correct the method of calculating payments going forward. Bowen, Bowen has no bearing on the unavailability of an injunction to enforce a contractual obligation to pay money past due. B Second, petitioners argue that their suit is authorized by 502(a)(3)(B) because they seek restitution, which they characterize as a form of equitable relief. However, not all relief falling under the rubric of restitution is available in equity. In the days of the divided bench, restitution was available in certain cases at law, and in certain others in equity. See, e. g., 1 Dobbs 1.2, at 11; 4.1(1), at 556; 4.1(3), at 564-565; 4.2-4.3, at 570-624; 5 Corbin 1102, at 550; ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, ; Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality *213 of Rational Decision Making, Thus, "restitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at law and an equitable remedy when ordered in an equity case," and whether it is legal
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| 2,002 | 9 |
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Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118471/great-west-life-annuity-ins-co-v-knudson/
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ordered in an equity case," and whether it is legal or equitable depends on "the basis for [the plaintiff's] claim" and the nature of the underlying remedies In cases in which the plaintiff "could not assert title or right to possession of particular property, but in which nevertheless he might be able to show just grounds for recovering money to pay for some benefit the defendant had received from him," the plaintiff had a right to restitution at law through an action derived from the common-law writ of assumpsit. 1 Dobbs 4.2(1), at 571. See also In such cases, the plaintiff's claim was considered legal because he sought "to obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money." Restatement of 160, Comment a, pp. 641-642 (1936). Such claims were viewed essentially as actions at law for breach of contract (whether the contract was actual or implied). In contrast, a plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant's possession. See 1 Dobbs 4.3(1), at 587-588; Restatement of 160, Comment a, at 641-642; 1 G. Palmer, Law of 1.4, p. 17; 3.7, p. 262 (1978). A court of equity could then order a defendant to transfer title (in the case of the constructive trust) or to give a security interest (in the case of the equitable lien) to a plaintiff who was, in the eyes of equity, the true owner. But where "the property [sought to be recovered] or its proceeds have been dissipated so that no product remains, [the plaintiff's] claim is only that of a general creditor," and the plaintiff "cannot enforce a constructive *214 trust of or an equitable lien upon other property of the [defendant]." Restatement of 215, Comment a, at 867. Thus, for restitution to lie in equity, the action generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant's possession.[2] Here, the funds to which petitioners claim an entitlement under the Plan's reimbursement provisionthe proceeds from the settlement of respondents' tort actionare not in respondents' possession. As the order of the state court approving the settlement makes clear, the disbursements from the settlement were paid by two checks, one made payable to the Special Needs Trust and the other to respondents' attorney (who, after deducting his own fees and
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Justice Scalia
| 2,002 | 9 |
majority
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Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118471/great-west-life-annuity-ins-co-v-knudson/
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to respondents' attorney (who, after deducting his own fees and costs, placed the remaining funds in a client trust account from which he tendered checks to respondents' other creditors, Great-West and Medi-Cal). The basis for petitioners' claim is not that respondents hold particular funds that, in good conscience, belong to petitioners, but that petitioners are contractually entitled to some funds for benefits that they conferred. The kind of restitution that petitioners seek, therefore, is not equitablethe imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on particular propertybut legalthe imposition of personal liability for the benefits that they conferred upon respondents. Admittedly, our cases have not previously drawn this fine distinction between restitution at law and restitution in equity, but neither have they involved an issue to which the *215 distinction was relevant. In we mentioned in dicta that "injunction, mandamus, and restitution " are categories of relief that were typically available in equity. 508 U.S., however, did not involve a claim for restitution at all; rather, we addressed the question whether a nonfiduciary who knowingly participates in the breach of a fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA is liable to the plan for compensatory damages. Thus, as courts and commentators have noted, "all the [Supreme] Court meant [in and other cases] was that restitution, in contrast to damages, is a remedy commonly ordered in equity cases and therefore an equitable remedy in a sense in which damages, though occasionally awarded in equity cases, are not." 33 F. 3d, at did not purport to change the well-settled principle that restitution is "not an exclusively equitable remedy," and whether it is legal or equitable in a particular case (and hence whether it is authorized by 502(a)(3)) remains dependent on the nature of the relief 33 F.3d, at See also (analyzing and explaining that "only equitable restitution will be available under Section 502(a)(3)"). Likewise, in Harris Trust and Sav. we noted that "an action for restitution against a transferee of tainted plan assets" is "appropriate equitable relief" within the meaning of 502(a)(3). While we did not expressly distinguish between legal and equitable restitution, the nature of the relief we described in Harris Trust a claim to specific property (or its proceeds) held by the defendantaccords with the restitution we describe as equitable today. ("The trustee or beneficiaries may then maintain an action for restitution of the property (if not already disposed of) or disgorgement of proceeds (if already disposed of)" ); - ("Whenever the legal title to property is obtained through means or under *216 circumstances `which render it unconscientious for the holder of
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Justice Scalia
| 2,002 | 9 |
majority
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Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118471/great-west-life-annuity-ins-co-v-knudson/
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*216 circumstances `which render it unconscientious for the holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest, equity impresses a constructive trust on the property thus acquired in favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to the same" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Justice Ginsburg's dissent finds it dispositive that some restitutionary remedies were typically available in equity. In her view, the touchstone for distinguishing legal from equitable relief is the "substance of the relief requested," post, at 228and since the "substantive" relief of restitution is typically available in equity, it is, she concludes, available under 502(a)(3). It is doubtful, to begin with, that "restitution"or at least restitution defined broadly enough to embrace those forms of restitution available at lawpertains to the substance of the relief rather than to the legal theory under which it is awarded. The "substance" of a money judgment is a compelled transfer of money; a money judgment for restitution could be thought to identify a particular type of relief (rather than merely the theory on which relief is awarded) only if one were to limit restitution to the return of identifiable funds (or property) belonging to the plaintiff and held by the defendantthat is, to limit restitution to the form of restitution traditionally available in equity. In any event, Justice Ginsburg's approach, which looks only to the nature of the relief and not to the conditions that equity attached to its provision, logically leads to the same untenable conclusion reached by Justice Stevens's dissentwhich is that 502(a)(3)(A)'s explicit authorization of injunction, which it identifies as a form of equitable relief, permits (what equity would never permit) an injunction against failure to pay a simple indebtednessor, for that matter, an injunction against failure to pay punitive damages. The problem with that conclusion, of course, is that it renders the statute's limitation of relief to "[injunction] or other appropriate equitable relief" utterly pointless. It *217 is easy to disparage the law-equity dichotomy as "an ancient classification," post, at 224 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.), and an "obsolete distinctio[n]," post, at 222 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Like it or not, however, that classification and distinction has been specified by the statute; and there is no way to give the specification meaningindeed, there is no way to render the unmistakable limitation of the statute a limitation at all except by adverting to the differences between law and equity to which the statute refers. The dissents greatly exaggerate, moreover, the difficulty of that task. Congress felt comfortable referring to equitable relief in this
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Justice Scalia
| 2,002 | 9 |
majority
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Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118471/great-west-life-annuity-ins-co-v-knudson/
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task. Congress felt comfortable referring to equitable relief in this statuteas it has in many others[3]precisely because the basic contours of the term are well known. Rarely will there be need for any more "antiquarian inquiry," post, at 233-234 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.), than consulting, as we have done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, which make the answer clear. It is an inquiry, moreover, that we are accustomed to pursuing, and will always have to pursue, in other contexts. See, e. g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. ; What will introduce a high degree of confusion into congressional use (and lawyers' understanding) of the statutory term "equity" is the rolling revision of its content contemplated by the dissents. Justice Stevens finds it "difficult to understand why Congress would not have wanted to provide recourse in federal court for the plan violation disclosed by the record in this case," post, at 223. It is, however, not our job to find reasons for what Congress has plainly done; and it is our job to avoid rendering what Congress has plainly done (here, *218 limit the available relief) devoid of reason and effect. If, as Justice Ginsburg surmises, post, at 234, Congress meant to rule out nothing more than "compensatory and punitive damages," it could simply have said that. That Congress sought to achieve this result by subtle reliance upon the dissenters' novel and expansive view of equity is most implausible. Respecting Congress's choice to limit the relief available under 502(a)(3) to "equitable relief" requires us to recognize the difference between legal and equitable forms of restitution.[4] Because petitioners seek only the former, their suit is not authorized by 502(a)(3). *219 C Third, the United States, as petitioners' amicus, argues that the common law of trusts provides petitioners with equitable remedies that allow them to bring this action under 502(a)(3). Analogizing respondents to beneficiaries of a trust, the United States argues that a trustee could bring a suit to enforce an agreement by a beneficiary to pay money into a trust or to repay an advance made from the trust. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17-19 (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts 252, 255 (1959) (hereinafter Restatement of Trusts)). These trust remedies are simply inapposite. In we rejected the claim that the special equity-court powers applicable to trusts define the reach of 502(a)(3). Instead, we held that the term "equitable relief" in 502(a)(3) must refer to "those categories of relief that were typically available in equity" 508 U.S., In any event, the cited sections of
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Justice Scalia
| 2,002 | 9 |
majority
|
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118471/great-west-life-annuity-ins-co-v-knudson/
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equity" 508 U.S., In any event, the cited sections of the Restatement, by their terms, merely allow a trustee to charge the beneficiary's interest in the trust in order to capture money owed. See Restatement of Trusts 252 ("If one of the beneficiaries *220 of a trust contracts to pay money to the trustee to be held as part of the trust estate and he fails to make the payment, his beneficial interest is subject to a charge for the amount of his liability"); 255 ("If the trustee makes an advance or loan of trust money to a beneficiary, the beneficiary's interest is subject to a charge for the repayment of the amount advanced or lent"). These setoff remedies do not give the trustee a separate equitable cause of action for payment from other moneys. III In the end, petitioners ask us to interpret 502(a)(3) so as to prevent them "from being deprived of any remedy under circumstances where such a result clearly would be inconsistent with a primary purpose of ERISA," namely, the enforcement of the terms of a plan. See Brief for Petitioners 30-31. We note, though it is not necessary to our decision, that there may have been other means for petitioners to obtain the essentially legal relief that they seek. We express no opinion as to whether petitioners could have intervened in the state-court tort action brought by respondents or whether a direct action by petitioners against respondents asserting state-law claims such as breach of contract would have been pre-empted by ERISA. Nor do we decide whether petitioners could have obtained equitable relief against respondents' attorney and the trustee of the Special Needs Trust, since petitioners did not appeal the District Court's denial of their motion to amend their complaint to add these individuals as codefendants. We need not decide these issues because, as we explained in "[e]ven assuming that petitioners are correct about the pre-emption of previously available state-court actions" or the lack of other means to obtain relief, "vague notions of a statute's `basic purpose' are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration." 508 U.S., at In the *221 very same section of ERISA as 502(a)(3), Congress authorized "a participant or beneficiary" to bring a civil action "to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan," without reference to whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. 29 U.S. C. 1132(a)(1)(B) ( ed.). But Congress did not extend the same authorization to fiduciaries. Rather, 502(a)(3), by its terms, only allows for equitable relief. We will
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per_curiam
| 1,993 | 200 |
per_curiam
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Dobbs v. Zant
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112806/dobbs-v-zant/
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The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. A Georgia jury found petitioner Wilburn Dobbs guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. In his first federal habeas petition, petitioner claimed, inter alia, that he received *358 ineffective assistance from his court-appointed counsel at sentencing. The District Court rejected this claim after holding an evidentiary hearing. Because a transcript of the closing arguments made at sentencing was, by the State's representation, unavailable, the District Court relied on the testimony of petitioner's counsel regarding the content of his closing argument to find that counsel had rendered effective assistance. Civ. Action No. 80-247 (ND Ga., Jan. 13, 1984), p. 24. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, also relying on counsel's testimony about his closing argument in mitigation. Subsequently, petitioner located a transcript of the penalty phase closing arguments, which flatly contradicted the account given by counsel in key respects. Petitioner moved the Court of Appeals, now reviewing related proceedings from the District Court, to supplement the record on appeal with the sentencing transcript. The court denied this motion without explanation. No. 90-8352 (CA11, Nov. 1, 1990). Affirming the District Court's denial of relief on other claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that the law of the case doctrine prevented it from revisiting its prior rejection of petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim. The court acknowledged the manifest injustice exception to law of the case, but refused to apply the exception, reasoning that its denial of leave to supplement the record left petitioner unable to show an injustice. We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it refused to consider the full sentencing transcript. We have emphasized before the importance of reviewing capital sentences on a complete record. Cf. (Georgia capital sentencing provision requiring transmittal on appeal of complete transcript and record is important "safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice"). *359 In this case, the Court of Appeals offered no justification for its decision to exclude the transcript from consideration. There can be no doubt as to the transcript's relevance, for it calls into serious question the factual predicate on which the District Court and Court of Appeals relied in deciding petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim. As the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged, its refusal to review the transcript left it unable to apply the manifest injustice exception to the law of the case doctrine, and hence unable to determine whether its prior decision should be reconsidered.[*] On the facts of this case, exclusion of the transcript cannot be justified by the delay
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