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Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | majority | Wainwright v. Sykes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109717/wainwright-v-sykes/ | will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing. There is nothing in the Constitution or in the language of 2254 which requires that the state trial on the issue of guilt or innocence be devoted largely to the testimony of fact witnesses directed to the elements of the state crime, while only later will there occur in a federal habeas hearing a full airing of the federal constitutional claims which were not raised in the state proceedings. If a criminal defendant thinks that an action of the state trial court is about to deprive him of a federal constitutional right there is every reason for his following state procedure in making known his objection. The "cause"-and-"prejudice" exception of the Francis rule *91 will afford an adequate guarantee, we think, that the rule will not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice. Whatever precise content may be given those terms by later cases, we feel confident in holding without further elaboration that they do not exist here. Respondent has advanced no explanation whatever for his failure to object at trial,[14] and, as the proceeding unfolded, the trial judge is certainly not to be faulted for failing to question the admission of the confession himself. The other evidence of guilt presented at trial, moreover, was substantial to a degree that would negate any possibility of actual prejudice resulting to the respondent from the admission of his inculpatory statement. We accordingly conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the United District Court for the Middle District of Florida with instructions to dismiss respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It is so ordered. MR. |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | majority | Heffernan v. City of Paterson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3197852/heffernan-v-city-of-paterson/ | The First Amedmet geerally prohibits govermet officials from dismissig or demotig a employee because of the employee’s egagemet i costitutioally protected political activity. See ; ; but cf. Civil Service I this case a govermet official demoted a employee because the official believed, but icorrectly believed, that the employee had supported a particular cadidate for mayor. The questio is whether the official’s factual mistake makes a critical legal differece. Eve though the employee had ot i fact egaged i protected political activity, did his demotio “deprive” him of a “right secured by the Costitutio”? 42 U.S. C. We hold that it did. I To decide the legal questio preseted, we assume the followig, somewhat simplified, versio of the facts: I 2005, Jeffrey Heffera, the petitioer, was a police officer i Paterso, New Jersey. He worked i the office of the 2 HEFFERNAN v. CITY OF PATERSON Opiio of the Court Chief of Police, James Wittig. At that time, the mayor of Paterso, Jose Torres, was ruig for reelectio agaist Lawrece Spagola. Torres had appoited to their curret positios both Chief Wittig ad a subordiate who directly supervised Heffera. Heffera was a good fried of Spagola’s. Durig the campaig, Heffera’s mother, who was bedridde, asked Heffera to drive dowtow ad pick up a large Spagola sig. She wated to replace a smaller Spagola sig, which had bee stole from her frot yard. Heffera wet to a Spagola distributio poit ad picked up the sig. While there, he spoke for a time to Spagola’s campaig maager ad staff. Other members of the police force saw him, sig i had, talkig to cam- paig workers. Word quickly spread throughout the force. The ext day, Heffera’s supervisors demoted Heffer- a from detective to patrol officer ad assiged him to a “walkig post.” I this way they puished Heffera for what they thought was his “overt ivolvemet” i Spag- ola’s campaig. I fact, Heffera was ot ivolved i the campaig but had picked up the sig simply to help his mother. Heffera’s supervisors had made a factual mistake. Heffera subsequetly filed this lawsuit i federal court. He claimed that Chief Wittig ad the other re- spodets had demoted him because he had egaged i coduct that (o their mistake view of the facts) costi- tuted protected speech. They had thereby “depriv[ed]” him of a “right secured by the Costitutio.” Rev. Stat. 42 U.S. C. The District Court foud that Heffera had ot e- gaged i ay “First Amedmet coduct,” 2 F. Supp. 3d 563, 580 (NJ 2014); ad, for that reaso, the respodets had ot |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | majority | Heffernan v. City of Paterson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3197852/heffernan-v-city-of-paterson/ | (NJ 2014); ad, for that reaso, the respodets had ot deprived him of ay costitutioally protected right. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. It wrote that “a free-speech retaliatio claim is actioable Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 3 Opiio of the Court uder oly where the adverse actio at issue was prompted by a employee’s actual, rather tha perceived, exercise of costitutioal rights.” (2015) (citig (CA3 2002); emphasis added). Heffera filed a petitio for certiorari. We agreed to decide whether the Third Circuit’s legal view was correct. Compare 777 F.3d, at (case below), with Dye v. Office of Racig Comm’, 702 F.3d 286, 300 (CA6 2012) (similar factual mistake does ot affect the validity of the govermet employee’s claim). II With a few exceptios, the Costitutio prohibits a govermet employer from dischargig or demotig a employee because the employee supports a particular political cadidate. See Brati v. The basic costitutioal requiremet re- flects the First Amedmet’s hostility to govermet actio that “prescribe[s] what shall be orthodox i poli- tics.” West Virgiia Bd. of 642 (1943). The exceptios take accout of “practical realities” such as the eed for “efficiecy” ad “effec- tive[ess]” i govermet service. ; see also Civil Service Comm’, at (eutral ad appropriately limited policy may prohibit govermet employees from egagig i partisa activity), ad Brati, (political affiliatio requiremet permissible where affiliatio is “a appropriate requiremet for effective performace of the public office ivolved”). I order to aswer the questio preseted, we assume that the exceptios do ot apply here. But see ifra, at 8. We assume that the activities that Heffera’s supervisors thought he had egaged i are of a kid that they caot costitutioally prohibit or puish, see Ruta v. Republi- 4 HEFFERNAN v. CITY OF PATERSON Opiio of the Court ca Party of Ill., (“joiig, workig for or cotributig to the political party ad cadidates of their ow choice”), but that the supervisors were mistake about the facts. Heffera had ot egaged i those protected activities. Does Heffera’s costitutioal case cosequetly fail? The text of the relevat statute does ot aswer the questio. The statute authorizes a lawsuit by a perso “depriv[ed]” of a “right secured by the Costitutio.” 42 U.S. C. But i this cotext, what precisely is that “right?” Is it a right that primarily focuses upo (the employee’s) actual activity or a right that primarily fo- cuses upo (the supervisor’s) motive, isofar as that motive turs o what the supervisor believes that activity to be? The text does ot say. Neither does precedet directly aswer the questio. I some |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | majority | Heffernan v. City of Paterson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3197852/heffernan-v-city-of-paterson/ | say. Neither does precedet directly aswer the questio. I some cases we have used laguage that suggests the “right” at issue cocers the employee’s actual activity. I Coick v. Myers, for example, we said that a court should first determie whether the plai- tiff spoke “ ‘as a citize’ ” o a “ ‘matter[] of public co- cer,’ ” We added that, if the employee has ot egaged i what ca “be fairly characterized as costitut- ig speech o a matter of public cocer, it is uecessary for us to scrutiize the reasos for her discharge.” at 146. We made somewhat similar statemets i Garcetti v. Ceballos, ad Pickerig v. Board of Ed. of Towship High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). These cases, however, did ot preset the kid of ques- tio at issue here. I Coick, for example, o factual mistake was at issue. The Court assumed that both the employer ad the employee were at every stage i agree- met about the uderlyig facts: that the employer dis- missed the employee because of her havig circulated withi the office a documet that criticized how the office Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 5 Opiio of the Court was beig ru (that she had i fact circulated). The ques- tio was whether the circulatio of that documet amouted to costitutioally protected speech. If ot, the Court eed go o further. Neither was ay factual mistake at issue i Pickerig. The Court assumed that both the employer (a school board) ad the employee uderstood the cause for dismis- sal, amely, a petitio that the employee had ideed circulated criticizig his employer’s practices. The ques- tio cocered whether the petitio was protected speech. Garcetti is substatially similar. I each of these cases, the oly way to show that the employer’s motive was ucostitutioal was to prove that the cotrover- sial statemet or activity—i each case the udisputed reaso for the firig—was i fact protected by the First Amedmet. is more to the poit. I that case the Court did cosider the cosequeces of a employer mistake. The employer wrogly, though reasoably, believed that the employee had spoke oly o persoal matters ot of public cocer, ad the employer dismissed the employee for havig egaged i that upro- tected speech. The employee, however, had i fact used words that did ot amout to persoal “gossip” (as the employer believed) but which focused o matters of public cocer. The Court asked whether, ad how, the employ- er’s factual mistake mattered. The Court held that, as log as the employer |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | majority | Heffernan v. City of Paterson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3197852/heffernan-v-city-of-paterson/ | mattered. The Court held that, as log as the employer (1) had reasoably believed that the employee’s coversatio had ivolved persoal matters, ot matters of public cocer, ad (2) had dismissed the employee because of that mis- take belief, the dismissal did ot violate the First Amedmet. at 679–680. I a word, it was the em- ployer’s motive, ad i particular the facts as the employer reasoably uderstood them, that mattered. I Waters, the employer reasoably but mistakely 6 HEFFERNAN v. CITY OF PATERSON Opiio of the Court thought that the employee had ot egaged i protected speech. Here the employer mistakely thought that the employee had egaged i protected speech. If the employ- er’s motive (ad i particular the facts as the employer reasoably uderstood them) is what mattered i Waters, why is the same ot true here? After all, i the law, what is sauce for the goose is ormally sauce for the gader. We coclude that, as i Waters, the govermet’s reaso for demotig Heffera is what couts here. Whe a employer demotes a employee out of a desire to prevet the employee from egagig i political activity that the First Amedmet protects, the employee is etitled to challege that ulawful actio uder the First Amed- met ad 42 U.S. C. —eve if, as here, the employer makes a factual mistake about the employee’s behavior. We ote that a rule of law fidig liability i these circumstaces tracks the laguage of the First Amed- met more closely tha would a cotrary rule. Ulike, say, the Fourth Amedmet, which begis by speakig of the “right of the people to be secure i their persos, houses, papers, ad effects” the First Amedmet begis by focusig upo the activity of the Govermet. It says that “Cogress shall make o law abridgig the free- dom of speech.” The Govermet acted upo a costitu- tioally harmful policy whether Heffera did or did ot i fact egage i political activity. That which stads for a “law” of “Cogress,” amely, the police departmet’s rea- so for takig actio, “abridge[s] the freedom of speech” of employees aware of the policy. Ad Heffera was di- rectly harmed, amely, demoted, through applicatio of that policy. We also cosider relevat the costitutioal implica- tios of a rule that imposes liability. The costitutioal harm at issue i the ordiary case cosists i large part of discouragig employees—both the employee discharged (or demoted) ad his or her colleagues—from egagig i Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 7 Opiio of the Court protected activities. The discharge of oe tells the others |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | majority | Heffernan v. City of Paterson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3197852/heffernan-v-city-of-paterson/ | Court protected activities. The discharge of oe tells the others that they egage i protected activity at their peril. See, e.g., (retaliatory employmet actio agaist oe employee “uquestioably ihibits protected belief ad associatio” of all employees). Hece, we do ot require plaitiffs i political affiliatio cases to “prove that they, or other employees, have bee coerced ito chagig, either actually or ostesibly, their political allegiace.” Brati, The employer’s factual mistake does ot dimiish the risk of causig precisely that same harm. Neither, for that matter, is that harm dimiished where a employer aouces a policy of demotig those who, say, help a particular cadi- date i the mayoral race, ad all employees (icludig Heffera), fearful of demotio, refrai from providig ay such help. Cf. Goodig v. Wilso, (1972) (explaiig that overbreadth doctrie is ecessary “because persos whose expressio is costitutioally protected may well refrai from exercisig their rights for fear of crimial sactios”). The upshot is that a dis- charge or demotio based upo a employer’s belief that the employee has egaged i protected activity ca cause the same kid, ad degree, of costitutioal harm whether that belief does or does ot rest upo a factual mistake. Fially, we ote that, cotrary to respodets’ asser- tios, a rule of law that imposes liability despite the em- ployer’s factual mistake will ot ormally impose sigifi- cat extra costs upo the employer. To wi, the employee must prove a improper employer motive. I a case like this oe, the employee will, if aythig, fid it more diffi- cult to prove that motive, for the employee will have to poit to more tha his ow coduct to show a employer’s itet to discharge or to demote him for egagig i what the employer (mistakely) believes to have bee differet (ad protected) activities. We cocede that, for that very reaso, it may be more complicated ad costly for the 8 HEFFERNAN v. CITY OF PATERSON Opiio of the Court employee to prove his case. But a employee brigig suit will ordiarily shoulder that more complicated burde volutarily i order to recover the damages he seeks. III We ow relax a assumptio uderlyig our decisio. We have assumed that the policy that Heffera’s em- ployers implemeted violated the Costitutio. at 3. There is some evidece i the record, however, suggest- ig that Heffera’s employers may have dismissed him pursuat to a differet ad eutral policy prohibitig police officers from overt ivolvemet i ay political campaig. See Brief for Uited States as Amicus Curiae 27–28. Whether that policy existed, whether Heffera’s supervisors were ideed followig it, |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Arkansas v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110119/arkansas-v-sanders/ | This case presents the question whether, in the absence of exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly stopped and searched for contraband. We took this case by writ of certiorari to the Supreme of Arkansas to resolve some apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our decision in United to warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles.[1] *755 I On April 23, 1976, Officer David Isom of the Little Rock, Ark., Police Department received word from an informant that at 4:35 that afternoon respondent would arrive aboard an American Airlines flight at gate No. 1 of the Municipal Airport of Little Rock. According to the informant, respondent would be carrying a green suitcase containing marihuana. Both Isom and the informant knew respondent well, as in January 1976 the informant had given the Little Rock Police Department information that had led to respondent's arrest and conviction for possession of marihuana. Acting on the tip, Officer Isom and two other police officers placed the airport under surveillance. As the informant had predicted, respondent duly arrived at gate No. 1. The police watched as respondent deposited some hand luggage in a waiting taxicab, returned to the baggage claim area, and met a man whom police subsequently identified as David Rambo. While Rambo waited, respondent retrieved from the airline baggage service a green suitcase matching that described by the informant. Respondent gave this suitcase to his companion and went outside, where he entered the taxi into which he had put his luggage. Rambo waited a short while in the airport and then joined respondent in the taxi, after placing the green suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle. When respondent's taxi drove away carrying respondent, Rambo, and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow officers gave pursuit and, with the help of a patrol car, stopped the vehicle several blocks from the airport. At the request of the police, the taxi driver opened the trunk of his vehicle, where the officers found the green suitcase. Without asking the permission of either respondent or Rambo, the police opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered what proved to be 9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in 10 plastic bags. On October 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged with possession of marihuana with intent to deliver in violation *756 of Ark. Stat. Ann. 82-2617[2] Before trial, respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the suitcase, contending that the search violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court held a hearing on January |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Arkansas v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110119/arkansas-v-sanders/ | Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court held a hearing on January 31, and denied the suppression motion without explanation. After respondent's conviction by a jury on February 3, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison and was fined $15,000. On appeal the Supreme of Arkansas reversed respondent's conviction, ruling that the trial court should have suppressed the marihuana because it was obtained through an unlawful search of the suitcase. Relying upon United and the court concluded that a warrantless search generally must be supported by "probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances." 559 S. W. 2d, at 706. In the present case, the court found there was ample probable cause for the police officers' belief that contraband was contained in the suitcase they searched. The court found to be wholly lacking, however, any exigent circumstance justifying the officers' failure to secure a warrant for the search of the luggage. With the police in control of the automobile and its occupants, there was no danger that the suitcase and its contents would be rendered unavailable to due legal process. The court concluded, therefore, that there was "nothing in this set of circumstances that would lend credence to an assertion of impracticality in obtaining a search warrant."[3] *757 II Although the general principles applicable to claims of Fourth Amendment violations are well settled, litigation over requests for suppression of highly relevant evidence continues to occupy much of the attention of courts at all levels of the state and federal judiciary. s and law enforcement officials often find it difficult to discern the proper application of these principles to individual cases, because the circumstances giving rise to suppression requests can vary almost infinitely. Moreover, an apparently small difference in the factual situation frequently is viewed as a controlling difference in determining Fourth Amendment rights. The present case presents an example. Only two Terms ago, we held that a locked footlocker could not lawfully be searched without a warrant, even though it had been loaded into the trunk of an automobile parked at a curb. United In earlier cases, on the other hand, the sustained the constitutionality of warrantless searches of automobiles and their contents under what has become known as the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. See, e. g., ; We thus are presented with the task of determining whether the warrantless search of respondent's suitcase falls on the or the Chambers/Carroll side of the Fourth Amendment line. Although in a sense this is a line-drawing process, it must be guided by established principles. We commence with a summary of these principles. The |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Arkansas v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110119/arkansas-v-sanders/ | principles. We commence with a summary of these principles. The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy and security of persons *758 in two important ways. First, it guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." In addition, this has interpreted the Amendment to include the requirement that normally searches of private property be performed pursuant to a search warrant issued in compliance with the Warrant Clause.[4] See, e. g., ; United states v. ; United ; ; In the ordinary case, therefore, a search of private property must be both reasonable and pursuant to a properly issued search warrant. The mere reasonableness of a search, assessed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required under the Fourth Amendment. See United As the said in at 481: "The warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow `weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the `well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement." *759 The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our decisions reflects the "basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of Government." United at By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," 3 U.S. 10, we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive authority. See 5 U.S. 4,[5] Nonetheless, there are some exceptions to the warrant requirement. These have been established where it was concluded that the public interest required some flexibility in the application of the general rule that a valid warrant is a prerequisite for a search. See United Thus, a few "jealously and carefully drawn"[6] exceptions provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate. See United But because each exception to the warrant requirement invariably impinges |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Arkansas v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110119/arkansas-v-sanders/ | But because each exception to the warrant requirement invariably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of *760 the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in which a search may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have been carefully delineated and "the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it." United See ; at Moreover, we have limited the reach of each exception to that which is necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society. See ; United 4 U. S., at 15; One of the circumstances in which the Constitution does not require a search warrant is when the police stop an automobile on the street or highway because they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See United ; United v. Ortiz, ; As the said in : "[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant"[7] *761 There are essentially two reasons for the distinction between automobiles and other private property. First, as the repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. See, e. g., United ; -50; In addition, the configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property. See ; United South 3 ; ; 413 U.S. 4, ; Almeida-Sanchez v. United III In the present case, the State argues that the warrantless search of respondent's suitcase was proper under Carroll and its progeny.[8] The police acted properlyindeed commendably in apprehending respondent and his luggage. They had ample probable cause to believe that respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana. A previously reliable informant had provided a detailed account of respondent's expected arrival at the Little Rock Airport, which account proved to be accurate in every detail, including the color of the suitcase in which respondent would be carrying the marihuana. Having probable cause to believe that contraband was being driven away in the taxi, the police were justified in stopping the vehicle, searching it on the spot, and seizing the suitcase they suspected contained contraband. See At oral argument, respondent conceded that the * stopping of the |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Arkansas v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110119/arkansas-v-sanders/ | oral argument, respondent conceded that the * stopping of the taxi and the seizure of the suitcase were constitutionally unobjectionable. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30, 44-46. The only question, therefore, is whether the police, rather than immediately searching the suitcase without a warrant, should have taken it, along with respondent, to the police station and there obtained a warrant for the search. A lawful search of luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a warrant. In we declined an invitation to extend the Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, noting that neither of the two policies supporting warrantless searches of automobiles applies to luggage. Here, as in the officers had seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their control at the time of the search. Consequently, "there was not the slightest danger that [the luggage] or its contents could have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained." 4 U.S., at 13. And, as we observed in that case, luggage is a common repository for one's personal effects, and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy. The State argues, nevertheless, that the warrantless search of respondent's suitcase was proper, not because the property searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an automobile lawfully stopped and searched on the street. In effect, the State would have us extend Carroll to allow warrantless searches of everything found within an automobile, as well as of the vehicle itself. As noted above, the Supreme of Arkansas found our decision in virtually controlling in this case.[9] The State contends, however, that *763 does not control because in that case the vehicle had remained parked at the curb where the footlocker had been placed in its trunk and that therefore no argument was made that the "automobile exception" was applicable. This has not had occasion previously to rule on the constitutionality of a warrantless search of luggage taken from an automobile lawfully stopped. Rather, the decisions to date have involved searches of some integral part of the automobile. See, e. g., South ; 423 U. S., at ; ; ; We conclude that the State has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating the need for warrantless searches of luggage properly taken from automobiles. A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in which it rides. But as we noted in the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the searchafter the police have seized the object to be searched and have it |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Arkansas v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110119/arkansas-v-sanders/ | have seized the object to be searched and have it securely within their control.[10] See 4 U.S., at 13. Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the place from which it was taken.[11] Accordingly, as a general rule there is *764 no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from other places.[12] Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from other locations. One is not less inclined to place private, personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by other means or temporarily checked or stored. Indeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for personal items when one wishes to transport them.[13] Accordingly, *765 the reasons for not requiring a warrant for the search of an automobile do not apply to searches of personal luggage taken by police from automobiles. We therefore find no justification for the extension of Carroll and its progeny to the warrantless search of one's personal luggage merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police.[] *766 In sum, we hold that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other locations. Thus, insofar as the police are entitled to search such luggage without a warrant, their actions must be justified under some exception to the warrant requirement other than that applicable to automobiles stopped on the highway. Whereas in the present casethe police, without endangering themselves or risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have detained one suspected of criminal activity and secured his suitcase, they should delay the search thereof until after judicial approval has been obtained. In this way, constitutional rights of suspects to prior judicial review of searches will be fully protected. The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme is Affirmed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in the judgment. |
per_curiam | 1,978 | 200 | per_curiam | Berry v. Doles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109927/berry-v-doles/ | This appeal presents a challenge to the scope of the remedy allowed by a three-judge District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for failure of appellees to comply with the approval provisions of 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V). In 1968, the State of Georgia enacted a statute intended to stagger the terms of the three members of the Peach County Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues. The then-existing statute, adopted in 1964, provided that all three posts were to be filled at four-year intervals. By operation of the *191 1968 amendment, the single at-large member was to be elected to a two-year term in 1968 and to a four-year term at subsequent general elections. Appellees concede, and the three-judge court found, that the 1968 statute constituted a change in voting procedures subject to the provisions of 5 and that the change had been implemented without first having been submitted for approval either to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or to the Attorney General as required by 5. Four days prior to the August 10, 1976, primary election for the two seats on the Board not including the at-large post, appellants filed this action to enforce the requirements of 5. Appellants' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were not acted upon until after the scheduled 1976 primary and general elections. On February 28, 1977, the three-judge court, without a hearing, enjoined further enforcement of the 1968 statute until such time as appellees effected compliance with 5. However, the District Court refused appellants' request to set aside the 1976 elections, noting "the rather technical changes made in the county's election law by the 1968 amendment and, more important, the apparent lack of any discriminatory purpose or effect surrounding the use of the law in the 1976 elections." In expressly limiting its order to prospective relief, the District Court also relied on our decision in On April 26, 1977, the three-judge court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration. In this Court, appellants take the position that the relief awarded in this case is wholly inadequate in failing to remedy the existing 5 violation. Appellants assert that by refusing either to set aside the 1976 election or to order that all three Board members be elected in 1978, the District Court, at least until the 1980 election, leaves undisturbed the effects of the 5 violation, thereby acknowledging that, at least for a time, local officials may successfully disregard 5 requirements. *192 Appellees urge us to |
per_curiam | 1,978 | 200 | per_curiam | Berry v. Doles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109927/berry-v-doles/ | may successfully disregard 5 requirements. *192 Appellees urge us to affirm the District Court judgment on grounds that the 1976 election involved the two Board posts which were not mentioned in the 1968 statute. Accordingly, appellees argue, election to these posts is not subject to 5. However, even assuming that the District Court had the power to effect one of the alternative remedies suggested by appellants, appellees believe that the court below was correct in refusing to do so. At our request, the United States, as amicus curiae, has filed a brief in this case. The Government takes the view, espoused by appellants, that the 1976 election was affected by the voting change prescribed in the 1968 statute and that the District Court's failure to require prompt compliance with 5 permits the violation to continue. It is the submission of the United States that the question whether the staggering of Board terms provided for by state statute in this case necessarily has a racially discriminatory effect should properly be promptly submitted to either the District Court for the District of Columbia or to the Attorney General in conformity with the approval procedures set forth in 5. In decided after we had occasion to address the remedy issue which now confronts us. We indicated in that case that "[i]n certain circumstances it might be appropriate to enter an order affording local officials an opportunity to seek federal approval and ordering a new election only if local official fail to do so or if the required federal approval is not forthcoming." -397. The circumstances present here make such a course appropriate. In this case, appellees' undisputed obligation to submit the 1968 voting law change to a forum designated by Congress has not been discharge. We conclude that the requirement of federal scrutiny imposed by 5 should be satisfied by appellees without further delay. Accordingly, we adopt the suggestion of the United States that the District Court should enter an *193 order allowing appellees 30 days within which to apply for approval of the 1968 voting change under 5. If approval is obtained, the matter will be at an end. If approval is denied, appellants are free to renew to the District Court their request for simultaneous election of all members of the Board at the 1978 general election. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed insofar as it holds that appellees have violated the approval provisions of 5 of the Voting Rights Act; the judgment is reversed insofar as it denies affirmative relief, and the case is remanded to the District |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | second_dissenting | Roberts v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109676/roberts-v-louisiana/ | The Court, feeling itself bound by the plurality opinion in has painted itself into a corner. I did not join that plurality opinion, and I decline to be so confined. I therefore dissent from the Court's disposition of the present *639 case and from its holding that the mandatory imposition of the death penalty for killing a peace officer, engaged in the performance of his lawful duties, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. I would uphold the State's power to impose such a punishment under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:30 (2) and I would reject any statements or intimations to the contrary in the Court's prior cases. The per curiam opinion asserts that "the precise question presented in this case was explicitly answered" in Stanislaus Ante, at 635. It also relies on the summary disposition of where a death sentence that had been imposed under 14:30 (2) was vacated and where it was stated that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Ante, at 635. Finally, the per curiam states that "it is essential that the capital-sentencing decision allow for consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances may be relevant to either the particular offender or the particular offense." Ante, at 637. Since 14:30 (2) does not allow for consideration of mitigating factors, the per curiam strikes down the death sentence imposed on petitioner. In my view, the question of the constitutionality of Louisiana's mandatory death penalty for killing a peace officer was not answered in Stanislaus Washington may be said to be a summary ruling on the merits, but that case was decided without the benefit of plenary consideration, and without focusing on the identity and activity of the victim. I believe its result to be incorrect as a constitutional matter and I would disapprove and withhold its further application. Stanislaus was charged and convicted under a different subsection, that is, 14:30 (1), of the Louisiana first-degree murder statute. See See also ante, at 634-635. Subsection (1) provided a mandatory death penalty in the case where the killer had a specific intent to kill or *640 to inflict great bodily harm and was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnaping, aggravated rape, or armed robbery. See ante, at 634 n. 1. Subsection (2), in contrast, provides that first-degree murder is committed when the killer has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm upon, a fireman or a peace officer who is engaged in the performance of his lawful duties. The |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | second_dissenting | Roberts v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109676/roberts-v-louisiana/ | is engaged in the performance of his lawful duties. The two subsections obviously should involve quite different considerations with regard to the lawfulness of a mandatory death penalty, even accepting the analysis set forth in the joint opinions of last Term.[*] Thus, to the extent that the plurality in Stanislaus alluded to subsections of the Louisiana law that were not before the Court, those statements are nonbinding dicta. It is indisputable that carefully focused consideration was not given to the special problem of a mandatory death sentence for one who has intentionally killed a police officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties. I therefore approach this case as a new one, not predetermined and governed by the plurality in Stanislaus Washington may present a different problem. It did decide the issue now before the Court, but it did so without the benefit of full briefing and argument, and it was one of three pending Louisiana cases treated as a cluster and routinely remanded at the Term's end in the immediate wake of Stanislaus Because an explicit finding was made that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment, perhaps Washington is not to be treated in the same way as summary affirmances were treated in I would simply inquire, as to Washington, whether its holding should not be overruled, *641 now that the Court has had the benefit of more careful and complete consideration of the issue. On the merits, for reasons I have expressed before, I would not find 14:30 (2) constitutionally defective. See See also Stanislaus -363 Furthermore, even under the opinions of last Term, I would conclude that 14:30 (2) falls within that narrow category of homicide for which a mandatory death sentence is constitutional. See ; ; Stanislaus n. 9. Since the decision in Washington is inconsistent with this view, I would overrule it. I should note that I do not read the per curiam opinion today as one deciding the issue of the constitutionality of a mandatory death sentence for a killer of a peace officer for all cases and all times. Reference to the plurality opinion in Stanislaus reveals that the Louisiana statute contained what that opinion regarded as two fatal defects: lack of an opportunity to consider mitigating factors, and standardless jury discretion inherent in the Louisiana responsive verdict system. Without the latter, as here, a different case surely is presented. Furthermore, it is evident, despite the per curiam's general statement to the contrary, that mitigating factors need not be considered in every case; even the per curiam continues to reserve |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | second_dissenting | Roberts v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109676/roberts-v-louisiana/ | in every case; even the per curiam continues to reserve the issue of a mandatory death sentence for murder by a prisoner already serving a life sentence. Ante, at 637 n. 5. Finally, it is possible that a state statute that required the jury to consider, during the guilt phase of the trial, both the aggravating circumstance of killing a peace officer and relevant mitigating circumstances would pass the plurality's test. Cf. For me, therefore, today's decision must be viewed in the context of the Court's previous criticism of the Louisiana system; *642 it need not freeze the Court into a position that condemns every statute with a mandatory death penalty for the intentional killing of a peace officer. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins, dissenting. The Court today holds that the State of Louisiana is not entitled to vindicate its substantial interests in protecting the foot soldiers of an ordered society by mandatorily sentencing their murderers to death. This is so even though the State has demonstrated to a jury in a fair trial, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a particular defendant was the murderer, and that he committed the act while possessing "a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm upon, a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his lawful duties" La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:30 (2) That holding would have shocked those who drafted the Bill of Rights on which it purports to rest, and would commend itself only to the most imaginative observer as being required by today's "evolving standards of decency." I am unable to agree that a mandatory death sentence under such circumstances violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription against "cruel and unusual punishments." I am equally unable to see how this limited application of the mandatory death statute violates even the scope of the Eighth Amendment as seen through the eyes of last Term's plurality in Nor does the brief per curiam opinion issued today demonstrate why the application of a mandatory death sentence to the criminal who intentionally murders a peace officer performing his official duties should be considered "cruel and unusual punishment" in light of either the view of society when the Eighth Amendment was passed, ; the "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude" today, ; or even the more *643 generalized "basic concept of human dignity" test relied upon last Term in striking down several more general mandatory statutes. While the arguments weighing in favor of individualized consideration for the convicted defendant are much the same here as they are for |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | second_dissenting | Roberts v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109676/roberts-v-louisiana/ | defendant are much the same here as they are for one accused of any homicide, the arguments weighing in favor of society's determination to impose a mandatory sentence for the murder of a police officer in the line of duty are far stronger than in the case of an ordinary homicide. Thus the Court's intimation that this particular issue was considered and decided last Term in Stanislaus simply does not wash. A footnoted dictum in Stanislaus discussing a different section of the Louisiana law from the one now before us scarcely rises to the level of plenary, deliberate consideration which has traditionally preceded a declaration of unconstitutionality. Such a meager basis for stare decisis would be less offensive were we not dealing with large questions of how men shall be governed, and how liberty and order should be balanced in a civilized society. But authority which might suffice to determine whether the rule against perpetuities applies to a particular devise in a will does not suffice when making a constitutional adjudication that a punishment imposed by properly enacted state law is "cruel and unusual." Mr. Justice Frankfurter wisely noted that a "footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of announcing a new constitutional doctrine," ; it is hardly a more appropriate device by which to anticipate a constitutional issue not presented by the case in which it appears. This seemingly heedless wielding of our power is least acceptable when we engage in what Mr. Justice Holmes described as "the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform." *644 Five Terms ago, in this Court invalidated the then-current system of capital punishments, condemning jury discretion as resulting in "freakish" punishment. The Louisiana Legislature has conscientiously determined, in an effort to respond to that holding, that the death sentence would be made mandatory upon the conviction of particular types of offenses, including, as in the case before us, the intentional killing of a peace officer while in the performance of his duties. For the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE WHITE for himself, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and me in his dissent in Stanislaus and by me in my dissent in I am no more persuaded now than I was then that a mandatory death sentence for all, let alone for a limited class of, persons who commit premeditated murder constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. But even were I now persuaded otherwise by the plurality's analysis last Term, and were I able to conclude that the mandatory death penalty |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | second_dissenting | Roberts v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109676/roberts-v-louisiana/ | were I able to conclude that the mandatory death penalty constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" when applied generally to all those convicted of first-degree murder, I would nonetheless disagree with today's opinion. Louisiana's decision to impose a mandatory death sentence upon one convicted of the particular offense of premeditated murder of a peace officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties is clearly not governed by the holding of Stanislaus and I do not believe that it is controlled by the reasoning of the plurality's opinion in that case. Today's opinion assumes, without analysis, that the faults of the generalized mandatory death sentence under review in Stanislaus must necessarily inhere in such a sentence imposed on those who commit this much more carefully limited and far more serious crime.[1] In words that would be *645 equally appropriate today, MR. JUSTICE WHITE noted last Term, : "Even if the character of the accused must be considered under the Eighth Amendment, surely a State is not constitutionally forbidden to provide that the commission of certain crimes conclusively establishes that the criminal's character is such that he deserves death. Moreover, quite apart from the character of a criminal, a State should constitutionally be able to conclude that the need to deter some crimes and that the likelihood that the death penalty will succeed in deterring these crimes is such that the death penalty may be made mandatory for all people who commit them. Nothing resembling a reasoned basis for the rejection of these propositions is to be found in the plurality opinion." *646 Under the analysis of last Term's plurality opinion, a State, before it is constitutionally entitled to put a murderer to death, must consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It is possible to agree with the plurality in the general case without at all conceding that it follows that a mandatory death sentence is impermissible in the specific case we have before us: the deliberate killing of a peace officer. The opinion today is willing to concede that "the fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular duties may be regarded as an aggravating circumstance." Ante, at 636. But it seems to me that the factors which entitle a State to consider it as an aggravating circumstance also entitle the State to consider it so grave an aggravating circumstance that no permutation of mitigating factors exists which would disable it from constitutionally sentencing the murderer to death. If the State would be constitutionally entitled, due to the nature of the offense, to sentence the murderer to death |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | second_dissenting | Roberts v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109676/roberts-v-louisiana/ | nature of the offense, to sentence the murderer to death after going through such a limited version of the plurality's "balancing" approach, I see no constitutional reason why the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause precludes the State from doing so without engaging in that process. The elements that differentiate this case from the Stanislaus case are easy to state. In both cases, the factors weighing on the defendant's side of the scale are constant. It is consideration of these factors alone that the opinion today apparently relies on for its holding. But this ignores the significantly different factors which weigh on the State's side of the scale. In all murder cases, and of course this one, the State has an interest in protecting its citizens from such ultimate attacks; this surely is at the core of the Lockean "social contract" idea. But other, and important, state interests exist where the victim was a peace officer performing his lawful duties. Policemen on the beat are exposed, in the service of society, to all the risks which the constant effort to prevent crime and apprehend criminals entails: Because these people *647 are literally the foot soldiers of society's defense of ordered liberty, the State has an especial interest in their protection. We are dealing here not merely with the State's determination as to whether particular conduct on the part of an individual should be punished, and in what manner, but also with what sanctions the State is entitled to bring into play to assure that there will be a police force to see that the criminal laws are enforced at all. It is no service to individual rights, or to individual liberty, to undermine what is surely the fundamental right and responsibility of any civilized government: the maintenance of order so that all may enjoy liberty and security. Learned Hand surely had it right when he observed: "And what is this liberty which must lie in the hearts of men and women? It is not the ruthless, the unbridled will; it is not freedom to do as one likes. That is the denial of liberty, and leads straight to its overthrow. A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few; as we have learned to our sorrow." The Spirit of Liberty 190 (3d ed., 1960). Policemen are both symbols and outriders of our ordered society, and they literally risk their lives in an effort to preserve it. To a degree unequaled in the ordinary first-degree murder |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | second_dissenting | Roberts v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109676/roberts-v-louisiana/ | it. To a degree unequaled in the ordinary first-degree murder presented in the Stanislaus case, the State therefore has an interest in making unmistakably clear that those who are convicted of deliberately killing police officers acting in the line of duty be forewarned that punishment, in the form of death, will be inexorable.[2] *648 This interest of the State, I think, entitled the Louisiana Legislature, in its considered judgment, to make the death penalty mandatory for those convicted of the intentional murder of a police officer. I had thought JUSTICES STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS had conceded that this responsethis need for a mandatory penaltycould be permissible when, focusing on the crime, not the criminal, they wrote last Term in Gregg, that "the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death." (Emphasis added.) I am quite unable to decipher why the Court today concludes that the intentional murder of a police officer is not one of these "certain crimes." The Court's answer appears to lie in its observation that "it is incorrect to suppose that no mitigating circumstances can exist when the victim is a police officer." Ante, at 636-637. The Court, however, has asked the wrong question. The question is not whether mitigating *649 factors might exist, but, rather, whether whatever "mitigating" factors that might exist are of sufficient force so as to constitutionally require their consideration as counterweights to the admitted aggravating circumstance. Like MR. JUSTICE WHITE, I am unable to believe that a State is not entitled to determine that the premeditated murder of a peace officer is so heinous and intolerable a crime that no combination of mitigating factors can overcome the demonstration "that the criminal's character is such that he deserves death." As an example of a mitigating factor which, presumably, may "overcome" the aggravating factor inherent in the murder of a peace officer, the Court today gives us the astonishing suggestion of "the existence of circumstances which the offender reasonably believed provided a moral justification for his conduct." Ante, at 637. I cannot believe that States are constitutionally required to allow a defense, even at the sentencing stage, which depends on nothing more than the convict's moral belief that he was entitled to kill a peace officer in cold blood. John Wilkes Booth may well have thought he was morally justified in murdering Abraham Lincoln, whom, while fleeing from the stage of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | second_dissenting | Roberts v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109676/roberts-v-louisiana/ | murdering Abraham Lincoln, whom, while fleeing from the stage of Ford's Theater, he characterized as a "tyrant"; I am appalled to believe that the Constitution would have required the Government to allow him to argue that as a "mitigating factor" before it could sentence him to death if he were found guilty. I am equally appalled that a State should be required to instruct a jury that such individual beliefs must or should be considered as a possible balancing factor against the admittedly proper aggravating factor. The historical and legal content of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause was stretched to the breaking point by the plurality's opinion in the Stanislaus case last Term. Today this judicially created superstructure, designed and erected more than 180 years after the Bill of Rights was *650 adopted, is tortured beyond permissible limits of judicial review. There is nothing in the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment which disables a legislature from imposing a mandatory death sentence on a defendant convicted after a fair trial of deliberately murdering a police officer. |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Netherland v. Tuggle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117969/netherland-v-tuggle/ | Because there is no support in the record for the conclusion that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it granted a stay of execution to enable respondent Tuggle to file a petition for certiorari, I respectfully dissent. The fact that the respondent has substantial grounds for challenging the constitutionality of his death sentence is demonstrated both by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the District Court and by the 19-page opinion filed by the Court of Appeals. Promptly after that opinion was announced, respondent filed a motion for a stay of execution supported by an explanation of why "the three-part inquiry," ante this page, described in warranted *953 that relief. It is disrespectful to the Court of Appeals to assume that its grant of that motion did not implicitly endorse the reasoning in respondent's moving papers. The stay of execution would merely have given respondent the opportunity to seek the review in this Court that has been authorized by Congress and our Rules. In my opinion it is both unwise and unfair to require a death row inmate who has acted diligently at all stages of his litigation to prepare and file a petition raising substantial claims more promptly than other litigants. I would deny the warden's application. Justice Souter would deny the application to vacate stay of execution. Justice Breyer, for reasons stated in the first paragraph of Justice Stevens' dissent, votes to deny the application |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | dissenting | Monge v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118243/monge-v-california/ | "The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding." *735[1] Today, the Court ignores this cardinal principle. In this case, the prosecution attempted to prove that petitioner had previously been convicted of a qualifying felony. If the prosecution had proved this fact, petitioner would have automatically been sentenced to an additional five years in prison.[2] The prosecution, however, failed to prove its case.[3] Consequently, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a "`second bite at the apple.' " Until today, the Court has never held that a retrial or resentencing is permissible when the evidence in the first proceeding was insufficient; instead, the Court has consistently drawn a line between insufficiency of the evidence and legal errors that infect the first proceeding.[4] In his unanimous *736 opinion for the Court in Chief Justice Burger emphasized this critical difference, i. e., "between reversals due to trial error and those resulting from evidentiary insufficiency." He specifically noted "that the failure to make this distinction has contributed substantially to the present state of conceptual confusion existing in this area of the law," ib and concluded that in order to hold, as we did, "that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient," it was necessary to overrule several prior cases, The Court's opinion today reflects the same failure to recognize the critical importance of this distinction. I agree that California's decision to "implement procedural safeguards to protect defendants who may face dramatic increases in their sentences as a result of recidivism enhancements," ante, at 734, should not create a constitutional obligation that would not otherwise exist. But the fact that so many States have done sonot just recently, but for many years[5]is powerful evidence that they were simply responding to the traditional understanding of fundamental fairness that produced decisions such as In re Winship,[6] and[7] It is this same traditional understanding of fundamental fairnessdating back centuries to the common-law plea of autrefois acquit and buttressed by a special interest in finalitythat undergirds the Double Jeopardy Clause.[8] I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Burger | 1,982 | 12 | dissenting | Eddings v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110641/eddings-v-oklahoma/ | It is important at the outset to remember as the Court does not the narrow question on which we granted certiorari. We took care to limit our consideration to whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of a death sentence on an offender because he was 16 years old in 1977 at the time he committed the offense; review of all other questions raised in the petition for certiorari was denied. Yet the Court today goes beyond the issue on which review was sought and granted to decide the case on a point raised for the first time in petitioner's brief to this Court. This claim was neither presented to the Oklahoma courts nor presented to this Court in the petition for certiorari.[1] Relying on this "11th-hour" claim, the Court strains to construct a plausible legal theory to support its mandate for the relief granted. I In we considered whether Ohio violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by sentencing Lockett to death under a statute that "narrowly limit[ed] the sentencer's discretion to consider the *121 circumstances of the crime and the record and character of the offender as mitigating factors." The statute at issue, Ohio Rev. Code 2929.03-2929.04(B) (1975), required the trial court to impose the death penalty upon Lockett's conviction for "aggravated murder with specifications,"[2] unless it found "that (1) the victim had induced or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that Lockett would have committed the offense but for the fact that she `was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation,' or (3) the offense was `primarily the product of [Lockett's] psychosis or mental deficiency.' " -594. It was plain that although guilty of felony homicide under Ohio law, Lockett had played a relatively minor role in a robbery which resulted in a homicide actually perpetrated by the hand of another. Lockett had previously committed no major offenses; in addition, a psychological report described her "prognosis for rehabilitation" as "favorable." However, since she was not found to have acted under duress, did not suffer from "psychosis," and was not "mentally deficient," the sentencing judge concluded that he had " `no alternative, whether [he] like[d] the law or not' but to impose the death penalty." We held in Lockett that the "Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." We therefore found the Ohio statute |
Justice Burger | 1,982 | 12 | dissenting | Eddings v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110641/eddings-v-oklahoma/ | sentence less than death." We therefore found the Ohio statute flawed, because *122 it did not permit individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances such as the defendant's comparatively minor role in the offense, lack of intent to kill the victim, or age. We did not, however, undertake to dictate the weight that a sentencing court must ascribe to the various factors that might be categorized as "mitigating," nor did we in any way suggest that this Court may substitute its sentencing judgment for that of state courts in capital cases. In contrast to the Ohio statute at issue in Lockett, the Oklahoma death penalty statute provides: "In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, 701.10 The statute further provides that "[u]nless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act is [found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt] or if it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed." 701.11. This provision, of course, instructs the sentencer to weigh the mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant against the aggravating circumstances proved by the State.[3] The Oklahoma statute thus contains provisions virtually identical to those cited with approval in Lockett, as examples of proper legislation which highlighted the Ohio statute's "constitutional infirmities." -607. Indeed, the Court does not contend that the Oklahoma sentencing *123 provisions are inconsistent with Lockett. Moreover, the Court recognizes that, as mandated by the Oklahoma statute, Eddings was permitted to present "substantial evidence at the [sentencing] hearing of his troubled youth." Ante, at 107.[4] In its attempt to make out a violation of Lockett, the Court relies entirely on a single sentence of the trial court's opinion delivered from the bench at the close of the sentencing hearing. After discussing the aggravated nature of petitioner's offense, and noting that he had "given very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular crime was committed," the trial judge said that he could not *124 "be persuaded entirely by the fact that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent background." App. 189. From this statement, the Court concludes "it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, |
Justice Burger | 1,982 | 12 | dissenting | Eddings v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110641/eddings-v-oklahoma/ | mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to consider the evidence." Ante, at 113. This is simply not a correct characterization of the sentencing judge's action. In its parsing of the trial court's oral statement, the Court ignores the fact that the judge was delivering his opinion extemporaneously from the bench, and could not be expected to frame each utterance with the specificity and precision that might be expected of a written opinion or statute. Extemporaneous courtroom statements are not often models of clarity. Nor does the Court give any weight to the fact that the trial court had spent considerable time listening to the testimony of a probation officer and various mental health professionals who described Eddings' personality and family history an obviously meaningless exercise if, as the Court asserts, the judge believed he was barred "as a matter of law" from "considering" their testimony. Yet even examined in isolation, the trial court's statement is at best ambiguous;[5] it can just as easily be read to say that, while the court *125 had taken account of Eddings' unfortunate childhood, it did not consider that either his youth or his family background was sufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances that the evidence revealed. Certainly nothing in Lockett would preclude the court from making such a determination. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals independently examined the evidence of "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors presented at Eddings' sentencing hearing. After reviewing the testimony concerning Eddings' personality and family background, and after referring to the trial court's discussion of mitigating circumstances, it stated that while Eddings' "family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the way he did, it does not excuse his behavior." From this the Court concludes that "the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a legal excuse from criminal liability." Ante, at 113.[6] However, there is no reason to read that court's statements as reflecting anything more than a conclusion that Eddings' background was not a sufficiently mitigating factor to tip the scales, given the aggravating circumstances, including Eddings' statements immediately before the killing.[7] The Court of Criminal Appeals most assuredly did not, as the Court's opinion suggests, hold that this "evidence in mitigation was not relevant," see ibid.; indeed, had the Court of Criminal Appeals thought the evidence irrelevant, *126 it is unlikely that it would have spent several paragraphs summarizing it. The Court's opinion offers no reasonable explanation for its |
Justice Burger | 1,982 | 12 | dissenting | Eddings v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110641/eddings-v-oklahoma/ | it. The Court's opinion offers no reasonable explanation for its assumption that the Court of Criminal Appeals considered itself bound by some unstated legal principle not to "consider" Eddings' background. To be sure, neither the Court of Criminal Appeals nor the trial court labeled Eddings' family background and personality disturbance as "mitigating factors." It is plain to me, however, that this was purely a matter of semantics associated with the rational belief that "evidence in mitigation" must rise to a certain level of persuasiveness before it can be said to constitute a "mitigating circumstance." In contrast, the Court seems to require that any potentially mitigating evidence be described as a "mitigating factor" regardless of its weight; the insubstantiality of the evidence is simply to be a factor in the process of weighing the evidence against aggravating circumstances. Yet if this is all the Court's opinion stands for, it provides scant support for the result reached. For it is clearly the choice of the Oklahoma courts a choice not inconsistent with Lockett or any other decision of this Court to accord relatively little weight to Eddings' family background and emotional problems as balanced against the circumstances of his crime and his potential for future dangerousness.[8] *127 II It can never be less than the most painful of our duties to pass on capital cases, and the more so in a case such as this one. However, there comes a time in every case when a court must "bite the bullet." Whether the Court's remand will serve any useful purpose remains to be seen, for petitioner has already been given an opportunity to introduce whatever evidence he considered relevant to the sentencing determination. Two Oklahoma courts have weighed that evidence and found it insufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances shown by the State. The Court's opinion makes clear that some Justices who join it would not have imposed the death penalty had they sat as the sentencing authority, see, e. g., ante, at 115-116. Indeed, *128 I am not sure I would have done so. But the Constitution does not authorize us to determine whether sentences imposed by state courts are sentences we consider "appropriate"; our only authority is to decide whether they are constitutional under the Eight Amendment. The Court stops far short of suggesting that there is any constitutional proscription against imposition of the death penalty on a person who was under age 18 when the murder was committed. In the last analysis, the Court is forced to conclude that it is "the state courts [which] must |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Miller v. Fenton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111542/miller-v-fenton/ | Under 28 U.S. C. 2254(d), state-court findings of fact "shall be presumed to be correct" in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless one of eight enumerated exceptions applies.[1] The question presented is whether the voluntariness *10 of a confession is an issue of fact entitled to the 2254(d) presumption. I On the morning of August 13, 1973, a stranger approached the rural New Jersey home of 17-year-old Deborah Margolin and told her that a heifer was loose at the foot of her driveway. She set out alone to investigate and never returned. Later that day, her mutilated body was found in a nearby stream. The victim's brothers were able to provide a description of the stranger's car and clothing. Based on this information, officers of the New Jersey State Police tentatively identified petitioner and, later that evening, found him at his place of employment. Petitioner responded to the officers' preliminary inquiries and agreed to return to the police barracks for further questioning. Approximately two hours later, Detective Charles Boyce led petitioner to an interrogation room and informed him of his Miranda rights. Petitioner inquired about the scope of his privilege to remain silent and then executed a written waiver, the validity of which is not at issue. A 58 minute long interrogation session ensued. During the course of the interview, Detective Boyce told petitioner that Ms. Margolin had just died. That statement, which Boyce knew to be untrue, supported another officer's earlier, and equally false, suggestion that the victim was still alive and could identify her attacker. App. 1-17; Record 109 and 305. Detective Boyce also told petitioner that he had been identified at the Margolin home earlier in the day. In fact, Ms. Margolin's brothers had only provided a general description of the stranger's car and clothing. Finally, Detective Boyce indicated that blood stains had been found on petitioner's front stoop. No such evidence was introduced at trial, and respondents do not now contend that it ever in fact existed. Throughout the interview, Detective Boyce presented himself as sympathetic to petitioner's plight. On several *107 occasions, he stated that he did not consider petitioner to be a criminal because the perpetrator of the deed had a "mental problem" and needed medical help rather than punishment. App. 19.[2] Eventually, petitioner fully confessed to the crime. After doing so, he lapsed into what Detective Boyce described as a "state of shock." Record 84-85. Repeated *108 efforts to rouse him from his stupor failed, and the police summoned an ambulance to transport him to the hospital. The trial court rejected petitioner's motion |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Miller v. Fenton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111542/miller-v-fenton/ | him to the hospital. The trial court rejected petitioner's motion to suppress the confession, and the jury found petitioner guilty of murder in the first degree. The Superior Court Appellate Division reversed, finding as a matter of law that the confession was the result of "intense and mind bending psychological compulsion" and therefore was impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. App. 53. Over three dissents, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed again. After examining the "totality of all the surrounding circumstances," including petitioner's educational level, age, and awareness of his Miranda rights, the court found that the interrogation "did not exceed proper bounds," and that the resulting confession, being voluntary, had been properly admitted into evidence. -224. Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. That court dismissed the application without an evidentiary hearing. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Relying on Circuit precedent,[3] the court held that the voluntariness of a confession is a "factual issue" within the meaning of 28 U.S. C. 2254(d). Accordingly, federal review of the New Jersey Supreme Court's determination that petitioner's confession was voluntary was "limited to whether the state court applied the proper legal test, and whether [its] factual conclusions. [were] supported on the record as a whole." Under this standard, the court concluded, *109 the District Court's denial of the petition for habeas relief was proper. Because the Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions on whether state-court voluntariness determinations are entitled to the 2254(d) presumption of correctness, and because of the issue's importance to the administration of criminal justice, we granted certiorari. Compare "([V]oluntariness of a confession is a mixed question of law and fact"), with (CA2) (state-court voluntariness determination entitled to 2254(d) presumption), cert. denied, We now reverse and remand. II This Court has long held that certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. was the wellspring of this notion, now deeply embedded in our criminal law. Faced with statements extracted by beatings and other forms of physical and psychological torture, the Court held that confessions procured by means "revolting to the sense of justice" could not be used to secure a conviction. On numerous subsequent occasions the Court has set aside convictions secured through the admission of an improperly obtained confession. See, e. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Miller v. Fenton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111542/miller-v-fenton/ | through the admission of an improperly obtained confession. See, e. g., ; ; ; Although these decisions framed the legal inquiry in a variety of different ways, usually through the "convenient shorthand" of asking whether the confession was "involuntary," the Court's analysis has *110 consistently been animated by the view that "ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system," and that, accordingly, tactics for eliciting inculpatory statements must fall within the broad constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness. Indeed, even after holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies in the context of custodial interrogations, and is binding on the States, the Court has continued to measure confessions against the requirements of due process. See, e. g., ; (197) Without exception, the Court's confession cases hold that the ultimate issue of "voluntariness" is a legal question requiring independent federal determination. See, e. g., at 5-; As recently as the Court reaffirmed that it was "not bound by" a state-court voluntariness finding and reiterated its historic "duty to make an independent evaluation of the record." That duty, as Mincey makes explicit, is not limited to instances in which the claim is that the police conduct was "inherently coercive." It applies equally when the interrogation techniques were improper only because, in the particular circumstances of the case, the confession is unlikely to have been the product of a free and rational will. See Because the ultimate issue in both categories of cases is the same whether the State has obtained the confession in a manner that comports with due process the decisions leave no doubt that our independent obligation to decide the constitutional question is identical. Mincey, Ashcraft, and many of the early decisions applying the independent-determination rule in confession cases came *111 to the Court on direct appeal from state-court judgments. The rule, however, is no less firmly established in cases coming to the federal system on application for a writ of habeas corpus. 4 U.S. 737 resolved the issue with unmistakable clarity. There, the State had admitted into evidence a confession elicited from an impoverished, mentally deficient suspect who had been held incommunicado for 1 days with barely adequate nourishment. Expressly relying on the direct-appeal cases, the Court stated unequivocally that state-court determinations concerning the ultimate question of the voluntariness of a confession are not binding in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Davis was decided four months before 28 U.S. C. 2254(d) was signed into law. Act of Nov. 2, 19, Stat. 1105. Respondent contends that, whatever may have been |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Miller v. Fenton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111542/miller-v-fenton/ | 19, Stat. 1105. Respondent contends that, whatever may have been the case prior to 19, the enactment of 2254(d) in that year fundamentally altered the nature of federal habeas review of state voluntariness findings. That suggestion finds no support in this Court's decisions. See, e. g., 394 U.S. (199) ; (199) More importantly, the history of 2254(d) undermines any argument that Congress intended that the ultimate question of the admissibility of a confession be treated a "factual issue" within the meaning of that provision. The 19 amendment was an almost verbatim codification of the standards delineated in for determining when a district court must hold an evidentiary hearing before acting on a habeas petition. When a hearing is not obligatory, Townsend held, the federal court "ordinarily should accept the facts as found" in the state proceeding. Congress elevated that exhortation into a mandatory presumption of *112 correctness. But there is absolutely no indication that it intended to alter Townsend's understanding that the "ultimate constitutional question" of the admissibility of a confession was a "mixed questio[n] of fact and law" subject to plenary federal review. and n. In short, an unbroken line of cases, coming to this Court both on direct appeal and on review of applications to lower federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus, forecloses the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the "voluntariness" of a confession merits something less than independent federal To be sure, subsidiary factual questions, such as whether a drug has the properties of a truth serum, at 30, or whether in fact the police engaged in the intimidation tactics alleged by the defendant, 410 U.S. 90, 93-95 are entitled to the 2254(d) presumption. And the federal habeas court, should, of course, give great weight to the considered conclusions of a coequal state judiciary. 37 U.S. 58, 05 But, as we now reaffirm, the ultimate question whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the Constitution is a matter for independent federal determination. III The Court of Appeals recognized that treating the voluntariness of a confession as an issue of fact was difficult to square with "fifty years of caselaw" in this It believed, however, that this substantial body of contrary precedent was not controlling in light of our more recent decisions addressing the scope of the 2254(d) presumption of correctness. See 49 U.S. 412, ; 47 U.S. 1025 *113 (impartiality of an individual juror); 44 U.S. 114 (effect of ex parte communication on impartiality of individual juror); 42 U.S. 111 (competency to |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Miller v. Fenton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111542/miller-v-fenton/ | on impartiality of individual juror); 42 U.S. 111 (competency to stand trial); We acknowledge that the Court has not charted an entirely clear course in this area. We reject, however, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that these casespecific holdings tacitly overturned the longstanding rule that the voluntariness of a confession is a matter for independent federal determination. In the 2254(d) context, as elsewhere, the appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive. See Bose 4 U.S. 485 ; 322 U.S. 5, 71 A few principles, however, are by now well established. For example, that an issue involves an inquiry into state of mind is not at all inconsistent with treating it as a question of fact. See, e. g., Equally clearly, an issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question. See Dayton Board of 443 U.S. But beyond these elemental propositions, negative in form, the Court has yet to arrive at "a rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion." 45 U.S. 273, Perhaps much of the difficulty in this area stems from the practical truth that the decision to label an issue a "question of law," a "question of fact," or a "mixed question of law and fact" is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of *114 analysis. See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, At least in those instances in which Congress has not spoken and in which the issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question. Where, for example, as with proof of actual malice in First Amendment libel cases, the relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through its application to the particular circumstances of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give the trier of fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip a federal appellate court of its primary function as an expositor of law. See Bose 4 U. S., at 503. Similarly, on rare occasions in years past the Court has justified independent federal or appellate review as a means of compensating for "perceived shortcomings of the trier of fact by way of bias or some other factor." See, e. g., 373 U. S., at ; 3 U.S. 49, Cf. In contrast, other |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Miller v. Fenton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111542/miller-v-fenton/ | S., at ; 3 U.S. 49, Cf. In contrast, other considerations often suggest the appropriateness of resolving close questions concerning the status of an issue as one of "law" or "fact" in favor of extending deference to the trial court. When, for example, the issue involves the credibility of witnesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process of applying law to fact to the trial court and according its determinations presumptive weight. and are illustrative. There the Court stressed that the state trial judge is in a position to assess juror bias that is far superior to that of federal judges reviewing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Principally *115 for that reason, the decisions held, juror bias merits treatment as a "factual issue" within the meaning of 2254(d) notwithstanding the intimate connection between such determinations and the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury. For several reasons we think that it would be inappropriate to abandon the Court's longstanding position that the ultimate question of the admissibility of a confession merits treatment as a legal inquiry requiring plenary federal review. We note at the outset that we do not write on a clean slate. "Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts should not lightly overrule past decisions." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Thus, even assuming that contemporary considerations supported respondent's construction of the statute, nearly a half century of unwavering precedent weighs heavily against any suggestion that we now discard the settled rule in this area. Moreover, as previously noted, Congress patterned 2254(d) after a case that clearly assumed that the voluntariness of a confession was an issue for independent federal determination. Thus, not only are stare decisis concerns compelling, but, unlike in 44 U.S. 114 or any of our other recent 2254(d) cases, in the confession context we have the benefit of some congressional guidance in resolving whether the disputed issue falls outside of the scope of the 2254(d) presumption. Although the history of that provision is not without its ambiguities, it is certainly clear enough to tip the scales in favor of treating the voluntariness of a confession as beyond the reach of 2254(d). In addition to considerations of stare decisis and congressional intent, the nature of the inquiry itself lends support to the conclusion that "voluntariness" is a legal question meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Although sometimes framed as an issue of *11 "psychological fact," 37 U. S., at 03, the dispositive question of the voluntariness of a |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Miller v. Fenton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111542/miller-v-fenton/ | at 03, the dispositive question of the voluntariness of a confession has always had a uniquely legal dimension. It is telling that in confession cases coming from the States, this Court has consistently looked to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to test admissibility. See, e. g., 437 U. S., The locus of the right is significant because it reflects the Court's consistently held view that the admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the defendant's will was in fact overborne. See, e. g., (192) ; at 05 This hybrid quality of the voluntariness inquiry,[4] subsuming, as it does, a "complex of values," 31 U. S., at itself militates against treating the question as one of simple historical fact. Putting to one side whether "voluntariness" is analytically more akin to a fact or a legal conclusion, the practical considerations that have led us to find other issues within the scope of the 2254(d) presumption are absent in the confession context. First, unlike the impartiality of a given juror, 47 U. S., at 103, or competency to stand trial, 42 U. S., at 117, assessments of credibility *117 and demeanor are not crucial to the proper resolution of the ultimate issue of "voluntariness." Of course, subsidiary questions, such as the length and circumstances of the interrogation, the defendant's prior experience with the legal process, and familiarity with the Miranda warnings, often require the resolution of conflicting testimony of police and defendant. The law is therefore clear that state-court findings on such matters are conclusive on the habeas court if fairly supported in the record and if the other circumstances enumerated in 2254(d) are inapplicable. But once such underlying factual issues have been resolved, and the moment comes for determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the confession was obtained in a manner consistent with the Constitution, the state-court judge is not in an appreciably better position than the federal habeas court to make that determination. Second, the allocution of a guilty plea, the adjudication of competency to stand trial, and the determination of juror bias, 49 U.S. 412 take place in open court on a full record. In marked contrast, the critical events surrounding the taking of a confession almost invariably occur in a secret and inherently more coercive environment. 4 U. S., at 458. These circumstances, standing alone, cannot be dispositive |
Justice O'Connor | 1,985 | 14 | majority | Miller v. Fenton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111542/miller-v-fenton/ | S., at 458. These circumstances, standing alone, cannot be dispositive of the question whether a particular issue falls within the reach of 2254(d). However, together with the inevitable and understandable reluctance to exclude an otherwise reliable admission of guilt, 378 U.S. 1 they elevate the risk that erroneous resolution of the voluntariness question might inadvertently frustrate the protection of the federal right. See 373 U. S., at ; 31 U.S. 547 We reiterate our confidence that state judges, no less than their federal counterparts, will properly discharge their duty to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. We *118 note only that in the confession context, independent federal review has traditionally played an important parallel role in protecting the rights at stake when the prosecution secures a conviction through the defendant's own admissions. IV After defending at length its conclusion that the voluntariness of a confession was entitled to the 2254(d) presumption, and after carefully analyzing the petitioner's confession under that standard, the Court of Appeals suggested in a brief footnote that it "would reach the same result" even were it to give the issue plenary 741 F.2d, at 147, n. 21. Inasmuch as it is not clear from this language that the court did in fact independently evaluate the admissibility of the confession, and because, in any event, we think that the case warrants fuller analysis under the appropriate standard, we reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Time, Inc. v. Pape | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108276/time-inc-v-pape/ | In November 1961, the United States Commission on Civil Rights issued the fifth volume of its Report for that year, a document entitled Justice. A part of Justice was devoted to a study of "police brutality and related private violence," and contained the following paragraph: "Search, seizure, and violence: Chicago, 1958. The Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Monroe v. Pape on February 20, 1961. Although this decision did not finally dispose of the case, it did permit the plaintiff to sue several Chicago police officers for violation of the Federal Civil Rights Acts on the basis of a complaint which alleged that: ". [O]n October 29, 1958, at 5:45 a. m., thirteen Chicago police officers led by Deputy Chief of Detectives *281 Pape, broke through two doors of the Monroe apartment, woke the Monroe couple with flashlights, and forced them at gunpoint to leave their bed and stand naked in the center of the living room; that the officers roused the six Monroe children and herded them into the living room; that Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight, calling him `nigger' and `black boy'; that another officer pushed Mrs. Monroe; that other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the floor; that the police ransacked every room, throwing clothing from closets to the floor, dumping drawers, ripping mattress covers; that Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on `open' charges for ten hours, during which time he was interrogated about a murder and exhibited in lineups; that he was not brought before a magistrate, although numerous magistrate's courts were accessible; that he was not advised of his procedural rights; that he was not permitted to call his family or an attorney; that he was subsequently released without criminal charges having been filed against him." Justice 20-21. A week later, Time, a weekly news magazine, carried a report of the Commission's new publication. The Time article began: "The new paperback book has 307 pages and the simple title Justice. It is the last of five volumes in the second report of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, first created by Congress in 1957. Justice carries a chilling text about police brutality in both the South and the Northand it stands as a grave indictment, since its facts were carefully investigated *282 by field agents and it was signed by all six of the noted educators who comprise the commission." There followed a description, with numerous direct quotations, of one of the incidents |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Time, Inc. v. Pape | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108276/time-inc-v-pape/ | description, with numerous direct quotations, of one of the incidents described in Justice, and then the following account of the Monroe incident: "Shifting to the North, the report cites Chicago police treatment of Negro James Monroe and his family, who were awakened in their West Side apartment at 5:45 a. m. by 13 police officers, ostensibly investigating a murder. The police, says Justice, `broke through two doors, woke the Monroe couple with flashlights' " The Time article went on to quote at length from the summary of the Monroe complaint, without indicating in any way that the charges were those made by Monroe rather than independent findings of the Commission. Pape sued Time for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, there being diversity of citizenship. Time moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the article was fair comment on a government report and therefore privileged under Illinois law; the District Court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. After remand, this Court decided New York and on the basis of that decision the District Court granted Time's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals again reversed, holding that there must be a trial on the question of whether Time's failure to make clear that it was reporting no more than allegations showed "actual malice." At the trial, Pape called the policemen who had participated in the Monroe raid. They all testified that nothing resembling the events described in the Time *2 article as findings of the Commission had occurred.[*] There was also extensive testimony from the Time staff member who had written the article and from the "researcher" who had been responsible for checking its factual accuracy. The author testified that he had written the article on the basis of the Justice report itself, a Commission press release accompanying the report, and a New York news story describing Justice. He conceded that he knew the meanings of the words "alleged" and "complaint," but denied that the Time article was false, given the full context of the Justice report. The researcher testified that she had consulted several newspaper articles describing Monroe's claims about the raid, and several articles describing Pape's previous career. She said that she had also read two dispatches from Time's Chicago correspondent, one of them describing Monroe's charges without comment as to their truth and the other asserting as fact that the events had actually occurred. She conceded that she was aware of the omission of the word "alleged" in |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Time, Inc. v. Pape | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108276/time-inc-v-pape/ | was aware of the omission of the word "alleged" in the Time article, but said that she believed the article to have been true as written. At the close of the evidence, the District Court granted Time's motion for a directed verdict, and Pape appealed for a third time. The Court of Appeals again reversed the District Court, holding that it was for the jury to determine whether Time's omission of the word "alleged" showed "actual malice." We granted certiorari in order to decide the constitutional issue presented under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. *284 The District Court and the Court of Appeals were in agreement that the plaintiff Pape was a "public official" by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of Detectives of the Chicago Police Department, and that the charges contained in the Monroe complaint, the Justice report, and the Time story concerned his "official conduct." The two courts differed only in their application of the rule of New York which "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." The only question before us, therefore, is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied this constitutional rule to the facts of this case in reversing the directed verdict for the defendant. Inquiries of this kind are familiar under the settled principle that "[i]n cases in which there is a claim of denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, this Court is not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will re-examine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are founded." Cf. -272. And in cases involving the area of tension between the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the one hand and state defamation laws on the other, we have frequently had occasion to review "the evidence in the record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment" for the plaintiff. New York ; Beckley ; St. U.S. 727; Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing The Time news article reported as a charge by the Commission what was, in its literal terms, a description *285 by the Commission of the allegations in a complaint filed by a plaintiff in a civil rights action. This situation differs in a number of respects from the conventional libel case. First, the publication sued on was not Time's independent report of the Monroe episode, but its report of what the Civil Rights Commission had said about that |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Time, Inc. v. Pape | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108276/time-inc-v-pape/ | of what the Civil Rights Commission had said about that episode. Second, the alleged damage to reputation was not that arising from mere publication, but rather that resulting from attribution of the Monroe accusations to an authoritative official source. Finally, Time made no claim of good-faith error or mere negligence. Both the author of the article and the researcher admitted an awareness at the time of publication that the wording of the Commission Report had been significantly altered, but insisted that its real meaning had not been changed. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was obvious that the omission of the word "allegation" or some equivalent was a "falsification" of the Report. Since the omission was admittedly conscious and deliberate, the only remaining question in the court's view was whether there had been "malice" in the sense of an "intent to inflict harm through falsehood." Such an intent, the court thought, might reasonably be inferred from the very act of deliberate omission, and the issue of malice was consequently one for the jury. Analysis of this kind may be adequate when the alleged libel purports to be an eyewitness or other direct account of events that speak for themselves. For example, in St. it made good sense to separate the question of the truth of St. 's charges of corruption and official misbehavior from the question of whether he had an adequate basis to believe them true. But a vast amount of what is published in the daily and periodical press purports to be descriptive of what somebody said rather than of what anybody did. Indeed, *286 perhaps the largest share of news concerning the doings of government appears in the form of accounts of reports, speeches, press conferences, and the like. The question of the "truth" of such an indirect newspaper report presents rather complicated problems. A press report of what someone has said about an underlying event of news value can contain an almost infinite variety of shadings. Where the source of the news makes bald assertions of factsuch as that a policeman has arrested a certain man on a criminal charge there may be no difficulty. But where the source itself has engaged in qualifying the information released, complexities ramify. Any departure from full direct quotation of the words of the source, with all its qualifying language, inevitably confronts the publisher with a set of choices. The Civil Rights Commission's Justice report is a typical example of these problems. The underlying story that gave the report newsworthiness was the picture of police violence against citizens. Many |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Time, Inc. v. Pape | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108276/time-inc-v-pape/ | newsworthiness was the picture of police violence against citizens. Many of the incidents included were quite clearly designed to shock, anger, and alarm the reader, indeed to move him into a position of support for specific legislative recommendations of the Commission. Yet the attitude of the Commission toward the factual verity of the episodes recounted was anything but straightforward. First, the episodes were presented in the context of a report which from the first page purported to be dealing with a problem of unquestionable reality and seriousness: "In 1931 President Hoover's Wickersham Committee found extensive evidence of police lawlessness, including unjustified violence. Sixteen years later another Presidential Committee, this one appointed by President Truman, concluded that police brutality, especially against the unpopular, the weak, and the defenseless, was a distressing problem. And *287 now in 1961 this Commission must report that police brutality is still a serious problem throughout the United States." Justice 1. Two pages later, the report said that "The Commission is particularly impressed by the fact that most police officers never resort to brutal practices. Because of this fact, instances of brutality or discrimination in law enforcement stand out in bold relief. It is hoped that by focusing the attention of the President, the Congress, and the public on these remaining incongruities, this Report may contribute to their correction." This process of focusing attention began on the next Page with the chapter heading, in large type: "UNLAWFUL POLICE VIOLENCE." There followed the crucial description of the foundations on which the ensuing reports were based: "In the text of this chapter the Commission briefly describes the alleged facts in typical cases of police brutality. They are presented in the belief that they contribute to an understanding of the problem. The allegations of misconduct are supported in several cases by criminal convictions or findings by impartial agencies; in others, by sworn testimony, affidavits from eye witnesses, or by staff field investigations. In no case has the Commission determined conclusively whether the complainants or the officers were correct in their statements. This is the function of a court. The Commission is of the opinion, however, that the allegations appeared substantial enough to justify discussion in this study." This statement may fairly be characterized as extravagantly ambiguous. On the one hand, what was to follow was " typical cases of police brutality," each *288 of which "contribute[s] to an understanding of the problem," and was "substantial enough to justify discussion" in the study. A range of sources was described, each of a nature to inspire confidence in the reader. But, the |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Time, Inc. v. Pape | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108276/time-inc-v-pape/ | a nature to inspire confidence in the reader. But, the reader was nonetheless told that these were "alleged facts," "allegations of misconduct," which had not been "determined conclusively" to be "correct." The suggestion that such a conclusive determination could be made only by a court capped the confusion: in context it was impossible to know whether the Commission was seeking to encourage belief or skepticism regarding the incidents about to be described. Turning the page, the reader was confronted with another heading in capitals, "PATTERNS OF POLICE BRUTALITY," and then the descriptions of the various incidents began. Each had an italicized heading (e. g., "The killing of a Negro in Georgia: 1943") followed by an account giving both sides of the story and carefully describing all facts as "alleged" or using direct quotations. The tone of total neutrality as to the truth or falsity of the claims of brutality was frequently marred, however, by remarks that appeared to indicate the Commission's unexpressed views. At the end of a description entitled "The killing of a Negro in Georgia: 1958," for example, the report said, "[n]o local disciplinary or criminal action was taken against any of the officers involved. The attitude of local authorities toward police was protective in this and several other cases of alleged brutality that occurred within a brief period" at The description of the Monroe incident bore the italicized title: "Search, seizure, and violence: Chicago, 1958." Unlike the reports of the other incidents, however, this report limited itself to the summary of a plaintiff's complaint in a lawsuit, as indicated at the outset of this opinion. No attempt was made to give any other version *289 of the story, and the next report ("The killing of a Negro in Cleveland: 1959") followed immediately after the end of the quotation. In a chapter entitled "Conclusions," the Commission set forth its findings and recommendations. These included a finding that "police brutality by some State and local officers presents a serious and continuing problem in many parts of the United States. Both whites and Negroes are the victims, but Negroes are the victims of such brutality far more, proportionately, than any other group in American society." The recommendations included proposals for a grant-in-aid program to improve the quality of state and local police forces and for passage of a federal statute outlawing illegal police violence. at 109-2. Since the series of incidents described earlier in the report was the only evidence the Commission presented in support of its findings and recommendations, there was a logically inevitable implication that the Commission must |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Time, Inc. v. Pape | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108276/time-inc-v-pape/ | there was a logically inevitable implication that the Commission must have believed that the incidents described had in truth occurred. In light of the totality of what was said in Justice, we cannot agree that, when Time failed to state that the Commission in reporting the Monroe incident had technically confined itself to the allegations of a complaint, Time engaged in a "falsification" sufficient in itself to sustain a jury finding of "actual malice." The author of the Time article testified, in substance, that the context of the report of the Monroe incident indicated to him that the Commission believed that the incident had occurred as described. He therefore denied that he had falsified the report when he omitted the word "alleged." The Time researcher, who had read newspaper stories about the incident and two reports from a Time reporter in Chicago, as well as the accounts of Pape's earlier career, had even more reason to suppose that the Commission took the charges to be true. *290 Time's omission of the word "alleged" amounted to the adoption of one of a number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled with ambiguities. The deliberate choice of such an interpretation, though arguably reflecting a misconception, was not enough to create a jury issue of "malice" under New York To permit the malice issue to go to the jury because of the omission of a word like "alleged," despite the context of that word in the Commission Report and the external evidence of the Report's overall meaning, would be to impose a much stricter standard of liability on errors of interpretation or judgment than on errors of historic fact. New York was premised on a recognition that, as Madison put it, "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press." 4 J. Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 571 (1876). With respect to errors of fact in reporting events, we said in New York : "A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amountleads to `self-censorship.' Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. Under such a |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Time, Inc. v. Pape | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108276/time-inc-v-pape/ | was true in all its factual particulars. Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." *291 These considerations apply with even greater force to the situation where the alleged libel consists in the claimed misinterpretation of the gist of a lengthy government document. Where the document reported on is so ambiguous as this one was, it is hard to imagine a test of "truth" that would not put the publisher virtually at the mercy of the unguided discretion of a jury. In certain areas of the law of defamation, New York added to the tort law of the individual States a constitutional zone of protection for errors of fact caused by negligence. The publisher who maintains a standard of care such as to avoid knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth is thereby given assurance that those errors that nonetheless occur will not lay him open to an indeterminable financial liability. This protection would not exist for errors of interpretation were the analysis of the Court of Appeals to be adopted, for once a jury was satisfied that the interpretation was "wrong," the error itself would be sufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff. In St. we said: "Our cases have furnished meaningful guidance for the further definition of a reckless publication. In New York the plaintiff did not satisfy his burden because the record failed to show that the publisher was aware of the likelihood that he was circulating false information. In the opinion emphasized the necessity for a showing that a false publication was made with a `high degree of awareness of probable falsity.' These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact *292 entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." Applying this standard to Time's interpretation of the Commission Report, it can hardly be said that Time acted in reckless disregard of the truth. Given the ambiguities of the Commission Report as a whole, and the testimony of the Time author and researcher, Time's conduct reflected at most an error of judgment. We |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Time, Inc. v. Pape | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108276/time-inc-v-pape/ | Time's conduct reflected at most an error of judgment. We have held that if "the freedoms of expression are to have the `breathing space' that they `need to survive,' " misstatements of this kind must have the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. New York at -272. We would add, however, a final cautionary note. Nothing in this opinion is to be understood as making the word "alleged" a superfluity in published reports of information damaging to reputation. Our decision today is based on the specific facts of this case, involving as they do a news report of a particular government publication that purported to describe the specific grounds for perceiving in 1961 "a serious problem throughout the United States." "Neither lies not false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation. But to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones." St. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [For separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, see ante, p. 277.] *293 MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,001 | 19 | majority | Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118430/buckhannon-board-care-home-inc-v-west-virginia-dept-of-health-and/ | Numerous federal statutes allow courts to award attorney's fees and costs to the "prevailing party." The question presented here is whether this term includes a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. We hold that it does not. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., which operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents, failed an inspection by the West Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshal because some of the residents were incapable of "self-preservation" as defined under state law. See -5H-1, 16-5H-2 (1998) (requiring that all residents of residential board and care homes be capable of "self-preservation," or capable of moving themselves "from situations involving imminent danger, such as fire"); W. Va. Code of State Rules, tit. 87, ser. 1, 14.07(1) (1995) (same). On October 28, 1997, after receiving cease-and-desist orders requiring the closure of its residential care facilities within 30 days, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., on behalf of itself and other similarly situated homes and residents (hereinafter petitioners), brought suit in the United States *601 District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia against the State of West Virginia, two of its agencies, and 18 individuals (hereinafter respondents), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief[1] that the "self-preservation" requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S. C. 3601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S. C. 12101 et seq. Respondents agreed to stay enforcement of the cease-anddesist orders pending resolution of the case and the parties began discovery. In 1998, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills eliminating the "self-preservation" requirement, see S. 627, I -986 (amending regulations); H. R. 4200, II -1199 (amending statute), and respondents moved to dismiss the case as moot. The District Court granted the motion, finding that the 1998 legislation had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions and that there was no indication that the West Virginia Legislature would repeal the amendments.[2] Petitioners requested attorney's fees as the "prevailing party" under the FHAA, 42 U.S. C. 3613(c)(2) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee and costs"), and ADA, 42 U.S. C. 12205 ("[T]he court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs"). Petitioners argued that they were entitled to attorney's fees under the "catalyst theory," which posits that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" if it achieves |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,001 | 19 | majority | Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118430/buckhannon-board-care-home-inc-v-west-virginia-dept-of-health-and/ | that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. Although *602 most Courts of Appeals recognize the "catalyst theory,"[3] the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected it in S-1 and ("A person may not be a `prevailing party' except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief sought"). The District Court accordingly denied the motion and, for the same reason, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion. Judgt. order reported at To resolve the disagreement amongst the Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari, and now affirm. In the United States, parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney's feesthe prevailing party is not entitled to collect from the loser. See Pipeline Service Under this "American Rule," we follow "a general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority." Key Tronic 1 U.S. 809, Congress, however, has authorized the award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" in numerous statutes in addition to those at issue here, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. e 5(k), the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S. C. 1973l (e), and the Civil Rights Attorney's *603 Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S. C. 1988. See generally 43-[4] In designating those parties eligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term "prevailing party," a legal term of art. Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines "prevailing party" as "[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded Also termed successful party. " This view that a "prevailing party" is one who has been awarded some relief by the court can be distilled from our prior cases.[5] In we reviewed the legislative history of 1988 and found that "Congress intended to permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims." Our "[r]espect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail." *604 We have held that even an award of nominal damages suffices under this test. See[6] In addition to judgments on the merits, we have held that settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of attorney's See Although a consent decree does |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,001 | 19 | majority | Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118430/buckhannon-board-care-home-inc-v-west-virginia-dept-of-health-and/ | an award of attorney's See Although a consent decree does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, see, e. g., it nonetheless is a court-ordered "chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant." Texas State Teachers ).[7] These decisions, taken together, establish that enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties" necessary to permit an award of attorney's 489 U.S., at -793; see *605 We think, however, the "catalyst theory" falls on the other side of the line from these examples. It allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties. Even under a limited form of the "catalyst theory," a plaintiff could recover attorney's fees if it established that the "complaint had sufficient merit to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27. This is not the type of legal merit that our prior decisions, based upon plain language and congressional intent, have found necessary. Indeed, we held in that an interlocutory ruling that reverses a dismissal for failure to state a claim "is not the stuff of which legal victories are made." 482 U.S., at See A defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. Our precedents thus counsel against holding that the term "prevailing party" authorizes an award of attorney's fees without a corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the parties. The dissenters chide us for upsetting "long-prevailing Circuit precedent." Post, at 622 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.) But, as Justice Scalia points out in his concurrence, several Courts of Appeals have relied upon dicta in our prior cases in approving the "catalyst theory." See post, at 621-622; see Now that the issue is squarely presented, it behooves us to reconcile the plain language of the statutes with our prior holdings. We have only awarded attorney's fees where the plaintiff has received a judgment on the merits, see, e. g., or obtained a court-ordered consent decree, at 129-130we have not awarded attorney's fees where the plaintiff has secured the reversal of a directed *606 verdict, see or acquired a judicial pronouncement that the defendant has violated the Constitution unaccompanied by "judicial relief," at Never have we awarded attorney's fees for a nonjudicial "alteration of actual circumstances." Post, at 633 (dissenting opinion). While urging |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,001 | 19 | majority | Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118430/buckhannon-board-care-home-inc-v-west-virginia-dept-of-health-and/ | of actual circumstances." Post, at 633 (dissenting opinion). While urging an expansion of our precedents on this front, the dissenters would simultaneously abrogate the "merit" requirement of our prior cases and award attorney's fees where the plaintiff's claim "was at least colorable" and "not groundless." Post, at 627 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We cannot agree that the term "prevailing party" authorizes federal courts to award attorney's fees to a plaintiff who, by simply filing a nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit (it will never be determined), has reached the "sought-after destination" without obtaining any judicial relief. Post, at 634 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).[8] *607 Petitioners nonetheless argue that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act supports a broad reading of "prevailing party" which includes the "catalyst theory." We doubt that legislative history could overcome what we think is the rather clear meaning of "prevailing party"the term actually used in the statute. Since we resorted to such history in and at 756 757, however, we do likewise here. The House Report to 1988 states that "[t]he phrase `prevailing party' is not intended to be limited to the victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits," H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 7 (1976), while the Senate Report explains that "parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief," S. Rep. No. 94 1011, p. 5 (1976). Petitioners argue that these Reports and their reference to a decision from the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, indicate Congress' intent to adopt the "catalyst theory."[9] We think the legislative history *608 cited by petitioners is at best ambiguous as to the availability of the "catalyst theory" for awarding attorney's Particularly in view of the "American Rule" that attorney's fees will not be awarded absent "explicit statutory authority," such legislative history is clearly insufficient to alter the accepted meaning of the statutory term. Key Tronic, 1 U. S., at ; see at ("[O]nly when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims has there been a determination of the `substantial rights of the parties,' which Congress determined was a necessary foundation for departing from the usual rule in this country that each party is to bear the expense of his own attorney" (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 8)). Petitioners finally assert that the "catalyst theory" is necessary to prevent defendants from unilaterally mooting an action before judgment in an |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,001 | 19 | majority | Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118430/buckhannon-board-care-home-inc-v-west-virginia-dept-of-health-and/ | defendants from unilaterally mooting an action before judgment in an effort to avoid an award of attorney's They claim that the rejection of the "catalyst theory" will deter plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive cases from bringing suit. We are skeptical of these assertions, which are entirely speculative and unsupported by any empirical evidence (e. g., whether the number of suits brought in the Fourth Circuit has declined, in relation to other Circuits, since the decision in S-1 and S-2 ). Petitioners discount the disincentive that the "catalyst theory" may have upon a defendant's decision to voluntarily change its conduct, conduct that may not be illegal. "The defendants' potential liability for fees in this kind of litigation can be as significant as, and sometimes even more significant than, their potential liability on the merits," and the possibility of being assessed attorney's fees may well deter a defendant from altering its conduct. And petitioners' fear of mischievous defendants only materializes in claims for equitable relief, for so long as the *609 plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the case.[10] Even then, it is not clear how often courts will find a case mooted: "It is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice" unless it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." Friends of Earth, If a case is not found to be moot, and the plaintiff later procures an enforceable judgment, the court may of course award attorney's Given this possibility, a defendant has a strong incentive to enter a settlement agreement, where it can negotiate attorney's fees and costs. Cf. We have stated that "[a] request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation," and have accordingly avoided an interpretation of the fee-shifting statutes that would have "spawn[ed] a second litigation of significant dimension," Among other things, a "catalyst theory" hearing would require analysis of the defendant's subjective motivations in changing its conduct, an analysis that "will likely depend on a highly factbound inquiry and may turn on reasonable inferences from the nature and timing of the defendant's change in conduct." *610 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Although we do not doubt the ability of district courts to perform the nuanced "three thresholds" test required by the "catalyst theory"whether the claim was colorable rather than groundless; whether the lawsuit was a substantial rather than an insubstantial cause |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,001 | 19 | majority | Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118430/buckhannon-board-care-home-inc-v-west-virginia-dept-of-health-and/ | the lawsuit was a substantial rather than an insubstantial cause of the defendant's change in conduct; whether the defendant's change in conduct was motivated by the plaintiff's threat of victory rather than threat of expense, see post, at 627-628 (dissenting opinion) it is clearly not a formula for "ready administrability." Given the clear meaning of "prevailing party" in the feeshifting statutes, we need not determine which way these various policy arguments cut. In we said that Congress had not "extended any roving authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them warranted." To disregard the clear legislative language and the holdings of our prior cases on the basis of such policy arguments would be a similar assumption of a "roving authority." For the reasons stated above, we hold that the "catalyst theory" is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney's fees under the FHAA, 42 U.S. C. 3613(c)(2), and ADA, 42 U.S. C. 12205. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | second_dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | The Court does not appreciate the value of individual liberty. It may well be true that in the vast majority of cases a veteran does not need to employ a lawyer, ante, at 329-330, and that the system of processing veterans benefit claims, by *359 and large, functions fairly and effectively without the participation of retained counsel. Ante, at 327. Everyone agrees, however, that there are at least some complicated cases in which the services of a lawyer would be useful to the veteran and, indeed, would simplify the work of the agency by helping to organize the relevant facts and to identify the controlling issues. Ante, at 328, 329. What is the reason for denying the veteran the right to counsel of his choice in such cases? The Court gives us two answers: First, the paternalistic interest in protecting the veteran from the consequences of his own improvidence, ante, at 323; and second, the bureaucratic interest in minimizing the cost of administering the benefit program. Ante, at 323-325. I agree that both interests are legitimate, but neither provides an adequate justification for the restraint on liberty imposed by the $10-fee limitation. To explain my disagreement with the Court, I shall first add a few words about the history of the fee limitation, then identify the flaws in the Court's analysis, and finally explain why I believe 3404(c) and 3405 impose an unconstitutional restraint on individual liberty. I The first fee limitation $5 per claim was enacted in 1862.[1] That limitation was repealed two years later and *360 replaced by the $10-fee limitation, which has survived ever since.[2] The limitation was designed to protect the veteran from extortion or improvident bargains with unscrupulous lawyers.[3] Obviously, it was believed that the number of scoundrels practicing law was large enough to justify a legislative prohibition against charging excessive fees. At the time the $10-fee limitation was enacted, Congress presumably considered that fee reasonable. The legal work *361 involved in preparing a veteran's claim consisted of little more than filling out an appropriate form, and, in terms of the average serviceman's base pay, a $10 fee then was roughly the equivalent of a $580 fee today.[4] At its inception, therefore, the fee limitation had neither the purpose nor the effect of precluding the employment of reputable counsel by veterans. Indeed, the statute then, as now, expressly contemplated that claims for veterans benefits could be processed by "agents or attorneys."[5] The fact that the statute was aimed at unscrupulous attorneys is confirmed by the provision for criminal penalties. Instead of just making |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | second_dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | by the provision for criminal penalties. Instead of just making an agreement to pay a greater fee unenforceable as an anticipatory pledge of an interest in future pension benefits is unenforceable the Act contains a flat prohibition against the direct or indirect collection of a greater fee, and provides that an attorney who charges more than $10 may be imprisoned for up to two years at hard labor.[6] Thus, an unscrupulous moneylender or merchant *362 who might try to take advantage of an improvident veteran might have difficulty collecting his bill, but the unscrupulous lawyer might go to jail. The language in 3405, particularly the use of the words "directly or indirectly," apparently would apply to consultations between a veteran and a lawyer concerning a claim that is ultimately allowed, as well as to an appearance before the agency itself. In today's market, the reasonable fee for even the briefest conference would surely exceed $10. Thus, the law that was enacted in 1864 to protect veterans from unscrupulous lawyers those who charge excessive fees effectively denies today's veteran access to all lawyers who charge reasonable fees for their services.[7] II The Court's opinion blends its discussion of the paternalistic interest in protecting veterans from unscrupulous lawyers and the bureaucratic interest in minimizing the cost of administration in a way that implies that each interest reinforces the other. Actually the two interests are quite different and merit separate analysis. In my opinion, the bureaucratic interest in minimizing the cost of administration is nothing but a red herring.[8] Congress has not prohibited lawyers from participating in the processing of claims for benefits and there is no reason why it *363 should.[9] The complexity of the agency procedures can be regulated by limiting the number of hearings, the time for argument, the length of written submissions, and in other ways, but there is no reason to believe that the agency's cost of administration will be increased because a claimant is represented by counsel instead of appearing pro se.[10] The informality that the Court emphasizes is desirable because it no doubt enables many veterans, or their lay representatives, to handle their claims without the assistance of counsel. But there is no reason to assume that lawyers would add confusion rather than clarity to the proceedings. As a profession, lawyers are skilled communicators dedicated to the service of their clients. Only if it is assumed that the average lawyer is incompetent or unscrupulous can one rationally conclude that the efficiency of the agency's work would be undermined by allowing counsel to |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | second_dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | the agency's work would be undermined by allowing counsel to participate whenever a veteran is willing to pay for his services. I categorically reject any such assumption. The fact that a lawyer's services are unnecessary in most cases, and might even be counterproductive in a few, does not justify a total prohibition on their participation in all pension claim proceedings. This fact is perhaps best illustrated by a case in which we held that the State does not have a constitutional obligation *364 to provide a parolee or probationer with counsel in every revocation proceeding. The informality of the proceeding makes counsel unnecessary in most cases, but we squarely held that in some cases a lawyer's presence was constitutionally required.[11] Although, surprisingly, the Court relies on Gagnon today, see ante, at 324-325, not a word in that opinion implies that a parolee or probationer could be denied the right to have retained counsel represent him. The case-by-case approach to the participation of counsel endorsed in Gagnon[12] is the approach that should apply to veterans claim proceedings. Lawyers may not be needed in most cases, but should be permitted in appropriate cases.[13] The interest in efficient administration plainly does not justify a total prohibition on representation by counsel. Nor can it justify a rule that indirectly accomplishes that result by discouraging their participation in all cases. *365 The paternalistic interest in protecting the veteran from his own improvidence would unquestionably justify a rule that simply prevented lawyers from overcharging their clients. Most appropriately, such a rule might require agency approval, or perhaps judicial review, of counsel fees. It might also establish a reasonable ceiling, subject to exceptions for especially complicated cases. In fact, I assume that the $10-fee limitation was justified by this interest when it was first enacted in 1864. But time has brought changes in the value of the dollar, in the character of the legal profession, in agency procedures, and in the ability of the veteran to proceed without the assistance of counsel. In 1982, the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs reviewed the fee limitation and concluded: "As was discussed in the VA's agency report on S. 330 (VA report on S. 330 at pages 16-17 (reprinted at pages 98-99 of S. Rept. No. 96-178)), the basis for Congressional action, first after the Civil War and then after World War I, limiting the amount an attorney could receive for representing a claimant before the VA was grounded in a belief that the lawyers of that day were unscrupulous and were taking unfair advantage of veterans by retaining an |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | second_dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | and were taking unfair advantage of veterans by retaining an unwarranted portion of the veterans' statutory entitlement in return for very limited legal assistance. Whatever the merits of such a view at the time the limitation was imposed, and despite numerous court opinions upholding the validity of the statutory limitation in the face of challenges to its constitutionality (see, e. g., (C. D. Cal.), aff'd mem. sub nom, ; ), it is the Committee's position that such a view of today's organized bar, particularly in light of the widespread network of local bar associations that now generally police attorney behavior, is no longer tenable. "The Committee is also of the view that the current statutory limitation is an undue hindrance on the rights *366 of veterans and other claimants to select representatives of their own choosing to represent them in VA matters. As noted above, there is a strong and vital system of veterans service officers who provide excellent representation at no cost to claimants. The Committee fully expects and believes that this system will continue and prosper, undiminished by the new right of judicial review and opportunity for attorney participation created in this legislation. However, an individual should not be arbitrarily restricted in retaining an attorney, whether such representation is desired for reasons of personal preference or because of a concern that the claim is likely to be denied a second time by the Board of Veterans' Appeals and will be appealed to court. A claimant could well conclude, for example, that some further development of the administrative record in a complex case would be of critical importance while the matter is still before the agency and that an attorney would be better able to so develop the record." S. Rep. No. 97-466, pp. 50-51 (1982) (emphasis added). Moreover, the growth of the strong system of active service officers who provide excellent representation at no cost to claimants is significant because it has virtually eliminated the danger that a claimant will be tempted to waste money on unnecessary legal services. As the Senate Committee recognized, however, the availability of such competent, free representation is not a reason for denying a claimant the right to employ counsel of his own choice in an appropriate case. III It is evident from what I have written that I regard the fee limitation as unwise and an insult to the legal profession. It does not follow, however, that it is unconstitutional. The Court correctly notes that the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to every Act of Congress requires the challenger to bear the |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | second_dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | every Act of Congress requires the challenger to bear the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. *367 Before attempting to do so, I must comment on two aspects of the Court's rhetoric: Its references to the age of the statute and to the repudiation of The fact that the $10-fee limitation has been on the books since 1864 does not, in my opinion, add any force at all to the presumption of validity. Surely the age of the de jure segregation at issue in or the age of the gerrymandered voting districts at issue in provided no legitimate support for those rules. In this case, the passage of time, instead of providing support for the fee limitation, has effectively eroded the one legitimate justification that formerly made the legislation rational. The age of the statute cuts against, not in favor of, its validity. It is true that the statute that was incorrectly invalidated in Lochner provided protection for a group of workers, but that protection was a response to the assumed disparity in the bargaining power of employers and employees, and was justified by the interest in protecting the health and welfare of the protected group. It is rather misleading to imply that a rejection of the Lochner holding is an endorsement of rational paternalism as a legitimate legislative goal. See ante, at 323. But in any event, the kind of paternalism reflected in this statute as it operates today is irrational. It purports to protect the veteran who has little or no need for protection, and it actually denies him assistance in cases in which the help of his own lawyer may be of critical importance.[14] *368 But the statute is unconstitutional for a reason that is more fundamental than its apparent irrationality. What is at stake is the right of an individual to consult an attorney of his choice in connection with a controversy with the Government. In my opinion that right is firmly protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment[15] and by the First Amendment.[16] The Court recognizes that the Veterans' Administration's procedures must provide claimants with due process of law, but then concludes that the constitutional requirement is satisfied because the appellees have not proved that the "probability of error under the present system" is unacceptable.[17]Ante, at 326. In short, if 80 or 90 percent of the cases are correctly decided, why worry about those individuals whose claims have been erroneously rejected and who might have prevailed if they had been represented by counsel? The fundamental error in the Court's analysis is its assumption |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | second_dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | The fundamental error in the Court's analysis is its assumption that the individual's right to employ counsel of his choice in a contest with his sovereign is a kind of second-class *369 interest that can be assigned a material value and balanced on a utilitarian scale of costs and benefits.[18] It is true that the veteran's right to benefits is a property right and that in fashioning the procedures for administering the benefit program, the Government may appropriately weigh the value of additional procedural safeguards against their pecuniary costs. It may, for example, properly decide not to provide free counsel to claimants. But we are not considering a procedural right that would involve any cost to the Government.[19]*370 We are concerned with the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of independent counsel in advancing his claim against the Government.[20] In all criminal proceedings, that right is expressly protected by the Sixth Amendment. As I have indicated, in civil disputes with the Government I believe that right is also protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and by the First Amendment. If the Government, in the guise of a paternalistic interest in protecting the citizen from his own improvidence, can deny him access to independent counsel of his choice, it can change the character of our free society.[21] Even though a dispute with the sovereign may only involve property rights, or as in this case a statutory *371 entitlement, the citizen's right of access to the independent, private bar is itself an aspect of liberty that is of critical importance in our democracy.[22] Just as I disagree with the present Court's crabbed view of the concept of "liberty,"[23] so do I reject its apparent unawareness of the function of the independent lawyer as a guardian of our freedom.[24] In my view, regardless of the nature of the dispute between the sovereign and the citizen whether it be a criminal trial, a proceeding to terminate parental rights, a claim for social security benefits, a dispute over welfare benefits, or a pension claim asserted by the widow of a soldier who was killed on the battlefield the citizen's right to consult an independent lawyer and to retain that lawyer to speak on his or her behalf is an aspect of liberty that is priceless. It *372 should not be bargained away on the notion that a totalitarian appraisal of the mass of claims processed by the Veterans' Administration does not identify an especially high probability of error.[25] Unfortunately, the reason for |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Richards v. Wisconsin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118103/richards-v-wisconsin/ | In we held that the Fourth Amendment incorporates the common-law requirement that police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible At the same time, we recognized that the "flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests," and left "to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment," In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that police officers are never required to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony *88 drug investigation. In so doing, it reaffirmed a pre-Wilson holding and concluded that Wilson did not preclude this per se rule. We disagree with the court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for this entire category of criminal activity. But because the evidence presented to support the officers' actions in this case establishes that the decision not to knock and announce was a reasonable one under the circumstances, we affirm the judgment of the Wisconsin court. I On December 1, 1991, police officers in Madison, Wisconsin, obtained a warrant to search Steiney Richards' motel room for drugs and related paraphernalia. The search warrant was the culmination of an investigation that had uncovered substantial evidence that Richards was one of several individuals dealing drugs out of hotel rooms in Madison. The police requested a warrant that would have given advance authorization for a "no-knock" entry into the motel room, but the Magistrate explicitly deleted those portions of the warrant. App. 7, 9. The officers arrived at the motel room at :40 a.m. Officer Pharo, dressed as a maintenance man, led the team. With him were several plainclothes officers and at least one man in uniform. Officer Pharo knocked on Richards' door and, responding to the query from inside the room, stated that he was a maintenance man. With the chain still on the door, Richards cracked it open. Although there is some dispute as to what occurred next, Richards acknowledges that when he opened the door he saw the man in uniform standing behind Officer Pharo. Brief for Petitioner 6. He quickly slammed the door closed and, after waiting two or three seconds, the officers began kicking and ramming the door to gain entry to the locked room. At trial, the officers testified that they identified themselves as police while they were kicking the door in. App. 40. When they finally did |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Richards v. Wisconsin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118103/richards-v-wisconsin/ | kicking the door in. App. 40. When they finally did break *89 into the room, the officers caught Richards trying to escape through the window. They also found cash and cocaine hidden in plastic bags above the bathroom ceiling tiles. Richards sought to have the evidence from his motel room suppressed on the ground that the officers had failed to knock and announce their presence prior to forcing entry into the room. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the officers could gather from Richards' strange behavior when they first sought entry that he knew they were police officers and that he might try to destroy evidence or to escape. The judge emphasized that the easily disposable nature of the drugs the police were searching for further justified their decision to identify themselves as they crossed the threshold instead of announcing their presence before seeking Richards appealed the decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and that court affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not delve into the events underlying Richards' arrest in any detail, but accepted the following facts: "[O]n December 1, 1991, police executed a search warrant for the motel room of the defendant seeking evidence of the felonious crime of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance in violation of (1m) (1991-92). They did not knock and announce prior to their Drugs were seized." Assuming these facts, the court proceeded to consider whether our decision in Wilson required the court to abandon its decision in cert. denied, which held that "when the police have a search warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possession with intent to deliver drugs, they necessarily have reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances exist" to justify a no-knock 549 N. W. 2d, at 221. The court concluded *90 that nothing in Wilson `s acknowledgment that the knockand-announce rule was an element of the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" requirement would prohibit application of a per se exception to that rule in a category of -855, 549 N. W. 2d, at 220. In reaching this conclusion, the Wisconsin court found it reasonableafter considering criminal conduct surveys, newspaper articles, and other judicial opinionsto assume that all felony drug crimes will involve "an extremely high risk of serious if not deadly injury to the police as well as the potential for the disposal of drugs by the occupants prior to entry by the police." Notwithstanding its acknowledgment that in "some cases, police officers will undoubtedly decide that their safety, the safety of others, and the |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Richards v. Wisconsin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118103/richards-v-wisconsin/ | decide that their safety, the safety of others, and the effective execution of the warrant dictate that they knock and announce," the court concluded that exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry are always present in felony drug Further, the court reasoned that the violation of privacy that occurs when officers who have a search warrant forcibly enter a residence without first announcing their presence is minimal, given that the residents would ultimately be without authority to refuse the police The principal intrusion on individual privacy interests in such a situation, the court concluded, comes from the issuance of the search warrant, not the manner in which it is executed. Accordingly, the court determined that police in Wisconsin do not need specific information about dangerousness, or the possible destruction of drugs in a particular case, in order to dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement in felony drug [1] *91 Justice Abrahamson concurred in the judgment because, in her view, the facts found by the trial judge justified a no-knock Specifically, she noted that Richards' actions in slamming the door when he saw the uniformed man standing behind Officer Pharo indicated that he already knew that the people knocking on his door were police officers. Under these circumstances, any further announcement of their presence would have been a useless gesture. n. While agreeing with the outcome, Justice Abrahamson took issue with her colleagues' affirmation of the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement in drug felony She observed that the constitutional reasonableness of a search has generally been a matter left to the court, rather than to the officers who conducted the search, and she objected to the creation of a blanket rule that insulated searches in a particular category of crime from the neutral oversight of a reviewing judge. -20. II We recognized in Wilson that the knock-and-announce requirement could give way "under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence," or "where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given." 514 U.S., It is indisputable that felony drug investigations may frequently involve both of these circumstances.[2] The question we must *92 resolve is whether this fact justifies dispensing with caseby-case evaluation of the manner in which a search was executed.[] The Wisconsin court explained its blanket exception as necessitated by the special circumstances of today's drug 201 Wis. 2d, -866, 549 N. W. 2d, at 226-227, and the State asserted at oral argument that the blanket exception was reasonable in "felony drug cases because of the convergence in a violent and dangerous form of |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Richards v. Wisconsin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118103/richards-v-wisconsin/ | of the convergence in a violent and dangerous form of commerce of weapons and the destruction of drugs." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. But creating exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule based on the "" surrounding a general category of criminal behavior presents at least two serious concerns.[4] *9 First, the exception contains considerable over generalization. For example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree. For example, a search could be conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evidence. Or the police could know that the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy quickly. In those situations, the asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence and maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock [5] Wisconsin's blanket rule impermissibly insulates these cases from judicial review. A second difficulty with permitting a criminal-category exception to the knock-and-announce requirement is that the *94 reasons for creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others. Armed bank robbers, for example, are, by definition, likely to have weapons, and the fruits of their crime may be destroyed without too much difficulty. If a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerablealbeit hypotheticalrisk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement would be meaningless. Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement. In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This standardas opposed to a probable-cause requirementstrikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries. |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Richards v. Wisconsin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118103/richards-v-wisconsin/ | warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries. Cf. 494 U.S. 25, 7 ; 92 U.S. 1, 0 This showing is not high, but the police *95 should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged. III Although we reject the Wisconsin court's blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement, we conclude that the officers' no-knock entry into Richards' motel room did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We agree with the trial court, and with Justice Abrahamson, that the circumstances in this case show that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Richards might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so.[6] The judge who heard testimony at Richards' suppression hearing concluded that it was reasonable for the officers executing the warrant to believe that Richards knew, after opening the door to his motel room the first time, that the men seeking entry to his room were the police. App. 54. Once the officers reasonably believed that Richards knew who they were, the court concluded, it was reasonable for them to force entry immediately given the disposable nature of the drugs. In arguing that the officers' entry was unreasonable, Richards places great emphasis on the fact that the Magistrate who signed the search warrant for his motel room deleted the portions of the proposed warrant that would have given the officers permission to execute a no-knock But this fact does not alter the reasonableness of the officers' decision, which must be evaluated as of the time they entered the motel room. At the time the officers obtained the warrant, they did not have evidence sufficient, in the judgment of the Magistrate, to justify a no-knock warrant. Of course, *96 the Magistrate could not have anticipated in every particular the circumstances that would confront the officers when they arrived at Richards' motel room.[7] These actual circumstancespetitioner's apparent recognition of the officers combined with the easily disposable nature of the drugs justified the officers' ultimate decision to enter without first announcing their presence and authority. Accordingly, although we reject the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | The question presented is whether the Constitution is violated by application to appellee, the lessor of a yacht, of Puerto Rican statutes providing for seizure and forfeiture of vessels used for unlawful purposes when (1) the yacht was seized without prior notice or hearing after allegedly being used by a lessee for an unlawful purpose, and (2) the appellee was neither involved in nor aware of the act of the lessee which resulted in the forfeiture. *665 In March 1971, appellee, Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., leased a pleasure yacht to two Puerto Rican residents. Puerto Rican authorities discovered marihuana on board the yacht in early May and charged one of the lessees with violation of the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 24, 2101 et seq. On July 11, the Superintendent of lice seized the yacht pursuant to P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 24, 2 (a) (4), (b)[1] and Tit. 34, 2[2] which provide that vessels used to *666 transport, or to facilitate the transportation of, controlled substances, including marihuana, are subject to seizure and forfeiture to the Commonwealth *667 of Puerto Rico. The vessel was seized without prior notice to appellee or either lessee and without a prior adversary hearing. The lessees, who had registered the yacht with the rts Authority of the Commonwealth, were thereafter given notice within 10 days of the *668 seizure, as required by 2 (a).[3] But when a challenge to the seizure was not made within 15 days after service of the notice, the yacht was forfeited for official use of the Government of Puerto Rico pursuant to 2 (c).[4] Appellee shortly thereafter first learned of the seizure and forfeiture when attempting to repossess the yacht from the lessees, because of their apparent failure to pay rent. It is conceded that appellee was "in no way involved in the criminal enterprise carried on by [the] lessee" and "had no knowledge that its property was being used in connection with or in violation of [Puerto Rican Law]." On November 6, appellee filed this suit, seeking a declaration that application of P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 24, 2 (a) (4), (b), and Tit. 34, 2, had (1) unconstitutionally denied it due process of law insofar as the statutes authorized appellants, the Superintendent of lice and the Chief of the Office of Transportation of the Commonwealth, to seize the yacht without notice or a prior adversary hearing, and (2) unconstitutionally deprived appellee of its property without just compensation.[5] Injunctive relief was also sought. *669 A three-judge District Court,[6] relying principally upon held |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | sought. *669 A three-judge District Court,[6] relying principally upon held that the failure of the statutes to provide for preseizure notice and hearing rendered them constitutionally defective. Viewing United as having effectively overruled our prior decisions that the property owner's innocence has no constitutional significance for purposes of forfeiture, the District Court further declared that the Puerto Rican statutes, insofar as applied to forfeit appellee's interest in the yacht, unconstitutionally deprived it of property without just compensation. -1342. Appellants were accordingly enjoined from enforcing the statutes "insofar as they deny the owner or person in charge of property an opportunity for a hearing due to the lack of notice, before the seizure and forfeiture of its property and insofar as a penalty is imposed upon innocent parties." We noted probable jurisdiction. We reverse. I Although the parties consented to the convening of the three-judge court and hence do not challenge our jurisdiction *670 to decide this direct appeal, we nevertheless may not entertain the appeal under 28 U.S. C. 1253[7] unless statutes of Puerto Rico are "State statute[s]" for purposes of the Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U.S. C. 2281.[8] We therefore turn first to that question. In this Court held that enactments of the Territory of Hawaii were not "State statute[s]" for purposes of Judicial Code 266, the predecessor to 28 U.S. C. 2281, reasoning: "While, of course, great respect is to be paid to the enactments of a territorial legislature by all courts as it is to the adjudications of territorial courts, the predominant reason for the enactment of Judicial Code 266 does not exist as respects territories. This reason was a congressional purpose to avoid unnecessary interference with the laws of a sovereign state. In our dual system of government, the position of the state as sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution requires a deference to state *671 legislative action beyond that required for the laws of a territory. A territory is subject to congressional regulation." -378 (emphasis added). Similar reasoningthat the purpose of insulating a sovereign State's laws from interference by a single judge would not be furthered by broadly interpreting the word "State"led the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit some 55 years ago to hold 266 inapplicable to the laws of the Territory of Puerto Rico. Congress, however, created the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico after Benedicto was decided. Following the Spanish-American War, Puerto Rico was ceded to this country in the Treaty of Paris, (1898). A brief interlude of military control was followed by congressional enactment of a series of Organic Acts |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | followed by congressional enactment of a series of Organic Acts for the government of the island. Initially these enactments established a local governmental structure with high officials appointed by the President. These Acts also retained veto power in the President and Congress over local legislation. By 1950, however, pressures for greater autonomy led to congressional enactment of Pub. L. 600, which offered the people of Puerto Rico a compact whereby they might establish a government under their own constitution. Puerto Rico accepted the compact, and on July 3, 1952, Congress approved, with minor amendments, a constitution adopted by the Puerto Rican populace, ; see note accompanying 48 U.S. C. 731d. Pursuant to that constitution the Commonwealth now "elects its Governor and legislature; appoints its judges, all cabinet officials, and lesser officials in the executive branch; sets its own educational policies; determines its own budget; and amends its own civil and criminal code." Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal *672 Law to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 Geo. L. J. 219, 221 ; see 28 Dept. of State Bull. 584-589 ; Americana of Puerto Rico, ; Magruder, The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, These significant changes in Puerto Rico's governmental structure formed the backdrop to Judge Magruder's observations in : "[I]t may be that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico`El Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico' in the Spanish versionorganized as a body politic by the people of Puerto Rico under their own constitution, pursuant to the terms of the compact offered to them in Pub. L. 600, and by them accepted, is a State within the meaning of 28 U.S. C. 2281. The preamble to this constitution refers to the Commonwealth. which `in the exercise of our natural rights, we [the people of Puerto Rico] now create within our union with the United of America.' Puerto Rico has thus not become a State in the federal Union like the 48 but it would seem to have become a State within a common and accepted meaning of the word. Cf. State of It is a political entity created by the act and with the consent of the people of Puerto Rico and joined in union with the United of America under the terms of the compact. "A serious argument could therefore be made that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a State within the intendment and policy of 28 U.S. C. 2281. If the constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is really a `constitution'as the Congress says it is,and not just another Organic *673 Act approved and enacted by the Congress, |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | another Organic *673 Act approved and enacted by the Congress, then the question is whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is to be deemed `sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution' of the United and thus a `State' within the policy of 28 U.S. C. 2281, which enactment, in prescribing a three-judge federal district court, expresses `a deference to state legislative action beyond that required for the laws of a territory' [, ] whose local affairs are subject to congressional regulation." -388 Lower federal courts since have adopted this analysis and concluded that Puerto Rico is to be deemed "sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution" and thus a State within the policy of the Three-Judge Court Act. See ;[9]Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, 346 F. *674 Supp. 470, 481 ; And in Wackenhut we summarily affirmed the decision of a three-judge court for the District of Puerto Rico that had ordered abstention and said: "[A]pplication of the doctrine of abstention is particularly appropriate in a case involv[ing] the construction and validity of a statute of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. For a due regard for the status of that Commonwealth under its compact with the Congress of the United dictates, we believe, that it should have the primary opportunity through its courts to determine the intended scope of its own legislation and to pass upon the validity of that legislation under its own constitution as well as under the Constitution of the United" Although the question of Puerto Rico's status under 28 U.S. C. 2281 was raised in neither the Jurisdictional Statement nor the Motion to Affirm in Wackenhut, and we do not normally feel ourselves bound by a sub silentio exercise of jurisdiction, see ; United this Court has noted that in three-judge court cases, "where the responsibility [is] on the courts to see that the three-judge rule [is] followed," unexplained action may take on added significance. -380. This is particularly so, when as in Wackenhut, the opinion supporting the judgment over which we exercised appellate jurisdiction had expressed the view that abstention was appropriate for reasons of comity, an oft-repeated justification for the abstention doctrine, see, e. g., Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. *675 6, 500[10] as well as the principal underpinning of the Three-Judge Court Act. See While still of the view that 2281 is not "a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality," we believe that the established federal judicial practice of treating enactments of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as "State statute[s]" |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | enactments of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as "State statute[s]" for purposes of the Three-Judge Court Act, serves, and does not expand, the purposes of 2281. We therefore hold that a three-judge court was properly convened under that statute,[11] and that direct *676 appeal to this Court was proper under 28 U.S. C. 1253. Accordingly, we now turn to the merits. II Appellants challenge the District Court's holding that the appellee was denied due process of law by the omission *677 from 2 (b), as it incorporates 2, of provisions for preseizure notice and hearing. They argue that seizure for purposes of forfeiture is one of those " `extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing." ; see ; We agree.[12] *678 In holding that lack of preseizure notice and hearing denied due process, the District Court relied primarily upon our decision in Fuentes involved the validity of Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes permitting creditors to seize goods allegedly wrongfully detained. A writ of replevin could be obtained under the Florida statute upon the creditor's bare assertion to a court clerk that he was entitled to the property, and under the Pennsylvania statute, upon filing an affidavit fixing the value of the property, without alleging legal entitlement to the property. Fuentes held that the statutory procedures deprived debtors of their property without due process by failing to provide for hearings " `at a meaningful time.' " Fuentes reaffirmed, however, that, in limited circumstances, immediate seizure of a property interest, without an opportunity for prior hearing, is constitutionally permissible. Such circumstances are those in which "the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance." *679 Thus, for example, due process is not denied when postponement of notice and hearing is necessary to protect the public from contaminated food, North American Storage ; from a bank failure, Coffin Bros. & ; or from misbranded drugs, U.S. 594 ; or to aid the collection of taxes, ; or the war effort, United The considerations that justified postponement of notice and hearing in those cases are present here. First, seizure under the Puerto Rican statutes serves significant governmental purposes: Seizure permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings,[13] thereby fostering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the property and in enforcing criminal sanctions. Second, preseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests served by the statutes, since the property seizedas here, a yachtwill often be of a sort that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given. And finally, unlike the situation in Fuentes, seizure is not initiated by self-interested private parties; rather, Commonwealth officials determine whether seizure is appropriate under the provisions of the Puerto Rican statutes.[14] In these circumstances, we hold that this case *680 presents an "extraordinary" situation in which postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure did not deny due process.[15] III Appellants next argue that the District Court erred in holding that the forfeiture statutes unconstitutionally authorized the taking for government use of innocent parties' property without just compensation. They urge that a long line of prior decisions of this Court establish the principle that statutory forfeiture schemes are not rendered unconstitutional because of their applicability to the property interests of innocents, and further that United did notcontrary to the opinion of the District Courtoverrule those prior precedents sub silentio. We agree. The historical background of forfeiture statutes in this country and this Court's prior decisions sustaining their constitutionality lead to that conclusion. At common law the value of an inanimate object directly or indirectly causing the accidental death of a *681 King's subject was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand.[16] The origins of the deodand are traceable to Biblical[17] and pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which reflected the view that the instrument of death was accused and that religious expiation was required. See O. Holmes, The Common Law, c. 1 (1881). The value of the instrument was forfeited to the King, in the belief that the King would provide the money for Masses to be said for the good of the dead man's soul, or insure that the deodand was put to charitable uses. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *300.[18] When application of the deodand to religious or eleemosynary purposes ceased, and the deodand became a source of Crown revenue, the institution was justified as a penalty for carelessness.[19] *682 Forfeiture also resulted at common law from conviction for felonies and treason. The convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all of his property, real and personal, to the Crown. See 3 W. Holdsworth, |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | real and personal, to the Crown. See 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 68-71 (3d ed. 1927); 1 F. llock & F. Maitland, History of English Law 351 (2d ed. 1909). The basis for these forfeitures was that a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King's peace, which was felt to justify denial of the right to own property. See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *299.[20] In addition, English Law provided for statutory forfeitures of offending objects used in violation of the customs and revenue lawslikely a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the wrongdoer. Statutory forfeitures were most often enforced under the in rem procedure utilized in the Court of Exchequer to forfeit the property of felons. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *261-262; C. J. Hendry Deodands did not become part of the common-law tradition of this country. See Parker-Harris Nor has forfeiture *683 of estates as a consequence of federal criminal conviction been permitted, see 18 U.S. C. 3563; Rev. Stat. 5326 (1874); (1790). Forfeiture of estates resulting from a conviction for treason has been constitutionally proscribed by Art. III, 3, though forfeitures of estates for the lifetime of a traitor have been sanctioned, see But "[l]ong before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courts in the Coloniesand later in the states during the period of Confederationwere exercising jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of [English and local] forfeiture statutes," C. J. Hendry which provided for the forfeiture of commodities and vessels used in violations of customs and revenue laws. See ; And almost immediately after adoption of the Constitution, ships and cargoes involved in customs offenses were made subject to forfeiture under federal law,[21] as were vessels used to deliver slaves to foreign countries,[22] and somewhat later those used to deliver slaves to this country.[23] The enactment of forfeiture statutes has not abated; contemporary federal and state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be used in the conduct of a criminal enterprise. Despite this proliferation of forfeiture enactments, the innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense. Thus, Mr. Justice Story observed in The Palmyra, that a conviction for piracy was not a prerequisite *684 to a proceeding to forfeit a ship allegedly engaged in piratical aggression in violation of a federal statute: "It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the party forfeited his goods |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | in many cases of felonies, the party forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a consequence, of the judgment of conviction. [T]he [Crown's right to the goods and chattels] attached only by the conviction of the offender. But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the Exchequer. The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offence be malum prohibitum, or malum in se [T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam." This rationale was relied upon to sustain the statutory forfeiture of a vessel found to have been engaged in piratical conduct where the innocence of the owner was "fully established." United The vessel was "treated as the offender," without regard to the owner's conduct, "as the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party."[24] *685 Dobbins's is an illustration of how severely this principle has been applied. That case involved a lessee's violations of the revenue laws which led to the seizure of real and personal property used in connection with a distillery. The lessor's assertions of innocence were rejected as a defense to a federal statutory forfeiture of his entire property, for the offense "attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and personal property used in connection with the same, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner, beyond what necessarily arises from the fact that he leased the property to the distiller, and suffered it to be occupied and used by the lessee as a distillery." ; see United Decisions reaching the same conclusion have continued into this century. In Goldsmith-Grant it was held that the federal tax-fraud forfeiture statute did not deprive an innocent owner of his property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. There, the claimant was a conditional vendor of a taxicab that had been used in the removal and concealment of distilled spirits upon which the federal tax was unpaid. Although recognizing that arguments against the application of the statute to cover an innocent owner were not without force, the Court rejected them, saying: "In breaches of revenue provisions some forms of property are facilities, and therefore it may be |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | forms of property are facilities, and therefore it may be said, that Congress interposes the care and responsibility *686 of their owners in aid of the prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, by ascribing to the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong. In such case there is some analogy to the law of deodand by which a personal chattel that was the immediate cause of the death of any reasonable creature was forfeited. To the superstitious reason to which the rule was ascribed, Blackstone adds `that such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by such forfeiture.' "But whether the reason for [the forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced." See also United ; General Motors Acceptance In Van the Court upheld, against a Fourteenth Amendment attack, a forfeiture under state law of an innocent owner's interest in an automobile that he had entrusted to an alleged wrongdoer. Judicial inquiry into the guilt or innocence of the owner could be dispensed with, the Court held, because state lawmakers, in the exercise of the police power, were free to determine that certain uses of property were undesirable and then establish "a secondary defense against a forbidden use" Plainly, the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes further the punitive and deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against constitutional challenge, the application of other forfeiture statutes to the property of innocents.[25] Forfeiture of conveyances that have been *687 usedand may be used againin violation of the narcotics laws fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing further illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1054, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. ; S. Rep. No. 926, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. ; H. R. Rep. No. 2751, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. ; S. Rep. No. 1755, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.[26] To the extent that *688 such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property. Cf. United -241 Against the legitimate governmental interests served by the Puerto Rican statute and the long line of this Court's decisions which squarely collide with appellee's assertion of a constitutional violation, the District Court opposed our decision in |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109026/calero-toledo-v-pearson-yacht-leasing-co/ | a constitutional violation, the District Court opposed our decision in United This reliance was misplaced. In Coin & Currency, the Government claimed that the privilege against self-incrimination could not be asserted in a forfeiture proceeding under 26 U.S. C. 7302 by one in possession of money seized from him when used in an illegal bookmaking operation. In the Government's view, the proceeding was not "criminal" because the forfeiture was authorized without regard to the guilt or innocence of the owner of the money. The Court's answer was that 7302, read in conjunction with 19 U.S. C. 1618, manifested a clear intention "to impose a penalty only upon those who [were] significantly involved in a criminal enterprise," 401 U.S., at -722, and in that circumstance the privilege could be asserted in the forfeiture proceeding by the person from whom the money was taken. Thus, Coin & Currency did not overrule prior decisions that sustained application to innocents of forfeiture statutes, like the Puerto Rican statutes, not limited in application to persons "significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." This is not to say, however, that the "broad sweep" *689 of forfeiture statutes remarked in Coin & Currency could not, in other circumstances, give rise to serious constitutional questions. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall intimated as much over a century and a half ago in observing that "a forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be employed." It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent. See, ; Goldsmith-Grant ; United ; Van 272 U. S., Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property;[27] for, in that circumstance, it *690 would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive. Cf. Armstrong v. United But in this case appellee voluntarily entrusted the lessees with possession of the yacht, and no allegation has been made or proof offered that the company did all that it reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful use. Cf. The judgment of the District Court is Reversed. MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, but, for the reasons stated in the |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Rankin v. McPherson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111946/rankin-v-mcpherson/ | The issue in this case is whether a clerical employee in a county Constable's office was properly discharged for remarking, *380 after hearing of an attempt on the life of the President, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him." I On January 12, 1981, respondent Ardith McPherson was appointed a deputy in the office of the Constable of Harris County, Texas. The Constable is an elected official who functions as a law enforcement officer.[1] At the time of her appointment, McPherson, a black woman, was 19 years old and had attended college for a year, studying secretarial science. Her appointment was conditional for a 90-day probationary period. Although McPherson's title was "deputy constable," this was the case only because all employees of the Constable's office, regardless of job function, were deputy constables. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. She was not a commissioned peace officer, did not wear a uniform, and was not authorized to make arrests or permitted to carry a gun.[2] McPherson's duties were purely clerical. Her work station was a desk at which there was no telephone, in a room to which the public did not have ready access. Her job was to type data from court papers *381 into a computer that maintained an automated record of the status of civil process in the county. Her training consisted of two days of instruction in the operation of her computer terminal. On March 30, 1981, McPherson and some fellow employees heard on an office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate the President of the United States. Upon hearing that report, McPherson engaged a co-worker, Lawrence Jackson, who was apparently her boyfriend, in a brief conversation, which according to McPherson's uncontroverted testimony went as follows: "Q: What did you say? "A: I said I felt that that would happen sooner or later. "Q: Okay. And what did Lawrence say? "A: Lawrence said, yeah, agreeing with me. "Q: Okay. Now, when you after Lawrence spoke, then what was your next comment? "A: Well, we were talking it's a wonder why they did that. I felt like it would be a black person that did that, because I feel like most of my kind is on welfare and CETA, and they use medicaid, and at the time, I was thinking that's what it was. ". But then after I said that, and then Lawrence said, yeah, he's cutting back medicaid and food stamps. And I said, yeah, welfare and CETA. I said, shoot, if they go for him again, I hope they |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Rankin v. McPherson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111946/rankin-v-mcpherson/ | shoot, if they go for him again, I hope they get him."[3] McPherson's last remark was overheard by another Deputy Constable, who, unbeknownst to McPherson, was in the room at the time. The remark was reported to Constable Rankin, *382 who summoned McPherson. McPherson readily admitted that she had made the statement, but testified that she told Rankin, upon being asked if she made the statement, "Yes, but I didn't mean anything by it." App. 38.[4] After their discussion, Rankin fired McPherson.[5] McPherson brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas under 42 U.S. C. 1983, alleging that petitioner Rankin, in discharging her, had violated her constitutional rights under color of state law. She sought reinstatement, backpay, costs and fees, and other equitable relief. The District Court held a hearing, and then granted summary judgment to Constable Rankin, holding that McPherson's speech had been unprotected and that her discharge had therefore been proper. Civ. Action No. H-81-1442[6] The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for trial, on the ground that substantial issues of material fact regarding the context in which the statement *383 had been made precluded the entry of summary judgment. On remand, the District Court held another hearing and ruled once again, this time from the bench, that the statements were not protected speech. App. 120. Again, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that McPherson's remark had addressed a matter of public concern, requiring that society's interest in McPherson's freedom of speech be weighed against her employer's interest in maintaining efficiency and discipline in the workplace. Performing that balancing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government's interest did not outweigh the First Amendment interest in protecting McPherson's speech. Given the nature of McPherson's job and the fact that she was not a law enforcement officer, was not brought by virtue of her job into contact with the public, and did not have access to sensitive information, the Court of Appeals deemed her "duties so utterly ministerial and her potential for undermining the office's mission so trivial" as to forbid her dismissal for expression of her political opinions. "However ill-considered Ardith McPherson's opinion was," the Court of Appeals concluded, "it did not make her unfit" for the job she held in Constable Rankin's office. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for determination of an appropriate remedy. We granted certiorari, and now affirm. II It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Rankin v. McPherson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111946/rankin-v-mcpherson/ | a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech. Even though McPherson was merely a probationary employee, and even if she could have been discharged for any reason or for no reason at all, she may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising her constitutional right to *384 freedom of expression. See Mt. Healthy City Board of ; at -598. The determination whether a public employer has properly discharged an employee for engaging in speech requires "a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." ; This balancing is necessary in order to accommodate the dual role of the public employer as a provider of public services and as a government entity operating under the constraints of the First Amendment. On the one hand, public employers are employers, concerned with the efficient function of their operations; review of every personnel decision made by a public employer could, in the long run, hamper the performance of public functions. On the other hand, "the threat of dismissal from public employment is a potent means of inhibiting speech." Pickering, Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees' speech. A The threshold question in applying this balancing test is whether McPherson's speech may be "fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern."[7] "Whether an employee's speech *385 addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." The District Court apparently found that McPherson's speech did not address a matter of public concern.[8] The Court of Appeals rejected this conclusion, finding that "the life and death of the President are obviously matters of public concern." 786 F.2d, Our view of these determinations of the courts *386 below is limited in this context by our constitutional obligation to assure that the record supports this conclusion: "[W]e are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they [were] made to see whether or not they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.' " quoting[9] Considering the statement in context, as requires, discloses |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Rankin v. McPherson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111946/rankin-v-mcpherson/ | " quoting[9] Considering the statement in context, as requires, discloses that it plainly dealt with a matter of public concern. The statement was made in the course of a conversation addressing the policies of the President's administration.[10] It came on the heels of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of the President.[11] While a statement *387 that amounted to a threat to kill the President would not be protected by the First Amendment, the District Court concluded, and we agree, that McPherson's statement did not amount to a threat punishable under 18 U.S. C. 871(a) or 18 U.S. C. 2385, or, indeed, that could properly be criminalized at all. See ; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8 ("[W]e do not think that respondent's remark could be criminalized"); cf.[12] The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern. "[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." New York Times ; see also : "Just as erroneous statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be similarly protected." *388 B Because McPherson's statement addressed a matter of public concern, Pickering next requires that we balance McPherson's interest in making her statement against "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." 391 U.S., at[13] The State bears a burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds. In performing the balancing, the statement will not be considered in a vacuum; the manner, time, and place of the employee's expression are relevant, as is the context in which the dispute arose. See ; We have previously recognized as pertinent considerations whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. Pickering, -573. These considerations, and indeed the very nature of the balancing test, make apparent that the state interest element of the test focuses on the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise. Interference with work, personnel relationships, or the speaker's job performance can detract from the public employer's function; avoiding such |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Rankin v. McPherson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111946/rankin-v-mcpherson/ | performance can detract from the public employer's function; avoiding such interference can be a strong state interest. From this perspective, however, petitioners fail to demonstrate a state interest that outweighs McPherson's First Amendment rights. While *389 McPherson's statement was made at the workplace, there is no evidence that it interfered with the efficient functioning of the office. The Constable was evidently not afraid that McPherson had disturbed or interrupted other employees he did not inquire to whom respondent had made the remark and testified that he "was not concerned who she had made it to," Tr. 42. In fact, Constable Rankin testified that the possibility of interference with the functions of the Constable's office had not been a consideration in his discharge of respondent and that he did not even inquire whether the remark had disrupted the work of the office.[14] Nor was there any danger that McPherson had discredited the office by making her statement in public. McPherson's speech took place in an area to which there was ordinarily no public access; her remark was evidently made in a private conversation with another employee. There is no suggestion that any member of the general public was present or heard McPherson's statement. Nor is there any evidence that employees other than Jackson who worked in the room even heard the remark. Not only was McPherson's discharge unrelated to the functioning of the office, it was not based on any assessment by the Constable that the remark demonstrated a character trait that made respondent unfit to perform her work.[15] *390 While the facts underlying Rankin's discharge of McPherson are, despite extensive proceedings in the District Court, still somewhat unclear,[16] it is undisputed that he fired McPherson based on the content of her speech. Evidently because McPherson had made the statement, and because the Constable believed that she "meant it," he decided that she was not a suitable employee to have in a law enforcement agency. But in weighing the State's interest in discharging an employee based on any claim that the content of a statement made by the employee somehow undermines the mission of the public employer, some attention must be paid to the responsibilities of the employee within the agency. The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability the employee's role entails. Where, as here, an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public *391 contact role, the danger to the agency's successful functioning from that employee's private speech is minimal. We cannot believe that |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Rankin v. McPherson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111946/rankin-v-mcpherson/ | that employee's private speech is minimal. We cannot believe that every employee in Constable Rankin's office, whether computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is equally required, on pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of being interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may be unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency.[17] At some point, such concerns are so removed from the effective functioning of the public employer that they cannot prevail over the free speech rights of the public employee.[18] *392 This is such a case. McPherson's employment-related interaction with the Constable was apparently negligible. Her duties were purely clerical and were limited solely to the civil process function of the Constable's office. There is no indication that she would ever be in a position to further or indeed to have any involvement with the minimal law enforcement activity engaged in by the Constable's office. Given the function of the agency, McPherson's position in the office, and the nature of her statement, we are not persuaded that Rankin's interest in discharging her outweighed her rights under the First Amendment. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that McPherson's discharge was improper, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130157/green-tree-financial-corp-v-bazzle/ | his case concerns contracts between a commercial lender and its customers, each of which contains a clause providing for arbitration of all contract-related disputes. he Supreme Court of South Carolina held (1) that the arbitration clauses are silent as to whether arbitration might take the form of class arbitration, and (2) that, in that circumstance, South Carolina law interprets the contracts as permitting class arbitration. 351 S. C. 244, We granted certiorari to determine whether this holding is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S. C. 1 et seq. We are faced at the outset with a problem concerning the contracts' silence. Are the contracts in fact silent, or do they forbid class arbitration as petitioner Green ree Financial Corp. contends? Given the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding, it is important to resolve that question. But we cannot do so, not simply because it is a matter of state law, but also because it is a matter for the arbitrator to decide. Because the record suggests that the parties have not yet received an arbitrator's decision on that question of contract interpretation, we vacate the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remand the case so that this question may be resolved in arbitration. I In 1995, respondents Lynn and Burt Bazzle secured a home improvement loan from petitioner Green ree. he *448 Bazzles and Green ree entered into a contract, governed by South Carolina law, which included the following arbitration clause: "ARBIRAIONAll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract. shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with consent of you. his arbitration contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S. C. section 1. HE PARIES VOLUNARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGH HEY HAVE O A JURY RIAL, EIHER PURSUAN O ARBIRAION UNDER HIS CLAUSE OR PURSUAN O A COUR ACION BY US (AS PROVIDED HEREIN). he parties agree and understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law and the contract. hese powers shall include all legal and equitable remedies, including, but not limited to, money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief." App. 34 (emphasis added, capitalization in original). Respondents Daniel Lackey and George and Florine Buggs entered into loan contracts and security agreements for the purchase of mobile homes with Green ree. hese agreements contained arbitration clauses that were, in all relevant respects, identical to the Bazzles' arbitration clause. (heir contracts substitute |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130157/green-tree-financial-corp-v-bazzle/ | respects, identical to the Bazzles' arbitration clause. (heir contracts substitute the word "you" with the word "Buyer[s]" in the italicized phrase.) 351 S. C., at 264, n. 18, n. 18 At the time of the loan transactions, Green ree apparently failed to provide these customers with a legally required form that would have told them that they had a right to name their own lawyers and insurance agents and would have provided space for them to write in those names. See *449 S. C. Code Ann. 37-10-102 he two sets of customers before us now as respondents each filed separate actions in South Carolina state courts, complaining that this failure violated South Carolina law and seeking damages. In April 1997, the Bazzles asked the court to certify their claims as a class action. Green ree sought to stay the court proceedings and compel arbitration. On January 5, the court both (1) certified a class action and (2) entered an order compelling arbitration. App. 7. Green ree then selected an arbitrator with the Bazzles' consent. And the arbitrator, administering the proceeding as a class arbitration, eventually awarded the class $10,935,000 in statutory damages, along with attorney's fees. he trial court confirmed the award, App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a-35a, and Green ree appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals claiming, among other things, that class arbitration was legally impermissible. Lackey and the Buggses had earlier begun a similar court proceeding in which they, too, sought class certification. Green ree moved to compel arbitration. he trial court initially denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement unenforceable, but Green ree pursued an interlocutory appeal and the State Court of Appeals reversed. he parties then chose an arbitrator, indeed the same arbitrator who was subsequently selected to arbitrate the Bazzles' dispute. In December the arbitrator certified a class in arbitration. App. 18. he arbitrator proceeded to hear the matter, ultimately ruled in favor of the class, and awarded the class $9,200,000 in statutory damages in addition to attorney's fees. he trial court confirmed the award. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a-54a. Green ree appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals claiming, among other things, that class arbitration was legally impermissible. *450 he South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew both cases from the Court of Appeals, assumed jurisdiction, and consolidated the proceedings. 351 S. C., at hat court then held that the contracts were silent in respect to class arbitration, that they consequently authorized class arbitration, and that arbitration had properly taken that form. We granted certiorari to consider whether that holding is consistent |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130157/green-tree-financial-corp-v-bazzle/ | We granted certiorari to consider whether that holding is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act. II he South Carolina Supreme Court's determination that the contracts are silent in respect to class arbitration raises a preliminary question. Green ree argued there, as it argues here, that the contracts are not silentthat they forbid class arbitration. And we must deal with that argument at the outset, for if it is right, then the South Carolina court's holding is flawed on its own terms; that court neither said nor implied that it would have authorized class arbitration had the parties' arbitration agreement forbidden it. Whether Green ree is right about the contracts themselves presents a disputed issue of contract interpretation. HE CHIEF JUSICE believes that Green ree is right; indeed, that Green ree is so clearly right that we should ignore the fact that state law, not federal law, normally governs such matters, see post, at 454 (SEVENS, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part), and reverse the South Carolina Supreme Court outright, see post, at 458-460 (REHNQUIS, C. J., dissenting). HE CHIEF JUSICE points out that the contracts say that disputes "shall be resolved by one arbitrator selected by us [Green ree] with consent of you [Green ree's customer]." App. to Pet. for Cert. 110a. See post, at 458. And it finds that class arbitration is clearly inconsistent with this requirement. After all, class arbitration involves an arbitration, not simply between Green ree and a named customer, but also between Green ree and other (represented) customers, all taking place before the *451 arbitrator chosen to arbitrate the initial, named customer's dispute. We do not believe, however, that the contracts' language is as clear as he Chief Justice believes. he class arbitrator was "selected by" Green ree "with consent of" Green ree's customers, the named plaintiffs. And insofar as the other class members agreed to proceed in class arbitration, they consented as well. Of course, Green ree did not independently select this arbitrator to arbitrate its disputes with the other class members. But whether the contracts contain this additional requirement is a question that the literal terms of the contracts do not decide. he contracts simply say (I) "selected by us [Green ree]." And that is literally what occurred. he contracts do not say (II) "selected by us [Green ree] to arbitrate this dispute and no other (even identical) dispute with another customer." he question whether (I) in fact implicitly means (II) is the question at issue: Do the contracts forbid class arbitration? Given the broad authority the contracts elsewhere bestow upon |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130157/green-tree-financial-corp-v-bazzle/ | arbitration? Given the broad authority the contracts elsewhere bestow upon the arbitrator, see, e. g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 110a (the contracts grant to the arbitrator "all powers," including certain equitable powers "provided by the law and the contract"), the answer to this question is not completely obvious. At the same time, we cannot automatically accept the South Carolina Supreme Court's resolution of this contract-interpretation question. Under the terms of the parties' contracts, the questionwhether the agreement forbids class arbitrationis for the arbitrator to decide. he parties agreed to submit to the arbitrator "[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract." And the dispute about what the arbitration contract in each case means (i. e., whether it forbids the use of class arbitration procedures) is a dispute "relating to this contract" and the resulting "relationships." Hence the *452 parties seem to have agreed that an arbitrator, not a judge, would answer the relevant question. See First Options of Chicago, And if there is doubt about that matterabout the "`scope of arbitrable issues'"we should resolve that doubt "`in favor of arbitration.'" Mitsubishi Motors In certain limited circumstances, courts assume that the parties intended courts, not arbitrators, to decide a particular arbitration-related matter (in the absence of "clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]" evidence to the contrary). A& echnologies, hese limited instances typically involve matters of a kind that "contracting parties would likely have expected a court" to decide. hey include certain gateway matters, such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy. See generally See also John Wiley & Sons, ; A&, he question herewhether the contracts forbid class arbitrationdoes not fall into this narrow exception. It concerns neither the validity of the arbitration clause nor its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties. Unlike First Options, the question is not whether the parties wanted a judge or an arbitrator to decide whether they agreed to arbitrate a matter. -945. Rather the relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to. hat question does not concern a state statute or judicial procedures, cf. Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of rustees of Leland Stanford *453 Junior Univ., It concerns contract interpretation and arbitration procedures. Arbitrators are well situated to answer that question. Given these considerations, along with the arbitration contracts' sweeping language concerning the scope of the questions committed to arbitration, this matter of contract interpretation should be for the |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130157/green-tree-financial-corp-v-bazzle/ | arbitration, this matter of contract interpretation should be for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide. Cf. at III With respect to this underlying questionwhether the arbitration contracts forbid class arbitrationthe parties have not yet obtained the arbitration decision that their contracts foresee. As far as concerns the Bazzle plaintiffs, the South Carolina Supreme Court wrote that the "trial court" issued "an order granting class certification" and the arbitrator subsequently "administered" class arbitration proceedings "without further involvement of the trial court." 351 S. C., at 250-251, Green ree adds that "the class arbitration was imposed on the parties and the arbitrator by the South Carolina trial court." Brief for Petitioner 30. Respondents now deny that this was so, Brief for Respondents 13, but we can find no convincing record support for that denial. As far as concerns the Lackey plaintiffs, what happened in arbitration is less clear. On the one hand, the Lackey arbitrator (the same individual who later arbitrated the Bazzle dispute) wrote: "I determined that a class action should proceed in arbitration based upon my careful review of the broadly drafted arbitration clause prepared by Green ree." App. to Pet. for Cert. 84a And respondents suggested at oral argument that the arbitrator's decision was independently made. r. of Oral Arg. 39. On the other hand, the Lackey arbitrator decided this question after the South Carolina trial court had determined *454 that the identical contract in the Bazzle case authorized class arbitration procedures. And there is no question that the arbitrator was aware of the Bazzle decision, since the Lackey plaintiffs had argued to the arbitrator that it should impose class arbitration procedures in part because the state trial court in Bazzle had done so. Record on Appeal 516-518. In the court proceedings below (where Green ree took the opposite position), the Lackey plaintiffs maintained that "to the extent" the arbitrator decided that the contracts permitted class procedures (in the Lackey case or the Bazzle case), "it was a reaffirmation and/or adoption of [the Bazzle c]ourt's prior determination." Record on Appeal 1708, n. 2. See also App. 31-32, n. 2. On balance, there is at least a strong likelihood in Lackey as well as in Bazzle that the arbitrator's decision reflected a court's interpretation of the contracts rather than an arbitrator's interpretation. hat being so, we remand the case so that the arbitrator may decide the question of contract interpretationthereby enforcing the parties' arbitration agreements according to their terms. 9 U.S. C. 2; he judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130157/green-tree-financial-corp-v-bazzle/ | Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. So ordered. JUSICE SEVENS, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. he parties agreed that South Carolina law would govern their arbitration agreement. he Supreme Court of South Carolina has held as a matter of state law that class-action arbitrations are permissible if not prohibited by the applicable arbitration agreement, and that the agreement between these parties is silent on the issue. 351 S. C. 244, 262-266, here is nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act that precludes either of these determinations *455 by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. See Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of rustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., Arguably the interpretation of the parties' agreement should have been made in the first instance by the arbitrator, rather than the court. See Because the decision to conduct a class-action arbitration was correct as a matter of law, and because petitioner has merely challenged the merits of that decision without claiming that it was made by the wrong decisionmaker, there is no need to remand the case to correct that possible error. Accordingly, I would simply affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Were I to adhere to my preferred disposition of the case, however, there would be no controlling judgment of the Court. In order to avoid that outcome, and because Justice Breyer's opinion expresses a view of the case close to my own, I concur in the judgment. See |
Justice Marshall | 1,973 | 15 | second_dissenting | Illinois v. Somerville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108729/illinois-v-somerville/ | The opinion of the Court explicitly disclaims the suggestion that it overrules the recent cases of United and Ante, at 469. But the Court substantially eviscerates the rationale of those cases. and Downum appeared to give judges some guidance in determining what constituted a "manifest necessity" for declaring a mistrial over a defendant's objection. Today the Court seems to revert to a totally unstructured analysis of such cases. I believe that one of the strengths of the articulation of legal rules in a series of cases is that successive cases present in a clearer focus considerations only vaguely seen earlier. Cases help delineate the factors to be considered and suggest how they ought to affect the result in particular situations. That is what and Downum did. The Court, it seems to me, today abandons the effort in those cases to suggest the importance of particular factors, and adopts a general "balancing" test which, even on its own terms, the Court improperly applies to this case. The majority purports to balance the manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial, ante, at 463, the public interest "in seeing that a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict," ibid., and the interest in assuring impartial verdicts, ante, at 464. The second interest is obviously present in every case, and placing it in the balance cannot alter the result of the analysis of different *478 cases. It is, at most, a constant whose importance a judge must consider when weighing other factors on which the availability of the double jeopardy defense depends. At the same time, the balance that the majority strikes essentially ignores the importance of a factor which was determinative in and Downum: the accused's interest in his "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal," quoted in United This is not a factor which is excised from isolated passages of as the majority would have it, ante, at 469; it is the core of that case, as even the most cursory reading will disclose. See, e. 484-486. By mischaracterizing and Downum, the Court finds it possible to reach today's result. A fair reading of those cases shows how the balance should properly be struck here. The first element to be considered is the necessity for declaring a mistrial. That I take to mean consideration of the alternatives available to the judge confronted with a situation in the midst of trial that seems to require correction. In Downum, for example, a key prosecution witness was not available when the case was called for trial, because of the prosecutor's negligence. Because the witness |
Justice Marshall | 1,973 | 15 | second_dissenting | Illinois v. Somerville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108729/illinois-v-somerville/ | for trial, because of the prosecutor's negligence. Because the witness was essential to presentation of only two of the six counts concerning Downum, there was no necessity to declare a mistrial as to all six. Trial could have proceeded on the four counts for which the prosecution was ready. Similarly, in the District Judge precipitately aborted the trial in order to protect the rights of prospective witnesses. Again, the alternative of interrupting the trial briefly so that the witnesses might consult with attorneys was available but not invoked. United *479 A superficial examination of this case might suggest that there were no alternatives except to proceed where "reversal on appeal [would be] a certainty" ante, at 464. Respondent had been indicted for "knowingly obtain[ing] unauthorized control over stolen property, to wit: thirteen hundred dollars in United Currency, the property of Zayre of Bridgeview, Inc., a corporation, knowing the same to have been stolen by another in violation of Chapter 38, Section 16-1 (d) of the Illinois Revised Statutes." Petition for Writ of Certiorari 3. The statute named in the indictment requires that the defendant have "[i]ntend[ed] to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property." Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, 16-1 (d) (1) The majority treats it as unquestionably clear that the failure to allege that intent in the indictment made the indictment fatally defective. And indeed, since the time of the trial of this case, Illinois courts have so held. See, e. ; But the answer was not so clear when the trial judge made his decision. The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure had just recently been amended to require that an indictment name the offense and the statutory provision alleged to have been violated, and that it set forth the nature and elements of the offense charged. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, 111-3 (a) The indictment here was sufficiently detailed to meet the federal requirement that the indictment "contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, `and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet,' " Hagner v. United ; see also Russell v. United Had the Illinois courts been made aware of the substantial constitutional questions raised by rigid application *480 of an archaic mode of reading indictments, they might well have refused to hold that the defect in the indictment here was jurisdictional and nonwaivable. Conscientious state trial judges certainly must attempt to anticipate the course of interpretation of state law. But they must also contribute to that course by pointing out the constitutional implications of |
Justice Marshall | 1,973 | 15 | second_dissenting | Illinois v. Somerville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108729/illinois-v-somerville/ | to that course by pointing out the constitutional implications of alternative interpretations. By doing so, they would themselves help shape the interpretation of state law. Here, for example, had the trial judge refused to declare a mistrial because of his constitutional misgivings about the implications of that course, he might have prevented what Chief Justice Underwood has called a "reversion to an overly technical, highly unrealistic and completely undesirable type of formalism in pleading which serves no useful purpose," in interpreting the Code of Criminal Procedure. People ex rel. A trial judge in 1965 might have forestalled that unhappy development. Thus, he could have proceeded to try the case on the first indictment, risking reversal as any trial judge does when making rulings of law, but with no guarantee of reversal. In proceeding with the trial, he would have fully protected the defendant's interest in having his trial completed by the jury already chosen. If the only alternative to declaring a mistrial did require the trial judge to ignore the tenor of previous state decisional law, though, perhaps declaring a mistrial would have been a manifest necessity. But there obviously was another alternative. The trial judge could have continued the trial. The majority suggests that this would have been a useless charade. But to a defendant, forcing the Government to proceed with its proof would almost certainly not be useless. The Government might not persuade the jury of the defendant's guilt. The majority *481 concedes that the Double Jeopardy Clause would then bar a retrial. Ante, at 467; United v. Ball, To assume that continuing the trial would be useless is to assume that conviction is inevitable. I would not structure the analysis of problems under the Double Jeopardy Clause on an assumption that appears to be inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. Once it is shown that alternatives to the declaration of a mistrial existed, as they did here, we must consider whether the reasons which led to the declaration were sufficient, in light of those alternatives, to overcome the defendant's interest in trying the case to the jury. Here and Downum run directly counter to the holding today. I would not characterize the District Judge's behavior in as "erratic," as the Court does, ante, at 469. His desire to protect the rights of prospective witnesses, who might have unknowingly implicated them in criminal activities if they testified, was hardly irrational. It, too, was "a legitimate state policy." The defect in was the District Judge's failure to consider alternative courses of action, not the irrationality of the policy he |
Justice Marshall | 1,973 | 15 | second_dissenting | Illinois v. Somerville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108729/illinois-v-somerville/ | courses of action, not the irrationality of the policy he sought to promote. But even if I agreed with the majority's description of that would not end the inquiry. I would turn to a consideration of the importance of the state policy that seemed to require declaring a mistrial, when weighed against the defendant's interest in concluding the trial with the jury already chosen. Here again the majority mischaracterizes the state policy at stake here. What is involved is not, as the majority says, "the right of each defendant to insist that a criminal prosecution against him be commenced by the action of a grand jury." Ante, at 468. Rather, the interest is in making the defect in the indictment here jurisdictional and not waivable by a defendant. *482 Ordinarily, a defect in jurisdiction means that one institution has invaded the proper province of another. Such defects are not waivable because the State has an interest in preserving the allocation of competence between those institutions. Here, for example, the petit jury would invade the province of the grand jury if it returned a verdict of guilty on an improper indictment. However, allocation of jurisdiction is most important when one continuing body acts in the area of competence reserved to another continuing body. While it may be desirable to keep a single petit jury from invading the province of a single grand jury, surely that interest is not so substantial as to outweigh the "defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal." Cf. is an even harder case for the majority, which succeeds in distinguishing it only by misrepresenting the facts of the case. The majority treats Downum as a case involving a procedure "that would lend itself to prosecutorial manipulation." Ante at 464. However, the facts in Downum, set out at -742 clearly show that the prosecutor's failure to have a crucial witness present was a negligent oversight. Except in the most attenuated sense that it may induce a prosecutor to fail to take steps to prevent such oversights, I cannot understand how negligence lends itself to manipulation. And even if I could understand that, I cannot understand how negligence in failing to draw an adequate indictment is different from negligence in failing to assure the presence of a crucial witness.[1] *483 I believe that Downum and are controllin[2] As in those cases, the trial judge here did not pursue an available alternative, and the reason which led him to declare a mistrial was prosecutorial negligence, a reason that this Court found insufficient in Downum. and |
Justice Powell | 1,982 | 17 | majority | United States v. Erika, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110695/united-states-v-erika-inc/ | The question is whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to review determinations by private insurance carriers of the amount of benefits payable under Part B of the Medicare statute. I Part B of the Medicare program, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1395j et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), is a federally subsidized, voluntary health insurance system for persons who are 65 or older or who are disabled. The companion Part A Medicare program covers institutional health costs such as hospital expenses. Part B supplements Part A's coverage by insuring against a portion of some medical expenses, such as certain physician services and X-rays, that are excluded from the Part A program. Eligible individuals pay monthly premiums if they choose to enroll in Part B. These premiums, together with contributions from the Federal *203 Government, are deposited in the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund that finances the Part B program. See 1395j, 1395r, 1395s, and 1395w (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). The Secretary of Health and Human Services administers the Medicare program. "In order to provide for the administration of the benefits with maximum efficiency and convenience for individuals entitled to benefits," the Secretary is authorized to assign the task of paying Part B claims from the Trust Fund to private insurance carriers experienced in such matters.[1] 1395u. See H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1965); S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1965). After Part B enrollees receive medical care, they (or, after their assignment, their medical providers) bill the private insurance carrier. If the carrier determines that a claim meets all Part B coverage criteria such as medical necessity and reasonable cost, the carrier pays the claim out of the federal funds. See 42 U.S. C. 1395u; Schweiker v. McClure, ante, p. 188. If the carrier decides that reimbursement in full is not warranted, the statute and the regulations designate an appeal procedure available to dissatisfied claimants. All may request a "review determination," which is a de novo written review hearing before a carrier employee different from the one who initially decided the claim. Claimants who remain dissatisfied and whose appeal involves more than $100 then may petition for an oral hearing before a hearing officer designated by the carrier. See 42 U.S. C. 1395u(b)(3)(C); 42 CFR 405.820 Unless the carrier or the hearing officer decides to reopen the proceeding, the hearing officer's decision is "final and binding upon all parties to the hearing." 405.835. Neither the statute nor the Secretary's regulations make further provision for review of hearing officer |
Justice Powell | 1,982 | 17 | majority | United States v. Erika, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110695/united-states-v-erika-inc/ | Secretary's regulations make further provision for review of hearing officer decisions. *204 II Respondent, a major distributor of kidney dialysis supplies, sold its products to institutions and individuals. About half of such sales were covered by the Part B program. Persons purchasing dialysis supplies assigned their Medicare Part B claims to respondent. See 42 U.S. C. 426(e); 426-1 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (establishing Part B coverage for renal disease). Respondent in turn billed the Prudential Insurance Company of America, the private insurance carrier for the New Jersey area in which it is based. According to its contract with the Secretary, Prudential was required to reimburse 80% of what it determined to be a "reasonable charg[e]" for these supplies. See 1395l(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Prudential interpreted the relevant statute and regulations to define the "reasonable charges" for respondent's products to be their catalog price as of July 1 of the preceding calendar year.[2] For example, Prudential reimbursed respondent's Part B invoices from July 1, 1975, to June 30, 1976, on the basis of prices contained in respondent's July 1, 1974, catalog. Prudential began reimbursing respondent on this basis in 1974. Early in 1976 the respondent learned about the grounds for Prudential's partial reimbursement of its invoices. *205 At that time it requested Prudential to adjust past and future reimbursements to reflect price increases effective after July 1, 1974. Prudential agreed to adjust prospectively the basis for payment for the drug heparin, the price of which apparently had increased sharply. Cf. U. S. Dept. of HEW, Medicare Part B Carriers Manual 5010.2 (permitting adjustments to customary charges in "highly unusual situations where equity clearly indicates that the increases are warranted"). But the carrier refused to make either retroactive adjustments for heparin or any adjustments at all for other products.[3] Respondent sought review of this refusal before one of Prudential's hearing officers pursuant to 42 U.S. C. 1395 u(b)(3)(C). The hearing officer affirmed Prudential's decision. Respondent then brought the instant action against the United States in the Court of Claims seeking reimbursement on the basis of its current charges, asserting that Prudential's refusal to set "reasonable charges" on the basis of respondent's interim price increases contravened the Fifth Amendment as well as the Social Security Act and applicable regulations. The Court of Claims ruled that respondent's suit was within the jurisdictional grant of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C. 1491, which permits the Court of Claims to hear "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department." opinion |
Justice Powell | 1,982 | 17 | majority | United States v. Erika, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110695/united-states-v-erika-inc/ | of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department." opinion clarified,[4] On the merits, the court decided that Prudential's calculation of respondent's *206 maximum allowable charge erred in several -268, 634 F. 2d, at 588-590. The court remanded the case to Prudential for redetermination of these matters.[5] We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over suits of this kind. We now reverse. III The United States argues that Congress, by enacting the Medicare statute, 42 U.S. C. 1395j et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), specifically precluded review in the Court of Claims of adverse hearing officer determinations of the amount of Part B payments. We agree.[6] Our lodestar is the language of the statute. Congress has specified in the Medicare statute that disputed carrier Part B determinations are to be subject to review in "a fair hearing *207 by the carrier, in any case where the amount in controversy is $100 or more" 42 U.S. C. 1395u(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added).[7] See Schweiker v. McClure, ante, p. 188. Congress also provided explicitly for review by the Secretary of "determination[s] of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under part A or part B, and [of] the determination of the amount of benefits under part A" 1395ff(a) (emphasis added). Individuals dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision on such matters are granted the right to additional administrative review,[8] together with a further option of judicial review,[9] in two instances only: when the dispute relates to their eligibility to participate in either Part A or Part B, and when the dispute concerns the amount of benefits to which they are entitled under Part A. 1395ff(b).[10] *208 Section 1395ff thus distinguishes between two types of administrative decisions: eligibility determinations (that decide whether an individual is 65 or over or "disabled" within the meaning of the Medicare program) and amount determinations (that decide the amount of the Medicare payment to be made on a particular claim). Conspicuously, the statute fails to authorize further review for determinations of the amount of Part B awards. In the context of the statute's precisely drawn provisions, this omission provides persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose further review of such claims. See, e. g., ; IV The legislative history confirms this view and explains its logic. The Committee Reports accompanying the original enactment of the Medicare program stated that the supplemental payments under the Part B program generally were expected to be smaller than those under the primary Part A program. Apparently, it was for this reason that the proposed bill did not provide for |
Justice Powell | 1,982 | 17 | majority | United States v. Erika, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110695/united-states-v-erika-inc/ | this reason that the proposed bill did not provide for judicial review of "a determination concerning the amount of benefits under [P]art B" S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 55 (1965).[11] *209 This intent to limit the review of the generally smaller Part B awards was reiterated when Congress amended 1395ff(b) in 1972.[12] When introducing this amendment, Senator Bennett stated that it was intended to clarify the intent of existing law, which "greatly restricted" the appealability of Medicare decisions "in order to avoid overloading the courts with quite minor matters." 118 Cong. Rec. 33992 (1972). The Senator explained that the amendment would assure that judicial review would be available as to questions of "eligibility *210 to any benefits of medicare but not [as] to decisions on a claim for payment for a given service."[13]Ibid. The Conference Committee advanced an identical explanation for this amendment: "CLARIFICATION OF MEDICARE APPEAL PROCEDURES "Amendment No. 561: The Senate amendment added a new section to the House bill which would make clear that there is no authorization for an appeal to the Secretary or for judicial review on matters solely involving amounts of benefits under Part B, and that insofar as Part A amounts are concerned, appeal is authorized only if the amount in controversy is $100 or more and judicial review only if the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more. "The House recedes." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1605, p. 61 (1972). *211 These expressions of legislative intent unambiguously support our reading of the statutory language. Respondent advances no persuasive evidence of contrary congressional will. In such circumstances, our task is at an end.[14] The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed. So ordered. |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4374576/fry-v-napoleon-community-schools/ | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), as amended, 20 U.S. C. et seq., ensures that children with disabilities receive needed special education services. One of its provisions, addresses the Act’s relationship with other laws protecting those children. Section 115(l) makes clear that nothing in the IDEA “restrict[s] or limit[s] the rights [or] remedies” that other federal laws, including antidiscrimination statutes, confer on children with disabilities. At the same time, the section states that if a suit brought under such a law “seek[s] relief that is also available under” the IDEA, the plaintiff must first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative In this case, we consider the scope of that exhaustion requirement. We hold that exhaustion is not necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff ’s suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA’s core guar antee—what the Act calls a “free appropriate public edu cation.” 2 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Opinion of the Court I A The IDEA offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a “free appropriate public educa tion”—more concisely known as a FAPE—to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities. Ibid.; see (listing covered disabilities). As defined in the Act, a FAPE comprises “special education and related services”—both “instruction” tailored to meet a child’s “unique needs” and sufficient “supportive services” to permit the child to benefit from that instruction. (26), (29); see Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. 58 U.S. 176, 203 (1982). An eligible child, as this Court has ex plained, acquires a “substantive right” to such an educa tion once a State accepts the IDEA’s financial assistance. Under the IDEA, an “individualized education pro gram,” called an IEP for short, serves as the “primary vehicle” for providing each child with the promised FAPE. ; see (Welcome to—and apologies for—the acronymic world of federal legislation.) Crafted by a child’s “IEP Team”—a group of school officials, teachers, and parents—the IEP spells out a personalized plan to meet all of the child’s “educational needs.” (d)(1)(B). Most notably, the IEP documents the child’s current “lev els of academic achievement,” specifies “measurable an- nual goals” for how she can “make progress in the general education curriculum,” and lists the “special education and related services” to be provided so that she can “advance appropriately toward [those] goals.” (II), (IV)(aa). Because parents and school representatives sometimes cannot agree on such issues, the IDEA establishes formal procedures for resolving disputes. To begin, a dissatisfied Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 3 Opinion of the Court parent may |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4374576/fry-v-napoleon-community-schools/ | U. S. (2017) 3 Opinion of the Court parent may file a complaint as to any matter concerning the provision of a FAPE with the local or state educational agency (as state law provides). See That pleading generally triggers a “[p]reliminary meeting” involving the contending parties, )(1)(B)(i); at their option, the parties may instead (or also) pursue a full- fledged mediation process, see Assuming their impasse continues, the matter proceeds to a “due pro cess hearing” before an impartial hearing officer. )(1)(A); see )(3)(A)(i). Any decision of the officer granting substantive relief must be “based on a determination of whether the child received a [FAPE].” )(3)(E)(i). If the hearing is initially conducted at the local level, the ruling is appealable to the state agency. See Finally, a parent unhappy with the outcome of the administrative process may seek judicial review by filing a civil action in state or federal court. See Important as the IDEA is for children with disabilities, it is not the only federal statute protecting their interests. Of particular relevance to this case are two antidiscrimi nation laws—Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 2 U.S. C. et seq., and of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S. C. cover both adults and children with disabilities, in both public schools and other settings. Title II forbids any “public entity” from discriminating based on disability; Section 50 ap plies the same prohibition to any federally funded “pro gram or activity.” 2 U.S. C. §–12132; 29 U.S. C. A regulation implementing Title II requires a public entity to make “reasonable modifications” to its “policies, practices, or procedures” when necessary to avoid such discrimination. (b)(7) (2016); see, e.g., Alboniga v. School Bd. of Broward Cty., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 135 (requiring an accommodation to permit use of a service animal under Title II). In simi FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Opinion of the Court lar vein, courts have interpreted as demanding cer tain “reasonable” modifications to existing practices in order to “accommodate” persons with disabilities. Alexan- ; see, e.g., Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist., 731 F. Supp. 97, 961–962 (ED Cal. 1990) (requiring an accommodation to permit use of a service animal under ). And both statutes authorize individuals to seek redress for viola tions of their substantive guarantees by bringing suits for injunctive relief or money damages. See 29 U.S. C. 2 U.S. C. This Court first considered the interaction between such laws and the IDEA in1 The plaintiffs there sought “to secure a ‘free appropriate public education’ for [their] handicapped child.” at 99. But instead |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4374576/fry-v-napoleon-community-schools/ | public education’ for [their] handicapped child.” at 99. But instead of bringing suit under the IDEA alone, they appended “virtually identical” claims (again alleging the denial of a “free appropriate public education”) under of the Rehabilitation Act and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. ; see The Court held that the IDEA altogether foreclosed those additional claims: With its “comprehen sive” and “carefully tailored” provisions, the Act was “the exclusive avenue” through which a child with a disability (or his parents) could challenge the adequacy of his educa tion. ; see Congress was quick to respond. In the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, it over turned ’s preclusion of non-IDEA claims while also adding a carefully defined exhaustion requirement. Now codified at 20 U.S. C. the relevant provision of —————— 1 At the time (and until 1990), the IDEA was called the Education of the Handicapped Act, or EHA. See –112 (renaming the statute). To avoid confusion—and acronym overload— we refer throughout this opinion only to the IDEA. Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 5 Opinion of the Court that statute reads: “Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Re habilitation Act [including ], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be re quired had the action been brought under [the IDEA].” The first half of (up until “except that”) “reaf firm[s] the viability” of federal statutes like the ADA or Rehabilitation Act “as separate vehicles,” no less integral than the IDEA, “for ensuring the rights of handicapped children.” H. R. Rep. No. 99–296, p. ; see According to that opening phrase, the IDEA does not prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims under such laws even if, as in itself, those claims allege the denial of an appropriate public education (much as an IDEA claim would). But the second half of (from “except that” onward) imposes a limit on that “anything goes” regime, in the form of an exhaustion provision. According to that closing phrase, a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws must in certain circumstances—that is, when “seeking relief that is also available under” the IDEA—first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative The reach of that requirement is the issue in this case. B Petitioner E. F. |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4374576/fry-v-napoleon-community-schools/ | is the issue in this case. B Petitioner E. F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral palsy, which “significantly limits her motor skills and 6 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Opinion of the Court mobility.” App. to Brief in Opposition 6, Complaint ¶19.2 When E. F. was five years old, her parents—petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry—obtained a trained service dog for her, as recommended by her pediatrician. The dog, a goldendoodle named Wonder, “help[s E. F.] to live as independently as possible” by assisting her with various life activities. In particular, Wonder aids E. F. by “retrieving dropped items, helping her balance when she uses her walker, opening and closing doors, turning on and off lights, helping her take off her coat, [and] helping her transfer to and from the toilet.” ¶27. But when the Frys sought permission for Wonder to join E. F. in kindergarten, officials at Ezra Eby Elementary School refused the request. Under E. F.’s existing IEP, a human aide provided E. F. with one-on-one support throughout the day; that two-legged assistance, the school officials thought, rendered Wonder superfluous. In the words of one administrator, Wonder should be barred from Ezra Eby because all of E. F.’s “physical and academic needs [were] being met through the services/programs/ accommodations” that the school had already agreed to. Later that year, the school officials briefly allowed Wonder to accompany E. F. to school on a trial basis; but even then, “the dog was required to remain in the back of the room during classes, and was forbidden from assisting [E. F.] with many tasks he had been specifi cally trained to do.” Ib ¶35. And when the trial period concluded, the administrators again informed the Frys that Wonder was not welcome. As a result, the Frys re moved E. F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her. —————— 2 Because this case comes to us on review of a motion to dismiss E. F.’s suit, we accept as true all facts pleaded in her complaint. See Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 7 Opinion of the Court In addition, the Frys filed a complaint with the U. S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), charging that Ezra Eby’s exclusion of E. F.’s service ani mal violated her rights under Title II of the ADA and of the Rehabilitation Act. Following an investigation, OCR agreed. The office explained in its decision letter that a school’s obligations under those statutes go beyond providing educational services: A school could offer a FAPE to a child with a disability |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4374576/fry-v-napoleon-community-schools/ | could offer a FAPE to a child with a disability but still run afoul of the laws’ ban on discrimination. See App. 30–32. And here, OCR found, Ezra Eby had indeed violated that ban, even if its use of a human aide satisfied the FAPE standard. See –36. OCR analogized the school’s conduct to “requir[ing] a student who uses a wheelchair to be carried” by an aide or “requir[ing] a blind student to be led [around by a] teacher” instead of permitting him to use a guide dog or cane. Regardless whether those—or Ezra Eby’s—policies denied a FAPE, they violated Title II and by discriminating against children with disabilities. See –36. In response to OCR’s decision, school officials at last agreed that E. F. could come to school with Wonder. But after meeting with Ezra Eby’s principal, the Frys became concerned that the school administration “would resent [E. F.] and make her return to school difficult.” App. to Brief in Opposition 10, ¶8. Accordingly, the Frys found a different public school, in a different district, where ad ministrators and teachers enthusiastically received both E. F. and Wonder. C The Frys then filed this suit in federal court against the local and regional school districts in which Ezra Eby is located, along with the school’s principal (collectively, the school districts). The complaint alleged that the school districts violated Title II of the ADA and of the Re 8 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Opinion of the Court habilitation Act by “denying [E. F.] equal access” to Ezra Eby and its programs, “refus[ing] to reasonably accommo date” E. F.’s use of a service animal, and otherwise “dis criminat[ing] against [E. F.] as a person with disabilities.” 17–18, ¶¶82–83. According to the com plaint, E. F. suffered harm as a result of that discrimina tion, including “emotional distress and pain, embarrass ment, [and] mental anguish.” –12, ¶51. In their prayer for relief, the Frys sought a declaration that the school districts had violated Title II and along with money damages to compensate for E. F.’s injuries. The District Court granted the school districts’ motion to dismiss the suit, holding that required the Frys to first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative See App. to Pet. for Cert. 50. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same ground. In that court’s view, applies if “the inju ries [alleged in a suit] relate to the specific substantive protections of the IDEA.” And that means, the court continued, that exhaustion is neces sary whenever “the genesis and the manifestations” of |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4374576/fry-v-napoleon-community-schools/ | is neces sary whenever “the genesis and the manifestations” of the complained-of harms were “educational” in nature. at 627 ). On that under standing of the Sixth Circuit held, the Frys’ suit could not proceed: Because the harms to E. F. were gener ally “educational”—most notably, the court reasoned, because “Wonder’s absence hurt her sense of independence and social confidence at school”—the Frys had to exhaust the IDEA’s 788 F.3d, 27. Judge Daugh trey dissented, emphasizing that in bringing their Title II and claims, the Frys “did not allege the denial of a FAPE” or “seek to modify [E. F.’s] IEP in any way.” at 63. We granted certiorari to address confusion in the courts of appeals as to the scope of ’s exhaustion re Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 9 Opinion of the Court quirement. 579 U. S. (2016).3 We now vacate the Sixth Circuit’s decision. II Section 115(l) requires that a plaintiff exhaust the IDEA’s procedures before filing an action under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws when (but only when) her suit “seek[s] relief that is also available” under the IDEA. We first hold that to meet that statutory standard, a suit must seek relief for the denial of a FAPE, because that is the only “relief ” the IDEA makes “avail able.” We next conclude that in determining whether a suit indeed “seeks” relief for such a denial, a court should look to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff ’s complaint. A In this Court, the parties have reached substantial agreement about what “relief ” the IDEA makes “avail- able” for children with disabilities—and about how the —————— 3 See (en banc) (cataloguing different Circuits’ understandings of ). In particular, the Ninth Circuit has criticized an approach similar to the Sixth Circuit’s for “treat[ing] as a quasi-preemption provi sion, requiring administrative exhaustion for any case that falls within the general ‘field’ of educating disabled students.” In reaching these conclusions, we leave for another day a further question about the meaning of : Is exhaustion required when the plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE, but the specific remedy she requests—here, money damages for emotional distress—is not one that an IDEA hearing officer may award? The Frys, along with the Solicitor General, say the answer is no. See Reply Brief 2–3; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16. But resolution of that question might not be needed in this case because the Frys also say that their complaint is not about the denial of a FAPE, see Reply Brief 17—and, as |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4374576/fry-v-napoleon-community-schools/ | the denial of a FAPE, see Reply Brief 17—and, as later explained, we must remand that distinct issue to the Sixth Circuit, see infra, at 18–20. Only if that court rejects the Frys’ view of their lawsuit, using the analysis we set out below, will the question about the effect of their request for money damages arise. 10 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Opinion of the Court Sixth Circuit went wrong in addressing that question. The Frys maintain that such a child can obtain remedies under the IDEA for decisions that deprive her of a FAPE, but none for those that do not. So in the Frys’ view, ’s exhaustion requirement can come into play only when a suit concerns the denial of a FAPE—and not, as the Sixth Circuit held, when it merely has some articula ble connection to the education of a child with a disability. See Reply Brief 13–15. The school districts, for their part, also believe that the Sixth Circuit’s exhaustion standard “goes too far” because it could mandate exhaustion when a plaintiff is “seeking relief that is not in substance avail- able” under the IDEA. Brief for Respondents 30. And in particular, the school districts acknowledge that the IDEA makes remedies available only in suits that “directly implicate[ ]” a FAPE—so that only in those suits can apply. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the parties’ shared view: The only relief that an IDEA officer can give—hence the thing a plaintiff must seek in order to trigger ’s exhaus tion rule—is relief for the denial of a FAPE. We begin, as always, with the statutory language at issue, which (at risk of repetition) compels exhaustion when a plaintiff seeks “relief ” that is “available” under the IDEA. The ordinary meaning of “relief ” in the context of a lawsuit is the “redress[ ] or benefit” that attends a favor able judgment. Black’s Law Dictionary 1161 (5th ed. 1979). And such relief is “available,” as we recently explained, when it is “accessible or may be obtained.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. (2016) (slip op., ) ). So to establish the scope of we must identify the cir cumstances in which the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress (or, similarly, to access a benefit). That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy of a FAPE in the statutory scheme. In its first section, the Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 11 Opinion of the Court IDEA declares as its first purpose “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4374576/fry-v-napoleon-community-schools/ | purpose “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education.” (d)(1)(A). That prin cipal purpose then becomes the Act’s principal command: A State receiving federal funding under the IDEA must make such an education “available to all children with disabilities.” The guarantee of a FAPE to those children gives rise to the bulk of the statute’s more specific provisions. For example, the IEP—“the center piece of the statute’s education delivery system”—serves as the “vehicle” or “means” of providing a FAPE. Honig, 8 U.S., at ; ; see at 2. And finally, as all the above suggests, the FAPE re quirement provides the yardstick for measuring the ade quacy of the education that a school offers to a child with a disability: Under that standard, this Court has held, a child is entitled to “meaningful” access to education based on her individual needs.5 The IDEA’s administrative procedures test whether a school has met that obligation—and so center on the Act’s FAPE requirement. As noted earlier, any decision by a hearing officer on a request for substantive relief “shall” be “based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” )(3)(E)(i); see6 Or said in Latin: In the IDEA’s administra tive process, a FAPE denial is the sine qua non. Suppose that a parent’s complaint protests a school’s failure to provide some accommodation for a child with a disability. —————— 5A case now before this Court, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School Dist. RE–1, No. 15–827, presents unresolved questions about the precise content of the FAPE standard. 6 Without finding the denial of a FAPE, a hearing officer may do noth ing more than order a school district to comply with the Act’s various procedural requirements, see )(3)(E)(iii)—for example, by allowing parents to “examine all records” relating to their child, 12 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Opinion of the Court If that accommodation is needed to fulfill the IDEA’s FAPE requirement, the hearing officer must order relief. But if it is not, he cannot—even though the dispute is between a child with a disability and the school she at tends. There might be good reasons, unrelated to a FAPE, for the school to make the requested accommodation. Indeed, another federal law (like the ADA or Rehabilita tion Act) might require the accommodation on one of those alternative grounds. See infra, at 15. But still, the hear ing officer cannot provide the requested relief. His role, under the IDEA, is to enforce the child’s “substantive right” to a FAPE. 68 U.S., at |
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