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Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | Smith v. Bayer Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218922/smith-v-bayer-corp/ | court cautioned, “ ‘may be persuasive, but [they are] not binding or controlling.’ ” 1, S. E. 2d, 1. And lest anyone mistake the import of this message, the court went on: The aim of “this rule is to avoid having our legal analysis of our Rules ‘amount to nothing more than Pav lovian responses to federal decisional law.’ ” (italics omitted). Of course, the state courts might still have adopted an approach to their Rule 23 that tracked the analysis the federal court used in McCollins’ case. But absent clear evidence that the state courts had done so, we could not conclude that they would interpret their Rule in the same way. And if that is so, we could not tell whether the certification issues in the state and federal courts were the same. That uncertainty would preclude an But here the case against an injunction is even stronger, Cite as: 564 U. S. (2011) 11 Opinion of the Court because the West Virginia Supreme Court has disap proved the approach to Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement that the Federal District Court embraced. Recall that the federal court held that the presence of a single individualized issue—injury from the use of Baycol—prevented class certification. See The court did not identify the common issues in the case; nor did it balance these common issues against the need to prove individual injury to determine which predominated. The court instead applied a strict test barring class treat ment when proof of each plaintiff’s injury is necessary.8 By contrast, the West Virginia Supreme Court in In re Rezulin adopted an all-things-considered, balancing inquiry in interpreting its Rule 23. Rejecting any “rigid test,” the state court opined that the predominance re quirement “contemplates a review of many factors.” 214 W. Va., at 2, S. E. 2d, at 2. Indeed, the court noted, a “ ‘single common issue’ ” in a case could outweigh “ ‘nu merous individual questions.’ ” That meant, the court further explained (quoting what it termed the “lead ing treatise” on the subject), that even objections to certifi cation “ ‘based on causation, or reliance’ ”—which typi cally involve showings of individual injury—“ ‘will not bar predominance satisfaction.’ ” ). So point for point, the analysis set out in In re Rezulin diverged from the District Court’s interpretation of Federal Rule 23. A state court using the In re Rezulin standard would decide a different question than the one —————— 8 The District Court’s approach to the predominance inquiry is consis tent with the approach employed by the Eighth Circuit. See In |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | Smith v. Bayer Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218922/smith-v-bayer-corp/ | with the approach employed by the Eighth Circuit. See In re St. Jude Medical, Inc., (holding that most commercial misrepresentation cases are “unsuitable for class treat ment” because individual issues of reliance necessarily predominate). We express no opinion as to the correctness of this approach. 12 SMITH v. BAYER CORP. Opinion of the Court the federal court had earlier resolved.9 This case, indeed, is little more than a rerun of Chick Kam A federal court and a state court apply differ ent law. That means they decide distinct questions. The federal court’s resolution of one issue does not preclude the state court’s determination of another. It then goes with out saying that the federal court may not issue an injunc tion. The Anti-Injunction Act’s re-litigation exception does not extend nearly so far. B The injunction issued here runs into another basic premise of preclusion law: A court’s judgment binds only the parties to a suit, subject to a handful of discrete and limited exceptions. See, e.g., 18A Wright & Miller 30. The importance of this rule and the narrowness of its exceptions go hand in hand. We have repeatedly “em phasize[d] the fundamental nature of the general rule” that only parties can be bound by prior judgments; accord ingly, we have taken a “constrained approach to nonparty preclusion.” Against this backdrop, Bayer defends the decision below by arguing that Smith—an unnamed member of a pro —————— 9 Bayer argues that In re Rezulin does not preclude an injunction in this case because the West Virginia court there decided that common issues predominated over individual issues of damages, not over indi vidual issues of liability (as exist here). See Brief for Respondent 25– 26. We think Bayer is right about this distinction, but wrong about its consequence. Our point is not that In re Rezulin dictates the answer to the class certification question here; the two cases are indeed too dissimilar for that to be true. The point instead is that In re Rezulin articulated a general approach to the predominance requirement that differs markedly from the one the federal court used. Minor variations in the application of what is in essence the same legal standard do not defeat preclusion; but where, as here, the State’s courts “would apply a significantly different analysis,” Chick Kam the federal and state courts decide different issues. Cite as: 564 U. S. (2011) 13 Opinion of the Court posed but uncertified class—qualifies as a party to the McCollins litigation. See Brief for Respondent 32–34. Alternatively, Bayer claims that the District Court’s judgment binds Smith under |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | Smith v. Bayer Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218922/smith-v-bayer-corp/ | Bayer claims that the District Court’s judgment binds Smith under the recognized exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion for members of class actions. See 4–39. We think neither contention has merit. Bayer’s first claim ill-comports with any proper under standing of what a “party” is. In general, “[a] ‘party’ to litigation is ‘[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought,’ ” United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U. S. (2009) (slip op., at 4), or one who “become[s] a party by intervention, substitution, or third party practice,” And we have further held that an unnamed member of a certified class may be “considered a ‘party’ for the [particu lar] purpos[e] of appealing” an adverse judgment. Devlin v. Scardelletti, But as the dissent in Devlin noted, no one in that case was “willing to advance the novel and surely erroneous argument that a non named class member is a party to the class-action litiga tion before the class is certified.” (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Still less does that argument make sense once certification is denied. The definition of the term “party” can on no account be stretched so far as to cover a person like Smith, whom the plaintiff in a lawsuit was denied leave to represent.10 If the judgment in the McCollins —————— 10 In support of its claim that Smith counts as a party, Bayer cites two cases in which we held that a putative member of an uncertified class may wait until after the court rules on the certification motion to file an individual claim or move to intervene in the suit. See Brief for Respon dent 32–33 (citing United Airlines, (19); American Pipe & Constr. (194)). But these cases, which were specifically grounded in policies of judicial administration, demonstrate only that a person not a party to a class suit may receive certain benefits (such as the tolling of a limitations period) related to that proceeding. See ; McDonald, 432 14 SMITH v. BAYER CORP. Opinion of the Court litigation can indeed bind Smith, it must do so under principles of nonparty preclusion. As Bayer notes, see Brief for Respondent 3, one such principle allows unnamed members of a class action to be bound, even though they are not parties to the suit. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 46 U.S. 86, 84 (4) (“[U]nder elementary principles of prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class action is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation”); see also (stating that nonparties can be bound in “properly conducted |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | Smith v. Bayer Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218922/smith-v-bayer-corp/ | also (stating that nonparties can be bound in “properly conducted class actions”). But here Bayer faces a conundrum. If we know one thing about the McCollins suit, we know that it was not a class action. Indeed, the very ruling that Bayer argues ought to be given preclusive effect is the District Court’s decision that a class could not properly be certi fied. So Bayer wants to bind Smith as a member of a class action (because it is only as such that a nonparty in Smith’s situation can be bound) to a determination that there could not be a class action. And if the logic of that position is not immediately transparent, here is Bayer’s attempt to clarify: “[U]ntil the moment when class certi fication was denied, the McCollins case was a properly conducted class action.” Brief for Respondent 3. That is true, according to Bayer, because McCollins’ interests were aligned with the members of the class he proposed and he “act[ed] in a representative capacity when he sought class certification.” 6. But wishing does not make it so. McCollins sought class certification, but he failed to obtain that result. Because the District Court found that individual issues predomi —————— U. S., 94, n. 15. That result is consistent with a commonplace of preclusion law—that nonparties sometimes may benefit from, even though they cannot be bound by, former litigation. See Parklane Ho siery ; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, (191). Cite as: 564 U. S. (2011) 15 Opinion of the Court nated, it held that the action did not satisfy Federal Rule 23’s requirements for class proceedings. In these circum stances, we cannot say that a properly conducted class action existed at any time in the litigation. Federal Rule 23 determines what is and is not a class action in federal court, where McCollins brought his suit. So in the absence of a certification under that Rule, the precondition for binding Smith was not met. Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties. What does have this effect is a class action approved under Rule 23. But McCollins’ lawsuit was never that. We made essentially these same points in v. Sturgell just a few Terms ago. The question there con cerned the propriety of binding nonparties under a theory of “virtual representation” based on “identity of interests and some kind of relationship between parties and non parties.” We rejected the theory unanimously, explaining that it “would ‘recogniz[e], in effect, a common-law kind of class action.’ ” Such a device, we objected, would authorize preclusion “shorn of [Rule |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | Smith v. Bayer Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218922/smith-v-bayer-corp/ | a device, we objected, would authorize preclusion “shorn of [Rule 23’s] procedural protections.” Or as otherwise stated in the opinion: We could not allow “circumvent[ion]” of Rule 23’s protections through a “virtual representation doctrine that allowed courts to ‘create de facto class ac tions at will.’ ” We could hardly have been more clear that a “properly conducted class action,” with bind ing effect on nonparties, can come about in federal courts in just one way—through the procedure set out in Rule 23. Bayer attempts to distinguish by noting that the party in the prior litigation there did not propose a class action. But we do not see why that difference matters. Yes, McCollins wished to represent a class, and made a motion to that effect. But it did not come to pass. To allow McCollins’ suit to bind nonparties would be to adopt 16 SMITH v. BAYER CORP. Opinion of the Court the very theory rejected.11 Bayer’s strongest argument comes not from established principles of preclusion, but instead from policy concerns relating to use of the class action device. Bayer warns that under our approach class counsel can repeatedly try to certify the same class “by the simple expedient of changing the named plaintiff in the caption of the com plaint.” Brief for Respondent 4–48. And in this world of “serial relitigation of class certification,” Bayer contends, defendants “would be forced in effect to buy litigation peace by settling.” ; see also In re Bridge stone/, Inc., Tires Prods. Liability Litigation, 6 (objecting to an “an asym metric system in which class counsel can win but never lose” because of their ability to relitigate the issue of certification). But this form of argument flies in the face of the rule against nonparty preclusion. That rule perforce leads to relitigation of many issues, as plaintiff after plaintiff after plaintiff (none precluded by the last judgment because none a party to the last suit) tries his hand at establishing some legal principle or obtaining some grant of relief. We confronted a similar policy concern in which in volved litigation brought under the Freedom of Infor —————— 11 The great weight of scholarly authority—from the Restatement of Judgments to the American Law Institute to Wright and Miller— agrees that an uncertified class action cannot bind proposed class members. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments p. 393 (0) (A nonparty may be bound only when his interests are adequately represented by “[t]he representative of a class of persons similarly situated, designated as such with the approval of the court”); ALI, Principles of the Law |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | Smith v. Bayer Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218922/smith-v-bayer-corp/ | the approval of the court”); ALI, Principles of the Law Aggregate Litigation Reporters’ Notes, cmt. b, p. 181 (“[N]one of [the exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion] extend generally to the situation of a would-be absent class member with respect to a denial of class certification”); 18A Wright & Miller at 45–458 (“[A]bsent certification there is no basis for precluding a nonparty” under the class-action exception). Cite as: 564 U. S. (2011) 1 Opinion of the Court mation Act (FOIA). The Government there cautioned that unless we bound nonparties a “ ‘potentially limitless’ ” number of plaintiffs, perhaps coordinating with each other, could “mount a series of repetitive lawsuits” de manding the selfsame But we rejected this argument, even though the payoff in a single successful FOIA suit—disclosure of documents to the public—could “trum[p]” or “subsum[e]” all prior losses, just as a single successful class certification motion could do. In re Bridgestone/, 333 F.3d, at 66, 6. As that response suggests, our legal system generally relies on principles of stare decisis and comity among courts to mitigate the sometimes substantial costs of similar litiga tion brought by different plaintiffs. We have not thought that the right approach (except in the discrete categories of cases we have recognized) lies in binding nonparties to a judgment. And to the extent class actions raise special problems of relitigation, Congress has provided a remedy that does not involve departing from the usual rules of preclusion. In the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S. C. 1453 (2006 ed. and Supp. III), Congress enabled defendants to remove to federal court any sizable class action involving minimal diversity of citizenship. Once removal takes place, Federal Rule 23 governs certification. And federal courts may consolidate multiple overlapping suits against a single defendant in one court (as the Judi cial Panel on Multi-District Litigation did for the many actions involving Baycol). See Finally, we would expect federal courts to apply principles of comity to each other’s class certification decisions when addressing a common dispute. See, e.g., Cortez Byrd Chips, ). CAFA may be cold comfort to Bayer with respect to suits like this one beginning before its enactment. But Con 18 SMITH v. BAYER CORP. Opinion of the Court gress’s decision to address the relitigation concerns associ ated with class actions through the mechanism of removal provides yet another reason for federal courts to adhere in this context to longstanding principles of preclusion.12 And once again, that is especially so when the federal court is deciding whether to go so far as to enjoin a |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | Smith v. Bayer Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218922/smith-v-bayer-corp/ | deciding whether to go so far as to enjoin a state proceeding. * * * The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits the order the District Court entered here. The Act’s relitigation exception au thorizes injunctions only when a former federal adjudica tion clearly precludes a state-court decision. As we said more than 40 years ago, and have consistently maintained since that time, “[a]ny doubts should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed.” Atlantic Coast 398 U.S., Under this approach, close cases have easy answers: The federal court should not issue an injunction, and the state court should decide the preclusion question. But this case does not even strike us as close. The issues in the federal and state lawsuits differed because the relevant legal standards differed. And the mere proposal of a class in the federal action could not bind persons who were not parties there. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. —————— 12 By the same token, nothing in our holding today forecloses legisla tion to modify established principles of preclusion should Congress decide that CAFA does not sufficiently prevent relitigation of class certification motions. Nor does this opinion at all address the permis sibility of a change in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to this question. Cf. n. (declining to reach Smith’s due process claim) |
Justice O'Connor | 1,988 | 14 | majority | Clark v. Jeter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112089/clark-v-jeter/ | Under Pennsylvania law, an illegitimate child must prove paternity before seeking support from his or her father, and a suit to establish paternity ordinarily must be brought within six years of an illegitimate child's birth. By contrast, a legitimate child may seek support from his or her parents at any time. We granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of this legislative scheme. I On September 22, petitioner Cherlyn Clark filed a support complaint in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on behalf of her minor daughter, Tiffany, who was born out of wedlock on June 3. Clark named respondent *458 Gene Jeter as Tiffany's father. The court ordered blood tests, which showed a3% probability that Jeter is Tiffany's father. Jeter moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the 6-year statute of limitations for paternity actions.[*] In her response, Clark contended that this statute is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the alternative, she argued that the statute was tolled by fraudulent and misleading actions of the welfare department, or by threats and assaults by Jeter. The trial court upheld the statute of limitations on the authority of vacated, reinstated on remand, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court there had considered and rejected constitutional challenges similar to Clark's. The trial court also rejected Clark's argument that the statute should be tolled, specifically finding that any fear that Clark may have had of Jeter had subsided more than six years before she filed her support complaint. Therefore, the trial court entered judgment for Jeter. Clark appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, again raising her constitutional challenges to the 6-year statute of limitations. Before the court decided her case, the *459 Pennsylvania Legislature enacted an 18-year statute of limitations for actions to establish paternity. Act of Oct. 30, 1985, No. 66, 1, subch. C, codified at 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. 4343(b) (1985). Pennsylvania thereby brought its law into compliance with a provision of the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of that requires all States participating in the federal child support program to have procedures to establish the paternity of any child who is less than 18 years old. 42 U.S. C. 666(a)(5) ( ed., Supp. IV). The Superior Court concluded, however, that Pennsylvania's new 18-year statute of limitations did not apply retroactively, and that it would not revive Clark's cause of action in any event. It affirmed the trial court's conclusions that the 6-year statute of limitations was constitutional, and that Clark's tolling argument was without merit. Thereafter, the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,988 | 14 | majority | Clark v. Jeter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112089/clark-v-jeter/ | and that Clark's tolling argument was without merit. Thereafter, the Superior Court denied Clark's motion for reargument. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied her petition for allowance of appeal. We granted Clark's petition for certiorari. II Clark's first argument to this Court is that Pennsylvania's 6-year statute of limitations is invalid because it conflicts with the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of which she says require States to adopt retroactive 18-year statutes of limitations in paternity cases. See 42 U.S. C. 666(a)(5) ( ed., Supp. IV). Because this argument raises an issue of statutory interpretation, we ordinarily would address it before reaching the constitutional ; see Having reviewed the record, however, we find that Clark did not adequately present a federal pre-emption argument to the lower courts. It is our practice, when reviewing decisions by state courts, not to decide federal claims that were not *460 "pressed or passed upon" below. Bankers Life & Casualty The Pennsylvania Legislature passed the 18-year statute of limitations on October 30, 1985. At that time, Clark already had filed her brief on appeal to the Superior Court. Clark immediately suggested a remand to determine the retroactivity of the new Pennsylvania statute. But the Superior Court instead itself decided that the 6-year statute of limitations would continue to apply to cases like Clark's. The court reasoned that, under Pennsylvania law, a statute is retroactive only if the legislature clearly and manifestly so intends, and it found insufficient evidence of such an intent. The decision did not address the relevance of the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments to the continuing validity of the 6-year statute of limitations. In her application for reargument in the Superior Court and in her petition for appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Clark argued that the Superior Court had overlooked Pennsylvania cases which had applied similar statutes of limitations retroactively, as well as indications that the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments required States to adopt retroactive 18-year statutes of limitations or their equivalent. See 42 U.S. C. 666(a)(5) ( ed., Supp. III); 19631 (1985). But Clark did not expressly assert that the 6-year statute of limitations was pre-empted by the new federal law. We interpret Clark's argument to be that the Pennsylvania Legislature intended to comply with the new conditions on the federal spending program, which arguably showed that it clearly and manifestly intended its new statute to be retroactive. This question of how to interpret the Pennsylvania statute ultimately is a matter of state law. We find that Clark's argument below was not adequate to raise a federal pre-emption claim. Accordingly, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,988 | 14 | majority | Clark v. Jeter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112089/clark-v-jeter/ | was not adequate to raise a federal pre-emption claim. Accordingly, we do not address it here and proceed to her equal protection claim. *461 In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1, we apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. San Antonio Independent School ; cf. Classifications based on race or national origin, e. g., and classifications affecting fundamental rights, e. g., are given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. See, e. g., Mississippi University for ; ; ; To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. Consequently we have invalidated classifications that burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit relations of their parents, because "visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust." 5 (2). Yet, in the seminal case concerning the child's right to support, this Court acknowledged that it might be appropriate to treat illegitimate children differently in the support context because of "lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity." This Court has developed a particular framework for evaluating equal protection challenges to statutes of limitations *462 that apply to suits to establish paternity, and thereby limit the ability of illegitimate children to obtain support. "First, the period for obtaining support must be sufficiently long in duration to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related to the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent " 456 U. S., at -100. In Mills, we held that Texas' 1-year statute of limitations failed both steps of the analysis. We explained that paternity suits typically will be brought by the child's mother, who might not act swiftly amidst the emotional and financial complications of the child's first year. And, it is unlikely that the lapse of a mere 12 months will result in the loss of evidence or appreciably increase the likelihood of fraudulent A concurring opinion in Mills explained why statutes of limitations longer than one year also may be unconstitutional. First, the State has a countervailing interest in ensuring that genuine claims for child support are satisfied. Second, the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,988 | 14 | majority | Clark v. Jeter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112089/clark-v-jeter/ | that genuine claims for child support are satisfied. Second, the fact that Texas tolled most other causes of action during a child's minority suggested that proof problems do not become overwhelming during this period. Finally, the practical obstacles to filing a claim for support are likely to continue after the first year of the child's life. In the Court unanimously struck down Tennessee's 2-year statute of limitations for paternity and child support actions brought on behalf of certain illegitimate children. Adhering to the analysis developed in Mills, the Court first considered whether two years afforded a reasonable opportunity to bring such suits. The Tennessee statute was relatively more generous than the *463 Texas statute considered in Mills because it did not limit actions against a father who had acknowledged his paternity in writing or by furnishing support; nor did it apply if the child was likely to become a public charge. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the 2-year period was too short in light of the persisting financial and emotional problems that are likely to afflict the child's mother. Proceeding to the second step of the analysis, the Court decided that the 2-year statute of limitations was not substantially related to Tennessee's asserted interest in preventing stale and fraudulent The period during which suit could be brought was only a year longer than the period considered in Mills, and this incremental difference would not create substantially greater proof and fraud problems. Furthermore, Tennessee tolled most other actions during a child's minority, and even permitted a support action to be brought on behalf of a child up to 18 years of age if the child was or was likely to become a public charge. Finally, scientific advances in blood testing had alleviated some problems of proof in paternity actions. For these reasons, the Tennessee statute failed to survive heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In light of this authority, we conclude that Pennsylvania's 6-year statute of limitations violates the Equal Protection Clause. Even six years does not necessarily provide a reasonable opportunity to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child. "The unwillingness of the mother to file a paternity action on behalf of her child, which could stem from her relationship with the natural father or from the emotional strain of having an illegitimate child, or even from the desire to avoid community and family disapproval, may continue years after the child is born. The problem may be exacerbated if, as often happens, the mother herself is a minor." Mills, Not all of these difficulties are likely to |
Justice O'Connor | 1,988 | 14 | majority | Clark v. Jeter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112089/clark-v-jeter/ | minor." Mills, Not all of these difficulties are likely to abate in six years. A mother might realize only belatedly "a loss of income attributable to the need to care for the child," Pickett, *464 Furthermore, financial difficulties are likely to increase as the child matures and incurs expenses for clothing, school, and medical care. See, e. g., 12, Thus it is questionable whether a State acts reasonably when it requires most paternity and support actions to be brought within six years of an illegitimate child's birth. We do not rest our decision on this ground, however, for it is not entirely evident that six years would necessarily be an unreasonable limitations period for child support actions involving illegitimate children. We are, however, confident that the 6-year statute of limitations is not substantially related to Pennsylvania's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent In a number of circumstances, Pennsylvania permits the issue of paternity to be litigated more than six years after the birth of an illegitimate child. The statute itself permits a suit to be brought more than six years after the child's birth if it is brought within two years of a support payment made by the father. And in other types of suits, Pennsylvania places no limits on when the issue of paternity may be litigated. For example, the intestacy statute, 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2107(3) permits a child born out of wedlock to establish paternity as long as "there is clear and convincing evidence that the man was the father of the child." Likewise, no statute of limitations applies to a father's action to establish paternity. In re Mengel, 429 A.2d 62 Recently, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted a statute that tolls most other civil actions during a child's minority. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5533(b) (Supp. 1987). In Pickett and Mills, similar tolling statutes cast doubt on the State's purported interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent -16; -105 ; Pennsylvania's tolling statute has the same implications here. *465 A more recent indication that Pennsylvania does not consider proof problems insurmountable is the enactment by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1985 of an 18-year statute of limitations for paternity and support actions. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. 4343(b) (1985). To be sure the legislature did not act spontaneously, but rather under the threat of losing some federal funds. Nevertheless, the new statute is a tacit concession that proof problems are not overwhelming. The legislative history of the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments explains why Congress thought such statutes of limitations are reasonable. Congress adverted to |
per_curiam | 1,973 | 200 | per_curiam | Ortwein v. Schwab | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108739/ortwein-v-schwab/ | Appellants contend that Oregon's $25 appellate court filing fee, as applied in this case, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and, also, the First Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth. The Supreme Court of Oregon decided otherwise. We affirm that decision for reasons we found persuasive in United Appellant Ortwein (who also was receiving social security and an urban renewal allowance) sustained a reduction of approximately $39 per month in his Oregon old-age assistance when his county welfare agency determined that he shared shelter and expenses with another person in a manner that relieved him of some of the costs upon which his original award had been based. *657 Ortwein appealed to the Oregon Public Welfare Division. The Division conducted a hearing and upheld the county agency's decision.[1] Appellant Faubion claimed that certain expenses related to work training under a federal program should have been deducted in calculating her income.[2] Most of these deductions were disallowed, after hearing, by the Public Welfare Division. The disallowance resulted in smaller welfare payments to Faubion over a five-month period. *658 Judicial review of these agency decisions is authorized under state law. Ore. Rev. Stat. 3.480 In cases that are contested, as these were, jurisdiction for judicial review is conferred upon the Oregon Court of Appeals. 3.480 (2). All appellants in civil cases in Oregon pay a $25 filing fee in appellate 21.010 and 21.040 Each of the present appellants alleged that he was an indigent unable to pay the filing fee; each moved to proceed in forma pauperis in the Oregon Court of Appeals. The motions were denied without opinions. Appellants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Oregon for an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the Court of Appeals to accept appellants' cases without payment of fees. The Supreme Court of Oregon requested supplemental briefs and then issued its opinion denying the petition for mandamus. From this denial the present appeal is taken. I Relying on this Court's opinion in and on the remand-for-reconsideration order in[3] appellants contend that the Oregon appellate filing fee, when applied to indigents seeking to appeal an adverse welfare decision, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In United this Court upheld statutorily imposed bankruptcy filing fees against a constitutional challenge based on Boddie. We emphasized the special nature of the marital relationship and its concomitant associational interests, and noted that they were not affected in that case and that the objective sought by appellant could be obtained through alternative *659 means that did not require a fee. Boddie, of |
per_curiam | 1,973 | 200 | per_curiam | Ortwein v. Schwab | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108739/ortwein-v-schwab/ | *659 means that did not require a fee. Boddie, of course, was not concerned with post-hearing review. We now conclude that rather than Boddie, governs the present appeal, and we emphasize that Frederick was remanded, and not summarily reversed. A. In we observed that one's interest in a bankruptcy discharge "does not rise to the same constitutional level" as one's inability to dissolve his marriage except through the In this case, appellants seek increased welfare payments. This interest, like that of has far less constitutional significance than the interest of the Boddie Compare and with ; ; and Each of the present appellants has received an agency hearing at which it was determined that the minimum level of payments authorized by law was being provided. As in we see "no fundamental interest that is gained or lost depending on the availability" of the relief sought by B. In the Court also stressed the existence of alternatives, not conditioned on the payment of the fees, to the judicial remedy. The Court has held that procedural due process requires that a welfare recipient be given a pretermination evidentiary hearing. These appellants have had hearings.[4] The *660 hearings provide a procedure, not conditioned on payment of any fee, through which appellants have been able to seek redress. This Court has long recognized that, even in criminal cases, due process does not require a State to provide an appellate system. ; see ; District of ; Under the facts of this case, appellants were not denied due process.[5] II Appellants urge that the filing fee violates the Equal Protection Clause by unconstitutionally discriminating against the poor. As in this litigation, which deals with welfare payments, "is in the area of economics and social welfare." 409 U.S., ; see -486. No suspect classification, such as race, nationality, or alienage, is present. See The applicable standard is that of rational justification. United The purpose of the filing fee, as with the bankruptcy fees in is apparent. The Oregon court system incurs operating costs, and the fee produces some small revenue to assist in offsetting those expenses. Cf. Ore. Rev. Stat. 21.590 Appellants do not contend that the fee is disproportionate or that it is not an effective means to accomplish the State's goal. The requirement of rationality is met. *661 III Relying on appellants contend that the fee is not required of certain classes of litigants, and that an appeal is thus "capriciously and arbitrarily denied" to other appellants, such as themselves, also in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See 405 U.S., at They assert |
per_curiam | 1,973 | 200 | per_curiam | Ortwein v. Schwab | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108739/ortwein-v-schwab/ | the Equal Protection Clause. See 405 U.S., at They assert that criminal appeals, habeas corpus petitions from state institutions or civil commitment proceedings, and appeals from terminations of parental rights may be filed in forma pauperis in the Oregon Court of Appeals. Jurisdictional Statement 23. We are not told just why these filings are permitted, but the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oregon makes it clear that in forma pauperis appeals are allowed only if supervening law requires a right to a free appeal. -762. If the Oregon courts have interpreted the applicable law to give special rights in the criminal area, in civil cases that result in loss of liberty, and in cases terminating parental rights, we cannot say that this categorization is capricious or arbitrary. Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE STEWART dissents, believing that the doctrine of requires reversal of this judgment. See United He is convinced, however, that the Court is so resolutely firm in its contrary view that it would serve no useful purpose to set this case for oral argument. MR. |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | dissenting | Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145637/fernandez-vargas-v-gonzales/ | In 1982, petitioner Humberto Fernandez-Vargas, an alien who had previously been deported, reentered the United States illegally. Over the next 20 years, petitioner remained here. He worked as a truckdriver, owned a trucking business, fathered a child, and eventually mar ried the child’s mother, a United States citizen. The laws in place at the time of petitioner’s entry and for the first 15 years of his residence in this country would have re warded this behavior, allowing him to seek discretionary relief from deportation on the basis of his continued pres ence in and strong ties to the United States. See 8 U.S. C. (1994 ed.). In 1996, however, Congress passed a new version of the applicable provision eliminating almost entirely the possi bility of relief from deportation for aliens who reenter the country illegally having previously been deported. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibil ity Act (IIRIRA), –599, 8 U.S. C. (2000 ed.); see also ante, at 3, n. 4. The 1996 provision is silent as to whether it was intended to apply retroactively to conduct that predated its enactment.1 —————— 1 The statutory provisions expanding the class of people to whom criminal penalties for illegal reentry might apply, however, explicitly 2 FERNANDEZ-VARGAS v. GONZALES STEVENS, J., dissenting Despite a historical practice supporting petitioner’s read ing, and despite the harsh consequences that attend its application to thousands of individuals who, like peti tioner, entered the country illegally before 1997, the Court not only holds that the statute applies to preenactment reentries but also that it has no retroactive effect. I dis agree with both of these conclusions. I In 1950, when Congress first gave the Attorney General the authority to reinstate an order of deportation, it en acted a reinstatement provision containing no explicit temporal reach.2 See Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 1012, 8 U.S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V). The natural reading of this provision, the one most consistent with the “deeply rooted” traditional presumption against retroactivity, Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994), is that it would apply to deportations that occurred before the provision’s enactment but not to preenactment reentries. While both deportation and reentry can constitute “events completed before [the provi sion’s] enactment,” an alien’s reentry is the act that triggers the provision’s operation and is therefore the act to which the provision attaches legal consequences. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) promulgated regulations implementing the 1950 statute, however, it did not read the statute so naturally. Instead, the INS’ regulations, embodying an overly strong version —————— apply only to |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | dissenting | Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145637/fernandez-vargas-v-gonzales/ | regulations, embodying an overly strong version —————— apply only to postenactment reentries. See IIRIRA, 110 Stat. 3009–629, note following 8 U.S. C. 2 The provision stated: “Should any alien subject to the provisions of subsection (c) unlawfully return to the United States after having been released for departure or deported pursuant to this section, the previous war-rant of deportation against him shall be considered as reinstated from its original date of issuance.” codified as 8 U.S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V). Cite as: 548 U. S. (2006) 3 STEVENS, J., dissenting of the presumption against retroactivity, provided that an order of deportation could only be reinstated if that depor tation occurred after the statute’s enactment date. See 8 CFR (1950 Cum. Supp.). Thus, the INS read the reinstatement provision as inapplicable even to reentries that occurred after the statute’s enactment date if the underlying deportation had been entered before that date; it follows a fortiori that the provision was considered inapplicable to reentries that occurred before the statute’s enactment. Congress corrected the INS’ error two years later by adding the clause “whether before or after the date of enactment of this Act.” Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S. C. (1994 ed.); see also ante, at 2, and nn. 2–3. As the Court correctly notes, that amendment “most naturally referred not to the illegal reentry but to the alien’s previous deportation or depar ture.” Ante, at 8. The best interpretation of Congress’ intent with regard to the 1952 statute, then, was that it meant to apply the reinstatement provision to preenact ment deportations but to preserve the status quo with regard to preenactment reentries: In accordance with the traditional presumption against retroactivity, preenact ment reentries would remain uncovered by the reinstate ment provision. In 1996, when Congress enacted the current reinstate ment provision, it drafted a version of the statute that, like its 1950 predecessor, was silent as to its temporal reach. See 8 U.S. C. (2000 ed.). If we assume (as the Court does) that the addition of the “before-or after” clause in the 1952 statute merely clarified Congress’ original intent in 1950 to make the provision applicable to preenactment departures without authorizing any appli cation to preenactment reentries, it is reasonable to at tribute precisely the same intent to the Congress that enacted the 1996 statute: As in the 1950 and 1952 ver 4 FERNANDEZ-VARGAS v. GONZALES STEVENS, J., dissenting sions of the provision, Congress intended the 1996 rein statement provision to apply to preenactment deportations but not to preenactment reentries. In sum, our normal rules of construction support |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | dissenting | Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145637/fernandez-vargas-v-gonzales/ | preenactment reentries. In sum, our normal rules of construction support the reasonable presumption that Congress intended the provi sion to cover only postenactment reentries. Accordingly, the 1996 reinstatement provision should not be construed to apply to petitioner’s earlier entry into the United States. II The Court not only fails to give the 1996 Act its most normal interpretation, but also erroneously concludes that the provision does not have any retroactive effect. The Court reaches this conclusion based on its judgment that the provision applies not to conduct that occurred before the statute’s enactment date, but rather to “an indefinitely continuing violation that the alien himself could end at any time by voluntarily leaving the country.” Ante, at 13. This reasoning is unpersuasive. It is true, of course, that the order of deportation en tered against petitioner in 1981 could not be reinstated unless he was present in the United States, and that, until he was arrested in 2003, petitioner could have chosen to leave the United States. But it is precisely petitioner’s “continuing violation” that allowed him to be eligible for relief from deportation in the first place: He was required to have been physically present in the United States for a period of not less than seven years, to have been a person of good moral character during that time, and to have developed ties to the United States such that his deporta tion would result in extreme hardship to himself or to his United States citizen wife or child.3 See 8 U.S. C. —————— 3 Although petitioner became eligible for relief from deportation after being physically present in the United States for seven years, he could not apply for that relief until the Government placed him in deporta Cite as: 548 U. S. (2006) 5 STEVENS, J., dissenting (1994 ed.); see also INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984) (strictly construing physical presence requirement). Moreover, under the pre-1996 version of the reinstatement provision, the longer petitioner re mained in the United States the more likely he was to be granted relief from deportation. See Matter of Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 882 (1994) (listing factors considered in evaluating extreme hardship requirement, including alien’s length of residence in United States, family in United States, business or occupation, and position in community). Given these incentives, petitioner legitimately com plains that the Government has changed the rules midgame. At the time of his entry, and for the next 15 years, it inured to petitioner’s benefit for him to remain in the United States continuously, to build a business, and |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | dissenting | Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145637/fernandez-vargas-v-gonzales/ | in the United States continuously, to build a business, and to start a family. After April 1, 1997, the date on which the applicable reinstatement provision became effective, all of these activities were rendered irrelevant in the eyes of the law. Only the Court’s unfortunately formalistic search for a single “past act that [petitioner] is helpless to undo,” ante, at 13, allows it to conclude that the provision at issue has no retroactive effect.4 For regardless of whether his —————— tion proceedings, at which point he could raise his eligibility as an affirmative defense. Cf. Hughes Aircraft (applying presumption against retroactivity to statute eliminating affirmative defense). 4 Even on its own terms the Court’s logic is troubling. The Court believes that petitioner could have avoided being affected by the 1996 reinstatement provision, not just retroactively but in any way whatso ever, by leaving the country prior to its effective date—a date that occurred six months after the statute’s enactment date not to give aliens “ample warning,” ante, at 11, 13, but instead to allow the Attor ney General to prepare for the substantial changes caused by the IIRIRA and to promulgate regulations to effectuate that Act. See –625. But had petitioner “take[n] advantage of the statutory warning,” ante, at 15, he would have imposed upon himself 6 FERNANDEZ-VARGAS v. GONZALES STEVENS, J., dissenting 1982 reentry was or was not an act that he could now “undo,” it is certainly an act to which the 1996 reinstate ment provision has attached serious adverse conse quences. Because the provision has an undeniably harsh retroactive effect, “absent a clear indication from Congress that it intended such a result,” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001), we should apply the presumption against retroactivity and hold that the 1996 reinstatement provi sion does not apply to petitioner. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. —————— the very same punishment—the guarantee of removal to Mexico—that he hopes to avoid. Just as we would not say that a defendant may avoid the retroactive application of a criminal statute by locking him self up for 10 years, it cannot be that petitioner’s ability to leave the country of his own accord somehow helps to prove that the provision at issue has no retroactive effect |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | After publicly burning an American flag as a means of political protest, Gregory Lee Johnson was convicted of desecrating a flag in violation of Texas law. This case presents the question whether his conviction is consistent with the First Amendment. We hold that it is not. I While the Republican National Convention was taking place in Dallas in 198, respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration dubbed the "Republican War Chest Tour." As explained in literature distributed by the demonstrators and in speeches made by them, the purpose of this event was to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and of certain Dallas-based corporations. The demonstrators marched through the Dallas streets, chanting political slogans and stopping at several corporate locations to stage "die-ins" intended to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war. On several occasions they spray-painted the walls of buildings and overturned potted plants, but Johnson himself took no part in such activities. He did, however, accept an American flag handed to him by a fellow protestor who had taken it from a flagpole outside one of the targeted buildings. The demonstration ended in front of Dallas City Hall, where Johnson unfurled the American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire. While the flag burned, the protestors chanted: "America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you." After the demonstrators dispersed, a witness to the flag burning collected the flag's remains and buried them in his backyard. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, though several witnesses testified that they had been seriously offended by the flag burning. *00 Of the approximately 100 demonstrators, Johnson alone was charged with a crime. The only criminal offense with which he was charged was the desecration of a venerated object in violation of (a)(3)[1] After a trial, he was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas affirmed Johnson's conviction, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the State could not, consistent with the First Amendment, punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals began by recognizing that Johnson's conduct was symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment: "Given the context of an organized demonstration, speeches, slogans, and the distribution of literature, anyone who observed appellant's act would have understood the message that appellant intended to convey. The act for which appellant was convicted was clearly `speech' contemplated by the First Amendment." To justify Johnson's conviction for engaging in symbolic speech, the State |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | justify Johnson's conviction for engaging in symbolic speech, the State asserted two interests: preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity and preventing breaches of the peace. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that neither interest supported his conviction. *01 Acknowledging that this Court had not yet decided whether the Government may criminally sanction flag desecration in order to preserve the flag's symbolic value, the Texas court nevertheless concluded that our decision in West Virginia Board of suggested that furthering this interest by curtailing speech was impermissible. "Recognizing that the right to differ is the centerpiece of our First Amendment freedoms," the court explained, "a government cannot mandate by fiat a feeling of unity in its citizens. Therefore, that very same government cannot carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a set of approved messages to be associated with that symbol when it cannot mandate the status or feeling the symbol purports to represent." Noting that the State had not shown that the flag was in "grave and immediate danger," of being stripped of its symbolic value, the Texas court also decided that the flag's special status was not endangered by Johnson's As to the State's goal of preventing breaches of the peace, the court concluded that the flag-desecration statute was not drawn narrowly enough to encompass only those flag burnings that were likely to result in a serious disturbance of the peace. And in fact, the court emphasized, the flag burning in this particular case did not threaten such a reaction. " `Serious offense' occurred," the court admitted, "but there was no breach of peace nor does the record reflect that the situation was potentially explosive. One cannot equate `serious offense' with incitement to breach the peace." The court also stressed that another Texas statute, prohibited breaches of the peace. Citing the court decided that 2.01 demonstrated Texas' ability to prevent disturbances of the peace without punishing this flag 755 S.W.2d, *02 Because it reversed Johnson's conviction on the ground that 2.09 was unconstitutional as applied to him, the state court did not address Johnson's argument that the statute was, on its face, unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We granted certiorari, and now affirm. II Johnson was convicted of flag desecration for burning the flag rather than for uttering insulting words.[2] This fact *03 somewhat complicates our consideration of his conviction under the First Amendment. We must first determine whether Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment in challenging his conviction. See, e. g., If his conduct was expressive, we |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | conviction. See, e. g., If his conduct was expressive, we next decide whether the State's regulation is related to the suppression of free expression. See, e. g., United ; If the State's regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent standard we announced in United for regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls. See O', at If it is, then we are outside of O''s test, and we must ask whether this interest justifies Johnson's conviction under a more demanding standard.[3] See A *0 third possibility is that the State's asserted interest is simply not implicated on these facts, and in that event the interest drops out of the picture. See 18 U.S., The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of "speech," but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word. While we have rejected "the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea," United we have acknowledged that conduct may be "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments," In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." -11. Hence, we have recognized the expressive nature of students' wearing of black armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam, ; of a sit-in by blacks in a "whites only" area to protest segregation, ; of the wearing of American military uniforms in a dramatic presentation criticizing American involvement in Vietnam, ; and of picketing about a wide variety of causes, see, e. g., Food ; United Especially pertinent to this case are our decisions recognizing the communicative nature of conduct relating to flags. Attaching a peace sign to the flag, -10; refusing to salute the flag, ; and displaying a red flag, we have held, all may find shelter under the First Amendment. See also (treating flag "contemptuously" by wearing pants with small flag sewn into their seat is expressive conduct). That we have had little difficulty identifying an expressive element in conduct relating to flags should not be surprising. The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country; it is, one might say, "the one visible manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood." Thus, we have observed: "[T]he flag |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | hundred years of nationhood." Thus, we have observed: "[T]he flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design." Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signifies this Nation as does the combination of letters found in "America." We have not automatically concluded, however, that any action taken with respect to our flag is expressive. Instead, in characterizing such action for First Amendment purposes, we have considered the context in which it occurred. In for example, we emphasized that 's taping of a peace sign to his flag was "roughly simultaneous with and concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy." The State of Washington had conceded, in fact, that 's conduct was a form of communication, and we stated that "the State's concession is inevitable on this record." The State of Texas conceded for purposes of its oral argument in this case that Johnson's conduct was expressive conduct, Tr. of Oral Arg. and this concession seems to us as *06 prudent as was Washington's in Johnson burned an American flag as part indeed, as the culmination of a political demonstration that coincided with the convening of the Republican Party and its renomination of Ronald Reagan for President. The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. At his trial, Johnson explained his reasons for burning the flag as follows: "The American Flag was burned as Ronald Reagan was being renominated as President. And a more powerful statement of symbolic speech, whether you agree with it or not, couldn't have been made at that time. It's quite a just position [juxtaposition]. We had new patriotism and no patriotism." 5 Record 656. In these circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication," 18 U. S., to implicate the First Amendment. III The government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word. See O', 391 U. S. -; ; It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements. "[W]hat might be termed the more generalized guarantee of freedom of expression makes the communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis for singling out that conduct for |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | conduct an inadequate basis for singling out that conduct for proscription. A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment requires." Community for Creative (emphasis in original), rev'd sub nom. It is, in short, not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the governmental *07 interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid. Thus, although we have recognized that where " `speech' and `nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms," O', we have limited the applicability of O''s relatively lenient standard to those cases in which "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression." at ; see also In stating, moreover, that O''s test "in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions," we have highlighted the requirement that the governmental interest in question be unconnected to expression in order to come under O''s less demanding rule. In order to decide whether O''s test applies here, therefore, we must decide whether Texas has asserted an interest in support of Johnson's conviction that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. If we find that an interest asserted by the State is simply not implicated on the facts before us, we need not ask whether O''s test applies. See The State offers two separate interests to justify this conviction: preventing breaches of the peace and preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. We hold that the first interest is not implicated on this record and that the second is related to the suppression of expression. A Texas claims that its interest in preventing breaches of the peace justifies Johnson's conviction for flag []*08 However, no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of Johnson's burning of the flag. Although the State stresses the disruptive behavior of the protestors during their march toward City Hall, Brief for Petitioner 3-36, it admits that "no actual breach of the peace occurred at the time of the flagburning or in response to the flagburning." The State's emphasis on the protestors' disorderly actions prior to arriving at City Hall is not only somewhat surprising given that no charges were brought on the basis of this conduct, but it also fails to show that a disturbance |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | conduct, but it also fails to show that a disturbance of the peace was a likely reaction to Johnson's The only evidence offered by the State at trial to show the reaction to Johnson's actions was the testimony of several persons who had been seriously offended by the flag burning. The State's position, therefore, amounts to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis.[5] Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption. On the contrary, they recognize that a principal "function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or *09 even stirs people to anger." See also ; -509; 02 U.S. 611, ; Hustler Magazine, 85 U.S. 6, It would be odd indeed to conclude both that "if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection," 38 U.S. 726, 75 and that the government may ban the expression of certain disagreeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke violence. Thus, we have not permitted the government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether the expression "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 3 U.S. 7 To accept Texas' arguments that it need only demonstrate "the potential for a breach of the peace," Brief for Petitioner 37, and that every flag burning necessarily possesses that potential, would be to eviscerate our holding in This we decline to do. Nor does Johnson's expressive conduct fall within that small class of "fighting words" that are "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." 57 (192). No reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson's generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. See ; (190); at 75 *10 We thus conclude that the State's interest in maintaining order is not implicated on these facts. The State need not worry that our holding will disable it from preserving the peace. We do not suggest that the First Amendment forbids a State to prevent "imminent lawless action." at 7. And, in |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | State to prevent "imminent lawless action." at 7. And, in fact, Texas already has a statute specifically prohibiting breaches of the peace, which tends to confirm that Texas need not punish this flag desecration in order to keep the peace. See 85 U. S., at 327-329. B The State also asserts an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. In we acknowledged that the government's interest in preserving the flag's special symbolic value "is directly related to expression in the context of activity" such as affixing a peace symbol to a flag. 18 U.S., We are equally persuaded that this interest is related to expression in the case of Johnson's burning of the flag. The State, apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people to believe either that the flag does not stand for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive concepts, or that the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that is, that we do not enjoy unity as a Nation. These concerns blossom only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates some message, and thus are related "to the suppression of free expression" within the meaning of O'. We are thus outside of O''s test altogether. IV It remains to consider whether the State's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justifies Johnson's conviction. As in "[w]e are confronted with a case of prosecution for the expression of an idea through activity," and "[a]ccordingly, we must examine with particular care the interests *11 advanced by [petitioner] to support its prosecution." 18 U.S., Johnson was not, we add, prosecuted for the expression of just any idea; he was prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the core of our First Amendment values. See, e. g., ; 87 U.S. 7, 79 Moreover, Johnson was prosecuted because he knew that his politically charged expression would cause "serious offense." If he had burned the flag as a means of disposing of it because it was dirty or torn, he would not have been convicted of flag desecration under this Texas law: federal law designates burning as the preferred means of disposing of a flag "when it is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display," 36 U.S. C. (k), and Texas has no quarrel with this means of disposal. Brief for Petitioner 5. The Texas law is thus not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed instead to protect it only against impairments that would cause serious offense to others.[6] Texas concedes as much: "Section 2.09(b) reaches only those severe acts of physical abuse of the flag carried out in a way likely to be offensive. The statute mandates intentional or knowing abuse, that is, the kind of mistreatment that is not innocent, but rather is intentionally designed to seriously offend other individuals." at Whether Johnson's treatment of the flag violated Texas law thus depended on the likely communicative impact of his expressive [7] Our decision in *12 tells us that this restriction on Johnson's expression is content based. In Boos, we considered the constitutionality of a law prohibiting "the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if that sign tends to bring that foreign government into `public odium' or `public disrepute.' " Rejecting the argument that the law was content neutral because it was justified by "our international law obligation to shield diplomats from speech that offends their dignity," we held that "[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a `secondary effect' " unrelated to the content of the expression itself. ; see also at 33 According to the principles announced in Boos, Johnson's political expression was restricted because of the content of the message he conveyed. We must therefore subject the State's asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic character of the flag to "the most exacting scrutiny."[8] *13 Texas argues that its interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity survives this close analysis. Quoting extensively from the writings of this Court chronicling the flag's historic and symbolic role in our society, the State emphasizes the " `special place' " reserved for the flag in our Nation. Brief for Petitioner 22, quoting 15 U. S., at 601 The State's argument is not that it has an interest simply in maintaining the flag as a symbol of something, no matter what it symbolizes; indeed, if that were the State's position, it would be difficult to see how that interest is endangered by highly symbolic conduct such as Johnson's. Rather, the State's claim is that it has an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity, a symbol with a determinate range of meanings. Brief for Petitioner 20-2. According to Texas, if one physically treats the flag in a way that would tend to cast doubt on either the idea that nationhood |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | tend to cast doubt on either the idea that nationhood and national unity are the flag's referents or that national unity actually exists, the message conveyed thereby is a harmful one and therefore may be prohibited.[9] *1 If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. See, e. g., Hustler Magazine, 85 U. S., at ; City Council of Los 66 U.S. 789, 80 ; 63 U.S. 60, ; 7 U.S. 55, 62-63 ; 38 U. S., at 75-76; 27 U.S. 50, ; 2 U.S. 1, ; 08 U.S. 10, ; Police Dept. of 08 U.S. 92, ; 397 U.S. 56, ; O', ; 383 U. S., at 12-13; -369. We have not recognized an exception to this principle even where our flag has been involved. In 39 U.S. 576 we held that a State may not criminally punish a person for uttering words critical of the flag. Rejecting the argument that the conviction could be sustained on the ground that Street had "failed to show the respect for our national symbol which may properly be demanded of every citizen," we concluded that "the constitutionally guaranteed `freedom to be intellectually diverse or even contrary,' and the `right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,' encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous." quoting 319 U. S., at 62. Nor may the government, we have held, compel conduct that would evince respect for the flag. "To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind." *15 In holding in that the Constitution did not leave this course open to the government, Justice Jackson described one of our society's defining principles in words deserving of their frequent repetition: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." at 62. In we held that the same interest asserted by Texas here was insufficient to support a criminal conviction under a flag-misuse statute for the taping of a peace sign to an American flag. |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | the taping of a peace sign to an American flag. "Given the protected character of ['s] expression and in light of the fact that no interest the State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag was significantly impaired on these facts," we held, "the conviction must be invalidated." 18 U.S., at 15. See also at (to convict person who had sewn a flag onto the seat of his pants for "contemptuous" treatment of the flag would be "[t]o convict not to protect the physical integrity or to protect against acts interfering with the proper use of the flag, but to punish for communicating ideas unacceptable to the controlling majority in the legislature"). In short, nothing in our precedents suggests that a State may foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it.[10] To bring its argument outside our *16 precedents, Texas attempts to convince us that even if its interest in preserving the flag's symbolic role does not allow it to prohibit words or some expressive conduct critical of the flag, it does permit it to forbid the outright destruction of the flag. The State's argument cannot depend here on the distinction between written or spoken words and nonverbal That distinction, we have shown, is of no moment where the nonverbal conduct is expressive, as it is here, and where the regulation of that conduct is related to expression, as it is here. See at 02-03. In addition, both and involved expressive conduct, not only verbal communication, and both found that conduct protected. Texas' focus on the precise nature of Johnson's expression, moreover, misses the point of our prior decisions: their enduring lesson, that the government may not prohibit expression simply because it disagrees with its message, is not dependent on the particular mode in which one chooses to express an idea.[11] If we were to hold that a State may forbid flag burning wherever it is likely to endanger the flag's symbolic role, but allow it wherever burning a flag promotes that role as where, for example, a person ceremoniously burns a dirty flag we would be saying that when it comes to impairing the flag's physical integrity, the flag itself may be used as *17 a symbol as a substitute for the written or spoken word or a "short cut from mind to mind" only in one direction. We would be permitting a State to "prescribe what shall be orthodox" by saying that one may burn the flag to convey one's attitude toward it |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | may burn the flag to convey one's attitude toward it and its referents only if one does not endanger the flag's representation of nationhood and national unity. We never before have held that the Government may ensure that a symbol be used to express only one view of that symbol or its referents. Indeed, in we invalidated a federal statute permitting an actor portraying a member of one of our Armed Forces to " `wear the uniform of that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force.' " quoting 10 U.S. C. 772(f). This proviso, we held, "which leaves Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it, cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment." We perceive no basis on which to hold that the principle underlying our decision in Schacht does not apply to this case. To conclude that the government may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries. Could the government, on this theory, prohibit the burning of state flags? Of copies of the Presidential seal? Of the Constitution? In evaluating these choices under the First Amendment, how would we decide which symbols were sufficiently special to warrant this unique status? To do so, we would be forced to consult our own political preferences, and impose them on the citizenry, in the very way that the First Amendment forbids us to do. See 7 U. S., at 66-67. There is, moreover, no indication either in the text of the Constitution or in our cases interpreting it that a separate juridical category exists for the American flag alone. Indeed, we would not be surprised to learn that the persons *18 who framed our Constitution and wrote the Amendment that we now construe were not known for their reverence for the Union Jack. The First Amendment does not guarantee that other concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole such as the principle that discrimination on the basis of race is odious and destructive will go unquestioned in the marketplace of ideas. See 3 U.S. We decline, therefore, to create for the flag an exception to the joust of principles protected by the First Amendment. It is not the State's ends, but its means, to which we object. It cannot be gainsaid that there is a special place reserved for the flag in this Nation, and thus we do |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | for the flag in this Nation, and thus we do not doubt that the government has a legitimate interest in making efforts to "preserv[e] the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country." 18 U. S., at 12. We reject the suggestion, urged at oral argument by counsel for Johnson, that the government lacks "any state interest whatsoever" in regulating the manner in which the flag may be displayed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Congress has, for example, enacted precatory regulations describing the proper treatment of the flag, see 36 U.S. C. 173-177, and we cast no doubt on the legitimacy of its interest in making such recommendations. To say that the government has an interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag, however, is not to say that it may criminally punish a person for burning a flag as a means of political protest. "National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is whether under our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement." 319 U. S., at 60. We are fortified in today's conclusion by our conviction that forbidding criminal punishment for conduct such as Johnson's will not endanger the special role played by our flag or the feelings it inspires. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, we submit that nobody can suppose that this one gesture of an unknown *19 man will change our Nation's attitude towards its flag. See 0 U.S. 616, Indeed, Texas' argument that the burning of an American flag " `is an act having a high likelihood to cause a breach of the peace,' " Brief for Petitioner 31, quoting 323 F. Supp. 70, 75 and its statute's implicit assumption that physical mistreatment of the flag will lead to "serious offense," tend to confirm that the flag's special role is not in danger; if it were, no one would riot or take offense because a flag had been burned. We are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag's deservedly cherished place in our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and source of our strength. Indeed, one of the proudest images of our flag, the one immortalized in our own national anthem, is of the bombardment it survived at Fort McHenry. It is the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity, that Texas sees reflected |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Texas v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112304/texas-v-johnson/ | the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity, that Texas sees reflected in the flag and it is that resilience that we reassert today. The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong. "To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." Whitney v. 27 U.S. 357, And, precisely because it is our flag that is involved, one's response to the flag *20A burner may exploit the uniquely persuasive power of the flag itself. We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one's own, no better way to counter a flag burner's message than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by as one witness here did according its remains a respectful burial. We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents. V Johnson was convicted for engaging in expressive The State's interest in preventing breaches of the peace does not support his conviction because Johnson's conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace. Nor does the State's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justify his criminal conviction for engaging in political expression. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore Affirmed. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Flores | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112833/reno-v-flores/ | I join the Court's opinion and write separately simply to clarify that in my view these children have a constitutionally protected interest in freedom from institutional confinement. That interest lies within the core of the Due Process Clause, and the Court today does not hold otherwise. Rather, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because the INS program challenged here, on its face, complies with the requirements of due process. "Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action." "Freedom from bodily restraint" means more than freedom from handcuffs, straitjackets, or detention cells. A person's core liberty interest is also implicated when she is confined in a prison, a mental hospital, or some other form of custodial institution, even if the conditions of confinement are liberal. This is clear beyond cavil, at least *316 where adults are concerned. "In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalfthrough incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal libertywhich is the `deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause" The institutionalization of an adult by the government triggers heightened, substantive due process scrutiny. There must be a "sufficiently compelling" governmental interest to justify such action, usually a punitive interest in imprisoning the convicted criminal or a regulatory interest in forestalling danger to the community. United ; see at -81. Children, too, have a core liberty interest in remaining free from institutional confinement. In this respect, a child's constitutional "[f]reedom from bodily restraint" is no narrower than an adult's. Beginning with In re Gault, we consistently have rejected the assertion that "a child, unlike an adult, has a right `not to liberty but to custody.' " Gault held that a child in delinquency proceedings must be provided various procedural due process protections (notice of charges, right to counsel, right of confrontation and cross-examination, privilege against self-incrimination) when those proceedings may result in the child's institutional confinement. As we explained: "Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of the Juvenile Court process A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequenceand of limited practical meaningthat the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a `receiving home' *317 or an `industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Flores | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112833/reno-v-flores/ | `industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours. Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, [and] state employees" See also In re Winship, ; ; Our decision in makes clear that children have a protected liberty interest in "freedom from institutional restraints," even absent the stigma of being labeled "delinquent," see or "mentally ill," see In we upheld a New York statute authorizing pretrial detention of dangerous juveniles, but only after analyzing the statute at length to ensure that it complied with substantive and procedural due process. We recognized that children "are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae. " 467 U.S., But this parens patriae purpose was seen simply as a plausible justification for state action implicating the child's protected liberty interest, not as a limitation on the scope of due process protection. See Significantly, was essentially a facial challenge, as is this case, and New York's policy was to detain some juveniles in "open facilit[ies] in the community without locks, bars, or security officers where the child receives schooling and counseling and has access to recreational facilities." 1. A *318 child's placement in this kind of governmental institution is hardly the same as handcuffing her, or confining her to a cell, yet it must still satisfy heightened constitutional scrutiny. It may seem odd that institutional placement as such, even where conditions are decent and humane and where the child has no less authority to make personal choices than she would have in a family setting, nonetheless implicates the Due Process Clause. The answer, I think, is this. Institutionalization is a decisive and unusual event. "The consequences of an erroneous commitment decision are more tragic where children are involved. [C]hildhood is a particularly vulnerable time of life and children erroneously institutionalized during their formative years may bear the scars for the rest of their lives." (opinion of Brennan, J.). Just as it is true that "[i]n our society liberty [for adults] is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception," so too, in our society, children normally grow up in families, not in governmental institutions. To be sure, government's failure to take custody of a child whose family is unable to care for her may also |
Justice O'Connor | 1,993 | 14 | concurring | Reno v. Flores | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112833/reno-v-flores/ | whose family is unable to care for her may also effect harm. But the purpose of heightened scrutiny is not to prevent government from placing children in an institutional setting, where necessary. Rather, judicial review ensures that government acts in this sensitive area with the requisite care. In sum, this case does not concern the scope of the Due Process Clause. We are not deciding whether the constitutional concept of "liberty" extends to some hitherto unprotected aspect of personal well-being, see, e. g., ; Michael ; but rather whether a governmental decision implicating a squarely protected liberty interest comports with substantive and procedural due process. See ante, at 301-306 *319 (substantive due process scrutiny); ante, at 306-309 (procedural due process scrutiny). Specifically, the absence of available parents, close relatives, or legal guardians to care for respondents does not vitiate their constitutional interest in freedom from institutional confinement. It does not place that interest outside the core of the Due Process Clause. Rather, combined with the Juvenile Care Agreement, the fact that the normal forms of custody have faltered explains why the INS program facially challenged here survives heightened, substantive due process scrutiny. "Where a juvenile has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, where the government does not intend to punish the child, and where the conditions of governmental custody are decent and humane, such custody surely does not violate the Constitution. It is rationally connected to a governmental interest in `preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,' and is not punitive since it is not excessive in relation to that valid purpose." Ante, at 303. Because this is a facial challenge, the Court rightly focuses on the Juvenile Care Agreement. It is proper to presume that the conditions of confinement are no longer "`most disturbing,' " ), and that the purposes of confinement are no longer the troublesome ones of lack of resources and expertise published in the Federal Register, see (1988), but rather the plainly legitimate purposes associated with the Government's concern for the welfare of the minors. With those presumptions in place, "the terms and conditions of confinement are in fact compatible with [legitimate] purposes," and the Court finds that the INS program conforms with the Due Process Clause. On this understanding, I join the opinion of the Court. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | This case presents a narrow but important issue in the administration of the federal general assistance program for needy Indians: Are general assistance benefits available only to those Indians living on reservations in the United (or in areas regulated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Alaska and Oklahoma), and are they thus unavailable to Indians (outside Alaska and Oklahoma) living off, although near, a reservation? The United District Court for the District of Arizona answered this question favorably to petitioner, the Secretary of the Interior, when, without opinion and on cross-motions for summary judgment, it dismissed the respondents' complaint. The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed. We granted certiorari because of the significance of the * issue and because of the vigorous assertion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was inconsistent with long-established policy of the Secretary and of the Bureau. I The pertinent facts are agreed upon, although, as to some, the petitioner Secretary denies knowledge but does not dispute them. App. 45-48. The respondents, Ramon Ruiz and his wife, Anita, are Papago Indians and United citizens. In 1940 they left the Papago Reservation in Arizona[1] to seek employment 15 miles away at the Phelps-Dodge copper mines at Ajo. Mr. Ruiz found work there, and they settled in a community at Ajo called the "Indian Village" and populated almost entirely by Papagos.[2] Practically all the land and most of the homes in the Village are owned or rented by Phelps-Dodge. The have lived in Ajo continuously since 1940 and have been in their present residence since 1947. A minor daughter lives with them. They speak and understand the Papago language but only limited English. Apart from Mr. Ruiz' employment with *203 Phelps-Dodge, they have not been assimilated into the dominant culture, and they appear to have maintained a close tie with the nearby reservation.[3] *204 In July 197, 27 years after the moved to Ajo, the mine where he worked was shut down by a strike. It remained closed until the following March. While the strike was in progress, Mr. Ruiz' sole income was a $15 per week striker's benefit paid by the union.[4] He sought welfare assistance from the State of Arizona but this was denied because of the State's apparent policy that striking workers are not eligible for general assistance or emergency relief.[5] On December 11, 197, Mr. Ruiz applied for general assistance benefits from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). He was immediately notified by letter that he was ineligible for general assistance because of the provision in Indian Affairs Manual 3.1.4 |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | assistance because of the provision in Indian Affairs Manual 3.1.4 (195) that eligibility is limited to Indians living "on reservations" and in jurisdictions under the BIA in Alaska and Oklahoma.[] An appeal to the Superintendent *205 of the Papago Indian Agency was unsuccessful. A further appeal to the Phoenix Area Director of the BIA led to a hearing, but this, too, proved unsuccessful. The sole ground for the denial of general assistance benefits was that the resided outside the boundaries of the Papago Reservation. The respondents then instituted the present purported class action against the Secretary, claiming, as a matter of statutory interpretation, entitlement to the general assistance for which they had applied, and also challenging the eligibility provision as a violation of Fifth Amendment due process and of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 2, of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals' reversal of the District Court's summary judgment for the Secretary was on the ground that the Manual's residency limitation was inconsistent with the broad language of the Snyder Act, 25 U.S. C. 13, "that Congress intended general assistance benefits to be available to all Indians, including those in the position" of the and that subsequent actions of Congress in appropriating funds for the BIA general assistance program did not serve to ratify the imposed limitation. The dissent took the position that the Secretary's policy was within the broad discretionary authority delegated to the Secretary by Congress with respect to the allocation of limited funds. II The Snyder Act,[7] 25 U.S. C. 13, approved November 2, 1921, provides the underlying congressional *20 authority for most BIA activities including, in particular and importantly, the general assistance program. Prior to the Act, there was no such general authorization. As a result, appropriation requests made by the House Committee on Indian Affairs were frequently stricken on the House floor by point-of-order objections. See H. R. Rep. No. 275, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); S. Rep. No. 294, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); 1 Cong. Rec. 459-472 (1921). The Snyder Act was designed to remedy this situation. It is comprehensively worded for the apparent purpose of avoiding these point-of-order motions to strike. Since the passage of the Act, the BIA has presented its budget requests without further interruption of that kind and Congress has enacted appropriation bills annually in response to the requests. The appropriation legislation at issue here, Department *207 of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 198, Stat. 59, 0 (197), recited: "BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS "Education and Welfare Services "For expenses necessary to provide education and welfare |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | Welfare Services "For expenses necessary to provide education and welfare services for Indians, either directly or in cooperation with and other organizations, including payment (in advance or from date of admission), of care, tuition, assistance, and other expenses of Indians in boarding homes, institutions, or schools; grants and other assistance to needy Indians; maintenance of law and order, and payment of rewards for information or evidence concerning violations of law on Indian reservations or lands; and operation of Indian arts and crafts shops; $12,478,000." This wording, except for the amount, is identical to that employed in similar legislation for prior fiscal years[8] and, indeed, for subsequent ones.[9] It is to be noted that neither the language of the Snyder Act nor that of the Appropriations Act imposes any geographical limitation on the availability of general assistance benefits and does not prescribe eligibility requirements or the details of any program. Instead, the Snyder Act states that *208 the BIA (under the supervision of the Secretary) "shall direct, supervise, and expend for the benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United " for the stated purposes including, as the two purposes first described, "[g]eneral support" and "relief of distress." This is broadly phrased material and obviously is intended to include all BIA activities.[10] The general assistance program is designed by the BIA to provide direct financial aid to needy Indians where other channels of relief, federal, state, and tribal, are not available. Benefits generally are paid on a scale equivalent to the State's welfare payments. Any Indian, whether living on a reservation or elsewhere, may be eligible for benefits under the various social security programs in which his State participates and no limitation may be placed on social security benefits because of an Indian claimant's residence on a reservation.[11] In the formal budget request submitted to Congress *209 by the BIA for fiscal 198, the program was described as follows: "General assistance will be provided to needy Indians on reservations who are not eligible for public assistance under the Social Security Act and for whom such assistance is not available from established welfare agencies or through tribal resources." Hearings on Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 198 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 777-778 (197),[12] and Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 198, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 95 (197).[12a] III We are confronted, therefore, with the issues whether the geographical limitation placed on general assistance eligibility by the BIA is consistent with congressional intent and the meaning of the applicable statutes, or, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | congressional intent and the meaning of the applicable statutes, or, to phrase it somewhat differently, whether the congressional appropriations are properly limited by the BIA's restrictions, *210 and, if so, whether the limitation withstands constitutional analysis. On the initial question, the Secretary argues, first, that the Snyder Act is merely an enabling act with no definition of the scope of the general assistance program, that the Appropriation Act did not provide for off-reservation Indian welfare (other than in Oklahoma and Alaska), and that Congress did not intend to expand the program beyond that presented to it by the BIA request. Secondly, he points to the "on reservations" limitation in the Manual and suggests that Congress was well acquainted with that limitation,[13] and that, by legislating in the light of the Manual's limiting provision, its appropriation amounted to a ratification of the BIA's definitive practice. He notes that, in recent years, Congress has twice rejected proposals that clearly would have provided off-reservation general assistance for Indians.[14]*211 Thus, it is said, Congress has appropriated no funds for general assistance for off-reservation Indians and, as a practical matter, the Secretary is unable to provide such a program. The Court of Appeals placed primary reliance on the Snyder Act's provision for assistance to "the Indians throughout" the United It concluded that the Act envisioned no geographical limitations on Indian programs and that, absent a clear congressional ratification of such a policy, the Secretary was powerless to shrink the coverage down to some lesser group of Indian beneficiaries. Although we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and its reversal of the judgment of the District Court, we reach its result on a narrower ground. We need not approach the issue in terms of whether Congress intended for all Indians, regardless of residence and of the degree of assimilation, to be covered by the general assistance program. We need only ascertain the intent of Congress with respect to those Indian claimants in the case before us. The question, so limited, is whether Congress intended to exclude from the general assistance program these respondents and their class, who are full-blooded, unassimilated Indians living in an Indian community near their native reservation, and who maintain close economic and social ties with that reservation. Except for formal residence outside the physical *212 boundaries of the Papago Reservation, the respondents, as has been conceded, meet all other requirements for the general assistance program. IV There is, of course, some force in the Secretary's argument and in the facts that the BIA's budget requests consistently contained "on reservations" general |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | that the BIA's budget requests consistently contained "on reservations" general assistance language and that there was testimony before successive appropriations subcommittees to the effect that assistance of this kind was customarily so restricted. Nonetheless, our examination of this and other material leads us to a conclusion contrary to that urged by the Secretary. A. In actual practice, general assistance clearly has not been limited to reservation Indians. Indeed, the Manual's provision, see n. so heavily relied upon by the Secretary, itself provides that general assistance is available to nonreservation Indians in Alaska and Oklahoma. The rationale proffered for this is: "The situation of Indians in Alaska and Oklahoma has historically been unique. Much of Oklahoma was once set aside as an Indian Territory, and though most of the reservations have been abolished, there remains a large area of concentrated Indian population with tribal organization, living on land held in trust by the United A similar situation of large concentrations of native Americans, with few reservations and substantial separate legislation prevails in Alaska The responsibilities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in these jurisdictions are substantially similar to the Bureau's responsibilities on the reservations." Brief for Petitioner 21. While this exception is not necessarily irrational, it *213 definitely demonstrates that the limitation in the budget requests is not rigidly followed by the BIA, inasmuch as most off-reservation Indians in the two named are regarded as eligible for general assistance funds. If, as the Secretary urges, we are to assume that Congress has been aware of the Manual's provision, Congress was just as clearly on notice that the words "on reservations" did not possess their literal meaning in that context. Surely, some of the reasons for the Alaska-Oklahoma exception are equally applicable to Indians of the Ruiz class. B. There was testimony in several of the hearings that the BIA, in fact, was not limiting general assistance to those within reservation boundaries and, on more than one occasion, Congress was notified that exceptions were being made where they were deemed appropriate. Notwithstanding the Manual, at least three categories of off-reservation Indians outside Alaska and Oklahoma have been treated as eligible for general assistance. The first is the Indian who relocates in the city through the BIA relocation program and who then is eligible for general assistance for the period of time required for him, under state law, to establish residence in the new location.[15] The second evidently is the Indian from the Turtle Mountain Reservation in North Dakota who lives on trust land near but apart from that reservation.[1] The third appears |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | land near but apart from that reservation.[1] The third appears to be the Indian residing in Rapid City, South Dakota.[17] *214 In addition, although not controlling, it is not irrelevant that the "on reservations" limitation in the budget requests has never appeared in the final appropriation bills. C. Even more important is the fact that, for many years, to and including the appropriation year at issue, the BIA itself made continual representations to the appropriations subcommittees that nonurban Indians living "near" a reservation were eligible for BIA services. Although, to be sure, several passages in the legislative history and the formal budget requests have defined eligibility in terms of Indians living "on reservations," the BIA, not infrequently, has indicated that living "on or near" a reservation equates with living "on" it. An early example of this appears at the fiscal 1948 Senate Hearing. The following colloquy between Senator McCarran and Assistant Commissioner Zimmerman is one of the stronger statements made to Congress concerning the BIA's policy of limiting general assistance to reservation Indians and yet, within this very dialogue, relied on explicitly by the Secretary, is an indication that "on reservations" is not given a rigid interpretation: "Senator McCarran. I have one question right there. "Do these items address themselves to reservation Indians or nonreservation Indians, or both? "Take, for instance, this welfare administration fund, $87,78. Is that given to reservation Indians, nonreservation Indians alike? "Mr. Zimmerman. No, sir; it is not. "Senator McCarran. To whom is it given? "Mr. Zimmerman. This money goes to reservation Indians. "Senator McCarran. Entirely? *215 "Mr. Zimmerman. Yes. "Senator McCarran. Now, in my State, for instance, you have in the outskirts of Reno and again on the outskirts of Battle Mountain small Indian villages. Do they get anything in the way of relief? "Mr. Zimmerman. Those town colonies are treated as reservations. "Senator McCarran. You regard them as reservations? "Mr. Zimmerman. Yes; some of them are. "Senator McCarran. Is the colony outside of the city of Reno a reservation? "Mr. Zimmerman. For certain purposes the courts have held that it is a reservation. "Senator McCarran. Do they own the land? "Mr. Zimmerman. Yes; the Federal Government owns the land. "Senator McCarran. The Federal Government owns the land? "Mr. Zimmerman. Yes, sir. "Senator McCarran. They build their houses on it or the Federal Government? "Mr. Zimmerman. They build their own houses. "Senator McCarran. But those Indians do receive the benefits? "Mr. Zimmerman. They would be eligible; yes, sir." Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1948, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 598-599 The interchangeability of "on" and "on or |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | 1st Sess., 598-599 The interchangeability of "on" and "on or near" appears more directly in later years. In the relocation services section of the BIA's budget justification for fiscal 1959 it is stated: "It is estimated that within the continental United there are approximately 400,000 members of Indian tribes and bands. Of this number, *21 approximately 300,000 live on or adjacent to reservations for which the Bureau assumes some responsibility. On most of the Indian reservations there is a surplus of population in proportion to reservation resources. Opportunities for self-support on or near these reservations are wholly inadequate and the increasing surplus population is faced with the alternative of moving away from the reservation or remaining to live in privation or dependent, partially or wholly, upon some form of public assistance." Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1959, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 288 (1958) (emphasis supplied).[18] The relocation program is covered by the welfare appropriation. It is designed to provide short-term assistance to the needy Indian who leaves the reservation area and thereby disqualifies himself for the general assistance program. By describing the Indians who "live on or adjacent to reservations" as those entitled to relocation services when they depart, the BIA in effect was telling Congress that "moving away from the reservation" was a possibility even though the Indian lives only "adjacent to" the reservation, and it would seem to follow that the Indian living "adjacent to" the reservation was also eligible for general assistance. At the fiscal 192 hearing, Congressman Fenton inquired of Assistant Commissioner Gifford as to the Indian population in the United She replied: "We have no absolute figure. Our best estimate of Indians on the reservations right now is about 375,000, I think. That is a figure we are using. Of course, there are Indians off of the reservations, and we do not have this count too clearly. However, *217 for those we consider our direct responsibility on the reservations "Mr. Fenton. To whom we contribute? "Miss Gifford. Yes we believe it is about 375,000." House Hearings, Fiscal Year 192, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 205-20 (191). The foregoing statement by the Assistant Commissioner, of course, is not in itself particularly revealing on the issue that confronts us. As can be seen from subsequent hearings, however, the stated figure includes Indians "on or near the reservations" and is not restricted to Indians who live "on." Also, this "on or near" group, in contrast to those who live "off" the reservation, are within the group for whom the BIA assumed "direct responsibility." Obviously, one can never be certain whether |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | assumed "direct responsibility." Obviously, one can never be certain whether this expanded reading of "on" is the result of the BIA's desire, when seeking appropriations, to represent its jurisdiction and function somewhat more broadly than it actually was, or whether it reflects actual policy. The "on or near" representations continued to be made to Congress. At the fiscal 193 House hearing, Congressmen questioned Commissioner Nash, Associate Commissioner Officer, and Assistant Commissioner Gifford as to the Indian population served by the BIA: "Mr. Denton. How many Indians are there at the present time? "Miss Gifford. You mean the total population? "Mr. Denton. Yes. "Miss Gifford. We estimate that the total population on or near the reservations that we serve is 380,000. "Mr. Denton. I expect there is no way you could tell how many Indians there are off the reservations. "Mr. Nash. Well, we can take the total census *218 figure for the Indian population and subtract those that are listed as living on or near the reservations, and this gives us a figure of 172,000 off the reservations; 380,000 on or near the reservations, including Alaska. "Mr. Kirwan. What did you say was on the reservation? "Mr. Nash. 380,000. "Mr. Officer. We are citing our figure of 380,000 to include those Indians who live in the reservation vicinity and are eligible to receive our services, as well as the Indians and other Alaska natives. The total of Alaska natives is 43,000. When we subtract that from 380,000, we have 337,000 Indians who live on or near reservations outside Alaska. Now if we are going to be concerned only with those who live on reservations, then we have that figure of 285,000, which was in our press release. "Mr. Kirwan. We want to clear that up. The press release emphasizes the 285,000 on the reservation. Now we have the figure on the reservation and those who live near the reservation. That is the point we want to clear. "Mr. Officer. The 380,000 are those who live on or near reservations plus the natives of Alaska. "Mr. Denton. That does include Eskimos? "Mr. Officer. Yes, sir. "Mr. Denton. What do you do in places like Oklahoma, where the Indians live `checkerboard'? "Mr. Officer. It is for that reason that we cite figures of Indians living on or near reservations; because we have a number of situations similar to those in Oklahoma, where you don't have a well-defined *219 reservation boundary." House Hearings, Fiscal Year 193, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 352-354 (192) (emphasis supplied).[19] It is interesting to note that the Subcommittee was |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | supplied).[19] It is interesting to note that the Subcommittee was advised that Alaska and Oklahoma Indians are subsumed in the "on or near" category rather than placed in the pure "on" group, and, admittedly, they are entitled to general assistance. The figures stated also indicate that the number quoted the preceding year by Miss Gifford as the number "on the reservation" actually referred to those "on or near". A nearly identical dialogue occurred in 194 at the Senate Subcommittee: "Senator Bible. How many Indians do you have under your jurisdiction? "Mr. Nash. 380,000. "Senator Bible. How many nonreservation Indians do you have? Are those just reservation Indians? "Mr. Nash. These are on or near. This would not include, for example, Indians living in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Denver, Minneapolis, unless they were brought there as part of our vocational training or relocation programs. "Senator Bible. What is the total Indian population in the United ? "Mr. Nash. The 190 census counted 552,000 Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. *220 "Chairman Hayden. Are these full-bloods or halfs? "Mr. Nash. The census does not make an inquiry as to full or half. They merely say, `Are you an Indian?' `Are you known as an Eskimo?' "Senator Bible. Following the Chairman's question, where does your jurisdiction rest in that regard? Do you have a measuring stick? "Mr. Nash. No, sir. Our basis for providing services to an Indian is primarily on real estate. That is, we service those individuals who reside on trust or restricted land, or so close to it that the program of the reservation would be affected by services not performed for that person." Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 195, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 227-228 (194) (emphasis supplied).[20] The now-familiar BIA representations appear again at the House hearing for fiscal 197: "Mr. Denton. How many Indians are there on the reservations and how many are under the Indian Bureau's supervision? "Mr. Nash. We recognize what we call the Federal Indian Service population at 380,000. "Mr. Denton. Are they on reservations? "Mr. Nash. This is on and near. The figure on the reservation is somewhat smaller, but this is the figure which is of those who are on reservations, are living on trust lands, have titles which are alienated, *221 restricted against aliens, or are village communities in Alaska, Oklahoma, or are so near to reservations that they are dependent upon the facilities provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for their major community services. "Mr. Denton. What is the total Indian population? "Mr. Nash. The 190 census counted 552,000. It would be |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | "Mr. Nash. The 190 census counted 552,000. It would be from there up, because there are a good many people who "Mr. Denton. And 380,000 are on the reservations, so about 170,000 are not under the Government's care. "Mr. Nash. That is correct." House Hearings, Fiscal Year 197, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 370-371 (19) (emphasis supplied). At the hearing for fiscal 198, the appropriation year directly at issue, Commissioner Bennett made like representations to the Senate Subcommittee. These could have led Congress to believe that there are only two relevant classes of Indians so far as non-land-related BIA services are concerned, those living "off" the reservation and those living "on or near": "Senator Bible. Mr. Commissioner, and I am sorry because you may have covered this in earlier questioning, but what is the total Indian population under your jurisdiction at the present time? "Mr. Bennett. The total Indian population under our jurisdiction at the present time is 380,000. These are on or near reservations and comprise our service population based on the 190 census. "Senator Bible. How many Indians do we have in the United who are not under your jurisdiction and are not your responsibility? *222 "Mr. Bennett. Based on the 190 census again the figure is about 170,000. These are people who moved away from the residential areas and generally have become a part of other communities." Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 198, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 819 (197) (emphasis supplied).[21] Another recurring representation made by the BIA throughout the annual hearings is that whenever it was asked about those Indians who were outside the agency's service area, that is, "off" the reservations, the answer would refer to Indians who had left the reservations and moved to urban areas or who had attempted to be assimilated by the general population. Certainly, none of the references to those outside the service area seem appropriately applied to Indians of the Ruiz class. During the fiscal 1950 Senate hearing, when the question arose as to the status of Indians who had left the reservation, Assistant Commissioner Zimmerman stated: "Frankly, it has not been considered the obligation of the Indian Service in the years past to police Indians after they have established themselves in Phoenix or Flagstaff or Grand Forks, or wherever it *223 may be." Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1950, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 483 (1949). At the fiscal 1952 hearing, the following exchange between Senator Young and Commissioner Myer gives some indication of what Congress had in mind with respect to Indian beneficiaries "leaving the reservation": "Senator Young. Is it true |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | Indian beneficiaries "leaving the reservation": "Senator Young. Is it true that, if an Indian leaves North Dakota to go out to the State of Washington to work, and if he runs out of work and runs out of money out there, he is eligible for relief only if he is back on the reservation? "Mr. Myer. No. If he has established residence, he is as eligible as anyone. I do not know what the situation is in the State of Washington, but some would require a 2-year residence; some do not. "Senator Young. Why could not an Indian get relief back there as well as on the reservation? "Mr. Myer. That presents a problem that is a matter of very basic policy. That is a matter of whether or not we are going to extend our services to Indians wherever they are and follow them around the United as they leave the reservation with the type of service we are providing on the reservation." Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1952, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 372 (1951). The following representation by Acting Commissioner Crow to the House Subcommittee in 191 seems to indicate that general assistance, although tied to residence, is concerned with those Indians who have not been assimilated: "The Bureau provides services and assists the states in furnishing services to Indians in the United including the natives of Alaska, in the fields of human and natural resources. This includes *224 among other things programs of education, welfare, law and order, and the protection, development, and management of trust property. Services are, in general, limited to those arising out of our relationship regarding trust property and to those Indian people who reside on trust or restricted land. Funds are not included in these estimates for furnishing services to Indian people who have established themselves in the general society." House Hearings, Fiscal Year 192, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 98 (191). In the fiscal 194 hearings, Commissioner Nash made the following statements indicating that "leaving the reservation" meant something far different from moving 15 miles to a nonurban Indian village while still maintaining close ties with the native reservation: "The 190 census showed 552,000 Indians, Eskimos and all others, all people defined as `Indians' by the census. This would include those who have left reservations, gone to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Chicago, because they simply answered to the census taker, `Yes, I am an Indian,' when they asked. We do not pretend to follow those people with services wherever they go. ". We have a need for services for 380,000 people. This |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | We have a need for services for 380,000 people. This includes those who are living directly on the reservations, and those who are living very close, so that the way in which they live affects reservations programs." House Hearings, Fiscal Year 194, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 889 (193) (emphasis supplied). See also Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 197, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 295-300 (19). It apparently was not until 1971, four years after the appropriation for fiscal 198, that anyone in Congress seriously questioned the BIA as to its precise policy concerning *225 the "off-on" dichotomy. The following dialogue between Senator Bible, long a member of the Senate Subcommittee, and Commissioner Bruce is instructive: "Senator Bible. What rule do you use to determine who is under your jurisdiction? Who is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs? "Mr. Bruce. American Indians living on reservations, one-fourth degree blood or more living in the United and Alaska. "Senator Bible. One-fourth degree or more is one of the qualifications. They must also live on a reservation? "Mr. Bruce. On or near. "Senator Bible. What does the word `near' mean? "Mr. Bruce. It is very difficult to define. Near reservation would be a nearby community. "Senator Bible. Well, half a mile, 1 mile, 5 miles, 100 yards? I am just trying to find out what your jurisdiction is. You have some responsibilities. Now what are you responsible for? "Mr. Bruce. They vary and that is why it is difficult to answer specifically. "Senator Bible. Well, give me the variables then. From 100 yards up to 10 miles? "Is that defined in a statute anywhere? If I was to become the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, God forbid, how would I know who I had jurisdiction over? They must make some determination. "Mr. Bruce. There is a definition for Oklahoma, and Alaska. "Senator Bible. What do your lawyers tell you? Can you go into the heart of Manhattan and find some Indian with one-fourth degree of Indian blood? Do you have jurisdiction over him in the heart of Manhattan? *22 "Mr. Bruce. No, sir; not over Manhattan. "Senator Bible. Well, if not over Manhattan, how about New York State? How about Troy or Syracuse or Rochester? "Senator Bible. I am just trying to get the record straight to see what your responsibility is for Indians beyond the reservation. I think we are clear for the Indians on the reservation." At this point a recess was taken and the Commissioner was instructed to present the Committee with a more precise breakdown. The dialogue continued: "Senator Bible. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | with a more precise breakdown. The dialogue continued: "Senator Bible. Do you have a breakdown for the Indians on the reservations and the number beyond Indian reservations? Can you give me figures on that? "Mr. Bruce. Yes. "Senator Bible. All right. What are they? "Mr. Bruce. 477,000 on or near. "Senator Bible. 477,000 on or near, and we still don't know what near is "Now on or near. Beyond the 477,000 Indians on reservations or near a reservation, you have no further jurisdiction over Indians? "Mr. Bruce. That is right. "Senator Bible. That is your total responsibility? "Mr. Bruce. That is our total responsibility.[22] *227 "Senator Bible. Of the money that is in this budget, the $408 million, how much of that will be expended within the reservations and how much beyond the reservations? "Mr. Bruce. Our total budget is to be spent for the benefit of reservation Indians. "Senator Bible. You are still tripping me up on that on or near business. I wish you would define that." [At this point there was an exchange as to whether BIA services extend to Indians living in Chicago and other urban areas.] "Senator Bible. Now how many urban Indians do we have? "Mr. Bruce. We are talking about more than 250,000. "Senator Bible. 250,000? "Mr. Bruce. Yes. "Senator Bible. That is over and above the 477,458? "Mr. Bruce. That is right. *228 "Senator Bible. And these are the difficulties that you have encountered in also a rather lengthy resume of some of the services that you perform for them as to your responsibility for the 250,000. "Where do you find these 250,000 nonreservation Indians? "Mr. Bruce. Living in urban citiesLos Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, Denver, Minneapolis." Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 751-75[23] Although most of these passages refer to the BIA's overall jurisdiction and not to the scope of the general assistance program, there is nothing to indicate that general assistance would not be made available for all within the service area. Unlike programs such as law enforcement and land projects, general assistance is not tied inherently or logically to the physical boundaries of the reservation. And programs, such as relocation, that explicitly extend beyond the reservation are not limited to "on or near." So it is difficult to ascertain precisely what relevance the "on or near" category would have if it did not relate to programs such as general assistance. Nowhere in the hearings had the BIA ever indicated which non-land-oriented programs are available to those "on" as opposed to those "on or near," |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | to those "on" as opposed to those "on or near," and the only conclusion that is to be drawn from the representations *229 to Congress is that those Indians who fit the "on or near" category are eligible for all BIA services not directly tied to the physical boundaries. Thus, the usual practice of the BIA has been to represent to Congress that "on or near" is the equivalent of "on" for purposes of welfare service eligibility, and that the successive budget request were for a universe of Indians living "on or near" and not just for those living directly "on." In addition, the BIA has continually treated persons "off" the reservations as not "on or near." In the light of this rather consistent legislative history, it is understandable that the Secretary now argues that general assistance has not been available to those "off" the reservation. We do not accept the argument, however, that the history indicates that general assistance was thereby restricted to those within the physical boundaries. To the contrary, that history clearly shows that Congress was led to believe that the programs were being made available to those unassimilated needy Indians living near the reservations as well as to those living "on." Certainly, a fair reading of the congressional proceedings up to and including the fiscal 198 hearing can lead only to the conclusion that Indians situated near the reservation, such as the were covered by the authorization.[24] *230 D. Wholly aside from this appropriation subcommittee legislative history, the Secretary suggests that Congress, each year since 1952, appropriated only in accord with the "on reservations" limitation contained in the BIA Manual. By legislating annually "in the light of [this] clear provision," the Secretary argues, Congress implicitly ratified the BIA policy. This argument, also, is not convincing. The limitation has not been published in the Federal Register or in the Code of Federal Regulations, and there is nothing in the legislative history to show that the Manual's provision was brought to the subcommittees' attention, let alone to the entire Congress. To assume that Congress was aware of this provision, contained only in an internally circulated BIA document, would be most strained. But, even assuming that Congress was fully cognizant of the Manual's limitation when the 1958 appropriation was made, the language of geographic restriction in the Manual must be considered in conjunction with the representations consistently made. There is no reason to assume that Congress did not equate the "on reservations" language with the "on or near" category that continuously was described as the service area. In the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | that continuously was described as the service area. In the light of the Manual's particular inclusion of Oklahoma and Alaska off-reservation Indians, it would seem that this interpretation of the provision would have been the logical one for anyone in Congress, who in fact was aware of it, to accept. V A. Having found that the congressional appropriation was intended to cover welfare services at least to those Indians residing "on or near" the reservation, it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary is without power to create reasonable classifications and eligibility requirements in order to allocate the limited funds available to him for this purpose. See ; 40 U.S. 535 Thus, if there were only enough funds appropriated to provide meaningfully for 10,000 needy Indian beneficiaries and the entire class of eligible beneficiaries numbered 20,000, it would be incumbent upon the BIA to develop an eligibility standard to deal with this problem, and the standard, if rational and proper, might leave some of the class otherwise encompassed by the appropriation without benefits. But in such a case the agency must, at a minimum, let the standard be generally known so as to assure that it is being applied consistently and so as to avoid both the reality and the appearance of arbitrary denial of benefits to potential beneficiaries. Assuming, arguendo, that the Secretary rationally could limit the "on or near" appropriation to include only the smaller class of Indians who lived directly "on" the reservation plus those in Alaska and Oklahoma, the question that remains is whether this has been validly accomplished. The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. In the area of Indian affairs, the Executive has long been empowered to promulgate rules and policies,[25] and the power has been given explicitly to the Secretary and his delegates at the BIA.[2]*232 This agency power to make rules that affect substantial individual rights and obligations carries with it the responsibility not only to remain consistent with the governing legislation. 411 U.S. 72 ; U.S. 8, (195); but also to employ procedures that conform to the law. See (199) No matter how rational or consistent with congressional intent a particular decision might be, the determination of eligibility cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by the dispenser of the funds. The Administrative Procedure Act was adopted to provide, inter alia, that administrative policies affecting individual rights and obligations be promulgated pursuant |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | administrative policies affecting individual rights and obligations be promulgated pursuant to certain stated procedures so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations. See generally S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 (1945); H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 21-23 (194). That Act states in pertinent part: "Each Agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public (D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability *233 formulated and adopted by the agency." 5 U.S. C. 552 (a) (1). The sanction added in 197 by Stat. 54, provides: "Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published." Ibid.[27] In the instant case the BIA itself has recognized the necessity of formally publishing its substantive policies and has placed itself under the structure of the APA procedures. The 198 introduction to the Manual reads: "Code of Federal Regulations: Directives which relate to the public, including Indians, are published in the Federal Register and codified in 25 Code of Federal Regulations (25 CFR). These directives inform the public of privileges and benefits available; eligibility qualifications, requirements and procedures; and of appeal rights and procedures. They are published in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Director of the Federal Register and the Administrative Procedure Act as amended. *234 "Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual: Policies, procedures, and instructions which do not relate to the public but are required to govern the operations of the Bureau are published in the Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual." 0 BIAM 1.2. Unlike numerous other programs authorized by the Snyder Act and funded by the annual appropriations, the BIA has chosen not to publish its eligibility requirements for general assistance in the Federal Register or in the CFR. This continues to the present time.[28] The *235 only official manifestation of this alleged policy of restricting general assistance to those directly on the reservations is the material in the Manual which is, by BIA's own admission, solely an internal-operations brochure intended to cover policies that "do not relate to the public." Indeed, at oral argument the Government conceded that for this to be a "real legislative rule," itself endowed with the force of law, it should be published in the Federal |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | force of law, it should be published in the Federal Register. Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required. 354 U.S. 33, ; The BIA, by its Manual, has declared that all directives that "inform the public of privileges and benefits available" and of "eligibility requirements" are among those to be published. The requirement that, in order to receive general assistance, an Indian must reside directly "on" a reservation is clearly an important substantive policy that fits within this class of directives. Before the BIA may extinguish the entitlement of these otherwise eligible beneficiaries, it must comply, at a minimum, with its own internal procedures. The Secretary has presented no reason why the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act could not or should not have been met. Cf. The BIA itself has not attempted to defend its rule as a valid exercise of its "legislative power," but rather depends on the argument that Congress itself has not appropriated funds for *23 Indians not directly on the reservations. The conscious choice of the Secretary not to treat this extremely significant eligibility requirement, affecting rights of needy Indians, as a legislative-type rule, renders it ineffective so far as extinguishing rights of those otherwise within the class of beneficiaries contemplated by Congress is concerned. The overriding duty of our Federal Government to deal fairly with Indians wherever located has been recognized by this Court on many occasions. See, e. g., Seminole 31 U.S. 28, 29 ; Board of County Particularly here, where the BIA has continually represented to Congress, when seeking funds, that Indians living near reservations are within the service area, it is essential that the legitimate expectation of these needy Indians not be extinguished by what amounts to an unpublished ad hoc determination of the agency that was not promulgated in accordance with its own procedures, to say nothing of those of the Administrative Procedure Act. The denial of benefits to these respondents under such circumstances is inconsistent with "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people." Seminole 31 U. S., at 29; see (195). Before benefits may be denied to these otherwise entitled Indians, the BIA must first promulgate eligibility requirements according to established procedures. B. Even assuming the lack of binding effect of the BIA policy, the Secretary argues that the residential restriction in the Manual is |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Morton v. Ruiz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108969/morton-v-ruiz/ | Secretary argues that the residential restriction in the Manual is a longstanding interpretation of the Snyder Act by the agency best suited to do this, and that deference is due its interpretation. See *237 The thrust of this argument is not that the regulation itself has created the "on" and "near" distinction, but that Congress has intended to provide general assistance only to those directly on reservations, and that the Manual's provision is simply an interpretation of congressional intent. As we have already noted, however, the BIA, through its own practices and representations, has led Congress to believe that these appropriations covered Indians "on or near" the reservations, and it is too late now to argue that the words "on reservations" in the Manual mean something different from "on or near" when, in fact, the two have been continuously equated by the BIA to Congress. We have recognized previously that the weight of an administrative interpretation will depend, among other things, upon "its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements" of an agency. See generally 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 5.03-5.0 In this instance the BIA's somewhat inconsistent posture belies its present assertion. In order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be consistent with the congressional purpose. 414 U.S. 8 ; Red Lion Broadcasting 395 U.S. 37, (199). It is evident to us that Congress did not itself intend to limit its authorization to only those Indians directly on, in contrast to those "near," the reservation, and that, therefore, the BIA's interpretation must fail. We emphasize that our holding does not, as was suggested at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 3, 5, and in the Brief for Petitioner 2, make general assistance available to all Indians "throughout the country." Even respondents do not claim this much. Brief for Respondents 23; *238 Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. The appropriation, as we see it, was for Indians "on or near" the reservation. This is broad enough, we hold, to include the who live where they found employment in an Indian community only a few miles from their reservation, who maintain their close economic and social ties with that reservation, and who are unassimilated. The parameter of their class will be determined, to the extent necessary, by the District Court on remand of the case. Whether other persons qualify for general assistance will be left to cases that arise in the future. In view of our disposition of the statutory issue, we do not reach the respondents' constitutional arguments. We intimate no views as to them. The judgment |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | concurring | Torres v. Puerto Rico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620876/torres-v-puerto-rico/ | Appellant's conviction of violating the Puerto Rico Controlled Substances Act was based on evidence discovered when police, admittedly without probable cause, searched appellant's luggage after he arrived in Puerto Rico from Florida. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has construed Public Law 22 to authorize such searches without probable cause.[*] *475 I concur in the Court's holding that the Fourth Amendment applies in full force to Puerto Rico, that the search of appellant's luggage without a warrant based on probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment, that Public Law 22 is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize what the Fourth Amendment prohibits, and that the evidence discovered in the unconstitutional search therefore must be suppressed. Appellee concedes that the Fourth Amendment applies to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Brief for Appellee 12, citing Examining ; Whatever the validity of the old cases such as and in the particular historical context in which they were decided, those cases are clearly not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth Amendment or any other provision of the Bill of Rightsto the Commonwealth *476 of Puerto Rico in the 1970's. As Mr. Justice Black declared in : "[N]either the cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion. The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government." |
per_curiam | 1,977 | 200 | per_curiam | Jones v. Hildebrant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109697/jones-v-hildebrant/ | Petitioner is the mother of a 15-year-old boy who was shot and killed by respondent Hildebrant, while respondent was acting in his capacity as a Denver police officer. Petitioner brought suit in her own behalf in state court. Respondent defended on the ground that he shot petitioner's son as a fleeing felon using no more force than was reasonably necessary. The amended complaint asserted three claims for relief: battery; negligence; and intentional deprivation of federal constitutional *184 rights. Although not specifically pleaded, the first two claims were admittedly based on the Colorado wrongful-death statute, (1973),[1] and the third, on 42 U.S. C. 1983. While petitioner alleged damages of $1,500,000, she stipulated to a reduction of her prayer for relief with respect to the first two claims, since the Colorado wrongful-death statute admittedly limited her maximum recovery to $45,000, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-21-203 (1973). The trial court also ruled that petitioner's 1983 claim was "merged" into her first claim and, accordingly, dismissed her 1983 claim. The remaining claims went to the jury, which returned a verdict for $1,500.[2] On petitioner's appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed. Her petition for certiorari presented a single question for review here: "Where the black mother of a 15-year-old child who was intentionally shot and killed by a white policeman acting under the color of state law brings a suit in state *185 court pursuant to 42 U.S. C. 1983, what is the measure of damages? Particularly, can the state measure of damages cancel and displace an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S. C. 1983?" We granted certiorari to consider what was thus explicitly presented as a question of whether a State's limitation on damages in a wrongful-death statute would control in an action brought pursuant to 1983. The majority opinion in the Supreme Court of Colorado proceeds on the assumption that if the Colorado wrongful-death statute applied to petitioner's claim, her recovery would be limited to $45,000. It held that this limitation did apply even to the one count of petitioner's complaint based on 42 U.S. C. 1983. A necessary assumption for this position would seem to be that petitioner was suing to recover damages for injuries under 1983 which were the same injuries as are covered by the state wrongful-death action. The question presented in the petition for certiorari is at the very least susceptible of that interpretation. But at oral argument, we were advised by counsel for petitioner that her sole claim of constitutional deprivation was not one of pecuniary loss resulting from her son's wrongful death, such as would be |
per_curiam | 1,977 | 200 | per_curiam | Jones v. Hildebrant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109697/jones-v-hildebrant/ | resulting from her son's wrongful death, such as would be covered by the wrongful-death statute, but one based on her personal liberty. Her claim was described at oral argument as a constitutional right to raise her child without interference from the State; it has nothing to do with an action for "wrongful death" as defined by the state law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5; see also An action for wrongful death, under Colorado law, is an action which may be brought by certain named survivors of a decedent who sustain a direct pecuniary loss upon the death of the decedent. It is "classified as a property tort action and cannot be classified as a tort action `for injuries done to the person,'"[3] Petitioner, however, articulates here a quite different constitutional claim which does not fit into the Colorado wrongful-death mold. While petitioner's constitutional claim is based on an alleged deprivation of her own rights, and not on deprivation of those of her son's,[4] the asserted deprivation is not for any "property loss," but, rather, for the right of a child's mother to raise the child as she sees fit.[5] This claim was not set forth in the complaint,[6] was not even hinted at in petitioner's briefs to the Supreme Court of Colorado, and is only casually referred to in the opinion of that court. The majority opinion held that insofar as a claim for actual pecuniary loss was a property right conferred upon petitioner by the State's wrongful-death statute, the damages recoverable under it were limited by the terms of *187 that statute. The majority opinion also refers in passing to a constitutional liberty right in petitioner herself, but its principal thrust is that petitioner's liberty claims, as presented to that court, are "really those of her son," and not claims personal to her.[7] This discussion, which occurs subsequent to that portion of the opinion in which the Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that state wrongful-death remedies were incorporated into 1983 to vindicate civil rights violations "that result in death," does not intimate that similar limitations would exist in a 1983 action where the alleged deprivation was that of liberty to a living plaintiff suing for a wrong done to her. We do not know how the Supreme Court of Colorado would have ruled on the damages limitation question had it found the 1983 claim to be that of the deprivation of the mother's right to raise the child. We have here then a shift in the posture of the case such that the question presented in the petition for |
per_curiam | 1,977 | 200 | per_curiam | Jones v. Hildebrant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109697/jones-v-hildebrant/ | case such that the question presented in the petition for certiorari is all but mooted by petitioner's oral argument. The question of whether a limitation on recovery of damages imposed by a state wrongful-death statute may be applied where death is said to have resulted from a violation of 42 U.S. C. 1983 would appear to make sense only where the 1983 damages claim is based upon the same injuries.[8] This is the assumption *188 on which the Supreme Court of Colorado proceeded in discussing whether the 1983 claim "merged" in the wrongful-death claim. The court does not intimate, or decide, that a 1983 claim based on an alleged deprivation such as petitioner asserts hereif the claim were otherwise cognizablewould require remedial assistance from the state wrongful-death statute or that recovery on such a claim would be limited by that statute. Petitioner's question presented assumes that the underlying constitutional violation necessary to support a 1983 claim on her behalf is undisputed, and that the only question upon which petitioner takes issue with the majority of the Supreme Court of Colorado is the limitation on the amount of recovery. But it would seem possible, if not probable, that if petitioner had presented to the Supreme Court of Colorado the same claim she presented here in oral argument, that court's opinion would not have turned on the application of the state wrongful-death statute as a limitation on recovery of damages, since the underlying 1983 claimdeprivation of a right to raise childrenis not at all the same underlying claim for which the wrongful-death action provides recompense. Whatever the merits of her constitutional liberty claim in her own right, a question on which we do not intimate an opinion, it would not seem logically to be subject to a damages limitation contained in the statute permitting survivors to recover for wrongs done to a property interest of theirs. In presenting to this Court in her petition for certiorari solely a damages issue of this nature, petitioner has wholly pretermitted the underlying question of whether she has been deprived of any constitutional liberty interest as a result of respondent's shooting of her son. In sum, the damages question which petitioner presents in her petition for certiorari is only the tip of the iceberg. *189 The question of whether she was deprived of a constitutional liberty interest of her own was neither alleged in her complaint in the Colorado trial court, presented in the petition for certiorari in this Court, nor fairly subsumed in the question that was presented. See this Court's Rule 23 (1) (c). |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | In this original action, several States, joined by the United States and a number of pipeline companies, challenge the constitutionality of Louisiana's "First-Use Tax" imposed on certain uses of natural gas brought into Louisiana, principally from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), as violative of the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution I The lands beneath the Gulf of have large reserves of oil and natural gas Initially, these reserves could not be developed due to technological difficulties associated with offshore drilling In 18, the first drilling rig was constructed off the coast of Louisiana, and with the advent of new technologies, *729 offshore drilling has become commonplace[1] Exploration and development of the OCS in the Gulf of have become large industries providing a substantial percentage of the natural gas used in this country[2] Most of the gas being extracted from the lands underlying the Gulf is piped to refining plants located in coastal portions of Louisiana where the gas is "dried"the liquefiable hydrocarbons gathered and removedon its way to ultimate distribution to consumers in over 30 States It is estimated that 98% of the OCS gas processed in Louisiana is eventually sold to out-of-state consumers with the 2% remainder consumed within *730 Louisiana[3] The contractual arrangements between a producer of gas and the pipeline companies vary Most often, the producer sells the gas to the pipeline companies at the wellhead, although the producer may retain an interest in any extractable components Some producers, however, retain full ownership rights and simply pay a flat fee for the use of the pipeline companies' facilities[4] The ownership and control of these large reserves of natural gas have been much disputed In United the Court applied the principle of its holding in United that the United States possesses paramount rights to lands beneath the Pacific Ocean seaward of California's low-water markto the offshore areas adjacent to Louisiana In 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, 43 US C 1301-13, ceding any federal interest in the lands within three miles of the coast, while confirming the Federal Government's interest in the area seaward of the 3-mile limit[5] See United ; United In the same year, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 US C 1331-1343 (OCS Act), which declared that the "subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition " 1322 The OCS Act also established procedures for federal leasing of OCS land to develop mineral resources While the passage of these |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | land to develop mineral resources While the passage of these Acts established the *731 respective legal interests of the parties, there has been extensive litigation to establish the legal boundaries of the federal OCS domain See generally United In 1978, the Louisiana Legislature enacted a tax of seven cents per thousand cubic feet of natural gas[6] on the "first use" of any gas imported into Louisiana which was not previously subjected to taxation by another State or the United States La Rev Stat Ann 47:1301-47:1307 (West Supp 1981) (Act) The Tax imposed is precisely equal to the severance tax the State imposes on Louisiana gas producers The Tax is owed by the owner of the gas at the time the first taxable "use" occurs within Louisiana 1305B About 85% of the OCS gas brought ashore is owned by the pipeline companies, the rest by the producers Since most States impose their own severance tax, it is acknowledged that the primary effect of the First-Use Tax will be on gas produced in the federal OCS area and then piped to processing plants located within Louisiana It has been estimated that Louisiana would receive at least $0 million in annual receipts from the First-Use Tax[7] *732 The stated purpose of the First-Use Tax was to reimburse the people of Louisiana for damages to the State's waterbottoms, barrier islands, and coastal areas resulting from the introduction of natural gas into Louisiana from areas not subject to state taxes as well as to compensate for the costs incurred by the State in protecting those resources 1301C Moreover, the Tax was designed to equalize competition between gas produced in Louisiana and subject to the state severance tax of seven cents per thousand cubic feet, and gas produced elsewhere not subject to a severance tax such as OCS gas 1301A The Act specified a number of different uses justifying imposition of the First-Use Tax including sale, processing, transportation, use in manufacturing, treatment, or "other ascertainable action at a point within the state" 1302 (8)[8] The Act itself, as well as provisions found elsewhere in the state statutes, provided a number of exemptions from and credits for the First-Use Tax The Severance Tax Credit provided that any taxpayer subject to the First-Use Tax was entitled to a direct tax credit on any Louisiana severance tax owed in connection with the extraction of natural resources within the State La Rev Stat Ann 47:647 (West Supp *733 1981)[9] Second, municipal or state-regulated electric generating plants and natural gas distributing services located within Louisiana, as well as any direct purchaser |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | services located within Louisiana, as well as any direct purchaser of gas used for consumption directly by that purchaser, were provided tax credits on other Louisiana taxes upon a showing that "fuel costs for electricity generation or natural gas distribution or consumption have increased as a direct result of increases in transportation and marketing costs of natural gas delivered from the federal domain of the outer continental shelf" which implicitly includes any increases resulting from the First-Use Tax La Rev Stat Ann 47:11B (West Supp 1981)[10] Furthermore, imported natural gas used for drilling oil or gas within the State was exempted from the First-Use Tax La Rev Stat Ann 47:1303A (West Supp 1981) Thus, Louisiana consumers of OCS gas for the most part are not burdened by the Tax, but it does uniformly apply to gas moving out of the State The Act also purported to establish the legal effect of the Tax in terms of defining the proper *734 allocation of the Tax among potentially liable parties Specifically, the Act declared that the "tax shall be deemed a cost associated with uses made by the owner in preparation of marketing of the natural gas" 1303C Any contract which attempted to allocate the cost of the Tax to any party except the ultimate consumer was declared to be "against public policy and unenforceable to that extent" On March 29, 1979, eight States filed a motion for leave to file a complaint under this Court's original jurisdiction pursuant to Art III, 2, of the Constitution The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the First-Use Tax was unconstitutional under: (1) the Commerce Clause, Art I, 8, cl 3; (2) the Supremacy Clause, Art VI, cl 2; (3) the Import-Export Clause, Art I, 10, cl 2; (4) the Impairment of Contracts Clause, Art I, 10, cl 1; and (5) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment The plaintiff States also sought injunctive relief against Louisiana or its agents collecting the Tax with respect to any gas in interstate commerce as well as a refund of taxes already collected We granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file on June 18, 1979 To date, the Special Master has issued two reports In the first report, dated May 14, 1980, the Special Master recommended that the Court approve the motions of New Jersey, the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and 17 pipeline companies to intervene as plaintiffs The Master's second report was issued on September 1980, and essentially made two recommendations First, the Master recommended that we deny Louisiana's motion to dismiss |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | the Master recommended that we deny Louisiana's motion to dismiss and reject the submissions that the plaintiff States had no standing to bring the action and that the case was not an appropriate one for the exercise of our original jurisdiction Second, on the plaintiff States' motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the Tax was unconstitutional on its face, the Special Master, while recognizing *735 that the statute was constitutionally suspect in certain respects, recommended that the motion be denied and that further evidentiary hearings be conducted We heard oral argument on the exceptions filed to the reports II Initially, we must resolve Louisiana's contention, rejected by the Special Master, that the case should be dismissed In support of its motion, Louisiana presents two principal arguments First, Louisiana contends that the plaintiff States lack standing to bring the suit under the Court's original jurisdiction Second, Louisiana argues that even if the bare requirements for exercise of our original jurisdiction have been met, this case is not an appropriate one to entertain here because of certain pending state-court actions in Louisiana in which the constitutional issues sought to be presented may be addressed See See also We agree with the Special Master that both contentions should be rejected A 1 The Constitution provides for this Court's original jurisdiction over cases in which a "State shall be a Party" Art III, 2, cl 2 Congress has in turn provided that the Supreme Court shall have "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States" 28 US C 1251 (a) (1976 ed, Supp III) In order to constitute a proper "controversy" under our original jurisdiction, "it must appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing ground for judicial redress, or is asserting a right against the other State which is susceptible of judicial enforcement according to the accepted principles of the common law or equity systems of *736 jurisprudence" See New ; [11] Louisiana asserts that this case should be dismissed for want of standing because the Tax is imposed on the pipeline companies and not directly on the ultimate consumers Under its view, the alleged interests of the plaintiff States do not fall within the type of "sovereignty" concerns justifying exercise of our original jurisdiction Standing to sue, however, exists for constitutional purposes if the injury alleged "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court" See |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | action of some third party not before the court" See Duke Power This is clearly the case here The plaintiff States are substantial consumers of natural gas[12] The First-Use Tax, while imposed on the pipeline companies, is clearly intended to be passed on to the ultimate consumer Indeed, the statute forbids the Tax from being passed on or back to any third party other than the purchaser of the gas and explicitly directs that it should be considered as a cost of preparing the gas for market La Rev Stat Ann 47:1303C (West Supp *737 1981) In fact, the pipeline companies, with the approval of the FERC, have passed on the cost of the First-Use Tax to their customers See Louisiana First-Use Tax in Pipeline Rate Cases, Docket No RM78-23, Order No 10, [13] Thus, the Special Master properly determined that "although the tax is collected from the pipelines, it is really a burden on consumers" Second Report, at 12 It is clear that the plaintiff States, as major purchasers of natural gas whose cost has increased as a direct result of Louisiana's imposition of the First-Use Tax, are directly affected in a "substantial and real" way so as to justify their exercise of this Court's original jurisdiction 2 Jurisdiction is also supported by the States' interest as parens patriae A State is not permitted to enter a controversy as a nominal party in order to forward the claims of individual citizens See Oklahoma ex rel ; New But it may act as the representative of its citizens in original actions where the injury alleged affects the general population of a State in a substantial way See, e g, ; ; See generally Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 Stan L *738 Rev 665, 671-678 Cf US 251, In this respect, this case is functionally indistinguishable from in which the Court entertained a suit brought by one State against another In that case, West Virginia, then the leading producer of natural gas, required gas producers in the State to meet the needs of all local customers before shipping any gas interstate Ohio and Pennsylvania moved for leave to file a complaint under the Court's original jurisdiction claiming that the statute violated the Commerce Clause in that the statute would have the effect of cutting off supplies of natural gas to those States Both States claimed to be protecting a twofold interest"one as the proprietor of various public institutions and schools whose supply of gas will be largely curtailed or cut off by the threatened interference |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | be largely curtailed or cut off by the threatened interference with the interstate current, and the other as the representative of the consuming public whose supply will be similarly affected" The Court granted leave to file, finding both interests to be substantial With respect to representing the interests of its citizens the Court stated: "The private consumers in each State not only include most of the inhabitants of many urban communities but constitute a substantial portion of the State's population Their health, comfort and welfare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream This is a matter of grave public concern in which the State, as the representative of the public, has an interest apart from that of the individuals affected It is not merely a remote or ethical interest but one which is immediate and recognized by law" *739 counsels that we should not dismiss this action Plaintiff States have alleged substantial and serious injury to their proprietary interests as consumers of natural gas as a direct result of the allegedly unconstitutional actions of Louisiana This direct injury is also supported by the States' interest in protecting its citizens from substantial economic injury presented by imposition of the First-Use Tax Nor does the incidence of the Tax fall on a small group of citizens who are likely to challenge the Tax directly Rather, a great many citizens in each of the plaintiff States are themselves consumers of natural gas and are faced with increased costs aggregating millions of dollars per year As the Special Master observed, individual consumers cannot be expected to litigate the validity of the First-Use Tax given that the amounts paid by each consumer are likely to be relatively small Moreover, because the consumers are not directly responsible to Louisiana for payment of the taxes, they of course are foreclosed from suing for a refund in Louisiana's courts In such circumstances, exercise of our original jurisdiction is proper B With respect to Louisiana's second argument, it is true that we have construed the congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction under 1251 (a) as requiring resort to our obligatory jurisdiction only in "appropriate cases" ; - This view is consistent with the general observation that the Court's original jurisdiction should be exercised "sparingly" United See 401 U S, at ; -20[14] In City of Milwaukee, we noted that what is *740 "appropriate" involves not only "the seriousness and dignity of the claim," but also "the availability of another forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues tendered may |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had" 406 US, at Louisiana urges that presently pending state lawsuits raising the identical constitutional issues presented here constitute sufficient reason to forgo the exercise of our original jurisdiction There have been filed in various lower courts several suits challenging the constitutionality of the First-Use Tax The first suit was brought by Louisiana in state court seeking a declaratory judgment that the First-Use Tax is constitutional Edwards v Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line No 216,867 (19th Judicial Dist, East Baton Rouge Parish) Among the named defendants were all of the pipeline companies doing business in the State The pipeline companies sought to have the Tax declared unconstitutional[] Other lawsuits were filed in state court seeking a refund of taxes paid under protest Southern Natural Gas Co v McNamara, No 225,533 (19th Judicial District, East Baton Rouge Parish) These refund actions were filed after this Court granted plaintiff States' motion for leave to file their complaint[16]*741 Since under Louisiana law there is no provision for interim injunctive relief, the pipeline companies were required to pay the Tax The receipts have been put in an escrow account subject to refund with interest paid on the account at the rate of 6% Neither the plaintiff States, the United States, nor the FERC is a named party in any of the state actions nor have they filed leave to intervene, although Louisiana represented at oral argument that such a motion would not be opposed[17] The final suit was commenced by the FERC against various state officials, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the First-Use Tax on constitutional grounds FERC v McNamara, No C A 78-384 (MD La) That action is presently stayed In City of Milwaukee, on which Louisiana relies, the proposed suit by Illinois against four municipalities did not fall within our exclusive grant of original jurisdiction because political subdivisions of the State could not be considered as a State for purposes of 28 US C 1251 (a) (1976 ed, Supp III) -98 Similarly, the decision in Wyandotte Chemicals did not involve 1251 (a), since it was a suit between a State and citizens of another State and so did not fall under our exclusive jurisdiction Louisiana also relies, *742 however, on for an example of a case where we determined not to exercise our exclusive jurisdiction in a case between States because the matter was "inappropriate" for determination[18] In that case, we denied Arizona's motion for leave to file a complaint against New Arizona was suing |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | leave to file a complaint against New Arizona was suing to challenge New 's electrical energy tax which imposed a net kilowatt hour tax on any electric utility generating electricity in New Arizona sought a declaratory judgment that the tax constituted, inter alia, an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce Arizona brought the suit in its proprietary capacity as a consumer of electricity generated in New and as parens patriae for its citizens Arizona further alleged that it had no other forum in which to vindicate its interests New asserted that the three Arizona utilities affected by the statute had chosen not to pay the tax and instead had jointly filed suit in state court seeking a declaratory judgment that the tax was unconstitutional This Court held that "[i]n the circumstances of this case, we are persuaded that the pending state-court action provides an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered *743 here may be litigated" 425 US, at Of course, the issue of appropriateness in an original action between States must be determined on a case-by-case basis Despite the facial similarity with there are significant differences from the present case that compel an opposite result First, one of the three electric companies involved in the state-court action in New was a political subdivision of the State of Arizona Arizona's interests were thus actually being represented by one of the named parties to the suit In this case, none of the plaintiff States is directly represented in the tax refund case[19] It is also important to note that Arizona had itself not suffered any direct harm as of the time that it moved for leave to file a complaint since none of the utilities had yet paid the tax Unlike the present case, it was highly uncertain whether Arizona's interest as a purchaser of electricity had been adversely affected[20] New 's procedure did not limit the utility companies to seeking a refund of taxes already paid, but rather permitted the companies to refuse to pay the tax pending a declaration of the statute's constitutionality In contrast, Louisiana requires the Tax to be paid pending the refund action with interest accruing at the rate of 6% As recognized by the Special Master, the effect of the limited interest rate is to permit Louisiana to benefit from any delay attendant to the state-court proceedings even if the Tax is ultimately found unconstitutional The tax at issue in the Arizona case did not sufficiently implicate the unique concerns of federalism forming the basis of our original jurisdiction At most, the New tax *744 affected |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | our original jurisdiction At most, the New tax *744 affected only some residents in one State In the present case, the magnitude and effect of the First-Use Tax is far greater The anticipated $0-million yearly tax is intended to be and is being passed on to millions of consumers in over 30 States Unlike the day-to-day taxing measures which spurred the Court's observations in Wyandotte, it is not at all a "waste" of this Court's time to consider the validity of a tax with the structure and effect of Louisiana's First-Use Tax Indeed, there is nothing ordinary about the Tax Given the underlying claim that Louisiana is attempting, in effect, to levy the Tax as a substitute for a severance tax on gas extracted from areas that belong to the people at large to the relative detriment of the other States in the Union, it is clear that the First-Use Tax implicates serious and important concerns of federalism fully in accord with the purposes and reach of our original jurisdiction The exercise of our original jurisdiction is also supported by the fact that the First-Use Tax affects the United States' interests in the administration of the OCSa factor totally absent in While we do not have exclusive jurisdiction in suits brought by the United States against a State, see 28 US C 1251 (b) (2) (1976 ed, Supp III), we may entertain such suits as original actions in appropriate circumstances See, e g, United See also United States v Alaska, 422 US 184, 186, n 2 To be sure, we "seek to exercise our original jurisdiction sparingly and are particularly reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit where the plaintiff has another adequate forum in which to settle his claim" United 412 U S, at In this case, however, it is clear that a district court action brought by the United States, which necessarily would not include the plaintiff States, would be an inadequate forum in light of the present posture of this case In addition, because of the interest of the United States in protecting its rights in the OCS area, with ramifications for all coastal States, as well *745 as its interests under the regulatory mechanism that supervises the production and development of natural gas resources, we believe that this case is an appropriate one for the exercise of our original jurisdiction under 1251 (b) (2) For the reasons stated above, we reject Louisiana's exceptions to the report of the Special Master, and accept the recommendation that we deny Louisiana's motion to dismiss[21] *746 III On the merits, |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | deny Louisiana's motion to dismiss[21] *746 III On the merits, plaintiffs argue that the First-Use Tax violates the Supremacy Clause because it interferes with federal regulation of the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce The Supremacy Clause provides that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Law of the Land any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding" Art VI, cl 2 It is basic to this constitutional command that all conflicting state provisions be without effect See McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, See also Hines v 312 US 52 Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law See Rice v Santa Fe Elevator 331 US 218, But as the Court stated in Rice: "Such a purpose [to displace state law] may be evidenced in several ways The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it Pennsylvania R Co v Public Service Comm'n, 250 US 566, ; Cloverleaf Butter Co v Patterson, 3 US 148 Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject Hines v 312 US 52 Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose Southern R Co v Railroad Commission, 236 US 439; Charleston *747 & W C R Co v Varnville Co, 237 US 597; New York Central R Co v Winfield, 244 US 147; Napier v Atlantic Coast Line R Co, [272 US 605] Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute Hill v Florida, 325 US " Of course, a state statute is void to the extent it conflicts with a federal statuteif, for example, "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc v Paul, 373 US 132, or where the law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" Hines v See generally Ray v Atlantic Richfield Co, 435 US 1, 7-8 ; City of Burbank v Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc, 411 US 624, Plaintiffs argue that 1303C of the Act violates the Natural Gas |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | argue that 1303C of the Act violates the Natural Gas Act, US C 717-717w (1976 ed and Supp III) (Gas Act), as amended by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978[22] In 18, Congress enacted the Gas Act to assure *748 that consumers of natural gas receive a fair price and also to protect against the economic power of the interstate pipelines See FPC v Hope Natural Gas Co, 320 US 591, ; Atlantic Refining Co v Public Service Comm'n of New York, 360 US 378, The Gas Act was intended to provide the Federal Power Commission, now the FERC, with authority to regulate the wholesale pricing of natural gas in the flow of interstate commerce from wellhead to delivery to consumers Phillips Petroleum Co v Wisconsin, 347 US 672, Under the present law, natural gas owners are entitled to recover from their customers all legitimate costs associated with the production, processing, and transportation of natural gas See FPC v United Gas Pipe Line Co, 386 US 237, As part of the First-Use Tax, Louisiana has directed that the amount of the Tax should be "deemed a cost associated with uses made by the owner in preparation of marketing of the natural gas" 1303C[23]*749 The Act further provides that an owner shall not have an enforceable right to seek reimbursement for payment of the Tax from any third party other than a purchaser of the gas, ibid, even though the third party may be the owner of marketable hydrocarbons that are extracted from the gas in the course of processing The effect of 1303C is to interfere with the FERC's authority to regulate the determination of the proper allocation of costs associated with the sale of natural gas to consumers The unprocessed gas obtained at the wellhead contains extractable hydrocarbons which are most often owned and sold separately from the "dried" gas The FERC normally allocates part of the processing costs between these related products, and insists that the owners of the liquefiable hydrocarbons bear a fair share of the expense associated with processing[24] See generally FPC v United Gas Pipe Line Co, at By specifying that the First-Use Tax is a processing cost to be either borne by the pipeline or other owner without compensation, an unlikely event in light of the large sums involved, or passed on to purchasers, Louisiana has attempted a substantial usurpation of the authority of the FERC by dictating to the pipelines the allocation of processing costs for the interstate shipment * of natural gas Owners of natural gas are foreclosed by the operation |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | gas Owners of natural gas are foreclosed by the operation of 1303C from entering into valid contracts requiring the owners of the extracted hydrocarbons to reimburse the pipelines for costs associated with transporting and processing these products The effect of 1303C is to shift the incidence of certain expenses, which the FERC insists are incurred substantially for the benefit of the owners of extractable hydrocarbons, to the ultimate consumer of the processed gas without the prior approval of the FERC The effect of 1303C is akin to the state regulation overturned in Northern Natural Gas Co v State Corporation Comm'n of Kansas, 372 US 84, In Northern Natural Gas, a state administrative agency's rule required an interstate pipeline company to purchase natural gas ratably from all the wells in a particular field The Court held that the rule violated the superior interests of the Federal Government under the Gas Act The state Commission's order shifted the burden of performing the "complex task of balancing the output of thousands of natural gas wells within the State" to the pipeline company This requirement "could seriously impair the Federal Commission's authority to regulate the intricate relationship between the purchasers' cost structures and eventual costs to wholesale customers who sell to consumers in other States This relationship is a matter with respect to which Congress has given the Federal Power Commission paramount and exclusive authority" While the Special Master noted that the FERC was of the opinion that the First-Use Tax was impermissible, the Special Master refused to recommend that the Court grant plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the Supremacy Clause issue respecting 1303C because he discerned a factual issue concerning the nature of the gas-drying process Under the Special Master's view, if the facts demonstrated that processing was done for the profit of the owners of the extractable hydrocarbons, then the position of the FERC that such costs *751 should not be passed on to the consumers was correct If, however, the processing was done as a means of standardizing the heat content of the gas for sale to consumers, then it would be reasonable to pass the Tax forward, and thus 1303C would be consistent with Gas Act policy The Special Master concluded that this question was best resolved after suitable factual development, and that in any event, it may be that "in the end FERC's orders can be adjusted so that the laws will mesh without conflict" It is our view, however, that the issue is ripe for decision without further evidentiary hearings Under the Gas Act, determining pipeline and producer |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | evidentiary hearings Under the Gas Act, determining pipeline and producer costs is the task of the FERC in the first instance, subject to judicial review Hence, the further hearings contemplated by the Special Master to determine whether and how processing costs are to be allocated are as inappropriate as Louisiana's effort to pre-empt those decisions by a statute directing that processing costs be passed on to the consumer Even if the FERC ultimately determined that such expenses should be passed on in toto, this kind of decisionmaking is within the jurisdiction of the FERC; and the Louisiana statute, like the state Commission's order in Northern Natural Gas, is inconsistent with the federal scheme and must give way At the very least, there is an "imminent possibility of collision," ibid[25] The FERC need not adjust its ruling to accommodate the Louisiana statute To the contrary, the State may not trespass on the authority of the federal agency As we see it, plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the pleadings that *752 1303C is invalid under the Supremacy Clause To that extent, therefore, we sustain plaintiffs' exceptions to the Special Master's second report[26] *753 IV Plaintiffs also argue that the First-Use Tax violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power [t]o *754 regulate Commerce among the several States " Art I, 8, cl 3 Prior case law has established that a state tax is not per se invalid because it burdens interstate commerce since interstate commerce may constitutionally be made to pay its way Complete Auto Transit, Inc v Brady, 430 US 274 See Western Live Stock v Bureau of Revenue, 303 US 250 The State's right to tax interstate commerce is limited, however, and no state tax may be sustained unless the tax: (1) has a substantial nexus with the State; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the State Washington Revenue Dept v Washington Stevedoring Assn, 435 US 734, One of the fundamental principles of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that no State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may "impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business" Northwestern States Portland Cement Co v Minnesota, 358 US 450, See Boston Stock v State Tax Comm'n, 429 US 318, This antidiscrimination principle "follows inexorably from the basic purpose of the Clause" to prohibit the multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the free commerce anticipated by the Constitution Boston Stock supra |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | the free commerce anticipated by the Constitution Boston Stock supra See Dean Milk Co v Madison, 340 US 349, Initially, it is clear to us that the flow of gas from the OCS wells, through processing plants in Louisiana, and through interstate pipelines to the ultimate consumers in over 30 States constitutes interstate commerce Louisiana argues that the taxable "uses" within the State break the flow of commerce and are wholly local events But although the Louisiana "uses" may possess a sufficient local nexus to support *755 otherwise valid taxation,[27] we do not agree that the flow of gas from the wellhead to the consumer, even though "interrupted" by certain events, is anything but a continual flow of gas in interstate commerce Gas crossing a state line at any stage of its movement to the ultimate consumer is in interstate commerce during the entire journey California *756 v Lo-Vaca Gathering Co, 379 US 366, See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co v Calvert, 347 US 7, ; FPC v East Ohio Gas Co, 338 US 464, ; Deep South Co v FPC, 247 F2d 882, See generally Illinois Natural Gas Co v Central Illinois Public Service Co, 314 US 498, A state tax must be assessed in light of its actual effect considered in conjunction with other provisions of the State's tax scheme "In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce" Best & Co v Maxwell, 311 US 454, See Halliburton Well Cementing Co v 373 US 64, ; Gregg Dyeing Co v Query, 286 US 472, (12) In this case, the Louisiana First-Use Tax unquestionably discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local interests as the necessary result of various tax credits and exclusions No further hearings are necessary to sustain this conclusion Under the specific provisions of the First-Use Tax, OCS gas used for certain purposes within Louisiana is exempted from the Tax OCS gas consumed in Louisiana for (1) producing oil, natural gas, or sulphur; (2) processing natural gas for the extraction of liquefiable hydrocarbons; or (3) manufacturing fertilizer and anhydrous ammonia, is exempt from the First-Use Tax 1303A Competitive users in other States are burdened with the Tax Other Louisiana statutes, enacted as part of the First-Use Tax package, provide important tax credits favoring local interests Under the Severance Tax Credit, an owner paying the First-Use Tax on OCS gas receives an equivalent tax credit on any state severance tax owed in connection with production in Louisiana |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | state severance tax owed in connection with production in Louisiana 47:647 (West Supp 1981) On its face, this credit favors those who both own OCS gas and engage in *757 Louisiana production[28] The obvious economic effect of this Severance Tax Credit is to encourage natural gas owners involved in the production of OCS gas to invest in mineral exploration and development within Louisiana rather than to invest in further OCS development or in production in other States Finally, under the Louisiana statutes, any utility producing electricity with OCS gas, any natural gas distributor dealing in OCS gas, or any direct purchaser of OCS gas for consumption by the purchaser in Louisiana may recoup any increase in the cost of gas attributable to the First-Use Tax through credits against various taxes or a combination of taxes otherwise owed to the State of Louisiana 47:11B (West Supp 1981) Louisiana consumers of OCS gas are thus substantially protected against the impact of the First-Use Tax and have the benefit of untaxed OCS gas which because it is not subject to either a severance tax or the First-Use Tax may be cheaper than locally produced gas OCS gas *758 moving out of the State, however, is burdened with the First-Use Tax[29] The Special Master was aware that the effect of the Louisiana tax system is to favor local interests With respect to the Severance Tax Credit, the Special Master noted that "[s]ince there is no apparent relation between the ownership of outer continental shelf gas and the production of gas in Louisiana, it is hard to understand Louisiana's motive in permitting this credit, but it obviously aids an intrastate operation in a way not available to a pipeline engaged only in interstate transportation or producing gas outside of Louisiana" Second Report, at 34 Moreover, the credit available to electrical generating plants, gas distributing services, and direct purchasers resulted in Louisiana customers being "protected in whole or in part from the incidence of the tax which is passed on to consumers out of the State" Despite these concerns, the Special Master did not recommend granting plaintiffs' motion to invalidate the Tax under the Commerce Clause because, as he saw it, it was difficult to tell the effect of the various credits, given the totality of the operation of the state tax provisions Thus, instead of being discriminatory, the "actuality of operation" test required by Halliburton Well Cementing Co v at might demonstrate after a full hearing that the First-Use Tax is a proper "`compensating' tax intended to complement the state severance tax as the use |
Justice White | 1,981 | 6 | majority | Maryland v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110488/maryland-v-louisiana/ | intended to complement the state severance tax as the use tax complemented the sales tax in Henneford v Silas Mason Co, 300 US 577 (17)" Second Report, at 35 In our view, the First-Use Tax cannot be justified as a compensatory tax The concept of a compensatory tax first requires identification of the burden for which the State is attempting to compensate Here, Louisiana claims that the *759 First-Use Tax compensates for the effect of the State's severance tax on local production of natural gas To be sure, Louisiana has an interest in protecting its natural resources, and, like most States, has chosen to impose a severance tax on the privilege of severing resources from its soil See Bel v Roland, 242 La 498, 137 So 2d 308, appeal dism'd, 371 US 2 ; Edwards v Parker, 332 So 2d 175 But the First-Use Tax is not designed to meet these same ends since Louisiana has no sovereign interest in being compensated for the severance of resources from the federally owned OCS land The two events are not comparable in the same fashion as a use tax complements a sales tax In that case, a State is attempting to impose a tax on a substantially equivalent event to assure uniform treatment of goods and materials to be consumed in the State No such equality exists in this instance The common thread running through the cases upholding compensatory taxes is the equality of treatment between local and interstate commerce See Boston Stock 429 U S, at 331-332; Henneford v Silas Mason Co, 300 US 577, (17) See generally Halliburton 373 U S, at 70 As already demonstrated, however, the pattern of credits and exemptions allowed under the Louisiana statute undeniably violates this principle of equality As we have said, OCS gas may generally be consumed in Louisiana without the burden of the First-Use Tax Its principal application is to gas moving out of the State Of course, it does equalize the tax burdens on OCS gas leaving the State and Louisiana gas going into the interstate market But this sort of equalization is not the kind of "compensating" effect that our cases have recognized It may be true that further hearings would be required to provide a precise determination of the extent of the discrimination *760 in this case, but this is an insufficient reason for not now declaring the Tax unconstitutional and eliminating the discrimination We need not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates Accordingly, we grant plaintiffs' exception that the First-Use Tax is |
per_curiam | 2,005 | 200 | per_curiam | Schriro v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1992717/schriro-v-smith/ | In 1982, an Arizona jury convicted respondent Robert Douglas Smith of first-degree murder, kidnaping, and sexual assault. He was sentenced to death. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and Smith's state petitions for postconviction relief proved unsuccessful. Smith then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In none of these proceedings did Smith argue that he was mentally retarded or that his mental retardation made him ineligible for the death penalty. Smith had, however, presented *7 evidence in mitigation during the sentencing phase of his trial showing that he had low intelligence. The District Court denied Smith's petition for habeas corpus in 1996. Following several rounds of appeals, remands, and petitions for certiorari to this Court ), and after we had issued our decision in the case returned to the Ninth Circuit. Shortly thereafter, Smith asserted in briefing that he is mentally retarded and cannot, under Atkins, be executed. The Ninth Circuit ordered suspension of all federal habeas proceedings and directed Smith to "institute proceedings in the proper trial court of Arizona to determine whether the state is prohibited from executing [Smith] in accordance with Atkins." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-2. The court further ordered that the issue whether Smith is mentally retarded must "be determined by a jury trial unless the right to a jury is waived by the parties." The State's petition for certiorari is granted,[*] the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded. The Ninth Circuit erred in commanding the Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve Smith's mental retardation claim. Atkins stated in clear terms that "`we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.'" ; modifications in original). States, including Arizona, have responded to that challenge by adopting their own measures for adjudicating claims of mental retardation. While those measures might, in their application, be subject to constitutional challenge, Arizona had not even had a chance to apply its chosen procedures *8 when the Ninth Circuit pre-emptively imposed its jury trial condition. Because the Court of Appeals exceeded its limited authority on habeas review, the judgment below is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | dissenting | Suter v. Artist M. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112712/suter-v-artist-m/ | The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 80 (Adoption Act or Act) conditions federal funding for state child welfare, foster care, and adoption programs upon, inter alia, the 's express commitment to make, "in each case, reasonable efforts" to prevent the need for removing children from their homes and "reasonable efforts," where removal has occurred, to reunify the family. 42 U.S. C. 671(a)(15). The Court holds today that the plaintiff children *365 in this case may not enforce the 's commitment in federal court either under 42 U.S. C. 83 or under the Act itself. In my view, the Court's conclusion is plainly inconsistent with this Court's decision just two Terms ago in in which we found enforceable under 83 a functionally identical provision of the Medicaid Act requiring "reasonable" reimbursements to health-care providers. More troubling still, the Court reaches its conclusion without even stating, much less applying, the principles our precedents have used to determine whether a statute has created a right enforceable under 83. I cannot acquiesce in this unexplained disregard for established law. Accordingly, I dissent. I A Section 83 provides a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United s. We recognized in that 83 provides a cause of action for violations of federal statutes, not just the Constitution. Since Thiboutot, we have recognized two general exceptions to this rule. First, no cause of action will lie where the statute in question does not "`create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of 83.' " ). Second, 83 is unavailable where "Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself." In determining the scope of the first exceptionwhether a federal statute creates an "enforceable right"the Court has developed and repeatedly applied a three-part test. We have asked (1) whether the statutory provision at issue "`was intend[ed] to benefit the putative plaintiff.' " at *366 509 ). If so, then the provision creates an enforceable right unless (2) the provision "reflects merely a `congressional preference' for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the governmental unit," ), or unless (3) the plaintiff's interest is so "`vague and amorphous' " as to be "`beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.' " (quoting Golden 493 U. S., at in turn quoting -432). See also (91) (quoting and applying the three-part test as stated in Golden ). The Court today has little difficulty concluding that the plaintiff children in this case have no enforceable rights, because it |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | dissenting | Suter v. Artist M. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112712/suter-v-artist-m/ | children in this case have no enforceable rights, because it does not mentionmuch less applythis firmly established analytic framework. B In we held that under the above three-part test, the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act creates an enforceable right. As does the Adoption Act, the Medicaid Act provides federal funding for state programs that meet certain federal standards and requires participating s to file a plan with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Most relevant here, the Medicaid Act, like the Adoption Act, requires that the undertake a "reasonableness" commitment in its plan. With respect to the rate at which providers are to be reimbursed, the Boren Amendment requires: "A plan for medical assistance must "provide for payment [of services] provided under the plan through the use of rates (determined in accordance with methods and standards developed by the) which the finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and *367 adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable access to inpatient hospital services of adequate quality." 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(13)(A) (emphasis supplied). In we had no difficulty concluding that the reimbursement provision of the Boren Amendment "was intend[ed] to benefit" the plaintiff providers of Medicaid We also concluded that the second part of the test was satisfied. The amendment, we held, does not simply express a "congressional preference" for reasonable and adequate reimbursement rates; rather, it imposes a "binding obligation" on the to establish and maintain such rates. In so concluding, we emphasized two features of the Medicaid reimbursement scheme. First, we observed that the language of the provision is "cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms," stating that the plan "must " provide for reasonable and adequate reimbursement. Second, we noted that the text of the statute expressly conditions federal funding on state compliance with the amendment and requires the Secretary to withhold funds from noncomplying s. In light of these features of the Medicaid Act, we rejected the argument, advanced by the defendant state officials and by the United s as amicus curiae, that the only enforceable state obligation is the obligation to file a plan with the Secretary, to find that its rates are reasonable and adequate, and to make assurances to that effect in the plan. -515. Rather, we concluded, participating s are required actually to provide reasonable and adequate rates, not just |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | dissenting | Suter v. Artist M. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112712/suter-v-artist-m/ | required actually to provide reasonable and adequate rates, not just profess to the Secretary that they have done so. Finally, we rejected the 's argument that Medicaid providers' right to "reasonable and adequate" reimbursement *368 is "too vague and amorphous" for judicial enforcement. We acknowledged that the has "substantial discretion" in choosing among various methods of calculating reimbursement rates. at 5; see also A 's discretion in determining how to calculate what rates are "reasonable and adequate," we concluded, "may affect the standard under which a court reviews" the 's reimbursement plan, but it does not make the right to reasonable reimbursement judicially unenforceable. at 5. C These principles, as we applied them in require the conclusion that the Adoption Act's "reasonable efforts" clause[1] establishes a right enforceable under 83. Each of the three elements of our three-part test is satisfied. First, and most obvious, the plaintiff children in this case are clearly the intended beneficiaries of the requirement that the make "reasonable efforts" to prevent unnecessary removal and to reunify temporarily removed children with their families. Second, the "reasonable efforts" clause imposes a binding obligation on the because it is "cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms," providing that a participating "shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which. shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them." Further, the statute requires the plan to "provid[e] that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made. " Moreover, as *369 in the statutory text expressly conditions federal funding on state compliance with the plan requirement and requires the Secretary to reduce payments to a if "in the administration of [the 's] plan there is a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the plan." 42 U.S. C. 671(b). Under our holding in these provisions of the Adoption Act impose a binding obligation on the Indeed, neither the petitioner state officials nor amicus United s dispute this point. Brief for Petitioners 17; Reply Brief for Petitioners 3, n. 2; Brief for United s as Amicus Curiae 13-14. What petitioners and amicus United s do dispute is whether the third element of the Golden -Dennis test has been satisfied: They argue that the "reasonable efforts" clause of the Adoption Act is too "vague and amorphous" to be judicially enforced. Aware that enforced an apparently similar "reasonableness" clause, they argue that this clause is categorically different. According to petitioners, the Court would not have found the Boren Amendment's reasonableness clause enforceable had the statute not provided an "objective benchmark" against which |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | dissenting | Suter v. Artist M. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112712/suter-v-artist-m/ | had the statute not provided an "objective benchmark" against which "reasonable and adequate" reimbursement rates could be measured. Reasonable and adequate rates, the Boren Amendment provides, are those that meet the costs that would be incurred by "an `efficiently and economically operated facilit[y]' providing care in compliance with federal and state standards while at the same time ensuring `reasonable access' to eligible participants." 496 U. S., at 5 (quoting 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(13)(A)). Petitioners claim that, given this benchmark, "reasonable and adequate" rates can be ascertained by "monetary calculations easily determined based on prevailing rates in the market." Brief for Petitioners 21. By contrast, they observe, there is "no market for `reasonable efforts' to keep or return a child home, and such `reasonable efforts' cannot be calculated or quantified." *370 Petitioners misunderstand the sense in which the "benchmark" in is "objective." The Boren Amendment does not simply define "reasonable and adequate" rates as market rates. Rather, it defines a "reasonable and adequate" rate by referring to what would be provided by a hypothetical facilityone that operates "efficiently and economically," "compli[es] with federal and state standards," and "ensur[es] `reasonable access' to eligible participants." Whether particular existing facilities meet those criteria is not a purely empirical judgment that requires only simple "monetary calculations." Indeed, the Boren Amendment's specification of the words "reasonable and adequate" ultimately refers us to a second reasonableness clause: The "benchmark" facility, we are told, is one that "ensure[s] `reasonable access ` to eligible participants." This second reasonableness clause is left undefined. Contrary to petitioners' suggestions, then, the "reasonable and adequate" rates provision of the Boren Amendment is not "objective" in the sense of being mechanically measurable. The fact that this Court found the provision judicially enforceable demonstrates that an asserted right is not "vague and amorphous" simply because it cannot be easily "calculated or quantified." Petitioners also argue that the right to "reasonable efforts" is "vague and amorphous" because of substantial disagreement in the child-welfare community concerning appropriate strategies. Furthermore, they contend, because the choice of a particular strategy in a particular case necessarily will depend upon the facts of that case, a court-enforced right to reasonable efforts either will homogenize very different situations or else will fragment into a plurality of "rights" that vary from to For both of these reasons, petitioners contend, Congress left the question of what efforts are "reasonable" to state juvenile courts, the recognized experts in such matters. Here again, comparison with is instructive. The Court noted the lack of consensus concerning which of various *371 possible methods of calculating reimbursable costs would |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | dissenting | Suter v. Artist M. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112712/suter-v-artist-m/ | of various *371 possible methods of calculating reimbursable costs would best promote efficient operation of health-care facilities. See -507. The Court further noted that Congress chose a standard that leaves the s considerable autonomy in selecting the methods they will use to determine which reimbursement rates are "reasonable and adequate." The result, of course, is that the "content" of the federal right to reasonable and adequate ratesthe method of calculating reimbursement and the chosen ratevaries from to And although federal judges are hardly expert either in selecting methods of Medicaid cost reimbursement or in determining whether particular rates are "reasonable and adequate," neither the majority nor the dissent found that the right to reasonable and adequate reimbursement was so vague and amorphous as to be "beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce." See at 5-520; flexibility in determining what is "reasonable," we held, "may affect the standard under which a court reviews whether the rates comply with the amendment, but it does not render the amendment unenforceable by a court. While there may be a range of reasonable rates, there certainly are some rates outside that range that no could ever find to be reasonable and adequate under the Act." at 5-520. The same principles apply here. There may be a "range" of "efforts" to prevent unnecessary removals or secure beneficial reunifications that are "reasonable." It may also be that a court, in reviewing a 's strategies of compliance with the "reasonable efforts" clause, would owe substantial deference to the 's choice of strategies. That does not mean, however, that no 's efforts could ever be deemed "unreasonable." As in the asserted right in *372 this case is simply not inherently "beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce." Petitioners' argument that the "reasonable efforts" clause of the Adoption Act is so vague and amorphous as to be unenforceable assumes that in and the Court was working at the outer limits of what is judicially cognizable: Any deviation from or petitioners imply, would go beyond the bounds of judicial competence. There is absolutely nothing to indicate that this is so. See (emphasis supplied). Federal courts, in innumerable cases, have routinely enforced reasonableness clauses in federal statutes. See, e. g., Virginian R. (37) Petitioners have not shown that the Adoption Act's reasonableness clause is exceptional in this respect. II The Court does not explain why the settled three-part test for determining the enforceability of an asserted right is not applied in this case. Moreover, the reasons the Court does offer to support its conclusionthat the Adoption Act's "reasonable efforts" clause |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | dissenting | Suter v. Artist M. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112712/suter-v-artist-m/ | to support its conclusionthat the Adoption Act's "reasonable efforts" clause creates no enforceable rightwere raised and rejected in The Court acknowledges that the Adoption Act is "mandatory in its terms." Ante, at 358. It adopts, however, a narrow understanding of what is "mandatory." It reasons that the language of 671(a), which provides that "[i]n order for a to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary," requires participating s only to submit and receive approval for a plan that contains the features listed in 671(a)(1) to (16). According *373 to the Court, the beneficiaries of the Act enjoy at most a procedural right under 671(a)the right to require a participating to prepare and file a plannot a substantive right to require the to live up to the commitments stated in that plan, such as the commitment to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent unnecessary removals and secure beneficial reunifications of families. Since the of Illinois has filed a plan that the Secretary has approved, the Court reasons, the has violated no right enforceable in federal court. The Court's reasoning should sound familiar: The state officials in made exactly the same argument, and this Court rejected it. In we noted that the Medicaid Act expressly conditions federal funding on state compliance with the provisions of an approved plan, and that the Secretary is required to withhold payments from noncomplying s. See 496 U.S., (citing 42 U.S. C. 1396c).[2] In substantially identical language, the Adoption Act, too, requires s to live up to the commitments stated in their plans.[3] To be sure, the Court's reasoning is consistent with the dissent in See 496 U.S., 527-528 But it flatly contradicts what the Court held in that case. The Court attempts to fend off this conclusion in two ways, neither of them persuasive. First, the Court seeks to distinguish asserting that our conclusionthat the Boren Amendment gave the health-care providers a substantive right to reasonable and adequate reimbursement"relied in *374 part on the fact that the statute and regulations set forth in some detail the factors to be considered in determining the methods for calculating rates." Ante, at 359 (citing 496 U. S., at 5, n. 17). By contrast, the Court continues, neither the provisions of the Adoption Act nor the implementing regulations offer any guidance as to how the term "reasonable efforts" should be interpreted. Even assuming that it is accurate to call the statute and regulations involved in that case "detailed,"[4] the Court has misread The Court there referred to the relative specificity of the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | dissenting | Suter v. Artist M. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112712/suter-v-artist-m/ | The Court there referred to the relative specificity of the statute and regulations not to demonstrate that the health-care providers enjoyed a substantive right to reasonable and adequate rateswe had already concluded that the was under a binding obligation to adopt such rates, see -515but only to reinforce our conclusion that the providers' interest was not so "vague and amorphous" as to be "beyond the competence of judicial enforcement." See 496 U.S., at 5, n. 17. Under our three-part test, the Court would not have inquired whether that interest was "vague and amorphous" unless it had already concluded that the was required to do more than simply file a paper plan that lists the appropriate factors. *375 Second, the Court emphasizes: "Other sections of the [Adoption] Act provide enforcement mechanisms for the reasonable efforts clause of 42 U.S. C. 671(a)(15)." Ante, at 360. Such "mechanisms" include the Secretary's power to cut off or reduce funds for noncompliance with the state plan, and the requirement of a state judicial finding that "reasonable efforts" have been made before federal funds may be used to reimburse foster care payments for a child involuntarily removed. The Court has apparently forgotten that ever since (70), the power of the Secretary to enforce congressional spending conditions by cutting off funds has not prevented the federal courts from enforcing those same conditions. See at 420, 422-. Indeed, we reasoned in that a similar "cutoff" provision supports the conclusion that the Medicaid Act creates an enforceable right, because it puts the "on notice" that it may not simply adopt the reimbursement rates of its choosing. See As for the Court's contention that 671(a)(15) should be enforced through individual removal determinations in state juvenile court, the availability of a state judicial forum can hardly deprive a 83 plaintiff of a federal forum. (61). The Court's reliance on enforcement mechanisms other than 83, therefore, does not support its conclusion that the "reasonable efforts" clause of the Adoption Act creates no enforceable right. The Court, without acknowledgment, has departed from our precedents in yet another way. In our prior cases, the existence of other enforcement mechanisms has been relevant not to the question whether the statute at issue creates an enforceable right, but to whether the second exception to 83 enforcement applieswhether, that is, "`Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself.' " (quoting 479 U. S., at *376 ). In determining whether this second exception to 83 enforcement applies, we have required the defendant not merely to point to the existence of alternative means of enforcement, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | dissenting | Suter v. Artist M. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112712/suter-v-artist-m/ | to point to the existence of alternative means of enforcement, but to demonstrate "by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose [ 83] enforcement." -521. We have said repeatedly that we will not "lightly" conclude that Congress has so intended. (quoting 479 U. S., at -424, in turn quoting (84)). In only two instances, where we concluded that "the statute itself provides a comprehensive remedial scheme which leaves no room for additional private remedies under 83," ante, at 360, n. 11, have we held that Congress has intended to foreclose 83 enforcement. See (84) ; Middlesex County Sewerage The Court does not find these demanding criteria satisfied here. See ante, at 360-361, and n. 11. Instead, it simply circumvents them altogether: The Court holds that even if the funding cutoff provision in the Adoption Act is not an "express provision" that "provides a comprehensive remedial scheme" leaving "no room for additional private remedies under 83," that provision nevertheless precludes 83 enforcement. In so holding, the Court has inverted the established presumption that a private remedy is available under 83 unless "Congress has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy." n. 9 (citing Golden Transit 493 U. S., at -107, and 479 U. S., at -424). *377 III In sum, the Court has failed, without explanation, to apply the framework our precedents have consistently deemed applicable; it has sought to support its conclusion by resurrecting arguments decisively rejected less than two years ago in ; and it has contravened 22 years of precedent by suggesting that the existence of other "enforcement mechanisms" precludes 83 enforcement. At least for this case, it has changed the rules of the game without offering even minimal justification, and it has failed even to acknowledge that it is doing anything more extraordinary than "interpret[ing]" the Adoption Act "by its own terms." Ante, at 358, n. 8. Readers of the Court's opinion will not be misled by this hollow assurance. And, after all, we are dealing here with children. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.[5] I dissent. |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | concurring | CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205024/crst-van-expedited-inc-v-eeoc/ | Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a district court may award attorney’s fees to “the prevailing party.” 42 U.S. C. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, this Court concluded that a prevailing plaintiff “ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances,” but a prevailing defendant is to be awarded fees only “upon a finding that the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or with- out foundation.” That holding “mistak- enly cast aside the statutory language” in interpreting the phrase “prevailing party.” v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 538 (1994) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the Court of Appeals compounded Christiansburg’s error by requiring a district court to make yet another finding before a Title VII defendant may be considered a “prevail- ing party”: The defendant must also obtain a “ruling on the merits.” Today, the Court correctly vacates that ruling and holds that “a favorable ruling on the merits is not a necessary predicate to find that a defendant has prevailed.” Ante, at 1. I therefore join the Court’s opinion in full. Nevertheless, I continue to adhere to my view that Christiansburg is a “dubious precedent” that I will “decline to extend” any further. |
Justice Powell | 1,982 | 17 | concurring | Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110657/logan-v-zimmerman-brush-co/ | As the challenged statute now has been amended, this is a case of little importance except to the litigants. The action commenced with an isolated example of bureaucratic oversight that resulted in the denial even of a hearing on appellant's claim of discrimination. One would have expected this sort of negligence by the State to toll the statutory period within which a hearing must be held. The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, read the statutory terms as mandatory and jurisdictional. The issue presented, at least for me, is too simple and straightforward to justify broad pronouncements on the law of procedural due process or of equal protection. I am particularly concerned by the potential implications of the Court's expansive due process analysis. In my view this is a case that should be decided narrowly on its unusual facts.[*] The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court effectively created two classes of claimants: those whose claims were, and those whose claims were not, processed within the prescribed 120 days by the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission. Under this classification, claimants with identical claims, despite equal diligence in presenting them, would be treated differently, depending on whether the Commission itself neglected to convene a hearing within the prescribed time. The question is whether this unusual classification is rationally related to a state interest that would justify it. *444 The State no doubt has an interest in the timely disposition of claims. But the challenged classification failed to promote that end or indeed any other in a rational way. As claimants possessed no power to convene hearings, it is unfair and irrational to punish them for the Commission's failure to do so. The State also has asserted goals of redressing valid claims of discrimination and of protecting employers from frivolous lawsuits. Yet the challenged classification, which bore no relationship to the merits of the underlying charges, is arbitrary and irrational when measured against either purpose. This Court has held repeatedly that state-created classifications must bear a rational relationship to legitimate governmental objectives. See, e. g., ; Although I do not join JUSTICE BLACKMUN's separate opinion, I agree that the challenged statute, as construed and applied in this case, failed to comport with this minimal standard. I am concerned by the broad sweep of the Court's opinion, but I do join its judgment. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Russello v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111043/russello-v-united-states/ | This is yet another concerning the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 170. Title IX, as amended, 18 U.S. C. 161-168 ( ed.). At issue here is the interpretation of the chapter's forfeiture provision, 163(a)(1), and, specifically, the meaning of the words "any interest [the defendant] has acquired in violation of section 162." I On June 8, 177, petitioner Joseph C. Russello and others were indicted for racketeering, conspiracy, and mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S. C. 1341, 162(c) and (d), and 2. App. 5. After a jury trial in the United States District Court for *18 the Middle District of Florida, petitioner was convicted as charged in four counts of the indictment. The jury then returned special verdicts for the forfeiture to the United States, under 18 U.S. C. 163(a), of four payments, aggregating $340,043.0, made to petitioner by a fire insurance company. App. 54-57. These verdicts related to the racketeering activities charged in the second count of the indictment under which petitioner had been convicted. The District Court, accordingly, entered a judgment of forfeiture against petitioner in that amount. Petitioner took an appeal to the former United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A panel of that court affirmed petitioner's criminal conviction, United and this Court denied certiorari, as to that aspect of the The panel, however, reversed the judgment of forfeiture. App. 64-6. The full court granted rehearing en banc on the forfeiture issue and, by a vote of 16-7, vacated that portion of the panel opinion, and then affirmed the forfeiture judgment entered by the District Court. United Because of this significant division among the judges of the Court of Appeals, and because the Fifth Circuit majority, stated that its holding "squarely conflict[ed]" with that of the Ninth Circuit in United we granted certiorari.[1] Since then, the Seventh Circuit has issued an opinion agreeing with the Ninth Circuit. United *1 II So far as the in its present posture is concerned, the basic facts are not in dispute. The majority opinion of the en banc court described them succinctly: "Briefly, the evidence showed that a group of individuals associated for the purpose of committing arson with the intent to defraud insurance companies. This association in fact enterprise, composed of an insurance adjuster, homeowners, promoters, investors, and arsonists, operated to destroy at least eighteen residential and commercial properties in Tampa and Miami, Florida between July 173 and April 176. The panel summarized the ring's operations as follows: " `At first the arsonists only burned buildings already |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Russello v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111043/russello-v-united-states/ | follows: " `At first the arsonists only burned buildings already owned by those associated with the ring. Following a burning, the building owner filed an inflated proof of loss statement and collected the insurance proceeds from which his co-conspirators were paid. Later, ring members bought buildings suitable for burning, secured insurance in excess of value and, after a burning, made claims for the loss and divided the proceeds'." Specifically, petitioner was the owner of the Central Professional Building in Tampa. This structure had two parts, an original smaller section in front and a newer addition at the rear. The latter contained apartments, offices, and parking facilities. Petitioner arranged for arsonists to set fire to the front portion. He intended to use the insurance proceeds to rebuild that section. The fire, however, spread to the rear. Joseph Carter, another member of the arson ring, was the adjuster for petitioner's insurance claim and helped him to obtain the highest payments possible. The resulting payments made up the aggregate sum of $340,043.0 *20 mentioned above. From those proceeds, petitioner paid Carter $30,000 for his assistance. III Title 18 U.S. C. 162(c) states that it shall be unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate. commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." Section 162(d) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate 162(c). Section 163(a)(1) provides that a person convicted under 162 shall forfeit to the United States "any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 162." The sole issue in this is whether profits and proceeds derived from racketeering constitute an "interest" within the meaning of this statute and are therefore subject to forfeiture. Petitioner contends that 163(a)(1) reaches only "interests in an enterprise" and does not authorize the forfeiture of mere "profits and proceeds." He rests his argument upon the propositions that criminal forfeitures are disfavored in law and that forfeiture statutes, as a consequence, must be strictly construed. In a RICO recently decided, this Court observed: "In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of `a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' " United quoting from Consumer Product Safety See also ; Here, 18 U.S. C. 163(a)(1) calls for the forfeiture to the United States of "any interest acquired in violation *21 of section 162." |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Russello v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111043/russello-v-united-states/ | of "any interest acquired in violation *21 of section 162." There is no question that petitioner Russello acquired the insurance proceeds at issue in violation of 162(c); that much has been definitely and finally settled. Accordingly, if those proceeds qualify as an "interest," they are forfeitable. The term "interest" is not specifically defined in the RICO statute. This silence compels us to "start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." The ordinary meaning of "interest" surely encompasses a right to profits or proceeds. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1178 (176), broadly defining "interest," among other things, as a "good," "benefit," or "profit." Random House Dictionary of the English Language 741 (17) defines interest to include "benefit." Black's Law Dictionary 72 (5th ed., 17) provides a significant definition of "interest": "The most general term that can be employed to denote a right, claim, title, or legal share in something." It is thus apparent that the term "interest" comprehends all forms of real and personal property, including profits and proceeds. This Court repeatedly has relied upon the term "interest" in defining the meaning of "property" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. See 408 U.S. 53, 1 (172) ; ; It undoubtedly was because Congress did not wish the forfeiture provision of 163(a) to be limited by rigid and technical definitions drawn from other areas of the law that it selected the broad term "interest" to describe those things that are subject to forfeiture under the statute. Congress selected this general term apparently because it was fully consistent with the pattern of the RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth. Among these are "enterprise" in 161(4); "racketeering *22 activity" in 161(1) ( ed.); and "participate" in 162(c). Petitioner himself has not attempted to define the term "interest" as used in 163(a)(1). He insists, however, that the term does not reach money or profits because, he says: " `Interest,' by definition, includes of necessity an interest in something." Brief for Petitioner Petitioner then asserts that the "something" emerges from the wording of 163(a)(1) itself, that is, an interest "acquired in violation of section 162," and thus derives its meaning from the very activities barred by the statute. In other words, a direct relationship exists between that which is subject to forfeiture as a result of racketeering activity and that which constitutes racketeering. This relationship, it is said, means that forfeiture is confined to an interest in an "enterprise" itself. Petitioner derives support for this approach |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Russello v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111043/russello-v-united-states/ | in an "enterprise" itself. Petitioner derives support for this approach from United and from language contained in two Federal District Court opinions, United (WD Pa. 177), and United (ND Ga. 17), aff'd on other grounds, He also now relies on the McManigal recently decided by the Seventh Circuit. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. We do not agree. Every property interest, including a right to profits or proceeds, may be described as an interest in something. Before profits of an illegal enterprise are divided, each participant may be said to own an "interest" in the ill-gotten gains. After distribution, each will have a possessory interest in currency or other items so distributed. We therefore conclude that the language of the statute plainly covers the insurance proceeds petitioner received as a result of his arson activities. IV We are fortified in this conclusion by our examination of the structure of the RICO statute. We disagree with those *23 courts that have felt that a broad construction of the word "interest" is necessarily undermined by the statute's other forfeiture provisions. The argument for a narrow construction of 163(a)(1) is refuted by the language of the succeeding subsection (a)(2). The former speaks broadly of "any interest acquired," while the latter reaches only "any interest in any enterprise which [the defendant] has established[,] operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 162." Similar less expansive language appears in 162(b) and 164(a). "[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." United (CA5 172). See United 688 F.2d 41, 50 Had Congress intended to restrict 163(a)(1) to an interest in an enterprise, it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection (a)(2). See North Haven Board of ; United (17). In the latter the Court said: "The short answer is that Congress did not write the statute that way." We refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections has the same meaning in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship. The evolution of these statutory provisions supplies further evidence that Congress intended 163(a)(1) to extend beyond an interest in an enterprise. An early proposed version of RICO, S. 1861, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. (16), had a single forfeiture provision for 163(a) that was limited to "all interest in the enterprise." This provision, however, later was |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Russello v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111043/russello-v-united-states/ | "all interest in the enterprise." This provision, however, later was divided into the present two subsections and the phrase "in the enterprise" was excluded from the first. Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill *24 but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended. See -581 (163). See Weiner, Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 225, and n. 4. It is no answer to say, as petitioner does, Brief for Petitioner that if the term "interest" were as all-encompassing as suggested by the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, 163(a)(2) would have no meaning independent of 163(a)(1), and would be mere surplusage. This argument is plainly incorrect. Subsection (a)(1) reaches "any interest," whether or not in an enterprise, provided it was "acquired in violation of section 162." Subsection (a)(2), on the other hand, is restricted to an interest in an enterprise, but that interest itself need not have been illegally acquired. Thus, there are things forfeitable under one, but not the other, of each of the subsections.[2] We note that the RICO statute's definition of the term "enterprise" in 161(4) encompasses both legal entities and illegitimate associations-in-fact. See United 452 U. S., 0-53. Forfeiture of an interest in an illegitimate association-in-fact ordinarily would be of little use because an association of that kind rarely has identifiable assets; instead, proceeds or profits usually are distributed immediately. Thus, construing 163(a)(1) to reach only interests in an enterprise would blunt the effectiveness of the provision in combating illegitimate enterprises, and would mean that "[w]hole areas of organized criminal activity would be placed beyond" the reach of the statute. United 452 U. S., Petitioner stresses that 21 U.S. C. 848(a)(2), contained in the Controlled Substances Act, as amended, specifically authorizes the forfeiture of "profits" obtained in a continuing criminal enterprise engaged in certain drug offenses. Brief for Petitioner 6-7. The Ninth Circuit in *25 Marubeni, 611 F. 2d, at 766, n. 7, placed similar reliance upon 848(a)(2) and observed that the two statutes were passed by the same Congress in the same month. We feel, however, that the specific mention of "profits" in the Controlled Substances Act cannot be accepted as an indication that the broader language of 163(a)(1) was not meant to reach profits as well as other types of property interests. Language in one statute usually sheds little light upon the meaning of different language in another statute, even when the two are enacted at or about the same time. The |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Russello v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111043/russello-v-united-states/ | two are enacted at or about the same time. The term "profits" is specific; the term "interest" is general. The use of the specific in the one statute cannot fairly be read as imposing a limitation upon the general provision in the other statute. In addition, the RICO statute was aimed at organized crime's economic power in all its forms, and it was natural to use the broad term "interest" to fulfill that aim. In contrast, the narcotics activity proscribed by 848 usually generates only monetary profits, a fact which would explain the use of the narrower term in 848(a)(2). Petitioner, of course, correctly suggests that Members of Congress who voted for the RICO statute were aware of the Controlled Substances Act. See 116 Cong. Rec. 33651 (170) (remarks of Rep. Brotzman); ; ; ; It is most unlikely, however, that without explanation a potent forfeiture weapon was withheld from the RICO statute, intended for use in a broad assault on organized crime, while the same weapon was included in the Controlled Substances Act, meant for use in only one part of the same struggle. If this was Congress' intent, one would expect it to have said so in clear and understandable terms. Petitioner also suggests that subsequent proposed legislation demonstrates that the RICO forfeiture provision of 170 excludes profits. Brief for Petitioner 2-34. The bills to which petitioner refers, however, were introduced in order to *26 overcome the decisions in Marubeni, Meyers, and Thevis. See, e. g., S. 2320, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. The introduction of these bills hardly suggests that their sponsors viewed those decisions as correct interpretations of 163(a)(1). See United (CA5), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 0 In any event, it is well settled that " `the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.' " Jefferson County Pharmaceutical 4 U.S. 150, quoting from United (1). See also United 33, n. Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's argument that his position is supported by the fact that certain state racketeering statutes expressly provide for the forfeiture of "profits," "money," "interest or property," or "all property, real or personal," acquired from racketeering. Brief for Petitioner 8-. Nearly all of the state statutes postdate the Meyers and Thevis District Court decisions. See, e. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-17-106 ; R. I. Gen. Laws 7-15-3 (enacted in 17). The legislatures of those States presumably employed language different from that of 163(a)(1) so as to avoid narrow interpretations of their laws along the lines of the narrow interpretations given the federal statute |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Russello v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111043/russello-v-united-states/ | the lines of the narrow interpretations given the federal statute by the courts in Meyers and Thevis. V If it is necessary to turn to the legislative history of the RICO statute, one finds that that history does not reveal, as petitioner would have us hold, see Brief for Petitioner 11-21, a limited congressional intent. The legislative history clearly demonstrates that the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots. Congress' statement of findings and purpose in *27 enacting 84 Stat. 22, is set forth in its 1. This statement dramatically describes the problem presented by organized crime. Congress declared, at 23: "It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." This Court has recognized the significance of this statement of findings and purpose. United 452 U. S., 8-58. Further, Congress directed, by 04(a) of 84 Stat. 47: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." So far as we have been made aware, this is the only substantive federal criminal statute that contains such a directive; a similar provision, however, appears in the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S. C. 3731. Congress emphasized the need to fashion new remedies in order to achieve its far-reaching objectives. See S. Rep. No. 1-617, p. 76 (16). "What is needed here are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts." at 7. Senator Scott spoke of "new legal weapons," 116 Cong. Rec. 81 (170), and Senator McClellan stressed the need for new penal remedies. at 51-52. Representative Poff, floor manager of the bill in the House, made similar observations. at 3513. Representative Rodino observed that "[d]rastic methods are essential, and we must develop law enforcement measures at least as efficient as those of organized crime." at 351. The RICO statute was viewed as one such "extraordinary" weapon. at 2 And the forfeiture provision was *28 intended to serve all the aims of the RICO statute, namely, to "punish, deter, incapacitate, and directly to remove the corrupting influence from the channels of commerce." at 1855 The legislative history leaves no |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Russello v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111043/russello-v-united-states/ | channels of commerce." at 1855 The legislative history leaves no doubt that, in the view of Congress, the economic power of organized crime derived from its huge illegal profits. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 24-256 Congress could not have hoped successfully to attack organized crime's economic roots without reaching racketeering profits. During the congressional debates, the sources and magnitude of organized crime's income were emphasized repeatedly. See, e. g., 115 Cong. Rec. 5873, 5884-5885 (16); 116 Cong. Rec. 50, 52 (170) From all this, the intent to authorize forfeiture of racketeering profits seems obvious. H. R. Rep. No. 1-154, p. 57 (170), recites that the forfeiture provision extends to "all property and interests, as broadly defined, which are related to the violations." It is true that Congress viewed the RICO statute in large part as a response to organized crime's infiltration of legitimate enterprises. United 452 U. S., at 51. But Congress' concerns were not limited to infiltration. The broader goal was to remove the profit from organized crime by separating the racketeer from his dishonest gains. Forfeiture of interest in an enterprise often would do little to deter; indeed, it might only encourage the speedy looting of an infiltrated company. It is unlikely that Congress intended to enact a forfeiture provision that provided an incentive for activity of this kind while authorizing forfeiture of an interest of little worth in a bankrupt shell. We are not persuaded otherwise by the presence of a 16 letter from the then Deputy Attorney General to Senator McClellan. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1st *2 Cong., 1st Sess., 407 (16). That letter, with its reference to "one's interest in the enterprise" does not indicate, for us, any congressional intent to preclude forfeiture of racketeering profits. The reference, indeed, is not to 163(a) as finally enacted but to an earlier version in which forfeiture was to be expressly limited to an interest in an enterprise. The letter was merely following the language of the then pending bill. Furthermore, the real purpose of the sentence was not to explain what the statutory provision meant, but to explain why the Department of Justice believed it was constitutional. The rule of lenity, which this Court has recognized in certain situations of statutory ambiguity, see United 452 U. S., 7, n. 10, has no application here. That rule "comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | United States v. Arthur Young & Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111119/united-states-v-arthur-young-co/ | We granted certiorari to consider whether tax accrual workpapers prepared by a corporations independent certified public accountant in the course of regular financial audits are protected from disclosure in response to an Internal Revenue Service summons issued under 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), 26 U.S. C. 7602. *808 I A Respondent Arthur Young & Co. is a firm of certified public accountants. As the independent auditor for respondent Amerada Hess Corp., Young is responsible for reviewing the financial statements prepared by Amerada as required by the federal securities laws.[1] In the course of its review of these financial statements, Young verified Amerada's statement of its contingent tax liabilities, and, in so doing, prepared the tax accrual workpapers at issue in this case. Tax accrual workpapers are documents and memoranda relating to Young's evaluation of Amerada's reserves for contingent tax liabilities. Such workpapers sometimes contain information pertaining to Amerada's financial transactions, identify questionable positions Amerada may have taken on its tax returns, and reflect Young's opinions regarding the validity of such positions. See infra, at 810-813. In 1975 the Internal Revenue Service began a routine audit to determine Amerada's corporate income tax liability for the tax years 1972 through 1974. When the audit revealed that Amerada had made questionable payments of $7,830 from a "special disbursement account," the IRS instituted a criminal investigation of Amerada's tax returns as well. In that process, pursuant to Code 7602, 26 U.S. C. 7602,[2] the IRS *809 issued an administrative summons to Young, which required Young to make available to the IRS all its Amerada files, including its tax accrual workpapers. Amerada instructed Young not to comply with the summons. The IRS then commenced this enforcement action against Young in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See 26 U.S. C. 7604.[3] Amerada intervened, as permitted by 26 U.S. C. 7609(b)(1).[4] The District Court found that Young's tax accrual workpapers were relevant to the IRS investigation within the meaning of 7602 and refused to recognize an accountant-client privilege that would protect the workpapers. Accordingly, the District Court ordered the summons enforced. B A divided United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals majority agreed with the District Court that the tax accrual workpapers were relevant to the IRS investigation of Amerada, but held that the public interest in promoting full disclosure to public accountants, and in turn ensuring the integrity of the securities markets, required protection for the work that such independent auditors perform |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | United States v. Arthur Young & Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111119/united-states-v-arthur-young-co/ | required protection for the work that such independent auditors perform for publicly owned companies. Drawing upon and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), the Court of Appeals fashioned a work-product immunity doctrine for tax accrual workpapers prepared by independent auditors in the course of compliance with the federal securities laws. Because the IRS had not demonstrated a sufficient showing of need to overcome the immunity and was not seeking to prove fraud on Amerada's part, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce the summons insofar as it sought Young's tax accrual workpapers. One judge dissented from that portion of the majority opinion creating a work-product immunity for accountants' tax accrual workpapers. The dissent viewed the statutory summons authority, 26 U.S. C. 7602, as reflecting a congressional decision in favor of the disclosure of such workpapers. The dissent also rejected the policy justifications asserted by the majority for an accountant work-product immunity, reasoning that such protection was not necessary to ensure the integrity of the independent auditor's certification of a corporations financial statements. We granted certiorari, We affirm in part and reverse in part. II Corporate financial statements are one of the primary sources of information available to guide the decisions of the investing public. In an effort to control the accuracy of the financial data available to investors in the securities markets, various provisions of the federal securities laws require *811 publicly held corporations to file their financial statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission.[5] Commission regulations stipulate that these financial reports must be audited by an independent certified public accountant in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.[6] By examining the corporations books and records, the independent auditor determines whether the financial reports of the corporation have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.[7] The auditor then issues an opinion as to whether the financial statements, taken as a whole, fairly present the financial position and operations of the corporation for the relevant period.[8] See n. 13, infra. *812 An important aspect of the auditor's function is to evaluate the adequacy and reasonableness of the corporations reserve account for contingent tax liabilities. This reserve account, known as the tax accrual account, the noncurrent tax account, or the tax pool, represents the amount set aside by the corporation to cover adjustments and additions to the corporation's actual tax liability. Additional corporate tax liability may arise from a wide variety of transactions.[9] The presence of a reserve account for such contingent tax liabilities reflects the corporations awareness of, and preparedness for, the possibility of an assessment of additional taxes. The |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | United States v. Arthur Young & Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111119/united-states-v-arthur-young-co/ | for, the possibility of an assessment of additional taxes. The independent auditor draws upon many sources in evaluating the sufficiency of the corporations tax accrual account. Initially, the corporations books, records, and tax returns must be analyzed in light of the relevant Code provisions, Treasury Regulations, Revenue Rulings, and case law. The auditor will also obtain and assess the opinions, speculations, and projections of management with regard to unclear, aggressive, or questionable tax positions that may have been taken on prior tax returns. In exploring the tax consequences of certain transactions, the auditor often engages in a "worst-case" analysis in order to ensure that the tax accrual account accurately reflects the full extent of the corporation's exposure to additional tax liability. From this conglomeration of data, the auditor is able to estimate the potential cost of each particular contingency, as well as the probability that the additional liability may arise. The auditor's tax accrual workpapers record this process of examination and analysis. Such workpapers may document the auditor's interviews with corporate personnel, judgments on questions of potential tax liability, and suggestions for alternative *813 treatments of certain transactions for tax purposes. Tax accrual workpapers also contain an overall evaluation of the sufficiency of the corporations reserve for contingent tax liabilities, including an item-by-item analysis of the corporation's potential exposure to additional liability. In short, tax accrual workpapers pinpoint the "soft spots" on a corporation's tax return by highlighting those areas in which the corporate taxpayer has taken a position that may, at some later date, require the payment of additional taxes. III In seeking access to Young's tax accrual workpapers, the IRS exercised the summons power conferred by Code 7602, 26 U.S. C. 7602, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to summon and "examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material" to a particular tax inquiry.[10] The District Court and the Court of Appeals determined that the tax accrual workpapers at issue in this case satisfied the relevance requirement of 7602, because they "might have thrown light upon" the correctness of Amerada's tax return.[11] Because the relevance *814 of tax accrual workpapers is a logical predicate to the question whether such workpapers should be protected by some form of work-product immunity, we turn first to an evaluation of the relevance issue.[12] We agree that such workpapers are relevant within the meaning of 7602. As the language of 7602 clearly indicates, an IRS summons is not to be judged by the relevance standards used in deciding whether to admit evidence in federal court. Cf. |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | United States v. Arthur Young & Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111119/united-states-v-arthur-young-co/ | in deciding whether to admit evidence in federal court. Cf. Fed. Rule Evid. 401. The language "may be" reflects Congress' express intention to allow the IRS to obtain items of even potential relevance to an ongoing investigation, without reference to its admissibility. The purpose of Congress is obvious: the Service can hardly be expected to know whether such data will in fact be relevant until they are procured and scrutinized. As a tool of discovery, the 7602 summons is critical to the investigative and enforcement functions of the IRS, see United ; the Service therefore should not be required to establish that the documents it seeks are actually relevant in any technical, evidentiary sense. *815 That tax accrual workpapers are not actually used in the preparation of tax returns by the taxpayer or its own accountants does not bar a finding of relevance within the meaning of 7602. The filing of a corporate tax return entails much more than filling in the blanks on an IRS form in accordance with undisputed tax principles; more likely than not, the return is a composite interpretation of corporate transactions made by corporate officers in the light most favorable to the taxpayer. It is the responsibility of the IRS to determine whether the corporate taxpayer in completing its return has streched a particular tax concept beyond what is allowed. Records that illuminate any aspect of the return such as the tax accrual workpapers at issue in this case are therefore highly relevant to legitimate IRS inquiry. The Court of Appeals acknowledged this: "It is difficult to say that the assessment by the independent auditor of the correctness of positions taken by the taxpayer in his return would not throw `light upon' the correctness of the return." We accordingly affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that Young's tax accrual workpapers are relevant to the IRS investigation of Amerada's tax liability. IV A We now turn to consider whether tax accrual workpapers prepared by an independent auditor in the course of a routine review of corporate financial statements should be protected by some form of work-product immunity from disclosure under 7602. Based upon its evaluation of the competing polices of the federal tax and securities laws, the Court of Appeals found it necessary to create a so-called privilege for the independent auditor's workpapers. Our complex and comprehensive system of federal taxation, relying as it does upon self-assessment and reporting, demands that all taxpayers be forthright in the disclosure of relevant information to the taxing authorities. Without such *816 disclosure, and the concomitant power of |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | United States v. Arthur Young & Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111119/united-states-v-arthur-young-co/ | authorities. Without such *816 disclosure, and the concomitant power of the Government to compel disclosure, our national tax burden would not be fairly and equitably distributed. In order to encourage effective tax investigations, Congress has endowed the IRS with expansive information-gathering authority; 7602 is the centerpiece of that congressional design. As we noted in United : "The purpose of [ 7602] is not to accuse, but to inquire. Although such investigations unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy, they are essential to our self-reporting system, and the alternatives could well involve far less agreeable invasions of house, business, and records." Similarly, we noted in United : "[T]his Court has consistently construed congressional intent to require that if the summons authority claimed is necessary for the effective performance of congressionally imposed responsibilities to enforce the tax Code, that authority should be upheld absent express statutory prohibition or substantial countervailing policies." While 7602 is "subject to the traditional privileges and limitations," any other restrictions upon the IRS summons power should be avoided "absent unambiguous directions from Congress." United We are unable to discern the sort of "unambiguous directions from Congress" that would justify a judicially created work-product immunity for tax accrual workpapers summoned under 7602. Indeed, the very language of 7602 reflects precisely the opposite: a congressional policy choice in favor of disclosure of all information relevant to a legitimate IRS inquiry. In light of this explicit statement by the Legislative Branch, courts should be chary in recognizing exceptions to the broad summons authority of the IRS or in fashioning new privileges that would curtail disclosure under *817 7602. Cf. If the broad latitude granted to the IRS by 7602 is to be circumscribed, that is a choice for Congress, and not this Court, to make. See United B The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that "substantial countervailing policies," at required the fashioning of a work-product immunity for an independent auditor's tax accrual workpapers. To the extent that the Court of Appeals, in its concern for the "chilling effect" of the disclosure of tax accrual workpapers, sought to facilitate communication between independent auditors and their clients, its remedy more closely resembles a testimonial accountant-client privilege than a work-product immunity for accountants' workpapers. But as this Court stated in "no confidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege had been recognized in federal cases." In light of Couch, the Court of Appeals' effort to foster candid communication between accountant and client by creating a self-styled work-product privilege was misplaced, and conflicts with what we see as the clear intent of Congress. |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | United States v. Arthur Young & Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111119/united-states-v-arthur-young-co/ | with what we see as the clear intent of Congress. Nor do we find persuasive the argument that a work-product immunity for accountants' tax accrual workpapers is a fitting analogue to the attorney work-product doctrine established in The Hickman work-product doctrine was founded upon the private attorney's role as the client's confidential adviser and advocate, a loyal representative whose duty it is to present the client's case in the most favorable possible light. An independent certified public accountant performs a different role. By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporations financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant *818 performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance of the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations. We cannot accept the view that the integrity of the securities markets will suffer absent some protection for accountants' tax accrual workpapers. The Court of Appeals apparently feared that, were the IRS to have access to tax accrual workpapers, a corporation might be tempted to withhold from its auditor certain information relevant and material to a proper evaluation of its financial statements. But the independent certified public accountant cannot be content with the corporation's representations that its tax accrual reserves are adequate; the auditor is ethically and professionally obligated to ascertain for himself as far as possible whether the corporation's contingent tax liabilities have been accurately stated. If the auditor were convinced that the scope of the examination had been limited by management's reluctance to disclose matters relating to the tax accrual reserves, the auditor would be unable to issue an unqualified opinion as to the accuracy of the corporations financial statements. Instead, the auditor would be required to issue a qualified opinion, an adverse opinion, or a disclaimer of opinion, thereby notifying the investing public of possible potential problems inherent in the corporation's financial reports.[13]*819 Responsible corporate management would not risk a qualified evaluation of a corporate taxpayer's financial posture to afford cover for questionable positions reflected in a prior tax return.[14] Thus, the independent auditor's obligation to serve the public interest assures that the integrity of the securities markets will be preserved, without the need for a work-product |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | United States v. Arthur Young & Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111119/united-states-v-arthur-young-co/ | markets will be preserved, without the need for a work-product immunity for accountants' tax accrual workpapers.[15] *820 We also reject respondents' position that fundamental fairness precludes IRS access to accountants' tax accrual workpapers. Respondents urge that the enforcement of an IRS summons for accountants' tax accrual workpapers permits the Government to probe the thought processes of its taxpayer citizens, thereby giving the IRS an unfair advantage in negotiating and litigating tax controversies. But if the SEC itself, or a private plaintiff in securities litigation, sought to obtain the tax accrual workpapers at issue in this case, they would surely be entitled to do so.[16] In light of the broad congressional command of 7602, no sound reason exists for conferring lesser authority upon the IRS than upon a private litigant suing with regard to transactions concerning which the public has no interest. Congress has granted to the IRS "broad latitude to adopt enforcement techniques helpful in the performance of [its] tax collection and assessment responsibilities." United n. 9. Recognizing the intrusiveness of demands for the production of tax accrual workpapers, the IRS has demonstrated administrative sensitivity to the concerns expressed by the accounting profession by tightening its internal requirements for the issuance of such summonses. *821 See Internal Revenue Manual 4024.4[17] Although though these IRS guidelines were not applicable during the years at issue in this case, their promulgation further refutes respondents' fairness argument and reflects an administrative flexibility that reinforces our decision not to reduce irrevocably the 7602 summons power. V Beyond question it is desirable and in the public interest to encourage full disclosures by corporate clients to their independent accountants; if it is necessary to balance competing interests, however, the need of the Government for full disclosure of all information relevant to tax liability must also weigh in that balance. This kind of policy choice is best left to the Legislative Branch. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | majority | Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117948/wilton-v-seven-falls-co/ | This case asks whether the discretionary standard set forth in or the "exceptional circumstances" test developed in Colorado Water Conservation and Moses H. Memorial governs a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings, and under what standard of review a court of appeals should evaluate the district court's decision to do so. I In early a dispute between respondents (the Hill Group) and other parties over the ownership and operation of oil and gas properties in Winkler County, Texas, appeared likely to culminate in litigation. The Hill Group asked petitioners (London Underwriters)[1] to provide them with coverage under several commercial liability insurance policies. London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group in a letter dated July 31, In September after a 3-week trial, a Winkler County jury entered a verdict in excess of $100 million against the Hill Group on various state law claims. The Hill Group gave London Underwriters notice of the verdict in late November On December 9, London *280 Underwriters filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, basing jurisdiction upon diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S. C. 1332. London Underwriters sought a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S. C. 2201(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V), that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability for the Winkler County judgment. After negotiations with the Hill Group's counsel, London Underwriters voluntarily dismissed the action on January 22, London Underwriters did so, however, upon the express condition that the Hill Group give London Underwriters two weeks' notice if they decided to bring suit on the policy. On February 23, the Hill Group notified London Underwriters of their intention to file such a suit in Travis County, Texas. London Underwriters refiled their declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of Texas on February 24, As promised, the Hill Group initiated an action against London Underwriters on March 26, in state court in Travis County. The Hill Group's codefendants in the Winkler County litigation joined in this suit and asserted claims against certain Texas insurers, thus rendering the parties nondiverse and the suit nonremovable. On the same day that the Hill Group filed their Travis County action, they moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay London Underwriters' federal declaratory judgment action. After receiving submissions from the parties on the issue, the District Court entered a stay on June 30, The District Court observed that the state lawsuit pending in Travis County encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the |
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