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Justice Thomas | 2,019 | 1 | concurring | Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4621279/merck-sharp-dohme-corp-v-albrecht/ | UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT [May 20, 2019] JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH join, concurring in the judgment. I concur in the judgment because I agree with the Court’s decision on the only question that it actually de- cides, namely, that whether federal law allowed Merck to include in the Fosamax label the warning alleged to be required by state law is a question of law to be decided by the courts, not a question of fact. I do not, however, join the opinion of the Court because I am concerned that its discussion of the law and the facts may be misleading on remand. I I begin with the law. The Court correctly notes that a drug manufacturer may prove impossibility pre-emption by showing that “federal law (including appropriate [Food and Drug Administration (FDA)] actions) prohibited the drug manufacturer from adding any and all warnings to the drug label that would satisfy state law.” Ante, at 13. But in expounding further on the pre-emption analysis, the Court provides a skewed summary. While dwelling on our decision in v. Levine, see ante, at 9–14, the Court barely notes a statutory provision enacted after the underlying events in that case that may have an important bearing on the ultimate pre-emption 2 MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. v. ALBRECHT ALITO, J., concurring in judgment analysis in this case. Under 21 U.S. C. which was enacted in 2007, Congress has imposed on the FDA a duty to initiate a label change “[i]f the Secretary becomes aware of new information, including any new safety information that the Secretary determines should be included in the label- ing of the drug.”* This provision does not relieve drug manufacturers of their own responsibility to maintain their drug labels, see but the FDA’s “actions,” ante, at 13, taken pursuant to this duty arguably affect the pre-emption analysis. This is so because, if the FDA declines to require a label change despite having received and considered information regarding a new risk, the logical conclusion is that the FDA determined that a label change was unjustified. See United (“The pre- sumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the con- trary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties”). The FDA’s duty does not depend on whether the relevant drug manufacturer, as opposed to some other entity or individual, brought the new infor- mation to the FDA’s attention. Cf. ante, at 13 (“the drug manufacturer [must] show that it |
Justice Thomas | 2,019 | 1 | concurring | Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4621279/merck-sharp-dohme-corp-v-albrecht/ | ante, at 13 (“the drug manufacturer [must] show that it fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law”). Nor does require the FDA to com- municate to the relevant drug manufacturer that a label change is unwarranted; instead, the FDA could simply consider the new information and decide not to act. Cf. ante, at 13 (“[T]he FDA, in turn, [must have] informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve —————— *Prior to October 2018, ’s language contained slight differences not relevant here. See Substance Use–Disorder Prevention That Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Com- munities Act, Pub. L. 115–271, –3943, effective Oct. 24, 2018. Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 3 ALITO, J., concurring in judgment changing the drug’s label to include that warning”). Section 355(o)(4)(A) is thus highly relevant to the pre- emption analysis, which turns on whether “federal law (including appropriate FDA actions) prohibited the drug manufacturer from adding any and all warnings to the drug label that would satisfy state law.” Ante, at 13 (em- phasis added). On remand, I assume that the Court of Appeals will consider the effect of on the pre- emption issue in this case. Two other aspects of the Court’s discussion of the legal background must also be mentioned. First, although the Court’s discussion of the point is a bit opaque, the Court holds—correctly, in my view—that ’s use of the phrase “clear evidence” was merely a rhetorical flourish. As the Court explains, a judge, in determining whether federal law would permit a label change allegedly required by state law, “must simply ask himself or herself whether the relevant federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably con- flic[t].’ ” Ante, at 14 ). Standards of proof, such as preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence, have no place in the resolution of this question of law. Second, for reasons that entirely escape me, the Court refuses to acknowledge that there are two ways in which a drug manufacturer may attempt to alter a drug’s label. The Court notes that a manufacturer may proceed under the FDA’s “ ‘changes being effected’ ” or “ ‘CBE’ ” regulation, which permits a manufacturer to change a label without prior FDA approval under some circumstances. See ante, at 3–4, 14. But the Court refuses to note that a manufac- turer may (and, in many circumstances, must) submit a Prior Approval Supplement (PAS). (b) (2018). As the name suggests, changes proposed in a PAS must receive FDA approval before drug manufac- turers may make the changes. And |
Justice Thomas | 2,019 | 1 | concurring | Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4621279/merck-sharp-dohme-corp-v-albrecht/ | approval before drug manufac- turers may make the changes. And 4 MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. v. ALBRECHT ALITO, J., concurring in judgment “[h]istorically,” the FDA has “accepted PAS applications instead of CBE supplements, as occurred in this case, particularly where significant questions exist on whether to revise or how to modify existing drug labeling.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5. II I now turn to the facts. Resolution of the legal question that the Court decides does not require much discussion of the facts, but if the Court wishes to include such a sum- mary, its presentation should be balanced. Instead, the Court provides a one-sided account. For example, it high- lights historical accounts dating back to the 1990s that purportedly linked atypical femoral fractures with Fosa- max use, see ante, at 5, 7, but it omits any mention of the extensive communication between Merck and the FDA during the relevant period. A reader of the Court’s opinion will inevitably be left with the impression that, once the FDA rejected Merck’s proposed warning in 2009, neither the FDA nor Merck took any other actions related to atypical femoral fractures “until 2011,” ante, at 6. But that is simply not true. While Merck’s 2008 proposal was pending, the FDA remained in contact with Merck about the issue of atypical femoral fractures, which Merck, at the time, labeled as a type of stress fracture. See, e.g., App. 707, 746–748. An internal Merck memorandum describes a phone call in which an FDA official allegedly told Merck that “[t]he conflicting nature of the literature does not provide a clear path forward, and more time will be need[ed] for FDA to formulate a formal opinion on the issue of a precaution around these data.” In an e-mail about a week later, another FDA official told Merck that the FDA would “close out” Merck’s applications if Merck “agree[d] to hold off on the [Precautions] language at this time.” The official went on to say that the FDA “would then work Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 5 ALITO, J., concurring in judgment with Merck to decide on language for a [Precautions] atypical fracture language, if it is warranted.” Then, months after the FDA rejected Merck’s proposed warning, the FDA issued a Safety Announcement regard- ing its “[o]ngoing safety review of oral bisphosphonates and atypical subtrochanteric femur fractures.” The Safety Announcement stated that, “[a]t this point, the data that FDA has reviewed have not shown a clear con- nection between bisphosphonate use and a risk of atypical subtrochanteric femur fractures.” Nonetheless, the Safety Announcement |
Justice Thomas | 2,019 | 1 | concurring | Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4621279/merck-sharp-dohme-corp-v-albrecht/ | risk of atypical subtrochanteric femur fractures.” Nonetheless, the Safety Announcement announced the FDA’s intent to further study the issue alongside a task force formed to address the atypical fractures. –520. And the Safety Announcement concluded by admonishing healthcare professionals to “continue to follow the recom- mendations in the drug label when prescribing oral bisphosphonates” and patients to “not stop taking their medication unless told to do so by their healthcare profes- sional.” at 520–521. In September 2010, the task force published its report, which concluded that, although there was no established “causal association” between bisphosphonates and atypical femoral fractures, “recent observations suggest that the risk rises with increasing duration of exposure, and there is concern that lack of awareness and underreporting may mask the true incidence of the problem.” The same day, the FDA issued a statement acknowledging the task force report and committing to “considering label revisions.” at 523–525. And in October 2010, the FDA issued another Safety Announcement in which the FDA stated that it would initiate changes in the Precautions section of bisphosphonate drug labels to warn of atypical femoral fractures. at 246–249. It was not until then that, pursuant to its obligations, the FDA instructed Merck to include a warning about such frac- tures in its Fosamax drug labels. at 526–534. 6 MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. v. ALBRECHT ALITO, J., concurring in judgment Thus, for years the FDA was: aware of this issue, com- municating with drug manufacturers, studying all rele- vant information, and instructing healthcare professionals and patients alike to continue to use Fosamax as directed. For this reason, the FDA itself, speaking through the Solicitor General, takes the position that the FDA’s deci- sion not to require a label change prior to October 2010 reflected the FDA’s “determin[ation]” that a new warning “should [not] be included in the labeling of the drug,” See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30, 33–34. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment only |
Justice Stevens | 2,005 | 16 | majority | Illinois v. Caballes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137742/illinois-v-caballes/ | Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped respondent for speeding on an interstate highway. When Gillette radioed the police dispatcher to report the stop, a second trooper, Craig Graham, a member of the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team, overheard the transmission and immediately headed for the scene with his narcotics-detection dog. When they arrived, respondent's car was on the shoulder of the road and respondent was in Gillette's vehicle. While Gillette was in the process of writing a warning ticket, Graham walked his dog around respondent's car. The dog alerted at the trunk. Based on that alert, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested respondent. The entire incident lasted less than 10 minutes. *7 Respondent was convicted of a narcotics offense and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and a $256,136 fine. The trial judge denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence and to quash his arrest. He held that the officers had not unnecessarily prolonged the stop and that the dog alert was sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause to conduct the search. Although the Appellate Court affirmed, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that because the canine sniff was performed without any "`specific and articulable facts'" to suggest drug activity, the use of the dog "unjustifiably enlarg[ed] the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation." The question on which we granted certiorari, is narrow: "Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop." Pet. for Cert. i. Thus, we proceed on the assumption that the officer conducting the dog sniff had no information about respondent except that he had been stopped for speeding; accordingly, we have omitted any reference to facts about respondent that might have triggered a modicum of suspicion. Here, the initial seizure of respondent when he was stopped on the highway was based on probable cause and was concededly lawful. It is nevertheless clear that a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. United A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. In an earlier case involving a dog sniff that occurred during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court held that use of the dog and the subsequent discovery *8 of contraband were the product of an unconstitutional seizure. We may |
Justice Stevens | 2,005 | 16 | majority | Illinois v. Caballes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137742/illinois-v-caballes/ | contraband were the product of an unconstitutional seizure. We may assume that a similar result would be warranted in this case if the dog sniff had been conducted while respondent was being unlawfully detained. In the state-court proceedings, however, the judges carefully reviewed the details of Officer Gillette's conversations with respondent and the precise timing of his radio transmissions to the dispatcher to determine whether he had improperly extended the duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to occur. We have not recounted those details because we accept the state court's conclusion that the duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop. Despite this conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the initially lawful traffic stop became an unlawful seizure solely as a result of the canine sniff that occurred outside respondent's stopped car. That is, the court characterized the dog sniff as the cause rather than the consequence of a constitutional violation. In its view, the use of the dog converted the citizen-police encounter from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation, and because the shift in purpose was not supported by any reasonable suspicion that respondent possessed narcotics, it was unlawful. In our view, conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent's constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Our cases hold that it did not. Official conduct that does not "compromise any legitimate interest in privacy" is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed "legitimate," and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband "compromises no legitimate privacy interest." This is because the expectation *9 "that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities" is not the same as an interest in "privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable." In United we treated a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog as "sui generis" because it "discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item." ; see also Respondent likewise concedes that "drug sniffs are designed, and if properly conducted are generally likely, to reveal only the presence of contraband." Brief for Respondent 17. Although respondent argues that the error rates, particularly the existence of false positives, call into question the premise that drug-detection dogs alert only to contraband, the record contains no evidence or |
Justice Stevens | 2,005 | 16 | majority | Illinois v. Caballes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137742/illinois-v-caballes/ | alert only to contraband, the record contains no evidence or findings that support his argument. Moreover, respondent does not suggest that an erroneous alert, in and of itself, reveals any legitimate private information, and, in this case, the trial judge found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause to conduct a full-blown search of the trunk. Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dogone that "does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view," 462 U. S., during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent's car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on respondent's privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement. This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful search. Critical to that decision was the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activityin that case, intimate details in a *410 home, such as "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath." The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of this case. |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109631/united-states-v-martin-linen-supply-co/ | A "hopelessly deadlocked" jury was discharged when unable to agree upon a verdict at the criminal contempt trial of respondent corporations in the District Court for the Western District of Texas.[1] Federal Rule Crim. Proc. 29 (c) provides *566 that in such case "a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made within 7 days after the jury is discharged [and] the court may enter judgment of acquittal."[2] Timely motions for judgments of acquittal under the Rule made by respondents six days after the discharge of the jury resulted two months later in the entry by the District Court of judgments of acquittal.[3] The sole question presented for our *567 decision is whether these judgments of acquittal under Rule 29 (c) are appealable by the United pursuant to 18 U.S. C. 3731. Section 3731 provides that an appeal by the United in a criminal case "shall lie to a court of appeals from a judgment of a district court dismissing an indictment except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United Constitution prohibits further prosecution."[4] The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that no appeal lay under 3731 from the judgments of acquittal entered by the District Court under Rule 29 (c). The Court of Appeals reasoned that, since reversal of the acquittals would enable the United to try respondents a second time, the bar of the Double Jeopardy Clause "leads inescapably to the conclusion that no appeal lies from the directed verdict ordered by the court below."[5] We granted certiorari. We affirm. *568 I It has long been established that the United cannot appeal in a criminal case without express congressional authorization. United ; United Only two Terms ago traced the uneven course of such statutory authority until 1970 when Congress amended the Criminal Appeals 420 U.S., at -339, and that history need not be repeated here. See also United It suffices for present purposes that this Court in found that in enacting 3731 as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control of 1970, "Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit." Therefore, unless barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, appeals by the Government from the judgments of acquittal entered by the District Court under Rule 29 (c) are authorized by 3731. Consideration of the reach of the constitutional limitations inhibiting governmental appeals was largely unnecessary during the prior regime of statutory restrictions. But see Fong ; However, now that Congress has removed the statutory limitations to appeal |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109631/united-states-v-martin-linen-supply-co/ | now that Congress has removed the statutory limitations to appeal and the relevant inquiry turns on the reach of the Double Jeopardy Clause itself, it has become "necessary to take a closer look at the policies underlying the Clause in order to determine more precisely the boundaries of the Government's appeal rights in criminal cases." United In the few cases decided since 1970 that have taken this "closer look," many of the policies shaping restrictions on governmental appeal rights have been brought into sharper focus. "The development of the Double Jeopardy Clause from its *569 common-law origins suggests that it was directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions, not at Government appeals, at least where those appeals would not require a new trial." Thus held that the "controlling constitutional principle" focuses on prohibitions against multiple trials. At the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second trial for the same offense would arm Government with a potent instrument of oppression. The Clause, therefore, guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict the accused, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." ; see also "[S]ociety's awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws." United[6] In animating this prohibition against multiple prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause rests upon two threshold conditions. The protections afforded by the Clause are implicated only when the accused has actually been placed in jeopardy. This state of jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn, or, in a bench trial, when the judge begins to receive evidence. ; Further, where *570 a Government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended. Thus a postverdict dismissal of an indictment after a jury rendered a guilty verdict has been held to be appealable by the United because restoration of the guilty verdict, and not a new trial, would necessarily result if the Government prevailed. United [7] II None of the considerations favoring appealability is present in the case of a Government appeal from the District Court's judgments of acquittal under Rule 29 (c) where the jury failed to agree on a verdict. The normal |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109631/united-states-v-martin-linen-supply-co/ | the jury failed to agree on a verdict. The normal policy granting the Government the right to retry a defendant after a mistrial that does not determine the outcome of a trial, United v. Perez, is not applicable since valid judgments of acquittal were entered on the express authority of, and strictly in compliance with, Rule 29 (c). Those judgments, according to the very wording of the Rule, act to terminate a trial in which jeopardy has long since attached.[8] And a successful governmental appeal reversing the judgments of acquittal would necessitate another trial, or, at least, "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged" United v. Jenkins, Therefore, the present case is not one where the *571 double jeopardy bar to appealability is automatically averted. Rather, we must inquire further into the constitutional significance of a Rule 29 (c) acquittal. Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that "[a] verdict of acquittal. could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution." United v. Ball, In Fong for example, a District Court directed jury verdicts of acquittal and subsequently entered formal judgments of acquittal. The Court of Appeals entertained the appeal of the United and reversed the District Court's ruling on the ground that the trial judge was without power to direct acquittals under the circumstances disclosed by the record. We reversed, holding that, although the Court of Appeals may correctly have believed "that the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation, [n]evertheless, `[t]he verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed without putting [the defendants] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.' " See also United -290; In applying this teaching of Ball, Fong Foo, and like cases, we have emphasized that what constitutes an "acquittal" is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's action. United ; cf. United 420 U. S., at[9] Rather, we must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. There can be no question that the judgments of acquittal *572 entered here by the District Court were "acquittals" in substance as well as form. The District Court plainly granted the Rule 29 (c) motion on the view that the Government had not proved facts constituting criminal contempt.[10] The court made only too clear its belief that |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109631/united-states-v-martin-linen-supply-co/ | contempt.[10] The court made only too clear its belief that the prosecution was " `the weakest [contempt case that] I've ever seen.' " In entering the judgments of acquittal, the court also recorded its view that " `the Government has failed to prove the material allegations beyond a reasonable doubt' " and that " `defendant should be found "not guilty." ' " Thus, it is plain that the District Court in this case evaluated the Government's evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court of Appeals concluded that this determination of insufficiency of the evidence triggered double jeopardy protection.[11] The Government, however, disputes the constitutional significance of the District Court's action. It submits that only a verdict of acquittal formally returned by the jury should absolutely bar further proceedings and that "[o]nce the district court declared a mistrial and dismissed the jury, any double jeopardy bar to a second trial dissolved." Brief for United 21. We cannot agree. Of course, as the Government argues, in a jury trial the primary finders of fact are the jurors. Their overriding responsibility is to stand between the accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government that is in command of the criminal sanction. For this reason, a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict, see Sparf & Hansen v. United ; Carpenters v. United *573 regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction. The trial judge is thereby barred from attempting to override or interfere with the jurors' independent judgment in a manner contrary to the interests of the accused. Such a limitation on the role of a trial judge, however, has never inhibited his ruling in favor of a criminal defendant. Fong establishing the binding nature of a directed verdict, is dispositive on that point. Since Rule 29 merely replaces the directed-verdict mechanism employed in Fong Foo, and accords the federal trial judge greater flexibility in timing his judgment of acquittal, no persuasive basis exists for construing the Rule as weakening the trial court's binding authority for purposes of double jeopardy.[12] Rather, the Notes of the Advisory Committee have confirmed that Rule 29 intends no substantive alteration in the role of judge or jury, but creates a purely formal modification of the directed-verdict device in order "to make the nomenclature accord with the realities." 18 U.S. C. App., p. 4504. Accordingly, United held that Rule 29 recognizes no "legal distinction" between judge and jury with respect to the invocation |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109631/united-states-v-martin-linen-supply-co/ | distinction" between judge and jury with respect to the invocation of the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Government, however, would read Fong Foo and, by implication, Rule 29 differently. It argues that the judge's directed verdict in Fong Foo was binding for double jeopardy *574 purposes because the formal verdict of acquittal, though on direction, was rendered not by the judge, but by the jury, which then was discharged. This in effect turns the constitutional significance of a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal on a matter of timing. Thus, if the judge orders entry of judgment of acquittal on his own or on defendant's motion prior to submission of the case to the jury, as he may under Rule 29 (a), or after submission but prior to the jury's return of a verdict, as authorized by Rule 29 (b)and the jury thereafter is dischargedthe Government's argument necessarily concedes that the Double Jeopardy Clause would preclude both appeal and retrial. If, however, the judge chooses to await the outcome of the jury's deliberations and, upon its failure to reach a verdict, acts on a timely motion for acquittal filed under Rule 29 (c) within seven days of its discharge, the Government submits that the Double Jeopardy Clause should not bar an appeal. We are not persuaded. Rule 29 contemplated no such artificial distinctions. Rather the differentiations in timing were intentionally incorporated into the Rule to afford a trial judge the maximum opportunity to consider with care a pending acquittal motion. Insofar as the Government desires an appeal to correct error, irrational behavior, or prejudice on the part of the trial judge, its interest is not dependent on the point of trial when the judge enters his Rule 29 judgment, and suffers no special prejudice by a judge's acquittal after the jury disagrees and is discharged.[13] And to the extent that *575 the judge's authority under Rule 29 is designed to provide additional protection to a defendant by filtering out deficient prosecutions, the defendant's interest in such protection is essentially identical both before the jury is allowed to come to a verdict and after the jury is unable to reach a verdict: In either case, the defendant has neither been condemned nor exculpated by a panel of his peers and, in the absence of intervention by the trial judge, his vindication must await further action by a jury. We thus conclude that judgments under Rule 29 are to be treated uniformly and, accordingly, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars appeal from an acquittal entered under Rule 29 (c) after a jury |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109631/united-states-v-martin-linen-supply-co/ | an acquittal entered under Rule 29 (c) after a jury mistrial no less than under Rule 29 (a) or (b). United v. Sanford, does not dictate a contrary result. In Sanford, a jury trial ended in the declaration of a mistrial. A judgment of acquittal was never entered. Some four months later, with the second trial well into the preparatory stage, the trial court dismissed the prosecution's indictment. Because the dismissal "occurred several months after the first trial had ended in a mistrial, but before the retrial of respondents had begun," the Court characterized the judge's dismissal as "a pretrial order," ib and concluded that its appealability was governed by The Court's linking of Sanford with Serfass highlights the distinctiveness of an acquittal under Rule 29 (c). In Serfass the Court carefully distinguished between appeal of a pretrial order and appeal of " `a legal determination on the basis of facts adduced at the trial relating to the general issue of the case.' " quoting United 399 U. S., n. 19. A Rule 29 acquittal, however, falls squarely within the latter category: By the very language of *576 the Rule, such a judgment of acquittal plainly concludes a pending prosecution in which jeopardy has attached, following the introduction at trial of evidence on the general issue. In that circumstance we hold that "although retrial is sometimes permissible after a mistrial is declared but no verdict or judgment has been entered, the verdict of acquittal foreclosed retrial and thus barred appellate review." United Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice White | 1,989 | 6 | dissenting | Reed v. Transportation Union | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112170/reed-v-transportation-union/ | I am persuaded that the 6-month statute of limitations prescribed by 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 *335 U. S. C. 160(b), should govern this action brought under 101 of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S. C. 411. Title I was part of a statute the purpose of which was to require that unions and employers adhere to high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in order to protect employee rights to organize and bargain collectively. Title I was thus necessary to eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part of labor unions and employers that "distort and defeat" the policies of the labor laws. 401(a)-(c). It is not readily apparent to me that Congress was simply moving to enforce the First Amendment rather than to ensure that unions were truly and effectively the representatives of their members for the purpose of collective bargaining. I therefore do not think that the 42 U.S. C. 1983 rule furnishes a closer analogy than does 10(b); neither does it serve the policies of the labor laws nor further the interests of consistency and repose that are involved in the early settlement of disputes between unions and their members. Undeniably, Congress made it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their organizational and collective-bargaining rights, 29 U.S. C. 158(a), thus seeking to protect the same interests furthered by Title I, yet insisting that such charges be aired and decided in prompt fashion. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that a great many alleged violations of Title I could be filed with the Board as unfair labor practices subject to the 6-month limitations period of 10(b). I find nothing of real substance in the Court's opinion to justify borrowing the much longer state statute that was not designed with the interests of the federal labor laws in mind. Respectfully, I dissent. |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | United States v. Timmreck | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110080/united-states-v-timmreck/ | The question presented is whether a conviction based on a guilty plea is subject to collateral attack whenever it can be shown that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was violated when the plea was accepted. In this case, acting on the advice of counsel, respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute various controlled substances. As required by Rule 11,[1] the District Judge formally addressed respondent and determined that *782 there was a factual basis for the plea and that he was acting voluntarily. The judge explained that respondent could receive a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment and a $25,000 fine, but the judge failed to describe the mandatory special parole term of at least 3 years required by the applicable statute.[2] The District Judge accepted the guilty plea and, at a later proceeding, sentenced respondent to 10 years' imprisonment plus a special parole term of 5 years, and a fine of $5,000. Pursuant to a plea bargain with the prosecutor, other charges against respondent were dismissed. No objection to the sentence was raised at the time, and respondent did not take an appeal from his conviction. About two years later, respondent moved to vacate the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2255[3] on the ground that the trial judge had violated Rule 11 by accepting his plea without informing him of the mandatory special parole term. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing, at which respondent's lawyer testified that it was his normal practice to inform his clients about the mandatory special parole term but that he could not recall whether or not he had given such advice to this defendant. Following this hearing, the District Court denied the motion. The court recognized that a violation of Rule 11 had occurred, but concluded that it did not justify collateral relief under 2255 because respondent *783 had not suffered any prejudice inasmuch as he had received a sentence within the maximum described to him at the time the guilty plea was accepted. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that a violation of Rule 11 will support a collateral attack on a conviction based on a guilty plea even when there is neither constitutional error nor any showing of special prejudice to the defendant. Because of the importance of that holding to the administration of justice, we granted certiorari, and now reverse. In the Court was presented with the question whether a collateral attack under 2255 could be predicated on a violation of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (a), which gives the defendant the |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | United States v. Timmreck | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110080/united-states-v-timmreck/ | Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (a), which gives the defendant the right to make a statement on his own behalf before he is sentenced. The Court rejected the claim, stating: "The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. It does not present `exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.' See ; ; 312 U.S. 5;" The reasoning in Hill is equally applicable to a formal violation of Rule 11. Such a violation is neither constitutional nor jurisdictional: the 1966 amendment to Rule 11 *784 obviously could not amend the Constitution or limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nor can any claim reasonably be made that the error here resulted in a "complete miscarriage of justice" or in a proceeding "inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Respondent does not argue that he was actually unaware of the special parole term or that, if he had been properly advised by the trial judge, he would not have pleaded guilty. His only claim is of a technical violation of the Rule. That claim could have been raised on direct appeal, see but was not. And there is no basis here for allowing collateral attack "to do service for an appeal." Indeed, if anything, this case may be a stronger one for foreclosing collateral relief than the Hill case. For the concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack[4] has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas. "Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice. The impact is greatest when new grounds for setting aside guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of criminal convictions result from such pleas. Moreover, the concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant is only rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea." United (Stevens, J., dissenting). As in Hill, we find it unnecessary to consider whether 2255 relief would be available if a violation of Rule |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | dissenting | Estelle v. Gamble | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109561/estelle-v-gamble/ | Most of what is said in the Court's opinion is entirely consistent with the way the lower federal courts have been processing claims that the medical treatment of prison inmates is so inadequate as to constitute the cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. I have no serious disagreement with the way this area of the law has developed thus far, or with the probable impact of this opinion. Nevertheless, there are three reasons why I am unable to join it. First, insofar as the opinion orders the dismissal of the complaint against the chief medical *109 officer of the prison, it is not faithful to the rule normally applied in construing the allegations in a pleading prepared by an uncounseled inmate. Second, it does not adequately explain why the Court granted certiorari in this case. Third, it describes the State's duty to provide adequate medical care to prisoners in ambiguous terms which incorrectly relate to the subjective motivation of persons accused of violating the Eighth Amendment rather than to the standard of care required by the Constitution. I The complaint represents a crude attempt to challenge the system of administering medical care in the prison where Gamble is confined. Fairly construed, the complaint alleges that he received a serious disabling back injury in November 1973, that the responsible prison authorities were indifferent to his medical needs, and that as a result of that indifference he has been mistreated and his condition has worsened. The indifference is allegedly manifested, not merely by the failure or refusal to diagnose and treat his injury properly, but also by the conduct of the prison staff. Gamble was placed in solitary confinement for prolonged periods as punishment for refusing to perform assigned work which he was physically unable to perform.[1] The only medical evidence presented to the disciplinary committee was the statement of a medical assistant that he was in first-class condition, when in fact he was suffering not only from the back sprain but from high blood pressure. Prison guards refused *110 to permit him to sleep in the bunk that a doctor had assigned. On at least one occasion a medical prescription was not filled for four days because it was lost by staff personnel. When he suffered chest pains and blackouts while in solitary, he was forced to wait 12 hours to see a doctor because clearance had to be obtained from the warden. His complaint also draws into question the character of the attention he received from the doctors and the inmate nurse in response to his 17 |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | dissenting | Estelle v. Gamble | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109561/estelle-v-gamble/ | doctors and the inmate nurse in response to his 17 attempts to obtain proper diagnosis and treatment for his condition. However, apart from the medical director who saw him twice, he has not sued any of the individuals who saw him on these occasions. In short, he complains that the system as a whole is inadequate. On the basis of Gamble's handwritten complaint it is impossible to assess the quality of the medical attention he received. As the Court points out, even if what he alleges is true, the doctors may be guilty of nothing more than negligence or malpractice. On the other hand, it is surely not inconceivable that an overworked, undermanned medical staff in a crowded prison[2] is following the expedient course of routinely prescribing nothing more than pain killers when a thorough diagnosis would disclose an obvious need for remedial treatment.[3] Three fine judges *111 sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit[4] thought that enough had been alleged to require some inquiry into the actual facts. If this Court meant what it said in these judges were clearly right.[5] *112 The Haines test is not whether the facts alleged in the complaint would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Rather, it is whether the Court can say with assurance on the basis of the complaint that, beyond any doubt, no set of facts could be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.[6] The reasons for the Haines test are manifest. A pro se complaint provides an unsatisfactory foundation for deciding the merits of important questions because typically it is inartfully drawn, unclear, and equivocal, and because thorough pleadings, affidavits, and possibly an evidentiary hearing will usually bring out facts which simplify or make unnecessary the decision of questions presented by the naked complaint.[7] *113 Admittedly, it is tempting to eliminate the meritless complaint at the pleading stage. Unfortunately, this "is another instance of judicial haste which in the long run makes waste," cited with approval in In the instant case, if the District Court had resisted the temptation of premature dismissal, the case might long since have ended with the filing of medical records or affidavits demonstrating adequate treatment. Likewise, if the decision of the Fifth Circuit reinstating the complaint had been allowed to stand and the case had run its normal course, the litigation probably would have come to an end without the need for review by this Court. Even if the Fifth Circuit had wrongly decided the pleading issue, no great harm would have been done by requiring the State |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | dissenting | Estelle v. Gamble | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109561/estelle-v-gamble/ | great harm would have been done by requiring the State to produce its medical records and move for summary judgment. Instead, the case has been prolonged by two stages of appellate review, and is still not over: The case against two of the defendants may still proceed, and even the *114 claims against the prison doctors have not been disposed of with finality.[8] The principal beneficiaries of today's decision will not be federal judges, very little of whose time will be saved, but rather the "writ-writers" within the prison walls, whose semiprofessional services will be in greater demand. I have no doubt about the ability of such a semiprofessional to embellish this pleading with conclusory allegations which could be made in all good faith and which would foreclose a dismissal without any response from the State. It is unfortunate that today's decision will increase prisoners' dependence on those writ-writers. See 327 n. 7 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). II Like the District Court's decision to dismiss the complaint, this Court's decision to hear this case, in violation of its normal practice of denying interlocutory review, see *115 R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 180 (4th ed. 1969), ill serves the interest of judicial economy. Frankly, I was, and still am, puzzled by the Court's decision to grant certiorari.[9] If the Court merely thought the Fifth Circuit misapplied by reading the complaint too liberally, the grant of certiorari is inexplicable. On the other hand, if the Court thought that instead of a pleading question, the case presented an important constitutional question about the State's duty to provide medical care to prisoners, the crude allegations of this complaint do not provide the kind of factual basis[10] the Court normally requires as a predicate for the adjudication of a novel and serious constitutional issue, see, e. g., Rescue ; ; (Harlan, J., concurring).[11] Moreover, as the Court notes, all the Courts of Appeals to consider the question have reached substantially the same conclusion that the Court adopts. Ante, at 106 n. 14. Since the Court seldom takes a case merely to reaffirm settled law, I fail to understand why it has chosen to make this case an exception to its normal practice. *116 III By its reference to the accidental character of the first unsuccessful attempt to electrocute the prisoner in Louisiana ex rel. see ante, at 105, and by its repeated references to "deliberate indifference" and the "intentional" denial of adequate medical care, I believe the Court improperly attaches significance to the subjective motivation of the defendant as a criterion for determining |
Justice Thomas | 2,020 | 1 | dissenting | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4748671/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires a federal permit for “the discharge of any pollutant by any person.” 33 U.S. C. see The CWA defines a “discharge” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” Based on the statutory text and structure, I would hold that a permit is required only when a point source discharges pollutants directly into navigable waters. The Court adopts this interpretation in part, con- cluding that a permit is required for “a direct discharge.” Ante, at 15. But the Court then departs from the statutory text by requiring a permit for “the functional equivalent of a direct discharge,” which it defines through an open- ended inquiry into congressional intent and practical con- siderations. Because I would adhere to the text, I respect- fully dissent. —————— 1 The CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” It defines a “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be dis- charged,” excluding “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” 2 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND THOMAS, J., dissenting I A In interpreting the statutory definition of “discharge,” the Court focuses on the word “from,” but the most helpful word is “addition.” That word, together with “to” and “from,” limits the meaning of “discharge” to the augmentation of navigable waters. Dictionary definitions of “addition” denote an augmenta- tion or increase. Webster’s Third New International Dic- tionary defines “addition” as “the act or process of adding: the joining or uniting of one thing to another.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 24 (1961); see also (listing “increase” and “augmentation” as synonyms for “ad- dition”). Other dictionary definitions from around the time of the statute’s enactment are in accord. See, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary 14, 15 (1981) (defining “addition” as “[t]he act or process of adding” and defining “add” as “[t]o join or unite so as to increase in size, quantity, or scope”); see also Webster’s New International Dictionary 29, 30 (2d ed. 1957) (defining “addition” as the “[a]ct, process, or in- stance of adding,” and defining “add” as to “join or unite, as one thing to another, or as several particulars, so as to in- crease the number, augment the quantity, enlarge the mag- nitude, or so as to form into one aggregate”). The inclusion of the term “addition” in |
Justice Thomas | 2,020 | 1 | dissenting | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4748671/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | into one aggregate”). The inclusion of the term “addition” in the CWA indicates that the statute excludes anything other than a direct dis- charge. When a point source releases pollutants to ground- water, one would naturally say that the groundwater has been augmented with pollutants from the point source. If the pollutants eventually reach navigable waters, one would not naturally say that the navigable waters have been augmented with pollutants from the point source. The augmentation instead occurs with pollutants from the groundwater. The prepositions “from” and “to” reinforce this reading. When pollutants are released from a point source to another Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 3 THOMAS, J., dissenting point source or groundwater, they are added to the second from the first. If the pollutants are later released to navi- gable waters, they are added to the navigable waters from the second point source or the groundwater. One would not naturally say that the pollutants are added to the navigable waters from the original point source. Interpreting “discharge” to mean a direct discharge makes sense of other parts of the definition as well. It re- spects the statutory definition of a point source as a “con- veyance,” see because a point source that re- leases pollutants directly into navigable waters is a means of conveyance. And it makes sense of the word “any” before “point source,” because that term clarifies that any kind of point source may require a permit. The structure of the CWA confirms this interpretation. It authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate discharges from point sources, including through the permitting process, but it reserves to the States the pri- mary responsibility for regulating other sources of pollu- tion, including groundwater. With respect to these sources, the EPA merely collects information, coordinates with the States, and provides funding. See 33 U.S. C. 1254(a)(5), 1282(b)(2), 1288, 1314(a), 9; ante, at 6–7. In the CWA, Congress expressly stated its “policy to recog- nize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.” Thus, construing the EPA’s power to regulate point sources to allow the agency to regulate nonpoint sources and groundwater is in serious tension with Con- gress’ design. My reading is also consistent with our decision in South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). The petitioner in that case argued that no permit was required when a point source was not the original source of the pollutant but instead conveyed the pollutant from further up a chain of sources. We rejected 4 COUNTY |
Justice Thomas | 2,020 | 1 | dissenting | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4748671/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | further up a chain of sources. We rejected 4 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND THOMAS, J., dissenting that argument because “a point source need not be the orig- inal source of the pollutant; it need only convey the pollu- tant to ‘navigable waters.’ ” Although that case did not involve the exact question presented here, the direct-discharge interpretation comports well with that previous decision. B The Court’s main textual argument reads the word “from” in isolation. But as the Court recognizes, “the word ‘from’ necessarily draws its meaning from context.” Ante, at 9–10. The Court’s example using “arrive” instead of “ad- dition” is thus unpersuasive, ante, at 13–14, because “from” takes different meanings with different verbs. The Court’s culinary example also misses the mark, ante, at 14, because if the drippings from the meat collect in the pan before the chef adds them to the gravy, the drippings are added to the gravy from the pan, not from the meat. This point becomes clear if we reorder the majority’s recipe to match the stat- ute; the chef has not added the drippings to the gravy from the meat. The Court’s bathwater example, ante, at 14, suf- fers from the same problem; if the well water is put in a bucket before it is put in the bathtub, it is added to the bath- tub from the bucket. Only by reading the phrase in its en- tirety can we interpret the definition of “discharge.” See The Court also asserts that a narrower reading than the one it adopts would create a “massive loophole” in the stat- ute. Ante, at 15. Far from creating a loophole, my reading is the most logical because it is consonant with the scope of Congress’ power. The CWA presumably was passed as an exercise of Congress’ authority “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U. S. Const., Art. I, cl. 3. My inter- pretation ties the statute more closely to navigable waters, on the theory that they are at least a channel of these kinds Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 5 THOMAS, J., dissenting of commerce. Further, the Court’s interpretation creates practical problems of its own. As the Court acknowledges, its opinion gives almost no guidance, save for a list of seven factors. But the Court does not commit to whether those factors are the only relevant ones, whether those factors are always relevant, or which factors are the most important. See ante, at 15–16. It ultimately does little to explain how function- ally |
Justice Thomas | 2,020 | 1 | dissenting | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4748671/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | 15–16. It ultimately does little to explain how function- ally equivalent an indirect discharge must be to require a permit.2 The Court suggests that the EPA could clarify matters through “administrative guidance,” ante, at 17, but so far the EPA has provided only limited advice and recently shifted its position, see (2019); ante, at 11–12. In any event, the sort of “ ‘general rules’ ” that the Court hopes the EPA will promulgate are constitutionally suspect. See Department of (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Despite giving minimal guidance as to how this case should be decided on remand, the majority speculates about whether a permit would be required in other factual circum- —————— 2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH believes that the Court’s opinion provides enough guidance when it states that “[t]ime and distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case,” ante, at 16 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). See ante, (concurring opin- ion). His hope for guidance appears misplaced. For all we know, these factors may not be the most important in 49 percent of cases. The ma- jority’s nonexhaustive seven-factor test “may aid in identifying relevant facts for analysis, but—like most multifactor tests—it leaves courts adrift once those facts have been identified.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U. S. (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3); see also Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 1186–1187 (1989) (noting that “when balancing is the mode of analysis, not much general guidance may be drawn from the opinion” and arguing that “to- tality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of analysis” should “be avoided where possible”). 6 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND THOMAS, J., dissenting stances. It poses the examples of a pipe that releases pol- lutants over navigable waters and a pipe that releases pol- lutants onto land near navigable waters. As an initial mat- ter, I am not as sure as the majority that a “pollutant,” as defined by the CWA, may be added to the air.3 Even if the majority is correct that a permit is not required in these hypothetical cases, drawing the line at discharges to water is not so absurd as to undermine the most natural reading of the statute. In any event, it is unnecessary to decide these hypothetical cases today. Finally, the Court speculates as to “those circumstances in which Congress intended to require a federal permit.” Ante, at 15. But we are not a superlegislature (or super- EPA) tasked with making good policy—assuming that is even what the Court accomplishes today. “Our |
Justice Thomas | 2,020 | 1 | dissenting | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4748671/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | policy—assuming that is even what the Court accomplishes today. “Our job is to fol- low the text even if doing so will supposedly undercut a basic objective of the statute.” Baker Botts L. L. P. v. ASARCO LLC, (internal quota- tion marks omitted). II I do agree with the Court on several points. First, the interpretation adopted by respondents and the Ninth Cir- cuit is unsupportable. That interpretation—which would require permits for discharges that are “ ‘fairly traceable’ ” to, and proximately caused by, a point source—is atextual and unsettles the CWA’s careful balance between federal regulation of point-source pollution and state regulation of nonpoint-source pollution. Ante, at 5–9. —————— 3 The CWA defines a “pollutant” as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incin- erator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or dis- carded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water,” with certain exceptions. Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 7 THOMAS, J., dissenting Second, I agree that the interpretation adopted by peti- tioner and JUSTICE ALITO reads the word “any” unnatu- rally, ante, at 11, although the majority appears to deploy that argument itself in another part of the opinion, ante, at 14. Petitioner’s and JUSTICE ALITO’s interpretation also gives insufficient weight to the meaning of “addition,” see Third, I agree that the EPA’s interpretation is not enti- tled to deference for at least two reasons: No party requests it, and the EPA’s reading is not the best one. Ante, at 12– 13. I add only that deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., (1984), likely conflicts with the Vesting Clauses of the Con- stitution. See Baldwin v. United States, 589 U. S. – (2020) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., –8); 761–764 (THOMAS, J., concurring); see also (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Finally, I agree with the Court’s implicit conclusion that does not re- solve this case. That plurality opinion, which I joined, ob- served that lower courts have required a permit when pol- lutants pass through a chain of point sources. – 744. But we expressly said in Rapanos that “we [did] not decide this issue.” We are not bound by dictum in a plurality opinion or by the lower court opinions it cited. III The best reading of the statute is that a “discharge” is the release of pollutants directly from a point source to naviga- ble waters. The application of this interpretation to the un- disputed facts of this case makes a remand |
Justice Brennan | 1,971 | 13 | majority | Gainesville Util. Dept. v. Florida Power Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108339/gainesville-util-dept-v-florida-power-corp/ | Under the Federal Power Act, an order of the Federal Power Commission that directs one electric utility "to establish physical connection of its transmission facilities with the facilities of" another utility "may prescribe the terms and conditions of the arrangement to be made including the apportionment of cost between them and the compensation or reimbursement reasonably due to any of them." Federal Power Act 202 (b), 16 U.S. C. 824a (b).[1] The Commission order *17 which directed respondent Florida Power Corp. to interconnect its electric system with that of petitioner Gainesville Utilities Department did not contain a term or condition sought by respondent requiring petitioner to pay an annual standby charge of approximately $10,000 for the emergency or backup service provided by the interconnection, 40 F. P. C. 1227 ; 41 F. P. C. 4 (1969). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, because of the omission of such a term or condition, "the terms of the interconnection do not adequately satisfy the statutory requirements because they do not provide Florida Power with the `reimbursement reasonably due' it. Thus we deny enforcement of this order insofar as no provision for the reasonable compensation of Florida Power is made." We granted the petition for certiorari of Gainesville Utilities Department in No. 464, and of the Federal Power Commission in No. 469, We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied enforcement of the Commission's order and remand for the entry of a new judgment enforcing the Commission's order in its entirety. I The demand upon an electric utility for electric power fluctuates significantly from hour to hour, day to day, *18 and season to season. For this reason, generating facilities cannot be maintained on the basis of a constant demand. Rather, the utility's generating capability must be geared to the utility's peak load of demand, and also take into account the fact that generating equipment must occasionally be out of service for overhaul, or because of breakdowns. In consequence, the utility builds certain "reserves" of generating capacity in excess of peak load requirements into its system.[2] The practice of a utility that relies completely on its own generating resources (an "isolated" system in industry jargon) is to maintain equipment capable of producing its peak load requirements plus equipment that produces a "reserve" capacity equal to the capacity of its largest generating unit. The major importance of an interconnection is that it *19 reduces the need for the "isolated" utility to build and maintain "reserve" generating capacity.[] An interconnection is simply a transmission line connecting |
Justice Brennan | 1,971 | 13 | majority | Gainesville Util. Dept. v. Florida Power Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108339/gainesville-util-dept-v-florida-power-corp/ | generating capacity.[] An interconnection is simply a transmission line connecting two utilities. Electric power may move freely through the line up to the line's capacity. Ordinarily, however, the energy generated by each system is sufficient to supply the requirements of the system's customers and no substantial amount of power flows through the interconnection. It is only at the times when one of the connected utilities is unable for some reason to produce sufficient power to meet its customers' needs that the deficiency may be supplied by power that automatically flows through the interconnection *20 from the other utility. To the extent that the utility may rely upon the interconnection to supply this deficiency, the utility is freed of the necessity of constructing and maintaining its own equipment for the purpose. The Gainesville Utilities Department is a municipally owned and operated electric utility serving approximately 17,000 customers in a 22-square-mile area covering the city of Gainesville and adjacent portions of Alachua County, Florida. In 196, Gainesville's "isolated" system had a total generating capability of 108.4 megawatts (mw) while its peak load was 1.1 mw. Gainesville's generating capacity in 196 consisted of five steam electric generating units ranging from five to 0 mw. Thus Gainesville's generating capacity of 108.4 mw gave it a reserve capacity of 7. mw over its annual peak load of 1.1 mwa reserve adequate to cover the shutdown of the system's largest generating unit of 0 mw. Gainesville's peak load was projected to be doubled to 102 mw by Its capacity, however, was projected to increase to only 18.4 mw through the addition in 1968 of two 1-mw gas-turbine generators. Thus an interconnection was necessary if Gainesville was to avoid having to make a still greater investment in generating equipment. Florida Power Corporation operates a major electric generation, transmission, and distribution system serving 70,000 retail customers in a 20,600-square-mile system serving 2 counties in central and northwest Florida, including Alachua County. It also supplies power at wholesale to 12 municipal distribution systems and 9 REA co-operatives. In 1966, Florida Power had an aggregate generating capability of 19 mw and experienced a peak load of 122 mw. At the time of the hearing before the Commission, Florida Power was building a 2-mw generating unit to begin service in December 1969, and *21 anticipated a generating capability of 2114 mw and a peak load of 1826 mw. Thus the anticipated excess of capacity over peak load, 288 mw, is less than the size of its largest generating unit, 2 mw. However, the deficiency is provided for by interconnections which Florida |
Justice Brennan | 1,971 | 13 | majority | Gainesville Util. Dept. v. Florida Power Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108339/gainesville-util-dept-v-florida-power-corp/ | However, the deficiency is provided for by interconnections which Florida Power has with four other Florida utilities. See n. All five of these utilities constitute the Florida Operating Committee, which, though informal in nature, serves as a medium through which the technical operations of its members are coordinated. As a result of the sharing of reserves made possible by the interconnection of the Committee's members, each utility is able to reduce the reserve generating capacity that would be required if it were electrically isolated. Specifically, each of the Florida Operating Committee members maintains generating capacity equal to 11% of its annual peak load. For several years prior to 196, Gainesville sought to negotiate an "interconnection" with Florida Power and with another member of the Florida Operating Committee, Florida Power & Light. When those efforts failed, Gainesville, in 196, filed an application with the Commission seeking an order under 202 (b) directing Florida Power to interconnect with Gainesville.[4] II Section 202 (b) authorizes the Federal Power Commission to order a utility to interconnect with another, and to "prescribe the terms and conditions of the arrangement." if the Commission "finds such action *22 necessary or appropriate in the public interest," and "if the Commission finds that no undue burden will be placed upon such public utility thereby." The proviso to the section makes explicit that the Commission has no authority in ordering an interconnection "to compel the enlargement of generating facilities [or] to compel such public utility to sell or exchange energy when to do so would impair its ability to render adequate service to its customers." 16 U.S. C. 824a (b). Following extensive hearings, an examiner made findings that the proposed interconnection would be in the public interest and that it would not place an undue burden on Florida Power. The Commission affirmed the findings and further found that the interconnection would neither compel Florida Power to enlarge its generating facilities nor impair its ability to serve its customers. The Commission ordered the interconnection but on conditions (1) that Gainesville pay the entire $ million cost of the interconnection, and (2) that Gainesville maintain generating capacity resources at least equal to 11% of its peak loadthe requirement imposed by the Florida Operating Committee on all its members. The order also fixed the rates of compensation to be paid for actual energy transfers across the interconnection. Respondent, Florida Power, does not challenge the Commission's order except in its omission of a term or condition that Gainesville pay approximately $10,000 annually as "compensation or reimbursement reasonably due" respondent for the backup service effected |
Justice Brennan | 1,971 | 13 | majority | Gainesville Util. Dept. v. Florida Power Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108339/gainesville-util-dept-v-florida-power-corp/ | or reimbursement reasonably due" respondent for the backup service effected by the interconnection. Respondent contended that this charge, computed on the basis of Gainesville's largest generator, was justified because only Gainesville could gain from the interconnection since the reserve made available to respondent from Gainesville was too small to be of any realistic value to respondent's massive power system. *2 The Commission rejected the contention. It noted that respondent had not included a comparable charge in any of the contracts for interconnection voluntarily negotiated with members of the Florida Operating Committee. The Commission also emphasized that "the apportionment of cost" factor had been satisfied by requiring Gainesville to bear the full cost of making the interconnection. Primarily, however, the Commission rested its rejection upon two grounds. First, the Commission stated its view that, in applying the statutory provision, the appropriate analysis should focus not upon the respective gains to be realized by the parties from the interconnection but upon the sharing of responsibilities by the interconnected operations: "[T]hat sharing must be based upon, and follow the proportionate burdens each system places upon the interconnected system networks, not the benefits each expects to receive. Benefits received in any given situation may approximate these responsibilities or they may not. In the course of negotiation of voluntary pooling arrangements, benefits received may, on occasion, serve to offset burdens imposed in determining the appropriate charge for particular services rendered or facilities supplied. But where, as here, the cost of providing such services and facilities and the appropriate charges therefor have equitably been determined after a careful analysis and apportionment of the burdens and responsibilities of each party, there is no basis for any further consideration of relative benefits" 40 F. P. C., at 127. Second, the Commission found that even if the interconnection were evaluated on the basis of relative benefits, "this record shows that the proposed intertie will afford both parties opportunities to take advantage of *24 substantial and important benefits: electrical operating benefits, and corporate financial savings." at 128. In its original opinion and in its opinion denying rehearing, the Commission specified the benefits that it found Florida Power would gain from the interconnection, as set out in the margin.[] On the basis of these findings, the Commission concluded that no standby charge should *2 be imposed on either party to the interconnection. Thus, under the terms of the Commission's final order, each party pays only for the power actually received from the other, and each party is obligated to deliver power only on an "as available" basis. 40 F. P. C., |
Justice Brennan | 1,971 | 13 | majority | Gainesville Util. Dept. v. Florida Power Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108339/gainesville-util-dept-v-florida-power-corp/ | only on an "as available" basis. 40 F. P. C., at 126 n. 4, 124. The Court of Appeals' denial of enforcement of the Commission's order insofar as no provision was made "for the reasonable compensation of Florida Power" *26 rested on the court's conclusion that the Commission's "proportionate burden" analysis was "largely illusory:" "The Commission's policy of proportionate utility responsibility really works only one way. The small system receives high benefits and, because of its size, no real obligations. The large system, however, receives no benefit but does incur real, substantial responsibilities. Such imaginary equity is not reasonable compensation." 42 F.2d, at The validity of this conclusion, however, depends upon whether the court correctly read the record as showing that Florida Power "receives no benefit" and that Gainesville incurs "no real obligations."[6] The Commission's findings are squarely contrary. Although the Commission did argue that the benefits to be derived from the interconnection by each party were irrelevant to the proper decision of the case, nonetheless, in view of respondent's strenuous protest, the Commission went on to bring its expertise and judgment to bear upon the benefits and burdens and made findings identifying several specific benefits that would accrue to Florida Power from the interconnection. See n. Merely because the Commission argued that on its view of the legal question involved, findings of benefits were unnecessary to its decision does not render them any the less findings on the question of benefits. A reviewing court should hardly complain because an agency provides more analysis than it feels is absolutely necessary.[7] *27 Section 1 (b) of the Federal Power Act 16 U.S. C. 82l (b), provides that "[t]he finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." See Universal Camera 40 U.S. 474 (191). Among the specific benefits the Commission found would accrue to Florida Power were increased reliability of Florida Power's service to customers in the Gainesville area, the availability of 60 to 100 mw of reserve capacity during certain periods of the year, and savings from coordinated planning to achieve use at all times of the most efficient generating equipment in both systems. The Commission's findings were aided by specific studies, made by the Commission's staff, and placed in the record. Insofar as the Court of Appeals' opinion implies that there was not substantial evidence to support a finding of some benefits, it is clearly wrong. And insofar as the court's opinion implies that the responsibilities assumed by Gainesville in combination with the benefits found to accrue to Florida Power were insufficient |
Justice Brennan | 1,971 | 13 | majority | Gainesville Util. Dept. v. Florida Power Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108339/gainesville-util-dept-v-florida-power-corp/ | the benefits found to accrue to Florida Power were insufficient to constitute "compensation reasonably due," the Court of Appeals overstepped the role of the judiciary. Congress ordained that that determination should be made, in the first instance, by the Commission, and on the record made in this case, the Court of Appeals erred in not deferring to the Commission's expert judgment. Florida Power's emphasis on Gainesville's small size occurs only when discussing Gainesville's ability to provide Florida Power with energy. But Gainesville's small *28 size has relevance in terms of the amount of power it may, even in emergencies, require from Florida Power. What Florida Power chooses to emphasize is that the availability of a certain amount of power flowing from it to Gainesville is relatively more valuable to Gainesville's small system than the availability of the same amount of power flowing from Gainesville to Florida Power. It is certainly true that the same service or commodity may be more valuable to some customers than to others, in terms of the price they are willing to pay for it. An airplane seat may bring greater profit to a passenger flying to California to close a million-dollar business deal than to one flying west for a vacation; as a consequence, the former might be willing to pay more for his seat than the latter. But focus on the willingness or ability of the purchaser to pay for a service is the concern of the monopolist, not of a governmental agency charged both with assuring the industry a fair return and with assuring the public reliable and efficient service, at a reasonable price. Our guidepost here is the Act's explicit commitment of the judgment as to what compensation is reasonably due, in this highly technical field, to the Commission. Cf. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 90 U.S. 747, In the exercise of this judgment, the Commission's order placed on Gainesville the entire $ million cost of constructing the interconnection. Thus the benefits that the Commission found that Florida Power will receive from the interconnection will come without any capital investment on its part. In addition, the Commission required Gainesville to maintain generating capacity equal to at least 11% of its annual peak load and to maintain operating reserves in accordance with the procedures established by the Florida Operating Committee. In light of these circumstances, the Commission concluded on the basis of its proportionate-burden *29 analysis that Gainesville should not pay a standby charge for the availability of emergency service, which is provided only on an "as available" basis. It simply required Gainesville |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | dissenting | Arizona v. Manypenny | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110465/arizona-v-manypenny/ | United announced the general rule that governments may not appeal in criminal cases in the federal courts in the absence of express statutory authority. Finding, inter alia, that the predecessor to 28 U.S. C. 1291 was not sufficiently express,[1] refused to allow an appeal by the Federal Government. Today, *252 however, the Court intertwines 1291 with an Arizona statute authorizing writs of certiorari on behalf of the State in criminal cases in the Arizona courts to make 1291 "sufficiently express" to authorize a State to appeal from a federal district court's judgment of acquittal. Because this result flouts Congress' authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, I respectfully dissent. I The Court proposes the novel interpretation of and its progeny as "flow[ing] from a tradition of requiring that a prosecutorial appeal be affirmatively sanctioned by the same sovereign that sponsors the prosecution." Ante, at 249.[2] I find this reading of the rule inaccurate: in my view, plainly requires express authorization from the legislative body controlling federal-court jurisdiction for all government appeals in criminal cases in the federal courts.[3] The Court stated that the express authorization must be made by the legislature "acting within its constitutional authority." Since Congress is the only entity constitutionally empowered to grant express authority for government appeals in the federal courts, the principle necessarily confines our inquiry to whether there is express authorization in federal statutes controlling criminal appeals by the in federal court. Therefore, the Court's finding that Arizona, the sovereign sponsoring the prosecution in the instant case, has sanctioned prosecutorial appeals in its courts is irrelevant to the question of federal appellate jurisdiction *253 here. Focusing as we must on federal statutes, I find the pertinent federal statutes wholly barren of any express authorization of criminal appeals by to the federal courts of appeals.[4] Today, as in 1892, 1291 "says nothing as to the party by whom the writ of error may be brought, and cannot therefore be presumed to have been intended to confer upon the government the right to bring [an appeal]." This conclusion is supported by which relied on the rule to conclude that a State has no right of appeal from a decision of a federal district court in a criminal case removed from state court. In Soper, four United prohibition agents and their chauffeur were indicted for murder in the State of Maryland. The defendants petitioned the Federal District Court for removal, averring that they were federal agents[5] and that their acts "were done in the discharge of their official duties as prohibition agents." The District |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | dissenting | Arizona v. Manypenny | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110465/arizona-v-manypenny/ | discharge of their official duties as prohibition agents." The District Court granted defendants' petition and the State subsequently applied to this Court for a writ of mandamus to overturn the removal order. Over respondent's objection that mandamus did not lie to correct an erroneous removal order, this Court granted the writ. Observing that "there should be a more liberal use of mandamus [in removal of State criminal cases] than in removal of civil cases," the Court specifically noted: "Except by issue of mandamus, [the State] is without an opportunity to invoke the decision of this Court upon the issue it would raise. The order of the United District Judge refusing to remand is not open to review *254 on a writ of error, and a judgment of acquittal in that court is final. United" Significantly, the predecessor to 1291 was available then, as it is now, to support an argument that the State had a right of appeal. Nonetheless, on the strength of the Court concluded that a judgment of acquittal was unreviewable[6] because there was no express federal statute authorizing an appeal by the State. See Government of Virgin The Court attempts to deflect the force of this precedent by interpreting as merely "reflect[ing] an awareness of controlling double jeopardy doctrine, which at the time was thought to protect a defendant once a judgment of acquittal had been entered in federal court." Ante, at 248, n. 25. But this is a clearly incorrect reading, for it ignores the fact that at the time was decided, the prohibition contained in the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause was applicable only against the Federal Government in federal prosecutions, and not against state governments in state prosecutions. See[7] It was not until 32 years later that Benton overruled Palko and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause was applicable against the Since the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to prosecutions initiated by the and state substantive law governed criminal cases removed to federal district court, the Court's suggestion that the statement in referred to double jeopardy limitations is plainly unfounded. II Even on its own terms the Court's opinion is unpersuasive. The Court concludes that appeals by the are permissible under 1291 "when the legislature responsible for that power has spoken in express terms, or when a legislative enactment has been authoritatively construed by the sovereign's highest court." Ante, at 249. The Arizona statute supposedly authorizing appeal, however, is anything but "express." That statute provides: "The writ of certiorari may be granted by the supreme and superior courts or by any judge thereof, |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | dissenting | Arizona v. Manypenny | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110465/arizona-v-manypenny/ | the supreme and superior courts or by any judge thereof, in all cases when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12-2001 (1956) The State may obtain a writ of certiorari by filing a petition for special action pursuant to Rule 4, Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. If it be true the State's petition for review "has been routinely granted" by the appellate courts, ante, at 240, this hardly qualifies as an authoritative construction by the State's highest court that the statute itself authorizes review in every case. The Court has failed to cite a single precedent in which the Arizona Supreme Court has investigated the intent of the state legislature in passing the statute authorizing *256 prosecutorial appeals. More importantly, by relying on state-court decisions allowing certiorari review on behalf of the State, the Court has undercut the only rationale justifying today's result. The Court reasons: "Our continuing refusal to assume that the United possesses any inherent right to appeal reflects an abiding concern to check the Federal Government's possible misuse of its enormous prosecutorial powers. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice when extending to the Executive a right to expand criminal prosecutions, and its subsequent applications have placed the responsibility for such assertions of authority over citizens in the democratically elected legislature where it belongs." Ante, at 247. It is difficult to understand how the Court's insistence that the democratically elected legislature speak with a clear voice can be satisfied without interpretive decisions of the State's highest court holding that the state legislature has done so in the case of 12-2001. Indeed, the Court's application of a less stringent requirement of clarity in the case of state legislation than in the case of federal legislation, see, e. g., United ; United ; ; ; United ; United is surely unprecedented. The Court has offered no justification for its more expansive treatment of state statutes. Indeed, since the Court has convinced itself that there are "express" provisions in the Arizona statute, I see no logical barrierunder the Court's novel determination of what is *257 "express"to a construction of 1291 as an express grant of authority for state appeals, without reference to state statutes. III The Court has noted time and again that appeals by the government in criminal cases are exceptional and not favored. E. g., ; at ; I would |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | dissenting | Arizona v. Manypenny | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110465/arizona-v-manypenny/ | and not favored. E. g., ; at ; I would have thought, therefore, that the Court would be especially careful before concluding that Congress intended that 1291 would authorize criminal appeals by the State in removal cases.[8] See at Instead, the Court has abandoned its traditional presumption in this area to implyon the strength of its own policy analysis authorization for a state appeal in a criminal case where no federal statute expressly authorizes one. But "[i]t is axiomatic that the existence of appellate jurisdiction in a specific federal court over a given type of case is dependent upon authority expressly conferred by statute. And since the jurisdictional statutes prevailing at any given time are so much a product of the whole history of both growth and limitation of federal-court jurisdiction they have always been interpreted in the light of that history and of the axiom that clear statutory mandate must exist to found jurisdiction." at *258 It is hard to imagine a federal "statutory mandate" for government appeals that is less clear than one that fluctuates depending on state law. This case admittedly presents an anomalous circumstance,[9] and concededly there is great temptation to correct it. But because I believe it is for Congress, not the courts, to make changes in federal jurisdictional statutes, cf. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Mississippi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112096/johnson-v-mississippi/ | In 1982, petitioner was convicted of murder and d to death. The was predicated, in part, on the fact that petitioner had been convicted of a felony in New York in 1963. After the Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's death the New York Court of Appeals reversed the 1963 conviction. Petitioner thereafter unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief from the Supreme Court. The question presented to us is whether the state court was correct in concluding that the reversal of the New York conviction did not affect the validity of a death based on that conviction. I On December 31, 1981, petitioner and three companions were stopped for speeding by a highway patrolman. While the officer was searching the car, petitioner stabbed him and, in the ensuing struggle, one of his companions obtained the officer's gun and used it to kill him. Petitioner was apprehended, tried and convicted of murder, and d to death. At the conclusion of the sentencing *581 hearing, the jury found three aggravating circumstances,[1] any one of which, as a matter of law, would have been sufficient to support a capital After weighing mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances "one against the other," the jury found "that the aggravating circumstances do outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that the Defendant should suffer the penalty of death." 13 Record 2290, 2294; App. 32. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and and we denied certiorari, The sole evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance that petitioner had been "previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another" consisted of an authenticated copy of petitioner's commitment to Elmira Reception Center in 1963 following his conviction in Monroe County, New York, for the crime of second-degree assault with intent to commit first-degree rape. App. 8-9. The prosecutor repeatedly referred to that evidence in the sentencing hearing, stating in so many words: "I say that because of having been convicted of second degree assault with intent to commit first degree rape and capital murder that Samuel Johnson should die." 13 Record 2276; App. 23.[2] *582 Prior to the assault trial in New York in 1963, the police obtained an incriminating statement from petitioner. Despite petitioner's objection that the confession had been coerced, it was admitted into evidence without a prior hearing on the issue of voluntariness. Moreover, after petitioner was convicted, he was never informed of his right to appeal. He made three efforts to do so without the assistance of counsel, each of which was rejected as untimely. After his conviction, however, his attorneys successfully prosecuted a postconviction proceeding |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Mississippi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112096/johnson-v-mississippi/ | his conviction, however, his attorneys successfully prosecuted a postconviction proceeding in New York in which they persuaded the Monroe County Court that petitioner had been unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal. The County Court then entered a new sentencing order from which petitioner was able to take a direct appeal. In that proceeding, the New York Court of Appeals reversed his *583 Petitioner filed a motion in the Supreme Court seeking postconviction relief from his death on the ground that the New York conviction was invalid and could not be used as an aggravating circumstance. That motion was filed before the New York proceeding was concluded, but it was supplemented by prompt notification of the favorable action taken by the New York Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, over the dissent of three justices, the Supreme Court denied the motion. The majority supported its conclusion with four apparently interdependent arguments. First, it stated that petitioner had waived his right to challenge the validity of the New York conviction because he had not raised the point on direct appeal.[4] Second, it expressed concern that 's capital sentencing procedures would become capricious and standardless if the postsentencing decision of another could have the effect of invalidating a death Third, it questioned whether the New York proceedings were "truly adversarial." -1339. Finally, it concluded that the New York conviction provided adequate support for the death penalty even if it was invalid, stating: "The fact remains that Johnson was convicted in 1963 by a New York court of a serious felony involving violence to a female for which he was imprisoned in that state. No New York court extended Johnson relief from his conviction before Johnson paid his debt to the state. If his crime was serious enough for him to be convicted and *584 final enough for him to serve time in a penal institution, it had sufficient finality to be considered as an aggravating circumstance by a jury of this state. No death penalty verdict based upon this conviction need be vitiated by the subsequent relief granted more than twenty years later by the New York Court of Appeals." In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly disavowed any reliance on the fact that two of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury did not turn on the evidence of petitioner's prior conviction. ; see, n. 8, infra.[5] We granted certiorari to consider whether the Federal Constitution requires a reexamination of petitioner's death We conclude that it does. II The fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Mississippi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112096/johnson-v-mississippi/ | underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment gives rise to a special " `need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment' " in any capital case. See ). Although we have acknowledged that "there can be `no perfect *585 procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death,' " we have also made it clear that such decisions cannot be predicated on mere "caprice" or on "factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process." The question in this case is whether allowing petitioner's death to stand although based in part on a reversed conviction violates this principle.[6] In its opinion the Supreme Court drew no distinction between petitioner's 1963 conviction for assault and the underlying conduct that gave rise to that conviction. In 's sentencing hearing following petitioner's conviction for murder, however, the prosecutor did not introduce any evidence concerning the alleged assault itself; the only evidence relating to the assault consisted of a document establishing that petitioner had been convicted of that offense in 1963. Since that conviction has been reversed, unless and until petitioner should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge. Indeed, even without such a presumption, the reversal of the conviction deprives the prosecutor's sole piece of documentary evidence of any relevance to 's sentencing decision. Contrary to the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court, the fact that petitioner served time in prison *586 pursuant to an invalid conviction does not make the conviction itself relevant to the sentencing decision. The possible relevance of the conduct which gave rise to the assault charge is of no significance here because the jury was not presented with any evidence describing that conduct the document submitted to the jury proved only the facts of conviction and confinement, nothing more. That petitioner was imprisoned is not proof that he was guilty of the offense; indeed, it would be perverse to treat the imposition of punishment pursuant to an invalid conviction as an aggravating circumstance. It is apparent that the New York conviction provided no legitimate support for the death imposed on petitioner. It is equally apparent that the use of that conviction in the sentencing hearing was prejudicial. The prosecutor repeatedly urged the jury to give it weight in connection with its assigned task of balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances "one against the other." 13 Record 2270; App. 17; see 13 Record 2282-2287; App. 26-30. Even without that express argument, there would be a possibility that the jury's belief that |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Mississippi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112096/johnson-v-mississippi/ | there would be a possibility that the jury's belief that petitioner had been convicted of a prior felony would be "decisive" in the "choice between a life and a death" We do not share the Supreme Court's concern that its procedures would become capricious if it were to vacate a death predicated on a prior felony conviction when such a conviction is set aside. A similar problem has frequently arisen in as well as in other s, in cases involving s imposed on habitual criminals. Thus, in the court held that the reversal of a Kentucky conviction that had provided the basis for an enhanced pursuant to 's habitual criminal statute justified postconviction relief. A rule that regularly gives a defendant the benefit of such postconviction relief is not even arguably arbitrary or capricious. Cf. United ; To the contrary, especially in the context of capital sentencing, it reduces the risk that such a will be imposed arbitrarily. Finally, we are not persuaded that the state court's conclusion that under state law petitioner is procedurally barred from raising this claim because he failed to attack the validity of the New York conviction on direct appeal bars our consideration of his claim. In its brief before this Court, the does not rely on the argument that petitioner's claim is procedurally barred because he failed to raise it on direct appeal. Because the Supreme Court asserted this bar as a ground for its decision, however, we consider whether that bar provides an adequate and independent state ground for the refusal to vacate petitioner's "[W]e have consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question." "[A] state procedural ground is not `adequate' unless the procedural rule is `strictly or regularly followed.'" ; see 379 U. S., at -448. We find no evidence that the procedural bar relied on by the Supreme Court here has been consistently or regularly applied. Rather, the weight of law is to the contrary. In the Supreme Court considered whether defendant could properly attack in a sentencing hearing a prior conviction which the sought to use to enhance his The court made it clear that the sentencing hearing was not the appropriate forum for such an attack: "[T]he trial court is not required to go beyond the face of the prior convictions sought to be used in establishing the defendant's status as an habitual offender. If, on its face, the conviction makes a proper showing that a *588 defendant's |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Mississippi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112096/johnson-v-mississippi/ | the conviction makes a proper showing that a *588 defendant's prior plea of guilty was both knowing and voluntary, that conviction may be used for the enhancement of the defendant's punishment under the habitual offender act. "[A]ny such frontal assault upon the constitutionality of a prior conviction should be conducted in the form of an entirely separate procedure solely concerned with attacking that conviction. This role is neither the function nor the duty of the trial judge in a hearing to determine habitual offender status. Likewise, any such proceeding should be brought in the state in which such conviction occurred, pursuant to that state's established procedures. Should such proceeding in the foreign state succeed in overturning the conviction, then relief should be sought in by petition for writ of error coram nobis." The reasoning of Phillips suggests that the direct appeal of a subsequent conviction and concomitant enhanced is not the appropriate forum for challenging a prior conviction that on its face appears valid. In directing that evidence of invalidation of such a conviction in another proceeding could be brought to the court's attention in a collateral attack of the subsequent conviction, the court did not suggest that the failure previously to raise the issue in the inappropriate forum would bar its consideration on collateral attack. The Supreme Court has applied its reasoning in Phillips to facts substantially similar to those presented in this case. In Nixon v. the court held that the reasoning of Phillips applied when a defendant in a capital case sought to attack the validity of a prior conviction introduced to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance at sentencing. In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Phillips and Nixon, we cannot conclude that the procedural bar relied on by the *589 Supreme Court in this case has been consistently or regularly applied. Consequently, under federal law it is not an adequate and independent state ground for affirming petitioner's conviction.[7] In this Court advances an argument for affirmance that was not relied upon by the Supreme Court. It argues that the decision of the Supreme Court should be affirmed because when that court conducted its proportionality review of the death on petitioner's initial appeal, it did not mention petitioner's prior conviction in upholding the Whether it is true, as respondent *590 argues, that even absent evidence of petitioner's prior conviction a death would be consistent with 's practice in other cases, however, is not determinative of this case. First, the Supreme Court expressly refused to rely on harmless-error analysis in upholding petitioner's 511 So. 2d, |
Justice Souter | 2,002 | 20 | majority | Christopher v. Harbury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121160/christopher-v-harbury/ | Respondent-plaintiff in this case alleges that Government officials intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband, a foreign dissident, was being detained and tortured in his own country by military officers of his government, who were paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). One count of the complaint, brought after the husband's death, charges that the official deception denied respondent access to the courts by leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband's life. The issue is whether this count states an actionable claim. We hold that it does not, for two reasons. As stated in the complaint, it fails to identify an underlying cause of action for relief that the plaintiff would have raised had it not been for the deception alleged. And even after a *406 subsequent, informal amendment accepted by the Court of Appeals, respondent fails to seek any relief presently available for denial of access to courts that would be unavailable otherwise. I Respondent Jennifer Harbury, a United States citizen, is the widow of Efrain Bamaca-Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader who vanished in his own country in March 1992. Since we are reviewing a ruling on motion to dismiss, we accept Harbury's factual allegations and take them in the light most favorable to her. See Bamaca was captured by Guatemalan army forces, including officers trained (in the United States), paid, and used as informants by the CIA. App. 27-28 (Respondent's Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 35-42, 46-47). He was detained and tortured for more than a year to obtain information of interest to the CIA, for which it paid. Bamaca was summarily executed on orders of the same Guatemalan officers affiliated with the CIA, -29 sometime before September 1993, 34[1] The CIA knew as early as March 18, 1992, that the Guatemalan army had captured Bamaca alive and shared this information with the White House and State Department. Officials there, however, "intentionally misled" Harbury, by "deceptive statements and omissions, into believing that concrete information about her husband's fate did not exist because they did not want to threaten their ability to obtain information from Mr. Bamaca through his detention and torture." *407 Harbury makes three specific allegations of such Government deception, all involving State Department officials, while Bamaca was still alive. First, she says she contacted several unnamed State Department officials in March 1993 to express concerns about her husband, who, according to an eyewitness, was still alive. They "promised to look into the matter and to assist her," ib but |
Justice Souter | 2,002 | 20 | majority | Christopher v. Harbury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121160/christopher-v-harbury/ | look into the matter and to assist her," ib but they neither gave her nor made public any information about Bamaca, though CIA reports from as early as May 1993 confirmed he was still alive. Second, in August 1993, Marilyn McAfee, then Ambassador to Guatemala, advised Harbury to submit a written report to the effect that remains found in a grave purported to be her husband's were not in fact his, as Harbury promptly did. -31 Although McAfee promised that she would "investigate the matter immediately[,] report her findings," and keep Harbury "properly informed regarding her husband's situation," she gave Harbury no information, Third, in September 1993 (the same month that the Government learned Bamaca was dead, ), Harbury engaged in a week-long hunger strike in Guatemala City to focus public attention on her husband's plight, but the State Department told her nothing, -32 According to Harbury's allegations, the Government's deceptions and omissions continued and intensified after Bamaca was killed. From October 1993 until March 1995, officials of the State Department and National Security Council (NSC) repeatedly met and communicated with Harbury, 34 (¶¶ 80, 83), 35 (¶ 86), conveying the impression that they knew nothing for sure but were seeking "concrete information" about her husband and would keep her informed, At one point, in November National Security Adviser Anthony Lake told Harbury that the Government had "`scraped the bottom of the barrel' " to no avail in seeking information about her husband, *408 All along, however, the Government officials knew that Bamaca had been killed by the Guatemalan army, but engaged in misleading statements and omissions because they did not want their complicity in Bamaca's torture and death revealed, Harbury learned that her husband was dead only in March 1995 when a congressman publicly announced that Bamaca had been killed on the orders of a Guatemalan army colonel who was also a paid agent of the CIA, II A year later, in March 1996, Harbury filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the CIA, the State Department, the NSC, and members of each in their official and individual capacities. The complaint, as amended, listed 28 causes of action under federal, state, and international law. App. 38-62. Although only the accessto-courts counts directly concern us here, it is important to know Harbury's other claims, in order to determine whether she has stated a tenable claim for denial of judicial access. A Harbury's complaint sought relief in four categories other than access to courts. First, on behalf of Bamaca's estate, she raised claims against the CIA |
Justice Souter | 2,002 | 20 | majority | Christopher v. Harbury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121160/christopher-v-harbury/ | behalf of Bamaca's estate, she raised claims against the CIA defendants under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for his imprisonment, torture, and execution, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,[2] and money damages against the officials in their individual capacities on the theory of App. 38-42 (counts 1-5). Next, on her own behalf, Harbury sued all the Government defendants for declaratory and injunctive relief *409 and money damages under Bivens for violating her "right to familial integrity" under the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments by imprisoning, torturing, and executing her husband. Third, she alleged common law torts invoking the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S. C. 2401(b) and 2675, App. 54, (1) on behalf of herself and her husband's estate against the CIA defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress by causing and conspiring to cause Bamaca's imprisonment, torture, and execution, ; (2) on behalf of her husband's estate against the CIA defendants for negligent supervision resulting in his false imprisonment, assault and battery, and wrongful death, ; and (3) on her own behalf against the State Department and NSC defendants for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, interference with the right to possess a spouse's dead body, and intentional infliction of emotional distress by making "intentionally deceptive statements and omissions about her husband, including concealing whether or not he was alive" Fourth, Harbury brought a tort claim said to arise under international law against the CIA defendants on behalf of herself and her husband's estate. In addition to these counts for direct harm, Harbury relied on the First and Fifth Amendments in raising four claims that the deceptive statements and omissions of the State Department and NSC defendants had unconstitutionally impeded her access to courts, as well as her to speak freely and to petition the Government, The basic theory as to access to courts was that if the officials had shared what they knew or simply said "no comment" rather than affirmatively misleading Harbury into thinking they were doing something, she might have been able "to take appropriate actions *410 to save her husband's life."[3] Harbury alleged that she "was foreclosed from effectively seeking adequate legal redress." B For failure to state a claim, the District Court dismissed all counts for declaratory and injunctive relief (counts 1-3, 6-9, 14, 16). It also dismissed all the Bivens counts: those on behalf of Bamaca's estate for his torture and execution said to have violated his Fifth Amendment due process (counts 4-5), and those brought on Harbury's own behalf based on the claimed violation of her constitutional of familial association |
Justice Souter | 2,002 | 20 | majority | Christopher v. Harbury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121160/christopher-v-harbury/ | on the claimed violation of her constitutional of familial association (counts 10-13), access to courts (count 15), and free speech and access to Government (count 17). But the District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the tort claims at common law (counts 18-27) and international law With respect to the access-to-courts claims (including Harbury's Bivens claim on this theory), the District Court acknowledged that five Courts of Appeals "have held that conspiracies to destroy or cover-up evidence of a crime that render a plaintiff's judicial remedies inadequate or ineffective violat[e] the right of access," App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a, but held that Harbury had not stated a valid cause of action for two reasons. First, the court held that Harbury's claim "would have to be dismissed" (without prejudice) because, having filed no prior suit, she had "nothing more than a guess" as to how the alleged coverup might "have prejudiced her to bring a separate action." at 46a. Second, the District Court reasoned that the defendants in any event would be entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities because, unlike officials in coverup cases who destroyed, manufactured, or hid evidence, the defendants *411 here did not act contrary to "clearly established constitutional norms that a reasonable official would understand" in being less than "forthcoming in discussing the intelligence that they received about Bamaca." at 48a49a. C Harbury did not pursue her claims for declaratory or injunctive relief, and appealed only the dismissal of the Bivens causes of action. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Bivens claims of violations of Bamaca's due process Harbury's of familial association, and her free speech and petition[4] It reversed the dismissal, however, of Harbury's Bivens claim against the State Department and NSC defendants for denial of access to courts. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a plaintiff who merely alleges without factual basis in the conduct of a prior lawsuit that "`key witnesses may now be dead or missing, crucial evidence may have been destroyed, and memories may have faded' " generally falls short of raising a claim for denial of access to courts. The court held, however, that Harbury's allegations stated a valid access claim insofar as she alleged that the Government's conduct had "effectively prevented her from seeking emergency injunctive relief in time to save her husband's life." The District of Columbia Circuit went on to conclude that "[b]ecause his death completely foreclosed this avenue of relief, nothing would be gained by requiring Harbury to postpone this |
Justice Souter | 2,002 | 20 | majority | Christopher v. Harbury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121160/christopher-v-harbury/ | nothing would be gained by requiring Harbury to postpone this aspect of her access to courts cause of action until she *412 finishes prosecuting her tort claims." Nor did the court hold that qualified immunity would bar suit because, in its words, "we think it should be obvious to public officials that they may not affirmatively mislead citizens for the purpose of protecting themselves from suit."[5] D Three categories of claims were left in the case after the Court of Appeals's decision: the various common law tort claims including intentional infliction of emotional distress, the international law claim against the CIA defendants (neither of which the District Court had dismissed), and Harbury's Bivens claims against the State Department and NSC defendants for preventing access to courts (which the Court of Appeals reinstated). The defendant officials petitioned for review of the court's holding as to the claim of denial of access to courts, but Harbury did not cross-petition on the other Bivens claims, leaving the Bivens access claim[6] the sole matter before us. We granted certiorari, because of the importance of this issue to the Government in its conduct of the Nation's foreign affairs, and now reverse. III A This Court's prior cases on denial of access to courts have not extended over the entire range of claims that have been brought under that general rubric elsewhere, but if we consider *413 examples in the Courts of Appeals[7] as well as our own, two categories emerge. In the first are claims that systemic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing suits at the present time. Thus, in the prisonlitigation cases, the relief sought may be a law library for a prisoner's use in preparing a case, ; or a reader for an illiterate prisoner, 7-348, or simply a lawyer, In denial-of-access cases challenging filing fees that poor plaintiffs cannot afford to pay, the object is an order requiring waiver of a fee to open the courthouse door for desired litigation, such as direct appeals or federal habeas petitions in criminal cases,[8] or civil suits asserting family-law e. g., ; M. L. (record fee in parental- termination action). In cases of this sort, the essence of the access claim is that official action is presently denying an opportunity to litigate for a class of potential plaintiffs. The opportunity has not been lost for all time, however, but only in the short term; the object of the denial-of-access suit, and the justification for recognizing that claim, is to place the plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate |
Justice Souter | 2,002 | 20 | majority | Christopher v. Harbury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121160/christopher-v-harbury/ | place the plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition has been removed. The second category covers claims not in aid of a class of suits yet to be litigated, but of specific cases that cannot now *414 be tried (or tried with all material evidence), no matter what official action may be in the future.[9] The official acts claimed to have denied access may allegedly have caused the loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, e. g., ; the loss of an opportunity to sue, e. g., or the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief, as Harbury alleges here. These cases do not look forward to a class of future litigation, but backward to a time when specific litigation ended poorly,[10] or could not have commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently unobtainable.[11] The ultimate object of these sorts of access claims, then, is not the judgment in a further lawsuit, but simply the judgment in the access claim itself, in providing relief obtainable in no other suit in the future. While the circumstances thus vary, the ultimate justification for recognizing each kind of claim is the same. Whether an access claim turns on a litigating opportunity yet to be gained or an opportunity already lost, the very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective *415 vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong. However unsettled the basis of the constitutional right of access to courts,[12] our cases rest on the recognition that the right is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court. We indicated as much in our most recent case on denial of access, where we noted that even in forward-looking prisoner class actions to remove roadblocks to future litigation, the named plaintiff must identify a "nonfrivolous," "arguable" underlying claim, and n. 3, and we have been given no reason to treat backward-looking access claims any differently in this respect. It follows that the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation. It follows, too, that when the access claim (like this one) looks backward, the complaint must identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought. There is, after all, no point in spending time |
Justice Souter | 2,002 | 20 | majority | Christopher v. Harbury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121160/christopher-v-harbury/ | brought. There is, after all, no point in spending time and money to establish the facts constituting denial of access when a plaintiff would end up just as well off after litigating a simpler case without the denial-of-access element. *416 Like any other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant. See generally Although we have no reason here to try to describe pleading standards for the entire spectrum of access claims, this is the place to address a particular risk inherent in backward-looking claims. Characteristically, the action underlying this sort of access claim will not be tried independently,[13] a fact that enhances the natural temptation on the part of plaintiffs to claim too much, by alleging more than might be shown in a full trial focused solely on the details of the predicate action. Hence the need for care in requiring that the predicate claim be described well enough to apply the "nonfrivolous" test and to show that the "arguable" nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.[14] And because these backwardlooking cases are brought to get relief unobtainable in other suits, the remedy sought must itself be identified to hedge against the risk that an access claim be tried all the way through, only to find that the court can award no remedy that the plaintiff could not have been awarded on a presently existing claim. *417 The particular facts of this case underscore the need for care on the part of the plaintiff in identifying, and by the court in determining, the claim for relief underlying the access-to-courts plea. The action alleged on the part of all the Government defendants (the State Department and NSC defendants sued for denial of access and the CIA defendants who would have been timely sued on the underlying claim but for the denial) was apparently taken in the conduct of foreign relations by the National Government. Thus, if there is to be judicial enquiry, it will raise concerns for the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other branches. See Department of ; Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Since the need to resolve such constitutional issues ought to be avoided where possible, cf. Department of Housing and Urban ; the trial court should be in a position as soon as possible in the litigation to know whether a potential constitutional ruling may be obviated because the allegations of denied access fail to state a claim |
Justice Souter | 2,002 | 20 | majority | Christopher v. Harbury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121160/christopher-v-harbury/ | the allegations of denied access fail to state a claim on which relief could be granted. In sum, the right of a defendant in a backward-looking access suit to obtain early dismissal of a hopelessly incomplete claim for relief coincides in this case with the obligation of the Judicial Branch to avoid deciding constitutional issues needlessly. For the sake of each, the complaint should state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),[15] just as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement should describe any remedy *418 available under the access claim and presently unique to it. B Under these standards, Harbury's complaint did not come even close to stating a constitutional claim for denial of access upon which relief could be granted. While we cannot read the complaint without appreciating Harbury's anguish, neither can we read it without appreciating the position of the District Judge who described Harbury's various requests for relief as "nearly unintelligible." App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a. Although the counts stating the Bivens claim for denial of judicial access seemed to confirm that Harbury intended to state a backward-looking claim, the complaint failed to identify the underlying cause of action that the alleged deception had compromised, going no further than the protean allegation that the State Department and NSC defendants' "false and deceptive information and concealment foreclosed Plaintiff from effectively seeking adequate legal redress." App. 50 (¶ 175). The District Court and the defendants were left to guess at the unstated cause of action supposed to have been lost, and at the remedy being sought independently of relief that might be available on the 24 other counts set out in the complaint. Nothing happened in the Court of Appeals to improve Harbury's position. That court, too, was frustrated by the failure to identify the predicate claim and the need for relief otherwise unattainable,[16] but it gave Harbury's counsel an opportunity at oral argument to supply the missing allegations. *419 Counsel responded that Harbury would have brought an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress[17] as one wrong for which she could have sought the injunctive relief that might have saved her husband's life: "[I]f defendants had disclosed the information they possessed about Bamaca, Harbury could have sought an emergency injunction based on an underlying tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Even if the NSC and State Department officials had simply said they could not discuss Bamaca's situation, counsel explained, Harbury would have filed her FOIA requests immediately, thus perhaps obtaining the information necessary to seek |
Justice Souter | 2,002 | 20 | majority | Christopher v. Harbury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121160/christopher-v-harbury/ | requests immediately, thus perhaps obtaining the information necessary to seek an injunction in time to save her husband's life. Instead, believing defendants' reassurances, Harbury waited for the State Department and NSC officials to complete their ` " 233 F.3d, The Court of Appeals adopted this theory in saying that the "adequate legal redress" alleged for purposes of Harbury's access claims meant emergency injunctive relief in a now futile lawsuit for intentional infliction of emotional distress, *420 and it accepted this amendment as a sufficient statement of an underlying cause of action.[18] We think, however, that treating the amendment as an adequate statement was error. For even on the assumption that Harbury could surmount all difficulties raised by treating the underlying claim as one for intentional infliction of emotional distress,[19] she could not satisfy the requirement *421 that a backward-looking denial-of-access claim provide a remedy that could not be obtained on an existing claim. We have no choice but to assume that what Harbury intends to claim as intentional infliction of emotional distress is set out in the counts of her complaint naming the "CIA defendants," including the Guatemalan officer who allegedly tortured and killed her husband, App. 55[20] These are among the tort counts that survived the motion to dismiss under the portion of the District Court's order not before us. If an intentional-infliction claim can be maintained at all, Harbury can seek damages and even conceivably some sort of injunctive relief for the demonstrated consequences of the infliction alleged.[21] It is true that she cannot obtain in any present tort action the order she would have sought before her husband's death, the order that might have saved her husband's life. But neither can she obtain any such order on her access claim, which therefore cannot recompense Harbury *422 for the unique loss she claims as a consequence of her inability to bring an intentional-infliction action earlier. She has not explained, and it is not otherwise apparent, that she can get any relief on the access claim that she cannot obtain on her other tort claims, i. e., those that remain pending in the District Court.[22] And it is just because the access claim cannot address any injury she has suffered in a way the presently surviving intentional-infliction claims cannot[23] that Harbury is not entitled to maintain the access claim as a substitute, backward-looking action. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Scalia | 1,995 | 9 | majority | Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117911/director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-v-newport-news/ | The question before us in this case is whether the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs in the United States Department of Labor has standing under 21(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), as amended, 33 U.S. C. 901 et seq., to seek judicial review of decisions by the Benefits Review Board that in the Director's view deny claimants compensation to which they are entitled. *124 I On October 24, 1984, Jackie Harcum, an employee of respondent Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock was working in the bilge of a steam barge when a piece of metal grating fell and struck him in the lower back. His injury required surgery to remove a herniated disc, and caused prolonged disability. Respondent paid Harcum benefits under the LHWCA until he returned to light-duty work in April 1987. In November 1987, Harcum returned to his regular department under medical restrictions. He proved unable to perform essential tasks, however, and the company terminated his employment in May 1988. Harcum ultimately found work elsewhere, and started his new job in February 1989. Harcum filed a claim for further benefits under the LHWCA. Respondent contested the claim, and the dispute was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). One of the issues was whether Harcum was entitled to benefits for total disability, or instead only for partial disability, from the date he stopped work for respondent until he began his new job. "Disability" under the LHWCA means "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment." 33 U.S. C. 902(10). After a hearing on October 20, 1989, the ALJ determined that Harcum was partially, rather than totally, disabled when he left respondent's employ, and that he was therefore owed only partial-disability benefits for the interval of his unemployment. On appeal, the Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ's judgment, and also ruled that under 33 U.S. C. 908(f), the company was entitled to cease payments to Harcum after 104 weeks, after which time the LHWCA special fund would be liable for disbursements pursuant to 944. The Director petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of both aspects of the Board's ruling. Harcum did not seek review and, while not *125 opposing the Director's pursuit of the action, expressly declined to intervene on his own behalf in response to an inquiry by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the question whether the Director had |
Justice Scalia | 1,995 | 9 | majority | Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117911/director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-v-newport-news/ | Appeals sua sponte raised the question whether the Director had standing to appeal the Board's order. It concluded that she did not have standing with regard to that aspect of the order denying Harcum's claim for full-disability compensation, since she was not "adversely affected or aggrieved" by that decision within the meaning of 21(c) of the Act, 33 U.S. C. 921(c).[1] We granted the Director's petition for certiorari. II The LHWCA provides for compensation of workers injured or killed while employed on the navigable waters or adjoining, shipping-related land areas of the United States. 33 U.S. C. 903. With the exception of those duties imposed by 919(d), 921(b), and 941, the Secretary of Labor has delegated all responsibilities of the Department with respect to administration of the LHWCA to the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP). 20 CFR 701.201 and 701.202 ; For ease of exposition, the Director will hereinafter be referred to as the statutory recipient of those responsibilities. A worker seeking compensation under the Act must file a claim with an OWCP district director. 33 U.S. C. 919(a); 20 CFR 701.301(a) and 702.105 If the district director cannot resolve the claim informally, 20 CFR 702.311, it is referred to an ALJ authorized to issue a compensation order, 702.316; 33 U.S. C. 919(d). The ALJ's decision is reviewable by the Benefits Review Board, whose members are appointed by the Secretary. 921(b)(1). The Board's *126 decision is in turn appealable to a United States court of appeals, at the instance of "[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by" the Board's order. 921(c). With regard to claims that proceed to ALJ hearings, the Act does not by its terms make the Director a party to the proceedings, or grant her authority to prosecute appeals to the Board, or thence to the federal courts of appeals. The Director argues that she nonetheless had standing to petition the Fourth Circuit for review of the Board's order, because she is a "person adversely affected or aggrieved" under 921(c). Specifically, she contends the Board's decision injures her because it impairs her ability to achieve the Act's purposes and to perform the administrative duties the Act prescribes. The phrase "person adversely affected or aggrieved" is a term of art used in many statutes to designate those who have standing to challenge or appeal an agency decision, within the agency or before the courts. See, e. g., federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S. C. 402(b)(6); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S. C. 660(a); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of |
Justice Scalia | 1,995 | 9 | majority | Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117911/director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-v-newport-news/ | U.S. C. 660(a); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S. C. 816. The terms "adversely affected" and "aggrieved," alone or in combination, have a long history in federal administrative law, dating back at least to the federal Communications Act of 1934, 402(b)(2) (codified, as amended, 47 U.S. C. 402(b)(6)). They were already familiar terms in 1946, when they were embodied within the judicial review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S. C. 702, which entitles "[a] person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute" to judicial review. In that provision, the qualification "within the meaning of a relevant statute" is not an addition to what "adversely affected or aggrieved" alone conveys; but is rather an acknowledgment of the fact that what constitutes adverse effect or aggrievement varies from statute to statute. As the United States Department of Justice, Attorney *127 General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) put it, "The determination of who is `adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of any relevant statute' has `been marked out largely by the gradual judicial process of inclusion and exclusion, aided at times by the courts' judgment as to the probable legislative intent derived from the spirit of the statutory scheme.' " We have thus interpreted 702 as requiring a litigant to show, at the outset of the case, that he is injured in fact by agency action and that the interest he seeks to vindicate is arguably within the "zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute" in question. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, ; see also Given the long lineage of the text in question, it is significant that counsel have cited to us no case, neither in this Court nor in the courts of appeals, neither under the APA nor under individual statutory-review provisions such as the present one, which holds that, without benefit of specific authorization to appeal, an agency, in its regulatory or policymaking capacity, is "adversely affected" or "aggrieved." Cf. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation (noting the issue of whether the Director has standing under 921(c), but finding it unnecessary to reach the question).[2]*128 There are cases in which an agency has been held to be adversely affected or aggrieved in what might be called its nongovernmental capacitythat is, in its capacity as a member of the market group that the statute was meant to protect. For example, in United we held that the United States had standing to sue the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in federal court |
Justice Scalia | 1,995 | 9 | majority | Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117911/director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-v-newport-news/ | to sue the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in federal court to overturn a Commission order that denied the Government recovery of damages for an allegedly unlawful railroad rate. The Government, we said, "is not less entitled than any other shipper to invoke administrative and judicial protection."[3] But the status of the Government as a statutory beneficiary or market participant must be sharply distinguished from the status of the Government as regulator or administrator. The latter status would be at issue ifto use an example that continues the ICC analogythe Environmental Protection *129 Agency sued to overturn an ICC order establishing high tariffs for the transportation of recyclable materials. Cf. United Or if the Department of Transportation, to further a policy of encouraging so-called "telecommuting" in order to reduce traffic congestion, sued as a "party aggrieved" under 28 U.S. C. 2344, to reverse the Federal Communications Commission's approval of rate increases on second phone lines used for modems. We are aware of no case in which such a "policy interest" by an agency has sufficed to confer standing under an "adversely affected or aggrieved" statute or any other general review provision. To acknowledge the general adequacy of such an interest would put the federal courts into the regular business of deciding intra branch and intra agency policy disputesa role that would be most inappropriate. That an agency in its governmental capacity is not "adversely affected or aggrieved" is strongly suggested, as well, by two aspects of the United States Code: First, the fact that the Code's general judicial review provision, contained in the APA, does not include agencies within the category of "person adversely affected or aggrieved." See 5 U.S. C. 551(2) (excepting agencies from the definition of "person"). Since, as we suggested in United the APA provision reflects "the general legislative pattern of administrative and judicial relationships," -434, it indicates that even under specific "adversely affected or aggrieved" statutes (there were a number extant when the APA was adopted) agencies as such normally do not have standing. And second, the United States Code displays throughout that when an agency in its governmental capacity is meant to have standing, Congress says so. The LHWCA's silence regarding the Secretary's ability to take an appeal is significant when laid beside other provisions of law. See, e. g., Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S. C. 932(k) ("The Secretary shall be a party in any proceeding *130 relative to [a] claim for benefits"); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e5(f)(1) (authorizing the Attorney General to initiate civil actions |
Justice Scalia | 1,995 | 9 | majority | Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117911/director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-v-newport-news/ | C. 2000e5(f)(1) (authorizing the Attorney General to initiate civil actions against private employers) and 2000e4(g)(6) (authorizing the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission to "intervene in a civil action brought by an aggrieved party"); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S. C. 1132(a)(2) (granting Secretary power to initiate various civil actions under the Act). It is particularly illuminating to compare the LHWCA with the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S. C. 651 et seq. Section 660(a) of OSHA is virtually identical to 921(c): It allows "[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved" by an order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (a body distinct from the Secretary, as the Benefits Review Board is) to petition for review in the courts of appeals. OSHA, however, further contains a 660(b), which expressly grants such petitioning authority to the Secretarysuggesting, of course, that the Secretary would not be considered "adversely affected or aggrieved" under 660(a), and should not be considered so under 921(c). All of the foregoing indicates that the phrase "person adversely affected or aggrieved" does not refer to an agency acting in its governmental capacity. Of course the text of a particular statute could make clear that the phrase is being used in a peculiar sense. But the Director points to no such text in the LHWCA, and relies solely upon the mere existence and impairment of her governmental interest. If that alone could ever suffice to contradict the normal meaning of the phrase (which is doubtful), it would have to be an interest of an extraordinary nature, extraordinarily impaired. As we proceed to discuss, that is not present here. III The LHWCA assigns four broad areas of responsibility to the Director: (1) supervising, administering, and making *131 rules and regulations for calculation of benefits and processing of claims, 33 U.S. C. 906, 908-910, 914, 919, 930, and 939; (2) supervising, administering, and making rules and regulations for provision of medical care to covered workers, 907; (3) assisting claimants with processing claims and receiving medical and vocational rehabilitation, 939(c); and (4) enforcing compensation orders and administering payments to and disbursements from the special fund established by the Act for the payment of certain benefits, 921(d) and 944. The Director does not assert that the Board's decision hampers her performance of these express statutory responsibilities. She claims only two categories of interest that are affected, neither of which remotely suggests that she has authority to appeal Board determinations. First, the Director claims that because the LHWCA "has many of the elements of social insurance, and as such |
Justice Scalia | 1,995 | 9 | majority | Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117911/director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-v-newport-news/ | many of the elements of social insurance, and as such is designed to promote the public interest," Brief for Petitioner 17, she has standing to "advance in federal court the public interest in ensuring adequate compensation payments to claimants," It is doubtful, to begin with, that the goal of the LHWCA is simply the support of disabled workers. In fact, we have said that, because "the LHWCA represents a compromise between the competing interests of disabled laborers and their employers," it "is not correct to interpret the Act as guaranteeing a completely adequate remedy for all covered disabilities." Potomac Elec. Power The LHWCA is a scheme for fair and efficient resolution of a class of private disputes, managed and arbitered by the Government. It represents a "quid pro quo between employer and employee. Employers relinquish certain legal rights which the law affords to them and so, in turn, do the employees." 1 M. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries 4.1, p. 106 (4th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). *132 But even assuming the single-minded, compensate-theemployee goal that the Director posits, there is nothing to suggest that the Director has been given authority to pursue that goal in the courts. Agencies do not automatically have standing to sue for actions that frustrate the purposes of their statutes. The Interior Department, being charged with the duty to "protect persons and property within areas of the National Park System," 16 U.S. C. 1a6(a), does not thereby have authority to intervene in suits for assault brought by campers; or (more precisely) to bring a suit for assault when the camper declines to do so. What the Director must establish here is such a clear and distinctive responsibility for employee compensation as to overcome the universal assumption that "person adversely affected or aggrieved" leaves private interests (even those favored by public policy) to be litigated by private parties. That we are unable to find. The Director is not the designated champion of employees within this statutory scheme. To the contrary, one of her principal roles is to serve as the broker of informal settlements between employers and employees. 33 U.S. C. 914(h). She is charged, moreover, with providing "information and assistance" regarding the program to all persons covered by the Act, including employers. 902(1), 939(c). To be sure, she has discretion under 939(c) to provide "legal assistance in processing a claim" if it is requested (a provision that is perhaps of little consequence, since the Act provides attorney's fees to successful claimants, see 928); but that authority, which is discretionary with her and contingent upon |
Justice Scalia | 1,995 | 9 | majority | Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117911/director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-v-newport-news/ | that authority, which is discretionary with her and contingent upon a request by the claimant, does not evidence the duty and power, when the claimant is satisfied with his award, to contest the award on her own. The Director argues that her standing to pursue the public's interest in adequate compensation of claimants is supported by our decisions in Pasadena *133 City Bd. of and General Telephone of Brief for Petitioner 18. None of those cases is apposite. Heckman and Moe pertain to the United States' standing to represent the interests of Indians; the former holds, see and the latter indicates in dictum, see n. 13, that the Government's status as guardian confers standing. The third case, based standing of the United States upon an explicit provision of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizing suit, 42 U.S. C. 2000h2, and the last, General Telephone based standing of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) upon a specific provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizing suit, 42 U.S. C. 2000e5(f)(1). Those two cases certainly establish that Congress could have conferred standing upon the Director without infringing Article III of the Constitution; but they do not at all establish that Congress did so. In fact, General Telephone suggests just the opposite, since it describes how, prior to the 1972 amendment specifically giving the EEOC authority to sue, only the "aggrieved person" could bring suit, even though the EEOC was authorized to use "`informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion' " to eliminate unlawful employment practices, 446 U.S., an authority similar to the Director's informal settlement authority here. The second category of interest claimed to be affected by erroneous Board rulings is the Director's ability to fulfill "important administrative and enforcement responsibilities." Brief for Petitioner 18. The Director fails, however, to identify any specific statutory duties that an erroneous Board ruling interferes with, reciting instead conjectural harms to abstract and remote concerns. She contends, for example, that "incorrect claim determinations by the Board frustrate [her] duty to administer and enforce the statutory scheme in a uniform manner." -19. But it is impossible to *134 understand how a duty of uniform administration and enforcement by the Director (presumably arising out of the prohibition of arbitrary action reflected in 5 U.S. C. 706) hinges upon correct adjudication by someone else. The Director does not (and we think cannot) explain, for example, how an erroneous decision by the Board affects her ability to process the underlying claim, 919, provide information and assistance regarding coverage, compensation, and procedures, 939(c), |
Justice Scalia | 1,995 | 9 | majority | Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117911/director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-v-newport-news/ | provide information and assistance regarding coverage, compensation, and procedures, 939(c), enforce the final award, 921(d), or perform any other required task in a "uniform" manner. If the correctness of adjudications were essential to the Director's performance of her assigned duties, Congress would presumably have done what it has done with many other agencies: made adjudication her responsibility. In fact, however, it has taken pains to remove adjudication from her realm. The LHWCA Amendments of 1972, assigned administration to the Director, 33 U.S. C. 939(a); assigned initial adjudication to ALJ's, 919(d); and created the Board to consider appeals from ALJ decisions, 921. The assertion that proper adjudication is essential to proper performance of the Director's functions is quite simply contrary to the whole structure of the Act. To make an implausible argument even worse, the Director must acknowledge that her lack of control over the adjudicative process does not even deprive her of the power to resolve legal ambiguities in the statute. She retains the rulemaking power, see 939(a), which means that if her problem with the present decision of the Board is that it has established an erroneous rule of law, see Chevron U. S. A. she has full power to alter that rule. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Her only possible complaint, then, is that she does not agree with the outcome of this particular case. The Director also claims that precluding her from seeking review of erroneous Board rulings "would reduce *135 the incentive for employers to view the Director's informal resolution efforts as authoritative, because the employer could proceed to a higher level of review from which the Director could not appeal." Brief for Petitioner 19. This argument assumes that her informal resolution efforts are supposed to be "authoritative." We doubt that. The structure of the statute suggests that they are supposed to be facilitativea service to both parties, rather than an imposition upon either of them. But even if the opposite were true, we doubt that the unlikely prospect that the Director will appeal when the claimant does not will have much of an impact upon whether the employer chooses to spurn the Director's settlement proposal and roll the dice before the Board. The statutory requirement of adverse effect or aggrievement must be based upon "something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable." United States v. The Director seeks to derive support for her position from Congress' later enactment of the BLBA in 1978, but it seems to us that the BLBA militates precisely against her position. The BLBA expressly provides that |
Justice Scalia | 1,995 | 9 | majority | Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117911/director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-v-newport-news/ | militates precisely against her position. The BLBA expressly provides that "[t]he Secretary shall be a party in any proceeding relative to a claim for benefits under this part." 30 U.S. C. 932(k). The Director argues that since the Secretary is explicitly made a party under the BLBA, she must be meant to be a party under the LHWCA as well. That is not a form of reasoning we are familiar with. The normal conclusion one would derive from putting these statutes side by side is this: When, in a legislative scheme of this sort, Congress wants the Secretary to have standing, it says so. Finally, the Director retreats to that last redoubt of losing causes, the proposition that the statute at hand should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes, see, e. g., Northeast Marine Terminal v. Caputo, That principle may be invoked, in case of ambiguity, to find present rather than absent elements that are essential *136 to operation of a legislative scheme; but it does not add features that will achieve the statutory "purposes" more effectively. Every statute purposes, not only to achieve certain ends, but also to achieve them by particular meansand there is often a considerable legislative battle over what those means ought to be. The withholding of agency authority is as significant as the granting of it, and we have no right to play favorites between the two. Construing the LHWCA as liberally as can be, we cannot find that the Director is "adversely affected or aggrieved" within the meaning of 921(c). * * * For these reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed. So ordered. Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,004 | 4 | majority | Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136990/hiibel-v-sixth-judicial-dist-court-of-nev-humboldt-cty/ | The petitioner was arrested and convicted for refusing to identify himself during a stop allowed by He challenges his conviction under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. I The sheriff's department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden stop. The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be *181 intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had "any identification on [him]," which we understand as a request to produce a driver's license or some other form of written identification. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to see identification. The officer responded that he was conducting an investigation and needed to see some identification. The unidentified man became agitated and insisted he had done nothing wrong. The officer explained that he wanted to find out who the man was and what he was doing there. After continued refusals to comply with the officer's request for identification, the man began to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and take him to jail. This routine kept up for several minutes: The officer asked for identification 11 times and was refused each time. After warning the man that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse to comply, the officer placed him under arrest. We now know that the man arrested on Grass Valley Road is Larry Dudley Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with "willfully resist[ing], delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office" in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) 199.280 The government reasoned that Hiibel had obstructed the officer in carrying out his duties under 171.123, a Nevada statute that defines the legal rights and duties of a police officer in the context of an investigative stop. Section 171.123 provides in relevant part: "1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances |
Justice Kennedy | 2,004 | 4 | majority | Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136990/hiibel-v-sixth-judicial-dist-court-of-nev-humboldt-cty/ | may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. "3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not *182 be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer." Hiibel was tried in the Justice Court of Union Township. The court agreed that Hiibel's refusal to identify himself as required by 171.123 "obstructed and delayed Dove as a public officer in attempting to discharge his duty" in violation of 199.280. App. 5. Hiibel was convicted and fined $250. The Sixth Judicial District Court affirmed, rejecting Hiibel's argument that the application of 171.123 to his case violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. On review the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge in a divided opinion. Hiibel petitioned for rehearing, seeking explicit resolution of his Fifth Amendment challenge. The petition was denied without opinion. We granted certiorari. II NRS 171.123(3) is an enactment sometimes referred to as a "stop and identify" statute. See Ala. Code 15-5-30 ; Ark. Code Ann. 5-71-213(a)(1) (2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. 16-3-103(1) ; Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 1902(a), 1321(6) ; Fla. Stat. 856.021(2) ; Ga. Code Ann. 16-11-36(b) ; Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, 5/107-14 (2004); Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-2402(1) ; La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 215.1(A) (West 2004); Mo. Rev. Stat. 84.710(2) ; Mont. Code Ann. 46-5-401(2)(a) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-829 ; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 594:2 and 644:6 ; N. M. Stat. Ann. 30-22-3 (2004); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 140.50(1) (West 2004); N. D. Cent. Code 29-29-21 ; R. I. Gen. Laws 12-7-1 ; Utah Code Ann. 77-7-15 ; Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, 1983 ; Wis. Stat. 968.24 See also Note, Stop and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an Inadequate Solution to an Old Problem, 12 Rutgers L. J. 585 (1981); Note, Stop-and-Identify Statutes After : Exploring *183 the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, Stop and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. The statutes vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. A few States model their statutes on the Uniform Arrest Act, a model code that permits an officer to stop a person reasonably suspected of committing a crime and "demand of him his |
Justice Kennedy | 2,004 | 4 | majority | Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136990/hiibel-v-sixth-judicial-dist-court-of-nev-humboldt-cty/ | suspected of committing a crime and "demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going." Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, Other statutes are based on the text proposed by the American Law Institute as part of the Institute's Model Penal Code. See ALI, Model Penal Code 250.6, Comment 4, pp. 392-393 (1980). The provision, originally designated 250.12, provides that a person who is loitering "under circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or about to engage in crime commits a violation if he refuses the request of a peace officer that he identify himself and give a reasonably credible account of the lawfulness of his conduct and purposes." 250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13) (1961). In some States, a suspect's refusal to identify himself is a misdemeanor offense or civil violation; in others, it is a factor to be considered in whether the suspect has violated loitering laws. In other States, a suspect may decline to identify himself without penalty. Stop and identify statutes have their roots in early English vagrancy laws that required suspected vagrants to face arrest unless they gave "a good Account of themselves," 15 Geo. 2, ch. 5, 2 (1744), a power that itself reflected common-law rights of private persons to "arrest any suspicious night-walker, and detain him till he give a good account of himself." 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 13, 6, p. 130. (6th ed. 1787). In recent decades, the Court has found constitutional infirmity in traditional vagrancy laws. *184 In the Court held that a traditional vagrancy law was void for vagueness. Its broad scope and imprecise terms denied proper notice to potential offenders and permitted police officers to exercise unfettered discretion in the enforcement of the law. See The Court has recognized similar constitutional limitations on the scope and operation of stop and identify statutes. In the Court invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court ruled that the initial stop was not based on specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was involved in criminal activity. See at 51-. Absent that factual basis for detaining the defendant, the Court held, the risk of "arbitrary and abusive police practices" was too great and the stop was impermissible. at Four Terms later, the Court invalidated a modified stop and identify statute on vagueness grounds. See 461 U.S. 3 The California law in Kolender required a suspect to give an officer "`credible and reliable'" identification when asked to identify himself. The Court held that |
Justice Kennedy | 2,004 | 4 | majority | Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136990/hiibel-v-sixth-judicial-dist-court-of-nev-humboldt-cty/ | identification when asked to identify himself. The Court held that the statute was void because it provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with it, resulting in "`virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.'" ). The present case begins where our prior cases left off. Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Further, the petitioner has not alleged that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Kolender. Here the Nevada statute is narrower and more precise. The statute in Kolender had been interpreted to require a suspect to give the officer "credible and reliable" *185 identification. In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted NRS 171.123(3) to require only that a suspect disclose his name. See ("The suspect is not required to provide private details about his background, but merely to state his name to an officer when reasonable suspicion exists"). As we understand it, the statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver's license or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other means a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs. See -1207. III Hiibel argues that his conviction cannot stand because the officer's conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree. Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. "[I]nterrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." Beginning with the Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer's reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. at ; United To ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable, a stop must be limited. The officer's action must be "`justified at its inception, and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'" United (quoting ). For example, the seizure cannot *186 continue for an excessive period of time, see United or resemble a traditional arrest, see Our decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many stops. See United ; ; Obtaining a suspect's name in the course |
Justice Kennedy | 2,004 | 4 | majority | Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136990/hiibel-v-sixth-judicial-dist-court-of-nev-humboldt-cty/ | United ; ; Obtaining a suspect's name in the course of a stop serves important government interests. Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in cases such as this, where the police are investigating what appears to be a domestic assault. Officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim. Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself in the course of a stop, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested *187 and prosecuted for refusal to answer. See n. 3. Petitioner draws our attention to statements in prior opinions that, according to him, answer the question in his favor. In Justice White stated in a concurring opinion that a person detained in an investigative stop can be questioned but is "not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest." The Court cited this opinion in dicta in a decision holding that a routine traffic stop is not a custodial stop requiring the protections of In the course of explaining why stops have not been subject to Miranda, the Court suggested reasons why stops have a "nonthreatening character," among them the fact that a suspect detained during a stop "is not obliged to respond" to questions. See at 440. According to petitioner, these statements establish a right to refuse to answer questions during a stop. We do not read these statements as controlling. The passages recognize that the Fourth Amendment does not impose obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights against the government. As a result, the Fourth Amendment itself cannot require a suspect to answer questions. This case concerns a different issue, however. Here, the source of the legal obligation arises from Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment. Further, the statutory obligation does not go beyond answering an officer's request to disclose a name. See NRS 171.123(3) ("Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer"). As a result, we cannot view the dicta in or Justice White's concurrence in as answering the question whether a State |
Justice Kennedy | 2,004 | 4 | majority | Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136990/hiibel-v-sixth-judicial-dist-court-of-nev-humboldt-cty/ | White's concurrence in as answering the question whether a State can compel a suspect to disclose his name during a stop. The principles of permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a stop. The reasonableness *188 of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined "by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests." The Nevada statute satisfies that standard. The request for identity has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a stop. The threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the Nevada statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself: it does not change its Place, at or its location, at A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Petitioner argues that the Nevada statute circumvents the probable-cause requirement, in effect allowing an officer to arrest a person for being suspicious. According to petitioner, this creates a risk of arbitrary police conduct that the Fourth Amendment does not permit. Brief for Petitioner 28-33. These are familiar concerns; they were central to the opinion in Papachristou, and also to the decisions limiting the operation of stop and identify statutes in Kolender and Petitioner's concerns are met by the requirement that a stop must be justified at its inception and "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified" the initial stop. 392 U.S., Under these principles, an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. The Court noted a similar limitation in Hayes, where it suggested that may permit an officer to determine a suspect's identity by compelling the suspect to submit to fingerprinting only if there is "a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime." It is clear in this case that the *189 request for identification was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified" the stop. The officer's request was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a stop yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State's requirement of a response did not contravene the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. IV Petitioner further contends that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment's prohibition |
Justice Kennedy | 2,004 | 4 | majority | Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136990/hiibel-v-sixth-judicial-dist-court-of-nev-humboldt-cty/ | further contends that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelled self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." To qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled. See United Respondents urge us to hold that the statements NRS 171.123(3) requires are nontestimonial, and so outside the Clause's scope. We decline to resolve the case on that basis. "[T]o be testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information." See also Stating one's name may qualify as an assertion of fact relating to identity. Production of identity documents might meet the definition as well. As we noted in acts of production may yield testimony establishing "the existence, authenticity, and custody of items [the police seek]." Even if these required actions are testimonial, however, petitioner's challenge must fail because in this case disclosure of his name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination. The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating. See v. Walker, A claim of Fifth Amendment privilege must establish "`reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer [T]he danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things, not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.'" (quoting Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 738 (Q. B. 1861) (Cockburn, C. J.)). As we stated in the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used." Suspects who have been granted immunity from prosecution may, therefore, be compelled to answer; with the threat of prosecution removed, there can be no reasonable belief that the evidence will be used against them. See In this case petitioner's refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it "would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute" him. As best we can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought his name was none of the officer's business. Even today, petitioner does not explain how the disclosure of his |
Justice Kennedy | 2,004 | 4 | majority | Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136990/hiibel-v-sixth-judicial-dist-court-of-nev-humboldt-cty/ | today, petitioner does not explain how the disclosure of his name could have been used against him in a criminal case. While we recognize petitioner's strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth *191 Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature's judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him. The narrow scope of the disclosure requirement is also important. One's identity is, by definition, unique; yet it is, in another sense, a universal characteristic. Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances. See Baltimore City Dept. of Social ; cf. In every criminal case, it is known and must be known who has been arrested and who is being tried. Cf. Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We need not resolve those questions here. The judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court is Affirmed. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,993 | 4 | concurring | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | I am in full agreement with the Court's decision that the competency standard for pleading guilty and waiving the right to counsel is the same as the test of competency to stand trial. As I have some reservations about one part of the Court's opinion and take a somewhat different path to reach my conclusion, it is appropriate to make some further observations. The Court compares the types of decisions made by one who goes to trial with the decisions required to plead guilty and waive the right to counsel. This comparison seems to suggest that there may have been a heightened standard of *40 competency required by the Due Process Clause if the decisions were not equivalent. I have serious doubts about that proposition. In discussing the standard for a criminal defendant's competency to make decisions affecting his case, we should not confuse the content of the standard with the occasions for its application. We must leave aside in this case any question whether a defendant is absolved of criminal responsibility due to his mental state at the time he committed criminal acts and any later question about whether the defendant has the minimum competence necessary to undergo his sentence. What is at issue here is whether the defendant has sufficient competence to take part in a criminal proceeding and to make the decisions throughout its course. This is not to imply that mental competence is the only aspect of a defendant's state of mind that is relevant during criminal proceedings. Whether the defendant has made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to make certain fundamental choices during the course of criminal proceedings is another subject of judicial inquiry. That both questions might be implicated at any given point, however, does not mean that the inquiries cease to be discrete. And as it comes to us, this case involves only the standard for determining competency. This Court set forth the standard for competency to stand trial in : "[T]he `test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' " In my view, both the Court of Appeals and respondent read "competency to stand trial" in too narrow a fashion. We have not suggested that the Dusky competency standard applies during the course of, but not before, trial. Instead, that standard is applicable from the time of arraignment through the return of a verdict. Although the Dusky standard refers to "ability to |
Justice Kennedy | 1,993 | 4 | concurring | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | a verdict. Although the Dusky standard refers to "ability to consult *404 with [a] lawyer," the crucial component of the inquiry is the defendant's possession of "a reasonable degree of rational understanding." In other words, the focus of the Dusky formulation is on a particular level of mental functioning, which the ability to consult counsel helps identify. The possibility that consultation will occur is not required for the standard to serve its purpose. If a defendant elects to stand trial and to take the foolish course of acting as his own counsel, the law does not for that reason require any added degree of competence. See ante, at 99-400, n. 10. The Due Process Clause does not mandate different standards of competency at various stages of or for different decisions made during the criminal proceedings. That was never the rule at common law, and it would take some extraordinary showing of the inadequacy of a single standard of competency for us to require States to employ heightened standards. See Indeed, we should only overturn Nevada's use of a single standard if it "`offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" ). The historical treatment of competency that supports Nevada's single standard has its roots in English common law. Writing in the 18th century, Blackstone described the effect of a defendant's incompetence on criminal proceedings: "[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defence?" 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *24. Accord, 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *4-*5. *405 Blackstone drew no distinction between madness for purposes of pleading and madness for purposes of going to trial. An English case arising in the Crown Court in 1865 indicates that a single standard was applied to assess competency at the time of arraignment, the time of pleading, and throughout the course of trial. See Regina v. Southey, 4 Fos. & Fin. 864, 872, n. a, 176 Eng. Rep. 825, 828, n. a (N. P. 1865) ("Assuming the prisoner to be insane at the time of arraignment, he cannot be tried at all, with or without counsel, for, even assuming that he has appointed counsel at a time when he was sane, it |
Justice Kennedy | 1,993 | 4 | concurring | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | appointed counsel at a time when he was sane, it is not fit that he should be tried, as he cannot understand the evidence, nor the proceedings, and so is unable to instruct counsel, or to withdraw his authority if he acts improperly, as a prisoner may always do"); n. a, 176 Eng. Rep., at 81, n. a ("[I]f [the defendant] be so insane as not to understand the nature of the proceedings, he cannot plead"). A number of 19th-century American cases also referred to insanity in a manner that suggested there was a single standard by which competency was to be assessed throughout legal proceedings. See, e. g., ; 60 Wis. 55, 19 N.W. 45, 46 ; 7 So. 12 See also 2 J. Bishop, Commentaries on Law of Criminal Procedure 664, 667 (2d ed. 1872) ("[A] prisoner cannot be tried, sentenced, or punished" unless he is "mentally competent to make a rational defense"). *406 Other American cases describe the standard by which competency is to be measured in a way that supports the idea that a single standard, parallel to that articulated in Dusky, is applied no matter at what point during legal proceedings a competency question should arise. For example, in it was held: "If. a person arraigned for a crime, is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against him; if he rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and can conduct his defence in a rational manner, he is, for the purpose of being tried, to be deemed sane." Because the competency question was posed in Freeman at the time the defendant was to be arraigned, the Freeman court's conception of competency to stand trial was that of a single standard to be applied throughout. An even more explicit recitation of this common-law principle is found in In the course of the opinion in that case, there was a discussion of the common-law rule regarding a defendant's competency to take part in legal proceedings: "The rule at common law is that if at any time while criminal proceedings are pending against a person accused of a crime, the trial court either from observation or upon suggestion of counsel has facts brought to his attention which raise a doubt of the sanity of defendant, the question should be settled before further steps are taken. The broad question to be determined then is whether the defendant is capable of understanding the proceedings and of making his defense, and whether he may have a full, fair and impartial trial." 1 |
Justice Kennedy | 1,993 | 4 | concurring | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | he may have a full, fair and impartial trial." 1 At common law, therefore, no attempt was made to apply different competency standards to different stages of criminal proceedings or to the variety of decisions that a defendant *407 must make during the course of those proceedings. See ; 15 S.W. 27, 28-29 ; 115 So. 70, 71-72 ; State ex rel. ; 167 F.2d 68, Commentators have agreed that the common-law standard of competency to stand trial, which parallels the Dusky standard, has been applied throughout criminal proceedings, not just to the formal trial. See H. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 428-429, 41 (1954) ("It has long been the rule of the common law that a person cannot be required to plead to an indictment or be tried for a crime while he is so mentally disordered as to be incapable of making a rational defense"); S. Brakel, J. Parry, and A. Weiner, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 695-696 (d ed. 1985) ("It has traditionally been presumed that competency to stand trial means competency to participate in all phases of the trial process, including such pretrial activities as deciding how to plead, participating in plea bargaining, and deciding whether to assert or waive the right to counsel"). That the common law did not adopt heightened competency standards is readily understood when one considers the difficulties that would be associated with more than one standard. The standard applicable at a given point in a trial could be difficult to ascertain. For instance, if a defendant decides to change his plea to guilty after a trial has commenced, one court might apply the competency standard for undergoing trial while another court might use the standard for pleading guilty. In addition, the subtle nuances among different standards are likely to be difficult to differentiate, as evidenced by the lack of any clear distinction between a "rational understanding" and a "reasoned choice" in this case. See ante, at 98. * It is true, of course, that if a defendant stands trial instead of pleading guilty, there will be more occasions for the trial court to observe the condition of the defendant to determine his mental competence. Trial courts have the obligation of conducting a hearing whenever there is sufficient doubt concerning a defendant's competence. See The standard by which competency is assessed, however, does not change. Respondent's counsel conceded as much during oral argument, making no attempt to defend the contrary position of the Court of Appeals. See, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 22 ("This is not a case |
Justice Kennedy | 1,993 | 4 | concurring | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | Tr. of Oral Arg. 22 ("This is not a case of heightened standards"); at 1 ; at A single standard of competency to be applied throughout criminal proceedings does not offend any "`principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' " Nothing in our case law compels a contrary conclusion, and adoption of a rule setting out varying competency standards for each decision and stage of a criminal proceeding would disrupt the orderly course of trial and, from the standpoint of all parties, prove unworkable both at trial and on appellate review. I would avoid the difficult comparisons engaged in by the Court. In my view, due process does not preclude Nevada's use of a single competency standard for all aspects of the criminal proceeding. Respondent's decision to plead guilty and his decision to waive counsel were grave choices for him to make, but as the Court demonstrates in Part II-B, there is a heightened standard, albeit not one concerned with competence, that must be met before a defendant is allowed to make those decisions. *409 With these observations, I concur in the judgment and in Parts I, II-B, and III of the Court's opinion. |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | In 1972 Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 so as to empower the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to bring suit in a federal district court against a private employer alleged to have violated the Act. The sole question presented by this case is what time limitation, if any, is imposed on the EEOC's power to bring such a suit. I On December 27, 1970, an employee of the petitioner Occidental Life Insurance filed a charge with the EEOC claiming that the company had discriminated against her because of her sex.[1] After a fruitless referral to the appropriate state agency, the charge was formally filed with the EEOC on March 9, 1971,[2] and subsequently served on the company. After investigation, the EEOC served proposed findings of fact on the company on February 25, 1972, to which the company in due course filed exceptions. Conciliation discussions between the EEOC and the company began in the summer of 1972. These discussions continued sporadically into 1973, but on September 13 of that year the EEOC determined that conciliation efforts had failed and so *358 notified the company and the original complainant. The latter requested that the case be referred to the General Counsel of the EEOC to bring an enforcement action. On February 22, 1974, approximately three years and two months after the complainant first communicated with the EEOC and five months after conciliation efforts had failed, the EEOC brought this enforcement action in a Federal District Court. The District Court granted the company's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the law requires that an enforcement action be brought within 180 days of the filing of a charge with the EEOC.[3] Alternatively, the court held that the action was subject to the most appropriate state limitations statute and was therefore barred by the one-year limitation provision of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. 340 (3) (West Supp. 1977).[4] The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the federal law does not impose a 180-day limitation on the EEOC's authority to sue and that the action is not governed by any state statute of limitations. We granted certiorari, to consider an important and recurring question regarding Title VII. II As enacted in 1964, Title VII limited the EEOC's function to investigation of employment discrimination charges and informal methods of conciliation and persuasion.[5] The failure *359 of conciliation efforts terminated the involvement of the EEOC. Enforcement could then be achieved, if at all, only if the charging party, or other person aggrieved by the allegedly unlawful practice, |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | party, or other person aggrieved by the allegedly unlawful practice, initiated a private suit within 30 days after EEOC notification that conciliation had not been successful.[6] In the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972[7] Congress established an integrated, multistep enforcement procedure culminating in the EEOC's authority to bring a civil action in a federal court. That procedure begins when a charge is filed with the EEOC alleging that an employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice. A charge must be filed within 180 days after the occurrence of the allegedly unlawful practice, and the EEOC is directed to serve notice of the charge on the employer within 10 days of filing.[8] The EEOC is then required to investigate the charge and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that it is true. This determination is to be made "as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge."[9] If the EEOC finds that there is reasonable cause it "shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."[10] When "the Commission [is] unable to secure a *360 conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge."[11] The 1972 Act expressly imposes only one temporal restriction on the EEOC's authority to embark upon the final stage of enforcementthe bringing of a civil suit in a federal district court: Under 706 (f) (1), the EEOC may not invoke the judicial power to compel compliance with Title VII until at least 30 days after a charge has been filed. But neither 706 (f) nor any other section of the Act explicitly requires the EEOC to conclude its conciliation efforts and bring an enforcement suit within any maximum period of time. The language of the Act upon which the District Court relied in finding a limitation that bars the bringing of a lawsuit by the EEOC more than 180 days after a timely charge has been filed with it is found in 706 (f) (1), 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. V), which provides in relevant part: "If a charge filed with the Commission is dismissed by the Commission, or within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference [from a state agency], whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section or |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | has not filed a civil action under this section or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was *361 filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice." On its face, 706 (f) (1) provides little support for the argument that the 180-day provision is such a statute of limitations. Rather than limiting action by the EEOC, the provision seems clearly addressed to an alternative enforcement procedure: If a complainant is dissatisfied with the progress the EEOC is making on his or her charge of employment discrimination, he or she may elect to circumvent the EEOC procedures and seek relief through a private enforcement action in a district court. The 180-day limitation provides only that this private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed. Nothing in 706 (f) (1) indicates that EEOC enforcement powers cease if the complainant decides to leave the case in the hands of the EEOC rather than to pursue a private action. In short, the literal language of 706 (f) (1) simply cannot support a determination that it imposes a 180-day time limitation on EEOC enforcement suits. On the contrary, a natural reading of 706 (f) (1) can lead only to the conclusion that it simply provides that a complainant whose charge is not dismissed or promptly settled or litigated by the EEOC may himself bring a lawsuit, but that he must wait 180 days before doing so. After waiting for that period, the complainant may either file a private action within 90 days after EEOC notification or continue to leave the ultimate resolution of his charge to the efforts of the EEOC. Only if the legislative history of 706 (f) (1) provided firm evidence that the subsection cannot mean what it so clearly seems to say would there be any justification for construing it in any other way. But no such evidence is to be found. The dominant Title VII battle in the 92d Congress was over what kind of additional enforcement powers should be granted to the EEOC. Proponents of increased EEOC power *362 constituted a substantial majority in both Houses of Congress, but they were divided between those |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | both Houses of Congress, but they were divided between those Members who favored giving the EEOC power to issue cease-and-desist orders and those who advocated authorizing it to bring suits in the federal district courts. The supporters of cease-and-desist authority won the first victory when Committees in both Houses favorably reported bills providing for that enforcement technique. The bill reported by the House Committee contained a section entitled "Civil Actions by Persons Aggrieved," embodying the provisions that eventually became that part of 706 (f) (1) at issue in the present case.[12] The Committee Report clearly explained that the purpose of this provision was to afford an aggrieved person the option of withdrawing his case from the EEOC if he was dissatisfied with the rate at which his charge was being processed: "In the case of the Commission, the burgeoning workload, accompanied by insufficient funds and a shortage of staff, has, in many instances, forced a party to wait 2 to 3 years *363 before final conciliation procedures can be instituted. This situation leads the committee to believe that the private right of action, both under the present Act and in the bill, provides the aggrieved party a means by which he may be able to escape from the administrative quagmire which occasionally surrounds a case caught in an overloaded administrative process."[13] Opponents of cease-and-desist authority carried their cause to the floor of the House, where Congressmen Erlenborn and Mazzoli introduced a substitute bill, which authorized the EEOC when conciliation failed to file federal-court actions rather than conduct its own hearings and issue cease-and-desist orders. The Erlenborn-Mazzoli substitute contained a private action provision substantially the same as that of the Committee bill.[14] There was no suggestion in the House debates that that section in the substitute bill was intended to be a statute of limitations on EEOC enforcement action, or that the purpose of the provision differed in any way from that expressed in the Committee Report. The Erlenborn-Mazzoli substitute was adopted by the House. Senate action on amendments to Title VII was essentially parallel to that of the House, beginning with the introduction of a bill giving the EEOC cease-and-desist power, and ending with the substitution of a bill authorizing it instead to file suits in the federal courts. As in the House, both the original and substitute Senate bills authorized complainants dissatisfied with the pace of EEOC proceedings to bring individual lawsuits after 180 days.[15] And, as in the House, the Senate Committee explained that such a provision was necessary *364 because the heavy caseload of the EEOC could |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | necessary *364 because the heavy caseload of the EEOC could result in delays unacceptable to aggrieved persons: "As it indicated in testimony, [the EEOC's] caseload has increased at a rate which surpasses its own projections. The result has been increasing backlogs in making determinations, and the possibility of occasional hasty decisions, made under the press of time, which have unfairly prejudiced complaints. Accordingly, where the Commission is not able to pursue a complaint with satisfactory speed, or enters into an agreement which is not acceptable to the aggrieved party, the bill provides that the individual shall have an opportunity to seek his own remedy, even though he may have originally submitted his charge to the commission."[16] The Senate Committee further noted that the "primary concern should be to protect the aggrieved person's option to seek a prompt remedy," and that the purpose of the 180-day provision was to preserve "the private right of action by an aggrieved person."[17] Senator Dominick led the opposition to the Committee bill on the floor of the Senate. His substitute bill did not give the EEOC power to issue cease-and-desist orders but authorized it instead to bring enforcement suits in federal courts. The substitute bill also contained a provision authorizing private lawsuits almost identical to that contained in the Committee bill. There ensued a month-long Senate debate, at the conclusion of which the substitute bill was adopted by the Senate. During the course of that debate there were only a few isolated and ambiguous references to the provision in the substitute bill authorizing federal suits by complainants dissatisfied with EEOC delay.[18] But a section-by-section *365 analysis of the substitute bill made available before the final vote in the Senate clearly explained the purpose of the 180-day provision: "In providing this provision, it is intended that the person aggrieved should [not] have to endure lengthy delays if the agency does not act with due diligence and speed. Accordingly, the provisions would allow the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy in the courts where agency action does not prove satisfactory."[19] After the final Senate vote the House and Senate bills were sent to a Conference Committee. An analysis presented to the Senate with the Conference Report provides the final and conclusive confirmation of the meaning of 706 (f) (1): "The retention of the private right of action, as amended, is designed to make sure that the person aggrieved does not have to endure lengthy delays if the Commission does not act with due diligence and speed. Accordingly, the provisions allow the person |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | due diligence and speed. Accordingly, the provisions allow the person *366 aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy under this title in the courts where there is agency inaction, dalliance or dismissal of the charge, or unsatisfactory resolution. "It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices of the EEOC. However, as the individual's rights to redress are paramount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief."[20] The legislative history of 706 (f) (1) thus demonstrates that the provision was intended to mean exactly what it seems to say: An aggrieved person unwilling to await the conclusion of extended EEOC proceedings may institute a private lawsuit 180 days after a charge has been filed. The subsection imposes no limitation upon the power of the EEOC to file suit in a federal court.[21] III The company argues that if the Act contains no limitation on the time during which an EEOC enforcement suit may be brought, then the most analogous state statute of limitations should be applied.[22] Relying on a long line of cases in this *367 Court holding state limitations periods applicable to actions brought under federal statutes, the company contends that California law barred the EEOC from bringing this lawsuit. When Congress has created a cause of action and has not specified the period of time within which it may be asserted, the Court has frequently inferred that Congress intended that a local time limitation should E. g., ; Auto ( 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); ; Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe (Sherman Antitrust Act); (Patent Act). This "implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial determination." But the Court has not mechanically applied a state statute of limitations simply because a limitations period is absent from the federal statute. State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies. "Although state law is our primary guide in this area, it is not, to be sure, our exclusive guide." State limitations periods will not be borrowed if their application would be inconsistent with the underlying policies of the federal |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | would be inconsistent with the underlying policies of the federal statute. ; Auto ; Board of County With these considerations in mind, we turn to the company's argument in this case. When Congress first enacted Title VII in 1964 it selected "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance as the preferred *368 means for achieving" the goal of equality of employment opportunities. To this end, Congress created the EEOC and established an administrative procedure whereby the EEOC "would have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit." Although the 1972 amendments provided the EEOC with the additional enforcement power of instituting civil actions in federal courts, Congress preserved the EEOC's administrative functions in 706 of the amended Act. Thus, under the procedural structure created by the 1972 amendments, the EEOC does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties; it is a federal administrative agency charged with the responsibility of investigating claims of employment discrimination and settling disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive fashion. Unlike the typical litigant against whom a statute of limitations might appropriately run, the EEOC is required by law to refrain from commencing a civil action until it has discharged its administrative duties. In view of the federal policy requiring employment discrimination claims to be investigated by the EEOC and, whenever possible, administratively resolved before suit is brought in a federal court, it is hardly appropriate to rely on the "State's wisdom in setting a limit on the prosecution." For the "State's wisdom" in establishing a general limitation period could not have taken into account the decision of Congress to delay judicial action while the EEOC performs its administrative responsibilities. See Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express ; ; Indeed, the one-year statute of limitations applied by the District Court in this case could *369 under some circumstances directly conflict with the timetable for administrative action expressly established in the 1972 Act.[23] But even in cases involving no inevitable and direct conflict with the express time periods provided in the Act, absorption of state limitations would be inconsistent with the congressional intent underlying the enactment of the 1972 amendments. Throughout the congressional debates many Members of both Houses demonstrated an acute awareness of the enormous backlog of cases before the EEOC[24] and the consequent delays of 18 to 24 months encountered by aggrieved persons awaiting administrative action on their complaints.[25]*370 Nevertheless, Congress substantially increased the workload of the EEOC by extending the coverage of Title VII to state employers, |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | by extending the coverage of Title VII to state employers, private employers with as few as 15 employees, and nonreligious educational institutions;[26] by transferring the authority to bring pattern-or-practice suits from the Attorney General to the Commission;[27] and by authorizing the Commission to bring civil actions in the federal courts.[28] It would hardly be reasonable to suppose that a Congress aware of the severe time problems already facing the EEOC would grant that agency substantial additional enforcement responsibilities and at the same time consign its federal lawsuits to the *371 vagaries of diverse state limitations statutes, some as short as one year. Congress did express concern for the need of time limitations in the fair operation of the Act, but that concern was directed entirely to the initial filing of a charge with the EEOC and prompt notification thereafter to the alleged violator. The bills passed in both the House and the Senate contained short time periods within which charges were to be filed with the EEOC and notice given to the employer.[29] And the debates and reports in both Houses made evident that the statute of limitations problem was perceived in terms of these provisions, rather than in terms of a later limitation on the EEOC's power to sue.[30] That perception was reflected in the final version of the 1972 Act, which requires that a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged *372 violation of Title VII, and that the alleged violator must be notified "of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) within ten days" thereafter.[31] The fact that the only statute of limitations discussions in Congress were directed to the period preceding the filing of an initial charge is wholly consistent with the Act's overall enforcement structurea sequential series of steps beginning with the filing of a charge with the EEOC. Within this procedural framework, the benchmark, for purposes of a statute of limitations, is not the last phase of the multistage scheme, but the commencement of the proceeding before the administrative body. IV The absence of inflexible time limitations on the bringing of lawsuits will not, as the company asserts, deprive defendants in Title VII civil actions of fundamental fairness or subject them to the surprise and prejudice that can result from the prosecution of stale claims. Unlike the litigant in a private action who may first learn of the cause against him upon service of the complaint, the Title VII defendant is alerted to the possibility of an enforcement suit within 10 |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | alerted to the possibility of an enforcement suit within 10 days after a charge has been filed. This prompt notice serves, as Congress intended, to give him an opportunity to gather and preserve evidence in anticipation of a court action. Moreover, during the pendency of EEOC administrative proceedings, a potential defendant is kept informed of the progress of the action. Regulations promulgated by the EEOC require that the charged party be promptly notified when a determination of reasonable cause has been made,[32]*373 29 CFR 1601.19b (b) and when the EEOC has terminated its efforts to conciliate a dispute, 1601.23, 1601.25. It is, of course, possible that despite these procedural protections a defendant in a Title VII enforcement action might still be significantly handicapped in making his defense because of an inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action after exhausting its conciliation efforts. If such cases arise the federal courts do not lack the power to provide relief. This Court has said that when a Title VII defendant is in fact prejudiced by a private plaintiff's unexcused conduct of a particular case, the trial court may restrict or even deny backpay relief. Albemarle Paper The same discretionary power "to locate `a just result' in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case," ib can also be exercised when the EEOC is the plaintiff. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting in part. While I agree with Part II of the Court's opinion, holding that 706 (f) (1), 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. V), does not impose a limitation on the power of the EEOC to file suit in a federal court, I do not agree with the Court's conclusion in Part III that the EEOC is not bound by any limitations period at all. The Court's actions, and the reasons which it assigns for them, suggest that it is more concerned with limitlessly expanding the important underlying statutory policy than it is with considerations traditionally dealt with by judges. Since I believe that a consistent line of opinions from this Court holding that, in the absence of a *374 federal limitations period, the applicable state limitations period will is being ignored by a process of unwarranted judicial legislation, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case. I Since I agree with the Court that the Act contains no limitation on the time during which an enforcement suit may be brought by the EEOC, I also agree |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | suit may be brought by the EEOC, I also agree with it that the relevant inquiry is whether the most analogous state statute of limitations applies. Unless the United States is suing in its sovereign capacity, a matter which I treat below, the answer one would have derived before today from the opinions of this Court over a period of 140 years would surely have been "yes." See, e. g., ; ; ; Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe ; ; Auto ; ; The Court, however, today relies on basically two interrelated reasons for refusing to California's applicable statute of limitations to suits brought by the EEOC. First, the Court postulates that "the Court has not mechanically applied a state statute of limitations simply because a limitations period is absent from the federal statute." Ante, at 367. Second, "State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies." Both of these assertions are created out of whole cloth; contrary to their tenor, neither statement, as applied to statutes of limitations, draws sustenance from *375 any cases whatsoever. Rather, anything more than a superficial examination of precedent reveals that they are contrary to the established line of decisions of this Court. This Court has long followed the rule that, unless the United States was suing in its sovereign capacity, "in the absence of any provision of the act of Congress creating the liability, fixing a limitation of time for commencing actions to enforce it, the statute of limitations of the particular State is applicable." See also The consistent nature of this history was described in Auto at 703-704: "As early as 1830, this Court held that state statutes of limitations govern the timeliness of federal causes of action unless Congress has specifically provided otherwise. In 1895, the question was re-examined in another context, but the conclusion remained firm. Since that time, state statutes have repeatedly supplied the periods of limitations for federal causes of action when federal legislation has been silent on the question. Yet when Congress has disagreed with such an interpretation of its silence, it has spoken to overturn it by enacting a uniform period of limitations. Against this background, we cannot take the omission in the present statute as a license to judicially devise a uniform time limitation for 301 suits." (Citations omitted.) This general policy has been recently reaffirmed with respect to lawsuits brought under 42 U.S. |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | recently reaffirmed with respect to lawsuits brought under 42 U.S. C. 11, see ; Indeed, Johnson noted that "the express terms of 42 U.S. C. 18 suggest" that there is not "anything peculiar to a federal civil rights action that would justify special reluctance in ing state law." 421 U.S., The Court fails to point to any case not involving the *376 United States in its sovereign capacity, in which, the federal statute being silent, the applicable state limitations period was disregarded in favor of either a judge-made limitations period or, as here, no limitations period at all. There is simply no support for the proposition that a federally created right of action should impliedly be without temporal limitations. Indeed, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in 1805, observed that a case without a limitations period "would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws." Yet, the Court today, without acknowledging the radical nature of its act, creates precisely such a situation.[1] As for the second point, I can readily concede that the California Legislature did not specifically consider the federal interests underlying the enactment of Title VII. But this argument begs the question. This Court, in 1830, rejected the argument that a state statute of limitations should not because the State had not considered the federal policies. It stated, in at -278: "It is contended that this statute cannot be so construed as to interpose a bar to any remedy sought against an officer of the United States, for a failure in the performance of his duty; that such a case could not have been contemplated by the legislature. *377 "It is not probable that the legislature of Ohio, in the passage of this statue, had any reference to the misconduct of an officer of the United States. Nor does it seem to have been their intention to restrict the provision of the statute to any particular causes for which the action on the case will lie. "Where the statute is not restricted to particular causes of action, but provides that the action, by its technical denomination, shall be barred, if not brought within a limited time, every cause for which the action may be prosecuted is within the statute." Similar arguments were also rejected in construing 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, Auto 383 U. S., -704. And in both and we followed, without hesitation, state limitations periods even though one would suppose that the federal policies underlying 42 U.S. C. 11 were of a magnitude comparable to those of Title VII and even |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | a magnitude comparable to those of Title VII and even though the general state statute of limitations would hardly have taken these policies into account. The Court apparently rests its case on the authority of three opinions: Auto and Board of County None are applicable. Johnson did not state, or hint, that "[s]tate limitations periods will not be borrowed if their application would be inconsistent with the underlying policies of the federal statute." Ante, at 367. Rather, after concluding that the state limitations period applied, it turned, in a separate section of the opinion, to a question of tolling, 421 U.S., at where the statement that "[a]lthough state law is our primary guide in this area, it is not, to be sure, our exclusive guide," so heavily relied on by the Court today, is found. Nor does Auto provide support for the Court: pointing *378 to the longstanding history of constant interpretation that when the federal statute does not speak, the state limitations period applies, it rejected the argument that federal uniformity required a federal limitations period by stating that "there is no justification for the drastic sort of judicial legislation that is urged upon us," The last of the three cases, Board of County Comm'rs, is also irrelevant. It involved a suit brought by the United States in its sovereign capacity, to which it is clear state limitations period do not In any case, the language the Court points to, at 351-, is in the context of a discussion of the absorption of substantive rights and liabilities, not in the context of a statute of limitations at all. The two are decisively different. See Auto n. 4; see also The premises of the majority, then, are supported, not by a slender reed, but by no reed at all. Perhaps the Court's decision can be explained by its apparent fear that the application of the State's limitations period will result in the anomaly of the statute's running before the EEOC is entitled to bring its suit at all. Ante, at 369 n. 23. The Court notes, ante, at 368: "Unlike the typical litigant against whom a statute of limitations might appropriately run, the EEOC is required by law to refrain from commencing a civil action until it has discharged its administrative duties." If this fear is the motivating reason behind the Court's unusual action today, it rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of the application of a State's limitations period to a federal action brought by the EEOC. The EEOC may not bring a suit on behalf of a |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | EEOC may not bring a suit on behalf of a complainant for a violation of Title VII until 30 days after a charge is filed with the EEOC, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. V); see ante, at 360. It would appear that, as a matter of federal law, the EEOC's cause of action accrues on that date, which is the date on which it first becomes entitled to *379 sue. See, e. g., 331 U. S., ; In this case, then, the EEOC would have one year, measured from that time, in which to bring suit under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. 340 (3) (West Supp. 1977).[2] Thus, the fears expressed by the Court are not well grounded. And while it is true that Congress, in enacting Title VII, chose "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance as the preferred means of achieving" its goals, this is not, in the context of this case, a reason to ignore the state limitations period. We noted, in 421 U. S., at in response to similar arguments, that the "plaintiff may ask the court to stay proceedings until the administrative efforts at conciliation and voluntary compliance have been completed." The EEOC in this case is given 30 days plus the one-year limitations period; the fact, then, that there is a federal policy for the EEOC to attempt to achieve its goals by voluntary compliance does not seem to me to be a sound basis for ignoring state limitations periods. That policy is not without constraints, as the statute itself acknowledges. 706 (f) (1).[3]*380 Given that, I am wholly unable to agree that the utilization of state statutes of limitations, which may be "as short as one year," ante, at 371, trenches so severely on the structure or policies of Title VII to warrant this departure from precedent.[4] II In this case, Tamar Edelson filed her charge with the EEOC on December 27, 1970, when it was referred to the California Fair Employment Practices Commission in accordance with the provisions of 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (c). When that agency took no action, the charge was formally filed with the EEOC on March 9, 1971. The EEOC, then, had 1 year and 30 days from that point in which to investigate and attempt to secure voluntary compliance. Since the EEOC is directed to "make its determination on reasonable cause as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days from the [formal] filing of the charge," 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V), this time |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | U.S. C. 2000e-5 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V), this time period of more than one year would appear ample to ensure that what the Court perceives to be federal policy, including voluntary settlement negotiations, is *381 not unduly denigrated.[5] Yet, here, the EEOC did not file its action in the District Court until February 22, 1974, almost three years after the formal filing of the charge. Since this is clearly outside the state limitations period, I would hold the action barred, unless the EEOC is to be considered to be suing on behalf of the United States in its sovereign capacity, a matter to which I now turn. Insofar as the EEOC seeks to recover backpay for individuals, it stands in the shoes of the individuals, and represents them in a suit the individuals would otherwise be entitled to bring, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Not only is the United States itself not a party to the suit, but the EEOC is vindicating a right which a private party was entitled to vindicate in his own right. Cf. Since the United States is not suing in its sovereign capacity, there is no reason to exempt these suits from the general application of state limitations statutes. The scope of the relevant inquiry *382 was formed by this Court in United 3 : "The principle that the United States are not bound by any statute of limitations, nor barred by any laches of their officers, however gross, in a suit brought by them as a sovereign Government to enforce a public right, or to assert a public interest, is established past all controversy or doubt. United and cases there cited. But this case stands upon a different footing, and presents a different question. The question is, Are these defences available to the defendant in a case where the Government, although a nominal complainant party, has no real interest in the litigation, but has allowed its name to be used therein for the sole benefit of a private person?" As this has been interpreted, the decisive fact which excepts the general applicability of these statutes is that the United States is suing to enforce "its rights." United ; see also United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. ; United States v. Des Moines Navigation & R. ; United States v. Bell Telephone ; French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy In itself, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he Government is charged with the duty to protect [the public domain] from trespass and unlawful appropriation" 127 U.S., at See also |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109704/occidental-life-ins-co-of-cal-v-eeoc/ | from trespass and unlawful appropriation" 127 U.S., at See also Yet this "interest" was not sufficient to make it a suit by the sovereign, unbounded by a limitations period. While the Government may be interested in the vindication of the policies enunciated in Title VII, cf. Franks v. Bowman Transportation as, *383 presumably, it would be interested in vindicating the policies expressed in all congressional enactmentsthat is not the decisive fact. It is not "interest," but whether the sovereign is suing to recover in its own right. Since here the suit is to recover backpay for an individual that could have brought her own suit, it is impossible to think that the EEOC was suing in the sovereign capacity of the United States. Cf. United Rather, it is suing as a conduit for the recovery of sums due an individual citizen rather than the public treasury. The Court does not suggest otherwise. The conclusion should be no different when we turn to the issue of injunctive relief. The decisive fact remains the same: The sovereign is not suing to redress "its" injury, rather it is seeking relief that the complaining individual otherwise would have been entitled to seek. While injunctive relief may appear more "broad based," it nonetheless is redress for individuals. The United States gains nothing tangible as a result of the suit. It does, to be sure, vindicate a congressional policy by seeking to enjoin practices proscribed by Title VII, but, it bears repeating, presumably the Government vindicates some congressional policy whenever it sues. That, then, cannot be the test, for it would exalt form (who brings the suit) over substance (whom the suit directly benefits). For these reasons, I am unable to agree with the Ninth Circuit that because the EEOC promotes public policy by its prayer for injunctive relief, it therefore "seeks to vindicate rights belonging to the United States as sovereign," This reason does not adequately distinguish a prayer for injunctive relief from a prayer by the EEOC for backpay for individuals.[6] *384 Since I believe that the EEOC's suit is barred by the running of the statute of limitations in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. 340 (3) (West Supp. 1977), I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | second_dissenting | Peretz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112645/peretz-v-united-states/ | When, at a pretrial conference, the United States District Judge assigned to this asked petitioner's counsel (in petitioner's presence) whether he had "[a]ny objection to picking the jury before a magistrate," counsel responded, "I would love the opportunity." App. 2. Before conducting voir dire, the Magistrate herself asked counsel, "I have the consent of your client to proceed with the jury selection?" Counsel answered, "Yes, your Honor." After the jury was selected under the Magistrate's supervision, but before it was sworn, the parties met with the District Judge to discuss unresolved pretrial matters. Neither petitioner nor his counsel raised any objection at that time or at any other point during the trial to the Magistrate's role in jury selection. Two significant events transpired thereafter. First, the jury convicted petitioner on all counts. Second, after the conviction but prior to sentencing, this Court announced holding that the Federal Magistrates Act did not authorize magistrates to conduct felony voir dire (in that where a defendant had objected). On appeal, petitioner sought to raise a claim, but the Court of Appeals held that his consent below *953 precluded him from raising this newly discovered objection to the Magistrate's role. As a general matter, of course, a litigant must raise all issues and objections at trial. See Freytag v. Commissioner, ante, at 894-895 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). For criminal proceedings in the federal courts, this principle is embodied in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51, which requires "a party, at the time the ruling or order of the [trial] court is made or sought, [to] mak[e] known to the court the action which that party desires the court to take or that party's objection to the action of the court and the grounds therefor." Rule 51's command is not, however, absolute. One of the hoariest precepts in our federal judicial system is that a claim going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the litigation by any party. See Freytag, ante, at 896 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Petitioner seeks to invoke that exception here, relying on our statement in that the Magistrate lacked "jurisdiction to preside" over the voir dire in that But, as Judge Easterbrook has aptly observed, "`jurisdiction' is a many-hued term." United (CA7), cert. denied, We used it in as a synonym for "authority," not in the technical sense involving subject-matter jurisdiction. The judgment here is the judgment of the District Court; the relevant question is whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction; and there is no doubt that it had. The fact that |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | second_dissenting | Peretz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112645/peretz-v-united-states/ | there is no doubt that it had. The fact that the court may have improperly delegated to the Magistrate a function it should have performed personally goes to the lawfulness of the manner in which it acted, but not to its jurisdiction to act. This venerable exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule being inapplicable here, petitioner plainly forfeited the right to advance his current challenges to the Magistrate's role. In certain narrow contexts, however, appellate courts have discretion to overlook a trial forfeiture. The most important *954 of these is described in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b): In criminal s, an appellate court may notice "errors or defects" not brought to the attention of the trial court if they are "plain" and "affec[t] substantial rights." See United Petitioner's contention that this falls into that exception comes up against our admonition that Rule 52(b) applies only to errors that are obvious as well as significantly prejudicial. See, e. g., United 456 U.S. 2, The error alleged here was anything but obvious. At the time this was tried, the Second Circuit had held that a magistrate was authorized to conduct felony voir dire even if the defendant objected, see United rev'd sub nom. No Circuit had held that it was error for a magistrate to conduct voir dire where the defendant consented. Perhaps the best indication that there was no "plain" error, of course, is that five Justices of this Court today hold that there was no error at all.[*] Even when an error is not "plain," this Court has in extraordinary circumstances exercised discretion to consider claims forfeited below. See, e. g., Glidden ; ; In my view, that course is appropriate here. Petitioner's principal claims are that the Federal Magistrates Act does not allow a district court to assign felony voir dire to a magistrate even with the defendant's consent, and that in any event the consent here was ineffective because given orally by counsel and not in writing by the defendant. By definition, these claims can be *955 advanced only by a litigant who will, if ordinary rules are applied, be deemed to have forfeited them: A defendant who objects will not be assigned to the magistrate at all. Thus, if we invariably dismissed claims of this nature on the ground of forfeiture, district courts would never know whether the Act authorizes them, with the defendant's consent, to refer felony voir dire to a magistrate, and, if so, what form the consent must take. Cf. 18 U.S. C. 3401(b) (defendant's consent to magistrate in misdemeanor trial must be in |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | second_dissenting | Peretz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112645/peretz-v-united-states/ | (defendant's consent to magistrate in misdemeanor trial must be in writing). Given the impediments to the proper assertion of these claims, I believe we are justified in reaching the statutory issue today to guide the district courts in the future performance of their duties. It is not that we must address the claims because all legal questions require judicial answers, cf. Valley Forge Christian ; but simply that the relevant rules and statutes governing forfeiture, as we have long construed them, recognize a limited discretion which it is eminently sensible to exercise here. Turning to the merits of the statutory claim, I am in general agreement with JUSTICE MARSHALL. In my view, was driven not primarily by the constitutional problems associated with forcing a litigant to adjudicate his federal claim before a magistrate, but by ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. By specifically authorizing magistrates to perform duties in civil and misdemeanor trials, and specifying the manner in which parties were to express their consent in those situations, the statute suggested absence of authority to preside over felony trials through some (unspecified) mode of consent. The canon of ejusdem generis keeps the "additional duties" clause from swallowing up the rest of the statute. See I would therefore conclude (as respondent in fact conceded) that district courts are not authorized by the Federal Magistrates *956 Act to delegate felony voir dire to magistrates. Having reached that conclusion, I need not, and do not, answer the serious and difficult constitutional questions raised by the contrary construction. I note, however, that while there may be persuasive reasons why the use of a magistrate in these circumstances is constitutional, the Court does not provide them today. The Court's analysis turns on the fact that courts themselves control the decision whether, and to what extent, magistrates will be used. Ante, at 937-939. But the Constitution guarantees not merely that no branch will be forced by one of the other branches to let someone else exercise its assigned powers but that none of the branches will itself alienate its assigned powers. Otherwise, the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power (which delegation cannot plausibly be compelled by one of the other branches) is a dead letter, and our decisions in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining are inexplicable. |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | This case concerns the remedy for missing a statutory deadline. The statute in question focuses upon mandatory restitution for victims of crimes. It provides that “the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” 18 U.S. C. We hold that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitution—at least where, as here, the sentenc ing court made clear prior to the deadline’s expiration that it would order restitution, leaving open (for more than 90 days) only the amount. I On February 8, 2007, petitioner Brian Dolan pleaded guilty to a federal charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. 18 U.S. C. 1153; App. 17. He entered into a plea agreement that stated that “restitution may be ordered by the Court.” The presen tence report, provided to the court by the end of May, noted that restitution was required. But, lacking precise information about hospital costs and lost wages, it did not 2 DOLAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court recommend a restitution amount. On July 30, the District Court held Dolan’s sentencing hearing. The judge sentenced Dolan to 21 months’ impris onment along with 3 years of supervised release. at 38. The judge, aware that restitution was “mandatory,” said that there was “insufficient information on the record at this time regarding possible restitution payments that may be owed,” that he would “leave that matter open, pending the receipt of additional information,” and that Dolan could “anticipate that such an award will be made in the future.” 9–40. A few days later (August 8) the court entered a judgment, which, among other things, stated: “Pursuant to the Mandatory Restitution Act, restitu tion is applicable; however, no information has been received regarding possible restitution payments that may be owed. Therefore, the Court will not order res titution at this time.” The probation office later prepared an addendum to the presentence report, dated October 5, which reflected the views of the parties, and which the judge later indicated he had received. The addendum documents the “total amount of restitution” due in the case (about $105,000). Its date, October 5, is 67 days after Dolan’s July 30 sentencing and 23 days before the stat ute’s “90 days after sentencing” deadline would expire. The sentencing court nonetheless set a restitution hear ing for February 4, 2008—about three months after the 90-day deadline expired. As far as the record shows, no one asked the court for an earlier hearing. At the hearing, Dolan pointed out |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | for an earlier hearing. At the hearing, Dolan pointed out that the 90-day deadline had passed. –55. And he argued that the law no longer au thorized the court to order restitution. at 60–64. The court disagreed and ordered restitution. See Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 3 Opinion of the Court Memorandum Opinion and Restitution Order in No. CR 06–02173–RB App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. And, in light of differences among the Courts of Appeals, we granted Dolan’s petition for certio rari on the question. Compare United 389 F.3d 35 (recognizing court’s authority to enter restitution order past 90 days) and United with United States v. Maung, (finding no such authority), and United II A There is no doubt in this case that the court missed the 90-day statutory deadline “for the final determination of the victim’s losses.” No one has offered any excuse for the court’s doing so. Nor did any party seek an extension or “tolling” of the 90 days for equitable or for other reasons. All the information needed to determine the requisite restitution amount was available before the 90-day period had ended. Thus, the question before us concerns the consequences of the missed deadline where, as here, the statute does not specify them. In answering this kind of question, this Court has looked to statutory language, to the relevant context, and to what they reveal about the purposes that a time limit is designed to serve. The Court’s answers have varied de pending upon the particular statute and time limit at issue. Sometimes we have found that the statute in ques tion imposes a “jurisdictional” condition upon, for example, a court’s authority to hear a case, to consider pleadings, or to act upon motions that a party seeks to file. See, e.g., But cf. Kontrick v. (finding bankruptcy rule 4 DOLAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court did not show legislative intent to “delineat[e] the classes of cases” and “persons” properly “within a court’s adjudica tory authority”); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. (2010) (slip op., –6) (discussing use of term “jurisdictional”). The expiration of a “jurisdic tional” deadline prevents the court from permitting or taking the action to which the statute attached the dead line. The prohibition is absolute. The parties cannot waive it, nor can a court extend that deadline for equitable reasons. See John R. Sand & Gravel In other instances, we have found that certain deadlines are more ordinary “claims-processing rules,” rules that do not limit a court’s jurisdiction, but |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | rules,” rules that do not limit a court’s jurisdiction, but rather regulate the timing of motions or claims brought before the court. Unless a party points out to the court that another litigant has missed such a deadline, the party forfeits the dead line’s protection. See, e.g., Kontrick v. at 454–456 (60-day bankruptcy rule deadline for creditor’s objection to debtor discharge); (7-day criminal rule deadline for filing motion for a new trial). In still other instances, we have found that a deadline seeks speed by creating a time-related directive that is legally enforceable but does not deprive a judge or other public official of the power to take the action to which the deadline applies if the deadline is missed. See, e.g., United (90) (missed deadline for holding bail detention hearing does not require judge to release defendant); v. Pierce County, (86) (missed deadline for making final determination as to misuse of federal grant funds does not prevent later recovery of funds); 171–172 (2003) (missed deadline for assigning industry retiree benefits does not prevent later award of benefits). Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 5 Opinion of the Court After examining the language, the context, and the purposes of the statute, we conclude that the provision before us sets forth this third kind of limitation. The fact that a sentencing court misses the statute’s 90-day deadline, even through its own fault or that of the Gov ernment, does not deprive the court of the power to order restitution. B Several considerations lead us to this conclusion. First, where, as here, a statute “does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with” its “timing provisions,” “federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.” United (93); see also Montalvo- –721. Cf., e.g., Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S. C. (statute specifying that missed 70-day deadline requires dismissal of indictment); (“The sanction for a violation of the Act is dismissal”). We concede that the statute here uses the word “shall,” but a statute’s use of that word alone has not always led this Court to interpret statutes to bar judges (or other officials) from taking the action to which a missed statutory deadline refers. See, e.g., Montalvo- at 718–7 (use of word “shall” in context of bail hearing makes duty “mandatory” but does not mean that the “sanction for breach” is “loss of all later powers to act”); (same in context of misuse of federal funds); at 158–1 (same in context of benefits assignments). See also Re gions (98) (same in respect to federal official’s reporting date). Second, the statute’s |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | in respect to federal official’s reporting date). Second, the statute’s text places primary weight upon, and emphasizes the importance of, imposing restitution upon those convicted of certain federal crimes. Amending 6 DOLAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court an older provision that left restitution to the sentencing judge’s discretion, the statute before us (entitled “The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 96”) says “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, when sen tencing a defendant convicted of [a specified] offense the court shall order that the defendant make restitu tion to the victim of the offense.” §36A(a)(1) (emphasis added); cf. §36(a)(1) (stating that a court “may” order restitution when sentencing defendants convicted of other specified crimes). The Act goes on to provide that restitu tion shall be ordered in the “full amount of each victim’s losses” and “without consideration of the economic circum stances of the defendant.” Third, the Act’s procedural provisions reinforce this substantive purpose, namely, that the statute seeks pri marily to assure that victims of a crime receive full resti tution. To be sure speed is important. The statute re quires a sentencing judge to order the probation office to prepare a report providing “a complete accounting of the losses to each victim, any restitution owed pursuant to a plea agreement, and information relating to the economic circumstances of each defendant.” The prosecu tor, after consulting with all identified victims, must “promptly provide” a listing of the amount subject to resti tution “not later than 60 days prior to the date initially set for sentencing.” (emphasis added). And the provision before us says: “If the victim’s losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior to sentencing, the attorney for the Government or the probation officer shall so in form the court, and the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to ex ceed 90 days after sentencing.” But the statute seeks speed primarily to help the victims of crime and only secondarily to help the defendant. Thus, Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 7 Opinion of the Court in the sentence following the language we have just quoted, the statute continues: “If the victim subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall have 60 days after discovery of those losses in which to petition the court for an amended restitution order.” The sentence imposes no time limit on the victim’s subse quent discovery of losses. Consequently, a court might award restitution for those losses long after the original sentence was imposed and the 90-day time limit has ex |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | sentence was imposed and the 90-day time limit has ex pired. That fact, along with the Act’s main substantive objectives, is why we say that the Act’s efforts to secure speedy determination of restitution is primarily designed to help victims of crime secure prompt restitution rather than to provide defendants with certainty as to the amount of their liability. Cf. S. Rep. No. 104–179, p. 20 (95) (recognizing “the need for finality and certainty in the sentencing process,” but also stating that the “sole due process interest of the defendant being protected is the right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid premises or inaccurate information”); see also (“[J]ustice can not be considered served until full restitution is made”). Fourth, to read the statute as depriving the sentencing court of the power to order restitution would harm those— the victims of crime—who likely bear no responsibility for the deadline’s being missed and whom the statute also seeks to benefit. Cf. (“No victim shall be re quired to participate in any phase of a restitution order”). The potential for such harm—to third parties—normally provides a strong indication that Congress did not intend a missed deadline to work a forfeiture, here depriving a court of the power to award restitution to victims. See 476 U.S., (parties concede and court as sumes that official can “proceed after the deadline” where “inaction” would hurt third party); see also 3 N. Singer & 8 DOLAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §57:, pp. 73–74 (hereinafter Singer, Statutory Construction) (missing a deadline does not remove power to exercise a duty where there is no “language denying performance after a specified time,” and especially “where a mandatory construction might do great injury to persons not at fault, as in a case where slight delay on the part of a public officer might prejudice private rights or the public interest” (footnote omitted)). Fifth, we have previously interpreted similar statutes similarly. In Montalvo-, for exam ple, we considered the Bail Reform Act of 84, which states that a “judicial officer shall hold a hearing” to de termine whether to grant bail to an arrested person and that “hearing shall be held immediately upon the person’s first appearance before the judicial officer.” (A continuance of up to five days may also be granted.) 18 U.S. C. (emphasis added). The judicial officer missed this deadline, but the Court held that the judicial officer need not release the detained person. Rather, “once the Gov ernment discovers that the time limits have expired, it |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | Gov ernment discovers that the time limits have expired, it may [still] ask for a prompt detention hearing and make its case to detain based upon the requirements set forth in the statute.” The Court reasoned that “a failure to comply” with the hearing deadline “does not so subvert the procedural scheme as to invalidate the hearing.” Missing the deadline did not diminish the strength of the Government’s interest in preventing release to avert the likely commission of crimes—the very objective of the Act. Nor would mandatory release of the detained person “proportion[ately]” repair the “inconvenience and uncertainty a timely hearing would have spared him.” at 721. Here, as in Montalvo-, neither the language nor the structure of the statute requires denying the victim Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 9 Opinion of the Court restitution in order to remedy a missed hearing deadline. As in Montalvo-, doing so would defeat the basic purpose of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. And, here, as in Montalvo-, that remedy does not “pro portion[ately]” repair the harm caused the defendant through delay, particularly where, as here, the defendant “knew about restitution,” including the likely amount, well before expiration of the 90-day time limit. App. 62. In deed, our result here follows from Montalvo- a fortiori, for here delay at worst postpones the day of finan cial reckoning. In Montalvo-, delay postponed a constitutionally guaranteed bail hearing with the attached risk that the defendant would remain improperly confined in jail. See (noting the seriousness “of the deprivation of liberty that physical detention imposes”). Nor does Montalvo- stand alone. The Court there found support in similar cases involving executive officials charged with carrying out mandatory public duties in a timely manner. See at 718 ; ). Those cases, in turn, are consistent with numerous similar decisions made by courts throughout the Nation. See, e.g., 522– 523 (Iowa 77); Hutchinson v. 756– 757, (42); (40); see also 3 Singer, Statutory Construction §57:, at 74 (citing cases). Sixth, the defendant normally can mitigate any harm that a missed deadline might cause—at least if, as here, he obtains the relevant information regarding the restitu tion amount before the 90-day deadline expires. A defen dant who fears the deadline will be (or just has been) missed can simply tell the court, which will then likely set a timely hearing or take other statutorily required action. 10 DOLAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court See (providing that “court may require addi tional documentation or hear testimony”); Though a deliberate failure of the sentencing court to comply with the statute |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | failure of the sentencing court to comply with the statute seems improbable, should that occur, the defendant can also seek mandamus. See All Writs Act, 28 U.S. C. La (57). Cf. 476 U.S., n. 7 (noting availability of district court action to compel agency compliance with time-related directive). C Petitioner Dolan, however, believes we have under stated the harm to a defendant that a missed deadline can cause. To show this he makes a three-part argument: (1) A defendant cannot appeal a sentence unless it is part of a “final judgment”; (2) a judgment setting forth a sentence is not “final” until it contains a definitive determination of the amount of restitution; and (3) to delay the determina tion of the amount of restitution beyond the 90-day dead line is to delay the defendant’s ability to appeal for more than 90 days—perhaps to the point where his due process rights are threatened. Brief for Petitioner 28–33. The critical problem with this argument lies in its third step. As we have said, a defendant who, like petitioner here, knows that restitution will be ordered and is aware of the restitution amount prior to the expiration of the 90 day deadline can usually avoid additional delay simply by pointing to the statute and asking the court to grant a timely hearing. That did not happen here. And that minimal burden on the defendant is a small cost relative to the prospect of depriving innocent crime victims of their due restitution. (Should the court still refuse, the defen dant could seek mandamus—which we believe will rarely be necessary.) Even in the unlikely instances where that delay does cause the defendant prejudice—perhaps by depriving him Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 11 Opinion of the Court of evidence to rebut the claimed restitution amount—the defendant remains free to ask the court to take that fact into account upon review. That inquiry might also con sider the reason for the delay and the party responsible for its cause, i.e., whether the Government or the victim. Cf., e.g., United (tolling 90-day deadline for defendant’s bad-faith delay); United 218–223 (CA3 2003) Adopting the dissent’s approach, by con trast, would permit a defendant’s bad-faith delay to pre vent a timely order of restitution, potentially allowing the defendant to manipulate whether restitution could be awarded at all. But since we are not presented with such a case here, we need not decide whether, or how, such potential harm or equitable considerations should be taken into consideration. In focusing upon the argument’s third step, we do not mean to imply |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | the argument’s third step, we do not mean to imply that we accept the second premise, i.e., that a sentencing judgment is not “final” until it contains a definitive determination of the amount of restitution. To the contrary, strong arguments favor the appealability of the initial judgment irrespective of the delay in determin ing the restitution amount. The initial judgment here imposed a sentence of imprisonment and supervised re lease, and stated that restitution would be awarded. This Court has previously said that a judgment that imposes “discipline” may still be “freighted with sufficiently sub stantial indicia of finality to support an appeal.” Corey v. United States, () (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Solicitor General points to statutes that say that a “judgment of conviction” that “includes” a “sentence to imprisonment” is a “final judgment.” 18 U.S. C. So is a judgment that imposes supervised release (which can be imposed only in conjunction with a sentence of imprisonment). ; So is a judgment that imposes a fine. 12 DOLAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33–34. Moreover, provides that a “sentence that im poses an order of restitution,” such as the later restitution order here, “is a final judgment.” Thus, it is not surprising to find instances where a defendant has appealed from the entry of a judgment containing an initial sentence that includes a term of imprisonment; that same defendant has subsequently appealed from a later order setting forth the final amount of restitution; and the Court of Appeals has consolidated the two appeals and decided them together. See, e.g., United United States v. Maung, ; cf. United That the defendant can appeal from the earlier sentenc ing judgment makes sense, for otherwise the statutory 90 day restitution deadline, even when complied with, could delay appeals for up to 90 days. Defendants, that is, would be forced to wait three months before seeking re view of their conviction when they could ordinarily do so within 14 days. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(b). Nonethe less, in light of the fact that the interaction of restitution orders with appellate time limits could have consequences extending well beyond cases like the present case (where there was no appeal from the initial conviction and sen tence), we simply note the strength of the arguments militating against the second step of petitioner’s argument without deciding whether or when a party can, or must, appeal. We leave all such matters for another day. The dissent, however, creates a rule that could ad versely affect not just restitution, |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | a rule that could ad versely affect not just restitution, but other sentencing practices beyond the narrow circumstances presented here. Consider, for example, a judge who (currently lack ing sufficient information) wishes to leave open, say, the amount of a fine, or a special condition of supervised re lease. In the dissent’s view, the entry of any such judg ment would immediately deprive the judge of the author Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 13 Opinion of the Court ity later to fill in that blank, in the absence of a statute specifically providing otherwise. See post, at 1–4 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). Thus, the sentencing judge would either have to (1) forgo the specific dollar amount or poten tial condition, or (2) wait to enter any judgment until all of the relevant information is at hand. The former alterna tive would sometimes deprive judges of the power to enter components of a sentence they may consider essential. The latter alternative would require the defendant to wait—perhaps months—before taking an appeal. As we have pointed out, our precedents do not currently place the sentencing judge in any such dilemma. See 8–9. And we need not now depart from those precedents when this case does not require us to do so; when the issue has not been adequately briefed; when the lower court had no opportunity to consider the argument (which the petitioner may well have forfeited); and when the rule would foreclose the current practices of some district courts and unnecessarily cabin the discretion they properly exercise over scheduling and sentencing matters. Cf., e.g., United ; United (illustrating district court practices). Certainly there is no need to create this rule in the context of restitution, for provisions to which the dissent refers are silent about whether restitution can or cannot be ordered after an initial sentencing. See, e.g., (c) (“A sanction authorized by [criminal forfeiture and restitution statutes] may be imposed in addition to the [rest of the] sentence”); §36A(c)(1) (mandatory orders of restitution “shall apply in all sentencing proceedings [for specified offenses]”). And even on the dissent’s theory, the statute elsewhere provides the necessary substantive authorization: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of [a specified] offense the court shall order that the defendant 14 DOLAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court make restitution to the victim of the offense.” §36A(a)(1) (emphasis added). The dissent cannot explain why a separate statutory provision regarding procedures as to when a “court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses,” automatically divests |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Dolan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/148484/dolan-v-united-states/ | for the final determination of the victim’s losses,” automatically divests a court of this distinct substantive authority. While of course that provision does not “plainly” confer “power to act after sentencing,” post, (emphasis deleted), neither does it “plainly” remove it or require that all sentencing matters be concluded at one point in time. (And the dis sent’s assertion, see post, at 6—that it uses the term “au thority” not in its “jurisdictional” sense, but rather in the sense that a court lacks “authority” to “impose a sentence above the maximum”—introduces a tenuous analogy that may well confuse this Court’s precedents regarding the term “jurisdictional.” See –4.) In any event, unless one reads the relevant statute’s 90 day deadline as an ironclad limit upon the judge’s author ity to make a final determination of the victim’s losses, the statute before us itself provides adequate authority to do what the sentencing judge did here—essentially fill in an amount-related blank in a judgment that made clear that restitution was “applicable.” App. 49 Since the sentencing judge’s later order did not “correct” an “error” in the sentence, Rule 35 does not apply. Com pare Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 35(a) with post, at 2–3. Hence the dissent’s claim that there is no other statute that creates authority (even were we to assume all else in its favor, which we do not) is merely to restate the question posed in this case, not to answer it. Moreover, the dissent’s reading creates a serious statu tory anomaly. It reads the statute as permitting a sen tencing judge to order restitution for a “victim” who “sub sequently discovers further losses” a month, a year, or 10 years after entry of the original judgment, while at the same time depriving that judge of the power to award Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 15 Opinion of the Court restitution to a victim whose “losses are not ascertainable” within 90 days. Compare (first sentence) with (second sentence). How is that a sensible reading of a statute that makes restitution mandatory for victims? Finally, petitioner asks us to apply the “rule of lenity” in favor of his reading of the statute. Dolan has not provided us with an example of an instance in which the “rule of lenity” has been applied to a statutory time provision in the criminal context. See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (0) (applying rule in interpreting substan tive criminal statute); Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 400 (80) (applying rule in interpreting “penal ties”). But, assuming for argument’s sake that the rule |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Glines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110173/brown-v-glines/ | The Department of the Navy used to have a regulation mandating that every communication to a Member of Congress from anybody in the Navy had to be forwarded through official channels, if the communication "affect[ed] the Naval Establishment." See 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951). Congress was informed about this regulation in 1951, and its reaction was to enact a statute that currently reads: "No person may restrict any member of an armed force in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of the United States." 10 U.S. C. 1034. Today, the Court holds that this statute does not in any way protect the circulation by servicemen on United States military bases of petitions addressed to Members of Congress. Specifically, the Court holds that the statute does not apply to a military regulation requiring that the content of petitions addressed to Members of Congress be precleared,[1] even when *375 the petitioning activity occurs on a base located in a noncombat area in time of peace. To reach this result, the Court necessarily concludes either that petitions are not "communication[s]" within the meaning of 1034 or that the compelled prescreening of petitions is not a "restrict[ion]" within the meaning of that statute. Since, in my view, each of these conclusions is at odds with the express language of the statute and with its legislative history, I respectfully dissent. Section 1034 protects those servicemen who "communicat[e]" with Members of Congress. As the Court necessarily acknowledges, a letter bearing one signature is a "communication" protected by 1034. Nothing in logic would suggest that such a letter forfeits the statute's protection simply by acquiring additional signatures. Accordingly, reason would indicate that petitions are a form of "communication" protected under 1034: they are no more than letters bearing many signatures. Moreover, it seems clear that a serviceman "communicates" with his Congressman just as much when he signs a letter drafted by a third person as when he writes and signs that letter himself. Yet the Court's opinion appears to conclude that petitions are not "communications" within the meaning of 1034. To reach this conclusion, the Court relies on the statute's legislative history. As the Court points out, the specific situation brought to the attention of Congress in 1951 was that of a *376 serviceman who had been threatened with court-martial proceedings if he sent a letter to his Congressman without prior command approval. By enacting the predecessor of 1034, Congress made clear that it wanted to prohibit this kind of restraint. But the legislative |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Glines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110173/brown-v-glines/ | wanted to prohibit this kind of restraint. But the legislative history cited by the Court shows that the purpose of the law was considerably broader than simply "to permit any man who is inducted to sit down and take a pencil and paper and write to his Congressman or Senator." 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951). The historic matrix of the law contains no suggestion that Congress intended 1034 to cover no more than a letter written and signed by one individual person.[2] If anything is to be drawn from 1034's history, it is that Congress intended to protect more than such single-signature letters. A precise and particularized problem was brought to the attention of Congress in 1951, one that could easily have been remedied by a similarly circumscribed solution. Congress chose instead to write broadly so as to accord protection to all "communications" sent by military personnel to Members of Congress. Clearly, the legislative purpose was to cover the myriad of ways in which a citizen may communicate with his Congressman. By limiting the scope of 1034 to the particular case brought to the attention of Congress in 1951, the Court, I think, reads the legislative history as mistakenly as it reads the language of the statute itself.[3] *377 The Court's opinion can be interpreted alternatively to hold that the regulations at issue do not constitute a "restrict[ion]" within the meaning of 1034. That position also gives the statute an unjustifiably narrow scope. An absolute ban of petitions or petitioning activity on military bases would obviously constitute a "restrict[ion]."[4] The regulations before us amount to such a ban, but with one difference. They permit a limited exception for petitions whose content has been precleared by command authority. This kind of exception, however, is precisely the type of "restrict[ion]" on the free flow of communication between servicemen and Congress that the law prohibits. As stated by the law's sponsor, a requirement that a serviceman send his communications through channels "is a restriction in and of itself." 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951). That the preclearance regulations at issue here restrict the free flow of communication between servicemen and Members of Congress could not be more clearly demonstrated than by the facts presented in Secretary of Navy v. Huff, post, p. 453. There, servicemen invoked the preclearance procedures contained in similar regulations, but were denied permission to collect signatures on several petitions addressed to Members of Congress, which denials the Government now concedes were improper.[5] Not only did the prescreening procedure unjustifiably prevent the circulation of those particular petitions; it also necessarily discouraged |
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