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Justice Scalia | 2,000 | 9 | concurring | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | productions, but to the fact that no one had complained. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. One instance of nonenforcementagainst a play already in production that prosecutorial discretion might reasonably have *309 "grandfathered"does not render this ordinance discriminatory on its face. To be sure, in the trial court counsel for the city said that "[t]o the extent that the expressive activity that is contained in [such] productions rises to a higher level of protected expression, they would not be [covered]," App. 53but he rested this assertion upon the provision in the preamble that expressed respect for "fundamental Constitutional guarantees of free speech and free expression," and the provision of Paragraph 6 of the ordinance that provided for severability of unconstitutional provisions,[5] What he was saying there (in order to fend off the overbreadth challenge of respondent, who was in no doubt that the ordinance did cover theatrical productions, see ) was essentially what he said at oral argument before this Court: that the ordinance would not be enforceable against theatrical productions if the Constitution forbade it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13. Surely that limitation does not cause the ordinance to be not generally applicable, in the relevant sense of being targeted against expressive conduct.[6] *310 Moreover, even were I to conclude that the city of Erie had specifically singled out the activity of nude dancing, I still would not find that this regulation violated the First Amendment unless I could be persuaded (as on this record I cannot) that it was the communicative character of nude dancing that prompted the ban. When conduct other than speech itself is regulated, it is my view that the First Amendment is violated only "[w]here the government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes." Here, even if one hypothesizes that the city's object was to suppress only nude dancing, that would not establish an intent to suppress what (if anything) nude dancing communicates. I do not feel the need, as the Court does, to identify some "secondary effects" associated with nude dancing that the city could properly seek to eliminate. (I am highly skeptical, to tell the truth, that the addition of pasties and G-strings will at all reduce the tendency of establishments such as Kandyland to attract crime and prostitution, and hence to foster sexually transmitted disease.) The traditional power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of the traditional judgment (if Erie wishes to endorse it) that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed by the First Amendment. Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting |
Justice Scalia | 2,000 | 9 | concurring | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | the First Amendment. Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion and agree with the analytical approach that the plurality employs in deciding this case. Erie's stated interest in combating the secondary effects associated with nude dancing establishments is an interest unrelated to the suppression of expression under United 391 U.S. 7 and the city's regulation is thus properly considered under the O'Brien standards. I do not believe, however, that the current record allows us to say that the city has made a sufficient *311 evidentiary showing to sustain its regulation, and I would therefore vacate the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and remand the case for further proceedings. I In several recent cases, we have confronted the need for factual justifications to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. See, e. g., ; Turner Broadcasting System, ; Turner Broadcasting System, Those cases do not identify with any specificity a particular quantum of evidence, nor do I seek to do so in this brief concurrence.[1] What the cases do make plain, however, is that application of an intermediate scrutiny test to a government's asserted rationale for regulation of expressive activity demands some factual justification to connect that rationale with the regulation in issue. *312 In Turner I, for example, we stated that "[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply `posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.' Quincy Cable TV, It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way." The plurality concluded there, of course, that the record, though swollen by three years of hearings on the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, was insufficient to permit the necessary determinations and remanded for a more thorough factual development. When the case came back to us, in Turner II, a majority of the Court reiterated those requirements, characterizing the enquiry into the acceptability of the Government's regulations as one that turned on whether they "were designed to address a real harm, and whether those provisions will alleviate it in a material way." Most recently, in Nixon, we repeated that "[w]e have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden," and we examined the "evidence introduced into the record by petitioners or cited by the lower courts in this action" at 393. The focus |
Justice Scalia | 2,000 | 9 | concurring | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | the lower courts in this action" at 393. The focus on evidence appearing in the record is consistent with the approach earlier applied in and In Young, Detroit adopted a zoning ordinance requiring dispersal of adult theaters through the city and prohibiting them within 500 feet of a residential area. Urban planners and real estate experts attested to the harms created by clusters of such theaters, see 427 U.S., and we found that "[t]he record *313 discloses a factual basis" supporting the efficacy of Detroit's chosen remedy, In Renton, the city similarly enacted a zoning ordinance requiring specified distances between adult theaters and residential zones, churches, parks, or schools. See The city "held public hearings, reviewed the experiences of Seattle and other cities, and received a report from the City Attorney's Office advising as to developments in other cities." We found that Renton's failure to conduct its own studies before enacting the ordinance was not fatal; "[t]he First Amendment does not require a city to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses." The upshot of these cases is that intermediate scrutiny requires a regulating government to make some demonstration of an evidentiary basis for the harm it claims to flow from the expressive activity, and for the alleviation expected from the restriction imposed.[2] See, e. g., That evidentiary basis may be borrowed from the records made by other governments if the experience elsewhere is germane to the measure under consideration and actually relied upon. I will assume, further, that the reliance may be shown by legislative invocation of a judicial opinion that accepted an evidentiary foundation as sufficient *314 for a similar regulation. What is clear is that the evidence of reliance must be a matter of demonstrated fact, not speculative supposition. By these standards, the record before us today is deficient in its failure to reveal any evidence on which Erie may have relied, either for the seriousness of the threatened harm or for the efficacy of its chosen remedy. The plurality does the best it can with the materials to hand, see ante, at 297-298, but the pickings are slim. The plurality quotes the ordinance's preamble asserting that over the course of more than a century the city council had expressed "findings" of detrimental secondary effects flowing from lewd and immoral profitmaking activity in public places. But however accurate the recital may be and however honestly the councilors may |
Justice Scalia | 2,000 | 9 | concurring | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | the recital may be and however honestly the councilors may have held those conclusions to be true over the years, the recitation does not get beyond conclusions on a subject usually fraught with some emotionalism. The plurality recognizes this, of course, but seeks to ratchet up the value of mere conclusions by analogizing them to the legislative facts within an administrative agency's special knowledge, on which action is adequately premised in the absence of evidentiary challenge. Ante, at 298. The analogy is not obvious; agencies are part of the executive branch and we defer to them in part to allow them the freedom necessary to reconcile competing policies. See Chevron U. S. A. That aside, it is one thing to accord administrative leeway as to predictive judgments in applying "`elusive concepts' " to circumstances where the record is inconclusive and "evidence is difficult to compile," 4 U.S. 775, and quite another to dispense with evidence of current fact as a predicate for banning a subcategory of expression.[3] As *315 to current fact, the city council's closest approach to an evidentiary record on secondary effects and their causes was the statement of one councilor, during the debate over the ordinance, who spoke of increases in sex crimes in a way that might be construed as a reference to secondary effects. See App. 44. But that reference came at the end of a litany of concerns ("free condoms in schools, drive-by shootings, abortions, suicide machines," and declining student achievement test scores) that do not seem to be secondary effects of nude dancing. Nor does the invocation of in one paragraph of the preamble to Erie's ordinance suffice. App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. The plurality opinion in made no mention of evidentiary showings at all, and though my separate opinion did make a pass at the issue, I did not demand reliance on germane evidentiary demonstrations, whether specific to the statute in question or developed elsewhere. To invoke therefore, does not indicate that the issue of evidence has been addressed. There is one point, however, on which an evidentiary record is not quite so hard to find, but it hurts, not helps, the city. The final O'Brien requirement is that the incidental speech restriction be shown to be no greater than essential to achieve the government's legitimate To deal with this issue, we have to ask what basis there is to think that the city would be unsuccessful in countering any secondary effects by the significantly lesser restriction of zoning to control the location of nude dancing, thus allowing for efficient law |
Justice Scalia | 2,000 | 9 | concurring | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | the location of nude dancing, thus allowing for efficient law enforcement, restricting effects on property values, and limiting exposure of the public. *316 The record shows that for years there has been a zoning ordinance on the books to regulate the location of establishments like Kandyland, but the city has not enforced it. One councilor remarked that "I think there's one of the problems. The ordinances are on the books and not enforced. Now this takes place. You really didn't need any other ordinances." App. 43. Another commented, "I felt very, very strongly, and I feel just as strongly right now, that this is a zoning matter." Even on the plurality's view of the evidentiary burden, this hurdle to the application of O'Brien requires an evidentiary response. The record suggests that Erie simply did not try to create a record of the sort we have held necessary in other cases, and the suggestion is confirmed by the course of this litigation. The evidentiary question was never decided (or, apparently, argued) below, nor was the issue fairly joined before this Court. While respondent did claim that the evidence before the city council was insufficient to support the ordinance, see Brief for Respondent 44-49, Erie's reply urged us not to consider the question, apparently assuming that authorized us to disregard it. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 6-8. The question has not been addressed, and in that respect this case has come unmoored from the general standards of our First Amendment jurisprudence.[4] Careful readers, and not just those on the Erie City Council, will of course realize that my partial dissent rests on a demand for an evidentiary basis that I failed to make when I concurred in I should have demanded the evidence then, too, and my mistake calls to mind Justice Jackson's foolproof explanation of a lapse of his own, when he quoted Samuel Johnson, "`Ignorance, sir, ignorance.' "[5] I may not be less ignorant of nude dancing than I was nine years ago, but after many subsequent occasions to think further about the needs of the First Amendment, I have come to believe that a government must toe the mark more carefully than I first insisted. I hope it is enlightenment on my part, and acceptable even if a little late. See (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). II The record before us now does not permit the conclusion that Erie's ordinance is reasonably designed to mitigate real harms. This does not mean that the required showing cannot be made, only that, on this record, Erie has not made it. I would remand |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | dissenting | McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112072/mclaughlin-v-richland-shoe-co/ | The Court today imports into a limitations provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) the "knowing or reckless" definition of "willful" that we previously adopted in construing a liquidated damages provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 621 et seq. See Trans World *136 Airlines, In doing so, the Court departs from our traditional contextual approach to the definition of the term "willful," ignores significant differences between the relevant provisions of the two Acts, and fails to accommodate the remedial purpose of civil actions under the FLSA. For these reasons, I would accept the slightly more expansive definition of "willful" urged by the Secretary of Labor and adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in cert. denied, Under this latter standard, a violation of the FLSA is "willful" and therefore subjects an employer to a 3-year rather than a 2-year statute of limitations if the employer knew that there was an appreciable possibility that it was covered by the Act and failed to take steps reasonably calculated to resolve the doubt. I have no quarrel with the opinion of the Court to the extent that it rejects the "in the picture" standard of willfulness elaborated in cert. denied, As the Court succinctly explains, by permitting a finding of willful violation every time an employer knew that the FLSA was "in the picture," the Jiffy June standard "virtually obliterates any distinction between willful and nonwillful violations." Ante, at 132-133. But the Court's focus on the shortcomings of the Jiffy June standard is disingenuous, because neither party in the instant case urged the adoption of that standard before this Court. Rather, the dispute in this case pits the "knowing or reckless" standard, adopted by the Third Circuit in this case and urged by respondent Richland Shoe, against the Laffey standard, adopted by the D. C. Circuit in an earlier case and urged by petitioner Secretary of Labor. The Court does not address this dispute until the penultimate page of its opinion, and its reasons for embracing the former standard over the latter are not convincing. *137 The Court seems to rely in part on "common usage" of the word "willful" in adopting the "knowing or reckless" standard. Ante, at 133, citing Roget's International Thesaurus 622.7, p. 479; 653.9, p. 501 (4th ed. 1977). The Court fails to acknowledge, however, that the dictionary includes a wide variety of definitions of "willful," ranging from "malicious" to "not accidental," and including precisely the intermediate definition urged by the Secretary under which an act is |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | dissenting | McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112072/mclaughlin-v-richland-shoe-co/ | urged by the Secretary under which an act is willful if it is "done without ground for believing it is lawful." Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979); see United By refusing to recognize the various meanings that the term "willful" has come to bear in different legal settings, the Court today departs from our previous contextual approach to defining that term. In this Court explained that "willful" is a word "of many meanings, its construction often being influenced by its context." Since Spies, we consistently have looked to the statutory context in which the word appears in order to determine its proper meaning. See, e. g., ; United The Court's apparent abandonment of this approach in favor of a nonexistent "plain language" definition of "willful," ante, at 133, is unprecedented and unwise. Had the Court properly applied the traditional contextual approach, I believe it would have adopted the willfulness standard urged by the Secretary. Such an approach would have revealed that the definition of "willful" adopted previously in the context of the ADEA in Trans World Airlines, does not transplant easily to the context of the FLSA. In this Court explicitly acknowledged that its choice of the "knowing or reckless" definition of "willful" was influenced by the "punitive" nature of the double damages that flow from a finding of willfulness under the ADEA. In the instant case, a finding *138 of willfulness leads not to a punitive sanction, but merely to an extended period during which an unlawfully underpaid employee may recover compensatory damages. What is at stake here is the applicability of the remedial provisions of the FLSA in the first instance. Perhaps recognizing this crucial distinction, the Court in expressly left open the possibility that the "knowing or reckless" definition of "willful" adopted for the ADEA might not be appropriate for the FLSA statute of limitations. See and n. 21. The answer that the Court provides today may have an attractive tidiness, but it fails to recognize the contextual differences that call for different standards of willfulness in varying provisions of the two Acts.[*] As a result, the Court has adopted a definition of "willful" that is improperly narrow in light of its effect on the remedial scope of the FLSA. Just how narrow that definition is remains to be seen. It is not entirely clear that the "knowing or reckless" definition of willfulness adopted by the Court will differ significantly in practical application from the approach that I would adopt. Employers who know that there is an appreciable possibility that the FLSA covers their operations |
Justice Thomas | 2,007 | 1 | majority | Limtiaco v. Camacho | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145750/limtiaco-v-camacho/ | The Legislature of Guam authorized Guam's Governor to issue bonds to fund the Territory's continuing obligations. Concluding that the bonds would violate the debt-limitation provision of the Organic Act of Guam, 11, as amended, 48 U.S.C. 142a, the attorney general[1] of Guam refused to sign contracts necessary to issue the bonds. In response, the Governor sought a declaration from the Guam Supreme Court that issuance of the bonds would not violate the Organic Act's debt limitation. The Guam Supreme Court held that 142a limits Guam's allowed indebtedness to 10 percent of the appraised valuation, not the assessed valuation, of taxable property in Guam. We granted certiorari to decide whether Guam's debt limitation must be calculated according to the assessed or the appraised valuation of property in Guam. We hold that it must be calculated based on the assessed valuation. I In 200, Guam lacked sufficient revenues to pay its obligations. To supplement revenues, the Guam Legislature authorized the Governor to issue bonds worth approximately $400 million. See Guam *1417 The Governor signed the new legislation and prepared to issue the bonds. However, under Guam law, Guam's attorney general must review and approve all government contracts prior to their execution. Guam Code Ann., Tit. 5, 22601 (1996). The attorney general concluded that issuance of the bonds would raise the Territory's debt above the level authorized by Guam's Organic Act. See 48 U.S.C. 142a (prohibiting debt "in excess of 10 per centum of the aggregate tax valuation of the property in Guam"). He therefore refused to approve the bond contracts. In response, the Governor sought a declaration from the Guam Supreme Court that issuance of the authorized bonds would not cause Guam's debt to exceed the debt limitation. That determination turned, in part, on the meaning of the phrase "aggregate tax valuation" in Guam's Organic Act. The attorney general calculated the debt limitation as 10 percent of the assessed valuation of property in Guam. But the Governor calculated the debt limitation as 10 percent of the appraised valuation. Because Guam assesses property at 5 percent of its appraised value, Guam Code Ann., Tit. 11, 24102(f), the attorney general's interpretation resulted in a much lower debt limit. The Guam Supreme Court agreed with the Governor and held that 48 U.S.C. 142a sets the debt limitation at 10 percent of the appraised valuation of property in Guam. The attorney general filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See 1424-2 (granting Ninth Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from Guam). The Court of Appeals granted the petition in |
Justice Thomas | 2,007 | 1 | majority | Limtiaco v. Camacho | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145750/limtiaco-v-camacho/ | from Guam). The Court of Appeals granted the petition in October 200. While the appeal was pending, Congress amended 1424-2 and removed the language that vested jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit over appeals from Guam. See 2, 48 U.S.C.A. 1424-2 In the Court of Appeals addressed the effect of the amendment on its jurisdiction. The court held that Congress had stripped its jurisdiction not only prospectively, but also for pending appeals. Citing Santos, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the attorney general's appeal in this case on March 6, See App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. The attorney general then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court. By statute, certiorari petitions must be filed "within 90 days after the entry of judgment" in a lower court. 28 U.S.C. 2101(c). The attorney general filed his petition more than 90 days after the judgment from which he appealsthat of the Guam Supreme Courtwas entered. Accordingly, when we granted certiorari in this case, 548 U.S. we directed the parties to address both the question presented by petitioner and whether the filing of a petition for certiorari or the pendency of a writ of certiorari before the Court of Appeals suspended the finality of the Guam Supreme Court's judgment for purposes of the 90-day period set out in 2101(c). II Only "a genuinely final judgment" will trigger 2101(c)'s 90-day period for filing a petition for certiorari in this Court. In most cases, the 90-day period begins to run immediately upon entry of a lower court's judgment. In some cases, though, the actions of a party or a lower court suspend the finality of a judgment and thereby reset the 90-day "clock." For instance, the timely filing of a petition for *1418 rehearing with the lower court or a lower court's appropriate decision to rehear an appeal may suspend the finality of a judgment by "rais[ing] the question whether the court will modify the judgment and alter the parties' rights." ). So long as that question remains open, "`there is no "judgment" to be reviewed,'" at (quoting at ), and 2101(c)'s 90-day period does not run. The same reasoning applies here. In 200, the Court of Appeals appropriately exercised discretionary jurisdiction over the attorney general's appeal. See 48 U.S.C. 1424-2. By granting the petition for certiorari, the Ninth Circuit raised the possibility that it might "modify the judgment" or "alter the parties' rights." at Thus, the Court of Appeals' grant of certiorari suspended the finality of the Guam Supreme Court's judgment and prevented the 90-day clock from running while the case was pending before the Court |
Justice Thomas | 2,007 | 1 | majority | Limtiaco v. Camacho | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145750/limtiaco-v-camacho/ | from running while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals. And until the Ninth Circuit issued its order dismissing the case, the appeal remained pending, and the finality of the judgment remained suspended. The Governor argues that the judgment was made final earliereither when Congress enacted the statute depriving the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction or when the Court of Appeals decided in Santos that the statute applied to pending cases. But when Congress removed the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction over appeals from Guam, it did not dismiss this appeal. Likewise, when the Ninth Circuit determined in Santos, that Congress had stripped its jurisdiction over pending appeals, the court did not finally determine the rights of the parties in this case. The jurisdiction-stripping statute and Santos may have signaled the Court of Appeals' ultimate dismissal of the appeal, but neither created a final judgment in the still-pending case. The attorney general's appeal remained pending until the Ninth Circuit issued its dismissal order. And the pendency of the appeal continued to "raise the question whether" any further action by the court might affect the relationship of the parties. at Accordingly, we hold that the judgment of the Guam Supreme Court did not become final, for purposes of this Court's review, until the Court of Appeals issued its order dismissing the appeal. We emphasize that our holding is limited to the unique procedural circumstances presented here. Specifically, our holding does not extend to improperly filed appeals or filings used as delaying tactics. See S. Ct. 241, III Having determined that we have jurisdiction, we turn to the merits. As always, we begin with the text of the statute. See Nebraska Dept. of Guam's Organic Act states that "no public indebtedness of Guam shall be authorized or allowed in excess of 10 per centum of the aggregate tax valuation of the property in Guam." 48 U.S.C. 142a. The present dispute centers on the meaning of the term "tax valuation." In its unmodified form, the word "valuation" means "[t]he estimated worth of a thing." Black's Law Dictionary 1721 (4th ed.1951) (hereinafter Black's). But as the parties' competing interpretations demonstrate, there are different *1419 sorts of valuations. An appraised valuation is the market value of property. See (defining "appraise" as "to fix and state the true value of a thing"). By contrast, an "assessed valuation" is the "[v]alue on each unit of which a prescribed amount must be paid as property taxes." These two kinds of valuation are related in practice because a property's assessed valuation generally equals some percentage of its appraised valuation. |
Justice Thomas | 2,007 | 1 | majority | Limtiaco v. Camacho | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145750/limtiaco-v-camacho/ | assessed valuation generally equals some percentage of its appraised valuation. See, e.g., Guam Code Ann., Tit. 11, 24102(f) (defining "value" as "thirty-five per cent (5%) of the appraised value"). The assessed valuation therefore could, but typically does not, equal the market value of the property. Though it has no established definition, the term "tax valuation" most naturally means the value to which the tax rate is applied.[2] Were it otherwise, the modifier "tax" would have almost no meaning or a meaning inconsistent with ordinary usage. "Tax valuation" therefore means "assessed valuation"a term consistently defined as a valuation of property for purposes of taxation. See Black's 149; see also (defining "assessed valuation" as "[t]he worth or value of property established by taxing authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied"). One would not normally refer to a property's appraised valuation as its "tax valuation." Appraised valuation is simply market value. And market value may or may not relate to taxation. Usually market value becomes relevant to taxation only because a specified percentage of market value is the assessed value to which taxing authorities apply the tax rate. It would strain the text to conclude that "tax valuation" means a valuation a step removed from taxation. The Guam Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion by interpreting the word "tax" to limit the kinds of property that qualify for inclusion in the debt-limitation calculation. But that interpretation impermissibly rearranges the statutory language. The word "tax" modifies "valuation," not "property." The phrase "tax valuation" therefore refers to the type of valuation to be conducted, not the object that is valued. The Guam Supreme Court also contrasted 48 U.S.C. 142a's language with explicit references to "assessed valuation" in the debt-limitation provision for the Virgin Islands. See 140 ("aggregate assessed valuation"). The court reasoned that, by using language in 142a that differed from that used in the Virgin Islands' debt-limitation provision, Congress expressed its intent to base Guam's debt limitation on something other than assessed value. We disagree. Certainly, Congress could have used the term "assessed valuation." But if Congress had meant actual, market, or appraised value, it could have used any one of those terms as well. See N.W. Halsey & Iowa 7, Or it could have left the word "valuation" unmodified: State courts interpreting other debt-limitation provisions have understood "valuation," standing alone, to mean the market or cash value of property. See, e.g., Board of Education, Rich Cty. School 2 P.2d 1078, At least *1420 in this context, Congress' rejection of "assessed" tells us no more than does its rejection of |
Justice Thomas | 2,007 | 1 | majority | Limtiaco v. Camacho | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145750/limtiaco-v-camacho/ | "assessed" tells us no more than does its rejection of "actual" or "appraised." Our interpretation comports with most States' practice of tying the debt limitations of municipalities to assessed valuation. See 15 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations 41:7, p. 422 (d ed. rev.2005) ("Most of the constitutional and statutory provisions make the assessed value of the taxable property of the municipality the basis for ascertaining the amount of indebtedness which may be incurred."). States that depart from the majority approach use clear language to do so. See ("The standard is generally the assessed value of the property for taxation, rather than the actual value, where the two are different; but where the constitution or statute uses the term `actual value,' such value governs rather than the taxable value" (citing N.W. Halsey & footnote omitted)). Congress has not used such language here. Indeed, as discussed earlier, only a strained reading of "tax valuation" would suggest a departure from the majority approach. The Governor suggests that our interpretation would result in no debt limitation at all because Guam may arbitrarily set its assessment rate above 100 percent of market value. For two reasons, we think the Governor has overstated this concern. First, most States have long based their debt limitations on assessed value without incident. Second, a strong political check exists; property-owning voters will not fail to notice if the government sets the assessment rate above market value. Finally, the Governor mistakenly argues that we owe deference to the Guam Supreme Court's interpretation of its Organic Act. It may be true that we accord deference to territorial courts over matters of purely local concern. See 40 L. Ed. 2d 1 This case does not fit that mold, however. The debt-limitation provision protects both Guamanians and the United States from the potential consequences of territorial insolvency. Thus, this case is not a matter of purely local concern. Of course, decisions of the Supreme Court of Guam, as with other territorial courts, are instructive and are entitled to respect when they indicate how statutory issues, including the Organic Act, apply to matters of local concern. On the other hand, the Organic Act is a federal statute, which we are bound to construe according to its terms. IV For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Guam Supreme Court and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice ALITO join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree that the petition for writ of certiorari |
Justice Thomas | 2,007 | 1 | majority | Limtiaco v. Camacho | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145750/limtiaco-v-camacho/ | part. I agree that the petition for writ of certiorari was timely, and join Part II of the Court's opinion. I disagree, however, that the phrase "tax valuation" in the Organic Act of Guam, 11, as amended, 48 U.S.C. 142a, refers unambiguously to assessed value. If I could not go beyond statutory text and the sources relied upon by the Court, a coin toss would be my only way to judgment. But I look to congressional purpose, which points to appraised value as the meaning of the term, leaving me in respectful dissent. The words "tax valuation" can plausibly be read in either of the ways the parties *1421 suggest: as synonymous with assessed value (the way the attorney general and the Court read them), because it is the assessed value to which the tax rate is immediately applied, Guam Code Ann., Tit. 11, 24102(f), 2410 (1996), or as meaning appraised value, because the appraisal is a "valuation" for "tax" purposes. The Court concedes that the term "tax valuation" has no canonical definition, ante, at 1419,[1] and says that the term "valuation," standing alone, means "`[t]he estimated worth of a thing,'" ante, at 1418 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1721 (4th ed.1951); alteration in original). Though taking property's "estimated worth" to be its "tax valuation" would make practical sense, the Court believes that construction would read the word "tax" out of the statute. I do not see the objection, though. Even if we say "valuation" means actual value, the word "tax" has a job to do, by specifying that the valuation in question be the valuation used for tax purposes, thus ruling out an appraisal made solely for the purpose of calculating the debt limitation, with its temptation to indulge in creative accounting when money is tight.[2] But as I said, seeing the legitimacy of this reading just leaves us with two textually plausible constructions. I see no tie-breaker in comparing Guam's debt limitation with those of other Territories. In each Territory mentioned by the parties, when Congress imposed a territorial debt limitation the assessed value was equal to the actual value of the property.[] Thus the attorney general can stress the significance of assessed value and argue that because the debt limitation in the other Territories was based on the assessed value, the same should be true for Guam. And the Governor can argue that because the debt limitation in the other Territories was based on the actual value, that should go for Guam, too. Nor is the tie to be broken by arguing that pegging the territorial debt limit |
Justice Thomas | 2,007 | 1 | majority | Limtiaco v. Camacho | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145750/limtiaco-v-camacho/ | be broken by arguing that pegging the territorial debt limit to "tax valuation" suggests that this Territory was meant to be treated more conservatively than a limit turning on full value; the *1422 suggestion is balanced by the question (without any answer proposed to us), why Congress would have wished a more restrictive (or nominally more restrictive) regime for certain Territories.[4] Comparing state practices is no help, either. The Court says that "States that depart from the majority approach" of linking debt limitations to assessed value "use clear language to do so," ante, at 1420, but in the preceding paragraph the majority recognizes that state courts "have understood `valuation,' standing alone, to mean the market or cash value of property," So it seems a stretch to suggest that state laws offer a clear rule that Congress may be presumed to have understood as background; better to read the state cases as products of the specific wording of their particular limitations and the state history of property taxation. See, e.g., ; N.W. Halsey & Iowa 7, It almost goes without saying that neither side has cited a state case involving language and background the same as Guam's. In sum, the congressional mind does not emerge from the words "tax valuation" or any settled construction of that phrase. Fortunately, though, the purpose of the legislation does point to a likely reading. The statute itself makes clear that what Congress meant to provide was a practical guarantee against crushing debt on the shoulders of future generations, and insolvency with the inevitable call for a bailout by Congress. See United States Nat. Bank of The attorney general claims that her reading is a better fit with these objectives because it ties the legislature's ability to incur debt to its willingness to tax. But this is hardly so. Under the attorney general's approach (now the Court's), the Guam Legislature could double the debt limitation without increasing taxes by a single penny, simply by doubling the assessment rate and cutting the tax rate by half.[5] Although it is arguable that tying the debt ceiling to the assessed value may to some vague degree enhance legislative accountability by requiring action to raise the debt ceiling as debt piles up, I know of no independent suggestion that the debt limit was designed to operate as a political discouragement, not as a hard cap. It would, after all, have been strange for Congress to set a debt cap to constrain the Guam Legislature, only to leave the limiting figure subject to easy manipulation by the legislature. While I know |
Justice Thomas | 2,007 | 1 | majority | Limtiaco v. Camacho | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145750/limtiaco-v-camacho/ | subject to easy manipulation by the legislature. While I know that actual valuation can be manipulated, too, manipulation of that figure could only be done by officials acting in bad faith and subject to an obvious political or judicial challenge. *142 The Court's approach, by contrast, gives the legislature a green light to subvert its own stated limit with a clear conscience.[6] The more practical understanding of what must have been intended is a statute tying the debt limitation to Guam's capacity to tax property. The actual, market value of property is the only economic index of Guam's ability to collect property taxes to pay its bills,[7] the only figure under consideration that is fixed in the real world, and the only figure that provides a genuine limitation. This was the figure employed or required by Congress in each of the other Territories mentioned above, see n. and I presume that its practical significance was in Congress's mind when it set the debt caps for each of them. I see no reason not to attribute the same practical assessment to Congress in this instance. I would affirm. |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Blystone v. Pennsylvania | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112383/blystone-v-pennsylvania/ | The hallmark of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is that because the "penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment," capital punishment may not be imposed unless the sentencer makes an individualized determination that death is the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant. This Court has repeatedly invoked this principle to invalidate mandatory death penalty statutes for even the most egregious crimes. See ; ; (all first-degree murders); Today, for the first time, the Court upholds a statute containing a *310 mandatory provision that gives the legislature rather than the jury the ultimate decision whether the death penalty is appropriate in a particular set of circumstances. Such a statute deprives the defendant of the type of individualized sentencing hearing required by the Eighth Amendment. I respectfully dissent. I After a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder in Pennsylvania, the court must hold a separate sentencing hearing at which the jury determines whether the death penalty is warranted. (a) The jury considers the aggravating circumstances that are listed in the statute.[1] In addition, the jury considers specific enumerated *311 mitigating circumstances and "any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense." 9711(e). The State must prove the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. 9711(c)(1)(iii). The statute provides that "[t]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance." 9711(c) (1)(iv)[2] The statute therefore deprives the jury of any sentencing discretion once it has found one aggravating circumstance but no mitigating circumstances; the jury may not consider whether the aggravating circumstance, by itself, justifies the imposition of the most extreme sanction available to society. This case illustrates the effect of the mandatory provision of the statute. The jury found as an aggravating circumstance that petitioner had committed murder during a $13 robbery. 9711(d)(6). But petitioner presented no evidence of mitigating circumstances and the jury found none. App. 19. The jury was told that in such a situation, it was not allowed to make the ultimate decision whether the death penalty was justified. The judge instructed the jury that once it found "an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating *312 circumstances, it is your duty to return a verdict of death." ; see[3] The prosecutor emphasized that each juror had sworn an oath to follow the law and that, in this case, the law mandated the death penalty: |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Blystone v. Pennsylvania | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112383/blystone-v-pennsylvania/ | that, in this case, the law mandated the death penalty: "Under the law, if you have an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, it is your duty to impose the death penalty so each of you were asked last week when we questioned you whether or not, under the appropriate circumstances, you could impose the death penalty and each of you replied that you could. Each of you replied that you would follow the law, and each of you replied that whatever your duty was, you would follow it." *313 Indeed, the prosecutor argued that because the jury had already found an aggravating circumstance by finding petitioner guilty of robbery, the statute mandated that the death penalty be imposed unless the defendant proved at least one mitigating circumstance. "Our law doesn't permit the jury to impose the death penalty or impose a life sentence as they feel it should be, but rather there are certain specific times when the death penalty should be imposed and there are certain specific times when it should not be imposed. The court touched upon it and told you of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The aggravating circumstance in this case is that this defendant committed a killing in the perpetration of a felony. The felony in this case was the robbery. You have already made a determination by your verdict that this defendant was guilty of that robbery, so you have the aggravating circumstance. It is already proven and you already believed it. You must determine from the evidence presented in this Courtroom whether or not there are any mitigating circumstances; if not, you must follow the law and impose the death penalty." Hence, both the judge and the prosecutor emphasized that if the jury failed to find any mitigating factors, the legislature had determined that death was the appropriate sentence. II The majority does not dispute this description of the Pennsylvania statute or its application in this case. Rather, the majority holds that "the Eighth Amendment does not require that aggravating circumstances be further refined or weighed by a jury. The requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence." Ante, at 306-307. That the majority cites no case to support this extraordinary conclusion is no surprise; careful analysis of our cases *314 compels the conclusion that a jury must be able to consider the weight of both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances when choosing whether to impose a death sentence. A The Pennsylvania Legislature's delineation of 12 aggravating circumstances represents an effort to |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Blystone v. Pennsylvania | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112383/blystone-v-pennsylvania/ | Legislature's delineation of 12 aggravating circumstances represents an effort to comply with our command that "[b]ecause of the uniqueness of the death penalty,. it [may] not be imposed under sentencing procedures that creat[e] a substantial risk that it [will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." ). In Furman, the Court held that vesting the sentencer with unbridled discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty resulted in a system in which there was no objective way to distinguish between defendants who received the death penalty and those who did not. See (death sentences at issue were "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. [T]he petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed"); ("[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not"). In however, the Court held that a State may impose the death penalty if the State adequately "guides" the sentencer's discretion in determining the appropriate ; Thus, the Court has held that a State must "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." The legislature *315 may narrow the death-eligible class at the guilt stage by defining the capital murder statute narrowly, see ; or at the sentencing stage by requiring the sentencer to find "aggravating factors" that objectively distinguish the murder from all other murders. At the same time, however, the Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment imposes a limit on a State's ability to "guide" the sentencer's discretion. On the same day that the Court upheld three death penalty statutes that "guided" the jury's discretion in imposing this sentence,[4] the Court invalidated two mandatory death penalty statutes. ; The plurality rejected the argument that Furman required removal of all discretion from the sentencer, holding that any consistency obtained by a mandatory statute would be arbitrary because the consistency would not take into account the individual circumstances of the defendant and the crime. See also A mandatory death penalty statute treats "all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death." Thus, the Court held that the "fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Blystone v. Pennsylvania | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112383/blystone-v-pennsylvania/ | humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally *316 indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." See also 483 U. S., at ; 431 U. S., at and its progeny are distinguishable from this case because the Pennsylvania statute allows the jury to consider mitigating circumstances. But once a Pennsylvania jury finds that no mitigating circumstances are proved by a preponderance of the evidence, it is required to impose the death penalty. The mandatory provision of the Pennsylvania statute may be effective in a smaller set of cases than the North Carolina statute at issue in Nevertheless, the effect of the mandatory provision in both statutes is the same: it substitutes a legislative judgment about the severity of a crime for a jury's determination that the death penalty is appropriate for the individual.[5] B The majority is unconcerned that in this category of cases the mandatory provision deprives the defendant of an individualized sentencing determination. The nature of the individualized determination required by is derived from this Court's recognition that the decision to impose the death penalty must reflect a reasoned moral judgment about the defendant's actions and character in light of all the circumstances of the offense and the defendant's background. See, e. g., ; Just as a jury must be free to consider and weigh mitigating circumstances as independently relevant to *317 the defendant's moral culpability, see at a jury must also be able to consider and weigh the severity of each aggravating circumstance. The weight of an aggravating circumstance depends on the seriousness of the crime a significant aspect of the defendant's moral culpability. Thus, a reasoned moral response to the defendant's conduct requires the consideration of the significance of both aggravating and mitigating factors. "[I]n the end it is the jury that must make the difficult, individualized judgment as to whether the defendant deserves the sentence of death." ; see also (emphasis in original).[6] The majority cites only for its conclusion that the jury need not consider the weight of the aggravating circumstance before imposing the death sentence. In Lowenfield, the Court upheld the Louisiana death penalty statute under which a jury could impose a death sentence even if the only aggravating factor found duplicated an element of the offense of capital murder. *318 at The sole question the Court addressed was whether such an aggravating circumstance sufficiently narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants. As the majority notes today, ante, at 307, Lowenfield |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Blystone v. Pennsylvania | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112383/blystone-v-pennsylvania/ | defendants. As the majority notes today, ante, at 307, Lowenfield held that "[t]he use of `aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion." 484 U.S., at Nothing in Lowenfield suggests that a State may preclude a jury from weighing the strength of the aggravating factor.[7] As the majority fails to recognize, under the Pennsylvania statute an aggravating circumstance does much more than "channel" the jury's discretion: in the absence of mitigating factors, it mandates the death penalty. This Court has never held that a legislature may mandate the death sentence for any category of murderers. Instead, a legislature's role must be limited to the definition of the class of death-eligible defendants. A legislature does not, and indeed cannot, consider every possible fact pattern that technically will fall within an aggravating circumstance. Hence, the definition of an aggravating circumstance provides a basis for distinguishing crimes only on a general level; it does not embody the type of reasoned moral judgment required to justify the imposition of the death penalty. See The Pennsylvania statute provides a stark example of this constitutional flaw. It permits the jury to find an aggravating circumstance if the * killing was committed in the course of a felony. (d)(6) A variety of murders fit under this aggravating circumstance. Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted this aggravating circumstance to include nonviolent felonies, (19), the aggravating circumstance covers a very wide range of cases. A jury, however, likely would draw a different inference about the culpability of the defendant and therefore the propriety of the death sentence if the murder were committed during a rape rather than (as here) during a $13 robbery. The majority today allows the legislature to preclude a jury from considering such factors in deciding whether to impose death.[8] Such a conclusion flies in the face of our reasoning in In we invalidated a statute that mandated death for a prisoner who committed murder while already serving a life term. Although the Court acknowledged the legislature's power to determine that the crime was sufficiently serious to make the defendants eligible for the death penalty, the Court held that the legislature had no power to conclude that the sole fact that the defendant was serving a life sentence justified the death penalty in every such case. -81. As the Court explained: "Past convictions of other criminal offenses can be considered as a valid aggravating factor in determining whether a defendant deserves to be sentenced to death |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Blystone v. Pennsylvania | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112383/blystone-v-pennsylvania/ | determining whether a defendant deserves to be sentenced to death for a later murder, but the inferences to be drawn concerning *320 an inmate's character and moral culpability may vary depending on the nature of the past offense. The circumstances surrounding any past offense may vary widely as well. Without consideration of the nature of the predicate life-term offense and the circumstances surrounding the commission of that offense, the label `life-term inmate' reveals little about the inmate's record or character. Even if the offense was first-degree murder, whether the defendant was the primary force in that incident, or a nontriggerman may be relevant to both his criminal record and his character. Yet under the mandatory statute, all predicate life-term offenses are given the same weight." The majority dismisses as inapposite because the sentencing scheme in that case did not allow for the consideration of mitigating evidence. Ante, at 306, n. 4. But the discussion quoted above clearly relates to a legislature's power to define aggravating circumstances and precedes any discussion of the significance of mitigating circumstances. In fact, we went on to state that "[n]ot only [do the defendant's prior convictions] serve as incomplete indicators of the circumstances surrounding the murder and of the defendant's criminal record, but also they say nothing of [mitigating circumstances]." 483 U.S., -82. In the Court invalidated the statute because it precluded the jury from considering mitigating factors and because it prevented the jury from determining whether certain crimes were serious enough to require the death penalty. C The Court's suggestion, ante, at 303, that supports its holding in this case reveals *321 a fundamental misunderstanding of petitioner's claim.[9] Although both the Texas and Pennsylvania statutes contain mandatory language, the Texas statute upheld in Jurek does not deprive the jury of its ability to determine the propriety of the death sentence in a particular case. In Texas, the class of death-eligible defendants is narrowed at the guilt stage because only five types of murder are classified as first-degree murder. See at At the sentencing stage, the jury is instructed that it must impose a sentence of death *322 if it answers the following two questions affirmatively: "(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing criminal threat to society."[10] These questions require the jury to do more than find facts supporting a legislatively defined aggravating |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Blystone v. Pennsylvania | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112383/blystone-v-pennsylvania/ | do more than find facts supporting a legislatively defined aggravating circumstance. Instead, by focusing on the deliberateness of the defendant's actions and his future dangerousness, the questions compel the jury to make a moral judgment about the severity of the crime and the defendant's culpability. The Texas statute directs the imposition of the death penalty only after the jury has decided that the defendant's actions were sufficiently egregious to warrant death. The mandatory language in the Pennsylvania statute, however, does deprive the jury of any power to make such an independent judgment. The jury's determination that an aggravating circumstance exists ends the decisionmaking process. In addition, whether an aggravating circumstance exists is generally a question of fact relating to either the circumstances of the offense,[11] the status of the victim,[12] or the defendant's criminal record.[13] In many cases, the existence of the aggravating factor is not disputed. Finding an aggravating circumstance does not entail any moral judgment about the nature of the act or the actor, and therefore it does not give the jury an opportunity to decide whether it believes the defendant's particular offense warrants the death penalty.[14]*323 Because the mandatory language in the Pennsylvania statute deprives a defendant of an individualized sentencing hearing in a way that the Texas statute does not, Jurek in no way supports the Court's conclusion that the Pennsylvania statute is constitutional. III The Court's refusal to recognize that the "mandatory aspect" of the Pennsylvania statute deprives the defendant of an individualized sentencing hearing is contrary to reason. Rather than address the merits of petitioner's claim, the majority summarily concludes that the Eighth Amendment is "satisfied" because the jury may consider mitigating evidence.[15] Although our cases clearly hold that the ability to consider mitigating evidence is a constitutional requirement, it does not follow that this ability satisfies the constitutional demand for an individualized sentencing hearing. The "weight" of an aggravating circumstance is just as relevant to *324 the propriety of the death penalty as the "weight" of any mitigating circumstances. The Court's unarticulated assumption that the legislature may define a group of crimes for which the death penalty is required in certain situations represents a marked departure from our previous cases. The Court's failure to provide any reasoning to reject a claim well grounded in our case law is always disturbing. An unexplained departure from fundamental principles in the death penalty context is inexcusable. I respectfully dissent. IV Even if I did not believe the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutionally deprives the jury of discretion to impose a life sentence, I would vacate petitioner's sentence. I |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | majority | United States v. Estate of Romani | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118201/united-states-v-estate-of-romani/ | The federal priority statute, 31 U.S. C. 3713(a), provides that a claim of the United States Government "shall be paid first" when a decedent's estate cannot pay all of its debts.[1] The question presented is whether that statute requires that a federal tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor's perfected lien on real property even though such a preference is not authorized by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 26 U.S. C. 6321 et seq. I On January 25, 1985, the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, Pennsylvania, entered a judgment for $400,000 in favor of Romani Industries, and against Francis *520 J. Romani. The judgment was recorded in the clerk's office and therefore, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, it became a lien on all of the defendant's real property in Cambria County. Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service filed a series of notices of tax liens on Mr. Romani's property. The claims for unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties described in those notices amounted to approximately $490,000. When Mr. Romani died on January 13, 1992, his entire estate consisted of real estate worth only $53,001. Because the property was encumbered by both the judgment lien and the federal tax liens, the estate's administrator sought permission from the Court of Common Pleas to transfer the property to the judgment creditor, Romani Industries, in lieu of execution. The Federal Government acknowledged that its tax liens were not valid as against the earlier judgment lien; but, giving new meaning to Franklin's aphorism that "in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes,"[2] it opposed the transfer on the ground that the priority statute ( 3713) gave it the right to "be paid first." The Court of Common Pleas overruled the Government's objection and authorized the conveyance. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, and the Supreme Court of the State also affirmed. That court first determined that there was a "plain inconsistency" between 3713, which appears to give the United States "absolute priority" over all competing claims, and the Tax Lien Act of 1966, which provides that the federal tax lien "shall not be valid" against judgment lien creditors until a prescribed notice has been given. 688 A. 2d, *521 at 705.[3] Then, relying on the reasoning in United which had noted that the Tax Lien Act of 1966 modified the Federal Government's preferred position in the tax area and recognized the priority of many state claims over federal tax liens, the court concluded that the 1966 Act had the effect of limiting the operation |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | majority | United States v. Estate of Romani | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118201/united-states-v-estate-of-romani/ | the 1966 Act had the effect of limiting the operation of 3713 as to tax debts. The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court conflicts with two Federal Court of Appeals decisions, Kentucky ex rel. and Moreover, in its petition for certiorari, the Government submitted that the decision is inconsistent with our holding in and with the admonition that "`[o]nly the plainest inconsistency would warrant our finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a *522 command as that of [31 U.S. C. 3713],' "United We granted certiorari, to resolve the conflict and to consider whether Thelusson, or any of our other cases construing the priority statute requires a different result. II There is no dispute about the meaning of two of the three statutes that control the disposition of this case. It is therefore appropriate to comment on the Pennsylvania lien statute and the Federal Tax Lien Act before considering the applicability of the priority statute to property encumbered by an antecedent judgment creditor's lien. The Pennsylvania statute expressly provides that a judgment shall create a lien against real property when it is recorded in the county where the property is located. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 4303(a) (1995). After the judgment has been recorded, the judgment creditor has the same right to notice of a tax sale as a mortgagee.[4] The recording in one county does not, of course, create a lien on property located elsewhere. In this case, however, it is undisputed that the judgment creditor acquired a valid lien on the real property in *523 Cambria County before the judgment debtor's death and before the Government served notice of its tax liens. Romani Industries' lien was "perfected in the sense that there is nothing more to be done to have a choate lienwhen the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established." United ; see also Illinois ex rel. The Federal Government's right to a lien on a delinquent taxpayer's property has been a part of our law at least since 1865.[5] Originally the lien applied, without exception, to all property of the taxpayer immediately upon the neglect or failure to pay the tax upon demand.[6] An unrecorded tax lien against a delinquent taxpayer's property was valid even against a bona fide purchaser who had no notice of the lien. United In 1913, Congress amended the statute to provide that the federal *524 tax lien "shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor" until notice has been filed with the clerk of |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | majority | United States v. Estate of Romani | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118201/united-states-v-estate-of-romani/ | creditor" until notice has been filed with the clerk of the federal district court or with the appropriate local authorities in the district or county in which the property subject to the lien is located. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, In 1939, Congress broadened the protection against unfiled tax liens to include pledgees and the holders of certain securities. Act of June 29, 1939, 401, -883. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 again broadened that protection to encompass a variety of additional secured transactions, and also included detailed provisions protecting certain secured interests even when a notice of the federal lien previously has been filed. 1132, as amended, 26 U.S. C. 6323. In sum, each time Congress revisited the federal tax lien, it ameliorated its original harsh impact on other secured creditors of the delinquent taxpayer.[7] In this case, it is agreed that by the terms of 6323(a), the Federal Government's liens are not valid as against the lien created by the earlier recording of Romani Industries' judgment. III The text of the priority statute on which the Government places its entire reliance is virtually unchanged since its enactment in 1797.[8] As we pointed out in United not only were there earlier versions of the statute,[9] but "its roots reach back even further into the English common law," The sovereign prerogative that was exercised by the English Crown and by many of the States as "an inherent incident of sovereignty," ib applied only to unsecured claims. As Justice Brandeis noted in 3 the common-law priority "[did] not obtain over a specific lien created by the debtor before the sovereign undertakes to enforce its right." Moreover, the statute itself does not create a lien in favor of the United States.[10] Given this background, respondent argues that the statute should be read as *526 giving the United States a preference over other unsecured creditors but not over secured creditors.[11] There are dicta in our earlier cases that support this contention as well as dicta that tend to refute it. Perhaps the strongest support is found in Justice Story's statement: "What then is the nature of the priority, thus limited and established in favour of the United States? Is it a right, which supersedes and overrules the assignment of the debtor, as to any property which the United States may afterwards elect to take in execution, so as to prevent such property from passing by virtue of such assignment to the assignees? Or, is it a mere right of prior payment, out of the general funds of the debtor, in the |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | majority | United States v. Estate of Romani | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118201/united-states-v-estate-of-romani/ | out of the general funds of the debtor, in the hands of the assignees? We are of opinion that it clearly falls, within the latter description. The language employed is that which naturally would be employed to express such an intent; and it must be strained from its ordinary import, to speak any other." Justice Story's opinion that the language employed in the statute "must be strained" to give it any other meaning is entitled to special respect because he was more familiar with 18th-century usage than judges who view the statute from a 20th-century perspective. We cannot, however, ignore the Court's earlier judgment in or the more recent dicta in United 397 U. S., at In Thelusson, the Court held that the priority statute gave the United States a preference over the claim of a judgment creditor who had a general lien on the debtor's real property. *527 The Court's brief opinion[12] is subject to the interpretation that the statutory priority always accords the Government a preference over judgment creditors. For two reasons, we do not accept that reading of the opinion. First, as a factual matter, in 1817 when the case was decided, there was no procedure for recording a judgment and thereby creating a choate lien on a specific parcel of real estate. See generally 2 L. Dembitz, A Treatise on Land Titles in the United States 127, pp. 948-952 (1895). Notwithstanding the judgment, a bona fide purchaser could have acquired the debtor's property free from any claims of the judgment creditor. See That is not the case with respect to *528 Romani Industries' choate lien on the property in Cambria County. Second, and of greater importance, in his opinion for the Court in the Conard case, which was joined by Justice Washington, the author of Thelusson,[13] Justice Story explained why that holding was fully consistent with his interpretation of the text of the priority statute: "The real ground of the decision, was, that the judgment creditor had never perfected his title, by any execution and levy on the Sedgely estate; that he had acquired no title to the proceeds as his property, and that if the proceeds were to be deemed general funds of the debtor, the priority of the United States to payment had attached against all other creditors; and that a mere potential lien on land, did not carry a legal title to the proceeds of a sale, made under an adverse execution. This is the manner in which this case has been understood, by the Judges who concurred in the decision; and it |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | majority | United States v. Estate of Romani | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118201/united-states-v-estate-of-romani/ | by the Judges who concurred in the decision; and it is obvious, that it established no such proposition, as that a specific and perfected lien, can be displaced by the mere priority of the United States; since that priority is not of itself equivalent to a lien." Conard,[14] The Government also relies upon dicta from our opinion in United 397 U. S., at which quoted from our earlier opinion in United 314 U. S., at : "Only the plainest inconsistency would warrant our *529 finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a command as that of [ 3713]." Because both and were cases in which the competing claims were unsecured, the statutory command was perfectly clear even under Justice Story's construction of the statute. The statements made in that context, of course, shed no light on the clarity of the command when the United States relies on the statute as a basis for claiming a preference over a secured creditor. Indeed, the opinion itself made this specific point: "This case does not raise the question, never decided by this Court, whether 3466 grants the Government priority over the prior specific liens of secured creditors. See United" n. 11. The opinion is only one of many in which the Court has noted that despite the age of the statute, and despite the fact that it has been the subject of a great deal of litigation, the question whether it has any application to antecedent perfected liens has never been answered definitively. See United In his dissent in United Justice Frankfurter referred to the Court's reluctance to decide the issue "not only today but for almost a century and a half." The Government's priority as against specific, perfected security interests is, if possible, even less settled with regard to real property. The Court has sometimes concluded that a competing creditor who has not "divested" the debtor of "either title or possession" has only a "general, unperfected lien" that is defeated by the Government's priority. E. g., Assuming the validity of this "title or possession" test for deciding whether a lien on personal property is sufficiently choate for purposes of the priority statute (a question of federal law, see Illinois ex rel. ), we are not aware of any decisions since Thelusson applying that theory to claims for real property, *530 or of any reason to require a lienor or mortgagee to acquire possession in order to perfect an interest in real estate. Given the fact that this basic question of interpretation remains unresolved, it does not seem appropriate to |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | majority | United States v. Estate of Romani | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118201/united-states-v-estate-of-romani/ | of interpretation remains unresolved, it does not seem appropriate to view the issue in this case as whether the Tax Lien Act of 1966 has implicitly amended or repealed the priority statute. Instead, we think the proper inquiry is how best to harmonize the impact of the two statutes on the Government's power to collect delinquent taxes. IV In his dissent from a particularly harsh application of the priority statute, Justice Jackson emphasized the importance of considering other relevant federal policies. Joined by three other Justices, he wrote: "This decision announces an unnecessarily ruthless interpretation of a statute that at its best is an arbitrary one. The statute by which the Federal Government gives its own claims against an insolvent priority over claims in favor of a state government must be applied by courts, not because federal claims are more meritorious or equitable, but only because that Government has more power. But the priority statute is an assertion of federal supremacy as against any contrary state policy. It is not a limitation on the Federal Government itself, not an assertion that the priority policy shall prevail over all other federal policies. Its generalities should not lightly be construed to frustrate a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute." On several prior occasions the Court had followed this approach and concluded that a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should control our construction of the priority statute, even though it had not been expressly *531 amended. Thus, in Cook County Nat. the Court concluded that the priority statute did not apply to federal claims against national banks because the National Bank Act comprehensively regulated banks' obligations and the distribution of insolvent banks' assets. And in United we determined that the Transportation Act of 1920 had effectively superseded the priority statute with respect to federal claims against the railroads arising under that Act. The bankruptcy law provides an additional context in which another federal statute was given effect despite the priority statute's literal, unconditional text. The early federal bankruptcy statutes had accorded to "`all debts due to the United States, and all taxes and assessments under the laws thereof' " a preference that was "coextensive" with that established by the priority statute. Guarantee Title & Trust (quoting the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Rev. Stat. 5101). As such, the priority Act and the bankruptcy laws "were to be regarded as in pari materia, and both were unqualified; as neither contained any qualification, none could be interpolated." 224 U.S., at The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, however, subordinated the priority of the |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | majority | United States v. Estate of Romani | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118201/united-states-v-estate-of-romani/ | Bankruptcy Act of 1898, however, subordinated the priority of the Federal Government's claims (except for taxes due) to certain other kinds of debts. This Court resolved the tension between the new bankruptcy provisions and the priority statute by applying the former and thus treating the Government like any other general creditor. at -160;[15] *532 There are sound reasons for treating the Tax Lien Act of 1966 as the governing statute when the Government is claiming a preference in the insolvent estate of a delinquent taxpayer. As was the case with the National Bank Act, the Transportation Act of 1920, and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Tax Lien Act is the later statute, the more specific statute, and its provisions are comprehensive, reflecting an obvious attempt to accommodate the strong policy objections to the enforcement of secret liens. It represents Congress' detailed judgment as to when the Government's claims for unpaid taxes should yield to many different sorts of interests (including, for instance, judgment liens, mechanic's liens, and attorney's liens) in many different types of property (including, for example, real property, securities, and motor vehicles). See 26 U.S. C. 6323. Indeed, given our unambiguous determination that the federal interest in the collection of taxes is paramount to its interest in enforcing other claims, see United -735, it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended the priority statute to impose greater burdens on the citizen than those specifically crafted for tax collection purposes. Even before the 1966 amendments to the Tax Lien Act, this Court assumed that the more recent and specific provisions of that Act would apply were they to conflict with the older priority statute. In the Gilbert Associates case, which concerned the relative priority of the Federal Government and a New Hampshire town to funds of an insolvent taxpayer, the Court first considered whether the town could qualify as a "judgment creditor" entitled to preference under the Tax Lien Act. -364. Only after deciding that question in the negative did the Court conclude that *533 the United States obtained preference by operation of the priority statute. at The Government would now portray Gilbert Associates as a deviation from two other relatively recent opinions in which the Court held that the priority statute was not trumped by provisions of other statutes: United - and United -333 In each of those cases, however, there was no "plain inconsistency" between the commands of the priority statute and the other federal Act, nor was there reason to believe that application of the priority statute would frustrate Congress' intent. The same cannot |
Justice Stevens | 1,998 | 16 | majority | United States v. Estate of Romani | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118201/united-states-v-estate-of-romani/ | the priority statute would frustrate Congress' intent. The same cannot be said in the present suit. The Government emphasizes that when Congress amended the Tax Lien Act in 1966, it declined to enact the American Bar Association's proposal to modify the federal priority statute, and Congress again failed to enact a similar proposal in 1970. Both proposals would have expressly provided that the Government's priority in insolvency does not displace valid liens and security interests, and therefore would have harmonized the priority statute with the Tax Lien Act. See Hearings on H. R. 11256 and 11290 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 197 (1966) (hereinafter Hearings); S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). But both proposals also would have significantly changed the priority statute in many other respects to follow the priority scheme created by the bankruptcy laws. See Hearings, 5, 198; Plumb 10, n. 53, 33-37. The earlier proposal may have failed because its wide-ranging subject matter was beyond the House Ways and Means Committee's jurisdiction. The failure of the 1970 proposal in the Senate Judiciary Committee explained by no reports or hearingsmight merely reflect disagreement with the broad changes to the priority statute, or an assumption that the proposal was not needed because, as Justice Story had believed, the priority statute does not *534 apply to prior perfected security interests, or any number of other views. Thus, the Committees' failures to report the proposals to the entire Congress do not necessarily indicate that any legislator thought that the priority statute should supersede the Tax Lien Act in the adjudication of federal tax claims. They provide no support for the hypothesis that both Houses of Congress silently endorsed that position. The actual measures taken by Congress provide a superior insight regarding its intent. As we have noted, the 1966 amendments to the Tax Lien Act bespeak a strong condemnation of secret liens, which unfairly defeat the expectations of innocent creditors and frustrate "the needs of our citizens for certainty and convenience in the legal rules governing their commercial dealings." 112 Cong. Rec. 22227 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Byrnes); cf. United These policy concerns shed light on how Congress would want the conflicting statutory provisions to be harmonized: "Liens may be a dry-as-dust part of the law, but they are not without significance in an industrial and commercial community where construction and credit are thought to have importance. One does not readily impute to Congress the intention that many common commercial liens should be congenitally unstable." E. Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 TermForeword: Process |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | n Jefferon Parih Hopital Dit. No. we repeated the well-ettled propoition that "if the Government ha granted the eller a patent or imilar monopoly over a product, it i fair to preume that the inability to buy the product elewhere give the eller market power." Thi preumption of market power, applicable in the antitrut context when a eller condition it ale of a patented product (the "tying" product) on the purchae of a econd product (the "tied" product), ha it foundation in the judicially created patent miue doctrine. See United n 1988, Congre ubtantially undermined that foundation, amending the Patent Act to eliminate the market power preumption in patent miue cae. See 102 Stat. 76, codified U.S. C. 271(d). The quetion preented to u today i whether the preumption of market power in a patented product hould urvive a a matter of antitrut law depite it demie in patent law. We conclude that the mere fact that a tying product i patented doe not upport uch a preumption. Petitioner, Trident, and it parent, llinoi Tool Work manufacture and market printing ytem that include three relevant component: (1) a patented piezoelectric impule ink jet printhead; (2) a patented ink container, coniting of a bottle and valved cap, which attache to the printhead; and (3) pecially deigned, but unpatented, ink. *32 Petitioner ell their ytem to original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who are licened to incorporate the printhead and container into printer that are in turn old to companie for ue in printing barcode on carton and packaging material. The OEM agree that they will purchae their ink excluively from petitioner, and that neither they nor their cutomer will refill the patented container with ink of any kind. Repondent, ndependent nk, ha developed an ink with the ame chemical compoition a the ink old by petitioner. After an infringement action brought by Trident againt ndependent wa dimied for lack of peronal juridiction, ndependent filed uit againt Trident eeking a judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of Trident' patent.[1] n an amended complaint, it alleged that petitioner are engaged in illegal tying and monopolization in violation of 1 and 2 of the Sherman 15 U.S. C. 1, 2. After dicovery, the Ditrict Court granted petitioner' motion for ummary judgment on the Sherman Act claim. ndependent nk, t rejected repondent' ubmiion that petitioner "necearily have market power in the market for the tying product a a matter of law olely by virtue of the patent on their printhead ytem, thereby rendering [the] tying arrangement per e violation of the antitrut law." Finding that repondent had ubmitted |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | violation of the antitrut law." Finding that repondent had ubmitted no affirmative evidence defining the relevant market or etablihing petitioner' power within it, the court concluded that repondent could not prevail on either antitrut claim. at 1167, 1173, The partie ettled their other claim, and repondent appealed. After a careful review of the "long hitory of Supreme Court conideration of the legality of tying arrangement," 13 the Court of Appeal for the *33 Federal Circuit revered the Ditrict Court' deciion a to repondent' 1 claim, Placing pecial reliance on our deciion in nternational and Loew', a well a our Jefferon Parih dictum, and after taking note of the academic criticim of thoe cae, it concluded that the "fundamental error" in petitioner' ubmiion wa it diregard of "the duty of a court of appeal to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court until the Court itelf chooe to exprely overrule them." We granted certiorari to undertake a freh examination of the hitory of both the judicial and legilative appraial of tying arrangement. Our review i informed by extenive cholarly comment and a change in poition by the adminitrative agencie charged with enforcement of the antitrut law. American court firt encountered tying arrangement in the coure of patent infringement litigation. See, e. g., Heaton-Peninular Button-Fatener Such a cae came before thi Court in in which, a in the cae we decide today, unpatented ink wa the product that wa "tied" to the ue of a patented product through the ue of a licening agreement. Without commenting on the tying arrangement, the Court held that ue of a competitor' ink in violation of a condition of the agreementthat the rotary mimeograph "`may be ued only with the tencil, paper, ink and other upplie made by A. B. Dick '"contituted infringement of the patent on the machine. Chief Jutice White diented, explaining hi diagreement with the Court' approval of a practice that he regarded a an "attempt to increae the cope of the monopoly granted by a patent which tend[] to increae monopoly and to burden the public in the exercie of their common right." Two year later, Congre *3 endored Chief Jutice White' diapproval of tying arrangement, enacting 3 of the Clayton See ; ee alo Motion Picture Patent (explaining that, in light of 3 of the Clayton Act, A. B. Dick "mut be regarded a overruled"). And in thi Court' ubequent cae reviewing the legality of tying arrangement we, too, embraced Chief Jutice White' diapproval of thoe arrangement. See, e. g., Standard Oil of ; n the year ince A. B. Dick, |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | Oil of ; n the year ince A. B. Dick, four different rule of law have upported challenge to tying arrangement. They have been condemned a improper extenion of the patent monopoly under the patent miue doctrine, a unfair method of competition under 5 of the Federal Trade Commiion Act, 15 U.S. C. 5, a contract tending to create a monopoly under 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. 1, and a contract in retraint of trade under 1 of the Sherman [2] n all of thoe intance, the jutification for the challenge reted on either an aumption or a howing that the defendant' poition of power in the market for the tying product wa being ued to retrain competition in the market for the tied product. A we explained in Jefferon Parih, 6 U. S., at 12, "[o]ur cae have concluded that the eential characteritic of an invalid tying arrangement lie in the eller' exploitation of it control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchae of a tied product that the buyer *35 either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchae elewhere on different term." Over the year, however, thi Court' trong diapproval of tying arrangement ha ubtantially diminihed. Rather than relying on aumption, in it more recent opinion the Court ha required a howing of market power in the tying product. Our early opinion conitently aumed that "[t]ying arrangement erve hardly any purpoe beyond the uppreion of competition." Standard Oil 337 U. S., at n 1962, in Loew', -8, the Court relied on thi aumption depite evidence of ignificant competition in the market for the tying product. And a recently a 1969, Jutice Black, writing for the majority, relied on the aumption a upport for the propoition "that, at leat when certain prerequiite are met, arrangement of thi kind are illegal in and of themelve, and no pecific howing of unreaonable competitive effect i required." Fortner Enterprie, v. United State Steel Corp., (Fortner ). Explaining the Court' deciion to allow the uit to proceed to trial, he tated that "deciion rejecting the need for proof of truly dominant power over the tying product have all been baed on a recognition that becaue tying arrangement generally erve no legitimate buine purpoe that cannot be achieved in ome le retrictive way, the preence of any appreciable retraint on competition provide a ufficient reaon for invalidating the tie." Reflecting a changing view of tying arrangement, four Jutice diented in Fortner arguing that the challenged "tie"the extenion of a $2 million line of |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | the challenged "tie"the extenion of a $2 million line of credit on condition that the borrower purchae prefabricated houe from the defendantmight well have erved a legitimate purpoe. ; (opinion of Forta, J.). n hi opinion, Jutice White noted that promotional tie-in may provide "uniquely advantageou deal" to purchaer. And Jutice Forta concluded that the *36 arrangement wa bet characterized a "a ale of a ingle product with the incidental proviion of financing." The dienter' view that tying arrangement may well be procompetitive ultimately prevailed; indeed, it did o in the very ame lawuit. After the Court remanded the uit in Fortner a bench trial reulted in judgment for the plaintiff, and the cae eventually made it way back to thi Court. Upon return, we unanimouly held that the plaintiff' failure of proof on the iue of market power wa fatal to it cae the plaintiff had proved "nothing more than a willingne to provide cheap financing in order to ell expenive houe." United State Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprie, The aumption that "[t]ying arrangement erve hardly any purpoe beyond the uppreion of competition," rejected in Fortner ha not been endored in any opinion ince. ntead, it wa again rejected jut even year later in Jefferon Parih, where, a in Fortner we unanimouly revered a Court of Appeal judgment holding that an alleged tying arrangement contituted a per e violation of 1 of the Sherman 6 U.S., at 5. Like the product at iue in the Fortner cae, the tying product in Jefferon Parihhopital ervicewa unpatented, and our holding again reted on the concluion that the plaintiff had failed to prove ufficient power in the tying product market to retrain competition in the market for the tied productervice of anetheiologit. 6 U.S., at 28-29. n rejecting the application of a per e rule that all tying arrangement contitute antitrut violation, we explained: "[W]e have condemned tying arrangement when the eller ha ome pecial abilityuually called `market power'to force a purchaer to do omething that he would not do in a competitive market. *37 "Per e condemnationcondemnation without inquiry into actual market conditioni only appropriate if the exitence of forcing i probable. Thu, application of the per e rule focue on the probability of anticompetitive conequence. "For example, if the Government ha granted the eller a patent or imilar monopoly over a product, it i fair to preume that the inability to buy the product elewhere give the eller market power. United -7. Any effort to enlarge the cope of the patent monopoly by uing the market power it confer to |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | patent monopoly by uing the market power it confer to retrain competition in the market for a econd product will undermine competition on the merit in that econd market. Thu, the ale or leae of a patented item on condition that the buyer make all hi purchae of a eparate tied product from the patentee i unlawful." Notably, nothing in our opinion uggeted a rebuttable preumption of market power applicable to tying arrangement involving a patent on the tying good. See infra, at ; ntead, it decribed the rule that a contract to ell a patented product on condition that the purchaer buy unpatented good excluively from the patentee i a per e violation of 1 of the Sherman Jutice O'Connor wrote eparately in Jefferon Parih, concurring in the judgment on the ground that the cae did not involve a true tying arrangement becaue, in her view, urgical ervice and anetheia were not eparate product. 6 U.S., at 3. n her opinion, he quetioned not only the propriety of treating any tying arrangement a a per e violation of the Sherman Act, but alo the validity of the preumption that a patent alway give the patentee ignificant market power, oberving that the preumption wa actually a product of our patent miue cae rather than *38 our antitrut juriprudence, t i that preumption, a vetige of the Court' hitorical ditrut of tying arrangement, that we addre quarely today. Jutice O'Connor wa, of coure, correct in her aertion that the preumption that a patent confer market power aroe outide the antitrut context a part of the patent miue doctrine. That doctrine had it origin in Motion Picture Patent which found no upport in the patent law for the propoition that a patentee may "precribe by notice attached to a patented machine the condition of it ue and the upplie which mut be ued in the operation of it, under pain of infringement of the patent," Although Motion Picture Patent imply narrowed the cope of poible patent infringement claim, it formed the bai for the Court' ubequent deciion creating a patent miue defene to infringement claim when a patentee ue it patent "a the effective mean of retraining competition with it ale of an unpatented article." Morton ; ee alo, e. g., Corp. of America v. American Patent Development Corp., Without any analyi of actual market condition, thee patent miue deciion aumed that, by tying the purchae of unpatented good to the ale of the patented good, the patentee wa "retraining competition," Morton U. S., at or "ecur[ing] a limited monopoly of an |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | U. S., at or "ecur[ing] a limited monopoly of an unpatented material," ; ee alo 283 U. S., at -32. n other word, thee deciion preumed "[t]he requiite economic power" over the tying product uch that the patentee could "extend [it] economic control to unpatented product." Loew', -. The preumption that a patent confer market power migrated from patent law to antitrut law in nternational *39 n that cae, we affirmed a Ditrict Court deciion holding that leae of patented machine requiring the leee to ue the defendant' unpatented alt product violated 1 of the Sherman Act and 3 of the Clayton Act a a matter of law. Although the Court' opinion doe not dicu market power or the patent miue doctrine, it aume that "[t]he volume of buine affected by thee contract cannot be aid to be inignificant or inubtantial and the tendency of the arrangement to accomplihment of monopoly eem obviou." The aumption that tying contract "ten[d] to accomplihment of monopoly" can be traced to the Government' brief in nternational which relied heavily on our earlier patent miue deciion in Morton The Government decribed Morton a "preent[ing] a factual ituation almot identical with the intant cae," and it aerted that "although the Court in that cae did not find it neceary to decide whether the antitrut law were violated, it language, it reaoning, and it citation indicate that the policy underlying the deciion wa the ame a that of the Sherman " Brief for United State in nternational O. T. 197, No. p. 19 (United State Brief). Building on it aertion that nternational wa logically inditinguihable from Morton the Government argued that thi Court hould place tying arrangement involving patented product in the category of per e violation of the Sherman United State Brief 26-33. Our opinion in nternational clearly how that we accepted the Government' invitation to import the preumption of market power in a patented product into our antitrut juriprudence. While we cited Morton only for the narrower propoition that the defendant' patent did not confer any right to retrain competition in unpatented alt or afford the defendant any immunity from the antitrut law, nternational -396, given the fact that *0 the defendant wa elling it unpatented alt at competitive price, -397, the rule adopted in nternational necearily accepted the Government' ubmiion that the earlier patent miue cae upported the broader propoition "that thi type of retraint i unlawful on it face under the Sherman Act," United State Brief 12. ndeed, later in the ame Term we cited nternational for the propoition that the licene of |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | we cited nternational for the propoition that the licene of "a patented device on condition that unpatented material be employed in conjunction with the patented device" i an example of a retraint that i "illegal per e." United State v. Columbia Steel And in ubequent cae we have repeatedly grounded the preumption of market power over a patented device in nternational See, e. g., Loew', -; Time-Picayune Publihing ; Standard Oil V Although the patent miue doctrine and our antitrut juriprudence became intertwined in nternational ubequent event initiated their untwining. Thi proce ha ultimately led to today' reexamination of the preumption of per e illegality of a tying arrangement involving a patented product, the firt cae ince 197 in which we have granted review to conider the preumption' continuing validity. Three year before we decided nternational thi Court had expanded the cope of the patent miue doctrine to include not only upplie or material ued by a patented device, but alo tying arrangement involving a combination patent and "unpatented material or [a] device [that] i itelf an integral part of the tructure embodying the patent." ; ee alo Dawon Chemical v. Rohm & Haa (decribing in detail and the cae leading up to it). n reaching thi concluion, the Court explained that it could ee "no *1 difference in principle" between cae involving element eential to the inventive character of the patent and element peripheral to it; both, in the Court' view, were attempt to "expan[d] the patent beyond the legitimate cope of it monopoly." Shortly thereafter, Congre codified the patent law for the firt time. See codified U.S. C. 1 et eq. (2000 ed. and Supp. ). At leat partly in repone to our deciion, Congre included a proviion in it codification that excluded ome conduct, uch a a tying arrangement involving the ale of a patented product tied to an "eential" or "nontaple" product that ha no ue except a part of the patented product or method, from the cope of the patent miue doctrine. 271(d); ee alo Dawon, Thu, at the ame time that our antitrut juriprudence continued to rely on the aumption that "tying arrangement generally erve no legitimate buine purpoe," Fortner 39 U. S., Congre began chipping away at the aumption in the patent miue context from whence it came. t i Congre' mot recent narrowing of the patent miue defene, however, that i directly relevant to thi cae. Four year after our deciion in Jefferon Parih repeated the patent-equal-market-power preumption, 6 U.S., Congre amended the Patent Code to eliminate that preumption in the patent |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | the Patent Code to eliminate that preumption in the patent miue context, 102 Stat. 76. The relevant proviion read: "(d) No patent owner otherwie entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent hall be denied relief or deemed guilty of miue or illegal extenion of the patent right by reaon of hi having done one or more of the following: (5) conditioned the licene of any right to the patent or the ale of the patented product on the acquiition of a licene to right in another patent or purchae of a eparate product, unle, in view of the circumtance, the patent owner ha *2 market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the licene or ale i conditioned." 35 U.S. C. 271(d)(5) (emphai added). The italicized claue make it clear that Congre did not intend the mere exitence of a patent to contitute the requiite "market power." ndeed, fairly read, it provide that without proof that Trident had market power in the relevant market, it conduct at iue in thi cae wa neither "miue" nor an "illegal extenion of the patent right." While the 1988 amendment doe not exprely refer to the antitrut law, it certainly invite a reappraial of the per e rule announced in nternational[3] A rule denying a patentee the right to enjoin an infringer i ignificantly le evere than a rule that make the conduct at iue a federal crime punihable by up to 10 year in prion. See 15 U.S. C. 1. t would be aburd to aume that Congre intended to provide that the ue of a patent that merited punihment a a felony would not contitute "miue." Moreover, given the fact that the patent miue doctrine provided the bai for the market power preumption, it would be anomalou to preerve the preumption in antitrut after Congre ha eliminated it foundation. Cf. 10 P. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp, & E. Elhauge, Antitrut Law ¶ 1737c (2d ed. 200) (hereinafter Areeda). After conidering the congreional judgment reflected in the 1988 amendment, we conclude that tying arrangement involving patented product hould be evaluated under the tandard applied in cae like Fortner and Jefferon Parih rather than under the per e rule applied in Morton and Loew'. While ome uch arrangement are till unlawful, *3 uch a thoe that are the product of a true monopoly or a marketwide conpiracy, ee, e. g., United State v. Paramount Picture, 33 U.S. 1, 15-1 that concluion mut be upported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | proof of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere preumption thereof.[] V Rather than arguing that we hould retain the rule of per e illegality, repondent contend that we hould endore a rebuttable preumption that patentee poe market power when they condition the purchae of the patented product on an agreement to buy unpatented good excluively from the patentee. Cf. upra, Repondent recognize that a large number of valid patent have little, if any, commercial ignificance, but ubmit that thoe that are ued to impoe tying arrangement on unwilling purchaer likely do exert ignificant market power. Hence, in repondent' view, the preumption would have no impact on patent of only light value and would be jutified, ubject to being rebutted by evidence offered by the patentee, in cae in which the patent ha ufficient value to enable the patentee to init on acceptance of the tie. Repondent alo offer a narrower alternative, uggeting that we differentiate between tying arrangement involving the imultaneou purchae of two product that are arguably two component of a ingle productuch a the proviion of * urgical ervice and anetheiology in the ame operation, Jefferon Parih, 6 U. S., at 3 or the licening of one copyrighted film on condition that the licenee take a package of everal film in the ame tranaction, Loew', and a tying arrangement involving the purchae of unpatented good over a period of time, a o-called "requirement tie." See alo Brief for Barry Nalebuff et al. a Amici Curiae. According to repondent, we hould recognize a preumption of market power when faced with the latter type of arrangement becaue they provide a mean for charging large volume purchaer a higher royalty for ue of the patent than mall purchaer mut pay, a form of dicrimination that "i trong evidence of market power." Brief for Repondent 27; ee generally Jefferon Parih, 6 U. S., at 15, n. 23 (dicuing price dicrimination of thi ort and citing ource). The opinion that imported the "patent equal market power" preumption into our antitrut juriprudence, however, provide no upport for repondent' propoed alternative. n nternational it wa the exitence of the patent on the tying product, rather than the ue of a requirement tie, that led the Court to preume market power. ("The appellant' patent confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward"). Moreover, the requirement tie in that cae did not involve any price dicrimination between large volume and mall volume purchaer or evidence of noncompetitive pricing. ntead, the leae at iue provided that if any competitor offered alt, the tied |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | majority | Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145673/illinois-tool-works-inc-v-independent-ink-inc/ | iue provided that if any competitor offered alt, the tied product, at a lower price, "the leee hould be free to buy in the open market, unle appellant would furnih the alt at an equal price." A we have already noted, the vat majority of academic literature recognize that a patent doe not necearily confer market power. See n. upra. Similarly, while price dicrimination may provide evidence of market power, particularly if buttreed by evidence that the patentee ha *5 charged an above-market price for the tied package, ee, e. g., 10 Areeda ¶ 1769c, it i generally recognized that it alo occur in fully competitive market, ee, e. g., Baumol & Swanon, The New Economy and Ubiquitou Competitive Price Dicrimination: dentifying Defenible Criteria of Market Power, 70 Antitrut L. J. 661, 666 (2003); 9 Areeda ¶ 1711; Lande & Poner 37-375. We are not peruaded that the combination of thee two factor hould give rie to a preumption of market power when neither i ufficient to do o tanding alone. Rather, the leon to be learned from nternational and the academic commentary i the ame: Many tying arrangement, even thoe involving patent and requirement tie, are fully conitent with a free, competitive market. For thi reaon, we reject both repondent' propoed rebuttable preumption and their narrower alternative. t i no doubt the virtual conenu among economit that ha peruaded the enforcement agencie to reject the poition that the Government took when it upported the per e rule that the Court adopted in the 190'. See upra, n antitrut guideline iued jointly by the Department of Jutice and the Federal Trade Commiion in 1995, the enforcement agencie tated that in the exercie of their proecutorial dicretion they "will not preume that a patent, copyright, or trade ecret necearily confer market power upon it owner." U. S. Dept. of Jutice and FTC, Antitrut Guideline for the Licening of ntellectual Property 2.2 (Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.udoj.gov/atr/public/guideline/0558.pdf (a viited Feb. 2, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court' cae file). While that choice i not binding on the Court, it would be unuual for the Judiciary to replace the normal rule of lenity that i applied in criminal cae with a rule of everity for a pecial category of antitrut cae. Congre, the antitrut enforcement agencie, and mot economit have all reached the concluion that a patent doe not necearily confer market power upon the patentee. * Today, we reach the ame concluion, and therefore hold that, in all cae involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff mut prove that the defendant ha market |
Justice Burger | 1,982 | 12 | majority | Finnegan v. Leu | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110704/finnegan-v-leu/ | The question presented in this case is whether the discharge of a union's appointed business agents by the union president, following his election over the candidate supported by the business agents, violated the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S. C. *433 401 et seq. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not protect the business agents from discharge. We granted certiorari to resolve Circuit conflicts,[1] and we affirm. I In December 1977, respondent Harold Leu defeated Omar Brown in an election for the presidency of Local 20 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, a labor organization representing workers in a 14-county area of northwestern Ohio.[2] During the vigorously contested campaign, petitioners, then business agents of Local 20, openly supported the incumbent president, Brown. Upon assuming office in January 1978, Leu discharged petitioners and the Local's other business agents, all of whom had been appointed by Brown *434 following his election in 1975.[3] Leu explained that he felt the agents were loyal to Brown, not to him, and therefore would be unable to follow and implement his policies and programs. Local 20's bylaws which were adopted by, and may be amended by, a vote of the union membership provide that the president shall have authority to appoint, direct, and discharge the Union's business agents. Bylaws of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local No. 20, Art. IX, 3 D, Joint Exhibit 1, p. 15 (1975). The duties of the business agents include participation in the negotiating of collective-bargaining agreements, organizing of union members, and processing of grievances. In addition, the business agents, along with the president, other elected officers, and shop stewards, sit as members of the Stewards Council, the legislative assembly of the Union. Petitioners had come up through the union ranks, and as business agents they were also members of Local 20. Discharge from their positions as business agents did not render petitioners ineligible to continue their union membership. Petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court, alleging that they had been terminated from their appointed positions in violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S. C. 411(a)(1), 411(a)(2), 412, and 529. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents Leu and Local 20, holding that the Act does not protect a union employee from discharge by the president of the union if the employee's rights as a union member are not affected. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding "that a union president should be able to |
Justice Burger | 1,982 | 12 | majority | Finnegan v. Leu | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110704/finnegan-v-leu/ | affirmed, concluding "that a union president should be able to work with those who will cooperate with his program and carry out his directives, and that these business agents, who *435 served at the pleasure of the union president, and actively supported the president's opponent could be removed from their employment as union business agents." App. to Pet. for Cert. A3. II The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership. The relevant provisions of the Act had a history tracing back more than two decades in the evolution of the statutes relating to labor unions. Tensions between union leaders and the rank-and-file members and allegations of union wrongdoing led to extended congressional inquiry. As originally introduced, the legislation focused on disclosure requirements and the regulation of union trusteeships and elections. However, various amendments were adopted, all aimed at enlarged protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution; not surprisingly, these amendments ultimately enacted as Title I of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 411-415 were introduced under the title of "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations."[4] The amendments placed emphasis on the rights of union members to freedom of expression without fear of sanctions by the union, which in many instances could mean loss of union membership and in *436 turn loss of livelihood. Such protection was necessary to further the Act's primary objective of ensuring that unions would be democratically governed and responsive to the will of their memberships. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6471-6472, 6476, 15530 (1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1098-1099, 1103, 6. Sections 101(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 411(a) (1) and (2), on which petitioners rely, guarantee equal voting rights, and rights of speech and assembly, to "[e]very member of a labor organization" (emphasis added).[5] In addition, 609 of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 529, renders it unlawful for a union or its representatives "to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis added.)[6] It is readily apparent, both from the *437 language of these provisions and from the legislative history of Title I, that it was rank-and-file union members not union officers or employees, as such whom Congress sought to protect.[7] Petitioners held a dual status as both employees and members of the Union. As members of Local 20, petitioners undoubtedly had a protected right to campaign for Brown and support |
Justice Burger | 1,982 | 12 | majority | Finnegan v. Leu | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110704/finnegan-v-leu/ | had a protected right to campaign for Brown and support his candidacy. At issue here is whether they were thereby immunized from discharge at the pleasure of the president from their positions as appointed union employees. III Petitioners contend that discharge from a position as a union employee constitutes "discipline" within the meaning of 609; and that termination of union employment is therefore unlawful when predicated upon an employee's exercise of rights guaranteed to members under the Act. However, we conclude that the term "discipline," as used in 609, refers only to retaliatory actions that affect a union member's rights or status as a member of the union. Section 609 speaks in terms of disciplining "members"; and the three disciplinary sanctions specifically enumerated fine, suspension, and expulsion are all punitive actions taken against union members *438 as members.[8] In contrast, discharge from union employment does not impinge upon the incidents of union membership, and affects union members only to the extent that they happen also to be union employees. See We discern nothing in 609, or its legislative history, to support petitioners' claim that Congress intended to establish a system of job security or tenure for appointed union employees. Congress used essentially the same language elsewhere in the Act with the specific intent not to protect a member's status as a union employee or officer. Section 101(a)(5), 29 U.S. C. 411(a)(5), states that "[n]o member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined" without enumerated procedural protections. The Conference Report accompanying S. 1555 as finally enacted, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 935, explains that this "prohibition on suspension without observing certain safeguards applies only to suspension of membership in the union; it does not refer to suspension of a member's status as an officer of the union" (emphasis added). This too is a persuasive indication that the virtually identical language in 609 was likewise meant to refer only to punitive actions diminishing membership rights, and not to termination of a member's status as an appointed union employee.[9] *439 We hold, therefore, that removal from appointive union employment is not within the scope of those union sanctions explicitly prohibited by 609. IV Our analysis is complicated, however, by the fact that 102, 29 U.S. C. 412, provides independent authority for a suit against a union based on an alleged violation of Title I of the Act. Section 102 states that "[a]ny person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by |
Justice Burger | 1,982 | 12 | majority | Finnegan v. Leu | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110704/finnegan-v-leu/ | by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate." Although the intended relationship between 102 and 609 is not entirely clear, it seems evident that a litigant may maintain an action under 102 to redress an "infringement" of "rights secured" under Title I without necessarily stating a violation of 609.[10] *440 The question still remains, however, whether petitioners' "rights secured" under Title I were "infringed" by the termination of their union employment. Petitioners, as union members, had a right under 101(a)(1) and (2) to campaign for Brown and to vote in the union election, but they were not prevented from exercising those rights. Rather, petitioners allege only an indirect interference with their membership rights, maintaining that they were forced to "choos[e] between their rights of free expression and their jobs." See Retail Clerks Union Local We need not decide whether the retaliatory discharge of a union member from union office even though not "discipline" prohibited under 609 might ever give rise to a cause *441 of action under 102. For whatever limits Title I places on a union's authority to utilize dismissal from union office as "part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt to suppress dissent within the union," cf. it does not restrict the freedom of an elected union leader to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own.[11] Indeed, neither the language nor the legislative history of the Act suggests that it was intended even to address the issue of union patronage.[12] To the contrary, the Act's overriding objective was to ensure that unions would be democratically governed, and responsive to the will of the union membership as expressed in open, periodic elections. See Far from being inconsistent with this purpose, the ability of an elected union president to select his own administrators is an integral part of ensuring a union administration's responsiveness to the mandate of the union election. Here, the presidential election was a vigorous exercise of the democratic processes Congress sought to protect. Petitioners appointed by the defeated candidate campaigned openly against respondent Leu, who was elected by a substantial margin. The Union's bylaws, adopted, and subject to amendment, by a vote of the union membership, grant the president plenary authority to appoint, suspend, discharge, and direct the Union's business agents, who have significant *442 responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of union affairs. Nothing in the Act evinces a |
Justice Powell | 1,978 | 17 | dissenting | Fulman v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109774/fulman-v-united-states/ | The Court's opinion, with commendable candor, recognizes that logic supports petitioners' position: "[We do] not deny the logical force of petitioners' *540 argument that, since the purpose of the personal holding company tax is to force individuals to include personal holding company income in their individual returns, the corporate distributor should get a deduction at the corporate level equal to the income generated by the distribution at the shareholder level as defined by 301, that is, the fair market value of the appreciated property in this case. See 26 U.S. C. 301 (b) (1) (A)." Ante, at 534-535. The Court also recognizes the "circularity," ante, at 534, and the "ambiguity," ante, at 536, of the relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, as well as the absence of any clarification thereof in the legislative history. The Court simply resolves the statutory jumble in favor of the Treasury Regulation. It is virtually conceded that this result cannot be squared with the acknowledged purpose of the personal holding company tax. Where statutory ambiguity exists without clarification in the legislative history, a court should read the statute to accord with its manifest purpose. A regulation that defies logic, as well as the statutory purpose, merits little weight. I find no answer in the Court's opinion to the arguments advanced by Professor Drake. See Drake, Distributions in Kind and Dividends Paid DeductionConflict in the Circuits, 1977 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 45. See also H. Wetter Mfg.[*] I respectfully dissent. |
per_curiam | 1,992 | 200 | per_curiam | Coleman v. Thompson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112735/coleman-v-thompson/ | As the District Court below observed, this is now the 12th round of judicial review in a murder case which began 11 years ago. Yet despite having had 11 years to produce exculpatory evidence, Coleman has produced what, in the words of the District Court, does not even amount to a "colorable showing of `actual innocence.' " Civ. Action No. 92-0352R p. 19. We are hardly well positioned to second-guess the District Court's factual conclusionwe certainly have no basis for concluding that Coleman has produced "substantial evidence that he may be innocent." Post, at 189 (emphasis added). Indeed, a good deal of Coleman's effort in this latest round is devoted to an attempt to undermine an expert's genetic analysis that further implicated him in the crimean analysis conducted after trial at Coleman's request under the supervision of the Commonwealth's courts. Contrary to the dissent's characterization, Coleman's claim is far from "substantially identical" to that of Leonel Herrera, see Herrera v. Collins, No. 91-7328, cert. granted, In Herrera the District Court concluded that the evidence of innocence warranted further inquiry. *189 See Here, in contrast, the District Court reviewed Coleman's claim of innocence and rejected it on the merits. The application for stay of execution presented to The Chief Justice and by him referred to the full Court is denied. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens concurs in the denial of a stay and would deny the petition for writ of certiorari. |
Justice Stevens | 2,007 | 16 | dissenting | Uttecht v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145726/uttecht-v-brown/ | Millions of Americans oppose the death penalty. A cross section of virtually every community in the country includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is unjust but who nevertheless are qualified *2239 to serve as jurors in capital cases. An individual's opinion that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is the severest sentence that should be imposed in all but the most heinous cases does not even arguably "`prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" Moreover, an individual who maintains such a position, or even one who opposes the death penalty as a general matter, "`may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment.'" Today the Court ignores these well-established principles, choosing instead to defer blindly to a state court's erroneous characterization of a juror's voir dire testimony.[1] Although this case comes to us under the standard of review imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the level of deference given by the Court to the state courts in this case is completely unwarranted based on the record before us. Because I find no justification in the record or elsewhere for the decision to strike Juror Z for cause, I must dissent. I When the State challenged Juror Z, it argued that he was "confused about the conditions under which [the death penalty] could be imposed and seemed to believe it only appropriate when there was a risk of release and recidivism." Ante, at 2227. A more accurate characterization of Juror Z's testimony is that although he harbored some general reservations about the death penalty, he stated that he could consider and would vote to impose the death penalty where appropriate.[2] When asked for "an idea of the underlying reason why you think the death penalty is appropriate [or] what purpose it serves," Juror Z responded that "the type of situation" in which the death penalty would be appropriate was "if a person was incorrigible and would reviolate if released." App. 62 (emphasis added). After it was explained *2240 to Juror Z that the only two sentencing alternatives available under Washington law would be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and a death sentence, Juror Z repeatedly confirmed that even if he knew the defendant would never be released, he would still be able to consider and vote for the death penalty. As for any general reservations Juror Z may have had about the imposition of the death penalty, it is clear from his |
Justice Stevens | 2,007 | 16 | dissenting | Uttecht v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145726/uttecht-v-brown/ | imposition of the death penalty, it is clear from his testimony that he was in no way categorically opposed to it. When asked whether he was "a little more comfortable that it is being used some of the time," Juror Z responded in the affirmative. While such testimony might justify a prosecutor's peremptory challenge, until today not one of the many cases decided in the wake of has suggested that such a view would support a challenge for cause. The distinction that our cases require trial judges to draw is not between jurors who are in favor of the death penalty and those who oppose it, but rather between two sub-classes within the latter classthose who will conscientiously apply the law and those whose conscientious scruples necessarily prevent them from doing so.[3] As then-Justice Rehnquist explained in his opinion for the Court in : "It is important to remember that not all who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law." Today's opinion simply ignores the justification for this strict rule. As we explained 20 years ago: "The State's power to exclude for cause jurors from capital juries does not extend beyond its interest in removing those jurors who would `frustrate the State's legitimate interest in administering constitutional capital sentencing schemes by not following their oaths.' [, ]. To permit the exclusion for cause of other prospective jurors based on their views of the death penalty unnecessarily narrows the cross section of venire members. It `stack[s] the deck against the petitioner. To execute [such a] death sentence would deprive him of his life without due process of law.' [, In its opinion, the Court blindly accepts the state court's conclusory statement that Juror Z's views would have "substantially impaired" his ability to follow the court's instructions without examining what that term means in practice and under our precedents. Ante, at 2228. Even AEDPA does not permit us to abdicate our judicial role in this fashion. The high threshold that must be crossed to establish the kind of impairment that would justify the exclusion of a juror under the rule of is illustrated by Justice Powell's opinion for the *2241 Court in In that case, we assumed that a prospective juror's affirmative answer to the following question would not suffice to support his exclusion |
Justice Stevens | 2,007 | 16 | dissenting | Uttecht v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145726/uttecht-v-brown/ | the following question would not suffice to support his exclusion for cause: "`Do you have any moral or religious, conscientious moral or religious principles in opposition to the death penalty so strong that you would be unable without violating your own principles to vote to recommend a death penalty regardless of the facts?'" We recognized that the juror's answer by itself did not compel the conclusion that he could not under any circumstances recommend the death penalty. See We nevertheless upheld his exclusion because the trial judge had previously explained that he wanted to know if "`you have such strong religious, moral or conscientious principles in opposition to the death penalty that you would be unwilling to vote to return an advisory sentence recommending the death sentence even though the facts presented to you should be such as under the law would require that recommendation?'" at (emphasis added). Our holding in Darden rested squarely on the distinction between mere opposition to the death penalty even when based on religious or moral principlesand an inability to perform the legally required duties of a juror. In contrast, in we reversed a death sentence where a juror had been impermissibly struck for cause. In that case, the trial court struck a juror who appeared confused and who at times seemed to equivocate, but who eventually acknowledged that "she could consider the death penalty in an appropriate case." ; cf. voir dire testimony of Juror Z, App. 73 ("I could [impose the death penalty] if I was convinced that it was the appropriate measure"). The Court distinguishes from the case now before us solely on the basis that in there was no state-court finding of substantial impairment. Ante, at 2223-2224. In the Court's view, this distinction is grounded in the fact that, here, there was "an explicit ruling that Juror Z was impaired." Ante, at 2228. That "ruling" consists of a one-sentence conclusion included in the final summary section of the Washington Supreme Court's opinion. That conclusion is based on an earlier part of the court's opinion, in which it found that during voir dire, Juror Z "indicated that he would impose the death penalty where the defendant `would reviolate if released,' which is not a correct statement of the law." Under our precedents, a juror's statement that he would vote to impose a death sentence where there is a possibility that the defendant may reoffend, provided merely as an example of when that penalty might be appropriate, does not constitute a basis for striking a juror for cause.[4] *2242 In the alternative, and |
Justice Stevens | 2,007 | 16 | dissenting | Uttecht v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145726/uttecht-v-brown/ | striking a juror for cause.[4] *2242 In the alternative, and perhaps recognizing the tenuous nature of the state court's "ruling," the Court relies on the fact that the trial court's judgment is entitled to deference because it had the unique opportunity to observe Juror Z's demeanor during voir dire. A ruling cannot be taken at face value when it is clear that the reasoning behind that ruling is erroneous in light of our prior precedents.[5] There is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest even in light of the trial court's tendency to provide "careful and measured explanations" for its decisions, ante, at 2225that anything about Juror Z's demeanor would dull the impact of his numerous affirmative statements about his ability to impose the death penalty in any situation. In effect, the Court reads something into nothing and defers to a finding that the trial court never made, instead of relying on the finding on which the Washington Supreme Court clearly based its own ruling and which finds no support in our decisions. In its analysis, the Court places great emphasis on defense counsel's failure to object to Juror Z's exclusion for cause, characterizing it as "voluntary acquiescence to, or confirmation of" his removal. Ante, at 2229. A closer look at the voir dire transcript, which the Court has included as an appendix to its opinion, reveals that the Court's interpretation of defense counsel's statement is not necessarily accurate. Upon being asked by the judge if either party had any challenge to Juror Z, the State provided that it did and the defense responded to the judge that it had "no objection." App. 75. Although the Court reads defense counsel's statement to mean that defense counsel had no objection to Juror Z's exclusion, it is more clearly read to mean that the defense had no objection to Juror Z serving on the jury and therefore no reason to challenge him.[6] Even if we were to interpret defense counsel's statement as the failure to provide an affirmative "defense of Juror Z," ante, at 2229, it is important to recognize that Washington law does not require an objection to preserve an error for review.[7]Ante, at 2230; see also ). In any event, whether defense counsel's statement is taken as a failure to provide a defense of Juror Z or as acquiescence in his recusal, it is irrelevant to the ultimate disposition of this case. We said in that the failure to object "in a situation later claimed to be so rife with ambiguity as to constitute constitutional error" is a factor that |
Justice Stevens | 2,007 | 16 | dissenting | Uttecht v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145726/uttecht-v-brown/ | ambiguity as to constitute constitutional error" is a factor that should be considered when assessing a defendant's claims, n. 11, but in this case there was absolutely no basis for striking Juror Z. Thus, counsel's failure to provide an affirmative response to the State's motion, though perhaps not strategically sound, does not doom respondent's constitutional claim. Unlike in which there was arguably some ambiguity in the juror's voir dire responses, here Juror Z had unambiguously asserted his full capability to follow the law. See, e.g., App. 58 ("I do believe in the death penalty in severe situations"); ; ; ; ; cf. (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("Given [the juror's] somewhat timorous responses, it is entirely possible that her appearance and demeanor persuaded trial counsel that he would prefer a vigorous or more reluctant juror"). II Even a juror who is generally opposed to the death penalty cannot permissibly be excused for cause so long as he can still follow the law as properly instructed. The Court recognizes this principle, see ante, at 2222-2223, and yet the perverse result of its opinion is that a juror who is clearly willing to impose the death penalty, but considers the severity of that decision carefully enough to recognize that there are certain circumstances under which it is not appropriate (e.g., that it would only be appropriate in "severe situations," App. 63), is "substantially impaired." It is difficult to imagine, under such a standard, a juror who would not be considered so impaired, unless he delivered only perfectly unequivocal answers during the unfamiliar and often confusing legal process of voir dire and was willing to state without hesitation that he would be able to vote for a death sentence under any imaginable circumstance. Cf. ("We repeat that the State may bar from jury service those whose beliefs about capital punishment would lead them to violate the law or violate their oaths. But [the Constitution does not allow the exclusion of] jurors whose only fault was to take their responsibilities with special seriousness or to acknowledge honestly that they might or might not be affected"). Today, the Court has fundamentally redefined or maybe just misunderstood the meaning of "substantially impaired," and, in doing so, has gotten it horribly backwards. It appears to be under the impression that trial courts should be encouraging the inclusion of jurors who will impose the death penalty rather than only ensuring the exclusion of those who say that, in all circumstances, they cannot. The Court emphasizes that "the State has a strong interest in having jurors who are able |
Justice Stevens | 2,007 | 16 | dissenting | Uttecht v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145726/uttecht-v-brown/ | has a strong interest in having jurors who are able to apply capital punishment within the *2244 framework state law prescribes." Ante, at 2224. But that does not and cannot mean that jurors must be willing to impose a death sentence in every situation in which a defendant is eligible for that sanction. That is exactly the outcome we aimed to protect against in developing the standard that, contrary to the Court's apparent temporary lapse, still governs today. See (explaining that to permit the exclusion of jurors other than those who will not follow their oaths "unnecessarily narrows the cross section of venire members" and "`stack[s] the deck against the petitioner'" (quoting )). Judge Kozinski's opinion for the Court of Appeals in this case is solidly grounded on the entire line of our cases recognizing the basic distinction dramatically illustrated by Justice Powell's opinion in Darden and by Justice Rehnquist's statement in Lockhart. He surely was entitled to assume that the law had not changed so dramatically in the years following his service as a law clerk to Chief Justice Burger that a majority of the present Court would not even mention that basic distinction, and would uphold the disqualification of a juror whose only failing was to harbor some slight reservation in imposing the most severe of sanctions. I respectfully dissent. |
per_curiam | 1,993 | 200 | per_curiam | El Vocero De Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112861/el-vocero-de-puerto-rico-v-puerto-rico/ | Under the Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure, an accused felon is entitled to a hearing to determine if he shall be held for trial. P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 34, App. II, Rule 23 (1991). A neutral magistrate presides over the hearing, People v. Opio Opio, 104 P. R. R. (4 Official Translations 231, 239) (1975), for which the defendant has the rights to appear and to counsel, Rules 23(a), (b). Both the prosecution and the defendant may introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses, Rule 23(c), and the defendant may present certain affirmative defenses, People v. Lebrón Lebrón, 116 P. R. R. (16 Official Translations 1052, 1058) The magistrate must determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged. Rule 23(c) provides that the hearing "shall be held privately" unless the defendant requests otherwise. Petitioner José Purcell is a reporter for petitioner El Vocero de Puerto Rico, the largest newspaper in the Commonwealth. By written request to respondent District Judges, he sought to attend preliminary hearings over which they were to preside. In the alternative, he sought access to recordings of the hearings. After these requests were denied, petitioners brought this action in Puerto Rico Superior Court seeking a declaration that the privacy provision of Rule 23(c) violates the First Amendment, applicable to the Commonwealth through the Fourteenth Amendment,[1] and an injunction against its enforcement. Petitioners based their claim on Press-Enterprise which addressed a California law that allowed magistrates to close preliminary hearings quite similar in form and function to those held under Rule 23 if it was reasonably likely that the *149 defendant's ability to obtain a fair hearing would be prejudiced. Applying the "tests of experience and logic," of Globe Newspaper Press-Enterprise struck down the California privacy law on the grounds that preliminary criminal hearings have traditionally been public, and because the hearings at issue were "sufficiently like a trial," that public access was "essential to the[ir] proper functioning," In affirming the dismissal of petitioners' suit, a divided Supreme Court of Puerto Rico found that Press-Enterprise did not control the outcome because of several differences between Rule 23 hearings and the California hearings at issue t App. to Pet. for Cert. 129.[2] It thus proceeded to determine the constitutionality of Rule 23 hearings by application anew of the Globe Newspaper tests. The court concluded that closed hearings are compatible with the unique history and traditions of the Commonwealth, which display a special concern for the honor and reputation of the citizenry, and that open hearings would prejudice defendants' ability to obtain fair |
per_curiam | 1,993 | 200 | per_curiam | El Vocero De Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112861/el-vocero-de-puerto-rico-v-puerto-rico/ | that open hearings would prejudice defendants' ability to obtain fair trials because of Puerto Rico's small size and dense population. The decision below is irreconcilable with Press-Enterprise: for precisely the reasons stated in that decision, the privacy provision of Rule 23(c) is unconstitutional.[3] The distinctions drawn by the court below are insubstantial. In fact, each of the features cited by Press-Enterprise in support of the finding that California's preliminary hearings were "sufficiently *150 like a trial" to require public access is present Rule 23 hearings are held before a neutral magistrate; the accused is afforded the rights to counsel, to crossexamination, to present testimony, and, at least in some instances, to suppress illegally seized evidence;[4] the accused is bound over for trial only upon the magistrate's finding probable cause; in a substantial portion of criminal cases, the hearing provides the only occasion for public observation of the criminal justice system;[5] and no jury is present. Cf. -13. Nor are these commonalities coincidental: As the majority noted, the Rule's drafters relied on the California law at issue in Press-Enterprise as one source of Rule 23. App. to Pet. for Cert. 93, n. 26. At best, the distinctive features of Puerto Rico's preliminary hearing render it a subspecies of the provision this Court found to be infirm seven years ago. Beyond this, however, the privacy provision of Rule 23(c) is more clearly suspect. California law allowed magistrates to close hearings only upon a determination that there was a substantial likelihood of prejudice to the defendant, yet the Press-Enterprise Court found this standard insufficiently exacting to protect public -15. By contrast, Rule 23 provides no standard, allowing hearings to be closed upon the request of the defendant, without more. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court's reliance on Puerto Rican tradition is also misplaced. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has correctly stated, the "experience" test of Globe Newspaper does not look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead "to the experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout the United States" The established and widespread tradition of open preliminary hearings among the *151 States was canvassed in Press-Enterprise and is controlling -11, and nn. 3-4. The concern of the majority below that publicity will prejudice defendants' fair trial rights is, of course, legitimate. But this concern can and must be addressed on a case-bycase basis: "If the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is a |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110101/reiter-v-sonotone-corp/ | We granted certiorari to decide whether consumers who pay a higher price for goods purchased for personal use as a result of antitrust violations sustain an injury in their "business or property" within the meaning of 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. 15. *335 I Petitioner brought a class action on behalf of herself and all persons in the United States who purchased hearing aids manufactured by five corporations, respondents here. Her complaint alleges that respondents have committed a variety of antitrust violations, including vertical and horizontal price fixing.[1] Because of these violations, the complaint alleges, petitioner and the class of persons she seeks to represent have been forced to pay illegally fixed higher prices for the hearing aids and related services they purchased from respondents' retail dealers. Treble damages and injunctive relief are sought under 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 737, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 15 and 26. Respondents moved for dismissal of the complaint or summary judgment in the District Court. Among other things, respondents argued that Reiter, as a retail purchaser of hearing aids for personal use, lacked standing to sue for treble damages under 4 of the Clayton Act because she had not been injured in her "business or property" within the meaning of the Act. The District Court held that under 4 a retail purchaser is injured in "property" if the purchaser can show that antitrust violations caused an increase in the price paid for the article purchased. The District Court relied on Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe and the legislative history of the Clayton Act set forth in Brunswick indicating that Congress intended to give a 4 remedy to consumers. The District Court determined, however, that the respondents had raised a "controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion." and accordingly certified the question for interlocutory review under 28 U.S. C. 1292 (b). It then stayed further proceedings in the case and declined to express any opinion on the merits of the other issues raised by respondents' motions or on the certifiability of the class. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that retail purchasers of consumer goods and services who allege no injury of a commercial or business nature are not injured in their "business or property" within the meaning of 4. Noting the absence of any holdings on this precise issue by this Court or other courts of appeals, the court reasoned that the phrase "business or property" was intended to limit standing to those engaged in commercial ventures. It relied on |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110101/reiter-v-sonotone-corp/ | standing to those engaged in commercial ventures. It relied on the legislative history and this Court's statement in that "business or property" referred to "commercial interests or enterprises." A contrary holding, the Court of Appeals observed, would add a substantial volume of litigation to the already strained dockets of the federal courts and could be used to exact unfair settlements from retail businesses. Small and medium-sized retailers would be especially hard hit by "gigantic consumer class actions," and granting standing to retail consumers might actually have an anticompetitive impact as a consequence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals thought "it sensible as a matter of policy and compelled as a matter of law that consumers alleging no injury of a commercial or competitive nature are not injured in their property under section 4 of the Clayton Act." 579 F. 2d. at 1087. *337 We granted certiorari,[2] We reverse.[3] II As is true in every case involving the construction of a statute, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S. C. 15 (emphasis added). On its face, 4 contains little in the way of restrictive language. In Pfizer we remarked: "`The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices *338 by whomever they may be perpetrated.' Mandeville Island Farms, ; cf. Perma Life Mufflers, And the legislative history of the Sherman Act demonstrates that Congress used the phrase `any person' intending it to have its naturally broad and inclusive meaning. There was no mention in the floor debates of any more restrictive definition." Similarly here, the word "property" has a naturally broad and inclusive meaning. In its dictionary definitions and in common usage "property" comprehends anything of material value owned or possessed. See, e. g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1818 (1961). Money, of course, is a form of property. Respondents protest that, if the reference to "property" in 4 means "money," the term "business" then becomes superfluous, for every injury in one's business necessarily involves a pecuniary injury. They argue that if Congress wished to permit one who lost only money to bring suit under 4, it would not have used the restrictive |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110101/reiter-v-sonotone-corp/ | suit under 4, it would not have used the restrictive phrase "business or property"; rather, it would have employed more generic language akin to that of 16, for example, which provides for injunctive relief against any "threatened loss or damage." 15 U.S. C. 26. Congress plainly intended to exclude some category of injury in choosing the phrase "business or property" for 4. Only a "commercial interest" gloss, they argue, both gives the phrase the restrictive significance intended for it and at the same time gives independent significance to the word "business" and the word "property." The argument of respondents is straightforward: the phrase "business or property" means "business activity or property related to one's business." Brief for Respondents 11 n. 7. That strained construction would have us ignore the disjunctive "or" and rob the term "property" of its independent *339 and ordinary significance; moreover, it would convert the noun "business" into an adjective. In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used. United Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise; here it does not. See Congress' use of the word "or" makes plain that "business" was not intended to modify "property," nor was "property" intended to modify "business." When a commercial enterprise suffers a loss of money it suffers an injury in both its "business" and its "property." But neither term is rendered redundant by recognizing that a consumer not engaged in a "business" enterprise, but rather acquiring goods or services for personal use, is injured in "property" when the price of those goods or services is artificially inflated by reason of the anticompetitive conduct complained of. The phrase "business or property" also retains restrictive significance. It would, for example, exclude personal injuries suffered. E. g., Congress must have intended to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase "business or property." But it taxes the ordinary meaning of common terms to argue, as respondents do, that a consumer's monetary injury arising directly out of a retail purchase is not comprehended by the natural and usual meaning of the phrase "business or property." We simply give the word "property" the independent significance to which it is entitled in this context. A consumer whose money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has been injured "in his property" within the meaning of 4. Indeed, this Court indicated as much in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe There the city alleged that the anticompetitive conduct of the defendants *340 had caused |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110101/reiter-v-sonotone-corp/ | that the anticompetitive conduct of the defendants *340 had caused the city to pay more for water pipes purchased for use in the city's water system. The defendants answered that the pecuniary injury resulting from the alleged overcharges did not injure the city in its "business or property" within the meaning of 4. This Court, without relying on the fact that the city was engaged in a business enterprise, stated: "The city was injured in its property, at least, if not in its business of furnishing water, by being led to pay more than the worth of the pipe. A person whose property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his property." 203 U.S., at The holding of Chattanooga Foundry could well have been grounded on the undisputed fact that the city was engaged in the commercial enterprise of supplying water for a charge and, therefore, engaged in a business. It was not uncommon for both municipalities and private companies to own and operate competing waterworks at the turn of the century. In operating a municipal public utility, the city was in a real sense engaged in the "business of furnishing water" when it purchased the pipe to carry water from the city's reservoirs to its customers. Yet, the Court's holding in Chattanooga Foundry was deliberately grounded on the premise that the city had been injured in its "property"independent of any injury it had sustained in its "business of furnishing water"because the defendants' antitrust violation caused it to pay a higher price for the pipe than it otherwise would have paid. Chattanooga Foundry therefore establishes that monetary injury, standing alone, may be injury in one's "property" within the meaning of 4. Thus, the fact that petitioner Reiter was deprived of only money, albeit a modest amount, is no reason to conclude that she did not sustain a "property" injury. Nor does her status as a "consumer" change the nature of *341 the injury she suffered or the intrinsic meaning of "property" in 4. That consumers of retail goods and services have standing to sue under 4 is implicit in our decision in There we held that a bar association was subject to a treble-damages suit brought under 4 by persons who sought legal services in connection with the purchase of a residence. Furthermore, we have often referred to "consumers" as parties entitled to seek damages under 4 without intimating that consumers of goods and services purchased for personal rather than commercial use were in any way foreclosed by the statutory language from asserting an injury |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110101/reiter-v-sonotone-corp/ | way foreclosed by the statutory language from asserting an injury in their "property." E. g., Pfizer -315; Brunswick n. 10; Hanover Shoe, v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., ; Mandeville Island is not to the contrary. There we held that injury to a state's total economy, for which the state sought redress in its parens patriae capacity, was not cognizable under 4. It is true we noted that the words "business or property" refer to "commercial interests or enterprises," and reasoned that Hawaii could not recover on its claim for damage done to its "general economy" because such injury did not harm Hawaii's "commercial interests." 405 U.S., at However, the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute. Use of the phrase "commercial interests or enterprises," read in context, in no sense suggests that only injuries to a business entity are within the ambit of 4. Respondents ignore the Court's careful use of the disjunctive and the naturally broad meaning of the term "interests" in The phrase "commercial interests" was used there as a generic reference to the interests of the *342 State of Hawaii as a party to a commercial transaction. This is apparent from Hawaii's explicit reaffirmance of the rule of Chattanooga Foundry and statement that, where injury to a state "occurs in its capacity as a consumer in the marketplace" through a "payment of money wrongfully induced." treble damages are recoverable by a state under the Clayton Act. at 263 n. 14. A central premise of our holding in Hawaii was concern over duplicative recoveries. We noted that a "large and ultimately indeterminable part of the injury to the `general economy'" for which the State sued was "no more than a reflection of injuries to the `business or property' of consumers" for which, on a proper showing, they could recover in their own right. -. Consumers in the United States purchase at retail more than $1.2 trillion in goods and services annually. Economic Report of the President 257 (Table B-1). It is in the sound commercial interests of the retail purchasers of goods and services to obtain the lowest price possible within the framework of our competitive private enterprise system. The essence of the antitrust laws is to ensure fair price competition in an open market. Here, where petitioner alleges a wrongful deprivation of her money because the price of the hearing aid she bought was artificially inflated by reason of respondents' anticompetitive conduct, she has alleged an injury in her "property" under 4. Nothing in |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110101/reiter-v-sonotone-corp/ | alleged an injury in her "property" under 4. Nothing in the legislative history of 4 conflicts with our holding today. Many courts and commentators have observed that the respective legislative histories of 4 of the Clayton Act and 7 of the Sherman Act, its predecessor, shed no light on Congress' original understanding of the terms "business or property."[4] Nowhere in the legislative record *343 is specific reference made to the intended scope of those terms. Respondents engage in speculation in arguing that the substitution of the terms "business or property" for the broader language originally proposed by Senator Sherman[5] was clearly intended to exclude pecuniary injuries suffered by those who purchase goods and services at retail for personal use. None of the subsequent floor debates reflect any such intent. On the contrary, they suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare prescription." R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 66 Certainly the leading proponents of the legislation perceived the treble-damages remedy of what is now 4 as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges resulting from price fixing. E. g., 21 Cong. Rec. 2457, 2460, 2558 (1890). Because Congress in 1890 rejected a proposal to allow a group of consumers to bring a collective action as a class, some legislators questioned whether individual consumers would be willing to bring actions for relatively small amounts. See, e. g., At no time, however, was the right of a consumer to bring an action for damages questioned.[6] In Brunswick after examining the legislative history of 4, we described the Sherman Act as "conceived of primarily as a remedy for `[t]he people of the United States as individuals,' especially consumers," and the treble-damages provision of the Clayton Act as "conceived primarily as `open[ing] the door of justice *344 to every man and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered.'" n. 10. Thus, to the extent that the legislative history is relevant, it supports our holding that a consumer deprived of money by reason of allegedly anticompetitive conduct is injured in "property" within the meaning of 4.[7] Respondents also argue that allowing class actions to be brought by retail consumers like the petitioner here will add a significant burden to the already crowded dockets of the federal courts. That may well be true but cannot be a controlling consideration here. We must take the statute as we find it. Congress created the treble-damages remedy of 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110101/reiter-v-sonotone-corp/ | a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations. Indeed, nearly 20 times as many private antitrust actions are currently pending in the federal courts as actions filed by the Department of Justice. Administrative Office of the United States Courts Ann. Rep. 101, Table 28 To be sure, these private suits impose a heavy litigation burden on the federal courts; it is the clear responsibility of Congress to provide the judicial resources necessary to execute its mandates. Finally, respondents argue that the cost of defending consumer class actions will have a potentially ruinous effect on small businesses in particular and will ultimately be paid by *345 consumers in any event. These are not unimportant considerations, but they are policy considerations more properly addressed to Congress than to this Court. However accurate respondents' arguments may prove to beand they are not without substancethey cannot govern our reading of the plain language in 4. District courts must be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settlements; they have broad power and discretion vested in them by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 with respect to matters involving the certification and management of potentially cumbersome or frivolous class actions. See generally Durham & Dibble, Certification: A Practical Device for Early Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation, B. Y. U. L. Rev. 299. Recognition of the plain meaning of the statutory language "business or property" need not result in administrative chaos, class-action harassment, or "windfall" settlements if the district courts exercise sound discretion and use the tools available. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN took no part in the decision of this case. MR. |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118090/dunn-v-commodity-futures-trading-commn/ | The question presented is whether Congress has authorized the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or *467 Commission) to regulate "off-exchange" trading in options to buy or sell foreign currency. I The CFTC brought this action in 1994, alleging that, beginning in 1992, petitioners solicited investments in and operated a fraudulent scheme in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S. C. 1 et seq., and CFTC regulations.[1] App. 10. See 7 U.S. C. 6c(b); 17 CFR 32.9[2] The CFTC's complaint, affidavits, and declarations submitted to the District Court indicate that customers were told their funds would be invested using complex strategies involving options to purchase or sell various foreign currencies. App. 8. Petitioners apparently did in fact engage in many such transactions. ; To do so, they contracted directly with international banks and others without making use of any regulated exchange or board of trade. In the parlance of the business, petitioners traded in the "off-exchange" or "overthe-counter" *468 (OTC) market.[3] No options were ever sold directly to petitioners' customers. However, their positions were tracked through internal accounts, and investors were provided weekly reports showing the putative status of their holdings. Petitioners and their customers suffered heavy losses. at -52. Subsequently, the CFTC commenced these proceedings. Rejecting petitioners' defense that off-exchange transactions in foreign currency options are exempt from the CEA, the District Court appointed a temporary receiver to take control of their property for the benefit of their customers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5b-6b. Relying on Circuit precedent,[4] and acknowledging a conflict with another Circuit,[5] the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 7 U.S. 1219 For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. II The outcome of this case is dictated by the so-called "Treasury Amendment" to the CEA. 7 U.S. C. 2(ii). We have previously reviewed the history of the CEA and generally described how it authorizes the CFTC to regulate the "volatile and esoteric" market in *469 futures contracts in fungible commodities. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, As a part of the 1974 amendments that created the CFTC and dramatically expanded the coverage of the statute to include nonagricultural commodities "in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in," see 7 U.S. C. 2 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), Congress enacted the following exemption, which has come to be known as the "Treasury Amendment": "Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118090/dunn-v-commodity-futures-trading-commn/ | transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade." 7 U.S. C. 2(ii) (emphasis added). The narrow issue that we must decide is whether the italicized phrase ("transactions in foreign currency") includes transactions in options to buy or sell foreign currency. An option, as the term is understood in the trade, is a transaction in which the buyer purchases from the seller for consideration the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an agreed amount of a commodity at a set rate at any time prior to the option's expiration.[6] We think it plain that foreign currency options are "transactions in foreign currency" within the meaning of the statute. We are not persuaded *470 by any of the arguments advanced by the CFTC in support of a narrower reading that would exempt futures contracts (agreements to buy or sell a specified quantity of a commodity at a particular price for delivery at a set future date)[7] without exempting options. III "[A]bsent any `indication that doing so would frustrate Congress's clear intention or yield patent absurdity, our obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it.' " 4 U.S. 695, ). The CFTC argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that an option is not itself a transaction "in" foreign currency, but rather is just a contract right to engage in such a transaction at a future date. Brief for CFTC 30-31; Hence, the Commission submits that the term "transactions in foreign currency" includes only the "actual exercise of an option (i. e., the actual purchase or sale of foreign currency)" but not the purchase or sale of an option itself. Brief for CFTC 31. That reading of the text seems quite unnatural to us, and we decline to adopt it. The more normal reading of the key phrase encompasses all transactions in which foreign currency is the fungible good whose fluctuating market price provides the motive for trading. The CFTC's interpretation violates the ordinary meaning of the key word "in," which is usually thought to be "synonymous with [the] expressions `in regard to,' `respecting,' [and] `with respect to.' " Black's Law Dictionary 758 (6th ed. 1990); see 5 U.S. 687, There can be no question that the purchase or sale of a foreign *471 currency option is a transaction "respecting" foreign currency. We think it equally plain as a matter of ordinary meaning that such an option |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118090/dunn-v-commodity-futures-trading-commn/ | as a matter of ordinary meaning that such an option is a transaction "in" foreign currency for purposes of the Treasury Amendment. Indeed, adopting the Commission's reading would deprive the exemption of the principal effect Congress intended. The CFTC acknowledges that futures contracts fall squarely within the Treasury Amendment's exemption, Brief for CFTC 30, and there is no question that the exemption of off-exchange foreign currency futures from CFTC regulation was one of Congress' primary goals.[8] Yet on the CFTC's reasoning the exemption's application to futures contracts could not be sustained. A futures contract is no more a transaction "in" foreign currency as the Commission understands the term than an option. The Commission argues that because a futures contract creates a legal obligation to purchase or sell currency on a particular date, it is somehow more clearly a transaction "in" the underlying currencies than an option, which generates only the right to engage in a transaction. This reasoning is wholly unpersuasive. No currency changes hands at the time a futures contract is made. And, *472 the existence of a futures contract does not guarantee that currency will actually be exchanged. Indeed, the Commission concedes that, in most cases, futures contracts are "extinguished before delivery by entry into an offsetting futures contract." at 30 (hereinafter Snider)); see also Munn & Garcia 414. Adopting the CFTC's reading would therefore place both futures and options outside the exemption, in clear contravention of Congress' intent. Furthermore, this interpretation would leave the Treasury Amendment's exemption for "transactions in foreign currency" without any significant effect at all, because it would limit the scope of the exemption to "forward contracts" (agreements that anticipate the actual delivery of a commodity on a specified future date) and "spot transactions" (agreements for purchase and sale of commodities that anticipate near-term delivery).[9] Both are transactions "in" a commodity as the CFTC would have us understand the term. But neither type of transaction for any commodity was subject to intensive regulation under the CEA at the time of the Treasury Amendment's passage. See 7 U.S. C. 2 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) ("term `future delivery,' as used in this chapter, shall not include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery"); Snider 9.01; J. Markham, The History of Commodity Futures Trading and Its Regulation 201-203 Our reading of the exemption is therefore also consonant with the doctrine that legislative enactments should not be construed to render their provisions mere surplusage. See 5 U. S., at 698 ; Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph *473 Finally, including options in the exemption is |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118090/dunn-v-commodity-futures-trading-commn/ | & Telegraph *473 Finally, including options in the exemption is consistent with Congress' purpose in enacting the Treasury Amendment. Although at the time the Treasury Amendment was drafted a thriving off-exchange market in foreign currency futures was in place, the closely related options market at issue here had not yet developed. See City of New York Bar Association Committee on Futures Regulation, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Foreign Currency Trading 18, 23 (1986). The CFTC therefore suggests that Congress could not have intended to exempt foreign currency options from the CEA's coverage. Brief for CFTC 41-42. The legislative history strongly suggests to the contrary that Congress' broad purpose in enacting the Treasury Amendment was to provide a general exemption from CFTC regulation for sophisticated off-exchange foreign currency trading, which had previously developed entirely free from supervision under the commodities laws. In explaining the Treasury Amendment, the Senate Committee Report notes in broad terms that the amendment "provides that inter-bank trading of foreign currencies and specified financial instruments is not subject to Commission regulation." S. Rep. No. 93-1131, p. 6 (1974).[10] Elsewhere, the Report again explains in general termswithout making reference to any distinction between options and futures that the legislation "included an amendment to clarify that the provisions of the bill are not applicable to trading in foreign currencies and certain enumerated financial instruments unless such trading is conducted on a formally organized futures exchange. A great deal of the trading in foreign currency in the United States is carried out through an informal network of banks and tellers. The Committee *474 believes that this market is more properly supervised by the bank regulatory agencies and that, therefore, regulation under this legislation is unnecessary." Similarly, the Treasury Department submitted to the Chairman of the relevant Senate Committee a letter that was the original source of the Treasury Amendment. While focusing on the need to exempt the foreign currency futures market from CFTC regulation, the letter points out that the "participants in this market are sophisticated and informed institutions," and "the [CFTC] would clearly not have the expertise to regulate a complex banking function and would confuse an already highly regulated business sector." The Department further explained that "new regulatory limitations and restrictions could have an adverse impact on the usefulness and efficiency of foreign exchange markets for traders and investors." Although the OTC market for foreign currency options had not yet developed in 1974, the reasons underlying the Treasury Department's express desire at that time to exempt offexchange commodity futures trading from CFTC regulation apply with equal force to options |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118090/dunn-v-commodity-futures-trading-commn/ | trading from CFTC regulation apply with equal force to options today. Foreign currency options and futures are now traded in the same off-exchange markets, by the same entities, for quite similar purposes. See Brief for Foreign Exchange Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 19. Contrary to the Commission's suggestion, we therefore think the purposes underlying the Treasury Amendment are most properly fulfilled by giving effect to the plain meaning of the language as Congress enacted it. The CFTC rejoins that the Treasury Amendment should be construed in the light of Congress' history of regulating options more strictly than futures. See Snider 7.03-7.04; Brief for CFTC 38-39. The Commission submits that this distinction was motivated by the view that options lend *475 themselves more readily to fraudulent schemes than futures contracts. Hence, the CFTC argues that Congress would have acted reasonably and consistently with prior practice had it regulated commodities differently from options. While that may be true, we give only slight credence to these general historical considerations, which are unsupported by statutory language, or any evidence evocative of the particular concerns focused on by the legislators who enacted the Treasury Amendment. We think the history of the Treasury Amendment suggestscontrary to the CFTC's view that it was intended to take all transactions relating to foreign currency not conducted on a board of trade outside of the CEA's ambit. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that, prior to the enactment of the CEA in 1974, foreign currency trading had been entirely unregulated under the commodities laws. Our interpretation is also consonant with the history of evolving congressional regulation in this area. That history has been one of successively broadening the coverage of regulation by the addition of more and more commodities to the applicable legislation.[11] It seems quite natural in this context to read the Treasury Amendment's exemption of transactions *476 in foreign currencies as a complete exclusion of that commodity from the regulatory scheme, except, of course, to the extent that the proviso for transactions "conducted on a board of trade" qualifies that exclusion. See 7 U.S. C. 2(ii). IV To buttress its reading of the statute, the CFTC argues that elsewhere in the CEA Congress referred to transactions "involving" a particular commodity to describe options or used other "more encompassing terminology," rather than what we are told is the narrower term transactions "in" the commodity, which was reserved for futures, spot transactions, and forward contracts. Brief for CFTC 30-33. Not only do we think it unlikely that Congress would adopt such a subtle method of drawing important distinctions, |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118090/dunn-v-commodity-futures-trading-commn/ | would adopt such a subtle method of drawing important distinctions, there is little to suggest that it did so. Congress' use of these terms has been far from consistent. Most strikingly, the use of the word "involving" in the Treasury Amendment itself completely eviscerates the force of the Commission's argument. After setting forth exemptions for, inter alia, "transactions in foreign currency," the amendment contains a proviso sweeping back into the statute's coverage "such transactions involv[ing] the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade." 7 U.S. C. 2(ii) (emphasis added). As we have already noted, the CFTC agrees that futures contracts are a subset of "transactions in foreign currency." The Commission further submits that the proviso uses the word "involve" to make the exemption inapplicable to those futures contracts that are conducted on a board of trade. This contradicts the "in" versus "involving" distinction. We would expect on the Commission's reasoning that this provision would refer to "transactions in futures." The use of the term "involving" instead, within the very amendment that the CFTC claims embraces *477 this distinction, weighs heavily against the view that any such distinction was intended by Congress.[12] The CFTC argues further that the proviso properly understood aids its cause. The proviso sweeps back into the CFTC's jurisdiction otherwise exempt "transactions in foreign currency" that "involve the sale thereof for future delivery" and are "conducted on a board of trade." Since the proviso refers to futures without mentioning options, the Commission submits that the exemption itself should be read only to cover futures because Congress cannot reasonably have intended to regulate exchange trading in foreign currency futures without also regulating exchange trading in *478 such options. We agree that Congress intended no such anomaly. But we are satisfied that the anomaly is best avoided by reading the proviso broadly rather than reading the exemption narrowly. The proviso's language fairly accommodates inclusion of both options and futures. To fall within the proviso, a transaction must "involve the sale [of foreign currency] for future delivery." 2(ii) (emphasis added). Because options convey the right to buy or sell foreign currency at some future time prior to their expiration, they are transactions "involv[ing]" or related to the sale of foreign currency for future delivery. Thus, both futures and options are covered by both the exemption and the proviso. While that may not be the only possible reading of the literal text, and we do not intend to suggest that a similar construction would be required with respect to other provisions of the CEA, our interpretation is faithful |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118090/dunn-v-commodity-futures-trading-commn/ | to other provisions of the CEA, our interpretation is faithful to the "contemporary legal context" in which the Treasury Amendment was drafted. ; see also ). Finally, the CFTC calls our attention to statements in the legislative history of a 1982 amendment to the CEA,[13] indicating that the drafters of that amendment believed that the CFTC had the authority to regulate foreign currency options "when they are traded other than on a national securities exchange." See S. Rep. No. 97-384, p. 22 Those statements, at best, might be described as "legislative dicta" because the 1982 amendment itself merely resolved a conflict between the Securities Exchange Commission and the CFTC *479 concerning their respective authority to regulate transactions on an exchange. See Snider 10.24. The amendment made no change in the law applicable to off-exchange trading. Although these "dicta" are consistent with the position that the CFTC advocates, they shed no light on the intent of the authors of the Treasury Amendment that had been adopted eight years earlier. See, e. g.,[14] V Underlying the statutory construction question before us, we recognize that there is an important public policy disputewith substantial arguments favoring each side. Petitioners, *480 their amici, and the Treasury Department argue that if off-exchange foreign currency options are not treated as exempt from CEA regulation, the increased costs associated with unnecessary regulation of the highly sophisticated OTC foreign currency markets might well drive this business out of the United States.[15] The Commission responds that to the extent limited exemptions from regulation are necessary, it will provide them, but argues that options are particularly susceptible to fraud and abuse if not carefully policed. Brief for CFTC 26, 49. As the Commission properly acknowledges, however, these are arguments best addressed to the Congress, not the courts. See United Lacking the expertise or authority to assess these important competing claims, we note only that "a literal construction of a statute" does not "yiel[d] results so manifestly unreasonable that they could not fairly be attributed to congressional design." The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112270/wards-cove-packing-co-v-atonio/ | I fully concur in JUSTICE STEVENS' analysis of this case. Today a bare majority of the Court takes three major strides backwards in the battle against race discrimination. It reaches out to make last Term's plurality opinion in the law, thereby upsetting the longstanding distribution of burdens of proof in Title VII disparate-impact cases. It bars the use of internal work force comparisons in the making of a prima *662A facie case of discrimination, even where the structure of the industry in question renders any other statistical comparison meaningless. And it requires practice-by-practice statistical proof of causation, even where, as here, such proof would be impossible. The harshness of these results is well demonstrated by the facts of this case. The salmon industry as described by this record takes us back to a kind of overt and institutionalized discrimination we have not dealt with in years: a total residential and work environment organized on principles of racial stratification and segregation, which, as JUSTICE STEVENS points out, resembles a plantation economy. Post, at 664, n. 4. This industry long has been characterized by a taste for discrimination of the old-fashioned sort: a preference for hiring nonwhites to fill its lowest level positions, on the condition that they stay there. The majority's legal rulings essentially immunize these practices from attack under a Title VII disparate-impact analysis. Sadly, this comes as no surprise. One wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimination or, more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was. Cf. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | The case before us presents a single issue: whether an Article I military appellate court has jurisdiction to enter tain a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to challenge its earlier, and final, decision affirming a criminal convic tion. The military court which had affirmed the conviction and where the writ of coram nobis was sought is the Navy- Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA). Its ruling that it had jurisdiction to grant the writ, but then denying its issuance for lack of merit, was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). After the CAAF agreed that the NMCCA has jurisdiction to issue the writ, it remanded for further proceedings on the merits. The Government of the United States, contending that a writ of coram nobis directed to a final judgment of conviction is beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts, now brings the case to us. I Respondent Jacob Denedo came to the United States in 1984 from his native Nigeria. He enlisted in the Navy in 1989 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. In 1998, military authorities charged him with conspiracy, 2 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of the Court larceny, and forgery—in contravention of Articles 81, 121, and 123 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S. C. 921, 923—all for his role in a scheme to defraud a community college. With the assistance of both military and civilian counsel, respondent made a plea bargain to plead guilty to reduced charges. In exchange for his plea the convening authority referred respondent’s case to a special court-martial, which, at that time, could not impose a sentence greater than six months’ confinement. The special court-martial, consisting of a single military judge, accepted respondent’s guilty plea after determining that it was both knowing and voluntary. The court con victed respondent of conspiracy and larceny. It sentenced him to three months’ confinement, a bad-conduct dis charge, and a reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade. Respondent appealed on the ground that his sentence was unduly severe. The NMCCA affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a–67a. Respondent did not seek further review in the CAAF, and he was discharged from the Navy on May 30, 2000. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security com menced removal proceedings against respondent based upon his special court-martial conviction. To avoid depor tation, respondent decided to challenge his conviction once more, though at this point it had been final for eight years. He maintained, in a petition for a writ of coram nobis |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | maintained, in a petition for a writ of coram nobis filed with the NMCCA, that the conviction it had earlier af firmed must be deemed void because his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent alleged that he informed his civilian attorney during plea negotiations that “ ‘his primary concern and objective’ ” was to avoid deportation and that he was willing to “ ‘risk going to jail’ ” to avert separation from his family. 66 M.J. 1, 118 (C. A. Armed Forces 2008). On respon dent’s account, his attorney—an alcoholic who was not Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 3 Opinion of the Court sober during the course of the special court-martial pro ceeding—erroneously assured him that “ ‘if he agreed to plead guilty at a special-court-martial he would avoid any risk of deportation.’ ” Petitioner argued that the NMCCA could set aside its earlier decision by issuing a writ of coram nobis under the authority of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S. C. The Government filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. It contended that the NMCCA had no author ity to conduct postconviction proceedings. In a terse, four sentence order, the NMCCA summarily denied both the Government’s motion and respondent’s petition for a writ of coram nobis. App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. Respondent appealed and the CAAF, dividing 3 to 2, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The CAAF agreed with the NMCCA that standing military courts have jurisdiction to conduct “collateral review under the All Writs Act.” 66 M.J., at 119. This is so, the CAAF explained, because “when a petitioner seeks collateral relief to modify an action that was taken within the subject matter jurisdiction of the military justice system a writ that is necessary or appropriate may be issued under the All Writs Act ‘in aid of’ the court’s existing jurisdiction.” at 120 she concluded that the UCMJ does not confer jurisdiction upon military tribunals to conduct “post-finality collateral review.” We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. (2008), and now affirm. II Before we address another court’s subject-matter juris diction we must first determine our own. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ante, at 6 (“Subject-matter jurisdiction should be considered when fairly in doubt”). The Government, upon which the burden to demonstrate subject-matter jurisdic tion lies, DaimlerChrysler 342 (2006), claims that our power to hear this appeal rests on 28 U.S. C. That jurisdictional provision permits us to review CAAF decisions in “ ‘cases in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted relief.’ ” Respondent maintains |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | Appeals for the Armed Forces granted relief.’ ” Respondent maintains that we lack jurisdiction because the CAAF did not “ ‘grant relief’ ”; “all it did was remand” to the NMCCA. Brief for Respondent 6–7 (brackets omitted). Respondent’s parsimonious construction of the word “relief” need not detain us long. Though does not define the term, its familiar meaning encompasses any “redress or benefit” provided by a court. Black’s Law Dictionary 17 (8th ed. 2004). The CAAF’s judgment reversing the NMCCA satisfies that definition. The NMCCA denied respondent’s petition for a writ of coram nobis, while the CAAF’s decision reversed and remanded so that the NMCCA could determine anew if the writ Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 5 Opinion of the Court should issue. That decision conferred a palpable benefit on respondent; for a chance of success on the merits, how ever slight, is superior to no possibility at all. To be sure, respondent would have preferred the CAAF to issue a writ of coram nobis or to direct the NMCCA to do so rather than remanding for the NMCCA to conduct further proceedings. We have jurisdiction, however, to review any decision granting “relief,” not just those provid ing “ultimate relief” or “complete relief.” Indeed, appellate courts reverse and remand lower court judgments—rather than issuing complete relief—with regularity. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, ante, at ; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., ante, at There is no merit to the view that a decision granting partial relief should be construed as granting no relief at all. Because the CAAF “granted relief” to respondent, the text of is satisfied here. We have jurisdiction to determine whether the CAAF was correct in ruling that the NMCCA had authority to entertain the petition for a writ of coram nobis. III A The writ of coram nobis is an ancient common-law remedy designed “to correct errors of fact.” United States v. In American juris prudence the precise contours of coram nobis have not been “well defined,” 416 (1882), but the writ traces its origins to the King’s Bench and the Court of Common Pleas. United States v. (No. 16,056) (CC Mass. 1859) (opinion for the court by Clifford, Circuit Justice); see also at n. 9 (citing 2 W. Tidd, Practice of Courts of King’s Bench and Common Pleas *1136–*1137). In English practice the office of the writ was to foster respect for judicial rulings by enabling the same court 6 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of the Court “where the action was commenced and where the judg ment was rendered” to avoid |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | commenced and where the judg ment was rendered” to avoid the rigid strictures of judg ment finality by correcting technical errors “such as hap pened through the fault of the clerk in the record of the proceedings prior to the judgment.” at 572–. Any rationale confining the writ to technical errors, however, has been superseded; for in its modern iteration coram nobis is broader than its common-law predecessor. This is confirmed by our opinion in In that case we found that a writ of coram nobis can issue to redress a fundamental error, there a deprivation of counsel in viola tion of the Sixth Amendment, as opposed to mere technical The potential universe of cases that range from technical errors to fundamental ones perhaps illustrates, in the case of coram nobis, the “ten dency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.” B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 51 (1921). To confine the use of coram nobis so that finality is not at risk in a great number of cases, we were careful in to limit the availability of the writ to “extraor dinary” cases presenting circumstances compelling its use “to achieve justice.” Another limit, of course, is that an extraordinary remedy may not issue when alternative remedies, such as habeas corpus, are available. See at 510–511. In federal courts the authority to grant a writ of coram nobis is conferred by the All Writs Act, which permits “courts established by Act of Congress” to issue “all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdic tions.” 28 U.S. C. Though military courts, like Article III tribunals, are empowered to issue extraordi nary writs under the All Writs Act, Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695, n. 7 (1969), that authority does not deter mine the anterior question whether military courts have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for coram nobis. As the Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 7 Opinion of the Court text of the All Writs Act recognizes, a court’s power to issue any form of relief—extraordinary or otherwise—is contingent on that court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or controversy. Assuming no constraints or limitations grounded in the Constitution are implicated, it is for Congress to deter mine the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts. (“Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider”). This rule applies with added force to Article I tribunals, such as the NMCCA and CAAF, which owe their existence to Con gress’ authority to enact legislation pursuant to Art. I, of the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | authority to enact legislation pursuant to Art. I, of the Constitution. –534. Our decision in demonstrates these teach ings. There an Air Force officer, James was convicted of various crimes by general court-martial and sentenced to six years’ confinement. Follow ing his conviction, Congress enacted a statute authorizing the President to drop convicted officers from the rolls of the Armed Forces. When the Air Force notified that he would be dropped from the rolls, he lodged a peti tion before the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) claiming that the proposed action contravened the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. at 532– 533. sought extraordinary relief as authorized by the All Writs Act to enjoin the President from removing him from the rolls. The AFCCA denied relief, but the CAAF granted it. Concluding that the UCMJ does not authorize military courts to review executive action—including a decision to drop an officer from the rolls—we held that the AFCCA and the CAAF lacked jurisdiction over ’s case. This was so, we unequivocally found, irrespec tive of the military court’s authority to issue extraordinary relief pursuant to the All Writs Act and its previous juris 8 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of the Court diction over ’s criminal proceeding. The power to issue relief depends upon, rather than enlarges, a court’s jurisdiction. –537. That principle does not control the question before us. Because coram nobis is but an extraordinary tool to cor rect a legal or factual error, an application for the writ is properly viewed as a belated extension of the original proceeding during which the error allegedly transpired. See (coram nobis is “a step in the criminal case and not, like habeas corpus where relief is sought in a separate case and record, the beginning of a separate civil proceeding”); see also United (noting that an “independent action”—which, like coram nobis, is an equitable means to obtain relief from a judgment— “ ‘may be regarded as ancillary to the prior suit, so that the relief asked may be granted by the court which made the decree in that suit The bill, though an original bill in the chancery sense of the word, is a continuation of the former suit, on the question of the jurisdiction of the [court]’ ”). It follows that to issue respondent a writ of coram nobis on remand, the NMCCA must have had statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over respondent’s original judgment of conviction. B In the critical part of its opinion discussing the jurisdic tion and authority of the NMCCA to issue a writ of |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | and authority of the NMCCA to issue a writ of coram nobis in an appropriate case, the CAAF describes respon dent’s request for review as one “under the All Writs Act.” This is correct, of course, if it simply confirms that the Act authorizes federal courts to issue writs “in aid of” their jurisdiction; but it does not advance the inquiry into whether jurisdiction exists. And there are limits to the use of coram nobis to alter or Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 9 Opinion of the Court interpret earlier judgments. As makes plain, the All Writs Act and the extraordinary relief the statute authorizes are not a source of subject-matter jurisdiction. –535. Statutes which address the power of a court to use certain writs or remedies or to decree certain forms of relief, for instance to award damages in some specified measure, in some circumstances might be construed also as a grant of jurisdiction to hear and de termine the underlying cause of action. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, We have long held, how ever, that the All Writs Act should not be interpreted in this way. ; 27 F. Cas., at 574 (jurisdiction cannot be acquired “by means of the writ to be issued”). The authority to issue a writ under the All Writs Act is not a font of jurisdiction. See Syngenta Crop Protection, Quite apart from the All Writs Act, we conclude that the NMCCA has jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s request for a writ of coram nobis. Article 66 of the UCMJ pro vides: “For the purpose of reviewing court-martial cases, the [Court of Criminal Appeals] may sit” 10 U.S. C. 66(a). Because respondent’s request for coram nobis is simply a further “step in [his] criminal” appeal, 3 U.S., the NMCCA’s jurisdiction to issue the writ derives from the earlier jurisdiction it exercised to hear and determine the validity of the conviction on direct review. As even the Government concedes, the textual authority under the UCMJ to “ ‘revie[w] court-martial cases’ ” provided the NMCCA with jurisdiction to hear an appeal of respondent’s judgment of conviction. See Brief for United States 17–18. That jurisdiction is sufficient to permit the NMCCA to entertain respondent’s petition for coram nobis. See also Courts of Criminal Appeals Rule of Practice and Procedure 2(b) (recognizing NMCCA discre tionary authority to entertain petitions for extraordinary writs). 10 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of the Court It is true that when exercising its jurisdiction under 66(a), the NMCCA “may act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening au thority.” 66(c). That limitation does not bar respon dent’s request for a writ of coram nobis. An alleged error in the original judgment predicated on ineffective assistance-of-counsel challenges the validity of a convic tion, see Knowles v. Mirzayance, ante, so respondent’s Sixth Amendment claim is “with respect to” the special court-martial’s “findings of guilty,” 10 U.S. C. 66(c). Pursuant to the UCMJ, the NMCCA has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear respondent’s request for extraordinary relief. Because the NMCCA had jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for coram nobis, the CAAF had jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s appeal from the NMCCA’s judg ment. When exercising its jurisdiction, the CAAF’s au thority is confined “to matters of law” connected to “the findings and sentence as approved by the convening au thority and as affirmed or set aside by the Court of Criminal Appeals,” 67(c), but these limitations pose no obstacle to respondent’s requested review of the NMCCA’s decision. Respondent’s Sixth Amendment claim presents a “matte[r] of law” “with respect to the [guilty] findings as approved by the [special court-martial] and as affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.” The CAAF had subject-matter jurisdiction to review the NMCCA’s denial of respondent’s petition challenging the validity of his original conviction. C The Government counters that Article 76 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S. C. 76, “affirmatively prohibit[s] the type of collateral review sought by respondent.” Brief for United States 18. That is incorrect. The Government’s argument commits the error of “conflating the jurisdictional question Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 11 Opinion of the Court with the merits” of respondent’s petition. Arthur Andersen LLP, ante, Article 76 states in relevant part: “The appellate review of records of trial provided by this chapter, the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-martial as approved, reviewed, or affirmed as required by this chapter, and all dismissals and discharges carried into execution under sentences by courts-martial following approval, review, or affirma tion as required by this chapter, are final and conclu sive. Orders publishing the proceedings of courts martial and all action taken pursuant to those pro ceedings are binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States” 10 U.S. C. 76. Article 76 codifies the common-law rule that respects the finality of judgments. 420 U.S. 738, Just as the rules of finality did not jurisdictionally bar the court in from examining its earlier judgment, neither does the principle of finality bar the NMCCA from doing so here. The Government may ultimately be correct that the facts of respondent’s case |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | may ultimately be correct that the facts of respondent’s case are insufficient to set aside the final judgment that Article 76 makes binding. No doubt, judgment finality is not to be lightly cast aside; and courts must be cautious so that the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis issues only in extreme cases. But the long recognized authority of a court to protect the integrity of its earlier judgments impels the conclusion that the final ity rule is not so inflexible that it trumps each and every competing consideration. Our holding allows military courts to protect the integrity of their dispositions and processes by granting relief from final judgments in ex traordinary cases when it is shown that there were fun damental flaws in the proceedings leading to their issu ance. The Government remains free to argue that 12 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of the Court respondent’s is a merely ordinary case that is not entitled to extraordinary relief. But respondent’s entitlement to relief is a merits question outside the scope of the jurisdic tional question presented. The Government’s contention that coram nobis permits a court “to correct its own errors, not those of an infe rior court,” Brief for United States 36, can be disposed of on similar grounds. Just as respondent’s request for coram nobis does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction, the Government’s argument that the relief should not issue “in light of the writ’s traditional scope” does not undermine it, In sum, the Gov ernment’s argument speaks to the scope of the writ, not the NMCCA’s jurisdiction to issue it. The CAAF rejected the former argument. Only the latter one is before us. We hold that Article I military courts have jurisdiction to entertain coram nobis petitions to consider allegations that an earlier judgment of conviction was flawed in a fundamental respect. That conclusion is consistent with our holding that Article III courts have a like authority. 3 U.S., at 508. The result we reach today is of central importance for military courts. The military jus tice system relies upon courts that must take all appropri ate means, consistent with their statutory jurisdiction, to ensure the neutrality and integrity of their judgments. Under the premises and statutes we have relied upon here, the jurisdiction and the responsibility of military courts to reexamine judgments in rare cases where a fundamental flaw is alleged and other judicial processes for correction are unavailable are consistent with the powers Congress has granted those courts under Article I and with the system Congress has designed. * * * We do not prejudge the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | has designed. * * * We do not prejudge the merits of respondent’s petition. To be sure, the writ of error coram nobis is an extraordi Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 13 Opinion of the Court nary writ; and “an extraordinary remedy should not be granted in the ordinary case.” Nken v. Holder, ante, at 1 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). The relative strength of re spondent’s ineffective-assistance claim, his delay in lodg ing his petition, when he learned or should have learned of his counsel’s alleged deficiencies, and the effect of the rule of judgment finality expressed in Article 76 are all factors the NMCCA can explore on remand. We hold only that the military appellate courts had jurisdiction to hear respondent’s request for a writ of coram nobis. The judg ment of the CAAF is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 1 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 08–267 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JACOB DENEDO ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES [June 8, 2009] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Court’s approach is simple: Jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis is a “belated extension” of a court’s original, statutory jurisdiction. Ante, at 8. The military courts here had original jurisdiction over Denedo’s case. Those courts therefore have implicit “extended” jurisdic- tion to consider Denedo’s coram nobis petition. The flaw in this syllogism is at the first step: The only arguable authority for the proposition that coram nobis jurisdiction marches hand in hand with original jurisdic- tion is a footnote in United and that case concerned Article III courts. The military courts are markedly different. They are Article I courts whose jurisdiction is precisely limited at every turn. Those careful limits cannot be overridden by judicial “extension” of statutory jurisdiction, or the addition of a “further step” to the ones marked out by Congress. Ante, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). I agree with the majority that this Court has jurisdic- tion to review the decision below, but respectfully dissent from its holding that military courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis. 2 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. I “Traditionally, military justice has been a rough form of justice emphasizing summary procedures, speedy convic tions and stern penalties with a view to maintaining obedience and fighting |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | stern penalties with a view to maintaining obedience and fighting fitness in the ranks.” Courts martial are composed of active service members who sit only to hear the particular case before them. Once a court-martial reaches a judgment and imposes a sentence, it is dissolved, and its members return to their regular duties. Prior to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), military courts of appeals did not exist. If a service mem ber wanted to challenge a court-martial conviction, he pursued a collateral attack in an Article III court. There, review was limited to whether the conviction was void “because of lack of jurisdiction or some other equally fun damental defect,” 420 U.S. 738, 747 ; beyond that, Article III courts adhered to “the general rule that the acts of a court martial, within the scope of its jurisdiction and duty, cannot be controlled or reviewed in the civil courts,” Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 177 (1886). The UCMJ established a “complete system of [military] review,” 3 U.S. 137, (plu rality opinion), including direct review in what are now the Courts of Criminal Appeals (CCAs) and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). But in keeping with the historical backdrop against which these courts were created, Congress did not grant military courts of appeals “broad responsibility with respect to administra tion of military justice”; on the contrary, their jurisdiction is “narrowly circumscribed” by the governing statutes. Clinton v. (in ternal quotation marks omitted). Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 3 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. The CCAs provide direct, record-based review of court martial judgments, but they may only review cases re ferred by the judge advocate general, who in turn refers only those cases in which specific sentences are imposed. 10 U.S. C. §66(b), (c). When reviewing that subset of court-martial judgments, a CCA “may act only with re spect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority.” 66(c). If a case is reviewed by the CCA, the CCA’s decision may then be reviewed by the CAAF. 67(a). But that court, too, conducts limited direct review: It “may act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority and as affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law by the [CCA].” 67(c). Once direct review in the CCA and the CAAF is complete, and review in this Court is exhausted or waived, a judgment as to the legality of the court-martial proceed ings is final, and the sentence imposed may be executed. 71(c)(1). The UCMJ provides only |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | sentence imposed may be executed. 71(c)(1). The UCMJ provides only one avenue for reconsideration of a final court-martial conviction: a petition for a new trial under Article 73. See 73. An Article 73 petition may be brought “within two years after approval by the convening authority of a court-martial sentence,” meaning it may be brought before or after a conviction becomes final. If direct review is still pending before a CCA or the CAAF when the petition is filed, the judge advocate general (to whom the petition must be directed) will refer the petition to that court. But once the conviction is final, only the judge advocate general may act on an Arti cle 73 petition. Article 76 “ ‘describ[es] the terminal point for proceed ings within the court-martial system.’ ” Councilman, (quoting 132 (1950)). Under that provision, final court-martial judgments are “binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States, subject only to 4 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. action upon a petition for a new trial [under Article 73],” or to action by the appropriate Secretary or the President. 10 U.S. C. 76 (emphasis added). Once an Article 73 petition is denied, a service member has no relief left to seek within the court-martial system. See at 133–134.1 Federal courts are authorized to issue extraordinary writs such as coram nobis only as “necessary or appropri ate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S. C. The All Writs Act “confine[s] the power of the CAAF to issuing process ‘in aid of’ its existing statutory jurisdiction” and “does not enlarge that jurisdiction.” at 534–535; see also Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695, n. 7 (1969) (although military courts can issue extraordinary writs in aid of their direct review jurisdiction, “[a] different question would, of course, arise in a case which the [courts are] not authorized to review under the governing statutes”). The UCMJ grants mili tary courts of appeals no jurisdiction over final court martial judgments, so there is no jurisdiction for a post conviction extraordinary writ to “aid.” A petition for co ram nobis by its nature seeks postconviction review; it is therefore beyond the scope of these courts’ “narrowly circumscribed” statutory jurisdiction. II The majority overrides these careful limits on military court jurisdiction by maintaining that later jurisdiction to —————— 1 A court-martial conviction may still be collaterally attacked in an Article III court, but that is because those courts possess jurisdiction beyond that granted by the UCMJ. See, e.g., 28 U.S. C. 13. We have repeatedly held that |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | e.g., 28 U.S. C. 13. We have repeatedly held that Article 76 “does not expressly effect any change in the subject-matter jurisdiction of Art. III courts.” Schlesinger v. Councilman, Our cases have never ques tioned that Article 76 limits the jurisdiction of military courts. Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 5 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. issue coram nobis is a “belated extension” of the statutory jurisdiction, that “jurisdiction to issue [coram nobis] de rives from the earlier jurisdiction.” Ante, at 8, 9. The authority the Court cites for this key jurisdictional analy sis is—a footnote. See ante, at 8 (citing 3 U.S., ); ante, at 9 (same). Now, footnotes are part of an opinion, too, even if not the most likely place to look for a key jurisdictional ruling. But since footnote 4 plays such an indispensable role in the majority’s analysis, it must be read with care. The first thing you notice in doing so is that the footnote does not mention the word “jurisdiction” at all. That is because it has nothing to do with jurisdiction. The issue addressed in the paragraph to which the footnote was appended was “choice of remedy.” 3 U.S., The Court concluded that coram nobis was the appropriate one. The footnote simply addressed the concern that the remedy might not be available because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had abolished coram nobis as a remedy; the concern was dismissed because the Court concluded the criminal rules, not the civil rules, applied. n. 4; see also United (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J.) (“The problem to which the footnote was addressed was that F. R. Civ. P. 60(b) had abolished writs of error coram nobis”). The point is further confirmed by the text in the body of the opinion: The Court’s conclusion in the paragraph in which the footnote appears is that since the remedy sought was “in the nature of coram nobis,” the trial court could “properly exercise its jurisdiction.” 3 U.S., (emphasis added). The issue was not the existence of jurisdiction, but whether the court had the authority to exercise it. The Court in the present case recognizes the distinction. See ante, at 10 (“When exercising its jurisdic tion, the CAAF’s authority is confined to matters of law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); ante, at 9 (“The au 6 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. thority to issue a writ under the All Writs Act is not a font of jurisdiction”). Even accepting the majority’s reading of ’s hith erto obscure footnote, that reading would only establish the “belated jurisdiction” |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | obscure footnote, that reading would only establish the “belated jurisdiction” theory for Article III courts. The military courts are Article I courts. The distinction has direct pertinence to the point at issue in this case. Legal doctrines “must be placed in their historical set ting. They cannot be wrenched from it and mechanically transplanted into an alien, unrelated context without suffering mutilation or distortion.” (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). The Article III courts have been given broad jurisdiction. I can under stand, if not necessarily agree with, the notion that they might enjoy some implicit “long-recognized authority” to correct their earlier judgments. See ante, at 11. But not so for Article I courts. The principle that Congress defines the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts “applies with added force to Article I tribunals.” Ante, at 7. That is especially true with respect to military courts. The mili tary justice system is the last place courts should go about finding “extensions” of jurisdiction beyond that conferred by statute. As we expressly recognized in “there is no source of continuing jurisdiction for the CAAF over all actions administering sentences that the CAAF at one time had the power to review.” 526 U.S., (empha sis added). Since the UCMJ grants military courts no postconviction jurisdiction, conferring on them perpetual authority to entertain coram nobis petitions plainly con travenes that basic principle.2 —————— 2 Once you get into the business of extending jurisdiction, it can be hard to stop. Denedo is no longer in the military. Ante, at 2. Military courts lack jurisdiction over “civilian ex-soldiers who ha[ve] severed all relationship with the military and its institutions.” United States ex rel. In the event coram nobis Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 7 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. III Even if the majority’s reading of ’s footnote could be transplanted to the military context, the majority’s conclusion would still not follow. “ ‘[T]he All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.’ ” Carlisle v. United States, ). The UCMJ contains not one, but two provisions specifi cally limiting the circumstances under which postconvic tion relief (other than action by the appropriate Secretary or the President) may be obtained within the court-martial system. First, Article 73 provides that, “within two years after approval by the convening authority of a court martial sentence, the accused may petition the Judge Advocate General for |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | sentence, the accused may petition the Judge Advocate General for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court.” 10 U.S. C. 73. The only relief available under this “special post conviction remedy” is a new trial, 3 U.S., at 1 and even that may be granted only in an expressly circumscribed timeframe (two years) and set of circumstances (newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court). Article 73 stands in stark contrast to coram nobis, which the majority characterizes as a writ infinitely available “to redress a[ny] fundamental error.” Ante, at 6; see (“fundamental error” not lim ited to jurisdictional defects or errors on the face of the —————— does issue with respect to a former service member, the Government maintains it would lack jurisdiction to retry. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56–57; see 10 U.S. C. §02–803. Avoiding that extraordinary result would require another “belated extension” of the original court-martial pro ceeding, expanding the jurisdiction of military courts to try individuals who have long since severed their ties to the military. 8 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. record). To be sure, the limited nature of relief available under Article 73 might lead one to question whether that is truly the only postconviction relief the UCMJ permits. “You’re in the Army now” is a sufficient answer to such concerns; the relief available looks positively extravagant in light of the prior history and tradition of military justice. In any event, as the majority recognizes, see ante, at 11, Article 76 makes clear that all court-martial judgments “carried into execution” after completion of direct review are “final and conclusive,” 10 U.S. C. 76. Contrary to the major ity’s assertion, that language does not simply “codif[y] the common-law rule that respects the finality of judgments.” Ante, at 11. In fact, Article 76 does not stop there. It goes on to instruct that final court-martial judgments are binding “subject only to action upon a petition for a new trial [under Article 73],” or action by the appropriate Secretary or the President. 10 U.S. C. 76 (emphasis added). In light of these provisions, only Article 73 provides any authority to the CCAs or the CAAF, and even that narrow authority is limited to pending cases. Once a conviction is final, only the judge advocate general can provide relief. See ; 10 U.S. C. 73. To the extent the CCAs or the CAAF could be deemed to have some inherent continuing authority to issue writs of coram nobis, Articles 73 and 76 extinguish it. IV The |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | coram nobis, Articles 73 and 76 extinguish it. IV The Government goes on to argue that even if military courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis, and even if Articles 73 and 76 do not bar such relief, the courts still lack authority to issue coram nobis, because the writ is neither “necessary” nor “appropriate” to the court martial system of justice. See 28 U.S. C. (federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 9 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. of their respective jurisdictions”). Coram nobis allows the court that issued a judgment to correct its own errors of fact. See 3 U.S., at n. 9 (“ ‘If a judgment in the King’s Bench be erroneous in matter of fact only, it may be reversed in the same court, by writ of error coram nobis’ ” (quoting 2 W. Tidd, Practice of the Courts of King’s Bench, and Common Pleas 1136 (4th Am. ed. 1856); some emphasis added)); see also ante, at 11 (referring to “authority of a court to protect the integrity of its earlier judgments” (emphasis added)). But a court-martial is not a standing court. On a case-by-case basis, “[i]t is called into existence for a special purpose and to perform a par ticular duty. When the object of its creation has been accomplished it is dissolved.” Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 5, 555–556 (1887); see also 66 M.J. 1, (CAAF 2008) (a court-martial “does not have independent jurisdiction over a case after the military judge authenti cates the record and the convening authority forwards the record after taking action”). Because the court-martial that issues the conviction no longer exists once the convic tion is final, there is no court to which a postconviction petition for coram nobis could be directed. The absence of standing courts-martial is no mere tech nicality, but rather an integral and intentional part of the military justice system. “Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within the military ranks there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience and order.” United States ex rel. 350 U.S. 11, 22 But meeting that need requires expending significant military resources, and “[t]o the extent that those responsible for performance of [the military’s] pri mary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served.” Accordingly, courts-martial, composed of active duty military personnel, have always been called into existence for a limited purpose and duration. 10 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of ROBERTS, |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | United States v. Denedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145866/united-states-v-denedo/ | and duration. 10 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. It is no answer that the CCAs and the CAAF are stand ing courts that could act as substitutes for coram nobis purposes. As this case illustrates, those courts are not equipped to handle the kind of factfinding necessary to resolve claims that might be brought on coram nobis. Instead, the CCAs will have to resort to the procedures invented by United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S. C. M. A. 7, 37 Cow. M. R. 411 (1967), under which a new convening authority will refer a case to a new court-martial, and task various military personnel who have no prior familiarity with the case to conduct an out-of-court evidentiary hear ing on the merits of the petitioner’s claim. at 9, 37 Cow. M. R., at 413. This “unwieldy and imperfect system” will undoubtedly divert valuable military resources, 66 M.J., at 136 (Ryan, J., dissenting), all in aid of postconvic tion relief Congress specifically withheld. The Court expressly declines to consider the Govern ment’s “necessary or appropriate” argument: “[T]he Gov ernment’s argument speaks to the scope of the writ, not the [CCA’s] jurisdiction to issue it. The CAAF rejected the former argument. Only the latter one is before us.” Ante, at 12. The Court may well be correct in dividing the ques tions into separate pigeonholes. But the Government’s argument, even if an argument about authority rather than jurisdiction, applies to every coram nobis case, given the nature of the military justice system. It is curious to conclude that military courts have jurisdiction, while not considering a raised and briefed argument that they may never exercise it. * * * Since the adoption of the UCMJ, “Congress has gradu ally changed the system of military justice so that it has come to more closely resemble the civilian system.” Weiss v. United States, “But the mili tary in important respects remains a specialized society Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 11 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. separate from civilian society.” (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither the jurisdiction nor the powers of Article III courts are necessarily appropriate for military courts, and Congress’s contrary determinations in this area are entitled to “the highest deference.” Loving v. United States, Rather than respect the rule that military courts have no jurisdiction to revisit final convictions, the majority creates an exception that swallows it. Because I would hold the military courts to the statutory restraints that govern them, I respectfully dissent |
per_curiam | 1,990 | 200 | per_curiam | Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112491/ashland-oil-inc-v-caryl/ | Appellant Ashland Inc., a Kentucky corporation, is an integrated oil company that maintains business locations worldwide, including in West Virginia. During the years at issue here, West Virginia imposed a gross receipts tax on persons selling tangible property at wholesale. -2c Local manufacturers were exempt from the tax. 11-13-2. The West Virginia Tax Department conducted a detailed audit of Ashland's tax returns for fiscal years ending September 1975 and 1976 and assessed a *917 deficiency in tax payments of $181,313.22 for wholesale sales with West Virginia destinations. Ashland filed a timely petition for reassessment, primarily contending that the tax was unconstitutional as applied because there was an insufficient connection between its in-state activities and the transactions sought to be taxed. Juris. Statement 38a. After the State Tax Commissioner rejected Ashland's petition, Ashland appealed to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. While the appeal was pending, this Court decided which invalidated the West Virginia tax scheme that had also been applied against Ashland as discriminatory against interstate commerce. The State Circuit Court granted Ashland summary judgment on the basis of our decision in The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that did not apply retroactively, and remanded for further proceedings. Relying on its state-law criteria for retroactivity, see which it considered to "follow closely the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron" Ashland the court determined that "represented a reversal of prior precedent, and that retroactive application of the rule would cause severe hardship." Accordingly, the court held that the State was not precluded from collecting the gross receipts taxes due for the fiscal years preceding the date of decision in -26, -537. We dismissed Ashland's appeal of this decision for want of a final judgment. Ashland 481 U.S. 10 On remand, the Circuit Court rejected Ashland's remaining claim, and the State Supreme Court of Appeals denied Ashland's request for review. *918 In its appeal to this Court, Ashland contends, among other claims, that the State Supreme Court of Appeals erred in determining that applied prospectively only. Because "[t]he determination whether a constitutional decision of this Court is retroactive is a matter of federal law," American Trucking Assns., we must examine the state court's determination that is not retroactive in light of our nonretroactivity doctrine. Applying the view of retroactivity delineated by either the dissent or the plurality in American Trucking Assns., we must reverse the state court's decision. Under the reasoning of the dissent in American Trucking Assns., applies retroactively to the taxes assessed against Ashland because constitutional decisions apply retroactively to all cases on |
per_curiam | 1,990 | 200 | per_curiam | Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112491/ashland-oil-inc-v-caryl/ | Ashland because constitutional decisions apply retroactively to all cases on direct review. American Trucking Assns., Under the approach of the plurality in American Trucking Assns., the same result obtains, because fails to satisfy the first prong of the plurality's test for determining nonretroactivity. See Chevron quoted in American Trucking Assns., The first prong of the Chevron test requires that "the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." 404 U.S., at In an Ohio corporation contested the applicability of West Virginia's wholesale tax on its in-state sales of steel and wire rope. In ruling that the tax violated the Commerce Clause, the Court relied on Boston Stock which held that a State "may not discriminate between transactions on the basis of some interstate element." On its face, West Virginia's *919 statutory scheme had just such a discriminatory effect, as it "provides that two companies selling tangible property at wholesale in West Virginia will be treated differently depending on whether the taxpayer conducts manufacturing in the State or out of it." The Court next considered the argument that the State's wholesale tax exemption did not discriminate against out-of-state taxpayers because it served as compensation for the imposition of a heavy manufacturing tax on in-state taxpayers. In 451 U.S. 7 we held that a tax on an out-of-state event may be considered a nondiscriminatory compensation for a tax on an in-state event when the State "is attempting to impose a tax on a substantially equivalent event to assure uniform treatment of goods and materials to be consumed in the State." Applying this test to the West Virginia tax scheme, the Court determined that "manufacturing and wholesaling are not `substantially equivalent events' such that the heavy tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate for the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out of State." The Court distinguished and Caskey Baking two cases that predated the compensatory tax doctrine enunciated in Boston Stock Exchange and n. 7. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that should be required to prove the tax had actual discriminatory impact. Instead, the Court asserted that the "internal consistency" test, enunciated in Container Corp. of was applicable "where the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate commerce." unquestionably contributed to the development of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e. g., Judson & Duffy, An Opportunity Missed: Inc. v. *920 Hardesty, A Retreat |
per_curiam | 1,990 | 200 | per_curiam | Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112491/ashland-oil-inc-v-caryl/ | Duffy, An Opportunity Missed: Inc. v. *920 Hardesty, A Retreat from Economic Reality in Analysis of State Taxes, and a return to a more formalistic analysis); Lathrop, A Narrow and Puzzling Test for Discriminatory State Taxes Under the Commerce Clause, In adopting the internal consistency test, extended that doctrine beyond the context in which it had originated. See Nevertheless, neither overturned established precedent[*] nor decided "an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Chevron To be sure, paved the way for Tyler Pipe Industries, which arguably "overturn[ed] a lengthy list of settled decisions" and "revolutionize[d] the law of state taxation," 7 by extending the internal consistency test. itself, however, was not revolutionary. See American Trucking Assns., ("At most, may be read for the proposition that a tax that is facially discriminatory is unconstitutional if it is not `internally consistent'"). *921 Because did not overrule clear past precedent nor decide a wholly new issue of first impression, it does not meet the first prong of the Chevron test. thus applies retroactively under either the rule advocated by the plurality or the rule advocated by the dissent in American Trucking Assns., Accordingly, the State Supreme Court of Appeals erred in declining to apply retroactively to determine the constitutionality of the State's imposition of taxes on Ashland for the years at issue. The motion of the Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae is granted. We reverse the judgment of the State Circuit Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | Section 707(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission () "to investigate and act on a charge" that an employer has engaged in "a pattern or practice" of employment discrimination Section 706(b) and regulations promulgated thereunder govern the form and content of such a charge and the manner in which the employer should be notified of the allegations of wrongdoing contained therein The question presented in this case is how much information must be included in the charge and provided to the employer before the Commission may secure judicial enforcement of an administrative subpoena compelling the employer to disclose personnel records and other material relevant to the charge *57 I On September 27, 1979, Commissioner Eleanor Holmes Norton, then Chair of the issued a sworn charge, alleging that respondent, Shell Oil Co, "has violated and continues to violate Sections 703 and 707 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by discriminating against Blacks and females on the basis of race and sex with respect to recruitment, hiring, selection, job assignment, training, testing, promotion, and terms and conditions of employment" App to Pet for Cert 44a The charge specified respondent's Wood River Refinery as the locale of the alleged statutory violations In addition, the charge identified six occupational categories access to which had been affected by racial discrimination and seven occupational categories access to which had been affected by gender discrimination[1] As originally drafted, the charge did not specify a date on which these alleged unlawful employment practices began The charge was filed with the St Louis District Office of the on October 16, 1979 A copy of the charge, accompanied by a cover letter and a request for various information from the personnel records of the Wood River Refinery, was served on respondent 10 days later In the course of discussions with the over the next several months, respondent took the position that "the charge that has been issued is not supportable by the facts" App 91 In defense of that position, respondent identified a "multi-county area" surrounding the Wood River Refinery *58 that, in respondent's view, was the "appropriate local labor market for the Refinery" Respondent argued that, when the percentages of Negroes and women in the labor market so defined were compared to the percentages of Negroes and women in the overall work force of the refinery (and the percentages of Negroes and women who had recently been hired, promoted, or accepted into the refinery's training programs), it became apparent that respondent was not engaging |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | training programs), it became apparent that respondent was not engaging in systemic discrimination -91[2] Respondent submitted some aggregate employment statistics supportive of its arguments but refused to disclose the records and data requested by the unless and until the Commission answered a series of questions regarding the basis of the charge and furnished information substantiating its answers The took the position that, until it had more evidence, it could not evaluate respondent's contention that the proper labor market constituted not the St Louis Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area but, rather, the smaller area proposed by respondent In answer to respondent's arguments concerning the numbers of Negroes and women employed at the refinery, the referred respondent to 162 of the Compliance Manual, which sets forth the standards the Commission has adopted for selecting employers suspected of engaging in systemic employment discrimination One of the groups targeted for investigation under that provision consists of "employers who employ a substantially smaller proportion of minorities and/or women in their higher paid job categories than in their lower paid job categories"[3] Respondent was thus alerted to the fact that its contentions based upon the percentages *59 of minorities and women in the aggregate work force of the refinery could not conclusively establish its compliance with the guidelines On those bases, the rejected respondent's suggestion that the charge be withdrawn and reiterated the request for information from respondent's files When respondent persisted in its refusal to provide the requested data, the issued a subpoena duces tecum, directing respondent to turn over certain information pertaining to its employment practices from 1976 to the present In accordance with Commission regulations, respondent petitioned the District Director of the to revoke or modify the subpoena The District Director altered the subpoena in one minor respect, but otherwise denied relief The General Counsel of the Commission upheld the decision of the District Director and ordered respondent to comply with the subpoena by September 18, 1980 Instead of complying, respondent filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to quash the subpoena and enjoin the Commission's investigation Respondent alleged, inter alia, that the subpoena was unenforceable because the Commission had failed to disclose facts sufficient to satisfy the mandate of 706(b) of Title VII, 42 US C 2000e-5(b) Subsequently, Commissioner Norton amended the charge to allege that respondent "had engaged in the identified unlawful employment practices on a continuing basis from at least July 2, 1965, until the present"[4] When respondent still refused to comply with the requests for information, the Commission filed an action in the District *60 |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | information, the Commission filed an action in the District *60 Court for the Southern District of Illinois seeking enforcement of the subpoena That action was transferred to the District Court in Missouri and consolidated with the suit brought by respondent The District Court denied respondent's request to block the Commission's inquiry into respondent's records and enforced the subpoena The court reasoned that "[t]he purpose of a charge under section 706 is only to initiate the investigation, not to state sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case" On that basis, the court rejected respondent's argument "that the Commissioner's charge does not specify sufficient facts" [5] A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed The court found that the had failed to comply with either the provisions of 706(b) governing the specificity of the notice given an accused employer or the Commission's own regulations governing the contents of a charge The court held that the charge and the notice thereof "should at least inform the employer of the approximate dates of the unlawful practices" and should include enough other information to show that those dates have " `some basis in fact' " In addition, the charge and notice should contain a "statement of the circumstances" of the alleged statutory violations "supported by some factual or statistical basis" 676 F2d, -326[6]*61 In the court's view, the material provided to respondent in this case failed to satisfy the foregoing standards The 's petition for rehearing en banc was denied [7] We granted certiorari to resolve the confusion in the Courts of Appeals concerning the material that must be included in charges of employment discrimination and notices thereof before the may obtain judicial enforcement of an administrative subpoena[8] We now reverse II A Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,[9] prohibits various employment practices involving discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" 42 US C 2000e-2, 2000e-3 Primary responsibility *62 for enforcing Title VII has been entrusted to the 2000e-5 In its current form, Title VII sets forth "an integrated, multistep enforcement procedure" that enables the Commission to detect and remedy instances of discrimination See Occidental Life Insurance The process begins with the filing of a charge with the alleging that a given employer[10] has engaged in an unlawful employment practice A charge may be filed by an aggrieved individual or by a member of the Commission 2000e-5(b) A Commissioner may file a charge in either of two situations First, when a victim of discrimination is reluctant to file a charge himself because of |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | discrimination is reluctant to file a charge himself because of fear of retaliation, a Commissioner may file a charge on behalf of the victim ; 29 CFR 16017, 160111 Second, when a Commissioner has reason to think that an employer has engaged in a "pattern or practice" of discriminatory conduct, he may file a charge on his own initiative 2000e-6(e) Prior to 1972, different statutory requirements governed charges filed by aggrieved individuals and charges filed by Commissioners Aggrieved parties were required simply to state their allegations "in writing under oath" Pub L 88-352, 706, By contrast, a Commissioner could file a charge only when he had "reasonable cause to believe a violation of [Title VII] ha[d] occurred," and was obliged to "se[t] forth the facts upon which [the charge was] based" [11] In 1972, as part of a comprehensive set of *63 amendments to the provisions of Title VII dealing with the 's enforcement powers, Congress eliminated the special requirements applicable to Commissioners' charges In its present form, 706(b) of the statute provides simply that "[c]harges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires" 42 US C 2000e-5(b) As originally enacted, Title VII required the to provide a copy of a charge to the employer accused of discrimination, but did not prescribe any time period within which the copy was to be delivered Pub L 88-352, 706, In 1972, Congress altered that provision to require the Commission to "serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on [the] employer within ten days" of the filing of the charge 42 US C 2000e-5(b) After a charge has been filed, the conducts an investigation of the allegations contained therein[12] In connection with its inquiry, the Commission is entitled to inspect and copy "any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by [Title VII] and is relevant to the charge under investigation" 2000e-8 In obtaining such evidence, the Commission may exercise all of the powers conferred upon the National Labor Relations Board by 29 US C 161, including the authority to issue administrative subpoenas and to request judicial enforcement of those subpoenas 2000e-9 If, after completing its investigation, the determines that there is "reasonable *64 cause to believe that the charge is true," it must "endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" 2000e-5(b)[13] If those methods prove ineffectual, the Commission is |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | persuasion" 2000e-5(b)[13] If those methods prove ineffectual, the Commission is empowered to bring a civil action against the employer 2000e-5(f)(1) At issue in this case is the relationship between three of the steps in the integrated procedure just described: the charge; the notice given to the employer of the allegations against him; and the judicial enforcement of an administrative subpoena of personnel records relevant to the allegations It is apparent from the structure of the statute that two of those steps the charge and the subpoena are closely related As indicated above, the 's investigative authority is tied to charges filed with the Commission; unlike other federal agencies that possess plenary authority to demand to see records relevant to matters within their jurisdiction,[14] the is entitled to access only to evidence "relevant to the charge under investigation" 2000e-8 The legislative history makes clear that this limitation on the Commission's authority is not accidental As Senators Clark and Case, the "bipartisan captains" responsible for Title VII during the Senate debate, explained in their Interpretative Memorandum: "It is important to note that the Commission's power to conduct an investigation can be exercised only after a specific charge has been filed in writing In this respect the Commission's investigatory power is significantly narrower than that of the Federal Trade Commission or of the Wage and Hour Administrator, who are authorized *65 to conduct investigations, inspect records, and issue subpenas, whether or not there has been any complaint of wrongdoing" 110 Cong Rec 7214 (1964) (citations omitted) When Congress in 1972 revamped Title VII, it retained the provision linking the Commission's investigatory power to outstanding charges, and nothing in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments suggests that Congress intended to expand the range of materials to which the Commission could demand access In construing the 's authority to request judicial enforcement of its subpoenas, we must strive to give effect to Congress' purpose in establishing a linkage between the Commission's investigatory power and charges of discrimination If the were able to insist that an employer obey a subpoena despite the failure of the complainant to file a valid charge, Congress' desire to prevent the Commission from exercising unconstrained investigative authority would be thwarted Accordingly, we hold that the existence of a charge that meets the requirements set forth in 706(b), 42 US C 2000e-5(b), is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial enforcement of a subpoena issued by the [15] The relationship between the requirement that an employer be notified promptly of allegations against it and the 's subpoena power is less clear |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | against it and the 's subpoena power is less clear The statutory provisions that define the Commission's investigative authority do not mention the notice requirement See 2000e-8, 2000e-9 And nothing in the legislative history of the sharpened notice provision that was added to 706 in 1972 suggests that Congress intended or assumed that compliance therewith was a prerequisite to judicial enforcement of the *66 Commission's subpoenas There is thus substantial reason to doubt whether an employer should be able to resist efforts by the Commission to enforce a subpoena on the ground that the had not adequately notified the employer of the "date, place and circumstances" of the employer's alleged unlawful employment practices or had not done so within 10 days of the filing of the charge[16] For two reasons, however, we decline to decide that troublesome question in this case First, all of the parties have assumed that noncompliance with the notice requirement is a legitimate defense to a subpoena enforcement action[17] Second, our conclusion that the Commission did comply with the notice provision in this case, see Part II-C, infra, renders it unnecessary to determine whether the judgment of the Court of Appeals could withstand scrutiny if the Commission had not done so In short, solely for the purpose of our decision *67 today, we assume that compliance with the notice requirement embodied in 706(b) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial enforcement of a Commission subpoena B The statute itself prescribes only minimal requirements pertaining to the form and content of charges of discrimination Section 706(b) provides merely that "[c]harges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires" 42 US C 2000e-5(b) However, in accordance with the last-mentioned clause, the has promulgated a regulation that provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]ach charge should contain [a] clear and concise statement of the facts, including the pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices" 29 CFR 160112(3) [18] Until rescinded, this rule is binding on the Commission as well as complainants See United ; There is no question that the charge in this case comported with the requirements embodied in the statute; Commissioner Norton's allegations were made in writing and under oath The only ground on which the validity of the charge can fairly be challenged is Commissioner Norton's compliance with the Commission's regulation The Court of Appeals concluded that the charge did not contain enough information to satisfy 160112(3) 676 F2d, To assess that conclusion, we must explicate the crucial portion of the regulation as |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | we must explicate the crucial portion of the regulation as applied to a charge alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination[19] *68 Three considerations, drawn from the structure of Title VII, guide our analysis First, a charge of employment discrimination is not the equivalent of a complaint initiating a lawsuit The function of a Title VII charge, rather, is to place the on notice that someone (either a party claiming to be aggrieved or a Commissioner) believes that an employer has violated the title The then undertakes an investigation into the complainant's allegations of discrimination Only if the Commission, on the basis of information collected during its investigation, determines that there is "reasonable cause" to believe that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, does the matter assume the form of an adversary proceeding Second, a charge does have a function in the enforcement procedure prescribed by Title VII As explained above, the Commission is entitled to access only to evidence "relevant" to the charge under investigation 2000e-8 That limitation on the Commission's investigative authority is not especially constraining Since the enactment of Title VII, courts have generously construed the term "relevant" and have afforded the Commission access to virtually any material that *69 might cast light on the allegations against the employer[20] In 1972, Congress undoubtedly was aware of the manner in which the courts were construing the concept of "relevance" and implicitly endorsed it by leaving intact the statutory definition of the Commission's investigative authority[21] On the other hand, Congress did not eliminate the relevance requirement, and we must be careful not to construe the regulation adopted by the governing what goes into a charge in a fashion that renders that requirement a nullity Third, it is crucial that the Commission's ability to investigate charges of systemic discrimination not be impaired By 1972, Congress was aware that employment discrimination was a "complex and pervasive" problem that could be extirpated only with thoroughgoing remedies; "[u]nrelenting broad-scale action against patterns or practices of discrimination" was essential if the purposes of Title VII were to be achieved[22] The because "[i]t has access to the most current statistical computations and analyses regarding employment patterns" was thought to be in the best position "to determine where `pattern or practice' litigation is warranted" and to pursue it[23] Accordingly, in its amendments to 707, *70 Congress made clear that Commissioners could file and the Commission could investigate such charges[24] Our interpretation of the 's regulations should not undercut the exercise of those powers With these three considerations in mind, we must assess the |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | With these three considerations in mind, we must assess the proffered interpretations of the requirement embodied in 160112(3) that a Commissioner, when filing a "pattern-or-practice" charge, must state "the facts constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices" One reading of the crucial phrase would impose on the Commissioner a duty to specify the persons discriminated against, the manner in which they were injured, and the dates on which the injuries occurred But such a construction of the regulation would radically limit the ability of the to investigate allegations of patterns and practices of discrimination The Commission has developed a complex set of procedures for identifying employers who may be engaging in serious systemic discrimination See Compliance Manual 16 The Commission staff reviews the annual reports filed by employers with the and with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs of the Department of Labor and combines those data with information garnered from other sources regarding employers' practices 163, (c) If the resulting composite picture of an employer's practices matches one of a set of prescribed standards,[25] the staff *71 presents a report to a Commissioner, recommending that a charge be filed 163(d), (e) If the Commissioner agrees with the recommendation, he files a sworn charge of systemic discrimination At that stage of the inquiry, the Commissioner filing the charge has substantial reason, based upon statistical manifestations of the net effects of the employer's practices, to believe that the employer has violated Title VII on a continuing basis But the Commissioner rarely can identify any single instance of discrimination until the Commission has gained access to the employer's personnel records Thus, a requirement that the Commissioner in his charge identify the persons injured, when and how, would cut short most of these investigations That result would be manifestly inconsistent with Congress' intent The Court of Appeals adopted a somewhat more moderate construction of the regulation In that court's view, 160112(3) requires a Commissioner to disclose some portion of the statistical data on which his allegations of systemic discrimination are founded 676 F2d, -326 This interpretation has little to recommend it The data that undergird the Commissioner's suspicions surely do not "constitute" the alleged unlawful employment practices; the Court of Appeals' proposal is thus unsupported by the plain language of the regulation More importantly, the court's interpretation is sustained by none of the three pertinent legislative purposes First, the Court of Appeals' construction would, in effect, oblige the Commissioner to substantiate his allegations before the initiates an investigation, the purpose of which is to determine whether there is reason to believe those allegations |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | to determine whether there is reason to believe those allegations are true Such an obligation is plainly inconsistent with the structure of the enforcement procedure Second, disclosure of the data on which the *72 Commissioner's allegations are based would in no way limit the range of materials to which the could demand access, because, under the statute, the Commission may insist that the employer disgorge any evidence relevant to the allegations of discrimination contained in the charge, regardless of the strength of the evidentiary foundation for those allegations[26] Third, the imposition on the of a duty to reveal the information that precipitated the charge would enable a recalcitrant employer, in a subpoena enforcement action, to challenge the adequacy of the Commission's disclosures and to appeal an adverse ruling by the district court on that issue The net effect would be to hamper significantly the Commission's ability to investigate expeditiously claims of systemic discrimination Rejection of the two proposals just discussed does not imply that a Commissioner should be permitted merely to allege that an employer has violated Title VII Such a result would be inconsistent with the evident purpose of the regulation to encourage complainants to identify with as much precision as they can muster the conduct complained of And it would render nugatory the statutory limitation of the Commission's investigative authority to materials "relevant" to a charge With these concerns in mind, we think that the *73 most sensible way of reading the prescription embodied in 29 CFR 160112(3) in the context of pattern-and-practice cases is as follows: Insofar as he is able, the Commissioner should identify the groups of persons that he has reason to believe have been discriminated against, the categories of employment positions from which they have been excluded, the methods by which the discrimination may have been effected, and the periods of time in which he suspects the discrimination to have been practiced The charge issued by Commissioner Norton, as amended, plainly satisfied the foregoing standards The charge identified Negroes and women as the victims of respondent's putative discriminatory practices It specified six occupational categories to which Negroes had been denied equal access and seven categories to which women had been denied equal access[27] It alleged that respondent had engaged in discrimination in "recruitment, hiring, selection, job assignment, training, testing, promotion, and terms and conditions of employment" And it charged respondent with engaging in these illegal practices since at least the effective date of the Civil Rights Act We therefore conclude that the charge complied with the requirement embodied in 160112(3) *74 that a |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | complied with the requirement embodied in 160112(3) *74 that a complainant must state "the facts constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices"[28] C To make sense of the notice requirement, embodied in 706(b), in the context of a charge filed by a Commissioner alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination, we must supplement the considerations discussed thus far with some additional principles and policies Most importantly, we must strive to effectuate Congress' purpose in incorporating into the statute the current notice provision Though the legislative history is sparse, the principal objective of the provision seems to have been to provide employers fair notice that accusations of discrimination have been leveled against them and that they can soon expect an investigation by the Prior to 1972, the had become prone to postponing until it was ready to begin an investigation the mandatory notification *75 to the employer that charges were pending against it[29] In response to complaints regarding the unfairness of this practice, Congress adopted the present requirement that notice be given to an accused employer within 10 days of the filing of the charge[30] The requirement that the notice contain an indication of the "date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice" seems to have been designed to ensure that the employer was given some idea of the nature of the charge; the requirement was not envisioned as a substantive constraint on the Commission's investigative authority[31] Respondent suggests that, despite the absence of supportive legislative history, we should infer from the structure of the statute, as amended, an intent on the part of Congress to use the notice requirement to limit the 's ability to investigate charges of discrimination The purpose of the obligation to inform an employer of the "circumstances" of its alleged misconduct, respondent contends, is to force the "to state the factual basis for its charge," and thereby *76 to provide a reviewing court with an "objective verifiable method for determining whether [the Commission] ha[s] authority to investigate" Brief for Respondent 30 Respondent's proposed reconstruction of the reasoning that might have prompted Congress to adopt the notice provision is inconsistent with the pattern and purposes of the 1972 amendments to Title VII At the same time it strengthened the notice provision, Congress eliminated the requirement that, before filing a charge, a Commissioner must have "reasonable cause" to believe a violation of Title VII had been committed The only plausible explanation for that change is that Congress wished to place a Commissioner on the same footing as an aggrieved private party: neither was held to any prescribed |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | an aggrieved private party: neither was held to any prescribed level of objectively verifiable suspicion at the outset of the enforcement procedure[32] Rather, the determination *77 whether there was any basis to their allegations of discrimination was to be postponed until after the Commission had completed its inquiries It is highly unlikely that, having deliberately freed Commissioners from the duty to substantiate their suspicions before initiating investigations, Congress sub silentio reinstated that duty by requiring that employers be notified of the "circumstances" of their unlawful employment practices[33] Accordingly, we conclude that the specific purpose of the notice provision is to give employers fair notice of the existence and nature of the charges against them Finally, in explicating the notice requirement, we must keep in view the more general objectives of Title VII as a whole The dominant purpose of the Title, of course, is to root out discrimination in employment But two other policies, latent in the statute, bear upon the problem before us First, when it originally enacted Title VII, Congress hoped to encourage employers to comply voluntarily with the Act That hope proved overly optimistic, and the recalcitrance of many employers compelled Congress in 1972 to strengthen the 's investigatory and enforcement powers[34] However, *78 Congress did not abandon its wish that violations of the statute could be remedied without resort to the courts, as is evidenced by its retention in 1972 of the requirement that the Commission, before filing suit, attempt to resolve disputes through conciliation See Ford Motor 458 US 219, Second, the statute contemplates that employers will create and retain personnel records pertinent to their treatment of women and members of minority groups[35] Both to assist the in policing compliance with the Act and to enable employers to demonstrate that they have adhered to its dictates, it is important that employers be given sufficient notice to ensure that documents pertaining to allegations of discrimination are not destroyed See Occidental Life Insurance 432 U S, at 372 With these considerations in mind, we turn to an assessment of the competing interpretations of the notice provision It would be possible to read the requirement that the employer be told of "the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice" as compelling a specification of the persons discriminated against, the dates the alleged discrimination occurred, and the manner in which it was practiced We reject that construction for the same reason we rejected an analogous reading of 29 CFR 160112 (3) pertaining to the contents of charges: it would drastically limit the ability of the Commission |
Justice Marshall | 1,984 | 15 | majority | EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111141/eeoc-v-shell-oil-co/ | charges: it would drastically limit the ability of the Commission to investigate allegations of systemic discrimination, and therefore would be plainly inconsistent with Congress' intent See A more moderate construction of 706(b) would require the Commission to include in the notice given to the employer *79 the same information that 29 CFR 160112(3) presently requires to be included in a charge alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination See That interpretation of the statutory requirement would seem to satisfy all of the pertinent legislative purposes First, it would provide the employer with fair notice of the allegations against it Second, by informing the employer of the areas and time periods in which the Commissioner suspects that the employer has discriminated, the notice so construed would enable the employer, if it is so inclined, to undertake its own inquiry into its employment practices and to comply voluntarily with the substantive provisions of Title VII Finally, notice of this sort would alert the employer to the range of personnel records that might be relevant to the Commission's impending investigation and thus would ensure that those records were not inadvertently destroyed[36] Respondent asks us to read the statute to require the to supplement notification of the kind just described with a summary of the statistical data on which the Commissioner's allegations are founded We decline the invitation The data relied upon by the Commissioner are not easily encompassed by the phrase, "date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice"; thus, the plain language of 706(b) provides little support for respondent's proposed construction More importantly, respondent's interpretation *80 of the provision would not advance significantly any of the provision's purposes Disclosure of the statistics relied on by the complainant clearly is not necessary to give the employer fair notice of the allegations against it Nor would such disclosure aid the employer in identifying and preserving those employment records that might be relevant to the forthcoming investigation Finally, revelation of the data on which the Commissioner relied would do little to aid an employer who wished to comply voluntarily with the Act A good-faith effort to remedy past misconduct and to prevent future violations would require the employer to investigate its prior and current practices in all of the areas identified in the charge; revelation of the evidence that precipitated the charge would not relieve the employer of the duty to conduct such an inquiry Moreover, most of the data on which a "pattern-or-practice" charge is based are provided by the employer itself in the form of annual reports filed with the see |
Subsets and Splits