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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S. C. requires federal agencies to make Government records available to the public, subject to nine exemptions for specific categories of material. This case concerns the scope of Exemption 2, which protects from disclosure material that is “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” Respondent Department of the Navy (Navy or Government) invoked Exemption 2 to deny a FOIA request for data and maps used to help store explosives at a naval base in Washing ton State. We hold that Exemption 2 does not stretch so far. I Congress enacted FOIA to overhaul the public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S. C. (964 ed.). That section of the APA “was plagued with vague phrases” and gradually became more “a withholding statute than a disclosure statute.” Congress intended FOIA to “permit access to official information 2 MILNER v. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY Opinion of the Court long shielded unnecessarily from public view.” FOIA thus mandates that an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall within one of nine exemptions. These exemptions are “explicitly made exclusive,” at and must be “narrowly construed,” At issue here is Exemption 2, which shields from com pelled disclosure documents “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” Congress enacted Exemption 2 to replace the APA’s ex emption for “any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency,” 5 U.S. C. (964 ed.). Believing that the “sweep” of the phrase “internal man agement” had led to excessive withholding, Congress drafted Exemption 2 “to have a narrower reach.” Depart ment of Air We considered the extent of that reach in Department of Air There, we rejected the Government’s invocation of Exemption 2 to withhold case summaries of honor and ethics hearings at the United States Air Force Academy. The exemption, we suggested, primarily targets material concerning employee relations or human re sources: “use of parking facilities or regulations of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like.” (quoting S. Rep. No. 8, 89th Cong., st Sess., 8 (965) (hereinafter S. Rep.)); see “[T]he general thrust” of Exemption 2, we explained, “is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining [such information] for public inspection.” We concluded that the case summaries did not fall within the exemption because they “d[id] not concern only routine matters” of “merely internal significance.” at 70. But we stated a possible caveat to our interpretation of Exemption 2: That understanding of the provision’s coverage governed,
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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of Exemption 2: That understanding of the provision’s coverage governed, we wrote, “at least where the situation Cite as: 562 U. S. (20) Opinion of the Court is not one where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation.” In the D. C. Circuit converted this caveat into a new definition of Exemption 2’s scope. Crooker approved the use of Exemption 2 to shield a man ual designed to train Government agents in law enforce ment surveillance techniques. The D. C. Circuit noted that it previously had understood Exemption 2 to “refe[r] only to ‘pay, pensions, vacations, hours of work, lunch hours, parking, etc.’ ” ). But the court now thought Exemption 2 should also cover any “predominantly internal” materials, Crooker, 670 F.2d, –057, whose disclosure would “significantly ris[k] circumvention of agency regulations or statutes,” at 074. This construction of Exemption 2, the court rea soned, flowed from FOIA’s “overall design,” its legislative history, “and even common sense,” because Congress could not have meant to “enac[t] a statute whose provisions undermined the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies.” In the ensuing years, three Courts of Appeals adopted the D. C. Circuit’s interpretation of Exemption 2. See 575 F.d 959, 965 (CA9 2009) (case below); Massey v. FBI, F.d 620, 622 (CA2 99); Kaganove v. EPA, 856 F.2d 884, 889 (CA7 988).2 And that interpretation spawned a —————— The court adopted the “predominantly internal” standard as a way of implementing the exemption’s requirement that materials “relat[e] solely to” an agency’s internal personnel rules and practices. The word “solely,” the court reasoned, “has to be given the construction, consonant with reasonableness, of ‘predominantly’ ” because otherwise “solely” would conflict with the expansive term “related.” 670 F.2d, at 056 (some internal quotation marks omitted). 2 Three other Courts of Appeals had previously taken a narrower view of Exemption 2’s scope, consistent with the interpretation adopted in 4 MILNER v. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY Opinion of the Court new terminology: Courts applying the Crooker approach now refer to the “Low 2” exemption when discussing mate rials concerning human resources and employee relations, and to the “High 2” exemption when assessing records whose disclosure would risk circumvention of the law. See, ; Schiller v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 205, 208 (CADC 992). Congress, as well, took notice of the D. C. Circuit’s decision, borrowing language from Crooker to amend Exemption 7(E) when next enacting revisions to FOIA. The amended version of Exemption 7(E) shields certain “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” if their disclosure “could rea sonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” see Freedom
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
|
be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” see Freedom of Information Reform Act of 986, –. II The FOIA request at issue here arises from the Navy’s operations at Naval Magazine Indian Island, a base in Puget Sound, Washington. The Navy keeps weapons, ammunition, and explosives on the island. To aid in the storage and transport of these munitions, the Navy uses data known as Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) ESQD informa tion prescribes “minimum separation distances” for explo sives and helps the Navy design and construct storage —————— See 09–0 (concluding that Exemption 2 covers only an agency’s internal “housekeeping matters” (internal quotation marks omitted)); (holding that Exemp tion 2 “must not be read so broadly as to exempt” an Occupational Safety and Health Administration manual for training compliance officers); 7 (“[T]he internal practices and policies referred to in [Exemption 2] relate only to employee-employer type concerns”). These Circuits have never revised their understandings of the See infra, n. 7. Cite as: 562 U. S. (20) 5 Opinion of the Court facilities to prevent chain reactions in case of detonation. The ESQD calculations are often incorporated into specialized maps depicting the effects of hypothetical explosions. See, App. 52. In 200 and 2004, petitioner Glen Milner, a Puget Sound resident, submitted FOIA requests for all ESQD information relating to Indian The Navy refused to release the data, stating that disclo sure would threaten the security of the base and surround ing community. In support of its decision to withhold the records, the Navy invoked Exemption 2. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Navy, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the High 2 interpretation developed in Crooker. 575 F.d, at 96. The Court of Appeals explained that the ESQD information “is predominantly used for the internal pur pose of instructing agency personnel on how to do their jobs.” And disclosure of the material, the court determined, “would risk circumvention of the law” by “point[ing] out the best targets for those bent on wreak ing havoc”—for example, “[a] terrorist who wished to hit the most damaging target.” The ESQD infor mation, the court concluded, therefore qualified for a High 2 575 F.d, We granted certiorari in light of the Circuit split re specting Exemption 2’s meaning, 56 U. S. (200), and we now reverse. —————— The Navy also invoked Exemption 7(F), which applies to “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 U.S. C. The courts below did not decide whether the Navy could withhold the ESQD data under that 575 F.d 959, 97, n. 8 (CA9 2009); No. CV–06–00 (WD Wash., Oct. 0, 2007), App. to Pet. for Cert. 4, 25, 6 MILNER v. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY Opinion of the Court III Our consideration of Exemption 2’s scope starts with its text. See, Park ’N Fly, (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose”). Judicial decisions since FOIA’s enactment have analyzed and reanalyzed the meaning of the But compara tively little attention has focused on the provision’s 2 simple words: “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” The key word in that dozen—the one that most clearly marks the provision’s boundaries—is “personnel.” When used as an adjective, as it is here to modify “rules and practices,” that term refers to human resources matters. “Personnel,” in this common parlance, means “the selec tion, placement, and training of employees and the formulation of policies, procedures, and relations with [or involving] employees or their representatives.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 687 (966) (hereinaf ter Webster’s). So, for example, a “personnel department” is “the department of a business firm that deals with problems affecting the employees of the firm and that usually interviews applicants for jobs.” Random House Dictionary 075 (966) (hereinafter Random House). “Personnel management” is similarly “the phase of man agement concerned with the engagement and effective utilization of manpower to obtain optimum efficiency of human resources.” Webster’s 687. And a “personnel agency” is “an agency for placing employable persons in jobs; employment agency.” Random House 075. FOIA itself provides an additional example in Exemp tion 6. See (994) (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory Cite as: 562 U. S. (20) 7 Opinion of the Court text is generally read the same way each time it appears”). That exemption, just a few short paragraphs down from Exemption 2, protects from disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per sonal privacy.” Here too, the statute uses the term “personnel” as a modifier meaning “human re sources.” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 2 (“[The Court:] It’s [an] H. R. file, right? [The Government:] That’s generally true”). As we recognized in “the common and con gressional meaning of ‘personnel file’ ” is the file “show ing, for example,
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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‘personnel file’ ” is the file “show ing, for example, where [an employee] was born, the names of his parents, where he has lived from time to time, his school records, results of examinations, [and] evaluations of his work performance.” It is the file typically maintained in the human resources office—otherwise known (to recall an example offered above) as the “personnel department.” Exemption 2 uses “personnel” in the exact same way. An agency’s “personnel rules and practices” are its rules and practices dealing with employee relations or human resources. The D. C. Circuit, in a pre-Crooker decision, gave as examples “matters relating to pay, pensions, vacations, hours of work, lunch hours, parking, etc.” 59 F.2d, at ; see That “etc.” is important; we doubt any court could know enough about the Federal Government’s operations to formulate a com prehensive list. But all the rules and practices referenced in Exemption 2 share a critical feature: They concern the conditions of employment in federal agencies—such mat ters as hiring and firing, work rules and discipline, com pensation and benefits.4 Courts in practice have had little —————— 4 Government records also must satisfy the other requirements of Exemption 2 to be exempt from disclosure. Information must “relat[e] solely”—meaning, as usual, “exclusively or only,” Random House 54 8 MILNER v. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY Opinion of the Court difficulty identifying the records that qualify for withhold ing under this reading: They are what now commonly fall within the Low 2 Our construction of the statutory language simply makes clear that Low 2 is all of 2 (and that High 2 is not 2 at all, see infra, at 0–4). The statute’s purpose reinforces this understanding of the We have often noted “the Act’s goal of broad disclosure” and insisted that the exemptions be “given a narrow compass.” Department of ; see Department of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Assn., 52 U.S. 7–8 (200).5 This practice of “constru[ing] FOIA exemp tions narrowly,” Department of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 65, 8 (99), stands on especially firm footing with respect to Exemption 2. As described earlier, Con gress worded that provision to hem in the prior APA ex emption for “any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency,” which agencies had used to prevent access to masses of documents. See 425 U.S., 62. We would ill-serve Congress’s purpose by —————— —to the agency’s “personnel rules and practices.” And the information must be “internal”; that is, the agency must typically keep the records to itself for its own use. See Webster’s 80 (“internal” means
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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itself for its own use. See Webster’s 80 (“internal” means “existing or situated within the limits of something”). An agency’s human resources documents will often meet these conditions. 5 The dissent would reject this longstanding rule of construction in favor of an approach asking courts “to turn Congress’ public informa tion objectives into workable agency practice.” Post, at 8–9 (opinion of BREYER, J.). But nothing in FOIA either explicitly or implicitly grants courts discretion to expand (or contract) an exemption on this basis. In enacting FOIA, Congress struck the balance it thought right—generally favoring disclosure, subject only to a handful of specified exemptions— and did so across the length and breadth of the Federal Government. See, John Doe 52–5 The judicial role is to enforce that congressionally determined balance rather than, as the dissent suggests, post, at 4–6, to assess case by case, department by department, and task by task whether disclo sure interferes with good government. Cite as: 562 U. S. (20) 9 Opinion of the Court construing Exemption 2 to reauthorize the expansive withholding that Congress wanted to halt. Our reading instead gives the exemption the “narrower reach” Con gress intended, through the simple device of confining the provision’s meaning to its words. The Government resists giving “personnel” its plain meaning on the ground that Congress, when drafting Exemption 2, considered but chose not to enact language exempting “internal employment rules and practices.” Brief for Respondent 0–4, and n. This drafting history, the Navy maintains, proves that Congress did not wish “to limit the Exemption to employment-related mat ters,” even if the adjective “personnel” conveys that meaning in other contexts, But we think the Navy’s evidence insufficient: The scant history con cerning this word change as easily supports the inference that Congress merely swapped one synonym for another. Cf. Mead (noting with respect to the “unexplained disappearance of one word from an unenacted bill” that “mute intermediate legislative maneuvers are not reliable” aids to statutory interpretation (internal quotation marks omitted)). Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambigu ous text. We will not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language. Exemption 2, as we have construed it, does not reach the ESQD information at issue here. These data and maps calculate and visually portray the magnitude of hypothetical detonations. By no stretch of imagination do they relate to “personnel rules and practices,” as that term is most naturally understood. They concern the physical rules governing explosives, not the workplace rules
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
|
concern the physical rules governing explosives, not the workplace rules gov erning sailors; they address the handling of dangerous 0 MILNER v. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY Opinion of the Court materials, not the treatment of employees. The Navy therefore may not use Exemption 2, interpreted in accord with its plain meaning to cover human resources matters, to prevent disclosure of the requested maps and data. IV The Government offers two alternative readings of Exemption 2 to support withholding the ESQD informa tion. We cannot square either with the statute. A The Navy first encourages us to adopt the construction of Exemption 2 pioneered by Crooker, which shields mate rial not only if it meets the criteria set out above (Low 2), but also if it is “predominant[ly] interna[l]” and its “disclo sure would significantly risk[] circumvention of federal agency functions” (High 2). Brief for Respondent 4 (in ternal quotation marks omitted). The dissent, too, favors this reading of the statute. Post, at But the Crooker interpretation, as already suggested, suffers from a patent flaw: It is disconnected from Exemption 2’s text. The High 2 test (in addition to substituting the word “predomi nantly” for “solely,” see n. ignores the plain meaning of the adjective “personnel,” see at 6–9, and adopts a circumvention requirement with no basis or referent in Exemption 2’s language. Indeed, the only way to arrive at High 2 is by taking a red pen to the statute— “cutting out some” words and “pasting in others” until little of the actual provision remains. (CADC 200). Because this is so, High 2 is better labeled “Non 2” (and Low 2 just 2). In support of its text-light approach to the statute, the Government relies primarily on legislative history, placing particular emphasis on the House Report concerning FOIA. See Brief for Respondent –8. A statement in that Report buttresses the High 2 understanding of the Cite as: 562 U. S. (20) Opinion of the Court exemption and, indeed, specifically rejects the Low 2 construction. According to the Report: “Operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners would be exempt from disclo sure [under Exemption 2], but this exemption would not cover employee relations and working conditions and routine administrative procedures.” H. R. Rep. No. 7, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 0 (966). But the Senate Report says exactly the opposite, explaining in support of a Low 2 interpretation that the phrase “internal personnel rules and practices of an agency” means “rules as to personnel’s use of parking facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like.” S. Rep., at 8.6 In we gave reasons for thinking the Senate Report the more reliable of the two. See 425 U.S., 66. But the more fundamental point is what we said before: Legislative history, for those who take it into ac count, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it. See ; Wong Yang (950) (declining to consult legislative history when that “history is more conflicting than the text is ambiguous”). When presented, on the one hand, with clear statutory language and, on the other, with dueling committee re ports, we must choose the language. The Government also advances, in support of Crooker’s High 2 approach, an argument based on subsequent legis lative action. Congress, the Government notes, amended Exemption 7(E) in 986 to cover law enforcement records whose production “would disclose techniques and proce dures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, —————— 6 We are perplexed that the dissent takes seriously Crooker’s notion that the reports are “reconcilable.” Post, at 4. To strip the matter to its essentials, the House Report says: “Exemption 2 means A, but not B.” The Senate Report says: “Exemption 2 means B.” That is the very definition of “irreconcilable.” 2 MILNER v. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY Opinion of the Court or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investi gations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reason ably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” That amendment, the Government con tends, codified Crooker’s “circumvention of the law” stan dard and, in so doing, ratified Crooker’s holding. Brief for Respondent 42–4. The dissent likewise counts as signifi cant that Congress “t[ook] note” of Crooker in revising FOIA. Post, ; see post, But the Government and the dissent neglect the key feature of the 986 amendment: Congress modified not Exemption 2 (the subject of Crooker), but instead Exemp tion 7(E). And the Crooker construction of Exemption 2 renders Exemption 7(E) superfluous and so deprives that amendment of any effect. See, TRW 54 U.S. 9, (200) (noting canon that statutes should be read to avoid making any provision “superfluous, void, or insignificant” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We cannot think of any document eligible for withholding under Exemption 7(E) that the High 2 reading does not capture: The circumvention standard is the same, and the law enforcement records listed in Exemption 7(E) are “predominantly internal.” So if Congress had agreed with Crooker’s reading of Exemption 2, it would have had no reason to alter Exemption 7(E). In that event, Congress would either
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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to alter Exemption 7(E). In that event, Congress would either have left the statute alone (on the theory that Crooker would do the necessary work) or would have amended Exemption 2 specifically to ratify Crooker. The decision instead to amend Exemption 7(E) suggests that Congress approved the circumvention standard only as to law enforcement materials, and not as to the wider set of records High 2 covers. Perhaps this legislative action does not show that Congress affirmatively disagreed with Crooker; maybe Congress was agnostic about whether the circumvention standard should apply to other records. But one thing is clear: The 986 amendment does not Cite as: 562 U. S. (20) Opinion of the Court ratify, approve, or otherwise signal agreement with Crooker’s interpretation of Exemption 2. This argument therefore cannot save the High 2 construction. The dissent offers one last reason to embrace High 2, and indeed stakes most of its wager on this argument. Crooker, the dissent asserts, “has been consistently relied upon and followed for 0 years” by other lower courts. Post, ; see post, at –2. But this claim, too, trips at the starting gate. It would be immaterial even if true, because we have no warrant to ignore clear statutory language on the ground that other courts have done so. And in any event, it is not true. Prior to Crooker, three Circuits adopted the reading of Exemption 2 we think right, and they have not changed their minds. See n. 2, 7 —————— 7 The dissent’s view that “two of th[ese] Circuits [have] not adher[ed] to their early positions” is incorrect. Post, In Abraham & P.L.C. v. United States, cited by the dissent, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Government’s claim that Exemption 2 shielded records of federal tax lien filings. 8 F.d 075, 082 (998). The court nowhere discussed the High 2 versus Low 2 question at issue here. Its only reference to Crooker concerned the part of that decision interpreting “solely” to mean “predominantly.” See 8 F.d, at 080; see also n. Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit once again held, in Rugiero v. Department of Justice, that Exemption 2 applies to “routine matters of merely internal significance.” 5 (200). In Sladek v. Bensinger, which the dissent also cites, the Fifth Circuit insisted that the Government disclose a Drug Enforcement Administration agent’s manual because it “is not the type of trivial rule, such as allocation of parking facilities, that is covered by Exemption 2.” (9). In confirming this Low 2 interpretation of the statute, the court acknowledged that another Circuit had embraced the High 2 standard.
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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acknowledged that another Circuit had embraced the High 2 standard. The court, however, declined to consider this alternative interpretation because it would not have changed the case’s outcome. See Finally, the Eighth Circuit’s last word on Exemption 2 is clear, and the dissent does not say otherwise. The exemption, according to that most recent Eighth Circuit decision, applies “only [to an agency’s] housekeep ing matters.” 576 F.2d, 09–0 (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissent is surely right to say, post that Crooker “has guided nearly every FOIA case decided over the last 0 years” in 4 MILNER v. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY Opinion of the Court Since Crooker, three other Circuits have accepted the High 2 reading. See One Circuit has reserved judgment on the High 2-Low 2 debate. See Audubon 04 F.d 20, 20–204 (CA0 997). And the rest have not considered the matter. (No one should think Crooker has been extensively discussed or debated in the Courts of Appeals. In the past three decades, Crooker’s analysis of Exemption 2 has been cited a sum total of five times in federal appellate decisions outside the D. C. Circuit—on average, once every six years.) The result is a 4 to split among the Circuits.8 We will not flout all usual rules of statutory interpretation to take the side of the bare majority. B Presumably because Crooker so departs from Exemption 2’s language, the Government also offers another con struction, which it says we might adopt “on a clean slate,” “based on the plain text alone.” Brief for Respondent 5. On this reading, the exemption “encompasses records concerning an agency’s internal rules and practices for its personnel to follow in the discharge of their governmental functions.” ; see also –4 (Exemption 2 “applies generally to matters concerning internal rules and practices to guide agency personnel in performing —————— Circuits applying Crooker; but that statement does not hold in the Circuits using the Low 2 approach. 8 Notably, even those courts approving Crooker have disagreed about how to apply High 2. Fault lines include whether the risk of circum vention must be significant, see, Hidalgo v. FBI, 54 F. Supp. 2d 250, 25 (DC 2008); Pet. for Cert. 5–6; whether courts should con sider the public interest in disclosure when calculating that risk, see, Department of Justice, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, p. 85 (2009); and whether an agency must regulate the person or entity threatening circumvention; compare, 575 F.d, with, 78 The disagreement is not surprising. Because High 2 is nowhere evident in the statute, courts lack the normal guideposts
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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nowhere evident in the statute, courts lack the normal guideposts for ascertaining its coverage. Cite as: 562 U. S. (20) 5 Opinion of the Court their duties”). According to the Government, this inter pretation makes sense because “the phrase ‘personnel rules and practices of an agency’ is logically understood to mean an agency’s rules and practices for its personnel.” But the purported logic in the Government’s definition eludes us. We would not say, in ordinary parlance, that a “personnel file” is any file an employee uses, or that a “personnel department” is any department in which an employee serves. No more would we say that a “personnel rule or practice” is any rule or practice that assists an employee in doing her job. The use of the term “personnel” in each of these phrases connotes not that the file or de partment or practice/rule is for personnel, but rather that the file or department or practice/rule is about personnel— i.e., that it relates to employee relations or human re sources. This case well illustrates the point. The records requested, as earlier noted, are explosives data and maps showing the distances that potential blasts travel. This information no doubt assists Navy personnel in storing munitions. But that is not to say that the data and maps relate to “personnel rules and practices.” No one staring at these charts of explosions and using ordinary language would describe them in this manner. Indeed, the Government’s “clean slate” construction reaches such documents only by stripping the word “per sonnel” of any real meaning. Under this interpretation, an agency’s “internal personnel rules and practices” ap pears to mean all its internal rules and practices. That is because agencies necessarily operate through personnel, and so all their internal rules and practices are for per sonnel. The modifier “personnel,” then, does no modifying work; it does not limit the class of internal rules and practices that Exemption 2 covers. What is most naturally viewed as the provision’s key word—the term that ought 6 MILNER v. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY Opinion of the Court to define its scope—does nothing more than state the truism that in an agency it is “personnel” who follow internal rules and practices. And this odd reading would produce a sweeping exemp tion, posing the risk that FOIA would become less a dis closure than “a withholding statute.” Mink, 40 U.S., at Many documents an agency generates in some way aid employees in carrying out their responsibilities. If Exemption 2 were to reach all these records, it would tend to engulf other FOIA exemptions, rendering
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Justice Kagan
| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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records, it would tend to engulf other FOIA exemptions, rendering ineffective the limitations Congress placed on their application. Exemp tion 7, for example, shields records compiled for law en forcement purposes, but only if one of six specified criteria is met. Yet on the Government’s view, an agency could bypass these restrictions by invoking Exemp tion 2 whenever law enforcement records guide personnel in performing their duties. Indeed, an agency could use Exemption 2 as an all-purpose back-up provision to with hold sensitive records that do not fall within any of FOIA’s more targeted exemptions.9 —————— 9 The dissent asserts that “0 years of experience” with a more expan sive interpretation of the exemption suggests no “seriou[s] inter fere[nce] with FOIA’s informational objectives.” Post, at 6. But those objectives suffer any time an agency denies a FOIA request based on an improper interpretation of the statute. To give just one example, the U. S. Forest Service has wrongly invoked Exemption 2 on multiple occasions to withhold information about (of all things) bird nesting sites. See Audubon 04 F.d 20, 20 (CA0 997); Maricopa Audubon 08 F.d 082, 084 (CA9 997). And recent statistics raise a concern that federal agencies may too readily use Exemption 2 to refuse disclosure. According to amicus Public Citizen, “while reliance on exemptions overall rose 8% from 998 to 2006, reliance on Exemption 2 rose 44% during that same time period.” Brief for Public Citizen et al. as Amici Curiae 24. In 2009 alone, federal departments cited Exemption 2 more than 72,000 times to prevent access to records. See Brief for Allied Daily Newspa pers of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae We do not doubt that many of these FOIA denials were appropriate. But we are unable to Cite as: 562 U. S. (20) 7 Opinion of the Court Interpreted in this way, Exemption 2—call it “Super 2” now—would extend, rather than narrow, the APA’s former exemption for records relating to the “internal manage ment of an agency.” 5 U.S. C. (964 ed.). We doubt that even the “internal management” provision, which Congress thought allowed too much withholding, see would have protected all information that guides employees in the discharge of their duties, includ ing the explosives data and maps in this case. And per haps needless to say, this reading of Exemption 2 violates the rule favoring narrow construction of FOIA exemptions. See, 456 U.S., at ; 425 U.S., at 6. Super 2 in fact has no basis in the text, context, or purpose of FOIA, and we accordingly reject it. V Although we
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| 2,011 | 3 |
majority
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Milner v. Department of Navy
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206187/milner-v-department-of-navy/
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of FOIA, and we accordingly reject it. V Although we cannot interpret Exemption 2 as the Gov ernment proposes, we recognize the strength of the Navy’s interest in protecting the ESQD data and maps and other similar The Government has informed us that “[p]ublicly disclosing the [ESQD] information would significantly risk undermining the Navy’s ability to safely and securely store military ordnance,” Brief for Respon dent 47, and we have no reason to doubt that representa tion. The Ninth Circuit similarly cautioned that disclo sure of this information could be used to “wrea[k] havoc” and “make catastrophe more likely.” 575 F.d, Concerns of this kind—a sense that certain sensitive information should be exempt from disclosure—in part led the Crooker court to formulate the High 2 standard. See 670 F.2d, at 074 (contending that “common sense” sup ported the High 2 interpretation because Congress would not have wanted FOIA to “undermin[e] the effective —————— accept the dissent’s unsupported declaration that a sweeping construc tion of Exemption 2 has not interfered with Congress’s goal of broad disclosure. 8 MILNER v. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY Opinion of the Court ness of law enforcement agencies”). And we acknowledge that our decision today upsets three decades of agency practice relying on Crooker, and therefore may force con siderable adjustments. We also note, however, that the Government has other tools at hand to shield national security information and other sensitive materials. Most notably, Exemption of FOIA prevents access to classified documents. §552(b)(); see 575 F.d, 80 (Exemp tion is “specifically designed to allow government agen cies to withhold information that might jeopardize our national security”). The Government generally may clas sify material even after receiving a FOIA request, see Exec. Order No. 526, §.7(d), 75 Fed. Reg. 7 (2009); an agency therefore may wait until that time to decide whether the dangers of disclosure outweigh the costs of classification. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–0. Exemption also may mitigate the Government’s security concerns. That provision applies to records that any other statute exempts from disclosure, thus offering Con gress an established, streamlined method to authorize the withholding of specific records that FOIA would not oth erwise protect. And Exemption 7, as already noted, pro tects “information compiled for law enforcement purposes” that meets one of six criteria, including if its release “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” The Navy argued below that the ESQD data and maps fall within Exemp tion 7(F), see n. and that claim remains open for the Ninth Circuit to address on remand. If these
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,970 | 18 |
majority
|
United States v. Reynolds
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108067/united-states-v-reynolds/
|
The United States brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky to condemn more than 250 acres of the respondents' land for a federal development known as the Nolin Reservoir Project located in that State. An important issue in the case was raised by the respondents' claim that 78 acres of the land, taken for construction of recreational facilities adjacent to the reservoir, had not been within the original scope of the project.[1] A jury *15 awarded the respondents $20,000 as just compensation for all the land taken. Upon an appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, finding that the District Judge in his instructions to the jury had erroneously referred to matters disclosed outside the jury's presence.[2] The trial and appellate courts were in agreement, however, in rejecting the Government's contention that the "scope-of-the-project" issue was for the trial judge to decide and should not, therefore, have been submitted to the jury at all. There being a conflict between the circuits on this question.[3] we granted certiorari to consider a recurring problem of importance in federal condemnation proceedings. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. *16 And "just compensation" means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken.[4] The owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.[5] In enforcing the constitutional mandate, the Court at an early date adopted the concept of market value: the owner is entitled to the fair market value of the property[6] at the time of the taking.[7] But this basic measurement of compensation has been hedged with certain refinements developed over the years in the interest of effectuating the constitutional guarantee. It is one of these refinements that is in controversy here. The Court early recognized that the "market value" of property condemned can be affected, adversely or favorably, by the imminence of the very public project that makes the condemnation necessary.[8] And it was perceived that to permit compensation to be either reduced or increased because of an alteration in market value attributable to the project itself would not lead to the "just compensation" that the Constitution requires.[9] On the other hand, the development of a public project may also lead to enhancement in the market value of neighboring land that is not covered by the project itself. And if that land is later condemned, whether for an extension
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,970 | 18 |
majority
|
United States v. Reynolds
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108067/united-states-v-reynolds/
|
if that land is later condemned, whether for an extension of the existing project or for some other public purpose, the general rule of just compensation requires that such enhancement in value be *17 wholly taken into account, since fair market value is generally to be determined with due consideration of all available economic uses of the property at the time of the taking.[10] In United the Court gave full articulation to these principles: "If a distinct tract is condemned, in whole or in part, other lands in the neighborhood may increase in market value due to the proximity of the public improvement erected on the land taken. Should the Government, at a later date, determine to take these other lands, it must pay their market value as enhanced by this factor of proximity. If, however, the public project from the beginning included the taking of certain tracts but only one of them is taken in the first instance, the owner of the other tracts should not be allowed an increased value for his lands which are ultimately to be taken any more than the owner of the tract first condemned is entitled to be allowed an increased market value because adjacent lands not immediately taken increased in value due to the projected improvement. "The question then is whether the respondents' lands were probably within the scope of the project from the time the Government was committed to it. If they were not, but were merely adjacent lands, the subsequent enlargement of the project to include them ought not to deprive the respondents of the value added in the meantime by the proximity of the improvement. If, on the other hand, they were, the Government ought not to pay any increase in value arising from the known fact that the lands probably would be condemned. The owners ought *18 not to gain by speculating on probable increase in value due to the Government's activities." -377. There is no controversy in the present case regarding these basic principles. The parties agree that if the acreage in issue was "probably within the scope of the project from the time the Government was committed to it," substantially less compensation is due than if it was not. For if the property was probably within the project's original scope, then its compensable value is to be measured in terms of agricultural use. If, on the other hand, the acreage was outside the original scope of the project, its compensable value is properly measurable in terms of its economic potential as lakeside residential or recreational property.
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,970 | 18 |
majority
|
United States v. Reynolds
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108067/united-states-v-reynolds/
|
of its economic potential as lakeside residential or recreational property. The issue between the parties is simply whether the "scope-of-the-project" question is to be determined by the trial judge or by the jury. There is no claim that the issue is of constitutional dimensions. For it has long been settled that there is no constitutional right to a jury in eminent domain proceedings. See As Professor Moore has put the matter: "The practice in England and in the colonies prior to the adoption in 1791 of the Seventh Amendment, the position taken by Congress contemporaneously with, and subsequent to, the adoption of the Amendment, and the position taken by the Supreme Court and nearly all of the lower federal courts lead to the conclusion that there is no constitutional right to jury trial in the federal courts in an action for the condemnation of property under the power of eminent domain."[11] *19 It is not, therefore, to the Seventh Amendment that we look in this case, but to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 71A (h) provides that, except in circumstances not applicable here, "any party" to a federal eminent domain proceeding "may have a trial by jury of the issue of just compensation," unless the court in its discretion orders that that issue "shall be determined by a commission of three persons appointed by it. Trial of all issues shall otherwise be by the court."[12] The Rule thus provides that, except for the single issue of just compensation, the trial judge is to decide all issues, legal and factual, that may be presented. The critical inquiry is thus whether "the issue of just compensation," as that phrase is used in the Rule, is broad enough to embrace the question whether the condemned property was probably within the scope of the federal project.[13] *20 Although the matter could be decided either way without doing violence to the language of Rule 71A (h), we think the Rule's basic structure makes clear that a jury in federal condemnation proceedings is to be confined to the performance of a single narrow but important functionthe determination of a compensation award within ground rules established by the trial judge. The Rule gives the trial court discretion to eliminate a jury entirely. And when a jury is afforded, the sweeping language of the final sentence of the Rule discloses a clear intent to give the district judge a role in condemnation proceedings much broader than he occupies in a conventional jury trial. It is for him to decide "all issues" other than the precise issue
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,970 | 18 |
majority
|
United States v. Reynolds
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108067/united-states-v-reynolds/
|
him to decide "all issues" other than the precise issue of the amount of compensation to be awarded. It follows that it is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the "scope-of-the-project" issue as a preliminary matter. We therefore approve and adopt the procedural rule announced by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in and hold that it is for the judge and not the jury to decide whether the property condemned was probably within the project's original scope.[14] *21 Finally, the Government asks us to take this occasion to "clarify" the "scope-of-the-project" test. We think the test was stated with admirable clarity by a unanimous Court in Miller: if the "lands were probably within the scope of the project from the time the Government was committed to it," no enhancement in value attributable to the project is to be considered in awarding compensation. As with any test that deals in probabilities, its application to any particular set of facts requires discriminating judgment.[15] The rule does not require a showing that the land ultimately taken was actually specified in the original plans for the project. It need only be shown that during the course of the planning or original construction it became evident that land so situated would probably be needed for the public use. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR.
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,983 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111007/arizona-v-san-carlos-apache-tribe-of-ariz/
|
"Nothing in the McCarran Amendment or in its legislative history can be read as limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Colorado Water Conservation That Amendment is a waiver, not a command.[1] It permits the United States to be joined as a defendant in state water rights adjudications; it does not purport to diminish the United States' right to litigate in a federal forum and it is totally silent on the subject of Indian tribes' rights to litigate anywhere. Yet today the majority somehow concludes that it commands the federal courts to defer to state-court water rights proceedings, even when Indian water rights are involved. Although it is customary for the Court to begin its analysis of questions of statutory construction by examining the text of the relevant statute,[2] one may search in vain for any textual support for the Court's holding today. "Most of the land in these reservations is and always has been arid. It can be said without overstatement that when the Indians were put on these reservations they were not considered to be located in the most desirable area of the Nation. It is impossible to believe that when Congress created the great Colorado Indian Reservation and when the Executive Department of this Nation created the other reservations they were unaware that most of the lands were of the desert kind hot, scorching sands and that water from the river would be essential to the life of the Indian people and to the animals they hunted and the crops they raised." This Court has repeatedly recognized that the Government, when it created each Indian reservation, "intended to deal fairly with the Indians by reserving for them the waters *574 without which their lands would have been useless." See ; United ; -601; This doctrine, known as the Winters doctrine, is unquestionably a matter of federal, not state, law. See ante, at 571; Colorado Its underlying principles differ substantially from those applied by the States to allocate water among competing claimants. Unlike state-law claims based on prior appropriation, Indian reserved water rights are not based on actual beneficial use and are not forfeited if they are not used. Vested no later than the date each reservation was created, these Indian rights are superior in right to all subsequent appropriations under state law. Not all of the issues arising from the application of the Winters doctrine have been resolved, because in the past the scope of Indian reserved rights has infrequently been adjudicated.[3] The important task of elaborating and clarifying these federal-law issues in the cases
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,983 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111007/arizona-v-san-carlos-apache-tribe-of-ariz/
|
of elaborating and clarifying these federal-law issues in the cases now before the Court, and in future cases, should be performed by federal rather than state courts whenever possible. Federal adjudication of Indian water rights would not fragment an otherwise unified state-court proceeding. Since Indian reserved claims are wholly dissimilar to state-law water claims, and since their amount does not depend on the total volume of water available in the water source or on the quantity of competing claims, it will be necessary to conduct separate proceedings to determine these claims even if the adjudication takes place in state court. Subsequently the state court will incorporate these claims like claims under state law or Federal Government claims that have been formally adjudicated in the past into a single inclusive, binding decree for each water source. Thus, as Justice Stewart wrote *575 in dissent in Colorado : "Whether the virtually identical separate proceedings take place in a federal court or a state court, the adjudication of the claims will be neither more nor less `piecemeal.' Essentially the same process will be followed in each instance." To justify virtual abandonment of Indian water rights claims to the state courts, the majority relies heavily on Colorado Water Conservation District, which in turn discovered an affirmative policy of federal judicial abdication in the McCarran Amendment.[4] I continue to believe that Colorado read more into that Amendment than Congress intended, and cannot acquiesce in an extension of its reasoning. Although the Court's decision in Colorado did, indeed, foreshadow today's holding, it did not involve an Indian tribe's attempt to litigate on its own behalf, n. 26. The majority today acknowledges that the question in these cases was "not directly answered," but in fact was "specifically reserved," in Colorado Ante, at 565. Although in some respects Indian tribes' water claims are similar to other reserved federal water rights, different treatment is justified. States and their citizens may well be more antagonistic toward Indian reserved rights than other federal reserved rights, both because the former are potentially greater in quantity and because they provide few direct or indirect benefits to non-Indian residents.[5] Indians have *576 historically enjoyed a unique relationship with the Federal Government, reflecting the tribes' traditional sovereign status, their treaty-based right to federal protection, and their special economic problems. Recently the Court reaffirmed " `the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.' " United States v. Mitchell, ante, at 225, quoting Seminole See also ;[6] One important aspect of the special relationship
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,983 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111007/arizona-v-san-carlos-apache-tribe-of-ariz/
|
See also ;[6] One important aspect of the special relationship is 28 U.S. C. 1362, which embodies a federal promise that Indian tribes will be able to invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts to resolve matters in controversy arising under federal *577 law.[7] Congress thereby assured Indians a neutral federal forum a guarantee whose importance should not be under-estimated.[8] The Senate Report noted: "There is great hesitancy on the part of tribes to use State courts. This reluctance is founded partially on the traditional fear that tribes have had of the States in which their reservations are situated. Additionally, the Federal courts have more expertise in deciding questions involving treaties with the Federal Government, as well as interpreting the relevant body of Federal law that has developed over the years." S. Rep. No. 1507, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966). *578 Section 1362 also assured the tribes that they need not rely on the Federal Government to protect their interests, an important safeguard in light of the undeniable potential for conflicts of interest between Indian claims and other Federal Government claims.[9] Despite the silence of the McCarran Amendment regarding Indian tribal claims, and the clear promise of a federal forum embodied in 1362, the Court holds that considerations of "wise judicial administration" require that Indian claims, governed by federal law, must be relegated to the state courts. It is clear to me that the words "wise judicial administration" have been wrenched completely from their ordinary meaning. One of the Arizona proceedings, in which process has been served on approximately 58,000 known water claimants, illustrates the practical consequences of giving the state courts the initial responsibility for the adjudication of Indian water rights claims. Because this Court may not exercise appellate jurisdiction in state-court litigation until after a final judgment has been entered by the highest court of the State, no federal tribunal will be able to review any federal question in the case until the entire litigation has been concluded. The Court promises that "any state-court decision alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by *579 federal law can expect to receive, if brought for review before this Court, a particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal interest in safeguarding those rights from state encroachment." Ante, at 571. If a state court errs in interpreting the Winters doctrine or an Indian treaty, and this Court ultimately finds it necessary to correct that error, the entire comprehensive state-court water rights decree may require massive readjustment. If, however, the quantification of Indian rights were to be adjudicated in a
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,983 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111007/arizona-v-san-carlos-apache-tribe-of-ariz/
|
quantification of Indian rights were to be adjudicated in a separate federal proceeding which presumably would be concluded long before the mammoth, conglomerate state adjudication comes to an end the state judgment would rest on a solid foundation that this Court should never need to examine. The Court acknowledges the logical force of these propositions, but sets them aside because the exercise of concurrent federal-court jurisdiction would create "the possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and controversy between the federal and state forums, hurried and pressured decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of property rights." Ante, at 569. These possibilities arise, as the Court candidly admits, from a pessimistic assessment of the likelihood that state courts, state legislatures, and state parties will assume a "cooperative attitude." In other words, the state courts might engage in an unseemly rush to judgment in order to give the Indians less water than they fear that the federal courts might provide. If state courts cannot be expected to adhere to orderly processes of decisionmaking because of their hostility to the Indians, the statutory right accorded to Indian tribes to litigate in a federal tribunal is even more important. In my view, a federal court whose jurisdiction is invoked in a timely manner by an Indian tribe has a duty to determine the existence and extent of the tribe's reserved water rights under federal law. It is inappropriate to stay or dismiss such federal-court proceedings in order to allow determinations *580 by state courts. In the cases before us today, complaints were timely filed in federal court by the Indian Tribes, before or shortly after the institution of state water adjudication proceedings; the state proceedings in Arizona and Montana remain at an early stage. The District Court should therefore grant the Tribes leave to amend the various complaints, where necessary, to seek adjudication of the scope and quantity of Indian reserved water rights and to eliminate other claims; the suits should then proceed in federal court. Today, however, on the tenuous foundation of a perceived congressional intent that has never been articulated in statutory language or legislative history, the Court carves out a further exception to the "virtually unflagging obligation" of federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction. The Court does not and cannot claim that it is faithfully following general principles of law. After all, just four months ago in Moses H. Cone Memorial the Court wrote: "[W]e emphasize that our task in cases such as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,983 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111007/arizona-v-san-carlos-apache-tribe-of-ariz/
|
substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the task is to ascertain whether there exist `exceptional' circumstances, the `clearest of justifications,' that can suffice under Colorado to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction. Although in some rare circumstances the presence of state-law issues may weigh in favor of that surrender the presence of federal-law issues must always be a major consideration weighing against surrender." Today that "major consideration" is but a peppercorn in the scales, outweighed by the phantom command of the McCarran Amendment. Instead of trying to reconcile this decision with Moses H. Cone and other prior cases, the Court *581 merely says: "But water rights adjudication is a virtually unique type of proceeding, and the McCarran Amendment is a virtually unique federal statute, and we cannot in this context be guided by general propositions." Ante, at 571. I submit that it is the analysis in Part IV of the Court's opinion that is "virtually unique." Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,004 | 9 |
concurring
|
Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134728/nixon-v-missouri-municipal-league/
|
I agree with much of the Court's analysis in Parts II and III of its opinion, which demonstrates that reading "any entity" in 47 U.S. C. 253(a) to include political subdivisions of States would have several unhappy consequences. I do not think, however, that the avoidance of unhappy consequences is adequate basis for interpreting a text. Cf. ante, at 140 ("The municipal respondents' position holds sufficient promise of futility and uncertainty to keep us from accepting it"). I would instead reverse the Court of Appeals on the ground discussed in Part IV of the Court's opinion: Section 253(a) simply does not provide the clear statement which would be required by for a statute to limit the power of States to restrict the delivery of telecommunications services by their political subdivisions. I would not address the additional question whether the statute affects the "power of localities to restrict their own (or their political inferiors') delivery" of telecommunications services, ante, at 129 (emphasis added), an issue considered and apparently answered negatively by the Court. That question is neither presented by this litigation nor contained within the question on which we granted certiorari.
|
Justice White
| 1,981 | 6 |
majority
|
California v. Sierra Club
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110467/california-v-sierra-club/
|
Under review here is a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that private parties may sue under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 to enforce 10 of that Act. An environmental organization and two private citizens (hereafter respondents)[1] seek to enjoin the construction and operation of water diversion facilities which are part of the California Water Project (CWP). They rely upon 10 of the Act, which prohibits "[t]he creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States"[2] Since the Act does not explicitly create a private *290 enforcement mechanism, the initial question presented by these consolidated cases is whether such a private right of action can be implied on behalf of those allegedly injured by a claimed violation of 10. Petitioner State of California also asks us to decide whether the Act requires permits for the state water allocation projects involved in these cases. I The California Water Project consists of a series of water storage and transportation facilities designed primarily to transport water from the relatively moist climate of northern California to the more arid central and southern portions of the State. The water which will be used by the CWP is initially stored behind dams on the Sacramento River and, as needed, released into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The CWP then diverts a quantity of this water from the Delta and directs it into canals and aqueducts which will carry it south. The project has both federal and state components. The federal component, the Central Valley Project, is designed in part to provide a constant source of water for irrigation to the Central Valley of California. Water for this project is diverted from the Delta by the Tracy Pumping Plant into the 115-mile Delta-Mendota Canal which transports the water to the Mendota Pool in California's Central Valley. The State Water Project supplies water to both central and southern California by way of the California Aqueduct. Water for this project is drawn from the Delta by the Delta Pumping Plant and deposited in the *291 northern terminus of the California Aqueduct, through which it flows to its destinations in central and southern California. Under the present system the quality of water captured in the north and released into the Delta may be degraded by intruding salt waters from the Pacific Ocean. As a consequence the water which is diverted from the Delta to the Delta-Mendota Canal or the California Aqueduct is potentially of a lesser quality than is the
|
Justice White
| 1,981 | 6 |
majority
|
California v. Sierra Club
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110467/california-v-sierra-club/
|
Aqueduct is potentially of a lesser quality than is the water which is transported to the Delta from storage facilities in the north and from there deposited in the Delta. The State of California has proposed the construction of a 42-mile Peripheral Canal along the eastern edge of the Delta area, which would avoid any mixing of the water from the north with the saline water of the Delta. Instead of depositing water in the Delta, the canal would carry high quality water directly to the Tracy and Delta Pumping Plants. Respondents commenced the present action in 1971 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Sierra Named as defendants were the various federal and state officials who administer the agencies responsible for overseeing the operation, construction, and regulation of the CWP facilities in question.[3] Petitioner water agencies, which had contracted with the State for water from the Delta and which had incurred extensive financial obligations in reliance thereon, were permitted to intervene.[4] The respondents alleged that present *292 and proposed diversions of water from the Delta degraded the quality of Delta water, and that such diversion violated 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. They sought to enjoin further operation or construction of water diversion facilities until the consent of the Army Corps of Engineers was obtained as required by the Act. The District Court concluded that respondents could avail themselves of a "private cause of action" to enforce 10 of the Act, and ruled on the merits that approval of the Corps of Engineers was required by 10 for the Tracy and Delta Pumping Plants and the Peripheral Canal. Sierra The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that a private cause of action to enforce the Act existed. Sierra It reversed the District Court as to the Tracy Pumping Plant, however, ruling that Congress has consented to its construction and operation.[5] We granted petitions for certiorari filed by the water agencies and the State of California. II outlined a "preferred approach for determining whether a private right of action should be implied from a federal statute" Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, ; see This approach listed four factors thought to be relevant to the inquiry: "First, is the plaintiff `one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with
|
Justice White
| 1,981 | 6 |
majority
|
California v. Sierra Club
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110467/california-v-sierra-club/
|
remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?" Combined, these four factors present the relevant inquiries to pursue in answering the recurring question of implied causes of action. Cases subsequent to Cort have explained that the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of action, see Universities Research Assn., ; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, ; Touche Ross & ; but the four factors specified in Cort remain the "criteria through which this intent could be discerned." ; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Under Cort, the initial consideration is whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for "'whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.'" ; see Touche Ross & ; v. University of Without analyzing either the language or legislative history of the Act, the Court of Appeals here concluded that the Act was designed for the especial benefit of private parties who may suffer "special injury" caused by an unauthorized obstruction *294 to a navigable waterway. It was apparently reasoned that since Congress enacted a statute that forbids such obstructions in navigable waters, any person who would be "especially harmed" by an unauthorized obstruction was an especial beneficiary of the Act. But such a definition of "especial" beneficiary makes this factor meaningless. Under this view, a victim of any crime would be deemed an especial beneficiary of the criminal statute's proscription. Cort did not adopt such a broad-gauge approach. The question is not simply who would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress intended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries. See In ascertaining this intent, the first consideration is the language of the Act. Here, the statute states no more than a general proscription of certain activities; it does not unmistakably focus on any particular class of beneficiaries whose welfare Congress intended to further. Such language does not indicate an intent to provide for private rights of action. "There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972] with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds
|
Justice White
| 1,981 | 6 |
majority
|
California v. Sierra Club
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110467/california-v-sierra-club/
|
or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices." v. University of ; see also Touche Ross & ; Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act is the kind of general ban which carries with it no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons. Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondents have identified anything in the legislative history suggesting that 10 was created for the especial benefit of a particular class. On the contrary, the legislative history supports the view that *295 the Act was designed to benefit the public at large by empowering the Federal Government to exercise its authority over interstate commerce with respect to obstructions on navigable rivers caused by bridges and similar structures. In part, the Act was passed in response to this Court's decision in Willamette Iron Bridge There the Court held that there was no federal common law "which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers." Although Willamette involved private parties, the clear implication of the Court's opinion was that in the absence of specific legislation no party, including the Federal Government, would be empowered to take any action under federal law with respect to such obstructions. The Act was intended to enable the Secretary of War to take such action.[6] See 21 Cong. Rec. 8603, 8605, and 8607 (1890); see also United ; United ; United Congress was not concerned with the rights of individuals. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is no "indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one."82-84; *296 Touche Ross & ; v. University of -703. The Court of Appeals recognized as much: "The legislative history of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 does not reflect a congressional intent either to afford a private remedy or to deny one." This silence on the remedy question serves to confirm that in enacting the Act, Congress was concerned not with private rights but with the Federal Government's ability to respond to obstructions on navigable waterways.[7] *297 As recently emphasized, the focus of the inquiry is on whether Congress intended to create a remedy. Universities Research Assn., 450 U. S., at ; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, 444 U. S., ; Touche Ross & The federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide. Here consideration of the first two Cort factors is dispositive. The language of the statute and its legislative history do not
|
Justice White
| 1,981 | 6 |
majority
|
California v. Sierra Club
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110467/california-v-sierra-club/
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language of the statute and its legislative history do not suggest that the Act was intended to create federal rights for the *298 especial benefit of a class of persons but rather that it was intended to benefit the public at large through a general regulatory scheme to be administered by the then Secretary of War. Nor is there any evidence that Congress anticipated that there would be a private remedy. This being the case, it is unnecessary to inquire further to determine whether the purpose of the statute would be advanced by the judicial implication of a private action or whether such a remedy is within the federal domain of interest. These factors are only of relevance if the first two factors give indication of congressional intent to create the remedy. Touche Ross & There being no such indication, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. III Petitioner the State of California urges that we reach the merits of these caseswhether permits are required for the state water allocation projectsregardless of our disposition of the private-cause-of-action issue. This we decline to do. Our ruling that there is no private cause of action permitting respondents to commence this action disposes of the cases: we cannot consider the merits of a claim which Congress has not authorized respondents to raise. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,019 | 24 |
concurring
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Rotkiske v. Klemm
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4685522/rotkiske-v-klemm/
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Like my colleagues in both the majority and the partial dissent, I agree that 15 U.S. C. is a one-year statute of limitations that typically begins to run when the alleged violation “occurs,” not when the plaintiff discovers it. Compare ante, at 1, with post, at 1 (GINSBURG, J., dis- senting in part and from judgment). The only daylight be- tween the majority and dissenting opinions is whether petitioner Rotkiske forfeited reliance on an “equitable, fraud- specific discovery rule” that forgives otherwise untimely fil- ings. Ante, at 6–7; cf. post, at 4–5. Because I believe the Court of Appeals fairly found that Rotkiske failed to pre- serve an equitable argument of this sort, see 429, and n. 5 (CA3 2018), and because the Court did not grant certiorari on that doctrine, I join the majority opinion. I write separately to emphasize that this fraud-specific equitable principle is not the “ ‘bad wine of recent vintage’ ” of which my colleagues speak. Ante, at 5 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)). Rather, the Court has long “recogni[zed]” and applied this “historical exception for suits based on fraud.” at ; see also (not- ing equitable discovery rule “in cases of fraud or conceal- ment”); ; Ex- ploration ; 2 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring v. Glover, ; 21 F. Cas. 1303 (No. 12,782) (CC NH 1828) (Story, J.). Nothing in today’s decision prevents parties from invoking that well- settled doctrine. Cite as: 589 U. S. (2019) 1 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 18–328 KEVIN C. ROTKISKE, PETITIONER v. PAUL KLEMM, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT [December 10, 2019] JUSTICE GINSBURG, dissenting from the opinion in part and from the judgment. Generally, I agree with the Court, the “discovery rule” does not apply to the one-year statute of limitations con- tained in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S. C. That limitations period ordinarily commences to run on the date “the violation occurs,” See TRW But the ordinarily applicable time trigger does not apply when fraud on the creditor’s part accounts for the debtor’s failure to sue within one year of the creditor’s violation. at (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). See also (ma- jority opinion). True, in the case at hand, debtor Rotkiske’s FDCPA claim does not rest on any fraud inhering in the claim creditor Klemm stated in his debt-collection suit. Rather, debtor Rotkiske alleges that creditor Klemm commenced the debt- collection suit too late. But Rotkiske was disarmed from asserting that
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,019 | 24 |
concurring
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Rotkiske v. Klemm
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4685522/rotkiske-v-klemm/
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suit too late. But Rotkiske was disarmed from asserting that defense in Klemm’s suit, for he never re- ceived notice of the suit and therefore had no opportunity to defend against it. For the same reason, he was stopped 2 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM Opinion of GINSBURG, J. from raising an FDCPA claim challenging Klemm’s suit within the one-year limitations period. By knowingly ar- ranging for service of the complaint against Rotkiske at an address where Rotkiske no longer lived, and filing a false affidavit of service, Rotkiske alleges, Klemm engaged in fraud. Such fraud, I would hold, warrants application of the discovery rule to time Rotkiske’s FDCPA suit from the date he learned of the default judgment against him. As today’s decision recognizes, see ante, at 6–7, this Court long ago “adopted as its own the old chancery rule that where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute [of limitations] does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.” v. Armbrecht, (internal quotation marks omitted). See also (“[W]hen the object of the suit is to obtain relief against a fraud, the bar of the statute does not commence to run until the fraud is discovered or becomes known to the party injured by it.”). Like the general discovery rule that lower courts have “appl[ied] when a statute is silent on the issue” of a claim’s accrual, TRW 534 U.S., ), the fraud-based discovery rule operates as a statutory pre- sumption “read into every federal statute of limitation,” 3 U.S., at This circumscribed rule is dis- tinct from the general discovery rule in that it governs only “case[s] of fraud.” Merck & 644 (2010). Unlike the general discovery rule, there is no reason to believe the FDCPA displaced the fraud-based dis- covery rule. The Court does not hold otherwise. The fraud-based discovery rule has a thrust different from equitable tolling.* “Equitable tolling” describes a doc- trine that pauses, or “tolls,” a statutory limitations period —————— *The two doctrines are often blended or confused. See Klehr v. A. O. Cite as: 589 U. S. (2019) 3 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. after it has commenced. 572 U.S. 1, 10 A litigant qualifies for equitable tolling only if he establishes “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circum- stance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Me- nominee Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 5)
|
Justice Sotomayor
| 2,019 | 24 |
concurring
|
Rotkiske v. Klemm
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4685522/rotkiske-v-klemm/
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United States, 577 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, in Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), a plaintiff filed an action under the Fed- eral Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) in Ohio state court, alleging that he sustained a workplace injury just under three years earlier. Several months later, the state court dismissed the suit for improper venue under state law. The plaintiff promptly brought an identi- cal action in federal district court. That court dismissed the action on the ground that the FELA’s three-year statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff was injured and had expired while his state-court action was pending. This Court reversed. Yes, the limitations period began to run on the date of the plaintiff’s injury. But, the Court held, the clock tolled during the pendency of the plaintiff’s state-court suit. Subtracting the time con- sumed by the state-court suit, the plaintiff’s federal action was timely. 434–436. By contrast, the fraud-based discovery rule sets the time —————— Smith Corp., The Court has sometimes re- ferred to and v. Arm- brecht, as equitable tolling decisions. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & (1991); And it has described as “stand[ing] for the proposition that equity tolls the statute of limitations in cases of fraud or concealment.” TRW v. Andrews, But as this Court recently clarified, each doctrine has an independent office. See 568 U.S. 442, 447, n. 2, 449 (2013) (addressing whether application of the fraud- based discovery rule was appropriate after acknowledging that the plain- tiff had expressly waived equitable tolling). 4 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM Opinion of GINSBURG, J. at which a claim accrues, i.e., the time when the statute of limitations commences to run. See Merck & Co., 559 U.S., at 644–645. It is “an exception to the standard rule” that “a claim accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” 448–449 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, when a plaintiff is “injured by fraud ‘the bar of the stat- ute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.’ ” 3 U.S., at (quoting 21 Wall., at 348). For example, in Exploration 247 U.S. 435 a company had unlawfully procured land from the United States through a series of fraudulent trans- actions in 1902. at 4, 438. The parties involved in the transactions successfully concealed the scheme until 1909. When the Government brought suit to void the transactions, the company raised the six-year statute of limitations as a defense. Applying the fraud- based discovery rule, the Court held
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,019 | 24 |
concurring
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Rotkiske v. Klemm
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4685522/rotkiske-v-klemm/
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defense. Applying the fraud- based discovery rule, the Court held that the limitations pe- riod began to run only upon the Government’s discovery of the fraud. The suit was filed within six years of that date and was therefore timely. I do not agree that Rotkiske failed to preserve a fraud- based discovery rule argument in the Court of Appeals. See ante, at 7. Rotkiske did raise the issue; he argued that “[a]t the very least, the discovery rule applies to [FDCPA] claims based on false or misleading misrepresentations or other self-concealing conduct.” Supp. Brief for Appellant in No. 16–1668 (CA3), p.13 (citing ). The Court of Appeals apparently declined to address that argument because Rotkiske had failed to raise “equitable tolling” in his appellate briefs. 428–429, and n. 5 (CA3 2018). But failure to raise “equitable tolling” should pose no obstacle to determining whether the discrete fraud-based discovery rule applies to Rotkiske’s claim. Nor do I agree that Rotkiske forfeited the issue by not Cite as: 589 U. S. (2019) 5 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. raising it in his petition for certiorari. See ante, at 7. Gen- erously read, Rotkiske asked whether a discovery rule of any kind applies to the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limita- tions. While hardly a model of the deft pleader’s art, the petition for certiorari stated that Rotkiske did not learn of Klemm’s debt-collection suit and default judgment until long after their occurrence because of the “intended re- service [of Klemm’s complaint] at a known incorrect address.” Pet. for Cert. 8. His brief on the merits in this Court noted: “Petitioner is not advocating that the Court adopt a gener- ally applicable discovery rule.” Brief for Petitioner 16, n.16. His reply brief was more precise: “The default judgment ob- tained by [Klemm] at issue in [Rotkiske’s FDCPA com- plaint] was made possible by the filing of a fraudulent Affi- davit of Service.” Reply Brief 15. Indeed, the Court recognizes that Rotkiske’s arguments included “a fraud- specific discovery rule as an equitable doctrine.” Ante, at 4. Rotkiske’s FDCPA complaint, in my view, falls comfort- ably within the fraud-based discovery rule’s scope. See Brief for Samuel L. Bray et al. as Amici Curiae 12–14. Rotkiske alleged that Klemm engaged in “sewer service”—intention- ally serving process in a manner designed to prevent Rot- kiske from learning of the collection suit. Klemm did so, according to Rotkiske, in order to ensure that Klemm’s un- timely suit would result in a default judgment that would remain undiscovered until time to oppose that judgment, and to commence an FDCPA suit,
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,019 | 24 |
concurring
|
Rotkiske v. Klemm
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4685522/rotkiske-v-klemm/
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to oppose that judgment, and to commence an FDCPA suit, ran out. Though Rot- kiske did not allege that “sewer service” is itself a practice independently proscribed by the FDCPA, such service is nonetheless a fraudulent abuse that should trigger the fraud-based discovery rule. See Reply Brief 15–17. The Government urges that the fraud-based discovery rule applies only when the fraudulent conduct is itself the basis for the plaintiff’s claim for relief. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31–32. That is not so of Rotkiske’s 6 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM Opinion of GINSBURG, J. complaint, the Government observes, for his claim is prem- ised on the assertion that Klemm’s debt-collection suit was time barred. I do not view the fraud-based discovery rule as so con- fined and would hold that the rule governs if either the con- duct giving rise to the claim is fraudulent, or if fraud infects the manner in which the claim is presented. That under- standing of the rule is consistent with its equitable roots and historic rationale. Nearly two centuries ago, Justice Story explained the rule this way: “[E]very statute is to be expounded reasonably, so as to suppress, and not to extend, the mischief[s ] which it was designed to cure.” Sherwood v. Sutton, (No. 12,782) (CC NH 1828). Because statutes of limitations “preven[t] fraudulent and unjust claims from starting up at great distances of time,” a limitations provision “ought not be so construed, as to become an instrument to encourage fraud, if it admits of any other reasonable interpretation.” “[C]ases of fraud, therefore, form an implied exception [to a limitations prescription],” so as not to “permi[t] the defendant to avail himself of his own fraud.” This Court expressed the same understanding of the fraud-based discovery rule in There, the Court stated: “To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it con- cealed itself until such time as the party committing the fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful and secure.” 21 Wall., at 349. Klemm allegedly employed fraudulent service to obtain and conceal the default judgment that precipitated Rot- kiske’s FDCPA claim. That allegation, if proved, should suffice, under the fraud-based discovery rule, to permit ad- judication of Rotkiske’s claim on its merits. * * * Cite as: 589 U. S. (2019) 7 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. For the reasons stated, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
dissenting
|
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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Many people come to our country because they fear persecution in their homeland. Congress has provided two forms of relief for such people: asylum, see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 208(a), as added by 8 U.S. C. 1158(a); and withholding of deportation, see 243(h), as amended, 8 U.S. C. 1253(h). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has concluded that there is no practical distinction between the objective proofs an alien must submit to be eligible for these two forms of relief. The Court rejects this conclusion. Because I believe the BIA's interpretation of the statute is reasonable, I dissent. I The Court's opinion seems to assume that the BIA has adopted a rigorous mathematical approach to asylum cases, requiring aliens to demonstrate an objectively quantifiable risk of persecution in their homeland that is more than 50%. The Court then argues that such a position is inconsistent with the language and history of the Act. But this has never been the BIA's position. Thus, it is useful to examine the BIA's approach in some detail before evaluating the Court's *456 rejection of the BIA's approach. After all, the BIA is the tribunal with the primary responsibility for applying the Act and the greatest experience in doing so. The BIA's interpretation of the statutory term "well-founded fear" appears in Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986[1] Under the BIA's analysis, an immigration judge evaluating an asylum application should begin by determining the underlying historical facts. The burden of persuasion rests on the applicant, who must establish the truth of these facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See at 7 (citing, inter alia, 1A C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure 5.10b, p. 5-121 (rev. ed. 1986)). Once the immigration judge has decided what historical facts the applicant has demonstrated, he then decides whether those facts meet the definition of "refugee" set forth in 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S. C. 1101(a)(42)(A). The major point of contention in this case concerns that section's requirement that the fear be "well-founded."[2] In *457 Acosta, the BIA adhered to the interpretation of that language it had developed in Matter of : " `[T]he requirement that the fear be "well-founded" rules out an apprehension which is purely subjective. Some sort of showing must be made and this can ordinarily be done only by objective evidence. The claimant's own testimony as to the facts will sometimes be all that is available; but the crucial question is whether the testimony, if accepted as true, makes out a realistic likelihood that he will be persecuted.' "
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Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
dissenting
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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out a realistic likelihood that he will be persecuted.' " Acosta, (quoting ) (emphasis added by Acosta Board). The Acosta Board went on to caution: "By use of such words [as `realistic likelihood'] we do not mean that `a well-founded fear of persecution' requires an alien to establish to a particular degree of certainty, such as a `probability' as opposed to a `possibility,' that he will become a victim of persecution. Rather as a practical matter, what we mean can best be described as follows: the evidence must demonstrate that (1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien." Acosta, Finally, the Acosta opinion compared this "realistic likelihood" standard to the "clear probability" standard applied to *458 applications for withholding of deportation. The BIA's comments are insightful: "One might conclude that `a well-founded fear of persecution,' which requires a showing that persecution is likely to occur, refers to a standard that is different from `a clear probability of persecution,' which requires a showing that persecution is `more likely than not' to occur. As a practical matter, however, the facts in asylum and withholding cases do not produce clear-cut instances in which such fine distinctions can be meaningfully made. Our inquiry in these cases, after all, is not quantitative, i. e., we do not examine a variety of statistics to discern to some theoretical degree the likelihood of persecution. Rather our inquiry is qualitative: we examine the alien's experiences and other external events to determine if they are of a kind that enable us to conclude the alien is likely to become the victim of persecution. In this context, we find no meaningful distinction between a standard requiring a showing that persecution is likely to occur and a standard requiring a showing that persecution is more likely than not to occur. Accordingly, we conclude that the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation are not meaningfully different and, in practical application, converge." In sum, contrary to the Court's apparent conclusion, the BIA does not contend that both the "well-founded fear" standard and the "clear probability" standard require proof of a 51% chance that the alien will suffer persecution if he is returned to his homeland. The BIA plainly eschews analysis resting on mathematical probabilities. Rather, the BIA has
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
dissenting
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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eschews analysis resting on mathematical probabilities. Rather, the BIA has adopted a four-part test requiring proof of facts that demonstrate a realistic likelihood of persecution actually occurring. The heart of the Acosta decision is the BIA's empirical conclusion, based on its experience in adjudicating asylum applications, that if the facts establish such a basis for an alien's *459 fear, it rarely will make a difference whether the judge asks if persecution is "likely" to occur or "more likely than not" to occur. If the alien can establish such a basis, he normally will be eligible for relief under either standard. II In Part II of its opinion, the Court examines the language of the Act. Section 243(h) provides that the Attorney General shall grant withholding of deportation to any country where "such alien's life or freedom would be threatened." 8 U.S. C. 1253(h). Section 208(a) provides that the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum "if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee." 1158(a). The crucial language of 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, as added by defines a refugee as a person who has "a well-founded fear of persecution." 1101(a)(42)(A). In the Court's view, this language all but disposes of the case. Ante, at 427-432. With respect to the issue presented by this case, I find the language far more ambiguous than the Court does. Respondent contends that the BIA has fallen into error by equating the objective showings required under 208(a) and 243(h). The Court notes that the language of 208(a) differs from the language of 243(h) in that it contemplates a partially subjective inquiry. From this premise, the Court moves with little explanation to the conclusion that the objective inquiries under the two sections necessarily are different. In reaching this conclusion, the Court gives short shrift to the words "well-founded," that clearly require some objective basis for the alien's fear. The critical question presented by this case is whether the objective basis required for a fear of persecution to be "well-founded" differs in practice from the objective basis required for there to be a "clear probability" of persecution. Because both standards necessarily contemplate some objective basis, I cannot agree with the Court's *460 implicit conclusion that the statute resolves this question on its face. In my view, the character of evidence sufficient to meet these two standards is a question best answered by an entity familiar with the types of evidence and issues that arise in such cases. Congress limited eligibility for asylum to those persons whom "the Attorney General determines" to be refugees. See 208(a),
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
dissenting
|
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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whom "the Attorney General determines" to be refugees. See 208(a), 8 U.S. C. 1158(a). The Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for making these determinations to the BIA. That Board has examined more of these cases than any court ever has or ever can. It has made a considered judgment that the difference between the "well-founded" and the "clear probability" standards is of no practical import: that is, the evidence presented in asylum and withholding of deportation cases rarely, if ever, will meet one of these standards without meeting both. This is just the type of expert judgment formed by the entity to whom Congress has committed the question to which we should defer. The Court ignores the practical realities recognized by the expert agency and instead concentrates on semantic niceties. It posits a hypothetical situation in which a government sought to execute every 10th adult male. In its view, fear of such executions would be "well-founded" even if persecution of a particular individual would not be "more likely than not" to occur. See ante, at 431. But this hypothetical is irrelevant; it addresses a mathematically demanding interpretation of "well-founded" that has no relation to the BIA's actual treatment of asylum applications. Nor does it address the validity of the BIA's judgment that evidence presenting this distinction will be encountered infrequently, if ever. Common sense and human experience support the BIA's conclusion. Governments rarely persecute people by the numbers. It is highly unlikely that the evidence presented at an asylum or withholding of deportation hearing will demonstrate the mathematically specific risk of persecution posited by the Court's hypothetical. Taking account of the *461 types of evidence normally available in asylum cases, the BIA has chosen to make a qualitative evaluation of "realistic likelihoods." As I read the Acosta opinion, an individual who fled his country to avoid mass executions might be eligible for both withholding of deportation and asylum, whether or not he presented evidence of the numerical reach of the persecution. See Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986, at 18-25.[3] Nowhere does the Court consider whether the BIA's four-element interpretation of "well-founded" is unreasonable. Nor does the Court consider the BIA's view of the types of evidentiary presentations aliens generally make in asylum cases. In sum, the words Congress has chosen "well-founded" fear are ambiguous. They contemplate some objective basis without specifying a particular evidentiary threshold. There is no reason to suppose this formulation is inconsistent with the analysis set forth in Acosta. The BIA has concluded that a fear is not "well-founded" unless the fear
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
dissenting
|
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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concluded that a fear is not "well-founded" unless the fear has an objective basis indicating that there is a "realistic likelihood" that persecution would occur. Based on the text of the Act alone, I cannot conclude that this conclusion is unreasonable. III The Court bolsters its interpretation of the language of the Act by reference to three parts of the legislative history. A closer examination of these materials demonstrates that each of them is ambiguous. Nothing the Court relies on provides a positive basis for arguing that there is a material difference between the two standards. *462 A First, the Court cites legislative history indicating that Congress wished to preserve some existing standard when it placed the words "well-founded fear" in the Act. The Court concludes that the standard Congress intended to preserve was the BIA's practice under the old 203(a)(7), (1965). That section authorized the Attorney General to grant conditional entry to aliens fleeing from Communist countries or the Middle East, so long as they established a "fear of persecution." The Court argues that Congress chose the words "well-founded fear" to "preserve" as an asylum standard the prior interpretation of the word "fear" in the standard for conditional entry. In contrast, the United States argues that Congress chose the words "well-founded fear" to preserve the Attorney General's regulations governing applications for asylum by aliens in the United States.[4] These regulations were substantially in accord with the BIA's view, namely that there is no significant difference between the "well-founded fear" and "clear probability" standards. Compare 8 CFR 108.3(a) and 236.3 (a)(2) (1980) (asylum) with 8 CFR 242.17(c) (1980) Common sense suggests that the United States has the better of this argument. It is more natural to speak of "preserving" an interpretation that had governed the same form of relief than one that had applied to a different form of relief. Moreover, the legislative history makes it clear that Congress was referring to the regulations rather than to 203(a)(7). The Senate Report states that the bill "improv[es] *463 and clarif[ies] the procedures for determining asylum claims filed by aliens who are physically present in the United States. The substantive standard is not changed." S. Rep. No. 96-256, p. 9 (1979). As the Court recognizes, ante, at 435, n. 17, this statement unquestionably refers to the informal procedures for aliens in the United States, not the statutory procedures under 203(a)(7).[5] Similarly, the House Report states that "the new definition does not create a new and expanded means of entry, but instead regularizes and formalizes the policies and practices that have been followed
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
dissenting
|
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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and formalizes the policies and practices that have been followed in recent years." H. R. Rep. No. 96-608, p. 10 (1979) (emphasis added). Congress hardly would have felt a need to "formalize" the statutory procedures under 203(a)(7). Indeed, the House Report cites the Attorney General's regulations as the extant procedures to which it was referring. H. R. Rep., at 17. In my view, the legislative history indicates that Congress' choice of the words "well-founded" fear as the standard of eligibility for asylum was intended to carry forward the practice of the Attorney General in adjudicating asylum applications. The Attorney General had concluded that the standard for asylum was substantially identical to the standard for withholding of deportation. His decision to interpret the language of 208 in the same way is entirely reasonable. B Second, the Court relies on materials interpreting the United Nations Protocol. Ante, at 437-440. For several reasons, I find these materials to be only marginally relevant. *464 Both the President and the Senate thought that the Protocol was perfectly consistent with our country's immigration laws. See We should be reluctant to assume that our country has been violating the Protocol during the 20 years since its adoption. Moreover, as the Court recognizes, statements by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have no binding force, because " `the determination of refugee status under the Protocol is incumbent upon the Contracting State.' " Ante, at 439, n. 22 (quoting Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 1(ii) (Geneva, 1979)). In any event, the materials discussed by the Court shed little or no light on the question presented by this case. None of them states that the burden of proof for nonrefoulement under Article 33.1 of the United Nations Protocol of 1967 a remedy essentially identical to withholding of deportation under 243(h) of the Act is higher than the burden of proof for asylum under Article 34. The only thing the materials tend to establish is that a mathematical approach to the likelihood of persecution in asylum cases is arguably inconsistent with the sense of the drafters of the Protocol. The BIA has declined to adopt such an approach. See It is simply irrelevant that this approach might be inconsistent with the views of commentators on the Protocol. C Finally, the Court places great weight on the changes in the Act made by the Conference Committee. The Court notes that the Senate bill, S. 643, authorized the Attorney General to grant asylum if the applicant "is
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
dissenting
|
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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the Attorney General to grant asylum if the applicant "is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) and his deportation or return would be prohibited under section 243(h) of this Act." S. Rep. No. 96-256, at 26. The Court conjectures that this language "indicates that the Senate recognized that *465 there is a difference between the `well-founded fear' standard and the clear-probability standard. The enactment of the House bill rather than the Senate bill in turn demonstrates that Congress eventually refused to restrict eligibility for asylum only to aliens meeting the stricter standard." Ante, at 442 (footnote omitted). Neither the premise of the Court nor its conclusion is justified. The language of the Senate bill does not demonstrate that the Senate recognized a difference between the two standards. The Senate just as easily could have included the language to ensure that the Attorney General held to his position that there was no difference between the standards. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the changes made by the Conference Committee reflected a considered rejection of this portion of the Senate's definition of refugee. Rather, the conference Committee Report demonstrates that the Conference thought both bills adopted the same general definition of refugee the U. N. definition. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-781, p. 19 (1980). The differences the Conference saw between the bills related to treatment of refugees still in their homeland, and to refugees who have been "firmly resettled" in another country. See In short, I see no reason to believe that the minor differences in wording between the Senate bill and the Act as passed reflect a rejection of the position that there is no significant difference between the two standards.[6] Thus, I place no weight on the Conference Committee's choice of the language of the House bill. IV Even if I agreed with the Court's conclusion that there is a significant difference between the standards for asylum and *466 withholding of deportation, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and uphold the decision of the BIA in this case.[7] A careful reading of the decisions of the BIA and the Immigration Judge demonstrates that the BIA applied the lower asylum standard to this case. Respondent's claim for asylum rested solely on testimony that her brother had experienced difficulties with the authorities in Nicaragua. The Immigration Judge rejected respondent's claim because he found "no evidence of any substance in the record other than her brother's claim to asylum." App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. He further found: "None of the evidence
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
dissenting
|
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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for Cert. 27a. He further found: "None of the evidence indicates that the respondent would be persecuted for political beliefs, whatever they may be, or because she belongs to a particular social group. She has not proven that she or any other members of her family, other than her brother, has [sic] been detained, interrogated, arrested and imprisoned, tortured and convicted and sentenced by the regime presently in power in Nicaragua." The absence of such evidence was particularly probative, because many of the other members of respondent's family her parents, two sisters, her brother's wife, and her brother's *467 two children were still in Nicaragua and thus presumably subject to the persecution respondent feared. On appeal, the BIA affirmed. It decided this case after the passage of the Act, but before its opinion in Acosta. At that time, the BIA was confronted with a number of conflicting decisions by Courts of Appeals as to the correct standard for evaluating asylum applications. The BIA noted three different formulations of the "well-founded fear" standard: the "clear probability" test, see ; the "good reason" test, see rev'd on other grounds, ; and the "realistic likelihood" test the BIA had adopted in Matter of App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. See Reviewing the evidence respondent had submitted to the Immigration Judge, the BIA concluded that respondent could not obtain relief under any of the standards. The BIA focused especially on the fact that respondent "has openly admitted that she herself has taken no actions against the Nicaraguan government. She admits that she has never been politically active. She testified that she never assisted her brother in any of his political activities. Moreover, she admits that she has never been singled out for persecution by the present government." App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a.[8] Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Without examining either the factual or legal basis for the BIA's decision, the court granted the petition, reversed the BIA's decision, and remanded the application to the BIA for further consideration. *468 The sole basis articulated for this action was a conclusion that the BIA had applied the wrong legal standard. The Court of Appeals repeated its position that the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation are different. According to that court, an asylum applicant must "present `specific facts' through objective evidence to prove either past persecution or `good reason' to fear future persecution." ) (emphasis added). It then noted that the BIA had reached a different conclusion in Acosta and stated: "[T]he
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Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
dissenting
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/
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had reached a different conclusion in Acosta and stated: "[T]he Board appears to feel that it is exempt from the holding of Marbury v. Madison and not constrained by circuit court opinions. [T]he Board applied its own construction of the applicant's burden of proof in an asylum case to the claims of both Cardoza-Fonseca and [her copetitioner]. It held that they were required to demonstrate a clear probability of persecution in order to be declared eligible for asylum." This statement is simply inconsistent with the BIA's opinion. As I have explained, the BIA acknowledged the conflicting decisions of the various Courts of Appeals and explicitly tested the application under three different standards. The least burdensome of these the "good reason" standard is identical to the court's statement quoted this page. The Court of Appeals completely ignored the words in which the BIA framed its decision. It failed to examine the factual findings on which the decision rested. At least in this case, it appears that the Court of Appeals, and not the BIA, has misunderstood the proper relation between courts and agencies. That court properly could have considered whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that respondent failed to demonstrate a "good reason" to fear persecution, but it should not have assumed that *469 the BIA tested respondent's application by a higher standard than the BIA's own opinion reflects. V In my view, the Court misconstrues the Act and misreads its legislative history. Moreover, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has identified an error in the decision of the BIA in this case. Neither court has examined the factual findings on which the decision rested, or the legal standard the BIA applied to these facts. I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Justice Marshall
| 1,990 | 15 |
concurring
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Shell v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112499/shell-v-mississippi/
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I concur in the reversal of petitioner's death sentence. For the benefit of lower courts confronted with the issue raised in this case, I write separately to clarify what I understand the basis of this disposition to be. Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He appealed his sentence on the ground that the jury had been improperly instructed to consider whether the charged murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel," an aggravating factor that we deemed unconstitutionally vague in The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. It reasoned that Maynard was distinguishable because the trial court in this case limited the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor in its charge to the jury. The instruction in question provided: "[T]he word heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment of[,] the suffering of others." These definitions, the court held, cured any constitutional deficiency in the underlying "heinous, atrocious or cruel" instruction. This conclusion was in error. The trial court in Maynard issued a supplemental instruction defining "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" in terms nearly identical to the "limiting" instruction given in this case: "[T]he term "heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; "atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile; "cruel" means pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the sufferings of others."' *3 The Tenth Circuit sitting en banc held that this instruction did not cure the constitutional defect in the underlying "heinous, atrocious or cruel" instruction, see and, in affirming that judgment, this Court implicitly agreed. The basis for this conclusion is not difficult to discern. Obviously, a limiting instruction can be used to give content to a statutory factor that "is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer" only if the limiting instruction's own "definitions are constitutionally sufficient," that is, only if the limiting instruction itself "provide[s] some guidance to the sentencer." The trial court's definitions of "heinous" and "atrocious" in this case (and in Maynard) clearly fail this test; like "heinous" and "atrocious" themselves, the phrases "extremely wicked or shockingly evil" and "outrageously wicked and vile" could be used by "`[a] person of ordinary sensibility [to] fairly characterize almost every murder.'" ) (emphasis added). Indeed, there is no meaningful distinction between these latter formulations and the "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" instruction expressly invalidated in Nor is it of any consequence that the trial court defined "cruel" in an arguably more concrete
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Justice Breyer
| 1,998 | 2 |
concurring
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New Jersey v. New York
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118213/new-jersey-v-new-york/
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Many of us have parents or grandparents who landed as immigrants at "Ellis Island, New York." And when this case was argued, I assumed that history would bear out that Ellis Island was part and parcel of New York. But that is not what the record has revealed. Rather, it contains a set of facts, set forth with care by Justice Souter and Justice Stevens (who do not disagree about the facts), which shows, in my view, that the filled portion of Ellis Island belongs to New Jersey. I cannot agree with Justice Scalia that custom, assumption, and late 19th-century history fills in, and explains, an ambiguity in the original Compact between the States, for I do not find sufficient, relevant ambiguity. The word "relevant" is important, for the document, in fact, is highly ambiguous. But what I find the more serious and difficult ambiguity arises in sections upon which New York State does not *813 rely. See ante, at 773-775, 781-782, and nn. 3, 4 (discussing Article Third). The State has basically rested its case upon Article First and Article Second. See Brief for Defendant 11-15; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, 35-36, 46. Those Articles specify that Ellis Island is in New Jersey waters, for the border between the States lies far to the east. Those Articles do mention an exception for New York's "present jurisdiction of and over Bedlow's and Ellis's islands," but they are silent about what would happen to an Ellis Island "avulsion," i. e., the creation of significant additional territory through landfill. As Justice Souter points out, ante, at 783, n. 6, silence is not ambiguity; silence means that ordinary background law applies; and that ordinary background law gives an island's avulsion not to the State that owns the island, but to the State in whose waters the avulsion is found. See ; ; see also ante, at 783-784. Nor can I agree with Justice Stevens that New Jersey lost through prescription what once rightfully was its own. Too much of the evidence upon which he relies is evidence of events that took place during the time that neither New York nor New Jersey, but the Federal Government, controlled Ellis Island. At that time, Judge Wyzanski expressed the view that: "Ellis Island and Bedloe's Island are no more a part of New York or New Jersey than the Philippine Islands or Hawaii are. They are territories of the United States not falling under the jurisdiction of any one of the fortyeight states." N. J. Exh. 43. The Federal Government's virtually exclusive authority over the Island
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Justice Breyer
| 1,998 | 2 |
concurring
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New Jersey v. New York
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118213/new-jersey-v-new-york/
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43. The Federal Government's virtually exclusive authority over the Island means that New Jersey could well have thought about the same. Perhaps more specialized property lawyers would have phrased their own conclusions in less ringing terms and with more numerous qualifications. But, still, *814 one cannot reasonably expect New Jersey to have mounted a major protest against New York's assertions of "sovereignty" (modest as they were) over territory that was within the control of the Federal Government. Nor can one expect the immigrants themselves to have taken a particular interest in state boundaries, for most would have thought not in terms of "New York" or "New Jersey," but of a New World that offered them opportunities denied them by the Old. Given this background, any legal rule of "prescription" that found New York to have surmounted its high barrier here would create serious problems of fairness in other cases. For these reasons, in particular, and others, all spelled out in detail by Justice Souter, I must conclude that the filled portion of Ellis Island belongs not to New York, but to New Jersey. I therefore join the Court's opinion.
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2675753/hall-v-florida/
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This Court has held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution forbid the execution of persons with intellectual disability. Florida law defines intellectual disability to require an IQ test score of 70 or less. If, from test scores, a prisoner is deemed to have an IQ above 70, all further exploration of intellectual disability is fore closed. This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is un I On February 21, 1978, Freddie Lee petitioner here, and his accomplice, Mark Ruffin, kidnaped, beat, raped, and murdered Karol Hurst, a pregnant, 21-year-old new lywed. Afterward, and Ruffin drove to a convenience store they planned to rob. In the parking lot of the store, they killed Lonnie Coburn, a sheriff’s deputy who at tempted to apprehend them. received the death penalty for both murders, although his sentence for the Coburn murder was later reduced on account of insuffi cient evidence of premeditation. 403 2 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court So. 2d 1319, 1 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam). argues that he cannot be executed because of his intellectual disability. Previous opinions of this Court have employed the term “mental retardation.” This opin ion uses the term “intellectual disability” to describe the identical phenomenon. See Rosa’s Law, (changing entries in the U. S. Code from “mental retarda tion” to “intellectual disability”); Schalock et. al, The Re naming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 Intellectual & De velopmental Disabilities 116 (07). This change in ter minology is approved and used in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, one of the basic texts used by psychiatrists and other experts; the manual is often referred to by its initials “DSM,” followed by its edition number, e.g., “DSM–5.” See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statisti cal Manual of Mental Disorders 33 (5th ed. 13). When was first sentenced, this Court had not yet ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits States from imposing the death penalty on persons with intellectual disability. See And at the time, Florida law did not consider intellectual disability as a statutory mitigating factor. After this Court held that capital defendants must be permitted to present nonstatutory mitigating evidence in death penalty proceedings, Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398–399 (1987), was resentenced. then presented substantial and unchallenged evidence of intel lectual disability. School records indicated that his teach ers identified him on numerous occasions as “[m]entally retarded.” App. 482–483. had been prosecuted for a different,
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2675753/hall-v-florida/
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“[m]entally retarded.” App. 482–483. had been prosecuted for a different, earlier crime. His lawyer in that matter later testified that the lawyer “[c]ouldn’t really understand anything [] said.” And, with respect to the murder trial given him in this case, ’s counsel recalled Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 3 Opinion of the Court that could not assist in his own defense because he had “ ‘a mental level much lower than his age,’ ” at best comparable to the lawyer’s 4-year-old daughter. Brief for Petitioner 11. A number of medical clinicians testified that, in their professional opinion, was “significantly retarded,” App. 507; was “mentally retarded,” ; and had levels of understanding “typically [seen] with toddlers,” As explained below in more detail, an individual’s abil ity or lack of ability to adapt or adjust to the requirements of daily life, and success or lack of success in doing so, is central to the framework followed by psychiatrists and other professionals in diagnosing intellectual disability. See DSM–5, at 37. ’s siblings testified that there was something “very wrong” with him as a child. App. 466. was “slow with speech and slow to learn.” at 490. He “walked and talked long after his other brothers and sisters,” and had “great difficulty forming his words,” ’s upbringing appeared to make his deficits in adap tive functioning all the more severe. was raised—in the words of the sentencing judge—“under the most horri ble family circumstances imaginable.” Al though “[t]eachers and siblings alike immediately recog nized [] to be significantly mentally retarded [t]his retardation did not garner any sympathy from his mother, but rather caused much scorn to befall him.” was “[c]onstantly beaten because he was ‘slow’ or because he made simple mistakes.” His mother “would strap [] to his bed at night, with a rope thrown over a rafter. In the morning, she would awaken by hoisting him up and whipping him with a belt, rope, or cord.” was beaten “ten or fifteen times a week sometimes.” His mother tied him “in a ‘croaker’ sack, swung it over a fire, and beat him,” “buried him in the sand up to his neck to ‘strengthen his legs,’ ” and 4 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court “held a gun on while she poked [him] with sticks.” (Barkett, C. J., dissenting). The jury, notwithstanding this testimony, voted to sentence to death, and the sentencing court adopted the jury’s recommendation. The court found that there was “substantial evidence in the record” to support the finding that “Freddie Lee has been mentally retarded his entire life.” App.
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2675753/hall-v-florida/
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“Freddie Lee has been mentally retarded his entire life.” App. 46. Yet the court also “suspect[ed] that the defense experts [were] guilty of some professional overkill,” because “[n]othing of which the experts testified could explain how a psychotic, mentally-retarded, brain damaged, learning-disabled, speech-impaired person could formulate a plan whereby a car was stolen and a conven ience store was robbed.” The sentencing court went on to state that, even assuming the expert testimony to be accurate, “the learning disabilities, mental retarda tion, and other mental difficulties cannot be used to justify, excuse or extenuate the moral culpability of the defendant in this cause.” was again sen tenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that “’s argument that his mental retarda tion provided a pretense of moral or legal justification” had “no merit.” Chief Justice Barkett dissented, arguing that executing a person with intellectual disability violated the State Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. at 481– 482. In 02, this Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of persons with intellectual disa bility. v. 536 U.S., at On November 30, filed a motion claiming that he had intellec tual disability and could not be executed. More than five years later, Florida held a hearing to consider ’s mo tion. again presented evidence of intellectual disabil ity, including an IQ test score of 71. ( had received Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 5 Opinion of the Court nine IQ evaluations in 40 years, with scores ranging from 60 to 80, Brief for Respondent 8, but the sentencing court excluded the two scores below 70 for evidentiary reasons, leaving only scores between 71 and 80. See App. 107; 109 So. 3d 704, 707 (Fla. 12)). In response, Florida argued that could not be found intellectually disabled be cause Florida law requires that, as a threshold matter, show an IQ test score of 70 or below before presenting any additional evidence of his intellectual disability. App. 278–279 (“[U]nder the law, if an I. Q. is above 70, a person is not mentally retarded”). The Florida Supreme Court rejected ’s appeal and held that Florida’s 70-point threshold was –708. This Court granted certiorari. 571 U. S. (13). II The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The Four teenth Amendment applies those restrictions to the States. ; (per curiam). “By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.” 0; see also
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2675753/hall-v-florida/
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to respect the dignity of all persons.” 0; see also (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man”). The Eighth Amendment “is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes en lightened by a humane justice.” To enforce the Constitution’s protection of human dignity, this Court looks to the “evolv ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” The Eighth 6 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court Amendment’s protection of dignity reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire to be. This is to affirm that the Nation’s constant, unyielding purpose must be to transmit the Constitution so that its precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and force. The Eighth Amendment prohibits certain punishments as a categorical matter. No natural-born citizen may be denaturalized. No person may be sentenced to death for a crime committed as a juvenile. And, as relevant for this case, persons with intellectual disability may not be executed. 536 U.S., at No legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person with intellectual disability. To do so contravenes the Eighth Amendment, for to impose the harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent dignity as a human being. “[P]unishment is justified under one or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution.” Rehabilitation, it is evident, is not an applicable rationale for the death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). As for deterrence, those with intellectual disability are, by reason of their condition, likely unable to make the calculated judgments that are the premise for the deterrence rationale. They have a “diminished ability” to “process information, to learn from experience, to en gage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses [which] make[s] it less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.” Retributive val ues are also ill-served by executing those with intellectual disability. The diminished capacity of the intellectually disabled lessens moral culpability and hence the retribu tive value of the punishment. See (“If the cul Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 7 Opinion of the Court pability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution”). A further reason for
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2675753/hall-v-florida/
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not merit that form of retribution”). A further reason for not imposing the death penalty on a person who is intellectually disabled is to protect the integrity of the trial process. These persons face “a special risk of wrongful execution” because they are more likely to give false confessions, are often poor witnesses, and are less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel. at 3–. This is not to say that under current law persons with intellectual disability who “meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility” may not be tried and punished. They may not, however, re ceive the law’s most severe sentence. The question this case presents is how intellectual disability must be defined in order to implement these principles and the holding of To determine if Florida’s cutoff rule is valid, it is proper to consider the psychiatric and professional studies that elaborate on the purpose and meaning of IQ scores to determine how the scores relate to the holding of This in turn leads to a better understanding of how the legislative policies of various States, and the holdings of state courts, imple ment the rule. That understanding informs our determination whether there is a consensus that instructs how to decide the specific issue presented here. And, in conclusion, this Court must express its own independent determination reached in light of the instruction found in those sources and authorities. III A That this Court, state courts, and state legislatures consult and are informed by the work of medical experts in determining intellectual disability is unsurprising. Those 8 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court professionals use their learning and skills to study and consider the consequences of the classification schemes they devise in the diagnosis of persons with mental or psychiatric disorders or disabilities. Society relies upon medical and professional expertise to define and explain how to diagnose the mental condition at issue. And the definition of intellectual disability by skilled professionals has implications far beyond the confines of the death penalty: for it is relevant to education, access to social programs, and medical treatment plans. In determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult the medical community’s opinions. As the Court noted in the medical community defines intellectual disability according to three criteria: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive functioning (the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances), and onset of these deficits during the developmental period. See at 308, n. 3; DSM–5, at 33; Brief for American Psychologi cal Association et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2675753/hall-v-florida/
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American Psychologi cal Association et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13 (hereinafter APA Brief). This last factor, referred to as “age of onset,” is not at issue. The first and second criteria—deficits in intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive functioning—are central here. In the context of a formal assessment, “[t]he existence of concurrent deficits in intellectual and adap tive functioning has long been the defining characteristic of intellectual disability.” On its face, the Florida statute could be consistent with the views of the medical community noted and discussed in Florida’s statute defines intellectual disability for purposes of an proceeding as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing con currently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” Fla. Stat. (13). The statute further defines “signifi Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 9 Opinion of the Court cantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” as “performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test.” The mean IQ test score is The concept of standard deviation describes how scores are dispersed in a popula tion. Standard deviation is distinct from standard error of measurement, a concept which describes the reliability of a test and is discussed further below. The standard devia tion on an IQ test is approximately 15 points, and so two standard deviations is approximately 30 points. Thus a test taker who performs “two or more standard deviations from the mean” will score approximately 30 points below the mean on an IQ test, i.e., a score of approximately 70 points. On its face this statute could be interpreted consistently with and with the conclusions this Court reaches in the instant case. Nothing in the statute precludes Florida from taking into account the IQ test’s standard error of measurement, and as discussed below there is evidence that Florida’s Legislature intended to include the meas urement error in the calculation. But the Florida Su preme Court has interpreted the provisions more nar rowly. It has held that a person whose test score is above 70, including a score within the margin for measurement error, does not have an intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other evidence that would show his facul ties are limited. See 712– 713 (Fla. 07) (per curiam). That strict IQ test score cutoff of 70 is the issue in this case. Pursuant to this mandatory cutoff, sentencing courts cannot consider even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual disability as measured and made manifest by the defendant’s failure or inability to adapt to his social and cultural
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2675753/hall-v-florida/
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failure or inability to adapt to his social and cultural environment, including medical histories, behavioral records, school tests and reports, and testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstances. This is 10 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court so even though the medical community accepts that all of this evidence can be probative of intellectual disability, including for individuals who have an IQ test score above 70. See APA Brief 15–16 (“[T]he relevant clinical authori ties all agree that an individual with an IQ score above 70 may properly be diagnosed with intellectual disability if significant limitations in adaptive functioning also exist”); DSM–5, at 37 (“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of indi viduals with a lower IQ score”). Florida’s rule disregards established medical practice in two interrelated ways. It takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence. It also relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own terms, imprecise. The professionals who design, administer, and interpret IQ tests have agreed, for years now, that IQ test scores should be read not as a single fixed number but as a range. See D. Wechsler, The Measurement of Adult Intel ligence 133 (3d ed. 1944) (reporting the range of error on an early IQ test). Each IQ test has a “standard error of measurement,” ib often referred to by the abbreviation “SEM.” A test’s SEM is a statistical fact, a reflection of the inherent imprecision of the test itself. See R. Furr & V. Bacharach, Psychometrics 118 (2d ed. 14) (identify ing the SEM as “one of the most important concepts in measurement theory”). An individual’s IQ test score on any given exam may fluctuate for a variety of reasons. These include the test-taker’s health; practice from earlier tests; the environment or location of the test; the examin er’s demeanor; the subjective judgment involved in scoring certain questions on the exam; and simple lucky guessing. See American Association on Intellectual and Develop Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 11 Opinion of the Court mental Disabilities, R. Schalock et al., User’s Guide To Accompany the 11th Edition of Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 22 (12) (hereinafter AAIDD Manual); A. Kaufman, IQ Testing 101, pp. 138–139 (09). The SEM reflects the reality that an individual’s intel lectual functioning cannot be reduced
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2675753/hall-v-florida/
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reality that an individual’s intel lectual functioning cannot be reduced to a single numeri cal score. For purposes of most IQ tests, the SEM means that an individual’s score is best understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score. The SEM allows clinicians to calculate a range within which one may say an individual’s true IQ score lies. See APA Brief 23 (“SEM is a unit of measurement: 1 SEM equates to a confidence of 68% that the measured score falls within a given score range, while 2 SEM provides a 95% confidence level that the measured score is within a broader range”). A score of 71, for instance, is generally considered to re flect a range between 66 and 76 with 95% confidence and a range of 68.5 and 73.5 with a 68% confidence. See DSM– 5, at 37 (“Individuals with intellectual disability have scores of approximately two standard deviations or more below the population mean, including a margin for meas urement error (generally +5 points). [T]his involves a score of 65– (70 ± 5)”); APA Brief 23 (“For example, the average SEM for the WAIS-IV is 2.16 IQ test points and the average SEM for the Stanford-Binet 5 is 2.30 IQ test points (test manuals report SEMs by different age group ings; these scores are similar, but not identical, often due to sampling error)”). Even when a person has taken mul tiple tests, each separate score must be assessed using the SEM, and the analysis of multiple IQ scores jointly is a complicated endeavor. See Schneider, Principles of As sessment of Aptitude and Achievement, in The Oxford Handbook of Child Psychological Assessment 286, 289– 291, 318 (D. Saklofske, C. Reynolds, V. Schwean, eds. 13). In addition, because the test itself may be flawed, 12 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court or administered in a consistently flawed manner, multiple examinations may result in repeated similar scores, so that even a consistent score is not conclusive evidence of intellectual functioning. Despite these professional explanations, Florida law used the test score as a fixed number, thus barring further consideration of other evidence bearing on the question of intellectual disability. For professionals to diagnose—and for the law then to determine—whether an intellectual disability exists once the SEM applies and the individual’s IQ score is or below the inquiry would consider factors indicating whether the person had deficits in adaptive functioning. These include evidence of past performance, environment, and upbringing. B A significant majority of States implement the protec tions of by taking the SEM into account,
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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the protec tions of by taking the SEM into account, thus acknowledging the error inherent in using a test score without necessary adjustment. This calculation provides “objective indicia of society’s standards” in the context of the Eighth Amendment. 543 U.S., 3. Only the Kentucky and Legislatures have adopted a fixed score cutoff identical to Florida’s. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Lexis Supp. 13); ; Va. Code Ann. (Lexis Supp. 13); Johnson v. Commonwealth, vacated and remanded on other grounds, Alabama also may use a strict IQ score cutoff at 70, although not as a result of legislative action. See (“The Alabama Supreme Court did not adopt any ‘margin of error’ when examining a defendant’s IQ score”). Petitioner does not question the rule in States which use a bright-line cutoff at or greater, Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, and Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 13 Opinion of the Court so they are not included alongside Florida in this analysis. In addition to these States, Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington have statutes which could be interpreted to provide a bright-line cutoff leading to the same result that Florida mandates in its cases. See –3(F) (West 13); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, §9(d)(3) (12 Supp.); Kan. Stat. Ann. (13 Supp.); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §15A–05 (Lexis 13); (2)(c) (12). That these state laws might be interpreted to require a bright-line cutoff does not mean that they will be so inter preted, however. See, e.g., 137, (10) (Although Nebras ka’s statute specifies “[a]n intelligence quotient of seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test,” “[t]he district court found that [the defendant’s] score of on the [IQ test], considered in light of the standard error of measurement, could be considered as subaverage general intellectual functioning for purposes of diagnosing mental retardation”). Arizona’s statute appears to set a broad statutory cutoff at 70, –3(F) (West 13), but another provision instructs courts to “take into account the margin of error for a test administered.” at 3(K)(5). How courts are meant to interpret the statute in a situation like ’s is not altogether clear. The prin cipal Arizona case on the matter, State v. Roque, 141 P.3d 368, (Ariz 06), states that “the statute accounts for margin of error by requiring multiple tests,” and that “if the defendant achieves a full-scale score of 70 or below on any one of the tests, then the court proceeds to a hearing.” But that case also notes that the defendant had an IQ score of 80, well outside the margin of error, and that all but
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majority
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Hall v. Florida
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well outside the margin of error, and that all but one of the sub-parts of the IQ test were “above” Kansas has not had an execution in almost five decades, 14 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court and so its laws and jurisprudence on this issue are unlikely to receive attention on this specific question. See (“[E]ven in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the practice is uncommon. Some States continue to authorize executions, but none have been carried out in decades. Thus there is little need to pursue legislation barring the execution of the mentally retarded in those States”). Delaware has executed three individuals in the past dec ade, while Washington has executed one person, and has recently suspended its death penalty. None of the four individuals executed recently in those States appears to have brought a claim similar to that advanced here. Thus, at most nine States mandate a strict IQ score cutoff at 70. Of these, four States (Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington) appear not to have considered the issue in their courts. On the other side of the ledger stand the 18 States that have abolished the death penalty, either in full or for new offenses, and Ore gon, which has suspended the death penalty and executed only two individuals in the past 40 years. See 543 U.S., (“[The] Court should have considered those States that had abandoned the death penalty altogether as part of the consensus against the juvenile death penalty”). In those States, of course, a person in ’s position could not be executed even without a finding of intellectual disability. Thus in 41 States an individual in ’s position—an individual with an IQ score of 71—would not be deemed automatically eligible for the death penalty. These aggregate numbers are not the only considera tions bearing on a determination of consensus. Consistency of the direction of change is also relevant. See at 565–566 (quoting ). Since many States have passed legislation to comply with the constitutional requirement that persons with intellectual disability not be executed. Two of these States, Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 15 Opinion of the Court and Delaware, appear to set a strict cutoff at 70, although as discussed, Delaware’s courts have yet to interpret the law. In contrast, at least 11 States have either abolished the death penalty or passed legislation allowing defend ants to present additional evidence of intellectual disabil ity when their IQ test score is above 70. Since five States have abolished the death pen alty through legislation. See 12
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| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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have abolished the death pen alty through legislation. See 12 Conn. Pub. Acts no. 12– 5; Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 725, (West 12); Md. Cor rec. Servs. Code Ann. et seq. ; N. J. Stat. Ann. (West Supp. 13); 09 N. M. Laws ch. 11, In addition, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated New York’s death penalty under the State Constitution in see and legislation has not been passed to reinstate it. And when it did impose the death penalty, New York did not employ an IQ cutoff in determining intellectual disability. N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law Ann. In addition to these States, at least five others have passed legislation allowing a defendant to present addi tional evidence of intellectual disability even when an IQ test score is above 70. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. (West Supp. 14) (no IQ cutoff); –2515A (Lexis Supp. 13) (“seventy (70) or below”); Pizzutto v. State, 146 Idaho 7, 2 P.3d 642, (“The alleged error in IQ testing is plus or minus five points. The district court was entitled to draw reasonable infer ences from the undisputed facts”); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.5.1 (West Supp. 14) (no IQ cutoff); Nev. Rev. Stat. (13) (no IQ cutoff); Utah Code Ann (Lexis 12) (no IQ cutoff). The U. S. Code likewise does not set a strict IQ cutoff. See 18 U.S. C. §36(c). And no State that previously allowed defendants with an IQ score over 70 to present additional evidence of intellectual disability has modified its law to create a 16 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court strict cutoff at 70. Cf. 6 no State that previ ously prohibited capital punishment for juveniles has reinstated it”). In summary, every state legislature to have considered the issue after —save ’s—and whose law has been interpreted by its courts has taken a position contrary to that of Florida. Indeed, the Florida Legisla ture, which passed the relevant legislation prior to might well have believed that its law would not create a fixed cutoff at 70. The staff analysis accompanying the 01 bill states that it “does not contain a set IQ level Two standard deviations from these tests is ap proximately a 70 IQ, although it can be extended up to” Fla. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, CS/SB 238, p. 11 (Feb. 14, 01). But the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the law to require a bright-line cutoff at 70, see 9 So. 2d, at 712–713, and the Court is bound by that interpretation. The rejection of the strict 70 cutoff in the
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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interpretation. The rejection of the strict 70 cutoff in the vast majority of States and the “consistency in the trend,” 7, toward recognizing the SEM provide strong evi dence of consensus that our society does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane. C itself acknowledges the inherent error in IQ testing. It is true that “did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides for determining when a person who claims mental retardation” falls within the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 831 (09). In the Court stated: “Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wain- Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 17 Opinion of the Court wright with regard to insanity, ‘we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to en force the constitutional restriction upon [their] execu tion of sentences.’ ” ; citation omitted). As discussed above, the States play a critical role in ad vancing protections and providing the Court with infor mation that contributes to an understanding of how intel lectual disability should be measured and assessed. But did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional protection. The Court twice cited definitions of intellectual disability which, by their express terms, rejected a strict IQ test score cutoff at 70. first cited the definition provided in the DSM–IV: “ ‘Mild’ mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50–55 to approximately 70.” n. 3 (citing Diag nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed. 00)). The Court later noted that “ ‘an IQ between 70 and or lower is typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition.’ ” n. 5. Further more, immediately after the Court declared that it left “ ‘to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction,’ ” the Court stated in an accompanying footnote that “[t]he [state] statutory definitions of mental retardation are not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions,” Thus itself not only cited clinical definitions for intellectual disability but also noted that the States’ standards, on which the Court based its own conclusion, conformed to those definitions. In the words of those persons who meet the “clinical definitions” of intel 18 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court lectual disability “by definition have
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| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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FLORIDA Opinion of the Court lectual disability “by definition have diminished capac ities to understand and process information, to communi cate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.” Thus, they bear “diminish[ed] personal culpability.” The clinical definitions of intellectual disability, which take into account that IQ scores represent a range, not a fixed number, were a fundamental premise of And those clinical definitions have long included the SEM. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 28 (rev. 3d ed. 1987) (“Since any measurement is fallible, an IQ score is generally thought to involve an error of meas urement of approximately five points; hence, an IQ of 70 is considered to represent a band or zone of 65 to Treat ing the IQ with some flexibility permits inclusion in the Mental Retardation category of people with IQs somewhat higher than 70 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior”). Respondent argues that the current Florida law was favorably cited by the Court. See Brief for Re spondent 18 (“As evidence of the national consensus, the Court specifically cited Florida’s statute at issue here, which has not substantively changed”). While did refer to Florida’s law in a citation listing States which had outlawed the execution of the intellectually disabled, 536 U.S., that fleeting mention did not signal the Court’s approval of Florida’s current understanding of the law. As discussed above, when was decided the Florida Supreme Court had not yet interpreted the law to require a strict IQ cutoff at 70. That new interpretation runs counter to the clinical definition cited throughout and to Florida’s own legislative report indicating this kind of cutoff need not be used. Respondent’s argument also conflicts with the logic of and the Eighth Amendment. If the States were to Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 19 Opinion of the Court have complete autonomy to define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s decision in could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not become a reality. This Court thus reads to provide substantial guidance on the definition of intellectual disability. D The actions of the States and the precedents of this Court “give us essential instruction,” 543 U.S., at 564, but the inquiry must go further. “[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.” Coker v. Georgia, 7 That exercise of independent judgment is the
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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v. Georgia, 7 That exercise of independent judgment is the Court’s judicial duty. See (“[T]o the extent Stanford was based on a rejection of the idea that this Court is required to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class of crimes or offenders, it suffices to note that this rejection was inconsistent with prior Eighth Amendment decisions” (citation omitted). In this Court’s independent judgment, the Florida stat ute, as interpreted by its courts, is un In addition to the views of the States and the Court’s precedent, this determination is informed by the views of medical experts. These views do not dictate the Court’s decision, yet the Court does not disregard these informed assessments. See (“[T]he science of psychiatry informs but does not control ultimate legal determinations”). It is the Court’s duty to interpret the Constitution, but it need not do so in isolation. The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic frame HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court work. itself points to the diagnostic criteria em ployed by psychiatric professionals. And the professional community’s teachings are of particular help in this case, where no alternative definition of intellectual disability is presented and where this Court and the States have placed substantial reliance on the expertise of the medical profession. By failing to take into account the SEM and setting a strict cutoff at 70, Florida “goes against the unanimous professional consensus.” APA Brief 15. Neither Florida nor its amici point to a single medical professional who supports this cutoff. The DSM–5 repudiates it: “IQ test scores are approximations of conceptual functioning but may be insufficient to assess reasoning in real-life situa tions and mastery of practical tasks.” DSM–5, at 37. This statement well captures the Court’s independent assess ment that an individual with an IQ test score “between 70 and or lower,” may show intellectual disability by presenting additional evidence regarding difficulties in adaptive functioning. The flaws in Florida’s law are the result of the inherent error in IQ tests themselves. An IQ score is an approxi mation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning. See APA Brief 24 (“[I]t is standard pyscho metric practice to report the ‘estimates of relevant reliabil ities and standard errors of measurement’ when reporting a test score”); (the margin of error is “inherent to the accuracy of IQ scores”); Furr, Psychometrics, 9 (“[T]he standard error of measurement is an important psychometric value with implications for applied meas
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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is an important psychometric value with implications for applied meas urement”). SEM is not a concept peculiar to the psychiat ric profession and IQ tests. It is a measure that is recog nized and relied upon by those who create and devise tests of all sorts. 8 (identifying the SEM as “one of the most important concepts in measurement theory”). This awareness of the IQ test’s limits is of particular Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 21 Opinion of the Court importance when conducting the conjunctive assessment necessary to assess an individual’s intellectual ability. See American Association on Intellectual and Develop mental Disabilities, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 40 (11th ed. 10) (“It must be stressed that the diagnosis of [intellectual disability] is intended to reflect a clinical judgment rather than an actuarial determination”). Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number. See DSM–5, at 37. Courts must recognize, as does the medical community, that the IQ test is imprecise. This is not to say that an IQ test score is unhelpful. It is of considerable significance, as the medical community recognizes. But in using these scores to assess a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty, a State must afford these test scores the same studied skepticism that those who design and use the tests do, and understand that an IQ test score repre sents a range rather than a fixed number. A State that ignores the inherent imprecision of these tests risks exe cuting a person who suffers from intellectual disability. See APA Brief 17 (“Under the universally accepted clinical standards for diagnosing intellectual disability, the court’s determination that Mr. is not intellectually disabled cannot be considered valid”). This Court agrees with the medical experts that when a defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowl edged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disa bility, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits. It is not sound to view a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment. See DSM–5, at 37 (“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score”). The Florida statute, as interpreted by its courts, misuses IQ score on its own terms; and 22 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court this, in turn, bars consideration of evidence that must be considered in determining whether a defendant in a capi tal case has intellectual disability. Florida’s rule is invalid under
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,014 | 4 |
majority
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Hall v. Florida
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tal case has intellectual disability. Florida’s rule is invalid under the Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. E Florida seeks to execute a man because he scored a 71 instead of 70 on an IQ test. Florida is one of just a few States to have this rigid rule. Florida’s rule misconstrues the Court’s statements in that intellectually dis ability is characterized by an IQ of “approximately 70.” 536 U.S., at 308, n. 3. Florida’s rule is in direct opposition to the views of those who design, administer, and interpret the IQ test. By failing to take into account the standard error of measurement, Florida’s law not only contradicts the test’s own design but also bars an essential part of a sentencing court’s inquiry into adaptive functioning. Freddie Lee may or may not be intellectually dis abled, but the law requires that he have the opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability, including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime. The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may impose. Persons facing that most severe sanction must have a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution. Florida’s law contravenes our Nation’s commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world. The States are laboratories for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the Constitu tion protects. The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 1 ALITO, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 12–10882 FREDDIE LEE HALL, PETITIONER v.
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Justice Scalia
| 1,995 | 9 |
dissenting
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Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117892/allied-bruce-terminix-cos-v-dobson/
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I have previously joined two judgments of this Court that rested upon the holding of Southland See Volt Information Sciences, ; In neither of those cases, however, did any party ask that Southland be overruled, and it was therefore not necessary to consider the question. In the present case, by contrast, one of respondents' central arguments is that Southland was wrongly decided, and their request for its overruling has been supported by an amicus brief signed by the attorneys general of 20 States. For the reasons set forth in Justice Thomas' opinion, which I join, I agree with the respondents (and belatedly with Justice O'Connor) that Southland clearly misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act. I do not believe that proper application of stare decisis prevents correction of the mistake. Adhering to Southland *285 entails a permanent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of disputes. Abandoning it does not impair reliance interests to a degree that justifies this evil. Primary behavior is not affected: No rule of conduct is retroactively changed, but only (perhaps) the forum in which violation is to be determined and remedied. I doubt that many contracts with arbitration clauses would have been forgone, or entered into only for significantly higher remuneration, absent the Southland guarantee. Where, moreover, reliance on Southland did make a significant difference, rescission of the contract for mistake of law would often be available. See 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 616 (1960 ed. and Supp. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 152 (1979). I shall not in the future dissent from judgments that rest on Southland. I will, however, stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling it, since Southland will not become more correct over time, the course of future lawmaking seems unlikely to be affected by its existence, cf. and the accumulated private reliance will not likely increase beyond the level it has already achieved (few contracts not terminable at will have more than a 5-year term). For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,976 | 11 |
majority
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Mathews v. Lucas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109523/mathews-v-lucas/
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This case presents the issue of the constitutionality, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of those provisions of the Social Security Act that condition the eligibility of certain illegitimate children for a surviving child's insurance benefits upon a showing that the deceased wage earner was the claimant child's parent and, at the time of his death, was living with the child or was contributing to his support. I Robert Cuffee, now deceased, lived with Belmira Lucas during the years 1948 through 1966, but they were never married. Two children were born to them during these years: Ruby M. Lucas, in 1953, and Darin E. Lucas, in 1960. In 1966 Cuffee and Lucas separated. Cuffee died in Providence, R. I., his home, in 1968. He died without ever having acknowledged in writing his paternity of either Ruby or Darin, and it was never determined in any judicial proceeding during his lifetime that he was the father of either child. After Cuffee's death, Mrs. Lucas filed an application on behalf of Ruby and Darin for surviving children's benefits under 202 (d) (1) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 402 (d) (1) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), based upon Cuffee's earnings record. II In operative terms, the Act provides that an unmarried son or daughter of an individual, who died fully or currently insured under the Act, may apply for and be *498 entitled to a survivor's benefit, if the applicant is under 18 years of age at the time of application (or is a full-time student and under 22 years of age) and was dependent, within the meaning of the statute, at the time of the parent's death.[1] A child is considered dependent for this purpose if the insured father was living with or contributing to the child's support at the time of death. Certain children, however, are relieved of the burden of such individualized proof of dependency. Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, a child *499 who is legitimate, or a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the insured parent's estate under the applicable state intestacy law, is considered to have been dependent at the time of the parent's death.[2] Even lacking this relationship under state law, a child, unless adopted by some other individual, is entitled to a presumption of dependency if the decedent, before death, (a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with the other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid,
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,976 | 11 |
majority
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Mathews v. Lucas
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but for a nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing had acknowledged the child to be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child's father, or (d) had been ordered by a court to support the child because the child was his.[3] *500 An Examiner of the Social Security Administration, after hearings, determined that while Cuffee's paternity was established, the children had failed to demonstrate their dependency by proof that Cuffee either lived with them or was contributing to their support at the time * of his death, or by any of the statutory presumptions of dependency, and thus that they were not entitled to survivorship benefits under the Act. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration affirmed these rulings, and they became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Lucas then timely filed this action, pursuant to 205 (g) of the Act, 42 U.S. C. 405 (g), in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island on behalf of the two children (hereinafter sometimes called the appellees) for review of the Secretary's decision. The District Court ultimately affirmed each of the factual findings of the administrative agency: that Robert Cuffee was the children's father; that he never acknowledged his paternity in writing; that his paternity or support obligations had not been the subject of a judicial proceeding during his lifetime; that no common-law marriage had ever been contracted between Cuffee and Lucas, so that the children could not inherit Cuffee's personal property under the intestacy law of Rhode Island; and that, at the time of his death, he was neither living with the children nor contributing to their support. None of these factual matters is at issue here.[4] *502 A motion for summary judgment, filed by the appellees, relied on It was urged that denial of benefits in this case, where paternity was clear, violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as that provision comprehends the principle of equal protection of the laws,[5] because other children, including all legitimate children, are statutorily entitled, as the Lucas children are not, to survivorship benefits regardless of actual dependency. Addressing this issue, the District Court ruled that the statutory classifications were constitutionally impermissible.[6] -1321. Recognizing that the web of statutory provisions regarding presumptive dependency was overinclusive because it entitled some children, who were not actually dependent, to survivorship benefits under the Actalthough not underinclusive, since no otherwise eligible child who could establish actual dependency at the time of death was denied such benefits the court
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,976 | 11 |
majority
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Mathews v. Lucas
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the time of death was denied such benefits the court concluded that the Act was not intended merely to replace actual support that a child lost through the death of the insured parent. Rather, the court characterized the statute as one designed to replace obligations of support or potential *503 support lost through death, where the obligation was perceived by Congress, on the basis of the responsibility of the relation between the child's parents, to be a valid one. Thus, the court concluded: "[The Act] conditions eligibility on the basis of Congress' views as to who is entitled to support and reflects society's view that legitimate and `legitimated' children are more entitled to support by or through a parent than are illegitimate children. But this is not a legitimate governmental interest, and thus cannot support the challenged classification. ]." (Emphasis in original.) With this conclusion, the District Court reversed the administrative decision and ordered the Secretary to pay benefits for both children. Jurisdictional Statement a. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. U.S. C. 1252. We noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument with III The Secretary does not disagree that the Lucas children and others similarly circumstanced are treated differently, as a class, from those childrenlegitimate and illegitimatewho are relieved by statutory presumption of any requirement of proving actual dependency at the time of death through cohabitation or contribution: for children in the advantaged classes may be statutorily entitled to benefits even if they have never been dependent upon the father through whom they claim.[7] Statutory *504 classifications, of course, are not per se unconstitutional; the matter depends upon the character of the discrimination and its relation to legitimate legislative aims. "The essential inquiry is inevitably a dual one: What legitimate [governmental] interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?" Although the District Court concluded that close judicial scrutiny of the statute's classifications was not necessary to its conclusion invalidating those classifications, it also concluded that legislation treating legitimate and illegitimate offspring differently is constitutionally suspect,[8] -1319, and requires the judicial scrutiny traditionally devoted to cases involving discrimination along lines of race[9] or national origin.[10] Appellees echo this approach. We disagree.[11] *505 It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. The Court recognized in that visiting condemnation upon the child in order
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,976 | 11 |
majority
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Mathews v. Lucas
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recognized in that visiting condemnation upon the child in order to express society's disapproval of the parents' liaisons "is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectualas well as an unjustway of deterring the parent." (Footnote omitted.) But where the law is arbitrary in such a way, we have had no difficulty in finding the discrimination impermissible on less demanding standards than those advocated here. New Jersey Welfare Rights ; ; ; And such irrationality in some classifications does not in itself demonstrate that other, possibly rational, distinctions made in part on the basis of legitimacy are inherently untenable. Moreover, while the law has long *506 placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to the legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly in regard to obligations of support or other aspects of family law, see generally, e. g., H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 21-42 ; Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance perhaps in part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct of the parents rather than the child,[12] and perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes. See We therefore adhere to our earlier view, see that the Act's discrimination between individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not "command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process," San Antonio School which our most exacting scrutiny would entail.[13] See -634, 636; 406 U. S., at 175-176. *507 Relying on the Court, in held that "once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother." The same principle, which we adhere to now, applies when the judicially enforceable right to needed support lies against the Government rather than a natural father. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Consistent with our decisions, the Secretary explains the design of the statutory scheme assailed here as a program to provide for all children of deceased insureds who can demonstrate their "need" in terms of dependency at the
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,976 | 11 |
majority
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Mathews v. Lucas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109523/mathews-v-lucas/
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can demonstrate their "need" in terms of dependency at the times of the insureds' deaths. Cf. He authenticates this description by reference to the explicit language of the Act specifying that the applicant child's classification as legitimate, or acknowledged, etc., is ultimately relevant only to the determination of dependency, and by reference to legislative history indicating that the statute was not a general welfare provision for legitimate or otherwise "approved" children of deceased insureds, but was intended just "to replace the support lost by a child when his father dies" S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 Taking this explanation at face value, we think it clear that conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is not impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those children for whom the loss of the parent is an immediate source of the need. Cf. ; ; See also -175. But appellees contend that the actual design of the statute belies the Secretary's description, and that the statute was intended to provide support for insured decedents' children generally, if they had a "legitimate" claim to support, without regard to actual dependency at death; in any case, they assert, the statute's matrix of classifications bears no adequate relationship to actual dependency at death. Since such dependency does not justify the statute's discriminations, appellees argue, those classifications must fall under These assertions are in effect one and the same.[14] The basis for appellees' argument is the obvious fact that *509 each of the presumptions of dependency renders the class of benefit-recipients incrementally overinclusive, in the sense that some children within each class of presumptive dependents are automatically entitled to benefits under the statute although they could not in fact prove their economic dependence upon insured wage earners at the time of death. We conclude that the statutory classifications are permissible, however, because they are reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death. A Congress' purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of dependency was obviously to serve administrative convenience. While Congress was unwilling to assume that every child of a deceased insured was dependent at the time of death, by presuming dependency on the basis of relatively readily documented facts, such as legitimate birth, or existence of a support order or paternity decree, which could be relied upon to indicate the likelihood of continued actual dependency, Congress was able to avoid the burden and expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large number of cases where dependency is objectively probable. Such presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may approximate, rather than
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,976 | 11 |
majority
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Mathews v. Lucas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109523/mathews-v-lucas/
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aid of administrative functions, though they may approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. See[15] In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations must be supported at least by a showing that the Government's *510 dollar "lost" to overincluded benefit recipients is returned by a dollar "saved" in administrative expense avoided. Under the standard of review appropriate here, however, the materiality of the relation between the statutory classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly reflect need not be " `scientifically substantiated.' " 407 U.S. 1, quoting Nor, in any case, do we believe that Congress is required in this realm of less than strictest scrutiny to weigh the burdens of administrative inquiry solely in terms of dollars ultimately "spent," ignoring the relative amounts devoted to administrative rather than welfare uses. Cf. Finally, while the scrutiny by which their showing is to be judged is not a toothless one, e. g., ; ; the burden remains upon the appellees to demonstrate the insubstantiality of that relation. See ; cf. United B Applying these principles, we think that the statutory classifications challenged here are justified as reasonable empirical judgments that are consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child's dependency at the time of the parent's death. To begin with, we note that the statutory scheme is significantly different from the provisions confronted in cases in which the *511 Court has invalidated legislative discriminations among children on the basis of legitimacy. See ; New Jersey Welfare Rights ; ; These differences render those cases of little assistance to appellees. It could not have been fairly argued, with respect to any of the statutes struck down in those cases, that the legitimacy of the child was simply taken as an indication of dependency, or of some other valid ground of qualification. Under all but one of the statutes, not only was the legitimate child automatically entitled to benefits, but an illegitimate child was denied benefits solely and finally on the basis of illegitimacy, and regardless of any demonstration of dependency or other legitimate factor. See also Griffin v. (Md.), summarily aff'd, ; Davis v. (Conn.), summarily aff'd, In the sole partial exception, the statutory scheme provided for a child's equal recovery under a workmen's compensation plan in the event of the death of the father, not only if the child was dependent, but also only if
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,976 | 11 |
majority
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Mathews v. Lucas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109523/mathews-v-lucas/
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only if the child was dependent, but also only if the dependent child was 406 U.S., at -174, and n. 12. invalidating discrimination among afterborn illegitimate children as to entitlement to a child's disability benefits under the Social Security Act, is similarly distinguishable. Under the somewhat related statutory matrix considered there, legitimate children and those capable of inheriting personal property under state intestacy law, and those illegitimate solely on account of a nonobvious defect in their parents' marriage, were eligible for benefits, even if they were born after the onset of the father's disability. *512 Other (illegitimate) afterborn children were conclusively denied any benefits, regardless of any showing of dependency. The Court held the discrimination among illegitimate afterborn children impermissible, rejecting the Secretary's claim that the classification was based upon considerations regarding trustworthy proof of dependency, because it could not accept the assertion: "[T]he blanket and conclusive exclusion of appellants' subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims [of dependency]. Assuming that the appellants are in fact dependent on the claimant [father], it would not serve the purposes of the Act to conclusively deny them an opportunity to establish their dependency and their right to insurance benefits." Hence, it was held that "to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment." See also v. ; cf. But this conclusiveness in denying benefits to some classes of afterborn illegitimate children, which belied the asserted legislative reliance on dependency in is absent here, for, as we have noted, any otherwise eligible child may qualify for survivorship benefits by showing contribution to support, or cohabitation, at the time of death. Cf. distinguishing summarily aff'd, It is, of course, not enough simply that any child of a deceased insured is eligible for benefits upon some showing *513 of dependency. In we found it impermissible to qualify the entitlement to dependent's benefits of a married woman in the uniformed services upon an individualized showing of her husband's actual dependence upon her for more than half his income, when no such showing of actual dependency was required of a married man in the uniformed services to obtain dependent's benefits on account of his wife. The invalidity of that gender-based discrimination rested upon the "overbroad" assumption, underlying the discrimination "that male workers' earnings are vital to the support of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not significantly contribute to their families' support." v. ; see n. 23. Here,
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,976 | 11 |
majority
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Mathews v. Lucas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109523/mathews-v-lucas/
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to their families' support." v. ; see n. 23. Here, by contrast, the statute does not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative considerations. The presumption of dependency is withheld only in the absence of any significant indication of the likelihood of actual dependency. Moreover, we cannot say that the factors that give rise to a presumption of dependency lack any substantial relation to the likelihood of actual dependency. Rather, we agree with the assessment of the three-judge court as it originally ruled in Norton v. 11 :[16] "[I]t is clearly rational to presume the overwhelming number of legitimate children are actually dependent upon their parents for support. Likewise. the children of an invalid marriage *514 would typically live in the wage earner's home or be supported by him. When an order of support is entered by a court, it is reasonable to assume compliance occurred. A paternity decree, while not necessarily ordering support, would almost as strongly suggest support was subsequently obtained. Conceding that a written acknowledgment lacks the imprimatur of a judicial proceeding, it too establishes the basis for a rational presumption. Men do not customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an illegitimate child unless the child is theirs and a man who has acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it support than one who does not." Similarly, we think, where state intestacy law provides that a child may take personal property from a father's estate, it may reasonably be thought that the child will more likely be dependent during the parent's life and at his death.[17] For in its embodiment of the popular *515 view within the jurisdiction of how a parent would have his property devolve among his children in the event of death, without specific directions, such legislation also reflects to some degree the popular conception within the jurisdiction of the felt parental obligation to such an "illegitimate" child in other circumstances, and thus something of the likelihood of actual parental support during, as well as after, life.[18] Accord, To be sure, none of these statutory criteria compels the extension of a presumption of dependency. But the constitutional question is not whether such a presumption is required, but whether it is permitted. Nor, in ratifying these statutory classifications, is our role to hypothesize independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative basis for presumption. These matters of practical judgment and empirical calculation are for Congress. Drawing upon its own practical experience, *516 Congress has tailored statutory classifications in accord with its calculations of
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,976 | 11 |
majority
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Mathews v. Lucas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109523/mathews-v-lucas/
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has tailored statutory classifications in accord with its calculations of the likelihood of actual support suggested by a narrow set of objective and apparently reasonable indicators. Our role is simply to determine whether Congress' assumptions are so inconsistent or insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions that individualized factual inquiry in order to isolate each nondependent child in a given class of cases is unwarranted as an administrative exercise. In the end, the precise accuracy of Congress' calculations is not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their detail beyond the evident consistency and substantiality. Cf. United 380 U. S., at We cannot say that these expectations are unfounded, or so indiscriminate as to render the statute's classifications baseless. We conclude, in short, that, in failing to extend any presumption of dependency to appellees and others like them, the Act does not impermissibly discriminate against them as compared with legitimate children or those illegitimate children who are statutorily deemed dependent. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
|
Justice Alito
| 2,009 | 8 |
majority
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Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145894/hawaii-v-office-of-hawaiian-affairs/
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This case presents the question whether Congress stripped the State of Hawaii of its authority to alienate its sovereign territory by passing a joint resolution to apolo gize for the role that the United States played in over throwing the Hawaiian monarchy in the late 19th century. Relying on Congress’ joint resolution, the Supreme Court of Hawaii permanently enjoined the State from alienating certain of its lands, pending resolution of native Hawai ians’ land claims that the court described as “unrelin quished.” We reverse. I A In 1893, “[a] so-called Committee of Safety, a group of professionals and businessmen, with the active assistance of John Stevens, the United States Minister to Hawaii, acting with the United States Armed Forces, replaced the [Hawaiian] monarchy with a provisional government.” “That government sought annexation by the United States,” 05, which the United States granted, see Joint Resolu tion to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the 2 HAWAII v. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS Opinion of the Court United States, No. 55, (hereinafter Newlands Resolution). Pursuant to the Newlands Resolution, the Republic of Hawaii “cede[d] absolutely and without re serve to the United States of America all rights of sover eignty of whatsoever kind” and further “cede[d] and trans fer[red] to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, Government, or Crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining” (hereinafter ceded lands).1 The Newlands Resolution further provided that all “prop erty and rights” in the ceded lands “are vested in the United States of America.” Two years later, Congress established a government for the Territory of Hawaii. See Act of Apr. 30, 0, ch. 339, The Organic Act reiterated the Newlands Resolution and made clear that the new Territory consisted of the land that the United States acquired in “absolute fee” under that resolution. See The Organic Act further provided: “[T]he portion of the public domain heretofore known as Crown land is hereby declared to have been, on [the effective date of the Newlands Resolution], and prior thereto, the property of the Hawaiian government, and to be free and clear from any trust of or concern ing the same, and from all claim of any nature what soever, upon the rents, issues, and profits thereof. It shall be subject to alienation and other uses as may be provided by law.” ; see also at 159. —————— 1 “Crown lands” were lands formerly
|
Justice Alito
| 2,009 | 8 |
majority
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Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145894/hawaii-v-office-of-hawaiian-affairs/
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also at 159. —————— 1 “Crown lands” were lands formerly held by the Hawaiian monarchy. “Public” and “Government” lands were other lands held by the Hawai ian government. Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 3 Opinion of the Court In 1959, Congress admitted Hawaii to the Union. See Pub. L. 86–3, Under the Admission Act, with exceptions not relevant here, “the United States grant[ed] to the State of Hawaii, effective upon its admission into the Union, the United States’ title to all the public lands and other public prop erty within the boundaries of the State of Hawaii, title to which is held by the United States immediately prior to its admission into the Union.” These lands, “together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposi tion of [these] lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by [the] State as a public trust” to promote various public purposes, including supporting public education, bettering conditions of Native Hawaiians, developing home ownership, making public improvements, and pro viding lands for public use. Hawaii state law also authorizes the State to use or sell the ceded lands, provided that the proceeds are held in trust for the benefit of the citizens of Hawaii. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. 171–18 (1993). In 1993, Congress enacted a joint resolution “to ac knowledge the historic significance of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, to express its deep regret to the Native Hawaiian people, and to support the reconciliation efforts of the State of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native ” Joint Resolution to Ac knowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Pub. L. 103–150, 1513 (hereinafter Apology Resolution). In a series of the preambular “whereas” clauses, Congress made various observations about Hawaii’s history. For example, the Apology Resolution states that “the indige nous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims over their national lands to the United States” and that “the health and well-being of the Native Hawai ian people is intrinsically tied to their deep feelings and 4 HAWAII v. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS Opinion of the Court attachment to the land.” In the same vein, the resolution’s only substantive section—entitled “Ac knowledgement and Apology”—states that Congress: “(1) acknowledges the historical significance of this event which resulted in the suppression of the in herent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people; “(2) recognizes and commends efforts of reconcilia tion initiated by the State of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians; “(3) apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf
|
Justice Alito
| 2,009 | 8 |
majority
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Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145894/hawaii-v-office-of-hawaiian-affairs/
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with Native Hawaiians; “(3) apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the par ticipation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination; “(4) expresses its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Ha waii, in order to provide a proper foundation for rec onciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people; and “(5) urges the President of the United States to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii and to support reconciliation ef forts between the United States and the Native Ha waiian people.” Finally, of the Apology Resolution states that “Nothing in this Joint Resolution is intended to serve as a settle ment of any claims against the United States.” at 1514. B This suit involves a tract of former crown land on Maui, now known as the “Leiali’i parcel,” that was ceded in “absolute fee” to the United States at annexation and has been held by the State since 1959 as part of the trust Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 5 Opinion of the Court established by of the Admission Act. The Housing Finance and Development Corporation (HFDC)—Hawaii’s affordable housing agency—received approval to remove the Leiali’i parcel from the trust and redevelop it. In order to transfer the Leiali’i parcel out of the public trust, HFDC was required to compensate respondent Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), which was established to receive and manage funds from the use or sale of the ceded lands for the benefit of native Haw. Const., Art. XII, In this case, however, OHA demanded more than mone tary compensation. Relying on the Apology Resolution, respondent OHA demanded that HFDC include a dis claimer preserving any native Hawaiian claims to owner ship of lands transferred from the public trust for redevel opment. HFDC declined to include the requested disclaimer because “to do so would place a cloud on title, rendering title insurance unavailable.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 207a. Again relying on the Apology Resolution, respondents then sued the State, its Governor, HFDC (since renamed), and its officials. Respondents sought “to enjoin the defen dants from selling or otherwise transferring the Leiali’i parcel to third parties and selling or otherwise transfer ring to third parties any of the ceded lands in general until a determination of the native Hawaiians’ claims to the ceded lands is made.” Office of Hawaiian Respondents “alleged that
|
Justice Alito
| 2,009 | 8 |
majority
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Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145894/hawaii-v-office-of-hawaiian-affairs/
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ceded lands is made.” Office of Hawaiian Respondents “alleged that an injunction was proper because, in light of the Apology Resolution, any transfer of ceded lands by the State to third-parties would amount to a breach of trust” The state trial court entered judgment against respon dents, but the Supreme Court of Hawaii vacated the lower court’s ruling. Relying on a “plain reading of the Apology 6 HAWAII v. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS Opinion of the Court Resolution,” which “dictate[d]” its conclusion, the State Supreme Court ordered “an injunction against the defendants from selling or other wise transferring to third parties (1) the Leiali’i parcel and (2) any other ceded lands from the public lands trust until the claims of the native Hawaiians to the ceded lands have been resolved,” In doing so, the court rejected petitioners’ argument that “the State has the undoubted and explicit power to sell ceded lands pursuant to the terms of the Admission Act and pursuant to state law.” (internal quo tation marks and alterations omitted). We granted certio rari. 555 U. S. II Before turning to the merits, we first must address our jurisdiction. According to respondents, the Supreme Court of Hawaii “merely held that, in light of the ongoing recon ciliation process, the sale of ceded lands would constitute a breach of the State’s fiduciary duty to Native Hawaiians under state law.” Brief for Respondents 17. Because respondents believe that this case does not raise a federal question, they urge us to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Although respondents dwell at length on that argument, see at 19–34, we need not tarry long to reject it. This Court has jurisdiction whenever “a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.” 463 U.S. 1032, –1041 Far from providing a “plain statement” that its decision rested on state law, at 1041, the State Supreme Court plainly held that its deci sion was “dictate[d]” by federal law—in particular, the Apology Resolution, see 117 Haw., 177 P. 3d, at 922. Indeed, the court explained that the Apology Resolu Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 7 Opinion of the Court tion lies “[a]t the heart of [respondents’] claims,” that respondents’ “current claim for injunctive relief is based largely upon the Apology Resolution,” and that respondents’ arguments presuppose that the Apology Resolution “changed the legal landscape and restructured the rights and obligations of the State.” at 189–,
|
Justice Alito
| 2,009 | 8 |
majority
|
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145894/hawaii-v-office-of-hawaiian-affairs/
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restructured the rights and obligations of the State.” at 189–, 177 P. 3d, at –900 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that “[t]he primary question before this court on appeal is whether, in light of the Apology Resolu tion, this court should issue an injunction” against sale of the trust lands, and it con cluded, “[b]ased on a plain reading” of the Apology Resolu tion, that “Congress has clearly recognized that the native Hawaiian people have unrelinquished claims over the ceded lands,” Based on these and the remainder of the State Supreme Court’s 77 references to the Apology Resolution, we have no doubt that the decision below rested on federal law.2 We are therefore satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction. See 28 U.S. C. III Turning to the merits, we must decide whether the Apology Resolution “strips Hawaii of its sovereign author ity to sell, exchange, or transfer” (Pet. for Cert. i) the lands —————— 2 Respondents argue that the Supreme Court of Hawaii relied on the Apology Resolution “simply to support its factual determination that Native Hawaiians have unresolved claims to the ceded lands.” Brief for Respondents 21. Regardless of its factual determinations, however, the lower court’s legal conclusions were, at the very least, “interwoven with the federal law.” See Office of Hawaiian 217, (“hold[ing]” that respondents’ legal claim “arose” only when “the Apol ogy Resolution was signed into law on November 23, 1993”); n. n. (emphasizing that “our holding is grounded in Hawai‘i and federal law”). See also n. 4, infra. 8 HAWAII v. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS Opinion of the Court that the United States held in “absolute fee” () and “grant[ed] to the State of Hawaii, effective upon its admission into the Union” (). We conclude that the Apology Resolution has no such effect. A “We begin, as always, with the text of the statute.” Permanent Mission of India to United The Apology Resolu tion contains two substantive provisions. See 107 Stat. 1513–1514. Neither justifies the judgment below. The resolution’s first substantive provision uses six verbs, all of which are conciliatory or precatory. Specifi cally, Congress “acknowledge[d] the historical signifi cance” of the Hawaiian monarchy’s overthrow, “recog nize[d] and commend[ed] efforts of reconciliation” with native Hawaiians, “apologize[d] to [n]ative Hawaiians” for the monarchy’s overthrow, “expresse[d] [Congress’s] com mitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the over throw,” and “urge[d] the President of the United States to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow” Such terms are not the kind that Congress uses to create substantive rights—especially those that are en forceable against the cosovereign States. See,
|
Justice Alito
| 2,009 | 8 |
majority
|
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145894/hawaii-v-office-of-hawaiian-affairs/
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those that are en forceable against the cosovereign States. See, e.g., Penn hurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1981).3 —————— 3 TheApology Resolution’s operative provisions thus stand in sharp contrast with those of other “apologies,” which Congress intended to have substantive effect. See, e.g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 903, 50 U.S. C. App. (2000 ed.) (acknowledging and apologizing “for the evacuation, relocation and internment” of Japanese citizens during World War II and providing $20,000 in restitution to each eligible individual); Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, 104 Stat. 920, notes following 42 U.S. C. §2 (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (“apolo giz[ing] on behalf of the Nation for the hardships” endured by those exposed to radiation from above-ground nuclear testing facilities and providing $100,000 in compensation to each eligible individual). Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 9 Opinion of the Court The Apology Resolution’s second and final substantive provision is a disclaimer, which provides: “Nothing in this Joint Resolution is intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United States.” By its terms, speaks only to those who may or may not have “claims against the United States.” The court below, however, held that the only way to save from superfluity is to construe it as a congressional recognition—and preserva tion—of claims against Hawaii and as “the foundation (or starting point) for reconciliation” between the State and native “We must have regard to all the words used by Con gress, and as far as possible give effect to them,” Louisville & Nashville R. (1), but that maxim is not a judicial license to turn an irrele vant statutory provision into a relevant one. And we know of no justification for turning an express disclaimer of claims against one sovereign into an affirmative recogni tion of claims against another.4 Cf. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U. S. —————— 4 The court below held that respondents “prevailed on the merits” by showing that “Congress has clearly recognized that the native Hawai ian people have unrelinquished claims over the ceded lands, which were taken without consent or compensation and which the native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations.” 117 Haw., And it further held that petitioners failed to show that the State has the “power to sell ceded lands pursuant to the terms of the Admission Act.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Respondents now insist, however, that their claims are “nonjusticiable” to the extent that they are grounded on “broader moral and political”
|
Justice Alito
| 2,009 | 8 |
majority
|
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145894/hawaii-v-office-of-hawaiian-affairs/
|
extent that they are grounded on “broader moral and political” bases. Brief for Respondents 18. No matter how respon dents characterize their claims, it is undeniable that they have asserted title to the ceded lands throughout this litigation, see (conceding the point), and it is undeniable that the Supreme Court of Hawaii relied on those claims in issuing an injunction, which is a legal (and hence justiciable) remedy—not a moral, political, or nonjusticiable one. 10 HAWAII v. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS Opinion of the Court (2009) (slip op., at 17) (“Two wrong claims do not make one that is right”). The Supreme Court of Hawaii erred in reading as recognizing claims inconsistent with the title held in “absolute fee” by the United States () and conveyed to the State of Hawaii at statehood. See at 2–3. B Rather than focusing on the operative words of the law, the court below directed its attention to the 37 “whereas” clauses that preface the Apology Resolution. See 107 Stat. 1510–1513. “Based on a plain reading of” the “whereas” clauses, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that “Congress has clearly recognized that the native Hawaiian people have unrelinquished claims over the ceded lands.” 117 Haw., That conclusion is wrong for at least three reasons. First, “whereas” clauses like those in the Apology Reso lution cannot bear the weight that the lower court placed on them. As we recently explained in a different context, “where the text of a clause itself indicates that it does not have operative effect, such as ‘whereas’ clauses in federal legislation a court has no license to make it do what it was not designed to do.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. n. 3 (slip op., at 4, n. 3). See also Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U.S. 174, (9) (“[A]s the preamble is no part of the act, and cannot enlarge or confer powers, nor control the words of the act, unless they are doubtful or ambiguous, the necessity of resorting to it to assist in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the legislature is in itself fatal to the claim set up”). Second, even if the “whereas” clauses had some legal effect, they did not “chang[e] the legal landscape and restructur[e] the rights and obligations of the State.” 117 Haw., at As we have emphasized, Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 11 Opinion of the Court “repeals by implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.” National
|
Justice Alito
| 2,009 | 8 |
majority
|
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145894/hawaii-v-office-of-hawaiian-affairs/
|
of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.” National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, (internal quotation marks omitted). The Apology Resolution reveals no indication—much less a “clear and manifest” one—that Congress intended to amend or repeal the State’s rights and obligations under Admission Act (or any other federal law); nor does the Apology Resolution reveal any evidence that Congress intended sub silentio to “cloud” the title that the United States held in “absolute fee” and transferred to the State in 1959. On that score, we find it telling that even respondent OHA has now abandoned its argument, made below, that “Congress enacted the Apology Reso lution and thus change[d]” the Admission Act. App. 114a; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31, 37–38. Third, the Apology Resolution would raise grave consti tutional concerns if it purported to “cloud” Hawaii’s title to its sovereign lands more than three decades after the State’s admission to the Union. We have emphasized that “Congress cannot, after statehood, reserve or convey sub merged lands that have already been bestowed upon a State.” (2001) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also (“[T]he consequences of admission are instantaneous, and it ig nores the uniquely sovereign character of that event to suggest that subsequent events somehow can diminish what has already been bestowed”). And that proposition applies a fortiori where virtually all of the State’s public lands—not just its submerged ones—are at stake. In light of those concerns, we must not read the Apology Resolu tion’s nonsubstantive “whereas” clauses to create a retro active “cloud” on the title that Congress granted to the State of Hawaii in 1959. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381–382 (2005) (the canon of constitutional 12 HAWAII v. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS Opinion of the Court avoidance “is a tool for choosing between competing plau sible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”). * * * When a state supreme court incorrectly bases a decision on federal law, the court’s decision improperly prevents the citizens of the State from addressing the issue in question through the processes provided by the State’s constitution. Here, the State Supreme Court incorrectly held that Congress, by adopting the Apology Resolution, took away from the citizens of Hawaii the authority to resolve an issue that is of great importance to the people of the State. Respondents defend that decision by arguing that they have both state-law property rights in the land in question and “broader moral and
|
Justice Douglas
| 1,971 | 10 |
dissenting
|
United States v. Armour & Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108351/united-states-v-armour-co/
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The antitrust decree before us last Term in United is here again in a new posture. Under the original decree of 1920 the defendants were required to abandon their interests in a wide variety of food and nonfood lines. They were required to divest themselves of any interest in the businesses of "manufacturing, jobbing, selling, transporting. distributing, or otherwise dealing in" some 114 specified food products and some 30 other products. *684 They were enjoined from "owning, either directly or indirectly any capital stock or other interests whatsoever in any corporation which is in the business, in the United States, of manufacturing, jobbing, selling, transporting distributing, or otherwise dealing in any" of the prohibited products. Under the decree the District Court retained jurisdiction "for the purpose of taking such other action or adding to the foot of this decree such other relief, if any, as may become necessary or appropriate for the carrying out and enforcement of this decree." Armour, one of the parties to the decree, is now the second largest meatpacker in the United States with total assets of almost $700 million and total sales in 1967 of approximately $2,150,000,000. In addition to meatpacking, Armour manufactures, processes, and sells various nonprohibited products. In early 1969 the Government filed a petition in Federal District Court to make General Host Corp., a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of numerous food products, a party to the decree and forbid it from acquiring control of Armour. The District Court held that the decree prohibited Armour from holding any interest in a company handling any of the prohibited products but did not prohibit such a company from acquiring Armour. The Government appealed the decision arguing that acquisition by General Host of a majority of Armour's stock would be in violation of the decree and General Host should have been made a party to the decree so that an injunction could issue. We noted probable jurisdiction. In the interim, General Host entered into an agreement to sell its controlling stock interest in Armour to Greyhound, a regulated motor carrier. The Interstate Commerce Commission approved the acquisition. Following *685 Greyhound's acquisition, the Court dismissed the case as moot. The Government then filed a new petition in the District Court alleging (as it had against General Host) that Greyhound is engaged in businesses forbidden to Armour, or any firm in which Armour has a direct or indirect interest, and therefore Greyhound's acquisition violates the decree. The petition prayed that Greyhound be brought before the Court under 5 of the Sherman Act and that an
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Justice Douglas
| 1,971 | 10 |
dissenting
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United States v. Armour & Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108351/united-states-v-armour-co/
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Court under 5 of the Sherman Act and that an order supplemental to the original decree be entered enjoining Greyhound from acquiring any additional stock or exercising control over or influencing the business affairs of Armour, and requiring Greyhound to divest itself of the Armour stock. The District Court dismissed the Government's complaint, ruling that since Greyhound was not a party to the original decree, Greyhound may not be enjoined from "committing any acts on the ground that they are prohibited by the decree." The court also rejected the Government's argument that acquisition of the Armour stock placed the two companies in a "corporate relationship" which was prohibited by the decree. The court stated "the decree does not speak in terms of corporate relationships; it speaks in terms of the defendants dealing in the specified lines of commerce." The Government appealed. The Sherman Act (15 U.S. C. 5) provides: "Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section 4 of this title may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof." *686 Under 5 and the All Writs Act (28 U.S. C. 1651 (a)) the District Court has ample power to prevent frustration of the original decree. Greyhound may well have devised a plan which would render the original decree nugatory. Under the decree, none of the meatpackers could own a chain of grocery stores. Yet under the interpretation of the District Court a chain of grocery stores could acquire a meatpacking company. I do not view the decree so narrowly. The evil at which the decree is aimed is combining meatpackers with companies in other food product areas. The authorities support the proposition that judges who construe, interpret, and enforce consent decrees look at the evil which the decree was designed to rectify. See Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees,[*] My interpretation of the evil at which this decree was aimed is the same as that of Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing for this Court in United As we stated in Chrysler the test for reviewing modifications is "whether the change served to effectuate or to thwart the basic purpose of the original consent decree." Neither nor United relied on by the Court, is to the contrary. Hughes involved a Government attempt to require the trustee to sell
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Justice Douglas
| 1,971 | 10 |
dissenting
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United States v. Armour & Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108351/united-states-v-armour-co/
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involved a Government attempt to require the trustee to sell stock in a voting trust where the consent decree expressly allowed Hughes a choice of selling the stock himself or placing the stock in a voting trust "until Howard R. Hughes shall have sold his holdings of stock." Atlantic *687 Refining was a case where for 16 years, right until the eve of the litigation, both parties had construed the decree in one way. Then the Government changed its interpretation not because it would effectuate the purposes of the decree but because it "would more nearly effectuate `the basic purpose of the Elkins and Interstate Commerce Acts.' " The evil at which the present decree is aimedcombining meatpackers with companies in other food product areasis present whether Armour purchases a company dealing in the various prohibited food lines or whether that company purchases Armour. When any company purchases Armour it acquires not only Armour's assets and liabilities, but also Armour's legal disabilities. And one of Armour's legal disabilities is that Armour cannot be combined with a company in the various food lines set out in the decree. I read the decree to prohibit any combination of the meatpacking company defendants with companies dealing in various food lines. In the District Court the Government offered an affidavit which showed that Greyhound deals in food products through its divisions and wholly owned subsidiaries, which provide industrial catering services, and operates restaurants, cafeterias, and other eating facilities. The affidavit states that in 1969 Greyhound had revenues of about $124 million from food operations which accounted for over 16% of Greyhound's total revenues that year. Greyhound has contended that it operates no grocery business and only buys raw foodstuffs and sells prepared meals. Thus, Greyhound argues, it can acquire Armour even if it is made a party to the decree because the decree does not prohibit meatpackers from entering the restaurant business. I do not pass on this contention. Rather, *688 I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to that court for any further proceedings which are necessary to determine if Greyhound's acquisition of Armour violates the decree. If it does, then the District Court should make Greyhound a party to that decree.
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per_curiam
| 1,975 | 200 |
per_curiam
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Lee v. Thornton
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109189/lee-v-thornton/
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Appellants brought actions in the District Court for the District of Vermont that challenged the constitutionality, facially and as applied, of various provisions of the customs laws, and 757, as amended, 19 U.S. C. 1460 and 1618, that mandate procedures to effect forfeiture and remission or mitigation of penalties imposed after Border Patrol agents apprehended them and seized their vehicles when they crossed the border from Canada without passing through a customs station. The complaints sought (1) declaratory judgments that the challenged provisions were unconstitutional, (2) injunctions against their enforcement, (3) mandamus relief requiring the return of moneys paid as mitigated forfeitures or penalties based on violations of the customs laws, and (4) damages. A three-judge court was convened. The court held that it had jurisdiction *140 under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C. 1346 (a) (2), rejected appellants' constitutional claims, enjoined appellees from applying the customs laws except as construed by the court, declined to remit appellants' fines, and returned to the single-judge District Court the question of damages. The District Court held that it had jurisdiction of the complaints under the Tucker Act, and did not address other alternative bases of jurisdiction asserted in the complaints. The jurisdiction of the district courts under the Tucker Act over "[a]ny civil action or claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress" does not include jurisdiction over appellants' claims to enjoin enforcement of the challenged provisions of the customs laws. The Tucker Act empowers district courts to award damages but not to grant injunctive or declaratory relief. ; United ; United It follows that the three-judge court was improperly convened, and this Court therefore has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal based on the District Court's refusal to grant injunctive relief founded on appellants' additional constitutional claims. Appellants' motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for consideration of appellants' other asserted bases of jurisdiction. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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n v Westview nstruments, nc, 517 US 370 (1996), we explained that a patent claim is that “por tion of the patent document that defines the scope of the patentee’s rights” We held that “the con struction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim,” is not for a jury but “exclusively” for “the court” to determine That is so even where the construction of a term of art has “evidentiary underpinnings” at 390 Today’s case involves claim construction with “eviden tiary underpinnings” See Part infra And, it requires us to determine what standard the Court of Appeals should use when it reviews a trial judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute Should the Court of Appeals review the district court’s factfinding de novo as it would review a question of law? Or, should it review that fact- finding as it would review a trial judge’s factfinding in other cases, namely by taking them as correct “unless clearly erroneous?” See Fed Rule Civ Proc 52(a)(6) We hold that the appellate court must apply a “clear error,” 2 TEVA PHARMACEUTCALS USA, NC v SANDOZ, NC Opinion of the Court not a de novo, standard of review The basic dispute in this case concerns the meaning of the words “molecular weight” as those words appear in a patent claim The petitioners, Teva Pharmaceuticals (along with related firms), own the relevant patent The patent covers a manufacturing method for Copaxone, a drug used to treat multiple sclerosis The drug’s active ingredient, called “copolymer-1,” is made up of molecules of varying sizes App 1143a And the relevant claim describes that ingredient as having “a molecular weight of 5 to 9 kilodaltons” at 1145a The respondents, Sandoz, nc (and several other firms), tried to market a generic version of Copaxone Teva sued Sandoz for patent infringement (SDNY 2011) Sandoz defended the suit by arguing that the patent was in The Patent Act requires that a claim “particularly poin[t] out and distinctly clai[m] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention” 35 US C ¶2 (2006 ed); see nc v Biosig nstruments, nc, 572 U S n 1 (slip op, at 3, n 1)) The phrase “molecular weight of 5 to 9 kilodaltons,” said Sandoz, did not satisfy this requirement The reason that the phrase is fatally indefinite, Sandoz argued, is that, in the context of this patent claim, the term “molecular weight” might mean any one of three different things The phrase might refer (1) to molecular weight as calculated by the weight of the molecule that is most prevalent in
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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the weight of the molecule that is most prevalent in the mix that makes up copolymer-1 (The scientific term for molecular weight so calculated is, we are told, “peak average molecular weight”) The phrase might refer (2) to molecular weight as calculated by taking all the different-sized molecules in the mix that makes up copolymer-1 and calculating the average weight, ie, Cite as: U S (2015) 3 Opinion of the Court adding up the weight of each molecule and dividing by the number of molecules (The scientific term for molecular weight so calculated is, we are told, “number average molecular weight”) Or, the phrase might refer (3) to molecular weight as calculated by taking all the different- sized molecules in the mix that makes up copolymer-1 and calculating their average weight while giving heavier molecules a weight-related bonus when doing so (The scientific term for molecular weight so calculated, we are told, is “weight average molecular weight”) See 723 F3d 1363, 1367 (CA Fed 2013); App 124a n Sandoz’s view, since Teva’s patent claim does not say which method of calculation should be used, the claim’s phrase “molecular weight” is indefinite, and the claim fails to satisfy the critical patent law requirement The District Court, after taking evidence from experts, concluded that the patent claim was sufficiently definite Among other things, it found that in context a skilled artisan would understand that the term “molecular weight” referred to molecular weight as calculated by the first method, ie, “peak average molecular weight” 810 F Supp 2d, 96; see at (slip op, at 12) (“[T]he definiteness inquiry trains on the understand ing of a skilled artisan at the time of the patent applica tion”) n part for this reason, the District Court held the patent On appeal, the Federal Circuit held to the contrary t found that the term “molecular weight” was And it consequently held the patent in 723 F3d, at 1369 n reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit reviewed de novo all aspects of the District Court’s claim construction, including the District Court’s determination of subsidiary facts ; see also Light- ing Control (en banc) (reaffirming de novo review of district court claim 4 TEVA PHARMACEUTCALS USA, NC v SANDOZ, NC Opinion of the Court construction) Teva filed a petition for certiorari And we granted that petition The Federal Circuit reviews the claim construc tion decisions of federal district courts throughout the Nation, and we consequently believe it important to clarify the standard of review that it must apply when doing so A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) states
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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doing so A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) states that a court of appeals “must not set aside” a district court’s “[f ]indings of fact” unless they are “clearly erroneous” n our view, this rule and the standard it sets forth must apply when a court of appeals reviews a district court’s resolution of subsidiary factual matters made in the course of its construction of a patent claim We have made clear that the Rule sets forth a “clear command” Ander- “t does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain catego ries of factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court’s findings unless clearly erroneous” 287 (1982) Accordingly, the Rule applies to both subsidi ary and ultimate facts And we have said that, when reviewing the findings of a “ ‘district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo’ ” (quoting Zenith Radio (1969)) Even if exceptions to the Rule were permissible, we cannot find any convincing ground for creating an excep tion to that Rule here The Rules Advisory Committee pointed out that, in general, exceptions “would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts multi ply appeals and needlessly reallocate judicial author Cite as: U S (2015) 5 Opinion of the Court ity” Advisory Committee’s 1985 Note on subd (a) of Fed Rule Civ Proc 52, 28 US C App, pp 908–909; see also at –575 (de novo review of fac- tual findings “would very likely contribute only negligibly” to accuracy “at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources”) Our opinion in neither created, nor argued for, an exception to Rule 52(a) The question presented in that case was a Seventh Amendment question: Should a jury or a judge construe patent claims? 517 US, We pointed out that history provides no clear answer The task primarily involves the construction of written instruments And that task is better matched to a judge’s skills (“The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis”) We consequently held that claim construction falls “exclusively within the province of the court,” not that of the jury When describing claim construction we concluded that it was proper to treat the ultimate question of the proper construction of the patent as a question of law in the way that we treat document construction as a question of law –391 But this does
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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construction as a question of law –391 But this does not imply an exception to Rule 52(a) for underlying factual disputes We used the term “question of law” while pointing out that a judge, in construing a patent claim, is engaged in much the same task as the judge would be in construing other written instruments, such as deeds, contracts, or tariffs at 384, 386, 388, 389; see also Motion Picture Patents v Universal Film Mfg (patent claims are “aptly likened to the description in a deed, which sets the bounds to the grant which it contains”); Goodyear Dental Vulcanite (1880) (analogizing patent construction to the construction of other written instruments like contracts) Construction 6 TEVA PHARMACEUTCALS USA, NC v SANDOZ, NC Opinion of the Court of written instruments often presents a “question solely of law,” at least when the words in those instruments are “used in their ordinary meaning” Great Northern R v Merchants Elevator But sometimes, say when a written instrument uses “technical words or phrases not commonly understood,” those words may give rise to a factual dispute f so, ex trinsic evidence may help to “establish a usage of trade or locality” And in that circumstance, the “determina tion of the matter of fact” will “preced[e]” the “function of construction” ; see also 12 R Lord, Williston on Contracts p 2, 34:19, p 174 (4th ed 2012) (n contract interpretation, the existence of a “usage”—a “practice or method” in the relevant industry—“is a ques tion of fact” (internal quotation marks omitted)) This factual determination, like all other factual determina tions, must be reviewed for clear error See Pullman- (The Rule does not “exclude cer tain categories of factual findings” and applies to both “subsidiary” and “ultimate” facts (internal quotation marks omitted)) Accordingly, when we held in that the ulti mate question of claim construction is for the judge and not the jury, we did not create an exception from the ordi nary rule governing appellate review of factual matters no more creates an exception to Rule 52(a) than would a holding that judges, not juries, determine equit able claims, such as requests for injunctions A conclusion that an issue is for the judge does not indicate that Rule 52(a) is inapplicable See Fed Rule Civ Proc 52 (setting the standard of review for “[Factual] Findings and Conclu sions by the Court” (emphasis added)) While we held in that the ultimate issue of the proper construction of a claim should be treated as a question of law, we also recognized that in patent con struction, subsidiary factfinding is
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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also recognized that in patent con struction, subsidiary factfinding is sometimes necessary Cite as: U S (2015) 7 Opinion of the Court ndeed, we referred to claim construction as a practice with “evidentiary underpinnings,” a practice that “falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact” 388, 390 We added that sometimes courts may have to make “credibility judgments” about n other words, we recognized that courts may have to resolve subsidiary factual disputes And, as explained above, the Rule re quires appellate courts to review all such subsidiary fac tual findings under the “clearly erroneous” standard Precedent further supports application of the “clearly erroneous” standard Before the creation of the Federal Circuit, the Second Circuit explained that in claim con struction, the subsidiary “question of how the art un- derstood the term was plainly a question of fact; and unless the [district court’s] finding was ‘clearly erroneous,’ we are to take” it “as controlling” (L Hand, C J) We have said the same as to subsidiary factual findings concerning other patent law inquiries, including “obviousness” Mfg v Panduit Corp, 475 US 809, 811 (1986) (per curiam) (“subsidiary determina tions of the District Court” subject to Rule 52(a)’s clear error standard) Finally, practical considerations favor clear error re view We have previously pointed out that clear error review is “particularly” important where patent law is at issue because patent law is “a field where so much de pends upon familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained in the general store house of knowledge and experience” Graver Tank & Mfg A district court judge who has presided over, and listened to, the entirety of a proceeding has a comparatively greater opportunity to gain that familiarity than an appeals court judge who must read a written transcript or perhaps just 8 TEVA PHARMACEUTCALS USA, NC v SANDOZ, NC Opinion of the Court those portions to which the parties have referred Cf Lighting (O’Malley, J, dissent ing) (Federal Circuit judges “lack the tools that district courts have available to resolve factual disputes fairly and accurately,” such as questioning the experts, examining the invention in operation, or appointing a court-appointed expert); 470 US, at (“The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experi ence in fulfilling that role comes expertise”) B Sandoz argues that claim construction mostly consists of construing a set of written documents that do not give rise to subsidiary factual disputes Tr of Oral Arg 39 t adds that separating “factual” from “legal” questions is often difficult And Sandoz, like the
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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from “legal” questions is often difficult And Sandoz, like the Federal Circuit itself, argues that it is simpler for that appellate court to review the entirety of the district court’s claim construction de novo rather than to apply two separate standards at 38; see also Lighting (criticizing clear error review in part because of the purportedly diffi cult task of “disentangling” fact from law) But even were we free to ignore the Federal Rule (which we are not), we would not find this argument convincing Courts of appeals have long found it possible to separate factual from legal matters See, eg, First Options of Chicago, (review of factual findings for clear error and legal conclu sions de novo is the “ordinary” standard for courts of ap peals) At the same time, the Federal Circuit’s efforts to treat factual findings and legal conclusions similarly have brought with them their own complexities See eg, (CA Fed 1998) (en banc) (claim construction does not involve “factual evidentiary findings” (citation and internal quota tion marks omitted)); Lighting Cite as: U S (2015) 9 Opinion of the Court (claim construction has “arguably factual aspects”); Dow Jones & 1344–1345 (CA Fed 2010) (“[T]his court,” while reviewing claim construction without deference, “takes into account the views of the trial judge”); Nazomi Communications nc, v Arm Holdings, PLC, (“[C]ommon sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry weight” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lightning (Lourie, J, concurring) (we should “rarely” overturn district court’s true subsidiary factfinding; “we should, and do, give proper informal deference to the work of judges of a subordinate tribunal”); (“By continuing the fiction that there are no facts to be found in claim interpretations, we confound rather than ease the litigation process”); see also at 575 (the parties “have already been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too much”); Brief for Peter S Menell et al as Amici Curiae 5 (Federal Circuit overturns district court claim construction at unusually high rate) Finally, the Circuit feared that “clear error” review would bring about less uniformity Lighting Neither the Circuit nor Sandoz, however, has shown that (or explained why) divergent claim con struction stemming from divergent findings of fact (on subsidiary matters) should occur more than occasionally After all, the Federal Circuit will continue to review de novo the district court’s ultimate interpretation of the patent claims And the attorneys will no doubt bring cases
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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patent claims And the attorneys will no doubt bring cases construing the same claim to the attention of the trial judge; those prior cases will sometimes be binding because of issue preclusion, see and sometimes will serve as persuasive authority Moreover, 10 TEVA PHARMACEUTCALS USA, NC v SANDOZ, NC Opinion of the Court it is always possible to consolidate for discovery different cases that involve construction of the same claims And, as we said in subsidiary factfinding is unlikely to loom large in the universe of litigated claim construc tion –390 C The dissent argues that claim construction does not involve any “factfinding,” or, if it does, claim construction factfinding is akin to the factfinding that underlies our interpretation of statutes Post, at 1, 5–7 (opinion of THOMAS, J) ts first, broader contention runs contrary to our recognition in that claim construction has “evidentiary underpinnings” and that courts construing patent claims must sometimes make “credibility judg ments” about 517 US, –390 ndeed, as dis in Part infra, this case provides a perfect example of the factfinding that sometimes underlies claim construction: The parties here presented the District Court with competing fact-related claims by different experts, and the District Court resolved the issues of fact that divided those experts The dissent’s contention also runs contrary to Sandoz’s concession at oral argument that claim construction will sometimes require subsidiary factfinding Tr of Oral Arg 33–34, 38–40 t is in tension with our interpretation of related areas of patent law, such as the interpretation of “obviousness,” which we have said involves subsidiary factfinding subject to Rule 52(a)’s clear error review See And it fights the question presented in this case, which assumes the existence of such factfinding See Pet for Cert i (whether “a district court’s factual finding in support of its construction of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, or only for clear error”) Neither do we find factfinding in this context sufficiently Cite as: U S (2015) 11 Opinion of the Court similar to the factfinding that underlies statutory inter pretation Statutes, in general, address themselves to the general public; patent claims concern a small portion of that public Statutes typically (though not always) rest upon congressional consideration of general facts related to a reasonably broad set of social circumstances; patents typically (though not always) rest upon consideration by a few private parties, experts, and administrators of more narrowly circumscribed facts related to specific technical matters The public, and often an adversarial public, typically considers and discusses the relevant general facts before Congress enacts a statute; only private
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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relevant general facts before Congress enacts a statute; only private par ties, experts, and administrators likely consider the rele vant technical facts before the award of a patent Given these differences, it is not surprising that this Court has never previously compared patent claim construction in any here relevant way to statutory construction As dis however, the Court has repeatedly compared patent claim construction to the construction of other written instruments such as deeds and contracts See, eg, ; Motion Picture Patent 243 US, at ; Goodyear, 102 US, at D Now that we have set forth why the Federal Circuit must apply clear error review when reviewing subsidiary factfinding in patent claim construction, it is necessary to explain how the rule must be applied in that context We recognize that a district court’s construction of a patent claim, like a district court’s interpretation of a written instrument, often requires the judge only to examine and to construe the document’s words without requiring the judge to resolve any underlying factual disputes As all parties agree, when the district court reviews only evi dence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and speci 12 TEVA PHARMACEUTCALS USA, NC v SANDOZ, NC Opinion of the Court fications, along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to a determina tion of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that construction de novo See Brief for Petitioners 27, Re- ply Brief 16; Brief for Respondents 43; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12–13 n some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the rele vant art during the relevant time period See, eg, Sey- (a patent may be “so interspersed with technical terms and terms of art that the testimony of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of its meaning”) n cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that ex trinsic evidence These are the “evidentiary underpin nings” of claim construction that we dis in Mark- man, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal For example, if a district court resolves a dispute be tween experts and makes a factual finding that, in gen eral, a certain term of art had a particular meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the inven tion, the
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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the art at the time of the inven tion, the district court must then conduct a legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan would ascribe that same mean ing to that term in the context of the specific patent claim under review That is because “[e]xperts may be examined to explain terms of art, and the state of the art, at any given time,” but they cannot be used to prove “the proper or legal construction of any instrument of writing” Winans v New York & Erie R 100–101 (1859); see also (“ ‘Where tech nical terms are used, or where the qualities of substances or any similar data necessary to the comprehension of Cite as: U S (2015) 13 Opinion of the Court the language of the patent are unknown to the judge, the testimony of witnesses may be received upon these sub jects, and any other means of information be employed But in the actual interpretation of the patent the court proceeds upon its own responsibility, as an arbiter of the law, giving to the patent its true and final character and force’ ” (quoting 2 W Robinson, Law of Patents pp 482–483 (1890); emphasis in original)) Accordingly, the question we have answered here con cerns review of the district court’s resolution of a subsidi ary factual dispute that helps that court determine the proper interpretation of the written patent claim The district judge, after deciding the factual dispute, will then interpret the patent claim in light of the facts as he has found them This ultimate interpretation is a legal con clusion The appellate court can still review the district court’s ultimate construction of the claim de novo But, to overturn the judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute, the Court of Appeals must find that the judge, in respect to those factual findings, has made a clear error Fed Rule Civ Proc 52(a)(6) n some instances, a factual finding will play only a small role in a judge’s ultimate legal conclusion about the meaning of the patent term But in some instances, a factual finding may be close to dispositive of the ultimate legal question of the proper meaning of the term in the context of the patent Nonetheless, the ultimate question of construction will remain a legal question Simply be cause a factual finding may be nearly dispositive does not render the subsidiary question a legal one “[A]n issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate” legal question t is analogous to a judge (sitting without a jury)
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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t is analogous to a judge (sitting without a jury) deciding whether a defendant gave a confession voluntarily The answer to the legal question about the voluntariness of the confes 14 TEVA PHARMACEUTCALS USA, NC v SANDOZ, NC Opinion of the Court sion may turn upon the answer to a subsidiary factual question, say “whether in fact the police engaged in the intimidation tactics alleged by the defendant” An appellate court will review the trial judge’s factual determination about the alleged intimidation deferentially (though, after reviewing the factual findings, it will review a judge’s ultimate determination of voluntariness de novo) See –118 An appellate court similarly should review for clear error those factual findings that underlie a district court’s claim construction We can illustrate our holding by considering an instance in which Teva, with the support of the Solicitor General, argues that the Federal Circuit wrongly reviewed the District Court’s factual finding de novo See Brief for Petitioners 54–56; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31–32 Recall that Teva’s patent claim specifies an active ingredient with a “molecular weight of about 5 to 9 kilodaltons” Recall Sandoz’s basic argument, namely that the term “molecular weight” is indefinite or ambiguous The term might refer to the weight of the most numerous molecule, it might refer to weight as calculated by the average weight of all molecules, or it might refer to weight as calculated by an average in which heavier molecules count for more The claim, Sandoz argues, does not tell us which way we should calculate weight See Part To illustrate, imagine we have a sample of copolymer-1 (the active ingredient) made up of 10 molecules: 4 weigh 6 kilodaltons each, 3 weigh 8 kilodaltons each, and 3 weigh 9 kilodaltons each Using the first method of calculation, the “molecular weight” would be 6 kilodaltons, the weight of the most prevalent molecule Using the second method, the molecular weight would be 75 (total weight, 75, di- vided by the number of molecules, 10) Using the third method, the molecular weight would be more than 8, depend- Cite as: U S (2015) 15 Opinion of the Court ing upon how much extra weight we gave to the heavier molecules Teva argued in the District Court that the term “molec ular weight” in the patent meant molecular weight calcu lated in the first way (the weight of the most prevalent molecule, or peak average molecular weight) Sandoz, however, argued that figure 1 of the patent showed that Teva could not be 810 F Supp 2d, 90 (We have set forth figure
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Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
|
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
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810 F Supp 2d, 90 (We have set forth figure 1 in the Appendix, infra) That fig ure, said Sandoz, helped to show that the patent term did not refer to the first method of calculation Figure 1 shows how the weights of a sample’s molecules were distributed in three different samples The curves indicate the num ber of molecules of each weight that were present in each of the three For example, the figure’s legend says that the first sample’s “molecular weight” is 77 According to Teva, that should mean that molecules weighing 77 kilo daltons were the most prevalent molecules in the sample But, look at the curve, said Sandoz t shows that the most prevalent molecule weighed, not 77 kilodaltons, but slightly less than 77 (about 68) kilodaltons See App 138a–139a After all, the peak of the first molecular weight distribution curve (the solid curve in the figure) is not at precisely 77 kilodaltons, but at a point just before 77 Thus, argued Sandoz, the figure shows that the pa tent claim term “molecular weight” did not mean molecu lar weight calculated by the first method t must mean something else t is 810 F Supp 2d, 90 The District Court did not accept Sandoz’s argument Teva’s expert testified that a skilled artisan would under stand that converting data from a chromatogram to mo lecular weight distribution curves like those in figure 1 would cause the peak on each curve to shift slightly; this could explain the difference between the value indicated by the peak of the curve (about 68) and the value in the figure’s legend (77) App 138a–139a Sandoz’s expert 16 TEVA PHARMACEUTCALS USA, NC v SANDOZ, NC Opinion of the Court testified that no such shift would occur App 375a–376a The District Court credited Teva’s expert’s account, thereby rejecting Sandoz’s expert’s explanation 810 F Supp 2d, 89; Brief for Respondents 61 The District Court’s finding about this matter was a factual finding—about how a skilled artisan would understand the way in which a curve created from chromatogram data reflects molecu lar weights Based on that factual finding, the District Court reached the legal conclusion that figure 1 did not undermine Teva’s argument that molecular weight re ferred to the first method of calculation (peak average molecular weight) 810 F Supp 2d, 90–591 When the Federal Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision, it recognized that the peak of the curve did not match the 77 kilodaltons listed in the legend of figure 1 723 F3d, at 1369 But the Federal Circuit did not accept Teva’s
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,015 | 2 |
majority
|
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/
|
at 1369 But the Federal Circuit did not accept Teva’s expert’s explanation as to how a skilled artisan would expect the peaks of the curves to shift And it failed to accept that explanation without finding that the Dis trict Court’s contrary determination was “clearly errone ous” See ibid The Federal Circuit should have accepted the District Court’s finding unless it was “clearly errone ous” Our holding today makes clear that, in failing to do so, the Federal Circuit was wrong Teva claims that there are two additional instances in which the Federal Circuit rejected the District Court’s factual findings without concluding that they were clearly erroneous We leave these matters for the Federal Circuit to consider on remand in light of today’s opinion We vacate the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and we re mand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion t is so ordered Cite as: U S (2015) 17 Opinion Appendix of the of to opinion Court the Court APPENDX FG 1 (with minor additions to emphasize that the peak of the solid curve does not correspond precisely to 77kDa) Cite as: U S (2015) 1 THOMAS, J, dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNTED STATES No 13–854 TEVA PHARMACEUTCALS USA, NC, ET AL, PETTONERS v SANDOZ, NC, ET AL
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Justice Stevens
| 1,991 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Payne v. Tennessee
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112643/payne-v-tennessee/
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The novel rule that the Court announces today represents a dramatic departure from the principles that have governed our capital sentencing jurisprudence for decades. JUSTICE MARSHALL is properly concerned about the majority's trivialization of the doctrine of stare decisis. But even if and South had not been decided, today's decision would represent a sharp break with past decisions. Our cases provide no support whatsoever for the majority's conclusion that the prosecutor may introduce evidence that sheds no light on the defendant's guilt or moral culpability, and thus serves no purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide in favor of death rather than life on the basis of their emotions rather than their reason. Until today our capital punishment jurisprudence has required that any decision to impose the death penalty be based solely on evidence that tends to inform the jury about the character of the offense and the character of the defendant. Evidence that serves no purpose other than to appeal to the *857 sympathies or emotions of the jurors has never been considered admissible. Thus, if a defendant, who had murdered a convenience store clerk in cold blood in the course of an armed robbery, offered evidence unknown to him at the time of the crime about the immoral character of his victim, all would recognize immediately that the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. Evenhanded justice requires that the same constraint be imposed on the advocate of the death penalty. I In this Court considered the scope of the inquiry that should precede the imposition of a death sentence. Relying on practices that had developed "both before and since the American colonies became a nation," Justice Black described the wide latitude that had been accorded judges in considering the source and type of evidence that is relevant to the sentencing determination. Notably, that opinion refers not only to the relevance of evidence establishing the defendant's guilt, but also to the relevance of "the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics." "Victim impact" evidence, however, was unheard of when was decided. The relevant evidence of harm to society consisted of proof that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged in the indictment. Almost 30 years after our decision in the Court reviewed the scope of evidence relevant in capital sentencing. See In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger concluded that in a capital case, the sentencer must not be prevented "from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,991 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Payne v. Tennessee
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112643/payne-v-tennessee/
|
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." As in the character of the offense and the character of the offender constituted *858 the entire category of relevant evidence. "Victim impact" evidence was still unheard of when was decided. As the Court acknowledges today, the use of victim impact evidence "is of recent origin," ante, at 821. Insofar as the Court's jurisprudence is concerned, this type of evidence made its first appearance in 1987 in In his opinion for the Court, Justice Powell noted that our prior cases had stated that the question whether an individual defendant should be executed is to be determined on the basis of "`the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime,'" ). See also Relying on those cases and on the Court concluded that unless evidence has some bearing on the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt, its admission would create a risk that a death sentence might be based on considerations that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process. 482 U.S., Evidence that served no purpose except to describe the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family was therefore constitutionally irrelevant. Our decision in was entirely consistent with the practices that had been followed "both before and since the American colonies became a nation," 337 U. S., Our holding was mandated by our capital punishment jurisprudence, which requires any decision to impose the death penalty to be based on reason rather than caprice or emotion. See The dissenting opinions in and in Gathers can be searched in vain for any judicial precedent sanctioning the use of evidence unrelated to the character of the offense or the character of the offender in the sentencing process. Today, however, relying on nothing more than those dissenting opinions, the Court abandons *859 rules of relevance that are older than the Nation itself and ventures into uncharted seas of irrelevance. II Today's majority has obviously been moved by an argument that has strong political appeal but no proper place in a reasoned judicial opinion. Because our decision in 438 U. S., recognizes the defendant's right to introduce all mitigating evidence that may inform the jury about his character, the Court suggests that fairness requires that the State be allowed to respond with similar evidence about the victim. See ante, -826.[1] This argument is a classic non sequitur: The victim is not on trial; her character, whether good or bad, cannot therefore constitute either
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,991 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Payne v. Tennessee
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112643/payne-v-tennessee/
|
her character, whether good or bad, cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance. *860 Even if introduction of evidence about the victim could be equated with introduction of evidence about the defendant, the argument would remain flawed in both its premise and its conclusion. The conclusion that exclusion of victim impact evidence results in a significantly imbalanced sentencing procedure is simply inaccurate. Just as the defendant is entitled to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence, so the State may rebut that evidence and may designate any relevant conduct to be an aggravating factor provided that the factor is sufficiently well defined and consistently applied to cabin the sentencer's discretion. The premise that a criminal prosecution requires an even-handed balance between the State and the defendant is also incorrect. The Constitution grants certain rights to the criminal defendant and imposes special limitations on the State designed to protect the individual from overreaching by the disproportionately powerful State. Thus, the State must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, Rules of evidence are also weighted in the defendant's favor. For example, the prosecution generally cannot introduce evidence of the defendant's character to prove his propensity to commit a crime, but the defendant can introduce such reputation evidence to show his law-abiding nature. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Evid. 404(a). Even if balance were required or desirable, today's decision, by permitting both the defendant and the State to introduce irrelevant evidence for the sentencer's consideration without any guidance, surely does nothing to enhance parity in the sentencing process. III Victim impact evidence, as used in this case, has two flaws, both related to the Eighth Amendment's command that the punishment of death may not be meted out arbitrarily or capriciously. First, aspects of the character of the victim unforeseeable to the defendant at the time of his crime are irrelevant *861 to the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt" and therefore cannot justify a death sentence. See 458 U. S., at ; see also ("[P]roportionality requires a nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness"); ; Second, the quantity and quality of victim impact evidence sufficient to turn a verdict of life in prison into a verdict of death is not defined until after the crime has been committed and therefore cannot possibly be applied consistently in different cases. The sentencer's unguided consideration of victim impact evidence thus conflicts with the principle central to our capital punishment jurisprudence that, "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,991 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Payne v. Tennessee
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112643/payne-v-tennessee/
|
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Open-ended reliance by a capital sentencer on victim impact evidence simply does not provide a "principled way to distinguish [cases], in which the death penalty [i]s imposed, from the many cases in which it [i]s not." The majority attempts to justify the admission of victim impact evidence by arguing that "consideration of the harm caused by the crime has been an important factor in the exercise of [sentencing] discretion." Ante, at 820. This statement is misleading and inaccurate. It is misleading because it is not limited to harm that is foreseeable. It is inaccurate because it fails to differentiate between legislative determinations and judicial sentencing. It is true that an evaluation of *862 the harm caused by different kinds of wrongful conduct is a critical aspect in legislative definitions of offenses and determinations concerning sentencing guidelines. There is a rational correlation between moral culpability and the foreseeable harm caused by criminal conduct. Moreover, in the capital sentencing area, legislative identification of the special aggravating factors that may justify the imposition of the death penalty is entirely appropriate.[2] But the majority cites no authority for the suggestion that unforeseeable and indirect harms to a victim's family are properly considered as aggravating evidence on a case-by-case basis. The dissents in and Gathers and the majority today offer only the recent decision in and two legislative examples to support their contention that harm to the victim has traditionally influenced sentencing discretion. Tison held that the death penalty may be imposed on a felon who acts with reckless disregard for human life if a death occurs in the course of the felony, even though capital punishment cannot be imposed if no one dies as a result of the crime. The first legislative example is that attempted murder and murder are classified as two different offenses subject to different punishments. Ante, at 819. The second legislative example is that a person who drives while intoxicated is guilty of vehicular homicide if his actions result in a death but is not guilty of this offense if he has the good fortune to make it home without killing anyone. See *863 These three scenarios, however, are fully consistent with the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reflected in and Gathers and do not demonstrate that harm to the victim may be considered by a capital sentencer in the ad hoc and
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,991 | 16 |
second_dissenting
|
Payne v. Tennessee
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112643/payne-v-tennessee/
|
considered by a capital sentencer in the ad hoc and post hoc manner authorized by today's majority. The majority's examples demonstrate only that harm to the victim may justify enhanced punishment if the harm is both foreseeable to the defendant and clearly identified in advance of the crime by the legislature as a class of harm that should in every case result in more severe punishment. In each scenario, the defendants could reasonably foresee that their acts might result in loss of human life. In addition, in each, the decision that the defendants should be treated differently was made prior to the crime by the legislature, the decision of which is subject to scrutiny for basic rationality. Finally, in each scenario, every defendant who causes the well-defined harm of destroying a human life will be subject to the determination that his conduct should be punished more severely. The majority's scenarios therefore provide no support for its holding, which permits a jury to sentence a defendant to death because of harm to the victim and his family that the defendant could not foresee, which was not even identified until after the crime had been committed, and which may be deemed by the jury, without any rational explanation, to justify a death sentence in one case but not in another. Unlike the rule elucidated by the scenarios on which the majority relies, the majority's holding offends the Eighth Amendment because it permits the sentencer to rely on irrelevant evidence in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The majority's argument that "the sentencing authority has always been free to consider a wide range of relevant material," ante, at 820-821 (emphasis added), thus cannot justify consideration of victim impact evidence that is irrelevant because it details harms that the defendant could not have foreseen. Nor does the majority's citation of *864 concerning the "wide scope of evidence and argument allowed at presentence hearings," support today's holding. See ante, at 821. The Gregg joint opinion endorsed the sentencer's consideration of a wide range of evidence "[s]o long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant." -204. Irrelevant victim impact evidence that distracts the sentencer from the proper focus of sentencing and encourages reliance on emotion and other arbitrary factors necessarily prejudices the defendant. The majority's apparent inability to understand this fact is highlighted by its misunderstanding of Justice Powell's argument in that admission of victim impact evidence is undesirable because it risks shifting the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant and the circumstances of
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